Author ORCID Identifier

https//orcid.org/0000-0001-7776-2626

Date Available

8-1-2024

Year of Publication

2024

Document Type

Doctoral Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

College

Graduate School

Department/School/Program

Public Policy and Administration

Advisor

Dr. Raj Darolia

Abstract

This dissertation comprises three essays that investigate different facets of environmental hazards and their implications for policy and governance. While each essay examines a different topic area, they are all linked by examining how entities respond to incentives at the intersection of environmental risk and public policy. Each chapter informs a distinct literature within environmental policy and utilizes different methodologies to examine largely unexplored research questions.

In the first essay, I examine how individuals respond to the low-visibility, long-term environmental risk presented by radon. I employ radon zone data from the Kentucky Geological Survey and home information from Zillow to test whether home in areas with higher average radon sell for less than comparable homes in lower radon areas. I utilize a boundary discontinuity design to causally answer this question by comparing the selling price of similar homes on either side of a radon boundary. I find that homes with basements in high radon areas sell for between 6% and 7.5% less than comparable homes in low-radon areas. My findings suggest that current radon policy of mandatory disclosure and information campaigns is communicating the risk of radon to consumers.

In the second essay, I turn my focus to whether administrative fee structure affects incentives for constructing impervious surfaces. This paper proposes a novel theory, examines a little-studied administrative entity, and utilizes large datasets that are not often used in public policy research. Specifically, I look at whether variable rate user fees based on impervious surface cover which imposed by stormwater utilities lower the total amount of impervious surface cover. To causally examine this question, I use a stacked difference-in-difference design to look at two outcomes before and after imposition of a variable rate fee: footprint size of new residential construction and total impervious surface cover drawn from the National Land Cover Database. I find that variable rate fees do not affect impervious surface cover in stormwater utility districts.

In the third essay, I explore whether federal disaster policy induces moral hazard in local governments. I leverage the fact that when a disaster is declared affected counties in a state receive recovery funds, while the entire state becomes eligible for mitigation funding. The essay provides a theoretical framework of moral hazard in local government, descriptive analysis of mitigation uptake among local governments, and a preliminary examination of differences in mitigation uptake between counties which receive a disaster declaration and those that do not. Overall, I find no conclusive evidence on moral hazard but set the stage for a fruitful research agenda.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2024.347

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