Archived
This content is available here for research, reference, and/or recordkeeping.
Author ORCID Identifier
https://orcid.org/0009-0007-6249-0286
Date Available
5-20-2027
Year of Publication
2026
Document Type
Doctoral Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Public Administration (DPA)
College
Graduate School
Department/School/Program
Public Policy and Administration
Faculty
J.S. Butler
Faculty
Annelise Russell
Abstract
This dissertation comprises three essays that examine the relationship between politics and public finance. It advances our understanding of how political factors shape fiscal outcomes.
The first essay examines how election administration reform influences public budget allocation. Specifically, it analyzes the impact of implementing Online Voter Registration (OVR) on redistributive spending, using political responsiveness as the theoretical lens. To identify the causal effect of OVR, instrumental variable estimation is employed using multiple datasets spanning 2000 to 2019. The empirical results indicate that states implementing OVR increase redistributive spending by approximately 9.8 to 12.8 percent. These findings provide evidence that election administration reform shapes public budget allocation by enhancing political responsiveness.
The second essay investigates the effect of Online Voter Registration (OVR) on education spending in U.S. states. Drawing on the political responsiveness framework, the analysis uses multiple datasets from 2000 to 2019 and applies instrumental variable estimation to address potential endogeneity. The results show that OVR increases political participation among young voters by approximately 4.9 percentage points and raises higher education spending by approximately 7.4 percent. These findings suggest that OVR influences higher education spending by increasing political responsiveness, as elected officials become more aligned with the policy preferences of young voters.
The third essay explores the relationship between political polarization and the debt size of state governments. It develops and tests two competing hypotheses based on the political incentive and political gridlock models using a state-level panel dataset covering 2000 to 2019. To address concerns about spurious regression, the analysis employs two-way fixed effects and first-difference estimation. The results indicate that greater political polarization increases state government debt, supporting the theoretical expectations of the political incentive model. These findings suggest that political polarization strengthens electoral incentives for debt financing and contributes to larger debt burdens in state governments.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2026.237
Archival?
Archival
Recommended Citation
Lee, Kitae, "ESSAYS ON THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICS AND PUBLIC FINANCE" (2026). Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and Administration. 55.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/msppa_etds/55
