The Canvas of the Other: Fanon and Recognition

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13023/DISCLOSURE.07.11

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Recommended Citation


DOI: https://doi.org/10.13023/DISCLOSURE.07.11

Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/disclosure/vol7/iss1/11

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Frantz Fanon’s identification and problematization of the process by which the colonized individual becomes transformed into a non-human through the explicit author(ial)ity of the colonizer remains among the most significant underpinnings for recent research on identity, in general, and race, in specific (La Capra 1991; Goldberg 1993, 1997; Hall 1996). As Fanon’s works suggest, the ideas of “color” and “coloring” must be embellished by investigations that do not only describe the values assigned to different colors, but that also explore the paramountcy of subjectivity and perception involved in the very act of coloring.

Fanon’s conception of subjectivity is defined by differentiation, and inherent in coloring is the activity of the subject painting on the canvas of the Other. He poses that liberation of the colonized is linked to contesting the subjectivity imposed by the colonizer, and writing one’s own identity. This emancipatory project, is weakened however, by the means of differentiation that he uses—a Manicheanism that reflects the influence of Hegel and Marx—and as a result the accessibility of the transformation of the non-human to human, and the object to subject, is fairly limited. This is particularly problematic in Fanon’s representation of gender and sexuality within the colonial condition. Rereading Fanon through a dialogic interpretation, rather than a strict dialectical one, however, renders Fanon’s writings more available to a more heterogeneous group, and as a result, better serves as a significant base for studies of race and identity.

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Identity is often only recognizable or conceivable when confronted with difference. This difference is not necessarily real, as it appears to be a form of distance which is imposed between the subject and an Other through speech acts, body language, or literary gestures. This process of differentiation is one in which the subject, then, imposes their descriptions, beliefs, and taxonomies upon the Other, which is seen as a site for the author(ial)ity of the subject. The subject in the colonial situation is able to alienate the colonized through a totalized structure of relations of dependency, wherein the European colonizer literally writes their Other. Fanon poses that this systematic form of alienation inherent in the colonial condition is so intense that it reduces the colonized to a non-human. His project, then, is an attempt to animate the colonial corps through a process of conscientization which aims at transforming the colonized from an object of the colonizer to a subject of its own system.

Fanon’s ontology begins with a Marxist-inspired conception of alienation and a Hegelian notion of recognition, concepts that he does not accept uncritically. Fanon emphasizes that alienation differs in the colonial context and that Marxist analysis “should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem” because wealth and whiteness are inextricably tied and mutually constitutive (1991: 40). More importantly, the alienation that has been observed in the European context cannot compare with the racialized and dehumanizing alienation inherent in the European colonization of Africa. Fanon writes that neither the German occupation of France nor the French occupation of Germany affected the humanity of the occupied people. He writes “[i]n Algeria there is not simply the domination but the decision to the letter not to occupy anything more than the sum total of the land. The Algerians, the veiled women, the palm trees and the camels that make up the landscape, the natural background to the human presence of the French” (1991: 250).

The alienation of Algeria occurs through the occupation and domination of social space by the colonizing French. This concept of domination, however, owes more to the influence of Hegel on Fanon than that of Marx. This is because the domination that occurs does so at the level of the self-conscious, within the process of recognition and acknowledgment of the Other. He writes “[i]man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose his existence on another man in order to be recognized by him” (Goldberg 1997: 81). Yet, as with Marx, Fanon transforms the Hegelian master-slave dialectic as he transports the idea of recognition from Northern Europe to Northern Africa and the Antilles. He writes “[f]or not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man,” (1967: 110) and “Antilleans have no inherent values of their own, they are always contingent on the presence of the Other” (1967: 211). Therefore, the colonizer has not just the ability to recognize, but also to define, the colonized.

The colonized becomes dehumanized by the colonial system which privileges the colonizer with a hegemonic author(ial)ity in valuation, through the cultivation of norms, culture, and ideas of progress, civilization, and barbarism. The colonized is further dehumanized by the national bourgeois who adopt the colonizer’s world as their own, and look upon their fellow colonized with disgust, anger, and pity, through a very profound internalization of the prejudices of the colonizer. Thus, the culture of the colonizer and colonized alike act to justify the identity/difference that has been set up by the colonial system. This includes everything from a literature which kow-tows to whiteness (1967:250-251) to scientific “discoveries” which explain alleged “Algerian”/“Negro” indolence, stupidity, violence and sexual potency (1967: 298-302).

In order to become liberated, Fanon asserts, the colonized must first become humans, which necessitates an awareness of dependent structures and a conscious effort to break from them. This dependency is both a “classical” one, in the economic sense of center-periphery relations, and a “corporeal” dependency, wherein the body of the colonized is dependent on the definitions, norms, and diagnoses of the colonizer. The otherization of the non-human by the colonizer not only serves to devalue the colonized’s humanity, but also places the colonized on the margins of society and social action, and therefore the colonized only “reacts” to events which are generated, contextualized, defined, and determined by the colonizer. In truth, the non-human’s body is a site which is objectified by and dependent upon the colonizer for its characterization. In such dependent relations, the colonizer defines itself as the “center” and places the colonized, and its “attributes,” along the “periphery.”

Fanon’s interest in the corpus of the black man points to the need to examine the corporeal politics inherent in de/colonization. The black man is “genitalized” by the colonizer, both white men and women, who reduce the black man to a phallus (1967: 157). Not his phallus, but a disproportionately large one, which is juxtaposed to representations of barbarism and uncontrolled sexual fantasies, issues that Victorianism and the rationality of the Enlightenment successfully banished from North-Western European civilization. Both white man and white woman represent the black man through cartoonized and hyperbolized genitalia, and the black man and black woman can only achieve some
measure of civilization, defined in gradations of whiteness, through their sexual encounters with white members of the opposite sex (1967: ch 2,3). The genitalization of the identity of the black man by the colonizer, thus, represents one of the most significant forms of dependency and colonialism, and, therefore, reinforces the primacy of corporeal politics in the struggle for liberation. It is a particularly powerful instance of the identity of the colonized being written by the colonizer, where the body of the colonized serves as a canvas for the differentiation of the colonizer. It is also an example of the colonizer’s truncation of the identity of the colonized into only one facet, sexuality.

The preeminence of corporeal politics explains the critical role of violence in Fanon’s writings. Violence is the genesis for the metamorphosis of the non-human, for its transformation from object to subject. It is only through violence, through the first drops of the colonizer’s blood, that the colonized recognize that the distance between them and the colonizer has been a socio-historical product of a process of “epidermalizing” the colonizer’s norms. The first act of violence bridges the space of asymmetrical socio-economic realities by demonstrating the somatic sameness of the colonizer and colonized.

“Thus the native discovers that his life, his breath, his beating heart are the same as those of the settler. He finds out that the settler’s skin is not of any more value than a native’s skin; and it must be said that this discovery shakes the world in a very necessary manner” (1991: 45).

Fanon’s conception of liberation requires such tremors because the dependence of the colonized is structural, and revolution is the only legitimate means of rupturing the structures which create, confine, and oppress the colonized. This is because revolution is a physical spectacle which generates agency as the colonized becomes active, rather than reactive. This is a radical shift in corporeal politics as the previously subjugated colonized corpus no longer recognize themselves as the “Other” and they become animated agents, capable of subjectivity. Revolution, thus, transvalues the colonial ontology by creating a race of “New Men,” whose agency locates them at the center of the post-revolutionary ontology.

The feminine, then, is the Other of the colonized man, perhaps in as many ways as the colonizer. It represents an image of a negation of humanity, and it occupies the subordinated space within the colonial master-slave dialectic, which may be overcome only through masculinizing the subject. Ato Sekyi-Otu explores the roles played by femininity and
masculinity within Fanon's prose, writing:

[emasculated as a colonized subject, the male returns to his household a colossus, his masculinity instantly recovered. For, the male, the union of patriarchy and colonialism provides an intriguing education in gender crossing, dictated by the differing modes of subjectivity he must enact in different spheres of existence. In the colonial context, in a racist world order, home is the perfect haven wherein a battered and bruised masculine subjectivity may rouse itself from abjection and reclaim the original position of “sovereignty” (1996: 229).

Recognizing the relation of masculinity to dignity within Fanon’s metaphors and language, bell hooks suggests that Fanon writes “gender through race in some ways” (hooks 1996: 41). This is a particularly diplomatic way of expressing that femininity and homosexuality are deemed “white” and “weak” properties which must be removed from black/Arab men who must be pure, masculine soldiers. Fanon explains that “…colonialism configured colonised masculinity as feminised and emasculated, and [he] concluded that men in the colony had to reconstruct their manhood and their freedom through a rejection of colonial images” (Verges 1996: 60-1). As a result, Fanon locates the weakness and maleness of femininity and homosexuality in the colonial system and denies any prior existence of homosexuality in the colonized territories. He declares “[l]ike it or not, the Oedipus complex is far from coming into being among Negroes” (1967: 152). Fanon insists that he is not being ethnocentric, only honest. After all, other “diseases” exist indigenously in Africa, just not homosexuality. This is not only curious from the perspective of a historian, but especially from Fanon’s chosen profession of psychiatry.

Fanon later explains that such psychological phenomena as “Fault, Guilt, refusal of guilt, [and] paranoia” can be placed in “homosexual territory” (1967: 183). If this is to be accepted as truth, then it follows that Fanon’s warrior/revolutionaries cannot be homosexuals since they are fierce, blameless individuals, who feel no remorse for their violence. In fact, their violence is sanctioned, and even praiseworthy, because decolonization is “always a violent phenomenon.” The revolutionaries have conquered their bodies and expelled the poisons of the colonial system, whereas homosexuals represent a continuation of the weakness and dependence of the colonized.

At least, in this respect Fanon is fairly consistent. However, he loses much credibility when he contends “I have never been able, without revolution, to hear a man say of another man: ‘he is so sensual!’ I do not know what the sensuality of a man is. Imagine a woman saying of an-other woman: ‘She’s so terribly desirable- she’s darling’” (1967: 201).

How can Fanon claim ignorance in this area when he discusses the sensuality and sexuality of black and white men and women at length in the same book?

Fanon’s treatment of women is equally unsatisfactory. Although he addresses sexual relations between “white men and women of color” and “men of color and white women,” there is a clear valuation of the roles of the actors involved. The “women of color” that he chooses to discuss are all mulattas, while the one “man of color” is black. The black woman, therefore, engages in “racial suicide” because she pursues white men (Young 1996: 89-92). Of course, she was condemned from the beginning since she is a mulatta, and has white blood, and therefore her race—black—has already been betrayed in her ancestry. The woman of color pursues the white man because she desires recognition from the white world. Fanon’s interpretation suggests that the woman of color pursues any white man, although preferably a wealthy one, because he can expose her to “civilization.”

The black man that Fanon chooses for his literary criticism “loves” the white woman with whom he has sexual relations, but suffers from an inferiority complex, brought on by the colonial situation. His feelings of inadequacy and inferiority lead Fanon to write “Jean Veneuse [the black man] represents not an example of black-white relations, but a certain mode of behaviour in a neurotic who by coincidence is black” (1967: 79). Fanon’s use of Veneuse as the only real example of relations between “men of color and white women” is suspect, then, since Fanon insists such neurosis is coincidental, and not related to being black. But Veneuse’s inferiority is connected to race relations, namely colonial ones, which have “feminized” him to the point where it can be said that “he loves just like a colonized person—that is to say, just like a woman” (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 216).

Fanon argues that real black men have a very different relationship with white women. Here he cites black men who, upon coming to Paris, want nothing more than to have sex with a white woman so that they can truly become “men,” having conquered the possession of the oppressor. “Thus black male sexual acts with the white woman constitute an initiation, a black male rite of passage into masculinity-conquering and debasing the white man’s possession-rather than simply a betrayal of the race” (Young 1996: 94).

Both black men and women seem to crave whiteness in Fanon’s narratives, but it is far more acceptable when it is done by a black man. The justifiability of the black man’s quest for whiteness is probably due to the violent nature of his sexual encounter with the white woman, that the encounter represents the defiling of the property of the white man,
and because this is just another level on which the revolutionary can wage war and wreak vengeance upon the colonizer. The sexual act of the black woman is unacceptable because she passively accepts the sex of the colonizer so that she can enter into his world, even if incompletely. She betrays her own people because the sexual act of the colonizer upon the black woman is the continuation of the colonial condition. Both of these situations should make clear that Fanon conceives of the woman’s body as a neutral and objective site which requires the presence and agency of a man to have any relevance. It should also be noted that sexual acts are only conceived of as inter-racial and heterosexual, leaving little room for intra-racial and/or homosexual relations within the realms of the “Other.”

Thus the road to humanity for the colonized seems to be paved by asserting the lack of humanity of women and homosexuals. Fanon’s often rigid and dichotomous definitions, particularly those involving women and homosexuality, limit the accessibility of his texts and the applicability of his emancipatory strategies. Yet, his writings remain highly inspirational and valuable defenses of marginalized peoples whose identities and “colors” have been orchestrated by hegemonic groups, and provide proscriptive forms of liberation from the linguistic, social and political dependency of the former upon the latter. The next section of this essay will attempt to address this apparent paradox.

**Manichean dialectics/Bakhtinian dialogics**

While Fanon’s theory proposes liberation of the Other, this liberation is for a specific Other, a monolithic, and male, group. This is due to a Manichean epistemology which necessitates an ontology in which there is only one oppressor and one oppressed, with neither internal divisions nor interlopers. This is why the position of internal Others and the recognition of a heterogeneous Other is so problematic in his work. Fanon’s writings, however, need not be condemned to said Manicheanism, and in fact engaging Fanon through a dialogical reading increases Fanon’s accessibility as a voice of the colonized, the colored, and the marginalized. Constructing the spectre of Fanon through such a dialogue allows Fanon’s prose to reassert its power and pre-science, while making it simultaneously more accessible and less gendered.

Fanon’s emancipatory project seems flawed, oddly enough because he does not recognize certain Others, although he claims to seek to transform the Other into a self-agent. Here the Manichean methodological influence of Hegel and Marx resurfaces. Francoise Verges writes “Fanon thought that decolonisation had to be the *tabula rasa* of a world cut in two... Hybridity and syncretism were impossible intellec-

tual positions” (1996: 62) The impossibility of “hybridity” and “syncretism” are essential to understanding Fanon’s methodology and explain his treatment of women and homosexuals. Because there can be only two options, that of the white, male, capitalist colonizer or that of the black-Arab, male, socialist revolutionary, identities are placed within one of the two camps, and any alternative identities are ignored or negated. Lola Young explains that this epistemological rigidity leads to the very specific marginalization of women. She writes “[t]he unassimilable ‘body-image’ based upon an ‘epidermal schema’ and possession of a phallus renders white and black women-on one level—peripheral to the central contest.” (1996: 89) This marginalization of women seems to be based on an ontological position which asserts the existence of only thesis and antithesis.

Ato Sekyi-Otu challenges the emancipatory potential within a dualist world writing, “How can such a dualist dramaturgy ever account for the project of liberation?... How can the consciousness of freedom be snatched from the experience of supine servitude?... How can meaning ever emerge from absolute contingency and the radical deed of an anchorless will?” (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 103) If the identity of the oppressed is dependent on the oppressor, if the oppressor defines and creates the oppressed, and if the oppressed body and mind are neutral objects which are perceived and valued by the oppressor, then the consciousness of the oppressed, or the ability of the oppressed to locate meaning seems an impossibility. If the oppressor is in a position where agency is monopolized by the oppressor, just as slavery and dependence is by the oppressed, then how, indeed, can “freedom be snatched?”

Sekyi-Otu argues that, despite these apparent limitations, Fanon addresses these questions through the methodological use of a “dialectical dramaturgy,” which recognizes the effects of historicity on the colonial struggle. But if history and genealogy are so important to Fanon, why are the “roles” of oppressor and oppressed dehistorised into a Manichean world which provides not just a Heaven and Hell, but very extreme versions thereof, with neither purgatory nor abyss? Sekyi-Otu would dispute this claim, arguing that there is a historicity even within the neo-Manichean epistemology by pointing to the “Concerning Violence” essay where Fanon argues that the “nationalist bourgeoisie” will betray the Revolution once decolonization occurs. He asks “[w]hat ever happened to the rapturous communitarianism lauded a moment ago[ during the colonial struggle]?” (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 106) Sekyi-Otu asserts this as proof that Fanon recognizes a historic dialectic which, in turn, informs his presentation of the colonial situation.

But the “nationalist bourgeoisie” must betray the Revolution, not because they are part of some grand, historical process, but because
they are prisoners of a dichotomous epistemology which can only recognize two homogeneous collective units: the oppressor and the oppressed. The nationalist bourgeoisie become the oppressors with the founding of the new state because, although the Revolution has rendered the formerly colonized as New Men, the formerly colonized are not oppressors. The absence of the colonizer requires that another oppressor exist, a role which, by default, is assumed by the nationalist bourgeoisie.

Sekyi-Otu’s suggestion that through the use of a “dialectical dramatic narrative,” Fanon consciously attempts to break down strict dichotomies, such as the colors imposed by the colonial condition, and produces a world where conclusiveness never truly exists, is not entirely convincing (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 5). Yet, what Sekyi-Otu’s reading of Fanon may lack in accuracy, it may make up for in intentionality. He is clearly attempting to loosen Fanon from rigid, and rigorous, readings which problematize Fanon’s use of dichotomies, and to initiate a reading of Fanon that is more palatable for a plethora of contemporary post-philosophers.

This new reading requires a transubstantiation of the writings of Fanon into the product of a dialogic encounter between his texts and contemporary readers. This product is the spectral legacy of Fanon, which is constructed “through communicative acts of negotiated meaning and values with others” (Der Derian 1997: 61). Therefore, the focus of the dialectic self/other divide becomes less of a situation of revolution and inevitable conflict, and more one of dialogue and pluralism.

Engaging Fanon within a dialogic universe, one where meaning and reality are negotiated between recognition and the voices of others, or better, engaging Fanon with Fanon, produces a Fanon which challenges the Manicheanism critiqued earlier. Such “communicative acts of negotiated meanings” between Fanon and a doppleganger produce a specter of Fanon which is capable of allowing more space within a politics of recognition. This allows for a polycentric, heteroglossic ontology, wherein femininity, like masculinity, is defined, delimited, and resisted through everyday politics. This in no way posits that this is Fanon’s “original intent,” only that this is a possible product of a dialogue between Fanon and himself, a product which is invaluable to any studies of identity because of its problematization of subjectivity formation and relations based on recognition of valued difference.

Such an expansion of Fanon’s writings as critic, to endure Fanon’s writings as critic, to unify the politician and the philosopher, provides a rich ground for studies of identity, particularly of race. Although the dichotomies I present in the previous sentence do not exist, they are particularly useful in outlining what Fanon, especially this reading of Fanon, offers studies of coloring. Fanon as a theorist offers concepts of community, solidarity, and resistance that are essential to any post-hegemonic or anti-hegemonic study of race. His critiques of Marx and Hegel indicate the salience of race, as a form of double marginalization, from economic, linguistic, and ontological means of production. Fanon’s political struggles highlights the importance and possibility of praxis, and that theoretical abstraction does not require an alienation from politics. Similarly, Fanon’s philosophical leanings underscore the limitation of studies of race that only examine immediate policy studies and evaluations. Blending all these yields a new incarnation of Fanon which is more powerful and accessible than its corporeal predecessor. And any study of the power, privilege, and author(ial)ity involved in othering—in coloring on the canvas of the colonized, the alienated, or the marginalized—within the nexus of political, theoretical, and discursive contexts may benefit immensely from the employ of the ideas such a spectre of Frantz Fanon.

Fanon’s coloring legacy or coloring Fanon’s legacy

Lewis Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renee T. Ehite are correct when they write “Frantz Fanon is a towering figure in African philosophy and twentieth century revolutionary thought” (Gordon et al 1996). Yet Fanon is far more than this as he is an equally significant figure among theorists who focus on democracy, citizenship, race, and identity, among other areas (Taylor 1992: 65). Fanon’s preeminence in the above areas is a result of his transformation of the processes of subject formation that appear in Marx and Hegel by infusing the realpolitik inherent in both thinkers with a spatiotemporal context of the post-colonial “world of color,” or, better, the world that colonialism “colored.”

Fanon’s legacy on studies of coloring is very strong. This legacy is so powerful precisely because of Fanon’s emphasis on subjectivity, subjugation, and liberation. David Goldberg discusses Fanon’s pursuit of the relationship between the visible and the invisible, between corporeal autonomy and dependence, as being fundamental to contemporary studies of race. He writes “[i]t is these dynamics of recognition and misrecognition...in which contemporary black intellectuals are embroiled, especially as they become elevated through media( ted) recognition as public intellectuals” (1997: 108).

Goldberg’s characterization of the role of Fanon and recognition in contemporary debates among “black intellectuals” is a very accurate one, as examples of the specter of Fanon abound in race studies. Kwame Anthony Appiah writes

But the reality is that the very category of the Negro is at root a
European product: for the “whites” invented the Negroes in order to dominate them. Simply put, the overdetermined course of cultural nationalism in Africa has been to make real the imaginary identities to which Europe has subjected us (1991: 150).

He poses this statement against Fanon’s argument that the Negro is dominated by whites. But his argument of the category of Negro being invented by whites for the purpose of subjugating the former, as well as his frustration with cultural nationalism in Africa following the European’s path, is an uncited, yet direct, quote from Fanon who writes “[i]t is the white man who creates the Negro. But it is the Negro who creates negritude” (1965: 47).

Fanon, similarly, haunts Amina Mama’s Beyond the Masks: Race, Gender, and Subjectivity. In her introduction she poses that she will challenge the way psychology has constructed the black subject, she will examine the “Black” as being a product of a white-dominated colonial discourse, and then she will pose her own “psychodynamic” theory which differs from psychological accounts in that it does not separate psychological and social spaces. (Mama 1995: 1) Certainly her goals seem to mimic those of Fanon, although her conclusions promote a diversity and heterogeneity that would reflect more of the above-mentioned and constructed spectre of Fanon than its corporeal predecessor. These are only two examples of what could be an impenetrable list of authors on race who have been heavily influenced by the works of Fanon, an influence that is particularly strong among those who theorize about subjectivity and its relation with coloring the Other. Additionally, the problematization of subjectivity and coloring within Fanon’s “body of work” may easily be applied to broader work on identity studies which focus on related issues of community and solidarity.

Coloring Fanon’s legacy, which is just what Sekyi-Otu and I may be doing, (although I believe that our Fanon is far more than a passive site for our academic predilections and differences) is necessary in order to revitalize the power of Fanon’s work, while distancing it from some of the problematics inherent in its overt androphilia. This requires a dialogic relation wherein Fanon is used to critique his own theory, and to negotiate with himself/ves a more pluralist epistemology, a more accessible theory, and a practical politics which poses more profound notions of recognition and revolution. Such notions render Fanon as invaluable a thinker today as he was thirty years ago in a context where the nature of the struggle for liberation may have changed, but where the objective has not.

endnotes

1. The phrasing that he uses is “under German occupation the French remained men...” (1991: 250) I believe Fanon means “humanity” but I am not so sure that “humanity” and “masculinity” are separable for him.
2. It should be noted that the “Algerians” and the “veiled women” are two separate groups. In fact, it is almost as if this brief list separates the Algerians, man, from nature, the veiled women, the palm trees, and the camels. This will in part be addressed in the next section.
3. Fanon writes “It is the white man who creates the Negro. But it is the Negro who creates negritude.” (1965: 47)
4. Although Black Skin White Masks will be especially critiqued here, it should be noted that The Wretched of the Earth makes many of the assumptions of Black Skin White Masks. For example, the revolutionary in The Wretched of the Earth is a black-Arab man, and his oppressor is a white man. The only females within the “Concerning Violence” essay are the “Church” and the “Nation”: one represses the rebel, the other must be freed by the male revolutionary. The female is thus an object, but unlike the “negro” who was a nonhuman/ object, her potential for humanity/ agency is unlikely, if not impossible.
5. The Oedipal Complex is described by psychologists to consist of a certain agonism between father and son, potentially with an unhealthy love of the mother resulting, on the part of the son. When the son recognizes he is of the same sex as his father, the competition between the two males begins. Steinberg argues that this competition is more about domination of the household, than for the mother’s attention or love. Steinberg writes “The view generally held by psychologists is that homosexuality is a pathological condition that attitude is derived from the theoretical conception that a homosexual orientation is engendered by faulty parenting; the son fails to separate adequately from the mother and consequently fears closeness to women, or inadequately resolves the Oedipal conflict. Steinberg does not properly identify with the father” (Steinberg 1993: 189). Steinberg questions whether this assessment of homosexuality is an accurate one, but for the purposes of this paper, the accuracy of the diagnosis is less important than the treatment of homosexuality by psychoanalysts as a pathological condition resulting from an incomplete resolution of the Oedipal conflict.
6. Fanon writes that the white woman unconsciously wants to be raped by the black man (1967: 140, 179).
7. Here the white woman is an object of both the white man and the black man.
8. Indeed, it is actually a “spectre” of Fanon that many contemporary
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race theorists speak of (Hall 1996: 14; Harris and Johnson 1996: xv).

9. In The Wretched of the Earth.


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acknowledgements

I would like to thank Tim Steigenga, James Der Derian, Patricia Mota-Guedes, and Chris Ciocchetti, Julie Cary and David Magill for earlier comments on this paper. Special thanks also to Howard Wiarda, Jerry Mileur, Jeff Sedgwick, Nick Xenos, Roberto Alejandro, and, of course, Stratoniiki and Petros Spanakos and Basilos Zundos. Any insight offered in this paper is to their credit, the flaws are purely my own.