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Date Available
4-22-2016
Year of Publication
2016
Document Type
Master's Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
College
Arts and Sciences
Department/School/Program
Philosophy
Faculty
Dr. David Bradshaw
Faculty
Dr. David Bradshaw
Abstract
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls names two conditions as necessary and sufficient for an agent to have self-respect. I argue that Rawls’s two conditions constitute an inadequate understanding of self-respect. Contrary to Rawls, I argue that self-respect requires moral desert, and that self-respect is a distinct concept from self-esteem.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
http://dx.doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2016.171
Recommended Citation
Logan, Benjamin A., "SELF-RESPECT AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRITIQUE OF RAWLS" (2016). Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy. 10.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/10
