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Do We Know Who We Are By Knowing Who We Are Not?: The Effects of Including Disliked Others in the Self-Concept

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DO WE KNOW WHO WE ARE BY KNOWING WHO WE ARE NOT?: THE EFFECTS OF INCLUDING DISLIKED OTHERS IN THE SELF-CONCEPT

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DISSERTATION

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By

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Lexington, Kentucky

Director: Dr. Nathan DeWall, Professor of Psychology

Lexington, Kentucky

2014

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

DO WE KNOW WHO WE ARE BY KNOWING WHO WE ARE NOT?: THE EFFECTS OF INCLUDING DISLIKED OTHERS IN THE SELF-CONCEPT

People include other people in their self-concept. Research has examined the causes and effects of including liked, but not disliked others into the self-concept. Liked others are included because of a motivation to affiliate and get closer to the other person. The current investigation examined whether disliked others are included as a result of a motivation to differentiate and distinguish oneself from the other person. It also examined how self-concept inclusion of disliked others affects self-concept clarity. First, I tested whether people include disliked others into their self-concepts by showing a memory bias for disliked others similar to that of liked others (Study 1). Liked others, but not disliked others or acquaintances, showed this memory bias. Next, I tested whether people were motivated to differentiate themselves from disliked others by measuring whether they had slower reaction times when characterizing the self with traits similar to those of disliked others (Study 2). I did not find this effect. Finally, neither study showed a mediating effect of self-concept clarity. These results failed to show support for the hypothesis that disliked others are included in the self-concept and that including others in the self affects self-concept clarity.

KEYWORDS: Self-Concept Clarity, Self-Concept, Disliked Others, Interpersonal Relationships

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DO WE KNOW WHO WE ARE BY KNOWING WHO WE ARE NOT?: THE EFFECTS OF INCLUDING DISLIKED OTHERS IN THE SELF-CONCEPT

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Chapter One: Introduction

The self-concept is both a dynamic and stable entity. It is a person’s sense of who they are, including attributes that describe them as well as objects, roles, and people who are important to them (e.g. Markus & Wurf, 1987). Interpersonal context and processes play an important role in the self-concept (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). For example, people incorporate significant people in their lives into their self-concepts (e.g. Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). A large body of research demonstrates that close others are incorporated in the self and such self-other overlap has significant cognitive consequences. What has not yet been studied, however, is the role of disliked others in the self-concept. Theories of the self indicate that people’s interactions with others affect their self-concept (e.g. Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; Markus & Wurf, 1987). This implies that people’s self-concepts are influenced not only by people they like and are close to, but also by people that they dislike.

I proposed that disliked others were also included in people’s self-concepts. Previous research supports the idea of an affiliation-based motivation for self-concept inclusion (e.g. Aron et al., 1991; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). People who are liked, especially those who are close to us, are incorporated in the self so that we can become more like them. I predicted that people also have a distinctiveness-based motivation for self-concept inclusion. The current research tested the hypothesis that significant people who are disliked are incorporated into the self for the purpose of differentiating ourselves from them and this distinctiveness motivation should increase people’s self-concept clarity.

Inclusion of Others in the Self-Concept
The self-concept is a dynamic reflection of the social world to which a person belongs and the interpersonal relationships they have within that world (e.g. Markus & Wurf, 1987). The people that others interact with have a significant impact on their self-concepts, regardless of whether they are liked or disliked. Early research on the self posited that people had as many social selves as they did people who knew them, regardless of whether they liked or disliked these people (James, 1890).

Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) were the first to expand on James’s theory of the self. Cooley introduced the concept of the “looking-glass self.” According to this theory, a person’s self-concept is not composed of their perceptions of themselves, but instead is composed of what they think others think of them (Cooley, 1902). The self-concept arises from a person’s interpretation of how others react or how they think others will react to him or her (Mead, 1934). To anticipate others’ reactions, people learn to perceive the world as others do. This knowledge is incorporated into a person’s sense of self and guides their behavior, even in the absence of others (Mead, 1934). According to Mead’s theory, people have as many selves as they have social roles. The more important the role is, the more important that particular self (Mead, 1934). Given that negative events and information have a greater impact on the self than positive ones do (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001 for a review), negative roles should be at least as important, if not more important, than positive roles. The present research also compared the effects of liked and disliked others on the self-concept.

The social context, especially our interaction partners, play an important role in the self-concept. For example, people’s ideas of not only who they are, but also who they want to become or fear becoming are incorporated into the self-concept (Markus &
Nurius, 1986). These possible selves are the pieces of the self-concept that represent hopes, fears, goals, and threats. These possible selves derive from salient categories, often based on personal history and experiences (Markus, 1977). Negative relationships are a likely candidate for a salient category from which to derive possible selves. People who do not want to become or fear becoming like a disliked other should have possible selves representing themselves with characteristics of the disliked other. The existence of these possible selves may increase people’s desire to differentiate from a disliked other. The next section will discuss what impact including others in the self-concept has on it.

Effects of Including Others in the Self-Concept

One of the consequences of expanding the self to include others is including the identities of that person into the self (Aron & Aron, 1986). Several empirical studies demonstrate this effect for liked others. For example, people show better memory for words associated with friends than with unknown others (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). After constructing sentences with the name of a friend or an unknown other, people remembered more of the nouns in the friend versus unknown other sentences on unexpected recall tests (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). Self-relevant information, such as information about people important to the self, is remembered better than other information (see Symons & Johnson, 1997 for a review). Similarly, people show better memory for nouns that they previously imagined they or a close other (i.e. their mother) interacting with compared to a stranger (i.e. a celebrity) (Aron et al., 1991). People remembered as many nouns paired with themselves as nouns paired with their mothers.

These studies demonstrate that people who are included in the self-concept are treated like the self when it comes to recall. I expected the same pattern to be shown for
disliked others as for liked others, but through a different mechanism. In the above studies, people are including liked others into the self-concept as a result of an affiliation motivation. Because they want to get closer to liked others, they include them in their self-concept, resulting in superior recognition for liked others. I expected that disliked others would be included into the self-concept as a result of a differentiation motivation. Because people want to differentiate themselves from disliked others, they include them in their self-concept, resulting in superior recognition for disliked others.

Additional evidence demonstrates that people extend their self-concepts to incorporate the attributes of liked others. For example, participants show slower reaction times correctly rejecting attributes that are descriptive of the self but not of a close other (Aron et al., 1991). The slower reaction times indicate that there is some cognitive overlap between the self and other, indicating the inclusion of the other in the self-concept. Discrepancies between traits that describe one person but not the other produce some confusion. People are motivated to be closer to liked others and therefore have a more difficult time acknowledging their differences. I predict a similar pattern for disliked others; discrepancies between traits that describe both the self as well as a disliked other should also produce confusion. If people are motivated to differentiate themselves from disliked others, they will have a more difficult time acknowledging their similarities.

The motivation to draw closer to liked others is not due solely to shared experience between these individuals. People show the same self-concept inclusion for traits that they imagine a liked other having (Slotter & Gardner, 2009). Participants imagined a conversation between themselves and their romantic partner or an
acquaintance in which the other tells them about an attribute that was important to them. This attribute was one that was pre-selected to be not descriptive of the participant or the romantic partner. Following the imagined scenario, participants reported greater self-integration with their partner than with the acquaintance (Slotter & Gardner, 2009). Specifically, participants rated the target attribute as more indicative of themselves than they had initially. They also took longer to correctly reject the attribute in a reaction time task. People are motivated to draw closer to a liked other by integrating information relevant to their partner’s sense of self into their own self-concept, even without shared experience of this information. A similar process should occur for disliked others.

**Effects of Disliked Others on the Self**

The available research on disliked others focuses primarily on enemy relationships. Although the present research focuses on others that are disliked and it is possible to dislike someone without considering them an enemy, an enemy is still a type of disliked other. Research on enemies contributes some insight onto the topic of disliked others. Over 70% of adults report having an enemy, or someone who actively and intentionally used power to block their goals and inflict harm (Holt, 1989; Wiseman & Duck, 1995). Given that the characteristics of an enemy are more stringent than those of a disliked other, it is likely that a greater number of people would report knowing at least one person they dislike. Some researchers claim that people have a fundamental need to have enemies (Barash, 1994; Boyer, 1986; Volkan, 1985). Indeed, the presence of enemy relationships is found across cultures. Evidence of enemy relationships was found in Ghana as well as in North America (Adams, 2005). Despite the importance of enemy relationships, however, very little research has been performed on this topic.
Existing research posits that enmyship (or “the perception that another person or group is using influence and power to undermine one’s own goals and well-being; Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010) serves an important psychological function. Specifically, enemies are perceived to be an influential source of misfortune in people’s lives. Controlling that misfortune by understanding it minimizes the threat it poses. Enemyship allows people to maintain a sense of perceived control over their lives because it allows them to identify and understand environmental threat (Sullivan et al., 2010). Incorporating a disliked other into one’s self-concept should increase understanding of the other and the perception of control over them.

Other research suggests that enemies may be included in the self-concept. The development of enemy relationships in children depends on the attainment of a more developed self-concept (Bigelow, 1977; Hesse and Mack, 1991). People thus do not possess enemies before having a well-developed self-concept, suggesting that the self-concept plays a crucial role in enemy relationships. Additionally, enemies dominate one another’s actions, thoughts, and feelings (Rieber & Kelly, 1991), suggesting that cognitive representations of these individuals are close at hand. This parallels what is known about including liked others in the self-concept. Research has shown that significant other representations are chronically accessible (Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995; Chen, Andersen, & Hinkley, 1999). If representations of both liked and disliked others possess a high baseline level of accessibility, it is likely that both are included in people’s self-concepts.

The need to have enemies stems from people’s desire to maintain a favorable self-image (Boyer, 1986). Incorporating enemies or disliked others into a person’s self-
concept and distancing oneself from them may allow people to maintain a positive image of themselves. As an exploratory hypothesis, I also measured state social self-esteem to tap into this mechanism. This process is similar to engaging in downward social comparisons. Festinger (1954) hypothesized that people have a unidimensional drive upward. That is, the drive to appear more capable than others involves an ego-enhancing motive that is better served by making downward comparisons (see Suls, 1977). Comparing oneself to less fortunate others enables the self to deduce that it is better off than the other. Although less fortunate others aren’t necessarily disliked, comparing oneself to disliked others may serve a similar function. Additional research empirically studies situations in which downward comparisons are made. Under conditions of threat, people responded by making a downward comparison for the purpose of self-enhancement (Hakmiller, 1966). The presence of disliked other—real, imagined, or implied—may serve as a threat. Differentiating oneself from a disliked other that is included in the self-concept may serve a similar self-enhancing purpose.

Recent research shows that one mechanism by which people are motivated to include disliked others in the self-concept is romantic jealousy (Slotter, Lucas, Jakubiak, & Lasslett, 2013). When people experience romantic jealousy toward a romantic rival, they are motivated to change their self-concepts to become more similar to this rival in order to keep their partner’s attention. Specifically, the experience of jealousy of a romantic rival as well as the perception that their romantic partner was interested in a rival predicted increased feelings of similarity to a romantic rival. Experimentally induced jealousy also mediated the relationship between perceiving the partner as interested in a rival and self-concept change toward the rival (Slotter et al., 2013).
My research proposes to show a different mechanism by which people are motivated to include disliked others in the self-concept, that is, distinctiveness. Slotter and colleagues’ (2013) research shows that in order to keep one’s partner faithful, people are willing to change themselves to become more like a disliked other—specifically a romantic rival. However, when they do not feel jealousy or think that their partner is interested in the rival, they do not show these effects. The effects are limited to situations in which people are motivated to become more like the rival. I expected that my research will extend that of Slotter and colleagues’ to show that when people are not motivated to become similar to disliked others, but instead are motivated to become distinct from them, they will include disliked others into the self-concept to differentiate themselves from them.

**Effects on Self-Concept Clarity**

I expected to find that including others into the self-concept would increase self-concept clarity. Self-concept clarity refers to the extent to which self-knowledge is clearly defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable (Campbell et al., 1996). Relational selves serve as a sense of clarity about who the self is in relation to others. The relational self includes knowledge about the self linked in memory to that of significant others. It exists at multiple levels of specificity, is capable of being contextually or chronically activated, and is composed of self-aspects that characterize the self when relating to significant others (Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006). According to this model, the relational self provides the self-regulatory direction that people who lack a clear sense of self are missing (Chen et al., 2006). In other words, it improves self-concept clarity. Possessing information about who one is in relation to others improves self-concept
clarity, while a lack of this information decreases it. Notably, the others can be close, liked others or disliked others. Including liked or disliked others in the self-concept should thus increase a person’s self-concept clarity.

Overview of Current Research

The present research examined the effects of disliked others on the self. I predicted that disliked others would be incorporated into people’s self-concepts. Specifically, I predicted that people have improved memory for words associated with both liked and disliked others, indicating that both liked and disliked others are incorporated into people’s self concepts. I also predicted that people will be faster to classify adjectives as self-descriptive or not if the adjective is descriptive of a disliked other or not respectively. Finally, I hypothesized that including disliked others in the self-concept would increase people’s self-concept clarity. Specifically, in both studies, people who differentiated themselves from disliked others, but not acquaintances, would show increased self-concept clarity. As an exploratory hypothesis, I also measured whether people who differentiate themselves from disliked others, but not acquaintances, showed increased state social self-esteem.
Chapter Two: Study 1

In Study 1, I tested the idea that both liked and disliked others are incorporated into people’s self-concepts. People show improved memory for concepts associated with friends rather than with unknown others (Aron et al., 1991; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). Modeling Greenwald and Banaji’s (1989) procedure, Study 1 attempted to replicate this effect with both liked and disliked others. I predicted that people would have improved memory for concepts associated with both liked and disliked others, but not acquaintances. I also predicted that the inclusion of liked and disliked others, but not acquaintances, into the self-concept will increase people’s self-concept clarity.

Method

Participants

Participants were 446 undergraduates (359 female) from the University of Kentucky, recruited from the Psychology subject pool. On average, participants were 19.04 years old, SD = 2.05. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for participating in my study.

Measures

Self-Concept Clarity Scale. To assess self-concept clarity, I asked participants to complete the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996; See Appendix A). This scale is a 12-item measure in which participants rated how much they agreed with several statements about themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). These statements assessed how much self-knowledge is clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable. I modified the items in the original scale slightly in order to measure state rather than trait levels of self-concept clarity (e.g. “At this moment, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.”) This scale
demonstrated good reliability, $\alpha = .87$ for initial self-concept clarity, $\alpha = .90$ for self-concept clarity at time 2.

*State Social Self-Esteem Scale.* To assess state social self-esteem, I asked participants to complete the social subscale of the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; See Appendix B). This subscale is a 7-item measure that assesses participants’ social self-esteem at a given point in time. Participants rate how much each item is true of themselves at the present time on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All) to 5 (Extremely) (e.g. “I feel that there are others who respect and admire me.”) This scale demonstrated good reliability, $\alpha = .88$ for initial state social self-esteem, $\alpha = .92$ for state social self-esteem at time 2.

*Sentence-pairing task.* Participants wrote 10 sentences, one for each of the generated names. Participants were instructed that each sentence should include a specific name (identified by number) and assigned noun. Nouns from Greenwald and Banaji’s (1989) study were used (See Appendix C). They included names of concrete objects from different noun categories. Participants typed their sentences on the computer after being given their sheet of names and the target nouns for each. General instructions for the task preceded the spaces for the sentences:

“If the task is ‘Create a sentence using name #4 and the word REFRIGERATOR’, you should turn to your sheet of names and look up name #4. If name #4 happens to be ‘Jones,’ then a suitable sentence might be:

Jones spent all Saturday morning repairing the refrigerator.
The sentence should be constructed so that the person and object are actively involved with one another.”

_Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS)._ This scale assesses people’s closeness to others (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Participants were given an image of seven pairs of overlapping circles, with varying degrees of overlap. For each person whose name they wrote, participants were asked to select one of the seven circles to indicate the degree of closeness they currently felt to that person as well as the degree of closeness they wanted to feel to that person (See Appendix D).

_Procedure_

Participants came to the lab expecting to participate in a study about trivia. After receiving a description of the study and signing a consent form, participants completed the self-concept clarity scale, state self-esteem scale, and other demographic and personality questionnaires. Next, they generated the names of 10 people they dislike, 10 friends, or 10 acquaintances onto a numbered piece of paper. Participants were instructed to write 10 sentences, one for each name they wrote, using assigned nouns. Following the sentence-pairing task, participants completed the Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) scale for each of the names they wrote. For each name, participants indicated how close they currently feel to that person and how close they want to feel to that person. Next, they completed a brief filler task in which they were given a booklet of trivia items and were given five minutes to study it.

After studying the trivia items, participants were given an unexpected test for recall of the nouns, names, and pairs of objects and names. First, they received instructions to type as many of the target nouns on the space available on the computer
that they remembered. After completing this recall task, participants repeated the same task, but for the names of the people they generated earlier. Next, participants were given back their original sheet of names and asked to type on the computer the object that had been paired with each name in the sentence task. Following these recall tasks, participants completed the self-concept clarity scale one more time. Finally, they were debriefed, credited, and dismissed.

Results

Before completing any analyses, I removed 108 participants’ data. Of these participants, 11 failed one or more control questions (e.g. “Select answer 3 for this question”), 15 did not complete the names task correctly (e.g. wrote names from the trivia questions instead of names of people they generated earlier), and 94 did not complete the noun task correctly (e.g. wrote verbs or other parts of speech instead of nouns, wrote names from the trivia questions instead of names of people they generated earlier).

Although we tried to make the task as comprehensible to participants as possible, both through additional written and verbal instructions, a large number of participants still did not follow the instructions.

Manipulation Check

I used the IOS measure as a manipulation check. I performed a one-way ANOVA on the effect of condition on average actual and desired closeness to the ten people whose names the participant wrote (these were averaged to create a composite for each participant). There was a significant effect of condition on average actual closeness measured by the IOS, $F(2, 329) = 302.13, p < .0001$. Planned contrasts indicated that participants writing about people they liked felt significantly closest to these individuals.
Participants writing about people who were their acquaintances felt marginally closer to these individuals compared to disliked others, $t(330) = 1.72, p = .09$.

There was also a significant effect of condition on average desired closeness measured by the IOS, $F(2, 329) = 324.80, p < .0001$. Planned contrasts indicated that participants writing about people they liked wanted to feel significantly closest to these individuals ($M = 5.61, SD = .98$) compared to acquaintances ($M = 3.42, SD = 1.27$), $t(330) = 15.31, p < .0001$, and compared to disliked others ($M = 2.15, SD = .88$), $t(330) = 25.24, p < .0001$. Participants writing about people who were their acquaintances also wanted to feel significantly closer to these individuals compared to disliked others, $p < .0001$. Overall, participants’ actual and desired closeness to the target individuals matched the condition they were assigned to (See Figure 2.1).

**Memory for Names**

The names of liked and disliked others should be included in participants’ self-concepts whereas the names of acquaintances should not. Thus, I expected to see increased cognitive processing for information associated with liked and disliked others, but not for acquaintances. A one-way ANOVA was used to measure whether participants’ recall of names was better when they were names of liked others, disliked others, or acquaintances. I predicted to find a main effect of person type. I expected that planned comparisons would indicate that participants will recall more names of disliked others compared to acquaintances, that participants will recall more names of liked others.
Figure 2.1. Effect of Condition on Average Actual and Desired Closeness to Targets in Study 1.
compared to acquaintances, and that participants will recall no more target nouns paired with liked others versus disliked others.

A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition, $F(2, 330) = 27.54, p<.0001$. Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the liked condition ($M = 9.81, SD = .44$) remembered significantly more names than participants in either the disliked ($M = 9.08, SD = 1.00$), $t(329) = 6.66 p < .0001$, or acquaintance ($M = 9.11, SD = .98$), $t(329) = 6.09, p = .001$ conditions. Participants in the disliked and acquaintance conditions did not differ from each other, $t(329) = .26, p = .76$ (See Figure 2.2).

Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on Memory for Names

I also conducted a mediational analysis testing the mediating effects of self-concept clarity on the relationship between person type and target name recall, controlling for initial levels of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.3). Specifically, I expected to find that greater self-concept clarity will mediate the effects of person type on target name recall. Because my data included a polytomous categorical independent variable with a continuous moderator, it was impossible to use the bootstrapping method or to use an ANOVA. Instead, I dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.

First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on self-concept clarity at time 2, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, $B = .03, t(332) = 1.05$, $p = .29$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly predict self-
Figure 2.2. Effect of Condition on Memory for Names and Free and Paired Recall Nouns.
Figure 2.3. Model of the Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on the Relationship between Condition and Recall.
concept clarity at time 2, $B = .02$, $t(332) = .69$, $p = .49$. For the b path, I tested the effects of self-concept clarity at time 2 on names recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. Self-concept clarity at time 2 did not significantly predict number of names recalled, $B = -.93$, $t(331) = -.95$, $p = .34$. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted names recalled, $B = -.73$, $t(332) = -6.62$, $p < .0001$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly predicted names recalled, $B = -.69$, $t(332) = -6.02$, $p < .0001$. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, $B = -.73$, $t(322) = -6.56$, $p < .001$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, $B = -.69$, $t(332) = -5.98$, $p < .001$. Thus, because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation.

Mediating Effects of Social State Self-Esteem on Memory for Names

As an exploratory analysis, I conducted the same set of analyses using state social self-esteem instead of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.4). I expected that state social self-esteem would significantly mediate the relationship between condition and memory for names. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between
Figure 2.4. Model of the Mediating Effects of State Social Self-Esteem on the Relationship between Condition and Recall.
the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.

First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on state social self-esteem at time 2, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = -.09, t(332) = -1.32, p = .19$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = .06, t(332) = .84, p = .40$. For the b path, I tested the effects of state social self-esteem at time 2 on names recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. State social self-esteem at time 2 did not predict number of names recalled, $B = -.07, t(333) = -.67, p = .51$. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial state self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted names recalled, $B = -.73, t(332) = -6.64, p < .0001$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly predicted names recalled, $B = -.70, t(332) = -6.08, p < .0001$. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = -.74, t(332) = -6.68, p < .0001$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly predicted names recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = -.69, t(332) = -6.03, p < .0001$. Thus, because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation.
Memory for Free-Recall Nouns

A second one-way ANOVA was used to measure whether participants’ free recall of nouns was better when those nouns had been associated with liked and disliked others rather than acquaintances. I predict to find a main effect of condition. I also predicted to find a main effect of person type, in which planned comparisons would indicate that participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with disliked others compared to acquaintances, that participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with liked others compared to unknown others, and that participants will recall no more target nouns paired with liked others versus disliked others.

A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition, $F(2, 327) = 6.22$, $p = .002$ (See Figure 2.2). Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the liked condition ($M = 7.37$, $SD = 2.36$) remembered significantly more names than participants in the disliked ($M = 6.35$, $SD = 2.27$), $t(326) = 3.52$, $p = .001$, and marginally more names than participants in the acquaintance ($M = 6.80$, $SD = 1.94$), $t(326) = 1.87$, $p = .06$ condition. Participants in the disliked and acquaintance conditions did not differ from each other, $t(326) = 1.49$, $p = .18$.

Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on Memory for Free Recall Nouns

I also conducted a mediational analysis testing the mediating effects of self-concept clarity on the relationship between person type and noun free-recall (See Figure 2.3). Specifically, I expect to find that greater self-concept clarity will mediate the effects of person type on name free recall. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found significant or marginally significant differences only between the liked and the other two
groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.

First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on self-concept clarity at time 2, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, $B = .03, t(332) = 1.05, p = .29$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, $B = .02, t(332) = .69, p = .49$. For the b path, I tested the effects of self-concept clarity at time 2 on free-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. Self-concept clarity at time 2 did not significantly predict number of free-recall nouns recalled, $B = -.15, t(332) = -.30, p = .77$. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on memory of free-recall nouns, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted free-recall nouns recalled, $B = -1.02, t(329) = -3.50, p = .001$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted free-recall nouns recalled, $B = -.56, t(329) = -1.83, p = .07$. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on free-recall noun recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted free-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, $B = -1.01, t(329) = -3.47, p = .001$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted free-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2, $B = -.55, t(329) = -1.81, p = .07$. Thus, because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation.
Mediating Effects of State Social Self-Esteem on Memory for Free Recall Nouns

As an exploratory analysis, I conducted the same set of analyses using state social self-esteem instead of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.4). I expected that state social self-esteem would significantly mediate the relationship between condition and memory for names. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.

First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on state social self-esteem at time 2, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = -.09$, $t(332) = -1.32$, $p = .19$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = .06$, $t(332) = .84$, $p = .40$. For the b path, I tested the effects of state social self-esteem at time 2 on free-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. State social self-esteem at time 2 did not significantly predict the number of free-recall nouns recalled, $B = .30$, $t(334) = 1.31$, $p = .19$. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on noun free recall, controlling for initial state self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted nouns free recalled, $B = -1.02$, $t(329) = -3.51$, $p = .001$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted names recalled, $B = -.56$, $t(329) = -1.83$, $p = .07$. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on target name recall, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted
nouns free recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = -1.00$, $t(329) = -3.44$, $p = .001$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted nouns free recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = -.57$, $t(329) = -1.86$, $p = .06$. Thus, because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation.

Memory for Paired-Recall Nouns

A third one-way ANOVA was used to measure whether participants’ paired recall of nouns was better when those nouns had been associated with liked and disliked others rather than acquaintances. I predict to find a main effect of condition. I predicted to find a main effect of person type, in which planned comparisons would indicate that participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with disliked others compared to acquaintances, that participants will recall more target nouns that were paired with liked others compared to acquaintances, and that participants will recall no more target nouns paired with liked others versus disliked others.

A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition, $F(2, 329) = 4.25$, $p = .02$ (See Figure 2.2). Planned comparisons indicated that participants in the liked condition ($M = 7.69$, $SD = 2.28$) remembered significantly more paired recall nouns than participants in the disliked ($M = 6.91$, $SD = 2.20$), $t(328) = 2.66$, $p = .01$, and marginally more names than participants in the acquaintance ($M = 6.97$, $SD = 2.24$), $t(328) = 2.34$, $p = .02$ condition. Participants in the disliked and acquaintance conditions did not differ from each other, $t(328) = .21$, $p = .83$.

Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity on Memory for Paired Recall Nouns
I also conducted a mediational analysis testing the mediating effects of self-concept clarity on the relationship between person type and noun paired-recall (See Figure 2.3). Specifically, I expect to find that greater self-concept clarity will mediate the relationship between person type on noun paired-recall. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found significant or marginally significant differences only between the liked condition and the other two conditions, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.

First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on self-concept clarity at time 2, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, $B = .03, t(332) = 1.05$, $p = .29$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable did not significantly predict self-concept clarity at time 2, $B = .03, t(332) = .69, p = .49$. For the b path, I tested the effects of self-concept clarity at time 2 on paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. Self-concept clarity at time 2 did not significantly predict number of paired-recall nouns recalled, $B = -.26, t(336) = -.53, p = .59$. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on memory of paired-recall nouns, controlling for initial self-concept clarity. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted paired-recall nouns recalled, $B = -.78, t(331) = -2.64, p = .01$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also significantly predicted paired-recall nouns recalled, $B = -.71, t(331) = -2.30, p = .02$. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on paired-recall noun recall, controlling for initial self-concept clarity and self-concept clarity at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted
Mediating Effects of State Social Self-Esteem on Memory for Paired Recall Nouns

As an exploratory analysis, I conducted the same set of analyses using state social self-esteem instead of self-concept clarity (See Figure 2.4). I expected that state social self-esteem would significantly mediate the relationship between condition and memory for paired recall nouns. For the same reasons as above, I dummy coded my independent variable and conducted a Sobel (1982) test in regression. Because I found differences only between the liked and the other two groups, I used the liked category as my comparison group and created dummy codes for the disliked and acquaintance group.

First for the a path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on state social self-esteem at time 2, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = -.09, t(332) = -1.32, p = .19$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable also did not significantly predict state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = .06, t(332) = .84, p = .40$. For the b path, I tested the effects of state social self-esteem at time 2 on paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem. State social self-esteem at time 2 did not significantly predict the number of paired-recall nouns recalled, $B = .13, t(336) = .54, p = .59$. Next, for the c path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on noun paired recall, controlling for initial state self-esteem. The dummy coded disliked variable
significantly predicted nouns pair recalled, $B = -.78$, $t(331) = -2.65$, $p < .01$. The dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted paired nouns recalled, $B = -.72$, $t(331) = -2.65$, $p = .02$. Finally, for the c’ path, I tested the effects of dummy-coded condition on paired-recall nouns recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2. The dummy coded disliked variable significantly predicted nouns paired recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = -.78$, $t(331) = -2.63$, $p < .01$,. The dummy coded acquaintance variable marginally predicted nouns paired recalled, controlling for initial state social self-esteem and state social self-esteem at time 2, $B = -.72$, $t(331) = -2.34$, $p = .02$. Thus, because only the c and c’ paths were significant, I do not have significant mediation.
Chapter Three: Study 2

Study 2 was designed to extend Study 1 by examining the effects of including disliked others into the self-concept. Specifically, I predicted that people will emphasize their distinctiveness with the disliked other such that people will be faster to classify a trait as self-descriptive if it is not descriptive of the other and as not self-descriptive if it is descriptive of the other. I also predicted that emphasizing distinctiveness with the disliked other will increase people’s self-concept clarity, but performing a similar task with an acquaintance will not.

Method

Participants

Participants were 237 undergraduates (208 female) from the University of Kentucky, recruited from the Psychology subject pool. On average, participants were 19.06 years old, $SD = 2.65$. Participants received partial course credit in exchange for participating in my study.

Measures

Self-Concept Clarity. Participants completed the Self-Concept Clarity Scale as in Study 1. This scale demonstrated good reliability, $\alpha = .87$ for initial self-concept clarity, $\alpha = .90$ for self-concept clarity at time 2.

State Social Self-Esteem. Participants completed the social subscale of the State Self-Esteem Scale as in Study 1. This scale demonstrated good reliability, $\alpha = .84$ for initial state social self-esteem, $\alpha = .89$ for state social self-esteem at time 2.

Inclusion of Other in Self. Participants completed the Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale as in Study 1.
**Trait Adjective Rating Task.** Participants rated how much each of 90 traits applied to themselves and a disliked other, a liked other, or an acquaintance. These traits were the same as those used in Aron and colleagues’ (1991) study (See Appendix E). They included traits that were previously rated as likeable, dislikeable, or neutral. They rated each item on a scale from 1 (extremely like the target person) to 7 (extremely unlike the target person). Participants will rate all traits for each person (i.e. self or other) at a time, before moving on to the next person.

**Me/Not Me Reaction Time Task.** Participants completed a reaction time task on the computer in which they were presented with a series of adjectives (as in Aron et al., 1991). They were instructed to decide as quickly as possible for each one whether it was descriptive (“me”) or not descriptive (“not me”) of them. Participants indicated whether or not the trait was descriptive of them based on which key they pressed on the keyboard. They were told to press E for “me” and I for “not me.” The adjective appeared on the screen and remained there until the subject pressed one of the keys. The amount of time a participant took to select one of the keys as well as which key was selected was recorded. The adjectives that were presented to participants were the same set of 90 adjectives used earlier. The set was presented two times in different random orders each time.

**Procedure**

Participants came to the laboratory ostensibly for an experiment about personality and reaction times. The experimenter informed the participant what the experiment was about and had them read and sign an informed consent form. First, participants completed the self-concept clarity and state self-esteem scales as well as some other demographic and personality questionnaires. Next, they completed the adjective-rating task. In this
task, participants completed a questionnaire in which they rated 90 trait adjectives in terms of how much they applied to themselves and a disliked other, a liked other, or an acquaintance. They then completed the IOS for the disliked other, liked other, or the acquaintance, indicating how close they felt and wanted to feel to that individual. Afterwards, participants completed the Me/Not Me reaction time task. In this task, they indicated whether the same adjectives are self-descriptive or not as fast as they could. Finally, participants once again completed the self-concept clarity scale. Following this task, participants were debriefed, credited, and dismissed.

Results

Before doing any analyses, I removed the data of 14 participants, leaving me with a total of 223. The participants whose data I removed failed one or more of three control questions (e.g. “Select answer 3 for this question”).

Manipulation Check

I used the IOS measure as a manipulation check. I performed a one-way ANOVA on the effect of condition on average actual and desired closeness to the other. There was a significant effect of condition on average actual closeness measured by the IOS, $F(2, 219) = 140.22, p < .0001$. Planned contrasts indicated that participants describing attributes of people they liked felt significantly closest to these individuals ($M = 5.82, SD = 1.21$) compared to acquaintances ($M = 2.48, SD = 1.20$), $t(218) = 14.62, p < .0001$, and compared to disliked others ($M = 2.21, SD = 1.53$), $t(218) = 15.81, p < .0001$. Participants writing about people who were their acquaintances did not feel significantly closer to these individuals compared to disliked others, $t(218) = 1.33, p = .18$. 
There was also a significant effect of condition on average desired closeness measured by the IOS, $F(2, 219) = 98.17, p < .0001$. Planned contrasts indicated that participants describing attributes of people they liked wanted to feel significantly closest to these individuals ($M = 6.14, SD = 1.11$) compared to acquaintances ($M = 4.11, SD = 1.56$), $t(218) = 7.19, p < .0001$, and compared to disliked others ($M = 2.12, SD = 1.90$), $t(218) = 13.92, p < .0001$. Participants describing attributes of people who were their acquaintances also wanted to feel significantly closer to these individuals compared to disliked others, $t(218) = 7.94, p < .0001$. Although participants’ actual closeness to the acquaintances and disliked others did not significantly differ, they did desire to be significantly closer to the acquaintance than the disliked other. This pattern of results suggests that participants’ actual and desired closeness to the target individuals matched the condition they were assigned to (See Figure 3.1).

**Pre-analysis coding**

Adjective ratings were divided such that those with ratings of 5 or higher were considered descriptive of the target person and those with ratings of 3 or lower were considered not descriptive of the target person. Adjective ratings of 4, the midpoint of the scale, were not considered given that this would indicate that the adjective was neither descriptive nor not descriptive of the target person. The adjectives were next divided into categories for each subject according to their pattern for the three target people. Response times were averaged based on category.

There were three possible combinations of descriptive and not-descriptive traits of each of the two people: traits descriptive of both the self and other (disliked other, liked other, or acquaintance), traits descriptive of the self but not of the other, and traits not
Figure 3.1. Effect of Condition on Actual and Desired Closeness to Target in Study 2.
I did not find any differences between the second two categories. I thus collapsed them into one category. This left us with two categories: traits descriptive of both the self and other and traits descriptive of either the self or the other.

**Effects of Condition and Attribute Type on Reaction Time**

Before doing any analyses, I also corrected for extreme reaction times (i.e. reaction times likely to be errors rather than real reaction times). Extreme times were defined as times faster than 300 ms or slower than 3000 ms. These times were replaced with those boundary limits (e.g. any time faster than 300 ms was re-coded as 300 ms) (e.g. Greenwald, McGee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).

A 2 (descriptive of self and other vs. descriptive of self or other) x 3 (acquaintantce vs. disliked other vs. liked other) repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted on the reaction times. I expected to find a significant interaction. I expected that participants would classify adjectives more slowly when they were descriptive of themselves and (rather than or) the disliked other, but that participants would classify adjectives more slowly when they were descriptive of themselves or (rather than and) the liked other. I did not expect any difference among classification speed based on category for the acquaintance however.

I found a significant interaction between attribute type and condition, $F(2, 182) = 5.40$, $p < .01$ (See Figure 3.2). To probe this interaction, I examined the effects of condition on reaction time when attributes were one of two different types (descriptive of both self and other vs. descriptive of self or other). First I examined the effects of
Figure 3.2. Interaction between Condition and Attribute Type on Reaction Time.
condition on reaction time for attributes descriptive of both the self and the other. I found no significant differences in reaction times between the disliked ($M = 1074.08, SD = 256.59$) and acquaintance ($M = 1062.33, SD = 249.64$) conditions, $F(1, 205) = .13, p = .72$. There was also no significant difference in reaction times between the acquaintance and liked ($M = 1031.06, SD = 180.94$) conditions, $F(1, 205) = 1.53, p = .22$. Finally, there was no difference between the liked and disliked conditions, $F(1, 205) = 2.28, p = .13$. For the attributes descriptive of both the self and the other, there were no differences between conditions.

Next, I examined the effects of condition on reaction time for attributes descriptive of either the self or the other. I found a marginally significant difference in reaction times between the disliked ($M = 1062.97, SD = 198.01$) and acquaintance ($M = 1125.21, SD = 278.56$) conditions, $F(1, 190) = 3.15, p = .08$. There was no significant difference in reaction times between the acquaintance and liked ($M = 1160.40, SD = 243.47$) conditions, $F(1, 190) = .14, p = .71$. Finally, I found a marginally significant difference in reaction times between the liked and disliked conditions, $F(1, 190) = 3.68, p = .06$.

Mediating Effects of Self-Concept Clarity

I initially planned to conduct a moderated mediation analysis to test the mediating effects of self-concept clarity on the interaction between descriptive type and person type on reaction time. However, because one of the independent variables was a repeated measures variable and the mediator was not, it was impossible to conduct this analysis. Given that the moderation did not work out as I predicted, even if I was able to do this analysis, interpreting it would be challenging.
Effects of Condition and Attribute Type on Response Errors

I conducted a 2 (descriptive of self and other vs. descriptive of self or other) x 3 (acquaintance vs. disliked other vs. liked other) repeated measures analysis of variance on the response errors. Recall that a response error was classified as an attribute rated by participants as descriptive of them in the attribute-rating task but not descriptive of them in the reaction time task or the reverse. I expected to find a significant interaction. I expected that participants would make more response errors for attributes descriptive of themselves and (rather than or) the disliked other, but that participants would make more response errors when they were descriptive of themselves or (rather than and) the liked other. I did not expect any difference among number of response errors based on category for the acquaintance however.

The interaction was not significant, \( F(2, 195) = 2.04, p = .13 \) (see Figure 3.3). The number of response errors made by participants in the disliked condition (\( M = 3.31, SD = 3.99 \) for attributes descriptive of self and other; \( M = 3.56, SD = 2.53 \) for attributes descriptive of self or other) did not significantly differ from the number of response errors made by participants in the acquaintance condition (\( M = 2.55, SD = 3.65 \) for attributes descriptive of self and other; \( M = 3.62, SD = 2.94 \) for attributes descriptive of self or other) nor the liked condition (\( M = 3.35, SD = 3.94 \) for attributes descriptive of self and other; \( M = 3.05, SD = 2.20 \) for attributes descriptive of self or other).
Figure 3.3. *Interaction between Condition and Attribute Type on Response Errors.*
Chapter Four: Discussion

The self-concept is inherently socially based. People’s self-concepts significantly impact how they interact with others. In turn, others significantly impact our self-concepts. Other people are thus a fundamental part of our self-concepts. Indeed, previous research suggests that people extend their selves to incorporate close others into their self-concepts (e.g. Aron et al., 1991). Such self-expansion involves self-other overlap. People are motivated to draw closer to liked others and in doing so, they take on their attributes (Aron et al., 1991; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). The current research tested whether disliked others are incorporated into the self-concept and what the implications are. I proposed that people would show the same memory bias for disliked as for liked others and that people would be motivated to be distinct from disliked others, as evidenced by faster reaction times for traits not descriptive of the self but descriptive of the other. I also proposed that including disliked others into the self-concept would increase people’s self-concept clarity.

Two studies, using multiple measures and methods, failed to show support for this hypothesis. Study 1 showed that liked others, but not disliked others or acquaintances, are included in the self-concept. The self-concept inclusion for liked others was evidenced by a memory bias for words associated with liked others compared to acquaintances and compared to disliked others. The same bias was not shown for disliked others or acquaintances. I tested whether including liked others in the self-concept increased people’s self-concept clarity or state social self-esteem by testing for moderated mediation. There was no significant mediating effect of either self-concept clarity or state social self-esteem.
Study 2 attempted to show that people enhance their distinctiveness from disliked others by correctly classifying traits more quickly and making more response errors when they are different from the disliked other on that trait. I also expected to replicate Aron and colleagues’ (1991) effect that people enhance their similarity to liked others by correctly classifying traits when they are different from the liked other on that trait and more slowly classifying traits when they are similar from the liked other on that trait more quickly. My analyses did not support either of these predictions. There were no differences between participants’ reaction times on classifying attributes that were descriptive of the self or the other or that were descriptive of the self and the other based on what condition they were in. There were also no differences between participants’ response errors on classifying attributes that were descriptive of the self or the other or that were descriptive of the self and the other based on what condition they were in.

This research suggests that affect may be important in determining what types of people are included in the self-concept. The determining factor of whether someone is included in the self-concept appears not to be their level of significance to the person, but the nature of their relationship toward this person. Previous research demonstrates that liked others are incorporated into the self-concept through an affiliation-based motivation. People are motivated to become more similar to liked others (e.g. Aron et al., 1991; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Slotter & Gardner, 2009). As a result, they engage in a variety of cognitions and behaviors that involve drawing closer to them. The present studies partially replicated previous research showing that liked others are included in the self-concept. Names of and nouns associated with liked others were remembered better than names of and nouns associated with disliked others or acquaintances. However,
unlike previous research, participants in the liked other condition were not any faster in classifying attributes associated with the self and other compared to the self or other and participants in the acquaintance and disliked other conditions. It is possible that participants in the acquaintance and disliked conditions were not as certain of the attributes of their acquaintances and disliked others as participants in the liked other condition were. Unfortunately I did not ask participants’ about their knowledge of acquaintances’ and disliked others’ traits, so there is no way of knowing whether this is the case. If participants were less certain of acquaintances and disliked others’ traits, it could be one of the driving forces behind the absence of this effect. More broadly, the results of this research suggest that perhaps affect does matter and negative information is not incorporated into the self-concept.

Limitations and Future Directions

There are several limitations that may serve as avenues for further research. First, there was a lot of data that had to be excluded from the analysis. In Study 1, 108 participants’ data was unusable because participants did not follow instructions. Although the instructions were written clearly and the experimenters explained the tasks in detail as per Greenwald & Banaji’s original study (1989), a large number of participants either still did not understand the tasks or did not take them seriously. I further clarified the task instructions in the middle of the study when it was clear participants were misunderstanding them, but this did not seem to help. For example, it was clear that about 15 participants did not understand what a noun was and instead identified verbs or other words when asked to report nouns. Many more participants gave nouns or names associated with the earlier trivia task or associated with neither task rather than the ones
associated with the earlier name-generating activity as they were instructed to do. Because I had a very large sample size to begin with, I do not think power was an issue in my analyses. However, there may have been other participants who were not paying attention or taking the task seriously.

Next, it is possible that the relationship to the disliked other is a moderating factor in whether or not this person is incorporated in the self-concept. Slotter and colleagues’ (2013) research suggests that when a person is motivated to incorporate aspects of a disliked other (i.e. romantic rival) in the self-self-concept for the purposes of mate-retention, they will do so. However, when a person lacks this motivation, they do not show the same effect. Perhaps people are only motivated to incorporate certain types of disliked others in order to differentiate themselves from this person. Future research could investigate the moderating role of types of disliked others on self-concept inclusion. For example, would people be more likely to include a romantic partner’s ex-partners in their self-concept for the purpose of distinguishing themselves from these people for a similar mate-retention purpose?

Finally, although participants were able to come up with disliked others to think about while completing the studies, many had difficulty coming up with 10 (in Study 1). It could be that the disliked others that participants listed were not very important to them in general. If the disliked others were not significant figures in participants’ lives, it is likely they would not be included in the self-concept, just as liked others who are not significant figures in participants’ lives are not.

Enemies do not play a prominent role in the lives of people in America in general (e.g. Adams, 2005). Contrastingly, enemys are “built into everyday worlds” as a
cultural norm in West African societies (Adams, 2005). This difference is attributed to cultural differences in the self-concept, specifically independent versus interdependent selves. People in West African societies have interdependent selves, that is selves that are defined more in terms of their relationships with others, whereas people in the U.S. have independent selves, selves that are defined more in terms of their internal attributes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Because of this, enemies or disliked others play a more significant role in the lives of people with interdependent self-concepts. Future research would benefit from replicating these studies using participants from a society with interdependent self-concepts, where disliked others are more likely to play a significant role in people’s lives and thus more likely to be included in the self-concept.

Concluding Remarks

Preliminary research shows that disliked others are not included in the self-concept. It could be that they do not play a significant enough role in people’s lives to be included in their self-concepts or that affect matters when determining whether or not people or other information is included in the self-concept. Additionally, including others into the self-concept does not increase a person’s self-concept clarity or their state social self-esteem. People do not know who they are by knowing who they are not.
Appendix A

Self-Concept Clarity Scale

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following items on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)

1. RIGHT NOW, my beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.*
2. RIGHT NOW, on one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have a different opinion.*
3. RIGHT NOW, I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am.*
4. RIGHT NOW, I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be.*
5. RIGHT NOW, when I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not sure what I was really like.*
6. RIGHT NOW, I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality.
7. RIGHT NOW, I think I know other people better than I know myself. *
8. RIGHT NOW, my beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently.*
9. RIGHT NOW, if I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being different from one day to another day.*
10. RIGHT NOW, even if I wanted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm really like.*
11. RIGHT NOW, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.
12. RIGHT NOW, it is hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don't really know what I want.*

* Indicates reverse-keyed item.
Appendix B

State Social Self-Esteem

This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There is, of course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true of yourself at this moment, be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain of the best answer. Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW using the scale below:

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
(not at all) (somewhat) (extremely)

1) RIGHT NOW, I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure
2) RIGHT NOW, I feel self-conscious
3) RIGHT NOW, I feel displeased with myself
4) RIGHT NOW, I am worried about what other people think of me
5) RIGHT NOW, I feel inferior to others at this moment
6) RIGHT NOW, I feel concerned about the impression that I am making
7) RIGHT NOW, I am worried about looking foolish
Appendix C

Nouns Used in Sentence-Writing Task

BROCCOLI
HOCKEY
PUZZLES
DESK
TOMATO
RULER
VAN
SHOES
EAGLE
ARROW
Appendix D

Inclusion of Other in Self Scale

We would like to ask you a few questions about your feelings of closeness to person #1-10. Please use the following picture to answer the questions below.

Please select a number, corresponding to the circles below, that represents how close you CURRENTLY feel to person #1-10.

Please select a number, corresponding to the circles below, that represents how close you WANT to feel to person #1-10.
Appendix E

List of 90 Traits used in Aron et al.’s (1991) original study and in Study 2

ACTIVE
AGGRESSIVE
ALERT
AMBITIOUS
AMUSING
ANTISOCIAL
APPRECIATIVE
ARGUMENTATIVE
ATTENTIVE
BLUNT
BOASTFUL
CHEERFUL
CHOOSY
COLD
CONGENIAL
CONSIDERATE
CORDIAL
COWARDLY
CREATIVE
CRUDE
DECEPTIVE
DOMINEERING
DULL
EMOTIONAL
ENVIOUS
FOOLHARDY
FOOLISH
FORWARD
FRANK
GENEROUS
GOOD-TEMPERED
HOT-HEADED
ILL-MANNERS
INDEPENDENT
INVENTIVE
IRRATIONAL
IRRITABLE
JEALOUS
LAZY
MATERIALISTIC
MATURE
METHODICAL
NAIVE
NEAT
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References


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Publications


