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Author ORCID Identifier
Date Available
1-1-2018
Year of Publication
2018
Document Type
Doctoral Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
College
Arts and Sciences
Department/School/Program
Political Science
Faculty
Dr. Daniel Morey
Faculty
Dr. Justin Wedeking
Abstract
It is the argument of this dissertation that states become tax havens as a conscious economic development strategy. These states – more properly referred to as "jurisdictions" because some lack the sovereignty of the traditional Westphalian state – do not have the natural resources or the population to pursue more traditional economic development strategies, but they do have the ability to write or implement laws that create a virtual resource: banking secrecy. These jurisdictions are able to carry out this strategy because they tend to be well-governed, stable, and relatively wealthy, making them attractive partners for the international banking, legal, and accounting firms that drive offshore finance, and then for their customers – both individual and corporate – as well. The qualities tax havens possess also enable them to calculate that the benefits they reap from pursuing this strategy outweigh any penalties assessed by anti-tax haven international collective action activities, such as the naming and shaming campaigns of 2000.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2018.017
Recommended Citation
Dainoff, Charles A., "OUTLAW HEAVEN: WHY STATES BECOME TAX HAVENS" (2018). Theses and Dissertations--Political Science. 24.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polysci_etds/24
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