Power and Pride: The Mythologization of the Cossack Figure in Russian History and Its Impact on Modern Russian National Identity

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fresh graduate of the Anthropology department with a minor in Russian and Eastern Studies, I spent the last four years toiling as both a scholarship athlete on the Women’s Soccer team and a recipient of UK’s National Excellence Scholarship. This past summer I embarked on my first journey to Russia as a recipient of the US Department of State Critical Language Scholarship to live and study in Nizhny Novgorod. January marked my second trip to Russia on a scholarship from the American Friends of Russian Folklore in combination with a travel and research grant from eUreKa! Resulting from this fieldwork were a slew of ever-changing papers, which I presented in gradually improving order at the Indiana University and Ohio State University Folklore Conference, National Conference of Undergraduate Research in La Crosse, Wisconsin, UK’s Showcase of Undergraduate Scholars, the Undergraduate Research Council’s AAFCS Annual Convention in Knoxville, Tennessee with support from eUreKa!’s travel and research funds, and a pending exhibit at the American Folklore Society’s Annual Conference in Boise, Idaho, this coming October.

This summer was spent on the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico, participating in an archaeological survey with UK Anthropology Professor Scott Hutson. Following this six week delight, I have secured a post teaching English this coming fall in Seoul, South Korea, with the Seoul Metropolitan Board of Education. Meanwhile, I plan to continually rework my article, submitting it to both the American Folklore Society and Western States Folklore Society for, hopefully, publication. On a whim, I hope to submit my original research idea (which was ingeniously reduced to manageable size by my wonderful mentor Professor Rouhier-Willoughby) to an up-and-coming independent publisher as a potential book. Eventually, I will return to Russia, endless tea, the beautiful language and people, and daily vodka toasts to life, good friends, and health.

Faculty Mentor: Professor Jeanmarie Rouhier-Willoughby
Division of Russian and Eastern Studies, Department of Modern and Classical Languages

Rachel Ulrich’s article represents the result of research performed in the field in Russia in the winter of 2008-09. She was able to travel to Cossack villages under the auspices of an expedition led by two folklorists from the Institute of World Literature to collect the songs and dances of these people. During the course of this research trip, she began her investigation of the Cossack myth within Russian culture.

Her work has hit upon one of the key tropes in Russian cultural history and anthropology: the disconnectedness between the state’s vision of national and cultural identity and that of Russia’s own people. She has produced a work that features an astute analysis of the dilemma faced by the Cossacks within Russia. Historically, the government, most recently Putin’s administration, has appropriated them to be symbols of Russian nationalism. Yet they are residents of villages in economic crisis, who are coping with the abandonment of Soviet-era government support systems, and struggling to find their place post-Soviet society as Cossacks. Ulrich’s nuanced study brings to bear Cossack discourse, folklore, and history to these contradictory strains of Cossack life and Russian society.

1. За лесом солнце воссияло,  
Там черный ворон прокричал,  
Прошли часы мои минуты,  
Когда с девчонкой я гулял,  
Прошли часы мои минуты,  
Когда с девчонкой я гулял,

2. Бывало, кончу я работу -  
Спешу на улицу гулять,  
Теперь мне служба предстоял  
Спешу я коника седлать!  
Теперь мне служба предстоял  
Спешу я коника седлать!

3. Седлаю я коня гнедого  
Казачьим убраным седлом  
Я сяду, сяду и поеду,  
Поеду в дальний край далек,  
Я сяду, сяду и поеду,
Power and Pride: The Mythologization of the Cossack Figure in Russian History and Its Impact on Modern Russian National Identity

Abstract
Our expedition traveled to the Don Cossack Ust-Khopiorskaia Stanitsa to record mythologized cultural practices in the form of rituals and performances. Located on the banks of the Don and Khopior River junction, about 1,500 people reside in a village consisting of several streets of wooden and stone houses, a cultural center, a school, and a few small markets. Most remaining residents in the village are pensioners, who support their meager incomes with backyard gardens and a few small farm animals. Young people who have finished secondary school leave for the nearest city, Volgograd, to find work or pursue further studies, as opportunities for neither exist in the village. Russia is experiencing a simultaneous mass urban migration and gradual population decline of one million each year and, as a result, villages such as Ust-Khopiorskaia Stanitsa are slowly disappearing.

Our expedition leader, Yelena Viktorovna Minyonok, is a renowned Russian folklorist and chief curator of archives at the Institute of World Literature in Moscow. For the past twenty years she has scoured the Russian countryside, documenting all elements of folklore in an effort to preserve dying traditions. Her most recent expeditions have concentrated on the Cossack villages along the Don River, our stop at the famous Ust-Khopiorskaia Stanitsa being the most recent of her trips in this region.

Collaborating with our team was Andrei Sergeievich Kabanov of the Moscow Conservatory and two of his graduate students. Andrei Sergeievich has travelled the Russian countryside for almost forty years, recording over 10,000 folksongs. His expertise in this area is almost unparalleled; over the course of his career he has often recorded at one village numerous times at different intervals, allowing him to observe first-hand the change underway in Russian folk tradition. He had been to our particular village in the sixties and eighties to document folksongs, and is considered the premier scholar on the subject in Russia. In the seventies, he started his own children’s choir in Moscow, using many folksongs, particularly traditional Cossack songs, in his repertoire.

Like most ethnographical fieldwork, the majority of our time was spent developing rapport with the villagers — in essence, consuming vast amounts of tea, vodka and zakuski, or snacks, to accompany the beverages. In an effort to document the traditional Cossack song repertoire, our primary goal lay in enticing former members of the
Beyond the Forest the Sun Shines
(Lyrics translated by Rachel Ulrich from the transcription by Yelena Viktorovna Minyonok, with the assistance of Professor Edward Lee, Russian and Eastern Studies program, University of Kentucky)

1. Beyond the forest the sun shines
There a black raven caws
The hours, my time has passed
When I walked with a young girl
The hours, my time has passed
When I walked with a young girl

2. I used to hurriedly finish working —
Only to meander outside
Now my fate awaits me
Hurriedly I mount the saddle!
Now my fate awaits me
Hurriedly I mount the saddle!

3. I mount the chestnut mare
Upon a Cossack’s decorated saddle
I’m sitting, waiting to set off
Off to a distant, faraway land
I’m sitting, waiting to set off
Off to a distant, faraway land

4. And if suddenly a stray bullet
Kills me from behind a bush
And if a saber, a mighty-wielded saber
Cuts through my skull
And if a saber, a mighty-wielded saber
Cuts through my skull

5. And hot blood pours over me
Flowing like a rapid stream
And my heart, my heart gives its last shudder
Oh, and I am never to return to my native land
And my heart, my heart gives its last shudder
Oh, and I am never to return to my native land

6. Farewell forever, mountains and valleys
Goodbye, village of my birth
Goodbye, my young woman
Goodbye, sky-blue flower
Goodbye, my young woman
Goodbye, sky-blue flower
In this song, the Cossack man must mount
Approaching Ust-Khopiorskaya from the icy banks of the Don River. At one time the village was situated on the opposite shore, until Peter the Great ordered the people to relocate across the river. Waiting until winter, they simply slid their houses over the frozen solid river and picked up where they left off.

Enduring practicality: In a land where the ground is covered in snow for three or four months, a homemade sleigh can be just as efficient as a car.
According to village custom, the two-week period of Svyatki beginning after the New Year is the most festive. Here we observe old-style Christmas (January 7) by waking before dawn to travel from house to house caroling in return for sweets.

A member of the original Ust-Khopiorskaya choir listens to a recording of herself for the first time ever. Unfortunately, this may also constitute the last recording of these cultural treasures as urban migration and a declining birth rate slowly eradicate Russian folklife.

Sometimes language isn’t necessary.
Russian winter freezes everything but gossip: The Ataman considers making a phone call, but no technology can surpass the speed of whispering neighbors. Especially when the news is that the first foreign visitors in seventy years have just arrived in the village of Ust-Khopiorskaya.

Our hostess, Zadaiena Nikolaevna, an embodiment of Russian spirit: unperturbed by hardship and never lacking an appropriately crass comment.

Russian winter freezes everything but gossip: The Ataman considers making a phone call, but no technology can surpass the speed of whispering neighbors. Especially when the news is that the first foreign visitors in seventy years have just arrived in the village of Ust-Khopiorskaya.
Rubber boots aren’t fit for a Russian winter, but why sit idle half the year? This pair busily points the way to the outhouse.

At 30 degrees below zero, a freezer isn’t necessary. Our hostess kept her fish in the first of a series of small rooms designed to trap the penetrating cold.
his horse and embark on a raid in a distant land. The contrast between his old life of idle freedom and the new destiny that awaits him as a member of the Cossack cavalry is deliberate. By accepting his responsibilities as a member of the group, he is identified as a man, and sits upon a kazachii ybrayniii sedlo, or a saddle that has been decorated with the booty of previous raids and pillages, symbolizing the honor of a Cossack warrior. The possibility of death is described in detail and glorifies the brutality of war. The sword that kills him is honored with an ascribed name (shashka likhodeika), invoking the idea that any sword which could take down an invincible Cossack warrior must be legendary in its own right.

Over time, Cossacks have become mythologized as military heroes and defenders of the Motherland, alluded to in literature as rabble-rousers and often serving as the ideal masculine protagonist. Originally, however, the Cossacks weren’t an ethnic group, but rather a hodge-podge band of the socially marginalized — those who “had run away from the political, military, economic, and penal systems of Polish Ukraine or Muscovy to live on what they hoped would be the freer frontier” (Kornblatt, 1992, p. 7). Several factions of Cossacks existed, all of whom developed military prowess to defend themselves against raids, and adopted a nomadic lifestyle to avoid omnipresent enemies. Living in a constant state of “military preparedness,” Cossacks were unable to garner subsistence through agricultural means, and instead depended on “fishing, hunting, some herding, but mostly pillage” (Kornblatt, 1992, p. 7). Cossack men were responsible for providing for their clan through raiding and pillage, living with their wives for only part of the year and leaving the moment duty called, embarking on raids and engaging in border skirmishes.

In this fashion, Cossack culture developed around male activities — folksongs of the Cossack repertoire, traditional Cossack dancing, and the mythologized Cossack images are mainly associated with images of horse-riding, raiding, masculine displays of aggression, bravery on the battlefield, and the glorified warrior. Despite the fact that Cossacks were later employed by the tsar to defend Russia’s borderlands, and eventually practiced subsistence agriculture (both evils by which the original Cossack ancestors swore to never be hindered), the image of the Cossack man is frozen in time and has become larger than reality. Indeed, the Cossack man was further mythologized through the nineteenth and twentieth century in Russian literature, and this image of Cossacks has become well-known internationally.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cossack image has swollen far beyond its historical origins and become recognized as synonymous with the strength of Russia — politically, militarily and economically. As former Soviet bloc countries fragmented and communist party ideology that had once served to unite vast amounts of space and diversity became obsolete, the search for national identity again took center stage. After struggling through repeated economic failures and the disastrous Yeltsin administration, Russia’s desperate need for guidance and reassurance came in the form of President Vladimir Putin. After his inauguration in 2000, Putin wasted no time in promulgating Russia’s revitalization as a world power.

Shortly after coming to power, then-President Putin began systematically invoking the image of a strong and united Russia, both economically and militarily. By “positioning himself as the symbol of a resurgent nation recovering from years of humiliation and weakness” (Ostrovsky, 2008, p. 4), President Putin propelled Russia onto the international plane through competition, “asserting that Russia has regained its status of a ‘mighty economic power’” and promising to “achieve economic and social development which befits a ‘leading world power of the 21st century’” (Ostrovsky, 2008 p. 6). Much reminiscent of Stalin’s five-year industrial plans in the infancy of the USSR, Putin has pushed industrial development, often at the expense of the common people: “Russia is building pipelines to Europe, but much of its own country has no gas or even plumbing. Russia’s ‘great leaps forward’ have rarely benefited its own people, who have traditionally been seen as a resource. Most Russians grumble about their lives, but see ‘international prestige’ as a consolation prize” (Ostrovsky, 2008 p. 6). The international image of Russia is more important than their quality of life for Russians themselves. Perhaps this perception is because those at the top of Putin’s bureaucracy continue to grow outrageously rich through Russia’s traditional corrupt top-down hierarchy while “the average Russian earns a mere $700 a month” (Ostrovsky, 2008 p. 6).

Despite dismal conditions for the majority of citizens, governmental corruption, and bureaucratic hierarchy, nationalism amongst Russians persists. Putin and his predecessors throughout centuries of Russian history have exploited this inherent nationalism of the Russian peoples. In May of 2008, Putin revived the Soviet-era practice of parading large weaponry during the annual May Day celebration. For the first time in seventeen years, 6,000 marching soldiers, tanks, and rockets — including the new intercontinental ballistic missile — were displayed throughout the streets of Moscow and other major cities across Russia (Harding, 2008). This isn’t the first time that Putin has invoked Soviet-era militaristic symbols to create a new Russian image of strength and unity. As Nikolay Petrov of the Carnegie Center in Moscow stated, “It’s an ideological concept. The point is to show that Russia was great before the revolution, was great during Soviet times, and to say we are restoring its greatness” (Harding, 2008).

Not coincidentally, the resurgence of these militaristic parades coincided with President Dmitry Medvedev’s election and Putin’s inauguration as Prime Minister. As the Eurasia Daily Monitor noted, “A public display of Russian armor and nuclear might is clearly a grand way to welcome Medvedev and to commend Putin” (Felgenhauer, 2008). Putin is symbolically passing down his legacy of militaristic and economic dominance, and promising the international community the same type of powerful reign in Russia’s next phase, with Medvedev as President.
and Putin as Prime Minister. Moscovites did not fail to take note of the irony of these military masquerades as the economy declines and food prices rise — the “Moscow daily Moskovski Komsomolets calculated that the cost of today’s military parade could have bought the city of Moscow 25 badly needed new nursery schools” (Zarakhovich, 2008).

To consolidate this new phase of Russian identity, Putin has masterminded the adoption of Cossack traditions and rituals as Russian national identity. Through systematic revivals of Cossack singing troupes and various staged heritage celebrations, the Kremlin has associated overtly masculine Cossack culture with the idea of Russia as a force to be reckoned with — militaristically inclined, united, and nationalized. This borrowing of cultural symbols for nationalistic purposes is possible due to the fact that the Cossack embodies a fluid identity, relatable even to those lacking traceable Cossack ancestry (Kornblatt, 1992, p. 15). In Russia, a country constituting one eighth of the earth’s inhabitable land mass and comprised of over 160 ethnic-linguistic groups, the establishment of national identity is of paramount importance, and a matter over which internal strife has persisted for centuries.

Cossack identity and the search for Russian national origins became integrated through the rediscovery of The History of the Russes or Little Russia, which “renders an idealized history of the Cossacks and is united with the history of all of Russia” (Kornblatt, 1992, p. 25). In it, Cossacks are depicted as “freedom fighters, organically and historically united to Russia and related in some way to the origins of the Russian people as mythic heroes” (Kornblatt, 1992, p. 26). The establishment of national origin as synonymous with Cossack origin was later combined with the idea of Cossacks as morally ambiguous mythological figures in literature. Because Cossacks were originally nomads, raiding and pillaging the steppe, free from the ties of land and master, they became “associated with barrierlessness” and therefore “the Cossack hero could easily absorb negative traits connected with him” (Kornblatt, 1992, p. 15). Lack of geographical boundaries translated into a lack of character trait polarization, or the inability to define the Cossack through binary opposites. Representing an idealized whole, the Cossack is able to provide one plausible solution to the long-standing identity crisis within Russian culture that cooperates seamlessly with Putin and Medvedev’s political agenda.

However, this idea of acceptance and identity with Cossack culture has failed to pervade the everyday lives of Russian citizens, and the Cossacks themselves continue to suffer from economic hardships and marginalization. Just as the rest of the country functions in a top-down, hierarchical manner, folklore itself has been transformed from an artistic expression inextricable with everyday life to a symbol of the power of intellectuals from urban epicenters over those remaining in ‘backward’ villages and ways of life. I was able to view this reallocation of power first-hand during our recording sessions in Ust-Khopiorskaia Stanitsa.

During the sessions, Andrei Sergeievich was the uncontested leader — directing his students in setting up the recording equipment and coaching the villagers in the correct way to sing traditional songs, changing the combination of people, who sat where, what lyrics were correct, and the timbre and pitch of various singers’ voices. In one instance a particularly low bass, a former member of the renowned 1970s choir originating from our village, was only allowed to record individually because he decided that the man’s pitch was too low and did not mix well with the women’s descant portion. (Traditionally, Cossack songs are performed by all-male choirs — even the higher descant portion — but due to numerous wars and the premature death of many male villagers, women began to fill in descant portions. Now it is very rare to find a male villager with the ability to sing descant.) In another instance, Andrei Sergeievich asked the village Ataman, the traditional public figurehead of the Don Cossacks and an esteemed member of the community, to sit farther away from the microphone because he did not know the words well enough. (This Ataman position was established during the formation of Cossack groups in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Today the position is retained mostly as a public figurehead, because much of the associated power has been lost. The Don Cossacks refer to their chief as an Ataman, while the Dnieper Cossacks use the term Hetman.)

To an American anthropologist, the way in which Andrei Sergeievich conducted the recording sessions might provoke confusion and even anger. Concerning his methodology, Professor Minyonok contends that the villagers simply loved working with Andrei Sergeievich — they respected his abilities and trusted his judgment. Some even proclaimed that they felt they had ‘returned to their youth’ after working with such a master. When Andrei Sergeievich was queried as to why he wouldn’t record the villagers without prior coaching, he replied that to have travelled such a long way to record a ruined tradition would have been a waste of time. The way the villagers sang before Andrei Sergeievich taught them the ‘correct’ way was a ruined tradition, and Andrei Sergeievich felt he was in a unique position, having recorded this village at intervals both forty and twenty years prior to the present date, to know exactly what the songs should sound like. Throughout the trip, Andrei Sergeievich and his two students sang traditional songs aloud themselves for the various villagers we met, at times asking villagers to join in even if they weren’t sure of the words themselves.

My own experience and very similar experiences detailed by ethnographers conducting fieldwork in Russian villages (Olson 2004, pp. 207-218) suggested to me the hierarchical way in which information is interpreted in Russia. Both intellectuals from Moscow and the villagers themselves accepted folksongs as a bounded, frozen entity, able to be performed ‘correctly’ in only one way. For example, during Soviet times, brigades of urban intellectuals were sent to the villages to educate the villagers in Western ways and to promote ‘progress’ (Riasanovsky and Steinberg 2005, p. 568). The same ideologies and methodologies were employed in the way intellectuals from the Moscow Conservatory, interacted with villagers concerning their own traditions. Village traditions and folklore are no longer associated with the village — they cannot be considered folklore because folklore is seamlessly
intertwined in everyday life, often richest when life is most difficult, and never set on a stage or viewed as a performance. Cossack songs as performed by ensembles in Moscow, such as the children’s choir headed by Andrei Sergeievich, are a form of high art — a mark of prestige, intellect, and power. In this sense, Cossack people have lost the power to control their own identity. Cossack folklore ensembles and the perpetuation of Cossack identity add to this fabricated image at a cultural level, perpetuating the idea that Russia will not hesitate to defend its borders using military force, just as Cossack nomads developed a reputation as warriors and skilled horsemen while protecting Russia’s borders during the tsarist era. Meanwhile, modern Cossack villagers continue to be marginalized even as Russia has adopted Cossack dress, songs, and traditions as national identity. Many live off pensions of less than 200 dollars a month, eking a living from individual backyard gardens. Monopolized farming conditions alienate many small farmers from their ability to sustain themselves and their families from their own land.

While we were visiting Riibhnii Hopeyor, the villagers and Ataman spoke openly concerning economic difficulties. The Ataman described his difficulties as chief of his village, because he earned no wages for these responsibilities, and was forced to run a taxi business on the side, employing fifteen drivers and using twenty-year-old vans. All of the men agreed that this situation was due to the onset of capitalism and economic corruption. A few years earlier there had been five smaller private farms on which the men had worked, but a larger farm absorbed all the failing smaller farms. Villagers could no longer keep animals and simultaneously make profit, but instead were forced to grow grain exclusively. The Russian government has refused to allow NGOs (non-governmental organizations) to assist villages such as Ust-Khopiorskaia Stanitsa in establishing economic foundations.

Despite economic dislocation, lack of government assistance, and intense pride in their own culture, Cossacks in Ust-Khopiorskaia Stanitsa and Riibhnii Hopeyor have a great deal of pride and love for Russia. In the tiny schoolhouse of Riibhnii Hopeyor, an entire room is devoted to the Battle of Stalingrad, a nine-month long battle in which the Russians withstood German advances during World War II. Many of the poems the villagers recited were of their own creation and dealt with heroic Cossack deeds in battle, the valor of the battlefield, and village pride in Cossack military prowess. During poetry recitations, some villagers would be so overwhelmed with emotion — cracking voices and welling eyes — that they were unable to finish the poems.

One elderly village man — a pensioner — lamented the promise of progress while his country maintains a unique position of cultural dissonance toward his village and traditions — simultaneously berated for their backward image and praised for their embodiment of true Russia.

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Works Cited


