Abstract
For numberless generations, jurisprudes waged total war in the
conflict among textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism.
Textualists insisted that courts must interpret statutes based on the
meaning of their text, intentionalists insisted on the intention of the
legislature, and purposivists insisted on the purpose of the statute.
Eventually, textualism prevailed. Courts universally recognize
that they are obligated to interpret statutes in light of their text, or
at least pretend that the text of the statute determined their
interpretation. And the few remaining heretics are swiftly identified
and corrected by their superiors. As Justice Kagan famously
observed, “We’re all textualists now.” Whether you like it or not.
But what are the practical implications of textualism? Does it
always reach the “right” result? And when it produces idiosyncratic
results, what should courts do with them?
This essay provides a textualist interpretation of a relatively
obscure statute, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. It observes
that the most plausible textualist interpretation of the statute is the
opposite of the statute’s obvious intention and purpose. And it asks
whether that is a problem, something we should celebrate, or
something we should just accept as an inevitable consequence of
statutory interpretation.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2021
1-23-2023
Repository Citation
Frye, Brian L., "A Textualist Interpretation of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990" (2021). Law Faculty Scholarly Articles. 742.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/742
Notes/Citation Information
Brian L. Frye, A Textualist Interpretation of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 19 Colo. Tech. L.J. 365 (2021).