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Abstract

Objective: To examine if the compensation of local public health directors responds to organizational size in the same manner found for other types of for-profit, not-for-profit, and public managers.

Design: Panel data ordinary least squares with fixed effects for the local health department and time period. Control variables include median household income, the unemployment rate, and the part-time versus full-time and independent versus district status of the local public health department.

Setting: Sample of Connecticut local health departments over the period from 2001 to 2011.

Main Outcome Measures: Annual wage of the local public health director and population in the jurisdiction of the local public health department.

Results: The size elasticity of local public health director equals 0.2. Full-time directors are paid more than part-time directors and directors managing district health departments are compensated more than those directing independent health departments. Directors are paid more if they manage health departments in jurisdictions with higher levels of income.

Conclusions: The findings for the size elasticity of compensation for local public health directors compares very closely to the size elasticity estimates found for other types of for-profit, not-for-profit, and public managers, perhaps suggesting that local public health directors are similarly motivated.

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