2016

Forget Not the Whip! Nietzsche, Perspectivism, and Feminism: A Non-Apologist Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Polemical Axiology

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Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2016.503

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Forget Not the Whip! Nietzsche, Perspectivism, and Feminism: A Non-Apologist Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Polemical Axiology

DISSERTATION

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Abstract

The nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is notoriously a misogynist according to many feminists. In parallel, Nietzsche’s theory of value, perspectivism, is relativist according to many philosophers. However, I propose a counter-reading of both Nietzsche’s comments regarding women and his comments regarding perspective in which I interpret Nietzsche as neither misogynistic nor relativistic. I adopt a stance which is non-apologist, in that I do not merely wash my hands of Nietzsche’s apparently sexist remarks about women as Walter Kaufmann does, for example. Rather I demonstrate that Nietzsche is performing a polemical attack on a particular kind of naïve feminism which only seeks certain privileges for women in principle without determining whether those privileges are valuable for the empowerment of any actual women.

I argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his remarks about women are explicitly and inextricably intertwined because of his repeated and explicit connections between ideas of women and ideas of truth. Thus any reading of Nietzsche’s remarks about women must be tied to a reading of Nietzsche’s remarks about truth and other axiological judgments made from necessarily human perspectives. Judgments made from the inhuman perspective of ‘objectivity’ fail to obtain regarding truth or women. Because Nietzsche’s perspectivism advocates a non-relativist plurality of interpretations about truth and hence also truths about women, I argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism actually provides a feminist argument.

KEYWORDS: Nietzsche, feminism, perspectivism, axiology, epistemology, relativism
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Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the mentorship of Dr. Arnold Farr. Thank you for your time, your positive feedback, your constructive criticism, and your ever-useful advice.

Special thanks goes to Amanda Lusky for her most constant friendship and support over the entirety of my time at the University of Kentucky; to Brandie Martinez-Bedard for crucial insight into argument and fallacy, among other things; to Kathleen Poynter and Jessica DeLeon for their good timing, generosity, and patience; and to Glenda Jarred who gave me strength.
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Introduction: A Feminist Counter-Reading of Nietzsche and Perspectivism

The nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is notorious as a misogynist. Likewise, Nietzsche’s axiological stance, commonly called perspectivism, is notorious as relativism. However, I would like to propose a counter-reading of both Nietzsche’s comments regarding women and his comments regarding perspective which interprets Nietzsche as neither misogynistic nor relativistic. In order to do so, I will adopt a stance which is non-apologist in that I will not merely wash my hands of Nietzsche’s apparently sexist remarks about women as Walter Kaufmann does, for example, but rather I will attempt to demonstrate that Nietzsche is performing a polemical attack on a particular kind of naïve feminism which only seeks certain privileges for women in principle without determining whether those privileges are valuable for the empowerment of any actual women. In my dissertation, I will argue that Nietzsche’s remarks about women and perspective are explicitly and inextricably intertwined, and thus any reading of Nietzsche’s remarks about women must be tied to a reading of Nietzsche’s remarks about truth and other axiological judgments made from necessarily human perspectives.

To begin, I would like to say a few things about both feminism and perspectivism. Concerning feminism, first note that not all feminisms are equal; there are many different kinds of feminism, frequently overlapping and blending together, other times at odds with one another. Furthermore, we must note that Nietzsche would not have been familiar with the vast majority of feminisms, and the feminism with which he would have been most familiar would have been a collection of Wilhelmine feminisms from nineteenth-century Germany.¹ Note that the Wilhelmine feminism with which Nietzsche would have been familiar would most likely be classifiable as a kind of nineteenth-century German first-wave feminism. Traditionally we

distinguish between several different ‘waves’ of feminism, although the waves model has also come under attack in recent years (Hewitt, p.1).²

First wave feminism encompasses the motives of nineteenth and early twentieth century suffragettes and activists who fought against *de jure* inequalities such as the infringement on rights to vote, own property, and obtain higher education; later feminists often criticize first wave feminism for ascribing to an essentialist and totalizing picture of femininity (Hewitt, p. 3). Second wave feminism encompasses the political activism of the 1960s and 70s focusing on *de facto* inequalities such as the glass ceiling, sexual liberation, and family planning, as well as *de jure* inequalities including reproductive rights and military integration; later feminists often criticize second wave feminism for being Euro-centric and hegemonic in that it ignored racial differences in discrimination against women, as well as differences in ethnicity, nationality, class, religion, sexuality, and ability (Hewitt, p. 4).³ Third wave feminism encompasses the movement towards gender studies, including transfeminism and queer theory, rather than exclusively women’s studies as well as having a broader international scope, and which attempts to be more inclusive generally speaking; current feminists both within and without third wave feminism often criticize this movement for its lack of focus, coherence, and distinct definition from second wave feminism, as well as being whiggish, among other things (Hewitt, p. 4).

Other feminisms outside and within the waves model include post-modern feminism, womanism, and postfeminism. Post-modern feminism incorporates post-structuralism, post-colonialism, and other post-modern theories in an attempt to move past modernist theories, particularly those concerning the determination of self-identity; other feminists often criticize post-modern feminism for undermining the basis for political movement by focusing on difference to the detriment of a shared female identity (Fernandes, p. 113). By contrast

² See also Henry, p. 103-5.
³ See also Maparyan, p. 18 and 24.
womanism focuses on racial inequalities, especially those due to anti-Black racism, slavery and segregation in the United States, and the mainstream feminists’ neglect of racial differences and inequalities; among others, Black feminists and other feminists of color often criticize womanism for its focus on naming conventions for pro-woman movements, thus distracting from the political goals of reducing and eliminating social inequalities, as well as uncritically essentializing and totalizing all women of color (Marpayan, p. 27-30). Postfeminism primarily rejects feminism on the grounds that sexual inequalities have been largely if not completely ameliorated; contemporary feminists often criticize postfeminism as being incoherent, reactionary, and deriving largely from ignorance of lived social inequalities, as well as sexualizing the rejection of feminism to the detriment of young women (Press, p. 17). Finally note that each of these feminisms, perhaps excepting much of womanism, for the most part focuses on the writings and experiences of women in the United States and Europe, and thus no one of them can comprehensively describe the feminisms extant in other nations.

Criticizing one form of feminism does not entail that one’s critique applies to any or all of the other feminisms. While some feminisms are essentialist, others are anti-essentialist; while some are hegemonic, others are heterogeneous; while some feminisms are separatist, others are anti-separatist; and while some feminisms exclude the interests of various female-identified persons on the basis of sexuality, race, being non-cisgendered, etc., others are highly inclusive and are concerned not only with the interests of female-identified persons, but also of male-identified, trans-identified, and intersex-identified persons. Likewise, we should note that criticizing feminism or women does not make one inherently anti-feminist or anti-woman; in fact, from the descriptions above we can see that criticizing feminism and women is a necessary part of nearly all feminisms. Thus we cannot conclude from the fact that Nietzsche claims to be opposed to feminism or critical thereof that he is necessarily sexist, misogynist, or naively anti-feminist. Just as we cannot say that all women are feminists, we cannot say that all white male
philosophers who criticize feminism are wholly or naïvely anti-feminist. Therefore there is a great deal of room for us to situate Nietzsche’s criticisms within the feminist canon, should my counter-reading prove viable. In doing so, however, I will strive to make clear exactly when and on what grounds we can say that Nietzsche is not being merely provocative with his remarks.

With regards to perspectivism, too, there are a number of different models and kinds. Defining “perspectivism” or enumerating all types of perspectivisms is a difficult task, as there is very little consensus among scholars as to what Nietzsche’s perspectivism is or what it entails. Throughout the dissertation I will focus primarily on the works of a limited number of Nietzsche’s commentators, namely Brian Leiter, R. Lanier Anderson, Maudemarie Clark, Christoph Cox, and John Wilcox. Each commentator provides different insights into the problems generated by the multitude of interpretations previous commentators have given, while simultaneously generating different problems within each of these newer interpretations. I hope to draw together the salvageable elements of each of these five interpretations in order to alleviate some general interpretive problems. I have not included many other authors primarily because I have a limited amount of space, and the reasons I have chosen these five authors are that they are all prominent interpreters of Nietzsche writing in English and engaged in a critical dialogue with each other. Importantly, each of these authors also rejects the reading of perspectivism which treats it as relativism, although not always for the same reasons or based on the same texts. By combining their critiques, I hope to alleviate some of the negative features of instability which appear to permeate perspectivism, while retaining the positive features of instability which Nietzsche seems to value for perspectivism.

However, as a group these authors also tend to focus on either epistemological or alethiological perspectivism to the exclusion of moral and aesthetic perspectivism, as well as perspectivisms of other kinds of value judgments. Thus the broader and more interesting question of determining what axiological perspectivism is remains mostly undeveloped or at least under-
developed in current literature on perspectivism. Furthermore, each of these authors tends to ignore how Nietzsche’s discussion of truth, falsity, and other value judgments are necessarily and inextricably tied to his comments regarding women. This is surprising, given Nietzsche’s explicit equation of truth to women in the very first sentence of the preface to *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE P, p. 192), and given Clark’s separate attempts to address the problem of Nietzsche’s supposed misogyny in BGE and other texts. Therefore further, the question of the relationship between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his use of women as metaphor for truth is also underdeveloped in the literature on perspectivism.

Thus, even if we limit perspectivism to a description of perspectively-limited knowledge and truth, we must connect our reading of perspectivism to our reading of Nietzsche’s remarks on women; further, if we expand perspectivism to include perspectively-limited axiological judgments more broadly, then it is even more important to connect our reading of perspectivism to our reading of Nietzsche’s remarks on women because many of these remarks appear to constitute political, moral, and aesthetic judgments about women, women’s behaviors, and women’s roles in society. Therefore, in my dissertation I hope to make this connection between Nietzsche’s remarks on women and his discussion of perspectival axiology much clearer, as well as discussing how each informs the other.

In what follows, I outline the chapter-by-chapter organization I propose for my dissertation. As is typical for a dissertation, I divide the work into five chapters, each with

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subsections dealing with particular themes. The first chapter introduces the received view regarding Nietzsche’s remarks on women. The second chapter introduces the received view regarding Nietzsche’s remarks on perspective. The third chapter provides a description of Nietzsche’s remarks on women, while the fourth chapter provides a description of Nietzsche’s remarks on perspective, truth, and falsity. The fifth and final chapter ties the preceding chapters together into a discussion of different kinds of perspectivism and accounts for the differences between Nietzsche’s position and relativism, standpoint theory, and misogyny, as well as accounting for any similarities between each of these positions; in the end I describe what my interpretative strategy offers to both Nietzsche scholars and feminist philosophers. I conclude by acknowledging any unresolved issues and by pointing towards future avenues of research.

Chapter One

The first chapter presents the problem of Nietzsche’s supposed misogyny. I wish to clearly describe the received view that Nietzsche is representative of a wide swath of middle-to-upper class white European male philosophers beginning with the ancient Greeks, including Plato, up through the end of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, who essentialize and totalize femininity as a singular morass of irrational, childish and maternalistic, uneducated and uneducable, subservient women; this femininity should be contrasted with the essentialist picture of masculinity as a singular morass of rational, adult and paternalistic, educated and educable, dominating men. Herein I expand on the above description of Nietzsche’s apologists and critics in order to provide the clearest view of the charges leveled against Nietzsche’s remarks regarding women, femininity, and feminism. To do so I focus primarily on Carol Diethe’s account of Nietzsche, as I consider it most representative of the position that Nietzsche is a misogynist.

Chapter Two
Additionally, I wish to clearly describe the received view that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is a relativism of truth and knowledge, while acknowledging that this relativism can further be applied to Nietzsche’s positions on morality and aesthetics, as well as all value judgments broadly speaking. I have to elaborate on the claim that perspectivism is tied to Nietzsche’s views on women at a later point, but in this chapter I hope to demonstrate the specific brand of nihilist relativism that leads many to conclude that misogyny is acceptable in certain times and places. This is the kind of relativism which justifies ignoring problems in other societies on the grounds that all moral systems are acceptable. Thus, I intend to demonstrate exactly the brand of relativism Nietzsche purportedly advocates as well as some of the flaws of this relativism. To do so I focus primarily on Arthur C. Danto’s account of Nietzsche’s philosophy, as I consider it most representative of the position that Nietzsche is a relativist.

Chapter Three

In this chapter I divide my account of Nietzsche’s hundreds of remarks concerning women, femininity, feminism, gender, sex, etc., into four parts preceded by my own biographical sketch. I divide this chapter according to Nietzsche’s periods of work, namely the early, middle, and late periods, concluding with a brief section on Nietzsche’s Nachlass. I choose to divide the chapter on women according to this method in order to determine whether or not Nietzsche’s views on women change over the course of his publishing career, as some philosophers claim.6 I do not wish to dwell on the Nachlass for long at the end because I associate myself with the camp of Nietzsche scholars who view his unpublished works as secondary to his published works. If claims about Nietzsche’s philosophy cannot be substantiated primarily by reference to his published texts, I am of the opinion that it is very difficult at best to substantiate those claims. Thus, if any of Nietzsche’s commentators rely heavily or primarily on the Nachlass, I suspect

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6 For example, see Young (Forthcoming), p. 4-5.
those commentators of being unreliable in their scholarship. Within this chapter I hope to address whether and how Nietzsche sexualizes women as exemplars of embodiment in contrast to treating men as exemplars of rationality, as well as the claim that for Nietzsche the animalistic or biological-physical aspect of our humanity is not a negative trope.

Chapter Four

I again move through Nietzsche’s texts in chronological order to continue determining whether or not Nietzsche’s treatment of perspective changes over the course of his publication history. Following this, I attempt to offer a summary and synthesis of the forty remarks Nietzsche published about perspectivism, and then defend it against the charge of relativism. In addition, I look at the problem of metaphors generally and more specifically the problems caused by Nietzsche’s use of metaphors like optics and femininity to explain his position with regards to truth, knowledge, and value. I conclude by explaining how both ‘truth’ and ‘women’ are ideals, and how a perspectivism of value is consistent with feminism.

Chapter Five

For my final chapter, I attempt to account for the differences and similarities perspectivism shares with feminist standpoint theory and pragmatism, and I will attempt to distinguish Nietzsche’s anti-Wilhelmine-feminism from naïve anti-feminism as well as more critical anti-feminism and sexism broadly speaking. I also hope to provide an account of what Nietzsche scholarship can offer feminist philosophers, and what feminist philosophers can in turn do for Nietzsche scholarship. I conclude by acknowledging any remaining unresolved problems, and discuss future lines of research both others and I may pursue.
In summary, in this dissertation I hope to address two main questions: first, the question of whether or not Nietzsche is a sexist and a misogynist philosopher; second, the question of whether or not Nietzsche’s axiology is relativist philosophy. I hope to show how my exegetical strategy can lead to negative answers for both of these questions, as well as showing how these questions are necessarily and inextricably tied to each other. In particular, it is my hope to demonstrate that a careful reading of Nietzsche’s discussion of truth and perspective leads to a clearer understanding of Nietzsche’s criticism of Wilhelmine feminism as well as the understanding that Nietzsche is at least not unequivocally misogynist in either his philosophy or his personal psychology, and that Nietzsche’s commentary regarding women is neither philosophically irrelevant nor inherently sexist. Nietzsche’s philosophy and feminism have a lot to offer each other, and it is my goal to strengthen this relationship for the benefit of both. While I am likely to conclude that there is no developed feminism in Nietzsche, I hope to develop a feasible Nietzschean feminism by the conclusion of my dissertation.
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Problem of Nietzsche’s Supposed Misogyny

§1 Two Received Views: Misogyny and Relativism
§2 The First Received View: Nietzsche as Misogynist
§3 Diethe on Nietzsche’s ‘Woman Question’
§4 Diethe on Nietzsche's Women: Part One
§5 Diethe on Nietzsche's Women: Part Two
§6 Other Accusations of Misogyny and Anti-Feminism
§7 Conclusion

§1 Two Received Views: Misogyny and Relativism

I would like to begin by establishing what the received views are with regards to Nietzsche’s supposed misogyny and his supposed relativism. To do so, I will provide descriptive summaries of the works of two prominent Nietzsche scholars: Carol Diethe and Arthur C. Danto. I will supplement their views in part with the works of other scholars as necessary, particularly in the case of arguing that Nietzsche is a misogynist. In this chapter, it is my explicit goal to strive for as much charity as is possible in my treatment of two philosophers with whom I disagree strongly. I will for the most part not respond to the accusations and misnomers these philosophers have applied to Nietzsche’s writings, as my more fully-fleshed responses will better fit in later chapters of the dissertation.

Instead, I will note what the primary problems are with their research methods and with the arguments they provide in support of their primary theses, namely that Nietzsche is a paradigmatic misogynist (Diethe) and that perspectivism is a nihilistic relativism (Danto).[^7]

[^7]: Note that Danto does not explicitly specify whether this perspectivism is broadly axiological, ethical, or epistemic, or whether it pertains exclusively to value, truth, knowledge, or belief.
Nietzsche is misogynist either personally, philosophically, or both; this misogyny may be characterized in a number of ways, including but not limited to conventional sexism, support for male dominance and female subservience, biological gender essentialism, anti-feminism, biological determinism, and sexual as well as gender dualism. Further, different authors accuse Nietzsche of both hypocrisy with regards to his own established standards of value and plagiarism with regards to the specific things he writes about women. I will also make note of the several interesting and informative moves each author makes in an attempt to better understand – or excoriate – Nietzsche, and indicate the replies I will explore in later chapters.

§2 The First Received View: Nietzsche as Misogynist

Different philosophers historically have had different approaches to Nietzsche’s supposed misogyny; some ignore it while others treat it as integral to Nietzsche’s philosophy, and yet others attempt to salvage parts of Nietzsche’s work at the expense of dismissing large portions of his texts as irrelevant, thus rejecting Nietzsche’s own holistic claim that understanding one of his books requires being familiar with all of his published texts (GM P §8, p. 22). One of the canonical apologists’ claims regarding Nietzsche’s misogyny and justifying ignoring Nietzsche’s misogyny comes from Walter Kaufmann in his seminal biography Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist: “Nietzsche’s writings contain many all-too-human judgments – especially about women – but these are philosophically irrelevant” (Kaufmann, p. 84). Thus Kaufmann wants to dismiss all of Nietzsche’s remarks concerning women as unimportant to the rest of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

Kaufmann takes Nietzsche’s commentary about women at face value, and assumes that Nietzsche merely has several “unjust and unquestioned prejudices of a philosopher” from nineteenth-century Europe that “may be of interest to the historian as well as to the psychologist,” but Kaufmann believes that “Nietzsche’s prejudices about women need not greatly concern the
philosopher” and furthermore that “ad hominem arguments against any philosopher on the basis of such statements seem trivial and hardly pertinent” (Kaufmann, p. 84). In addition to this dismissal of Nietzsche’s apparent misogyny as philosophically irrelevant although historically appropriate for a European male of Nietzsche’s socio-economic class, in a footnote Kaufmann goes on to state that “Nietzsche’s epigrams about women may have been connected with his own experiences, but also […] were copied from Chamfort, La Rochefoucauld, and – of course – Schopenhauer” (Kaufmann, p. 84, fn. 13). Thus Kaufmann not only dismisses Nietzsche’s commentary about women as obviously and uninterestingly sexist, Kaufmann also dismisses Nietzsche’s commentary about women as plagiarized sexism. Carol Diethe makes a similar claim about plagiarism below.

Before moving forward to Diethe’s treatment of Nietzsche, it is important to say a few words about Kaufmann: his claim that Nietzsche’s views on women are irrelevant to his philosophy is to my mind patently absurd; even Nietzsche’s most scathing feminist critics argue that Nietzsche’s views on women are extremely important to Nietzsche’s philosophy, and Nietzsche himself says that one’s sexuality reaches to the pinnacle of one’s spirit (BGE §75). Our own subjective views of the sexes are at least one component of human sexuality; therefore, understanding Nietzsche’s views of the sexes will definitely lead to at least a partial understanding of the Nietzschean philosophical spirit. In particular this is interesting because of the historical concern over Nietzsche’s own sexual orientation: as a white male of his class, most scholars have assumed without question Nietzsche’s heterosexuality, but some have suspected Nietzsche might have been homosexual or even bisexual, and this has influenced their readings of

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8 See for example Diethe 1989, p. 871.
9 Kaufmann translates “Grad und Art der Geschlechtlichkeit eines Menschen reicht bis in den letzten Gipfel seines Geistes hinauf” as “The degree and kind of a man’s sexuality reach up into the ultimate pinnacle of his spirit,” but I think a more accurate translation of “Menschen” would substitute ‘person’ or ‘human’ for ‘man,’ and I will take this tactic throughout my dissertation. This is a common problem throughout the history of Nietzsche translation.
his personal life and his philosophy as well; I will speak more on this in the biographical sketch at the beginning of Chapter 2.

Also, it is extremely important not to take Nietzsche’s remarks about many things, particularly about women, at face value as Kaufmann, Diethe, Oliver, Lorraine, Singer, and Schutte frequently do, because of Nietzsche’s admonition to his readers to learn the art of exegesis; as an example, Nietzsche offers a twenty-eight part essay to decipher even a short passage from his *Zarathustra*. Thus a thorough-going exegesis of each of Nietzsche’s remarks about women would require attention not only to the context in which Nietzsche places each aphorism, but also to Nietzsche’s published writings as a whole body of work. However, it will also be important for me to clearly establish how we can tell when Nietzsche intends us to take him literally, if ever, in order to avoid relativism in my own reading of Nietzsche. That is to say, if my interpretation is to be more accurate than any other interpretation, I must establish clear grounds for why Nietzsche is best read from my perspective rather than other perspectives, such as Kaufmann’s, Diethe’s, or Danto’s, and why my exegetical strategy is better than others. I hope to demonstrate by example that the best method to avoid this relativism and preserve the accuracy of my interpretation is twofold: contextualizing what Nietzsche meant based on the position of aphorisms in relation to one another in his published works, and contextualizing what he meant with regards to his explicit statements of intention.

By contrast to Kaufmann, there are at least five feminist critics of Nietzsche who approach Nietzsche’s philosophy on the grounds that Nietzsche is an avowed misogynist, and who attempt to respond to and critique Nietzsche’s remarks about women. The first and most prominent of these is Carol Diethe, a founder of the British Friedrich Nietzsche Foundation, who argues in several places that while it is right to say that Nietzsche’s remarks about women do

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10 "An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been ‘deciphered’ when it has simply been read; rather, one has then to begin its *exegesis*, for which is required an art of exegesis. I have offered in the third essay of the present book an example of what I regard as ‘exegesis’ in such a case – an aphorism is prefixed to this essay, the essay itself is a commentary on it” GM P §8, p. 23.
indicate that Nietzsche is a virulent misogynist and chauvinist *par excellence*, it would be wrong
to simply dismiss Nietzsche’s commentary about women as philosophically irrelevant as
Kaufmann does. Diethe discusses Nietzsche’s supposed misogyny in her 1989 essay “Nietzsche
and the Woman Question”\(^\text{11}\) and updates and supplements these views at greater length in her
1996 book *Nietzsche’s Women: Beyond the Whip*. To evaluate Diethe’s lengthy discussion
concerning Nietzsche’s misogyny, I will begin by exploring Diethe’s 1989 essay, and then move
on to her 1996 book. Rather than saying Nietzsche’s misogyny is philosophically irrelevant,
Diethe argues at length that Nietzsche’s misogyny fits perfectly logically with his philosophy and
hence is intrinsic to his philosophy in general. Following my discussion of Diethe’s work, I will
briefly touch upon the arguments made by Kelly Oliver, Tamsin Lorraine, Linda Singer, and
Ofelia Schutte, as each author offers a glimpse of other avenues for research into the problem of
Nietzsche’s misogyny.

§3 Diethe on Nietzsche’s ‘Woman Question’

At the beginning of the 1989 essay, we see that Diethe uncritically assumes that
Nietzsche’s position on women as articulated in his many aphorisms is explicitly sexist, noting
that Nietzsche is wholly conventional in his acceptance of the nineteenth-century Wilhelmine\(^\text{12}\)
veneration of the maternal instinct and the housewife role for women in the religious form of
Mary as opposed to the usually more villainized form of Eve, representative of particularly sexual
sin and degradation. Diethe does point out that Nietzsche differs from his contemporaries because
the “raw sexuality” in the form of Eve is not “bad in itself” for Nietzsche and is even valuable for
his goals (Diethe, p. 865). Despite this, Diethe describes Nietzsche as “clearly terrified of female
sexuality at a personal level” and following his relationship with Lou Andreas-Salomé Diethe

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\(^{11}\) A gruesome phrase reminiscent of the Nazi’s ‘Jewish question,’ and perhaps ideologically related,
Wilhelmine feminists wrote texts with the offending phrase in the title. See, for example, Marie Stritt’s *Das
bürgerliche Gesetzbuch und die Frauenfrage [The Legal Code and the Woman Question]* (1900).

\(^{12}\) The period of German history extending approximately from 1871 to 1918.
believes that he was “prepared to pour his feelings of sexual inadequacy into his writing” (Diethe, p. 866).

Although Diethe sees Nietzsche as praising the birth process in some places,13 “elsewhere his ambiguous stance is apparent” in that he seems to denigrate birth in other places (Diethe, p. 867).14 This “oscillation” regarding birth is crucial for Diethe because it demonstrates in her mind that, like his contemporaries, Nietzsche was unable to distinguish between female sexuality and female reproduction; thus Diethe accuses Nietzsche of being a biological essentialist and determinist with regards to women, regarding all women as defined solely by their reproductive capacities, and ultimately sees Nietzsche as inventing “a confused new species, a female predator whose sole instinct is to crave for children” (Diethe, p. 867). For Diethe’s Nietzsche the infamous whip passage15 entails that men must keep control over cunning women; the picture of Lou holding the whip symbolizes for Diethe what she thinks is Nietzsche’s fear of dominant women and indicates therefore the reason why Nietzsche engages in “pronouncements on the need for male dominance; it is an extremely recidivist aspect of his thought and echoes Rousseau’s ambivalence in a similar context a full century earlier” (Diethe, p. 868).

Further, Diethe agrees with Kaufmann16 that Nietzsche abandons his own thesis that ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are inadequate and arbitrary concepts whenever Nietzsche makes such sexist claims: “Man is told how he ‘can’ and ‘must’ think; there is no hint at a revaluation of values except in the regressive sense that liberal views towards women must be repressed” (Diethe, p. 868). Even further, Diethe proposes that Nietzsche is only mimicking his predecessors in much the same way Kaufmann accuses Nietzsche of copying other philosophers: “Moreover, Nietzsche contrasts the superiority of male gravitas with woman’s innate frivolity, again echoing

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13 For example, TI X “What I Owe to the Ancients” §4.
14 Here Diethe refers to TSZ IV:13 “On the Higher Man” §12.
15 From TSZ I:18, see p. 65-67, particularly “‘You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!’” – the nested quotes here indicate that I am quoting Zarathustra, who is himself quoting an old woman he encountered the previous evening.
16 See Kaufmann’s footnote 23 in BGE §232, pg. 353 in The Basic Writings of Nietzsche.
Rousseau’s view of woman as ‘coquette par état’” (Diethe, p. 868). Not only does Diethe feel Nietzsche echoes Rousseau, she also states quite clearly that Nietzsche’s commentary on women is virtually identical to Schopenhauer’s own notoriously misogynistic writing (Diethe, p. 868).

In addition to claiming that Nietzsche sees women as inherently inferior to men, Diethe also claims that Nietzsche believes women “should not try to deepen their knowledge, but should remain on the level of instinctive sexual proclivity” and that even genuine quests for knowledge on the part of women are strategies for outwitting men or are merely indicative of the need for “a new adornment” (Diethe, p. 868-9, cf. BGE §232, p. 353). Diethe calls this a “sexist joke” wherein the “problematic mystique” of Goethe’s ewig Weibliche is “downgraded to include woman’s love of finery,” and which obscures Nietzsche’s inability “to construct a proper theory to justify ‘das Aufklärren’ as a male province” (Diethe, p. 869). Yet further, Diethe describes Nietzsche as particularly abhorring women’s scholarly pursuits primarily because they “could open up the argument on sexual equality in a way which he refused to face because it would challenge all his ideas on the Übermensch” whereas the dominance of the hypothetical and male Übermensch “depends as much on the subservience of the female sex as it does on the subservience of the inferior male herd” such that a “proper woman, then, exultant in her instinctive drives, but still the coquette, reads as little as possible and even then she feels guilty about it” (Diethe, p. 869). Diethe takes Nietzsche to be explicitly saying that “an academic woman is actually maladjusted” sexually and that barren women are ‘mannish’; she also sees this passage as culminating in an “ironic jibe about animals” that “barely disguises the authorial sigh

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17 “Flirt by nature.”
18 Diethe cites the German here: “Nichts ist von Anbeginn an dem Weibe fremder, widriger, feindlicher als Wahrheit, – seine grosse Kunst ist die Lüge, seine höchste Angelegenheit ist der Schein und die Schönheit,” or “From the beginning, nothing has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than the truth – her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty” (BGE §232, p. 353 in Basic Writings). I would note that ‘mere’ does not appear in the German at all.
19 “Eternal Feminine.”
20 “Enlightenment” or “education.”
21 Diethe cites TI I “Maxims and Arrows” §20 here.
of relief that man does not bear the young,” which she takes to be additionally indicative of Nietzsche’s oscillation of affect with regard to birth caused by his fear of female sexuality (Diethe, p. 869).22

Although Diethe makes the attempt to be charitable to Nietzsche by recognizing that “he had some uncomplimentary things to say about herd men and indeed about male scholars,” she still thinks that “the sexual slur is reserved for women” because “even when he wants to insult a man – Ibsen – Nietzsche does so by calling him an old maid, a slur which actually rebounds on women rather than on men” (Diethe, p. 870).23 These passages from *Ecce Homo* represent for Diethe Nietzsche’s “evangelical fervour” in that “he firmly believes that natural sexual instincts will be damaged by female emancipation” because of “his views on women’s biological destiny” but she finds great irony highly ironic the fact that Nietzsche was so dogmatic about what female sexual instinct should be when he insisted so strongly on the value of instinct in the first place (Diethe, p. 870). In other words, Diethe is saying that Nietzsche is dogmatic about the importance of pregnancy and birth as central to female sexual behavior while simultaneously and evangelically insisting that female emancipation would damage these reproductive instincts.

While Diethe finds Nietzsche’s views on the importance of childbearing respectable to a degree, she finds “unforgivable” Nietzsche’s so-called sexist joke because “it devalues his own arguments on woman’s status” (Diethe, p. 871). The reason why Diethe thinks Nietzsche relies on sexist jokes is because “sexual discourse is vital to Nietzsche’s canon; he constructs a virile male and must keep woman servile. Sexist jokes are an efficient tool to use to that end” (Diethe, p. 871). Diethe recognizes that Nietzsche does not deny the existence of female sexual urges as

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22 Diethe cites BGE §144: “When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong with her sexually. Sterility itself disposes one toward a certain masculinity of taste; for man is, if I may say so, ‘the sterile animal.’” Kaufmann’s translation in *Basic Writings* (on p. 279) is identical to Diethe’s translation.

23 Again citing EH III §5, see p. 723 in *Basic Writings*: “One whole species of the most malignant ‘idealism’ – which, incidentally, is also encountered among men; for example, in Henrik Ibsen, this typical old virgin – aims to poison the good conscience, what is natural in sexual love.” The German word is “alten Jungfrau,” most commonly translated as “old maid.”
many of his contemporaries did, but states that Nietzsche’s admittance of female sexual urges is not much better than his peers’ de-sexing of women because while “Nietzsche is saying that women do have sexual urges” he additionally reduces women so that “they are little more than the embodiment of a sexual urge” (Diethe, p. 871). Diethe concludes her essay by claiming that Nietzsche’s ideas on women “might well be unfortunate, but they are not an aberration: as we have seen, his views on female sexuality and gender division are crucial to his thesis and remain constant throughout his work” (Diethe, p. 871).

§4 Diethe on Nietzsche’s Women: Part One

Diethe’s 1996 book, Nietzsche’s Women: Beyond the Whip, begins by arguing that Derrida’s Spurs especially has slanted Nietzsche scholarship regarding women towards treating all usages of ‘woman’ as metaphor. This can be problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is because it means that some scholars dismiss readings of Nietzsche’s misogyny on the basis of the supposed metaphorical nature of his every use of ‘woman.’ Diethe finds that despite the fact that poststructuralism and deconstructive practices were reactions to dogmatic patriarchal thinking, they have in turn become dogmatic in their own right. For Diethe, it is far more important to look at the women with whom Nietzsche interacted, for these gave him the raw material for his claims. However, Diethe will argue, Nietzsche lives a double life with regards to women: in particular, she makes three claims: 1) That Nietzsche desired women to live lives of cloistered domesticity; 2) That Nietzsche viewed the destiny of women as espousal and motherhood; and 3) That Nietzsche based these views on his youthful studies of ancient Greece, which he preferred as the model for social order.

Further, Diethe claims that Nietzsche sounds paradoxical in at least two respects: namely for refuting socialism in favour of aristocracy, and likewise when he insults feminists while supporting female sexual liberation. Based on Nietzsche’s unpublished early essay “Homer on
Competition,” Diethe claims that Nietzsche’s views were thus contradictory in that the ancient Greeks cared very little for the sexual desires of the women, and it is precisely this insensitivity to the needs of others that attracted Nietzsche to the Greeks (Diethe, p. 2). Diethe states that Nietzsche’s failure is to recognize that his own Wilhelmine society was rather like the ancient Greek in its oppression of women, perhaps because of the new form of oppression: enforced leisure. Middle- and upper-class women were expected to spend most of their time in leisure, but this not only institutionalized the secondary status of women, it also perpetuated an ideology idealizing role of wife and mother. Thus, for Diethe, Nietzsche contradictorily was both iconoclastic and conventional.

Diethe describes Nietzsche’s stance on matters concerning women as “mercurial” and “remarkably complex” (Diethe, p. 11). Due to the fact that his behavior was “impeccably chivalrous” he attracted the friendship of many women, some of them the “New Women” who had university educations. They do this by as a rule willfully ignoring Nietzsche’s misogynistic remarks about women who read, and his vision of a world ruled by male Übermenschen who force women to be domestics and mothers. Diethe reconciles their interest in Nietzsche by pointing out how they focused on freedom, and claiming that these women like many men before and after just took what they wanted from Nietzsche.

Among many contradictions within Nietzsche, Diethe finds that Nietzsche is a Wilhelmine gentleman and a critic of Wilhelmine Germany. Nietzsche is conservative regarding woman’s role as breeding stock, but liberated with regards to women’s sexuality. Nietzsche advocates freedom, but wants to enslave women. With her focus on Nietzsche’s family life in the midst of this discussion, Diethe strongly implies that Nietzsche’s upbringing had great influence on his views of women and womanhood. This familial structure – particularly because it was matriarchal – inclined Nietzsche initially to prefer the company of younger, ‘caring’ mothers like his sister and older motherly types like Mawilda von Meysenbug. Mawilda in particular was
instrumental in introducing Nietzsche to younger, independent women, beginning with Salomé and moving on to others.

Diethe claims that both Nietzsche & his father were accustomed to women’s familial control. Erdmuthe, Carl Ludwig’s mother and Franziska’s mother-in-law, ran the house. Erdmuthe’s oppression of Franziska resulted from Carl Ludwig’s failure to get the Erdmuthe to give Franziska the front rooms as was her due, and Erdmuthe treating Franziska like a guest and a servant. Many works catalogue the damaging influence of Franziska’s religiosity on Friedrich and Elisabeth, noting the emotional blackmail, invoking God in the place of the late Carl Ludwig, divine wrath threatened for disobedience, and the withholding of affection. Now here some interesting things happen: First Diethe points out that these authors criticize Franziska’s profound faith while noting that for the middle-class female in the nineteenth century such was a desired norm. Then she points out that education such as George Eliot’s was necessary to become an informed skeptic. Next she points out that Nietzsche, supposedly so handicapped by his religious mother, had little sympathy for women like Eliot and had a reactionary attitude toward women’s education.

The paradox, then, is that Nietzsche disliked ignorant women but “refused to support those who wished to educate women out of their ignorance” (Diethe, p. 17). As we shall see in my biographical sketch, this is an outright falsehood. Diethe’s conclusion is that we cannot blame Franziska for just repeating what she had learned or for being ignorant. Note that no woman close to Nietzsche receives even a fraction of the education he did, regardless of how he excoriated his educational system. Note also that growing up with a Lutheran parson for a father would likely not have reduced the quantity of religious influence throughout Nietzsche’s childhood, and so I am inclined to agree with Diethe that Franziska is not solely to blame. At the same time, however, I feel Diethe may be stripping Franziska of some agency in her own adherence to her religious beliefs.
Diethe goes on to critique how various biographers treat Franziska misogynistically, how they also should and fail to critique the men who would have given him the same religious upbringing. Nietzsche loved his mother, respected her sacrifices, and rejected her faith as well as condemning its resultant errors of judgment. Another paradox: Nietzsche is hostile to Christianity, but makes exceptions for pietist Lutherans like his childhood and early adulthood friends. Pietism & revivalism were both dominant in Basel, and influential for Nietzsche’s friend Franz Overbeck. And yet growing up the way he did was not conclusive for Nietzsche’s intellectual development; during puberty Nietzsche goes from an all-female atmosphere at home to the all-male atmosphere of school at Schlupforta, “an institution of Spartan discipline” (Diethe, p. 22). This leads Diethe to make remarks about various biographers’ accusations that Nietzsche is a homosexual, and how his childhood and education repressed his homosexuality, though this repression was alleviated by studies of Classical Greece. Diethe mentions Nietzsche’s praise of the cloistered life of Greek women in an unpublished fragmentary essay *The Greek Woman* because of the sons they produced, because of the lifestyle possible for Greek men, the “passion for naked *male* beauty!” (D 170).24

From Diethe we learn that Nietzsche was infuriated off when Wagner contacted his doctor and implied he was a pederast.25 Freudian analysis indicates frequent masturbation is a sign of neurosis; Wagner’s analysis based pederasty on the assumption that Nietzsche was an onanist because of his increasing blindness. Diethe does not think Nietzsche is “convincingly indignant” in his correspondence during this dispute (Diethe, p. 23) and thinks Nietzsche is hostile towards ‘abnormal’ people of either sex who are not conducive towards breeding (cf. GM II:14 wherein he appears to be scornful of “moral onanists and self-gratifiers”). This is central to

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24 Note that this passage is entitled “Different perspectives of feeling” and discusses how different “our” (presumably 19th c. European) perspective on art, male beauty, female beauty, reverence and despising are from those of the Ancient Greeks.

25 I only note here that pederasty or pedophilia, also known as child abuse and sexual assault, is distinct from homosexuality and it would behoove Diethe not to conflate the two.
Diethe’s argument that Nietzsche’s primary objection to emancipation for women was “sexual inversion” it causes (Diethe, p. 24).

However, Diethe thinks tracing Nietzsche’s misogyny to putative homosexuality is improvable and tendentious (and I would add tedious), and that rather Nietzsche was influenced by a particularly Wilhelmine feminine self-hatred in a world where ‘feminist’ was an ugly word in polite society; thus Nietzsche’s anti-feminism has its roots in the beliefs of his mother and the other women in his childhood home. While Nietzsche accepted the mother role, he rejected the sexual hypocrisy which held women to be helpless during courtship. At the same time, however, he rejected the unmarried life which could provide women with educational and occupational opportunities outside the home because of the loss of status accompanying such a social move. Note also that Diethe associates such a value system with Augusta, Rosalie, and Franziska’s interpretation of the *das Ewig-Weibliche*, though it is unclear whether their interpretation of this key phrase in any way mirrors Nietzsche’s.

Diethe explains the connection to Goethe’s *Faust*: In *Faust*, Gretchen’s purity is what Faust needs for his redemption. Gretchen is both a ‘Madonna’ as well as the archetypal fallen woman. Nietzsche mocks “self-righteous Wilhelmine women” who presented themselves as ‘saving graces’ when they were actually “(in his opinion) morally and spiritually bankrupt” (Diethe, p. 24). However, Nietzsche never wholly rejected the notion nor the phrase, which Diethe claims is evidenced by his focus on *Ewig Wiederkehr* or the eternal recurrence. This certainly resembles the eternal feminine or “Eternal-Womanly,” and further his discussion with Salomé enhanced his notion of eternal recurrence greatly (Diethe, p. 25). However, Diethe surmises, their relationship foundered because he wanted a helpmeet or muse and Salomé dashed Nietzsche’s hopes. Ultimately, Nietzsche’s defense of the sexuality of Madonnas shocked the sexless women of his family; his mother had only six years of too-early marriage, whereas Elisabeth’s four years of marriage came too late.
Thus Diethe segues into Nietzsche’s relationship with his sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Prior to the break with Salomé, Elisabeth and Friedrich were very close and helpful towards each other. Friedrich introduced Elisabeth to the Wagners and Cosima liked her so well she used “Du” rather than the formal “Sie” in their letters. During these visits & in their correspondence, they discussed Nietzsche’s marriage options at length, about which Diethe provides a discussion of suppositions, probabilities, and the likelihood of Nietzsche’s attitudes towards these women despite his chivalry and model manners in person and by letter. Diethe agrees with Klaus Goch\textsuperscript{26} that Elisabeth’s & Friedrich’s household in 1875 was a kind of sibling marriage for a time (Diethe, p. 27).

Diethe makes no apologies for Elisabeth’s fascism. Although her passion for her brother’s work was laudable, her poor scholarship and penchant for propaganda was not. However, it is sad that a woman of Elisabeth’s drive and intelligence would waste her energies on a failed colony and to spend her energies scrupulously on bending the facts about her brother so he could become famous. The break over Salomé was a watershed moment for both siblings, though they eventually bridged the divide somewhat. It seems Elisabeth married Förster out of rebellion against Friedrich, who objected specifically to the kinds of anti-Semitic nationalistic views Förster published. Diethe then goes into great detail concerning Nietzsche’s friendships with Sophie Ritschl, Ida Overbeck, Cosima Wagner, Marie Baumgartner, and Louise Ott, and notes that Nietzsche tended to gravitate towards women who were unavailable: married women, women with children. The Overbecks were especially important following the break with Salomé. Ida Overbeck also spoke out against Nietzsche’s misogyny, though like von Meysenbug she thought it was not Nietzsche’s true self and was a result of his quarrel with Elisabeth rather than with Salomé.

\textsuperscript{26} Goch, Klaus. \textit{Nietzsche über die Frauen} (Frankfurt am Main und Leipzig: Insel, 1992), p. 141.
Concerning the Wagners, Diethe thinks the religion of Cosima is a private matter unlike her anti-semitism and nationalism, and thus should not be condemned. Further, Diethe thinks it is objectionable that Nietzsche would place “questions of taste on a par with matters which are more deserving of censure” (Diethe, p. 34), particularly because Nietzsche objected more publicly and vociferously about things like Parsifal than he did about things like the Wagners’ public anti-semitic slurring of Paul Rée. For Diethe, Nietzsche’s earliest and closest relationships thus demonstrate how he shared in the idealization and respect for young mothers, although his relationship with older women was more complex and built around taboo, such that Nietzsche recoiled from women who were actually interested and available.

Diethe provides a historical account of the attitudes in Germany during Nietzsche’s time: During the Biedermeier period, Germans idealized motherhood particularly in the form of the middle-class wife of leisure. Diethe refers to this as the cult of family life. Such idealization of motherhood led to the suspicion and hostility directed at career-oriented women. In particular, Diethe suggests that Nietzsche’s BGE §144 is evidence that he accepted the popular belief “that book-learning would affect the sexuality of a woman and weaken her natural moral goodness and nurturing qualities” (Diethe, p. 41). For contrast, Diethe refers to the essay “The Greek Woman” to argue that Nietzsche prefers that women be cloistered, though she backtracks by saying that insulting women is not his actual point, but “actually concentrating his attention on the Hellenic woman within the context of Plato’s remarks…without drawing conclusions about Wilhelmine Germany, though later in his oeuvre, of course, he looked back to the culture of Ancient Greece with a good deal of nostalgia” (Diethe, p. 42). Diethe recognizes the fragmentary nature of this early, unpublished piece, but contends nonetheless that this characterized his early opinion and that Nietzsche never changed his mind.

27 Approx. 1815-1848, characterized by growing urbanization and industrialization, a growing middle-class, and restrictive policies leading to the a-politicization of the arts, which thus tended to focus on the domestic rather than the public (see Encyclopedia of the Romantic Era, p. 27).
She bases this claim on the later BGE §238, wherein she reads Nietzsche as saying that Greek and Asian cultures flourished because of how they oppressed women, and goes on to say that it is clear where his sympathies lie based on his tone. Specifically, Diethé makes the following claim: “Nietzsche’s disapproval of woman’s right to participate in society as man’s equal can thus be viewed as remarkably consistent” (Diethé, p. 42). The surprising thing for Diethé is that Nietzsche can be such an iconoclast but still blend seamlessly with conventional misogyny insisting on women having only a domestic role, believing that bluestockings were unfeminine, and suspecting that feminists were lesbians. Diethé goes on to show how many men used Nietzsche to further their own misogynistic ends, but this proves little to nothing; despite what the Nazis did with Nietzsche, he was never an anti-semitic nationalist, and so the fact that men like Otto Weininger based their writings on Nietzsche’s is extraneous to the argument, though Diethé seems to ignore this and uses Weininger to connect to her discussion of Persönlichkeiten in the introduction.

Diethé now moves to discuss Nietzsche’s claims regarding female sexuality within the context of Wilhelmine attitudes to the same, in combination with Lou Salomé’s theories. An important unconventionality for both Nietzsche and Salomé is that they both reject the idea that a respectable woman is disinclined to engage in sex. Similar to Victorian woman who learned to endure sex by lying back and thinking of England, Wilhelmine women also learned to view sex as a duty rather than a pleasure. Wilhelmine Germans thought unmarried women were potentially unhealthy because of their (presumed) lack of opportunity to fulfil marital duties, and Nietzsche’s aunts did not escape casual diagnoses of hysteria or Nervosität. Diethé agrees with Nietzsche’s contempt of the doctors who did this to so many people (GM I:6). Interestingly, Wilhelmine society saw married motherhood as essentially sexless and hence non-threatening, which Diethé points out is illogical (Diethé, p. 44). The Eternal-Womanly dictates that woman’s role is as “helpmeet to man” despite the fact that this is contrary to Goethe’s original work (Diethé, p. 44,
This ideology permeated even the working classes where it was economically impossible for women to meet such aspirations.

Diethe claims that despite the fact that Nietzsche was not a friend of the Wilhelmine regime, he attacks “neither the Goethean concept itself nor the manipulative force which Wilhelmine patriarchy set behind it, but the women who upheld the values enshrined in it, who were sanctimonious in their patriotic moralising and superficial in their tastes and aspirations” (Diethe, p. 45). Interestingly, Diethe seems to accept Meta von Salis’s bitter critique of contemporary women who fit such a description, but rejects Nietzsche’s. This may have to do with the fact that Diethe recognizes that von Salis “did so much for women’s emancipation” (Diethe, p. 45) but cannot recognize what Nietzsche offered towards the same end. Diethe emphasizes that “It should not go unobserved that Nietzsche’s (and Meta’s) criticisms always relate to better-off women who, whether they liked it or not, had to play by the social rules, which often forced them to be duplicitous and artificial; moreover, they were in direct competition with each other in the marriage mart” (Diethe, p. 45).

With reference to BGE §232, Diethe points out how Nietzsche recognized the severity with which women judged each other, but “he links the idea of women’s antipathy with each other not with the social factors which marginalized women unfairly…but with the wrong-headed attempt by some women to actually change that situation, which they could only do by entering the world of men” (Diethe, p. 45). Diethe’s reading of Nietzsche has him trying to have it both ways: women are superficial, but this should not change, because BGE VII defends the claim that women are and should be “feather-brained dependents” (Diethe, p. 45). Thus concludes Diethe’s proof; the only difference Diethe sees between Nietzsche’s view of sex and that of the Wilhelmines is Nietzsche’s defense of female libido.
However, Diethe turns Nietzsche’s attitude towards women and sex into a double-edged sword as she argues that Nietzsche is only concerned with the ‘right’ sexual activities, and that emancipated women had not engaged in the appropriate affirmation of their sexual desires (cf. EH III:5). This appears primarily to be because such women are incapable of having children, and Diethe emphasizes the connection to Zucht or breeding. Under this interpretation, feminism becomes degenerate, life-denying, even sterile, de-feminizing women. Further, Diethe claims Nietzsche’s remarks about the Eternal-Womanly are all “humorously dismissive rather than analytically critical” (Diethe, p. 46). She points out Nietzsche’s claim that women should allow the Eternal-Masculine\(^{28}\) to lead them higher, his definition of the Eternal-Womanly as a liking for adornment, and his declaration in a letter that the first priority of the Eternal-Womanly was laughing with a head full of nonsense (Diethe, p. 46). Diethe basically says Nietzsche is a liar when he claims to disavow the Wilhelmine idealization of the domestication of women through the Eternal-Womanly because he supported certain aspects thereof (Diethe, p. 46). She finds this further evidenced by Nietzsche’s attraction to motherly women, a claim also supported by Brann (Diethe p. 46).\(^{29}\)

Still, Diethe insists we credit the importance of Nietzsche and Salomé’s challenge to conventional received misogyny in the form of praising women’s sexual drive. In particular, she notes his railing against the ignorance about sex which society enforced for young women (GS §71), and compares this compassionate Nietzsche with the one who attacks Christianity in its life-negating form of denying sexuality (TI X:4) and for its control of women (A §53). Diethe then asks a strange question: What went wrong? This seems to imply that something changed between Gay Science and Beyond Good and Evil, although we see that even Diethe points out that Nietzsche maintains similar attitudes in later works Twilight of the Idols and Antichrist. She

\(^{28}\) An strange inconsistency in Diethe’s translation is that one is the Eternal-Womanly, but the other is the Eternal Masculine.

\(^{29}\) Brann, Henry Walter, Nietzsche und die Frauen (Bonn: Bouvier, 1976) [1931], p. 32.
implies that Nietzsche was on his way to emancipating himself “from the Schopenhauerian view of sexual intercourse as a manifestation of the *Wille zum Leben* (will to life), in spite of his repeated criticism of Schopenhauer throughout his work” and instead she claims that Nietzsche stayed trapped within the view that female sexuality was “inextricably and ineluctably bound up with child-rearing” (Diethe, p. 47), a view he shares with Salomé. Basically then, Diethe ends this section by implying that Salomé is the reason Nietzsche never overcame his supposed sexism at the same time that she recognizes that Nietzsche did go beyond Wilhelmine standards by affirming not only female reproduction but female intercourse as well.

Diethe describes Nietzsche and Salomé’s ‘affair’ at great length, a discussion which I will refrain from including for this is so complex that I cannot do it justice here, and it is only peripherally relevant. Regardless, Diethe finds that Nietzsche’s correspondence had changed such that “a tone of what can only call spitefulness is evident” based on things like his crossness with Ida because of her “prim moralizing” (Diethe, p. 52). Further, Diethe finds that the misogynistic statements increase in Nietzsche’s work from this point on, though she provides no evidence for this claim. This will be Diethe’s frequent pattern: sweeping claims regarding the development of Nietzsche’s thought, or the persistence of misogyny over the course of his work, but with little to no evidence to support such broad conclusions.

I would like to take a moment to note that it is extraordinarily problematic to blame any person’s misogyny on the behavior of women in general or on the behavior of a particular woman. Misogyny in the individual arises from the heuristics of the patriarchal hegemony; that is to say, one person learns to be misogynistic because of the way society trains persons, both male and female, to view women, which training in turn arises from centuries of trial-and-error at oppressing women. This is no less true for a man raised in a household of deeply indoctrinated women as Nietzsche was than it is for a man raised by indoctrinated men, and it is to Diethe’s credit that she repeatedly emphasizes the similarities in upbringing Nietzsche would have had.
were his father to have lived. However, it is deeply troubling that Diethe among others implies that Nietzsche’s “deepest misogyny” resulted from his relationship with Lou (Diethe, p. 54).

Diethe’s Nietzsche agrees with many contemporaneous German women that career interfered with motherhood and hence was damaging to Nietzsche’s goal of populating the world with a new race of males. Salomé’s secret was that she was liberated in actuality without admitting allegiances to women’s liberation movements. Other feminists such as Hedwig Dohm, however, described such Lou as anti-feminist precisely because of her stance (Diethe, p. 59). Apart from the fact that Lou did not enact her own principles, her stance was full of contradictions: namely that she agrees that feminists are freaks and abominations, that women are stupid for seeking careers; she argued with Dohm extensively about women’s writing, which she condemns with faint praise according to Diethe (Diethe, p. 60). Lou’s radical differences from Nietzsche include the fact that “her ideal woman emerges as a quasi-detached being enshrouded in mystique,” the fact that she agrees with Wilhelmine society that woman’s erotic desire is fulfilled with childbirth and goes no further, ending when no further children are wanted, though she differs from society in that she does believe such desire is very weak. Nietzsche’s big difference from Lou here is that he views women as permanently sexually motivated (though he agrees with the goal of childbirth) rather than tapering in desire as the number of born children increases. In short, Diethe believes that Nietzsche’s position with regards to female sexuality is as follows: “the big difference is that Nietzsche does not join in the cant about the genteel woman’s lack of sexual inclination. He roundly asserts that woman, as a highly-sexed creature, is permanently out to attract the male with the sole end in view of becoming pregnant” (Diethe, p. 61), an idea to which she will return in the penultimate section of this chapter.
Stating that Nietzsche views female sexuality as the “will to pregnancy” (Diethe, p. 61), Diethe discusses what I think Kaufmann rejects: Nietzsche’s elitist breeding program designed to strengthen humanity to prepare us for the Übermensch. She describes “the great health of the new race” of Übermenschen in terms of a foray into eugenics, despite the fact that she recognizes that “Nietzsche did distance himself from Darwinism and positivism in general” (Diethe, p. 61). With reference to Nietzsche’s fragmentary essays, Diethe defends Nietzsche’s attitude regarding sexual desire in women as non-nymphomaniac, but at the same time decries the fact that he accepts concubinage as an acceptable solution for a wife’s inability to satisfy her husband’s sexual needs. Diethe sees Nietzsche’s attitude towards prostitution as indicative of the claim that passionate, satisfying wives do not educate the new race of Übermenschen and hence as contradictory to what Nietzsche says about women’s sexual liberation.

According to Diethe, the most important thing Nietzsche said about women, then, was the fact that he granted woman her sex drive thus giving “even the best bred, carte blanche for as much sexual enjoyment as they liked – providing the goal was pregnancy” (Diethe, p. 62). Diethe construes later feminists’ adoption of Nietzsche for this reason as an understandable, since they mistook him as a forerunner for their own neue Ethik or New Morality movement. Rather than seeing passages such as BGE 239 as mocking the attitude that woman’s first and last profession is birthing children and that work disables women for such work, Diethe takes this as a clear statement of Nietzsche’s support for Wilhelmine views about women. I would say that what Nietzsche really says in this passage includes things like scholarly asses of the male sex should not tell women how to act, particularly if they are telling her to imitate male sickness; Nietzsche

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30 See Kaufmann’s chapter 10, “The Master Race,” wherein he demonstrates that if Nietzsche has any breeding program at all, it revolves around racial mixing instead of racial purity.

31 In response, I would have to suggest that Diethe has misunderstood the connections between motherhood, childrearing, sexual partnership, prostitution, and sexual liberation, or at least how these things are connected in lived experience, whether or not this is an appropriate understanding of Nietzsche. A sexually liberated woman might be more comfortable having a concubine around so that she can pursue her own interests – including her sexual, non-pregnancy interests – without undue preoccupation with an insensitive spouse. Whether such a relationship is exploitative or harmful depends largely on the culture, the established nature of the relationship, and the sexualities of the individuals involved.
rejects the so-called free-thinkers and scribblers, and no man or woman of value would want to imitate them. Finally, I also note it is interesting that Diethe points out Nietzsche’s many women writer friends, and Diethe casts aspersions on their understanding of Nietzsche’s relevance and usefulness to feminism, and possible the individual motivations of such women.

Diethe addresses the infamous picture of Nietzsche, Réé, and Salomé, wherein the two men are positioned in front of the cart where the dray beasts would go and Salomé is seated in the cart, holding the whip. Nietzsche did the arranging. Diethe says “This photograph appears to contrast starkly with the comment by the old crone” from *Zarathustra*. Diethes recognize that the old woman’s words acquire greater weight because she speaks so little. She says that the initial reading is of a subservient response to Zarathustra’s description of masculinity and dominance and machismo. The problem acquires even further difficulty as Diethe points out that the German says ambiguously “the” whip and not “your” whip as Hollingdale had translated the passage. Pieper states that the woman could hold the whip, making certain that men strive for the Übermensch, and then we arrive at a symbol of self-overcoming, the circus whip, self-chastisement, etc., a whole variety of possible meanings (Diethe, p. 64). Because this passage is so key in what most people believe about Nietzsche’s misogyny, Diethe is right to describe Hollingdale’s mistranslation as unfortunate.

However, Diethe does not appear to believe that this section of *Zarathustra* actually describes Nietzsche’s personal position with regard to women. Many of Nietzsche’s female friends found his views on women troubling, some referencing the passage from *Zarathustra* explicitly, though Diethe thinks Elisabeth’s attempt to correct this issue by pointing out that the infamous line is the old woman’s advice to Zarathustra is a valuable contribution to the discussion. More problematic for Diethe is Zarathustra’s statement that man is always a means to

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a child for woman (also from Z I:18), because Nietzsche repeats the same claim in an “anti-feminist diatribe” in *Ecce Homo* (Diethe, p. 65). Where Diethe sees a stress on the claim that this is Nietzsche’s answer, I instead see the emphasis and the scare-quotes on the notion that a child is a cure or a redemption for woman. Diethe sees Nietzsche making a jeer and oblique insult against women, where I see Nietzsche jeering and insulting those who imply women need curing or redeeming. She hears the tone of a sexist joke, I hear cunning subterfuge. Precisely because she thinks Nietzsche so highly valued woman’s ability to bear offspring, she thinks this is an unfortunate betrayal of his own principles. Note how Diethe states that *Human, All-Too-Human* is subsequent to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Diethe, p. 66), and that she does not say why she thinks Nietzsche rejected equality in marriage despite the fact that he wanted respect and friendship in them; but most interesting for me is the fact that Diethe says the following:

However, in the light of Zarathustra’s comment on the solution to the riddle of woman, which in terms of humour backfires badly, readers of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* who have so persistently ‘got it wrong’ when it came to understanding the reference to the whip can be excused for not quite knowing when Nietzsche was joking or not, or speaking in his own voice or not, or advocating male aggression and female passivity – or not.

Diethe, p. 66.

This is a fascinating attitude on Diethe’s part, since she seems to get it wrong as well; more interesting and relevant is the fact that she offers us no reason for why her exegetical methods reveal the true Nietzsche. I hope to avoid this pitfall in my own research by clearly establishing the merits of my methods at the end of this chapter.

Diethe goes on to connect Rousseau’s misogyny to Nietzsche’s. While she acknowledges that Nietzsche “excoriated all those who admired Rousseau and emulated him” and that “Admittedly, there is a big distinction between Rousseau’s version of woman’s nature, where the ideal woman is constructed as ‘man’s better self’…and Nietzsche’s notion of the predatory woman propelled by the ‘will to pregnancy,’” she still argues at length that “Both men, however, start from the premise that there is a separate female ‘nature’ which can be analyzed without
recourse to social factors” (Diethe, p. 67). Diethe notes a few parallels between Goethe and Rousseau: both had relationships with lower-class women despite admiration on Rousseau’s part for society women and what Nietzsche called ‘nobility’ in Goethe (Diethe, p. 67, cf. AOM §298); however, Thérèse and Christiane seem to Diethe to offer a compromise in the midst of the Eve-Mary dichotomy of womanhood. Both relationships result in negative social repercussions.

Diethe suggests that Nietzsche’s most overt misogyny is visible in remarks that apparently refer to society women rather than lower-class women (e.g., BGE §237, reference to the tailoress) and connects such remarks to journals which would publish sexist jokes, such as Simplicissimus and Fliegende Blätter, and include references to höhere Töchter (‘higher daughters’ or unwed ‘young ladies,’ cf. p. 68); such jokes reinforce prejudices concerning female mental capacity. Other journals in this time put forth liberal views, by contrast, so it is problematic to say that conservative views were the only product of the time. For Diethe, “Part of the problem of interpretation,” of Nietzsche’s sexist jokes “is caused by the social factors during the period which...can be summed up in one phrase, the ‘double standard.’ This distorted the behaviour of both men and women – with Nietzsche operating his own version in which he purported to attack conventional society, but in terms of sexism at least, often did no such thing,” (Diethe, p. 69).

Given Nietzsche’s own modest background and his preference for older women from the higher echelons of society, it is interesting to note that Nietzsche likely would not have been as minimally successful as he was without the support of patronesses like Cosima Wagner and Malwida von Meysenbug. One important dissimilarity: though Nietzsche tried the patience of both Cosima and Malwida, he never saw the vengeance Rousseau did from Mme d’Epinay. Diethe’s conclusions include the claim that Nietzsche is similar to Rousseau in that “some of Nietzsche’s remarks appear to suggest a cunning guile in women, more specifically society women, in line with the dishonest streak which Rousseau had identified as women’s innate and
characteristic feature” (Diethe, p. 69, cf. BGE §232, supposedly parallel to Émile Book V, wherein woman is a “coquette by profession”).

Regardless, both authors admired ancient Greek culture and used it to support their claims about the importance of women’s role as nurturing mother, educator, and helpmeet, particularly with reference to the women Guardians in Plato’s Republic. Similarly, Nietzsche’s pronouncement “Let woman be a plaything” (TSZ I:18) seems to echo Rousseau’s attitude towards Sophie’s role in conjunction with her brother – nurse, helper, and amusement. However, Diethe thinks such roles in no way resemble what Plato suggests for Guardian women. Likewise, Diethe offers a final comment on Zarathustra and the whip: “Nietzsche’s probable desire to expose Wilhelmine preconceptions through Zarathustra’s bluster has been discussed in the previous section, but again we can note that in the absence of any direct stress from Nietzsche (who could certainly hammer a point home when he wished) to the effect that the remark is intended to be ironic, it has been more than possible to couple this statement by Zarathustra with Nietzsche’s own misogynic [sic] and take it at face value as indicative of his own naked misogyny and whole retroactive stance on women’s issues” (Diethe, p. 70).

At any rate, the point is that claiming that men are enslaved to women ignores the real power men held and still hold over women, and Diethe accuses Nietzsche of also ignoring “the real hardships caused to [sic] women by the lack of women’s rights in Wilhelmine Germany” (Diethe, p. 71). Diethe includes some of Adorno’s criticisms of Nietzsche, namely that Nietzsche had a “second-hand and unverified image of feminine nature from the Christian civilization which he otherwise so thoroughly mistrusted” and “he fell for the fraud of saying ‘the feminine’ when talking of women. Hence the perfidious advice not to forget the whip: femininity itself is already the effect of the whip” (see p. 71, cf. Minima Moralia, p. 96). To finish, note that Diethe sees Nietzsche’s discussion of women as “lop-sided from the outset” because she thinks he

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33 At this point, I can only speculate that Nietzsche’s point might actually lie within this criticism.
refuses to account for femininity outside of what is inherent, and completely disregards the social construction of gender:

When Nietzsche speculates as to whether woman wants to gain mastery over man, it is both a retrospective reference to the type of principles held by Rousseau, the complexity and duplicity of which we have discussed, and a forward reference to the leveling-down which Nietzsche feared would take place if woman pursued her quest for enlightenment and emancipation; a common fear at the time which was expressed amid general skepticism towards democratisation in conventional circles. Nietzsche’s comments are therefore predictably vitriolic.

Diethe, p. 71

Note also that Diethe sees both Nietzsche and Rousseau as “uncompromising” in their attitudes against women’s education being equal to men’s, although she sees Nietzsche’s prefacing of his remarks in BGE as “my truths” (§231) as a caveat to this lack of compromise. Regardless, Diethe’s attitude is that no matter how many times he shifts in his position, “Nietzsche was at least consistent in this area: he remained from first to last a convinced opponent of female emancipation in general, and of women’s equal opportunities for education in particular, believing that equality would lead to mediocrity” (Diethe, p. 71). For my purposes, this attitude is problematic for several reasons.

First of all, we have to ask whether equality leads to mediocrity. For example, we might reference Kurt Vonnegut’s short story “Harrison Bergeron,” wherein the strong are literally weighed down to make them ‘equal’ to the weak, and wherein the intelligent are constantly distracted to make them ‘equal’ to the unintelligent. We must also ask whether Nietzsche feels that equality leads to mediocrity, and whether Nietzsche’s apparent rejection of egalitarian political ideals is based solely or primarily on a rejection of mediocrity. We must also ask whether the belief that equality leads to mediocrity necessarily entails a rejection of feminism, or a misunderstanding about the meaning of equality, or some other thing. Finally, if it is not mediocrity which motivates Nietzsche’s rejection of equality, we must also ask whether Nietzsche is more concerned with a motley society than a mediocre one, for this could become a
problem for my and other pluralistic readings of Nietzsche should such pluralism lack a Rangordnung or order of rank.

Diethe’s third chapter begins with a discussion of women’s education during Nietzsche’s time in Wilhelmine Germany and elsewhere: Various factions in the women’s movement disagreed about a lot of things, but all agreed that women’s and girls’ education needed expansion. Europeans highly regarded Wilhelmine boys’ education, no matter what Nietzsche said about it. German women lacked most basic civil rights, including suffrage as well as the right to attend political meetings and join trade unions, so many believed that it was preposterous to allow women to attend school. However, other European universities had opened admissions for women, particularly in Switzerland, Britain, and France in the latter half of the nineteenth century, so Germany lagged behind other countries in this regard; on the other hand, it should be noted that this did not mean that the “New Women” were any more welcome elsewhere. Further, note that they frequently referred to themselves as die Emanzipierten or die Frauenrechtlerinnen; finally, note that while “neues Weib” was a pejorative term in Wilhelmine Germany, “neue Frau” in the subsequent Weimar period indicated the newly-independent working girl.

Zurich admitted first Hörerinnen (“listeners” or female students allowed to attend lectures) and then allowed female students to enroll; Diethe states that this process occurred mostly by accident and less because of any sustained effort on behalf of women’s rights, and they seem to have not realized how much interest they would receive from foreign female students not allowed to study in their home countries. The situation was also even worse in Russia than it was in Germany, which is probably one of the reasons Lou Salomé enrolled as a Hörerin. Interestingly, it is Malwida who introduces Lou to the Wagner circle in Bayreuth in July 1882, and it is to Malwida’s role in aristocratic society that Diethe turns next. Diethe goes into great detail about Nietzsche’s relationship with each of these women.

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34 So we might ask whether this speaks more to how wrong Europeans were about education or about Nietzsche’s evaluation of his educational experiences.
Diethe characterizes as “catty” the remarks Nietzsche writes to Elisabeth that he “had sufficient humanity to adapt myself to these basically uninspiring [unerquicklichen], though also worthy, females [Weiblichkeiten] as best I could” (15 October, 1887), while I think it is possible to recognize that Nietzsche did view Meta and her friend Hedwig Kym as both worthy and uninspiring, as well as unpleasant about his own family behind their backs, without being automatically the condescending misogynist Diethe describes. I argue that it is possible to not love and adore every single woman alive and still not be a misogynist; even hating a specific woman or five does not make one a misogynist unless one hates them precisely because they are women. Hating a liar who happens to be a woman does not make one a misogynist if what one despises is the lie. The same holds for other features, such as being uninspiring, backstabbing, etc.

The problem of misogyny comes in when one attributes such despised features exclusively or primarily to the bearer’s femininity, and Diethe has assumed but not shown that this is what Nietzsche is doing, and I think it is therefore unfair of Diethe to accuse Nietzsche of indulging in behavior which does not tally “with the prescriptions for higher health which we expect from the creator of the Übermensch” (Diethe, p. 90).

Diethe concludes this section with accusations that Nietzsche’s “ideal woman should be physically attractive, but with as little intelligence as possible” which contrasted with the “evidence that he was more than ready to spend considerable amounts of time with intelligent women, several of whom might have been prepared to take him seriously as a match” but Nietzsche attempted to avoid this and “deceive himself…[by raising] the stakes by insisting upon youth and beauty in a potential wife” (Diethe, p. 95). Diethe basically says Nietzsche was inventing reasons to not marry because subconsciously he had no intention of doing so,\(^{35}\) the only

\(^{35}\text{Cf. Chapter One in Diethe’s book. Since Diethe ends the chapter with Nietzsche’s 1884 declaration in a letter to Elisabeth that he consciously has no intention to marry, it seems disingenuous to construe his lack of interest in marriage as subconscious here.}\)
reason the break with Salomé was as troubling as it was had nothing to do with the loss of a spouse, but rather with the loss of a disciple and friend.

Helene von Druskowitz was another of Nietzsche’s female acquaintances. Diethe describes Helene as ‘feisty,’ saying she was willing to challenge Nietzsche’s ideas, which neither Meta nor Resa did. She completed school and then a doctorate at an early age, and Nietzsche briefly thought she would replace Lou as his disciple. I interject here to state that because Diethe states clearly that Nietzsche considered these younger women disciples, it is highly problematic for her to believe that Nietzsche had no use for women as students, wives, or friends. Regardless, Diethe describes Helene’s literary works as “lightweight” (Diethe, p. 96) and Helene herself as a “poetaster” (Diethe, p. 99). She then goes on to “surmise that if Nietzsche had not become mentally ill when he did, he would have made some acid comments about Helene von Druskowitz’s dramatic output”; at this point, Diethe feels she has already demonstrated that Nietzsche has rejected women’s writing “out of hand” (Diethe, p. 97). However, given the fact that Diethe has several times made claims with no or insufficient evidence, confused the order of his works, and generally approached the task with no spirit of charity whatsoever, I find this conclusion of Diethe’s to be especially suspect.

Despite the fact that Helene was a lightweight, “his negative criticism is reserved for her philosophical essays, though he had nothing but praise for her critical work on English Literature” and until 1886 Nietzsche maintained that “She’s a noble, well-made creature who does no harm to my ‘philosophy’” (Diethe, p. 97, cf. 22 October, 1884). However, when she began attacking his philosophy in her own publications, Nietzsche declared that “[t]hat little literary-goose Druscowitz (sic) is anything but my pupil” (Diethe, p. 98, cf. 17 September, 1887, cf. also TI I:20). I disagree with Helene that all of Nietzsche’s writings are incomplete and vague, though I will concede that many of them are; I find it no surprise that Meta would sympathize with Nietzsche’s criticisms of Helene, namely that she was clumsy and judgmental, though I
agree with Diethe that it is condescending of Meta to say that she “went mad long ago” (Diethe, p. 98, cf. *Philosoph und Edelmensch*, p. 40).

Based on Diethe’s description of Helene’s philosophy, I find it unsurprising that Nietzsche would find her philosophical writings a disappointing departure from his own work. In particular I cite Diethe’s claims that Helene posited “a basic knowledge of good and evil in human beings which they understand intuitively and which forms the basis of their acceptance of responsibility” (Diethe, p. 97), the fact that Helene attacked the vision of the Übermensch as seeking an eternal stationary point for humanity, and that she “argues for the development of moral responsibility along Darwinian (i.e. evolutionary) lines” (Diethe, p. 98), and finally that she believed nature would bring about an ethical world order. Thus von Druskowitz was an emancipated New Woman uncaptivated by Nietzsche unlike Meta and Resa – though Diethe accuses those two of suspending critical judgment entirely – and although Diethe feels Nietzsche would have been justified in finding fault with her philosophy, she seems to think Nietzsche was more disappointed that Helene was not more faithful specifically to his own ideas.

Diethe accuses Nietzsche’s female friends of choosing “to brush aside the misogynic comments in his publications (though of course, they had no idea what Nietzsche was writing about them in his letters)” and instead focusing on his impeccable manners and the genteel courtesy with which he treated women in person (Diethe, p. 99). At the same time, she accuses Nietzsche of not reciprocating the friendships these women offered, particularly in terms of the kind of friendship necessary for marriage (Diethe, p. 100). Again, I question Diethe’s characterization here. For one, she presumes that Nietzsche valued absolute honesty in friendships and somehow betrayed this through his ‘disloyal’ and ‘deceptive’ comments about how unmarriageable or unphilosophical he finds certain prospective wives and female friends. For another, I have no doubt that Nietzsche could tell that none of the friendships he shared with
women were of the marrying kind. Finally, I would note that Nietzsche found that lies were of value in several circumstances (see, for example, HATH 40 & 104, as well as UM II:10).

§5 Diethé on Nietzsche’s Women: Part Two

From the second part of the book, I have a few remaining concerns. For one thing, motherhood is an important theme for Nietzsche as well as the women he influenced. One of the fascinating things about motherhood and gender is the fact that while men may choose to take on maternal roles, and may even have biologically rooted caretaker behaviors or socially learned behaviors or whatever, there are very few cases of male-identified individuals also being mothers, and I speculate that many such cases involve individuals transitioning from their assigned birth gender to the gender with which they identify. Thus, there is good reason to believe that at least in the social construction of femininity motherhood has a legitimate parallel with womanhood (and sometimes girlhood or pubescence). This is not to say that there is or should be a moral obligation for women to become mothers, or that women who do not become mothers are failures at performing femininity, or that all women desire motherhood whether they realize it or not. All I mean to indicate here is that there are good, viz. non-arbitrary, reasons for humans to connect motherhood with the social construction of femininity. What I ultimately want to do with this is respond to Diethé’s emphasis here (Diethé, p. 111) on Zarathustra’s pronouncement that for women the end (possibly telos) is always the child.

One of Diethé’s more interesting moves is that despite the fact that Modersohn-Becker disliked feminists as very ugly and unpleasant especially in groups, Diethé still says “Even so, I would argue that Modersohn-Becker practised her own brand of feminism by showing, for example, the nude mother as a natural figure, absorbed in her own ecstatic contemplation of her child, in a way that we are not used to seeing from male portrayals which are often voyeuristic” and it is this frankness which is so offensive to misogynists and dismissed as hysterical, trivial,
and truly female art (Diethe, p. 112). Now here, if Diethe were not so predisposed to see Nietzsche as a virulent misogynist, she might not be so confused as to why these women liked his work so much: “For the moment let it suffice to say that Nietzsche’s own comments on creative women were often as uncomplimentary as those made by Scheffler” and “We must remember that his intense admiration for ancient Greek art was largely based on the fact that Greek art was so sublime: more pertinently for this study, it was also exclusively produced by men” (Diethe, p. 112, but Diethe again provides no citation to Nietzsche). Diethe sees this as being exactly Nietzsche’s point:

The domesticated life of the Greek women had been decisive in allowing this cultural flowering to come about. None of these aspects of Nietzsche’s thought bothered any of the women under discussion in this chapter. They saw Nietzsche as a liberating force for them personally, paradoxical though this might sound. Certainly, Nietzsche’s ground-breaking ideas on noble values and on the principle of individual freedom informed the way Modersohn-Becker actually lived her life. It is not going too far to say that the influence of Nietzsche was crucial in forcing her forward, press-ganging her into creativity. Like the new women in Chapter Three, who for a variety of reasons all chose to ignore Nietzsche’s [sic] misogyny, Modersohn-Becker simply selected what she could use from Nietzsche’s thought, and on the basis of that remained his enthusiastic and lifelong admirer

Diethe, p. 112-113

Generally then, Diethe is accusing Modersohn-Becker and other women of cherry-picking Nietzsche; whether this is an indictment against them for being bad scholars or not is not clear.

Another accusation Diethe makes is that the following is “entirely commensurate with Nietzsche’s view on the matter: ‘This observer believes that the woman who destroys her harmonious unity and forces herself to will in a one-sided, manly manner nearly always has to pay for this decision with debility, sickliness or the drying up of sexual feeling, perversion or infertility (Impotenz)’” (Diethe, p. 114, and again, no citations from Diethe to support this). It is possible that Diethe does not see that Nietzsche is mocking the ideal of the subservient domestic female, that she really believes that he takes that ideal as his own (cf. p 115 & 115 fn. 41). What
is more confusing is how Diethe both sees how committed Nietzsche is to the transformation of values, and yet misses the more nuanced aspects of his discussion of gender (cf. p. 118-119).

Ultimately, Diethe finds that many women, and not only the most conservative, were very hostile towards New Women; generally men and women objected to such emancipated women either because of their loss of femininity or their ushering in socialism. “Old school” women still affirmed female sexuality in a way most other women writers failed to do at the time; Diethe discusses Nietzsche’s influence on these women at length. Interestingly, Diethe finds that Nietzsche’s misogyny falls short of the ‘benchmark’ established by Carl Bleibtreu with the following remark: “Everyone today wants to speak with Zarathustra’s tongue … even Meisel-Heß showers out poems in Nietzschean mode in her rhapsodic masturbation” (Diethe, p. 128) – this, Diethe says “introduces a level of invective and vulgarity which is something of a bench-mark and outdoes even the worst insults Nietzsche hurled at the feminists” (Diethe, p. 128).

In addition to looking at Nietzsche’s influence on the creative and artistic women who followed him, Diethe also writes on his influences on the feminists who followed him and, like the artists above, never met Nietzsche while he was sane or at all. In addition to this, she concludes her chapter with a discussion of “the relevance which Nietzsche’s ideas have, or could have for the present-day feminist if they were not filtered and diluted through post-structuralist theory to the point where much of Nietzsche’s challenge to feminism is dissipated by being funnelled into the discussion of ‘woman as such,’” a discussion which is problematic because it is a “biologically essentialist examination of woman’s nature as inherently different, which represents only one line of feminist enquiry, as Alcoff has argued, can lead to a neglect of more practical issues, a point put very strongly by Heidi Schlüpmann” (Diethe, p. 138). There is thus a major divide within feminism: those who said women were different from men and thus deserved

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honour and great recognition, and those who said such an argument was unhelpful in bettering the lot of women.

In Diethe’s treatment of the development of the Bund Deutscher Frauen (German Women’s Association), she discusses the relationship between German and British feminism; note that some men in both countries did support women’s emancipation. Though Diethe does not say it, I want to emphasize the fact that we cannot just wave our hands at bigots from eras past and say they did not know any better precisely because there were men in these periods who did speak up on behalf of the oppressed. Therefore we cannot excuse a bigot’s thoughts as just being a product of the times because, as John Stuart Mill and others throughout history demonstrate, opposition to bigotry is also a product of the times. So, to be perfectly clear, I aim to never merely wave away problems in Nietzsche as merely being products of his time; indeed, if I find that Nietzsche really must be exhibiting bigoted thought, I hope to try to explain it as being a product of his time without excusing or forgiving it one whit.

Diethe basically blames the failure of German feminism during the Wilhelmine and Weimar periods on the feminists themselves for accepting the maternal stereotype and trying to ennoble it – while I would point out that feminists have for a long time been trying to get us to see that motherhood is a valid social role with value for women beyond what value mothers have to men, and although we should not stereotype women as mothers, neither should we say that valuing mothering is damaging to feminism qua feminism. I do not know if Diethe is being a good or bad feminist here, but it does seem like she is blaming the victims a little.

Diethe describes Helene Stöcker’s writings as apologetic in tone, saying that Helene “compensates by arguing that the gain from Nietzsche is greater than any loss, which – apart from the fact that it is brought in as a justification, is a wholly legitimate view” because of the freedom from Christianity Nietzsche brought (Diethe, p. 162). Helene also sympathized with noble rather
than socialist leanings. Diethe also seems to believe that Nietzsche does explicitly support racial breeding though she does not construe it as sinister (Diethe, p. 163). And lastly:

When Stöcker spoke or wrote about Nietzsche and women, she nearly always began with a preamble on the actual women in his life who were important to him; there would always be the concession that some of his remarks have unfortunate connotations, before she took the argument further, to discuss how Nietzsche’s ideas could liberate women and ultimately have a positive effect on the future. At this point she usually listed the chief points of Nietzsche’s philosophy which were life-affirming and led to self-transcendence and a revaluation of morality. A full century later, this is still, I believe, a valid approach to the topic of Nietzsche and women, especially as the philosophical approaches to Nietzsche’s metaphorical use of the trope ‘woman’, which currently constitute a veritable growth industry, have tended to eschew any discussion of real women. I feel that these discussions, however valuable in themselves, have tended to become increasingly obscure and remote from the issues which concern women in everyday life.

Diethe, p. 163

I am strongly inclined to agree with Diethe on this point. It is absolutely imperative for contemporary feminist discussions to focus on those concrete issues women must face in their lived daily experiences. In particular, I want to combat problematic readings of Nietzsche which perpetuate the kind of sexism which causes harassment and assault even within the hallowed walls of academia. Philosophers who read Nietzsche as a misogynist may well be more inclined to accept subconsciously pronouncements read superficially as orders to remove women from universities, to offer just one possible example. While I do feel it is important to explore the use of woman as metaphor, and how that usage affects research and the various aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, I also see how the metaphor has seen heavy employment and could do well to be retired for at least a while.37

Diethe states that she cannot deny the different physiology of women, but she hopes “the idea that women inherently think and react differently can and, for this writer at least, should be

37 See also Diethe’s review article of Paul Patten’s *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory* (1994) in the *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 8, Autumn 1994, 123-127 for Diethe’s critique on the use of deconstruction in feminist interpretations of Nietzsche’s views on women, and her belief that Derrida removed not only goalposts but also removed the goal.
challenged” (Diethe, p. 164). Diethe intended this book to provide context for debates on the contemporary philosophical readings of Nietzsche’s views of ‘woman,’ showing Nietzsche’s relationships with women and the discrepancies between his words and deeds, as well as showing how women of his generation “were prepared to overlook his misogynic remarks…or look beyond them” because of his liberalizing effect generally on their lives (Diethe, p. 165), and I do feel that Diethe did at least in part accomplish the goal of providing some historical context and some aspects of his relationships with and influences on women during his generation. However, the following conclusion I find very problematic:

I think it should be accepted that his notion of maintaining women in domestic subordination was impractical, and led him to make statements about women’s role in society and women’s nature which were inconsistent with the views on individual liberty (and the responsibility of that individual’s self-overcoming) which are so frequently expressed elsewhere in his writings. This ambiguity at the heart of the topic makes the discussion of Nietzsche’s influence on the women of his generation peculiarly complicated. Nevertheless, as we have seen, a host of women who were leading figures in the artistic, pedagogic or political domain in Wilhelmine society believed – ironically, perhaps – that his invitation to affirm life included them.

Diethe, p. 165

Ultimately, the problem with Diethe’s arguments that Nietzsche is a misogynist is that she does not actually present arguments that Nietzsche is a misogynist. Rather, she assumes that he is a misogynist, and cherry-picks his biography and his writings to elaborate on this assumption just as she accuses Nietzsche’s feminist supporters of doing. At no point does she provide a demonstration for why her interpretative strategy is superior to those she derides, nor does explain how we can judge the quality of various exegetical processes despite plainly assuming that hers is the best. Further, most of her strongest claims against Nietzsche are based on little-known fragmentary and unpublished works which lack context in the canon.

38 See also Diethe’s article “Nietzsche’s New Woman after a Century” read at Third International Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, Graz, 22-26 August 1994, in Journal of European Ideas.
Therefore, what I want to do in this dissertation is to carefully comb primarily through Nietzsche’s published writings and explore the related themes of feminism and femininity, perspective and value, and the Eternal Feminine as a metaphor for Truth. I will use Chapters 2 and 3 to provide the foundation for my own argument that my methods are if not the best, then at least better than Diethe’s and Danto’s, and hopefully closer to an interpretation congruent with Nietzsche’s own beliefs. I say ‘congruent’ rather than the loaded ‘consistent,’ ‘accurate,’ etc., because I seek a position which is relevant, harmonious, and fits well with whatever is valuable in Nietzsche, but I do want to avoid what pitfalls and disharmonies do exist within Nietzsche while not merely excusing or glossing over those problems but rather confronting them with an honest and critical though charitable eye.

§6 Other Accusations of Misogyny and Anti-Feminism

Several other feminist philosophers have also levied the charge of misogyny against Nietzsche, and many of these claims can be found in the collection of essays included in the book Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche. However, not all feminists read Nietzsche exactly the same way, and there are at least two possible approaches which characterize feminist interpretations of Nietzsche: “First, many debates have focused on how to interpret Nietzsche’s remarks about women and femininity […] Second, is his philosophy useful to feminist theory? Can we separate his philosophy from his seemingly derogatory remarks about women?” (Oliver and Pearsall, p. 2). Thus, there are feminists who are primarily concerned with how we should interpret Nietzsche’s comments on women, whether literally as Diethe and Nietzsche’s apologists read Nietzsche or ironically as many of Nietzsche’s defenders read him, and there are feminists who wish to make use of Nietzschean philosophy and thus are concerned with whether or not

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39 I suppose ‘charity’ is not a particularly Nietzschean value when one views it from the Christian definition of giving to those impoverished. However, if we define ‘charity’ in this philosophical context, we might mean something like ‘the attempt to describe a philosopher’s position fairly and without rancor,’ which I feel could be construed as Nietzschean in the sense that fair play could be a value we retain after the revaluation of all values.
Nietzsche’s apparent misogyny is separable from the useful parts of his philosophy. Within this second group:

There are two main approaches to the emphasis on sexual dualism in Nietzsche’s writings. The first camp sees his sexual dualism as incompatible with feminist principles. Those holding this viewpoint to Nietzsche’s apparent privileging of masculinity and denigrating of femininity and his paradigms of domination such as the master/slave morality. They find that the Overman is masculine; woman can only be mate or mother. They cite his attack on the feminist demand for sexual equality. The second approach, while recognizing the insistence on sexual dualism in Nietzsche’s texts, find his distinction of masculinity and femininity compatible with feminism. They view his sexual dualism within the context of Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism and anti-dualism. They cite his ironic treatment of an ‘eternal feminine’ or essential woman. They see his perspectivism as questioning the fixity of sexual difference in favor of a social constructionism. In his critique of the will to truth or the ascetic ideal, some find affinities with feminist emphasis on the bodily and ‘playfulness.’ Others hold that Nietzsche’s perspectivism supports the transvaluation of value for women and the feminine.”

(Oliver and Pearsall, p. 11-12)

I will focus on those few authors from this collection who explicitly refer to Nietzsche or his writings as misogynistic, two of whom are concerned primarily with the interpretation of Nietzsche’s remarks about women and two of whom are concerned primarily with the separation between Nietzsche’s misogyny and the rest of his philosophy. Briefly, these are the four authors and their respective positions: Kelly Oliver argues that Nietzsche’s use of woman as a trope demonstrates a reappropriation of the feminine for and by masculine and masculinist philosophers while at the same time rejecting any objective femininity or objective truth, and most importantly identifying feminism as congruent with the kind of truth Nietzsche rejects; Tamsin Lorraine determines that there is no female Zarathustra extant or possible in Nietzsche and that feminists must create such a figure; Linda Singer argues at length that Nietzsche betrays his own feminist-friendly principles by devaluing femininity uncritically; and Ofelia Schutte argues that Nietzsche’s dualism is incompatible with feminism and his writings reveal patriarchal thinking with regards to women.
Oliver offers a Derridean reading of Nietzsche which is reliant on *Spurs* and its treatment of woman as a metaphor for truth, and on Nietzsche’s own equation of woman and truth. According to this reading, Nietzsche has three kinds of truth and women, identifiable with ascending or descending life: the feminist or castrated truth/woman, the artist or castrating truth/woman, and the affirming truth/woman (Oliver, p. 68). However, each of the three is a deception “employed by the ‘avidious will’ in order to ‘detain its creatures in life and compel them to live on’” (Oliver, p. 67). Regarding the feminist or castrated woman, Oliver’s Nietzsche identifies all feminism as an attempt to transform women into men and the corresponding kind of truth is as tyrannical as the progression from the Platonic realm of the Forms towards the Kantian thing-in-itself (Oliver, p. 68-9).

This truth is hostile to life and to the will to power, and mistakes the means for the end of life (Oliver, p. 69-70). Within the interpretive heuristic of contemporary feminism, Oliver argues, Nietzsche takes the inferior socioeconomic position of women to entail women’s inferiority as human beings (Oliver, p. 71). Nietzsche himself falls back onto this kind of

40 Note that woman is a metaphor for truth just as much as the optical metaphor is; in my account of perspectivism, I hope to identify and incorporate any other metaphors Nietzsche utilizes.

41 See BGE Preface: “Supposing truth is a woman – what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women?”

42 Citing BT §18; in the Kaufmann translation in *Basic Writings* this passage is on p. 109: “It is an eternal phenomenon: the insatiable will always finds a way to detain its creatures in life and compel them to live on, by means of an illusion spread over things.”

43 Citing BGE §239, see p. 359 in *Basic Writings*: “To be sure, there are enough imbecilic friends and corrupters of woman among the scholarly asses of the male sex who advise woman to defeminize herself in this way and to imitate all the stupidities with which ‘man’ in Europe, European ‘manliness,’ is sick…”

44 Citing TI IV “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable: The History of an Error” (see p. 485 of *Portable Nietzsche*): “2. The true world – unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man (‘for the sinner who repents’). (Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible – it becomes female, it becomes Christian.)”

45 Citing WP §608, p. 328: “‘Wisdom’ as the attempt to get beyond perspective valuations (i.e., beyond the ‘will to power’): a principle hostile to life and decadent…”

46 Citing TI V “Morality as Anti-Nature” §2, see p. 487 in *Portable Nietzsche*: “The same means in the fight against a craving – castration, extirpation – is instinctively chosen by those who are too weak-willed, too degenerate, to be able to impose moderation on themselves; by those who are so constituted that they require *La Trappe*, to use a figure of speech, or (without any figure of speech) some kind of definitive declaration of hostility, a *cleft* between themselves and the passion.”

47 Citing the entire fragment from WP §354, p. 194-5.
‘castrated’ truth whenever he talks about ‘my truths,’ and thus he “falls prey to the will to truth” (Oliver, p. 72). Regarding the artist or castrating woman, Oliver’s Nietzsche uses the will to illusion to unbalance and undermine the will to truth, but the artist and the will to illusion cannot and “do not destroy truth altogether” (Oliver, p. 75). Finally, regarding the affirming woman, Oliver’s Nietzsche identifies a woman outside of the discourse of truth, who has no need for truth, as she is a “self-perpetuating Dionysian force who has no need for a foundation” (Oliver, p. 76). Each of the latter two women/truths are less misogynistic, so in my response to Oliver in the fifth chapter I will focus on the first, the castrated woman/truth, which Oliver analogizes with feminists.

Lorraine chooses to neither ignore nor fixate on Nietzsche’s misogyny but rather to both confront and go beyond it. A serious feminist ideal of non-oppressive society may require some of Zarathustra’s teachings, she argues, and she identifies four possible positions for female subjectivity in Zarathustra: the woman desired by men, the disciple, the representative of life, and Zarathustra’s own role as role-model and ideal (Lorraine, p. 120). With the woman desired by men there are two possibilities: either Zarathustra wants from women what he wants from men, or Zarathustra wants something different from women than what he wants from men. Lorraine goes with the latter because women are incapable of friendship and have a different kind of happiness from men (Lorraine, p. 120-1). Like many of Nietzsche’s commentators, Lorraine assumes that the whip to which the old woman refers is Zarathustra’s or a man’s whip and Lorraine reads Zarathustra as saying that woman should be faithful to men and not the earth or herself by evoking children and the creative will from men rather than attending to her own body and its needs (Lorraine, p. 121).

48 See BGE §231, p. 352.
52 Again from TSZ I:18, p. 67 “‘You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!’”
Further, Lorraine reads Zarathustra as having very little to say to women as disciples, calling out to his brothers but never to his sisters, but Lorraine sees Nietzsche’s female readers as refusing to just be recreation for warriors and instead choosing to be warriors themselves (Lorraine, p. 122). According to Lorraine, it is the feminine in the form of Life and Wild Wisdom that Zarathustra seems to take the most seriously and perhaps the least sexist although he cannot maintain a relationship with her because he cannot keep up with Life (Lorraine, p. 124-5). Finally, noting that “nothing is impossible with woman” (Lorraine, p. 126), Lorraine derives what she thinks Zarathustra’s advice for women reading the text would have to be: affirm Zarathustra “in light of one’s own vision for the future” (Lorraine, p. 126). From Zarathustra, Lorraine finds that “If I can read Nietzsche as a feminist, it is because Nietzsche himself gives me some suggestions as to how to transform the often ugly and nauseating ‘truths’ that are my cultural resource into something I can affirm in the present” (Lorraine, p. 126). Lorraine concludes by offering a picture of her feminist and female Zarathustra, an artist who dances, cooks, and builds a community of like-minded artists.

Singer begins by rejecting Kaufmann’s apologetic stance regarding Nietzsche’s position on women, saying that it indicates an attitude which is phallocentric and unacceptable in Nietzsche studies because it is “inappropriate to the spirit of philosophizing that Nietzsche himself mapped out” and further if we are going to take Nietzsche’s powerful and fecund thought seriously, we must clearly disclose the irresponsibility of his discussion of women (Singer, p. 174). Thus Singer’s Nietzsche describes women as animalistic and paradigms of undesirable

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53 See TSZ I:18, p. 66: “Let woman be a plaything, pure and fine, like a gem, irradiated by the virtues of a world that has not yet arrived.”
54 See TSZ I:18, p. 67: “It is strange: Zarathustra knows women little, and yet he is right about them. Is this because nothing is impossible with women?” I strongly suspect that here Nietzsche may have been punning on the Bible: “With God nothing shall be impossible” (KJV Luke 1:37).
55 See TSZ III:12 “On Old and New Tablets” §3, p. 198: “…I taught them to work on the future and to redeem with their creation all that has been. To redeem what is past in man and to re-create all ‘it was’ until the will says, ‘Thus I willed it! Thus I shall will it’ – this I called redemption and this alone I taught them to call redemption.”
qualities like shallowness and superficiality. As an example of Nietzsche’s very bad opinions of women, Singer references Nietzsche’s claim that pregnancy is the solution to all of woman’s problems, a claim she calls both cavalier and an oversimplification of female human existence that is particularly problematic given Nietzsche’s more fine-grained treatment of human existence elsewhere (Singer, p. 173).

Singer’s Nietzsche also denies self-creation to women in that for women *amor fati* means love of oppression because while the Eternal Feminine is a destiny determined by nature, there is no Eternal Masculine and male nature is therefore determined by will alone (Singer, p. 175). Singer’s Nietzsche thus espouses a biological determinism with regards to women in that he sees women as naturally and biologically indispensable only as mothers, functioning as servants to men because they are naturally subservient and passive (Singer, p. 176). Singer’s reading of Nietzsche claims that there is a natural division of power between women and men and that this is an unquestionable feature of the human condition and further testimony to female inferiority (Singer, p. 176). Nietzsche therefore misconstrues as natural what is socially conditioned, and dooms the sexes to an eternal and unwinnable war (Singer, p. 177). Further, Singer’s Nietzsche judges women harshly for their values and says women are responsible for their own condition and should be ashamed of it (Singer, p. 178). Nietzsche even discredits female claims to truth

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57 See TSZ I:18, p. 66: “Everything about woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: that is pregnancy.”

58 Citing EH III “Why I Write Such Good Books,” and BGE §232-39. Note: the claim that there is absolutely no Eternal Masculine in Nietzsche’s writing is an outright falsehood; see BGE §236, p. 355: “I do not doubt that every nobler woman will resist this faith, for she believes the same thing about the Eternal Masculine.”

59 Citing GS §119 and 363; BGE §§85, 131, 145, and 238.

60 Citing BGE §139 and EH III:5.

61 Citing BGE §85, 232, 239; GS §65.
because they have a natural aversion to truth, which explains Nietzsche’s advice to philosophers and Europeans to avoid women and become virile (Singer, p. 179). Further, Singer’s Nietzsche designates the female human condition as a Catch-22 which is doomed to failure (Singer, p. 180-1); and on the same note, Singer’s Nietzsche wants women to remain ignorant and disempowered (Singer, p. 181).

Finally, Singer reads Nietzsche as “committed to a normative theory of sexual difference in which masculinity is the privileged or dominant form of humanness” (Singer, p. 183) and to a picture of philosophy as masculine wherein the masculine metaphors do “more harm than good, because of both their erroneous assumptions about sexual essentialism and the positive practices they suggest to philosophers” (Singer, p. 184). However, what is valuable in Nietzsche is that “his emphasis on the power of individuals to create themselves through a process of commitment and will offers one road past an essentialist conception of masculinity and femininity,” and further “its reproduction as an arbitrary system of privilege in both the social and philosophical spheres” but ultimately Singer concludes that “Nietzsche’s sexual politics betray his best insights, as well as what is best in the Western tradition of which he and we are a part” (Singer, p. 185). Thus Singer’s Nietzsche ultimately fails the feminist enterprise.

Schutte begins by addressing “in particular, how Nietzsche defended the exploitation of the masses for the advantage of the ‘higher’ individual as well as the exploitation of so-called ‘feminine’ values for the sake of a ‘masculine’ cultural ideal” (Schutte, p. 283-4). While we may interpret Nietzsche as playful or ironic sometimes, Schutte believes that we must still recognize that “it is also the case that Nietzsche’s statements fit logically into a well-defined political ideology regarding what special groups and power structures ought to control the future of

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62 See BGE §232, p. 353: “But she does not want truth: what is truth to woman? From the beginning, nothing has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than truth – her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty.”
63 Citing GM III:8 and GS §363.
64 Citing BGE §127, 144, 232, 233, 238, and 239.
65 Citing EH III:5.
Europe,” namely the group of men and patriarchal power structures (Schutte, p. 284). Schutte further argues “that Nietzsche’s defense of exploitation cannot be entirely separated from his other theories” and that “as a part of his intended transvaluation of all values he expects to see a rebirth in society’s appreciation for a tyrannical type of government” (Schutte, p. 285). Even further, Schutte claims that just because Nietzsche sought a rebirth of human spirit does not mean he was always correct in specifying how to attain such a goal (Schutte, p. 285). Democracy, socialism, organized labor, and the emancipation of women all represent modern decadence for Nietzsche, and while he was antagonistic to nationalism, this was only because he rejected the kind of nationalism which espoused democratic and especially Christian ideals; ultimately, Nietzsche’s elitism lead him to a kind of supra-nationalism devoted to the production of ‘higher men’ (Schutte, p. 288-9).

While Schutte agrees with Kaufmann that Nietzsche was not anti-Semitic, Schutte does think that a kind of racism certainly is Nietzschean and that Nietzsche’s critique of traditional morality still favors an order of rank and the rejection of ethnic pluralism (Schutte, p. 288-9). While Nietzsche rejected the good-versus-evil kind of dualism, Schutte finds that Nietzsche is subject to his own criticism with regards to his higher-versus-lower dualism, and additionally his “counterproposals to democracy do not take him any farther along the road to a non-alienated, non-fragmented conception of human reality than the dualistic and reductionist structures of value that he himself attacked” (Schutte, p. 292-3). However, if Nietzsche is not seeking a non-alienated, non-fragmented conception of human reality, then Schutte’s critique seems irrelevant.

Specifically with regards to women, Schutte’s reading of Nietzsche employs a criticism of this higher-versus-lower dualism with regards to the power relations between higher men and lower women. First, she notes that Nietzsche praises intolerance in the aristocracy as a virtue,

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66 Citing BGE §252-3.
67 Citing BGE §44 and 242.
68 Citing TI IX “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” §39, WP §957, and BGE §242 and 251.
69 Citing TSZ I:11 “On the New Idol.”
namely justice, with regards to marital arrangements,\textsuperscript{70} and that his ideal family structure in *Twilight* reproduces the inequalities evident in the aristocratic governmental structures, wherein a departure from the will to tradition is a sign of decadence (Schutte, p. 294-5).\textsuperscript{71} Because Schutte’s Nietzsche believes that the rationality of marriage lies in its structural domination, Nietzsche further claims that modern marriage has lost its rationality (Schutte, p. 295-6).\textsuperscript{72} For Schutte’s Nietzsche, the nature of love is reduced to the impersonal sex and property drives, the husband is the center of power in rational, masculine marriage, and short-term marriages are a viable alternative to prostitution; all of this leads to a more authoritarian family structure than Nietzsche’s own insufferable one (Schutte, p. 296-7).\textsuperscript{73} Schutte’s Nietzsche suppresses not sexuality but rather love in his family structure thanks to his “rigid adherence to fixed categories” in his order of rank regarding the sexes (Schutte, p. 298-9). Finally, Schutte’s reading of Nietzsche has him likening men who lack the ability for friendship on Zarathustra’s model to women and animals, thus presenting an inherently dualistic picture of higher men versus lower humans, namely inferior men and all women (Schutte, p. 299).\textsuperscript{74}

Schutte’s conclusions are that while it is a mistake to take Nietzsche as either a capitalist or imperialist generally, he is certainly elitist and an imperialist of rank; this is revealed by the fact that when we apply Nietzsche’s ideal of a society lead by the highest philosophical types, “we are led to unmask the elevated rhetoric as an empty effort to make a political and ethical myth out of a few banal and destructive attitudes, such as considering oneself a member of a highly select group or devaluing others so that, by contrast, one appears to be heroic” (Schutte, p. 300). Weeding out Nietzsche’s “thoughtless” or “inessential” claims as apologists like Kaufmann and Danto are wont to do counts as “either self-deceit or censorship, and that, in any case, this

\textsuperscript{70} Citing BGE §262.
\textsuperscript{71} Citing TI IX:39.
\textsuperscript{72} Citing TI IX:39 again, but see also BGE §238.
\textsuperscript{73} Again citing TI IX:39 and BGE §238; see also WP §733.
\textsuperscript{74} Citing TSZ I:14 “On the Friend.”
practice keeps us from understanding the whole of Nietzsche’s vision” (Schutte, p. 301). Likewise, Schutte finds that Nietzsche’s “politics of unspecified prejudice” applies to women and slaves and thus reveals a Nietzsche who is anti-liberal and anti-critical to the point of malice (Schutte, p. 301-2).\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, this malice is logically tied to his other positions in that “thanks to his uninhibited articulation of the extreme he has exposed the logic of patriarchal domination in its essence” while at the same time “insisting upon an honest self-examination of the origins of our claims to knowledge and of our conception of being” and challenging “the dualism of good and evil which he found to be so damaging to human fulfillment and the creative life” (Schutte, p. 303-4).

\section*{Conclusion}

Lastly, I would like to note that Nietzsche himself wrote that neither he nor his philosophy was feminist, at least not by the Wilhelmine definition with which he would have been familiar, or perhaps by a new definition I will suggest in Chapter 3, and he makes this quite explicit: “All ‘feminism,’ too – also in men – closes the door: it will never permit entrance into this labyrinth of audacious insights” (EH III:3, p. 720). Nietzsche goes on to indicate that feminism by this definition would require one to spare oneself, be soft, not cheerful, and in poor spirits in the presence of hard truths, but in good spirits otherwise. Further, under the rubric of feminism Nietzsche includes the desire for “higher education, slacks, and political voting-cattle rights,” which are “the instinctive hatred of the abortive woman, who is incapable of giving birth, against the woman who is turned out well” (EH III:5, p. 723). Likewise Nietzsche appears to generally oppose scholarship amongst women, for he describes a “vain” and “goose” female who is educated but ultimately absorbed with herself and hence uninterested in truth (TI VIII:27, p. 531). Thus concludes my initial brief description of the first received view, wherein even

\textsuperscript{75} Citing BGE §236 and TI IX:40.
Nietzsche gives us explicit claims about his anti-“feminism” which must be answered should we attempt to read him as a non-misogynist. However, because it is perfectly possible to critique feminism from within, it is one of my goals to explore whether and how Nietzsche represents common attitudes towards even Wilhelmine feminism, whether and how this situates him amongst later feminist critiques of feminism, and lastly whether and how Nietzsche is guilty or innocent of these specific charges of misogyny.
§1 The Second Received View: Nietzsche as Relativist

The second received view relevant to my research is the claim that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is relativism, particularly when treating Nietzsche’s epistemological perspectivism or his alethiological perspectivism. Nietzsche’s commentators differ widely in interpreting perspectivism as either relativistic or not. Leiter identifies the ‘Received View’ of perspectivism as the position that perspectivism does entail relativism, based on four claims: i) the world is indeterminate, ii) our concepts do not correspond to the world because of its indeterminacy, iii) our concepts are mere perspective, and iv) no perspective is privileged above any other, the final claim being the one which effectively reduces perspectivism to relativism (Leiter, p. 334).

Likewise, Clark identifies a ‘falsification thesis’ commonly attributed to perspectivism, namely the claim ‘All beliefs are false’ (Clark, p. 135). Clark claims that Nietzsche’s antifoundationalism concerns justification and certainty, but not truth or falsity, and therefore it
need not entail accepting the falsification thesis (Clark, p. 131). This received view in particular is
e exemplified by the argument Arthur C. Danto makes in his 1980 book, *Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study*. To provide a comprehensive understanding of this argument, and in order to
scrupulously avoid straw-manning this position, I will now embark on a detailed discussion of
Danto’s position.

§2 Danto’s Nietzsche

Note first of all how much Danto buys into the “central teaching” of analytical
philosophy “that the problems of philosophy are *au fond* problems of language, however heavily
disguised” (Danto, p. 8) and second of all that he ascribes the same position to Nietzsche
unequivocally: “Nietzsche’s own view, that the structures of language determine what are the
structures of reality for those whose language it is, and that the deep order of the world, so sought
by philosophers of the past, is but the cast shadow of the deep order of their grammar” which
leads in turn to “the startling thesis that a change in human reality cannot be expected until there
is a change in language – that we shall not get rid of God, as he says in *Beyond Good and Evil*,
until we get rid of grammar” (Danto, p. 8-9, note the lack of specific citation to aphorism or page
number). Indeed, Danto does not even believe that Nietzsche understood exactly onto what novel
philosophy of language he had stumbled, and that “It took an independent development of
contemporary philosophy to render it logically visible” (Danto, p. 9).

Danto provides some commentary about how offensive the title is, because some
academics did not see Nietzsche as a real philosopher in 1965 when Danto published the first

consider knowledge nonperspectival would be to insist that it must be grounded in a set of foundational
beliefs, beliefs all rational beings must accept no matter what else they believe, beliefs that could therefore
constitute a neutral corner from which the justifiability of other beliefs might be assessed. In calling
nonperspectival knowledge ‘an absurdity and a nonsense,’ Nietzsche suggests the impossibility of such
self-justifying foundations for knowledge.”
edition, and some might even have felt that by comparison, other philosophers were not the real philosopher Nietzsche was:

So I wanted to show that whatever else he was or was not, he was certainly a philosopher in just the way that everyone who is one is one: that he thought systematically and deeply about each of the closed set of questions which define what philosophy is, and that he gave serious, original, and coherent answers to them all”

Danto, p. 9

Note how interesting it is that Danto claims here that Nietzsche’s answers were coherent and original, while throughout the book he accuses Nietzsche as lacking both coherence and originality in major areas, particularly when it comes to his own moral values. Danto remarks that “There were lots of Nietzsches,” and he is trying to rescue Nietzsche for philosophy from the various other disciplines such as “poets, politicians, potheads, and photographers from Princeton” (Danto, p. 10). Likewise, I will be dealing with a lot of Nietzsches. Danto’s Nietzsche is very different from Diethe’s Nietzsche, and both are virtually unrecognizable in the face of Clark’s and Higgins’s Nietzsches.

Danto discusses the technicality of philosophical language and how it is difficult to translate between ordinary language and technical language; how this is similar to Nietzsche. Danto’s guiding interpretive strategy can be discerned in the first sentence of the second paragraph:

Nietzsche’s philosophy is often expressed in sentences which sound such dissonances when taken in conjunction with ordinary language, and some of his most celebrated utterances acquire their pungency through the stresses and strains of using the same word simultaneously in a wide and a narrow context.

Danto, p. 11

Danto returns to this theme repeatedly throughout the book, referring to the wide and narrow contexts of terminology like ‘art,’ ‘religion,’ ‘philosophy/philosopher,’ ‘truth,’ and ‘science.’ However, Danto does not believe this was an intentional or conscious strategy on Nietzsche’s
part, at least not every time he does it, and furthermore, Danto accuses Nietzsche of being as frequently “misled by what he wrote as his puzzled readers must have been” some of the time (Danto, p. 12). Changing contexts rapidly could sometimes have an infelicitous effect; other times it could seem silly or downright absurd.

With regard to Nietzsche’s penchant for philosophizing with a hammer, Danto says that Nietzsche’s purpose:

…was in part to crack the habitual grip on thought in which language holds us, to make us aware of how much our minds are dominated by concepts from which we can hardly escape, given the rules our language follows. Then, realizing the conventional nature of our language, we might try to create fresh concepts and so whole new philosophies. The violent chemistry of subtle linguistic incongruities yielded a prose that was sparkling and explosive at its best, and a means to the liberation of the human mind. Men had to be made to understand that everything was possible if they were to be moved to try anything at all, Nietzsche felt, and his philosophy, therefore, is one of total conceptual permissiveness

Danto, p. 12

This is probably the first statement in which Danto reveals his relativistic interpretation of Nietzsche, for this conceptual permissiveness extends in Danto’s Nietzsche to the various axiological judgment schemas, beginning with aesthetics, moving through epistemology, and concluding with morality and religion, all closely intertwined.

Despite the fact that Danto sees Nietzsche as attempting to construct a fairly systematic philosophical structure, he nonetheless also characterizes Nietzsche’s writings as “piecemeal elaborations” in “loosely structured volumes” which require taking “the trouble to eke his philosophy out” because “Nietzsche seems distrustful and almost officially defiant of philosophic rigor” and thus has a “not altogether undeserved reputation as an intellectual hooligan” (Danto, p. 12-13). The important thing to carry away from this portion of the preface is the fact that Danto

79 Note this first instance of victim-blaming behavior from Danto; I would rather state that Nietzsche does not deserve such a reputation because he is more honest and true to his own methods and principles than most other philosophers. However, I suspect that the scholars who favor most other philosophers would
himself cannot decide whether to believe Nietzsche when he says he mistrusts all “systemizers” (TI I:26) and what to make of that belief. On using the Nachlass, Danto strongly feels that much of it would have been eventually published if Nietzsche had not descended into madness and died, which is the only justification he offers for his dependence on those unpublished writings.

Danto characterizes Nietzsche’s philosophy as nihilistic, relativistic, and pragmatic, and does not appear to see these as conflicting labels for the same program. While I see how someone may arrive at pragmatism after accepting a nihilistic or relativistic worldview, my primary objection is that it makes no sense whatsoever to say a given philosopher is both a nihilist and a relativist. Essentially, the problem is this: a nihilist denies meaning or value or whatever data supposedly exists, while a relativist does say such data exist in one form or another, just relative to the group or individual. To say it slightly differently: a nihilist might say that there is no meaning in the universe, but a relativist would say meaning definitely exists, despite its relativity. Both are dogmatic positions, though the relativist is a positive dogmatist, and the nihilist is a negative dogmatist.

Perhaps Danto’s confusion on this issue has something to do with the fact that nihilists deny both objective and subjective existence of the object in question, whereas relativists only deny the objective existence but do affirm the subjective existence of the object, whether meaning or value or what have you. If what objectively exists is the only kind of existence that matters to a contemporary analytic philosopher, then I can easily see how he came to confuse the two positions. Regardless, I want to suggest that Nietzsche is far more of a pluralist than either nihilist or relativist. In my research I have found that Nietzsche is far more likely to be accused of relativism than nihilism, and I find the former accusation to be far more damaging an interpretation of his philosophy precisely because it is the more difficult problem to address.80

find such a statement highly contentious, and thus defending said statement would require more space than is feasible in this volume.

80 For example, I personally find creating value to be a good antidote to the claim that no value exists.
The very fact that Nietzsche offers his own notions of valuation and philosophical principles seems prima facie to refute the claim that he is without question a nihilist, though it would be interesting to pursue this separate issue in greater detail after I have settled the issue of relativism to my satisfaction.

§3 Danto’s Interpretive Strategies

The major interpretive difference between Danto and I is that while I feel that Nietzsche did construct his texts in such a way that one aphorism leads to the next, and that the corpus of his work is at least somewhat structured by Nietzsche’s intellectual development, Danto feels strongly that the opposite is true. Specifically, Danto claims:

Any given aphorism or essay might as easily have been placed in one volume as in another without much affecting the unity or structure of either. And the books themselves, except for their chronological ordering, do not exhibit any special structure as a corpus. Although there undoubtedly was a development in Nietzsche’s thought and in his style, his writings may be read in pretty much any order, without this greatly impeding the comprehension of his ideas”

Danto, p. 19

To this I retort that it is because of Danto’s attitude towards Nietzsche’s work that he has had his own comprehension of Nietzsche’s ideas so greatly impeded. Danto applies this same strategy to Nietzsche’s unpublished works, saying that “it would be difficult even for a close reader to tell the difference between those works he saw through the press and those pieced together by his editors” with the exceptions of The Birth of Tragedy and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which nevertheless lack ordered development and direction of argument according to Danto’s reading. Danto finds Nietzsche in large doses cloying and repetitive, and ultimately to “make no heavy demands on his readers’ intelligence or learning” for the most part (Danto, p. 21).

In the first instance of Danto’s use of wide and narrow senses Danto describes Nietzsche as a philosopher in the narrow sense of having specific identifiable doctrines (namely eternal
recurrence, *amor fati*, the *Übermensch*, the will-to-power, and the Apollinian and Dionysian artistic styles). Also in this first chapter we see the first case of Danto contradicting what he said previously: “these doctrines do not give the sense of fitting together in any systematic and coherent way, nor do they, either individually or as a group, fall readily under one or another of the convenient and unavoidable headings with which we identify philosophical ideas. They do not seem to be solutions to what we would acknowledge as philosophical problems” (Danto, p. 21, cf. p. 12-13). Thus, in fewer than ten pages Danto goes from claiming that Nietzsche is coherent to claiming that he does not appear to be a coherent thinker. It is Danto’s task, then, to present as coherent a picture as possible, a picture he does not believe exists within Nietzsche’s works.

Danto claims that Nietzsche is a nihilist but does not cite any passage where Nietzsche makes implies such a claim (Danto, p. 22). Danto sees himself as drawing the systematically connected doctrines out of Nietzsche’s messy assembly of aphorisms, explaining how the surrounding passages do connect to these doctrines by way of explaining or illustrating them, and connecting these doctrines to conventional philosophical categories. So, despite the fact that Danto believes such a system of doctrines exists within Nietzsche’s work, at the same time he claims “There exists no place in which this system – as I shall prematurely regard it – appears in Nietzsche’s writings” and that the reason therefore is Nietzsche’s “singular lack of architectonic talent” which is exhibited not only in his writings but also in his musical compositions, though Danto does recognize his “flair for improvisation” (Danto, p. 22).

Danto sees Nietzsche’s philosophy as “built up…scrap by scrap” but he claims that “A philosophical system does not ordinarily grow by accretion” (Danto, p. 23) which I suspect Nietzsche might dispute, and I in fact dispute myself. After all, it does seem that many philosophers ascribe system to their thought long after they have already worked through much of it both consciously and subconsciously. Likewise, I’ve heard some scientists note that their own
insights occur suddenly, with the explanations and justifications coming after the fact and I have little doubt that this is how many philosophers also work in actuality, no matter how our memories trick us into seeing our behavior as intentionally systematic. It is a feature of the human mind that we draw recognizable patterns out of random noise; pareidolia, such as seeing a face in the grains of wood on one’s desktop, is just one example among many of how we do this.

Regardless, Danto sees Nietzsche as unconscious of creating a system, though this does not entail that he was creating a system unconsciously. Rather, Danto sees this unconscious system as stemming from two causes: the systematic nature of philosophy and the retroactive unification that historical understanding imposes. Thus, Danto realizes that “To say that the system I wish to discuss was truly Nietzsche’s raises some complicated questions concerning the integrity of the history of philosophy” not the least because he believes that Nietzsche would have disavowed any system (Danto, p. 25). But he feels his theoretical reconstruction “has a certain predictive power; that is, it allows us to know more or less what Nietzsche is going to be saying” (Danto, p. 26) which is far more than I think is possible or desirable. Thus Danto is not so much interpreting Nietzsche as he is attempting to draw out the logical consequences of Nietzsche’s unconscious system.

If new information, such as undiscovered texts, presents itself then we might change our minds, “But the sheer mass of his posthumous writings – the Nachlass – together with his seeming total inability to impose any but the most external form upon his work, virtually guarantees that there would have been no integrating systematization even if he had retained his mind. The vastness of the Nachlass, together with the size of his published work, guarantees something else” (Danto, p. 26). At any rate, we must recognize Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche’s depredations on the Nietzsche corpus and that “The life and work of Nietzsche is the most heavily

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81 Cf. for example the anecdote of Archimedes leaping from the bath to shout “Eureka!” naked in the streets after having the sudden insight that different materials displace differing quantities of water.
falsified phenomenon of modern literary and intellectual history” (Danto, p. 26-7). Danto is of the opinion that Elizabeth’s worst falsehoods concerned her relationship with her brother or saving his reputation among the people she valued, and both because of this and because of the fact that “she had barely a child’s comprehension of philosophical ideas, and would not have known one to distort it” as well as the fact that Danto sees Nietzsche’s work as “loosely federated aphorisms, fragments, and essays,” we need not worry about how much she has affected the textual purity of his philosophical thought: “His message appears over and over again, so much so that from any random sample of his writings the entirety of his philosophy can almost be reconstructed” (Danto, p. 27). I reiterate that I reject this interpretive strategy, and instead believe that it is possible that Elizabeth might have altered aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and that she was perhaps at least somewhat capable, no matter what sexist assumptions Danto has accepted. Until I obtain the ability to read Nietzsche’s crabbed, archaic German script, however, I shall have to trust the many scholars who have devoted themselves to attempting to remove Elizabeth’s influence from the text.

Danto notes some partial resemblance between Nietzsche’s so-called nihilism and that of the Nihilism of Emptiness, which he attributes to Hinduism, Buddhism, and Schopenhauer’s Oriental pessimism, as well as the Nihilism of Negativity, which he attributes to Russian Nihilists in the St. Petersburg style. The main thesis of the Nihilism of Emptiness seems to be that the world of appearance is a meaningless illusion and the only salvation lies in escaping life; by contrast, the main thesis of the Nihilism of Negativity seems to be that we should reject the dogmas of our elders while also accepting a crudely materialistic scientific faith, thus replacing one faith with another rather than rejecting faith wholesale. Danto finds Nietzsche more negative than his contemporaries in this fashion, but construes his nihilism as a metaphysics rather than an ideology. This nihilism, however, sounds rather pragmatist more than a rejection-and-

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replacement-of-previous-faiths form of nihilism: “Science he regards not as a repository of truths or a method for discovering them but as a set of convenient fictions, of useful conventions, which has as much and as little basis in reality as any alleged set of fictions which might be thought to conflict with it…an instance of what he termed Will-to-Power” (Danto, p. 30). Danto wants to have Nietzsche both as a negative nihilist and as an empty nihilist: both denying former definitions of things like ‘truth’ while also denying the existence of truth altogether; he accomplishes this by construing this as a difference between senses of ‘truth’ (Danto, p. 31).

Danto sees the two non-Nietzschean forms of nihilism as derivative of the same attitude, namely that there ought to be purpose to the world, whereas he finds that Nietzsche believed that “It is a general tendency of the human mind, which, to Nietzsche, is ultimately as disastrous disposition, to imagine, and to seek to identify a purposive armature, a basis for significance, in the world itself, something objective to which men may submit and in which they may find a meaning for themselves” and yet I would say Nietzsche is a great purpose-seeker or purpose-maker himself; after all, we find ourselves in the world and so can use ourselves in some way as the basis for significance (Danto, p. 31-2). The ‘final form’ of nihilism is one wherein the adherent acquires “a disbelief in any world alternative and metaphysically preferable to this one. At the same time, he regards this world as the only one, however unstructured and purposeless it may be, and however valueless” (Danto, p. 32). Note the confusingly unspecific ‘he’ in the second part of the quote: within the context of the paragraph, this ‘he’ could refer to humanity generally (though no doubt Danto would use the word ‘mankind’ were he writing this sentence), to a Buddhist or other Nihilist of Emptiness, or to Nietzsche himself. The offending pronoun allows Danto to segue into a context-less portion of the Nachlass which seems to support the idea that Nietzsche believes that the world is not a thing capable of being categorized within value schema, and more simply that “all our beliefs are false” (Danto, p. 33). While I agree with Danto that Nietzsche rejects the correspondence theory of truth, and I hope to support this working
primarily from Nietzsche’s published works, I do not believe that this means Nietzsche eliminates or rejects the concept of truth or ceases using it in a meaningful fashion.

Thus Danto takes *amor fati* to be an embracing of meaninglessness and cosmic insignificance, eternal recurrence to be the view that the world did in fact actually, physically recur and will recur eternally, and that this all connects to the *Übermensch* in a systematic fashion. In conclusion, Danto sees Nietzsche’s position as the claim that “There is then no true, rational, orderly, permanent, or benign universe fore us. Our entire mode of thinking, [Nietzsche] believed, is based on the assumption that there is such a universe; it is far from simple, accordingly, to work out a form of thought adequate to the nullity of things as they are: a total revolution in logic, science, morality, and in philosophy itself would be demanded. Nietzsche sought to achieve at least the beginning of such a revolution” (Danto, p. 35). Danto thus opens the framework for exploring what he calls “the diagnostic part” of Nietzsche’s philosophy, namely that regarding the division between the Apollonian and the Dionysian in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

Danto also introduces another method I reject: “I do not propose to follow any chronological order in my exposition of Nietzsche’s philosophy, nor do I intend to relate it in any special way to events in his life. My concern is with the reasons for rather than the causes of his doctrines” (Danto, p. 37). For one thing, I do not understand what distinction he is trying to make between reasons and causes, particularly since he emphasizes later how Nietzsche’s psychology and understanding of psychology were so important for his philosophical methods. For another, I have every intention of attempting to follow chronologically the development of connected ideas as well as relating these ideas to Nietzsche’s life in certain special ways. In particular, for example, I will connect Nietzsche’s thoughts on education, and the education of women especially, to his own behaviour and experiences in the educational system. Lastly, note that Danto restricts discussion of Nietzsche’s aesthetic philosophy to what he calls Nietzsche’s “earliest period of genuine productivity – when he was a young professor at Basle, brooding on
the art and philosophy of the ancients, and when his sympathies with Wagner were profound and uncontaminated and, to a measure, reciprocated by the composer himself” (Danto, p. 37).

Interestingly, Danto both recognizes that Nietzsche’s thought develops over time and recognizes that despite this, “the dominant philosophical preoccupations of his mature thought were present and insistent, and though the immediate subject of his interest was art, the logic of his ideas already had a wider implication” (Danto, p. 37).

§4 Danto’s Treatment of Art

Danto discusses at length Nietzsche’s theory about the cognitive import of art and whether it provides special knowledge/truth/objectivity/intellectual benefits. Danto identifies the primary component of Nietzsche’s radical character as the fact that “he is indeed prepared to allow that art has no less a claim than sense or science to objective truth. But this is because neither sense nor science can make any stronger claim to truth than art” (Danto, p. 37). This I am willing to grant. However, I disagree with the direction Danto takes this thought: namely that this is because there is no such thing as truth. Regardless, Danto connects this all to an epistemological analysis he finds similar to that of Bertrand Russell, “according to which our perceptions are said not to resemble their causes, so that the language we employ, learned in connection with the having of perceptions, does not describe the world as it really is. Language rather describes – insofar as, in Nietzsche’s view, we may think of language as descriptive at all – the illusions we take for reality” (Danto, p. 38). Furthermore, Danto goes on to claim that during this early stage of Nietzsche’s thought, “given his ideas concerning the origin and function of our language, we could not say what the world might in fact be like, even if, per impossibile, we were in a position to experience whatever causes our perceptions” (Danto, p. 38).

The primary distinction between truth and art, then, has to do with the fact that art provides fresh illusions, while the illusions of established truth are stale and worn. This argument
Danto supports with reference to Nietzsche’s unpublished essay “On Truth and Lie.” Indeed, Danto finds that the question “What is truth?” “occupied him throughout his entire philosophical life, and the answer that he gave here, apart from its rhetoric and to some extent apart from the reasons he advanced in its favor, was one that he never saw fit to modify in any essential respect” (Danto, p. 38). Danto takes Nietzsche to claim that language can express routine but not deviant experiences, and that his account thus differs from Kant’s claims in a number of ways. Where Kant sees experience conforming to our categorical structure, Danto’s Nietzsche finds conceptual schema differing from one society to the next and possibly from person to person, thus blurring the line between a more cultural relativism and an absolute subjectivism. This difference between societies and individuals makes possible the occurrence of experiences which fall outside our own scheme “so that language which is deviant her and now may sometime and somewhere else be plain speech” (Danto, p. 41).

Deviant speech and experiences are dangerous in two ways: to society if they threaten conceptual schemes which house us within the world, and to the individual if they lead one away from safety as defined by one’s society. Due to the fact that Nietzsche increasingly saw himself as an outsider and hence a danger to society, it is little wonder he would find such a problem so important, despite the fact that it was accompanied by “a hopeless feeling that any set of metaphors he might formulate would be misunderstood by the society in which he lived and, at the very best, would degenerate into stale ‘truths’ in any new society they might help make possible” (Danto, p. 42). What I find troubling about Danto’s reading here is that he believed that Nietzsche worried that his own metaphors “would yield concepts different from the ones he contested, but they would be no less binding, if successful, and no more true” (cf. BGE 296) and thus “saw inevitable failure for himself” (Danto, p. 42). Lastly, Danto commits an error of confusing the list of at least two with a list of only two; he ascribes to Nietzsche the belief in two types of humans – the rational and the intuitive – again with reference to “On Truth and Lie.” The
difference is ultimately relative, according to Danto. Artistic/intuitive activity becomes the basic way humans explore, despite the fact that such metaphysical activity results in the arbitrary, fantastic, and empty (cf. BT P §5).

Now comes Danto’s criticism of a semi-straw man, to which he replies with what Nietzsche might have said. Danto finds absurd the claim that “every sentence is metaphorical, each sentence is deviant,” and says that Nietzsche might reply by saying “Metaphors are sentences which, at the very least, are never literally true; no sentence ever is literally true of what it is about; hence every sentence is to some extent metaphorical” and that “The demand that in addition it be literally true is a philosophical not a realistic or practical demand. The one-to-one correspondence between sentence and fact, sometimes entertained as the ideal relationship between an ideal language and the world it isomorphically mirrors, is more than will ever be required or, as he would later have said, more than is theoretically possible” (Danto, p. 43). Further, Danto claims that Nietzsche says that “every sentence is literally false” (Danto, p. 43) without citing or providing any reference to where “later” in his work he makes such a claim. Danto additionally finds that Nietzsche’s notion of metaphor is ill-defined, and that he nowhere asks what literal truth would entail for a sentence, while also claiming that Nietzsche could reply that we (presumably Danto means this ‘we’ to refer to all of humanity) lack a clear idea of literal truth and “manage well enough with our notion of metaphor” (Danto, p. 43).

Danto also makes what he characterizes as a sly suggestion “that Nietzsche’s general proposition has semi-paradoxical consequences” (Danto, p. 44). This is not sly. This is a mealy-mouthed formulation of one of the basic problems of perspectivism and related ideas. To wit: “To say that all sentences are metaphorical entails that the thesis itself is metaphorical, hence not literally true, hence literally false. So, if he is right, he is wrong,” (Danto, p. 44) despite the fact that the abolition of literal truth would also entail the abolition of literal falsity. More interestingly, Danto goes on to say that not only does he believe “Nietzsche would have
acknowledged this criticism” but he further thinks Nietzsche would have “underscored it” (Danto, p. 44). This is what seems to lead Danto’s Nietzsche to a kind of pragmatic nihilism: because there is no such thing as literal truth, “He then could ask only that men try his way, and see whether it did not enable them to get on in the world by means of it” (Danto, p. 44). Thus art in the narrow sense of paintings, music, sculpture, and such becomes merely one instance of art in the wider sense of a “transformation of experience through metaphor and analogy, image and illusion,” (Danto, p. 44). Danto goes on to presume that Nietzsche might have pointed to this “in indication of his most radical insight” (Danto, p. 44).

However, Danto seems to find this objectionable, in that it would water down and “stretch this concept [of art] to the point of ultimate debasement” despite the fact that this is frequently how philosophy deals with ordinary-language concepts (Danto, p. 44-45). While he recognizes that Nietzsche uses language in this way “to demolish barriers, to emphasize similarities that had been overlooked, and, more important, to draw attention to the real nature of the activity or thing which was typically contrasted with the activity or thing it is now said to be” and to attack conventional thought structures, Danto feels that Nietzsche “presupposes the precise concept which is under attack,” thus turning Nietzsche’s criticism of language into a circular argument. Despite this, Danto finds Nietzsche has determined a “singularly interesting idea” which he fails to deeply exploit, namely the notion that “our original and most fundamental involvement with experience is artistic and transforming” such that we are “artistically creating subject[s]” (Danto, p. 45, cf. OTL §1).

More interesting is Danto’s assertion that “it is hard to see how language could have originally been imaginative” if it is in fact the case that fantasy relies on standard usage, and that “nothing counts as a poetic response if nothing counts as a prosaic one” (Danto, p. 46). I am not entirely sure why Danto believes that imaginative use must rely on or presuppose ordinary use; this seems more like a wholesale rejection of Nietzsche’s claim that language begins as metaphor.
than an argument against it. In fact, Danto asserts without equivocation that “The first sentences uttered simply could not have been metaphors” when I have to ask how they possibly could have been anything other than metaphors. Danto only sees Nietzsche’s possible response as a weaker “they could not have been literal descriptions either” and so it is less than surprising that Danto believes such a claim would be unsupportive of his Nietzsche’s belief that “metaphors and straightforward uses are conceptual interdependencies” (Danto, p. 47). Following this, Danto offers an analogy between dreams and painting because of imagery, as well as analogies between Cartesian and Freudian accounts of dreams, and imaging and wish-fulfillment.

The way in which philosophers and others contrast dreams with waking life is apt to cause problems, not the least because we tend to equate waking life with veracity and dreams with illusion. Since Descartes we have attempted to discern the difference between the two, with the primary objective being the search for a proof that there is at least some experience which is not illusory; even ordinary people distinguish between the two states freely and treat dreams as an interruption of real life: “The real business of life is conducted in the intervals between dreams’ (Danto, p. 53). Danto goes on to connect this to Nietzsche’s work through BT 4 especially; saying that “‘empirical reality’ has no ultimate existence anyway, being our own creation” and that because of this “The question as to whether we experience reality or suffer illusion is gratuitous, and the difference which vexes us is between illusion pure and simple, which is what our waking life is, and illusions within illusion, which is what dreams are” (Danto, p. 53-4). From BT 4, Danto concludes that dreams are more valuable than life because they meet some unarticulated need for illusion, and which in turn explains the value of art that similarly meets this need. Interestingly, Danto finds that Nietzsche is sometimes more specific about what he means when Danto’s Nietzsche says that all experience is illusory (a claim I reject), “only that temporal, spatial, and causal concepts have application to it or, to put it another way, that we perceive things in space and time” (Danto, p. 54), an over-simplification of the Kantian treatment of space
and time wherein the two forms of intuition become ‘mere illusions’ rather than the very conditions for our ability to know objects at all.

Danto further construes naturalism as aesthetic Socratism. Socrates’s mistrust of the poets was because of their inability to give reasons, or instinct without insight. Socrates may have been the turning point of human history but he was still causing the decline of Greek tragedy because the two were interconnected. Interestingly, at this point Danto states this: “Despite the artistic (or anti-artistic) consequences of Socratism, Nietzsche expresses an almost unqualified admiration for its rational achievement” (Danto, p. 59) because without it humankind would have weakened and become mere barbarism (cf. BT 15). This is important to remember because Danto explicitly states that “because neither here nor in any later work was Nietzsche ever hostile to rationality or to science, and he never regarded either of them as inimical to ‘life’” and “never opposed art in the narrow sense against art in the wide sense – the latter counting science as one of its forms” (Danto, p. 59-60) – a rather sweeping claim to let go without citations, but we all know the trouble of trying to prove a negative. However, Danto later does state that there were circumstances in which reason could be opposed to life (Danto, p. 81), which directly contradicts this statement.

At any rate, instead of reason and science contrasting with life, Danto sees the contrast as “always between suffering and exultation, between barbarism and civilization” because science is always for enhancing life just as much as art (Danto, p. 60). The problem with Socratism, then, is the fact that it reserves this instrumentality for reason alone, to the exclusion of art and all else,

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83 I refer here to the anecdote regarding the philosopher who claimed there were no black swans; I believe European colonialism in Australia eventually revealed this claim to be false. The problem, then, is that a negative statement always looks true until counterevidence arises, though I feel sure there is a more rigorous treatment of this problem elsewhere. My point here is simply that a different reading may find some of Nietzsche comments to be exactly hostile to science and rationality, and to find both inimical to life, and in fact I do think such readings exist and could be feasible, particularly given Nietzsche’s critique of the will to truth where such can be at the expense of life-affirmation (BGE, I think), and given his suggestion that some falsehoods might be necessary for life or at least certain forms of life (see also BGE, probably near the beginning?).
for all else is illusory; the fact that Nietzsche sees science as similarly illusory to art means that art and science must be judged on a different scale from the Socratic distinction between illusion and reality. Danto’s Nietzsche thus sees reason as merely one tool among many for coping with the fearful nature of life, and hence as a limited tool; further, Danto’s Nietzsche is already “singularly skeptical” of “our cognitive claims” and accepting of the Nihilistic doctrine that “the world, in contraposition to an old empiricist idea, is in effect a blank tablet upon which we make imprints” (Danto, p. 61). However, due to Nietzsche’s falling out with Wagner, Danto believes we see Nietzsche’s estimate of the arts decline, in part because of the high demands Nietzsche makes for art in his first book: “In the end, Nietzsche was left with his own skeptical conclusions, and one might truly describe his intellectual activity from this point on as a quest for a philosophy to fill the space left empty by art” and which religion could not fill, so Nietzsche turned to the natural sciences (Danto, p. 61) and entered what Danto and others have called his positivistic period or phase (Danto, p. 69, see also Young, p. 221-2).

Danto’s conclusion transitions into a discussion of perspectivism, and how Birth of Tragedy leads into it: quote from end of BT P2, “to view science through the lens of art, and art through the lens of life.” Danto takes this to mean that Nietzsche aimed “to appreciate the role human practice plays in the furtherance and enhancement of life” despite its illusory nature (Danto, p. 67). However, “All of life rests upon appearance, art, illusion, optics, the necessity of error and the perspectival” (cf. BT P5), and Danto reads this as meaning “We score the blank surface of reality with the longitudes and parallels of concepts, but the concepts and ideas are ours, and they have not the slightest basis in fact” (Danto, p. 67), which strikes me as taking a deflationary thesis about metaphysics and turning it into a concrete metaphysical dogmatism, much the way Danto turns eternal recurrence into a physics and an ontology. Danto takes this to be Nietzsche’s doctrine of Perspectivism, central to his early book and never repudiated by Nietzsche.
§5 Danto’s Perspectivism

Before beginning Danto’s third chapter, “Perspectivism,” I have to point out that it baffles me that Danto writes this whole book without ever referencing GM III:12. It has always seemed to me that Nietzsche makes his ideas concerning perspective most explicit in this passage, and while Danto does reference other portions of the *Genealogy*, he never once hits on this key section. I suspect this could be the primary reason Danto mistakes perspectivism for a nihilistic relativism.

Danto begins the third chapter by establishing that for Nietzsche, all humans, even the supposedly tough Greeks, have needed the consolation and healing provided by various means. Art, religion, even philosophy, each of which is untruthful, still have been instrumental for this need. Nietzsche considered science for a time during his positivistic period as a means to the real nature of the world and a way of giving meaning to life (Danto, p. 69, see HATH 24 and 29). Furthermore, Danto’s Nietzsche sees himself as a scientist of the origins of thought, with one working proposition that “religion, metaphysics, morality, and art rest on errors and originate in fear” (Danto, p. 69), and therefore we need not take them seriously. Additionally, we neutralize their poisons “by showing how the problems and solutions to which they gave rise ever came about,” a “methodological device” Nietzsche “employed constantly” (Danto, p. 70).

Therefore, much like the Pyrrhonian skeptics of ancient Greece, Nietzsche sought not to solve the metaphysical problems of the ages, “but rather to show how these quarrels might have arisen,” such that “a philosophical problem is a question not to be answered but to be overcome,” and at the time Nietzsche believed he could do this through science (Danto, p. 70). Danto states that Nietzsche sees the value of science, even describing himself as a scientist, because of

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84 We might call this science the genealogy of thought.
science’s uniquely dry & clear atmosphere for thought, but Danto is careful to point out that “Nevertheless, science was not immune to the corrosiveness of his analysis, and he became increasingly persuaded that science, as well as its cultural rivals, rested on errors, accepted (as it has to) fictions which it took for truths and metaphors which it honored as description” (Danto, p. 71, cf. BGE 204). To think that science is truthful is just as naïve as thinking that art or religion is, and with each of these “alternative modes of thought” Nietzsche considered replacing “with science, the question became for him whether one could deny the basic propositions of science and still manage to survive. This was the problem, essentially, of viewing science ‘through the lens of life’” (Danto, p. 71).

Now Danto does something academically disingenuous: he explicitly refers to Birth of Tragedy but cites the Nachlass instead. This is at least accidentally misleading, and is a demonstration of poor scholarship if not something worse. Despite this, I do agree with the following remarks Danto makes: “The criterion was always and only whether any of the structures which science exemplified enhanced and facilitated life. More than this, he felt, one could not claim, and more than this one should not need” (Danto, p. 71-2). Whether Danto means that ‘should’ in the sense of moral imperative or psychological likelihood is unclear, but I feel Nietzsche may have meant both. Furthermore, Danto goes on to find that “To demand that science be true is to expose oneself to question whether ‘truth’ means anything more than the facilitation of life” and that Nietzsche later advances “a pragmatic criterion of truth: \( p \) is true and \( q \) is false if \( p \) works and \( q \) does not” (Danto, p. 72). At this point, I am still uncertain if this is really all there is to Nietzsche’s criterion for truth, but I will explore this issue at length in my final chapters.

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86 By which Nietzsche suggests we judge science and art among other things.

87 Nietzsche indicates that our pursuit of science morally should facilitate and enhance life in GS §12 and that it psychologically should do so in GM III §23.
Danto seems to want to characterize perspectivism as a “peculiar form of skepticism which is not only central to his thought but also exceptional in the extremes to which he carried it” (Danto, p. 72). Danto’s Nietzsche says “that no distinction which we make, even the plainest distinction between thing and thing, has the slightest basis in reality,” and that “There are no distinctions between things because the concept of thinghood is itself already a fiction,” and further that he considers this belief a “Dionysiac insight” (Danto, p. 72). However, attaching value to life means we must also attach value to whatever makes life possible, and “this is the only criterion he would allow” (Danto, p. 72). Anything failing to meet this criterion must be thrown away because “the question is not whether they are true but whether we should believe them, and why” (Danto, p. 72), which some might characterize itself as a Socratic, reason-seeking motivation, and which Danto characterizes as always psychological.

Danto next explains the Ordinary View of Truth, also known as the Correspondence Theory of Truth, and Nietzsche’s rejection thereof (with which I agree, more or less):

Philosophers and plain men alike are inclined to believe that there is an objective order in the world, which is antecedent to any theories we might have about the world; and that these theories are true or false strictly according to whether they represent this order correctly. The conception of an independent and objective world structure, and the conception of truth which states that truth consists in the satisfaction of a relationship of correspondence between a sentence and a fact, are views which Nietzsche rejects.

Danto, p. 72

Further, Danto thinks Nietzsche is unique in the lengths to which he carried these views, perhaps because for one he would question the contrast other philosophers might make between commonsense and philosophical questions, as well as because other philosophers might suppose philosophical theory unimportant for practical life, whereas Nietzsche took the connection between the two much more seriously. Especially important for Danto’s Nietzsche is the fact that many philosophers take the commonsense world for granted as a starting point, when they should have looked at the possibility that we humans are the creators of this commonsense world of
appearance rather than the discoverers: “So common sense is an interpretation (as Nietzsche will call it), not something with which interpretations contrast” (Danto, p. 74). Like all else, commonsense is one more metaphor made routine.

In particular, Danto’s Nietzsche has “a complicated attitude toward commonsense” because it is “a tissue of errors and false beliefs, an interpretation only, without the slightest correspondence to reality” but at the same time it is the kind of error without which we cannot life and therefore “relative to any other interpretation we are obliged to say that common sense is true” (Danto, p. 74, cf. NL 814, 915). Therefore, rejecting common sense in favor of other schemas will fail to work inasmuch as common sense is what allows humans to survive, and alternative schemas could either less dangerously be something we can survive without or more dangerously be something we could not survive having. I would interject here that just because common sense works does not mean all other systems will fail to work; this kind of dualistic reduction is characteristic of Danto’s treatment of Nietzsche.

Danto defines Nietzsche’s characterization of ‘truth’ as follows: a set of errors without which our kind of organic creature could not survive (Danto, p. 74, rephrasing Danto’s explicit definition of falsity). However, Danto goes on to say that Nietzsche therefore believes that nothing is true and everything is false in the “more conventional sense of expressing what is the case” (Danto, p. 75), and while Danto claims Nietzsche says this time and again, he again provides no citation. Thus, with regard to conventional truth, common sense is false because everything is false, but with regard to survival, common sense is true in the only sense that matters. I do agree that there are such multiple uses of truth and falsity within Nietzsche, but I think Danto is off-base to presume that it all reduces to a binary system.

Interestingly, for Danto’s Nietzsche “It is a mistake to say that the problem of truth is exclusively of philosophical import. It is of most vital significance to get it right” (Danto, p. 75).
Likewise, Danto recognizes that the dismissal of the apparent world in favor of some other world has had many forms:

This other world may be the noumenal world, the kingdom of heaven, Nirvana, Brahma, the universe of pure Forms, or what you will. Insofar as metaphysicians demand that, as a price for a different world, we turn our backs on this one, they are, Nietzsche insists, demanding that we turn our backs on life. Even though this world is made by us, and has certainly no more substance than any proposed alternative, it is the one in which we are able to live.

Danto, p. 75

I would add that this is only so far as we know right now. Nietzsche’s experimental attitude inclines me to believe that we could create other survivable worlds as well, such as the world of the Übermensch. Thus the importance philosophical questions have is one of immediate relevance to practical life, and the different struggles to answer those questions Danto relates to Nietzsche’s vision of will struggling against will which is at the bottom of his doctrine of will to power.

Unlike many philosophers, Nietzsche does not defend commonsense against philosophy but sets it up as one of many possible interpretations; Danto uses an analogy with different geometrical systems to illustrate his take on this point:

The question sometimes arises to which of these geometries [including but not limited to Euclidean geometry] correctly describes the geometry of the physical world; a Nietzschean answer would be that not one of them does, for the world has no geometry to describe. So with philosophies, including that of common sense. There is no real world structure of which each of these is an interpretation, no way the world really is in contrast with our modes of interpreting it.

Danto, p. 76

Danto moves on to quote NL 903 “There are no facts, only interpretations,” and NL 705 “As though there would be a world left over once we subtracted the perspectival!” Properly speaking, then, we cannot even say that interpretations ‘distort’ reality, “for there is nothing that counts as a veridical interpretation relative to which a given interpretation could distort: or every
interpretation is a distortion, except that there is nothing for it to be a distortion of’ (Danto, p. 77).

Thus, the analogy with geometries demonstrates that correctness has to do with what works, or in other words, Danto’s Nietzsche’s sole criterion for truth is instrumentality.

Now begins one of the most worrisome paragraphs in this book: “The doctrine that there are no facts but only interpretations was termed *Perspectivism,*” (Danto, p. 77, cf. again NL 903) whereas I see the central doctrine as GM III:12: all knowledge is necessarily from a perspective. Danto goes on to note some of the “logical features” of perspective, namely that “we speak of seeing the same thing from different perspectives, and we might allow that there is no way to see the thing *save* through a perspective and, finally, that there is no one perspective which is privileged over any other,” though he does not cite these elaborations, and then again does not cite when he claims that “The only difficulty here is in talking about the ‘same thing’ on which these are different perspectives” (Danto, p. 77). I note now only that the absence of privilege for any perspective is what reduces this treatment of perspectivism to a relativism.

Danto’s conclusion that this is because “We can meaningfully say nothing, then, about whatever it is on which these are perspectives” (Danto, p. 77) is troubling, because it seems to me that Nietzsche finds meaning only existing within perspective; to try to establish meaning outside of perspective is nonsensical at best. Further, the fact that Danto goes on to conclude that “Because we cannot appeal to any fact independently of its relation to the perspective it is meant to support, we can do little more than insist on our perspective, and try, if we can, to impose it on other people,” (Danto, p. 77) is troubling as well, for several reasons.

First of all, it is inconsistent with his own claim that there are no facts and even if they were they could not be used to ‘support’ perspectives, whatever that means. Secondly, Danto’s wish to connect everything to will-to-power has led to a barbaric sort of ‘blonde beast’ treatment of how he thinks Nietzsche would have applied perspectivism practically, despite the fact that Danto recognizes that Nietzsche did not wish to retrogress to such an ideal. It would have been
better if Danto had continued with the practical and the biological themes of what keeps human beings alive, and thus expressly clarified that Nietzsche had at least one moral value he considered significantly non-relative (or what I might call multi-perspectival rather than objective). Thirdly, “true” redefined as use for life does allow us to speak of true perspectives and wrong or false ones do sometimes prevail over true in this sense (cf. Nietzsche’s many discussions of how religious morality is antithetical to life in *Twilight of the Idols* among other texts). Lastly, at the end of this disconcerting paragraph, I note that it seems perhaps dismissive and elitist of Danto to call common sense a herd perspective, but that may well be an accurate supposition; at this time I am unsure, but that by no means implies that herd perspectives are always bad perspectives, especially if our criterion is life. After all, herd morality has often kept herds alive, and Nietzsche knew this.

Danto does provide one citation in this paragraph – again to NL 903 – which does support a claim I believe is supportable with reference to the published work, namely that “we cannot say what it [the ‘same thing’ we discuss] is except from one or another perspective, and we cannot speak about it as it is in itself” (Danto, p. 77) because Nietzsche wrote “We cannot establish a fact *an sich*, and it is perhaps non-sense [*ein Unsinn*] to wish to do so.” This claim that we cannot talk about the *an sich* I believe to have corollaries entailing that we cannot determine whether or not the *an sich* has any ‘causality’ as we understand it. We may not claim positively that it does or negatively that it does not, since of necessity the *an sich* is unknowable, knowledge being defined as from perspective, and the *an sich* as existing outside perspective entirely. Beyond that we can really say little else at this time, and it is hard to predict how we can move beyond this issue, short of adding new sensory perception capacity to the human body by genetic or technological implant.88

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88 This perhaps demonstrates the importance of science fiction to philosophy, but I digress.
Danto next does something with which I am ready to agree: he seems to hit upon the importance of connecting perspective to lived, and maybe even embodied, experience. To wit: “We cannot speak of a perspective, of course, without relating it to the conditions of existence of the one whose perspective it is” (Danto, p. 77). While Danto may have had Kant more than feminism in mind, I think this insight may apply well to the kind of standpoint-influenced reading of perspective. However, I again disagree when Danto claims that “the only world we can significantly speak of is the world from where we are” (Danto, p. 78) because Nietzsche does speak of adopting multiple and different perspectives (GM III:12); it would be more accurate to say that we cannot significantly speak of a world viewed from no perspective or from a perspective we have not been able to adopt yet. However, I do agree that we cannot significantly speak of the ‘other’ or ‘after’ worlds of the noumenal realm, realm of the Forms, Heaven, etc., precisely because these demand the impossible non-perspective of God-like objectivity, and Danto’s citation to HATH 9 is apt: “For concerning the metaphysical world nothing could be said except that it would be a different world, but an inaccessible and incomprehensible one” (Danto, p. 78).

It baffles me that Danto now sees that common sense is of use and “not to be lightly set aside” based on his earlier claim that Nietzsche considered it herd thinking (Danto, p. 77), and I also note a poor citation-out-of-context misstep, wherein Danto seems to assert that all common sense is errors, when the passage he cites from HATH 33 only attributes erroneousness to the belief in the value and dignity of life within a certain context (Danto, p. 78). Also problematic is Danto’s uncited claim that we can only oppose common sense with dangerous alternatives, but I am inclined to accept his claim that “there remains the possibility – a dangerous [and exciting] one – that if we were differently constituted, a different perspective might be ours” (Danto, p. 78). Danto does, however, see Nietzsche as attempting to turn away from the herd in the name of life, and that he tried to demonstrate how to do so through his philosophy (Danto, p. 78-9). This
placed Nietzsche in a “complicated polemic situation” that makes it difficult for his readers to follow, because “He had at once to criticize common sense (the philosophy of the herd) and to defend it against all the traditional philosophical and religious criticisms” (Danto, p. 79).

Puzzling is the fact that Danto wants to identify both wide and narrow usages of truth, but he still characterizes this as a “seeming inconsistency” in Nietzsche’s usage, basically accusing Nietzsche of failing to keep the distinct usages separate and clear because of an inability to develop a new language to transition between the old and the new thought (Danto, p. 79-80). Erroneous is Danto’s claim that Nietzsche spoke from an “extraperspectival standpoint about perspectives” (Danto, p. 80); rather, I would say Nietzsche attempted to speak from plural perspectives, but the extraperspectival or nonperspectival perspective is by definition impossible for humans as we are right now at an absolute minimum. Again, Danto has Nietzsche as a Nihilist with no order or moral order in the world; only this time, Danto adds that Nietzsche wants to say what the world is actually like, namely that it “is made up of points of origin for perspectives” and that these points are the beginning of the doctrine of will-to-power, complete with a positive metaphysics (Danto, p. 80). Danto also attributes a “twofold sense of metaphysics, just as there is a double sense of truth” (Danto, p. 81), which I find to be reductively dualist, and I would like to suggest that “Nietzsche’s more infuriating paradoxical utterances” would be clearer to Danto if he did not treat everything as a pair of two, but as existing on a scale or spectrum instead.

The central problem to most accusations of relativism, I think, can be encapsulated in the question Danto asks here: “Does Perspectivism entail that Perspectivism itself is but a perspective, so that the truth of this doctrine entails that it is false?” (Danto, p. 80), essentially an ouroboros of a logical paradox. In response, I must say that I think the question actually misunderstands what Nietzsche is saying about truth as definable by perspective.  

89 Precisely...
because all beliefs and knowledge claims are necessarily from perspectives, anyone who does believe in perspectivism necessarily does so from a perspective. Because truth can only be a measure from within a perspective, we can no longer use ‘false’ in the same way to refer to objective reality, but only in terms of perspectival knowledge and value. Perspectivism may turn out to be more or less palse or prue, then, dependent on how much evidence we gather that it helps perpetuate, extend, and improve life, and further may be palse for some while prue for others without devolving into relativism precisely because the same value scheme may dictate different beliefs for different people; what belief keeps you alive might kill or injure me, and *vice versa*. One question we might ask, then, is whether other value schemes can dictate different behaviors (including belief) for different individuals without lapsing into relativism.

Danto notes that while many classify Nietzsche as an anti-rationalist, “Nietzsche in fact opposes reason only when reason is opposed to life, or to whatever makes life possible” (Danto, p. 81). Danto also makes Nietzsche over into a Humean, believing reason should rule the passions; however, unlike many philosophers who have advocated a life of reason, Nietzsche opposes theories of reason which result in depreciation of the body and the senses. Hence Nietzsche is not so much an anti-rationalist as he is against the sole worship of reason to the exclusion of all else, particularly the living body. As examples of philosophers prone to this depreciation of the body or the senses, Danto indicates the Eleatic philosophers and Plato as well as Descartes. Further:

claim,” but we might also assume that such a claim has psychological efficacy in that person’s behavior and worldview, and frequently explicit and implicit belief in such claims may derive from what some of Nietzsche’s predecessors, the modern philosophers, might have called empirical experience, namely the experience that such a belief helps them stay alive and well. Therefore, a claim may be “prue” when it has perspectival truth and likewise a claim can be “palse” when it fails to have perspectival truth. Thus, we can now say that a given claim may be both prue and palse at the same time, even for the same person (who is capable of adopting different perspectives and frequently does); claims are the most prue when the most perspectives agree on the truth of such claims, and claims are most palse when most perspectives agree on the falsity of such claims. Pruth is exhibited in degrees, whether or not old-fashioned objective “Truth” could be. Because Nietzsche did not take the (somewhat questionable) step of simply inventing a new word, and tried to play with the various meanings of the old word ‘truth,’ I agree with Danto that he ended up obscuring what he meant some of the time, and it is frequently tricky to follow his various steps.
Even empiricists, who denied that we had access to any truths not based on sense experience, were sufficiently in the shadow of the rationalistic tradition to take a dim, skeptical view of the scant, uncertain knowledge afforded us only by the senses. Empirical propositions were deprecated, even by empiricists, by applying to them criteria which have proper application only to rational propositions, and which empirical ones can only fail to satisfy.

Danto, p. 82

While Danto doesn’t classify Nietzsche as an empiricist “in any reductive sense of the term,” at the same time he recognizes Nietzsche’s belief that “reason could not seriously be accepted should it propose theses contrary to the senses’ evidence – even though the relationship between our beliefs and sense experience is a complicated one”; and interestingly Danto also claims that this was Nietzsche’s belief throughout his works, and not merely in the ‘positivistic’ period of *Human, All-Too-Human* (Danto, p. 82, cf. TI III:3)

Danto finds it banal that we divide thought into the two irrationalist and rationalist trends of Existentialism versus Logical Positivism and their outgrowths. What he wants to emphasize is that “Nietzsche, who is so naturally taken as a predecessor of the irrationalistic tendency in contemporary philosophy, in his own writings exhibits attitudes toward the main problems of philosophy which are almost wholly in the spirit of Logical Positivism” (Danto, p. 83). These include Nietzsche’s policy of putting metaphysical claims ‘on ice’ (EH III HATH), or in other words undermining rather than refuting philosophical claims, precisely because refuting one claim about a problem often requires accepting another claim about a problem when what needs doing is actually extirpating the problem itself, a process which Danto finds very similar to the Positivistic claim that metaphysical problems are nonsense and pseudo-problems. Additionally, Danto claims that Nietzsche’s criterion of meaningfulness is the same as that later advocated by Positivists, namely that meaningfulness comes in terms of verifiability through sense experience.

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90 “We possess science today strictly insofar as we have decided to accept the testimony of the senses – to the extent that we sharpen, arm, and learn to think through them…The rest is miscarriage and not-yet-science. I mean metaphysics, theology, psychology, and theory of knowledge. Or else: formal science, sign-theories: Like logic and that applied logic, mathematics” – to which my conclusion is: A theory of knowledge becomes science to the extent of acceptance of testimony of the senses.
and certifiability through the meanings of the words alone; Danto supports this claim with a single citation to HATH 20: “The Ding an sich is worth a Homeric laugh, since it seems to be so much, to be everything, when really it is empty – empty of meaning” (Danto, p. 83, emphasis Nietzsche’s).

Most important for Danto is Nietzsche’s preoccupation with language and how this demonstrates Nietzsche’s affinities to contemporary analytic philosophy and not just parochial Positivism; this is especially significant given the connections Danto draws between common sense and how it is expressed in ordinary language. In particular, Danto cites WS 55 “Every word is a preconceived judgment,” to support the claim that “in speaking the language we have learned from infancy, we are implicitly prescribing how the world is to be viewed and comprehended” (Danto, p. 83). More interesting is the idea that speech perpetuates philosophical errors, and Russell’s claim that we must develop new language to avoid committing ourselves to such errors before we even begin reasoning (Danto, p. 83-4). While Danto recognizes that Nietzsche did not anticipate these later discussions, he still sees Nietzsche as “unquestionably a predecessor” because of his attacks on “misleading modes of expression” and the seduction of grammar to accept certain implicit beliefs, particularly the belief that language describes the world (Danto, p. 84). Quoting WS 11: “There lies hidden in language a philosophical mythology which breaks out at every moment, however careful one might be,” as well as HATH 11, D47, and HATH 519, Danto’s Nietzsche further concludes that this and other such errors have led to the fortunate (for us) development of humans out of mere animals.

Further, language’s role in developing philosophical concepts shows when we note how philosophical concepts all grow in interconnection with one another (citing BGE 20), family-resemblances, etc., and so Danto’s Nietzsche concludes that “any world view different form our own could not be expressed in any language with the same [grammatical] structure as ours” as well as noting that we might address the “certain grammatico-philosophical elements of our
linguistic family” which strike us “as being especially pernicious intellectually, however indispensable in practice” (Danto, p. 85). Two such elements include the tendency to posit entities based on subject-verb structure and the tendency to think in terms of things (quoting TI III:5 “unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, and being”) based on verb-object structure. Along these same lines, Danto also cites TI III “I am afraid we shall not get rid of God until we get rid of grammar.”

All of this is to explain that by making the assumption “that there are objects which continue to exist between our perceptions of them, and the existence of which does not depend upon anyone’s perception,” Danto’s Nietzsche states that “common sense is asserting, implicitly, a philosophical proposition of the most audacious sort” (Danto, p. 86), and language assists through every sentence we speak (TI III) when what we should really conclude is that things are a fiction as well (NL 776), despite the fact that we need these fictions in both daily life and science (GS 112). So, while the ideas are useful, they do not denote the world, and therefore “sentences which make an essential use of them are not true because there is nothing for them to be true about” (Danto, p. 87) which seems to me to miss the point.

For example, if I point to a rhinoceros that happens to be vomiting and say “That unicorn is sick” then the sentence is not false because there is no such thing as a unicorn, but rather because the term ‘unicorn’ does not refer to the creature in question. Sentences which make essential use of things and thinghood are not false (or true) in the objective or non-perspectival sense because of the absence of things from the world, but rather because one is trying to discuss the world using terms (or more properly grammatical structures) that do not refer\footnote{This was the first verb I selected, but I am not sure ‘reference’ is the appropriate way to talk about how perspective works in this context. Other candidates include structure, organize, disclose, and reveal.} to the world in question. Furthermore, it is perfectly possible to have true sentences about things that do not exist. “Unicorns are equine creatures with a single horn protruding from the top of the head and
various magical properties” is a true sentence, regardless of the fact that to my knowledge no unicorn has ever existed beyond the pages of fiction books.

Danto’s Nietzsche also finds that such sentences have no explanatory value because they are only interpretations (BGE 14), and that even discussing atoms requires such essential reference to things which do not exist (NL 896). I am drawn to what Danto characterizes as a temptation, namely speculating “that what Nietzsche has in mind here is what philosophers of science today discuss as ‘theoretical entities’ – entities postulated by certain terms which play a highly systematizing role in the theories utilizing them, but which, if they denote any entities at all, denote unobservable ones” (Danto, p. 87). In particular, Danto wants to say that Nietzsche’s thesis is far more sweeping than this paltry claim, “Rather, all entities are in that sense theoretical, and any such reference to concrete particulars is fictive” (Danto, p. 87, cf. GS 121). Then, in a footnote, Danto does something problematic: he states that the distinction between interpretation and explanation is “obvious enough” and existing “throughout Nietzsche in one way or another” citing Daybreak p. 428, which does not seem to exist, though §428 is about demonstration versus explanation, and does not in my translations refer to interpretation at all.

Danto’s Nietzsche explains that primitive psychology leads to the grammatical structure of our language, which in turn becomes our survival mechanism or the condition for life for our species (GS 110), and so if we accept “the empiricist thesis that reliance upon the senses is indispensable for knowledge, knowledge must be understood instrumentally, and we cannot truly accept the simple empiricist account of how our knowledge develops” (Danto, p. 88, cf. BGE 20). At the same time, Nietzsche does reject some aspects of Kant’s revision of empiricism, particularly the notion of synthetic a priori judgments inherent in the human mind (BGE 11, GS 111). Danto claims that it is a “weird argument” (Danto, p. 89) to claim that generalization

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92 “Without these articles of faith [bodies, lines, surfaces, cause and effect, motion and rest, form and content], no one would be able to live! But this hardly constitutes a proof. Life is no argument. Among the conditions of life, error might be one”
requires abstraction but that abstraction takes us further from the truth of what each thing is while it make also make it easier to survive; with references to D 117, GS 110 and 265, and NL 727, Danto’s Nietzsche ultimately finds that human truth is constituted by irrefutable errors, and it is only those useful errors which allow us to stay alive and even flourish (Danto, p. 89).

Danto points out Nietzsche’s “sly points about the unreasonableness of reason,” relying on “the principle of *a minori ad majus*, that the universe can hardly be very rational if the part of it consisting of *human* reason is as unreasonable as it is” (Danto, p. 89, cf. WS 2). This is of particular interest because “we are going to find the universe rational, or logical, only to the extent that we have made it so through imposition” of our human rationality (Danto, p. 89, cf. NL 526). Logic and mathematics themselves are only psychologically derived and cannot be factual since there are no facts according to Danto’s treatment, though Danto merely states that they have “no basis in fact” (Danto, p. 89).

Danto goes on to state that Nietzsche’s argument goes as follows: accepting the claim that there are no ‘things’ consequently entails accepting the claim that there is no such thing as equality or identity, though these are necessary for logical systems; applying these systems to the world misleads humans into accepting the belief that entities or things exist, may be equal to each other, self-identical, etc. Had we known from the beginning that there were no such relationships and things in the world, we would never have created logical systems in the first place (cf. HATH 11), but philosophers should have known better (cf. NL 726). The problem with philosophy, then, is that it “turns back *against* the commonsense world in the name of concepts which are presupposed by the world of common sense – and then declares the latter to be illusory… But in fact the very things repudiated are projections of the categorical traits they are said not to exemplify. Metaphysics has repudiated the common-sense world on its own terms, by erecting a supernumerary world which is only the conceptual skeleton of the world to which it is said to be
superior and more real” (Danto, p. 90). Nietzsche’s somewhat eliminivist response is to reject the notions of both the ‘true’ and the ‘apparent’ world (cf. TI IV).

Danto now turns to a different contrast between the so-called common-sense and scientific pictures of the world, referring to Galileo and other scientists whose discoveries conflicted with what was perceivable by the unaided senses of common individuals; specifically, Danto lists the following examples: heliocentric theory, evolution, psychoanalysis, curved space, the fourth dimension, and the electronic theory of matter. Seventeenth century natural philosophers determined that observable predicates known as secondary qualities were not as real as unobservable predicates known as primary qualities; Danto connects this to Nietzsche’s attribution of the ‘true’ world of scientists in NL 704. Danto finds that nothing is “impervious” to Nietzsche’s utilitarian test of beliefs, and that the collapse of concepts would thus not dismay Nietzsche at all (Danto, p. 91), and I would only point out that this is not the usual sense of ‘utility’ but rather one more connected to the survival and flourishing of specifically human life. However, Nietzsche would not tolerate science’s boast that it had found the ‘true’ world after all when in fact it had “an ontology equally suspect with that of common sense” (Danto, p. 92).

Here is where Danto sees the main difference between Nietzsche and the Positivists, namely that Nietzsche saw science just as he did religion, art, and commonsense, as “a creative organization of the world, an arrangement which stands to observation in complicated ways,” and the scientist is no more “philosophically abreast of his own theories and discoveries” than the common individual (Danto, p. 92, cf. BGE 12), particularly because the scientist believes that the entities of scientific theory are “genuinely explanatory” (Danto, p. 93). The only significant way in which the scientist is better than a metaphysician is that the fictions of science are useful in that they “contribute to human vitality,” though Danto also believes that this means that they “increasingly make us masters over the world” because unlike metaphysics, science is not necessarily “hostile to life and this world, beckoning us on to another and better one” (Danto, p.
The only problem for Danto’s Nietzsche with science is when science claims to discover truth because “It has not done that. For there is none to discover” (Danto, p. 93).

So it sounds like Danto wants Nietzsche to be both a pragmatist, claiming that there is a (kind of) truth and that truth is defined by usefulness, and a nihilist, claiming simply that there is no truth, full stop. To my mind, these are contradictory positions, even granting Danto the wider and narrower senses of ‘truth,’ because an alethiological nihilist denies the existence of truth, and not merely the truth of one’s forebears. Further, Danto repeatedly emphasizes Nietzsche’s full denial of the existence of any truth, and does not argue that Nietzsche’s narrow versus wide definitions of truth are counterevidence against this denial. The problem with also attributing pragmatism to Nietzsche in addition to nihilism is that alethiological pragmatism does seem to require belief that some working form of ‘truth’ exists, regardless of what non-useful definitions of ‘truth’ there might be. Nihilism rejects that baseline belief about truth, and thus the positions are inconsistent. When Danto addresses this and other seeming inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s thought, he attributes them more to a problem with Nietzsche than with a problem with his own interpretive strategy.

Danto believes the third chapter suffices to clarify the general outlines of perspectivism, despite the fact that Danto recognizes that Nietzsche “did not work it out with any rigor, or in great detail, but he thought it through consistently in a number of areas and applications” (Danto, p. 93). Regardless, this leaves us with the many remaining problems of philosophy; Danto begins with a discussion of Nietzsche’s treatment of causality, which he finds strikingly similar to Hume’s. Note that there are few references to Hume in Nietzsche, and that there are several differences between the two authors Danto is careful to share, beginning first with a few similarities, and then stating: “Nietzsche believed, as Hume should have, that the concept of causality has no application outside our experience, so that the notion of ‘objective cause’ must be strictly meaningless if it suggests something any different from what the word has been
analyzed to mean in terms of experience. But, as so typically happened when Nietzsche wrote, he expressed his views in an objective mode by saying, simply, that there are no causes in the world” (Danto, p. 94, emphasis mine, cf. D 121). To this I would add the caveat ‘of which we know or are capable of knowing from current perspectives’ or something similar.

Then Danto describes a deviation, from NL 876 and 501, wherein Nietzsche differs from Hume by conceiving of habit as not merely individualistic, and secondly because of Nietzsche’s tendency to find that we frequently reverse cause & effect, thinking of the effect as the purpose of the cause (Danto, p. 95). Danto takes this to an extreme, saying Nietzsche believes we are locked into our perspective; causality as derived from human self-projection is based on a mythopoetic process of generalization which allows us to create ‘things’ – hence “The concept of causality is therefore a fiction because it logically depends upon fictions” (Danto, p. 95). Referring to Beyond Good and Evil as always representing Nietzsche’s “maturest philosophy” (Danto, p. 95), and citing §21, Danto finds an extremely radical view exceeding even Kant: “the Ding an sich is precisely a notion Nietzsche wants to ‘freze,’ for it leads to a debasement of the ‘apparent world’” (Danto, p. 95). Similarly, Danto sees Nietzsche exceeding Spinoza by freezing substance along side the Ding an sich.

Despite all this, Danto does not think Nietzsche was either an idealist or a phenomenalist because he still felt “that there was a world which remained over, tossing blackly like the sea, chaotic relative to our distinctions and perhaps to all distinctions, but there nevertheless” (Danto, p. 96). I disagree with Danto’s claim that Nietzsche was to any extent “seduced by his own arguments,” but I do recognize that there might be a problem if it turns out to be true that because Nietzsche “wanted to say that all our beliefs are false, he was constrained to introduce a world for them to be false about; and this had to be a world without distinctions, a blind, empty, structureless thereness,” a belief Nietzsche “never surrendered,” and contra Leiter, Clark and
Danto believes that Nietzsche was in the end in fact beginning to speculate about what could be said about the real world after all (Danto, p. 96).

Such a world would require a completely different language with a completely different metaphysical grammar, according to Danto’s Nietzsche, who “never sought for a new language,” and Danto says this despite what comes in his very next breath: “although I believe sometimes that his frenzied employment of poetic diction, his intentionally paradoxical utterances, and his deliberately perverted use of terms might be taken in the spirit of the Zen *koan*, calculated to crack the shell which linguistic habit has erected between ourselves and reality and to expose us to open seas” (Danto, p. 97). Danto goes on to claim that any such invented language would be impossible to understand and that there could be no bridges or translations between this and such a language (Danto, p. 97-8). Even new terms become difficult within the new language because ostensive definition requires pointing out things. At the same time, however, Danto’s Nietzsche still believes in a “primal, undifferentiated *Ur-Eine*, a Dionysiac depth” (Danto, p. 97). Regardless, I would suppose that one possible new kind of definition might get around the problem of ostension and a lack of things at which to point; in particular, stipulative definitions might help, especially given that the whole new language would have to be stipulated *in toto*. I do see Danto’s point that it would be exceedingly difficult to translate between a language which presupposes things and a language which does not, I just do not know that this means translation would be impossible, nor that Nietzsche suggests such impossibility.

Danto believes Nietzsche had far more interest in pointing out the fictive nature of our core beliefs than in describing the world as it is: “He was less interested in saying what was true than in telling what was false” (Danto, p. 98). The end of the chapter includes the notion that Nietzsche believed we should experiment with new systems of thought, language, and

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philosophy. Indeed, what Danto identifies as the ‘deep’ sense of truth, namely correspondence theory, “is perhaps not very important and possibly not at all useful,” (Danto, p. 99) citing GS 110: “Truth is the most impotent form of knowledge. Instrumental truth, however, is crucial for life, and it is this more shallow meaning of truth which Danto sees both as liberating for Nietzsche and as his means for transforming humanity “into fantastically more vital creatures” (Danto, p. 99).

Before moving on to the final chapters, I would like to first note that it is presumptuous of Danto to reduce the deep sense of truth to correspondence and to state that the pragmatist or instrumental theory of truth is a more shallow sense; it seems that one problem is that there are several alethiological theories competing to fulfill the deep and shallow senses of truth, though some of those theories may deny the value of multiple senses therefore. Second, we should be wary of attributing value to the deep and less or a lack of value to the shallow for Nietzsche, particularly given his praise or at least appreciation for the surface and superficial (see for example GS §13, 354, and 373). Third, we should also be wary of seeing the senses of truth as solely dichotomous as Danto seems to do; there are not merely wider and narrower or shallower and deeper senses of truth, there are also middling senses and extreme senses as well, or at least so I suppose.

§6 Danto’s Psychologies, Religion, and Moralities
Danto opens the fourth chapter with one more reformulation of his definition of perspectivism: “that what passes at any time for knowledge is but a confection of simplifications and falsifications, brought forth out of ourselves, by means of which we may house ourselves in the blank, indifferent universe” (Danto, p. 100), but Danto believes despite citing three examples that “There are surprisingly few arguments in Nietzsche’s writings to sustain these conclusions with which, by now, the reader hardly can be unfamiliar” and “Even when support of one or
another sort is offered, it often consists in an appeal to facts about which, outside the context of
the argument, Nietzsche could, and sometimes does, raise at least as many doubts” (Danto, p.
101). Where Higgins sees Nietzsche skillfully shifting perspective (see *Comic Relief*), Danto
accuses Nietzsche of “irresponsible shifting of ground, and an infuriating skeptical jugglery”
(Danto, p. 101). Further, Danto finds that Nietzsche has “ruled out” justification and so any
justification whatsoever becomes possible without any rhyme or reason (Danto, p. 101). While
we might agree with Danto that “Nietzsche was in no sense the circumspect epistemologist,”
(Danto, p. 101), some of Danto’s judgments seem either too quick, too harsh, or both.

More accurate is Danto’s recognition that Nietzsche saw a quest for certainty as a sign of
weakness (cf. 347, p. 101), but it is baffling that Danto both sees that Nietzsche has his own new
notions of truth and falsehood but still calls him a nihilist (Danto, p. 102). Nietzsche does not
permit himself the “comfort” of bedrock assumptions which are impervious to doubt (Danto, p.
102-3), and I find very interesting Danto’s supposition that “unless something is taken as certain,
nothing can be seriously doubted” (Danto, p. 103). Danto describes Nietzsche’s self-identification
as a psychologist, and as examples of “Nietzsche’s sure diagnostic hits” he mentions “Some of
the things he says about sex, for example, that most canvassed of psychological topics, go beyond
what many thinkers have come to believe” (Danto, p. 103-4). Whether this is an obscure
reference to Nietzsche’s purported misogyny or something else is unclear, but Danto wants to
focus more on Nietzsche’s analysis of so-called logical behavior, which Danto finds
complementary to perspectivism, as well as religious and moral theses.94

Despite Nietzsche’s self-identification as a psychologist, he still found contemporary
psychology to be flawed due to moral prejudices (cf. BGE 23), and this problem existed even in

94 Note that Danto refers to these as “a cluster of circularities” – is this a logical criticism? “Our
psychological theories are part of our perspective; but our perspective is to be explained with reference to
psychological phenomena which are part of it. Our moral attitudes are responsible (in part) for the
perspectives we seek to impose, including our psychologies; but psychology is appealed to in explanation
of having the moral perspectives” (Danto, p. 104). It seems like causal rather than logical circularity, a
feedback loop.
Descartes; psychic atomism as derived from Christianity led to meaningless oppositions and dualisms, and:

It is always more or less Nietzsche’s predictable view that distinctions between inner and outer, between matter and mind, and comparable polarities, come to nothing; and that, being logically correlative with one another, any attempt to deny the reality of one pole at the expense of the other is meaningless. One must accept either both or neither of these antitheses; and Nietzsche always presses for neither, virtually as though it were his methodological directive to abolish distinctions whenever found.

Danto, p. 104-5

Rather, my position is that Nietzsche can be more accurately described as rejecting dualism in favor not of nihilism but rather of pluralism, though I agree with Danto that something similar to the following is true: “Whatever description [if any] he will finally give of reality as he sees it, it will at least have to be neutral to any of the distinctions we are accustomed to draw” (Danto, p. 105). The upshot of this is that without the mind/matter distinction, there is no psyche for psychology; instead, psychology concerns itself with how we organize our lives.

Ultimately, this view Danto finds to be the most harmonious with contemporary thought, in particular citing J. L. Austin, Wittgenstein, and P. F. Strawson. And while Danto states that “It is philosophical disingenuously to raise doubts about the external world on the basis of consciousness and our purported intimate relationship with, and epistemologically superior access to, our own states of mind. Yet Nietzsche draws some consequences from this analysis which later philosophers would disagree with in all likelihood” (Danto, p. 122). Nietzsche in particular differs from other philosophers in that he does not consider ordinary language a departure from more esoteric metaphysics; rather, Danto’s Nietzsche finds that philosophy “has been not so much a deviation from ordinary usage as a projection of the grammatical structure of ordinary language onto the neutral screen of reality” (Danto, p. 122). Thus we are all under great pressure to conform and are left without a means for communicating non-normative experiences (Danto, p.
123), a claim which all sounds rather like some feminist critiques of patriarchal linguistic structures.

Thus Danto finds that “Nietzsche must then himself felt constrained, through the logic of his position, to develop new terms to give odd and special twists of meaning to old terms, to warp common speech or the hammer out a whole new tongue” (Danto, p. 123). Translation back into banal ordinary language would thus cheapen Danto’s Nietzsche’s thought, and he therefore felt he would be at best understood only poorly by his contemporaries. So Nietzsche tried to speak to future generations⁹⁵ (Danto, p. 123-4). “Knowledge” can no longer mean the same thing; Danto’s Nietzsche’s definition of das Bekannte “is only ‘that to which we are accustomed, so that we no longer wonder at it; the commonplace, any kind of rule which is fixed, whatever we are at home with” (Danto, p. 124, cf. GS 355). Despite Nietzsche’s rejection of utilitarianism,⁹⁶ Danto finds that Nietzsche defines both truth and knowledge with relation to utility (Danto, p. 124).

Additionally, Nietzsche describes knowledge as ‘false’ when we treat it under the ordinary language definition of correspondence while he at the same time finds the errors of knowledge pragmatically ‘true’ insomuch as those errors are useful; this flexibility is both liberating and terrifying for Danto’s Nietzsche at the same time (Danto, p. 124). Nietzsche’s analysis of dreams also connected to the discussion of perspective and knowledge within psychology. In particular, note the discussion of ‘imaginary causes’ (Danto, p. 125, cf. NL 732, HATH 13, D 119, TI V:4, NL 442) and how it has a much wider application than merely to dreams; to be specific, Danto finds that these arguments also apply to the distinction between the real world and the world of appearance (Danto, p. 127, cf. NL 442, 673, TI P). The destruction of the duality shows that inner and outer are merely correlative, and hence Nietzsche’s perspectivism and psychology internally relate (Danto, p. 128, cf. NL 667, D 48).

⁹⁵ My hope is that we have no begun to transition into these future generations.
⁹⁶ See GM I:2, p. 25-6. At a moral level, Nietzsche rejects utility as being too remote a concern to account for human action; similarly, at the epistemological level, Nietzsche rejects utility as equally too remote to account for human judgment.
Danto concludes by going too far: “The world has no rational structure other than what we have given to it, recapturing with a philosophical left hand what we have given with a psychological right one” (Danto, p. 128). Rather, I would say that we cannot know whether there is structure beyond our perception in part because we structuring perceivers. Where Higgins sees skill, Danto sees “lapses,” of Nietzsche’s critical insight, “sheer dramatization,” and “verbal perversity” as “tiresome philosophical jokes” when Nietzsche discusses the irrationality of reason and other such seeming contradictions (Danto, p. 128). Despite the fact that reason, truth, knowledge, etc. are all airy fictions of our own creation, Danto’s Nietzsche claims that we cannot abandon them and we are incredibly lucky to have made these mistakes. Ultimately our goal is to find out what moral prejudices still obstruct and deform our perceptions, as when the Church denied the elliptical as opposed to circular movement of heavenly bodies (Danto, p. 129). With this, Danto turns to Nietzsche’s moral critiques.

Danto’s chapter on morality opens with two statements making very different claims: “It is not a criticism of the beliefs we hold regarding the world when one says that all of them are false” and “It is not the fact that they are false to which Nietzsche objects when he considers these beliefs critically” (Danto, p. 130). The first statement is very broad, the second very narrow; and while one might object to the first, I find the second to be true. Nietzsche’s primary objection, in my opinion, is that certain beliefs may be damaging to human flourishing and even to the survival of the species. Danto arrives at a similar conclusion first going by way of contemporary theory, finding that Nietzsche’s primary criticism of flawed beliefs has to do with second-order beliefs or beliefs about beliefs, particularly the belief that our beliefs should be true, that they ought to correspond to facts. Thus, Danto finds that “The fact that our beliefs are false relative to that theory of truth (the Correspondence Theory) in accordance with which we demanded that they be true, is perfectly irrelevant as to whether we should hold these beliefs” (Danto, p. 130). Correspondence ultimately does us little to no good in an anti-realist ontology, and the falseness
of a belief in correspondence theory is therefore not a good reason to abandon that belief. The pay-off comes when Danto reaches the claim that we should only abandon the expectation of correspondence, because the real value of beliefs lies in their perpetuation of life (Danto, p. 130, cf. BGE 4). Thus Danto finds that Nietzsche is not attacking common sense but rather the philosophical justifications added onto common sense beliefs; in short, “Nietzsche’s polemic has been with philosophers” (Danto, p. 131).

Philosophers supposedly strive for rigor and caution, but Danto’s Nietzsche claims that especially the earlier philosophers failed to accomplish this goal: “earlier philosophers were slack: they never really succeeded in calling into question, or even recognizing for what they were, the deep falsehoods and unexpendable fictions which were worked out in the predawn of the human mind. Consequently, philosophers were locating their foundations upon foundations already there, so to speak, their edifices conforming to a conceptual geography laid down by the primitive mentality, and so familiar as not to have been detected as even present” (Danto, p. 131, cf. BGE 3, 5, and 6). Indeed, the claim that every philosophy is the confession of its originator seems especially true of moral philosophy for Danto’s Nietzsche, despite their attempts to make a science of morality. Part of the problem is that our moral claims are interpenetrated with our factual claims about perception, and vice versa (Danto, p. 132).

Danto’s Nietzsche objects that it is our beliefs about our beliefs which are problematic: “Philosophers might acknowledge that they are lobbying and not reporting” when they moralize (Danto, p. 133). Of course, moralizing, preferring, and valuing are all just what life is, and our so-called moral discoveries are just discoveries about ourselves rather than discoveries about the world because there is no such thing as moral phenomena, just interpretations thereof (Danto, p. 133, cf. BGE 108, TI VI:1). Danto takes this to be a special instance of Nietzsche’s more general thesis that there are no facts at all, “But it is as though his entire general philosophy was a preparation for this application” (Danto, p. 133). Again, Danto’s Nietzsche’s goal is meta: he
wants us to jettison our meta-ethical beliefs concerning how we justify our moral beliefs, while
still retaining those moral beliefs which survive revaluation.

Despite the fact that Danto says Nietzsche wants us to abandon our second-order beliefs
he still writes, point blank, that “There is no constraint to the abandonment of beliefs,” (Danto, p.
134) presumably referring only to first-order beliefs. While I agree with Danto that Nietzsche
sees in his revaluation the opening up of “the possibility that an entirely different kind of
justification might allow us a choice among moralities far wider than we had imagined,” (Danto,
p. 134), I disagree that this does not entail rejecting any of our current beliefs, precisely because if
we find that other justifications allow us such a choice between moral systems, we would end up
rejecting some previously held beliefs in favor of others.

However, I do agree with Danto that “the critique of moral systems, which Nietzsche
sustained during his productive period was not incompatible with his fierce and militant advocacy
of the overthrow of one morality and the acceptance of another” (Danto, p. 134). In other words,
criticizing morality is compatible with advocating overthrowing one moral system in favor of
another. I would even take this further, and claim that criticizing axiology is just as compatible
with advocating overthrowing on axiological scheme in favor of another, and this applies within
feminist criticisms as well. Danto sees this as Nietzsche basically playing two roles, namely that
of moral critic and moralist. As an immorralist or moral critic, Nietzsche scrutinized moral
systems specifically and morality generally, but as a moralist he would sometimes advocate
certain moral principles himself by condemning or endorsing various claims (Danto, p. 134-5).
Thus Danto has Nietzsche as sometimes speaking from an extramoral position, and at other times
speaking from contramoral positions.

This is where Danto connects Nietzsche to Hume more extensively. First he reviews the
naturalistic fallacy, wherein one derives a moral prescription from a factual (and presumably non-
moral) description; an argument is not fallacious according to this scheme if the facts from which
one derives the prescription are themselves moral facts. However, Danto’s Nietzsche denies the
very existence of such moral facts, and finds that the distinction between non-moral and moral
facts is metalinguistic (Danto, p. 135-6). Danto then proceeds to explain how Nietzsche
accounted for moral interpretations, noting that Nietzsche was concerned with the “value of
value” (Danto, p. 136, cf. NL 480, see also NL 485 and BGE 4). In particular, Danto cites the
following claims: Morality is just obedience to custom (Danto, p. 136, cf. D 9), and custom may
not have any intrinsic use, but customs *qua* custom are useful in a way because “Any rule is
better than none” (Danto, p. 137, citing D 16). Morality, however, does not consist solely in a set
of customs because it typically offers reasons for the rules. Nietzsche saw the actual practice of
morality as the imposition of the will to power of one upon another, but this is not how morality
typically justifies itself. Further, morality demands sacrifices of the individual, requiring her to
conform, and the group adhering to a moral system will prune those individuals who fail (Danto,
p. 137).

Nietzsche identifies these reasons as “imaginary causalities” (Danto, p. 137, D 10, see
also HATH 96) which ‘stupefy’ us (Danto, p. 138, cf. D 19). Further, while a moral system
preserves the life of the group, it can also damage or even halt the life of the individual and
“Instead of becoming a means for the successful conduct of life, it becomes a brake against the
furtherance of life and fulfillment for the living” (Danto, p. 138). What is disappointing is that in
response to Nietzsche’s claim that morality and religion belong “to a stage of ignorance at which
the concept of reality, of any distinction between imaginary and real, is lacking” (Danto, p. 138,
TI VI:1), Danto goes on to say very little that is enlightening or helpful: “In such comments one
feels a tension in Nietzsche’s thought. How, after all, can *he* distinguish real from imaginary?
What sense can he give to the notion of ‘reality’ at all except a negative and unspecifying one?”
(Danto, p. 138). Following this “general reservation,” Danto moves on to conclude that we can
easily connect Nietzsche’s views into a coherent account of morality. For one thing, the two
rhetorical questions do nothing justify the claim Danto is making, namely that Nietzsche only
gives us a negative notion of reality, and for another thing, Danto provides no explanation of what
this notion is.

Contrary to Nietzsche’s seeming barbarism, Danto finds that in actuality, “It cannot be
said that Nietzsche stood for the ‘natural’ discharge of emotional energy and a ruthless pushing
back of emotional restraint. What he did stand for is plain enough, if less exciting. He is, as usual,
employing language whose power is so in excess of the point he wishes to make that it drives him
past his message into bordering conceptual territory” (Danto, p. 147-8). Rather, Danto’s
Nietzsche advocates “a qualification on our attitudes toward the emotional and passionate side of
men. He is attacking what he takes to be a tendency to extirpate rather than to spiritualize or
discipline the passions. Philosophers, he felt, were frightened of the passions…But like any force
in nature, their danger is compensated for by their utter necessity, and the problem is essentially
how to give them form and purpose” (Danto, p. 148). So Nietzsche had two goals: one, making
the passions less frightening, and two, making the passions less dominating (Danto, p. 148, cf.
WS 37).

Danto’s Nietzsche also deviates from the ancients in that “he was not seeking a ‘formula’
for leading a happy life…[but] in breaking through to a new metaphysics and a new morality, and
he believed that this could be effected only through modifications in our emotional life and
release within us of the ‘life-conditioning’ effects” (Danto, p. 149, Danto provides no citation for
the quotes). Danto again concludes with victim-blaming: “He cannot, of course, be completely
exonerated from the misinterpretations that have been given of him. He might have said what he
meant more plainly and with less conflagrating a language…” and generally misled us about how
difficult his thought was (Danto, p. 149-50).

Nietzsche’s immoralism is thus more anti-Christianity than it is anti-morality, but I think
Danto goes again too far by saying that Nietzsche finds all morality opposed to animality (Danto,
Danto further finds that Nietzsche’s primal horde/herd has little application to contemporary society, and that master morality is not identifiable with our own heroes who only illustrate rather than creating morality (Danto, p. 160). Danto wraps up the chapter by noting that Nietzsche “Finally, as though forgetting completely his main perspectivistic message, he goes on to speak of aristocrats and slaves as natural kinds” (Danto, p. 161, citing BGE 259), as if the belief in nature subscribes one to belief in natural kinds, and as if perspectivism necessarily denies the existence of natural kinds. Further, Danto finds that “Nietzsche often falls into the stupidest errors of the social Darwinian, identifying survival with excellence,” (Danto, p. 161) when I would again say this is a failing on Danto’s reading rather than on Nietzsche’s writing, for Nietzsche frequently identifies cases of flourishing and prefers them to cases of mere survival. What happens when masters apply slave morality to themselves requires a trip into religious psychology, wherein Danto does find Nietzsche to be both “original and deep” (Danto, p. 161).

Though he did not state it, Danto seems to be moving (admittedly haphazardly) through Nietzsche’s books somewhat in order of publication; Chapter Two addresses Birth of Tragedy and some of Nietzsche’s early unpublished writings for the most part, Chapter Three Human, All-Too-Human, Daybreak, and Wanderer, Chapters Four and Five a mixture of Beyond Good and Evil, Gay Science, and Twilight of the Idols. This chapter appears to refer primarily to the Genealogy, Seven to Zarathustra and Ecce Homo, and Eight largely depends on the Nachlass. The Nachwort at the end only references BGE, and Danto appears to have left Antichrist out entirely. With the Genealogy, Danto’s Nietzsche introduces the idea that “moralties have a genealogy, which is to say that they descended and evolved and were not, as it were, handed down from on high by some supreme and superhuman giver of laws” (Danto, p. 162).

While moralities have both use and function, Nietzsche brings up the possibility that a morality can outlive its original utility, the result of which can be stunting the growth of a people.
In such a situation, as Danto’s Nietzsche believed was the case for contemporary Europe, the people need a new morality. Danto accounts for Nietzsche’s tone shifts by noting both his hope that we, or superior humans, would develop a new table of values and his diagnostic aim of determining why humanity – or at least European culture – seemed to be in decline. In **GM** Nietzsche offers a “more refined psychological analysis” than he had previously given in **BGE** (Danto, p. 163), one conclusion of which is that what is best for the most powerful individuals may not perpetuate the longest survival of the group: “These ends are neither interdependent nor, for that matter, even compatible” (Danto, p. 164), though I would add the caveat “at least not necessarily.”

Danto explores Nietzsche’s two psychological innovations, bad consciousness and *ressentiment*, as means for the slave revolt in morality; in particular, Danto’s Nietzsche explains how the slaves affect an “odd strabismus in moral optics” by getting masters to evaluate themselves from the perspective of slaves through religious doctrine (Danto, p. 164-5). Nietzsche is specifically discussing Judeo-Christian religious doctrine when he talks about slave morality; Danto takes care to note Nietzsche was not an anti-Semite but an anti-anti-Semite, but at the same time, Danto feels Nietzsche is once again to blame for his own misinterpretations: “If he was not an anti-Semite, his language is misleading to a point of irresponsibility” and it is no wonder, even plausible, that Nazis were drawn to Nietzsche.

Further, Danto claims that “the subsequent disaster of Nazism, and the semiofficial adaptation of Nietzsche as the philosopher of that ghastly movement, have given to this negligible aspect of his thought an importance quite out of proportion to its systematic relevance” (Danto, p. 166-7). By contrast, I would say that racism is highly systematically relevant for any philosopher, particularly if we take seriously the claim that philosophies are the biographies of their authors; it is no surprise we find Kantian moral theory so problematic given that it comes from the same thinker who perpetuated the notion of biological racial determinism. While I do not think Kantian
moral theory depends on racism any more than racism depends on Kantian moral theory, I suspect that the problems with both can be and frequently are interconnected.

Contrariwise, with regard to Nietzsche’s purported misogyny, Danto is mum, saying only about Schopenhauer: “If some insane dictator had come into power on a program of misogyny, and consequently been responsible for the death of six million women, we should be disinclined, supposing this man had read and been inspired by Schopenhauer, to regard that philosopher’s antipathy toward women with the indulgence we now assign it” (Danto, p. 167). Thus we may deduce that Danto regards Nietzsche’s purported misogyny in a similar light, something admitted but to be indulged, perhaps because he was a product of his time, perhaps for some more substantial reason. Note again that I reject the idea that a philosopher can be forgiven the prejudices ‘of his time’ whenever there are those within that time and place who object to those prejudices. Complete and total ignorance of counter-arguments to prejudice only mitigates the blame of the prejudiced, it does not erase it, and it is hard to believe that most well-read philosophers could be wholly ignorant of such counter-arguments.

Danto also claims must view Nietzsche’s ‘admiration’ for the aristocratic type as “something akin to the excesses we find in some of our contemporary writers on sex, who are apt to dramatize matters in proportion to the inertia they feel they must overcome as erotic reformers” (Danto, p. 169). Danto shudders at the notion of the ‘blond beast’ despite recognizing its reference to lions and Nietzsche’s inclusion of Romans, Arabs, and Vikings.97

Now consider the grammar behind the discharge of drives: “If we assume that a drive simply is discharge (as Nietzsche’s theory seems to require), and not something which is the

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97 It is strange to me that Danto thinks that if lions had been black Nietzsche would have been taken up as support for African rather than German nationalists. On the one hand, there is no single African nation but many, many African nations; had Danto said ‘Nigerian nationalism’ instead, he might have been more on point. But on the other hand, Danto is completely disregarding the historical European tendency to associate good with light, hence also gold and white, and evil with darkness. I find it highly dubious that Nietzsche’s hypothetical ‘black beast’ would have meant the same thing to Europeans or Africans that ‘blond beast’ did for German Nazis.
subject of the verb *discharge*, then there will be discharging during the time the prohibition holds; if the prohibition is obeyed, the discharge will not be against an *external* object. This leaves only the possibility of an *internal* object, the person himself, as it were, who turns his aggressive discharges inward. Intensity remains constant, only direction changes” (Danto, p. 179, cf. GM II:16). This internalization or *Verinnerlichung* helps in turn to develop consciousness as it entails a struggle of the will against itself. But Danto’s Nietzsche does not see this triumph of morality over animality as a bad thing: “Nietzsche was *not* asking for release from its cage of the beast which morality hemmed in; he was not, in the name of some specious theory of happy savagehood, urging reversion to barbarity, or to an infantile immediacy in the reduction of drives. Nietzsche was asking that we go *beyond* what we are, not *back* to what we were” (Danto, p. 180). And I am inclined to agree with this characterization of Nietzsche, though I do not agree with Danto that this entails Nietzsche’s assent to the righteousness of conventional morality.

What Danto takes as evidence that Christian morality caused much to live that should have died, I also take as evidence that humanity is not improving according to Nietzsche’s view (Danto, p. 186, cf. TI IX:14). Finally, note that Danto finds “truly incoherent” the fact that Nietzsche speaks “as though an objectively better type of being can be talked of, whereas it is wrong to take normative criteria as having the least bearing on the way things are to be judged in reality,” (Danto, p. 187). Had Danto recognized that Nietzsche was not speaking in this objective mode but rather referring to his own new standards of types of beings, perhaps Danto would not have seen this as “an unpleasantly tangled pocket in his system, and an aberration from the overwhelmingly dominant direction of his thought” (Danto, p. 187).

Once humanity became conscious, we discovered that we were in constant danger; not only were we in disharmony with nature but we were in disharmony with ourselves: “we suffer from the disparity between what we are and what we hope” (Danto, p. 189). This suffering becomes meaningful when we create religion; and while Danto is right that Nietzsche believes
any reason is better than no reason, I would also add the claim that some reasons are better than others. Also note that our instincts do not decrease but are redirected through religion. Now onto the second topic introduced above: “The ascetic ideals are only exemplified in religious life; and religion itself, as Nietzsche wishes to see it now, is only exemplified through what would in common speech be called religions” (Danto, p. 190). This broad sense allows us to see how one can be religious in a broad sense while still being antireligious in a more narrow sense; a devoted medical doctor may object to Christian Science, for example. We are still pious “insofar as we continue to believe in truth” (Danto, p. 191).

Danto proceeds to draw the inference that if God is dead, and God is truth, then truth must be dead as well, which Danto takes to be a Nietzsche’s clear statement of nihilism: “Is this not another way of stating that there is perhaps no truth, no objective order, nothing which we must acknowledge as higher than ourselves, as fixed, eternal, and unchanging? Which is nihilism?” (Danto, p. 191, cf. GS 344). By contrast, I would argue that Nietzsche’s end is not nihilism but the instatement of wholly new gods, truths, and idols. Danto also makes mention of his disagreement with Kaufmann’s claim that Nietzsche believed himself to also remain pious to the truth in a footnote on this page. Danto also cites GM III:24 and 25 to back up his claim that Nietzsche’s “ultimate question concerning truth” (Danto, p. 192) is whether we should even believe truth exists and has value; science is no help because it is just as much a mere perspective as religion is (Danto, p. 193).

Here is where I think Danto makes his essential interpretive misstep: “He had hit upon the idea that for a statement to be true, nothing need correspond to it. Then he made a metaphysical principle of this ‘not’ by saying that nothing corresponded to our proposition, so that – since they were meant to say something – all propositions were false” (Danto, p. 193). I agree that Nietzsche hits upon the idea that truth need not be mere correspondence, but I don’t think that this necessarily entailed a commitment to this negative metaphysical claim, and instead
I would say that the statement “all propositions are false” only means ‘false’ in the sense of correspondence. Despite this misstep, I feel Danto gets back on track with his recognition that Nietzsche does not want us to regress but to become creative in the face of the death of correspondence truth.

§7 Danto on the Übermensch, Eternal Recurrence, and the Will-to-Power

In the seventh chapter, Danto defines Nietzsche’s Nihilism as “his idea that there is no order or structure objectively present in the world and antecedent to the form we ourselves give it” (Danto, p. 195), whereas I would argue Nietzsche’s claim is not this form of anti-realist dogmatism Danto presents, but instead the deflationary metaphysical claim that we cannot make claims about what is objectively present in the world and antecedent to the form we ourselves give it from the position of perspectival knowledge precisely because discussion of the objective requires aperspectival or non-perspectival knowledge, an oxymoron. It is Nietzsche’s rejection of aperspectival knowledge which leads to the consequences Danto explains next.

The consequence of accepting this nihilism according to Danto’s Nietzsche is a lack of temptation to disesteem human life in favor of alternate worlds; Nietzsche’s sense of urgency was motivated by an attempt to get humanity to make more of itself than it had previously been capable because of its acceptance of false philosophies (Danto, p. 195). Thus Nietzsche’s philosophy seeks to provide affirmative ideas which motivate human flourishing; Danto identifies two primary ideas for this chapter, namely the Übermensch and eternal recurrence. Danto explains that Nietzsche selected Zarathustra as his spokesman because it was Zoroastrian religious philosophy which first made the error of supposing moral value to be an objective feature of the world; thus, to rectify this error, “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra announced the relativity of all values and moralities, saying, in various ways, that each people heretofore had adhered to a different schedule of values, worked out for them in connection with the local conditions of their
perdurance” (Danto, p. 196, cf. EH IV:3). In the face of this relativity, these thousand goals, Zarathustra proposes a single, unitary goal: the Übermensch (Danto, p. 196, cf. TSZ P3 and 1:15).

Danto seems to find frustrating the fact that “it is a goal of singular indefiniteness and unspecificity” despite Nietzsche’s contrast of the Übermensch with the “Last Man” or der Letzte Mensch “who is and wishes to be as much like everyone else as possible, and who would be happy just to be happy” (Danto, p. 197, cf. TSZ P5). Part of Danto’s frustration may be caused by his inability to identify the ‘last men’ in contemporary society, variously comparing them to the complacent, the resigned, and those who leave well enough alone, as well as those who “feel that human beings are what they are, that human nature cannot be changed,” (Danto, p. 197), the last of which being a position that some might ascribe to Nietzsche himself, and which Danto has even implied in this text (see Danto’s discussion of Nietzsche’s treatment of drives and instincts as something that cannot be changed, p. 189, 150-2, 178-80). If anything, I would say the complacent and resigned fit the category of der Letzte Mensch better than the others, and I feel that those who primarily exemplify these last humans are dogmatists of all stripes, those who believe they have a monopoly on truth and hence happiness.

Most important is Danto’s recognition that “The Übermensch is not the blond beast. The blond beast remains behind, hopefully forever. The Übermensch lies ahead” (Danto, p. 198). Danto feels it is insufficient for Nietzsche/Zarathustra to merely enjoin us to be better, and that Nietzsche ought to be blamed for leaving the specifics so open, given how Elisabeth convinced Hitler he was the Übermensch, and how later readers believed Nietzsche specifically meant one of his heroes, such as Goethe, Napoleon, or Cesare Borgia (Danto, p. 198). Danto feels Nietzsche should have made it clearer that there has never yet been an Übermensch, one Danto identifies as having great command over both intellectual and passionate internal life without the pettiness of mere humanity (Danto, p. 199, cf. TSZ II:4).
Danto identifies Nietzsche’s belief that the Übermensch was not inevitable as the reason why this ideal was not Darwinian (Danto, p. 200). Nietzsche makes much of the fact that humanity seems frequently to level off and enter stasis in the midst of its spiritual development, what I would characterize as Nietzsche’s recognition of cultural decadence or decay; at the same time, Danto’s Nietzsche believes that humanity cannot reach its final stage because no final stage exists, because if it existed humanity would have reached it already (Danto, p. 201). Danto identifies this claim as one of the consequences of eternal recurrence: “Eternal Recurrences is the idea that whatever there is will return again, and that whatever there is, is a return of itself, that it has all happened before, and will happen again, exactly in the same way each time, forever” (Danto, p. 201-2, cf. Ecclesiastes 1:9, see also TSZ III:2, III:13:2). This claim that time is a circle, without beginning or end, only the endless repetition of the same story, seems to me to contradict Zarathustra’s dialogue with his animals, but that would take a great deal of exploration to explain.

Danto states that Nietzsche seemed terrified by this most important teaching, his “most scientific of hypotheses” as well as “the highest formula of affirmation that can ever be attained” (Danto, p. 203, cf. NL 856 and EH III TSZ:I). The only places Danto identifies pronouncements of eternal recurrence in Nietzsche’s published works are in Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, Ecce Homo, and The Gay Science. Furthermore, Danto finds no argument or proof of the doctrine in these places, though there is a sketch of a book concerning eternal recurrence in the Nachlass. Evidence for the eternal recurrence would not be evidence in any simple sense, as exact resemblance to the past precludes clues to its repetition; therefore, “A simple-minded Verificationist could thus rule out the teaching as meaningless,” though such a treatment of meaning would not be profitable here (Danto, p. 204).

Danto finishes the chapter with a discussion of Nietzsche’s response to this doctrine and its position within the history of science and philosophy. Nietzsche swings between horror, 

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98 I feel Danto makes the error of many Darwinians, which is to mistake evolution for progress.
mania, and despair, because “there is no meaning to the universe if it has no end” and therefore we must give our world a goal (Danto, p. 211), hence Danto’s pairing of the Übermensch with eternal recurrence. Ultimately, Danto derives a moral imperative from these paired doctrines: “So act (or so be) that you would be willing to act exactly the same way (or be exactly the same thing) an infinite number of times over” (Danto, p. 212, cf. EH II:10, TSZ III:13:2, and related passages concerning eternal recurrence and amor fati). If we heed this doctrine, Danto’s Nietzsche believes humanity will cease feeling ressentiment and hence be liberated (Danto, p. 212-3).

The final chapter on the “Will-to-Power” begins with Danto’s explanation that he uses the phrase “Will-to-Power” throughout the book prior to explaining it because he feels much of Nietzsche’s thought would be poorly represented without reference to this doctrine, despite the fact that Nietzsche offers little explanation or emphasis on it within his published works (Danto, p. 214). In particular, Danto believes that “Nietzsche hoped to write a truly systematic work” concerning the will to power, “the constructive idea with which he was to replace all of what had heretofore passed for philosophy and much of what had passed as science,” and that Elizabeth had some justification for trying to compose Nietzsche’s notebooks into such a systematic work, though she did not succeed (Danto, p. 214). Like amor fati, eternal recurrence, and the Übermensch, Danto’s Nietzsche sees the will to power as an affirmation. Further, Danto declares it a pitfall for readers to assume that the will to power is something only blond beasts have; rather, “It is a generic trait of living creatures and, more important, it is not a drive alongside others, as for example the sex drive: the sex drive, the hunger drive, whatever drives there might be, are but modes and instances of Will-to-Power” (Danto, p. 215).

Thus Danto sees will to power as what drives are, their substance in a sense, and not something we possess but rather something that we are, and not just humans but all things: “The entire world is Will-to-Power; there is nothing more basic, for there is nothing other than it and its modifications” (Danto, p. 215). Danto’s Nietzsche is therefore the progenitor of a new ontological
concept designed to answer the question “What exists?” or “What is there?” (Danto, p. 215). Danto sees Nietzsche methodology as primarily motivated by a principle of parsimony Danto calls Methodological Monism: “Given any pair of allegedly distinct things, one must always seek to find some connecting principle in virtue of which one is licensed to treat them alike, … we press toward a single principle in connection with which all may be treated as of a piece” (Danto, p. 215-6, cf. BGE 13, 36).

Thus Danto’s Nietzsche’s program is to reduce all problems to psychology, specifically the psychology of unconscious, instinctual life (Danto, p. 216). Unifying human life with non-human life, Danto’s Nietzsche derives a universally unifying principle, namely the will to power (Danto, p. 217). Danto also notes that Nietzsche qualified his work as hypothesis and experiment he could not refuse, and that Nietzsche’s notion of will is not merely psychological. Danto’s Nietzsche views mechanics as fiction which did not touch upon the fundamental quanta of the world, namely will to power (Danto, p. 218-9, cf. NL 778). Danto claims Nietzsche’s use of the word ‘will’ might have been intended to permit an easy analogy for his readers (Danto, p. 219).

Danto concludes by relating will to power to nihilism by explaining that nihilism clears away old idols and allows us to be creative, because while we do need some meaning, it does not matter what meaning we choose. Ultimately, based on Danto’s description, I find that this form of nihilism is actually a world-denying rather than a world-affirming end, something Nietzsche rejects as insufficient for human flourishing. Nihilism does not generate creativity but rather stultifies the creator, for it says all purposes are without meaning, rather than allowing for new meanings. The afterword contains Danto’s advocacy of the careful scrutiny of Nietzsche’s work, hoping we might exercise more mature restraint than Nietzsche possessed, and he states “I hope that I have not merely imposed my own will-to-system upon the galaxy of fragments and aphorisms of which his work is composed – a corpus which critics sometimes think of as an immense literary deposit left by a philosopher who expressed himself in shards, so to speak, there
never having been a parent body to which they all once belonged” (Danto, p. 229). Danto indicates that he would “not be dismayed” if we could argue that any systematicity were misguided, but he would “be amazed” if we found any other system than he discovered (Danto, p. 230).

Danto here also raises the problem of whether Nietzsche’s philosophy, too, was only “a matter of mere convention, fiction, and Will-to-Power,” and whether Nietzsche attempted to say something true by saying that nothing was true (Danto, p. 230). Danto feels that Nietzsche was aware of this problem, given BGE 22: “Supposing that this, too, is only an interpretation – and one will be eager enough to raise this objection. Well – so much the better,” and hence we should only judge Nietzsche by the criterion of “whether his philosophy works in life” (Danto, p. 230), whatever Danto means by that, and which Danto finds unsatisfying. Despite this, Danto does believe that “There are assumptions of a profound philosophical nature behind Nietzsche’s system, sunk so deeply into the form of his thought that he perhaps never became conscious that they were there” (Danto, p. 231). Danto focuses on one assumption, namely the claim that “will can only act upon will” (Danto, p. 231, cf. BGE 36). Danto connects this to Nietzsche’s physics of wills, and compares it to Berkeley’s ontology (Danto, p. 231-2). Danto concludes by doubting this connection between Berkeley and Nietzsche, saying that if Nietzsche can be characterized as having an idealist philosophy, then it is “a dynamic idealism” (Danto, p. 232).

§8  Conclusion

One of the reasons I want to argue that Nietzsche is not a relativist is in fact because of the principle of charity: I would like to demonstrate that a philosopher I value does not make one of what I consider the most basic and sophomoric ethical (/epistemological/axiological) mistakes in human history. The fact that different ethical systems exist does not mean that all systems are equal in value, though each may have value in specific contexts for specific purposes. Likewise,
just because each has some value for some context does not mean that we therefore cannot rank those systems according to some new table of values or from some new perspective, although perhaps rather than ‘new’ I should just say ‘new to me’ or ‘new to you,’ since some Nietzsche scholars argue that the doctrine of eternal recurrence entails that there is quite literally nothing new under the sun.

At this point it has become clearer to me that a lot of Nietzsche scholarship involves pitting one author’s version of Nietzsche against another author’s version. This is why I talk so much about Danto’s Nietzsche or Diethe’s Nietzsche or Clark’s Nietzsche; when talking about each of these author’s interpretations, I am attempting to provide a summary of the image of Nietzsche each presents, which is somewhat different from the image Nietzsche presents of himself. Each author has her own vision or interpretation of Nietzsche, distinct from but frequently having a family resemblance to Nietzsche’s Nietzsche (as we might discern from his own self-commentary, such as the preface of Birth of Tragedy and most of Ecce Homo), as well as sharing that resemblance with other authors’ Nietzsches.

When philosophers engage in philology, they frequently take their own vision of the author for (if you will forgive the pun) the author-in-himself, and this is no less true of Nietzsche’s reading of himself than it is of his subsequent readers. This is related to the central problem of perspectivism, and the central problem of this dissertation: why is my Nietzsche a superior image to the others? Why should we not just read Nietzsche and arrive at our own individual conclusions? – a remarkably Protestant attitude to take, as opposed to the more Catholic attitude of seeking the correct interpretation from a single holy source, and likewise a subjectivist approach in a field where so many seem to buy into objectivism and realism and other ontologically absolutist ideas.

I do not know that my goal is to attempt what I consider the impossible task of revealing the author’s true intended meaning. I do not feel my role is either that of apologist or literalist or
high priestess of Nietzsche; perhaps I see myself more similarly to how Nietzsche sometimes said he saw himself – a psychologist, or a scientist, even a genealogist, but most of all I see myself as one of these who is trying to work out what comes next. What I am really trying to do here is to get to those ideas Nietzsche presented which I find extraordinarily useful or important for philosophy, feminism, and feminist philosophy. Regardless of whether Nietzsche’s own presentation is ultimately incoherent, bigoted, or whatever, I feel that he had a lot of those useful or important ideas, and my role is almost one of a facilitator, even a Socratic midwife and nanny; I want to generate a structure or perspective through which to understand these ideas and which makes them more accessible and useful to others or, more poetically, I want to assist Nietzsche’s troubled labor and provide a nurturing environment for the ideas to begin growing. These are two sides to the same act, and by being involved in the process, by optically lensing Nietzsche’s thought through my own perspectives, I hope to make the best parts clearer without obscuring anything significant.

If my treatment is more accurate than any other’s treatment, then it would be for the following reasons: for one thing, I am attempting to be both as comprehensive as possible and to follow Nietzsche’s thought as chronologically as possible, both to account for any change in his ideas as well as to look for what remains consistent. In this way, I hope to avoid the pitfalls I have discovered in other authors’ works throughout my research; many authors make uncited claims about Nietzsche’s specific ideas, and at least one author on at least one occasion explicitly referred to a published work while citing the Nachlass. I have yet to encounter a single book which uses my methodology: working from the beginning to the end of Nietzsche’s published texts and searching for all possible references to relevant terminology. More importantly, I am approaching this project with the understanding that I am working from within not one but several different perspectives, not only concerning my lived, bodily experience, but also concerning my academic inheritance; I assent to Nietzsche’s claim that knowledge is not
objective but by definition always from some perspective, while at the same time having the training to want to avoid relativism, and likewise having the training to recognize how important a role the feminine metaphor plays in this discussion of truth while at the same time recognizing how important a role Nietzsche’s treatment of truth plays in his discussion of both women and feminism. Just as I have yet to see a book with my research methodology, I have also yet to see a book-length work by a single author which focuses primarily on the relationship between Nietzsche’s axiology and his treatment of women and feminism.

However, the value of my work need not rest only on its uniqueness and comprehensive methodology; I also hope to demonstrate that my perspective makes a lot of Nietzsche’s ideas work better. In other words, what I mean to say is that I want to salvage Nietzsche’s best ideas from the worst interpretations which make those ideas appear bankrupt or self-undermining at first blush. I feel like Kaufmann did some of this work in his demonstration that Nietzsche was not a proto-Nazi and actually an anti-anti-Semite, and that Nietzsche’s philosophy reflects this coherently. I want to further this work to the best of my ability, standing on the shoulders of the giants who came before me to reach just a little bit further. I both want to demonstrate that Nietzsche’s ideas deserve to have a respectable place within the philosophical and feminist canons and perhaps to show by correlation that those philosophies and feminisms which ignore these ideas might just be lacking something important. At his best, I believe Nietzsche proves himself to be an anti-misogynist if not a kind of proto-feminist as well.

I want to side with Clark and Leiter, among others, who reject the relativist interpretation of perspectivism as described by the Received View and the falsification thesis, and argue that Nietzsche gives us several reasons that perspectivism is not merely empty relativism precisely because it denies the falsification thesis and the Received View. The passage from the *Genealogy*
states that all knowledge\textsuperscript{99} is necessarily from a perspective, the core perspectivism claim according to Leiter, and it further states that one’s knowledge can be better or worse dependent on how many perspectives one can utilize, or at least this is implicit in the plurality claim that more perspectives means better, more complete knowledge (Leiter, p. 345); we could therefore take this as a pluralism rather than as a relativism claim, namely stating that because knowledge is perspectival, and because perspectives are plural, therefore knowledge is plural in its sources, and perhaps in other ways as well.\textsuperscript{100} Further, perspectivism entails a rejection of the Kantian thing-in-itself (Wilcox, p. 144) and arguably also a rejection of the Platonic Forms (see, for example, Tl IV “History of an Error,” p. 485), but neither of these positions necessarily commits Nietzsche to relativism.

Contrary to Clark, I think perspectivism is a rejection of even minimal commonsense correspondence theory about truth (see Clark, p. 135), but I do think that perspectivism offers a standard for ranking knowledge from different perspectives in terms of pluralism. In rejecting disinterested knowledge, perspectivism still designates some beliefs as non-knowledge claims even for Nietzsche, but rather than being false because such claims fail to correspond to reality, such claims are false because they are disinterested and attempts at non-perspectival or aperspectival knowledge, what Nietzsche sees as an oxymoron. Thus there are at least two perspectivisms here: a perspectivism of knowledge and a perspectivism of truth;\textsuperscript{101} these entail a rejection of the axiological standard of disinterested objectivity with regards to both truth and knowledge, and a rejection of axiological relativism with regards to both as well. We can further extend perspectivism to describe a much broader axiological perspectivism, namely the claim that all assignments of value occur from some perspective or set of perspectives (Simpson, p. 9).

\textsuperscript{99} Arguably this claim is extendable to the different ‘knowledges’ addressed in standpoint theory.
\textsuperscript{100} Such as its truth valuations; rather than either ‘true’ or ‘false,’ a knowledge claim can be ‘true for x’ where ‘x’ is some perspective, interest, or affective interpretation.
\textsuperscript{101} There could also perhaps be perspectivism of belief, justification, coherence, reliability, etc., but these are not directly pertinent to the two paragraphs from GM III:12.
Finally, because Nietzsche rejects the Kantian noumenal realm and the Platonic realm of the Forms as making similar errors, I also think that perspectivism entails at least in part the deflationary metaphysical claim that we cannot make metaphysical claims about what truth and falsity entail for reality because we have no knowledge about our access or lack thereof to non-perceivable realms, whether noumenal or intelligible. I will reserve my own interpretation of the passage from the *Genealogy* for the third chapter. I also hope to address the relationship between Nietzschean perspectivism and feminist standpoint theory, and possibly between perspectivism and pragmatism, in order to more fully develop perspectivism not only as an epistemology but also as an axiology, though this discussion will not come until the last chapter.
Chapter 3: An Account of Nietzsche’s Remarks Regarding Women, Gender, and Feminism

§1  A Biographical Sketch
§2  Nietzsche’s Early Period
§3  Nietzsche’s Middle Period
§4  Nietzsche’s Late or Mature Period
§5  Conclusion

Now I would like to transition to Nietzsche himself and his works. I will begin by offering a biographical sketch emphasizing those aspects of his life not covered by Dieth and Danto and which are particularly relevant to the charge of misogyny. The remaining sections of this chapter will be devoted to a comprehensive and chronological look at what Nietzsche says about women. My index on Women, Gender, and Intersections provides the groundwork for this chapter, covering all of Nietzsche’s references to women, including references that do not use either the German weib or frau but rather discuss mothers, goddesses, maidens, girls, etc. While this index also includes references to masculinity, race, and class, the discussion of these topics would extend this dissertation overlong, and so I will refrain and save these for future research. To be sure, should Nietzsche prove to be a paradigmatic racist or classist, this would cause problems for any reader seeking to classify him as a contemporary feminist, as many contemporary feminists adhere to principles such as intersectionality which rightly and strongly devalue racist and classist thought.

I divide Nietzsche’s works into four sections: his ‘early period’ including Birth of Tragedy, the Untimely Meditations, and the unpublished essay “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”; the ‘middle’ period including Human, All-Too-Human and its two additional

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102 See Appendix: Index 2.
sections *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* and *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, as well as *Daybreak* (also known as *The Dawn*) and *Gay Science*; and the ‘late’ or ‘mature’ period including *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, the *Genealogy of Morals*, the *Antichrist*, *The Case of Wagner*, *Ecce Homo*, *Twilight of the Idols*, and *Nietzsche contra Wagner*. If I include a discussion of Nietzsche’s *Nachlass* beyond the essay “On Truth and Lie,” it will come in the penultimate section of this chapter. Different authors divide Nietzsche’s works a number of different ways; Brian Leiter even states that *Daybreak* is the first book of Nietzsche’s mature intellectual life.¹⁰³ I place the beginning of Nietzsche’s ‘mature’ period at the start of *Zarathustra* because it is important for the purposes of this dissertation to distinguish between Nietzsche’s philosophy before and after the infamous Salomé events, and I start the ‘middle’ period with Nietzsche’s positivist turn in *Human, All-Too-Human*.

### §1 A Biographical Sketch

Friedrich ‘Fritz’ Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on the ides of October, 1844, in the village of Röcken, in Saxony, to Franziska Oehler Nietzsche (age 18), a young homemaker, and Karl Ludwig Nietzsche (age 30), a Lutheran pastor. As Diethe points out, other than his father, Nietzsche lived in a house of all women, and after the death of his father no men lived in the Nietzsche home (Diethe, p. 12); these women included the mother Franziska, the Aunts Rosalie and Augusta, the latter of whom died in 1855, Mine the maid, Fritz’s infamous sister Elizabeth Therese Alexandra Nietzsche, and until her passing in 1856 Ludwig’s widowed mother Erdmuthe Nietzsche, the matriarch of the family, described by Diethe as domineering (p. 13) but as kind and sickly by Young (p. 6). Unfortunately, Nietzsche was a tender four years old when his father passed away; and autopsy revealed that a quarter of Karl Ludwig’s brain was missing, so many

speculate his death was caused by some brain disease (Young, p. 9), and Kaufmann points out that this disease was probably not heritable, thus entailing that Nietzsche’s insanity must have been caused by some other problem (Kaufmann, p. 22). Nietzsche’s picturesque childhood suffered two further blows to its stability when first Joseph, his infant brother, also passed away, and when secondly the Vaterhaus or the Röcken vicarage had to be vacated for the next pastor, and the whole Nietzsche family moved to Erdmuthe’s hometown of Naumberg.

Nietzsche began experiencing blinding headaches in grammar school at the age of 10, but nonetheless was a devoted student (Young, p. 14) who intended to enter the priesthood like his father (Young, p. 18). At the age of 14, Nietzsche received a scholarship to the prestigious secondary school Pforta, where he remained until just shy of his twentieth birthday (Young, p. 21-32). Following his time at Pforta, Nietzsche decided to apply to the University in Bonn, where he lived in the constant state of student poverty (Young, p. 51-3). Nietzsche fulfilled his civic duty as a conscript in war against Austria, until his myopia resulted in a nasty chest wound that kept him out of action for five months and had him temporarily declared unfit for service on his twenty-fourth birthday (Young, p. 74).

After his medical discharge, Nietzsche returned to Leipzig, where he first met Richard Wagner and began his tumultuous relationship. In 1869, the University of Basel invited Nietzsche to fill an assistant professorship, and promoted him to full professor only a year later (Young, p. 78-9). Because the university required Nietzsche to give up his Prussian nationality, and because he never acquired Swiss nationality, his official status for the rest of his life was “heimatslos” or “homeless,” and so it is quite appropriate that he later described himself as simply European (Young, p. 80).

During his time in Basel, Nietzsche adjusted to Swiss life and survived a rather heavy teaching load until interrupted by the Franco-Prussian War (Young, p. 101). While Nietzsche did not initially appear to intend to involve himself in the Franco-Prussian War, despite having the
inclination to make use of his military training, he did eventually undergo training as a medical orderly in a precursor to the Red Cross (Young, p. 135-6). After less than a month of service, Nietzsche contracted a severe case of dysentery combined with diphtheria and spent over a month recuperating physically, though he continued to suffer from post-traumatic stress (Young, p. 138-9). Though Nietzsche returned to teach at Basel in October 1870, by February of the next year he had to take sick leave because his health continued to be extremely poor after his wartime experiences (Young, p. 148).

During this period of his life, Nietzsche was frequently physically and psychologically ill, suffering both from depression and increasing ocular deterioration, as well as the after effects of dysentery. Nietzsche frequently had to take sick leave from his work as an educator, though he did begin to publish some of his own works, including *Birth of Tragedy* and the *Untimely Meditations*. Despite his own suffering, however, Nietzsche maintained friendships with many women and men through correspondence, and even on one occasion stood firmly in favor of the right of women to become educated. I will quote at length:

What nearly all his women friends (Elizabeth excepted) have in common, however, is that they were intelligent, highly educated, and widely read. Biographically, therefore, it is no surprise that when the application of a Fräulein Rubinstein from Leipzig to enrol for a Ph.D. programme brought the question of admitting women to the university before the committee of Basel’s combined faculties on July 10, 1874, Nietzsche was among the four members who voted for their admission. Because, after a two-hour discussion, six faculty members (including Burckhardt) voted against admission, the motion was lost. But Nietzsche and the other three supporters of the motion must have been upset by the result, because they requested that their dissenting view be explicitly recorded.

Young, p. 191

Even Young notes how Nietzsche’s writings are “famously anti-feminist, even misogynistic,” by the time he reaches his mature phase, but what I want to ask at this point is whether Diethe was simply ignorant of Nietzsche’s defense of this female applicant during his tenure at Basel. While Diethe would not have had access to Julian Young’s biography, published in 2010, she should
have had access to C. P. Janz’s biography, published in 1978 which was well before even her 1989 article, and so perhaps should have known about these events.

While I do not believe all or any of Nietzsche’s aphorisms about women can be simply brushed away on the basis of this single event, I do think this event is highly relevant to understanding Nietzsche’s implicit beliefs, particularly given the fact that he is so subtle and changes trains of thought so quickly in his writings. Any account of Nietzsche’s beliefs with regards to ‘scholarly women’ must address this event, whether to wave it away as the youthful indiscretion of an otherwise vehement misogynist, or to construct a complex narrative regarding education and gender. I will return to this point as I move through Nietzsche’s texts. At this time I only wish to emphasize Young’s claim that Nietzsche’s female friends and romantic interests were almost as a rule educated women, and to thus begin to challenge the notion that Nietzsche despised all women of learning.

Despite his reputation, Nietzsche’s remarks on women during this time seem frequently to be “extremely sympathetic to the plight of women in nineteenth-century, paternalistic society” because the butt of Nietzsche’s jokes and other remarks inevitably seems to be “not women but the male culture which forces them into devalued roles” (Young, p. 287). Indeed, Nietzsche himself writes that he does “not wish to present the appearance of diminishing women” and cuts out an entire passage which seems to do so because his “view of women should not be brought into contact with the word ‘domestic animal’” (Young, p. 287). However, as we shall see below, there are other instances in which Nietzsche aligns women with domesticated herd beasts such as cows when referring to democratic rights for men and women as cattle-rights, so it remains to be seen whether Nietzsche is intentionally diminishing women or some other group with such parallels.

104 Citing KGB 11.5 900.
105 See, for example, EH III:5, p. 723.
By the autumn of 1879, Nietzsche had decided that his worst afflictions were caused by extremes of climate and began seeking moderate climes by going to the warm sea in the winter and high into the cool mountain air during the summer in places such as Sils Maria (Young, p. 289). Nietzsche actually spent his first summer in Sils Maria the same time he published his book *Daybreak or Dawn* in 1881, and despite extensive self-medication his health was worse than ever (Young, p. 316-17). However, even with his health in such poor sorts, Nietzsche also had perhaps his greatest breakthrough that summer in Sils Maria, namely the thought of the eternal recurrence which appears as a mere thought experiment in *The Gay Science*, published a year later in 1882 (Young, p. 318-9).

Barely four months prior to the publication of *Gay Science*, Nietzsche had his fateful meeting with Lou Salomé through Paul Rée and Malwida von Meysenbug on or about April 26, 1882 in Saint Peter’s Basilica in Rome (Young, p. 339-40). While different authors speculate about the motivation of the various players, a few facts emerge from all accounts, namely that Rée and Nietzsche both fell in love with Salomé, and she ultimately rejected both of them. Nietzsche proposed marriage twice, once through Rée and once himself, and both times Salomé declined him on the grounds that it would cause the loss of her financial independence (Young, p. 341-2). Despite these rejections, the trio remained friends for a time, and their activities included a trip to Lucerne wherein Nietzsche himself posed the infamous ‘whip’ photograph with Lou perched in a cart brandishing a lilac sprig as a whip, and Friedrich and Paul as the ‘horses’ posed in front of the cart, albeit pulling in different directions (Young, p. 343).

Again, different authors have different accounts of the context of the whip passage, which I will discuss below, but Young in particular suggests a promising interpretation from Curt Janz, namely that the photograph is an allusion to the character Fricka in Wagner’s *Ring* cycle, “who is literally equipped with a whip and a horse-drawn chariot as well as almost always holding the whip hand over her husband, the supposedly supreme, but actually severely
henpecked god, Wotan,” thus implying that “Nietzsche’s point, in arranging the tableau vivant… is to give ironic expression to both his own and Rée’s enslavement to Lou” (Young, p. 343). Unfortunately for Nietzsche and Rée, Salomé had no intention of marrying either of them, despite their protestations of love and devotion. However, solely unfortunately for Nietzsche, Rée was scheming to keep Salomé all to himself, and engaged in extensive and increasingly personal letter-writing towards this end (Young, p. 343-4).

Another party in the campaign to dissolve the friendship between Lou and Friedrich came in the form of Elizabeth Nietzsche, who by all accounts had a terrible time in Bayreuth in July, when and where she first spent time with Lou. Elizabeth claimed that Lou had been scornful of Friedrich to gain the favor of the Wagner circle, but Nietzsche eventually brushed these claims aside (Young, p. 346-7). In Jena in August, however, Elizabeth and Lou had a terribly violent argument regarding the purity of Friedrich’s character, and which ended only when Elizabeth began vomiting, perhaps at the horrific claims Lou made about Friedrich’s proposed ‘concubinage’ or two year marriage, a plan Friedrich proposed to Paul and quickly abandoned in favor of a permanent marriage (Young, p. 348-9). When Lou arrived where Friedrich was staying in Tautenburg, she and Friedrich spent a great deal of time excluding Elizabeth; and, so as to assuage Paul’s jealousy, Lou kept a detailed diary of their time together which reveals deep intellectual connection between the two (Young, p. 349-50).

By the end of this sojourn, Elizabeth had become “Lou’s mortal enemy” because of the time in Bayreuth, Lou’s tendency to provocatively pass around the whip photograph, and the horrible argument in Jena (Young, p. 352). As any sibling would do, whether looking out for her brother or nursing her own injured pride, she gave their mother an account of these events which many biographers, Young included, refer to as ‘embroidered’ to put it mildly (Young, p.

107 Citing KGB 111.1 301.
Franziska’s response was also open horror at Lou’s disgraceful behavior, and the resulting family conflict sent Nietzsche packing; the breach with his family never fully healed (Young, p. 353). To make matters even worse, Lou and Paul abandoned the plan of joining together in one celibate household with Friedrich, which left him completely distraught; Nietzsche spent the next few months tormented by the loss of his love, his friends, and his family (Young, p. 353-4).

Much of the scholarship on Nietzsche’s relationship with women and feminism is tied up with a discussion of Friedrich’s, Lou’s, and Elizabeth’s behavior during this time. Frequently, scholars assert that Nietzsche suddenly shifts into full-blown misogyny after their falling-out, and more often than not the women are blamed for Friedrich’s supposed sudden hatred of women, as if any single woman or group of women can be blamed for an entire system of sexism or an individual’s adherence to that system. No doubt the insulting letters Nietzsche wrote during this period were properly called all-too-human (Young, p. 356), and I would be shocked if there were no changes whatsoever to Nietzsche’s philosophy at this turning point, but it seems intellectually disingenuous to assert wide-spread changes without extensive evidence, and furthermore unrealistic to assert that all said changes pertain exclusively to one traumatic set of experiences. In my discussion below I will pay careful attention to whether and how such a shift occurs between The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

Following these events, Nietzsche fled to Italy where he suffered a tremendously ill winter and even considered suicide, overcoming the thought with his commitment to his work (Young, p. 357). In ten clear days of weather, Nietzsche produced the first part of Zarathustra; however, it took an exceedingly long time to get it published, first because of the publisher’s reservations about its anti-Christian content, and second because of the publisher’s absences on account of his virulent anti-Semitic activities (Young, p 358). The fourth and final part was not complete until May 1885 (Young, p. 383). During this time, Nietzsche lived a migratory lifestyle.

108 Citing KGB 111.1 444.
alternating summers in Sils Maria and winters in Nice, and widening his social circle to include a number of women such as Resa von Schirnhofer, Meta von Salis, Helen Zimmern, and Helene Druskowicz (Young, p. 387-8, 390, 391, 395).

Like his other books, Beyond Good and Evil, published in August 1886, received a number of hostile and negative reviews (Young, p. 405). Summering in Genoa and wintering in Nice, Nietzsche completed a number of new prefaces, revisions, and even an entire new fifth section for Gay Science during 1886, and the whole Genealogy by November 1887 (Young, p. 435-6, 460). Later in 1888, in Sils Maria again and then in Turin, Nietzsche completed The Case of Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Nietzsche contra Wagner and Ecce Homo, but only the first saw publication before Nietzsche’s collapse and the last was not published until after Nietzsche’s death (Young, p. 492, 497, 509, 524). During these last years Nietzsche had also been working on a project he called The Will to Power, and though the preparatory notes were never ready for publication and Nietzsche did abandon the project, Elizabeth had the audacity to edit Nietzsche’s notebooks into a volume with the same name (Young, p. 534-5). Though many authors discuss and speculate about Nietzsche’s mental condition during these final years, I do not feel that at this time I have anything fruitful to contribute which is also relevant to my main topic, and so I will instead encourage those who are curious to read Kaufmann’s and Young’s accounts, among others.

By all accounts, however, Nietzsche’s deterioration was rapid, moving from semi-private mad episodes in his boarding house to the famous incident where he collapsed weeping with his arms around a horse that had been beaten ferociously by its driver (Young, p. 531-2). Nietzsche’s friend Overbeck eventually succeeded in moving Nietzsche from Italy to a sanatorium in Basel, until the doctors transferred him to Jena (Young, p. 550-2). Eventually his mother took over his care and returned him to Naumberg but after Franziska’s death Elizabeth finally had sole control of her brother and his works, which she used to elevate herself politically and by almost all
accounts did so without the philosophical skill necessary to understand what she was editing (Young, p. 554-6). Nietzsche died on August 25th, 1900, following two strokes in 1898 and 1899, in the Archive his sister established in Weimar (Young, p. 558).

§2 Nietzsche’s Early Period

Again, I choose to leave out Nietzsche’s Jugendschriften and the rest of the Nachlass at this point because even Nietzsche derided his first published work, and explicitly wished for his notebooks to be destroyed rather than preserved after his death (Leiter, p. xvii). This includes three short essays of which Danto and Diethe make much, namely the two introductions “The Greek State” and “Homer’s Contest” written in 1872 and gifted to Cosima Wagner with three other introductions to books never written, and a fragment from 1871 commonly called “The Greek Woman,” though Nietzsche does not title this fragment in his notebooks. The only reason I am including the essay “On Truth and Lie” is because it has been so heavily read as one of the primary texts on Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and interestingly does make several references to women.

Birth of Tragedy (BT)

109 An entire book could be devoted to how Nietzsche scholars have treated Elizabeth horrendously. While I have little doubt that her behavior with regards to re-packaging her brother as a proto-Nazi is scurrilous at best, I also strongly suspect that scholars have been too quick to judge her as a philosophical imbecile and that some of their comments rank as misogynistic as Nietzsche’s reputation.

Nietzsche’s first work, *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music* opens as an exploration of the science of aesthetics, and establishes the now well-known relationships between the Apollinian, Dionysian, and Socratic forms of art. The first reference to women in the work is two mentions of “Hexentrank,” translated as “witches’ brew,” in the second section, notable because it explicitly connects a horrific blend of sensuality and cruelty with Pan rather than Dionysus, perhaps implying that sensuality without cruelty, or blended more skillfully with cruelty, is superior to the motley madhouse assortment found within Pan and his festivals (BT §2, p. 39-40). This may become significant as an initial glance at the difference between the motley and the plural: Nietzsche seems to indicate that the Dionysian festivals skillfully maneuver through plurality\(^{111}\) towards the oneness behind the veil of māyā while the lesser festivals of Pan feverishly engaged in utter abandon. Nietzsche clearly states that harmony, rhythm, and dynamics are necessary for the symbolism of music, the Dionysian art, and thus distinguishes Dionysus from Pan on the grounds of certain guiding principles. Similarly, in the third section, Nietzsche references Orestes’s matricide as one of the horrors of “the sylvan god” or Pan which the Greeks overcame “with the aid of the Olympian *middle world* of art” or the world structured by tales of the hierarchical Olympian gods (BT §3, p. 42). If this holds true for further distinctions between the plural and the motley, we may assume that the primary reason the plural is superior to the motley is because of the fact that it is ruled or ranked by certain principles.

The fifth section only offers a glancing reference to Archilochus’s proclamation of mad love and contempt to the daughters of Lycambes and the similarity this event shares with Dionysus and the Maenads (BT §5, p. 49), but the eighth and ninth sections offer more material. Nietzsche here compares the chorus of Attic tragedies to a pale imitation of true Bacchants, themselves only imitations of satyrs, that are yet still only imaginings of the sexual omnipotence

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\(^{111}\) In this passage, Nietzsche explicitly discusses duality, but given his later warning against dualism (BGE 2) and the fact that the Apollinian and Dionysian are not a strict dualism because of the Socratic, I choose to read this duality as a twosome open to the possibility of more.
of nature (BT §8, p. 61-3). For comparison, Nietzsche offers the image of Apollo’s holy virgins proceeding solemnly while singing processional hymns; these women who maintain their names and statuses stand in stark contrast with the nameless and status-free members of the dithyrambic choruses (BT §8, p. 64). In a sense, this chorus is the Dionysian womb birthing the Apollinian dialogue of tragedies and stage drama, which is interesting because Nietzsche poses the birth process as a parallel for “the shattering of the individual and his fusion with primal being,” and hence birth-giving as shattering the paradigm of the *principium individuationis* (BT §8, p. 65).

As we will see, Nietzsche frequently discusses birth and uses it as a metaphor. While this may be appropriative, and hence a kind of conceptual violence, I find that there are many more marks in Nietzsche’s favor here: to begin with, I would point out that Nietzsche is unusual within his generation for not only speaking about birth, but also treating it with some respect. That he sometimes additionally demonstrates disgust with the process need not be misogynistic, as birth-giving is frequently sufficiently disgusting for the women physically performing biological birth as well as the men and women mentally performing conceptual birth. This is not to say that just because women have similar or the same beliefs about birth (or anything else) as men do, that makes men’s thoughts non-misogynistic; but I feel strongly that all or most humans share feelings of disgust when faced with so-called ‘natural’ bodily functions, though the expressions and manifestations of this disgust probably vary from culture to culture, and that this disgust may well be perfectly healthy given the bacterial content of and health risks from contacting bodily fluids and other excreta. Disgust with the body becomes problematic and misogynistic in particular when people treat the body and bodily functions as exclusively or primarily female, and downgrade either women or corporeality as a result. At this point, Nietzsche does not appear to be engaging in such behavior, and later appears to prefer to prioritize the corporeal over the intellectual.
Nietzsche considers the mythological character Admetus grieving the loss of his wife Alcestis, who has a vision of a veiled female figure moving towards him, and compares Admetus’s trembling excitement with that of the spectator viewing the approach of his masked god-substitute on the stage (BT §8, p. 66). This is the first instance in Nietzsche’s works of a veiled female figure representing some hidden truth, revealed to the eyes “in continual rebirths” as the veils drop away, but already we get the sense that behind the veil is another veil, so that there are no ‘deeper’ truths, but only more and more surfaces to be found. I will continue to attend to this distinction between depth and superficiality, and note how Nietzsche appears to value each. In this instance, he hints that depth does not exist and that only surfaces are real, but at the same time that there are many, many surfaces available.

These mediatory symbols and images allow the ancient Greeks to tolerate their suffering and instead have the kind of uniquely ‘Greek cheerfulness’ Nietzsche identifies (BT §9, p. 67). In particular, Nietzsche focuses on the myth of Oedipus and the various literary depictions of his story; what Nietzsche finds is that Oedipus’s violations of nature – namely murdering his father and marrying his mother – are a Sophoclean means for compelling nature to “surrender her secrets” (BT §9, p. 68). By contrast, Nietzsche shows how Aeschylus’s telling of the Prometheus tale elevates the Moirae or the female goddesses known as the Fates above the gods, even Zeus, in a profound demand for justice, and Nietzsche sets up the pairs of playwrights Sophocles and Aeschylus and their characters Oedipus and Prometheus as progenitors of the characters of two peoples with myths that “are related to each other like brother and sister,” namely the Semites with their myth of the fall and the ‘Aryans’ with the Promethean mythos (BT §9, p. 70-1).

Nietzsche goes on to establish that these mythological backgrounds explain why Semites despise sin as feminine, but the Aryans respect sacrilege as masculine, a claim he further supports
with reference to the witches’ chorus from Goethe’s *Faust*. Interestingly, Nietzsche describes the Aeschylean Prometheus as having a dual nature, both Apollinian and Dionysian, and hence both masculine and feminine, but this does not seem to satisfy or please him when he finds that Prometheus’s “nature…might be expressed thus in a conceptual formula: ‘All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both.’ That is your world! A world indeed!—” (BT §9, p. 72).

Given that Nietzsche ends this section here, however, it is very difficult to say exactly at what his dissatisfaction or displeasure might have been directed. However, I will also point out that Nietzsche demonstrates great acuity and sensitivity here in pointing out the social constructions of sin and sacrilege as feminine and masculine respectively. Furthermore, he does not imply that either such construction is appropriate or accurate, though omitting his opinion in this regard does not commit him to either approve or disapprove.

Nietzsche also first implies that truth is a female goddess in this work, and the first instance comes in the midst of a discussion of how one myth dies and gives way to another; in particular, “wild and naked nature beholds with the frank undissembling gaze of truth the myths of the Homeric world as they dance past: they pale, they tremble under the piercing glance of this goddess – till the powerful fist of the Dionysian artist forces them into the service of the new deity,” Dionysus, and then the process begins again when the Dionysian myths die and Euripides decides to systematize them all (BT §10, p. 74-5). Again, Nietzsche has a problematic tendency to ascribe femininity to a number of different ‘entities’ starting here with truth, but also including Greek tragedy, the predecessor, mistress, and mother to New Attic Comedy, and sister to a number of other arts Nietzsche leaves ambiguous (BT §11, p. 76).

This tendency to name things as women, even though her respects and loves Tragedy, Truth, Wisdom, and Life, seems initially problematic if Nietzsche devalues these entities on the

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112 Lines 3982-85. Note that Goethe uses “Frau” in these lines, but Nietzsche uses “Weib” throughout this section.
113 The last two exclamatory statements are line 409 from Goethe’s *Faust.*
basis of their femininity, or devalues femininity on the basis of its relationship with these entities. One such devaluation, however, may exist for femininity in this section: Nietzsche describes “flight from seriousness and terror” as “womanish” or “weibische,” though it is unclear if this is his adjective or the adjective of Greeks denigrating Christians (BT §11, p. 78). Either way, such a usage could be to my mind misogynistic if it implies that flightiness is a uniquely or primarily female quality which either lacks positive value or possesses negative value. However, Nietzsche does later on associate seriousness with the spirit of gravity, a demonic entity (see Zarathustra in particular), and hence this flightiness, being womanly, may rather have positive value or at least lack negative value. It will not make Nietzsche non-misogynistic if he places femininity on a pedestal, but it does count against the charge of misogyny if he repeatedly emphasizes positive values for what he considers to be feminine traits.

The naked goddess shows up once more during Nietzsche’s discussion of the difference between theoretical and artistic men, who are distinguishable through their reactions to the uncovering of truth: the theoretical man obsesses about the discarded veils, but the artist focuses on the skin and surfaces revealed but still yet concealing what lies beneath (BT §15, p. 94). Furthermore, Nietzsche states, “There would be no science if it were concerned only with that one nude goddess and with nothing else” because her devotees would be endowed with a purely Sisyphean task such as if two people were digging holes in the same patch of earth and unintentionally filled each other’s holes as they dug; the image seems intentionally comical, even what we might now call cartoonish, as Nietzsche goes on to point out the “sublime metaphysical illusion” that humans can use “the thread of causality” to “penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it” (BT §15, p. 95). Thus even in his earliest published book Nietzsche connects the feminine truth and her unveiling with a deflationary claim about metaphysics, namely that due to the nature of human knowledge
we do not and cannot substantiate various metaphysical claims, and he ties it all to his critique of the Platonic Socrates.

The next few remarks Nietzsche makes connected to women include two references to the Mothers of Being, an allusion to Goethe’s *Faust*, or “the innermost heart of things” which Dionysus makes available by destroying the Apollinian spell of individuation (BT §16, p. 99-100), and whom he later names “Delusion, Will, Woe” or “Wahn, Wille, Wehe” (BT §20, p. 124). With this destruction, Dionysian art cries out in the voice of nature herself, claiming the status of “the eternally creative primordial mother” and ceaselessly impelling existence (BT §16, p. 104). The last few remarks on mothers include references to music as the mother tongue as if learned within the womb (BT §21, p. 126) and the notion that the loss of myth constitutes the loss of the “mythical maternal womb” in a similar sense (BT §23, p. 136). Again, note that Nietzsche does not devalue the womb or the mother and, if one reads him as favoring Dionysian mythos, he even appears to affirm this female nature. Furthermore, the fact that he ties this femininity to a male god seems to at least in some way defy a gender essentialist reading here: the womb and feminine primordial creativity seem to belong at least in part to both halves of the traditional gender dyad, Nature herself and her son Dionysus.

Nietzsche has only one additional remark in *Birth of Tragedy* which refers to women explicitly, namely in discussing how art critics rather than aesthetic listeners fill audiences because “the student, the school boy, and even the most innocuous female had been unwittingly prepared by education and newspapers for this kind of perception of works of art” (BT §22, p. 133). While we might read this as dismissive of ‘innocuous’ women, I think it demonstrates that Nietzsche did not see all women as copies of each other; in particular, I believe he has his paternal aunt Rosalie Nietzsche in mind, as she was a highly religious woman who, despite that conventionality, read newspapers and was active as a member of a charitable women’s

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114 Lines 6216ff.
organization\textsuperscript{115} (Diethe, p. 18). No doubt, given the lack of education available for women in Nietzsche’s time, it makes very good sense to assume that many such ‘innocuous’ women did not have the skill or training to be good aesthetic listeners; and the fact is that Nietzsche’s turn of phrase here leaves open the possibility of women who could achieve such a status, though he does not explicitly state so once again.

\textit{Untimely Meditations: David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer} (UM I)

The first of Nietzsche’s \textit{Untimely Meditations} concerns a discussion of the theologian and philosopher David Strauss as a means to address the uncultivated and complacent Prussian philistines and chauvinists. Nietzsche’s remarks on women throughout tend to fall into two categories: those which treat of women as part of mundane family and business, and those which discuss more mythical feminine beings. Nietzsche’s first salvo concerning women comes in the form of a critique of the cultural philistine, who keeps the ‘serious’ part of life separate from pleasure; in particular, this philistine keeps “profession, business, wife \textit{[Weib]} and child” segregated from art (UM I §2, p. 11).

A few passages do not fit this neat dichotomy of mundane and mythical women, and the first of these is a translation issue in a criticism of Schiller as a chilled version of Kant: Hollingdale and Ludovici both translate “\textit{sondern als GrossOnkel-Einfall aus dem Mutterleibe kam}” as a statement entailing the birth of something prematurely aged. Hollingdale translates this statement as “it came into the world already old,” and Ludovici as “it was senile at birth,” and neither translation is able to preserve the connotation of ‘mother-love’ associated with ‘coming into the world’ or ‘birth’ (UM I §4, p. 20). After this trickier section, Nietzsche explicitly associates a specific woman’s words to another specific woman with the philosophy of the

\textsuperscript{115} These kinds of charitable organizations provided the ideological core of the ‘moderate,’ bourgeois feminism of the \textit{Bund Deutscher Frauen} which were more concerned with the development of a uniquely feminine \textit{Persönlichkeit} associated with the rôle of women as mothers and homemakers.

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cultural philistine and the Straussian, namely claiming that “what the duchess Delaforte said to Madame de Staël: ‘I have to admit, my dear friend, that I know of nobody who is always right except me’” could at any time have been said by the Straussian or the philistine (UM I §5, p. 24).

The more mythical feminine aspect does not appear until the philistine Strauss finds it necessary to call in “the sorceress, that is to say metaphysics” to soothe the fear of those who cannot understand a miraculous god because they have never worked miracles (UM I §7, p. 33). However, the mythical female flits away again as the mundane women show up once more. Those same fearful philistines appear later in their “full domestic ease and comfort” when “we discover them with their women [Frauen] and children engaged with their newspapers and commonplace chatter about politics,” especially regarding “marriage and universal suffrage, capital punishment and workers’ strikes” (UM I §9, p. 44-5). This time, however, Nietzsche brings in the mythical female very closely upon the heels of the more mundane variety.

Nietzsche notes that Strauss claims his work is “lightly clad,” a euphemism for the naked truth (UM I §10, p. 46). Nietzsche appears to accept the myth: “Of the goddess truth, the few who have seen her affirm that she has been naked; and perhaps in the eyes of those who have not seen her but accept the word of those few who have, nakedness or lightly-cladness is in itself proof of truth, even if only circumstantial proof” (UM I §10, p. 47). However, at the same time, Nietzsche rejects Strauss’s claim and instead states that Strauss’s genius is only “disguised as a lightly clad goddess,” (UM I §10, p. 47) a disguise which by definition is not nudity at all, for disguises are layers, masks, even wholly new identities atop older ones.116

The final appearance of women in this text, and one which does not fit the mundane/mythical dichotomy is a reference to prostitution, though the passage in which this reference occurs is not usually translated into English as it is a part of a long series of examples

116 Interestingly, Nietzsche also associates Strauss’s claim about “Rothhāute” (translated unapologetically as the slur against Native Americans it is, namely ‘Redskins’) with thoughtless similes and metaphors implying that ‘new’ = ‘modern’ (UM I §11, p. 51).
concerning poor grammar amongst other issues Nietzsche finds problematic in Strauss’s writings. In particular, Nietzsche appears to be accusing Strauss of not being able to answer certain questions regarding the ‘world-historical humbug’ of this erring God to whom Strauss prostitutes the nobler passions out of fear.\footnote{Da uns auf diese Frage Strauss gar keine Antwort geben kann, falls er sich scheuen sollte, seinen Gott, das heisst den aus nobler Passion irrenden Gott als diesen Schwindler zu prostituiren—so bleiben wir zunächst dabei, den Ausdruck für ebenso ungereimt als geschmacklos zu halten.} This accusation that Strauss ‘prostitutes’ the passions does seem to imply a negative judgment against prostitution. However, this need not be an absolute position on Nietzsche’s part, and I believe it would be going too far if we were to conclude based on this one claim that Nietzsche negatively judged all prostitution and all prostitutes or that he believed that all women were prostitutes who sold their bodies and selves for money or children (Diethe, p. 65).

Untimely Meditations: On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (UM II)

The second Untimely Meditation was the first book Nietzsche wrote without the direct influence or express enthusiasm of Wagner and primarily concerns the relationship between humanity and history as well as a criticism of the unexamined and whiggish teleology usually accompanying a complacent form of historicism (UM p. xiv-xv). Note first of all that there are no uses of “Frau” throughout this text. Second, note that the Hollingdale translation renders several women Nietzsche mentions invisible: in particular, I note “the best teacher” Polybius has in mind in the beginning of the second section (UM II §2, p. 68),\footnote{vorzüglichste Lehrmeisterin} perhaps better translated as “best schoolmistress” though some might find ‘schoolmistress’ pejorative by comparison to the more gender-neutral ‘teacher’; the “unique master, nature” from the final section (UM II §10, p. \footnote{einzigen Meisterin Natur} 118),\footnote{einzigen Meisterin Natur} perhaps better translated as the “unique mistress, nature”; and finally the statement from

\footnotesize{\begin{quote}
117 “Da uns auf diese Frage Strauss gar keine Antwort geben kann,—falls er sich scheuen sollte, seinen Gott, das heisst den aus nobler Passion irrenden Gott als diesen Schwindler zu prostituiren—so bleiben wir zunächst dabei, den Ausdruck für ebenso ungereimt als geschmacklos zu halten.”
\end{quote}}

\footnotesize{\begin{quote}
118 “vorzüglichste Lehrmeisterin”
\end{quote}}

\footnotesize{\begin{quote}
119 “einzigen Meisterin Natur”
\end{quote}}
the seventh section wherein “Mutterschooss” or “womb” is elided such that the statement “man müsste denn den sogenannten Protestanten-Verein als Mutterschooss einer neuen Religion” becomes “one is to regard the so-called Protestant Union as the work of a new religion,” (UM II §7, p. 96) thus losing the implications of maternal labor.

This Meditation also contains two references to goddesses, namely the “goddess of victory” who can balance “without growing dizzy and afraid” (UM II §1, p. 62) and “the honest naked goddess philosophy” who is the “most truthful of all sciences” (UM II §5, p. 85). The way Nietzsche lionizes these idealized women stands in stark contrast to a separate passage some might regard as derogatory towards women: “As the final and most natural outcome we have the universally admired ‘popularization’ (together with ‘feminization’ and ‘infantization’) of science, that is to say the infamous trimming of the coat of science to fit the body of the ‘general public’” (UM II §7, p. 99). However, I would argue that Nietzsche’s use of scare-quotes around ‘feminization’ and ‘infantization’ implies that what is made falsely ‘popular’ is also made falsely ‘feminine’ and ‘infantile,’ so that while we might associate popular science with girlish and immature thought, such an association is problematic. At the very least, Nietzsche intentionally gives us pause when considering what exactly he means by apparently devaluing pop science as part of the feminizing of culture, and I argue that he implies with his scare-quotes that these are not his terms but rather the terms of someone with whom he disagrees.

Nietzsche also indicates that a (heterosexual) man’s passion for women is comparable with a passion for great thoughts and notes how such passion can transform one’s perspective: “imagine a man\textsuperscript{120} seized by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea: how different the world has become to him!” (UM II §1, p. 64). To my mind, this indicates the worthiness of women as a preoccupation of equal value or at least of equal force as powerful and intriguing thoughts. While this may play into certain heterosexist stereotypes, I appreciate the fact that

\textsuperscript{120}“\textit{einen Mann}”
Nietzsche does not dismiss thoughts of women as immediately and inherently frivolous. Similarly, Nietzsche attributes value to maternal origins at least metaphorically in the following section, wherein he describes how humans and their abilities are like plants which need careful transplantation because the lack of certain nutrients causes degradation: “the critic without need, the antiquary without piety, the man who recognizes greatness but cannot himself do great things, are such plants, estranged from their mother soil and degenerated into weeds” (UM II §2, p. 72). This extremely earthy metaphor demonstrates a third feminine value in addition to courage and honesty as represented by the goddesses above, namely, the virtue so commonly lauded by Wilhelmine feminists and overemphasized as a part of Nietzsche’s imago of femininity by Diethe: a nurturing disposition.

Lastly, Nietzsche also discusses the eternal feminine for the first time in this *Meditation*. In this passage, Nietzsche is drawing a parallel between those who have an “objective” approach to history to eunuchs or neuters. I will quote the passage at length:

But, as I have said, this is a race of eunuchs, and to a eunuch one woman is like another, simply a woman, woman in herself, the eternally unapproachable – and it is thus a matter of indifference what they do so long as history itself is kept nice and ‘objective’, bearing in mind that those who want to keep it so are for ever [*sic*] incapable of making history themselves. And since the eternally womanly will never draw you upward, you draw it down to you and, being neuters, take history too for a neuter. But so that it shall not be thought that I am seriously comparing history with the eternally womanly, I should like to make it clear that, on the contrary, I regard it rather as the eternally manly: though, to be sure, for those who are ‘historically educated’ through and through it must be a matter of some indifference whether it is the one or the other: for they themselves are neither man nor woman, nor even hermaphrodite, but always and only neuters or, to speak more cultivatedly, the eternally objective.

UM II §5, p. 86-7

There are many things happening here. First of all, Nietzsche is explicitly stating that those who take an ‘objective’ approach to history are incapable of ‘making history’ or ascending to greater

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121 Allusion to Goethe’s *Faust II*: “Das Ewig-Weibliche/Zieht uns hinan” – “The eternal feminine draws us upward.”
heights. The metaphor plays out through the implication that eunuchs have no interest in women, and this disinterest is supposed to be similar to the disinterest of objectivity, particularly in historical studies but as we shall see later\textsuperscript{122} this also applies to the sciences and even aesthetics. Second, note that Nietzsche implies that the attempt to treat femininity objectively drags femininity down, which I argue demonstrates his recognition of the importance of intersubjective inquiry with regards to women as well as his recognition that treating women under the aegis of the eternal feminine actually does harm to living women.

Third and finally, I find it interesting that Nietzsche goes out of his way to claim that history has more to do with the eternal masculine than the eternal feminine. I strongly suspect that this eternally masculine history is a reference to the sterility of the distinterested objective history he appears to deride, primarily because Nietzsche often associates sterility with masculinity.\textsuperscript{123} When we contrast this apparently negative valuation of masculinity as sterile with the apparently positive valuation of femininity as nutritive and fertile, what we find is a reversal of the classical positive valuation of masculinity as objective subject and negative valuation of femininity as subjective object. While Nietzsche does not appear to be advocating a strictly subjective approach to history here, he has strongly undermined the value of a simply objective approach and thus in tandem, albeit more subtly, undermined the value of the masculine in its dominance over the feminine.

\textit{Untimely Meditations: Schopenhauer as Educator} (UM III)

Nietzsche’s third Meditation serves both to polemicize against mere academic philosophy and to characterize what genuine philosophy should look like, and spends virtually no time

\textsuperscript{122} See GM III:12.
\textsuperscript{123} See for example BGE §144
discussing Schopenhauer’s philosophy at all (UM p. xvi). Thus, the education Schopenhauer provides for his readers has more to do with example his life provides, in particular, a certain image of humanity Nietzsche apparently derives more from his own imagination than from either Schopenhauer’s works or his biography (UM p. xviii). From his reflections on and eventual rejection of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche generates the notion that a true education requires liberation from those things which are incompatible with one’s self (UM p. xix). This liberation ties directly with the first of only six mentions of women in the text.

In his wish to distinguish sham education from true culture, Nietzsche describes culture as “liberation, the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the tender buds of the plant, an outstreaming of light and warmth, the gentle rustling of nocturnal rain, it is imitation and worship of nature where nature is in her motherly and merciful mood” (UM III §2, p. 130). Nietzsche places this idyllic flourishing combined with careful custodianship in direct contrast to nature’s “stepmotherly mood and her sad lack of understanding” that we see in “her cruel and merciless assaults” (UM III §2, p. 130). Thus we have an almost fairy-tale influenced contrast between the good and beneficent genetic mother and the evil and violent stepmother. Such a dualism could be arguably problematic, in that it parrots the standard Madonna/whore dichotomy of femininity, but on the other hand I find it intriguing that Nietzsche places both standards within the same vessel: Nature. At the very least we can say that this provides evidence that Nietzsche does not have an uncomplicated picture of femininity in the form of nature, though his quick and regular association of femininity with nature does raise an eyebrow. Given Nietzsche’s positive valuation of nature generally, however, it remains to be seen whether he is placing femininity on a pedestal, placing femininity outside of the ambiguously valued civilized, masculine world, or doing some other thing.

Nietzsche continues with stepmothers as a metaphor for the “false, idle and unworthy mother, his age;” the era which birthed Schopenhauer’s desire for “a healthier and simpler
humanity” (UM III §3, p. 146). This desire of Schopenhauer’s won out and hence “the intention of his stepmother age to conceal his genius from him was frustrated” (UM III §3, p. 146). As above, the problem with this passage is the implication that ‘false’ mothers are ‘idle and unworthy’ or even violent and evil. Nietzsche’s choice of family as a metaphor for Schopenhauer’s philosophical development is not straightforward; he speaks of both the metaphorical stepmotherly era, but also discusses Schopenhauer’s literal parents and how their contrary natures were exactly what is required for philosophical development:

There is no lack of contrary conditions, to be sure: the perversity of the age came fearfully close to him, for example, in the person of his vain and culturally pretentious mother. But the proud, free republican character of his father as it were saved him from his mother and bestowed upon him the first thing a philosopher needs: inflexible and rugged manliness.

UM III §7, p. 180

Though Nietzsche does use the word “Männlichkeit” here, the traits of ‘manliness’ indicated here are not necessarily something he identifies as masculine: inflexibility and ruggedness both apply to his feminized nature when she does not draw a flattering veil over her ‘sad lack of understanding’ and instead unleashes a cruel and merciless storm. What Nietzsche appears to intend to emphasize in this passage is not that masculinity is required for philosophy, but rather strong contrasts in the conditions in which we grow and mature.

The influence of fairy tales on Nietzsche’s imagery of women is also echoed briefly in a reference to witches: Nietzsche describes the upheaval of his contemporary time as subject to “tremendous forces, but savage, primal and wholly merciless,” such that we might gaze “upon them with a fearful expectation, as though gazing into the cauldron of a witch’s kitchen [Hexenküche]: at any moment sparks and flashes may herald dreadful apparitions” (UM III §4, p. 149). The imagery of the feminine power of witchcraft some might say signals Nietzsche’s fear of womanly power, or fear of the unknown female essence, or some such thing; they might also note the connection of this witchcraft to the primal forces of nature. And yet I do not believe this is
intended as negative on Nietzsche’s part; rather, he could be attempting in this passage to counteract the picture of femininity in his contemporary time as weak and dull, and so I instead would say this signals Nietzsche’s respect for natural forces and his recognition that women have strength possibly beyond his ken.

The fifth mention of women is actually a reference to girls’ high schools; in disparaging ‘bad’ philosophers who will flee philosophy when the going gets tough, Nietzsche ticks off a list of places they will “seek a roof wherever they can find it; one will become a parson, another a schoolmaster, a third will creep into the shelter of an editorial job on a newspaper, a fourth will write instruction manuals for girls’ high schools…” (UM III §8, p. 190). To my mind this is not so much an indictment against writing for girls’ high schools as it is against bad philosophers and their willingness to take advantage of whoever needs a writer and educator, though at first glance it is easy to read this as quite dismissive of professional positions in charge of young women’s education. Instead, we should be suspicious of bad philosophers applying their trade in places where it can do great harm, such as in the education of girl children especially.

The final discussion of women comes on the very last page. Nietzsche describes Diogenes’ response to the praise of another philosopher: “How can he be considered great, since he has been a philosopher for so long and has never yet disturbed anybody?” (UM III §8, p. 194). Nietzsche says such a description would be a suitable epitaph for mere academic philosophy, that “it disturbed nobody,” and that such an epitaph is not praise of the goddess of truth, but rather that of an old woman; and furthermore, “it is not to be wondered at if those who know that goddess only as an old woman are themselves very unmanly and thus, as might be expected, completely ignored by the men of power” (UM III §8, p. 194). I note first of all that this final passage in the third Meditation cements Nietzsche’s use of the feminine metaphor for truth well within his early period and, as we shall see, he continues to use this metaphor throughout his

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124 “…the most sensible of them will take up the plough and the vainest will go to court.”
works. Thus we should pay careful attention to this apparently clumsy emphasis on masculinity in relation to truth. Nietzsche may have in mind a kind of romantico-sexual metaphor wherein the masculinity of men and the femininity of women draw each to the other in heterosexual courtship displays; perhaps the nature of the goddess and the nature of the philosopher is supposed to be similar here.

Second, I cede to Nietzsche the claim that those men who do not represent themselves within the constructs of masculinity will be ignored by men of power in a society which values those constructs positively. I also cede the claim that saying someone ‘disturbs nobody’ is not the praise of someone with strength, and it is possible that there have been many nice little old ladies who lacked the kind of strength Nietzsche probably has in mind, namely the strength to garden one’s self and cultivate one’s true nature. But the implication that all or most old women lack such strength is troubling. If one’s philosophy disturbs no one, one is likely to be ignored and live a quiet life. Such a life is not congruent with the superabundant flourishing Nietzsche seems to hold as ideal. However, we should not expect old women raised in human-all-too-human times to be overwhelmingly philosophers of the future, either, which is no harsh judgment against the elderly or elderly women in particular.

Nietzsche seems to want to say that an old, quiet truth differs sufficiently from truth in its full glory such that those who only attend to the quiet version would have a very different philosophy. It is plausible, and even evidenced in some cases, that quiet philosophies and philosophers attract little attention from those in power; we need only look at Machiavelli and Cesare Borgia for one historical example. It is also plausible that the rugged and inflexible characteristics of Männlichkeit identified above were more commonly represented by men than the women in Nietzsche’s social circles, as Franziska was a biddable girl rather than a force of nature in her own right; however, Nietzsche would have seen through his own grandmother Erdmuthe, who so oppressed Franziska, that old women can also be rugged and inflexible, though
she may have a quiet woman living a quiet life. It is also possible that associating the ‘unmanly’ with the negative is a false connection, though such a connection seems warranted on the grounds that power ignores the unmanly in this context.

At this point, this concluding passage from the third Meditation is the most troubling I have encountered; I am uncertain as to whether Nietzsche is simply writing under the influence of Schopenhauer’s misogyny, playing a deeper game I cannot discern, or simply being clumsy with his metaphors. It may be that I have no better explanation than to say that this may be one piece of evidence for my opposition, but it is the first good piece of evidence I have found so far, and I do not believe it is one of the many on which my opponents have focused. At the very least, we do see here one of the earliest forms of Nietzsche’s playful suggestion that philosophers must romance truth, though the possible implication that older women are beyond romance is ignorant at best. To strive for charity, I postulate here that what Nietzsche intends is not necessarily that old women do not deserve romance or any other critique of aged femininity, but rather that our tropes of masculinity and greatness ignore the quiet and the subtle, which could be to our detriment theoretically.

Untimely Meditations: Richard Wagner in Bayreuth (UM IV)

The fourth and final Meditation is an uneasy book, balanced between Nietzsche’s desire to maintain his intellectual integrity as he begins moving away from Wagner’s ‘histrionic’ romanticism and Nietzsche’s wish to express publicly his admiration for the way Wagner had inspired him despite ultimately falling short of even Wagnerian ideals (UM p. xxii). We also see the reappearance of the term ‘Frau’ in this Meditation as well as the first appearance of ‘Schwester’ since The Birth of Tragedy. Further, the references to women throughout this work are almost entirely positive or at least neutral, with little to none of the implicit misogynistic themes in the previous text.
The first two references are both to sisters, the first noting the various kinds of loyalty possible, including the “most glorious and rarest among them: loyalty of brother to sister, of friend to friend, of servant to master…” and also including the loyalty of various fictional women to men such as Elizabeth and Tannhäuser or Isolde and Tristan (UM IV §2, p. 203). The fact that Nietzsche sees women as capable of loyalty certainly undercuts any adherence to misogynistic beliefs about the inherent treacherous nature of women an uncritical scholar might otherwise assume. Nietzsche’s other reference to sisters in this work comes in the form of a metaphor apparently belonging to Wagner concerning the “corresponding necessary shape in the world of the visible” with which music pairs, “that is to say, to its sister, gymnastics” (UM IV §5, p. 216-7). This reference itself may be part of a dualism where the masculine music necessitates the more feminine gymnastics, but note that this dualism itself shatters the stereotypical tendency to class physical pursuits as primarily masculine and non-physical or less physical pursuits as more feminine. I also note that this dualistic picture is more properly Wagner’s than Nietzsche’s, and thus does not necessarily invest Nietzsche in a strict gender binary; far more evidence would be required at this point to demonstrate Nietzsche’s adherence thereto.

Wagner’s gender binary appears again in the distinction between the more “miraculous and serious manly nature” of myth and the “deeply debased and disfigured” nature of mere fairy tales which are “the plaything of the women and children of the degenerate folk” (UM IV §8, p. 230). At this point in time, Nietzsche does not appear critical of this particular distinction between serious masculinity and debased femininity so much as he is critical of Wagner’s inability to answer the call to make myth ‘manly’ again, but I do note that the women of the ‘degenerate’ folk stand in contrast with Nietzsche’s later mention of the “Fürsten und Frauen,”\textsuperscript{125} who participated in Wagner’s attempts to masculinize myth (UM IV §10, p. 246). Indeed, contrasts seem to be a predominant technique in gendered treatment of music, because when

\textsuperscript{125} Translated as “princes and women” but perhaps better translated along the lines of “lords and ladies.”
musicians historically discovered the “charm of contrast” they engaged in “an antithetical ethos, for example by allowing a masculine theme to come into conflict with a feminine theme” (UM IV §9, p. 241).

The last three references to women are far more in keeping with Wagner’s romantic themes, and the first of these is one in which Nietzsche likens Wagner to the kinds of female characters in his works: “[Wagner] lives like a fugitive whose aim is to preserve, not himself, but a secret; like an unfortunate woman\(^\text{126}\) who wants to save the life of the child she carries in her womb, but not her own: he lives like Sieglinde, ‘for the sake of love’” (UM IV §10, p. 247). These kinds of women again appear near the end of the Meditation in the form of women who prefer death to unfaithfulness, or death to the loss of their beloveds’ souls, or who accept some new genius despite the outcry of traditionalists, or even those like Brünnhilde who sacrifice their wisdom only to gain the highest wisdom at all, namely that the deepest suffering opens one’s eyes (UM IV §11, p. 252, 254). Strikingly, these are women of action rather than passivity. These women make choices and take actions, albeit frequently the action of death or sacrifice, but choices and actions nonetheless, and hence these women are very unlike the stereotypes of the maternal nurturer or the tender, retiring wallflower more commonly associated with femininity by Nietzsche’s contemporaries.

The only remaining passage to discuss from the final Meditation is one which continues the theme from Schopenhauer as Educator which represents women as protectors rather than the protected, particularly in their maternal mode. In particular, Nietzsche is discussing a drive Wagner possesses which in this text appears to have a negative effect: “…the force of the drive, protective and as it were motherly, which he brings to every sacrifice draws him back into the atmosphere of the scholar and the cultivated to which as a creator he has said farewell for ever,” a culture whose language is inadequate for artistic communication (UM IV §10, p. 249). Thus,

\(^{126}\) “\text{unglückliches Weib}”
Nietzsche appears to view negatively Wagner’s tendency to regress to a more infantile artistic period, and attributes this to one motivating force within Wagner’s character which has a maternally protective urge. While it is certainly the case that maternal protectiveness is necessary in nursing a new idea, regression thereto is not congruent with the healthy development of growing ideas and artistic forms. Therefore, I would not characterize this passage as negatively judgmental towards women, and in fact I rather appreciate the fact that Nietzsche sees the feminine capability for protection as opposed to the stereotypically masculine form of protection.

“On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” (OTL)

Though commonly referenced in discussions of Nietzsche’s epistemology, “On Truth and Lie” is not one of Nietzsche’s published works. I have chosen to include it here primarily because of the preponderance of attention it has received in Nietzsche scholarship concerning perspectivism, to which I will return in the next chapter, rather than because of its significance to the discussion of misogyny. However, it does turn out that Nietzsche references women several times throughout this short work and each serves as a means to connect Nietzsche’s discussion of truth to his discussion of women. There are three passages which contain such references. The first of these is an early and quick observation about the arbitrariness of the German language’s assignation of gender to nouns: “We divide things up by gender, describing a tree\textsuperscript{127} as masculine and a plant\textsuperscript{128} as feminine – how arbitrary these translations are!” (OTL §1, p. 144). Thus Nietzsche demonstrates that while originally words may have derived from sensory perceptions, such as the hardness of a stone, words have flown far “beyond the canon of certainty” (OTL §1, p. 144). This remark indicates that for Nietzsche certainty is connected to empirical experiences, a connection we will explore more thoroughly in a later chapter.

\textsuperscript{127} Der Baum (masculine).
\textsuperscript{128} Die Pflanze (feminine).
Similarly, in the second passage referencing women, Nietzsche finds that concepts are removed from the words which are themselves removed from the initial sensory experience: “concepts too…are only the left-over residue of a metaphor, and that the illusion produced by the artistic translation of a nervous stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then at least the grandmother of each and every concept” (OTL §1, p. 147). This maternal, or perhaps more accurately grandmaternal, metaphor once again serves to connect femininity to truth, as truth itself is one such concept; in particular, truth is the concept of using metaphors according to a set of socially accepted rules: “Within this conceptual game of dice, however, ‘truth’ means using each die in accordance with its designation, counting its spots precisely, forming correct classifications, and never offending against the order of castes nor against the sequence of classes of rank” (OTL §1, p. 147). Thus metaphor is the mother of concepts, and sensory experience the mother of metaphor.

The final passage contains references to many different kinds of women, each of which serves as a connection between myth and nature. Nietzsche argues that the ancient Greeks’ waking lives must have been akin to dreams “If, one day, any tree may speak as a nymph, or if a god can carry off virgins in the guise of a bull, if the goddess Athene herself is suddenly seen riding on a beautiful chariot in the company of Pisistratus through the market-places of Athens” (OTL §2, p. 151). Indeed, for the Ancient Greeks, Nietzsche sees the entirety of nature as cavorting about humanity “as if it were just a masquerade of the gods who are merely having fun by deceiving men in every shape and form” (OTL §2, p. 151). This distinction between the so-called sobriety of modern science and the implied intoxication of ancient myth serves to demonstrate the evolution of truth as socially accepted; while arboreal nymphs, god-besotted virgins, and market-place goddesses all may have followed the rules for truth in ancient society, such figments no longer fit within modern rules for the employment of concepts.

129 Arguably even socially constructed, but more on this later.
At this point I will also suggest that Nietzsche is making very subtle moves towards classifying the notion of femininity as a myth unto itself. While there is no doubt that real human women exist, Nietzsche has begun to demonstrate an inkling of the idea that the essence of femininity as demarcated by concepts such as the Eternal Feminine (Ewig-Weibliche) may itself be a metaphor for which the corresponding sensory impressions are so far removed as to become meaningless and without proper employment within the rules for truth in modern culture. However, I grant that such a claim is only flimsily based on the preceding text, and I have a great deal of work remaining to show how this initial hint plays out in the middle and late periods of Nietzsche’s publications.

§3 Nietzsche’s Middle Period

Nietzsche’s middle period as I construe it contains five published works: Human, All-Too-Human minus the 1886 preface and plus its two sequels, Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow, as well as Daybreak and the first four books of The Gay Science minus Book V published in 1887, also both minus their respective 1887 and 1887 prefaces. Each work references women well over twenty times. One thing I plan to attend to closely is how Nietzsche construes women and femininity in these works as contrasted with his later works, primarily because scholars claim repeatedly that Nietzsche’s attitude towards women changes drastically after his break with Lou Salomé in November 1882; if these scholars are correct, Zarathustra, the first book of Nietzsche’s late period, should demonstrate a particularly malevolent turn not seen in the early or middle periods. Based on my familiarity with Nietzsche’s works, I suspect such a turn does not exist, and I hope to be able to demonstrate this below. Further, because there are so many references to women from this point forward, I may be able to
offer only glancing remarks on some passages, but I hope to continue to be as comprehensive as possible.

*Human, All-Too-Human* (HATH)

If we count each of the *Untimely Meditations* as individual books, *Human* is Nietzsche’s sixth published work, and the first wherein he devotes an entire chapter, specifically the seventh of nine, to the related issues of women and children. While the bulk of Nietzsche’s remarks about women lie in this chapter, Nietzsche also discusses women elsewhere throughout the text. Many of these remarks are simple examples in longer lists including men and gender-unspecified individuals. Other remarks are somewhat traditional characterizations of womanly roles in society without any particular judgment or valuation indicated regarding these roles; for example, Nietzsche’s comment that women are “the custodians of the ancient” who have preserved the relic of the noble’s cold glance for the servant “more faithfully” than men (HATH §64, p. 43-44). Other comments indicate a sympathetic willingness to mitigate judgment against women on the basis of “historical reasons” (HATH §356, p. 143), and that Nietzsche explicitly believes that women are capable of nobility as much as men (HATH §440, p. 162).

Several such comments refer to various goddesses, including the *Moirae* or Fates and the Catholic Holy Virgin (§111), Truth again, this time in youthful and aged aspects (§257), Health (§282), Destiny (§370), and Justice (§637). Nietzsche also makes passing references to witches or “sorcerers” (“Hexenmeister,” §627), “cultural mother’s milk” (§218), the “mother tongue” (§267), a love for religion akin to love for one’s mother and nurse (§292), “mother-love” (§363), and wealth enabling access to the “fairest women” (§479). Beyond such passing references, Nietzsche also discusses motherhood in more detail outside of the seventh chapter in terms of the pleasure of play between mother and young (§98), similarity of child to mother both in terms of

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130 See §57, 72, 111, 113, 133, 373, 629.
human offspring and as an analogy for dogmatic inheritance (§110), another analogy between how children come to understand their mothers and how people generally learn to understand each other (§216), an ambivalent description of how the masculine ancient Greek culture treated women and mothers and benefited from such treatment (§259), and a third analogy between a prince who invents a casus belli in order to war with a neighbor and a father who foists a stepmother or “substituted mother” on his child (§596).131

Outside of the seventh chapter, only a few passages remain: a relatively heterosexist description of male and female sexual interest (§98), which in combination with Nietzsche’s claim that the ancient Greek homoerotic relationships were emphasized “to a degree we can no longer comprehend” (§259) could be construed as either a case of protesting too much and implying that Nietzsche does have homoerotic tastes or as indicative that Nietzsche does have a more traditionally heterosexist understanding of human sexuality. However, in the service of being as charitable as possible in my reading, I choose to read these cases as Nietzsche describing generally accepted attitudes towards human sexuality in his time without either explicitly or implicitly prescribing approval for those attitudes. Another troubling passage that becomes less problematic if we read it as description without prescription is Nietzsche’s statement that the beauty of architectural structures is “The same thing as the beautiful face of a mindless woman: something mask-like” (HATH §218, p. 101). While it might be easy to assume that Nietzsche is implying that mindful women are not beautiful, I do not believe Nietzsche uses this example to that purpose; rather, he states that such facades are masks, and hence implies that a beautiful face of mindlessness may conceal an active and aware mind. Further, this may be a play on the Kantian notion of disinterestedness in evaluating beauty, such that mindlessness rather than disinterestedness is something his contemporaries associated with feminine human beauty.

131 One could perhaps argue that Nietzsche implies that both such false but publicly declared motives and substitute mothers are to be negatively valued, but I feel such a valuation would be derived from very thin evidence indeed; Nietzsche’s aphorism is far more descriptive than it is prescriptive.
Nietzsche also compares men and women in a way demonstrating an awareness that women’s history has lead to their current character, a strikingly non-essentialist view for a man so repeatedly accused of biological essentialism. In these aphorisms he notes that men and women’s speech behavior reflects their centuries of divided labor (§342); that a lack of female nobility is due to history (§356); that intelligent women may look harshly unpleasant under mass scrutiny but that tête-à-tête interactions reveal how pleasant they truly are (§374); that men learn to treat their profession as most important while women learn to treat their lovers as most important (§492); that all scholars, people of intelligence, and especially women, who have so long been excluded from education, must be especially careful when considering particularly exciting new hypotheses (§635), and that men and women often have different words for the same thing, for example “conviction” versus “faith,” both of which Nietzsche considers “shortsighted” (§636).

Of the fifty-nine passages in the seventh chapter, “Weib und Kind” or “Woman and Child,” §377-§437, twelve contain no explicit mention of women, though the majority of these twelve aphorisms imply women through a heterosexist lens because they discuss marriage and love or parenting. Three refer explicitly and exclusively to the relationship between fathers and their children, and one of these three explicitly refers to sons rather than children in general.132 Some of these statements demonstrate Nietzsche’s prescient anticipation of Freud,133 others discuss motherly love or motherly wisdom,134 or girlhood,135 noble women and other women of consequence including wives and candidates for marriage,136 and so forth. Many of these statements can be interpreted in a number of ways, alternatively as praising or insulting various kinds of women for their adherence to (or failure to adhere to) social norms or biological drives.

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132 This fact is obscured in §386 by translating “Menschen” as “man” and “sein” as a masculine possessive, rather than using a gender neutral option. See also 381 and 382.

133 See for example §380, “Everyone bears within him a picture of woman derived from his mother: it is this which determines whether, in his dealings with women, he respects them or despises them or is in general indifferent to them.” See also 379, 384, 385, 387, 422, 423, among others.

134 385, 387, 392, 404, 421, 424, 429, and 434.

135 404, 407, 409, and 421.

but Nietzsche appears to set this chapter as an especial challenge to interpretation. I base this claim on context.

Most significant for me is the passage proceeding this chapter and the second aphorism within this chapter; §376, the conclusion of “[The Human] in Society” or “Der Mensch in Verkehr,” is paragraph about friendship which contains a sage concluding that there is no such thing as friendship and Nietzsche responding that “yes, there are friends, but it is error and deception regarding yourself that led them to you; and they must have learned how to keep silent in order to remain your friend” and therefore that absolute truth destroys friendships, but maintaining deceptions allows the friendships to survive (HATH §36, p. 148-9). By contrast, the second passage in “Woman and Child” states that “The best friend will probably acquire the best wife [Gattin], because a good marriage is founded on the talent for friendship” (HATH §378, p. 150). Thus heterosexual marriage, just like non-gendered and asexual friendship, must be based at least in part on a healthy dose of deception and error. Some of these errors might resemble the errors of noble women Nietzsche mentions, who “think that a thing does not exist if it is not possible to speak about it in company” (HATH §383, p. 150).137

Some of these errors might also resemble the error Nietzsche offers in the first and final passages of this chapter; §377 states that perfect women are both higher and rarer than perfect men, and that this proposition is demonstrable by the “natural science of the animals” (HATH §377, p. 150). By contrast, the chapter ends with §437, which states that when fate contrives to give hemlock to the free spirit, as fate usually does, “the women” around “will lament and cry out and perhaps disturb the repose of the thinker’s sunset hours” as they did when they made Socrates finally cry out “do tell someone to take those women away!” (HATH, §437, p. 160). I believe that each of these claims is Nietzsche either intentionally or subconsciously presenting errors for our

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137 I find this statement especially remarkable in that it explains psychologically a survival mechanism of silence about abuse and rape in circles of quality; if no one speaks about a thing, we can all pretend it is not happening. Nonetheless, a pretense at silence does not prevent such harm and frequently makes it worse; I will return to this theme and Nietzsche’s apparent sympathy in *The Gay Science*. 

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consideration, errors which could be construed as necessary for making conventional heterosexual marriages function in Wilhelmine society.

The claim that perfect women are so much rarer and better than perfect men could have been a belief that made a long search for the best mate (or true love) more tolerable; in a similar fashion, the practice of sending voluble mourners away could help the dying husband cope with his own grief at parting from his wife and loved ones. I do not mean to suggest that Nietzsche believes either error is necessarily the best belief, but only that Nietzsche claims that such errors made certain relationships possible in his society, or at least that these errors facilitated smooth functioning. What is particularly interesting is the notion that constant contact and absolute honesty do not always make for the happiest marriages, perhaps because not all individuals can appreciate either, though maybe there are those who can. Furthermore, the insight that interpersonal relationships, especially between men and women, are based on deceptions and errors, provides us reason good to believe that Nietzsche considers much of what he writes about women and relationships with women to be based on deception and error as well. I believe this insight will color a great deal of Nietzsche’s further commentary on women.

Assorted Opinions and Maxims (AOM)

The two sequels to Human, All Too Human, Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow, discuss women with decreasing frequency, though Nietzsche will pick up the pace again with the two final books from his middle period. The first mention of femininity of any kind in Assorted Opinions and Maxims is in the prefatory discussion of Wagner’s cloying romanticism. Nietzsche states that he had grown “weary with disgust at the femininity and ill-bred rapturousness of this romanticism” and that “such music unnerves, softens, feminizes, its ‘eternal womanly’ draws us – downwards!” (AOM P§3, p. 211). Nietzsche echoes these sentiments later in this book when he refers to the “all too feminine nature of music”
as adhering to naturalistic art and language (AOM §134, p. 244). The immediate problem with this is the somewhat obvious association of femininity with the things Nietzsche appears to consider negative: being ill-bred, romantic, soft, enervated, and decadent or in decline.

At the same time, however, the obviousness of this association gives me pause: Nietzsche prefers playing with language to being obvious, and he intentionally puts ‘eternal womanly’ or *Ewig-Weibliches* in scare quotes, leading me to think there is more for us readers to unearth. This is a clue that Nietzsche does not accept the traditional characterization of the essence of femininity, the eternal feminine, at its face value or as necessarily valuable; at the same time, however, in this passage Nietzsche demonstrates his willingness to play along with traditional characterizations for the purposes of lambasting his former idols while simultaneously subverting some of those same traditions. Nietzsche goes on to explain that this attitude of his was his vengeance against romantic music (AOM P§3, p. 211) and even a turning against himself and towards pessimism, the antithesis of romanticism (AOM P§4, p. 211), which required that he reverse his perspective in order to restore himself to himself using optimism (AOM P§5, p. 212).

Thus, I believe that Nietzsche is – perhaps unconsciously – indicating that his initial acceptance of the traditional notion of femininity has analogously been subject to various inversions and reversals of perspective, such that he has – this time perhaps consciously – rejected the notion of femininity and other so-called ‘eternal’ concepts as singular, pure, unitary essences. Therefore we as readers should make an effort to perceive the concept of femininity, among other concepts, from inverted and reversed perspectives, alongside Nietzsche’s attempts to do the same.

Nietzsche draws explicit parallels between women and artists in several places in this text (§30, 169, 173, 274, 284), noteworthy in connection with the preface if only because artists frequently toy with perspective in their work. Similar to artists, women also have a taste for knowledge as an ornament, as opposed to the masculine taste for knowledge as weaponry (AOM §290, p. 280). Nietzsche makes other comparisons between masculine and feminine ‘natures’
(§95, 272, 273, 274, 287) or remarks about feminine ‘nature’ or ‘wisdom’ alone (§276, 278, 279, 282, 286, 291, 292), or in conjunction with childishness (§265) and remarks about specifically maternal ‘nature’ (§36), that again seem obviously essentialist, but with Nietzsche’s earlier hints that femininity might only be inappropriately portrayed as an essence, I suspect Nietzsche may simply be playing with the false dualities here in an attempt to impose reversals of perspectives on his readers.

Imposing reversals of perspectives on his readers may also be the reason Nietzsche employs so many metaphorical goddesses, mothers, sisters, and grandmothers as representatives of things he values strongly, whether positively or negatively: see for example the beings of excess (§77), spirit (§99), poetry (§111), moral monstrosity (§150), the Gothic period of the arts (§171), art more generally (§227), freethinking and presumption (§320), and rules (§392). However, some of Nietzsche’s references to mythical females do appear to be solely references to mythology, as in the nameless reference to the nymph Calypso and the human Penelope from the myth of Odysseus in §159, and as in the explicit reference to Penthesilea, the queen of the Amazons, and to apparently any one of the Muses in §100. Likewise, when Nietzsche offers women and girls as examples of various sorts I believe he sometimes uses them simply as examples existing as part of a diverse whole, such as kinds of artistic need (§169) or people with artistic needs (§173), theatrical talents (§170), sources of wisdom (§176), and as examples of bad taste in the bourgeois (§304) and Germans generally (§324); Nietzsche’s remark that witches need not actually exist for the belief in witches to have terrible effects is just another of this kind of example, and does not indicate any judgment either for or against women who identify as witches or are so identified by others (AOM §225, p. 270).

*The Wanderer and His Shadow (WS)*
The second sequel to *Human, All Too Human* has even fewer references to women than the first, and many of them are similar in kind to the references in *Assorted Opinions and Maxims*; however, some of these passages provide rich fodder for the discussion of Nietzsche’s misogyny. Pregnancy and motherhood in particular are dominant themes, perhaps problematic if we find Nietzsche making biologically essentialist claims about femininity on the basis of maternity. Nietzsche’s first mention of motherhood is a discussion of Schopenhauer’s thoughts on pregnancy and how it relates to different kinds of women, including ‘every woman,’ ‘women of more mature or the maturest years,’ ‘the cleverest and most intelligent women,’ ‘stupid women,’ as well as to ‘younger women,’ (WS §17, p. 309-10). Nietzsche’s criticism of Schopenhauer’s thoughts is particularly interesting, especially because he rejects the universality of Schopenhauer’s claims about women being ashamed should they be seen having sex, but ‘displaying’ their pregnancies, the result of having unprotected sex, “without a trace of shame, indeed with a kind of pride” (WS §17, p. 309). Criticizing universalizing claims about women is a staple of contemporary feminist critique, so this passage, while dubious in other ways – particularly Nietzsche’s ableist implication that ‘stupid women’ have good reasons to be ashamed of bearing stupid children – nonetheless demonstrates a decidedly though not perfectly feminist line of thought.

Nietzsche’s second and third references to motherhood come close on the heels of the first: Nietzsche draws an analogy between ‘acquiring’ children and ‘acquiring’ punishment in that mothers and criminals come to acquire these things after having performed the necessary actions hundreds of times without consequence (WS §27, p. 314). However, Nietzsche primarily focuses

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138 All *Weiber*.  
139 The only *Frauen* in this passage.  
140 This will be the ‘No True Scotsman’ problem of identifying Nietzsche’s feminism. A perfect or ‘true’ feminist may not be elitist, racist, classist, ableist, nationalist, anti-theist, religious, shadeist, sizeist, or otherwise bigoted – but if this is the case, then no true or perfect feminist probably and provably exists. The solution to this problem, as I hope to demonstrate, is to provide clear cases of Nietzsche’s advocacy of feminist values, and I believe his explicit rejection of Schopenhauer’s universalizing claims about women and femininity on the grounds of their false generalization here is one such clear case.
on the criminal half of the analogy, and does not appear to find fault with such mothers here. Similarly, in his third reference to motherhood, he seems to be using the mythical Niobe’s abundant blessing of children just as an example without apparent negative judgment (WS §30, p. 315). Nietzsche’s fourth reference to motherhood explains both Raphael’s idealization of noble and even not-so-noble femininity in the painting of the Sistine Madonna as well as Raphael’s ‘honesty’ in his inclusion of the other two characters in the piece: the “lovely girl” on the right side of the painting who is much less devout in her expression than the “graybeard” on the left who adores the Madonna, represented as what might count as a noble young man’s “vision of a future wife, of a clever, noble-souled, silent and very beautiful woman bearing her first-born in her arms” (WS §73, p. 328). This passage is more of a comment on Raphael’s artistry than it is on femininity, but both the noble Madonna and the less-noble girl are valued positively; similarly, Nietzsche’s fifth mention of motherhood is more of a comment on language than on femininity, in that he criticizes dependence on one’s “mother tongue” (WS §132, p. 342), but this is because dependence is bad not because mother tongues are bad; and Nietzsche’s sixth mention of motherhood is more of a comment on art again, in that ambition is a ‘mother’ of the arts, but this too seems to be a positive valuation of femininity if any normative implications are present (WS §158, p. 346).

One passage which might seem to indicate Nietzsche’s association of certain qualities with femininity comes in the midst of a discussion of the value of unselfishness; here he describes how different people bring the best they have to a demonstrably beneficial virtue like so-called ‘unselfishness,’ including “the women” with “their gentleness” (WS §190, p. 358). However, Nietzsche does not imply one way or another whether these best qualities are inherent to each type, and so this passage is not definitive. Likewise, when Nietzsche states later that certain authors do not appear to have written for any particular group, and includes “young ladies” in a
list of Germans, Christians, children, dreamers, and others, this in no way confers definitive value for or against femininity, youthful or otherwise (WS §214, p. 363).

Nietzsche’s description of how the European women of his social circles contrast in their approach and contribution to fashion also confers no definitive value on femininity in contrast to masculinity and reads more like a psychological profile than a moral judgment; indeed, he accuses both the men and women of Europe of being “still immature” because they have not repudiated national, class, and individual vanity (WS §215, p. 364). That America is the ‘daughter-land’ of ‘mother’ Europe just goes to show how much more immature American fashion and culture must be by Nietzsche’s estimation, but only by virtue of her youth and not her feminine gendering (WS §215, p. 365). Further, Nietzsche seems to recognize just how much variation there is in femininity in that he contrasts women of his contemporary society with women of the past and other societies: in particular, it is important to note how Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of convictions on the behavior of women in his society. Nietzsche points out that it is only because these women are convinced “that men are terrified of intellect in a woman” that they are so “ready to deny they have any sharpness of mind at all and deliberately impose on themselves a reputation for shortsightedness” because they believe it will make themselves more inviting and men more confiding and trusting (WS §270, p. 376). Thus Nietzsche evinces his awareness that many attributes of femininity – including the disinclination to intellectual pursuits – are socially imposed rather than biologically essential.

Therefore, when Nietzsche goes on to use the adoring gaze of “a pretty young wife” as an example of happiness (WS §271, p. 376); or to say that many women have “an intelletto del sacrificio and can no longer enjoy life when her husband refuses to sacrifice her” (WS §272, p. 376); or that stupidity is “unwomanly” (WS §273, p. 376); or again that male temperament is worse than female temperament (WS §274, p. 376) in the immediately following four passages, I cannot take these to be statements about the inherent properties of masculinity or femininity, but
rather must assume that Nietzsche intends these to be statements about his own contemporary socialization with regards to gender.

The remaining comments seem less coherent thematically; Nietzsche uses an example of a woman for comedic effect, and perhaps with a modicum of respect. She is the wife of an old soldier who listens with him to the tale of Faust and who declares that the only thing Faust did wrong “was to have no ink in his inkwell! To write with blood is a sin” (WS §42, p. 321). Nietzsche’s desire for humor, even directed at objects of affection, is again evident when he suggests that friends of music should nonetheless be permitted to “make fun of [music] and laugh” at it from time to time, just a little, and this includes joking about “the woman in music” (WS §169, p. 349). We should also note that Nietzsche also makes reference to “truly good men and women,” (WS §20, p. 310) thus casually including women in the category of persons who are capable of being good and therefore leading me to believe that at least at this point in his intellectual development Nietzsche does not exclude women from moral agency or personhood, which leaves open the later possibility of women Übermenschen. The final mentions of women in Wanderer include a passing description of a “girl clad almost as a boy” in the midst of a passage describing an idyllic Arcadia (WS §295, p. 385) and a reference to circumspection as the “great-grandmother and queen” of the virtues (§294, p. 384). Lastly, Nietzsche refers to the “proud mistress” of foreign policy, namely utility, though the Hollingdale translation obscures this reference by translating “Gebieterin” as “master” (WS §292, p. 384).

Daybreak (D)

The fourth and penultimate book of Nietzsche’s middle period is Morgenröte, variously translated as Dawn and Daybreak, and it contains significantly more references to women than the previous two works. Many of these are innocuous and uninteresting passing references to family members and strangers, such as fathers and mothers (§128), grandfathers and
grandmothers (§35), wives (§42, 149, 262, 369), the mother of Odysseus (§562), a glancing reference to “all the women in the vicinity scream[ing] aloud” in reaction to a man collapsing in the street (§119), and yet another parallel between women and artists (§544). However, Nietzsche also begins to do some interesting work regarding women, femininity, and explicitly misogyny in this text.

Nietzsche’s first mention of gender in the text is actually a remark about gendered language reminiscent of “On Truth and Lie,” particularly in the sense that in some languages like German various nouns are ascribed some gender: die Sonne or the sun is feminine, for example, while der Mond or the moon is masculine and das Leid or grief is neuter. What Nietzsche does is to point out a parallel between our ascriptions of ethical significance and our ascriptions of gender upon the world: noting that we now consider it an error to give all things a “sex,” “In the same way humanity has ascribed to all that exists a connection with morality and laid an ethical significance on the world’s back. One day this will have as much value, and no more, as the belief in the masculinity or femininity of the sun has today” (D §3, p. 9). In other words, just as we no longer consider the gender of the sun important, so we will someday consider morality – or at least our tendency to consider everything under the lens of morality – no longer important. Nietzsche does not go on to address gender in language, but the rest of the text is full of pronouncements about women, their relationships, and their circumstances, which leads me to believe that the above parallel has a deeper meaning: namely, that Nietzsche believes that one day our emphasis on gender values will go the way of gendered language by falling out of use over time, and not necessarily by concerted effort.142

141 This parallel is a recurring theme which I consider non-misogynist given contemporary theories about the performativity of gender. See for example Candace West and Don Zimmerman’s “Doing Gender.” Gender & Society. 1, 2 (1987) pp. 125-151.
142 I do not believe this is necessarily the problematic claim that we should become ‘gender-blind’ in the same way some claim to be ‘color-blind,’ but this is not the place to address that issue.
Nietzsche’s next discussion of gender is more troubling. First, he claims that degeneration of the body and spirit through long subjection to custom causes one to grow increasingly beautiful, while exercising the organs of body and spirit and the disposition required for such exercise (as opposed to submission to custom) increases ugliness: “That is why the old baboon is uglier than the young one, and why the young female baboon most closely resembles man: it is the most beautiful baboon, that is to say. – One could from this draw a conclusion as to the origin of the beauty of women!” (D §25, p. 20). Now, we can critique the notion that all women are beautiful (and degenerate) humans; after all, the European paradigms of feminine beauty have tended to be suspiciously white, pale, upper-class, cisgender, etc., there is a long history of viewing women as less-than-fully-human in comparison to men, etc., and if this were Nietzsche’s meaning it would be plainly misogynist.

However, a second reading reveals several things: first of all, Nietzsche’s use of ‘degeneration’ is not as straightforward as it initially looks. While we might consider degeneration to be a decrease in value, Nietzsche complicates this picture by pairing physical and psychological lassitude with both increasing degeneration and increasing beauty, and increased effort or labor with both decreased degeneration and decreased beauty. The relative resistance of a person to cultural norms thus corresponds to relative ugliness; the young are beautiful because they have not yet resisted at all, and the compliant are the most beautiful out of their cohort because they resist the least. Correlatively, the old are ugly because they have had more time to resist than the young, and the rebellious and ornery will thus be the ugliest in each cohort because they resist the most. This only becomes a value judgment about gender when we assume that one’s beauty and one’s value are similarly correlative, or in other words that increasing beauty means the person is more civilized, desirable, moral, etc.; this is precisely the step I think Nietzsche leaves uncompleted to trip up his reader intentionally.
The ‘beauty of women’ here is supposed to point towards the next step ‘up’ from or ‘past’ humanity, as humanity is apparently a step up from or past baboons; and while this beauty is not necessarily a matter of being most compliant with society, I think it is supposed to emphasize how the yet-to-be-named Übermensch will be the most degraded and thus most beautiful version of a human being which will overcome its ancestral all-too-human inheritance. This ‘degradation’ cannot be mere compliance with society, as the picture Nietzsche later presents of the Übermensch is certainly not a paradigm of social compliance. Thus we might infer that the appearance of degradation comes with the ability to project the appearance of compliance, and we might further infer that Nietzsche grants such an ability to women in this parallel. Such an inference might require that we also assume Nietzsche will grant parallel abilities between the most beautiful of baboons and humanity more generally, and while I cannot confirm that he does so here, I think it would be foolish to rule out the possibility.

Next, Nietzsche discusses how some of us use our virtue as a refined form of cruelty against others; in addition to great artists who defeat their rivals, Nietzsche points to “The chastity of the nun: with what punitive eyes she looks in the faces of women who live otherwise!” (D §30, p. 23). Later on, Nietzsche also refers to a nun’s chastity as forgoing “the world without knowing it” (D §440, p. 442). Neither passage offers a particularly insightful or original picture of women who enter nunneries, but there is no reason to assume either is supposed to be a description of all nuns; in the case of those nuns who do fit such descriptions, and I doubt not that such nuns exist, I think Nietzsche’s claims do apply without rancor.

The only remaining remark on women from Book I is remarkably racist and ignorant, and a testament to Nietzsche’s intellectual inheritance from Schopenhauer and others who ascribe to Orientalist stereotypes. Nietzsche should not be excused for parroting the words of his predecessors, however, and so I take the following to be frustratingly problematic:
Not European and not noble. – There is something Oriental and something feminine in Christianity: it betrays itself in the idea: ‘whom the lord loveth he chastiseth’; for in the Orient women regard chastisements and the strict seclusion of their person from the world as a sign of their husband’s love, and complain if this sign is lacking.

D §75, p. 45

I seriously doubt Nietzsche ever spoke to an Asian woman who spoke about her abuse without reserve, or even to German women who spoke explicitly about their own experiences with spousal abuse. I do not doubt that Nietzsche probably learned this canard from someone who believed it; and indeed, I have met and read about women who fear their husbands do not love them when these men do not yell at them, call them names, and otherwise abuse them, though many of these women later come to recognize the abuse for what it is. However, just because a woman accepts a belief about something does not make it either feminist or non-misogynist (for internalized misogyny can lead to a woman believing the most heinously misogynistic things and even that she has never experienced misogyny), and just because a victim believes abuse is a sign of love does not make physical and sexual violence, psychological torture, or relentless insult a sign of love (for internalizing the message of the abuser can lead to a victim believing the most heinous things about what is an appropriate expression of love). Even more worrying is the fact that Nietzsche seems to place the ‘feminine’ as the opposite of the ‘noble,’ granting that the European and the Oriental are similarly opposed in this passage.

I cannot deny the central premise: there is something similar between the notion that God punishes the ones he loves and the notion that an abuser abuses the ones he loves. However, Nietzsche’s use of racism to make this point here is deeply problematic. I cannot find evidence in the surrounding passages that Nietzsche is trying to use racial stereotypes to make some deeper point about knowledge or value, and while we can make arguments about how Nietzsche elsewhere includes women in the nobility, complicates femininity by presenting multiple aspects thereof, and even sometimes describes aspects of nobility as feminine or the feminine as noble, we cannot get around the problem of his racism. Thus, the first caveat to my thesis that Nietzsche
is not a misogynist has to concern race: if we can construe Nietzsche as a kind of feminist, that kind of feminism is not sufficiently intersectional to be inclusive of racism.

The next passage is significantly less troubling; though Nietzsche does discuss empathy in connection with women there is no reason to presume that he assumes that “the play on the faces of women” of the “continual imitation and reflection of what is felt to be going on around them” (D §142, p. 89) is either inherently feminine or negative; these women here serve as just one example of how “we always almost involuntarily [practice] this skill” whenever we exercise empathy “in the presence of another person” (D §142, p. 89). Should the reader take this to be a negative judgment on women, I believe that says more about the reader than about Nietzsche; should the reader take this to be an affirmation of gender norms, however, we have no reason to assume Nietzsche’s ascription to such on the basis of essentialism.

Books III and IV contain around a dozen remarks each on women, including the introduction of ‘little woman’ or Weiblein we see repeated throughout Nietzsche’s later works. The first such little woman is a place-holder for the stereotypical ‘hen’ who plucks “to pieces” the achievements of others, particularly men (D §150, p. 97). However, Nietzsche reserves his rancor primarily for the carelessness of these great achievers rather than for the little woman who picks at their laurels, and for the carelessness of their marital choices. Similarly, when ‘beautiful women’ appear in a list of “the good things of life,” these women seem to be little more than place-holders (D §153, p. 98). Nietzsche is not making a judgment about all beautiful women, but rather pointing out a flaw in the men who seek to make the prizes of valor “accessible also to cowards” (D §153, p. 98).

143 I debated whether or not to make note of the Lehrmeisterin or instructress (translated as ‘instructor’) in this passage, but I think it is sufficient to point out that the instructress of empathy, namely timidity or Furchtsamkeit is a feminine noun; hence I do not believe that Nietzsche is making a remark about the gender of timidity here, just using fairly typical German noun-constructing conventions to my knowledge.
Book III is also one of the only places where Nietzsche explicitly connects perspective to our social constructions of gender, specifically regarding our different appreciations for male and female beauty. In particular, he points out that “Different perspectives of feeling” lead us to misunderstand the art of the ancient Greeks and their “passion for naked male beauty” and the fact that “It was only from that viewpoint that they were sensible of female beauty” (D §170, p. 104). Hence, Nietzsche concludes, “their perspective on female beauty was quite different from ours. And similarly with their love of women: they revered differently, they despised differently” (D §170, p. 104). While it is certainly possible that Nietzsche never connected such a difference in perspective on despising women to his revaluation of all values, I find it hard to believe that he completely ignored the connection between the two, especially given passages like this. Thus, even if Nietzsche himself never explicitly suggests or addresses a revaluation of gender values, I believe he must be aware of the possibility.\textsuperscript{144}

Nietzsche does emphasize the fact that there are gender differences by briefly noting Madame de Sévigné’s “accents of a woman” to contrast more strongly how the playwright Corneille was “a complete man”\textsuperscript{145} (D §191, p. 112). Further, Nietzsche does include a genuine gender expression among things which are noble and good, such as in the case of Madame de Guyon and her circle who have “a genuine, feminine, fine and noble old French naivety in word and gesture” (D §192, p. 113). However, noting that one can genuinely express gender in a good way does not necessarily mean that Nietzsche believes only such genuine expressions are good, nor that they are necessary, innate, or unchanging. I highlight this part because of his inclusion of femininity amongst things which are noble and good. I would also like to point out that Nietzsche demonstrates his awareness of misogyny or woman-hatred (\textit{Weiberhaft}) when he acknowledges

\textsuperscript{144} Part of my dissertation may have to address the difference or similarities between the slave revolt in morality and the revaluation of all values; one key point is probably going to rely on the relative passive, reactive qualities of a slave revolt as opposed to the active qualities of a revaluation of all values, akin to the distinction between the knightly-aristocratic form of “I am good, you are not me, you are bad” reasoning and the priestly-slave form of “You are evil, I am not you, I am good” reasoning.

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Manne}.
that he quotes from “the ancient misogynist Aeschylus” (D §193, p. 114), and while Nietzsche appears to simply drop in his quote about how ‘young women peep through their veils,’ we could make much of the fact that Nietzsche drops this quote into a passage discussing witty yet indiscreet inspirations. To say the least, we could argue that Nietzsche is hinting here that his own use of remarks on gender can be just such witty, indiscreet inspirational kernels as those which gave Hegel his style.

Nietzsche draws an apparently incidental but nonetheless explicit connection between truth and women in this text as well, noting that in several situations we choose rather to not tell the truth: “to talk of buffooneries with children and not of the truth, to talk of compliments to women who are later to become mothers and not of the truth, to talk of their future and their pleasures to young people and not of the truth” (D §196, p. 117) – Nietzsche criticizes the fact that we have time for these pleasant falsehoods and untruths but not enough time in all of our education to address the questions of “What am I really doing? And why am I doing it?” (D §196, p. 116-7). While this is more a criticism of European and particularly German educational systems than anything else, I find this a fruitful passage because Nietzsche identifies several ways in which we can fail to tell the truth – buffooneries, compliments, future speculation and uneducated self-reflection, while not straightforward falsehoods all fall short of the truth in interesting ways. Nietzsche here also identifies three groups of persons who are commonly excluded from full epistemic agency, though not explicitly, namely young children, women (and especially future mothers or pregnant women), and young adults. We can draw further connections between the fact that our education leads us to not exactly withhold truth from such groups but at least to manipulate and massage the truth for these groups and the fact that these groups tend to be excluded from full membership in the epistemic community.

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146 Such a roundabout way to say pregnant women!
Nietzsche also offers evidence that he believes that at least some things apply to all of certain human groups regardless of gender, particularly the fact that “A person of aristocratic habits, man or woman, does not like to fall into a chair as if utterly exhausted” (D §201, p. 119-20). Again, I highlight this to note Nietzsche’s inclusion of feminine persons within the nobility, and feminine habits within noble ones. The final remarks on women from Book III come in the form of a reference to the “healthy mistrust” which “mother Europe has embodied in her sons,” namely the colonists who “could transform the disgrace of slavery into a virtue” and the “workers of Europe” who “ought henceforth to declare themselves as a class” and the corresponding tendency of such sons to reject “the dull old woman” because they are “in danger of becoming as querulous, irritable, and pleasure-seeking as she herself was” (D §206, p. 126-7). This whole passage is particularly interesting because of Nietzsche’s judgments that slavery is a disgrace, that the workers of Europe should unite, and his implication that pleasure-seeking is not a valuable trait. The gendering of Europe as a fitful old woman is little more than an uninteresting metaphor, as we could just as easily construe Europe as a querulous, irritable, and pleasure-seeking dull old man for the purposes of this passage.147

Book IV reveals a number of very feminist moments for Nietzsche: to start, he counsels his readers to “Beware of all spirits that lie in chains! Of clever women, for example, whom fate has confined to a petty, dull environment, and who grow old there,” because while they appear to be “sluggish and half-blind in the sunlight” they will “start up and bite” at anything unfamiliar or unexpected and “take their revenge on everything that has escaped from their dog-kennel” (D §227, p. 138). First of all, Nietzsche acknowledges that women can be clever; secondly, he acknowledges the injustice of confining women in a way that prevents the exercise of their

147 An aside: one could criticize this point on the grounds of the fact that ‘Europa,’ the mythological origin of the name of the continent Europe, was a young woman; if Europa had been a young man, European history might have been dramatically different, not the least because Zeus’s rape of Europa is the primary feature of the myth. Gender-swapping Europa might necessitate a corresponding gender-swap of Zeus and of all his rapes, and it is very difficult for me to imagine a world in which the Queen of all Olympus is a serial rapist the way the male Zeus has been because female-perpetrated rape is so rare by comparison to male-perpetrated rape.
talents; thirdly, he acknowledges that the abused can and often do retaliate, and that victims may not direct their retaliation at the appropriate targets, but simply any passer-by. Each of these is a remarkable insight for a man who supposedly just parrots Schopenhauer’s misogyny.

Nietzsche notes that dissimulation can be required by duty in some cases, and that frequently the “The lie is, if not the mother, then the nurse of goodness” (D §248, p. 143), once again demonstrating the connection of femininity to goodness. Also, I would like to take this opportunity to point out that Nietzsche has not set up truth and falsehood as a masculine/feminine dichotomy. While Nietzsche later indicates that truth is a woman in the preface to Beyond Good and Evil, here he describes lies or falsehoods as being a mother or (female) nurse. Thus both truth and its opposite are feminine for Nietzsche and the fact that he uses these metaphors consistently and repeatedly leads me to believe he is not merely incidentally gendering these ideas on the basis of the gender of the words die Wahrheit and die Lüge.

Nietzsche appears to judge harshly the empty-headed music appreciator who is content to be deceived and cannot even distinguish the approach of a beautiful woman from the approach of a beautiful horse (D §255, p. 144), and I would argue further that he harshly judges the married man who suddenly realizes that his “young wife” is dull but believes she is interesting as well as “those women whose flesh is willing but whose spirit is weak” (D §276, p. 150), thus demonstrating that his criticism for those who are slow to understand or control themselves is equal-opportunity in its fierceness. When Nietzsche describes the ‘danger in beauty’ as the exclamation “how much cleverer she would have become if she were not beautiful!” (D §282, p. 151), I read this as a statement about society more than about beautiful women: for in a society which prizes a woman’s beauty over her intelligence, many women either learn to hide their cleverness or learn to actively avoid exercising it. Similarly, Nietzsche’s comments on “dear ladies” who “count the beauty of their children, their clothes, their dog, their physician, their town

148 Junge Gattin.
to their own credit” demonstrate a problem with a society which also creates “great men” with great egos that appropriate all of time as their own as if “they were the head of this long body” (D §285, p. 151); a woman whose ego is large in a society which deems women inferior will spread her ego over her immediate surroundings, while a man whose ego is large in a society which deems men superior will spread his ego over all of history. Again, this is a statement about the social construction of gender rather than the biological innateness of gender expression, and this is a descriptive rather than prescriptive statement.

Nietzsche continues in his theme of criticizing men for their relationships with women rather than blaming the women for the behavior of men: for in the case of saints, Nietzsche remarks that “It is the most sensual men who have to flee from women and torment their body” rather than saying that women represent lustful temptations responsible for men straying from the path of virtue (D §294, p. 153). Nietzsche also cautions us against victim-blaming in a sense, because innocence corresponds to an ignorance which prevents innocents “from distinguishing between measure and excess and from keeping themselves in check in good time” (D §321, p. 159); thus, when he calls young wives “ignorant” it is not a judgment against such women but rather a judgment about their innocence (D §321, p. 159). In another passage, Nietzsche notes amusingly that the appearance of adult children next to their mothers demonstrates how appearance is an argument against history, for given such an image it is hard to credit the claim that those children at some point emerged from the bodies of their mothers (D §340, p. 164); this claim is more interesting because of its epistemological implications – namely that appearance or sensory experience is contrary to inductive logic which in turn happens to be built on sensory experiences – than because of its connection to pregnancy, motherhood, and gender.

Perhaps the most explicit statement of Nietzsche’s opinion about misogyny, and one of the things I take to mark him at least as an anti-misogynist in the same way he is an anti-anti-Semite, comes in a fairly brief aphorism which I shall quote in full: “Misogynists. – ‘Woman is
our enemy’ – out of the man who says that to other men there speaks an immoderate drive which hates not only itself but its means of satisfaction as well” (D §346, p. 165). Thus I take this to be Nietzsche characterizing misogyny as follows: misogyny is the voice of a (heterosexual or perhaps heteronormative) masculine sexual drive which hates its own sensuality as well as its means of satisfaction, namely women. We may find a parallel in the often-voiced opinion that homophobia arises from repressed homosexuality: like misogyny which hates both the desire for sexual satisfaction with women and the women desired, homophobia hates both the desire for sexual satisfaction with men and the (gay) men desired.

Nietzsche does not therefore appear to side with such men, though he is explicitly aware of and critical of their existence, just as he is critical of those “proud fellows” who “always require others whom they can dominate and rape149, in order “to produce in themselves a feeling of dignity and importance,” whether those ‘others’ dominated are dogs, friends, wives, political parties, or even whole eras (D §369, p. 169). I say he is critical of these fellows precisely because he construes this domination not as mastery and healthiness but rather as requiring one’s “environment to be wretched in order to raise themselves for a moment above their own wretchedness” (D §369, p. 169). Further, when Nietzsche designates some women of questionable value as “little” women, I do not think this smallness is gender-dependent because he also includes “little” men generally within the category of “anyone who is not an expert” who “starts to play the judge” (D §372, p. 169).

I struggle more with the meaning of the aphorism “Probable and improbable” which Nietzsche sets up as a plausible but nonetheless never-occurring scenario, wherein both a woman and a man secretly love each other and elevate each other far beyond their actual selves (D §379, p. 170-1). Upon simultaneously confessing this secret, the woman grows cold and declares that they have both falsely elevated each other – and so Nietzsche ends by asking why this never

149 Vergewaltigen – to rape or violate.
happens (D §379, p. 171). Arguably, one could say that ‘what never happens’ is that women never reject a compliment, but I am inclined to state that Nietzsche’s deeper meaning might be that neither men nor women are inclined to reject the high images our lovers have of us except perhaps in jest, that neither men nor women ever earnestly try to convince their lovers that their elevated image is an illusion, and that his use of a woman as the spokesperson in this hypothetical is to play with the heads of the misogynists he knows must be reading him. Thus when Nietzsche later discusses the behavior of women and their ‘different kind of pride’ from men, I do not take this as a remark about inherent difference, and given his earlier comments in this text I think we can construe this as a socially constructed gender difference once again (D §403, p. 174).

There are only four more remarks to discuss from Book V that I have not yet touched: first, Nietzsche offers a remark which demonstrates how Wilhelmine male friendships resembled Victorian male friendships in their romanticization of male friendships in antiquity and incidentally states that “All great achievements on the part of the man of antiquity were supported by the fact that man stood beside man, and that a woman was not allowed to claim to be the nearest or the highest, let alone sole object of his love – as sexual passion teaches us [modern Europeans] to feel” (D §503, p. 204-5). Nietzsche says all of this to demonstrate how much modern philosophy has changed, because his contemporaries would never object to the uselessness of philosophy to one’s friends, while in antiquity friendship was valued the way Nietzsche’s contemporaries valued sexual love. Thus this remark is not a judgment that women ought to be excluded from friendship or love, but rather a statement that living something to the fullest has a tendency to exclude other things.

Second, Nietzsche describes “Erlichkeit” or honesty as a temptress for all fanatics, including Martin Luther: “That which seemed to approach Luther in the shape of the Devil or a beautiful woman, and which he warded off in so uncouth a manner, was no doubt honesty, and

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150 I find this amusing particularly now because we are now seeing a revival in the need to demonstrate the usefulness of philosophy to freshmen, to educational boards, and even to politicians.
perhaps, in rarer cases, even truth” (D §511, p. 206). This characterization of honesty as a temptress corresponds to Nietzsche’s other uses of feminine personifications of entities pertaining to the Goddess Truth. Third, Nietzsche describes how love wants to do away with the feeling of otherness and replace it by “feigning a sameness which in reality does not exist” such that “women in love deny this dissimulation and continual tender deceit and boldly assert that love makes the same (that is to say, that it performs a miracle!)” and even sometimes so much so that both parties devote themselves to this sameness until “neither knows what he is supposed to be imitating, what dissimulating, what pretending to be” (D §532, p. 210-1). Precisely because Nietzsche describes both men and women as capable of this, I do not think it is problematic for the questions of feminism. Fourth and last, Nietzsche describes an old philosopher whose “age and weariness [are that] which permit him to ripen out in this way, to grow silent, and to repose in the radiant idolatry of a woman” (D §542, p. 215). Again, this idolatry seems to have no component value judgment attached to it or the gender to which Nietzsche ascribes it, and thus we close the final book of this text.

*The Gay Science* (GS)

The last text from Nietzsche’s middle period is *The Gay Science*. This publication contains a number of references to gender and arguably “complicates any appraisal of Nietzsche’s alleged sexism” (Higgins, p. 73). To maintain chronological order, I will focus in this section on the original parts of the work and return to the additions of the 1887 preface, Book V, and the appendix when Nietzsche publishes them in his mature period. Interestingly, Nietzsche makes

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151 Kathleen Higgins has already provided an excellent reading of gender in Book II in *Comic Relief: Nietzsche’s Gay Science*. I do not so much disagree with her reading as I diverge from it here in my methods and goals: her book primarily concerns illuminating various themes and controversies concerning one text, and only regards gender in depth for one of the five books of *The Gay Science*, whereas I seek to explore Nietzsche’s philosophy with regards to gender over the course of all of his published works. As such, my reading of *The Gay Science* will not be perfectly identical to Higgins’s reading, but in many respects will tend to parallel it.
references to women in every part of *The Gay Science*, including the preface, the prelude, each of the five books, and the appendix. Thus I anticipate that this text will be especially revealing regarding Nietzsche’s position with regards to feminism and misogyny. In particular, I hope this divided reading of *The Gay Science* reveals whether Nietzsche’s attitude towards women changes as dramatically after his break with Lou as some commentators maintain.  

The “Prelude in German Rhymes” contains four explicit references to women, if you include a remark about Minerva’s owl (GS F §53, p. 63). The first reference is in a couplet titled “The Involuntary Seducer”: “He shot an empty word, just for a ball, / Into the blue – it made a woman fall” (GS F §19, p. 47). How we read this poem depends on whether our sympathies lie with the ‘involuntary’ seducer or with the fallen woman, and more importantly where we believe Nietzsche’s sympathies lie. Given §68 and §71 which advise more ‘kindness’ for women, I am given to believe that Nietzsche feels more sympathy for the fallen woman than he does with the careless seducer. Thus also, in “Man and Woman,” when he states “Seize forcibly the wench for whom you feel! / Thus thinks a man. Women don’t rob, they steal” (GS §22, p. 49), I am inclined to believe he is not negatively judging women but rather recognizing a socially conditioned difference between women and men. Nietzsche does not assert that this is how men and women should behave, but rather how they do behave. Again, given the aforementioned passages in Book II, I do not believe Nietzsche’s sympathies lie with the man who forcibly seizes wenches.

The third reference to women is the quatrain titled “Lost His Head” concerning a man who loses his wits in love: “Why is she clever now and so refined? / On her account a man’s out of his mind, / His head was good before he took this whirl: / He lost his wits – to the aforesaid girl” (GS §50, p. 63). As this poem is written long before the falling out with Lou, I cannot read

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152 See, for example, p. 21 of Carol Dieth’s *Historical Dictionary of Nietzscheanism*. I find it troubling that scholars wish to emphasize Salomé’s rejection of Nietzsche over the break with the Wagners; if the loss of Cosima’s love did not turn Nietzsche to virulent misogyny, it seems to me that the loss of Salomé’s love should not particularly do so either. The fact that Cosima was married to Richard seems no more of a hindrance to Nietzsche’s love than was Lou’s friendship with Paul during Nietzsche’s courtship, and thus the cases do not seem to be so different.
this as a degradation of the ‘girl’ involved, but rather a statement about how we perceive women given their relationships with men: I take Nietzsche to say that a girl appears more ‘clever’ and ‘refined’ when society sees her through the lens of a young man in love, which is not to imply that she was neither refined nor clever before, just that no one noticed, or perhaps that she just seems to be more of herself than she already was. To say that the man ‘lost his wits’ does not imply that it is irrational to love this girl because she in reality lacks refinement and cleverness, but rather that love causes us to lose perspective with regards to the ones we love, and may cause us to attribute more to those we love than they otherwise have.

The last reference to women from the prelude is more of a self-reflection than a discussion of women or gender; Nietzsche offers a quatrain in which he evaluates “Human, All Too Human: A Book,” saying to himself “You’re sad and shy when looking at the past, / But trust the future when yourself you trust: / Are you some kind of eagle in pursuit? / Or just Minerva’s favorite hootootoot?” (GS §53, p. 63). The contrast between the eagle and the owl seems to be a contrast between an independent and prideful perspective and a dependent and privileged perspective, but properly understanding this would require more attention to Nietzsche’s usage of various birds throughout his work. At the very least, we should note the appearance of Minerva at the beginning of this text because she is the goddess of wisdom, crafts, and war. Nietzsche’s invocation of her here seems to indicate that the women of The Gay Science, which include mothers, sisters, and maidens again as well as goddesses, prostitutes, and witches, will be neither weak nor uncomplicated.

Book I contains six passages with references to women, and the first of these is the second passage in the book. Following the initial passage, which ends with Nietzsche’s question and exclamation: “Do you understand this new law of ebb and flood? There is a time for us, too!” (GS §1, p. 76), Nietzsche states something which leads me to conclude that women can be included in the ‘us’ for whom there is a time coming, or at the very least that there is no reason
women should be excluded. Again, this is because Nietzsche does see women as capable of possessing nobility, though this does not always come with every feature one may desire: “I mean: *the great majority of people* does not consider it contemptible to believe…without even troubling themselves about such reasons afterward: the most gifted men and the noblest women still belong to this ‘great majority’” (GS §2, p. 76). We know Nietzsche to associate nobility with ‘higher’ types of humanity, including the highest type, and the fact that Nietzsche grants women their nobility thus leads me to conclude that there is no reason to exclude women from the highest category of humanity under Nietzsche’s later terminology, the Übermensch.

It is also important to point out that these higher types are “more unreasonable, for those who are noble, magnanimous, and self-sacrificial do succumb to their instincts, and when they are at their best, their reason *pauses*” (GS §3, p. 77), or in other words that being ‘higher’ does not necessarily mean more ‘rational’ – a departure from the traditional modern philosopher’s view that men are more rational and hence better than non-men, including animals, children, and women – and hence a provides a counterargument to any suspicions that Nietzsche advocates rule by the intellectual elite. This applies also to male animals who die in the mating process or to any animal in the protection of their offspring; I will quote the passage in full because it demonstrates something interesting which I feel may be especially useful for later chapters:

An animal that protects its young at the risk of its life, or that during the mating period follows the female even into death, does not think of danger and death; its reason also pauses, because the pleasure in its young or in the female and the fear of being deprived of this pleasure dominate it totally: the animal becomes more stupid than usual – just like those who are noble and magnanimous. They have some feelings of pleasure and displeasure that are so strong that they reduce the intellect to silence or to servitude: at that point their heart replaces the head, and one speaks of ‘passion’ … The unreason or counterreason of passion is what the common type despises in the noble, especially when this passion is directed toward objects whose value seems quite fantastic and arbitrary.

GS §3, p. 77-78
I quote this at length in order to emphasize this distinction between the noble and the common: the noble are passionate, while the common are less so and hence more reasonable. This does not mean that Nietzsche necessarily devalues all reason and rationality, but certainly that he is changing the weights of value here: where we used to despise the passions and prefer reason, Nietzsche is teaching us to see the value that the passions have.

To take this a bit further than Nietzsche does, I will say the following: as women and particularly feminists are construed by misogynists and anti-feminists as ‘emotional’ or in other words passionate, we might be able to draw a parallel here between the noble and the common. Women and feminists are therefore nobler due to their passion, while misogynists and anti-feminists are more common due to their lack thereof and their corollary high esteem for reason. It is little wonder, then, that misogynists and anti-feminists should despise women and feminists, “especially when this passion is directed toward objects whose value seems quite fantastic and arbitrary,” to misogynists and anti-feminists, such as wearing pants, working outside the home, receiving equal pay, etc. Without the passion for fighting oppression, including both sartorial and career options in the same list of goals would seem quite fantastic and arbitrary, but with that passion we can see more clearly how such disparate choices can be so closely related.

The third mention of women concerns pity, namely that “Pity is praised as the virtue of prostitutes” (GS §13, p. 88). This declaration follows a discussion of the feeling of power, and the contempt the strong have for ‘easy prey.’ Nietzsche describes pity as “the most agreeable feeling among those who have little pride and no prospects of great conquests” and who are therefore enchanted by easy prey (GS §13, p. 87). Thus it would be easy to conclude that Nietzsche is suggesting that pity is the virtue of prostitutes because they have neither pride nor prospects. However, the use of the passive voice¹⁵³ here is a clue that Nietzsche may not actually be

¹⁵³ “Man rühmt das Mitleid als die Tugend der Freudenmädchen.” – “One praises pity as the virtue of prostitutes.” Though in German the structure is strictly speaking not passive, the ‘one’ doing the praising is
ascribing pity to the prostitutes: rather, he is saying that this is how society identifies prostitutes, whether as virtuous because they are pitiable or as virtuous because they are taking pity on their clients; thus Nietzsche leaves open the possibility that society is wrong here. Because even Dieth describes Nietzsche as being remarkably sex-positive, we may conclude that Nietzsche is not necessarily judging prostitutes negatively, whether with regards to their selling sex or with regards to their supposed virtue of pity. We might say Nietzsche has a negative view of prostitution, given his description of the commonness and “prostitution of the spirit” in his contemporary political sphere (GS §31, p. 103), but this negative view of metaphorical prostitution does not entail a negative view of actual prostitutes, for it is possible to imagine a world where sexual prostitution is treated as a rare and noble profession rather than a common and low profession, and hence where the word ‘prostitution’ does not have the same connotations that allow us to talk about the metaphorical prostitution of the spirit.

The fourth passage presents some problems. Nietzsche opens with a distinction between a “weak and quasi feminine type” and a “strong or masculine type” which is unsettling: the former type of ‘dissatisfied’ being “has a sensitivity for making life more beautiful and profound” while the latter metaphorical type “has a sensitivity for making life better and safer” (GS §24, p. 98). Nietzsche’s qualification of the former as merely “quasi feminine” helps to distance him from a strictly dualistic gendering of these two types, allowing for a third unqualifiedly feminine type, but the fact that he does not explore this possibility here leaves me troubled. However, he does indicate that the quasi-feminine was actually dominant in Europe for a long time, thus implying that many human men are quasi-feminine in this metaphorical sense, and further that the quasi-feminine type lead to a European capacity for change, which Nietzsche does appear to value positively (GS §24, p. 99). Hence, a quasi-feminine dissatisfaction which manifests “by gladly being deceived occasionally and settling for a little intoxication” and which “suffers from the left non-specific, and Nietzsche places the action of identifying the virtue on the ‘one’ rather than the prostitutes, so I believe the explanation I offer works regardless of the translation.
incurability of its dissatisfaction” and “assures the continuation of real misery” (GS §24, p. 98-9) is not simplistically evil or bad, and may be either or both necessary and good for some purposes. After all, it is this “intellectual irritability” of the quasi-feminine type “that almost amounts to genius and is in any case the mother of all genius” (GS §24, p. 99). Thus we see Nietzsche connecting the quasi-feminine to the maternal, which may also leave some room between the unqualifiedly feminine and the maternal. In other words, this move on Nietzsche’s part reveals that he does not necessarily characterize the feminine as having a one-to-one relationship with motherhood. The significance of this move will be more apparent later on.

In the fifth passage, Nietzsche discusses the relationship between heresy and witchcraft; he points out that non-customary thought is not a sign of superiority but frequently a sign of “strong, evil inclinations that detach and isolate one, and that are defiant, nasty, and malicious” (GS §35, p. 104). Nietzsche describes heresy as no more harmless than witchcraft, and claims that both heretics and witches are “species of evil human beings” who “feel that they are evil” and “are impelled by an unconquerable lust to harm what is dominant” (GS §35, p. 104). This ‘medieval spirit’ intensified in the form of the Protestant Reformation “at a time when that was no longer accompanied by a good conscience” (GS §35, p. 104). However, I do not take Nietzsche to thus be saying that witches (and heretics) should be stopped or eradicated from society, as this all seems rather tongue-in-cheek. Given the claim from the immediately preceding section which states “So many retroactive forces are still needed!” (GS §34, p. 104), I am inclined rather to read Nietzsche as describing the necessity of those who consider themselves evil and lust to harm whatever ideas or persons are dominant.

Nietzsche’s final discussion of women in Book I comes in the form of a discussion of how mortal sins and the penal code of a people indicate what that people finds to be foreign; the Muslim sect of Wahhabis who only recognize smoking and having any God other than Allah as mortal sins show that the Wahhabis only find idolatry and smoking foreign (GS §43, p. 109).
Similarly, Nietzsche mentions the Roman notion “that a woman could incur only two mortal sins: adultery and – drinking wine” (GS §43, p. 109). Drinking wine in particular could cause a woman to be executed not only because “women under the influence of alcohol sometimes lose the ability to say no” but also and more importantly because the Romans feared the invasion of “the orgiastic and Dionysian cult that afflicted the women of Southern Europe” (GS §43, p. 109). Hence Romans developed a custom of kissing relatives “only to keep women under control” in this combined matter of sex, religion, and nationalistic fears of invasion by foreign powers (GS §43, p. 109). This passage is interesting first because it reveals Nietzsche’s recognition that laws about women are not laws about women’s behaviors but rather laws about male fears, both the fear that male property (wives and daughters) might be damaged (by sexual assault) but also and more importantly the fear that this property might choose to stray. We could take this further to say that men attempt to control women not out of feminine inferiority and male superiority, but because of a male inferiority complex. Secondly, this is interesting because it demonstrates Nietzsche’s recognition of how alcohol can influence consent; women “lose the ability” to say no under the influence, but not necessarily the desire, and this recognition puts Nietzsche’s nineteenth century politics ahead of the politics of some twenty-first century American politicians. Further, it demonstrates Nietzsche’s recognition that some displays of affection, such as kissing, are not always expressions of affection but can express other things such as a need to control. We can take this further to say that this understanding parallels the claim that rape is not about sex but about power, an understanding many of us still lack today. The Romans thus feared that their women would be violated; the fear of the Dionysus cult, however, was a fear not of sexual violation but of sexual agency.

Book II contains the vast majority of Nietzsche’s remarks on women in The Gay Science. Many of these are remarkably forward-thinking for a man taken as a canonical misogynist, and many of them complicate the strictly dualist picture of gender common during the modern era of
philosophy. We also see a number of themes from his earlier works repeated: woman and artists, language, love, sex, pregnancy, and motherhood, as well as the reappearances of old women, noble women, goddesses, and little girls. As with Book I, Nietzsche wastes little time bringing women into the discussion; the first two passages are one section directed to realists which warns that “We are not nearly as different as you think” (GS §57, p. 121), and one concerning creators which ends with the reminder that creating “new names and estimations and probabilities” creates new ‘things’ in the long run (GS §58, p. 122). Following these, Nietzsche addresses his next section to artists: “When we love a woman, we easily conceive a hatred for nature on account of all the repulsive natural functions to which every woman is subject” and ultimately see these natural functions as “a horror and unthinkable, a blasphemy against God and love” (GS §59, p. 122). This in turn serves as an analogy for how worshipers regard God’s omnipotence (GS §59, p. 122-3), and initially reads as the kind of squeamishness that caused Ruskin to avoid intercourse because of his disgust with his wife’s pubic hair (Higgins, 2000, p. 80).

In addition to the epistemological concerns Higgins addresses, I think we can add some context which makes this passage more interesting than a mere expression of disgust. The fact that the first section of Book II warns that “we” are not so different as you might think inclines me to take Nietzsche to not be restricting “artists” to his male readers as Higgins suggests (Higgins, p. 80). Instead, we can flip the gender of this passage and see whether what Nietzsche says still applies, and I have little doubt that there is a sufficiently large number of women who would agree that the biological necessities of their lovers are disgusting, and that they too go through mental gyrations to avoid connecting ‘repulsive natural functions’ to the ones they love. Further, given the reminder that new words and estimations lead to new things immediately preceding this section, I find it hard to believe that Nietzsche intends for us to take this disgust as innate and rather read him as suggesting that this disgust was created by new words and

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154 Given such a profusion of women and female figures, I am baffled as to why anyone would suggest that Nietzsche’s views on women are irrelevant to his philosophy, except for their own latent sexism.
estimations, which in turn implies that we can unlearn this disgust as well as learning a new
disgust.

Similarly, when Nietzsche speaks of women and their “action at a distance,” gender-flipping the script helps reveal that his claims do not only apply to men’s relationships with women, but also women’s relationships with men (GS §60 p. 123-4). Nietzsche again demonstrates that he does not separate women from men in how the world affects them: just as “warm, rainy winds” can inspire the artist and the churchgoer, they can also inspire the romantically-inclined woman (GS §63, p. 124-5). Further, even though Nietzsche implies that “old women” are superficial and skeptical about depth (GS §64, p. 125), this is no negative judgment against these old women but an alliance therewith, for he later describes himself as having become superficial through long exposure to profundity (GS P §4, p. 38). Nietzsche also demonstrates sympathy for those “noble women” who “know no better way to express their deepest devotion than to offer their virtue and shame” and whose lovers accept their sacrifices without returning the same devotion (GS §65, p. 125). Given this sympathy, I see no reason to judge Nietzsche’s next pronouncement about ‘all women’ negatively:

*The strength of the weak.* – All women are subtle in exaggerating their weaknesses; they are inventive when it comes to weaknesses in order to appear as utterly fragile ornaments who are hurt even by a speck of dust. Their existence is supposed to make men feel clumsy, and guilty on that score. Thus they defend themselves against the strong and ‘the law of the jungle.’

GS §66, p. 125

I do not read this as Nietzsche saying women are weak and deceptive creatures who only fake being sick and exaggerate being weak, particularly as he is offering here a reasoned deception for the purpose of self-defense. Rather, I read Nietzsche as saying that in a system of oppression, those who are oppressed must resort to subterfuge in order to survive. We might draw a parallel here with the way African slaves in the Americas engaged in various forms of resistance to ‘the law of the jungle’ by breaking tools, stealing food, etc.; just as white supremacists read this
activity as “indicative of clumsiness and stupidity,” (Yancy, p. 120) rather than a sign of agency, a misogynist might read a woman’s feigning illness as indicative of a lack of agency rather than a sign thereof as well. However, the fact that Nietzsche construes this not necessarily as resistance but definitely as a matter of inventiveness and self-defense indicates his recognition and positive valuation of female agency. Thus again, when Nietzsche describes a woman who no longer acts the way she did in courtship, and the fact that this disturbs her now-spouse (GS §67, p. 125-6), I take this to be more of a judgment against the husband for his foolishness than against the wife for her new-found stability.

Perhaps the clearest statement of Nietzsche’s sympathies for women, and one of the reasons I am coming to read him as an anti-misogynist, comes in the passage titled “Will and Willingness,” wherein his sage tells the people that “Men need to be educated better” rather than women because men are the ones who corrupt women (GS §68, p. 126). Further, the statement that “it is man who creates for himself the image of woman, and woman forms herself according to this image” (GS §68, p. 126) seems to me to indicate the following, though Nietzsche would never have used this terminology: first, the patriarchy controls the image of woman, and the ‘laws’ of the sexes; secondly, this gender-imago of femininity is a social construction rather than some fixed biological essence; thirdly, women learn to internalize the patriarchal construction of femininity. Ultimately I would agree with Nietzsche’s sage that this is “truly, a hard law for women” (GS §68, p. 126). Interestingly, this rejection of gender essentialism puts Nietzsche in antithesis with the Wilhelmine feminists of his day but simultaneously puts Nietzsche in accord with some contemporary feminists.

Nietzsche appears to recognize equal capacities inherent in people regardless of gender, as evidenced by the claim that “we have little respect for anyone who lacks both the capacity and the good will for revenge – regardless of whether it is a man or a woman” and that this capacity to “wield a dagger (any kind of dagger)” against us or oneself is part of what enthralls us (GS §69,
p. 126). Why he feels it necessary to construe self-harm as “Chinese revenge” (GS §69, p. 126) is wholly unclear and suspiciously racist, once again.\(^{155}\) Again, however, we can read this as a sign of Nietzsche’s recognition of women’s agency, and perhaps further as a statement that whether or not men admit it, women’s agency is important, not only for love and sex but also in a number of other respects.

Nietzsche describes how agency and social constructions can fight against each other in “Die Herrinnen der Herren”\(^ {156}\) in that, for example, the theater uses voices that make us think of agency, such as the “deep and powerful alto voice” that inspires thoughts of “women with lofty, heroic, and royal souls,” as the voices of romantic leads, which instead inspires thoughts of the socially constructed “motherly and housewifely” woman (GS §70, p. 127). Thus Nietzsche admits the possibility of higher women, but finds that media representations of women discourage society from seeing women as capable of higher things. This shockingly progressive claim written in the nineteenth century directly corresponds to the kinds of motivations which have lead to twenty-first century feminist projects like Miss Representation, which demonstrate how poor representation of women in the media is connected with women’s lived experiences social injustice.

Further, Nietzsche’s aphorism “On female chastity” is a remarkably sympathetic and forgiving discussion about the way women are trained to regard sex, particularly upper-class women for his era: “What could be more paradoxical? All the world is agreed that they are to be brought up as ignorant of possible erotic matters…And then to be hurled, as by a gruesome lightning bolt, into reality and knowledge, by marriage – precisely by the man they love and

\(^{155}\) Given Nietzsche’s apparent rejection of gender essentialism, there is no clear reason he should not also reject racial essentialism. Thus either I misunderstand his apparent racism, or Nietzsche demonstrates an inconsistency in his thought not unknown to so-called white feminism; again, however, I feel I cannot properly treat the problem of race in the space allowed for this project, and will have to return to this point in another work.

\(^{156}\) Kaufmann translates this as “Women who master the masters.” If it were not for the unfortunate connotations of concubinage or sadomasochism associated with ‘mistress’ I would suggest that “The mistresses of the masters” might be a better title.
Nietzsche recognizes this ‘education’ as “something quite amazing and monstrous” that causes many women to develop a defensive self-blindness, and for them to also see their children as an atonement for the question mark against their honor that their husbands come to represent (GS §71, p. 127-8). Again, Nietzsche repeats that “one cannot be too kind about women” (GS §71, p. 128), a curious refrain if we assume Nietzsche is a vicious misogynist.

Thus when we read Nietzsche’s remarks about how male animals treat female animals\textsuperscript{157} in contrast with how men treat women\textsuperscript{158} (GS §72, p. 128-9), these are not intended as harsh judgments against human women or biological determinations. The notion that maternal love can be a form of dominance (GS §72, p. 129) is no objection to mother love, nor is the notion that pregnancy can in a sense gentle a woman or make her “more pleased to submit” (GS §72, p. 129) an objection to pregnancy. We might think of ‘spiritual pregnancy’ as appropriative, but Nietzsche’s intention is to draw out the ‘male mothers’ or “the character of the contemplative type, which is closely related to the feminine character” (GS §72, p. 129) that I take Nietzsche to be saying we socially construct as associated with pregnancy and motherhood. This notion of male mothers who are close to femininity I also take as evidence that Nietzsche rejects a strict gender binary, which is in keeping with his general tendency to avoid dualisms.\textsuperscript{159} I do not know that we can say that Nietzsche is engaged in a conscious project to universalize feminine experiences as a way to counter the universalization of masculine experience as the definition of humanity, but his repeated theme of pregnancy and maternal natures as not just feminine, as masculine and even as quasi-feminine, and generally as something not definitive of gendered boundaries even socially, would be a first step in this direction.

\textsuperscript{157}\textit{Weibchen}.
\textsuperscript{158}\textit{Weiber}.
\textsuperscript{159}§73 is interesting because it calls for the infanticide of a misshapen newborn, but leaves women out entirely – instead two men talk to each other. If Nietzsche had written this today, I would call it a parody of how male politicians seem to debate women’s reproductive rights without ever involving women. As it is, we may take it as commentary on how men excluded women from any authority in decisions concerning their children.
Nietzsche again voices his sympathies for the “poor women” who lose their composure and “fail” by chattering and hence failing to seduce the men they like (GS §74, p. 129-30). We could take this as an admonition to women to shut up if they want male attention, because that is the only thing that matters to women; but I think instead that Nietzsche is voicing his ability to recognize nervousness in social situations, and again reminding men that they cannot be too kind about women, if only they could see things from a woman’s perspective. Thus also, when Nietzsche says that “small females seem to me to belong to another sex than tall women” and also that “A small woman is never beautiful” in the mouth of “old Aristotle” the “dancing master,” (GS §75, p. 130), he is highlighting perspective: from the point of view of a tall man seeking a dancing partner, a small woman is never valuable. Nietzsche-Aristotle can say “A small man is a paradox but still a man” (GS §75, p. 130) because a small man is still supposed to lead the dance by virtue of his gender, which he shares with the tall man. But a small woman will be left to the side, because small men model their tastes after tall men, and so seek tall, valuable, ‘beautiful’ women.\footnote{Note also that Lou von Salome was not a particularly tall woman, and if Nietzsche was as enamored of her as we believe, we have no reason to believe that Nietzsche has any bias against the possible beauty of small women.}

Though Kaufmann claims that after this “absurd aphorism” Nietzsche’s remarks on women “reach their nadir and end” (GS §75, fn. 12, p. 130), Nietzsche still has a few more comments on women to include before the end of Book II. A long discussion of art ensues, continuing Nietzsche’s theme of connecting women to art, and includes several references to goddesses, such as the fates (GS §84, p. 140), poetry (GS §92, p. 145), “Charm, the rural sister of the Graces” (GS §103, p. 158), and imperfections transformed by art (GS §107, p. 163). Further, Nietzsche discusses how an artist can be motivated by his mother’s feelings of hatred and revenge (GS §95, p. 148) and how style is strongly influenced by one’s mother tongue (GS §104, p. 160). Indeed, this style so influences a people that even “young officials, teachers, women, merchants”
all strive to imitate the ‘elegance’ of their language such that “even little girls” imitate the popular “officer’s German” Nietzsche appears to dislike so strongly (GS §104, p. 161). This is no judgment against women and little girls, however, for Nietzsche recognizes that each of these groups acts in “good will” here (GS §104, p. 161).

Book III includes far fewer references to women than Book II, only six in total. Several of these considers women in their relationships with other people. The first mentions as an example of people who desire to be a function “those women who transform themselves into some function of a man that happens to be underdeveloped in him” (GS §119, p. 176), a nature we can construe alternatively as opportunistic, parasitic, or survivalist. Given §66, I am inclined to accept the latter. Likewise, when Nietzsche claims that “Fathers and sons have much more consideration for each other than mothers and daughters” (GS §221, p. 210), we should hearken back to §68 and remember that men corrupt women and so have socially constructed the relationships women are allowed to have with each other. Similarly again, the “poor woman” who wrongly “infers that it will be easy to control” a man who cannot control himself (GS §227, p. 211), we may ourselves more rightly infer on the grounds of §71 that this is through no fault of her own but rather because of how society has taught her to behave.

Another passage suggests that our contemporary efforts pale against those of the “old Meisterin – ancient humanity” (GS §152, p. 197). We also see Nietzsche again blurring the boundaries of the gender binary by suggesting that “a big man” may in fact be “merely a boy, or a chameleon…or a bewitched little woman” (GS §208, p. 208). This is no insult to little women, who are just as susceptible to bewitchment as anyone; the deeper meaning here is that greatness need not be attached to a particularly gendered nature, and that we sometimes mistake other things for greatness. Lastly, witches make another appearance, and again it seems that Nietzsche

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161 Again, the connotations of ‘mistress’ are problematic, so I leave the term untranslated, though Kaufmann translates it as “master.”
162 Kaufmann translates Weiblein as “little female,” but I think ‘little woman’ is more in keeping with Nietzsche’s meaning here.
does not judge witches the same way society does, for “Although the shrewdest judges of the witches and even the witches themselves were convinced of the guilt of witchery, this guilt nevertheless did not exist” (GS §250, p. 216). Thus Nietzsche neither blames the witches for being convicted, nor does he appear to blame them for internalizing the guilt the judges pushed upon them.

Book IV contains several more passages on women: again, Nietzsche draws parallels between women and artists (GS §293, p. 235). Nietzsche points out that the sciences would never have originated “if the way had not been prepared by magicians, alchemists, astrologers, and witches” (GS §300, p. 240). He also continues to note the plight of women, who are abused by those who vent their anger on “their dogs, servants, and wives” (GS §312, p. 250) and who learn virtuosity with regards to bearing suffering the way “even slaves” do, though Nietzsche claims that true greatness does not perish of suffering the way the weak do (GS §325, p. 255). In commenting about how American manners are affecting how Europeans associate “with friends, women, relatives, children, teachers, pupils, leaders, and princes” (GS §329, p. 259) Nietzsche manages to squeeze in another racist remark, this time regarding “the ferocity peculiar to the Indian blood” which influences the American lust for gold (GS §329, p. 258).

A long aphorism titled “Long live physics!” includes a remark that compares our compulsion to listen to our consciences with “a woman who loves the man who commands,” but who does not appear to be any different from the “good soldier who hears his officer’s command” (GS §335, p. 263-4). Nietzsche also notes two ‘sisterly’ relationships, between the sublime and cruelty (GS §313, p. 250) and between happiness and unhappiness (GS §338, p. 270), the latter of which explains how the religion of comfort can be the mother of the religion of pity (GS §338, p. 270). Finally, in the four passages from the end of Book IV, Nietzsche declares, “Yes, life is a woman” (GS §339, p. 272). Nietzsche associates this life-woman with veils and unveilings, and hence also with the superficial surfaces of veils, a theme of which I may make much, as so much
of survival is built on surfaces. Thus concludes Nietzsche’s middle period, and the last of the work he wrote prior to meeting Lou von Salomé.

§4 Nietzsche’s Late or Mature Period

Thus far, I have only encountered a few questionable issues with Nietzsche’s work with regards to misogyny: first and foremost is Nietzsche’s apparent racism. Unfortunately, I find no reason in the text to dismiss this racism as the same kind of ploy his suspicious commentary on women seems to provide. Nietzsche never suggests that the truth is a raced woman, just a veiled woman, and since her race is unremarkable she is probably white; and so far whenever he has mentioned race it has been subject to various stereotypes which appear uncritically employed: see for example his remarks about Chinese women and domestic abuse in Daybreak and the comment about ferocious Native Americans in Gay Science. Secondly, Nietzsche does appear to present a largely heterosexist picture of gender relations, namely that men are sexually attracted to women and vice versa, and no other relationships are (any longer) normal in European society. However, much of this heterosexism is built in the framing of his discussion of romantic love rather than any explicit homophobia or hatred for GLBTQI persons at least so far. Thirdly, we might also note that some remarks about old women in particular may show evidence of ageism particularly with regards to women, fourthly note apparent ableism with regard to ‘stupid’ women, and fifthly question how fine a line Nietzsche walks between valuing femininity as positive versus placing it on a pedestal.

Further, if Nietzsche is the anti-misogynist I want to claim he is, I can also challenge how his winking, jocular, and subtler aphorisms contrast with his more bombastic and explicit aphorisms: it seems that Nietzsche could have made his allegiances far more explicit than he frequently chooses to do, and continually relying on the thesis that his anti-misogyny is all intended as an exercise for the reader to extract through the art of exegesis would weaken my
argument if I failed to provide explicitly sympathetic passages concerning women, and if Nietzsche ever made repeatedly explicit a single consistent political view. However, I have already provided a number of explicitly sympathetic passages, and Nietzsche only rarely offers normative political statements explicitly, so I feel this criticism is less important than it seems at first glance.

Nietzsche’s Late or Mature Period as I construe it contains eight published whole books, four new prefaces, and an additional section appendix for a book: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, new prefaces to Birth of Tragedy and Human, All-Too-Human, followed by The Genealogy of Morals, after which Nietzsche published new prefaces to Daybreak, Gay Science, and also Book V and the appendix to Gay Science; then The Case of Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche contra Wagner, and lastly Ecce Homo. Given the vast quantity of material remaining, I see no benefit to a deeper exploration of the Nachlass for the purposes of the dissertation, and so will not include it.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra (TSZ)

Nietzsche claimed to have produced each part of Zarathustra in about ten days (TSZ, p. xiii); the first of these following not far on the heels of his falling out with Lou von Salomé in January 1883, though he did not publish it until August that year (Young, p. 358). The delay in publishing was due to the anti-Semitic activities of the publisher Schmeitzer which continually distracted him from his work, and sparked a good deal of Nietzsche’s anti-anti-Semitism during this time (Young, p. 358). During this time, Nietzsche’s ex-idol Wagner died of a heart attack, and Elizabeth took advantage of Friedrich’s heartache to verbally assault Lou in a vicious letter-writing campaign (Young, p. 359-363). Nietzsche’s commentators claim that Zarathustra served for Nietzsche as a great ‘bloodletting’ following the torment of the Salomé affair (Young, p. 366),
but overall while there might be some increase in the viciousness of his barbs, I do not think this book particularly marks a sharp shift towards misogyny.

The preface does not explicitly refer to women, though they might be included in the unnumbered people in the marketplace; the first book contains nine out of twenty-two sections which discuss or mention women, the second eight of twenty-two, the third ten of sixteen, and the fourth eleven out of twenty. In Book I, the first mentions of women are in passages where Nietzsche again anthropomorphizes and feminizes desirable qualities: in this case, instead of truth, “the fair little women” are the virtues (TSZ I §2, p. 28); similarly, wisdom “is a woman and always loves only a warrior” who is “brave, unconcerned, mocking, violent” (TSZ I §7, p 41). Contrast this woman with the “little girls”\(^\text{163}\) in “On War and Warriors”; Zarathustra tells us to let little girls say “To be good is at the same time pretty and touching,” but instead that the good is bravery (TSZ §10, p. 47). I am uncertain whether this is ageist or a healthy distancing from childish things. What is more interesting to me is the notion implicit here that feminine desire can and does provide legitimate motivation for male behavior; assuming Nietzsche is continuing in his presumably heterosexist mode, a woman’s love can motivate her masculine lover to great heights as a warrior. Nietzsche does not portray this as foolishness on the warrior’s part, either, which to me indicates some legitimacy to the rationale.

However, desire seems to be troubling for Zarathustra, particularly when humanity is “in heat,” whether masculine or feminine: “It is bad to live in cities: there too many are in heat. Is it not better to fall into the hands of a murderer than into the dreams of a woman in heat? And behold these men: their eyes say it – they know of nothing better on earth than to lie with a woman” (TSZ I §13, p. 54). Animals, by contrast are perfect in their innocence and do not appear influenced by “the bitch, sensuality”\(^\text{164}\) who “leers enviously out of everything” humans do,
particularly humans who make chastity a vice (TSZ I §13, p. 54-5). The fact that Nietzsche describes this ‘bitch’ as begging “for a piece of spirit when denied a piece of meat” (TSZ I §13, p. 55) inclines me to believe he is describing a female dog, and not necessarily using the term in the sense Americans do today when they devalue human women by comparing them to female animals. However, we could make more of the distinction between the dog Sensuality who lusts for sufferers and the goddesses Truth, Wisdom, etc. who we could characterize as seeking health instead. This lust is sexual, but for Nietzsche being chaste does not appear to mean being celibate, given how celibacy can become a vice, but rather to have an innocence about sexual bodies even when not abstaining from sex. The lack of innocence in turn seems correlated to the suffering so tempting to the hound, Sensuality. Given Nietzsche’s otherwise positive attitude towards the body and sex, I believe it is the suffering and the desire to create more suffering which Nietzsche is negatively portraying here.

Nietzsche also connects suffering to heresy and witchcraft; the connection to witchcraft is interesting because thus conjoined to heresy we can interpret it commonly as a negative feminine concept close to nature much like the above analogy using female animals and human women who behave like them. Though Kaufmann suggests “On the Pale Criminal” reads like it is about Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov (TSZ I tn. 6, p. 6), I am inclined to believe it has more to do with an evaluation of Christ, Christianity, and the murder of God; either way, when Nietzsche describes how “the sick became heretics or witches: as heretics or witches they suffered and wanted to inflict suffering” (TSZ I §6, p. 39), this has more to do with what happens to sufferers in a religion which promotes suffering than it does with a negative evaluation of women. Rather, witchcraft and heresy are traditionally feminine and masculine outlets for sickness and suffering in a Christian context, and this by no means implies that all witches and heretics deviate from

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165 *Wollust*. Kaufmann translates this as ‘lust,’ ‘sex,’ and even ‘voluptuousness’ – see Translator note 10 on Book III, p. 149 – but ‘sensuality’ is also a possible translation.
Christianity because they suffer and are inclined to inflict suffering, only that the sick find these outlets useful in such societies.

Witchcraft and heresy appear again in Zarathustra’s counsels to his ‘brother’ who seeks solitude and is “On The Way of the Creator”: “Lonely one, you are going the way to yourself. And your way leads past yourself and your seven devils. You will be a heretic to yourself and a witch and soothsayer and fool and doubter and unholy one and villain” before rising like a phoenix from the ashes again (TSZ I §17, p. 64). It is interesting that the soothsayer is included with the other six devils here, and that these devils are not relative to any overarching value system but completely subjective. Nietzsche thus does not only position witchcraft against Christianity given its subjective opposition to one’s self, nor yet does he oppose it to truth given its alignment with soothsaying or truthsaying, but rather seems characterize witchcraft as one of several possible methods for combating various alternative beliefs. Thus we could make the argument that witchcraft is an instrument of war, and can be employed wisely by the cunning warrior. Nietzsche only mentions witchcraft twice more in this text: once as an accusation against Life, that she is a “damned nimble, supple snake and slippery witch!” in “The Other Dancing Song” (TSZ III §15:2, p. 226), an insult which nonetheless reveals his respect for her as a worthy opponent and partner; and once as a supposition that the approaching retired pope is a “Hexenmeister” or wizard (TSZ IV §6, p. 259).

Nietzsche’s discussion of women and friendship strikes me as an underhanded insult against all men rather than an attack against women: despite his claim that women are “not yet capable of friendship” because they know only love, and his associations between women and various animals, he concludes “But tell me, you men, who among you is capable of friendship? Alas, behold your poverty, you men, and the meanness of your souls!” (TSZ I §14, p. 57). I believe this conclusion is a harsher judgment against human men than it is against women, for at least women are capable of love, and Nietzsche does not seem to imply that men are capable of
even this, though by leaving this implication inexplicit he uses ambiguity as an exercise in exegesis for his reader.

Similarly, when the little old woman gives Zarathustra her truth “You are going to women?” Do not forget the whip!” (TSZ I § 18, p. 67), I believe Nietzsche quite deliberately leaves the ownership of the whip ambiguous for the purposes of a complex exegesis. It is easy to misinterpret Zarathustra’s long recital of rules for women and the old woman’s response as a call to spousal abuse and worse if you see the whip in the hands of men only, and if you envision only women and wives as the recipients of pain at the end of the whip, but I caution against a superficial interpretation here. For one thing, from Nietzsche’s life we have the photograph of Lou von Salomé holding the whip in the back of the cart Nietzsche and Reé are ‘pulling.’ For another, in “The Other Dancing Song,” Zarathustra uses a whip to keep time in a dance. Thus I think the best way to see the whip is not as a sign of Zarathustra’s (or the old woman’s) desire for male supremacy, but rather as a symbol of rule-keeping which can be employed by all genders. History indicates that especially men enforce the rules of the patriarchy, true, and that there are a number of women who internalize misogyny and ‘keep time’ in the patriarchy as well. However, it is very difficult for me to imagine that Nietzsche writes the all-too-human Zarathustra as here enforcing the laws of the future Übermensch concerning gender, particularly since future laws are unknown; rather, this passage reads more as a warning that traditional gender roles will change when the new time-keeper enters the dance.

This seems particularly true given Zarathustra’s discussion of the tablets of overcoming peoples hung up over themselves in “On the Thousand and One Goals”: for example, “To honor father and mother and to follow their will to the root of one’s soul” was a tablet of overcoming which one people used to become “powerful and eternal thereby” (TSZ I §15, p. 59). As creators change, values change, and destruction is a necessary part of the process of creation: “Whoever

166 Interestingly, Nietzsche uses “Weib” throughout §18 except in this question and one other statement (“Go to it, women, discover the child in man!” (TSZ I §18, p. 66)) where he uses “Frau” instead.
must be a creator always annihilates” (TSZ I §15, p. 59); thus, when we create a new tablet of gender values for our people, we will have to destroy the old tablets. This destruction almost certainly will require some kind of war against those who uphold the tablets of the old regime and, to carry a metaphor perhaps into madness or perhaps into a neat circle, those on each side shall march on rather different measures.

Lastly from Book I, “On Child and Marriage” reads as a call for more worthy marriages which “produce something higher” than merely yourself (TSZ I §20, p. 69). Nietzsche’s judgments about bad marriages do not read as necessarily misogynistic, given the plethora of examples from *Gay Science* in which women get the short end of the marital stick, though he does here focus more on how men suffer in marriages to women who are not the best matches. After all, a man may seem worthy until you know his wife, because the results of his search for a mate can reveal how bad he is at judging for himself what the truth is, what good taste and company is, what virtue is (TSZ I §20, p. 70). However, in each of these brief vignettes – the truth-seeking hero who conquers a lie, the reserved and choosy bachelor who spoils his own company, the seeker of angels who would be better off an angel himself now – Nietzsche is not so much judging the women for their flaws as he is the men for their bad judgment. My own feminism is capable of admitting that women and men both have flaws, so this is not a troubling claim. Indeed, Nietzsche seems to focus on the men’s responsibilities and flaws here more, and claims that the real problem with man’s “love of woman, and woman’s love of man” is that there is no “compassion for suffering and shrouded gods” because “for the most part, two beasts find each other” (TSZ I §20, p. 71). However, two fully-fleshed humans, though yet all-too-human, can through a holy marriage and the best love arouse longing for the *Übermensch*. Nietzsche thus does not hate marriage or women or exclude them from the pursuit of his ultimate goal, but neither does he claim or imply here that women’s only role in his picture is to give birth to little *Übermenschen*. 
Book II only mentions women in eight of the twenty-two sections, the fewest and least
dense discussion of women out of all four parts in Zarathustra, and it is not even until section 5,
“On the Virtuous,” that women first appear in Book II. Zarathustra is critiquing those who claim
to be virtuous while still desiring to be rewarded or paid for their virtue, for they claim to love
their virtue “as a mother her child; but when has a mother ever wished to be paid for her love?”
(TSZ II §5, p. 94). I can see how some might read this as a false idealization of maternal love,
particularly given contemporary knowledge and policing of mothers who are neglectful or even
abusive. This idealization may seem to be reinforced by one of Zarathustra’s concluding claims:
“Oh, my friends, that your self be in your deed as the mother is in her child – let that be your
word concerning virtue!” (TSZ II §5, p. 96). However, I suspect his apparent valorization of
maternal love is subterfuge, given Zarathustra’s remarks criticizing the ‘virtuous’ between these
two comments about mothers and children, and given this emphasis on the word ‘your,’ as if to
imply that this is not Zarathustra’s – or Nietzsche’s – ‘word concerning virtue.’ One’s self can be
in one’s deed as the mother is in her compliant child or her rebellious child, and Nietzsche is
deliberately ambiguous about what kind of ‘child’ the deed of the virtuous self is.

Zarathustra mentions mothers twice more in Book II: once in reference to “fatherlands
and motherlands” he seeks from mountain tops, but away from which he is driven (TSZ II §14, p.
121); and once in the question “Is not hurt vanity the mother of all tragedies?” (TSZ II §21, p.
143). Zarathustra’s claim that he cannot find home in fatherlands or motherlands handily becomes
a metaphor for the fact that Nietzsche can find value in neither the patriarchal male supremacy
nor the bizarrely self-abnegating maternal Wilhelmine feminism of his time: the ‘fathers’ of his
era fit his taste no better than do the ‘mothers.’ Further, the notion that hurt vanity mothers
tragedies provides a useful counterpoint to false valorization of motherhood: while women can
and do ‘mother’ many good things in Nietzsche’s texts, he does not present a one-sided
uncomplicated idealization of women. However, neither of these remarks seem especially nasty
devaluations of motherhood either, and so provide no evidence that Nietzsche unhealthily over- or under-appraises the aspects of femininity as maternal.

Likewise, in “The Dancing Song,” Zarathustra proclaims that he is “no enemy of girls,” or maidens, and sings while Cupid, “the little god whom maidens like best,” dances with the young women; and Zarathustra’s song is about wild Life and wild Wisdom and revisits the theme from Gay Science that speaking all truths about a person to that person is not correct behavior (TSZ II §10, p. 107-9). Zarathustra also appears to complicate the notion of virtue and evil when he sings both that life is “not virtuous” (p. 108) and that wisdom “is evil and false and a woman in every way” (p. 109). For one thing, usually philosophers and theologians take wisdom to be a virtue, and though life itself may be virtueless or a-virtuous, philosophers also frequently take virtue to be a better way to live than other options; a cursory familiarity with the history of world philosophy and religion can reveal this to be true of Confucians, Christians, and Platonists alike. For Zarathustra to call two ‘women’ he loves evil and not virtuous could indicate that Nietzsche hates the women he loves, but I think it is more plausible that he rejects and mocks the values philosophers historically attribute to many so-called pure ‘virtues’ and ‘goods.’

Zarathustra/Nietzsche continues his mockery of purist ideals in “On the Land of Education” when he jokes that the pale scholars of this land are so sterile and thin about the ribs that one of them invented the notion that “Probably some god secretly took something from me while I slept. Verily, enough to make himself a little woman!” Strange is the poverty of my ribs” (TSZ II §14, p. 120-121). Likewise, Nietzsche mocks ‘immaculate perception’ with his fancy that the moon was pregnant with the sun when she rose yesterday: “But she lied to me with her pregnancy; and I should sooner believe in the man in the moon than in the woman” (TSZ II §15,

167 “...kein Mädchen-Feind,” a play on Frauenfeind or ‘misogynist.’
168 “…und in Allem ein Frauenzimmer.” It is odd that Kaufmann chooses ‘female’ for ‘Frauen’ instead of ‘woman’ here, when usually he reserves the animal adjective for Nietzsche’s uses of ‘Weib.’
169 “Weibchen” – again, Kaufmann translates using the adjective “female” – from here on I will simply replace ‘female’ with ‘little woman’ whenever Nietzsche uses ‘Weibchen.’
p. 121). But women and their metaphorical fertility, changeability, and false faces represent something positive for Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the Eternal-Feminine in poets, with whom Zarathustra explicitly associates himself, despite the fact that he also describes poets as “bad learners” and people who “lie too much” (TSZ II §17, p. 127).

Provided this context, the following does not seem straightforwardly insulting as some might construe it:

And because we know so little, the poor in spirit please us heartily, particularly when they are young little women. And we are covetous even of those things which the old little women tell each other in the evening. That is what we ourselves call the Eternal-Feminine in us. And, as if there were a special secret access to knowledge, buried for those who learn something, we believe in the people and their ‘wisdom.’

TSZ II §17, p. 127

For one thing, though Zarathustra emphasize how young little women are pleasing when poor in spirit, this by no means implies that all young women or even all small young women are poor in spirit. Rather, this is a statement of inclusion of even those least loved by society – the smallest women, poorest in spirit, whether young or old. For another, Zarathustra is here stating that the Eternal-Feminine is not something reserved exclusively for women, and thus implying perhaps that the title “Feminine” is something of a misnomer. Thus again when Zarathustra emphasizes in “On Great Events” that “especially the old little women among the people say that [a volcano] has been placed like a huge rock before the gate to the underworld,” (TSZ II §18, p. 129) and that devils are beings “of whom not only old women are afraid,” (TSZ II §18, p. 131), these are not devaluations of these beliefs but complicated and sometimes self-contradictory valuations of these mytho-poetic concepts. However, self-contradiction is sometimes necessary and even good in poetry, myth and dream, as indicated by the final section.

Nietzsche concludes Book II with Zarathustra’s speech concerning his “stillest hour,” the name of his “angry” and “awesome mistress” (TSZ II §22, p. 145), yet another
anthropomorphized mytho-poetic ‘woman’ to add to his budding pantheon including Life and Wisdom; she commands him back to solitude and there speaks to him in a dream, telling him that he must become more humble, and yet childlike and without shame “for you must yet become mellow”\textsuperscript{170} (TSZ II §22, p. 147). This sounds odd to the contemporary ear: usually we associate humility and shame; a person who is ‘shameless’ is rarely also recognizable as ‘humble.’ Another contradiction comes in the stillest hour’s statement “You are one who has forgotten how to obey: now you shall command….This is what is most unforgivable in you: you have the power, and you do not want to rule” (TSZ II §22, p. 146). To the contemporary political mind this seems odd: we tend to idealize politicians who have greatness thrust upon them rather than those who are power-hungry. Thus again we see contradiction as a primary component for Zarathustra’s dream-myths.

Book III is the part of \textit{Zarathustra} most densely packed with references to women, containing ten out of sixteen passages which reiterate and expand on previous themes. The first of these is yet another addition to Nietzsche’s womanly pantheon, Happiness: at the conclusion of “On Involuntary Bliss,” which addresses Zarathustra’s solitary joy in the ‘afternoon’ of his life and his rejection thereof because it “came at the wrong time,” Zarathustra laughs and says mockingly to his own heart, “Happiness runs after me. That is because I do not run after women. For happiness is a woman” (TSZ III §3, p. 160-163). The notion that women do not enjoy being ‘run after’ is a far cry from our own contemporaries who claim that street harassment and other untoward forms of romantic pursuits are compliments, and so I find this claim to be a remarkably though obscurely feminist comment.

Second, Zarathustra listens to Solitude, and finds home and maternal comfort in her: “Now you may threaten me with your finger, as mothers do; now you may smile at me, as mothers smile” before she speaks to him at length (TSZ III §9, p. 183). Another addition to Nietzsche’s pantheon is Number, of whom Zarathustra’s wisdom states “Wherever there is force,

\textsuperscript{170} I cannot resist remarking that Nietzsche never did seem to take this advice to mellow out.
number will become mistress: she has more force” (TSZ III §10:1, p. 187). I emphasize the existence of these goddesses, mistresses, etc. as counterevidence to the notion that Nietzsche does not see women as rightfully powerful and therefore that the title of Übermensch is reserved for men. Nietzsche even privileges “the most exquisite” women epistemically in matters of taste (TSZ III §11:2), something he has repeatedly emphasized as a component of more highly developed humans. Lastly, note that in “Before Sunrise” Zarathustra speaks to the pre-dawn heavens and asks, “Have you not the sister soul to my insight?” (TSZ III §4, p. 164). Though only a passing reference to a feminine component to the sky, I think this could provide an interesting contrast to traditional Western notions of the ‘Heavenly Father’ and ‘Father Sky.’ Further, Nietzsche does not set the sky and earth in duality with each other, as both can be feminine to Zarathustra given that “the earth is like the breasts of a woman: useful as well as pleasing” (TSZ III §12:17, p. 207).

Several remarks in Book III are more mundane and discuss the various women Zarathustra encounters or considers in his journeys: there is a woman who tears her child away from Zarathustra because his “eyes scorch children’s souls” (TSZ III §5:2, p. 168); there are the “padded, rumpless daughters” of the city where Zarathustra’s ‘ape’ mocks Zarathustra with nonsense mimicry (TSZ III §7, p. 176); the young women from whom apostates seek love and the old women of whom apostates have grown weary (TSZ III §8:2, p. 181). However, Zarathustra also explores the social construction of gender and how the feminine and the masculine play against each other in the way men and women perform gender: in “On the Virtue that Makes Small” he notes of the ‘small’ people in this small town that “There are unconscious actors among them and involuntary actors: the genuine are always rare, especially genuine actors. There is little of man here; therefore their women strive to be mannish. For only he who is man enough
will release the woman in woman” (TSZ III §5:2, p. 169). To me this passage indicates that only those who perform masculinity can cause women to perform femininity, which I associate with the notion of the Eternal Feminine. Thus later in “On the Three Evils,” when Zarathustra refers to “all the priests, the world-weary, and all those whose souls are womanish and servile,” (TSZ III §10:2), I take this as a reference to performed femininity as a social construct and not to inherent biological femaleness. Given all these false faces, it makes a great deal of sense for Zarathustra to exclaim: “For too many is marriage promised, and more than marriage – to many who are strangers to each other than man and woman. And who can wholly comprehend how strange man and woman are to each other?” (TSZ III §10:2, p. 189).

From “On Old and New Tablets” Zarathustra adds two more comments regarding women to the earlier remark about the earth Following a comment about how humans have stripped animals of their virtues and noting that their “rapaciousness” would find new heights if only humans could fly (TSZ III §12:22, p. 210), Zarathustra makes his famous proclamation that he wants man and woman just so: “the one fit for war, the other fit to give birth, but both fit to dance with head and limbs. And we should consider every day lost on which we have not danced at least once. And we should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one laugh” (TSZ III §12:23, p. 210). The fact that Nietzsche concludes this proclamation with the notion that truths should also be accompanied by laughter implies to me that this gender-dualist picture is not precisely what he wishes to make canonical.

At the same time he recognizes that biology can divide humanity, he also proclaims something that ought to unite us: dancing with ‘head and limbs,’ an image which implies a more or less equal cognitive capacity for all genders. Further, a desire for ‘fitness’ for birth is not the same thing as an obligation to actually become pregnant and give birth; I would argue that fitness

171 “…in Weibe das Weib.” For some reason Kaufmann does not translate this with the emphasis that exists in the original German.
172 Raublust.
for motherhood is first predicated on being a good person, and I would hope the same would apply to fitness for war. It might be a bit much for Nietzsche to be expected to support women in combat explicitly, as I have no knowledge of even Wilhelmine feminists demanding to serve in the military; however, given his tendency to discuss metaphorical male pregnancies and births and his feminization of the traditionally masculine heavens and thus to generally genderbend the world around him, I see no reason to assume that Nietzsche would have argued women should be forbidden from serving in various military capacities. No doubt he would have been inclined to valorize Spartan women, for one consideration.

Nietzsche also does not appear to harshly judge women who violate various social restrictions for our gender; in particular, he seems sympathetic to women who ‘break wedlock’:

Your wedlock: see to it that it not be a bad lock. If you lock it too quickly, there follows wedlock-breaking: adultery. And better even such wedlock-breaking than wedlock-picking, wedlock-tricking. Thus said a woman to me: “Indeed I committed adultery and broke my wedlock, but first my wedlock broke me!”

TSZ III §12:24, p. 211

Zarathustra thus sounds more inclined to forgive the adulteress, not because he is a sinner himself but rather because of the implication that adultery does not occur in well-made marriages and hence is not really to be blamed on the victim of a bad marriage.

However, lest we think that Zarathustra uncritically feminizes the good or places femininity on a pedestal, note also in “The Convalescent” that his “abyssal thought” of the eternal recurrence of the smallest man which brings nausea and woe (TSZ III §13:1-2, p. 215-221) is a “great-grandmother” he must awake from her sleep and bid remain awake eternally (TSZ III §13:1, p. 215). Thus also, in “The Other Dancing Song,” Zarathustra has not forgotten his whip for keeping time for Life to dance, for she is an “owl” and a “bat” who intends to “confound” him; a “damned nimble, supple snake and slippery witch” who has slapped him twice in the face (TSZ III §15:1, p. 224-226), rather than some ethereal, pure, angelic being. And so we
may conclude that Zarathustra/Nietzsche’s pantheon is more like the Greco-Roman pantheon than
the Christian one; these beings are not perfect but given over to contradiction, trickery, and even
violence.

Book III ends with a final addition to the pantheon of goddess-women, Eternity. “The
Seven Seals (Or: The Yes and Amen Song)” is a hymn to Eternity, wherein Zarathustra repeats at
the end of all seven subsections: “Never yet have I found the woman from whom I wanted
children, unless it be this woman whom I love: for I love you, O eternity. For I love you, O
eternity!” (TSZ III §16:1-7, p. 228-231). It is easy to read this as the bitter utterance of a rejected
man, and that may be all there is to this: Nietzsche here could simply be the fox trying to
convince himself that he never really wanted those sour grapes after all by means of repeating this
refrain a magical or holy seven times. At the same time, however, I do think
Zarathustra/Nietzsche is attempting to fight his own rejection of the thought of recurrence by
means of wedding himself to eternity by ritually repeated proclamation. This would have to
include Nietzsche’s attempt to not regret the Salomé affair but rather to affirm it as part of
eternally recurring life, and hence I read the refrain of this song as catharsis and purging of
bitterness rather than an ingrained and malicious hatred of all human women.

The discussion of women tapers off in Book IV, with women appearing in only slightly
more than half of the passages, but strikingly they appear more varied in kind than in previous
sections, and the first woman to appear in this part of Zarathustra is again connected to the truth:
the Sibyl. Strikingly, she also appears in one of the few passages where Nietzsche mentions
prostitution or prostitutes: as Zarathustra wanders his mountain seeking the source of the cry of
distress, he encounters two kings driving a heavily laden ass who appear to understand his moral
critique of mob virtues, and he describes the words of the Sibyl exclaiming “Now everything goes
wrong! Oh woe! / Decay! The world has never sunk so low! / Rome sank to whoredom and
became a stew, / The Caesars became beasts, and God – a Jew!” (TSZ IV §3:1, p. 247). That
Rome ‘sinks’ to whoredom implies that prostitution is a valueless profession (though we might note Nietzsche’s rancor for the motley cultural ‘stew’); in this however, the Sibyl’s words represent common social attitudes which would have been the norm in the ancient world – as well as among the Wilhelmine feminists. Note that neither here nor later in “The Voluntary Beggar” does Nietzsche make these negative words about prostitutes Zarathustra’s own – here he is quoting the Sibyl, and later the statement that in the cities there are women who are “obliging, lascivious, and forgetful…none of them is too far from the whores – mob above and mob below!” (TSZ IV §8, p. 270-271) comes from the beggar, and not Zarathustra again. Thus I do not think Nietzsche wishes to associate himself – or even his main character – with a particular hatred of sex workers.

If we skip past the ‘Hexenmeister,’ ‘wizard’ or literally ‘witchmaster,’ at the beginning of “Retired,” the next feminine allusion Nietzsche makes is to how the god the retired pope used to serve has grown “old and soft and mellow and pitying, more like a grandfather than a father, but most like a shaky old grandmother” (TSZ IV §8, p. 261). While there are many women who maintain their strength and vitality in old age these days, and even Nietzsche’s grandmother was a strong-willed woman, I suspect the historical difference in medical science and the gender differences in treatment and lifestyle during Nietzsche’s time would have meant that there would have been a great deal more elderly grandmothers who fit this depiction and contrasted more strongly with the grandfathers of the day. That Nietzsche emphasizes the gender resemblance of the elderly god to an elderly human implies to me that he is intentionally using the notion of an old woman seeking comfort, peace, and stability because such a archetype did not have a socially salient male counterpart for his contemporaries.

Aside from a subtle reference to truth’s feminine gender in “The Shadow,” namely “she kicked me in the face” (TSZ §9, p. 274), women do not appear again until “The Last Supper,” where Zarathustra lists “the most beautiful women” among the best things his kind will take when
they are not given (TSZ §12, p. 285). Unequivocally, this makes women objects to be acquired; however, I do not take it too seriously given the tone of this supper, and the implication that wine is liberally drunk, and that “in the course of it, nothing else was discussed but the higher human” (TSZ §12, p. 286). Let us remember that even the highest of humans is still all-too-human, and have not yet overcome their humanity as will/should the Übermenschen. Nietzsche/Zarathustra only values the higher humans in as much as they are steps towards the Übermensch, but beyond that, we need not think that the values he associates with higher humans are for his audience’s uncritical acceptance – I would even go so far as to suggest that he would have us reject many or most of these values, or at least to reevaluate them.

This is the context in which I read “On the Higher Humans,” so when Zarathustra associates “What is womanish” with “what derives from the servile, and especially the mob hodgepodge” (TSZ IV §13:3, p. 287) we need not take this as a claim that all women/femininity is/are a servile, common, motley crew. And again when Zarathustra associates women and birth (TSZ IV §13:12, p. 291) this is not a claim that actual birth makes all women unclean (though it is amusing that he points out “one does not give birth because it is fun”), or that we ought to consider birth and creation to be dirty processes – just that the higher humans need to consider them this way for the benefit of their own all-too-human nature. Thus also, recognizing “folly” of reactionary chastity in response to one’s parents’ overindulgence (TSZ IV §13:13, p. 292) can additionally include a critique of our inherited attitudes towards women, namely that they associate women with wine, song, hunt, etc.

I find that the bombastic tone as well as the rote objectification of women in “On the Higher Humans” contrasts strongly and intentionally with the more subdued and gender-blurring “Song of Melancholy,” though this blur accompanies the “wicked spirit of deception” and “melancholy devil” belonging to the old magician (TSZ IV §14:2, p. 296). As Zarathustra leaves

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173 Note that this is the only use of “Frauen” in Book IV.
his cave, the magician claims that he loves Zarathustra “for the sake of my evil spirit,” who now “has the desire to come naked; whether male or female I do not know yet…hear then and see, you higher men, what kind of devil, whether man or woman, this spirit of evening melancholy is!” (TSZ IV §14:2, p. 297), following which he proceeds to sing the titular song and in which he describes himself three times as a ‘suitor of truth’ (TSZ IV §14:3, p. 298). That he cannot determine the gender of this devil frustrates the old magician, just as the nakedness of dancing maidens and the men who lust after them seem to disturb the conscientious man (TSZ §15, p. 301). However, these are the attitudes of the ‘higher’ men around the table – as is the wanderer’s description of postprandial melancholy as being seized by “feeble feminine spirits” after dinner (TSZ §16:1, p. 304).

It is here that we see women with descriptions of their race appear, namely the “Oriental” maidens who are the daughters of the wilderness (TSZ IV §16:1, p. 304), later described as “wicked brown girls” (TSZ IV §18:1, p. 314), though I do not take the wickedness as a judgment against the daughters of the wilderness because of Nietzsche’s general zest for playfulness and rule-breaking, and because this wickedness is a reference to the conscientious man’s words in “On Science.” Further, contrast this “charming” wickedness that the wanderer associates with his “lusting / For the round mouth of a girl, / But even more for girlish, / Ice-cold, snow-white, cutting / incisors” like those belonging to the two “Girl-cats, / Dudu and Suleika” (TSZ IV §16:2, p. 307-9) with the evil intent of the ass reiterated throughout Book IV which seems more ominous and negatively valued by Zarathustra/Nietzsche. And again, when the wanderer sings that Europe is “more doubt-addicted than all / Elderly married women” (TSZ IV §16:2, p. 306-7), and roars “As a moral lion…before the daughters of the wilderness!” (TSZ IV §16:2, p. 309) this is the higher man playing on a contemporary theme, and not a value Zarathustra attributes to those who overcome their humanity.
In “The Awakening” Zarathustra notes that the words of the higher humans are not suitable nourishment for “children or for nostalgic old and young little women” (TSZ IV §17:1, p. 311) when contrasted with what might nourish this great big nostalgic men and their great big egos. This is no judgment against children or women, just a note that different people need different words to nourish their souls, and what helps a small soul flourish is different than what is healthy for more expansive souls. Given the way we treat the young and the marginalized, however, it is no wonder that many of them rely on faith as a means of nourishment, so I take it as no parody when Nietzsche describes the higher men kneeling before the ass in worship as being “like children and devout little old women” (TSZ IV §17:2, p. 312), or when he accuses their behavior as being like “the worst blasphemers or the most foolish of all little old women” (TSZ IV §18:1, p. 313).

The final feminine appearance in Zarathustra belongs again to the Sibyl, who earlier spoke “drunken[ly] without any drink” (TSZ IV §3:1, p. 247); Zarathustra’s “Drunken Song” includes a ‘verse’ dedicated to “this drunken poetess” and how “she speaks soberly now” while ruminating on joy and woe: “For joy, even if woe is deep, joy is deeper yet than agony” (TSZ IV §19:8, p. 322). Tying this to her earlier despair that Rome has become ‘stew,’ we might see out of this Zarathustra/Nietzsche’s hope that the overcoming of humanity – and not just masculine humans, but also the feminine ones and even the indeterminate ones that disturb the higher men – is possible and good. Thus, after a thorough and sequential evaluation of Zarathustra, I cannot see that women have been exceptionally criticized in this book – or at least no more so and not very much more viciously than in prior books. However, we must also look at the remainder of books in Nietzsche’s mature period to determine whether or not this pattern persists, or if he grows more misogynistic as he ages and the madness – whether physiological, psychological, or both – takes hold.
**Beyond Good and Evil (BGE)**

Nietzsche’s next book followed very quickly on the heels of the first, published a little over a year after the fourth section of *Zarathustra*, and contains a profusion of references to women: Nietzsche mentions women in every section of *Beyond Good and Evil* at least once from the preface to the final part excluding only the ‘aftersong,’ “From High Mountains.” Maudemarie Clark has already provided a discussion of some of these remarks in Part VII of BGE, “Our Virtues,” but mine differs somewhat and so I will bypass elaboration of her exegesis for the most part. Additionally, I strongly emphasize the importance of the preface to *Beyond Good and Evil* with regards to the connection between Nietzsche’s discussion of women and his discussion of truth and perspective. The preface sets the tone for the entire text, and to my mind is the set-up for the joke, the pledge which precedes the turn in the magic trick or, only slightly less metaphorically, the kernel of thought on which much rest an accurate exegesis of both Nietzsche’s views on women and his doctrine of perspectivism.

Nietzsche opens the second book of his mature period by challenging his predecessors; given the importance of this passage, it bears quoting in full:

> Supposing truth is a woman – what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for winning a woman’s heart? What is certain is that she has not allowed herself to be won – and today every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged. If it is left standing at all! For there are scoffers who claim that it has fallen, that all dogmatism lies on the ground – even more, that all dogmatism is dying.

*BGE P, p. 192*

Nietzsche goes on to connect the Platonic “dogmatist’s error,” or “the invention of the pure spirit and the good as such” with “standing truth on her head and denying *perspective*, the basic condition of all life,” and additionally connects Platonic dogmatism with Christian dogmatism (*BGE P, p. 193*) and later Kantian dogmatism (*BGE §2, p. 200*). Though there are significant
philosophical differences between the Platonic Form of the Good and the Kantian Ding an sich, there are sufficient parallels between the two concepts that I contend that Nietzsche demonstrates that the flaws of dogmatic axiology apply to both theories. Thus we have the following metaphor: If truth is a woman, then philosophers have been poor suitors because of their dogmatism. Though Nietzsche does not make this explicit, he seems to me to imply the following corollary over the course of the rest of this book: If ‘woman’ has any truth as a concept, then philosophers (and feminists) have been very poor theorists of gender again because of their dogmatism.

The primary metaphor elucidates the intellectual poverty of axiological dogmatism, most especially epistemological and alethiological dogmatism, and serves as the primary theme of Part I, “On the Prejudices of Philosophers.” There are only two passages with explicit references to women that I could find but both tie to the problem at hand: first, Nietzsche insults Kant’s “stiff and decorous Tartuffery” alongside Spinoza’s “hocus-pocus of mathematical form” as betraying the “personal timidity and vulnerability” of hermits daring “to glance at that invincible maiden and Pallas Athena,” (BGE §5, p. 203) or in other words, Nietzsche mocks the bad taste of hermetical philosophers who make a show of their bad taste before the goddess of Truth and Wisdom. Second, Nietzsche unsubtly demands “that psychology shall be recognized again as the queen of the sciences,” (BGE §23, p. 222) a demand that the knowledge of the self will preface all other branches of knowledge – almost Confucian despite his apparent previous disparagement of the Chinese.

Part II, “The Free Spirit,” contains only one explicit reference to women, but it is remarkable in that it is Nietzsche’s only apparent reference to “Gouvernanten” or governesses throughout all of his published works. Nietzsche is in the process of demonstrating how dogmatic

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174 As well as Christian philosophy/theology, whether broadly or narrowly construed.
175 See previous sections on Daybreak and The Gay Science.
metaphysics tends to rely subconsciously on linguistic structures to justify abolishing perspective in favor of supposed objectivity (BGE §34, p. 236), and he connects this to the prim nature of a governess’s adherence to grammar and other beliefs: “Shouldn’t philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in grammar? All due respect for governesses – but hasn’t the time come for philosophy to renounce the faith of governesses?” (BGE §34, p. 237). Under the guise of a privileged schoolboy snarking at his childhood nurses, educators, and caretakers, Nietzsche appears to be making two points, one axiological and one feminist: axiologically, we should not pretend to objectivity of metaphysics and epistemology on the basis of childhood assumptions; with regards to feminism, we should not pretend to objectivity about women and women’s beliefs on the basis of childhood assumptions either.

Part IV, “What Is Religious,” also contains only one passage with explicit references to women, and it is herein that Nietzsche enumerates several different forms of ‘passion for God,” including peasant-like Lutheranism, ‘Oriental’ and slavish ecstasy like in St. Augustine, Madame de Guyon’s “womanly tenderness and lust,” as well as “a disguise for the puberty of a girl or youth,” and “even as the hysteria of an old maid, also as her final ambition,” in which case the church has several times “proclaimed the woman a saint” (BGE §50, p. 254). Though the pictures of womanly religious fervor are not exactly flattering, I would not expect Nietzsche to exude praise for the religiously fervent. Again we can note his degradation of the ‘oriental’ by his association of the non-occidental with slavishness. Lastly, I would emphasize that here he does provide at least a more complicated picture of femininity and masculinity, and that the variety here demonstrated belies claims of gender essentialism.

Part IV, “Epigrams and Interludes,” contains far more references to women than we have seen so far in this book: at least twelve, possibly thirteen.\(^{176}\) This comes as no surprise, given that

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\(^{176}\) See §105 and the use of *pia fraus* and *impia fraus*, literally ‘holy lie’ and ‘unholy lie.’ I only mention these on the bare possibility that Nietzsche could intend a pun on pious or impious *Frauen*, but I suspect such a pun is not intended in this context.
Nietzsche precedes several of these women-specific epigrams with this statement: “The degree and kind of a human’s sexuality reach up into the ultimate pinnacle of one’s spirit” (BGE §75, p. 271). The first salvo of remarks on women is a trio of statements sandwiched between an aphorism on instinct and an aphorism on free spirits with tethered hearts. Nietzsche begins with the claim that “Woman learns to hate to the extent to which her charms – decrease” (BGE §84, p. 272). We could easily read this as a remark about women who grow more bitter as their youthful beauty ages, but I would note the verbs ‘learns to hate,’ which implies to me that Nietzsche is making a remark corollary to the adage “You catch more flies with honey”; thus my alternative reading is that women are practical social agents who learn to use the tools of hatred when their tools of seduction grow less effective due to ageism.

The second statement in the trio is that “The same affects in man and woman are yet different in *tempo*: therefore man and woman do not cease to misunderstand each other” (BGE §85, p. 272). If Nietzsche were a gender essentialist, we could read this as a biological or otherwise essentialist remark about gender difference, but given his repeated rejection of essentialism so far I instead must read this as a statement of how men and women are socially trained to follow a different *tempo* from each other. Given various divergences in Western and Eastern societies’ gender training, the remark that we do not cease to misunderstand each other is a plausible observation which concords with much feminist literature globally. Further, given Nietzsche’s rejection of essentialism, when he goes on to state that “Women themselves always still have in the background of all personal vanity an impersonal contempt – for ‘woman’” (BGE §86, p. 272), we might critique the implication that all women are non- or anti-essentialists about ‘woman,’ and we might also view the connection to vanity as degrading if Nietzsche elsewhere demonstrates contempt for vanity, but the claim that at least some women are contemptuous of

177 Given aphorisms like §143, “Our vanity desires that what we do best should be considered what is hardest for us. Concerning the origin of many a morality” (p. 279), I am disinclined to believe that
the essentialist and reductive concept of the Eternal Feminine is congruent with Nietzsche’s own rejection of essentialist and reductive concepts generally, as well as being congruent with contemporary anti-essentialist feminisms.

The next pair of aphorisms explicitly about women follow an aphorism which sounds like it could be advice addressed to a woman: in quotes as though writing dialogue, Nietzsche writes, “‘You want to prepossess him in your favor? Then pretend to be embarrassed in his presence – ’” (BGE §113, p. 275). The following aphorism to me implies that Nietzsche views the quoted advice as perhaps only mediocre or even poor counsel for women: “The enormous expectation in sexual love and the sense of shame in this expectation spoils all perspective for women from the start” (BGE §114, p. 275). Teaching sexual shame leads to women significantly lacking knowledge, understanding, and perspective on relationships, copulation, reproduction, etc.

Further, enough time spent maintaining a pretense, including a pretense of shame, can lead to an internalization of that pretense; thus if women internalize the advice to pretend to embarrassment in the presence of those they wish to attract, they will spoil their own perspective on their relationship and relations with that person because they will internalize that embarrassment. Thus also, given how women have internalized the social prescriptions for what pursuits are appropriate for women, when Nietzsche says next that “Where neither love nor hatred is in the game, a woman’s game is mediocre,” (BGE §115, p. 275), this is less of a judgment against women, who Nietzsche implies excel where they direct their energies, and rather more a judgment against society who so restricts women that they may only play at love or hatred.

The remaining remarks from Part IV are clustered near the end and begin with the statement that “Science offends the modesty of all real women. It makes them feel as if one wanted to peep under their skin – yet worse, under their dress and finery” (BGE §127, p. 277).

Nietzsche has a straightforwardly negative view of vanity, and more likely to assert that Nietzsche sometimes values vanity for various reasons.  

— Rechten Frauen. —
Given the context provided by the following aphorism, “The more abstract the truth is that you would teach, the more you have to seduce the senses to it” (BGE §128, p. 277), we can see that Nietzsche is playing at double meanings again: for one, ‘right’ women are offended by violations of their modesty; this is to me no insult because Nietzsche does not define what that modesty entails but rather emphasizes the fact that violating a woman’s boundaries is an offense. I am inclined to believe that most women have boundaries, though they may shift and contradict and vary from woman to woman, and women who lack boundaries are only not ‘right’ in the sense that someone has probably done something ‘wrong’ to disturb their sense for boundaries.179

Secondly, Nietzsche is playing at the metaphor of Truth the woman/goddess by saying that Truth finds the scientists who make “objectivity” their faith to be arrogant violators of boundaries and surfaces that are there for a reason – a theme we will revisit when we come to the new prefaces published following Beyond Good and Evil.

Nietzsche’s next remark about women is actually more about the men involved with women: “The sexes deceive themselves about each other – because at bottom they honor and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to put it more pleasantly). Thus man likes woman peaceful – but woman is essentially unpeaceful, like a cat, however well she may have trained herself to seem peaceable” (BGE §131, p. 277). Again, given Nietzsche’s previous rejection of essentialism, and the suspicious emphasis he here puts on the word, I read him as saying that man’s false essentializing of ‘woman’ in herself as an unpeaceful animal leads him to deceive himself when he contradictorily wishes for a peaceful woman in his life. So also, when he says “In revenge and love woman is more barbarous than man” (BGE §139, p. 278), he precedes this with the statement that “When we are awake we also do what we do in our dreams: we invent and make up the person with whom we associate – and immediately forget it” (BGE §138, p. 278).

179 And if there are women or men who joyously celebrate an absolute lack of all boundaries and have never experienced a violation or did not experience violations which lead to their lack of boundaries, all I can say is that I have never met such people and find it hard to believe they exist.
This intentional juxtaposition implies that the statement about ‘woman’ is a statement about a fictionialized essence of femininity that has notion to do with living, breathing women.

One of the most-cited remarks Nietzsche makes about women is “When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong with her sexually”; however most commentators fail to continue the quote: “Sterility itself disposes one towards a certain masculinity of taste; for man is, if I may say so, ‘the sterile animal’” (BGE §144, p. 279). Again, several things are happening here: for one, we might recall the ‘feminine’ rejection of science’s impertinent plucking at Truth’s petticoats; for another, note that Nietzsche implies that people with scholarly inclinations, both male and female, are sterile. Thirdly, note the reversal of Aristotelian sexual dynamics; any familiarity with Historia Animalium or De Generatione Animalium reveals Aristotle’s identification of men as the fertile, active creatures and women as the sterile, passive recipients in sexual congress and reproduction. Here, Nietzsche flips the script and insults men and women scholars but also men generally as being the infertile and passive partners in intellectual and sexual activity. This is not to say that women and men who pursue intellectual goals are sexually sterile, only that scholarly pursuit in particular necessitates a form of sterility in contemporary Western/European educational practices.

The next remark is that when “Comparing man and woman on the whole, one may say: woman would not have the genius for finery if she did not have an instinct for a secondary role” (BGE §145, p. 279). The barb is transformed into a feminist insight when we remember that an instinct need not be inborn biologically but can be learned through social indoctrination; thus a womanly preoccupation with and talent for fashion and makeup is a sign of her secondary status in society for many reasons, though Nietzsche does not enumerate them. For one thing, we can say that ‘finery’ has a secondary status in our society because it is associated with women, and women are the ‘second sex’ even in the twenty-first century. For another, we can say that women have learned to develop a genius for ‘finery’ as a self-defense mechanism: when men the world
over repeat and enforce the primacy of a woman’s appearance, when mothers reinforce these lessons through internalized misogyny to their daughters, when a woman cannot even run for president without commentary on her hair, makeup, and dress, a learned instinct for beauty tips and tricks can be a healthy way to navigate social expectations. Likewise, so can the reasoned rejection of such unhealthy beauty standards be a healthy way to respond to social pressures.

Sandwiched between the two above and the two below aphorisms is probably the most quoted and most misquoted statement from all of Nietzsche’s bibliography, and I find it remarkable that no one appears to emphasize this positioning or regard it as at all significant. In full, Nietzsche states, “Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you” (BGE §146, p. 279). Any half-awake Freudian could write a treatise on the genital metaphors, imagery, and connotations here, but I prefer a more modestly contextualized understanding of this aphorism. Preceded by the remarks about women’s self-defensive genius for finery, and followed by the little note from “old Florentine novels; also – from life” that “Buona femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone”\(^{180}\) (BGE §147, p. 279) that emphasizes how commonplace the abuse of women is, I take the famous abyss quote to be a caution to women and other fighters of oppression that we not lose ourselves by becoming reflections of our oppressors. This is a risk all free spirits face: in rejecting the behavior of the oppressive forces of our lives and attempting to fight back against them, we often have to fight fire with fire, so to speak. But, as Nietzsche earlier reminded us, pretense can lead to internalization – and fighting misogyny and abuse can lead to us internalizing misogyny and becoming abusive ourselves.

Nietzsche further emphasizes this point with the final aphorism in this cluster and in Part IV by asking “Seducing one’s neighbor to a good opinion and afterwards believing piously in this opinion – who could equal women in this art?” (BGE §148, p. 179-80). Again, he points out how

\(^{180}\) “Good and bad women want a stick.”
women in particular have learned pretense and internalization as self-defense mechanisms in society; men cannot equal women in this art precisely because they have not experienced the pressures necessary for developing the genius required.

Nietzsche writes about women in seven more aphorisms in Part V, “Natural History of Morals,” including the very first of this section. Nietzsche begins by remarking that the notion of a “science of morals” is really too far-reaching “and offends good taste” and that rather the best we can hope for is a typology (BGE §186, p. 287). As an example of what is “almost venerable innocence” in this regard, Nietzsche offers Schopenhauer, and asks us to “then draw your conclusions about the scientific standing of a ‘science’ whose ultimate masters still talk like children and little old women” (BGE §186, p. 288). It would be easy to write this off as devaluation of the speech of children and elderly women, but Nietzsche does not say we should draw our conclusions about his personal opinions of science whose masters speak in this fashion; he only tells us to draw our conclusions about the standing of such speech in the scientific community. If Nietzsche accepted the scientific faith he is known for criticizing then the conclusion that he devalues such speech would be correct, but given that selfsame criticism I do not believe such a conclusion is warranted. Rather, Nietzsche leaves open the possibility for the value of the speech of children and little old women, but implies that such value is not recognized by the contemporary scientific community.

Nietzsche’s next mention of a woman is parenthetical and involves more of a metaphorical woman, namely Nature. Nietzsche discusses the moral imperatives of nature and only genders her when he remarks that these imperatives are neither categorical “nor addressed to the individual (what do individuals matter to her?), but to peoples, races, ages, classes – but above all to the whole human animal, to humanity” (BGE §188, p. 292). Again, we can challenge the notion that women should be equated with nature, or that nature should be equated with femininity. Here I want to emphasize Nietzsche’s appraisal of nature as beyond good and evil and
claim that this is no way implies that women are immoral or amoral but rather that women are capable of the revaluation of values inasmuch as any other human animal, all of us being products of nature in one way or another.

Nietzsche refers to women more explicitly though indirectly when he discusses the tablets of goods of various types of humans, particularly with regards to their attitudes towards women. Interestingly, he does not appear to use “man”/“Mann” or their plurals throughout this passage, leaving the heteronormativity of the passage more open: modest types see sex with a woman as possession of her; more suspicious types want “subtler tests” such as giving up the things she loves just for them; a third type requires even more, proof that they are capable of being loved down to their depths; a fourth wants to possess a whole people (BGE §194, p. 296-7). Each of these types speaks more about the persons seeking to possess women than it does about the women targeted for possession. This possession extends to the children born to different types of parents; Nietzsche remarks that “Deep in her heart, no mother doubts that the child she has borne is her property; no father contests his own right to subject it to his concepts and valuations” (BGE §194, p. 297). Not having been a parent, I cannot speak to this fully; however, I doubt the universality of these claims. Surely some mothers and fathers doubt and contest what Nietzsche says no parents do.

However, Nietzsche himself throws some doubt on this universality only a few aphorisms later when he says of moralities addressed to individuals that “little and great prudences and artifices that exude the nook odor of old nostrums and of the wisdom of old women; all of them baroque and unreasonable in form – because they address themselves to ‘all,’ because they generalize where one must not generalize” (BGE §198, p. 299). Nietzsche also sees fear as “again the mother of morals” in the case of herd utility and love of the neighbor (BGE §201, p. 303), and finds the “cry and impatience of pity” and the hatred of suffering to be “almost feminine” (BGE
§202, p. 306). Given the common constructs of femininity as piteous, fearful, etc., it is no wonder Nietzsche sees a semblance to femininity, but note that he does not equate the stereotype with the feminine itself – just near femininity, “fast weiblichen.”

Part VI, “We Scholars,” contains five passages referencing women. The first of these again associates women with artists: Nietzsche opens Part VI by speaking “out against an unseemly and harmful shift in the respective ranks of science and philosophy,” noting that he is “of the opinion that only experience – experience always seems to mean bad experience? – can entitle us to participate in the discussion of such higher questions of rank, lest we talk like blind men about colors – against science the way women and artists do” namely by sighing “their instinct and embarrassment; ‘it always gets to the bottom of things!’” (BGE §204, p. 311, emphases his). I understand Nietzsche to be saying several things here: first of all, that we must not allow science to become independent of philosophy; this is supported by the immediately following statement that the scientist’s “declaration of independence, his emancipation from philosophy, is one of the more refined effects of the democratic order – and disorder” (BGE §204, p. 311), the implication being that such independence is a degradation and part of the decay of science rather than a sign of strength and value. Secondly, Nietzsche is saying that only experience allows us to deal with questions of rank, and he implies by interrogation that such experience is somehow necessarily or at least very frequently bad or negative experiences with problems of rank. Third, Nietzsche makes what we might construe as an ableist analogy, in that he explicitly suggests that speaking without experience is akin to a blind person discussing colors, and that this is further similar to the way artists and women speak against science in that they have no direct experiences with science. Fourth, Nietzsche notes that women and artists (and presumably women artists) have a distaste for science because it gets to the “bottom” of things, uncovers what is shameful and embarrassing.

181 Kaufmann inserts “unmanly” into the passage for no discernable reason.
As with his apparent racism, this apparent ableism would indicate that Nietzsche could not be construed as intersectionally feminist in any clear and straightforward way, a point to which I will return again. The notion that artists and women would be likely to have little or no direct experience with science is a factual matter; many women were scientists in the nineteenth century and had their accomplishments overshadowed by husbands or male scientists or otherwise ignored by the scientific communities in many regards, but by the numbers and because of the academic restrictions on women during this time there would have been significantly fewer women scientists than men scientists during this time. As for artists and their involvement in the sciences, I am somewhat willing to assent. Some artists use anatomical studies or biology for their art; others study physics and make that their subject matter; most artists employ one form of technology or another to create their art whether they understand the theoretical principles behind it or not. Generally however, I think many artists, including myself, would assent that the science is not always as significant to the artist as the effect. This would make an interesting line of new research.

To argue that Nietzsche would completely and unequivocally exclude women from being scientists here would ring false, however, when Nietzsche regards Science as a woman at the end of this same passage: “Science is flourishing today and her good conscience is written all over her face, while the level to which all modern philosophy has gradually sunk, this rest of philosophy today, invites mistrust and displeasure, if not mockery and pity” (BGE §204, p. 313). The fact that he genders science as feminine implies that he sees no inherent reason women cannot be scientists, understand science, or that they all hate science either. In fact, he goes on to explicitly state that scientists do have a certain kind feminine quality in contrast with a different kind of feminine quality present in genuine philosophers (see §205):

Compared to a genius – that is, to one who either begets or gives birth, taking both terms in their most elevated sense – the scholar, the scientific average man, always rather resembles an old maid: like her he is not conversant with the two most valuable functions.
of humanity. Indeed, one even concedes to both, to the scholars and to old maids, as it were by way of a compensation, that they are respectable – one stresses their respectability – and yet feels annoyed all over at having to make this concession.

BGE §206, p. 315

Nietzsche goes on to closely examine this parallel between herd animals, dependent human beings, the average scholar toiling respectably, and the reproductively sterile male or female old maid, all who are unable to beget (masculine) or give birth (feminine) in the highest sense – which I would argue for Nietzsche must be the sense of producing higher forms of humanity, overcoming humanity, paving the way for the Übermensch, etc. Thus by reference to old maids Nietzsche includes by implication actual physical pregnancy and birth-giving as part of the project of begetting and giving birth in the highest sense, as well as genius, deviation from the herd, and independence; hence I feel comfortable saying that Nietzsche does not see sterile humans as necessarily bad or without virtue or useless for his project of getting past humanity, only that he sees them as bad for sexual reproduction.

Nietzsche then goes on to criticize objective persons with “disinterested knowledge” (BGE §207, p. 316) as ultimately not even being persons anymore, and insomuch as they are still have some small portion of person remaining, it seems arbitrary and disturbing (BGE §207, p. 317). Whether it is his health that torments him “or the pettiness and cramped atmosphere of wife and friend, or the lack of companions and company” the objective spirit reflects on his torments in vain; and if we ask him to love or hate in the sense that Nietzsche means, “I mean love and hatred as God, woman, and animal understand them” this objective person will try, but we shouldn’t be surprised when “His love is forced, his hatred artificial” (BGE §207, p. 317). Thus Nietzsche construes the understanding of God, women, and animals (including human animals, I must insist) as all being like each other and wholly unlike the purported objective and disinterested person. Such a person, Nietzsche says, is “for the most part, a man without substance and content, a ‘selfless’ man. Consequently, also nothing for women, in parenthesis.”
This parenthetical conclusion implies to me that Nietzsche here again is hearkening back to the Preface and claiming that objective persons have no relationship with the truth, nor with actual human women.

The fourth reference to women in Part VI comes in a passage discussing by way of parable the “new warlike age into which we Europeans have evidently entered” and to what extent such an age “may also favor the development of another and stronger type of skepticism” (BGE §209, p. 321), a parable which offers evidence of Nietzsche’s rejection of German nationalism by the way. In a passage liberally peppered with literary references, Nietzsche explains the shudder of fear “warmblooded and superficial humanitarians” feel in the presence of a “virile skepticism”:

…if we want to really feel what a distinction such fear of the ‘man’ in the German sprit confers – a spirit through which Europe was after all awakened from her ‘dogmatic slumber’ – we have to remember the former conception which was replaced by this one: it was not so long ago that a masculinized woman could dare with unbridled presumption to commend the Germans to the sympathy of Europe as being gentle, goodhearted, weak-willed, and poetic dolts. At long last we ought to understand deeply enough Napoleon’s surprise when he came to see Goethe: it shows what people had associated with the ‘German spirit’ for centuries. “Voilà un homme!” – that meant: “But this is a man! And I had merely expected a German.”

BGE §209, p. 323

If Nietzsche were a warmonger, considered himself and his fellow free spirits to be coldblooded and deep, if he valued only masculinity for men and only femininity for women, it would make sense to read this as virulently sexist. However, given Nietzsche’s repeated self-association and high esteem for surfaces and the superficial, the fact that as a warm-blooded creature he values cold thoughts, and the fact that he repeatedly values the feminine in men in a number of ways instead causes me to read this passage as a prescient warning of this virile German skepticism that “despises and nevertheless seizes,” that “undermines and takes possession” which is a “form of a continued Frederickianism that had been sublimated spiritually” hand which “brought Europe for
a long time under the hegemony of the German spirit” (BGE §209, p. 322). In short, I read this passage as a warning of German hegemony and rebuke against German nationalism.

The final passage referencing women contains some of Nietzsche’s speculations about the philosophers of the future, the “people of experiments,” critics rather than skeptics who smile perhaps in amusement at fools who believe that whatever elevates must be true, that whatever delights must be beautiful, that whatever makes us great is itself great, and feel “a genuine Ekel” – revulsion or disgust, though translated as nausea – “over everything that is enthusiastic, idealistic, feminine, hermaphroditic in this vein” (BGE §210, p. 324-5). Let us not be fooled into believing that Nietzsche shares this disgust for the feminine or hermaphroditic, however, for Nietzsche concludes by noting that “critics are instruments of the philosopher and for that very reason, being instruments, a long ways from being philosophers themselves,” including in particular “the great Chinese of Königsberg,” or Immanuel Kant (BGE §210, p. 325, see also fn. 33).

Part VII, “Our Virtues,” contains twelve aphorisms with explicit references to women, and perhaps one of the most famous sets of aphorisms on women from his published works. As with Kathleen Higgins’s discussion of various works above, I choose to elide Maudemarie Clark’s treatment of the passages here for various reasons, including consistency in tone and content. Before approaching his discussion of women, Nietzsche opens Part VII with an explanation of how even “We Europeans of the day after tomorrow” still have virtues of their own, including himself in this crowd, and how nonetheless “very soon – all will be different!” (BGE §214, p. 335). Further, modern humans are determined by many different moralities and virtues, “thanks to the complicated mechanics” of the various metaphorical suns and stars rising and setting for different peoples at different times (BGE §215, p. 336). Thus, humanity has learned well the lesson to love one’s enemies; so well, in fact, that “we learn to despise when we love” and come to find that “Morality as a pose – offends our taste today” (BGE §216, p. 336).
Hence we should beware of the morally tactful because they hold grudges for their own personal failings: “inevitably they become our instinctive slanderers and detractors” even under the pretense of friendship (BGE §217, p. 336). He recommends that psychologists therefore “vivisect the ‘good man’” (BGE §218, p. 337) as well as exploring the connections between high spirituality and ‘order of rank’ (BGE §219, p. 337-8).

Having said all this, Nietzsche finally arrives at the first two remarks about women in Part VII; to counter the notions of disinterested knowledge, beauty, etc., the problem of unegoistic love, and the selfless sacrifice, Nietzsche comments, “even now truth finds it necessary to stifle her yawns when she is expected to give answers. In the end she is a woman: she should not be violated” (BGE §220, p. 338-9), thus implying that if we seek ‘disinterested’ objectivity, truth will not be interested in the query. Nietzsche then goes on to remark on the nature of order of rank again, saying that moralities should bow thereto “until they finally reach agreement that it is immoral to say: ‘what is right for one is fair for the other’” and asks whether the moralistic pedant deserves “to be laughed at for thus admonishing moralities to become moral?” (BGE §221, p. 339). The last passing remark on women until the deluge comes in a passage on pity, “the only religion preached now,” and whose “first symptoms were registered in a thoughtful letter Galiani wrote to Madame d’Épinay” (BGE §222, p. 339-40).

This Nietzsche follows with a section on the “ugly plebian” and “hybrid European” (BGE §223, p. 340), one on historical sense (§224), one on suffering (§225), so-called immoralists (§226), honesty (§227), the soporific quality of moral philosophy heretofore (§228), late humanity (§229), and one on the basic will of the spirit (§230) in which he claims that we must “translate humanity back into nature” (p. 351), a reference to Nietzsche’s positing life as his new

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182 I include this question here because later in this section it almost seems like Nietzsche is admonishing feminists to become feminist.
criterion of value metaethically, before finally offering us his infamous “few truths about ‘woman as such’” (BGE §231, p. 352). Let me emphasize that: these truths Nietzsche offers are about the concept of ‘womanhood’ or ‘femininity’ or the ‘Eternal Womanly/Feminine’ or even ‘woman in herself,’ das Weib an sich, which I take to be an intentional parallel with das Ding an sich or the thing-in-itself, as well as other ‘dogmatist’s errors’ based on the opening salvos in the Preface. Thus Nietzsche is critiquing herein not only the problem of an essential feminine nature but also the problem of essential, objective truth. Further, given the preceding passage containing the impetus to translate humanity back into nature, I see the following ‘truths’ as an experiment in translating das Weib an sich and his contemporaries’ attitudes thereto into something closer to nature, or at least closer to an understanding of humanity’s place in the order of rank. Nietzsche emphasizes “how very much these are after all only – my truths,” implying that they do not have the kind of “objective” truth erroneously ascribed to the various dogmatic errors of the past, and that he is exploring these ideas as a kind of “spiritual fatum” in the sense that his answers are somehow already predetermined: “Whenever a cardinal problem is at stake, there speaks an unchangeable ‘this is I’; about man and woman, for example, a thinker cannot relearn but only finish learning – only discover ultimately how this is ‘settled in him’” (BGE §231, p. 352).

Again, based on Nietzsche’s rejection of the “faith in opposite values” (BGE §2, p. 200) and the Preface wherein Nietzsche establishes woman as a metaphor for truth (BGE P, p. 192), I think we have no reason to believe that Nietzsche assigns the value of absolute truth to these truths on woman as such, but this need not entail the conclusion that Nietzsche assigns the value of absolute falsity to these truths on woman as such, either. Furthermore, the fact that §231 is about self-knowledge demonstrates that Nietzsche is proffering these truths which constitute

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183 I believe Nietzsche sees life as a criterion for ranking the value of different truths, presumably not only for the purposes of survival but also for the purposes of the flourishing of higher forms of life up to and including the Übermensch.

184 If they cannot have objective truth, I think Nietzsche must also deny them objective falsity – at least in the sense of ‘objective’ used by the erroneous dogmatists he critiques.
“steps to self-knowledge” (BGE §231, p. 352) as beliefs to be judged against the new criterion of value. I am optimistic that Nietzsche recognizes that “Learning changes us” at the opening of this passage even though he makes it fairly clear that thinks of some of his beliefs as incorrigible: he sees his and other thinkers’ beliefs about gender in particular as “signposts to the problem we are – rather, to the great stupidity we are, to our spiritual fatum, to what is unteachable very ‘deep down’” (BGE §231, p. 352). Nietzsche demonstrates here that he is aware that some of his beliefs are not only false but outright stupid, and he is furthermore willing to claim them as merely subjectively true for the stupid and incorrigible, rather than intersubjectively true or as wholly objectively true beliefs.

Nietzsche’s first truth on woman as such is a description of the early German feminist movement, with which he had become familiar through his relationship with women like Mawilda von Meysenbug. Nietzsche initially proposes that the reason women are “beginning to enlighten men about ‘woman as such’” is because “Woman wants to become self-reliant” (BGE §232, p. 352), although he also considers the possibility that “woman seeks a new adornment for herself” in seeking self-enlightenment because he thinks self-adornment is “part of the Eternal-Feminine” (BGE §232, p. 353). However, Nietzsche does not view this enlightenment as a good thing – rather it “is one of the worst developments of the general uglification of Europe” (BGE §232, p. 352) because of all the negative features woman as such possesses.

Let me emphasize again that Nietzsche is talking about the concept of the woman as such and we therefore need not attribute to Nietzsche the belief that all or even most human women possess the “pedantrity, superficiality, schoolmarmishness, petty presumption, petty licentiousness and immodesty” which “lies concealed in woman” as such (BGE §232, p. 353). Thus it appears that rather than accusing Nietzsche of despising women, we can more accurately say that Nietzsche despises the concept of woman as such, presumably because like das Ding an sich, the concept of das Weib an sich is inimical to life; and furthermore, Nietzsche himself claims “that
on the whole ‘woman’ has so far been despised most by woman herself – and by no means by us” (BGE §232, p. 354). Given the internalization of misogyny many women undergo, and further given second- and third-wave feminism’s anti-essentialism, I would say that this is a fair point on Nietzsche’s behalf – many women have despised the concept of woman as such because they have been taught to hate femininity, while many feminists have despised the essentializing concept of woman as such because it reduces all women to one universal and hence false definition; further, given the early German feminist inclination to valorize the Hausfrau\textsuperscript{185} above all other women (Diethe, p. 73), I would additionally say that Nietzsche was right to criticize what was his contemporary feminist ideal of femininity, and later feminists have done so with regards to their predecessors.\textsuperscript{186} Though my own feminist credentials might come into question by admitting as much, were my own contemporary feminists to advocate the seclusion of all women at hearth and home I might also counsel them “mulier taceat de muliere” (BGE §232, p. 354).\textsuperscript{187}

Not being familiar with the works of Madame Roland, Madame de Staël, or “Monsieur” George Sand, I do not feel able to properly judge Nietzsche’s portrayal of them as “the best involuntary counterarguments against emancipation and feminine vainglory” rather than “anything in favor of ‘woman as such’” (BGE §233, p. 354), although such a reaction does seem extreme; however, if they advocated any form of essentialism, I would also consider their works a counterargument against feminism. Likewise, when Nietzsche criticizes the notion of “woman as cook,” it again is more of a criticism of the notion that women \textit{qua} woman have any inherent or essential quality allowing them to be experts in the kitchen, regardless of what society dictates or assumes about a woman’s place therein (BGE §234, p. 354). Nietzsche also demonstrates that it is

\textsuperscript{185} Housewife.
\textsuperscript{187} Woman should be silent about woman.
not only the common but also the nobler types who buy into essentialist gender frameworks when he remarks that Dante and Goethe believed “the Eternal-Feminine attracts us higher” and furthermore that Nietzsche himself does “not doubt that every nobler woman will resist this faith, for she believes the same thing about the Eternal-Masculine” (BGE §236, p. 355). Thus even the noblest of people seem to find these ‘great stupidities’ insurmountable in certain cases.

Note before Nietzsche goes on to offer his “Seven Epigrams on Woman,” that two passages above Nietzsche describes epigrams as such: “There are expressions and bull’s-eyes of the spirit, there are epigrams, a little handful of words, in which a whole culture, a whole society is suddenly crystallized” (BGE §235, p. 355). Thus, we can remember that Nietzsche’s epigrams here in §237 are crystallizations of his society. If we were to take these epigrams to refer to human women rather than the concept of woman, would be seem rather obscene, particularly to the first: “How the longest boredom flees, when a man comes on his knees” (BGE §237, p. 355). We could take the first aphorism to refer to the woman’s boredom fleeing when a man grovels before her, although more vulgar meanings are possible; however, because Nietzsche is intentionally nonspecific, it is quite possible that the boredom fleeing belongs both to the man and to the woman in such a situation, which would be consistent with the way the whip from Zarathustra and the lust in Gay Science were left ambiguous.

The second epigram is that “Science and old age at length give weak virtue, too, some strength” (BGE §237, p. 355). If we take it to mean that inherently weak women become more cunning as they become more educated and aged, this could seem like a nasty remark. Yet that does not strike me as a particularly cruel observation as it could also apply to weak men and is once again presumably intended as a comment on woman as such, and not any or all women: once the concept of womanhood is old and becomes part of the sciences, even its weak connection to human women gains strength in the public mind. The third statement seems like an echo of “mulier taceat de muliere,” as Nietzsche remarks “Black dress and a silent part make
every woman appear – smart” (BGE §237, p. 355), and he repeats this connection to appearance in the fourth epigram, “Whom I thank for my success? God! – and my dear tailoress,” and again in the fifth, “Young: flower-covered den. Old: a dragon denizen” (BGE §237, p. 356). However, this emphasis on the importance of a woman’s appearance contrasts with the sixth epigram: “Noble name, the legs are fine, man as well: that he were mine!” (BGE §237, p. 356), wherein Nietzsche subtly points to the fact that beauty and youth seem a double-standard. A man can get away with not necessarily being young and beautiful, provided his name is noble and he is still mobile, whereas a woman’s value degrades as her age increases, her appearance is less manicured, or when she voices any opinion. Nietzsche points to this subtlety by warning his reader in the seventh and final epigram: “Ample meaning, speech concise – she-ass, watch for slippery ice!” (BGE §237, p. 356), thus implying that we must be very careful indeed with our reading here, or in other words, “dance with expertise” on such “smooth ice” (GS F §13, p. 47).

Nietzsche goes on to describe men historically treating women “as something one has to lock up lest it fly away” (BGE §237a, p. 356) and appears to recommend that thinkers with “depth” to their souls ought to “conceive of woman as a possession, as property that can be locked, as something predestined for service and achieving her perfection in that” (BGE §238, p. 257). I do not think this is as straightforward a statement about possessing women as property as some critics claim; for one thing, Nietzsche takes an unusual step in describing this kind of masculinity as “Oriental,” when in the nineteenth century it was far more common to associate Eastern Asia with femininity, and which Nietzsche has done elsewhere. 188 For another, Nietzsche opens the first of these two sections by saying that this is how men have treated women “so far,” which implies that things can, and perhaps should, change. One psychological explanation for the backlash against feminism might be simple resistance to change, another could be fear on the part of men that they will lose what power they have over women. Not only does this explain why

188 As, for example, in GS §69, p. 126.
men would want to retain control of the concept of woman as such, but it also indicates a specific avenue of attack feminists can take in response to sexism, namely, disputing women’s status as property. Furthermore, again, we can take this to be a discussion to be about ‘woman as such,’ in which case so-called deep thinkers might consider the concept their property rather than actual human women. Properly speaking, the misogynistic essentializing of women is a concept belonging to the patriarchy. Finally, we might also remember Nietzsche’s appreciation for superficiality rather than depth, in which case his final statement about this severity towards women, “How necessary, how logical, how humanely desirable even, this was – is worth pondering,” (BGE §238, p. 357) seems to challenge rather than enforce the dictates of the misogynistic deep thinker.

Nietzsche concludes Part Seven with a longer passage which superficially seems to argue that democratic emancipation of women is a social ill; however, this is not because Nietzsche considers it to be a bad thing for women to have influence in society. Indeed, Nietzsche says that “Since the French Revolution, woman’s influence in Europe has decreased proportionately as her rights and claims have increased,” and he implies that this is because women have lost “the sense for the ground on which one is most certain of victory” (BGE §239, p. 358). Thus, the reason why the democratic emancipation of women is a bad thing is because it actually diminishes the influence of women rather than increasing it. Therefore, Nietzsche is not proposing that women ought to have less impact on society but more impact, an idea consistent with his later claim that “the eternal war between the sexes, gives her by far the first rank” (EH 3:5, p. 723). This sounds less like anti-feminism and more like a form of feminism which advocates matriarchal rather than patriarchal rule, although I doubt the early German feminists would have considered it feminism at all.

Part VIII, “Peoples and Fatherlands,” contains only three explicit references to women. The first of these is in a description of Schumann and his small rather than great taste: “a noble
tender-heart who wallowed in all sorts of anonymous bliss and woe, a kind of girl and noli me tangere\textsuperscript{189} from the start” (BGE §245, p. 372). Though this passage appears to disparage Schumann and his kind of maidenly femininity, I also note that here Nietzsche again connects the noble to the feminine, even the youthful, tender variety. That we can misunderstand this as a disparagement of women can be attributable to the social divides between the genders, who have a tendency to misunderstand each other because of those social divides, as Nietzsche reminds us again in his second reference to women in this section (BGE §248, p. 375).

While some may take his division between masculine genius as begetting and feminine genius as being fertilized and giving birth (BGE §248, p. 374) to be a biologically essentialist division of two genders, I rather choose to emphasize the notion of feminine genius as extant in Nietzsche’s work in the first place – thus again leaving room for higher types of femininity and the possible place of women among a race of Übermenschen –and to also note that these types of geniuses belong not just to individual men and women but also to whole peoples by Nietzsche’s estimation. Thus a Greek or French man may be more likely to have a feminine genius, just as a Jewish or Roman woman might have a more masculine genius. Nietzsche concludes Part VIII with a poem in which he refers to the “nunnish ogling” of Wagner’s Parsifal (BGE §256, p. 388). Given the context, he could just as easily have used “monkish” instead of “nunnish,” though we might make much of the fact that priestly power is feminine here and that thus once again Nietzsche ascribes femininity to power or power to femininity.

Part IX, “What is Noble,” contains five passages referencing women, the last ones in the book, for the “Aftersong” appears to contain none explicit, and only implies their inclusion through the repeated gender-neutral usage of “friends” throughout. The first is a parenthetical remark in a passage discussing how many humans, particularly the ignoble but also some of the noble, tend to accept and internalize the values ascribed to us by those higher in the social

\textsuperscript{189} A biblical reference, John 20:17, “Touch me not!”
hierarchy: “consider, for example, the great majority of the self-estimates and self-underestimates that believing women accept from their father-confessors, and believing Christians quite generally from their church” (BGE §261, p. 399). So also, when Nietzsche remarks in this passage, “how much ‘slave’ is still residual in woman” (BGE §261, p. 399), we can read this as an internalization of the biases of those in power.

Thus also, when Nietzsche comments on the various aristocratic types, we should remember that “species accorded superabundant nourishment and quite generally extra protection and care soon tend most strongly toward variations of the type and become rich in marvels and monstrosities (including monstrous vices)” (BGE §262, p. 400). This is should be keenly remembered when at the bottom of the next paragraph he remarks that the aristocratic moralities historically have been “intolerant – in the education of youth, in their arrangements for women, in their marriage customs, in the relation of young an old, in their penal laws” and further that “they consider intolerance itself a virtue, calling it ‘justice’” (BGE §362, p. 400). Thus Nietzsche implies that such intolerance is a monstrous vice which nonetheless creates precisely the unfavorable conditions necessary to fix and harden a type as opposed to the superabundant nourishment which allows a species to vary (BGE §262, p. 401). Nietzsche concludes here by naming danger, rather than fear, the “mother of morals” (BGE §262, p. 402).

Nietzsche then again uses the Chinese people as a rhetorical device, stating “a proverb that mothers even teach children: siao-sin – ‘make your heart small!’” and remarking that this is the tendency of “late civilizations” that is recognizable in his contemporary fellow Europeans (BGE §267, p. 406). Thus Nietzsche offers some small evidence that he associates his own contemporaries with these stereotypical images of the Chinese; other evidence includes the final aphorism of the book, wherein he appears to include himself in “we mandarins with Chinese brushes” (BGE §296, p. 426). Perhaps we might note that the late civilizations lead to the birth of
new civilizations and presumably new moralities, and thus have a value for Nietzsche, though probably not as much value as he places on particular kinds of (new) civilizations.

Nietzsche’s penultimate remark on women in this text comes in a discussion of psychologists and poets, love and pity; Nietzsche states:

It is easy to understand that these men should so readily receive from woman – clairvoyant in the world of suffering and, unfortunately, also desirous far beyond her strength to help and save – those eruptions of boundless and most devoted pity which the multitude, above all the venerating multitude, does not understand and on which it lavishes inquisitive and self-satisfied interpretations. This pity deceives itself regularly about its powers; woman would like to believe that love can achieve anything – that is her characteristic faith.

BGE §269, p. 409

That women are “clairvoyant in the world of suffering” is an observation congruent with the notion that women have more experience with suffering in an oppressive society; that women desire far beyond our strength to help and save is no objection against women trying to help and save, nor is it an implication that women are necessarily weak, useless, or unhelpful. Rather it includes women with the rest of humanity whose desires often exceed our means. That our desire to act may lead us to deceive ourselves is another psychological truth about humanity. Lastly, the fact Nietzsche claims women’s characteristic faith is that love can do anything is no judgment against women, but rather can be interpreted as yet another remark about how society has constructed womanhood. Nietzsche’s final remark about women is more of a reference to the man “who is able to manage something, to carry out a resolution, to remain faithful to a thought, to hold a woman, to punish and prostrate one who has presumed too much,” in short, a man who has power in the hierarchy and who therefore has a kind of pity which is of value because it can be used to actually benefit those in need, as opposed to the pity of those who cannot help or worse (BGE §293, p. 420). Nietzsche thus distinguishes between a truer pity and a falser pity, one which helps and one which harms; the fact that he ascribes ‘unmanliness’ to the false pity (BGE §293, p. 421) can again be interpreted as a part of the social construction of gender. Thus also with Beyond
Good and Evil I see continued engagement with the problems of gender without particular malice against women qua women.

Preface to Birth of Tragedy and Human, All-Too-Human (BT P & HATH P)

From this point forward, following the flurry of comments on the feminine in Beyond Good and Evil, we see a slight decrease in the frequency of Nietzsche’s remarks on women. Nietzsche next wrote new prefaces for two of his earlier works, each of which mentions women only briefly. Birth of Tragedy makes two references to women in §3 of his preface “Attempt at a Self-Criticism”: the first, in which he describes his book as “saccharine to the point of effeminacy” (BT P §3, p. 19) and the second, in which he describes his voice as “something like a mystical, almost maenadic soul that stammered with difficulty” (BT P §3, p. 20). The contrast between these demonstrates Nietzsche’s ability to recognize both the mundane social construction of effeminacy and the mystical nature-bound feminine mythos that he regularly utilizes in his works. Nietzsche re-imagines this womanly nature-goddess at the end of a passage predicting the arc of a ripened free spirit; specifically, Nietzsche concludes that “Solitude encircles and embraces him, ever more threatening, suffocating, heart-tightening, that terrible goddess and mater saeva cupidinum – but who today knows what solitude is?...” (HATH P §3, p. 7). That each preface discusses both perspective and femininity offers further incidental support to my thesis that these two concepts are intertwined throughout Nietzsche’s work.

Towards a Genealogy of Morals (GM)

I would argue that the Genealogy has probably the most conventional narrative style out of Nietzsche’s mature works, as it contains a preface explaining the purpose of the three distinct perspectives and error” P §5, p. 23
essays each with a connected topic to the others. Further, the final section of the preface contains my preferred source for an understanding of the authorial method for reading Nietzsche: namely, exegesis and rumination (GM P §8, p. 23). Though Nietzsche comments fewer times on women in the *Genealogy* than has been his wont in previous works, there are still at least twenty-five explicit remarks concerning or involving women, mothers, maidens and even once again witches.

Further, Nietzsche explicitly states that the entire third essay, “What Is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?” is an example of the exegesis of the prefixed aphorism (GM P §8, p. 23); I emphasize here the fact that the prefixed quote is “Unconcerned, mocking, violent – thus wisdom wants us; she is a woman and always loves only a warrior” (from TSZ I §7, p. 41, though Nietzsche leaves out the first word ‘brave’). It strikes me that Nietzsche would rather write an essay about this particular quote on women from *Zarathustra* rather than the infamous whip quote, and I have no doubt that this choice is quite deliberate. For one thing, Wisdom as a goddess in his pantheon emphasized in connection to this preface to the *Genealogy* is clearly evocative of Truth as a woman in the preceding book *Beyond Good and Evil*. For another thing, by this time Nietzsche had attempted to convince Resa von Schirnhofer and other women he valued that there was no intended offense in the whip passage, as it was based on a reference to Elisabeth’s internalized misogyny, though he did not have this vocabulary to explain himself and instead referred to it as a private joke.\(^1\) Thus, as if in response to his actual or perceived respondents on the subject of his treatment of women, Nietzsche explains by way of his third essay in the *Genealogy* that understanding either his cheeky whip remark or more important remarks like Wisdom’s womanly preference for warriors requires not merely reading an aphorism *in situ* but in context and with a familiarity with the aphorist’s body of work generally, as well as rumination on the thoughts throughout that work over some time, and finally the product of said

\(^{191}\) See Gilman, p. 123-5 where Elisabeth gives her version of the events, and see Gilman, p. 151 for Resa von Schirnhofer’s account. See also Oppel, p. 151-2; Oppel provides the context of the novel by Turgenev (*First Love*), and describes Nietzsche’s feigned surprise that Elisabeth counsels men to beat women.
rumination and an art for exegesis. Nietzsche offers by way of example for such ruminatory production and exegetical art a sixty-six page, twenty-eight section essay on what is really only a single line from a two page aphorism contained in a much larger work. Notably, the bulk of his comments about women in the *Genealogy* lie within this third essay. I cannot emphasize the significance of this enough: one line about women in *Zarathustra* leads to an entire essay which makes up a full third of the *Genealogy* and in which women are mentioned in over half of the sections. For anyone to suggest that women are less than significant to Nietzsche’s work seems philologically and philosophically inappropriate.

Nietzsche only mentions women a handful of times in the first two essays of the *Genealogy*, as if to highlight his especial emphasis on women in the third essay by contrast. The first essay, “‘Good and Evil,’ ‘Good and Bad,’” remarks on women in only three sections, and the second essay, “‘Guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience,’ and the Like,” remarks on women in only four. In his just-so story on the evolution of two distinct breeds of morality, Nietzsche includes in passing a remark demonstrating his awareness that women also have different values in different moral systems; in particular, his discussion of the ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ points out that a ‘pure’ man, in addition to other things, “does not sleep with the dirty women of the lower strata,” (GM I:6, p. 32). These women contrast directly with the most pure women Nietzsche mentions also in passing twice late in the first essay: Mary, mother of Christ. First he notes that in Tertullian “the mother of Jesus” is the son of “quaestuariae,” translated as ‘carpenter’ but really meaning ‘prostitute,’ which Nietzsche takes to be a Church Father’s insult against Mary’s Judaism (GM I:5, p. 51, see fn.1, p. 50 and Kaufmann’s bracketed comment). Nietzsche repeats this insight in response to his question about “Which of them has won for the present, Rome or Judea?” answering himself that it is “three Jews, as is known, and one Jewess (Jesus of Nazareth, the fisherman Peter, the rug weaver Paul, and the mother of the aforementioned Jesus, named Mary). This is very remarkable: Rome has been defeated beyond all doubt” (GM I:16, p. 53).
The second essay includes a man’s wife one possession among many including his body, his freedom, and his life, which could be used to repay a debt (GM II:5, p. 64). Nietzsche also notes that when morality teaches disgust with our bodily existence we tend to find this teaching connected with as sense that “life itself has become repugnant” and Nietzsche recounts with horror how humanity learns to disapprove of our own so-called “repellent aspects (‘impure begetting, disgusting means of nutrition in [our] mother’s womb, baseness of the matter out of which man evolves, hideous stink, secretion of saliva, urine, and filth)” (GM II:7, p. 67). If we take this hatred of maternal physicality to be anti-woman or misogynist, then Nietzsche’s critique of moral systems which so hate maternal bodies is remarkably feminist, particularly during his mature and supposedly most virulently misogynistic period. By contrast, Nietzsche elevates artists and creators by connecting their creativity and self-justification in their work with the creativity and self-justification of “a mother in her child” (GM II:17, p. 87). Nietzsche’s last reference to women in the second essay is an additional use of the maternal metaphor and the pain of creation; by employing this metaphor, Nietzsche explains how an artist’s active bad conscience can serve and has served as “the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena” which can and has brought about “an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty itself” (GM II:18, p. 87-8).

Essay three, “What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?” opens with the quote from Zarathustra, “Unconcerned, mocking, violent – thus wisdom wants us: she is a woman and always loves only a warrior,” implying that the meaning of ascetic ideals has to do with Wisdom’s demand for our behavior – ‘us’ being presumably the readers and writers in the given aphorism. The themes in the speech from which this aphorism is taken – if indeed Nietzsche was not referring to the speech as a whole – include writing “with blood,” reading the blood of others, including idlers, and how the universalizing of reading degrades the spirit from God to human to rabble, the aphoristic writer’s desire to be learned by heart, the qualities of aphorisms (thin, pure
air, heights, mountain peaks, sarcasm, laughter, elevation), the dancing god, gaiety as opposed to gravity, running, and flight. Perhaps the most clearly relevant part of the passage immediately follows the quote Nietzsche provides:

You say to me, ‘Life is hard to bear.’ But why would you have your pride in the morning and your resignation in the evening? Life is hard to bear; but do not act so tenderly! We are all of us fair beasts of burden, male and female asses. What do we have in common with the rosebud, which trembles because a drop of dew lies on it? True, we love life, not because we are used to living but because we are used to loving. There is always some madness in love. But there is also always some reason in madness.

TSZ I §7, p. 41

This notion that there is some reason in madness points towards an explanation of the meaning of the ascetic ideal, said explanation being Nietzsche’s goal in his third essay in the *Genealogy*.

Nietzsche even provides a preview of his ultimate answer to the titular question at the end of the first aphorism in the third essay, namely, “*That* the ascetic ideal has meant so many things to humanity, however, is an expression of the basic fact of the human will, its *horror vacui: it needs a goal* – and it will rather will *nothingness* than *not* will” (GM III:1, p. 97). By including women amongst artists, philosophers and scholars, the majority of humanity, priests, and saints in his list of the multiple possible loci for meanings of the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche further signals that women will appear repeatedly throughout this essay. Indeed, women appear so often in the third essay that it would be shorter to list the aphorisms in which women do not appear, namely in 2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 20, 22, 23, and 28. For women in particular, the ascetic ideal serves “at best as one more seductive charm, a touch of *morbidezza* in fair flesh, the angelic look of a plump, pretty animal” (GM III:1, p. 97). I note that Nietzsche makes clear that this is what the ascetic ideal serves at best for women and elides what the ascetic ideal serves at worst for women, though perhaps one could argue that at worst for women the ascetic ideal serves one of the other indicated purposes, depending on whether the women in question are artists, philosophers and scholars, members of the deformed and deranged majority of humanity, priests, or saints.
Regardless, even in the case of becoming just one more seductive charm, the ascetic ideal still serves as a way to will nothingness rather than not willing at all; thus the ascetic woman, though she might seem attractive to various men because of her asceticism, is nonetheless a woman exercising her will. Nietzsche does not define these ascetic women as thralls to the male artistic, academic, literary, and religious communities in this exercise of her will, or at least no more so than the men in those communities. Such a woman appears here as remarkably independent even though Nietzsche portrays her as seen through the lens of a male predatory-type viewing her as one appealing morsel among many.

Nietzsche again revives the themes of wombs and pregnancy in connection with the artist/creator. In particular, he describes the artist as “only the precondition of his work, the womb, the soil, sometimes the dung and manure on which, out of which, it grows - and therefore in most cases something one must forget if one is to enjoy the work itself” (GM III:4, p. 100-1). Nietzsche draws an explicit parallel between the need to forget the preconditions of artwork and the need to forget the preconditions of a child; more specifically, he says that the artist can be spared the frightful aspects of creating art no more “than can a pregnant woman be spared the repellent and bizarre aspects of pregnancy – which as aforesaid, must be forgotten if one is to enjoy the child” (GM III:4, p. 101). Indeed, for all the love parents may bear their children, many readers may be able to refer to at the very least some anecdotal evidence even in our own time to see how common it is for parents, and especially pregnant mothers, to object strenuously to the “repellent and bizarre aspects of pregnancy,” such as morning sickness, increased mucous production, episiotomies, afterbirth, etc., or at least to gloss over and forget these in order to better enjoy their offspring. It may seem strange that Nietzsche seems so disgusted by the human reproductive process here, especially given his prior elevation of the body, but to my mind he is indicating common attitudes rather than referring to his own conception of and experience with pregnancy and pregnant women. It is not that pregnancy is bizarre and repellent, but rather
because society sees it to be so that such aspects must be forgotten by the individual. Arguably, in a more Nietzschean society (should such a thing even be conceivable), both creative and procreative pregnancies would be heralded as holy expressions of human embodiment rather than the disgusting reminders of our being trapped within base flesh that color human experience in a world still beholden to ascetic ideals.

Nietzsche’s next reference to women is in passing, merely a description of one of the several roles to which Nietzsche ascribes to Wagner’s early music. In contrast with later work, Wagner made his early music “a means, a medium, a ‘woman’ who required a goal, a man, in order to prosper – namely drama!” (GM III:5, p. 103). Nietzsche thus ascribes to Wagner the opinion that music needs a goal to prosper as a woman needs a man to prosper; this parallel, properly speaking, belongs to the Schopenhauerian Wagner rather than Nietzsche himself, and it seems to me that Nietzsche here tries to make this distinction clear precisely by placing Weib in scare-quotes. Nietzsche goes on to criticize the Schopenhauerian concept of beauty, inherited from Kant, that objective determinations of beauty are disinterested; in particular, Nietzsche pokes fun at the notion that “under the spell of beauty, one can even view undraped statues of women ‘without interest,’” saying “one may laugh a little at their expense: the experiences of artists on this ticklish point are more ‘interesting,’ and Pygmalion was in any event not necessarily an ‘unaesthetic man’” (GM III:6, p. 104). Schopenhauer’s move is to say specifically that aesthetic contemplation “counteracts sexual ‘interestedness’” (GM III:6, p. 104). Nietzsche argues that this indicates exactly how much personal interest Schopenhauer has in supposedly disinterested aesthetic contemplation, precisely because it expresses the viewpoint “of a tortured man who gains release from his torture” (GM III:6, p. 105-6). Nietzsche describes Schopenhauer’s relationship with sexuality as one between a man and his enemy, who regards women as a tool of the enemy as well as enemies in themselves, included with Hegel and sensuality generally (GM III:7, p. 106).
Thus for philosophers like Schopenhauer the ascetic ideal becomes part of their irritation and rancor with sensuality, and their rejection of anything which detracts from their ability to sit in contemplation. Nietzsche illustrates the pervasiveness of this sentiment by asking “What great philosopher hitherto has been married?” and noting that “as for that exception, Socrates – the malicious Socrates, it would seem, married ironically, just to demonstrate this proposition” (GM III:7, p. 107). Given the context and the brevity of the list, I see this as Nietzsche again voicing Schopenhauer’s opinions; married philosophers include not only Socrates, but also (depending on how broad your definition of ‘philosopher’ is) Aristotle, Bacon, Calvin, Cicero, Confucius, Darwin, Dostoevsky, Goethe, Hegel, Luther, Malthus, Mill, Montesquieu, Montaigne, Paine, Pascal, Rousseau, Schelling, Schiller, Strauss, and Tolstoy, just to name a few with whom Nietzsche would have been familiar. Though Nietzsche might not have described these men as all being philosophers, much less great philosophers, I suspect that Nietzsche would include Goethe among the ranks of great philosophers and thus belie the implication that Nietzsche believes that great philosophers never marry except to be ironic.

Nietzsche goes on to repeatedly emphasize the way a certain kind of philosopher avoids sensuality in the form of “fame, princes, and women” (GM III:8, p. 110) in the same way “an athlete or jockey abstains from women” (GM III:8, p. 111). Further, this abstention is again part of the creative ‘maternal’ and self-protective instinct which requires one to pay less attention to oneself as one focuses on the needs of others, whether children or ideas, and “has hitherto generally kept woman in a dependent situation” (GM III:8, p. 110), a dependence we may extend to cover philosophers. While there are several directions we can take this depiction of maternal/philosophical dependence, I do not think we need read this as a biological imperative; rather, Nietzsche demonstrates his awareness of how society values self-abnegation in the creative and procreative processes. We may also be able to draw out the implication that such self-abnegation may actually be counter-productive and foolish; after all, a mother who fails in
her self-care will be less able to care for her children, and so philosophers who fail in their self-care will be less able to care for their ideas. Nietzsche concludes this discussion by describing how aesthetic pleasure is ultimately derived from sensuality “just as the ‘idealism’ of adolescent girls derives from this source” (GM III:8, p. 111). I would argue that any perceived rancor against adolescent girls here lies within the reader; Nietzsche’s scare-quotes on ‘idealism’ to me only indicate that a teenager’s romantic idealizing is a distinct category from philosophical Idealism. Nietzsche also notes that Luther described reason as “Mistress Clever, the clever whore” (GM III:9, p. 112) before moving on to demonstrate how “every original sin has turned into an original virtue” with regards to marriage as originally being a “transgression against the rights of the community; one had to make reparation for being so immodest as to claim a woman for oneself” including *jus primae noctis* (GM III:9, p.113-4). Note that Nietzsche is not saying that women are community property, but rather that this was the common attitude before the institution of marriage made women private property.

Nietzsche additionally points out how those most interested in or indebted to an ideal are oftentimes not the best defenders of that ideal: “the ascetic priest will hardly provide the best defense of his ideal, just as a woman who tries to defend ‘woman as such’ usually fails – and he certainly will not be the most objective judge of this controversy” (GM III:11, p. 116-7). However, Nietzsche is quick to demonstrate that so-called objectivity is an overrated quality in the very next aphorism, III:12; I will return to this passage in the next chapter when I discuss perspectivism, but can note here that Nietzsche in no way devalues women or ascetic priests by saying that the most interested are the least objective. Rather, we can say that such as statement is more or less simply a truism. Likewise, when Nietzsche identifies the “sick woman” as manifesting the “will of the weak to represent some form of superiority,” (GM III:14, p. 123), he is not devaluing sick women but rather in a sense praising their expression of will to power. Though women frequently are depicted as weak even in contemporary society, and sick women
especially, Nietzsche points out that “no one can excel her in the wiles to dominate, oppress, and tyrannize. The sick woman spares nothing, living or dead; she will dig up the most deeply buried things (the Bogos say: ‘woman is a hyena’)” (GM III:14, p. 123). Thus the supposedly powerless also partake of the will to power, even when they do not recognize such a will within themselves for what it is.

People who suffer seek a cause for their suffering, particularly when the physiological source is unclear; Nietzsche makes a parenthetical remark detailing several possible outdated anatomical possibilities, including the “degeneration of the ovaries” among other things (GM III:15, p. 127). Nietzsche also describes how sufferers tear into themselves and those around them as a means for coping with their suffering, saying “they tear open their oldest wounds, they bleed from long-healed scars, they make evildoers out of their friends, wives, children, and whoever else stands closest to them” (GM III:15, p. 127-8). This inclination to not only dwell in suffering but to exacerbate it as a coping mechanism applies also to our concepts of sin and guilt, which Nietzsche describes as being interpretations of physical symptoms once again: “humanity’s ‘sinfulness’ is not a fact, but merely the interpretation of a fact, namely of physiological depression,” and as an example he suggests we “Recall the famous witch trials: the most acute and humane judges were in no doubt as to the guilt of the accused; the ‘witches’ themselves did not doubt it – and yet there was no guilt” (GM III:16, p. 129). Thus also, when an ascetic man exercises his power over himself by dictating “no women, or as little as possible” (GM III:17, p. 131), this has less to do with the actual sin or guilt of indulging in sexual congress and more to do with the beliefs and physiology of the ascetic individual.

Nietzsche continues discussing the ascetic priest with reference to how he helps or handles various kinds of sufferers; I think it is interesting and fruitful to notice that Nietzsche parenthetically includes women with “sufferers of the lower classes, with work-slaves or prisoners” because women “are mostly both at once, work-slaves and prisoners” (GM III:18, p.
This comment elucidating women’s positions in society shows remarkable sensitivity and awareness about the feminine condition in the modern Western world. Further, it parallels many of the arguments people in the United States were making in connection to the Civil War; at least a decade before the publication of the *Genealogy*, feminists and anti-feminists alike were using slavery as an admittedly flawed analogy for women’s roles in marriage throughout the nineteenth century (Cott, p. 60). Given that feminism is no monolithic structure it should come as no surprise that there has apparently always been internal criticism, though this subtlety might not be clear to outsiders or objectors; within this context, Nietzsche’s criticism of feminism as “moral mawkishness and falseness” and as an “idealism” (GM III:19, p. 137) is not necessarily a simple and straightforward devaluation of all feminism *qua* feminism, but rather *qua* its ascetic morality as emphasized by Wilhelmine feminists in nineteenth-century Germany and other Victorian-era feminists. I would argue that Nietzsche’s dismissal of “equal rights for women” (GM III:25, p. 154) and inclusion of feminism with indecency, dishonesty, mendacity, weakness, and cowardice (GM III:27, p. 161) apply to this Wilhelmine feminism specifically rather than feminism broadly. I point out here also that the notion of ‘equality’ is now rejected by many contemporary feminists on the grounds that women seek power in the political arena rather than mere equality, and that ultimately equity rather than equality should be our goal.

The last two remaining remarks on women from the *Genealogy* are one more reference to witch hunts and a comment including Philosophy with Truth as one of Nietzsche’s feminine pantheon. First note that Nietzsche criticizes the ascetic priests’ ‘medication’ for the people in those cases where it makes the sufferer sicker; as one example among many, Nietzsche lists “the witch-hunt hysteria” as a symptom of those medicines which make the people more ill (GM III:21, p. 142). Finally, Nietzsche points out that science must come from philosophy and not vice

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192 I never yet have heard the phrase “the feminine condition” used; I mean here to indicate a particular subset of the human condition applying to women particularly by virtue of their self-identification or position in society as women.
versa, and that “Whoever has the opposite notion, whoever tries, for example, to place philosophy
‘on a strictly scientific basis,’ first needs to stand not only philosophy but truth itself on its head –
the grossest violation of decency possible in relation to two such venerable ladies” (GM III:24, p.
152). Nietzsche will continue with this theme of turning truth upside-down as a demonstration of
bad taste in his later works.

Prefaces to Daybreak and Gay Science and Book V of Gay Science (D P, GS P, and GS V)

The prefaces to Daybreak and Gay Science each contain a few remarks on women in
sections 3 and 4 in both works, though the bulk of this subsection will be devoted to the fifth
book of Gay Science. In the preface to Daybreak, Nietzsche first identifies morality as “the
greatest of all mistress of seduction – and, so far as we philosophers are concerned, the actual
Circe of the philosophers” (D P §3, p. 2). Recall that Circe transformed Odysseus’s men into
pigs; we might therefore conclude that the enchantress, morality, turns philosophers into
metaphorical pigs as well, perhaps in the sense that they build nothing that can make the
foundations of our philosophy more firm or less treacherous (D P §3, p. 3). Thus the moralist and
especially the moral idealist works not only in bad taste but is actually counterproductive to her
own goals; this same judgment applies to feminists who are moral idealists. By Nietzsche’s light,
most feminists are idealists who are antithetical to good taste more generally and to art more
specifically; Nietzsche includes himself with the artists who are “hostile, in short, to the whole of
European feminism (or idealism, if you prefer that word), which is [sic] for ever ‘drawing us
upward’ and precisely thereby for ever ‘bringing us down’” (D P §4, p. 4-5). It strikes me that
this remark intentionally recalls BGE §236 and the notion that the eternal feminine draws nobler
men ‘higher’ just as the eternal masculine does for nobler women. Given this recollection, I
suspect that Nietzsche here could intend the implication that feminist idealism falls short of the
eternal feminine, but I feel a more accurate interpretation based on his criticism of the concept of the eternal feminine would rather state that the reason feminist idealism fails is precisely because it utilizes the concept of the eternal feminine in just the way Nietzsche criticizes: as an essentialist framework for womanhood. Thus nineteenth century feminism brings us down because it uncritically accepts essentialism about femininity.

The preface to *Gay Science* revives the parallel between mothers and creators, including not only artists but also philosophers: “We are not thinking frogs, nor objectifying and registering mechanisms with their innards removed: constantly, we have to give birth to our thoughts out of our pain and, like mothers, endow them with all we have of blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, and catastrophe” (GS P §3, p. 35-6). Nietzsche continues with the theme of pain throughout this section, concluding that it does not necessarily make us “gloomy” for “Even love of life is still possible, only one loves differently. It is the love for a woman that causes doubts in us” (GS P §3, p. 37); the ‘woman’ in question here must be Life herself because of this close juxtaposition. Though life wounds us, this causes us not to love her less but to love her differently and more profoundly by Nietzsche’s estimation.

Because of this profundity, Nietzsche is no longer convinced that “truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn” and indeed that withdrawing all veils is a sign of bad taste and indecency; Nietzsche conveys this attitude through a perhaps fictional anecdote accompanied by a reference to Demeter’s search for her daughter:

> “Is it true that God is present everywhere?” a little girl asked her mother; “I think that’s indecent” – a hint for philosophers! One should have more respect for the bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her name is – to speak Greek – *Baubo*?

GS P §4, p. 38
The initial anecdote wherein the mother calls God’s omnipresence indecent implies to me that an omnipredicate God is not only present in public and everywhere generally but also in private places, which makes God out to be a kind of peeping Tom. The hint for philosophers then is that snooping for the sake of snooping is not doing philosophy in good taste. Baubo, however, presents a more difficult interpretive task: according to Kaufmann, she is a “primitive and obscene female demon” who was “originally a personification of the female genitals” (GS P §4, fn. 8, p. 38). Perhaps more accurately, we can say Baubo is a minor goddess associated with the vulva and reproduction. In the mythos surrounding the Eleusinian mysteries, Demeter seeks her daughter Persephone, whom Hades has raped and kidnapped; Demeter neither bathes, nor eats, nor drinks in her grief-stricken search for her daughter. However, by lifting her own skirts and inappropriately revealing her genitals (or perhaps a drawn figure on her belly), Baubo is able to shock Demeter into laughing. Thus Truth, who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons, conceals and reveals herself not only to enlighten us, but also to shock and even sometimes amuse us.

Book V of *Gay Science* adds another ten aphorisms which refer to women, and the afterword includes four poems which refer to women as well. Nietzsche opens the fifth book with an aphorism explaining the death of God, followed by a description of how free spirits and philosophers of Nietzsche’s stripe are still ‘pious,’ and then turns to a treatment of morality as a ‘problem,’ wherein the first reference to women appears. Nietzsche makes the claim that “All great problems demand great love,” explaining that those who approach great problems with disinterested and weak personalities will find it impossible to properly grasp such problems because great problems anthropomorphically find it distasteful to be held by “frogs and weaklings,” to which Nietzsche adds “a taste, incidentally, that they share with all redoubtable women” (GS §345, p. 283), thus including Great Problems in his pantheon of goddesses. These redoubtable or formidable women contrast with the women at the end of this section: Nietzsche
comments that medicine works for a person regardless “of whether he thinks about medicine scientifically or the way old women do” (GS §345, p. 285). Though we might initially think that ‘the way old women’ think about medicine, when opposed to thinking ‘scientifically’ about medicine, sets ‘bad’ thought in opposition to ‘good’ thought, but given Nietzsche’s harsh critique of science and his repeated rejection of dualisms I do not think this is his intention. Rather, these two types of thought appear as an abbreviated but not mutually exclusive listing of ways people can think; the superstitions of scientists do not necessarily exclude the superstitions of old women, nor are they necessarily any better. Nietzsche’s point is that the value of medicine to the sick does not depend on our belief system, and more broadly that the value of moral commands is similarly independent of our ability to understand or critique the grounds of those commands.

After a long gap, Nietzsche returns to women in a passage discussing the problem of what it is to be German and whether philosophers from Germany can be described properly as ‘German.’ Nietzsche argues in particular that Schopenhauer need not be German in order to pose the problem of the value of existence independently of God’s existence, because “the decline of the faith in the Christian god, the triumph of scientific atheism, is a generally European event in which all races had their share and for which all deserve credit and honor” (GS §357, p. 306), and because atheism is the natural outgrowth of a religion which worshiped truth and ultimately had to forbid itself “the lie in faith in God” (GS §357, p. 307). It is this self-undermining morality that Nietzsche claims Europeans now feel is “mendaciousness, feminism, weakness, and cowardice,” and he takes the shift in public opinion on religious faith as a mark of a ‘good European’s’ severity and inheritance in “Europe’s longest and most courageous self-overcoming” (GS §357, p. 307). Nietzsche implies that associating Christian morality with ‘feminism’ and ‘weakness’ is not necessarily an accurate description but merely the general attitude of his contemporaries; the fact that he separates himself from this claim in this way allows him to use the derogatory language of his peers without necessarily accepting their beliefs. So also, when he refers to
“dilettantes and old spinsters [such] as that mawkish apostle of virginity, Mainländer” (GS §357, p. 309), he might appear to be using femininity as an insult. However, it occurs to me that the appearance of insult may be a result of internalized misogyny; the problem for Nietzsche is not that his target is a spinster but rather that he is ‘mawkish’ or feebly sentimental.

The next passage discusses the “peasant rebellion of the spirit” (GS §358, p. 310) primarily in terms of Luther’s revolt against the aristocratic Church of his time:

> He gave back to the priest sexual intercourse with woman; but three quarters of the reverence of which the common people, especially the women among the common people, are capable, rests on the faith that a person who is an exception at this point will be an exception in other respects as well; it is here that the popular faith in something superhuman in man, in the miracle, in the redeeming god in man, finds its subtlest and most insidious advocate. Luther, having given the priest woman, had to take away from him auricular confession; that was right psychologically.

GS §358, p. 311-2

We might ask why Nietzsche remarks that it is “especially the women among the common people” whose faith rests on a priest’s ability to abstain from sex with women, more so than for the men among the common people; given Nietzsche’s earlier remarks about how women are trained to abhor sex with men (see, for example, GS §71), I believe the best explanation for why common women more than common men base their faith largely on priestly chastity is precisely because so many women know men to be brutes in sexual conquest, especially in the lower classes as contrasted with an aristocratic woman’s learned ignorance concerning sex. Given also that the lower classes frequently tend to emulate the upper classes, we might also suspect that common women learn the same kind of pretend ignorance as well.

Nietzsche appears to be highly aware of the ways in which society teaches women to put on pretenses. In his section on “the problem of the actor” (GS §361, p. 316), Nietzsche concludes by noting that if one were to consider “the whole history of women” one must ask “do they not have to be first of all and above all else actresses?” a question answerable at least in part by
listening to the “physicians who have hypnotized women” (GS §361, p. 317). Thus, when Nietzsche concludes with the pun that women “put on something” even when they take off everything,” we need not read this as mere low-brow humor as Kaufmann indicates (GS §361, p. 317, see also fn. 93), but rather a somewhat sophisticated understanding of how society forces women to perform their gender artificially. Hence, Nietzsche’s conclusion that “Woman is so artistic” (GS §361, p. 317) is not a statement about the inherent essence of femininity but rather a statement about the social construction of femininity in the modern world.

Nietzsche also addresses the free spirits’ “faith that Europe will become more virile” in the sense of Napoleon’s dream: “one unified Europe, as is known – as mistress of the earth,” and even now Nietzsche credits Napoleon “for the fact that in Europe the man has again become master over the businessman and the philistine – and perhaps even over ‘woman’ who has been pampered by Christianity and the enthusiastic spirit of the eighteenth century, and even more by ‘modern ideas’” (GS §362, p. 318). It would be all too easy to read this passage as the valuation of the masculine over the feminine and the glorification of ‘virility,’ Vermännlichung, the masculinization of Europe. It is not only the ease of this interpretation but also the games Nietzsche is playing with words and language here that indicates to me that the interpretation of this passage cannot be so straightforward. For one thing, despite the emphasis on virility, mastery, and ‘man,’ Nietzsche still genders Europe as a female entity as is often the convention with continents and countries; it strikes me here that Nietzsche does not describe Europe as a potential mistress of the world without doing so as an intentional contrast with the masculine themes above. For another, Nietzsche does not say that men will be master over women, but rather that ‘the man’ will be master over ‘woman’ in scare-quotes; thus we may read Nietzsche as saying that the free spirit has faith that a certain kind of masculinity, as defined by past social conventions, is now on the rise over a certain kind of femininity, also as defined by past social conventions and which had itself been preceded by the dominance of another kind of masculinity
once again. This is less an advocation of masculine superiority and more an observation about a shift in European mores from the Napoleonic and warlike masculinity to the Renaissance and its artistic femininity, and then further to another warlike era afterwards. In this prediction, that Europe would be entering another masculine era of war, Nietzsche demonstrates chilling prescience.

Thus Nietzsche shows a reactionary seesaw between more masculine and more feminine eras of Europe; Nietzsche next demonstrates how this tug-of-war between gendered sensibilities also plays out in love and romantic relationships, especially in monogamous marriage. Specifically, Nietzsche speaks about how the genders each have different prejudices about love, and early states “I will never admit the claim that man and woman have equal [gleichen] rights in love; these do not exist. For man and woman have different conceptions of love” (GS §363, p. 318-9). While I could spend some time explaining the difference between equity and equality here, I think it will suffice for now to state that Nietzsche here is pointing out an important though perhaps apparently tautological fact about the nature of mutual endeavors, romantic or otherwise: that when two people have different concepts of any mutual goal, activity, or relationship, they will not discuss or think about the same concept and so will not have the same expectations or desires for that end, most especially not the same expectations of rights and responsibilities with regards to that end.

Nietzsche again repeatedly uses the more abstract singular of ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ thus signaling that he is again referring to the constructions of each gender rather than specific men and women or actual men and women more generally; thus claims like “Woman gives herself away, man acquires more” for the duration of this passage (GS §363, p. 319) are explications of our social training more than they are pronouncements on biological predispositions. Nietzsche also again makes use of the parallels that nineteenth century feminists were drawing between slavery and marriage: “A man who loves like a woman becomes a slave; while a woman who
loves like a woman becomes *a more perfect woman*” (GS §363, p. 319). In the end, I think Nietzsche offers a concise explanation of how and why romantic love often evanesces: men are taught to take and women are taught to give, when mutual beneficence requires both that everyone be taking and that everyone be giving.

Following two brief speeches by the ‘hermit’ and a distinction regarding art, Nietzsche lets the ‘cynic’ within himself speak, and the cynic objects strenuously to Wagner, and most especially to the way Wagner’s art fails to speak to higher types and instead to the “common people, audience, herd, woman, pharisee [sic], voting cattle, democrat, neighbor, fellow human” and the leveling of good taste (GS §368, p. 326). That *Weib* is singled out and singular again indicates Nietzsche’s reference to common conceptual femininity. We can have a fruitful discussion about whether elitism of pursuit of basic commonalities is more feminist, but I think that such a discussion should be careful to avoid the no true Scotsman fallacy. Both individuation and community have important roles for contemporary feminists, but I do not think it is troubling to assert that common femininity belongs with other common aspects of humanity.

Following a long gap, Nietzsche again discusses his artistic “motherly human type” (GS §376, p. 337); and then offers a passage wherein he describes himself as one of many ‘homeless’ Europeans whom “the hysterical little males and females” would like to convert to a “religion of pity” (GS §377, p. 338-9). Indeed, Nietzsche rejects humanity as an animal: “Has there ever been a more hideous old woman among all old women – (unless it were ‘truth’: a question for philosophers)?” (GS §377, p. 339). Thus for all his veneration of the feminine anthropomorphizations in his pantheon, Nietzsche does not necessarily view these goddesses as beautiful young creatures, at least not in all their aspects; furthermore, while “Humanity” may be another such idol, she does not belong in Nietzsche’s Olympus. Nietzsche goes on to explain his lack of love for humanity as a whole in a passage that could give hope for interpreting his various racialized comments:
No, we do not love humanity; but on the other hand we are not nearly “German” enough, in the sense in which the word “German” is constantly being used nowadays, to advocate nationalism and race hatred and to be able to take pleasure in the national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning that now leads the nations of Europe to delimit and barricade themselves against each other as if it were a matter of quarantine.

GS §377, p. 339

Nietzsche’s rejection of common humanity is thus tied to his rejection of the commonness and pettiness of German volkish attitudes, and though not stated explicitly here a rejection of the rising anti-Semitism that ultimately lead to World War II. Nietzsche has no love for the “asses and old maids of both sexes” who have nothing to individuate them and who wallow in sentimentality (GS §381, p. 345) and it is clear to him that this type makes up the majority of humanity.

The remaining four passages referring to women all occur in his Appendix, “Songs of Prince Vogelfrei.” The first again describes Truth as less than beautiful: “I loved a creepy ancient belle: The name of this old hag was Truth” (GS A §3, p. 357). The second reference apparently presented Kaufmann with a translation challenge, resulting in him rhyming “God loves a lassy”/ “Gott liebt die Weibchen” at the beginning of “Pious Beppa” with “When I am old and gassy”/ “Als altes Wackelweibchen” at the end (GS A §4, p. 357 and 359). This poem describes God loving “pretty maids,” a direct contrast with the “old hag” Truth; so also Nietzsche’s description in “Rimus remedium” of the “speichelflüssige Hexe Zeit,” the witch Time as a “drooling ghoul” (GS A §10, p. 365) and a disdainful “whore”/ “Dirn’” (GS A §10, p. 367) again present a less than flattering description of the goddesses by whom Nietzsche feels alternately blessed, controlled, or damned. However, even great suffering does not deter Nietzsche from worship, and he sings “Let us dance like troubadours, between holy men and whores [Huren], between god and world beneath!” (GS A §14, p. 375).
Despite the brevity of this piece, Nietzsche manages to work in multiple references to women; the primary source of these references includes the cast of women and heroines from Wagner’s operas, as well as cast members from other operas, such as *Carmen*. These named women include the titular Carmen, as well as Senta, Kundry, Isolde, Brunhilde, the Valkyries, Madame Bovary, Circe, the Queen of Sheba, and the goddesses Erda and Venus, though Nietzsche remarks largely concern the natures of the author-composers rather than the women about whom they write and compose. This is to be expected, given that this essay in particular concerns Nietzsche’s ‘recovery’ from Wagner and his criticism of the self-same composer.

Nietzsche explicitly rejects the sentimentality of “a ‘higher virgin’” found in Wagner’s pieces (CW §2, p. 614) in favor of Bizet’s representation of love as war and hatred between the sexes as a more rarified and philosophical conception of love (CW §2, p. 615). He lists at length Wagner’s attempts to use marriage and love to “redeem” his characters: whether innocence redeeming “interesting sinners,” marriage redeeming the mythical Wandering Jew, “corrupted females” redeemed by “chaste youths,” beautiful maidens or married women redeemed by Wagnerian knights, or even “the old God” redeemed by “a free spirit and immoralist” (CW §3, p. 616). Nietzsche challenges not only the truth but also the desirability of Wagner’s preached doctrines, in particular the kernel of the doctrine of the Eternal Feminine: “that woman makes even the most restless man stable” (CW §3, p. 617). If it were true, it would entail that a romantically entangled culture hero like the Wandering Jew no longer fulfills his mytho-poetic role when he is adored and made ‘stable’ by a woman: “He merely ceases to be eternal; he gets married, he is of no further concern to us” (CW §3, p. 617). Thus if Wagner were correct about women, then “adoring women” would confront artists and geniuses with the danger of “corruption,” specifically that “soon they condescend to the level of the women,” and furthermore – if Wagner were correct about his doctrine on the Eternal Feminine – then it would have to be
the case that “Man is a coward, confronted with the Eternal-Feminine – and the women know it” as demonstrated by famous representations of feminine love as “merely a more refined form of parasitism” (CW §3, p. 617). Thus Nietzsche subtly criticizes the notion of the Eternal Feminine while painting its worst representations as Wagner’s idealized understanding of femininity and feminine love.

Nietzsche offers a brief history of Goethe “in moralone-sour, old maidish Germany” in contrast to Wagner’s current fate; Goethe so offended German tastes and made “higher virgins” indignant with the Venetian Epigrams that “he had honest admirers only among Jewesses” (CW §3, p. 617-8). Nietzsche’s tone fills with disgust as he describes how Wagner “redeems” Goethe by luring him to perfection with a “higher virgin” (CW §3, p. 618), and he concludes this section with a philosophical epilogue by noting how holiness is “perhaps the last thing the people and women still get to see of the higher values, the horizon of the ideal for all who are by nature myopic” (CW §3, p. 618-9). Though Nietzsche’s language is generalized here, I believe that given his previous works we can specify that it is common people, including common women, who are by nature of their positions and roles in society “myopic” and unlikely to see higher values beyond holiness.

Nietzsche then goes on to recount Wagner’s Ring Cycle, wherein he characterizes Wagner’s “main enterprise” as the aim “to emancipate woman – ‘to redeem Brunhilde’” through Siegfried and “the sacrament of free love,” but in the end “everything goes wrong, everything perishes, the new world is as bad as the old: the nothing, the Indian Circe beckons” (CW §4, p. 619-20). Nietzsche explains that Wagner’s course changed from the twilight of the gods towards a land of lotus-eaters when his ship struck the reef of Schopenhauer’s philosophy; thus Brunhilde’s intended end changes as well: “She has to study Schopenhauer first; she has to transpose the fourth book of The World as Will and Representation into verse. Wagner was redeemed” (CW §4, p. 620). Thus Wagner’s success “with nerves and consequently women” is a
symptom of both his own and Schopenhauer’s decadence (CW §5, p. 622), it being understood once again that the association between women and ‘nerves’ is a matter of the construction of femininity based on the concept of the Eternal Feminine. Nietzsche’s derision of the harmful concept of the Eternal Feminine appears again when he lists those who buy into the concept along with others he has no taste for: “the culture crétins, the petty snobs, the eternally feminine, those with a happy digestion, in sum the people” (CW §6, p. 623).

Nietzsche also recounts how far Wagner’s attempts to ‘emancipate’ woman extend, so far that “He emancipates the oldest woman of the world, Erda: ‘Come up, old grandmother! You have to sing!’” (CW §9, p. 631). Once Wagner’s purposes are fulfilled, he immediately “abolishes the old lady again,” and returns to one of his other heroines (CW §9, p. 631). Thus it appears that the reason Nietzsche continues to mock Wagner’s ‘emancipation’ of women is that like so many false emancipators, Wagner only frees his female characters for the purpose of using them for his own benefit, towards his own ends and regardless of theirs. Nietzsche objects to Wagner’s use of “Music as Circe,” a sedative he describes as Wagner’s mastery of “all the feminisms from the idioticon of happiness” brought to the people in the shape of “Magic maidens” (CW PS1, p. 639-40). In other words, Wagner uses the most restrictive notions of womanhood from an oversimplified idiom to seduce his audience into hating knowledge.

Nietzsche lambastes Wagner’s effect, saying he “is bad for youths; he is calamitous for women” in such a way that “a doctor can’t confront young women too seriously with this” Wagnerian false redemption; ultimately “Woman impoverishes herself for the benefit of the master” at the same time that Wagner “robs our women and drags them into his den” (CW PS1, p. 641). Nietzsche bemoans the loss of “the most beautiful maidens and youths” every year in trains to the old “Minotaur” in Bayreuth (CW PS1, p. 641), and notes how Wagner takes advantage of “a certain type of dissatisfied woman” (CW PS2, p. 643). Only two remarks on women remain in this piece: Nietzsche’s decision to ignore “the clever apes of Wagner” including the author of
Queen of Sheba (CW PS2, p. 644), and lastly the claim that in his old age, Wagner had definitely become a kind of “feminini generis” or feminine type, especially a Christian feminine type (CW E, p. 647). I emphasize the last remark as a further indication that Nietzsche rejects biological essentialism and sees the potentiality for masculinity and femininity, whether good or bad types of each, in humans of all sexes and genders.

Twilight of the Idols (TI)

The last three texts to be published during Nietzsche’s lifetime were published after his descent into madness though along with the posthumously published Ecce Homo, they were all written before January 1889. Nietzsche’s commentators frequently cite especially Twilight, Antichrist, and Ecce Homo as containing his most vicious barbs against women. Twilight of the Idols contains the most remarks about women out of all four of Nietzsche’s final four published works, each of which returns to various themes we have already explored, including the Eternal Feminine, artistry, truth, profundity versus superficiality, the witch hysteria, revenge, sensuality, morals, commonality, and sentimentality. Nietzsche includes six “Maxims and Arrows” which reference women; the first of these states that “Man has created woman – out of what? Out of a rib of his god – of his ‘ideal’” (TI I:13, p. 468), thus establishing consistency with his previous works. In particular, the notion expressed herein that society, and men in particular, have created the concept of femininity and especially the Eternal Feminine maintains Nietzsche’s previous rejection of gender essentialism in favor of a socially constructed concept of gender.

Nietzsche’s next maxim or arrow is “Among women: ‘Truth? Oh, you don’t know truth! Is it not an attempt to assassinate all our pudeurs?’” (TI I:16, p. 468), and refers back to the theme that truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons, that an objective God is in a sense indecent for seeing everything everywhere at every time. Following this we have a depiction of a ‘perfect’ woman who “perpetrates literature” as a sin, “as an experiment, in
passing, looking around to see if anybody notices it – and to make sure that somebody does” (TI I:20, p. 469), and given the early signal that man has created the ideal of womanhood I believe Nietzsche uses ‘perfect’ here to again refer to the construction of the Eternal Feminine.

This further seems to be the case in the remaining three arrows or maxims: first, one stating that contentment protects against colds with the questionably witty question and assumption, “Has a woman who knew herself to be well dressed ever caught cold? I am assuming that she was barely dressed” (TI I:25, p. 470). Second, one stating that “one considers woman profound” with the question and answer “Why? Because one never fathoms her depths. Woman is not even shallow” (TI I:27, p. 470). Third, one stating that “If a woman has manly virtues, one feels like running away; and if she has no manly virtues, she herself runs away” (TI I:28, p. 470). Each of these responses is a comment on how men and women respond to internalizing the concept of the Eternal Feminine: women learn to objectify themselves; men and women both believe in the incommunicability and mysteriousness of femininity and the feminine experience; and men are repulsed by the presence of masculine qualities in women just as women learn to think of femininity as flightiness. Note also how Nietzsche interjects a genderless aphorism between the first and second of these: “I mistrust all systemizers and I avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity” (TI I:26, p. 470). Given how Nietzsche lobs this remark betwixt projectiles concerning gender, I believe it must be intended to reject both the misogynists of his day and the Wilhelmine feminists because both parties were indebted to certain systemic beliefs about women. In particular, I suggest these systemic beliefs were essentialist doctrines and false dualities between men and women.

Nietzsche does not comment on women again until he begins discussing “Reason” in philosophy, a concept he anthropomorphizes as another woman in his pantheon: “‘Reason’ in language – oh, what an old deceptive woman she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God because we

193 I have retranslated this to reflect Nietzsche’s use of the singular das Weib instead of the plural die Weiber.
still have faith in grammar” (TI III:5, p. 483). Nietzsche is no misologist, but he also sees that reason, logic, syntax and grammar all have limited use, but especially as philosophers we tend to overemphasize their prominence. Nietzsche also returns to the theme of the problematically ‘mysterious’ femininity when he recounts the “History of an Error”: “2. The true world-unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man (‘for the sinner who repents’). (Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible – it becomes woman, it becomes Christian)” (TI IV, p. 485). Nietzsche appears to intend to indicate that in a world which has constructed women as prizes to be won, we at one point characterized truth as something mysterious and out of reach unless one underwent trials and tribulations, much the way many men still characterize their interactions with women as conquests for ‘prizes’ they receive by achieving masculine ideality.

In “The Four Great Errors,” Nietzsche discusses how we tend psychologically to prefer any explanation as better than no explanation, and furthermore how depending on our type we tend to incline to one explanation over others, “as simply precluding other causes and explanations. The banker immediately thinks of ‘business,’ the Christian of ‘sin,’ and the girl of her love” (TI VI:5, p. 497-8). However, most frequently these causes have very little to do with the effects in question; unfortunately, we have a tendency to assign these imaginary causes with malice and fear: “They are produced by beings that are hostile to us (evil spirits: the most famous case – the misunderstanding of the hysterical as witches)” (TI VI:6, p. 498). Though Nietzsche’s description of women who are mentally ill or dissatisfied with society as ‘hysterical’ is now outdated, I believe the term was psychologically accurate at the time;194 either way, Nietzsche is certainly right to point out that even women falsely accused of evil or witchcraft may still buy into that accusation through internalized misogyny or the madness of crowds.

Nietzsche also rejects many of the “improvers” of humanity and their false or bad moralities. Nietzsche discusses in particular the case of “so-called morality, the case of breeding a particular race and kind” as “furnished by Indian morality, sanctioned as religion in the form of ‘the law of Manu’” (TI VII:3, p. 503). Unlike Christians who struggle with the difference between humanity and animality, the laws of Manu indicate a struggle with the difference between the civilized human and “their counter-concept, the unbred human, the mish-mash human, the chandala” and their effort to weaken and sicken such people (TI VII:3, p. 503). In particular, Nietzsche recounts the prohibition against Sudra women assisting chandala women in childbirth and the further prohibition against chandala women assisting each other (TI VII:3, p. 504). As a consequence of the policing of racial sanitation, Nietzsche asserts the following evils arose: “murderous epidemics, ghastly venereal diseases,” and “the law of the knife” or circumcision of male and female children, as well as “adultery, incest, and crime” (TI VII:3, p. 504). Nietzsche’s statement that “we learn that the concept of ‘pure blood’ is the opposite of a harmless concept” (TI VII:4, p. 504) is unequivocal.

The remaining thirteen aphorisms on women in Twilight all populate “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man.” Nietzsche includes among his “impossible ones” the composer Franz Liszt “or the school of smoothness – with women” and the authoress “George Sand: Or lactea ubertas – in translation, the milk cow with ‘a beautiful style’” (TI IX:1, p. 513). Each of these creators represents some struggle or skirmish for Nietzsche, whether of taste or some other issue. Nietzsche describes Sainte Beauve as “a woman at bottom, with a woman’s lust for revenge and a woman’s sensuality,” related to Rousseau’s ressentiment, “Poet and half-woman enough to sense the great as a power; always writhing like the famous worm because he always feels stepped on” (TI IX:3, p. 514). Nietzsche finds the pretense inherent in the Eternal Feminine objectionable, whether emulated by man or woman; thus Nietzsche also rejects De imitatione Christi because “it exudes a perfume of the Eternal-Feminine” as much as Sainte Beuve and other “little moralisitic
females à la Eliot” (TI IX:4-5, p. 515). Similarly, Nietzsche rejects the pretension inherent in “the female’s coquetry with male attributes” in Sand’s work (TI IX:6, p. 516).

Nietzsche characterizes Plato as a “Another queer saint!” (TI IX:23, p. 528) because of his intense sensuality and appreciation for the beautiful young men of Athens; to modern eyes who associate sensuality with femininity, however, reading Plato allows one to look everywhere “for the amatory, the senses, the sexual contest, ‘the woman’ – one will never look in vain” (TI IX:23, p. 529). Nietzsche returns to the notion that the ancient world considered beauty the province of young men rather than young women later when he states that Cicero “expresses his surprise about this” that “the men and youths were far superior in beauty to the women” (TI IX:47, p. 552). Nietzsche again recalls the contemporary construction of femininity as a contrast with historical constructions of femininity with a picture of the ‘literary woman’ who is “vain enough and goose enough to speak secretly with herself in French” even when she is “educated enough to understand the voice of nature even when it speaks Latin” (TI IX:27, p. 531), and again when he describes contemporary virtue as “‘cowardice’ perhaps, ‘wretchedness,’ ‘old ladies’ morality’” (TI IX:37, p. 539).

Nietzsche strongly rejects the motley crowd filled indiscriminately with the desire for the “contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen, and other democrats” (TI IX:38, p. 542), and just as strongly rejects the notion that institutional marriage can be founded on love; instead, he states that institutional marriage “can be founded on the sex drive, on the property drive (wife and child as property), on the drive to dominate” etc. (TI IX:39, p. 544). This is not to say that married persons cannot be in love, but rather that institutional marriage as we know it has very little if anything to do with love, and has historically at least in part required treating women and children as property. In such a context, it makes sense to say that “A woman who loves, sacrifices her honor; a knower who ‘loves’ may

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195 The adjective is wunderlicher, which I do not believe has the same connotations ‘queer’ does to LGBTQ people today.
perhaps sacrifice his humanity; a God who loved because a Jew” (TI IX:46, p. 551) because in each case the individual in question must sacrifice themselves or that part of them which makes them who they are. Women lose their identity as persons and become property; knowers lose their identity as perspectival beings and become objective; and God loses his identity as omnipredicate to become a limited human being. Lastly, Nietzsche again associates ‘feminism’ with ‘hypersentimentality’ on the basis of the social construction (TI IX:50, p. 555).

*The Antichrist(ian)* (A)

*The Antichrist*, a title which might be better translated as *The Antichristian*, contains only nine aphorisms which refer to women out of the total of sixty-two. Again Nietzsche refers to the sentimentality of “little women” found in “great enthusiasts and prodigies” (A §12, p. 578). However, the majority of the references to women contained herein explore the ways religion controls men and women on the basis of gender constructions and restrictions. Nietzsche also notes how religion uses sexuality to arouse spiritual excitement: “To excite the ardor of the women, a beautiful saint must be placed in the foreground, and to excite that of the men, a Mary” (A §23, p. 591). Nietzsche briefly discusses religious restrictions to not divorce one’s wife “under any circumstances, not even if [one’s] wife has been proved unfaithful” (A §33, p. 607).

Then Nietzsche turns to the Christian conception of the feminine and Eve’s role in creation: “God’s *first* mistake: man did not find the animals entertaining; he ruled over them, he did not even want to be animal” and therefore “God created woman. And indeed, that was the end of boredom – but of other things too! Woman was God’s *second* mistake” (A §48, p. 628). Just as Christianity conceptualizes humanity as separate from and better than animality, which is the part of creation which causes us humans to err, so does Christianity conceptualize masculinity as separate from and better than femininity, which is the part of creation which causes men to err. Thus every priest knows that “Woman is by nature a snake” and that “from woman comes all
calamity in the world” as well as knowledge and consequently science because it was “only from
woman did man learn to taste of the tree of knowledge” (A §48, p. 628-9). In turn for this sin, the
priestly type “invents distress, death, the mortal danger of pregnancy, every kind of misery, old
age, trouble, and, above all, sickness – all means in the fight against science” (A §48, p. 629).

This lying priestly type thus teaches falsehood as virtue and impresses most strongly
these virtues upon the most vulnerable in our society: “one should observe hysterical women and
children with a tendency to rickets to see how regularly instinctive falseness, the inclination to lie
in order to lie, and the incapacity for straight glances and steps are the expression of decadence”
because by definition “‘Faith’ means not wanting to know what is true” (A §52, p. 635).
Christianity teaches “all idiots, woman and the people included, that there must be something to a
cause for which someone goes to his death” and has been so successful in this doctrine that “Even
today woman lies on her knees before an error because she has been told that somebody dies on
the cross for it” (A §53, p. 637). Thus women are taught to be sick and weak in every respect.

Nietzsche describes those trained to such weakness of will as eventually finding it
necessary to find “something regulatory, which will bind them from without and tie them down;
how compulsion, slavery in a higher sense, is the sole and ultimate condition under which the
more weak-willed human being, woman in particular, can prosper,” and states that understanding
this necessity allows one to better understand faith (A §54, p. 639): in other words, faith teaches
us to be weak, and then we discover that because of this weakness of will we must now enslave
ourselves to the binds of faith afterwards. Nietzsche objects repeatedly to the way Christianity has
vented “its unfathomable meanness” on so many things, including “procreation, for example,
woman, marriage” in contrast with the Law of Manu (A §56, p. 542). Nietzsche lambasts St.
Paul’s “vile dictum” that “to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every
woman have her own husband” and the fact that people take the book containing such malice and
dirting of human origins and place it “in the hands of children and women” (A §56, p. 542).
On the other hand, Nietzsche describes the Law of Manu as having much more “tender and gracious things” to say about women in a courteous way, namely on the purity of “The mouth of a woman” as well as “the bosom of a girl,” and her breath, and her whole body (A §56, p. 643). Nietzsche describes Christian femininity in contrast as “cowardly” and “saccharine,” in such a way as to imply that it falls far short of ancient “subterranean cults of all kinds,” including those who worshiped “the Great Mother” (A §58, p. 649). Though we might object to the valorization of womanhood when it is ‘pure’ as equally problematic as the devaluation of womanhood when it is ‘sinful,’ Nietzsche’s inclination to find religious doctrines which call women inherently good more palatable than religious doctrines which call women inherently evil does suit my own tastes better than it would reversed, as does his preference for a more robust femininity found in ancient goddess worship over the saccharine femininity of Christian Mary-worship.

“Nietzsche contra Wagner” (NCW)

This brief essay only contains seven references to women; as each of these is simply a revision of earlier published passages, I will skip reviewing them again.

_Ecce Homo_ (EH)

Nietzsche’s final book largely comments on his body of work and his own understanding of himself, and contains thirteen more passages which remark on women, including the many women who affected him throughout his life. Nietzsche opens the first chapter, “Why I Am So Wise,” with the riddle that he is “already dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living and becoming old,” or in other words he is both decadent from the highest rung “on the ladder of life” and beginning to climb up from the lowest rung simultaneously (EH I:1, p. 678). This is perhaps the kindest thing he has to say about his mother in all of _Ecce Homo_. Nietzsche
additionally says that his mother “is at any rate something very German; ditto, my grandmother on my Father’s side” who spent her youth in Weimar and was connected to Goethe’s circle by way of her mother, Nietzsche’s great-grandmother, who “is mentioned in the diary of the young Goethe” (EH I:3, p. 681-2). Thus Nietzsche connects himself to one of his greatest influences.

In the alternate version of this section, Nietzsche grows more vicious concerning his mother and especially his sister, saying that when he looks for “the most profoundly opposite type, an incalculable vulgarity of the instincts” in contrast with the Polish aristocratic type, he always finds his mother and sister, the relationship to whom he counts as “a blasphemy against my divinity” (Kaufmann, p. 456). He further describes the way they treat him as filling him with “inexpressible horror” and “disharmonia praestabilita,” and says that the existence of his mother and sister is “the most profound objection to the ‘eternal recurrence,’ my truly abysmal thought” (Kaufmann, p. 456-7). By contrast, “Frau Cosima Wagner is by far the noblest type” of person; indeed, Nietzsche finds it wholly objectionable to say we are most related to our families: “One is related least of all to one’s parents; it would be the most extreme sign of vulgarity to be related to one’s parents” (Kaufmann, p. 457, emphasis Nietzsche’s). Nietzsche later reiterates his praise of Cosima Wagner, saying that she is “by far the first voice in matters of taste that I have ever heard” (EH II:3, p. 699) in contrast to the German tastes he finds so despicable. It seems that in addition to Nietzsche’s outrage over his mother and sister’s behavior, he is disgusted by their very German-ness. Though Nietzsche elsewhere continues his objections against Germans and German tastes, he has nothing more to say explicitly about his mother and sister for the rest of this text.

Nietzsche’s remaining remarks about women continue previous themes. First, Nietzsche again associates “woman” and the Eternal Feminine with vengeance: “the aggressive pathos belongs just as necessarily to strength as vengefulness and rancor belong to weakness. Woman, for example, is vengeful: that is due to her weakness, as much as is her susceptibility to the
distress of others” (EH I:7, p. 688). Thus Nietzsche explains the false dualism of masculine strength and feminine weakness; active, aggressive fight-seeking is a pathos and pathology as much as reactive, passive vengefulness and pity. Nietzsche’s description of himself as ‘warlike’ and thus constantly seeking the enemy is tied to his notion of a worthy opponent: in particular he seeks “equality before the enemy” so that he can engage in an “honest duel. Where one feels contempt, one cannot wage war; where one commands, where one sees something beneath oneself, one has no business waging war” (EH I:7, p. 688). Hence we may read the subtext that anyone against whom Nietzsche wages war must be in some way an equal to Nietzsche, a worthy opponent. Thus I feel it necessary to note that, among many other people, Nietzsche must consider women and especially feminists in some significant way to be deserving enemies; otherwise Nietzsche would not have written about women, femininity, or feminism in every single published text. Rather, because Nietzsche claims that “An artist chooses his subjects: that is his way of praising” (GS §245, p. 215), I get the impression that had feminism not been a worthy opponent, Nietzsche would have completely ignored the subject.

Nietzsche finds much to praise in his equals and opponents as well as their qualities, for indeed they would not be worthy opponents if he could find nothing in them to praise; femininity is something he values strongly in art especially, and this is exhibited in the next remark about women and what he really wants from music: “That it be cheerful and profound like an afternoon in October. That it be individual, frolicsome, tender, a sweet small woman full of beastliness and charm” (EH II:7, p. 707). To me and I believe also for Nietzsche this passage is meant to evoke “Miss Lou von Salomé” whom Nietzsche poignantly describes as the “young Russian woman who was my friend at that time,” of the creation of his orchestral composition, the Hymn to Life, and the inspiration for the text thereto (EH III TSZ:1, p. 752). Thus even this late in life, when he is supposed to be at his most virulently misogynistic period, and yet even on the brink of incipient madness, Nietzsche still finds value in kinds of femininity and kinds of women; though this is no
evidence that he is not a misogynist, for even the worst misogynist may love or try to love at least one woman, it does counter or at least mitigate the claim of rabid virulence.

Nietzsche also takes pride in the fact that he was never a womanizer or a seeker of wealth or glory, unlike so many of the men of his day: “A man over forty-four who can say that he never strove for honors, for women, for money!” (EH II:9, p. 711). Behaviorally, there are many indicators of misogyny; in particular, one indicator does tend to be the indiscriminate pursuit of sex with women, often painted falsely as the ‘love’ of women; that Nietzsche does not engage in such pursuit again is not conclusive evidence against the claim of misogyny, but certainly I believe a mitigating factor once more. Further, this passage also recalls ideas from the third essay of the Genealogy, wherein Nietzsche discusses asceticism and the abstention from “fame, princes, women” (GM III:8, p. 110), as well as the fifth book of Gay Science, wherein Nietzsche discusses the awe certain women have in the face of priestly chastity (GS §358, p. 311-2).

Thus it may come as no surprise that despite Nietzsche’s warnings to some women not to read him (e.g. Resa von Schirnhofer, see Gilman, p. 151), he still claims that his very small ears, being the opposite of a donkey’s large ears, are the better for hearing women: “I dare assert that I have the smallest ears. This is of no small interest to women – it seems to me that they may feel I understand them better. – I am the anti-ass par excellence and thus a world-historical monster – I am, in Greek, and not only in Greek, the Antichrist” (EH III:2, p. 719). With all of Nietzsche’s remarks about his own feminine qualities, such as calling himself a “female elephant” (EH III TSZ:1, p. 751), and his praise of kinds of women and kinds of femininity, it might them seem contradictory for Nietzsche to say things like “All ‘feminism,’ too – also in men – closes the door: it will never permit entrance into this labyrinth of audacious insights” (EH III:3, p. 720). However, I believe Nietzsche contrasts ‘feminism’ in this sense with various lived expressions of femininity and the women who he thinks believe that he hears them better with his tiny ears; this
‘feminism’ is what he associates with the Eternal Feminine and the false dualism of masculinity and femininity.

Nietzsche refers to happiness as the “Circe of humanity” in a passage where he criticizes the notion of unegoistic love, saying that it is self-contradictory and “Ultimately women know that only too well: they don’t give a damn about selfless, merely objective men” (EH III:5, p. 722). He claims that as part of his “Dionysian dowry” he can “venture the surmise” that he knows women, and that perhaps he is “the first psychologist of the eternally feminine” (EH III:5, p. 722). He goes on to say that all of the eternally feminine love him, which we may presume includes not only those women who emulate the Eternal Feminine but also those men who buy into the Eternal Feminine, excepting only “abortive women, the ‘emancipated’ who lack the stuff for children” (EH III:5, p. 722).

I believe Nietzsche here means to specify a subset of women who emulate the Eternal Feminine, because he goes on to say “the perfect woman tears to pieces when she loves. – I know these charming maenads. – Ah, what a dangerous, creeping, subterranean little beast of prey she is! And yet so agreeable! – A little woman who pursues her revenge would run over fate itself” (EH III:5, p. 722). Nietzsche continues, mixing admiration and censure, saying that “Woman is indescribably more evil than man; also cleverer: good nature is in a woman a form of degeneration” (EH III:5, p. 722). As if to contrast himself with the “typical old virgin” Henrik Ibsen, who “aims to poison the good conscience, what is natural in sexual love,” Nietzsche fills this section with several paragraphs about the nature of the Eternal Feminine and those small persons who perform it:

In all so-called “beautiful souls” something is physiologically askew at bottom; I do not say everything, else I should become medi-cynical. The fight for equal rights is actually a symptom of a disease: every physician knows that. – Woman, the more she is a woman, resists rights in general hand and foot: after all, the state of nature, the eternal war between the sexes, gives her by far first rank. 

EH III:5, p. 723

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Here Nietzsche indicates that his objection against so-called ‘equal rights’ is that they do not appropriately prescribe what is necessary for the benefit of various types; furthermore, he claims that the ‘natural’ ranking of the sexes gives women the first rank by far. Though placing ‘woman’ on a pedestal is problematic, this is assuredly a counter to any claim that Nietzsche ranks men above women in his system of value.

Has my definition of love been heard? It is the only one worthy of a philosopher. Love – in its means, war; at bottom, the deadly hatred of the sexes.

Has my answer been heard to the question how one cures a woman – “redeems” her? One gives her a child. Woman needs children, a man is for her always only a means thus spoke Zarathustra.

EH III:5, p. 723

Nietzsche describes love as war and deadly hatred, a sentiment which echoes with the cynicism and bitterness of those whose love was not reciprocated; however, this also describes the social construction of how the genders do and should interact in their pursuit of love. Men are trained to see love as a predatory act, wherein they hunt for a wife while also bagging affairs and one-night stands, while women’s trained predation is a pursuit of children rather than mere sex; however both of these two genders are taught to see love as a hunt for a trophy of a kind, rather than as some mutually beneficial endeavor which elevates both parties rather than elevating one party at the expense of the devaluation of the other party.

Given such an environment, the notion of equal rights, equal prescriptions of behavior, etc. makes little if any sense. A woman seeking a child requires very different modes of behavior than a man seeking a sexual liaison. Those women who either fail to see this distinction or who are incapable of having children, have a similar reaction to the social construction of the Eternal Feminine which often express as the pursuit of equal rights, either because of the instinct that the Eternal Feminine comes first in order of rank or because of the thwarted instinct to enact the Eternal Feminine by giving birth:
“Emancipation of woman” – that is the instinctive hatred of the abortive woman, who is incapable of giving birth, against the woman who is turned out well – the fight against the ‘man’ is always a mere means, pretext, tactic. By raising themselves higher, as ‘woman in herself,’ as the ‘higher woman,’ as a female ‘idealist,’ they want to lower the level of the general rank of woman; and there is no surer means for that than higher education, slacks, and political voting-cattle rights. At bottom, the emancipated are anarchists in the world of the “eternally feminine,” the underprivileged whose most fundamental instinct is revenge.

EH III:5, p. 723

If women are to be first rank, then it makes little sense to lower them from their rightful role as queens to common voting democrats; if women are to be first rank, then it also makes little sense for them to make themselves common by ascribing to a social norm like the Eternal Feminine. The ‘emancipation of woman’ proposed by Wilhelmine feminists makes little sense in a world still in thrall to such a universalizing and devaluing concept as the Eternal Feminine.

Two more remarks have to do with his books Human, All-Too-Human and The Case of Wagner; the first of these describes Human as Nietzsche’s “sudden end” to his “infections with ‘higher swindle,’ ‘idealism,’ ‘beautiful feelings,’ and other effeminacies,” (EH III HATH:5, p. 744), and the second of these repeats the theme that ‘woman’ is a surface, a mask: “It is with Germans almost as it is with women: one never fathoms their depths; they don’t have any, that is all. They aren’t even shallow” (EH III CW:3, p. 778). For the first I note that Nietzsche rejects certain ‘effeminacies’ just as he affirms other femininities, and for the second I ever recall Nietzsche’s small poem “For Dancers”: “Smooth ice / is paradise / for those who dance with expertise” (GS §13, p. 47). Nietzsche has great love for surfaces and superficialities, so I do not take the remark that women ‘aren’t even shallow’ as an insult but rather as a compliment.

The final passage in all of Nietzsche’s published works which remarks on women again uses the label of the “Circe of humanity,” this time to refer to Christian morality specifically. Nietzsche thus asserts that so many things basically deserve each other: “The millennia, the nations, the first and the last, the philosophers and old women – excepting five, six moments in
history, and me as the seventh – at this point all of them are worthy of each other” (EH IV.7, p. 788). Nietzsche thus concludes his publications with the idea that all of humanity is equal to itself, excepting himself and perhaps six others; thus he rejects the traditional systems which rank philosophers and old women differently, as well as the notion of the progress of humanity in the whiggish sense. Humanity – and human femininity – exist and perpetuate themselves until, as Nietzsche hopes, they begin to self-overcome. Humanity must overcome the all-too-human, just as femininity must overcome the Eternal Feminine, both of which hold us back from creating what is superhuman.

§5 Conclusion

In conclusion to this very detailed chapter, I will attempt to offer first a depiction of the accusations Nietzsche’s commentators have made regarding his purported misogyny, his ‘rap sheet’ if you will. Next, I will provide a brief recounting of several of the passages in Nietzsche’s published works which give counterevidence to the charges against Nietzsche. Lastly I will explore other issues which offer further lines of research and exploration of the problems explored in this chapter. To begin, let us remember the charges against Nietzsche: Nietzsche’s ‘rap sheet’ includes the following claims: first, that he is a biological essentialist who defines femininity on the basis of the reproductive urge to get pregnant and have babies and who treats sex as indistinct from reproduction; second, that he accepts conventional sexism that venerates mothers and housewives; third, that he prefers male dominance and female subservience in his order of rank; fourth that he is a dualist regarding gender and sexuality; fifth that he is wholly anti-feminist; sixth that he is a biological determinist; and seventh that he is a hypocrite in that he advocates moral systems which distinguish between the good and the bad but when it comes to feminism he abandons this principle and instead distinguishes between the good and the evil.
I believe that much of the evidence I provided in this chapter showed how each of these claims is false or at the very least only superficially true; for my conclusion here I will offer seven quotes as more specific counter evidence, one each to combat each claim. I assert with more conviction now the claim that Nietzsche may not be a “true” feminist, whatever that may entail, but I do believe that he intends to comport himself as an anti-misogynist. For brevity I will not reiterate my commentary or re-quote the cited passages here. First, the claim that he is an essentialist regarding femininity: given the wide variety of women to whom he refers, including not only mothers and wives but also sisters and daughters, witches, nuns, nurses, common women, noble women, maidens, old maids, virgins, the Holy Virgin, all sorts of historically worshipped goddesses, his own pantheon of Truth, Life, Philosophy, etc., authors, artists, performers, and so forth, (e.g. HATH §342, 356, 635, 636 for just a few; see the Appendix: Index II for a more complete listing), we cannot say that Nietzsche singles out only motherhood and marriage as the appropriate roles for women in society. This variety and praise for various types also serves as counterevidence to the claim that Nietzsche is conventionally sexist in the form of desiring women to remain in such essentialist roles.

Thirdly, Nietzsche rejects the idea that men are inherently higher than women or that women should serve in a subservient role (see UM II §5 as well as HATH §377 and 440). Fourthly, Nietzsche rejects dualism not only generally but also with regards to sex and gender (see BT §16, 21, and 23, as well as D §248, and GS §24, 72, and 75). Fifthly, Nietzsche portrays himself as anti-misogynistic and offers several feminist insights (see WS §17, 20, D §192, 201, 227, 346, 369, GS §68, 71, and TSZ I:14). Sixthly, Nietzsche appears to reject biological determinism with regards to the relationship between sex and gender (see GS §68, 71, 144, etc.). Lastly, Nietzsche’s so-called hypocrisy in calling women ‘evil’ on the basis of deception reads rather as a statement about what society does to women (HATH §36, etc.), or even a kind of praise (TSZ II:10, BGE §188, and EH III:5). Further, Nietzsche repeatedly identifies himself with
the feminine or identifies the feminine as explicitly good (see BT §16, 21, 23, among others). I am disinclined to accept the claim that Nietzsche turns especially viciously misogynist in his later works, as evidenced by the inclusion of several such late works in the above citations.

Given that I wish to avoid committing the No True Scotsman fallacy here, I do not offer these last considerations as proof that Nietzsche cannot conclusively be a true feminist. Rather, I note that these remaining issues outside of the immediate purview of this dissertation complicate Nietzsche’s relationship with feminism. In particular, two matters of intersection with gender, sex, and sexuality remain: for one, Nietzsche appears to value the elite over the average, preferring noblemen and geniuses to commoners. While he does not value wealth per se, Nietzsche’s pursuit of something higher than mere humanity smacks distinctly of an elitism which could be highly problematic for many feminisms. For the other, Nietzsche has several racist tendencies, in particular with regards to the Occidental/Oriental dualism generally and anti-Asian racism more specifically. Given Kaufmann’s endeavors to show Nietzsche to be the anti-anti-Semite and the anti-nationalist he is, however, and given my own endeavors to reveal Nietzsche as an anti-misogynist, I hope that a more detailed exploration of Nietzsche’s discussion of race and ethnicity would prove that he might aim for anti-racism as well, however short he in fact falls.

My work concerning the role of solely and generally women in Nietzsche’s works, however, is incomplete. I have yet to properly explore Nietzsche’s depiction of truth and perspectivism; this is necessary because of Nietzsche’s repeated use of the metaphor of truth as a woman, and sometimes falsehood also. While I again do not have the space here to explore Nietzsche’s entire pantheon of goddesses and how they relate to the discussion of women and truth, I feel it is necessary to explore the relationship of women to Truth specifically because the notion that truth specifically is a woman is a consistent theme and exists from Nietzsche’s first publication (BT §8 and 10) to one of the last (A §48) and virtually all in between. Nietzsche’s
characterization of truth may reveal further aspects of his commentary on women, just as his commentary on women may reveal further aspects of his commentary on truth.
Chapter 4: An Account of Nietzsche’s Remarks Regarding Perspective, Truth, and Falsity

§1 Introduction
§2 Perspective and Perspectivism: 40 Aphorisms
§3 Defining Perspectivism and Defending Against Relativism
§4 The Problem of Optics and Other Metaphors
§5 Truth as a Woman and the Veiled Figure at Saïs
§6 Standing Truth on Her Head: Reversing Perspectives
§7 Conclusion

§1 Introduction

I intend this chapter to provide an account of Nietzsche’s axiological theory of perspectivism; in particular, I wish to focus on how Nietzsche characterizes truth and value as perspectival, or in other words Nietzsche’s claim that truth specifically and value broadly are by definition matters of perspective. It is not my goal in this dissertation to prove either that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is an accurate axiology or value theory or that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is an accurate alethiology or theory regarding the nature of truth; rather, here my goal is to establish what claims Nietzsche makes regarding specifically the relationship of truth, value, and perspective, and then to show how this connects to Nietzsche’s remarks about women and the broad optical metaphor. My contribution to Nietzsche scholarship in particular here is to provide a new reading of both truth and women as they appear in his published works; my contribution to philosophy more generally here is to facilitate the integration of feminism as more central both to epistemology, value theory, and to the history of philosophy, and to facilitate the
integration of Nietzsche studies and especially perspectivism as more central to at least some feminism as well.

§2  Perspective and Perspectivism: 40 Aphorisms

In order of publication, Nietzsche refers to perspective, the perspectival, or perspectivism explicitly:¹⁹⁶ twice in Untimely Meditations II, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life; once in the first edition of Human, All-Too-Human; twice in Wanderer and His Shadow; twice in Daybreak; seven times in the early edition of The Gay Science; ten times in Beyond Good and Evil; once in the 1886 preface to Birth of Tragedy; once more in the 1886 prefaces to Human, All-Too-Human and Assorted Opinions and Maxims; six times in Genealogy of Morals; four more times in Gay Science Book V; and then once each in Twilight of the Idols, Antichrist, and Ecce Homo. All told, in his published works Nietzsche only refers to perspective forty times total, and only once uses the word ‘perspectivism’ (GS §354, p. 299). However, there are hundreds of references to eyes and seeing, to ‘standpoints’ and ‘points of view,’ to spectacles and to blindness. Just as with women, Nietzsche has a lot to say about eyesight both literally and metaphorically. Interestingly, Nietzsche leaves out any explicit reference to perspective in his two pieces on Wagner, which may be a sign of how limited Wagner’s vision was, perhaps only metaphorically speaking. However, Nietzsche also decides not to refer to perspective explicitly throughout Zarathustra, though he talks extensively of eyes, sight, and images therein. Even the

¹⁹⁶ I used the prefix “persp” in my search through digital versions of the publicly available German-language texts. In this way, I was able to capture all of Nietzsche’s uses of the terms ‘perspective’ and ‘perspectivism’ and the related term ‘perspectival’ without accidentally including any of the translators’ uses of ‘perspective’ when Nietzsche writes Standpunkt or another word unrelated etymologically to ‘perspektive,’ as Kaufmann is wont to do. I was also able to capture Nietzsche’s uses of ‘perspektive’ where translators had eliminated or replaced it, as with Hollingdale.
early edition of *Birth of Tragedy* discusses the valence between objectivity and subjectivity and has numerous references as well to the optical metaphor, as does “On Truth and Lie,” though neither refer explicitly to perspective. In this section I will focus exclusively on Nietzsche’s use of ‘perspective’ and directly related words like ‘perspectival’ and ‘perspectivism.’

Nietzsche’s first explicit use of ‘perspective’ appears in the second of the *Untimely Meditations, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*; here Nietzsche discusses how treating history as a science homogenizes perspectives: “All perspectives have been shifted back to the beginning of all becoming, back into infinity” (UM II:4, p. 77). Later, he expresses his mockery of “the senseless displacement of all perspectives” coming at the expense of life (UM II:9, p. 112) and argues that excessive history deprives humanity of its greatest ideas “by continually shifting horizon-perspectives and removing a protective atmosphere and thus preventing humans from feeling and acting *unhistorically*” (UM II:9, p. 115). These first three mentions of perspective offer three concepts basic to perspectivism: first, that perspectives are not and should not be homogenous; second, that displacing perspectives should not be done senselessly, which thus requires the meaningful displacement of perspective; and third that the shifting of perspectives allows humans to feel and act outside of their historical position, which Nietzsche appears to value highly given his own estimation of himself as being ‘untimely’ and thus existing outside of his own historical place in time. That Nietzsche sees a distinction between “senseless” and more sensible displacement of perspectives makes clear very early that perspectivism is not intended to be just another form of relativism. He offers two specific criteria here to avoid relativism: first, heterogeneity of perspective is a desirable property, at least for some purposes; and second, being able to act unhistorically is a desirable property, at least for some purposes. Thus Nietzsche provides two criteria for ranking perspectives, which is precisely what relativism fails to provide. Following this summary of Nietzsche’s remarks about

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197 Hollingdale simply leaves out the word ‘perspectives’ here and in the subsequent aphorism from *Human.*
perspective, I will explain in more detail how these criteria allow us to rank and thus avoid relativism.

Nietzsche’s next reference connects perspective explicitly to his optical metaphor and shows how perspective allows us to act, in this case in a preventative capacity: “Precisely because we are able to seize this perspective with our eye, we are perhaps in a position to prevent this prospect from occurring” (HATH §247, p. 117). Nietzsche also acknowledges the existence of “false perspectives” at least with regards to the kinds of perspectives one might use in a painting, or in transcribing a conversation into legible text (WS P, p. 302). Nietzsche provides an example of how sometimes only one perspective is available while in other cases multiple perspectives may coexist, and though contextually the ‘here’ of this passage is unclear he could have in mind matters of style or education therein:

Bird’s perspective. – Here torrential streams plunge from many directions into a gorge: their motion is so violent, and draws the eyes so vigorously after it, that the bare and wooded cliffs all around seem, not to sink, but to flee down. The prospect arouses in us an anxious fear, as though something inimical lay behind it all from which everything had to take flight and against which the abyss would lend us protection. This region cannot in any way be painted unless one is hovering above it in the air like a bird. Here the so-called bird’s perspective is for once not an artistic caprice but the sole possibility.

WS §138, p. 343

Thus, when trying to account for how to ‘paint’ – whether metaphorically or literally – certain scenes, one does not always make decisions about perspective capriciously but rather out of physical, stylistic, or other necessity. Hence we must conclude that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is not capricious; I offer this as new evidence towards my claim that perspectivism is not axiological relativism: axiological relativism as I understand it would be the claim that value is determined relative to the individual or the individual’s culture, and hence can be capricious and lacking necessity. Nietzsche here shows that perspective is sometimes if not often a matter of necessity, and thus cannot be relative in the form of being capricious.

198 Hollingdale chooses to not translate ‘perspective’ directly but rather as ‘bird’s-eye view’ in this case.
In the next book, Nietzsche describes the ‘different perspectives of feeling’ which predicated ancient Greek appreciation of female beauty on the appreciation of male beauty: because “their perspective on female beauty was quite different from ours” Nietzsche claims the ancient Greeks “reverenced differently” and “despised differently” than his contemporary Europeans (D §170, p.104). Thus note how Nietzsche explicitly ties perspective to the various modes of valuation our culture engages in with regards to gender. Nietzsche also explains that there is a relationship between his propensity for solitude and his frequent reliance on ‘distant perspectives’: “when I am alone I seem to see my friends in a clearer and fairer light than when I am with them; and when I loved and appreciated music the most, I lived far from it. It seems I need a distant perspective if I am to think well of things” (D §485, p. 199-200). Perspectives of close proximity are useful things for certain purposes, for certain individuals, surely, but Nietzsche as psychologist recognizes that close proximity is not always the best way to appreciate things, especially for one like himself. This passage also reflects Nietzsche’s several remarks about how too-close proximity to one’s beloved reveals those biological aspects, at least, that one might prefer to ignore in order to better appreciate one’s beloved (e.g. GS §60).

*The Gay Science* provides a flurry of perspectives; in the first of these, Nietzsche notes almost in passing how different perspectives can generate different feelings when he remarks on how members of the ‘knightly’ caste can be “spurred by the good feeling of *this* perspective” of obliging and honoring one’s peers (GS §13, p. 87). Later Nietzsche describes how “eternal perspectives” have affected humanity and concedes “a singular merit” to Christianity for teaching us to see every individual’s sin “through a magnifying glass, turning the sinner into a great, immortal criminal” by way of such eternality: “By surrounding it with eternal perspectives, it taught humanity to see itself from a distance and as something past and whole” – in other words, I suggest, as something to be overcome (GS §78, p. 133). However, Nietzsche later states explicitly that humanity is incapable of such eternal perspectives: “hence man alone among all the animals
has no eternal horizons and perspectives” (GS §143, p. 192), despite the pretenses of religions and belief systems like Christianity. I suggest that the reason Christianity thus has merit for Nietzsche is that it creates an appreciation for a distant perspective on humanity, but one of the reasons Nietzsche sees Christianity as flawed at the outset is that it treats distance as eternality and objectivity rather than simply as distance.

Nietzsche offers an example of a different belief system with a different employment of perspective: “Egoism is the law of perspective applied to feelings: what is closest appears large and weighty, and as one moves farther away size and weight decreases” (GS §162, p. 199). Yet another example provides us with the “most dangerous” perspective: “What I do or do not do now is as important for everything that is yet to come as is the greatest event of the past: in this tremendous perspective of effectiveness all actions appear equally great and small” (GS §233, p. 212-3). Regardless, Nietzsche advocates the learning of new perspectives; in particular he praises artists for granting us even the merest “glimpses of architectural perspectives” (GS §299, p. 239). Indeed, this ability to not only see things from new perspectives but to actually generate new perspectives seems to be a quality of creator- and creative-types, a part of the “fancy of the contemplatives” who “think and feel at the same time” and “who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations” (GS §301, p. 241-2).

Though Nietzsche does not write about perspective explicitly in Zarathustra, the seven discussions of perspectives from the Gay Science are quickly followed by another ten discussions of perspectives in Beyond Good and Evil. The first of these comes in the preface, in connection to the notion that truth is a woman. Specifically, Nietzsche connects problems with perspective to the “dogmatist’s error,” which he also describes as “Plato’s invention of the pure spirit and the good as such,” and ties it to Christianity as “Platonism for ‘the people’” (BGE P, p. 193). Nietzsche explicitly states that the dogmatist’s error reverses the truth: “To be sure, it meant
standing truth on her head and denying *perspective*, the basic condition of all life, when one spoke of spirit and the good as Plato did” (BGE P, p. 193). Thus perspectivism is not a denial of the existence of truth, but rather a redefinition of what truth entails in contrast with the erroneous Platonic and Christian versions of the truth. Later, Nietzsche will also explicitly include Kantian philosophy as one of the doctrines that reverses the truth in a similar way.

Nietzsche also offers a kind of perspective to contrast with the bird’s perspective from earlier, namely a perspective from below for which he criticizes metaphysicians; Nietzsche asks whether the “faith in opposite values” and the opposite values themselves “are not perhaps merely foreground estimates, only provisional perspectives, perhaps even from some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it were, to borrow an expression painters use” (BGE §2, p. 200). Nietzsche goes on to suppose that life might in some cases benefit from or even require deception and falsehood, and thus the ranking of truth over falsehood for the value of life in particular would be incorrect (BGE §2, p. 200). Nietzsche describes the behavior of the anti-real metaphysicians as a form of nihilism and weariness of the soul, and contrasts them with the anti-appearance metaphysicians who are “stronger and livelier thinkers who are still eager for life,” who “side *against* appearance, and speak of ‘perspective,’ with a new arrogance,” and who “rank the credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility of the visual evidence that ‘the earth stands still,’” in an attempt to regain “something of the ancient domain of the faith of former times” (BGE §10, p. 206-7). Though Nietzsche seems to reject both the metaphysicians who are anti-reality and those who are anti-appearance, his sympathies do seem to lie with the latter group at least in their mistrust of modernity and the desire to rise up and get away from this embodied life.

Nietzsche then criticizes Kant for operating from perspectives which do not facilitate life, giving us another criterion for perspective which allows us to dispute the claim that perspectivism is relativism. In particular, he says that we should not ask the Kantian question of how synthetic a
priori judgments are possible, but rather “Why is belief in such judgments necessary?” a question he answers by saying that “such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they might, of course, be false judgments for all that!” (BGE §11, p. 209). Thus life might not only require deception, but even self-deception. Nietzsche continues by asserting that these synthetic judgments “should not ‘be possible’ at all; we have no right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is necessary, as a foreground belief and visual evidence belonging to the perspective optics of life” (BGE §11, p. 209). In saying this, Nietzsche makes several claims relevant to perspectivism: that humans have no right to assert the possibility of synthetic judgments by virtue of our humanity; that regardless of our lack of right to such assertions, we nonetheless must believe in their possibility; and that this is necessary because it provides the foregrounding required to make life itself possible for creatures like ourselves.

Reversals of perspectives can occur in many different ways, and are thus not merely limited to the dogmatist’s error from the preface. Nietzsche in particular notes how we tend to take the cause for the effect and vice versa; this can include how we judge the morality of an action, such as in Kantian practical philosophy where the results are less important than one’s intentions: “Instead of the consequences, the origin: indeed a reversal of perspective!” (BGE §32, p. 234). Though Nietzsche describes this reversal as hard-won, he also finds it to be “calamitous” and to necessitate another “reversal and fundamental shift in values” in the present day (BGE §32, p. 234). Indeed, because of the basic error at the foundation of his contemporaries’ philosophies, Nietzsche claims that “Whatever philosophical standpoint one may adopt today, from every point of view the erroneousness of the world in which we think we live is the surest and firmest fact that we can lay eyes on” (BGE §34, p. 235).

Nietzsche himself has learned to value truth and deception differently, and to understand the difference between a philosopher’s ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’ differently, and so challenges:
It is no more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than mere appearance; it is even the worst proved assumption there is in the world. Let at least this much be admitted: there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and appearances; and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm and clumsiness of some philosophers, one wanted to abolish the “apparent world” altogether – well, supposing you could do that, at least nothing would be left of your “truth,” either. Indeed, what forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of “true” and “false”? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance – different “values,” to use the language of painters? Why couldn’t the world that concerns us – be a fiction? And if somebody asked, “but to a fiction there surely belongs an author?” – couldn’t one answer simply: why? Doesn’t this “belongs” perhaps belong to the fiction, too? Is it not permitted to be a bit ironical about the subject no less than the predicate and object? Shouldn’t philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in grammar? All due respect for governesses – but hasn’t the time come for philosophy to renounce the faith of governesses?”

BGE §34, p. 237

Though Nietzsche’s language only clumsily manages to convey this here, I believe he intends to reject the falseness of the philosopher’s ‘reality,’ but without necessarily affirming the truth of their concept of ‘appearance’ because the two are based on a false dichotomy between what is real and what is apparent. The notion of ‘appearance’ is the closest thing contemporary philosophers offer him in terms of a label for the idea he wants to convey or re-write herein: a thing in a sense manufactured by the conjunction of observer and perspective, but unmanufactured in the sense that there is no one ‘creating’ that conjunction, not even God. Nietzsche rejects the childish assumption that just because grammar indicates the necessity of a subject for every verb, there must be a creator for every fiction or ‘created’ concept. So also Nietzsche supplants his contemporaries’ usage of ‘value’ for a more artistic understanding; colors come in lighter and darker ‘values,’ tints and shades, pastels and hues in a painter’s world, and a painter can use each of these to different purposes. Thus the ‘value’ of an ‘appearance’ which is less-true or more-true is not a value of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in some nebulous and falsely ‘objective’ sense, but a darkness or lightness useful for different purposes.
Nietzsche cannot resist reminding us that his treatment of truth and perspective is connected to his treatment of women in this text as well; one of his epigrams reminds us that “The enormous expectation in sexual love and the sense of shame in this expectation spoils all perspective for women from the start” (BGE §114, p. 275), a problem for which society is primarily to blame. Thus, as well as being useful the way ‘values’ were to the painter, a perspective can be harmful to the beholder. Further, perspectives come in different kinds, narrower or wider: “The devil has the broadest perspectives for God; therefore he keeps so far away from God – the devil being the most ancient friend of wisdom” (BGE §129, p. 277). I take this interlude between several epigrams about gender and sex to say several things: first, that because the devil views God from these broadest perspectives, he must maintain great distance; second, a great distance from God is wise at least for some; third, these two claims together seem to imply that broader perspectives – whatever those entail – are wiser than narrower perspectives. Based on my knowledge of Nietzsche’s upcoming remarks in the Genealogy (see especially Essay III §12), I believe the idea of ‘broadness’ of perspective here has something to do with the ability to attain or use multiple perspectives when ‘viewing’ or considering a concept. This would imply in connection with his surrounding epigrams on women that perhaps the reason Wilhelmine feminists failed to persuade Nietzsche to accept their definition of womanhood has to do with the fact that they were still too close to the concept, viewing it from entirely too narrow a perspective.

Nietzsche later describes “teaching the narrowing of our perspective” as teaching “thus in a certain sense stupidity” (BGE §188, p. 292), one of the things any system of morality whatsoever “as opposed to laisser aller” does to human perspective (BGE §188, p. 290). That this narrowing is “a bit of tyranny against ‘nature’; also against ‘reason’” is not an objection for Nietzsche “as long as we do not have some other morality which permits us to decree that every

\[199\] Letting go.
kind of tyranny and unreason is impermissible” (BGE §188, p. 290). In fact, it is this long-standing compulsion that Nietzsche describes as “what is essential and inestimable in every morality” (BGE §188, p. 290). I suppose here that Nietzsche finds this essential and inestimable in the value system with which he experiments in his work, namely perspectivism.

Thus Nietzsche connects his notion of perspective not only to epistemological rankings of values, but also to moral systems; hence I argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not exist exclusively in either narrower sense of value, but in the broader and overarching sense of axiology. Nietzsche again refers to moral perspective before the close of this text: he analyzes the Christian concept of neighbor-love as based on the fear of the neighbor, and states “After the structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems secure against external dangers,” and there is no longer much need to fear the outsider, one begins to fear that those who protected the community against outsiders will now turn their strength against the community, and that “it is this fear of the neighbor that again creates new perspectives of moral valuation” (BGE §201, p. 303). Instead of valuing violent tendencies, the community of people now draws up new tables of values: “How much or how little is dangerous to the community, dangerous to equality, in an opinion, in a state or affect, in a will, in a talent – that now constitutes the moral perspective: here, too, fear is again the mother of morals” (BGE §201, p. 303). Thus perspective may be affected significantly by human emotions and needs.

Following this second book of his late or mature period, Nietzsche includes a smattering of references to perspective in the 1886 prefaces he added to Birth of Tragedy, Human, All-Too-Human, and the sequel Assorted Opinions and Maxims. First, in his “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” Nietzsche describes a problematic feature inherent in the beliefs of Wagner, Schopenhauer, and their attendant Christianity that he deems as the “will to decline,” and which we may also think as a will to decadence, a denial of perspective in favor of the aforementioned dogmatist’s error that implies only truth can be necessary or even useful for life:
Behind this mode of thought and valuation, which must be hostile to art if it is at all genuine, I never failed to sense a hostility to life – a furious, vengeful antipathy to life itself: for all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspectives and error. Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life’s nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed up as, faith in ‘another’ or ‘better’ life.”

BT P:5, p.23

Nietzsche elsewhere calls “afterworldly” (see TSZ I:3, for one example) this proposition that a ‘better’ life will come along after this one and links this body-hatred to the Platonic ‘afterworld’ of the Forms and the Kantian noumenal realm, as well as the Christian Heaven and other religious afterlives. Therefore, we can see that Nietzsche finds a basic connection between afterworldly attitudes and anti-perspectival axiologies. As if to reinforce this, Nietzsche then praises the free spirit who gets “control over your For and Against” and learns “to grasp the necessary injustice in every For and Against, injustice as inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned by the sense of perspective and its injustice,” and becomes able to see with one’s “own eyes the problem of order of rank, and how power and right and spaciousness of perspective grow into the heights together” (HATH P §6, p. 9). By this Nietzsche makes clear that if perspective is necessary for life, then this entails that each perspective comes at the expense of others; ranking things one way means that something ‘unjustly’ comes at the bottom of the order, and ranking things by a different perspective means that something else ‘unjustly’ comes at the bottom instead. True equalization would reject this order of rank. This may explain Nietzsche’s distaste for democracy and its attempts at false equalities; even in democracies some are ranked less than others for the purposes of the democratic perspective, and this entails once again that someone comes at the bottom of the order. Perhaps also this offers a useful distinction for the difference between striving for equality and striving for equity: equity offers more to those who have greater need, while equality just gives everyone the same thing regardless of their need.
Nietzsche’s last prefatory remark about perspective comes in a different tone, and discusses the “pessimism of the renunciators” like Schopenhauer and Wagner in terms of a formula: “there is a will to the tragic and to pessimism that is as much a sign of severity and of strength of intellect,” a claim he perhaps self-indulgently believes is solely his own new and unique belief, as it “has been my pessimistic perspective from the beginning – a novel perspective, is it not? A perspective that even today is still novel and strange?” (AOM P §7, p. 213). Thus, just as the severe and strongly intelligent ancient Greek type tended towards cheerfulness (not to be confused with happiness), the severe and strongly intelligent modern European type tends towards a more pessimistic perspective of asceticism and renunciation. The parallel I want to draw out here is that the same effect may have different causes and that the same cause can have multiple effects. Severity can lead to cheerfulness or pessimism, self-indulgence and self-restraint; but different times and types can all generate a similar severity at the same time. Just so, we may train multiple perspectives on one object and get similar results or concepts; likewise, a singular perspective can sometimes produce a multitude of concepts about that self-same single object. That there is no one-to-one relationship between cause and effect or perspective and concept is not evidence of its illogic, but rather of its consistency with both human experience and the human condition.

Ultimately, however, Nietzsche seems to value most highly the diversity of perspective rather than the pre-eminence of any non-self-defeating perspective over others. In other words, Nietzsche privileges diversity over ‘objectivity’ and undermines the notion of objectivity that is so problematic for epistemologists and feminists alike. Nietzsche’s problem with objectivity is largely based on the fact that it denies the presence of interest in even the broadest perspectives; in other words, the philosopher who pretends to objectivity is pretending he has no interest or investment in the outcome of his intellectual pursuits. This is the case whether in valuing a claim as true or false or valuing an action or law as good or bad: “The question: what is the value of this..."
or that table of values and ‘morals’? should be viewed from the most divers perspectives; for the problem ‘value for what?’ cannot be examined too subtly” (GM I:17 Nietzsche’s note, p. 55).

When questioning value, Nietzsche appears to reject the idea of intrinsic value; all value is extrinsic, it is value for someone or some purpose, some perspective. The idea of intrinsic value rests on the perspective of a non-person with non-interests, and therefore must have a non-existence.

As if to bolster this claim, Nietzsche offers a plausible but probably fictive just-so story about the origins of the concepts of legal rights and justice from the perspective that everything can be “objectively” measured, priced, and sold, saying that “it was rather out of the most rudimentary form of personal legal rights that the budding sense of exchange, contract, guilt, right, obligation, settlement, first transferred itself to the coarsest and most elementary social complexes” as well as the comparison of power between people; once it became the case that one’s “eye was now focused on this perspective,” it was inevitable that people would ultimately arrive at the belief that “everything has its price; all things can be paid for” and that they could thus arrive at justice (GM II:8, p. 70). The notion of objectivity built in to this initial valuation of all things claimed that the evaluator was disinterested, whether by one’s own nature or by the nature of knowledge.

Nietzsche finds particularly absurd the claim that “there is a realm of truth and being, but reason is excluded from it!” and dismisses this “incarnate will to contradiction and antinaturalness” as part and parcel of the dogmatist’s error and the flipping of truth onto her head (GM III:12, p. 118). Here Nietzsche explicitly includes Kant and Vedanta ascetics with other wrongly oriented philosophers; these philosophers, like Platonists and Christians, have all determined that reality and value and truth all exist but are by definition out of the grasp of humanity. Thus Kant can discuss an “intelligible character” which signifies that “things are so constituted that the intellect comprehends just enough of them to know that for the intellect they
are – *utterly incomprehensible*” (GM III:12, p. 119). Nietzsche seems to find these “resolute reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations” more mischievous and futile than maliciously and negatively affecting humanity, and indeed even having some useful qualities for the flourishing of something new in humanity:

…to see differently in this way for once, to *want* to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity” – the latter understood not as “contemplation without interest” (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to *control* one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a *variety* of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge.

Thus the value of the false objectivity is that it has trained philosophers to try to discipline themselves to see the world differently, a useful skill when employed properly; properly in this case necessitates learning how to use one’s “Pro and Con,” rather than being solely controlled by them. Nietzsche goes on to offer an emphatic warning against this dogmatist’s erroneous asceticism of knowledge and absurd concepts of impossible and false objectivity especially, and to instead advocate the plurality of many interested perspectives over the Platonic, Christian, and Kantian ideals of a singular uninterested perspective. I quote at length:

Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject”; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as “pure reason,” “absolute spirituality,” “knowledge in itself”: these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing *something*, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the *more* affects we allow to speak about one thing, the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe on thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity,” be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this – what would that mean but to *castrate* the intellect? –

GM III:12, p. 119

Rather than completely throwing out the concept of objectivity, Nietzsche seeks to redefine it: Nietzschean objectivity, or the objectivity which belongs properly to this doctrine of
perspectivism, is the accumulation of perspectives rather than the absence of perspectives. Thus objectivity becomes multi-perspectival instead of aperspectival or non-perspectival. In this new definition, objectivity is not the opposite of subjectivity but a palimpsest of subjectivities. I argue that this notion of objectivity is far more consistent with feminist epistemologies than the historical modern philosopher’s notion of objectivity.

Nietzsche also believes that a perspective which used to hold sway can fall out of favor and efficacy as time marches on; he states that the “religio-moral perspective” in particular “is no longer binding on us” the way it was binding on peoples of the past (GM III:16, p. 129). Nonetheless, he has high regard as a sufferer for the genius possible from this perspective that the alleviation of suffering matters most: “if one adopts the only perspective known to the priest, it is not easy to set bounds to one’s admiration of how much he has seen, sought, and found under this perspective” (GM III:17, p. 130). However, Nietzsche still is able to find fault with this perspective even as a party interested in the alleviation of his own pain, precisely because it is antithetical to life and its conditions: “This interpretation – there is no doubt of it – brought fresh suffering with it, deeper, more inward, more poisonous, more life-destructive, suffering: it placed all suffering under the perspective of guilt” (GM III:28, p. 162). Thus, much as Kant destroyed reason in order to make a place for faith, Nietzsche sees asceticism as destroying life in order to make a place for the will.

Only seven passages with comments on perspective remain: four from Book V of Gay Science, and one each from Twilight, Antichrist, and Ecce Homo. In a section exploring the nature of consciousness, communication, and ‘the genius of the species,’ Nietzsche remarks that our consciousness by its nature translates even our most individual thoughts “back into the perspective of the herd,” and then offers an explicit pairing of perspectivism with phenomenalism, which I again quote at length:
This is the essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand them: Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious is only a surface- and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd, signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalization. Ultimately, the growth of consciousness becomes a danger; and anyone who lives among the most conscious Europeans even knows that it is a disease.

You will guess that it is not the opposition of the subject and object that concerns me here: This distinction I leave to the epistemologists who have become entangled in the snares of grammar (the metaphysics of the people). It is even less the opposition of ‘thing-in-itself’ and appearance: for we do not “know” nearly enough to be entitled to any such distinction. We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for “truth”: we “know” (or believe or imagine) just as much as may be useful in the interests of the human herd, the species; and even what is here called “utility” is ultimately also a mere belief, something imaginary, and perhaps precisely that most calamitous stupidity of which we shall perish some day.

GS §354, p. 299-300

I take Nietzsche here to be playing out the consequences of the dogmatist’s error: if we define truth as this false Kantian or Platonic or otherwise dogmatic “objectivity,” then by definition we prevent humanity by virtue of our animal nature from ever achieving or ascertaining truth in our beliefs. Perspectivism is then connected to phenomenalism by their shared essential claim that animal perception and awareness are in an important sense superficial. This becomes a problem in phenomenalism, such as some describe Kantian epistemology among that of other modern philosophers, because phenomenalism also includes the claim that truth is not superficial. Because perspectivism allows for superficial, shifting, temporary ‘truths,’ it does not necessarily require that humanity exist forever without access to ‘objective’ truth. Remembering Nietzsche’s new definition of objectivity for perspectivism, all the perspectivist has to do to become more objective is to learn to see from new and more perspectives; the phenomenalist by contrast has no such escape clause because he has defined himself as incapable in principle of achieving whatever his ‘objectivity’ entails, and is forever trapped in a vale of shadows, the merely apparent world. Perspectivism does not treat the apparent as ‘mere’ in any sense; there is (or at least so far
has been) nothing more than surfaces, and therefore the superficial is richly and importantly valuable.

Nietzsche’s next remark about perspective notes how certain beliefs may be required for certain perspectives: Schopenhauer’s answer to the question of the meaning of existence remained “stuck – in precisely those Christian-ascetic moral perspectives in which one had renounced faith along with the faith in God” (GS §357, p. 308). Thus Nietzsche offers further evidence of the way the dogmatist’s error engages in self-undoing by defining value, truth, and existence as outside of human grasp. However, this is not the only kind of perspective Nietzsche finds objectionable. Nietzsche later goes on to reject perspectives originating from the notorious social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer: “a human race that adopted such Spencerian perspectives as its ultimate perspectives would seem to us worthy of contempt, of annihilation!” (GS §373, p. 334). Thus we may have some inkling that though Nietzsche may uncritically accept racial stereotypes, he was not uncritical of the kinds of beliefs which later became atrociously exemplified by the Nazi regime.

The last passage remarking on perspective in Book V of *The Gay Science* again offers Nietzsche’s redefinition of ‘objectivity’ and the infinite, and what a new objectivity or new ‘infinite’ must be for new philosophers. He cautions us against worshiping this new definition as the past erroneous dogmatists worshiped their own conception of truth starting with Plato, running through Christianity, and thenceforth through the history of Western philosophy. It is important to note that he does permit with a shudder the possibility of an infinite number of different perspectives and interpretations, particularly because he thinks we limit ourselves too much if we reserve perspective only for human or even animal existence. In this way, this passage makes Nietzsche’s perspectivism into a cousin of Leibniz’s monadology, which not only permits but outright requires a kind of perspective or viewpoint possible from every point in the universe. I will again quote this at length to offer the fullest picture of Nietzsche’s perspectivism:
How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without “sense,” does not become “nonsense”; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially actively engaged in interpretation – that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these. We cannot look around our own corner: it is a hopeless curiosity that wants to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives there might be; for example, whether some beings might be able to experience time backward, or alternately forward and backward (which would involve another direction of life and another concept of cause and effect). But I should think that today we are at least far from the ridiculous immodesty that would be involved in decreeing from our corner that perspectives are permitted only from this corner. Rather has the world become “infinite” for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that it may include infinite interpretations. Once more we are seized by a great shudder; but who would feel inclined immediately to deify again after the old manner this monster of an unknown world? And to worship the unknown henceforth as “the Unknown One”? Alas, too many ungodly possibilities of interpretation are included in the unknown, too much devilry, stupidity, and foolishness of interpretation – even in our own human, all too human folly, which we know.

GS §374, p. 336-7

I leave this text with a question: is Nietzsche’s shudder here the shake of a fearful man, the palsy of a man growing old too quickly, a wave of proto-existentialist nausea, or even a frisson of excitement? I suspect that Nietzsche is in a sense nauseated because of the thought that humanity would foolishly deify the unknown. This final passage on perspective in the last book of The Gay Science offers several other claims about perspective: those perspectives which we never experience in any way are inaccessible to us by definition; the number of possible perspectives may extend to infinity; and it is at least partly a matter of axiological taste and epistemic modesty that Nietzsche in his perspectivism rejects objectivity as defined by the dogmatist’s error.

In the one reference to perspective in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche states that “one misunderstands great human beings if one views them from the miserable perspective of some public use” (TI IX:50, p. 555), thus giving us the claim that not all perspectives provide the same understanding of the same concept, with the implied corollary that certain perspectives are better than others for understanding certain concepts. Given Nietzsche’s repeated prioritizing of values
congruent with life and the overcoming of humanity, I assert here that Nietzsche’s order of rank with regards to perspective must also be congruent with these standards if he is to be minimally coherent. I do not think that Nietzsche would find outright contradictions to be objectionable, given his claims about the sometimes necessity of contradiction and falsehood for life, but coherence is an epistemic quality which does seem necessary for life, particularly human life. Incoherence renders communication and thus social interaction unfeasible; social interaction is necessary for human life at a variety of levels including the most basic of acquiring food and shelter in the contemporary, modern, and even the classical societies; therefore, coherence is necessary for life as a Nietzschean standard of value, and thus also for a perspectivist axiology.

The one reference to perspective in Antichrist appears in a long passage concerning the Christian Gospels. Nietzsche discusses how as a matter not only of tradition but of heritage, the Christian has not merely learned to reject other perspectives but has been in a sense “determined, as a matter of principle, to apply only concepts, symbols, attitudes which have been proved by the practice of the priest; instinctively to reject every other practice, every other perspective of value and usefulness” in favor of those approved by their religious leaders (A §44, p. 620-1). By this almost off-hand use of “perspective of value and usefulness,” Nietzsche demonstrates clearly how broad his conception of perspectivism truly is: perspective does not pertain solely to truth, knowledge, and epistemic concerns, nor only to reality, ontology, and metaphysical concerns, but rather appears to encompass the very broad categories of value and use in addition to those connected to belief and existence. Thus I argue that properly speaking perspectivism is a doctrine concerning axiology narrowly and value theory broadly. Perspectivism therefore pertains to multiple branches of philosophical study and their connected spectra of value: epistemology and its attendant alethiology given the various ‘values’ assigned such as true/false, known/unknown, etc.; metaphysics and especially ontology given the ‘values’ assigned such as real/illusory,
extant/not existing, etc.; ethics and morality given the traditional ‘values’ assigned such as good/bad/evil, right/wrong, etc.

I have already included these three branches in my discussion of perspectivism elsewhere; here I add the remaining three major branches based on the evidence above: social and political philosophies given the ‘values’ assigned such as just/unjust, reward/punishment, etc.; aesthetics and its assigned ‘values’ such as art/non-art, beautiful/sublime/ugly, etc.; and finally also logic itself with its assigned ‘values’ such as valid/invalid, strong/weak, etc. I also wish to point out that given Nietzsche’s moral value scheme which includes the good, the bad, and the evil, and particularly given his explicit resistance to simple and simply false dualities, even the dichotomies I included here are not necessarily limited to a simplistic black-and-white two-value structure. As an additional example of how value need not be dualistic, I included the trio of values beautiful/sublime/ugly. Further, I suggest that even these sets of three values are not necessarily limited to triplets. Part of the benefit of perspectivism is that we can multiply value schemes theoretically infinitely, depending on our purposes and needs, and provided that those purposes do not conflict with the flourishing and overcoming of humanity.

Nietzsche’s final published remark on perspective closes the first section of “Why I am So Wise,” the first chapter in Ecce Homo. It is easy to read this text as the grandstanding of a megalomaniac madman, but I think we can charitably temper that reading in some small way if we see it instead as a sort of how-to manual for the philosophers of the future who Nietzsche anticipates: how to create a person who is wise and clever or how to make oneself become as wise and clever, as good a writer of books, and even as much a destiny as Nietzsche believes he can prove to be. Nietzsche’s keen insight into decadence in particular is a matter of experience and experimentation with perspective, so we might be able to replicate some of his results and gain his insight by experiencing similar observations and experimenting with the ideas with which Nietzsche has experimented throughout his almost two decades of published work.
Nietzsche describes his mastery over decadence as history of actions wherein he has intentionally and unintentionally experimented with the reversals of perspectives and changes between kinds of perspectives, and he offers this behavior as a kind of psychological prescription:

Looking from the perspective of the sick toward healthier concepts and values and, conversely, looking again from the fullness and self-assurance of a rich life down into the secret work of the instinct of decadence – in this I have had the longest training, my truest experience; if in anything, I became master in this. Now I know how, have the know-how, to reverse perspectives: the first reason why a “revaluation of values” is perhaps possible for me alone.

EH I:1, p. 679

Hence, for the philosophers of the future, the progenitors of Übermenschen, and other Nietzschean types, Nietzsche prescribes looking back and forth from one kind of perspective to another, changing perspectives, and learning how to reverse perspective at will as the necessary means for the revaluation of all value. Though Nietzsche here only depicts sick and healthy, abundant and decadent as his interchanging perspectives, I will argue later that we can connect this to a variety of concern, including those concerns motivating standpoint theory and feminist epistemologies based on the Hegelian notion of the slave’s superior understanding of the master.

§3 Defining Perspectivism and Defending Against Relativism

I will now attempt to summarize the preceding as well as to synthesize Nietzsche’s poetic aphorisms into something more akin to contemporary philosophical claims. Some of the phrasing may be slightly redundant, but I do this to maintain contiguity with the above interpretations. Now that we have the chronological layout, I offer a more thematic approach wherein I divide Nietzsche’s forty aphorisms into four connected categories of claims: truth and objectivity, the dogmatist’s error and other objectionable perspectives, the various types of perspective including broad and narrow, and some remaining instructive remarks. To begin, one of the central issues is truth, falsity, and the definition of objectivity: The falseness of perspective depends on the
purpose for which it is employed (WS P, p. 302). Sometimes the choice of perspective is necessarily the only choice available (WS §138, p. 343). Value is always value for some purpose and should be explored from as many perspectives as possible (GM I:17, Nietzsche's fn, p. 55). Given certain perspectives, certain beliefs are inevitable; objectivity leads to disinterested value (GM II:8, p. 70). There is only perspective knowing, seeing, conceiving, willing, etc. (GM III:12, p. 118). The most dangerous perspective is the belief that one's actions weigh equally on the future as all past (GS §233, p. 212-3). Rather, we should learn multiple new perspectives (GS §299, p. 239), and know how to do so because creative types tend to do this and also to create new perspectives (GS §301, p. 241-2), and because new emotions and needs lead to new perspectives (BGE §201, p. 303).

Second, the dogmatist's error is the denial of perspective in favor of objectivity, 'standing truth on her head' (BGE P, p. 193). The consequences of the dogmatist's error in perspective are dire, but redefining objectivity as a plurality of perspectives allows human flourishing and potential access to the only kind of objectivity worth having as humans (GS §354, p. 299-300). The wrong perspective leads to errors like false dichotomies as throughout metaphysics (BGE §2, p. 200). These false dichotomies in metaphysics lead to reject lived bodily life for imaginary other worlds (BGE §10, p. 206-7). Lived bodily life often requires superficial belief for survival and flourishing (BGE §11, p. 209). Reversals of perspective, like taking cause for effect, can be harmful; they can also help (revaluation) (BGE §32, p. 234). Perspective and appearance are necessary for life far more than a metaphysician's 'real' world (BGE §34, p. 247). And yet, the wrong perspectives are antithetical to life: the perspectives we teach women do them great harm (BGE §114, p. 275). Christianity proves its antipathy to life by its antipathy to perspective (BT P:5, p. 23). Because perspective is necessary for life, it is good to learn to control perspectives (HATH P:6, p. 9). Another objectionable perspectives is Social Darwinism a la Herbert Spencer (GS §373, p. 334).
Third, different perspectives lead to differing understandings and valuations (the epistemic-axiological connection) (D (§170, p. 104). For example, distance allows one to appreciate friends better (D §485, p. 199-200). And just as a perspective may permit certain beliefs, certain beliefs may permit certain perspectives (GS §357, p. 308). Not all perspectives provide the same understanding, and some are better than others for certain purposes (TI IX:50, p. 555). Additionally, not all perspectives work the same way on all types of people (GS §13, p. 87). Eternal perspectives from Christianity gave us a distant perspective on humanity (GS §78, p. 133). However, these eternal perspectives are strictly speaking impossible for human creatures (GS §143, p. 192). When we apply the way distance works on perspective to feelings, we get egoism (GS §162, p. 199). Broadness of perspective and distance are wiser and further removed from false objectivity (BGE §129, p. 277). Compulsions to narrow perspective are in a sense stupid but also necessary to all moral systems (BGE §188, p. 290-2). Adopting the perspectives of a type allows one to admire that type better (GM III:17, p. 130). Nonetheless, that adoption does not preclude our ability to criticize that type (GM III:28, p. 162).

Fourth and last, some remaining instructive remarks: perspectives are not homogenous and should not be homogenized (UM II:4, p. 77). The senseless displacement by homogenization of perspective damages human life and growth (UM II:9, p. 112), but intentional shifting perspective is useful unless it prevents us from acting unhistorically (UM II:9, p. 115). Perspectives can be and frequently tend to be optical (HATH §247, p. 117). At the same time, however, perspective is a very broad category including eyesight, truth, knowledge, belief, reality, existence, value, etc. (A §44, p. 620-1). Nietzsche’s pessimistic perspectives are still novel and strange, which may show the strength of one’s intellect (AOM P:7, p. 213). As self-aware students of perspective, the old perspectives no longer bind us (GM III:16, p. 129). Reversing perspectives allows for the revaluation of values (EH I:1, p. 679), but the possibility of infinite perspectives does not necessitate deifying the unknown (GS §374, p. 336-7).
From this synthesis I distill four essential claims which make up a kind of perspectival doctrine for value theory broadly construed: one, objectivity must be redefined as the plurality of perspectives; two, the previous definition of objectivity was antithetical to life and rather we must preserve and facilitate life, particularly the flourishing and overcoming of humanity; three, the value of different perspectives depends on purpose; four, the value of perspectives depends on their experimental viability. Thus I see these claims as four binding values which must be shown to be internally coherent for perspectivism to hold: redefinition of objectivity, promotion of life, purposive plurality, experimental viability. Finally, these values offer the fullest evidence against the claim that perspectivism is relativism: Nietzsche’s requirements for perspective do dictate an order of rank and a new determination of what ‘objective values’ can mean in the mouths of humans.

Given this new understanding of ‘truth,’ we can correlative redefine ‘falsity’ as follows: claims are false which fail to meet the four values of intersubjective agreement, permitting life to flourish, depending on purpose, and playful but careful experimentation. A false claim would thus be one which has little or no intersubjective agreement, which hinders or damages life, which is purposeless, and which is experimentally unviable. Claims are more false the more criteria they fail to fulfill, or the worse they fail a given criteria; thus a claim can be false which has intersubjective agreement but is totally inimical to life, or a claim may fail on multiple accounts, etc. Thus I believe Nietzsche can coherently use the word ‘false’ to describe objectionable claims from within perspectivism.

Given this account of perspectivism, it is difficult for me to believe that this axiology could fall prey to relativism. I will borrow my definition of relativism from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Relativism, roughly put, is the view that truth and falsity, right and
wrong, standards of reasoning, and procedures of justification are products of differing conventions and frameworks of assessment and that their authority is confined to the context giving rise to them,” or:

More precisely, “relativism” covers views which maintain that—at a high level of abstraction—at least some class of things have the properties they have (e.g., beautiful, morally good, epistemically justified) not *simpliciter*, but only relative to a given framework of assessment (e.g., local cultural norms, individual standards), and correspondingly, that the truth of claims attributing these properties holds only once the relevant framework of assessment is specified or supplied. Relativists characteristically insist, furthermore, that if something is only relatively so, then there can be no framework-independent vantage point from which the matter of whether the thing in question is so can be established.  

Thus I take the criteria of broadly axiological relativism to be that 1) values are products of different frameworks of assessment and 2) the authority of these values is confined to their context. These values may include truth, beauty, reality, rightness, etc. Thus the objects of which these values are properties only have these values relative to their given framework of assessment, and there is no framework-independent means of establishing those values. This definition of relativism thus does imply the claim that values are real, extant things, but limits their existence to specific contexts. To put it another way: value is real and value is context-dependent. Relativism can be construed as a denial of absolutism, objectivism, monism, and/or realism; that is to say, the context-dependence of value may be set up in opposition to the universality and ahistoricity of value, or to the mental independence of value, or to the reduction of correctness of evaluation to a single option, or to the existence of value where existence requires objectivity or monism.

I have already argued that Nietzsche does not intend perspectivism to be relative, but intentions often pave the way to deleterious effects. It is quite possible that the criteria I have

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recovered (redefinition of objectivity as intersubjective, promotion of life, purposive plurality, experimental viability) might fail to save perspectivism from relativism despite my arguments to the contrary. However, the fact that from within perspectivism Nietzsche attempts to make some substantive normative epistemic claims, especially regarding the value of deceptions and the creation of new values, I am more confident that perspectivism cannot or at least should not be relativist.

By contrast, Danto and other of Nietzsche’s commentators who describe perspectivism as relativism often conflate nihilism with relativism, that is, they conflate the claim that there is no value with the claim that value (exists and) is relative. Given the fourth opposition to relativism – realism – it is perhaps understandable that some philosophers confuse relativism and nihilism. Further, given Nietzsche’s infamous statement in the Nachlass that “there are no facts, only interpretations,” elsewhere published as “there are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena” (BGE §108, p. 275), it is also perhaps understandable that some commentators take Nietzsche to be nihilistic about the truth. However, the denial of reality is not the same as saying what is real is not objective or monistic, and a deflationary metaphysical claim is not the same thing as a substantive dismissal of an idea. Further, the denial of facts, especially so-called objective facts about evaluative phenomena, is not the denial of all kinds of truth. 202 Thus, Danto and others who define perspectivism as hybridized relativism-nihilism are not only wrong about their definition of perspectivism, but they are wrong about how they understand relativism in the first place. Philosophical rigor requires that we make clear distinctions between our definitions, and in this respect many of Nietzsche’s commentators have failed to be rigorous. Nietzsche’s perspectivism cannot be axiological relativism if we define it on the basis of nihilist denials of the existence of truth.

202 I was inspired to this difference by a pronouncement from the poet Robert Graves: “Fact is not truth, but a poet who willfully defies fact cannot achieve truth.” See p. 224 of The White Goddess (Noonday Press: 1948). Additionally, I found this inspiration reinforced by a science fiction character written by Anne McCaffrey: “Fact is not the only truth.” See p. 159 of All the Weyrs of Pern (Del Rey: 1997).
If perspective does depend on the individual in any way, it is because knowledge in some way does seem to be connected to perception. Because perception is relative to the individual and the way the individual conceptualizes within the social constructions of their society, it is important that we do not merely define perspectivism as “the truth depends on perceptions” alone. Further, and more importantly, I believe my definition of Nietzsche’s perspectivism avoids relativism without falling into nihilism either. The last two criteria may not be much use in this regard. First, purposiveness of perspective might not avoid relativism, though it does avoid nihilism. When value is dependent in anyway on the purpose of an individual or group, this still presumes the existence of that value. Second, experimental viability does not seem to avoid either relativism or nihilism in all cases; conditions can vary such that what works in one experiment may fail in another experiment and hence viability may be strictly relative to specific conditions. Likewise, depending on the kind of experiment, in particular if one is performing a thought experiment, one may be experimenting with objects which do not physically exist, such as unicorns or empty sets and hence viability may not be a preventative against nihilism or the lack of existence.

However, I find that intersubjective agreement and promotion of life both help perspectivism avoid lapsing into either relativism or nihilism. Intersubjective agreement in its pluralist redefinition of objectivity is a fail-safe which acts as a preventative: against nihilism, perspectivism does assert the reality of value, provided that the value has intersubjective agreement; against relativism, perspectivism asserts the independence of context through the agreement of increasingly more subjectivities. If a value is dependent on intersubjective agreement, then it cannot be merely context-dependent (though it may be contextually generated), for the more subjectivities in agreement on the value, the truer the value can be. A value is maximally true when all subjectivities are in agreement, and though this maximal truth may in practice be unattainable at the moment, theoretically it is not necessarily impossible. As for the
promotion of life, such a criteria has as its objects what fills most of our existence: living beings, especially humans. Thus the promotion of life is a criteria which also prevents nihilism. By the same token, I argue that promoting life is a criteria which prevents relativism because while the particulars of what allows an individual to survive and flourish might be context-dependent, the promotion of life itself is not and cannot be context-dependent. It is not and cannot be context-dependent because life and the promotion thereof are prerequisite for value: without living beings there can be no value at all.

The core motivation for perspectivism as I see it is the rejection of the sensibility and desirability of the modern understanding of epistemic objectivity in any kind of evaluation. Other philosophers have addressed this as a problem concerning the relationship between our epistemic judgments and our beliefs concerning metaphysics. As Gideon Rosen points out, “however interesting the contrast between the causally or explanatorily potent features of the world and the rest may be for epistemology, it seems to have no intrinsic connection between the metaphysical contrast between that which exists independently of us and that which does not” (Rosen, 313). Thus, whether an evaluation is true is a question wholly independent of whether or not the evaluation depends on an individual. In other words, it is meaningless to consider objectivity as a matter of independence from humans, cultures, or individuals. Such an objectivity would have no use for us in the sense that it could not possibly contribute to human flourishing. This is not relativism, however, for precisely the reason that we are motivated by what can promote life and human flourishing from a plurality of perspectives which intersubjectively agree, are purposive, and are experimentally viable.

The arguments against relativism typically include: the claim that relativism entails that the majority in any given context is infallible; the claim that relativism precludes the possibilities of inter-societal comparisons, social development or progression, and the resolution of inter-societal disagreements; and the claim that relativism can lead to undesirable consequences. Each
consequence is of especial importance for feminism, which seeks to avoid ethnocentrism but cannot risk relativism either. First, feminism needs a means to argue against majority rule, for often times the political majority has oppressed women throughout history and round the globe. Second, feminism needs a means of comparing different societies, arguing for concrete social development, and resolving inter-societal disagreements, for without a means for comparison and judgment, feminists have no recourse to argue against social practices like excision or to claim that a world where women have the same rights as men is better than a world without. Third, feminism seeks to avoid the undesirable consequences relativism permits, such as slavery and patriarchal hegemony, for a relativist simply has to accept that slavery and patriarchal hegemony are ‘right’ in other cultures than our own while a feminist wants to be able to say that slavery and patriarchal hegemony are always wrong.

However, perspectivism is not susceptible to these arguments against relativism and provides the axiological means feminism requires. First, with regards to majority rule, perspectivism reveals that the ‘political’ majority is not the perspectival majority, and shows that even if most or all people believe something to be true or just, it can still be false or unjust if it is inimical to life, lacking in purpose, or experimentally unviable. Excision may be purposive and accepted by the majority in a limited group, but more perspectives reveal the harm of excision and other cultures prove excision to be experimentally unviable. In this way, perspectivism unites the valuable insights from relativism, naturalism, and pragmatism while using each as a fail-safe against the flaws of the others. Second, with regards to inter-societal comparisons, social development, and inter-societal disagreement, perspectivism reveals multiple means for giving ground to these kinds of arguments beyond what is simply accepted by the cultures and societies themselves. In this way, feminists can claim that patriarchal hegemony is unjust and regressive through the comparison of multiple perspectives. Third, with regards to undesirable consequences, perspectivism allows us to increasingly correct our understanding of the world as
we multiply perspectives, and hence we can through the accumulation of perspectives determine reasons why for example slavery is wrong in every circumstance, even if it does allow a given society to flourish for a time. Thus Nietzsche can make claims that great civilizations have always predicated their greatness on slavery, and it can also be true that regardless of this fact, slavery was wrong in each case despite its ostensible purposiveness because adding the perspectives of the slaves reveals the harms of slavery and its lack of intersubjective agreement; additionally, slavery is shown historically to be experimentally unviable: every civilization dependent on slavery either has collapsed or has had to abolish slavery to continue to survive. Maximally true claims fulfill all the criteria of perspectivism, not just one or two, and the lack of fulfillment of any given criteria requires a re-evaluation of the truth of a claim. Thus we have recourse to argue against the relativist and the nihilist both, and can provide a much stronger defense of perspectivism.

§4 The Problem of Optics and Other Metaphors

Zarathustra remarks in “On Redemption” how he has seen many who have lost body parts like an eye, ear, or leg, but that he has also seen what is worse: “human beings who are nothing but a big eye or a big mouth or a big belly…Inverse cripples I call them,” or creatures “who had too little of everything and too much of one thing” (TSZ II:20, p. 137-8). Zarathustra describes an encounter with a genius who happened to be “An ear as big as a man!” with a “little bloated soul…dangling from the stalk” that held up the ear (TSZ II:20, p. 138). I suspect this giant ear with a little bloated soul might well be Wagner; regardless, we have one of Nietzsche’s tools of criticism within perspectivism: overspecialization, or narrowness of perspective. A problem for perspectivism from within thus might be the narrowness of perspective with which Nietzsche or his commentators focus on the optical metaphor or, to put it figuratively, perspectivism runs the risk of being a doctrine which is little more than a giant eye walking
around with only the tiniest bloated soul dangling from its stalk. Though Nietzsche himself explicitly states the broadness of his category of perspective as including eyesight, truth, knowledge, belief, reality, existence, value, etc. (e.g., A §44, p. 620-1), his commentators cannot resist the allure of the metaphor, and Nietzsche himself makes use of it extensively. Thus, we must address the problems with optics as a metaphor. I will focus in this section on the problems with the optical metaphor, and use the next section to focus on the problems with the feminine metaphor.

One of the problems with metaphors generally is that they can be both too broad and too narrow to capture the intended meaning. In this way, the problem with the optical metaphor is that it requires an analogy between knowing and sight, which artificially limits knowledge to seeing and imagery while artificially expanding the limits of knowledge to include all things seen or otherwise perceived. However, Nietzsche is a poetical author; metaphor is his preferred method of argumentative analogy. We must then ask whether perception a better analogy for knowing than other processes or faculties. If a better analogy exists, perspectivism might benefit from a change in perspective. We might also find the metaphor to be inappropriate to the context of human knowledge: after all, blind and visually impaired humans are still capable of knowledge. Given this I expand the metaphor to perception: with apologies to Bishop Berkeley, esse may not be percipi aut percipere, but scire may well be. To translate: while ‘being’ or existence may not mean ‘perceiving or being perceived,’ it is possible that ‘knowing’ means ‘perceiving or being perceived.’

Another problem with the metaphor is that it perhaps falls into Nietzsche’s identified error of having ‘faith in grammar’: we must ask why does knowledge requires a knower. In other words, ‘knowing’ might be the kind of event that occurs in living beings, an event without a subject as we have previously understood. For example, an event with no subject might be a thunderstorm: the weather ‘storms’ without there being a subjective entity doing the storming.
Likewise, despite our experience as subjective beings experiencing learning, believing, and knowing, we might be operating under some sort of illusion based on linguistic structures like grammar. It could be the case that like the thunderstorm, we are knowing without being the kinds of subjective entities we think we are doing the knowing. The fact that this metaphor is difficult to comprehend as an apparently subjective entity is not necessarily an argument against it, but I confess I have no solution at this time.

Additionally, we might question the fact that it is a metaphor in the first place as being too figurative, obscure, vague, or ambiguous to provide a coherent argument against or in favor of anything at all. However, I think this last concern is the least of our concerns; in one sense, this problem applies to any argument in natural language, and is not therefore a problem with perspectivism which puts it at a disadvantage to any other axiological doctrine. If language is metaphor, this is not a problem with perspectivism or with Nietzsche’s philosophy generally, or with the metaphors of optics and women.

Remaining questions include whether there is a difference between sensory perspectives and ‘cognitive’ or ‘intellectual’ perspectives, and whether or not cognition and perception are sufficiently analogous for perspectivism to hold. Optics is too narrow a category to encompass all perception, but the broadness and multiplicity of sensory perception overall might be sufficient to do the work that we want. To go yet further: if someone were completely deprived of all perception from conception or birth or whenever perception would usually begin, if such a ‘person’ were even conceivable, we must ask whether and how such a person could know anything. In a way this is a question of developmental psychology: How can there be a self without the other? An existentialist, or a proto-existentialist like Nietzsche, might answer that without perception there can be no ‘other’ and hence can be no ‘self,’ and hence there can be no knower and no knowing.
R. Lanier Anderson raises several problems for the optical metaphor. First, there are no laws of cognitive optics the way there are laws of physical optics, so cognitive perspectives are not compatible with each other in the way visual perspectives are (Anderson, p. 4). Second, Anderson finds the optical analogy too narrow, and argues that it is better to reframe perspective as a matter of interpretation involving both an object and an interpreter. Other commentators agree that interpretation is tied to perspective in a meaningful way; Christoph Cox defines “perspective” as an evaluation made possible and caused by the operation of a particular affective interpretation (Cox, p. 112).  

In response to Anderson’s first criticism, I argue instead that just because we lack a set of laws for cognitive optics does not mean that such laws do not exist. Though psychology is a discipline only a few hundred years old, we have already determined some principles which appear to drive human behavior in law-like ways. Also he presupposes that all visual perspectives are compatible which they need not be. In response to Anderson’s second criticism, I argue that Anderson’s metaphor requires a Kantian thing-in-itself type of cognitive ‘object’ metaphorical to the visual object, and a grammatically assumed ‘subject’ doing the interpretation, both of which Nietzsche would find objectionable. Further, I agree with Cox who says that sensory perception and interpretation are “inseparable activities” (Cox, p. 98); thus Anderson’s reframing of optics as interpretation does not get us out of the difficulty we encounter with the limitations on Nietzsche’s metaphor.

As for the issue of relativism, I believe my most convincing argument is as follows: Nietzsche builds in a self-correcting control against relativism in the form of intersubjectivity and the multiperspectival redefinition of objectivity. As human beings and ‘knowing’ entities, we are creatures of perception (or interpretation, or whatever metaphor works best), and perception is relative to our idiosyncratic bodies and to our cultural umbrellas of cognitive structures.  

203 I decline to use Cox’s discussion of Heidegger’s horizons, as Heidegger is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
However, we correct for this relativity by checking our perceptions with each other, and employing intersubjectivity or the plurality of perspectives to determine how ‘objective’ our perceptions are. The more perspectives we employ, the closer we can get to a more perfect ‘objectivity’ in our self-correction. Hence we can account for individual hallucinations, groupthink, and other internally coherent but intersubjectively/objectively false beliefs as existing in a bubble with an insufficient number of perspectives or insufficient number of kinds of perspectives for self-correction.

These are not the only problems with optics as a metaphor for perspectivism and perspectival truth, but they do seem to be the predominant issues in the literature. However, I do not believe these problems are so troubling. Ultimately many of these objections against “optics as metaphor” are merely objections against metaphors in philosophical argument: metaphors are too imprecise and lacking in rigor to do the work many philosophers need or prefer to do. However, this is not the kind of philosophy Nietzsche needs or prefers to do, and so I do not feel these objections hold much force. Metaphor is an important tool for Nietzsche precisely because of its imprecision and lack of rigor; after all, he would levy these objections against most of if not all of human language. The point is to try and forge new metaphors and to use old metaphors in new and interesting ways, to experiment and see what generates the best conditions for human flourishing in changing times and conditions.

§5 Truth as a Woman, the Sexual Metaphor, and the Veiled Figure at Saïs

We must also address Nietzsche’s feminine metaphor for truth as a woman because women and optics serve as dual metaphors connected to truth, objectivity, and perspective throughout the corpus of Nietzsche’s published work. I argued in the last section that metaphors are too broad and too narrow to capture the intended meaning with regards to perspectivism and
optics. Likewise, a problem with the feminine or sexual metaphor is that it requires an analogy between truth and woman, which is also both too broad and too narrow a metaphor in that it artificially limits truth to definitions of femininity and artificially expands truth to include all definitions and experiences of femininity.

I initially raise the problem of using women and things associated with women, like pregnancy, as metaphor in Chapter Three, in relation to Birth of Tragedy §8. What I now want to explore is whether it is always sexist to use or appropriate women as a metaphor for anything. If is sometimes acceptable in the sense of not being misogynistic, then it could be the case that, for example, Nietzsche’s remarks about Truth’s veiled pudenda are not inherently vulgar statements about biological sexuality. I would be more inclined to suspect that Nietzsche falls into the trap of complementary sexism by elevating women metaphorically as goddesses like Truth, Life, Wisdom, etc., but on the contrary I also feel that goddess-worship is consistent with his appreciation for the ancient peoples and their pluralistic pantheons.

Another problem is how we are supposed to be able to tell when Nietzsche is referring to women as metaphors and when as people. Sometimes he is happily explicit for us: using metaphors like Wisdom or Life as goddesses versus discussing the effects a human woman like Georges Sand has had on the literary world. However, there are times when he seems to shift from speaking in a metaphorical mode to speaking in a more literal mode or vice versa, and these occasions in particular seem to present problems for exegesis. If Nietzsche blurs the boundaries between metaphorical and literal women, then he makes difficult determining whether he directs his apparent insult at a real woman or whether he directs his apparent insult at the metaphor. Not all insults against a woman are necessarily misogynistic just for the sake of being insults against a person who happens to be a woman, and by the same token insults against a metaphorical woman rather than an actual woman would not by any means be automatically non-misogynistic just for
the sake of being insults against metaphorical women or womanhood rather than against a human woman.

However, we cannot simply dismiss these concerns out of hand. Metaphors are significant not only for Nietzsche but for human communication in general. They can serve as frames of reference, models for behavior or understanding, speculations, constraints and prescriptions, as well as explanations (Haste, p. 43-47):

> Metaphors are not just peripheral linguistic frills. They provide analogies, models for explanation, and therefore facilitate innovative thought...Metaphor is a rhetorical process, and an important insight from rhetoric is that in every communication there are things that are taken for granted and things that are problematic. If something is taken for granted, it lends itself to shorthand expression and needs neither elaboration nor advocacy. What is problematic, however, must be explained and justified. Changing social values or deep-seated beliefs requires challenging what is taken for granted to make it problematic in new ways.

Haste, p. x (“Preface”)

If Nietzsche’s use of the sexual metaphor is conventional shorthand for the stereotypes and biases of his contemporaries, then it is uninteresting standard-grade misogyny. However, I believe I have demonstrated in my third chapter that Nietzsche’s use of these feminine and sexual metaphors is anything but conventional derogation of women. Thus I claim that Nietzsche instead is doing what Helen Haste argued feminism did in the twentieth century, that Nietzsche challenges and is concerned with making problematic what his contemporaries took for granted about gender.

In particular I wish to address Kelly Oliver’s argument that Nietzsche’s use of woman as a trope demonstrates a reappropriation of the feminine for and by masculine and masculinist philosophers while at the same time rejecting any objective femininity or objective truth, and most importantly her identification of feminism as congruent with the kind of truth Nietzsche rejects. Given that Nietzsche identifies ‘feminism’ as he explicitly refers to it as ‘idealism’ and hence as a kind of dogmatism, I do not think he is engaging in the kind of malicious appropriation
Oliver claims. Further, because Nietzsche redefines rather than rejects objectivity, I do not think
Oliver is right to say that Nietzsche rejects ‘truth’ or ‘femininity.’ Rather, Nietzsche offers a
redefinition of truth and hence also femininity, which permits and even requires the diverse
plurality of views so valuable to feminism. Finally, Nietzsche repeatedly describes himself as
having feminine instincts, qualities, abilities, etc., so we must acknowledge the way he aligns
himself with femininity under a different aegis.

Further, Nietzsche’s sustained resistance to dualism plays out in the multitudinous roles
he assigns women in his pantheon, and the ways in which they break out of sexual dualism in
particular. To list around a dozen he names explicitly would include Wisdom, Life, Number,
Truth, Zarathustra’s Stillest Hour, Happiness, Eternity, Philosophy, various Great Problems,
Reason, Victory, Poetry, and Charm. Compare these with the primary metaphors of sexual
dualism, otherness, hierarchy, and polarity: light-dark, public-private, rational-intuitive, order-
chaos, active-passive, thinking-feeling, higher-lower (see Haste, p. 3). Given that sexual dualism
had come into vogue and displaced sexual monism (where ‘male’ was the only sex) during
Nietzsche’s time, and given Nietzsche’s various disruptions of this and other dualisms, we must
read Nietzsche as engaged with challenging the taken-for-granted assumptions built into sexual
dualism which was championed by the Wilhelmine feminists and misogynists alike.

Further evidence comes with Nietzsche’s equation of Truth, Wisdom, and Reason with
feminine entities; by making this equation, Nietzsche upsets the traditional treatment of
rationality as essentially masculine. Some feminists (including Haste, p. 33) see the critique of
reason as solely masculine in nature as central to the feminist enterprise. In this regard, by calling
Reason a woman, Nietzsche again proves himself to at least be trying to disrupt sexual dualism.
Another concern is Nietzsche’s reliance on the relationship between women and nature as part of
his metaphorical environment. However, the woman-nature relation only becomes problematic
when it is used to oppress women, typically by enforcing the status quo as ‘natural’ (Haste, p.
On the contrary, Nietzsche makes arguments that the status quo is unacceptable, with regards to men, men’s education about women, and women as well. Nietzsche finds especially deplorable the state of women’s education concerning sex, as we saw in The Gay Science, and appears to reject enforced chastity for healthy sexual fulfillment. Even Carol Diethe, Nietzsche’s strongest detractor, recognizes this, as I pointed out in Chapter 1. Note also that Nietzsche does not appear to be under the false impression that woman’s sexual power leads to political power the way misogynists from antiquity into the modern day like to insinuate (see Haste, p. 171), for as we have seen he points out multiple ways in which women are oppressed politically; this is true despite the fact that he is against women’s suffrage, but then he was generally against voting anyway. Nietzsche was anti-democratic, which I think is sufficient reason for him to be against anyone’s suffrage without necessarily lapsing into being regressive, reactive, defensive, or otherwise repressive. Democracy is imperfect: it does fail in that it opens government power to those who proselytize lifestyles founded on bigotry, willful ignorance, intolerance, and otherwise ill health. Mass enfranchisement in these respects is not much better than mass disenfranchisement.

§6  Standing Truth on Her Head: Reversing Perspectives

Nietzsche often claims that the correct perspective is a reversal of whatever perspective seems common in each given context. Thus Nietzsche reverses cause and effect frequently, showing that what we purport to be the cause is actually the effect and vice versa. Given my initial defense of perspectivism above, we can see how Nietzsche’s perspectival definition of truth allows him to engage in these reversals. I wish to demonstrate now how such reversals are
of inestimable value to contemporary feminism, particularly standpoint theory and other feminist epistemologies, as well as other feminist axiologies more generally.

In particular I believe perspectivism, and especially the claim that we must learn to control perspectives and learn to become more ‘objective’ by experimenting with perspective, contributes to feminism in the following ways: first, reversals of perspective provide a tool for feminists to question and challenge the privileged perspectives of entrenched white masculine discourses; second, reversals of perspective provide a tool for feminists to introduce new modes of valuation which are not merely reactionary but considered analytical responses to existing value schemes; third, reversals of perspective provide a tool for feminists to act intentionally and hence to avoid slave morality and its unintentionally reactionary reversal which merely posits the opposite of the master morality, as Conway argues occurs in Harding’s standpoint epistemology (Conway, p. 274).

First, I see perspectivism as a tool for questioning and challenging privilege. Nietzsche frequently uses ‘noble’ in a positive sense, and comes off as extraordinarily elitist. Though elitism may be endemic to philosophy, this does not excuse Nietzsche from the idiosyncrasy at best and intellectual violence at worst. However, it is his ability to reverse perspective which allows him to challenge the established tables of values and modes of valuation in his own time; without perspectivism, Nietzsche could not be so scathingly critical of Christianity, Kantianism, or Platonism, all established dogmas which privileged white men of property. We also see that he uses these reversals to challenge misogyny and the mistreatment of women in multiple places.

Next, I see perspectivism as a tool for creating new tables of values and modes of valuation. First, perspectivism is a value creator’s tool because perspectivism permits reversals and other changes in perspective. These reversals and other changes like tinting, shading, etc.
Second, perspectivism is a tool for value-creation because perspectivism requires a plurality of experiences and points of view with regards to any given concept. The more ways we learn to understand a concept, the more ways we can see how value can apply to that concept and related concepts. Third, perspectivism is a value-creation tool because perspectivism requires us to avoid caprice. Capriciousness theoretically could create new value, but only accidentally; non-accidental creation requires perspective knowing, not mere relative belief.

Last, I see perspectivism as a tool for avoiding slave valuation and mere reaction in favor of intentional action. That we can reverse perspective does not always dictate that we should reverse perspectives, whether on gender or other concepts. Perspectivism requires that our reverses be purposeful and consciously chosen where possible, and that we should gather as many perspectives as possible in our continuous process of re-valuation. Slave axiology is defined by its knee-jerk reactionary response, and makes the dogmatic error of belief in an eternal afterworld of ‘being’ which is superior to the changing world of ‘becoming.’ I believe Nietzsche would agree that we have never ‘arrived’ at any final conclusion because humans exist as creatures of ‘becoming’ rather than the dogmatically erroneous eternal ‘being’ of the ancients.

§7 Conclusion

One of the questions which plagues philosophers concerned with perspectivism is whether and how Nietzsche can claim that his doctrine of perspectivism is a true doctrine. Now that I have provided all forty of Nietzsche’s remarks on perspectivism and what claims this doctrine appears to entail, I will in a future work seek to show that perspectivism is ‘true’ in the perspectival sense of ‘truth’ and thus internally coherent. Other concerns for the viability of perspectivism include: Nietzsche’s criteria of the promotion of life, which he does not appear to clearly define; a coherent and contextual definition of nature and the natural, also not provided
explicitly by Nietzsche but perhaps in large part based on the literary culture of the nineteenth century; and, given that so much of what Nietzsche writes is polemical rhetoric rather than argumentative, the rational reconstruction of the mutual relationships between the plurality of perspectives Nietzsche employs which ought to reveal what *a priori* moral assumptions Nietzsche makes in his table of values.

To conclude this chapter on perspectivism, and how it relates to Nietzsche’s remarks about women, I offer one final set of considerations: Truth is an ideal. ‘Woman’ is also an ideal. Ideals are valuations. Perspectivism dictates the necessity of a plurality of valuations. Therefore perspectivism implies that we should pluralize our ideals/valuations of women (and truth) to be more inclusive of more perspectives, different perspectives, more eyes, different eyes. This strikes me as eminently feminist in a contemporary sense. However, this kind of perspectivist argument in favor of pluralism is directly counter to Wilhelmine feminism and similar feminisms which tend to objectivism, dualism, and essentialism. Thus Nietzsche would not respond to all feminisms the same way, and would find pluralist, intersubjective feminisms far more palatable.
§1 Introduction

I will take this concluding chapter to tie up some loose ends remaining from the extensive discussion in the preceding chapters. First, it remains to be seen how perspectivism as I define it differs from other leading value theories in philosophy broadly and feminism more specifically; in particular, I must distinguish perspectivism from pragmatism and standpoint theory. Pragmatism and standpoint theory both differ in that they offer different means for ranking values than perspectivism offers. Further, I wish to offer some final considerations to the argument that Nietzsche’s rejection of Wilhelmine feminism is distinct from misogynist arguments against feminism and consistent with what I believe is his attempt to represent himself as an anti-misogynist to the best of his ability. I believe Nietzsche would have found contemporary feminism far more palatable than the feminism of his own time.

I would additionally like to explicitly address what perspectivism and feminism provide for each other working together rather than considered wholly unrelated. This is partially in response to those who suggest it is sufficient to consider each alone, or that feminism is a tertiary concern to perspectivism, and partially in response to those who argue that Nietzsche has no place in feminist theory. Lastly, I will offer some suggestions for future avenues of research which I feel are necessary supplements to the work I have done in this dissertation. I do this because
contemporary feminism requires intersectional study of gender and the social problems connected to it. Hence a twenty-first century feminist study of any subject is not fully engaged until we considered the intersections of race, class, ability, sexuality, and all of the other socially constructed categories affecting the lived human condition.

§2 Distinguishing Perspectivism from Pragmatism and Standpoint Theory

In this section I seek to distinguish perspectivism from other axiological and epistemological theories, particularly pragmatism and standpoint theory. We must look at pragmatism because several times over the course of researching for and writing this dissertation my initial (and more glib) definitions of perspectivism led people to ask about the difference between it and pragmatic theories of truth. I have already established the many reasons perspectivism is not nihilism, primarily because perspectivism does not wholly deny meaning or truth, and the many reasons perspectivism is not relativism, primarily because perspectivism does not leave all truths as equal to each other in value.

Pragmatism is different from both nihilism and relativism in a superficially similar way to perspectivism: it neither denies the existence of value nor the possibility (even necessity) of ranking values. Likewise, we must look at standpoint theory because it has a similar set of superficial similarities to perspectivism, neither denying value or the possible rank thereof, and some commentators have tried to tie perspectivism to standpoint theory explicitly. However, neither pragmatism nor standpoint theory fully parallel the specific requirements perspectivism posits for defining truth and value as the new multiperspectival ‘objectivity’ and as such must be distinguished from perspectivism proper, though they may prove to be useful instruments in the perspectivist’s toolbox.
Pragmatists tend to define knowledge, truth, value, etc. on the basis of what can make differences in lived experience. For my general definition of a pragmatic concept of truth, I refer to the lecture William James gave on the Schiller-Dewey view, “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth.” James poses several questions which reveal the tendency of pragmatists to rely on what makes differences in lived experience, saying that pragmatism:

…asks its usual question. “Grant an idea or belief to be true,” it says, “what concrete difference will its being true make in any one’s actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?”

James, p. 88

These questions lead James to define truth pragmatically as follows: “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we can not. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as” (James, p. 88-9). Thus the pragmatic view of truth is that truth depends wholly on what can be experienced, and what can cause one experience to be different from another experience. James offers one essential criteria for truth, which he interchangeably discusses as usefulness or verifiability.

Given my four criteria for perspectival truth and other values, namely the redefinition of objectivity, promotion of life, purposive plurality, and experimental viability, I see that there is some overlap between pragmatic truths and perspectival truths. Useful and verifiable truths will tend to promote life in at least some cases, though Nietzsche is very clear that sometimes the contradictory – and hence perhaps what is not useful or verifiable – is what promotes life in many cases. Further, useful and verifiable truths are going to tend to have experimental viability, but I suggest on the basis of Nietzsche’s taste for contradictions that some contradictory perspectival ‘truths’ are going to be experimentally viable as well. Thus perspectivism may include pragmatism both with and without any contradictions, but is not limited to pragmatism alone.
As an example of a contradictory perspectival truth which is nonetheless experimentally viable, I would suggest considering religious experiences derived from entheogens. Many cultures and religions have employed the use of dangerous natural poisons to induce experiences of the divine. The contradiction lies in the idea that one can approach something pure and holy by introducing deadly toxins into the body; and yet, so many religions are in part connected to or based on this contradiction. Zoroaster had his bath in haoma water, Indra and Agni consume soma, alcohol and especially wine figures prominently in ancient Dionysian, Osirian, Jewish, and Christian religions; examples from the ancient and the contemporary world abound, whether in revivals of old religions, continuations of indigenous traditions, or syncretic ‘new age’ religious invention. For further examples of contradictions which are nonetheless perspectival truths, note the few “Nothlügen” or “necessary lies” Nietzsche explicitly references in UM II:10 and HATH 40 and 104, and consider also his many discussions of opposites (see ‘gegensatz’ in the index).

Standpoint theory derives from the ideas in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic and Marxist accounts of social relations (Conway, p. 260 fn. 11, citing multiple sources from Harding 1986, Ch. 7). In particular, Harding’s account of feminist standpoint theory perpetuates a slave revolt in epistemology, because it treats the ‘slave’ perspectives epistemically privileged and more ‘objective’ than ‘master’ perspectives, as Conway has already demonstrated at length (see p. 266-277). Standpoint theory values a reactionary rather than creative-experimental value system, which is counter to the fourth criteria of experimental viability and the second criteria of purposive plurality. Crucially, because Hegel’s master-slave dialectic is a false dichotomy with regard to perspective, standpoint theory carries over the same fallacious dualism.

Consider: the slave has no more a complete panoptic view of the world than the master; he has merely learned to see the world in two ways, which is only one additional way to the way the master can see the world. This is dualism, not pluralism. For Nietzsche’s perspectivism to be consistent with standpoint theory, the slave would have to learn to control his perspectives and
multiply them further, not merely or solely invert the value scheme provided by the singular perspective of the master. Inversion is a necessary first step, but it cannot be the end game. Going beyond the revolt to build a new table of values is ultimately what Nietzsche is arguing must be necessary for the health of those who survive the revolution in value, in order to continue thriving in a new world.

§3 Distinguishing Misogyny from Anti-Wilhelmine Feminism

The criticism of feminism is not equivalent to the hatred of women. Indeed, many feminists themselves engage in critiques of their own feminisms and the feminisms of others. An intersectionally-oriented contemporary feminist will have at minimum one doctrine in common with Nietzsche: the rejection of gender essentialism and dualism as seen in Wilhelmine feminism and other essentialist/dualist feminisms. Critiquing essentialism and dualism are at the heart of many contemporary feminist critiques of past feminists. However, this is a minimum requirement, and we must establish a more robust connection here; not all misogynists need be dualists or essentialists. It is at least theoretically possible for a misogynist to recognize the plurality of gender and to understand the nature of the social construction of gender and to still maintain conventional sexism such as veneration of apparently chaste or religious women at the expense of less ‘pure’ women, or the preference for the dominance of men in society on non-biological grounds, just as a few examples.

In particular, I argue that Nietzsche’s philosophy is connected to the kind of feminism which rejects gender essentialism and dualism as well as the politics of Wilhelmine feminists, misogynists, and those like them throughout history who sought primarily to improve women’s qualities and conditions as wives and mothers rather than as persons or humans with particular
wants and needs, and thus both to generalize women categorically as wives and mothers and to keep women submissive to male dominance. I do not argue here that it is misogynist or otherwise harmful to improve the conditions of married women or women who have children, for that seems patently false *prima facie*; I do however claim that focusing on the state of women in these positions to the exclusion of all other women is misogynist and harmful precisely because it reduces female human beings to a mere fraction of their personhood and potential lived experience.

It is possible to value human reproduction, socialization, romantic and sexual coupling, etc., without making these the exclusive or primary domain of women as has been the historical trend in Western society. That Nietzsche grants women their sexuality rather than denying it like his Victorian peers, that he even discusses women in other roles beyond marriage and motherhood, such as scholars and artists, and that he sympathizes with the plight of their bad sexual education I take to be counter-evidence to the claims that Nietzsche prefers to keep women subservient and locked into their traditional roles. Rather, Nietzsche’s use of metaphor and multiplicity in his expressions about women and femininity allow him to break the traditional labels, roles, and criticisms his contemporaries employed to keep women with children, in the kitchen, or in the church.

That Nietzsche sometimes discusses women in these relationships is no doubt a result of the fact that “gendered metaphors of women in power cannot avoid perpetuating gender-sexual systems that privilege masculinity” (Lim, p. 266, citing Haste). However, we can also see Nietzsche’s attempt to create new metaphors or recreate old ones when he revives old goddesses like Athena and old feminine gods like Dionysus, as well as when he breathes life into his own pantheon of goddesses such as Truth, Wisdom, Philosophy, etc. By including discussions of women from all walks of life, not only mothers and wives but also nuns and prostitutes, ladies of quality and common women, scholars and artists, young maidens and little old women, Nietzsche
shows a kind of embracing of the plurality of kinds of women that we do not see in other canonical western philosophers who more accurately fit the category of misogynist, like Schopenhauer, Kant, and Aristotle, all of whom come under Nietzsche’s scrutiny explicitly and repeatedly.

§4 What Perspectivism and Contemporary Feminism Offer Each Other

Another challenge I encounter concerning my work on this dissertation is the thought that there is nothing fruitful to be gained from tying perspectivism to feminism. Some have argued that it would be sufficient to write about perspectivism alone, as it is a rich and underexplored field of study in itself. The majority of commentators have restricted themselves to either epistemological, alethiological, or ethical understandings of perspectivism, and have failed to explore the aesthetic, logical, metaphysical, and socio-political perspectivisms specifically as well as axiological perspectivism broadly. As such, there is much work which remains with regard to perspectivism as a philosophical theory or doctrine. Similarly, feminism, women’s studies, and gender studies are all rich and underexplored fields of study in themselves without digging up theories from yet another dead white European man; any number of dissertations could be written about the intersection of philosophy with these fields of study, particularly focusing on the many women of color who are writing today or in the recent past.204

It probably would have been in some respects easier to write a shorter dissertation on one of these narrower topics. However, a work like I wanted to read had not yet been written: no one had gone through Nietzsche’s publications chronologically to explore everything he wrote about women, and no one had done so with an eye to his significant claim that truth is a woman. The claim that truth is a woman is significant because it makes explicit something philosophers have

204 I have in mind much work which could be done exploring Octavia Butler’s science fiction and how she plays with our notions of humanity, gender, society, etc. in works like her trilogy Lilith’s Brood, as just one of several possible examples.
historically assumed implicitly, namely a parallel between the unknowable mysteries of pure objectivity – in other words, the common understand of what “Truth” entails – and the unknowable mysteries of the gender they basically invented to assuage their fragile masculine egos.

“Truth is a woman” is a psychological evaluation of canonical Western philosophy as a whole. These philosophers were unhappy with their limited perspectives, their physical limitations, their lack of socio-economic power over their fellow men, their lack of ability to enforce their will over the world, their lack of ability to know all with absolute accuracy, and their inability to produce inviolable proofs of their claims to this absolute knowledge. As a result, or perhaps correlative, they turned their self-hatred on others and declared ‘Truth’ itself to be unattainable, at least without extensive study, thus placing the truth on a pedestal out of reach of all common men, all non-philosophers. Like many psychologically suffering men, they also lashed out at women and invented ‘Woman,’ also known as the Eternal Feminine. She became as unreachable as Truth, and placed on the same pedestal, out of reach not only of all men but also of all living, human women. No man could gain a ‘real woman’ as his prize any more than he could gain the ‘real truth,’ and no woman could ever hope to do anything more than perform and attempt to emulate this impossible ideal. Because women thus were tricked into becoming performers, it then became easy (and cheap) to attack them for the quality of their performance or the fact that they were performing at all. When ‘real’ women – and ‘real’ truth – become ideals like this, everyday women and truth become false by definition. Nietzsche’s redefinition of truth allows for everyday women and truths to enter the category of real once again.

Further, he reveals how all gender is performance, since masculinity in this system is defined by its striving for the capture of the eternally feminine woman. This entails that masculinity is a performance as well because men are complicit in the definition of the eternal feminine, and thus can only perform a chase of this ideal, knowing it is by definition out of reach.
In parallel, when truth is defined as out of reach, and the philosopher is complicit in that
definition, philosophy as well becomes a performance. However, Nietzsche does not devalue
performance and superficiality, as these make up the majority of our lives and he chooses to value
life most highly. It does, on the other hand, become hypocritical of philosophers to accuse
feminists of being dilettantes or falseness without recognizing themselves as performers in the
same light, as Nietzsche points out at the end of the too often abbreviated “When a woman has
scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong with her sexually” quote from Beyond
Good and Evil, which concludes: “Sterility itself disposes one toward a certain masculinity of
taste; for man is, if I may say so, ‘the sterile animal’” (BGE §144, p. 279).

Thus what perspectivism offers feminism is a doctrine and set of values which allows for
self-critique without self-undoing, or to say it more metaphorically, an ability to stare into the
abyss and to allow the abyss to stare back into oneself without losing one’s sanity or identity, or
the ability to fight monsters without oneself becoming a monster. If we have the ability to change
perspectives and control our ‘pro and con,’ then we can perhaps use the master’s tools to destroy
the master’s house. Perspectivism allows all this because it advocates pluralism with coherent
style that avoids empty-headed relativism because it also has a means to rank values without
becoming falsely objectivist.

Feminism has introduced the language Nietzsche lacked, and which clarifies what he
tended to express poetically: terminology like essentialism, gender, social construction. Feminism
has also made our social environment more receptive to his concept of revaluating all values and
the pluralist value of his perspectivism. Further, contemporary feminism has made the academic
landscape more receptive to some of Nietzsche’s criticisms of gender norms and criticisms of
essentialist Wilhelmine-like feminisms in particular, though not necessarily when those criticisms
come from Nietzsche’s texts specifically. Contemporary feminism if anything is aimed at self-
criticism and self-improvement within the field of academic study and social activism.
§5 Conclusion

All projects are of necessity incomplete in some way. Even a dissertation of this size could not encompass all of the possible concerns tied to perspectivism or feminism. I have already mentioned a few of these throughout, but I would like to include an explicit list of these future avenues of research that would significantly supplement the work I have completed here. First and more important, a more thorough-going exploration of Nietzsche’s attitudes towards racial difference is necessary; one insight which emerged in chapter three is that any intersectional feminist study of Nietzsche’s attitudes towards gender must attend to how Nietzsche regards Chinese women, for example. Though I am somewhat satisfied by Kaufmann’s explanation of Nietzsche’s anti-anti-Semitism, I do not believe this is the entire story with regards to Nietzsche and race. Close readers will note Nietzsche’s discussion not only of the ‘blond beast’ as pertaining to multiple nationalities and ethnicities but also of the fact that Nietzsche seems to dislike the Orientalism of his peers regardless of whether Orientalism was even remotely related to Chinese, Japanese, or other Asian philosophies and lived conditions. Given Nietzsche’s apparent reject of essentialism, especially gender essentialism, we must question any apparent racial essentialism or dualistic racist value schemes.

Socio-economic class intersects with gender and race as well. Nietzsche seems to express a preference for aristocrats over common folk, at least on a superficial reading. That there are valid criticisms of democracy is no reason to prefer aristocracy to democracy per se if only because aristocracy also has its flaws, but a more thorough-going analysis of Nietzsche’s discussion of social and economic classes is necessary to determine his attitudes with regards to classism as an intersecting form of bias. Some might argue that Nietzsche prefers exceptional people, geniuses, and heroes to peasants, commoners, and the voting masses because of their capacity to point us to Nietzsche’s aspirational doctrine of the Übermensch. I suspect that
Nietzsche’s criticisms of democracy and commoners are not based on the belief that most aristocrats are essentially better people; again, I think Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism is an important guide, but that more focused study on class is necessary to explore this problem.

Nietzsche also frequently discusses health, illness, disease, and disability. Ableism is a social bias now receiving more recognition, as it intersects with race, gender, and class, and disproportionately aggravates the injustices of otherwise already oppressed individuals. Intersectional feminist readings of Nietzsche thus would benefit from exploring Nietzsche’s attitudes here. Nietzsche does not see sickness or disability as an inherently negative thing, and even in a way prescribes ill health and other changes of abilities as methods of changing perspectives (see *Ecce Homo*). This is not the kind of inspirational commodification of disability seen in feel-good movies and media; rather, this is the recognition of value of traditionally disparaged perspectives and the persons who inhabit them. As Nietzsche discusses not only physical but also psychological disabilities, additional focused research on ability and health would be multiply useful.

Sexuality studies also intersect with gender, race, class, and ability, and Nietzsche discusses sexuality both explicitly and metaphorically, though usually he does seem to restrain himself to traditional heterosexuality, more or less monogamy, etc. However, I note that in the *Gay Science* he names one aphorism “The Third Sex,” which opens a number of doors for interpretation. Further, many scholars have suspected or insinuated that Nietzsche was not strictly heterosexual, heteroromantic, monogamous, etc. Additionally, his willingness to cohabitate with both Lou and Paul implies a more polyamorous sexuality at minimum. We might even see some sado-masochistic tendencies in his handing a whip to Lou for the infamous photo, or in the infamous whip passage from *Zarathustra*. All of these facts combine to produce a less than traditional picture: Nietzsche appears to be someone who may have strayed from the heterosexual, hetero-romantic, monogamous, mono-sexual, ‘vanilla’ standards of his day.
Nietzsche’s philosophy in general does seem to be amenable to a ‘create-your-own adventure’ sort of sexual value system; at the very least we must consider the fact that Nietzsche’s philosophy concerning sexuality is not explicitly and perfectly traditional itself.

These are just four additional possible cultural lenses which we can apply to a better understanding of Nietzsche’s apparent misogyny. If Nietzsche ultimately fails on these and other points, then his anti-misogyny is not congruent with intersectional feminism; this does not mean his feminism would be not ‘true’ feminism, but that it would be a lesser feminism in the intersectional feminist’s rank of values. However, if he proves to reject essentialism and dualism with regards to race, class, ability, and sexuality in addition to gender, then his anti-misogyny would be in many significant respects identical to intersectional feminism, and thus his would be a higher feminism in the contemporary intersectional feminist philosopher’s ranking of values.
Appendix: Indices of Passages Containing Key Terms

This appendix contains the results of the research necessary for building the second and third chapters. Below you will find several indices of passages in Nietzsche’s works containing references to or usages of the key terms for this dissertation. In particular, you will find indices of passages using words related to truth, knowledge, and epistemology, as well as indices of passages using words related to gender, femininity, women, and the Eternal Feminine. I have tried to be as inclusive as possible with my research, such that I not only include references to perspective, but also to the perspectival, not only to women but also to womanhood, etc. In this appendix I have striven for the most thoroughness of which I am capable. However, I am only human and also not a native German speaker. Suggestions for revisions and missing passages are welcome.

INDEX I: PERSPECTIVE AND THE OPTICAL METAPHOR

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VISION:  II:4, III BT:4, UM:3, HATH:2

GM  OPTI:  none
AUGEN:  P (7), I:7, 8, 11, 14, 16, II:6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 18, III:6, 8, 10 12, 14, 19, 20, 26, 26, (Augenblick:  I:14, II:2, 3, 23, III:6, 15, 23, 24)

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VISION:  79, 370

HATH  OPTI:  none

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NCW  OPTI:  I
VISION:  none

OTL  OPTI:  none
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VISION:  none

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TSZ OPTI: none  
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VISION: none  

UM OPTI: I: none, II: none, III: none, IV: none  
AUGEN: I: 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12; II: I: 2, 4, 6, 9, 10; III: I: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11; IV: I: 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, (Augenblick: I: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, II:1, 3, 5, 6, 8, III: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10; IV: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)  

WS OPTI: none  
VISION: 73, 217  

Total:  

Variations on sight: (“-betracht-,” “-Blick-,” “-Meinung-,” “-sah/seh/sicht/sieht-”)

Note: excluding Gesichtspunkt, included below, and excluding Augenblick

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MEINUNG: none  
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NCW BETRACHT: none

BLICK: I, VI, X (1), E

MEINUNG: IV (1), V, VI (1), X (1)

SEHEN: F, I, II, III, IV (1), V, VI, VII, X (1, 2), P

OTL BETRACHT: 1

BLICK: none

MEINUNG: none

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MEINUNG: I:1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12; II:1, 6, 7, 8; III: none; IV: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8
SEHEN: I:q, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11; II:P, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; III:1, 2q, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; IV: 1, 2, 2q, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11

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Note: excluding references to education “Bildung,” etc., and to illustration

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NCW ILLUS: none
EINBILD: none
BILD: none

OTL ILLUS: 1
EINBILD: none
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TSZ ILLUS: none
EINBILD: none
BILD: I:6, II:2, 7, 15, 21, III:12 (2), IV:3 (2), 9, 14 (3), 17 (2)

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NCW STANDPUNKT: none
GESICHTSPUNKT: none
Other PUNKT: none

OTL STANDPUNKT: none
GESICHTSPUNKT: 1
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TI STANDPUNKT: none
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TSZ STANDPUNKT: none
GESICHTSPUNKT: none
Other PUNKT: none

UM STANDPUNKT: I:4, 9; II:1, 9; III: none; IV: none
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419, 421, 424, 425, 436, 437), 479, 629, 636
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List of passages referencing women: (“Frau-”)  

Note that there are no references to misogyny or what is “Frauenfeindlich,” (though Nietzsche explicitly uses ‘Weiberfeinde’ as the title of D §346; nor are there any references to women’s rights or “Frauenrechten.” Lastly, note that Nietzsche does not make use of the term “neue Frau” or “neues Weib” in his published texts.

A 52 (Frauenzimmer), 56 (Kindern und Frauen)
AOM 30, 36, 169, 173, 265, 272, 276, 279 (frauenhafte), 282, 284, 286, 304, 324
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NCW none
OTL 2
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AOM  
P (3)  

BGE  
147, 210  

BT  
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D  
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EH  
III:3  

GM  
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GS  
339 (*vita femina*), 357  

HATH  none  

NCW  none  

OTL  none  

TI  
IX:50  

TSZ  none  

UM  
I: none; II: 7; III: none; IV: none  

WS  
none  

Total:  14  

List of passages referring to sex, including the ‘third’ sex: (“-Geschlecht-,” “-dritte-”)  

Note that “*Geschlecht*” can mean “bad,” “sex,” and “race, family, lineage,” the latter frequently translated as “generation”; I will focus here on the sexual meaning and exclude the other two.  

A  
52, G  

AOM  
95, 113, 273, 278, 291

I have chosen not to include a list of the individual women named by Nietzsche throughout his works, though I will include a few here for example: Nietzsche does discuss specific goddesses like Athena and Artemis, mythical and fictional characters like Isolde and Ophelia, religious icons like St. Theresa and Rahula, as well as references to his female family members, friends like Lou and Cosima, and women writers like George Sand. See for example GM III:8, BT 7, GM III:17, and EH II:3. Also note that there are only two references to the goddess Baubo: GS P (4) and NCW E (2).

Lastly, note that Nietzsche only references *Gouvernanten* or governesses once, in BGE §34.

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D MUTTER: 35, 128, 196, 206, 248, 340, 562
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GM MUTTER: I:15, 16, II:7, 17, 18, III:4, 8
HERRIN: none
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DAME: none
MÄDCHEN: III:8
GATTIN: none
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HEXE: III:16, 21
NONNE: none
JUNGFERN: none

GS MUTTER: P (3, 4), 24, 70, 72, 95, 104, 221, 338, 376
HERRIN: 70, 362
HURE: A (14)
DAME: 362
MÄDCHEN: P (4), 13, 104, A (4)
GATTIN: none
SCHWESTER: 103, 313, 338
TANTE: none
TOCHTER: 221
NICHTE: none
GÖTTIN: F (53, Minerva), 84, 92, 107
GEBIETERIN: none
MEISTERIN: 152
PROSTI: 31
DIRN: A (10)
KÖNIGIN: none
DICHTERIN: none
HEXE: 35, 250, 300, A (10)
NONNE: none
JUNGFERN: 357, 381
HERRIN: none
HURE: none
DAME: none
MÄDCHEN: 57, 257, 404, 407, 409, 421
GATTIN: 373, 378, 424, 434
SCHWESTER: none
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NICHE: none
GÖTTIN: P (3), 282, 370, 637
GEBIETERIN: none
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HEXE: 627
NONNE: none
JUNGFERN: none
NCW MUTTER: E (2), P
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HURE: none
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MÄDCHEN: E (2), P
GATTIN: none
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HEXE: none
NONNE: VIII:1
JUNGFERN: none

OTL MUTTER: 1
HERRIN: none
HURE: none
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MÄDCHEN: none
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DICHTERIN: IV:19 (8)

HEXE: I:6, 17, III:15 (1), IV:6

NONNE: none

JUNGFERN: none

UM MUTTER: I:4; II:2; 7, III:1, 3, 7; IV:10

HERRIN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

HURE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

DAME: I:5; II: none; III: none; IV: none


GATTIN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

SCHWESTER: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: 2, 5

TANTE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

TOCHTER: I: none; II: none; III: 8 (höhere Töchterschulen); IV: none

NICHTE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

GÖTTIN: I:10 (Göttin Wahrheit); II:1, 5, III: 8 (Göttin der Wahrheit); IV: none

GEBIETERIN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

MEISTERIN: I: none; II:2, 10; III: none; IV: none

PROSTI: I:12; II: none; III: none; IV: none

DIRN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

KÖNIGIN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

DICHTERIN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

HEXE: I: 7; II: none; III:4; IV: none

NONNE: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

JUNGFERN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none

WS MUTTER: 30, 73, 132, 158, 294

HERRIN: none
HURE: none
DAME: none
MÄDCHEN: 73, 295
GATTIN: 42, 73
SCHWESTER: none
TANTE: none
TOCHTER: 215 (Tochterl?)
NICTHE: none
GÖTTIN: none
GEBIETERIN: 292
MEISTERIN: none
PROSTI: none
DIRN: none
KÖNIGIN: 294
DICHTERIN: none
HEXE: none
NONNE: none
JUNGFERN: none

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References to one’s beloved: (“Geliebte-,”)
A none
AOM 95, 227
BGE 194
BT none
CW none
D 403, 524, 562
EH none
GM none
GS 62, 72, 337
HATH 57, 81, 153, 418
NCW   4
OTL   none
TI     none
TSZ    II:3, 11, III:3
UM     I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: 11
WS     80
Total:

References to marriage: (“-heirat,-” “-ehe,-”)
A     HEIRAT:  none
      EHE:   26, 56
AOM   HEIRAT:  none
      EHE:   26, 169, 273
BGE    HEIRAT:  none
       EHE:   61, 123, 262
BT     HEIRAT:  17
      EHE:   4
CW     HEIRAT:  3
      EHE:   3, 4
D      HEIRAT:  276, 387
      EHE:   9, 27, 150, 151, 205, 206, 240, 246, 359, 387
EH     HEIRAT:  none
      EHE:   none
GM     HEIRAT:  III:7
      EHE:   III:2, 7, 9
GS     HEIRAT:  none
      EHE:   7, 43, 71, 364
HATH   HEIRAT:  389, 421, 436
      EHE:   227, 240, 243, 259, 378, 389, 392, 393, 394, 399, 402, 406, 411, 418,
References to pregnancy: (“-schwanger-”)

A  48
AOM  63, 216, 285
BGE  248, 292
BT  none
CW  none
D  18, 177, 307, 552
EH  II:3, III: TSZ (1)
GM  II:19, III:4, 8, 9
GS  72, 369, 370
HATH P (7)
NCW  none
OTL  none
TI  X:4

Total:

References to pregnancy: (“-schwanger-”)

A  48
AOM  63, 216, 285
BGE  248, 292
BT  none
CW  none
D  18, 177, 307, 552
EH  II:3, III: TSZ (1)
GM  II:19, III:4, 8, 9
GS  72, 369, 370
HATH P (7)
NCW  none
OTL  none
TI  X:4

Total:
References to rape, commonly translated as ‘violation’: (“Vergewalt-,” or “Nothzucht-”)

Note that Nietzsche only makes one reference to incest or “Blutschande” in his entire published corpus, namely in CW 4.

A VERGEWALT: none
NOTHZUCHT: none

AOM VERGEWALT: none
NOTHZUCHT: none

BGE VERGEWALT: 202, 229, 260
NOTHZUCHT: 21

BT VERGEWALT: none
NOTHZUCHT: none

CW VERGEWALT: 11
NOTHZUCHT: none

D VERGEWALT: 369, 432
NOTHZUCHT: none

EH VERGEWALT: none
NOTHZUCHT: II:4

GM VERGEWALT: I:13, II:5, 11, 13, 18, III:9, 10, 12, 24
NOTHZUCHT: none

GS VERGEWALT: 49
NOTHZUCHT: none

HATH VERGEWALT: 137
NOTHZUCHT: none
List of passages referring to race: (“-Geschlecht,” “Rasse,” “Gattung”)

Note that “Geschlecht” can mean “bad,” “sex,” and “race, family, lineage,” the latter frequently translated as “generation,” “tribe,” “clan,” etc.; I will focus here on the racial meaning and exclude the other two. Note also that translators, such as Hollingdale, have sometimes inserted the term ‘race’ where Nietzsche does not use a German equivalent; for example, see AOM 224 where Nietzsche refers to “Barbaren” but the translator refers to a “barbarian race.” Likewise, note that sometimes when Nietzsche uses “Geschlecht” translators simply translate as “kind” or even simply “you” in the plural; see for example UM IV:11 and D 76.

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Hudgens

Forget Not the Whip

GATTUNG: 2, 28, 42, 247, 251, 268

BT GESCHLECHT: 3, 9
RASSE: none
GATTUNG: 2, 7, 11, 14, 19

CW GESCHLECHT: PS2
RASSE: 1, PS2
GATTUNG: none

D GESCHLECHT: 13, 31, 42, 60, 130, 136, 146, 183, 189, 247, 501
RASSE: 70, 272
GATTUNG: 16, 26, 41, 49, 65, 77, 113, 129, 189, 298, 312, 323, 427, 538, 546, 551

EH GESCHLECHT: II:5, IV:7
RASSE: I:3, 4, 7, III: CW:2, 3, 4
GATTUNG: III:5

GM GESCHLECHT: I:5, 9, 11, 16, II:2, 7, 13, 19, 20, 21, III:9, 10
RASSE: I:5, 9, 10, 11, 17fn, II:13, 17, 20, III:11, 14, 17, 21
GATTUNG: none

GS GESCHLECHT: 1, 7, 10, 58, 95, 100, 102, 135, 291, 310, 346, 348, 354, 361
RASSE: P (2), 10, 40, 348, 354, 357, 377
GATTUNG: 1, 20, 35, 42, 48, 143, 330, 354, 356

HATH GESCHLECHT: 22, 261, 424, 440, 472, 475
RASSE: 45, 224, 475, 479

NCW GESCHLECHT: none
RASSE: III
GATTUNG: none

OTL GESCHLECHT: 1
RASSE: none
GATTUNG: 1

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List of passages referring to specific races, nationalities, religious groups, and ethnicities:
“Cambodja-,” “Neger-,” “Phöni-,” “Gäl-,”)
I have chosen to exclude references to Germans, Europeans, Christians, and Jewish people if only because the fact that Nietzsche discusses each is well-known. I include some of the less well-known groups on which Nietzsche comments, though this list is by no means completely exhaustive. I also include the Greeks and Romans to have an idea of the scope of Nietzsche’s discussion; because Nietzsche’s treatment of the Greeks and Romans is fairly prominent, their inclusion provides a gauge for his interest in other groups. Finally, while he does discuss the Aryan race, note that Nietzsche does not use the term “Herrenvolk” or “master race” anywhere in his published texts.

A   RÖM: 46, 58, 59
    SCHWARZ: none
    AFRIK: none
    INDI/E: 20, 31, 32
    ASIA: none
    CHINES: 11, 32
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AFRIK: none (but note VII, where Nietzsche remarks on the ‘dark continent’
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and “Pöbel-,”)

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PÖBEL: none

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RANG: 14

JUNKER: none

PÖBEL: none

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GEBIETER: none

MAGNAT: none

LORD: none

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MAGISTER: none

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SOHN: PS1
KNABE: none
HERR: 6, 8, 12, PS1
GEBIETER: none
MAGNAT: none
LORD: none
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PRINZ: none
MAGISTER: none

EH BRUDER: I:8
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JUNG: P (4)
SOHN: none
KNABE: II:1
HERR: I:4, 6, 7, II:3, 4, 6, III:1, UM:2, HATH:2, 5, D:2, TSZ:8, CW:2, 3, 4,
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GEBIETER: none
MAGNAT: none
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MEISTER: I:1, III HATH:2, CW:1
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KÖNIG: III HATH:2
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PRINZ: III GS
MAGISTER: none

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MAGNAT: none
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Total: 385
References to the human: (“Mensch-,” and “Human-”)

Note: Because Nietzsche uses the word “Mensch” so frequently, I have included only the number of usages below, followed after the semicolon by the specific passages in which the more rare “Human” variants appear.

A  135 usages; §62
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References to democracy: (“demok-” root)

Please note that Nietzsche makes only a single reference to “Emanzipation,” in his published works, namely A 48, and this is specifically a reference to the “Emanzipation vom Priester,” with no explicit reference to the emancipation of any other group.

References to equality, sameness, and identity: (“gleich-,” “Gleichheit”)

Note that there are no references to the ‘egalitarian’ or “egalitären/egalitaeren” in Nietzsche’s published works.
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Note: “Irrthum” refers to error, and “irre” to madness; see “irre” below. Note also the few “Nothlügen” or “necessary lies” Nietzsche explicitly references in UM II:10 and HATH 40 and 104.

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|   |     | LÜGE: | 1, 7, 12, E |
|   |     | UNTREU: | none |
|   |     | IRRT: | 9fn |</p>
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         LÜGE:  none
         UNTREU:  none
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Note: this excludes references to knowledge and other related usages of the w-e-i-s spelling in German words.

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WAHNSINN: P (3), I:3, 6, 7, 11, 22 (2), II:7, 20, III:12 (11), IV:14
IRRE: P (5), III:12 (19), 15 (1)
IRRSINN: none
WILD: I:5, 6, 8, 9, II:1, 8, 10, 11, 13, 21, III:2 (2), 8 (2), 9, 12 (2), 15 (1), IV:1, 4, 5 (1), 6, 8, 11, 13 (13, 20), 14 (3), 15, 20
IRRATION: none
VERRÜCK: III:11 (2)

UM GEISTESKRANK: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none
WAHNSINN: I: none; II:6; III: none; IV:5
IRRE: I:7, 12; II:3, 8, 10; III:3, 4; IV:4, 5, 10
IRRSINN: I: none; II: none; III: none; IV: none
WILD: I:2, 7; II:1; III:4, 6, 8; IV:2, 5, 9
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VERRÜCK: I: none; II:6; III:4; IV: none

WS GEISTESKRANK: none
WAHNSINN: none
IRRE: 171, 189, 343
IRRSINN: none
WILD: 37, 65, 138, 274, 275
IRRATION: none
VERRÜCK: 39, 221

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Bibliography

Abbreviations

[A] The Antichrist
[AOM] Assorted Opinions and Maxims
[BGE] Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future
[BT] The Birth of Tragedy, Or: Hellenism and Pessimism
[D] Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality
[EH] Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is
[GM] Towards the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic
[GS] The Gay Science (“la gaya scienza”)
[HATH] Human, All-Too-Human: A Book For Free Spirits
[KS] Kritische Studienausgabe Herausgegeben
[TI] Twilight of the Idols, Or: How One Philosophizes with a Hammer
[TSZ] Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All
[UM] Untimely Meditations
[UM I] 1: “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer”
[UM II] 2: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”
[UM III] 3: “Schopenhauer as Educator”
[UM IV] 4: “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth”
[WP] Will to Power
[WS] The Wanderer and His Shadow
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