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Juror Bias in Perceptions of Lesbian Intimate Partner Violence

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JUROR BIAS IN PERCEPTIONS OF
LESBIAN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of Psychology
at the University of Kentucky

By
Nesa Elizabeth Wasarhaley

Lexington, Kentucky

Director: Dr. Jonathan M. Golding, Professor of Psychology

Lexington, Kentucky

2014

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

JUROR BIAS IN PERCEPTIONS OF LESBIAN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

Homophobic attitudes pervade our society and specifically our justice system, which negatively impact legal protection for lesbian victims of intimate partner violence (IPV). Juror stereotypes about IPV victims and perpetrators as well as their biases based on sexual orientation may be a hindrance to IPV cases being reported and successfully prosecuted. The primary goal of this study was to investigate the impact that mock jurors’ attitudes toward homosexuals and gender roles, and their acceptance of myths about domestic violence had on their perceptions of lesbian IPV. Heterosexual undergraduate students (N = 259) read a trial summary in which the defendant was charged with physically assaulting her same-sex partner. The trial varied as to whether the victim and defendant were depicted via images as feminine or masculine and thus were either stereotypical or counter-stereotypical. Participants rendered verdicts and made judgments about the victim and defendant (e.g., credibility, sympathy). Results indicated that a masculine victim indirectly increased the likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts by increasing anger toward the defendant. Participants with negative attitudes toward lesbians rated the defendant as low in credibility, and when the victim was masculine, these participants had more anger toward the defendant than participants with more positive attitudes. Participants high on hostile sexism (i.e., attitudes that justify male power) or domestic violence myth acceptance (i.e., endorsement of false beliefs that justify physical aggression against intimate partners) minimized the seriousness of the incident, which decreased the likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts. Participants low in benevolent sexism (i.e., feelings of protectiveness toward women that support traditional gender roles) rated the incident as lower in seriousness and had less anger toward the defendant for a feminine victim paired with a masculine defendant. Participants high in benevolent sexism rated the incident as less serious when the victim and defendant were both feminine, and had more anger toward the defendant when the victim was masculine and the defendant was feminine. Results provide insight into the relationships between victim and defendant stereotypicality and individual differences in attitudes on mock juror decision-making in lesbian IPV cases.
KEYWORDS: Intimate Partner Violence, Gender Stereotypes, Juror Perceptions, Attitudes

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution states that “no State shall… deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (Ronner, 2005). Yet, the American legal system has openly discriminated against homosexuals (e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 1986). One of the main hurdles that society faces in dealing with unequal justice for homosexuals is jury bias (Brunelli, 2000). Jurors view cases through a subjective lens and can rely on inaccurate prior knowledge, stereotypes, and prejudicial views when rendering judgments in court. For example, gender stereotypes about aggression can influence perceptions of violent crimes (Hendree & Nicks, 2000). Specifically, male defendants are more likely to be found guilty and receive longer sentences than female defendants (for some crimes; see Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Prior work indicates that individuals possess prototypes for crimes (Smith, 1991) as well as stereotypes about crime victims (e.g., a “real” rape victim suffers physical injury while resisting her attacker; Du Mont, Miller, & Myhr, 2003) and perpetrators (e.g., homosexual men are more likely to commit child sexual abuse than heterosexual men; Wiley & Bottoms, 2009). When the details of a case do not match the crime prototype, jurors may be more likely to render judgments based on victim stereotypes (McKimmie, Masser, & Bongiorno, 2014b), perpetrator stereotypes (McKimmie, Masters, Masser, Schuller, & Terry, 2013) or their individual attitudes (Masser, Lee, & McKimmie, 2010). Biases based on sexual orientation likely influence juror decision-making and are under-examined by the empirical literature. Brunelli (2000) argues that allowing jury bias to prevail creates unequal justice for homosexuals.
within the justice system. The purpose of the present research was to investigate the impact of jury bias regarding homosexuality on perceptions of lesbian intimate partner violence (IPV). Specifically, the present study explored the extent to which mock jurors’ attitudes toward lesbians, gender role stereotypes, and domestic violence myth acceptance impacted perceptions of lesbian IPV cases that matched or violated the crime prototype, victim stereotype, and defendant stereotype.

**Heterosexism**

Researchers have used a variety of terms to refer to biases toward gay men and lesbians (e.g., homophobia), but herein, I will use the term heterosexism (Walls, 2008a). Heterosexism refers to “the system of attitudes, behaviors, policies, and norms toward lesbian women and gay men (both at individual and institutional levels) that support the subjugation of lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals and communities, and the concomitant privileging of heterosexual identities” (Walls, 2008a, p.228). Recent work on prejudice and stereotypes has examined the ways in which prejudicial attitudes toward historically marginalized groups have changed over time. There has been a shift whereby overt expressions of prejudice are decreasing and being replaced by more subtle and covert forms of prejudice (Walls, 2008b). The “old-fashioned” form of heterosexism is based on traditional values and moral objections to homosexuality (Morrison & Morrison, 2002). For instance, traditional individuals may view homosexuality as immoral and sinful based on religious ideals, and/or as unnatural based on the moral principles of natural law (Walls, 2008a).

Modern heterosexism has moved away from religious and moral concerns and reflects more contemporary concerns about homosexuality. For example, modern
heterosexists may believe that gay men and lesbians demand excessive change to the status quo, that discrimination against gay men and lesbians no longer occurs, and that homosexual men and women prevent their own acceptance into the dominant culture by exaggerating the importance of their sexual preference (Morrison & Morrison, 2002). Such views may even evoke supposedly positive stereotypes about gay men and lesbian women (Walls, 2008a). Thus, modern heterosexism is less overtly hostile than old-fashioned heterosexism (Walls, 2008a), but still promotes a social climate in which homosexual men and women are discriminated against. For instance, someone may believe that gay and lesbian relationships are not inferior to heterosexual relationships, but may also believe that only heterosexual couples should be able to legally marry (Cowan, Heiple, Marquez, Khatçhadourian, & McNevin, 2005).

**Heterosexism and the Law**

The 2012 election was a watershed day for gay rights in the United States in that citizens voted to successfully pass state initiatives in Maine, Maryland, and Washington to legalize same-sex marriage. Since that time, state and court decisions have legalized same-sex marriage in eight additional states, and the U.S. Supreme Court declared the federal Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional. However, homophobic attitudes still pervade both legislative and judicial decisions (Ronner, 2005). For example, 33 states presently define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman and prohibit same-sex marriages. Heterosexist beliefs are both rooted in and perpetuate stereotypes about homosexuals and lead to a denial of rights based on sexual orientation and gender identity (Ronner, 2005).
One of the legally-relevant stereotypes about homosexuals has a religious basis and speaks to perceptions of homosexuals engaging in sodomy, viewed as an act of moral depravity. In *Bowers v. Hardwick* (1986), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute banning homosexual sodomy in the privacy of one’s home and likened this act to the possession of stolen goods or drugs and to the ownership of potentially lethal firearms (Ronner, 2005). This ruling employed judicial reasoning denying basic rights to gay men and lesbians, thus promoting damaging stereotypes. Although the U.S. Supreme Court eventually overturned this ruling in *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003), which struck down the sodomy law in Texas, the *Bowers* decision branded homosexuality as a type of criminality, a pervasive sentiment that continues to influence attitudes about homosexuals (Ronner, 2005). While it is clear that various areas of the law discriminate against homosexuals, the present study focused on one particular crime for which heterosexist attitudes can negatively impact a homosexual victim’s pursuit of legal remedies: IPV.

**Same-Sex Intimate Partner Violence**

Studying IPV in terms of homosexual rights is important because state law dictates whether an IPV victim in a same-sex couple is entitled to statutory protection (Ronner, 2005). Whereas the wording of domestic violence statutes varies by state, domestic violence (synonymous with IPV) is generally defined as a "pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner" (Office on Violence Against Women [OVW], 2012). It can take many forms including physical, sexual, and psychological abuse and can happen to anyone regardless of race, age, gender, or sexual orientation. It occurs in
both opposite-sex and same-sex relationships and can happen to intimate partners who are married, living together, or dating (OVW, 2012). Researchers have estimated that IPV occurs at similar frequencies in the heterosexual and homosexual communities at approximately 25% to 35% of all partners (e.g., Gunther & Jennings, 1999).

Under domestic violence laws, victims can seek personal protection orders (PPOs) to reduce the violence by limiting contact between the victim and offender (DeJong & Burgess-Proctor, 2006). All states include spouses, ex-spouses, and couples with a child in common, and many states include individuals in a dating relationship as eligible for filing a PPO (DeJong & Burgess-Proctor, 2006). State statutes that refer specifically to spouses can exclude homosexuals from protection under the law (Ronner, 2005), and three states (Delaware, Montana, and South Carolina) explicitly specify that the parties must be in a heterosexual relationship to seek a PPO (DeJong & Burgess-Proctor, 2006). For example, PPOs are available in Montana to individuals who have been the victim of abuse or fear abuse from a “partner or family member,” which is defined as “spouses, former spouses, persons who have a child in common, and persons who have been or are currently in a dating or ongoing intimate relationship with a person of the opposite sex” (Montana Code Annotated § 40-15-102, 2011). Denying homosexual abuse victims protection under the law consequently sanctions the abuse and inhibits these victims from turning to the justice system to prevent future abuse (Robson, 1990).

Although IPV occurs in heterosexual, gay, and lesbian relationships, the present study focused specifically on IPV within lesbian relationships for three main reasons. First, violence-related perceptions of gay men and lesbians differ substantially in that the view of women as aggressors contradicts societal norms (Richardson, 2005). Society
views women as less aggressive and less violent than men (Brown, 2008), and views violence perpetrated by women as less serious than violence perpetrated by men (e.g., Seelau & Seelau, 2005). Because men are socialized to be more violent, individuals may minimize the seriousness of same-sex IPV in gay male couples by viewing it as an example of a “boys will be boys” situation (Brown, 2008). Second, negative attitudes toward lesbians in general may be more related to gender role violation than their sexual behavior (Corley & Pollack, 1996). In contrast, negative attitudes toward gay men are often tied to their sexuality, such as stereotypes about their promiscuity and their role in the AIDS epidemic (Ronner, 2005). Finally, perceptions of lesbians can differ from perceptions of gay men in that lesbians are a double minority due to their social status as both women and sexual minorities (Brown, 2008). Because the present study was concerned with juror biases impacting perceptions of IPV in court, the differing attitudes toward gay men and lesbians may have led to different mechanisms through which jurors’ attitudes influenced perceptions of IPV.

Lesbian Intimate Partner Violence

Nearly 1 in 3 women (30.3%; 36.2 million) in the U.S. has been slapped, shoved, or pushed by an intimate partner at some point in her life. Approximately 1 in 4 women in the U.S. (24.3%, 29 million) has experienced severe physical violence (e.g., hurt by pulling hair, slammed against something, hit with a fist or something hard, beaten, kicked, choked or suffocated, burned on purpose) by an intimate partner in her lifetime (Black et al., 2011). Empirical findings about the prevalence of IPV among lesbian women vary. Data from the National Violence Against Women Survey indicated that 21.7% of women with opposite-sex cohabitants reported being raped, physically
assaulted, and/or stalked by a marital/cohabitating partner at some point in their lives. The victimization rate by a female partner for same-sex cohabitating women (respondents did not specify their sexual orientation) was 11.4% (Tjaden & Thonnes, 2000). Other researchers estimate lesbian IPV rates as comparable to those of heterosexual women. In a review of research studies on lesbian IPV prevalence, West (2002) established that approximately 30-40% of lesbian women have been involved in at least one physically abusive relationship. Many factors contributing to IPV also appear similar for lesbian and heterosexual IPV, such as substance abuse (Klostermann, Kelley, Milletich, & Mignone, 2011; Renzetti, 1992).

There are several reasons why lesbian IPV prevalence rates are hard to determine. Namely, lesbian IPV victims are living as an oppressed minority in a heterosexist society (Speziale & Ring, 2006). The heterosexual privilege within the United States’ culture has determined how society views, studies, reports, and responds to IPV (Brown, 2008). As discussed, lesbians face barriers from seeking legal protection from partner abuse. The abovementioned domestic violence statutes that reduce choices for homosexual IPV victims may make it more advantageous for them to hide their abuse and therefore reward their invisibility (Ronner, 2005). They also face social barriers to reporting abuse. Some of these barriers are the same as those faced by heterosexual victims including lack of friends or social support, but lesbians also face the unique threat of being “outed” by reporting abuse (Brown, 2008). Renzetti (1989) found that many lesbian IPV victims were unable to tell their families about their abuse because their families did not know they were lesbians or were in a relationship. Lesbian IPV perpetrators may also threaten to “out” the victim by revealing her sexual orientation to her employer, friends, or family.
Researchers’ estimates of lesbian IPV prevalence may vary due to the aforementioned barriers to reporting as well as the use of self-report measures, varied definitions of violence, and inadequate racial and ethnic diversity in samples across studies (Speziale & Ring, 2006).

**Gender Role Stereotypes**

In combination with heterosexism, gender role socialization also determines who can and cannot be a “valid” victim of IPV (Brown, 2008). Traditional gender roles impart greater power and authority to men and lead to women’s dependency on men. Sanctioning the idea that women and men should occupy different social roles can be considered sexist because this belief supports differential treatment of women and men and reflects a lack of support for those who do not occupy traditional roles (Swim & Hyers, 2009). Open endorsement of traditional gender role behavior in a manner that is readily apparent and observable is considered “old-fashioned” sexism (Swim and Cohen, 1997). Research has shown that individuals who endorse traditional gender roles express more support for the use of violence against women (i.e., husbands using violence against their wives) than those with egalitarian gender role attitudes (Berkel, Vandiver, & Bahner, 2004).

While a substantial amount of people still endorse old-fashioned sexist beliefs, modern forms of sexism are more subtle in that unequal treatment of women goes unnoticed because individuals perceive it to be normal behavior (Swim & Cohen, 1997). Attitudes toward women can encompass both hostile and benevolent feelings, which Glick and Fiske (1997) termed ambivalent sexism. Hostile sexism seeks to justify male power, traditional gender roles, and sexual exploitation of women whereas benevolent
sexism recognizes men’s dependence on women and includes feelings of protectiveness and fondness toward women. Although these attitudes differ in valence, they both presume traditional gender roles. Both also share three subcomponents: power, gender differentiation, and sexuality. The hostile beliefs for these components are that 1) women want to be controlled by men, 2) men are better than women, and 3) women are just sexual objects. The benevolent beliefs for these components are that 1) men should protect and provide for women, 2) women have complementary traits to men, and 3) women provide sexual intimacy. Ambivalent sexism has been associated with myths about victimization and victim-blaming in cases of violence against women including rape (e.g., Masser et al., 2010; Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald, 1999) and IPV (Yamawaki, Ostenson, & Brown, 2009). For IPV, Yamawaki and colleagues (2009) found that participants who scored high on hostile sexism minimized the seriousness of a heterosexual IPV scenario, and those high on benevolent sexism engaged in more victim-blaming.

**Biases in the Justice System**

Legal professionals across various divisions of the justice system may view a case of lesbian IPV in terms of heterosexist attitudes and gender role stereotypes, thus impacting the legitimacy and credibility of a lesbian woman’s claim of IPV. Many judges and other legal officials have been educated about domestic violence issues in terms of the dominant/submissive patriarchal conceptualization of relationships based on gender. In evaluating a case of lesbian IPV in which one party seeks a protective order, judges may not be able to determine against whom they should issue the order because the gender role cues are absent. Consequently, a judge may either deny the protective order,
which allows the violence to continue, or issue a mutual PPO. In cases in which the judge issues a mutual restraining order, the judge sets a precedent that the violence between the parties is mutual (Robson, 1990). The abused individual is therefore denied the status of victim during legal proceedings and the likelihood that the actual victim of the violence will be punished increases (DeJong & Burgess-Proctor, 2006).

Heterosexist attitudes and gender role stereotypes can also influence law enforcement officers’ perceptions of a lesbian’s abuse claim. Law enforcement officers may rely on stereotypes, such as which partner is physically larger or dresses in masculine clothing, to categorize which is the “dominant” partner in determining who is the aggressor (Robson, 1990). Yet, “dominance” is a hetero-relational concept that may not apply to lesbian relationships and should not be used to evaluate an IPV situation (Robson, 1990). Furthermore, lawyers may rely on the masculine or feminine appearance of the victim or defendant in an IPV case in order to play into jurors’ stereotypes about gender roles in lesbian relationships. For instance, in a case in which a lesbian IPV victim appears more masculine and the defendant appears more feminine, a lawyer may explicitly discuss the victim’s appearance to incite skepticism that a feminine lesbian would abuse her more masculine partner (e.g., Renzetti, 1994). Yet, a lesbian’s masculine or feminine appearance is unrelated to whether or not she is a victim of IPV (Renzetti, 1992). As such, without an understanding of lesbian relationships, the legal system may implicitly or explicitly impose heterosexual gender role stereotypes on a lesbian couple experiencing IPV.
Empirical Research on Perceptions of IPV

Perceptions of Women Perpetrators

Gender role socialization has impacted perceptions of IPV in that it perpetuates the belief that only females can be victims and only males can be perpetrators (Brown, 2008). Several empirical studies have found that individuals perceive IPV perpetrated by women as less serious than IPV perpetrated by men. Harris and Cook (1994) conducted one of the early studies in this area by presenting undergraduate participants with a fictitious newspaper report of a person who was arrested on charges of domestic abuse. The scenario described a man who abused his wife, a wife who abused her husband, or a gay man who abused his male partner. Participants rated the female perpetrator as being the least responsible and the most liked compared to the male perpetrator in either the heterosexual or homosexual scenario. Participants also felt that the abused husband should remain with his abusive wife rather than leave her, indicating that they view violence perpetrated by a woman as less serious than that perpetrated by a man. However, these researchers did not examine perceptions of same-sex IPV within a lesbian couple.

Another study by Poorman, Seelau, and Seelau (2003) fully crossed victim and perpetrator gender to examine undergraduates’ perceptions of IPV vignettes. As such, their study included a same-sex condition with a female victim and female perpetrator. They found that participants viewed an abuse case with a male perpetrator and female victim as significantly more serious than any of the other conditions and were more likely to recommend that the victim press charges in this condition. Additionally, participants rated lesbian and gay male victims of IPV as less believable than heterosexual victims. The questionnaire in this study also included two questions regarding how participants
would respond if they were jurors for such a case. Most participants (95.9%) indicated they would decide in favor of the prosecution, and subsequently recommended significantly higher penalties for male perpetrators than female perpetrators (regardless of victim gender). In sum, undergraduates held female perpetrators less responsible, and rated lesbian victims as less believable.

Further research by Taylor and Sorenson (2005) employed a diverse community sample to assess attributions of fault and responsibility in IPV cases using an experimental vignette design. These researchers varied contextual characteristics about the case, including the gender and sexual orientation of the victim and assailant. They found that participants assigned the least fault to the victim when she was a straight female, but they assigned equal fault to the victim and assailant when the victim was a gay male or a lesbian. Additionally, lesbian victims had greater odds of being assigned mutual solution responsibility (i.e., who should do something about the abuse). Finally, when the assailant was a woman (regardless of the gender of the victim), participants had lower expectations that the victim should seek a formal intervention for the violence, compared to when the assailant was a man. The researchers suggest that community members perceived IPV committed by women as less serious or less harmful than that committed by men.

To better understand the underlying beliefs that lead to perceiving violence perpetrated against women as more concerning than violence perpetrated against men, Seelau and Seelau (2005) used a vignette study that crossed IPV victim and perpetrator gender. They asked undergraduate participants to rate characteristics of the scenario such as the perpetrator’s capability of seriously injuring the victim, the seriousness of the
victim’s injuries, and the level of aggressiveness of each partner. Consistent with gender-role stereotypes, they found a significant interaction such that participants perceived male against female IPV as more serious than same-sex or female against male IPV. They also viewed male perpetrators as more capable than female perpetrators of seriously injuring the victim.

Cormier and Woodworth (2008) built on this existing research by examining perceptions of IPV within law enforcement officers. The researchers employed a within-subjects design using two samples: Canadian undergraduates and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers. Participants read and responded to questions about Harris & Cook’s (1994) vignettes that depicted either heterosexual or same-sex couples. Student participants rated the vignette depicting a male perpetrator and female victim as more violent, were more likely to say they would report the depicted abuse to the police if they witnessed it, and were more likely to believe that the perpetrator should be convicted of assault than in the same-sex or female perpetrator/male victim vignettes. While the RCMP officers viewed the violence in all vignettes as more serious overall than the students, they also reported that they would be more likely to call the police (if off duty) if they witnessed a man abusing his wife than when witnessing the same abuse of a same-sex victim. The RCMP officers were also more likely to believe that a man abusing his wife should be convicted of assault than should a woman hitting her partner (regardless of gender). Thus, even within law enforcement officers, individuals perceived lesbian IPV victims as less credible compared to heterosexual female victims (Cormier & Woodworth, 2008).
Impact of Lesbian Gender Role Stereotypes

The above studies suggest that gender role socialization plays a role in perceptions of IPV in terms of the stereotypical roles of men and women (i.e., men are the perpetrators of violence whereas women are the “legitimate” victims). However, they did not examine participants’ gender role expectations specifically for the same-sex couples when evaluating the IPV scenarios. Little and Terrance (2010) examined the impact of gender role expectations on perceptions of a lesbian IPV vignette by manipulating the masculinity and femininity of the female victim and defendant. They did so by presenting participants with a photo of a masculine- or feminine-appearing woman labeled as the victim or offender and altered the descriptions of their jobs to be stereotypically masculine or feminine. The researchers found that undergraduate participants rated a feminine lesbian victim as less blameworthy than a masculine victim. Additionally, female participants rated the feminine victim’s claim as more plausible when the offender was masculine. They also blamed the feminine offender more than the masculine offender, perhaps because they perceived her to be violating traditional gender-based expectations that women should not be aggressive.

Although this study provides insight into perceptions of lesbian IPV, participants did not evaluate the IPV scenarios in a court context. Participants in these prior studies evaluated aspects of the IPV scenario such as severity of the abuse and blameworthiness of each person, but the study did not require participants to evaluate the veracity of the abuse claim beyond a reasonable doubt in the context of a court trial. To address this issue, Wasarhaley, Golding, Renzetti, and Lynch (2014, unpublished manuscript) presented undergraduate mock jurors with a trial summary of a woman charged with 4th
degree assault of her domestic partner. In the trial scenario, the defendant had prior convictions of assaulting a family member and thus was subject to an enhanced penalty for the present case. As such, the jurors could find her guilty of a misdemeanor or guilty of a felony, which carries more serious penalties. The researchers manipulated the masculinity and femininity of the alleged victim and defendant by presenting drawings of their faces with their testimony. When mock jurors perceived the victim to be feminine, which is more stereotypical, they were more likely to render harsher judgments of the defendant and attributed more responsibility to the defendant. When mock jurors viewed the image of a masculine victim, which is counter to the victim stereotype, they were more lenient on the defendant (regardless of defendant appearance) as compared to when they viewed the feminine victim paired with the masculine defendant. This experiment and the above-mentioned research made significant contributions to our understanding of perceptions of lesbian IPV, including the impact that gender role expectations can have on these perceptions. However, none of these studies actually examined relevant attitudes and beliefs that may bias how mock jurors perceive such cases.

**Domestic Violence Myth Acceptance**

Myths about domestic violence may influence perceptions of lesbian IPV. Research has shown that myths about victimization can promote tolerance and acceptance of that victimization. For instance, Burt (1980) identified several widespread prejudicial or false beliefs regarding rape, including that “women ask for it,” known as Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA). RMA is related to attitudes regarding traditional gender roles and hostility toward women, and leads to victim blaming. Based on this work, Peters (2008) proposed a similar measure for domestic violence myths called the
Domestic Violence Myth Acceptance Scale. Peters defines domestic violence myths as widely held but false beliefs that “serve to minimize, deny, or justify physical aggression against intimate partners” (p. 5). He suggested that men and women who endorse conservative sex-role stereotypes and beliefs more strongly endorse domestic violence myths, such as “a woman who does not like being abused can simply leave.” He also suggests that domestic violence myths can serve defensive psychological functions for both men and women. For men, myths allow for avoiding anticipated blame; for women, myths protect them from the threat of potentially suffering similar harm in their own lives (Peters, 2008).

There are robust findings demonstrating that individuals who are more supportive of rape myths (typically men) are more likely to engage in victim blaming and less likely to assign responsibility to the accused perpetrator (e.g., Hammond Berry, & Rodriguez, 2011; Suarez & Gadalla, 2010). Emerging research has similarly shown that endorsement of domestic violence myths impacts victim blame attribution in an IPV scenario. Specifically, Yamawaki, Ochoa-Shipp, Pulsipher, Harlos, and Swindler (2012) found that undergraduates who scored higher on domestic violence myth acceptance were more likely to blame the victim in a heterosexual IPV scenario in which she returned to her abuser (and therefore acted in a manner opposing the myths) than a scenario in which this information was not provided. No known research to date has examined the influence of domestic violence myth acceptance on perceptions of lesbian IPV.

**Juror Decision-Making**

The justice system assumes that jurors render judgments based on the elements presented during a trial. However, the juror and jury decision-making literature indicates
that jurors are influenced by a range of extra-legal factors (e.g., Ford, 1986; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994) including jurors’ own attitudes (e.g., Russell, Ragatz, & Kraus, 2009) and prior knowledge (e.g., Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jimenez-Lorente, 1999). The story model of jury decision-making (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) posits that jurors actively attempt to organize the trial information into a coherent mental representation that combines case-specific information from the trial, knowledge about events similar to the topic of the present trial, and generic expectations about elements that are necessary for completing a story. Jurors must determine the extent to which the story they devise is consistent with real world events (real or imagined; Pennington & Hastie, 1992), which suggests that extra-legal information, including jurors’ biases and personal experiences, may influence how they interpret the trial evidence. To comprehend new information presented during a trial (e.g., elements of a crime or testimony) individuals match the evidence to their existing crime prototypes (Wiener, Richmond, Seib, Rauch, & Hackney, 2002).

**Crime Prototypes, Victim Stereotypes, and Offender Stereotypes**

A prototype is a mental representation that includes a set of features that define membership in a particular category. Research has demonstrated that laypeople have prototypes of crime categories that guide their verdict decisions, even though the features of their crime categories may be inaccurate (Smith, 1991). With regard to victimization, rape myths support the notion that “legitimate” rapes involve certain details (e.g., an attack by a stranger in a deserted public place; Du Mont et al., 2003) and therefore dictate the prototypical features of rape (McKimmie et al., 2014b). Such myths also prescribe
stereotypes about victims, including their behavior and gender-based characteristics (McKimmie et al., 2014b).

Due to the similarity of the functions and outcomes of rape myth acceptance and domestic violence myth acceptance, it is likely that domestic violence myths similarly impact the features of the IPV prototype. Since the start of the battered women’s movement in the 1970’s, society has conceptualized IPV in terms of a male-female occurrence, focusing on men’s violent behavior toward women (Miller, Greene, Causby, White, & Lockhart, 2001). IPV thus represents a gendered crime based on the gender stereotype of men as dominant (Hannon, Hall, Nash, Formati, & Hopson, 2000) as well as heterosexist-based assumptions about intimate relationships (Little & Terrance, 2010). Consequently, a central feature of the prototypical IPV scenario is that a man is the aggressor and a woman is the victim.

When characteristics of a specific case fit the prototype for that crime, jurors can process the case more efficiently (Smith, 1991), or in terms of the story model, more easily construct a story that seems plausible. In doing so, jurors may ignore individuating information when a case closely matches the prototypical crime (see Bodenhausen, 2005). For example, McKimmie and colleagues (2014b) found that in the context of a prototypical rape case (i.e., stranger rape), the stereotypicality of the victim generally did not impact participants’ perceptions, but victim stereotypicality did impact perceptions of a non-prototypical rape case (i.e., acquaintance rape). A lesbian IPV case would closely approximate a prototypical IPV case when the victim and defendant appear stereotypically submissive and dominant, respectively. Research has shown that visual cues such as hair length, size and form of eyes, nose, and chin can prime gender-
stereotypical associations and influence judgments (Sczesny & Ko, 2008). Therefore, when the victim looks feminine and the defendant looks masculine, jurors may overlook the individuating detail that the defendant is in fact a woman who is breaking the gender role stereotype by being aggressive. Jurors can construct a story in which the IPV perpetration is plausible, which will guide their decision-making process toward a congruous verdict.

Research on victimization suggests that when the victim’s characteristics are consistent with the victim stereotype for a particular crime, reactions to that victim may follow semiautomatically (Howard, 1984). However, victim behaviors that disconfirm a stereotype may lead jurors to make inferences about individual characteristics, such as the perceived likelihood that the victim was vulnerable (Howard, 1984). Furthermore, jurors viewing a counter-stereotypical victim may be more likely to render judgments based on their attitudes. Masser et al. (2010) found that after being presented with a counter-stereotypical rape victim, participants higher in benevolent sexism (i.e., feelings of protectiveness toward women that support traditional gender roles) engaged in significantly more victim-blaming than did participants presented with a stereotypical victim. In a lesbian IPV case, a victim with a masculine appearance deviates from the preconceived notions of a stereotypical IPV victim. As such, it may seem doubtful that a masculine woman would be a victim of an aggressive act committed by another woman. Jurors therefore may not find a counter-stereotypical (i.e., masculine) victim credible, may blame her more, or may render judgments in line with their attitudes toward lesbians and/or women.
Gender-related offender stereotypes also play a role in information processing and decision making. Generally speaking, women do not fit the offender stereotype, especially not for violent crimes (e.g., Hendree & Nicks, 2000). As mentioned above, IPV perpetrated by women is not viewed as serious or as harmful as that perpetrated by men (e.g., Seelau & Seelau, 2005). With regard to the implications for jury decision making, McKimmie and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that mock jurors process trial evidence differently for stereotypical versus counter-stereotypical defendants. They found that participants presented with a gender counter-stereotypical defendant focused more attention on the defendant at the expense of evaluating the strength of the evidence presented against her. The researchers suggested that the inability to apply a stereotype to the defendant required mock jurors to use effortful processing to encode the defendant at the expense of having resources available for processing trial evidence. Consequently, having limited resources could lead biased individuals to render judgments based on those biases (Kleider, Knuycky, & Cavrak, 2012). In the context of a lesbian IPV case, mock jurors may process the trial evidence more easily when the defendant is masculine and therefore a more stereotypical perpetrator. With a feminine defendant, mock jurors may focus more on her counter-stereotypical features and render judgments in line with their attitudes.

**Present Study**

Investigating perceptions of lesbian IPV can further our understanding of the nature of juror bias in such cases. The present study examined the role of the IPV crime prototype, victim and defendant stereotypes, and effects of attitudes toward lesbians, attitudes toward women, and domestic violence myth acceptance on mock juror
perceptions of a lesbian IPV trial. Male and female undergraduates read a trial summary in which a female defendant was charged with allegedly assaulting her same-sex partner. The trial varied as to whether it depicted the victim and defendant as either physically feminine or physically masculine. Thus, the case represented a prototypical IPV scenario (i.e., feminine victim, masculine perpetrator) or the case did not conform to the IPV prototype. Furthermore, the victim was either stereotypical (i.e., feminine) or counter-stereotypical (i.e., masculine) and the defendant was either stereotypical (i.e., masculine) or counter-stereotypical (i.e., feminine). Participants rendered verdicts and made judgments about the victim and defendant (e.g., credibility, sympathy). Participants also completed measures of heterosexist attitudes, sexist attitudes, and domestic violence myth acceptance.

**Hypotheses**

The primary hypotheses are detailed below:

**Victim and defendant appearance.**

1. Participants who viewed a feminine victim and masculine defendant (i.e., both are stereotypical) would be more likely to render guilty verdicts than in any other condition. This would support Little and Terrance’s (2010) findings that a feminine IPV victim was less blameworthy than a masculine victim, and a claim was more plausible when the offender was masculine. A masculine (counter-stereotypical) victim would decrease the likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts, in line with Wasarhaley et al.’s (2014) and McKimmie et al.’s (2014b) findings. With a feminine victim/feminine defendant, the expectation for decreased likelihood of guilty verdicts was based on McKimmie et al.’s (2013) finding that participants viewed female defendants who were
counter-stereotypical as less guilty, and the general findings of leniency toward female defendants of violent crimes (e.g., Mazzella & Feingold, 1994).

2. Following the same rationale as Hypothesis 1, victim femininity (stereotypicality) would be associated with ratings of higher levels of victim credibility, sympathy for the victim, and defendant responsibility, and lower levels of victim responsibility, defendant credibility, and sympathy for the defendant. I expected the opposite pattern of ratings associated with victim masculinity (counter-stereotypicality).

3. Given support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, I expected that the rating variables would mediate the effect of victim appearance on verdict. Thus, a feminine victim would lead to higher pro-victim and lower pro-defendant ratings, which would increase the likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts. A masculine victim would lead to lower pro-victim ratings and higher pro-defendant ratings, which would decrease the likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts. (See Figure 1.1.)

4. I also expected that the qualitative data regarding participants’ reasons for choosing their verdict would be in line with the stereotypicality of the victim and defendant in the scenario. I predicted that participants who viewed a feminine victim and masculine defendant (prototypical scenario) would cite reasons for guilty verdicts that related to the intentionality of the injuries to the victim- either that the violence was intentional, or that the defendant should be punished regardless of her intent. Participants who cited not guilty verdicts in conditions with a masculine victim or feminine defendant (counter-stereotypical scenarios) would likely cite reasons that minimize the seriousness of the incident, including that the injuries were accidental or not serious enough to warrant punishment.
Attitudes and myth acceptance.

5. Participants high in hostile sexism would rate the violence as less serious, rate the victim as less credible and more responsible, and be less likely to render guilty verdicts compared to those low in hostile sexism (Masser et al., 2010; Yamawaki et al., 2009).

6. Participants high in domestic violence myth acceptance would rate the violence as less serious, rate the victim as less credible and more responsible, and be less likely to render guilty verdicts compared to those low in myth acceptance (Yamawaki et al., 2012).

7. Given support for Hypotheses 5 and 6, I expected the rating variables, particularly seriousness of the incident, would mediate the effect of hostile sexism and domestic violence myth acceptance on verdict. Therefore, participants high in HS or DVMAS would rate the incident as less serious and have lower pro-victim ratings which would decrease their likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts. (See Figure 1.2.)

8. Heterosexism (ATL-S and MHS-L) would moderate the relationship between victim appearance, defendant appearance, and victim credibility/responsibility ratings as follows: With a feminine victim and masculine defendant (prototypical scenario), participants’ levels of heterosexism would not impact trial ratings. However, for the scenarios in which the victim, the defendant, or both are counter-stereotypical, participants would be more attuned to the individuating information regarding the victim’s and defendant’s sexual orientation and would be more likely to render judgments based on their negative attitudes toward lesbians. Thus, when the victim was masculine or when the defendant was feminine (counter-stereotypical), participants with higher
heterosexist attitude scores would be less likely to render judgments in favor of the victim (e.g., low victim credibility, low sympathy for the victim; see Figure 1.3).

Although individuals with more modern heterosexist attitudes (compared to old-fashioned heterosexism) may not typically engage in overtly hostile behaviors against gay individuals, I hypothesized the same effect for both the ATL-S (old-fashioned heterosexism) and MHS-L (modern heterosexism) scales. This was based on Dovidio & Gaertner’s (2000) findings that aversive racists (i.e., modern, non-overt racists) discriminated when given an ambiguous situation.

9. Benevolent sexism would moderate the relationship between victim appearance, defendant appearance, and victim credibility/responsibility ratings as follows: When the victim was feminine, participants with high benevolent sexism would be more likely to render judgments in favor of the victim (e.g., more guilty verdicts, high victim credibility, high sympathy for victim) compared to those low in benevolent sexism. A feminine individual matches the victim stereotype, so benevolent sexists would make more automatic judgments based on their attitudes (e.g., women need to be protected). Previous research has shown that participants high on benevolent sexism rated a stereotypical rape victim as less blameworthy than a counter-stereotypical rape victim (Masser et al., 2010). When the victim was masculine (counter-stereotypical) participants would be less likely to render judgments in her favor regardless of their levels of benevolent sexism. (See Figure 1.4.)
Figure 1.1. Example of theoretical mediation model whereby trial ratings mediate the effect of victim/defendant appearance on verdict.
Figure 1.2. Example of theoretical mediation model whereby trial ratings mediate the effect of hostile sexism on verdict.
Figure 1.3. Hypothesized moderation model depicting the interactive effects of victim appearance, defendant appearance, and attitudes toward lesbians on trial ratings.
Figure 1.4. Hypothesized moderation model depicting the interactive effects of victim appearance and benevolent sexism on trial ratings.
Chapter 2

Method

Participants

The initial sample consisted of 293 undergraduates from Introduction to Psychology courses at the University of Kentucky who received partial course credit for their participation. Students completed the study either in a Spring 2013 or Fall 2013 cohort. Fifteen cases were excluded from analyses for incomplete data or because they did not qualify to participate: 7 participants did not complete the entire trial, 1 participant did not complete the trial questionnaire, 2 participants incorrectly answered 3 or more comprehension check questions during the trial, and 2 participants described the masculine defendant as being male in their qualitative responses. Furthermore, I removed from the analyses participants whose self-identified sexual orientations were bisexual (10), homosexual (5), other (3), or preferred not to indicate their sexual orientation (4). Therefore, the final dataset consisted of 259 (97 males) jury-eligible (i.e., U.S. citizens, at least 18 years old) heterosexual participants.

The average age of participants was 18.84 years (ranging from 18 to 28 years old). The racial/ethnic make-up of the sample was 85% White, 6% Black, 4% Bi-racial, 2% Asian, 1% Hispanic, 1% Middle Eastern, 0.5% Native American, and 1% other. The average participant was somewhat politically conservative ($M = 4.52$, $SD = 1.54$) and

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1 An *a priori* power analysis using the program G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) for a small to medium effect size ($f^2 = .10$), power of .90, and an $\alpha$-level of .05 yielded a desired total sample size of 249.
somewhat religious ($M = 4.52, SD = 1.89$). Three participants had prior experience of serving on a jury.

**Design**

The design was a 2 (Participant Gender) x 2 (Victim Appearance: Masculine or Feminine) x 2 (Defendant Appearance: Masculine or Feminine) between-participants design.

**Materials**

**Demographic questionnaire.** Participants indicated demographic information including age, race/ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and U.S. citizenship. Participants rated their political orientation on a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly liberal*; 4 = *moderate*; 7 = *strongly conservative*), and their religiosity on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*; 4 = *moderately*; 7 = *completely*). Participants also rated how masculine and feminine they consider themselves to be on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*; 7 = *completely*).

**Heterosexual attitude questionnaires.** The Attitudes Toward Lesbians short form (ATL-S) sub-scale of the Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale (Herek, 1988) measured old-fashioned heterosexism. It contains 5 items such as, “Female homosexuality is a sin,” scored on a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*). Scores can range from 5 to 25, with higher scores indicating more heterosexual attitudes. Research by Herek (1988) indicated that the ATL-S correlated highly with the full ATL scale ($r = .95$).

The lesbian subscale of the Modern Homonegativity Scale (MHS-L; Morrison & Morrison, 2002) measured modern heterosexism. This scale captures attitudes toward lesbians that are not based on religious or moral objections, but are somewhat negatively
valenced (Walls, 2008b), including “Lesbians have all the rights they need.” The 12 scale items are scored on a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*). Scores can range from 12 to 60, with higher scores representing greater heterosexism. The MHS-L has performed well with regard to reliability and validity, including differentiation between the MHS-L and old-fashioned heterosexism (Morrison & Morrison, 2002).

**Sexist attitudes questionnaire.** Modern sexist attitudes were measured with the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1997), a 22-item measure with sub-scales for Hostile Sexism and Benevolent Sexism. Hostile items include “Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.” Benevolent items include “Women should be cherished and protected by men.” Items are scored on a 6-point scale (0 = *disagree strongly*; 5 = *agree strongly*) with some items reverse scored. Scores are computed by averaging the items relevant to that subscale. Scores can range from 0 to 55 for each measure, with higher scores indicating more sexist attitudes.

**Domestic violence myth acceptance questionnaire.** The Domestic Violence Myth Acceptance Scale (DVMAS; Peters, 2008) is an 18-item scale that assessed acceptance of myths about domestic violence across four dimensions: character blame of the victim (e.g., “If a woman doesn’t like it she can leave”), behavior blame of the victim (e.g., “Women can avoid physical abuse if they give in occasionally”), minimization of the seriousness and extent of the abuse (e.g., “Domestic violence does not affect many people”), and exoneration of the perpetrator (e.g., “When a man is violent it is because he lost control of his temper”). Items are scored on a 6-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 6 = *strongly agree*). Peters (2008) found this scale to have moderate to high convergent validity with theoretically related scales (e.g., Burt’s [1980] Rape Myth Acceptance
scale) and excellent overall reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .88$). Reliability was somewhat weak for the exoneration factor for females (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .64$) and the minimization factor for males (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .68$). Therefore, the use of the total score is recommended (Jankowski, Johnson, Holtz Damron, & Smischney, 2011).

**Criminal trial summary.** All participants read an approximately 1,500-word fictional case summary of a 4th degree assault trial in which the defendant allegedly physically abused her domestic partner (adapted from the vignette in Harris & Cook, 1994; see Appendix A). The summary contained a description of the trial, the prosecution’s case, the defense’s case, and the judge’s instructions. Each condition contained the same information, varying only the images of the victim and defendant presented at the start of the trial and with their testimony. The trial summary contained information about both the direct- and cross-examination for both the prosecution’s and the defense’s cases. The defendant pleaded not guilty. A pilot test with a separate undergraduate sample ($N = 40$) indicated that based on the trial content alone (without the image manipulation), mock jurors were equally likely to render guilty and not guilty verdicts, one-sample $\chi^2$ test, $p = .527$.

The prosecution’s case included testimony by the alleged victim and the emergency room doctor who examined the victim. The victim indicated that she and her partner had been in a committed relationship for two years and had lived together for eight months. On the night in question, the defendant provoked a verbal argument with the victim about her household duties. The victim testified that the verbal argument escalated into a physical altercation when the defendant grabbed her, punched her in the face, knocked her to the floor, and kicked her. The defendant left the house and the
victim called the police. In the cross-examination, the victim testified that she and the defendant had engaged in verbal arguments previously but her partner had never physically assaulted her prior to this incident. She stated that she had never seen the defendant act physically violent before.

The emergency room doctor testified that he performed a physical exam on the victim. She had sustained a black eye, sprained wrist, and a large contusion on her hip, which were consistent with her description of the incident. During cross-examination, the doctor indicated that he did not know for certain how the victim sustained her injuries and who, if anyone, had caused them.

The defense’s case included testimony by the defendant’s co-worker and the defendant. The co-worker testified that she had known the defendant for nine years. The night before the incident, the defendant had called her because the defendant was having relationship issues and was upset with the victim. The co-worker stated that the defendant indicated that she planned to talk to the victim about these issues. In cross-examination, the co-worker stated that the defendant never had any issues in the workplace.

The defendant testified that on the night in question, she tried to talk to the victim about putting more effort into her share of the household duties, and the victim became angry and started shouting obscenities at her. The defendant claimed that she put her arm around the victim to comfort her but the victim pushed her away. The defendant testified that the victim threatened to leave so she grabbed the victim’s arm, causing her to accidentally trip and fall to the floor. The defendant said she left the house because the victim screamed at her to get away, and was surprised to be confronted by a police officer when she returned home. The defendant indicated that she was not aware that the victim
had injured her eye, but must have hit it when she fell, and probably bruised her hip at the same time. In cross-examination the defendant admitted that she grabbed the victim’s arm, but did not intend to make the victim fall.

The judge’s instructions were based on Kentucky Revised Statute 508.030, Assault in the fourth degree (1982). The judge stated that jurors should find the defendant guilty of Assault in the fourth degree if, and only if, they believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally or wantonly caused physical injury to the victim or with recklessness caused physical injury to the victim by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. (Parts of the human body may be considered a “dangerous instrument.”)

Victim and Defendant images. Participants viewed a drawing of a masculine or feminine woman labeled as the victim and defendant during the initial overview of the trial and when the trial summary presented the victim’s testimony and the defendant’s testimony. The drawings were black and white and featured the woman’s face and shoulders against a blank background. There were two masculine and two feminine images (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). The feminine women had long hair and small chins as
compared to the masculine women, who had short hair and wider chins (Berry & McArthur, 1985). The images were counterbalanced for each condition.  

**Trial questionnaire.** The trial questionnaire instructed participants to provide a verdict (i.e., *not guilty* or *guilty*) and indicate how confident they were in their verdict on a 10-point scale (with only the endpoints labeled; 1 = *not at all* and 10 = *extremely*). Then they were asked to write the reason(s) for their verdicts. Participants then completed a variety of ratings on 10-point scales with only the endpoints labeled. They rated how guilty they thought the defendant was (1 = *completely not guilty* and 10 = *completely guilty*) and how serious they thought the incident was (1 = *not at all* and 10 = *extremely*). They also rated the credibility and honesty of the victim, how responsible the victim was for her own injuries, the credibility of the doctor and coworker, the credibility and

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2 Both of the feminine images (A, B) and one of the masculine images (C) were from Wasarhaley et al. (2014). The second masculine image (D) was adapted from Wasarhaley et al. Within the context of the IPV trial in Wasarhaley et al., participants rated the feminine images as equally feminine and significantly less masculine than the masculine image, regardless of being described as the victim or defendant. With a separate student sample (N = 30), I conducted a series of post-hoc paired-samples *t*-tests to compare the ratings of the present images outside the context of an IPV trial. Results indicated that the feminine images were rated as equal in masculinity, femininity, and looking realistic. However, feminine image A (*M* = 4.73, *SD* = 1.02) was rated as significantly more attractive than feminine image B (*M* = 4.07, *SD* = 1.34), *t*(29) = 2.88, *p* = .007. The masculine images were rated as equal in masculinity and looking realistic. Masculine image D (*M* = 2.41, *SD* = 1.42) was rated as significantly less feminine than masculine image C (*M* = 4.24, *SD* = 1.30), *t*(16) = -3.44, *p* = .003. The masculine images were rated as equal in attractiveness, however, all but one participant thought image D was of a man. All pairwise comparisons of one feminine and one masculine image indicated that both feminine images were rated as significantly more feminine and less masculine than both masculine images. Ratings of attractiveness significantly differed for three of these pairs: feminine image A compared to masculine image C (*M* = 3.53, *SD* = 1.59), *t*(29) = -4.97, *p* < .001; feminine image A compared to masculine image D (*M* = 2.47, *SD* = 1.23), *t*(16) = -6.20, *p* < .001; and feminine image B compared to masculine image D, *t*(16) = -3.69, *p* = .002. Participants in the present study also rated the images on masculinity, femininity, and attractiveness in the IPV trial context (described below). Due to the differences in attractiveness ratings for the images, I controlled for victim attractiveness and defendant attractiveness in all analyses.
honesty of the defendant, and how responsible the defendant was for the victim’s injuries (1 = not at all and 10 = completely). Other rating questions asked participants to indicate how much sympathy and anger they had for the victim and defendant (1 = none at all and 10 = a lot). Participants also rated how attractive, feminine, and masculine the victim’s and defendant’s appearance were (1 = not at all and 10 = extremely).

Procedure

Participants completed the Attitudes Toward Lesbians scale (ATL-S), Modern Homonegativity scale (MHS-L)³, and the Domestic Violence Myth Acceptance Scale (DVMAS) during a mass testing session at the beginning of the semester. The questionnaires were presented in the order listed above⁴, embedded within a variety of other questionnaires. For the trial portion of the study, participants were alerted to the study through SONA, an online experiment management system. First, participants completed a consent form online, which directed them to Surveymonkey.com (randomly distributing them to a trial condition) to read the trial summary and complete the trial questionnaire. The experiment instructions informed participants that they would act as a juror by reading a trial summary and answering questions about the trial. Then they indicated their age and whether they were a U.S. citizen. Next, the website presented each witness’s testimony and cross-examination from the trial summary as a separate webpage. There was no time limit, so participants could proceed through the trial summary at their own pace. After the presentation of each witness’s testimony, the

³ For the Spring 2013 cohort, the MHS-L scale presented during the mass testing was missing the middle rating option due to a clerical error. Therefore, these participants completed the measure on a 1-4 scale instead of a 1-5 scale.
⁴ There was no theoretical reason to believe the order of questions would significantly affect participants’ responses, and the mass testing session did not allow for randomization of questionnaire order.
webpage required participants to answer a multiple choice question to ensure that they read and comprehended the trial content. If participants answered incorrectly, they received a message indicating that their response was incorrect and that they should read carefully so they can answer all questions correctly (see Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). They then proceeded to the next portion of the trial summary.

At the conclusion of the trial summary participants answered the trial questionnaire. Participants then completed the remaining demographic questions and indicated if they had ever served on a jury, on how many occasions, what crime was involved, and what the outcome was for each instance. Next, participants received instructions that they would complete a set of questionnaires under the guise of helping the researchers develop new research studies. They completed two filler questionnaires, the sexism measures, a third filler questionnaire, and the MHS-L. Finally, the website directed participants to read a general explanation of the study and print a copy of the consent form. The experiment took approximately 30 minutes to complete.

**Analytic Strategy**

**Treatment of Measurements**

With regard to the trial rating questions, I only included measures of theoretical importance in the present analyses. Prior to testing predictions related to victim and defendant ratings, I created two subscales by combining related rating measures: (1)

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5 Participants completed the MHS-L after the trial (in addition to during the mass testing) in order to have data for all participants that used the missing middle rating option (see footnote 3). I standardized the scores for both MHS-L measures and compared them using a paired-samples *t*-test. The results showed that participants’ scores for the measure completed after the trial were significantly higher than their scores for the measure completed during mass testing, *t*(205) = -3.61, *p* < .001. This suggests that the trial may have primed heterosexist attitudes. Therefore, I used the standardized scores for the MHS-L completed during mass testing for all analyses.
victim credibility subscale (victim credibility and victim honesty; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .91$) and (2) defendant credibility subscale (defendant credibility and defendant honesty; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .81$). I also used victim responsibility, sympathy toward the victim, anger toward the victim, defendant responsibility sympathy toward the defendant, and anger toward the defendant as predictive measures. Thus, I used eight rating measures in the analyses.

As for the qualitative reason for verdict data, two research assistants naïve to the hypotheses each scored all of the data based on the following categories, which were of theoretical relevance or related to general aspects of the trial: the defendant had no history of violence/aggression, the incident was not serious enough for punishment, the victim sustained injuries by accident, the defendant intended to cause harm, the defendant was guilty by the letter of the law regardless of whether she intended to cause injury, belief in the victim’s testimony, belief in the defendant’s testimony or the testimony presented by the defense, suspicion or distrust of the defendant’s explanation, the doctor’s testimony, the physical evidence of injury, instinct or “gut” feeling, lack of evidence or “she-said-she-said”, and reasonable doubt. The scorers had 92.4% agreement and I settled any disagreement. Because participants described a variety of reasons for their verdicts, there were many empty cells or cells with very few data points. Thus, I present this data descriptively, as the percentages of participants in each condition that gave particular reasons for rendering not guilty or guilty verdicts.

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6 The research assistants were also instructed to code for mention of the victim’s or defendant’s appearance. Only two participants mentioned reasons related to the defendant’s appearance, but these participants described the defendant as male and were therefore removed from the analyses.
Regarding the attitude measures and myth acceptance, I computed overall scores by summing the ratings for each scale item; low scores indicate low endorsement and high scores designate high endorsement. For the heterosexist attitudes, the reliability for both the ATL-S and MHS-L scales was high in the present sample (Cronbach’s \( \alpha = .84 \) and .90, respectively). For the ambivalent sexism measures, the HS and BS scales had good reliability (Cronbach’s \( \alpha = .83 \) and .77, respectively). The DVMAS had a Cronbach’s \( \alpha \) of .86. Next, I centered each scale prior to creating interaction terms for the regressions as suggested by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003) to reduce multicollinearity and aid in the interpretation of the regression coefficients.

**Logistic and Linear Regression**

I conducted a series of regression analyses to test all of the hypotheses. To test the models with verdict as the dependent variable, I used logistic regression because verdict is dichotomous. I employed linear regression to analyze the impact of the independent variables and attitude measures on the trial ratings. I conducted all regression analyses hierarchically and entered the variables based on their causal priority. The steps of all regression models contained the following variables: Step 1, participant gender (demographic factor); Step 2, ratings of victim and defendant attractiveness (control variables); Step 3, victim appearance and defendant appearance (manipulated independent variables); and Step 4: the two-way interaction term for victim appearance by defendant appearance. For those hypotheses examining an attitude or myth acceptance, the steps were the same as described above, with the addition of the scale of interest entered at Step 3 with the independent variables.
For the hypotheses involving mediation (3 and 7), I tested only those variables significantly predicted by the independent variables as potential mediators of the relationships between victim appearance and verdict or defendant appearance and verdict. In the event that I did not find a significant direct effect of the independent variables on verdict, I still tested those models for significant indirect effects (Hayes, 2009; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). For these analyses I employed a bootstrapping procedure. Bootstrapping is considered the optimal means for testing mediation models, particularly multiple mediator models (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 2008). The traditional causal steps strategy (Baron & Kenny, 1986) does not test the significance of the indirect effect. The Sobel test can test the significance of the indirect effect but it is conservative for smaller sample sizes and requires the assumption that the sampling distribution of the indirect effect is normal (Hayes, 2009; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). I conducted the bootstrapping analyses using Preacher & Hayes’ (2008) “indirect” macro for SPSS because it allows for more than one mediator in the model and is able to estimate models with dichotomous outcomes. This procedure used 1000 bootstrap samples to test whether or not the indirect pathways from victim or defendant appearance to the intervening variables (e.g., sympathy for the victim, anger toward the defendant) to verdict, were significantly different from zero. Significant mediation occurs when the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence interval (CI) do not cross zero (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).

For the hypotheses involving moderated effects (8 and 9), the regression models contained the following variables: Step 1, participant gender; Step 2, ratings of victim and defendant attractiveness; Step 3, attitude measure, victim appearance, and defendant appearance; Step 4: the two-way interaction terms for victim appearance by defendant
appearance, victim appearance by attitude, and defendant appearance by attitude; Step 5, the three-way interaction term between victim appearance, defendant appearance, and the attitude. I probed any significant interactions from the linear regression models using a utility provided by Preacher, Curran, & Bauer (2006). I used a resource provided by Dawson to plot any significant interactions from the logistic regression models (Dawson, 2014; Dawson & Richter, 2006).
Figure 2.1. Feminine images A and B.
Figure 2.2. Masculine images C and D.
Chapter 3

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Prior to analysis, examination of the main variables of interest indicated that the data met the necessary assumptions for conducting regression analyses (i.e., correct model specification, homoscedasticity, independence and normality of residuals; Cohen et al., 2003). Table 3.1 presents the means, standard deviations, and total number of participants for each of the primary dependent variables by condition. Table 3.2 presents the correlations among the major variables. Across all conditions the conviction rate was 59.8%.

Manipulation check. I conducted a series of independent samples \( t \)-tests to determine whether participants perceived the counterbalanced images of the victim and defendant to be similar in masculinity, femininity, and attractiveness. Table 3.3 presents the mean femininity, masculinity, and attractiveness ratings for each image. Table 3.4 presents the statistics from each \( t \)-test. Results indicated that participants rated the two feminine images as similarly feminine to each other when they were presented as the defendant, similarly masculine to each other when they were presented as the victim or defendant, and similarly attractive when presented as the victim or defendant. When presented as the victim, participants rated image A as significantly less feminine than B. However, one-sample \( t \)-tests showed that participants rated each feminine image as significantly more feminine than the midpoint of the scale: A, \( t(61) = 9.76, p < .001 \); B, \( t(65) = 14.56, p < .001 \). Therefore, the manipulation for femininity was successful in that participants did perceive the feminine images as feminine.
For the two masculine images, participants rated image C as significantly more feminine than D when presented as the victim or the defendant. However, one-sample t-tests showed that participants rated each masculine image as significantly less feminine than the midpoint of the scale as the victim, C, \( t(69) = -9.79, p < .001; \) D, \( t(60) = -17.08, p < .001; \) and as the defendant, C, \( t(58) = -7.77, p < .001; \) D, \( t(61) = -26.82, p < .001. \) Additionally, participants rated image C as significantly less masculine than D when presented as the victim and as the defendant. However, one-sample t-tests showed that participants rated each masculine image as significantly more masculine than the midpoint of the scale as both the victim, C, \( t(69) = 2.05, p = .044; \) D, \( t(60) = 6.49, p < .001; \) and as the defendant, C, \( t(58) = 2.32, p = .024; \) D, \( t(61) = 13.24, p < .001. \) Thus, the masculine images did convey masculinity to participants, as intended. Finally, participants rated image C as significantly more attractive than D when presented as the victim and defendant.

Comparing the feminine and masculine images, participants rated both feminine images as significantly more feminine and less masculine than both of the masculine images in all instances in which the images depicted the victim or the defendant, as desired. However, participants rated the feminine images as more attractive than the masculine images when they depicted the victim or the defendant. Due to the differences in attractiveness ratings, I controlled for victim and defendant attractiveness in all analyses.

Finally, I conducted an additional series of independent samples t-tests to compare average ratings of each image when it depicted the victim to the average ratings for the same image when it depicted the defendant. This was to ensure that the
description of the IPV scenario did not lead participants to rate the same image as significantly more masculine, feminine, or attractive when the image depicted the defendant versus the victim. There were two instances in which ratings differed for a single image depending on who it depicted. Participants rated feminine image A as significantly more attractive when it depicted the defendant than when it depicted the victim, \( t(123) = -2.26, p = .025 \). Participants rated masculine image D as significantly more masculine when it depicted the defendant than when it depicted the victim, \( t(121) = -3.04, p = .003 \). There were no other differences in femininity, masculinity, or attractiveness ratings for each image due to who it depicted in the trial. Therefore, participants generally did not view a particular image differently based on its label.

**Hypothesis 1 – Effect of Victim and Defendant Appearance on Verdict**

I hypothesized that participants in the feminine victim, masculine defendant condition would have the highest likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts. The data did not support this hypothesis. For the logistic regression model, defendant appearance was marginally significant for verdict, \( \text{OR} = 1.92, 95\% \text{ CI: 0.91 to 4.04, } p = .087 \), with a masculine defendant more likely to be convicted than a feminine defendant, but the overall model was not significant, \( \chi^2 = 6.57, p = .255 \). Therefore, victim and defendant appearance did not have a direct effect on verdict.

**Hypothesis 2 – Effect of Victim and Defendant Appearance on Trial Ratings**

I predicted that a feminine victim would lead to higher pro-victim ratings and a masculine victim would lead to lower pro-victim ratings. The results did not support this hypothesis. The linear regression models for seriousness of the incident, sympathy for the victim, and anger toward the defendant produced a significant amount of variance.
explained with the addition of victim appearance at Step 3, $\Delta R^2 = .02, F(5, 253) = 2.31, p = .045$; $\Delta R^2 = .02, F(5, 253) = 3.35, p = .006$; and $\Delta R^2 = .02, F(5, 253) = 4.05, p = .001$, respectively. Compared to a feminine (stereotypical) victim, when the victim was masculine (counter-stereotypical), participants viewed the incident as more serious ($\beta = .19, p = .025$), had higher sympathy for the victim ($\beta = .17, p = .046$), and more anger toward the defendant ($\beta = .19, p = .026$). These findings are in the opposite direction than I predicted. Furthermore, the effect of victim appearance was only significant for more emotional variables (sympathy and anger). The models for credibility and responsibility for the victim or defendant were not significant.

**Hypothesis 3 – Indirect Effects of Victim and Defendant Appearance on Verdict**

I expected victim appearance to have a significant indirect effect on verdict via the rating variables. I first established significant relationships between the rating variables and verdict before conducting the bootstrapping procedure to test the indirect effects of victim appearance on verdict. I only tested those rating variables that were significantly associated with victim appearance in Hypothesis 2. In separate logistic regression models (controlling for participant gender, victim and defendant attractiveness ratings), I found that seriousness of the incident, OR = 1.34, 95% CI: 1.16 to 1.56, $p < .001$, sympathy for the victim, OR = 1.41, 95% CI: 1.22 to 1.63, $p < .001$, and anger toward the defendant, OR = 1.56, 95% CI: 1.35 to 1.82, $p < .001$, significantly predicted verdict.

The data somewhat supported Hypothesis 3. The individual bootstrapping procedure for seriousness indicated that the indirect path from victim appearance to seriousness to verdict was significant, 95% CI:.04 to .45. As well, the bootstrapping
procedures for sympathy for the victim, 95% CI: .02 to .54, and anger toward the
defendant, 95% CI: .03 to .67, indicated significant indirect effects on verdict. When the
victim looked masculine, participants thought the incident was more serious, had higher
levels of sympathy for the victim, and more anger toward the defendant than when the
victim looked feminine, which increased the likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts. As a
more conservative test of the indirect effects I also entered all three ratings
simultaneously\(^7\). Only anger toward the defendant remained significant, 95% CI: .008 to
.59. Hypothesis 3 therefore received some support in that there was a significant indirect
effect of victim appearance on verdict via anger toward the defendant, however, this
effect was in the opposite direction than predicted due to the findings in Hypothesis 2.

**Hypothesis 4 – Reason for Verdict**

Table 3.5 presents the most commonly stated reasons for rendering guilty and not
guilty verdicts for each condition. I expected that participants who viewed a feminine
victim and masculine defendant would cite reasons for guilty verdicts that related to the
intentionality of the injuries to the victim, and participants who viewed a masculine
victim or feminine defendant would cite reasons for not guilty verdicts that minimize the
seriousness of the incident. Hypothesis 4 received some support from the reason data.

Across all conditions, the most frequently stated reason for a guilty verdict was
the physical evidence. However, there was some variation to the reasons cited within
each condition. When the defendant was feminine, participants mentioned that they

\(^7\) This test is more conservative in that a multiple mediator model determines the extent to
which each rating variable mediates the effect of victim appearance on verdict
conditional on the presence of the other rating variables in the model. Testing all three
rating variables simultaneously thus reduces the likelihood of parameter bias due to
omitted variables (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008).
thought the defendant inflicted injuries on the victim intentionally with a higher frequency when the victim was feminine (24%) than when she was masculine (14%). Participants who viewed a stereotypical couple (feminine victim, masculine defendant) stated that the defendant was guilty regardless of whether she intended to harm the victim at a slightly higher frequency (32%) than the other three conditions (26%, 25%, 25%).

Very few participants mentioned that they rendered a guilty verdict based on their intuition, and the condition with a feminine victim and feminine defendant had the highest percentage of participants stating this reason (13%).

With regard to participants who rendered not guilty verdicts, in both conditions with a feminine victim (regardless of defendant appearance), the most frequently stated reason for a not guilty verdict was lack of evidence. However, in both conditions involving a masculine victim (regardless of defendant appearance), the most common reason for a not guilty verdict was belief in the defendant or the testimony of the defendant’s character witness. Additionally, a higher percentage of participants who viewed a feminine defendant stated that they thought the injuries were accidental (34%), compared to those who viewed a masculine defendant (regardless of victim appearance; 19% and 16%)

Interestingly, participants mentioned the doctor’s testimony as support for both guilty and not guilty verdicts. When both the victim and defendant were feminine, participants focused on the doctor’s testimony as being consistent with the victim’s account of the incident and stated it as a reason for rendering a guilty verdict. In conditions in which the couple consisted of a masculine and feminine partner, regardless
of which was the victim or defendant, participants cited as a reason for a not guilty verdict that the doctor could not state with certainty who, if anyone, caused the injuries.

**Hypothesis 5 – Hostile Sexism**

I hypothesized that participants high in HS would rate the violence as less serious, rate the victim as less credible and more responsible, and be less likely to render guilty verdicts compared to those low in HS. There was some support for Hypothesis 5. The linear regression models for seriousness of the incident and sympathy for the victim produced a significant amount of variance explained with the addition of HS at Step 3, $\Delta R^2 = .08, F(6,250) = 4.71, p < .001$; and $\Delta R^2 = .07, F(6, 250) = 4.22, p < .001$, respectively. Higher HS was associated with overall lower ratings of incident seriousness, $\beta = -.24, p < .001$, and lower ratings of sympathy for the victim, $\beta = -.18, p = .005$. The linear regression model for sympathy for the defendant was significant at Step 3, $\Delta R^2 = .02, F(6, 250) = 2.34, p = .033$. Higher HS was marginally associated with lower ratings of sympathy for the defendant ($\beta = -.12, p = .055$).

However, the models for victim credibility and victim responsibility were not significant. Additionally, the logistic regression model indicated that HS was not associated with verdict, OR = 1.01, $p = .475$.

**Hypothesis 6 – Domestic Violence Myth Acceptance**

I predicted that participants high in DVMAS would rate the violence as less serious, rate the victim as less credible and more responsible, and be less likely to render guilty verdicts compared to those low in DVMAS. There was some support for Hypothesis 6. The linear regression models for seriousness of the incident and sympathy for the defendant produced a significant amount of variance explained with the addition
of DVMAS at Step 3, $\Delta R^2 = .04, F(6, 239) = 3.06, p = .007$; and $\Delta R^2 = .03, F(6, 239) = 3.37, p = .003$, respectively. Higher DVMAS was associated with overall lower ratings of incident seriousness, $\beta = -.14, p = .031$. Participants high in DVMAS also had lower ratings of sympathy for the defendant, $\beta = -.16, p = .017$, which was in the opposite direction than expected. Additionally, the models for victim credibility and victim responsibility were not significant. Finally, the logistic regression model indicated that DVMAS was not associated with verdict, $OR = 1.01, p = .206$.

Hypothesis 7 – Indirect Effects of Hostile Sexism and Domestic Violence Myth Acceptance on Verdict

I only tested those rating variables that were significantly associated with HS and DVMAS in Hypotheses 5 and 6. I demonstrated the associations between seriousness of the incident and verdict, and sympathy for the victim and verdict for Hypothesis 3. In a separate logistic regression model (controlling for participant gender, victim and defendant attractiveness ratings), I found that sympathy for the defendant significantly predicted verdict, $OR = 0.56, 95\% CI: 0.47$ to 0.66, $p < .001$.

I expected there to be a significant indirect effect of HS and DVMAS on verdict via the rating variables, specifically seriousness. Supporting Hypothesis 7 for HS, the individual bootstrapping procedure for seriousness of the incident indicated that the indirect path from HS to seriousness to verdict was significant, $95\% CI$: -.04 to -.01. In addition, the bootstrapping procedure for sympathy for the victim, $95\% CI$: -.03 to -.01, indicated a significant indirect effect on verdict. Participants higher in HS (i.e., holding attitudes that justify male power and support traditional gender roles) rated the incident as less serious and had less sympathy toward the victim, which decreased their likelihood of
rendering guilty verdicts. These indirect effects remained significant when I tested a more conservative model by entering both mediators simultaneously: seriousness 95% CI: -0.03 to -0.001; sympathy for the victim 95% CI: -0.03 to -0.004.

For DVMAS, the individual bootstrapping procedure for seriousness indicated that the indirect path from DVMAS to seriousness to verdict was significant, 95% CI: -0.01 to -0.0001, as was the indirect effect of DVMAS on verdict through sympathy toward the defendant, 95% CI: 0.002 to 0.03. Participants higher in DVMAS (endorsement of false beliefs that minimize or justify physical aggression against intimate partners) viewed the incident as less serious, which decreased their likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts, supporting Hypothesis 7. Participants high in DVMAS also had less sympathy for the defendant, which increased their likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts, which was counter to the expected direction of the relationship. However, these indirect effects were significant only when tested in individual models. The more conservative model containing seriousness and sympathy for the defendant simultaneously indicated that the above indirect effects were not significant, seriousness 95% CI: -0.01 to 0.0001; sympathy for the defendant 95% CI: -0.0001 to 0.03.

**Hypothesis 8 – Heterosexism (Old-Fashioned and Modern)**

I predicted that when the victim was masculine or when the defendant was feminine, participants with higher heterosexist attitude scores would be less likely to render judgments in favor of the victim, for both ATL-S (old-fashioned heterosexism) and MHS-L (modern heterosexism). The data revealed an effect counter to predictions for ATL-S for Hypothesis 8. The logistic regression model for verdict was marginal, Model (3) $\chi^2 = 11.11, p = .085$. Higher ATL-S (more negative attitudes toward lesbians)
was associated with an increased likelihood for rendering guilty verdicts, \( \text{OR} = 1.05, 95\% \text{ CI: 1.00 to 1.10, } p = .043 \). The linear regression model for defendant credibility produced a significant amount of variance explained with the addition of ATL-S at Step 3, \( \Delta R^2 = .06, F(6, 251) = 3.92, p = .001 \). Higher ATL-S was associated with lower ratings of defendant credibility \( \beta = -.22, p = .001 \).

The model for anger toward the defendant was also significant at Step 3, \( \Delta R^2 = .04, F(6, 251) = 4.24, p < .001 \), such that higher ATL-S was associated with more anger toward the defendant, \( \beta = .14, p = .021 \). This effect was qualified at Step 4, \( \Delta R^2 = .02, F(9, 248) = 3.58, p < .001 \), by a significant interaction with victim appearance, \( \beta = .17, p = .049 \). At higher levels of ATL-S (i.e., more negative attitudes toward lesbians; +1 SD), viewing a masculine victim caused participants to have more anger toward the defendant, \( B = 1.51, S.E. = 0.49, t(248) = 3.09, p = 0.0023 \). In contrast, at low levels of ATL-S (i.e., less negative attitudes toward lesbians; -1 SD), there was a null effect of victim appearance, \( B = 0.49, S.E. = 0.47, t(248) = 1.04, p = 0.299 \) (see Figure 3.1).

MHS-L did not predict verdict or any trial ratings as a main effect or interaction. Thus, the data did not support Hypothesis 8 with regard to MHS-L.

In summary, ATL-S did impact trial ratings when the victim was masculine (counter-stereotypical), however, the impact of ATL-S was in the opposite direction than I expected. I hypothesized that negative attitudes toward lesbians would lead to negative perceptions of the victim, but it led to negative perceptions of the defendant. Specifically, participants with high ATL-S thought the defendant was less credible than those with low ATL-S, and were angrier at the defendant when the victim was masculine in particular.
Only old-fashioned heterosexism impacted trial judgments whereas more modern heterosexist attitudes did not.

**Hypothesis 9 – Benevolent Sexism**

I hypothesized that participants high in BS would be more likely to render judgments in favor of a feminine victim than a masculine victim, but that victim appearance would not impact judgments for participants low in BS. Hypothesis 9 received some support. The logistic regression model for verdict was significant at Step 3, \( \chi^2 = 9.23, p = .026 \). There was a main effect of BS on verdict such that participants with higher levels of BS (i.e., more feelings of protectiveness toward women) were more likely to render guilty verdicts, \( OR = 1.04, 95\% CI: 1.01 \text{ to } 1.08, p = .014 \).

This effect was qualified by the addition of the interaction terms to the model at Step 5, \( \chi^2 = 8.75, p = .003 \). There was a significant 2-way interaction of victim appearance with BS, \( OR = 1.14, 95\% CI: 1.03 \text{ to } 1.26, p = .009 \), which was qualified by a significant 3-way interaction between victim appearance, defendant appearance, and BS, \( OR = .82, 95\% CI: 0.71 \text{ to } 0.94, p = .004 \). A simple effects analysis indicated that BS did not have an effect on verdict when a feminine defendant was paired with a feminine victim, \( OR = .99, p = .800 \). In contrast, when a feminine defendant was paired with a masculine victim, participants higher in BS were significantly more likely to render guilty verdicts than those low in BS, \( OR = 1.10, 95\% CI: 1.03 \text{ to } 1.19, p = .008 \). For a masculine defendant, BS did not impact verdict when paired with a masculine victim, \( OR = .99, p = .670 \). However, when a masculine defendant was paired with a feminine victim, participants high in BS were marginally more likely to render guilty verdicts than those low in BS, \( OR = 1.09, p = .063 \) (see Figure 3.2).
The linear regression model for seriousness of the incident was significant at Step 5, $\Delta R^2 = .03, F(10, 246) = 2.24, p = .016$. There was a significant interaction between defendant appearance and BS, $\beta = -.22, p = .001$, which was qualified by a three-way interaction between victim appearance, defendant appearance, and BS, $\beta = -.39, p = .004$. At lower levels of BS (-1 SD), there was a null effect of a feminine defendant, $B = 0.22, S.E. = 0.50, t(248) = 0.45, p = 0.656$, but a masculine defendant paired with a feminine victim led participants to rate the incident as lower in seriousness, $B = 1.57, S.E. = 0.55, t(248) = 2.88, p = 0.004$. In contrast, at high levels of BS, a feminine defendant paired with a feminine victim led participants to rate the incident as lower in seriousness, $B = 1.39, S.E. = 0.56, t(248) = 2.47, p = 0.014$, but there was a null effect of a masculine defendant, $B = 0.09, S.E. = 0.57, t(248) = 0.16, p = 0.877$ (see Figure 3.3).

The linear regression model for defendant credibility was significant at Step 5, $\Delta R^2 = .05, F(10, 246) = 2.72, p = .003$. There was a significant interaction between victim appearance and BS, $\beta = -.43, p = .003$, and between defendant appearance and BS, $\beta = -.32, p = .018$. The two-way interactions were qualified by a three-way interaction between victim appearance, defendant appearance, and BS, $\beta = .47, p = .001$. At lower levels of BS (-1 SD), a feminine defendant paired with a feminine victim led to lower ratings of defendant credibility, $B = 1.01, S.E. = 0.48, t(248) = 2.09, p = 0.038$, but there was a null effect of a masculine defendant, $B = -0.51, S.E. = 0.46, t(248) = -1.12, p = 0.264$. In contrast, at high levels of BS (+ 1 SD), a feminine defendant paired with a masculine victim led to marginally lower ratings of defendant credibility, $B = 0.95, S.E. = 0.55, t(248) = -1.74, p = 0.083$, but there was a null effect of a masculine defendant, $B = 0.73, S.E. = 0.55, t(248) = 1.51, p = 0.13$ (see Figure 3.4).
The linear regression model for sympathy for the victim was significant at Step 3, \( \Delta R^2 = .04, F(6, 250) = 3.60, p = .002 \). There was a main effect of BS on sympathy for the victim, \( \beta = .13, p = .032 \), such that participants higher in BS had more sympathy for the victim.

The linear regression model for sympathy for the defendant produced a significant amount of variance explained at Step 5, \( \Delta R^2 = .03, F(10, 246) = 2.0, p = .034 \), with the addition of the three-way interaction between victim appearance, defendant appearance, and BS, \( \beta = .37, p = .007 \). At lower levels of BS (-1 SD), a feminine defendant paired with a feminine victim led to marginally lower ratings of sympathy for the defendant, \( B = 0.86, S.E. = 0.52, t(248) = 1.65, p = 0.100 \), but there was a null effect of a masculine defendant, \( B = -0.91, S.E. = 0.46, t(248) = -1.59, p = 0.114 \). In contrast, at high levels of BS (+ 1 SD), the simple slopes were not significant for a feminine defendant, \( B = -0.41, S.E. = 0.61, t(248) = -0.67, p = 0.505 \), or a masculine defendant, \( B = 0.79, S.E. = 0.63, t(248) = 1.25, p = 0.211 \) (see Figure 3.5).

The linear regression model for anger toward the defendant was significant at Step 3, \( \Delta R^2 = .06, F(6, 250) = 5.29, p < .001 \), with the addition of BS to the model, \( \beta = .21, p = .001 \). The main effect of BS on anger toward defendant was qualified by significant interactions at Step 5, \( \Delta R^2 = .04, F(10, 246) = 4.56, p < .000 \). The two-way interaction between victim appearance and BS was significant, \( \beta = .37, p = .007 \), as was the three-way interaction between victim appearance, defendant appearance, and BS, \( \beta = -.42, p = .001 \). At lower levels of BS (-1 SD), there was a null effect of a feminine defendant, \( B = 0.04, S.E. = 0.51, t(248) = 0.07, p = 0.942 \), but a masculine defendant paired with a feminine victim led participants to have less anger toward the defendant, \( B \)
= 1.56, \textit{S.E.} = 0.56, t(248) = 2.78, p < 0.001. In contrast, at high levels of BS, a feminine defendant paired with a masculine victim led participants to have more anger toward the defendant, \( B = 2.06, \textit{S.E.} = 0.60, t(248) = 3.45, p < 0.001 \), but there was a null effect of a masculine defendant, \( B = 0.21, \textit{S.E.} = 0.62, t(248) = 0.34, p = 0.737 \) (see Figure 3.6).

In summary, participants low in BS rated the incident as lower in seriousness and had less anger toward the defendant with a feminine victim and masculine defendant (i.e., when both the victim and defendant were stereotypical). Furthermore, when the victim was feminine and the defendant was also feminine, participants low in BS rated the defendant as less credible and had marginally lower sympathy for her. In contrast to the low BS participants, participants with high BS rated the incident as less serious when the victim and defendant were both feminine (i.e., the victim was stereotypical but the defendant was counter-stereotypical). High BS also led to lower defendant credibility and a higher likelihood of guilty verdicts for the condition with a feminine victim and masculine defendant (i.e., both stereotypical). Finally, in the masculine victim, feminine defendant condition (i.e., both counter-stereotypical), high BS led to more anger toward the defendant as well as a higher likelihood of guilty verdicts.
Table 3.1

Descriptive Statistics for Primary Variables by Condition – Means (Standard Deviation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feminine</th>
<th>Feminine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 58</td>
<td>n = 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdict (percent guilty)</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Verdict</td>
<td>6.79 (1.71)</td>
<td>6.53 (1.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant Guilt</td>
<td>6.05 (2.50)</td>
<td>5.54 (2.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriousness of incident</td>
<td>5.00 (1.98)</td>
<td>5.00 (1.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim credibility subscale</td>
<td>5.64 (1.91)</td>
<td>5.82 (1.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim responsibility</td>
<td>3.66 (2.23)</td>
<td>4.10 (2.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy for victim</td>
<td>5.50 (2.37)</td>
<td>5.50 (1.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger toward victim</td>
<td>2.81 (1.88)</td>
<td>2.87 (2.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defendant credibility subscale</td>
<td>5.10 (1.74)</td>
<td>5.12 (1.93)</td>
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<td>Defendant responsibility</td>
<td>6.60 (2.47)</td>
<td>6.53 (2.35)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sympathy for defendant</td>
<td>4.00 (1.88)</td>
<td>4.10 (2.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger toward defendant</td>
<td>3.60 (2.13)</td>
<td>3.44 (2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes Toward Lesbians (ATL-S)</td>
<td>12.78 (5.51)</td>
<td>12.71 (5.23)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>27.14 (8.49)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benevolent Sexism (BS)</td>
<td>29.59 (7.44)</td>
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<td>44.94 (12.54)</td>
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Note: Standardized score reported for MHS-L.
Table 3.1 (continued)

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*Note: Standardized score reported for MHS-L.*
Table 3.2

**Correlations among Trial Ratings, Attitude Scales, and Domestic Violence Myth Acceptance**

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*Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01*
Table 3.2 (continued)

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*Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
Table 3.2 (continued)

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*Note:* * p < .05, ** p < .01
Table 3.3

*Descriptive Statistics for Image Ratings by Image Label – Means (Standard Deviation)*

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*Note:* Ratings on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*completely*).
Table 3.4

*Results of Independent Samples t-tests for Image Rating Comparisons*

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<tr>
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<td>D</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>-3.72</td>
<td>.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-7.27</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>-11.25</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>-8.33</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-13.07</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>119</td>
<td>-4.37</td>
<td>.000**</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>132</td>
<td>-7.70</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>-14.61</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* * p < .05, ** p < .01
Table 3.5

*Percentages of Reasons for Verdict by Condition.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Feminine</th>
<th>Feminine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guilty</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical evidence</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicion of Defendant’s story</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilty regardless of intent</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injuries were intentional</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim testimony</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor testimony – injuries consistent with victim’s story</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuition</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Guilty</strong></td>
<td>n = 21</td>
<td>n = 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Evidence</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable Doubt</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No history of violence</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant testimony</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Serious</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor testimony – uncertain who caused injuries</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.5 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Masculine</th>
<th>Masculine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 44</td>
<td>n = 36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Guilty**

- Physical evidence: 64% | 50%
- Suspicion of Defendant’s story: 36% | 28%
- Guilty regardless of intent: 25% | 25%
- Injuries were intentional: 20% | 14%
- Victim testimony: 18% | 11%
- Doctor testimony – injuries consistent with victim’s story: 2% | 11%
- Intuition: 2% | 6%

**Not Guilty**

- Lack of Evidence: 16% | 28%
- Reasonable Doubt: 16% | 16%
- No history of violence: 16% | 16%
- Accidental: 16% | 34%
- Defendant testimony: 47% | 41%
- Not Serious: 21% | 0%
- Doctor testimony – uncertain who caused injuries: 5% | 28%
Figure 3.1. Interactive effect of victim appearance and attitudes toward lesbians on anger toward the defendant.
Figure 3.2. Interactive effect of victim appearance, defendant appearance, and benevolent sexism on verdict.
Figure 3.3. Interactive effect of victim appearance, defendant appearance, and benevolent sexism on seriousness of the incident.
Figure 3.4. Interactive effect of victim appearance, defendant appearance, and benevolent sexism on defendant credibility.
Figure 3.5. Interactive effect of victim appearance, defendant appearance, and benevolent sexism on sympathy for the defendant.
Figure 3.6. Interactive effect of victim appearance, defendant appearance, and benevolent sexism on anger toward the defendant.
Chapter 4

Discussion

The present study suggested that the masculinity of a victim as well as attitudes toward lesbians and women in general can impact perceptions of and ultimately judgments about a lesbian IPV case. The reasons participants listed for guilty and not guilty verdicts suggested that the victim’s and/or defendant’s appearance did impact their decision-making in a manner consistent with gender stereotypes. The manipulation of victim and defendant appearance in the present study did not directly impact verdict, but did so indirectly via anger toward the defendant. Counter to predictions, victim masculinity was associated with more pro-victim ratings, which increased the likelihood of rendering guilty verdicts. This did not support previous findings of victim masculinity causing negative responses to a lesbian IPV victim (i.e., victim blame, Little & Terrance, 2010; not guilty verdicts, Wasarhaley et al., 2014). Perhaps the present finding was due to methodological differences. Little and Terrance combined their image manipulation with a masculine or feminine job description for the victim and perpetrator. Wasarhaley and colleagues used similar images for their manipulation but the context of the trial was somewhat different— the defendant in that trial had a documented history of violence.

Along those lines, the present study used the masculinity and femininity of the victim and defendant’s appearance as a proxy for stereotypicality in the context of an IPV incident. However, the present study did not explicitly ask participants to rate the typicality of the victim and defendant. It is possible that some other factor or factors impacted the perceived stereotypicality of the victim and defendant in this context. For instance, a masculine victim could have made the defendant seem less stereotypical,
regardless of the defendant’s appearance and vice versa. Furthermore, there were other aspects of the incident described in the present trial summary that ranged in gender stereotypicality. For instance, the couple was arguing about the victim’s responsibility regarding household chores— a stereotypically female/feminine duty. Additionally, the victim claimed that the defendant punched and kicked her, which could be viewed as a more masculine type of violence than, for example, pulling hair or hitting with a frying pan. Subsequent research should tease apart being a stereotypical IPV victim or perpetrator from general gender role stereotypes. Additional research on lesbian IPV should also investigate other factors examined in the heterosexual IPV literature, such as the relationship of the couple (married vs. dating) and whether the victim returned to the abuser (Yamawaki et al, 2012), to determine the stereotypical elements of a lesbian IPV scenario and how those interact with victim and defendant masculinity and femininity.

With regard to the indirect effects of the independent variables on verdict through the trial rating variables, it was noteworthy that the masculinity/femininity manipulation impacted participants’ emotional responses (i.e., sympathy and anger) rather than more cognitive evaluations (i.e., credibility and responsibility). Based on an abundance of victimization literature, I had expected participants to engage in victim-blaming, but did not find that in this study. Instead, participants chose guilty verdicts based more on visceral responses such as anger, an approach-oriented emotion that leads individuals to feel a sense of certainty or confidence (see Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Despite this apparent emotional component of choosing a verdict, very few participants who viewed the masculine victim explicitly stated their reason for a guilty verdict as intuition or a
“gut” feeling, but rather cited the physical evidence and suspicion of the defendant’s story.

Research has also shown that anger is associated with using more heuristic strategies for information processing, including making guilt judgments based on stereotypes (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). Relatedly, anger was a prominent factor in the findings regarding heterosexism. I had expected that a masculine victim would lead participants to focus more on the couple’s sexual orientation and therefore they would be more likely to render judgments based on their negative attitudes toward lesbians, specifically by judging the victim more negatively (thereby being lenient on the defendant). But counter to my prediction, when the victim was masculine, participants with more negative attitudes toward lesbians were angrier at the defendant. Perhaps viewing a masculine victim did cause participants to focus more on the sexual orientation of the victim and defendant, but rather than acting on their negative attitudes by engaging in victim-blaming, they got angry at the defendant and were able to take their anger out on her via negative trial judgments. Future studies should further investigate the role of emotions such as anger in decision-making in lesbian IPV cases.

Another notable finding regarding heterosexist attitudes was that the old-fashioned heterosexist attitudes (ATL-S) impacted trial judgments but the modern heterosexist attitudes (MHS-L) did not. This appears to be consistent with the aforementioned anger findings in that old-fashioned heterosexist attitudes could be considered to have a more affective nature (e.g., “lesbians are sick”). In contrast, the modern heterosexist attitudes are more abstract (Morrison & Morrison, 2002) and potentially less instinctual, which may explain why they did not predict any of the
ratings. It seems as though being high in ATL-S led to more intuitive and therefore biased processing, whereas individuals high in MHS-L potentially engaged in more systematic processing strategies that allowed them to make less biased judgments. Perhaps individuals high in MHS-L were more motivated to not appear biased, which led them to engage in systematic processing. These are of course empirical questions that require additional research to be able to answer.

For benevolent sexism (BS), the present findings yielded inconsistent support for prior research examining heterosexual IPV and other types of victimization (i.e., rape). In Yamakawi et al.’s (2009) research on perceptions of heterosexual IPV, individuals high in BS did not minimize the seriousness of the violence, but in the present study, individuals high in BS minimized the seriousness in the case of a feminine victim and feminine defendant. Individuals high in BS view women as worthy of protection as long as they adhere to their stereotypical gender roles. In this instance, the feminine defendant defied her gender role by allegedly perpetrating violence, so perhaps this led mock jurors to see the situation as less threatening. High BS participants in this condition also had more anger toward the feminine defendant, supporting this explanation. With regard to Masser et al.’s (2010) work on rape victim stereotypicality, their findings indicated that high BS participants perceived a stereotypical victim as less blameworthy. In the present study, there were no significant differences in victim ratings, but high BS participants who viewed the stereotypical victim (feminine) and defendant (masculine) rated the defendant as less credible. It is possible that the influence of gender stereotypes on benevolent sexists’ attributions of blame are not consistent across different types of
victimization or that the picture gets particularly complicated when examining a case of female same-sex violence.

The hostile sexism (HS) and domestic violence myth acceptance (DVMAS) findings were mixed with regard to their support for prior findings in the victimization literature. Consistent with Yamakawi’s (2009, 2012) work, participants high in HS and DVMAS minimized the incident. As discussed previously, I had expected HS and DVMAS to impact credibility and responsibility ratings (Masser et al., 2010), but again found that these variables impacted more emotional ratings (i.e., sympathy). Also, the impact of DVMAS on sympathy for the defendant was in a counter-intuitive direction – higher DVMAS led to less sympathy for the defendant. Perhaps DVMAS differentially impacts perceptions of heterosexual IPV compared to same-sex IPV. Future studies that include a heterosexual comparison would help illuminate whether attitudes toward women and domestic violence myth acceptance actually impact perceptions of heterosexual and same-sex IPV in different ways, or whether the present study found differences due to the specific trial used. In addition, employing statistical techniques that allow for modeling complex relationships among variables, such as structural equation modeling, might allow for a clearer picture of the relationships between jurors’ individual attitudes and the victim and defendant attributes.

The implications of the present study are both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, findings from this research suggest that when a victim does not fit the physical stereotype, individuals may rely more on their general negative attitudes toward lesbians to render judgments. Additionally, jurors may make more emotion-based decisions in cases of lesbian IPV. Such findings help us better understand the nature of
juror biases with regard to heterosexist attitudes. In an applied sense, determining how such attitudes influence legal proceedings can help educate justice system personnel and inform public policy decisions. Improved treatment within the justice system could lead to lesbian victims of IPV being more likely to report cases and thus more perpetrators being held accountable. Moreover, empirically demonstrating the impact of heterosexist attitudes in a legal setting would provide the scientific impetus to revise current anti-discrimination legislation. Nevertheless, the latter implications will not be attainable until researchers amass a larger body of research in this area. I do not want to overstate the legal implications of the present study because legal practitioners can be critical of research that is not highly representative of what would occur in the courtroom (DeMatteo & Anumba, 2009).

Although the present research has contributed new findings to this area, this study represents an early phase of investigation into juror perceptions of lesbian IPV. There are a number of methodological limitations that reduced the ecological validity of the present study. First, the use of written trial summaries abbreviated the trial to an unrealistic degree and, despite having sketches of the victim and defendant, did not allow mock jurors to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Research indicates that cues from demeanor can impact juror perceptions of witness testimony and act as cue to the witnesses’ credibility (McKimmie, Masser, & Bongiorno, 2014a). However, the use of trial summaries allows for stringent control of variables and is a worthwhile methodology (Bottoms, Golding, Stevenson, Wiley, & Yozwiak, 2007). Although the findings should not be over-generalized, this research represents a valuable starting point for the investigation of lesbian IPV in court (Wiener, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2011).
Second, participants completed the study using online rather than in a more naturalistic context. However, the mock jury literature has reported few differences between studies using different presentation media (Bornstein, 1999). Furthermore, the present study addressed concerns about the potential for anonymity of online research compromising the data (Gosling, Vazire, & Srivastava, 2004) by requiring participants to enter their student identification number and blocking repeat numbers from accessing the study. Finally, a comparison of web-based and traditional research methods indicated that data provided online was at least as good as that collected in a paper-and-pencil manner (Gosling et al., 2004).

Third, the present study did not include a deliberation process. For this initial study, examining my research questions at the individual juror level allowed me to examine the impact of individual juror differences. Furthermore, the patterns of responses of individual jurors generally predict jury outcomes (Diamond, 1997). However, the deliberation process allows jurors to correct for various biases or errors (e.g., London & Nuñez, 2000), which is particularly relevant to this line of research. Furthermore, jury deliberations are subject to a variety of influential group processes, such as group polarization, conformity, and social loafing, which are likely to impact the verdict as the jury strives for a unanimous outcome (see Nuñez, McCrea, & Culhane, 2011). Future studies including deliberation would allow us to learn even more about perceptions of lesbian IPV by examining how jurors discuss and evaluate the evidence. Including deliberations would also reveal if and how the discussion corrects for individual biases when reaching a group decision.
Fourth, although the present sample met the minimum age and citizenship requirements to serve on a jury, it is unclear whether the participants would actually be impaneled as jurors for a lesbian IPV case. College students typically constitute a small portion of the jury pool (Nuñez et al., 2011) and serve as actual jurors relatively infrequently (Bornstein, 1999). Jury pools are intended to be representative of the community’s composition (Greene & Heilbrun, 2011), and undergraduates and community members may differ widely on life experiences that speak to cases of domestic abuse. Despite these concerns, Bornstein’s (1999) review of relevant mock juror literature indicated that there are no consistent differences between student and non-student mock juror samples and where there are differences, they are generally in the direction of leniency on the part of the students. Nevertheless, Weiner and colleagues (2011) assert that the field lacks a thorough comparison of sample effects and that mock juror researchers should replicate studies that used undergraduate samples with community member samples closer to the population of ultimate interest. Thus, future studies should employ a community sample that would more likely reflect the relevant social, political, and life experiences of a typical juror, particularly when interested in examining attitudes as moderating factors.

In summary, the present research adds to the sparse literature on perceptions of lesbian IPV in that it is the first study to examine the impact of individual differences in attitudes on juror decision-making in such cases. The results indicate that jurors may be more favorable toward a masculine-looking victim, and that they are likely to rely on emotional responses such as anger toward the defendant when rendering a verdict.
Additionally, old-fashioned heterosexist and ambivalent sexist attitudes impact perceptions of lesbian IPV.

The present study examines a very timely issue and will lay the groundwork for future studies in this area. The increasing legalization of same-sex marriage across the United States demonstrates continual progress for gay rights. Such changes have implications for IPV within the lesbian community. Legalizing same-sex marriage may increase the number of IPV cases that can legally qualify as domestic violence, because some state domestic violence statutes require the perpetrator to be a current or former spouse. Legally married same-sex couples will also be entitled to statutory protection from domestic violence, which is not currently obtainable for lesbian IPV victims in many states. Finally, legitimizing same-sex couples removes a barrier that battered lesbians face in considering whether to report their victimization: they will not have to “out” themselves in the process. Given the added layers of difficulty that lesbian women face in reporting same-sex partner abuse, more research is needed to understand attitudes that influence judgments about lesbian IPV cases in a legal context.
Appendix A

Trial Summary

The Commonwealth of Kentucky vs. Karen Morrison (Defendant)
KRS 508.030 Assault in the 4th degree

Case background:
This is a criminal trial for the alleged assault of Sandra Bishop by the defendant, Karen Morrison. It is alleged that the above-named defendant assaulted her partner, Sandra Bishop in their residence in Fayette County, Kentucky, on the evening of October 11, 2012 at approximately 6:30pm.

Courtroom sketch of Victim, Sandra Bishop (left), Defendant, Karen Morrison (right)

The state called on two witnesses for the prosecution: Sandra Bishop (alleged victim) and Carl Fleming, M.D. (the emergency room doctor who examined Sandra Bishop).

Karen Morrison pleaded not guilty. The defense stated that the defendant and her partner (alleged victim, Sandra Bishop) were having an argument, and Sandra Bishop was injured by accident. The defense also argued that Karen Morrison would never intentionally hurt her partner, Sandra Bishop. The defense called two witnesses: Vanessa Walsh (co-worker of the defendant) and Karen Morrison (the defendant).

Comprehension-check question:
What are the charges against the defendant, Karen Morrison?
(a) 4th degree Assault
(b) 2nd degree Assault
(c) 1st degree Robbery
Prosecution’s Case

Prosecution Witness No. 1: Sandra Bishop (alleged victim)

Sketch of the alleged victim Sandra Bishop as she testified

Direct Examination

Sandra Bishop stated that she and the defendant, Karen Morrison, were in a committed relationship for over two years and had been living together for about eight months. Sandra stated that on the night in question, she had arrived home late from work and hurriedly began cooking dinner for herself and her partner, the defendant. Sandra and the defendant began arguing about the dish Sandra had chosen to cook for dinner. The defendant said Sandra should make sure to arrive home on time so that they can have a nice meal. Sandra became upset as the defendant continued to nag her about household duties.

As both of their anger heightened, Sandra began to shout at the defendant and threatened to leave the defendant if she did not lighten up. Sandra stated that at that point, the defendant grabbed her by the arm and punched her in the face, knocked her to the floor, and kicked her. Sandra remained on the floor as the defendant left the house. Sandra then called the police to report the incident.

Cross Examination

Sandra Bishop stated that while she and the defendant had engaged in verbal arguments before, the defendant had never physically assaulted her prior to this incident. Sandra had never seen the defendant act physically violent before.

Comprehension-check question:
How does Sandra Bishop know the defendant?
(a) They are co-workers
(b) They are in a relationship
(c) They are neighbors

Prosecution Witness No. 2: Dr. Carl Fleming

Direct Examination

Dr. Fleming stated that he is a licensed doctor. He received his M.D. from Vanderbilt University and has testified in ten other court trials. Dr. Fleming stated that he performed a physical exam on the alleged victim, Sandra Bishop, in the emergency room.
at the hospital. Dr. Fleming indicated that the alleged victim sustained a black eye, a sprained wrist, and a large contusion on her hip. He indicated that these injuries were consistent with the alleged victim’s description of the incident.

Cross Examination

Dr. Fleming admitted that he did not know for certain how Sandra Bishop’s injuries were sustained and who, if anyone, had caused them.

*Comprehension-check question:*
Where did Dr. Fleming receive his M.D.?
(a) Columbia  
(b) Wake Forest  
(c) Vanderbilt

**Defendant's Case**

**Defense Witness No. 1: Vanessa Walsh (defendant’s co-worker)**

Direct Examination

Vanessa Walsh stated that she was a co-worker of the defendant, Karen Morrison, and had known her for nine years. Ms. Walsh stated that the defendant is a caring person and an excellent employee at work. Ms. Walsh stated that the day before the incident, October 10, 2012, the defendant called Ms. Walsh and told her that she was going through some relationship issues and was planning to talk to her partner Sandra about them. The defendant had said that her partner Sandra seemed more concerned about going to work and watching TV than she did about their relationship and helping maintain their home. Ms. Walsh said she felt that the defendant was upset with her partner Sandra, but did not seem angry.

Cross Examination

Ms. Walsh said that in the nine years she has known the defendant, the defendant has never had any issues in the workplace.

*Comprehension-check question:*
How does Vanessa Walsh know the defendant?
(a) They are co-workers  
(b) They are neighbors  
(c) They are cousins
Direct Examination

The defendant, Karen Morrison, stated that she and Sandra Bishop were in a 2-year relationship and shared a residence for 8 months. The defendant stated that on the night in question, she had arrived home from work to find her partner Sandra warming up leftovers instead of preparing the nice meal that she had promised. The defendant tried to talk to Sandra about putting more effort into her share of the household duties. Sandra got angry and began shouting obscenities at her, calling her a “nagging bitch.” The defendant stated that she tried to comfort Sandra by putting her arm around her and Sandra pushed her away.

Sandra threatened to leave so the defendant grabbed Sandra’s arm, accidentally causing Sandra to trip and fall to the floor. Sandra screamed for the defendant to get away from her so the defendant left the house. The defendant stated that she was surprised to be confronted by a police officer when she returned home. She and Sandra had had verbal arguments previously, but never hurt each other physically. The defendant also indicated that she did not realize Sandra had injured her eye, but must have hit it on the kitchen island or the tile floor when she tripped and fell. She suggested that Sandra must have bruised her hip when she fell as well.

Cross Examination

Karen admitted that she was upset with Sandra the night of the incident. She acknowledges that their argument got out of hand and that she did grab Sandra’s arm. She said she may have grabbed her harder than she realized because she had not intended to make Sandra fall.

**Comprehension-check question:**
What reason did the defendant give to account for the victim’s injuries?

(a) She was injured in a car accident  
(b) She fell and was injured by accident  
(c) She was injured playing rugby
Instructions to Jurors

You will find the Defendant guilty of Assault in the 4th degree under the following Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:

That in this county on or about October 11, 2012, the defendant, Karen Morrison
(a) Intentionally or wantonly caused physical injury to Sandra Bishop;
   OR
(b) With recklessness she caused physical injury to Sandra Bishop by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument

Note: "Dangerous instrument" means any instrument, including parts of the human body when a serious physical injury is a direct result of the use of that part of the human body, article, or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
References


doi:10.2466/pms.2000.90.2.485


Vita

NESA E. WASARHALEY

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Experimental Psychology, University of Kentucky (expected 2014)

M.S., Experimental Psychology, University of Kentucky (2010)


B.A., Psychology (Honors), Summa Cum Laude, Hamilton College (2004)

PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

2013  Research Assistant, Center on Drug and Alcohol Research, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY

2012-2013  Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology, Transylvania University, Lexington, KY

2012  Instructor, Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY

2008-2012  Teaching Assistant, Department of Psychology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY

2011  Visiting Instructor, Department of Psychology, Centre College, Danville, KY

2009-2011  Research Assistant, Center on Drug and Alcohol Research, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY

2007-2008  Research Assistant, Council of State Governments Justice Center, New York, NY

AWARDS AND HONORS

2013–2014  Dissertation Year Fellowship, University of Kentucky Graduate School
2013  College of Arts & Sciences Certificate for Outstanding Teaching, University of Kentucky
2012–2013  Diversity Research Award, American Psychology-Law Society
2012  Provost’s Award for Outstanding Teaching for Teaching Assistants, University of Kentucky
2011 Gunto Award for Graduate Student Research in Social Psychology, University of Kentucky
2004 Phi Beta Kappa, Hamilton College
2004 Jonathan Marder Prize for Excellence in the Study of Psychology, Hamilton College
2003 Fillius/Drown Prize Scholarship, Hamilton College
2003 Michael Maslyn '01 Memorial Prize Scholarship, Hamilton College
2003 Alexander Hamilton’s List for Excellence in Writing, Hamilton College
2002 Psi Chi, Hamilton College
2002 Kingsley Prize Scholarship, Hamilton College
2001 Alexander Hamilton’s List for Excellence in Writing, Hamilton College

PUBLICATIONS

Refereed Journal Articles


**Teaching Resources**


**Other Publications**


**PRESENTATIONS**


POSTERS


Dickson, M. F., **Wasarhaley, N. E.**, & Webster, J. M. (2010, October). *Problem recognition and readiness to change among DUI offenders in rural Appalachian Kentucky*. Poster presented at the Addiction Health Services Research Conference, Lexington, KY.


