Author ORCID Identifier

https://orcid.org/0009-0000-5989-2208

Date Available

5-4-2025

Year of Publication

2025

Document Type

Doctoral Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

College

Arts and Sciences

Department/School/Program

Political Science

Faculty

Dr. Clayton Thyne

Faculty

Dr. Jilliene Haglund

Faculty

Dr. Michael Zilis

Abstract

The state is often conceptualized as an entity with a monopoly over the use of force within some set borders. Yet, more and more frequently, states allow or deliberately create friendly non-state military organizations. Five-hundred and four of these groups, known as Pro-Government Militias (PGMs), were observed between 1981 and 2014 and were present in a little more than thirty percent of country-years in that timeframe (Carey et al. 2022). Moreover, while some groups are relatively small and weak, many constitute a considerable military force within their country and beyond. For example, the Xinjiang Construction Corps in China, which maintains well over two million members, has business interests in over a hundred countries and has been accused by the United States of playing a central role in the persecution of the Uyghur people (Bao 2020; Lew 2020). The increasing prevalence of these groups has garnered a great deal of scholarly attention on PGMs and produced valuable insights into where and when these groups are likely to appear and their effects. However, several key relationships have yet to be investigated, despite other scholarly efforts suggesting a clear need to. In this dissertation, I aim to unify the literature on PGMs, establishing the existence and logic behind their relationship with three of the most impactful political phenomena we observe: mass protests, coups, and civil wars.

In the first chapter, I investigate PGM’s ability to protect states from the domestic costs of repression. While scholars often suggest that PGMs can do so by “blame shifting” or obscuring the connection between a state and its repressive behavior, here I suggest an alternative mechanism. I contend that PGMs protect states from the domestic costs of repression, namely mass protests, by deterring potential dissidents with the threat or actual use of violence against lower levels of protest a state would otherwise allow. Findings show that, in contrast to the blame-shifting argument, protests are less likely in states with stronger ties to their PGMs.

In the second chapter, I investigate the relationship between PGMs and the occurrence of coup attempts. Incumbents often create personal militaries, and we see that PGMs are more common in states with more recent coup experience. Yet, it is unclear if their presence affects the occurrence or outcome of coup attempts. I contend and find evidence that PGMs increase the risk of coup attempts, as these groups elevate the disposition of the regular military to attempt a coup but lack the capacity to deter or defeat them. Empirical analyses show that PGMs do not decrease the likelihood that a coup attempt occurs or fails. Moreover, PGMs created explicitly to coup-proof or protect an incumbent relate to an increased risk of a coup attempt's occurrence and success.

In the third and final chapter, I investigate the relationship between PGMs and the occurrence of civil conflict. This topic has received considerable attention, and much is known about the relationship between PGMs and conflict termination, duration, severity, and recurrence. Yet, it remains unclear if they affect the occurrence of conflict onset or are simply a byproduct of the instability it produces. Using the bargaining model of war, I contend that PGMs increase the likelihood of conflict onset by exasperating information asymmetries and a state’s commitment problem. The findings show that PGMs do increase the likelihood of civil conflict onset but that this effect is only observed for groups that were not formed by the state, those groups that should exert the most outsized impact on the presence of information asymmetries and commitment problems.

This dissertation provides evidence that PGMs are even more destabilizing a force than previously considered and potentially a serious impediment to democratizing efforts. While their presence can shield leaders from the occurrence of mass protests, it comes at the cost of an elevated risk of coup attempts and civil conflict onset.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2025.166

Download

Share

COinS