Local Politics in Communist Countries

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Preface

This volume represents only a fraction of the research now being done in a rapidly expanding field—local-level politics in communist states. As such, its inception and the work of each author were based upon clear premises.

We cannot arrive at an adequate understanding of what it means to live under a Communist party government unless we supplement knowledge about politburos, central committees, and national ministries in capital cities with knowledge regarding the people who participate in the political life of villages, cities, counties, or regions (all subnational units), as well as why and how they do so. Moreover, the processes of making and implementing public policies in communist systems, vacuously described by party leaders with such phrases as "democratic centralism" and "socialist harmony," cannot be understood unless we observe the roles in these processes which are performed by local party and state organs that constitute day-to-day government for the citizenry.

In this collection of writings, eight scholars have addressed themselves to the issues of political participation and policymaking roles at subnational levels in states where they have done extensive field research. Their efforts provide a broadly comparative view, with chapters devoted to the USSR, Yugoslavia, China, Poland, and Romania. A concluding essay assesses the findings.

My thanks go, of course, to each contributing scholar for his or her cooperation and patience. In a personal context, I have both the International Research and Exchanges Board and the National Academy of Sciences to thank for their support of my own research in Eastern Europe, as well as the people's council deputies, local leaders, and academicians who gave me their time in both Romania and Poland.

D.N.N.
Introduction:
Local Communist Politics
An Overview

There are many good reasons why it is important to study local politics—political culture, government, political process—in Communist party states. Let me suggest three major ones: First, as in all politics, local politics in Communist party states are the sum total of the political articulation of the local community. This is the political arena where policies concerning local issues are formulated by the officials. This is where the officials are approached by citizens with their particular demands. This is where citizens articulate their preferences, aspirations, and values through political participation. And this is where officials, both elected and appointed, are recruited.

True, local government is also the fundamental link between the local population and the larger external forces, the district, regional, and national governments. In fact, since the local political system is an integral part of larger political systems within which it acts, we tend to assume that it is overly responsive to pressures and pulls emanating from the outside—political, economic, fiscal, social, and technological
pressures and pulls which are many, sustained, and overwhelming.

It would be a serious mistake, I submit, to perceive local governments simply as local extensions of superior governments and dismiss them as either unimportant or impotent. In no Communist party states are local governments simply convenient arrangements for national governing, mere local tools of national administration. They are more than that. Some local autonomy does exist. Local cleavages do exist. Local governments are concerned not only with legal institutions and administrative arrangements but with politics, i.e., devices by which things are actually done. The local actors are not only bureaucrats concerned with procedures by which routines are carried out but also politicians who see to it that forces which determine contents of policy are brought together and decisions made with a view to the local political context and climate.

Second, by studying local politics in Communist party states we can learn a great deal about national politics. Not only do studies of localities afford us a unique opportunity for comparison, both within and across political systems, but they offer us an important insight into national politics as well. We can study the urban-rural cleavage at the grass roots; assess the impact of industrialization and urbanization on political organization; analyze the political structure and function of communities, towns, counties, and cities in their relations to higher levels of government; and study the role of citizens' views on local issues.

This volume shows the ways in which local units of government, party, and local social and political forces are articulated in the national and party organizations; it also demonstrates how the study of comparative local politics provide vitality for the study of national politics. Rather than treating local communities as receivers and translators into local conditions of national inputs, the several authors argue that a more appropriate research strategy requires a reconceptualization of the local politics frameworks which would link the local dimension to the workings of national politics and vice versa.
Third, over the years we have discovered that it is easier to gain access to field research of politics in Communist party states on local than on national level. While it has been well-nigh impossible to study empirically councils of ministers or central committees and politbureaus, a number of scholars have gained permission to study local communities. (In fact, it is a sad paradox and a strange commentary on the state of the communist studies that while there are many studies of top party and government bodies, entirely inaccessible to western scholars, there are few studies of local political culture, government, and process.) Not only are community studies considered by communist officials much less sensitive than national studies but there are often local scholars ready and willing to join their western colleagues in the actual field research. Such combining of research interests and activities, we have learned, makes access even easier.

We used to think that there was a great deal of uniformity in communist politics. Now we know better. It is especially different localities—with their different objective and subjective conditions—where diversity is so well observable, within as well as across Communist party states. Citizens do have impact on politics—in some communities more than in others, at some times more than at others, and in some Communist party states more than in others. After all, as Daniel Nelson rightly points out in his preface, it is at the local level where the meaning of communism for the citizenry is most directly and constantly apparent.

The central theme of Joel C. Moses' chapter entitled "Local Leadership Integration in the Soviet Union" is citizen participation in regional politics with a principal emphasis on the relationship between masses, lower party cadres, and regional leadership. The study is based on an analysis of regional leadership change in twenty-five different regional party organizations of the Russian and Ukrainian republics between 1954 and 1976. The study attempts to tie the analysis of regional leadership change to the general political significance of the party congress—the regional leadership change as evidence of broad political patterns identifiable with the
4 Introduction

party congress. The empirical data base for the chapter is both contemporary and original. The analysis of regional leadership focuses upon dimensions of the leadership indicative of political integration relative to demands arising from the immediate regional environments.

“Evaluating Citizen Performance at the Community Level: The Role of Party Affiliation in Yugoslavia” by Jan F. Triska and Ana Barbie is a study of the ways in which citizens participate in community problem-solving. The chapter is based on a survey research project conducted in Yugoslavia in the early seventies. It describes the scope, structure, and types of political participation; analyzes attitudinal factors associated with participation (political interest, information, evaluation of governmental performance, and sense of civic obligations); examines the relationship between demographic and ecological (community) characteristics on the one hand and citizen participatory behavior and attitudes on the other; and compares members of the League of the Communists with members of the Socialist Alliance and with the rest of the citizens. The authors conclude that, as far as citizen performance on community level is concerned, party affiliation does make a difference, but that this difference is not made by a simple party affiliation only and that other factors are important as well.

Romanian citizens can, do, and in some ways are required to participate in politics as members of local representative assemblies called people’s councils, argues Daniel N. Nelson in “Citizen Participation in Romania: The People’s Council Deputy.” The subject of his chapter are citizens who become involved in political life as people’s council deputies. How do citizens become deputies; who are those selected for that role; and what is their relationship with constituents? The data upon which this study is based were gathered by the author through extensive interviews with deputies and local elites. An intranational comparison of four counties is employed to ascertain those aspects of citizen participation as deputies that are common across Romania as well as to note differences that exist. Deputy responses are reported which tend to suggest fairly uniform procedures by which people become
deputies, but there is considerable diversity among Romanian counties as to deputies' opinions regarding why they were selected as well as the political backgrounds of those individuals recruited to be deputies. From questions probing these latter differences, the author draws tentative inferences relating diversity in the political backgrounds of deputies to socioeconomic factors.

Jan S. Adams in "Political Participation in the USSR: The Public Inspector" asks two major questions: Is it correct to describe the participatory activity of the Soviet volunteer inspector as "genuine" political participation; and does the answer to this question relate to the larger question of how we view the Soviet political system as a whole? The author identifies the Soviet public inspector and describes his organizational setting, the numbers of inspectors involved, and the kinds of missions they perform. The thesis of the study is that the public inspector performs the following political functions: He serves as an extension of government agencies in carrying out a number of administrative tasks at the local level, including monitoring the work of local government agencies; he acts as a safeguard for citizens against local abuses of power, helping personally to process citizen demands; and he directly influences political decision-making at both local and national levels. Professor Adams argues that the subject of citizen participation in the USSR has been passed over too lightly in the past on the assumption that it is irrelevant in terms of western democratic theory. She counters this assumption by making available a close study of one type of citizen participatory activity.

Following recent analyses of Soviet politics that focus upon regional differences to illuminate the central elements of communist politics, Cal Clark in "Commune Policies and Socioeconomic Parameters in Yugoslavia" uses aggregate data on Yugoslav communes to delineate, and to explain, variations in Yugoslav local politics. Four basic variables are tested in the chapter for interrelations between and among one another: 1) Aspects of the socioeconomic environment (e.g., per capita GNP, proportion of income derived from industry, population density, and energy consumption); 2) bud-
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getary and investment figures (e.g., per capita educational expenditures, gross investment, and housing construction); 3) broader policy outcomes affecting the "quality of life" in the commune (e.g., literacy rate, retail trade per capita, and medical facilities); and 4) other potential influences upon commune policy, such as republic location and amount of intergovernmental transfers received. The analysis begins by comparing the levels of budgetary and investment policy outputs for 1969 when Yugoslavia's political and economic decentralization was at its height; consideration is also given to the mixes of policy outputs, in particular the relative emphases upon economic growth and activity versus social services and quality-of-life amenities. Turning to relational analysis, the author generally accepts economic development as a prime determinant of public policy; thus, the socioeconomic contextual factors are used as "independent variables" to explain political outputs. Republic membership and intergovernmental transfers are then added as "intervening variables" to further explicate development's impact upon commune policy. Finally, the author relates policy outputs to the quality-of-life outcomes to assess the factors conditioning the effectiveness of policies.

Between 1971 and 1974 Polish local administration underwent an extensive reorganization which changed it from a three-layer system of communes, counties, and provinces to a two-level structure of townships and provinces. The size of provinces was reduced and their number increased from twenty-two to forty-nine. They were to be compact, self-sufficient, and viable economic, social, and political units, reflecting in many instances the historical traditions of different regions in Poland. In his chapter entitled "Polish Local Politics in Flux: Concentration or Deconcentration," Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz examines this reorganization of local government in its political and administrative contexts. The changes introduced a strict division between the legislative and executive organs of local government. The previous system, which, in accordance with the Marxist theory of local self-government, maintained the executive presidium chosen from among the membership of the local council, was re-
placed by "professional" managers nominated by the central government. Within the council, not by law but by a well-established custom, the first secretary of the local Communist party organization became the chairman of the council's presidium, thus allocating additional and direct control by the party of the deliberations of the council. The party claimed that the reorganization brought local government affairs closer to the people. At the same time, in reality, such changes destroyed the power of previously large provinces run by important state and party bosses. Moreover, the direct control by the center over local executives was increased and relatively small provinces were eliminated as potential future rivals to Warsaw. Finally, the reorganization has introduced considerable confusion into the general state administration, and one can assume that the already large state bureaucracy will grow even more.

In "Decentralization and Control in Chinese Local Administration," Victor C. Falkenheim contends that subnational administration in China is best conceived of as a "nested" prefectoral system, with each level of field administration responsible for a slightly different set of functions and operations. He sets forth and defends this view of Chinese local administration, focusing primarily on the changing relationship between the administrative district (Ti-ch'u) and county (hsien). The author examines the tensions and conflicts inherent in this "nested" prefectoral system by examining the issues raised in the three campaigns to "revolutionize" county party leadership in 1965, 1972, and 1975. His analysis inevitably touches on structural variables, including the degree of functional differentiation in local administration. It also touches upon the issue of local participation, in the context of examining the relationship between field administrators and their constituencies (here defined to include both local farms and factories as well as the "masses").

In this volume, the authors have brought together some of the main avenues of ongoing research and analysis dealing with local politics in Communist party states. It is our hope that these essays will promote new modes of thinking of com-
munist polities, stimulate further research in the field of com-
munist local politics analysis, and raise our general intellec-
tual appraisal of communist politics. In the meantime, we are
getting on with the job of doing the empirical research we be-
lieve should be done, along the lines which we hope will con-
tribute to our understanding of social reality in communist
societies.
Part I

Participants in Subnational Communist Politics

In the four chapters that follow, local political life in communist systems is examined from the standpoint of individuals performing roles in institutions of the state and party at subnational levels. Important and ongoing debates regarding political participation under communism provide the core for each of these chapters—debates both about the leadership stratum and about citizen participation.

The careful analysis of biographical data by Joel Moses for Soviet local leadership comes to grips with two of these vital issues: who become leaders in communist states at the lower levels and what trends are evident within that echelon? The point of trying to find an answer to these questions is, of course, to shed light both on the linkage between the local population and the national political environment as well as on the policies set by Leonid Brezhnev to preserve integration within the leadership stratum. Of particular concern in the USSR is the degree to which the generational gap can be bridged to integrate the ruling elite. The party, in seeking to preserve political stability, tends to encourage longevity in a local leadership post, but it must also be aware of the poten-
Part I

Frustratingly troublesome frustrations of younger, ambitious party careerists created by that longevity. Moses’ empirical analysis provides a thorough view of the complexities of local elite recruitment in communist states and the implications such recruitment might have for regime stability.

Three papers are devoted to the broader range of citizen participation in communist systems. All of these examine the activities of citizens outside the leadership level in an effort to analyze not only who participates but also why and how they are active. Although the data sources and methodologies differ, the Triska-Barbic, Nelson, and Adams chapters complement one another in significant ways. Jan Triska and Ana Barbic use a large data base from a survey questionnaire administered to Yugoslav citizens which tested for relationships between the degree and kinds of citizen participation and political values—particularly those norms promoted in the Yugoslav constitution and party program. In general, Triska and Barbic seek to evaluate the local political system in Yugoslavia (in light of that regime’s emphasis on self-management and decentralization) “in terms of citizens’ civic awareness, their political attitudes, their views of government, and the participatory activities.” Insofar as their research uncovers the degree to which party norms have penetrated the attitudes and activities of people in their local community, the Triska-Barbic effort offers extraordinary insight regarding the political life of citizens under communist government and their long-term commitment to it.

People’s council deputies are a particular form of participation in communist states, and a paper by Daniel Nelson focuses upon this role in the Romanian system. Citizens within communist states participate in politics as members of local representative assemblies. The Nelson paper is an effort to delineate recruitment procedures in one such system (Romania)—why particular individuals fill such roles and the nature of their relationship with constituents. Using a survey of deputies as a data base, the author compares four counties (județe) to ascertain similarities of citizen participation by deputies across Romania as well as to note differences that exist. From questions probing these latter differences, Nelson
Part I

draws inferences from deputies' responses that relate diversity in their political backgrounds to the socioeconomic change sought by the regime and describes the uniformity of electoral procedure and recruitment maintained by central authorities.

Jan Adams's paper, as does the Nelson article, concentrates on a single form of participation. The volunteer public inspector in the Soviet Union, a role nominally performed by millions, is examined by Adams in both formal and operational senses. The Adams paper begins by considering who the public inspectors are and then describes the institutional setting for such a participatory role. Adams, however, is more predictive in her assessment of such participation. Viewing the volunteer inspector as a "symbol of a significant transformation . . . in Soviet society," Adams points to the influence of this local role on national policymaking as part of growing pressures from the grassroots level for responsiveness to demands. This is, quite clearly, a provocative theme boldly appearing on the horizon of the Soviet system.

Taken together, the four authors' perspectives on participation in communist states suggest that an impetus for further political change exists. Whether in the local leadership, among those who occupy officially sanctioned roles at subnational levels (e.g., people's council deputies and public inspectors) or in the citizenry at large, elements that may promote systemic transformation are present in participatory trends. In this volume's conclusion, such an interpretation will be examined in greater detail.
1. Local Leadership Integration in the Soviet Union

If political integration is conceived as the general condition of unity or responsiveness between a society and its political system, the relative political integration of the Soviet Union has often been interpreted by western scholars on the basis of those holding local political leadership positions in the USSR. From this narrow elitist interpretation, western scholars have assumed that the background characteristics of the local Soviet leadership are key indicators of integration within the USSR and the most relevant benchmarks from which overall integrative trends could be objectively identified through quantitative elite analysis. Equating political integration in the Soviet Union with the nature of the local political leadership, western scholars have gained a certain measure of clarity and preciseness in their studies; but the seeming precision of their analysis underscores an inherent irony in the very manner by which they have so narrowly defined the problem of Soviet political integration. For western scholars have unwittingly evolved almost an identical perspective with no less than the cadre officials themselves within the Soviet Communist party, whose own defense of the par-
ty's dominant role in Soviet society proceeds from arguments and logical premises very similar to those adopted by western scholars in their elite analysis. We can observe the parallel assumptions and approaches of western scholars and Communist party cadre officials more clearly in distinguishing the three dimensions or levels of elite analysis which they have jointly employed.

First, western scholars and party cadre officials commonly argue that the relative success of the Soviet economy is directly dependent upon the technical and administrative capabilities of the local political leadership. From the perspective of political integration, western scholars have assumed a potential for political instability and mass disaffection exists in Soviet society from any sharp downturn or continuing stagnation in the productive output of the Soviet economy. The potential has always been magnified in the Soviet context because of the predominant position of the political leadership in economic planning and implementation. The problem remains whether technically unqualified and doctrinaire party apparatchiki will continue to interpose their own biases upon the free interchange of information and economic rationality required by the nonpolitical specialists in the Soviet labor force. Rapid technological advances during the last two decades and recent interest on the part of the central Soviet leadership in comprehensive long-term planning would only seem to have raised the need for local political leaders with the requisite technical-administrative expertise to implement those advances and planning in cooperation with the highly trained Soviet technicians. The stated policy goals and fragile coalition nature of the current Brezhnev leadership also may have heightened the potential for instability and disaffection linked to declining economic output, by raising mass expectations and in staking so much of his own rule upon a promised ability to improve the standard of living in the Soviet Union. In this sense, the composition of the local leadership, measured in terms of those with specialized career backgrounds and extensive administrative training, will eventually affect not only the quality and output of goods and services produced in the Soviet economy but also the resulting level of
mass support for Soviet political institutions in general.

In order for the party to minimize any conflict with the scientific-technical community and any resulting potential for economic slowdown and political disintegration, some western scholars have contended that a conscious effort has been undertaken in recent years in the Soviet Union to co-opt an increasing number of technically trained specialists with prior nonpolitical administrative backgrounds directly into local party leadership positions. The same western scholars would caution that the growing prominence of the co-opted specialists among party leaders should not be misinterpreted as a major shift in the Soviet political system to a politically rational technocracy. Instead, western scholars generally assume that even co-opted party leaders retain the same high level of partisan attachment to ideological beliefs typical of the old-guard party apparatchiki, but an attachment tempered with a more flexible, pragmatic outlook and a greater willingness to consider a wider range of alternatives in problem-solving. One western scholar has argued that the new leadership stratum of administrative specialists in Leninist regimes like the Soviet Union could be validly termed "political managers." As such, these "political managers" parallel in their practical administrative experience and aggressive commitment to rational problem-solving the same group of "political managers" symbolized by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as the emerging dominant leadership group in western industrialized democracies.

Cadre officials in the USSR would have little difficulty in accepting these premises and interpretation in the career-line analysis of the party leadership by western scholars. In support of the party's dominant policy role in Soviet society, cadre officials consistently emphasize the importance of the background, training, and demonstrated administrative competence of local party leaders for any continuing expansion of Soviet economic output. Almost endorsing the western terminology of party co-optation or "political managers," cadre officials in recent years have seemed to lay particular stress on the importance of prior specialized backgrounds and practical administrative training as prerequisites for an effective
party leader. A very conspicuous departure in tone, the importance now openly attributed to administrative-technical qualifications contrasts with the amorphous generalities (modesty, ability to inspire others) or references to party leadership as an intangible "art," by which cadre officials have conventionally depicted the attributes of a competent party leader.

A recent authoritative review of cadre policy in the Soviet Union, conducted by the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the All-Union Central Committee of the party, makes very explicit the intent of the party to increase the number of nonpolitical administrative specialists selected as local party leaders. This intent is reflected in over half of the current chairmen of councils of ministers and chairmen of local administrative levels throughout the USSR (who were recruited as former directors and chairmen of state-collective farms or as directors of industrial enterprises and construction sites) and in the increasing tendency of selecting local party secretaries only from specialists in the functionally intensive branch of the economy most characteristic of the locales in which the party organ is situated. Careful to remind its readers that party committees should remain primarily organs of political leadership and should not intervene unnecessarily in the actual daily administrative process, the review, nevertheless, concluded that the recruitment of such highly trained administrative specialists to local leadership roles had assumed an "enormous and ever increasing significance under the conditions of the scientific-technological revolution."³

The syllogism underlying the analysis of both western scholars and party cadre officials is thus self-evident: more highly qualified and technically proficient party leaders create the necessary preconditions for more comprehensive and rational policymaking in the economy, which in turn assures a steady level of mass political support and identification with the Soviet political institutions. Positive or negative shifts in the technical-administrative preparedness of party leaders could be interpreted as indirect measures of political integration in Soviet society.
A second level of convergence within the analytical frameworks of both western scholars and party cadre officials has found a common appreciation for the symbolic representative nature of party leadership as an integrative factor in Soviet society. Legitimacy, the unquestioning acquiescence to political authority, is essential to any highly integrated political system; and legitimacy in the USSR has evolved in part from an ability to forge a psychological identification and involvement among the diverse groups of Soviet society with the composition of local political leaders invested with such unquestioning arbitrary discretion over their daily lives. Western scholars have long assumed that the enduring stability of the single-party system in the Soviet Union has derived not just from the indoctrination and coercion of the population but from the widely projected image of the party as a meaningful channel for political participation to millions of Soviet citizens. Some may directly benefit in their recruitment as party leaders in the locales, but many more at least can or must sense an indirect symbolic participation through the conspicuous representation of their fellow group members in local party leadership positions. Whether or not party leaders actually make policy influenced by their nominal group identifications may be no less important than the image of their presence in affirming the alleged unity of party institutions and Soviet society. A failure to generate or sustain this symbolic representative image would threaten to create a widespread perception of the party as an intruding outsider, with all the resentment or outright hostility from the local population groups that could be anticipated as attendant results. Youth, women, ethnic nationalities, and workers have been only the most obvious groups whom the party has attempted to mobilize in support of the system by their direct recruitment to party leadership positions.\(^4\)

Cadre officials in the Soviet Union would vehemently deny this interpretation of the party's legitimacy in western analysis. They would contend that it distorts the party's concern in "unifying" Soviet society into an obsession with proportional group representation relevant only to mass political parties in western capitalist societies. Proportional
group representation in western capitalism is actually a means manipulated by the ruling class to subvert real class consciousness from emerging. Furthermore, they would argue that such an anti-Marxist interpretation by western scholars overlooks both the primary importance of individual personal characteristics as a criterion in leadership selection and the more fundamental Leninist precept of the party as an elite vanguard of the proletarian working class. Cadre officials would insist that the party’s legitimacy resides only in its successful defense and promotion of these distinct proletarian interests in advancing the stage of communist construction in the Soviet Union.

Yet the same analysis of party legitimacy by cadre officials, openly contemptuous of bourgeois proportional group representation as a meaningful factor, quickly reduces itself to a formal breakdown of the allegedly diverse and representative nature of the local party leadership, even with the qualification that common class consciousness unites these “best representatives” of all Soviet groups within the party. In his report on cadre policy to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, Leonid Brezhnev struck this conventional theme and defended the party’s position in Soviet society by citing the broadened representative base of the party leadership, indicated by such trends as the large number of workers and collective farmers assigned to leadership roles and the recruitment of first secretaries in local party organs almost exclusively from “local workers” active within their own locales. By 1972 a review of cadre policy published by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the Central committee offered as explicit evidence of “internal party democracy” the 36 to 43 percent of obkom (regional party committee) and krajkom (area party committee) members in Moscow, Krasnodar, Krasnoiarsk, Murmansk, and Altai who are workers and peasants still active directly in their production units. In the previously cited review of cadre policy by the Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, the increasing number of women and ethnic natives promoted to influential leadership positions at the local level and in their own republics is offered as support for the party’s alleged commitment to a
broadly based multinational leadership, a commitment that could only have been realized by the socioeconomic and cultural advances achieved among these same groups under socialism. Thus, while critical of the anti-Marxist bias among western scholars, even party cadre officials appear to concede the premise that the integrative capacity of the Soviet system can be judged by the level and degree of participation attained by various groups through their recruitment to local leadership positions.

Western scholars and party cadre officials have also converged on a third level of analysis. The principal determinant of political integration becomes the rate of turnover and renewal in local leadership positions and the related opportunities for real career advancement perceived by lower-ranking younger functionaries, particularly at local levels of the party hierarchy. In this sense, the unity of Soviet society and the party leadership comes to be defined more narrowly as a problem of responsiveness to the career aspirations of the party's own immediate constituency of younger party functionaries and the extent to which leadership changes reflect an attempt to accommodate their own political ambitions. In their analysis of party leadership turnover and renewal, western scholars have drawn an implicit analogy between the Soviet Communist party and behavioral characteristics assumed common to all bureaucratic structures like the party. As in any bureaucracy, the internal integrative capacity of the Communist party can be determined by the general state of motivation and morale generated among younger lower-level party functionaries. In turn, the state of motivation and morale will be logically keyed to their perceived opportunities for career advancement into higher leadership ranks and will be directly cued for young functionaries by the actual rates of turnover and renewal among party leaders over time.

Failure on the part of the higher party leaders to consider the career aspirations of their younger subordinates could well have disintegrative repercussions beyond just the sense of injured self-esteem among lower-level functionaries. For one reason, the composition of younger lower-level function-
aries parallels in Soviet society to some extent the very same key identifiable groups whose support the party leadership must retain. Yet, as the most visible and perhaps more politically articulate representatives of their specific groups, the same younger functionaries could generalize their own career frustrations to the system at large and become “flash points” for the emergence of highly politicized groups that reject the legitimacy of Soviet political institutions. Rather than reducing conflict as a symbolic factor, an entrenched and unchanging party leadership actually could aggravate group tensions, as the perennial conflict between younger functionaries and their older superiors in a bureaucracy like the Communist party becomes extended along the same potential ideological, ethnic, class, and generational differences within Soviet society. Western scholars have long assumed that a pattern of career frustrations generalized to the system at large has been a persistent underlying problem for party organizations among Soviet ethnic nationalities, who supposedly have been co-opted into party leadership roles but may also have been kept in secondary and noninfluential positions at the lower end of the political hierarchy. 10

Even were the frustrations and unfulfilled career aspirations not to politicize group tensions in Soviet society, reduced or unsatisfactory rates of turnover among party leaders at least could have serious negative consequences for the Soviet economy. Unable to perceive that their efforts will be awarded with promotion to higher offices, younger functionaries would have less incentive to complete their work assignments, would be more likely to shun responsibilities and adopt a typical bureaucratic dodge of doing only enough to protect themselves against criticism or demotion, and would infect factory and farm workers (with whom they are in daily contact) with their own declining state of morale and motivation. At least one obkom first party secretary in the Soviet Union has openly tied the level of economic success attained in his region to the perceived opportunities for career mobility among younger lower-level native functionaries. 11 Thus, low motivation and morale in the party, with its evident signs in reduced economic output, would eventually create
preconditions for diminishing mass political support in the Soviet system.

The problems associated with leadership change and the morale of younger functionaries have also figured more prominently during recent years in the formal discussion of cadre policy written in the Soviet Union. In contrast to the presumed necessity for orderly leadership turnover to assure morale and motivation at lower cadre ranks, however, analysis in the Soviet Union has assumed a marked conservative bias, arguing the greater desirability of a very limited leadership turnover to conserve the "tested practical experience" and "worldly wisdom" of the older and more established senior officials. The ideological rationale for retaining senior officials has been termed the "combination of old and new leadership" in the Soviet Union, and its appearance should not have been unexpected. The rationale follows in the wake of renunciations of Nikita Khrushchev's "artificially conceived regulations" to revitalize the party leadership, including the mandatory turnover ratios in all elected party organs after 1961 and the doubling of locally elected party organs in 1963-1964 to open up career opportunities for younger functionaries. Not only were Khrushchev's leadership reforms, which directly undermined senior officials, immediately rescinded after his ouster, but the relatively stable gerontocracy who have led the All-Union Politburo since 1965 has seemingly been enshrined as the model of leadership continuity to be implemented uniformly throughout the party hierarchy. The extended tenure of many party functionaries and of officials in the state and mass bureaucracies has now emerged as a major lauded achievement of cadre policy since 1965.

A new euphemism has been coined during recent years to justify the high retention rate of officials in the Soviet Union. Cadre officials refer to the high retention rate as the "stabilization" of cadre ranks. "Stabilization," so it is alleged by cadre officials, actually enhances the administrative effectiveness of the party by providing party functionaries a better opportunity to develop expertise in their own particular assignments and to become more completely familiar with
the requirements of their specific functional policy roles. In this sense, cadre officials identify "stabilization" with their general concern in raising the level of administrative skills among party leaders. An alternative to co-opting administrative specialists directly into party leadership positions, the actual apprenticeship in a leadership position over a lengthy period is now extolled as a kind of internal administrative learning experience on the job for full-time party functionaries. To further this process of internal bureaucratic training, cadre officials have also implied that party functionaries during recent years more consistently have been assigned only to those political roles for which they have already amassed a certain level of prior expertise; and internal leadership rotation at local party levels should be distinguished in terms of the specific functional specializations closely associated over the career span of the various subgroups of administrative specialists platooned in the party.15

Yet the same reviews of cadre policy that have heralded the advantages of "stabilization" have also hinted at an underlying problem over this reluctance or inability to alter the composition of party leadership (and the related leadership in the state, police, and mass bureaucracies normally assigned to full-time party functionaries in the Soviet Union). The problem stems from a growing resentment of the younger and, in most cases, more highly trained lower-level functionaries in the party, whose own opportunities for career advancement have been so drastically reduced as a consequence of "stabilization." Openly, any problem is downplayed or denied in the Soviet Union by cadre officials. Cadre officials are careful to stress the number of new party leaders supposedly recruited from the lower ranks since 1965 (for example, a reported 50 percent of all regional, area, and Union-republic party secretaries were replaced between the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Party Congresses in 1966–1970).16

Articles and speeches in defense of the "combination of old and new leadership" frequently offer ambiguous reassurances to younger functionaries: "the Party is committed to combine the tested worldly wisdom of older Party leaders
with the better technical training and enthusiasm provided by a steady influx of younger Party cadres”; “the stability of Party leadership at the same time should not make difficult a sufficient influx of new younger forces into elected leadership organs”; “the essence of selecting leading cadres exists in only such a combination, when the rich experience of some are being supplemented by the energy and innovation of others”; and “the task of the Party consists in eliminating completely the fear of assigning young cadres and in evidencing to them every kind of support.”

The allegedly generational conflict between older traditional apparatchiki and lower-ranking administrative specialists in the party has been denounced as the “tendentious and groundless fanciful ideas of bourgeois ideologues and revisionists” by the Tatar obkom first secretary, who hastened to point out that at least half of all party apparatchiki in his own region by 1975 were under forty years of age. As General Secretary Brezhnev bluntly noted during his Central Committee Report to the Twenty-fourth Congress in 1971, “our leadership positions are not attached to anyone in perpetuity.”

On the other hand, the ambiguous reassurances and apparent sensitivity to the issue by senior cadre officials often accompany mounting criticism by them of the same younger functionaries for their lack of enthusiasm, motivation, and initiative in carrying out their duties. The admonitions perhaps more readily admit to the resulting demoralizing impact that the reduced turnover and aging of senior leaders has had on younger functionaries. Even natural attrition of leadership through retirement is not necessarily held out as a hopeful prospect for ambitious younger functionaries; for policy analysis in support of “stabilization” also concludes that “there should be no need to hasten the removal of a Party worker even at pension age who works well and is full of energy and force.” How accurately this statement reflects reality in the local party leadership will be glaringly evident in a later section of this paper, by the presence of so many prominent Russian Republic officials in 1973 over the nominal mandatory retirement age of sixty.

Based solely on the nature of local leadership characteris-
tics, however, a comprehensive view of political integration in the USSR would have to assess all three alternative levels of analysis distinguished by both western scholars and cadre officials: 1) technical-administrative integration, a function of the party's dominant impact on Soviet economic output and measured in terms of party leaders with specialized careers and prior administrative backgrounds; 2) symbolic integration, a function of the group basis of party leadership to Soviet society and measured in terms of the range of group origins represented among party leaders relative to those found in Soviet society; 3) internal integration, a function of morale and motivation among younger lower-level functionaries and measured in terms of leadership turnover and renewal and the ages of leaders.

**INTERNAL INTEGRATION IN THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC**

The following analysis in this paper will attempt to establish some comparative quantitative measures for the level of internal integration in the Soviet Union since 1954. As presented in Tables 1.1–1.8, the analysis relies upon the age and leadership tenure characteristics of several hundred regional and area officials identified in elected or appointed political offices in the Russian Republic in 1973. Party cadre officials in the Soviet Union have readily admitted that leadership turnover has declined since 1964, but they have defended the reduction as moderate in scope and been as equally insistent that it has not prevented a significant continuing influx of new younger functionaries to major political offices. With this analysis, it may be possible to throw some objective light on the vague declarations of cadre officials and the real extent of change that has occurred since 1964 in the potential opportunities for career advancement among younger functionaries. An increasing rate of turnover and low average age of officials in equivalent political offices over time should foster an enhanced level of internal integration, as younger lower-level functionaries should be more inspired in high expectation of career advancement. Conversely, any sharp reduc-
tion in leadership turnover associated with an aging of officials in equivalent political offices over time may precipitate a declining level of internal integration, a consequence of the frustrated ambitions and indifference felt by younger functionaries and transmitted as a general malaise throughout Soviet society.

The extent of change or stability among regional and area officials in the Russian Republic is a particularly relevant basis from which to assess potential career opportunities for the entire Soviet political system. From a theoretical perspective, regional and area officials occupy a sufficiently prestigious status in the political system to substantiate generalizations on integration trends for the entire country. Regional and area officials stand apart from the hundreds of thousands of less-influential officials and political activists found at lower positions, as deputies to district state soviets or as secretaries of primary party organizations. Yet, in contrast to the more prominent but more removed All-Union and Union-republic officials, regional and area officials fulfill a presumably vital integrative function at the grassroots level of Soviet society by the very immediate impact of their direct presence. Regional and area officials have a pervasive symbolic visibility for the diverse groups residing within their own locales, and their performance and nominal characteristics as the local leadership group will have a direct bearing on the felt level of political support maintained among these groups. Regional and area officials also by the demands of their political roles must interact directly with the younger lower-level functionaries under their authority in the locales, determine the promotion of these same younger functionaries, and together constitute the highest leadership ranks to which most such younger functionaries could ever reasonably aspire in their own political careers.21

Indeed, a clear political hierarchy forms at the regional (area) level between officials in the highest political status, elected to one of the same thirteen to fifteen political positions that presumably ascribe membership on all obkom (krai-kom) Russian bureaus (as the locus of real political authority in all locales) and the remaining officials in the next-
ranking political status, the regular obkom (krai kom) members holding what have been termed the "middle-elite" positions in Soviet locales. Middle-elite officials would include the heads of regional party departments, secretaries of urban-district party committees, second-ranking officials of regional mass organizations such as the trade-unions councils, deputy chairmen of the oblispolkom (regional state executive committee), directors and administrators of oblispolkom departments, and the principal police-judicial authorities in the locales. My research has previously disclosed that the same middle-elite officials typically make up the leadership pool from which obkom bureau members most frequently have been recruited, particularly in the period since 1964. Therefore, we could logically infer the level of internal integration in the Communist party from the changing career opportunities for middle-elite officials to advance into one of the privileged highest-ranking positions included in the membership of Russian obkom (krai kom) bureaus. The probability of their advancement could be estimated on the basis of the actual leadership turnover and ages of those holding one of these same thirteen to fifteen bureau positions over time.

Local officials in the Russian Republic, the largest of the fifteen Union republics in the USSR and the only one without an intermediary republic party organization, are also more likely to reflect general political trends than would local officials in the other republics. Russian Republic local officials are appointed by and accountable solely to the central cadre organs of the party in Moscow and are therefore insulated from any intervening influence manifested by Union-republic leaders in other republics in their designation of local officials.

From a practical perspective, over the last eight years I have compiled career-biographical data on all known obkom bureau members elected in eighteen different regions of the Russian Republic since 1954. I would contend that any changes in tenure and age of this somewhat representative elite sample shown in Tables 1.1-1.6 should provide a valid measure of internal integration over time. In addition, I recently obtained lists of over 2,300 bureau and middle-elite of-
TABLE 1.1: Average and Distribution of Total Years on Obkom Bureau, 1962-1964 and 1973, Eighteen Russian Regions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Bureau Positions, 1973</th>
<th>Seven Major Bureau Positions, 1973§</th>
<th>All Bureau Positions, 1962-1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>all regions</strong></td>
<td>7.6 (223)</td>
<td>8.7 (124)</td>
<td>5.3 (182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>rural regions</strong></td>
<td>7.4 (116)</td>
<td>8.2 (63)</td>
<td>5.5 (89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>urban regions</strong></td>
<td>7.8 (107)</td>
<td>9.3 (61)</td>
<td>5.1 (93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distribution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>all regions</strong> 10+ years</td>
<td>30% (10%)**</td>
<td>40% (13%)**</td>
<td>15% (&lt;.5%)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5- years</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratio</strong></td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>rural regions</strong> 10+ years</td>
<td>28% (9%)</td>
<td>35% (10%)</td>
<td>17% (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5- years</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratio</strong></td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>urban regions</strong> 10+ years</td>
<td>33% (12%)</td>
<td>46% (16%)</td>
<td>13% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5- years</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratio</strong></td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


† Positions with ascribed candidate or full membership on obkom bureaus since 1954: five obkom secretaries, chairmen and first deputy chairmen of oblispolkom, first secretary of the regional capital party committee (gorkom), chairman of the regional trade-unions council and people's control committee, regional Komsomol first secretary, head of the obkom organizational-party work department, editor of regional newspaper, chairman of regional economic council in 1957-1964 (sovmarkhoz), and urban-district first party secretaries in specific regions. Although full bureau members since 1954, chiefs of the regional KGB (secret police) are excluded from bureau membership in all the tables except Tables 1.5 and 1.8.

§ Seven major bureau positions: five obkom secretaries, oblispolkom chairman, and capital gorkom first secretary.

** The percentages within parentheses represent those with a minimum bureau tenure of fifteen years.

†† The ratio is the absolute number a maximum of five years on the same bureau (5-) divided by the absolute number a minimum of ten years (10+) on the same bureau.
ficials in forty-five regions and areas of the Russian Republic. This large number of officials were identified by their formal positions and dates of birth in the same forty-five local newspapers during the period of their nomination as deputies to local state soviets in May and June of 1973. This large cross section of officials in forty-five different Russian locales for 1973 thus presents us with a unique research find: an unusually accurate and complete universe of local Russian officials from which to compare the ages of those simultaneously active at the two status ranks of local leadership (that is, bureau and middle-elite officials).

**Total Years on Obkom Bureaus**

One basic measure of the reduced opportunities for promotion among younger party functionaries can be seen in the total number of years that local Russian bureau members have remained after 1964 in their leadership positions. In Table 1.1 the tenure of bureau members in the eighteen Russian regions from my original research discloses the actual extent of stability in party leadership ranks by 1973 in contrast to the tenure typical of bureau members elected in 1962–1964. By average number of years, the tenure of bureau members in 1973 has reached 7.6, increasing by an average 2.5 years from the average tenure in 1962–1964. An even more evident change has occurred among those officials elected to the seven major policymaking offices represented within the obkom bureaus. Among these 124 officials in 1973, bureau tenure has increased 3.4 over the 1962–1964 period to an average of 8.7 years.

Even the average tenures of bureau members may understate the extent of reduced opportunities for the regional middle elite since 1964. Rather than average tenures, the younger party functionary is more likely to calculate the probability of his promotion over time by the number of those current bureau members only recently elected relative to the number of bureau members retaining their positions for an extended period. The higher the balance of new to more established members on obkom bureaus, the better the perceived prospects for career promotion held out to younger party functionaries. In this light, younger functionaries are unlikely to have been en-
couraged by recent trends. In 1962–1964 as a norm, a high 59 percent of all bureau members in Table 1.1 had served no more than five consecutive years, and the ratio of these junior members to the senior members (senior defined as bureau members with a minimum bureau tenure of ten years) stood at 4:1. By 1973 a subtle shift in tenure distribution can be observed in Table 1.1. While the total 47 percent of all junior bureau members has remained fairly equivalent to the total 59 percent in 1962–1964, the comparable number of senior bureau members has jumped to 30 percent and even to 40 percent among those elected to the seven major bureau offices. The tenure ratios in Table 1.1., indirectly measuring the balance of career opportunities for younger middle elite, indicate the scope of this shift in distribution. By 1973 the ratio of junior to senior bureau members has declined to 1.54 and to only 0.86 among the seven major bureau offices. In other words, the probability of recruitment to any bureau position can be reasonably estimated by the current younger middle elite at little better than equal to the probability that the composition of bureaus will remain unchanged and prevent but a limited entry of new members. For regional middle elite aspiring to a major policymaking role, the ratio of junior to senior members in the top seven positions presents an even more dismal picture. They would have less than an equivalent opportunity to break into the inner core of the top seven positions.

The analysis in Table 1.1 also confirms that differential career opportunities may be a product of the particular Russian locale. Obkom bureau members in the urban industrialized regions constitute a more stable leadership group, evident in 1973 by the average tenure of 9.3 years and the ratio of 0.68 for major bureau members in the urban regions. Almost one-half (46 percent) of all major bureau officials in the urban regions have a cumulative bureau tenure of at least ten years, and 16 percent with a minimum of fifteen years were first elected sometime before 1960. The leadership in the highly urban regions of Kaliningrad, Novosibirsk, and Rostov typify this trend toward lengthy tenure, with fifteen of the twenty-one major bureau officials ranging from ten to fourteen total years on their respective bureaus. In contrast, major bu-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All regions</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.190</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural regions</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban regions</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The quotient obtained by dividing the actual changes in seven major bureau positions per year by potential changes that could have occurred if a new individual had been elected to each of the seven positions per year. In each time period, the potential change was a product of the number of years times the number of positions. The actual number of changes in all eighteen regions was then added and divided by the combined potential position-year changes to yield a quotient from 0.000 to 1.000 (turnover in each position for each year). Any individual elected to one of the bifurcated bureaus in January 1963 who had never previously been a bureau member was considered a change between 1962 and 1963. All others merely elected to a different position on one of the two 1963-1964 bureaus were not considered changes when they had already been on the bureaus in 1962.

† The quotient obtained by dividing the absolute number of individuals who never previously held one of these seven positions prior to their election by the absolute number of potential changes in all seven bureau positions.

Bureau members elected in the rural agricultural regions in 1973 have remained a year less as an average (8.2 years), and the ratio of junior to senior bureau members is still better than a factor of one (1.09). Fifteen of the twenty-one major officials in the predominantly agricultural locales of Belgorod, Kursk, and Vologda by the end of 1973 had not even been elected as bureau members before 1969. The probability of elite recruitment into major policymaking roles for the middle elite appears to be much higher in agricultural than in urban locales, and our data in several of the following tables will tend to substantiate this variation among Russian locales.

Bureau Turnover and Change

The decline in obkom bureau membership can be verified from an alternative dimension in Table 1.2, by the actual rates of turnover and renewal among officials elected to the
### Table 1.3: Average Ages of Russian Regional and Area Bureau Members, 1955-1973*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total bureau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members, all regions</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(196)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>(123)</td>
<td>(232)</td>
<td>(220)</td>
<td>(549)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total bureau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members, rural regions</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(95)</td>
<td>(131)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(122)</td>
<td>(116)</td>
<td>(346)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total bureau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members, urban regions</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(119)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(110)</td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td>(203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven major</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bureau members, all</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regions</td>
<td>(171)</td>
<td>(162)</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(136)</td>
<td>(122)</td>
<td>(301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven major</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bureau members, rural</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regions</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(86)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven major</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bureau members, urban</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regions</td>
<td>(89)</td>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(115)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The averages are based on the ages of individuals in the first year of the time periods when they were elected regional bureau members. Individuals promoted to one of the seven major bureau positions after they had already been elected to a lower position on the bureau are calculated twice in the tables for the different ages at which they were first elected to the bureau and to a major bureau position.

† The same thirteen to fifteen positions are assumed to have ascribed candidate or full membership on the bureaus of the other twenty-seven Russian regions and areas during 1973. The forty-five include the original eighteen Russian regions of our sample and the following regions and areas: Rural: Altai, Arkhangel, Astrakhan, Chita, Krasnodar, Kalinin, Lipetsk, Magadan, Murmansk, Novgorod, Omsk, Orenburg, Penza, Riazan, Stavropol, Tula, Ul'ianovsk, Vladimir, Voronezh; Urban: Cheliabinsk, Irkutsk, Gorky, Krasnoyarsk, Kiybyshew, Leningrad, Maritime, Sverdlovsk.
same major bureau offices for the comparable five-year periods of 1960–1964 and 1969–1973. The composite ratios in Table 1.2 further underscore the extent of conservative retrenchment within the inner policy elite during the last decade. As one measure of change, the actual turnover ratio in the 1969–1973 period (the actual to potential changes) has fallen to .106, less than one-half the comparable ratio of .229 in the 1960–1964 period. Nor could party leaders seriously defend the reduced turnover merely as a stabilizing factor unrelated to any real opportunities for advancement among lower-level functionaries, for the reduced turnover in absolute positions has been exactly paralleled by the emerging pattern of internal elite rotation among the seven major positions. By internal elite rotation, positions have more frequently been reassigned only to those already holding one of the seven major bureau offices. As a result, the renewal ratio in the 1969–1973 period (the absolute number of newly elected members to all potential changes) has fallen to .073, less than one-half the comparable renewal ratio of .190 in the 1960–1964 period. Stability and internal rotation have almost become the rule particularly for elites in the urban Russian regions. Since 1969, less than 6 percent (.056) of potential positions in the urban regions have been assigned to individuals never previously holding one of the seven major bureau positions. In the 1960–1964 period, lower-level functionaries could anticipate that almost one out of every five new openings (.196) in urban regions would have been assigned to newly elected inner-core bureau members.

**Ages of Bureau Members**

Despite the reduced turnover and extended tenure of most Russian bureau members, the actual impact of these changes on the age composition of the regional elites has not been totally one-sided. The comparable age data for bureau members in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 provide contradictory support both for party cadre officials, who have denied any real stagnation in leadership ranks since 1964, and for western scholars, who have logically assumed that a much older local leadership has emerged as a result of stabilization.
On one hand, cadre officials could emphasize their positive conclusion by comparing the average ages of bureau members first elected in the 1965–1973 period. The rejuvenation of regional party leadership has continued at a pace similar to that apparent during the preceding Khrushchev era. In Table 1.3, the average ages of 45.4 and 46 years (seven major offices) for bureau members when first elected in 1965–1973 closely approximate the average ages of 44.1 and 44.3 years for bureau members in 1955–1964; and the average ages in 1965–1973 actually are younger than the comparable 46.2 years for bureau members in office during the 1962–1964 period immediately prior to Khrushchev’s fall. Cadre officials would also be quick to point out the balanced age composition of all bureau members in the forty-five Russian regions and areas, shown in Table 1.4. The presence of an equivalent 29 percent of all bureau members from both extreme age cohorts (those over 54 and under 46 years old) in 1973 almost seems to symbolize the balanced “combination of old and new leadership,” the very tenet enunciated by cadre officials as policy since 1964. Party responsiveness to younger functionaries can also be observed in the 10 percent of all bureau members in 1973 under 40 and in the equivalent 28 percent of major bureau officials drawn from the two extreme age cohorts. On the basis of these aggregate figures, cadre officials would justifiably contend that internal integration has not been undermined by the leadership stabilization and, despite any reduced turnover, meaningful opportunities for promotion continue to be held out to younger party functionaries in the Russian Republic.

On the other hand, the data in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 invite a quite different interpretation of their significance. For one reason, while average ages of bureau members first elected in 1965–1973 have not increased, the reduced turnover and extended tenure of bureau members obviously have been trends implemented over the total span of the last ten years. They represent trends whose impact could only be evaluated from the ages of bureau members at the end of the period in 1973. In this sense, an equally valid argument could be made that the typical bureau member by 1973 is more importantly five to
TABLE 1.4: Age Distribution of Bureau Members, 1973, Forty-five Russian Regions and Areas and, 1962-1964, Eighteen Russian Regions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Forty-five Russian Regions and Areas</th>
<th>Eighteen Russian Regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Bureau Positions, 1973</td>
<td>Seven Major Bureau Positions, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+ years old</td>
<td>29% (4%)§</td>
<td>27% (5%)§</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45- years old</td>
<td>29% (10%)**</td>
<td>28% (3%)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio††</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rural regions

|                      | 28% (5%)§                          | 28% (6%)§                 | 2%                                      |
| 45- years old        | 29% (11%)**                         | 26% (3%)**                | 34%                                     |
| Ratio††              | 1.04                                | 0.92                      | 20.00                                   |

Urban regions

|                      | 30% (4%)§                          | 25% (3%)§                 | 5%                                      |
| 45- years old        | 28% (8%)**                         | 30% (3%)**                | 45%                                     |
| Ratio††              | 0.95                                | 1.21                      | 9.67                                     |

* In Tables 1.4, 1.5, 1.7, and 1.8, the forty-five Russian regions and areas include both those eighteen regions for which I have accumulated tenure and age data on bureau officials over the 1954-1973 period and those additional twenty-seven regions and areas listed in Table 1.3 for which I have only the birth dates and positions held in 1973.

† The age distribution for 1962-1964 was derived from the age of bureau members in the first year of the period when they were elected.

§ The percentages within parentheses represent those whose minimum age was 61 in 1973.

** The percentages within parentheses represent those whose maximum age was 39 in 1973.

†† The ratio is the absolute number 45 years or younger (45-) divided by the absolute number 55 years or older (55+).

seven years older than his counterpart would have been when first elected in 1955-1964, dependent on the nature of the locale (rural or urban) or the position (all bureau offices or only the subgroup of seven major positions) to which he has been elected. By 1973 the inner elite among the seven top positions constitute a generation predominantly in their early fifties, averaging 51 for the 122 officials in the eighteen Russian regions and 49.9 for the larger sample of 301 officials in the forty-five Russian regions and areas. Even the apparent balance of age cohorts found in Table 1.4 could be questioned. Al-
though 10 percent of all bureau members are under 40 in 1973, it is also true that only 3 percent of them are represented within the top seven positions and that a stable 5 percent of the top seven positions are held by those over 60, past the formal retirement age for officials. Comparable if very limited age data for bureau members in 1962-1964 further tend to overshadow any positive significance attributed to the balanced age cohorts in 1973. During the 1962-1964 period, 40 percent of all bureau members for whom ages could be obtained were under 46 and only 3 percent over 54 years old. While merely a tentative measure, the proportion of younger to older bureau members in 1962-1964 was 12.25:1. Thus, it could be argued as well that the actual opportunities for promotion among younger functionaries have been reduced more than twelvefold since 1964.

**Tenure and Age of Comparable Bureau Officials**

If the aggregate ages of all bureau members in 1973 demonstrate possibly contradictory interpretations, the contradiction may only stem from the wide disparity of background characteristics among officials holding different positions on the bureaus. With the exception of the seven major bureau offices, I have assumed until now that Russian bureaus constitute merely a homogeneous elite, even though leaders from different bureaucracies and functional policy areas actually make up the collective bureaus. Yet, whether as the party agricultural and industrial secretary, the capital gorkom first secretary, chairman of the trade-unions council, editor of the regional newspaper, oblishpolkom chairman and first deputy chairman, Komsomol first secretary, or chief of the regional KGB, the official has only been elected a bureau member because of his simultaneous elevation to the principal leadership role in one of these diverse bureaucracies or functional policy areas. Different factors or considerations very likely determine the probability of promotion within any of these bureaucracies or functional policy areas distinguishable in all Russian locales. We should conceive internal integration as a different set of career promotion opportunities for each of the various middle-elite subgroups within the particular
bureaucracies and functional specializations in the Russian Republic.

The rationale for this differentiation has even been provided inadvertently by cadre officials. Cadre officials in recent years have contended that leadership capability should be defined carefully in the context of particular administrative positions and functional roles associated over the career span of different leadership subgroups in the party. The alleged increase in the qualifications of functionaries recruited as indoctrination specialists, full-time staff in the local party apparat, or departmental administrators in the local state apparat has received the most visible acclaim among cadre analysts, who at the same time have admitted begrudgingly that the quality of functionaries assigned to consumer-trade departments remains unsatisfactory. Implicit within this general contention by cadre officials is the logical corollary that career promotion opportunities among younger functionaries may also vary, depending on the specific administrative positions to which they aspire or the particular nature of their functional career specializations. Agricultural specialists or local urban-district party secretaries in the Russian Republic may find better opportunities for promotion at younger ages within their own defined career tracks than would consumer-trade specialists or staff officials in the local party apparat; and the particular nature of the Russian locale in which a younger functionary hopes to advance may be a further determining factor.

From the perspective of the Russian bureaus in 1973, the cross-sectional analysis shown in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 does reveal rather important and consistent variations in tenure and age for individuals elected to different bureau positions. For the forty-five Russian locales in Table 1.5, the position of capital gorkom first secretary has been almost uniformly designated to one of the youngest bureau members (almost as a rule, the youngest bureau member elected to candidate status will be the Komsomol first secretary). Almost one-half of all forty-three capital gorkom first secretaries in 1973 were under 46, and the proportion of junior to senior bureau members is a high 9.5:1. At the opposite extreme in age are those four
### TABLE 1.5: Average Age and Age Distribution of Five Comparable Bureau Positions, 1973, Forty-five Russian Regions and Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Average age</th>
<th>55+ years old</th>
<th>45- years old</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Control Committee</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>51% (9%)</td>
<td>2% (2%)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Trade-Unions Council</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>49% (5%)</td>
<td>5% (0)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief KGB</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>52% (3%)</td>
<td>6% (0)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editor Newspaper</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>42% (7%)</td>
<td>7% (0)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Secretary Capital Gorkom</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>5% (0)</td>
<td>45% (5%)</td>
<td>9.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 1.6: Bureau Tenure and Age of Six Comparable Positions, 1973, Eighteen Russian Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Average years</th>
<th>10+ years</th>
<th>5- years</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Average age</th>
<th>all regions</th>
<th>10+ years</th>
<th>5- years</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Average age</th>
<th>all regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Control Committee</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>41% (29%)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>41% (29%)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman, Trade-Unions Council</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>35% (18%)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>35% (18%)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Secretary Capital Gorkom</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>12% (0)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>12% (0)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology Secretary</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>39% (6%)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>39% (6%)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Secretary</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>17% (0)</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>17% (0)</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry Secretary</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>13% (0)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>13% (0)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
positions with specific responsibilities for cadre supervision or political control and indoctrination in the regions and areas. As chairman of the trade-unions council and people's control committee, editor of the local newspaper, or chief of the secret police (KGB), the officials in these four positions in 1973 average from 52.7 to 54 years old; only 2 to 7 percent are under 46; and the ratios of junior to senior bureau members range low from 0.05 to 0.16. Nine percent of all people's control committee chairmen and 7 percent of all newspaper editors alone are in their early or late sixties.

Based on ages and tenure for a slightly different range of positions in the eighteen Russian regions, the data in Table 1.6 evidence the same consistent variation in characteristics by region. There appears to be a greater willingness to recruit younger and (possibly) more technically qualified administrators in those positions directly affecting the economic production of the locales. Among the two distinct industrial specialists represented on the obkom bureaus, over 50 percent of both capital gorkom first secretaries and obkom industrial secretaries in 1973 constitute a group of recent bureau recruits less than six years in the regional leadership; and their combined average ages are both under 48. An even greater process of rejuvenation can be observed among all obkom agricultural secretaries, thirteen of whom have been recruited within five years prior to 1973 and eleven of whom are under 46.

In certain regional bureaus, the nature of the local economy seems to have been a major factor weighed in the election of either young industrial or agricultural specialists. They appear to have been selectively co-opted into the leadership only because of an overriding concern with the qualifications of those officials most directly responsible for the major economic sector in the region. The very selective nature of their recruitment is underscored by the contrasting large number of older leaders typical in these same regional bureaus. Thus, in predominantly agricultural regions like Kirov, Tambov, and Smolensk, fourteen of all bureau members are at least 55 in 1973, although the three obkom agricultural secretaries range in age from 43 to 45; and in predom-
inantly industrial regions like Iaroslavl', Kemerovo, and Tomsk, fourteen of the bureau members are also over 54 in 1973, although the obkom industrial secretaries and capital gorkom first secretaries average only 44.5 (an age range from 39 to 47). These younger economic specialists in industry and agriculture, co-opted on a limited basis for their expertise, may represent the emerging stratum of "political managers" to whom I referred earlier.

In contrast, cadre and indoctrination roles on the eighteen regional bureaus continue to be held by the oldest and most senior apparatchiki by tenure. By tenure, the three cadre and indoctrination officials average three to six years longer on the bureaus than the agricultural-industrial specialists. While not even one agricultural or industrial specialist has remained as long as fifteen years on the same bureau, 29 percent of control committee chairmen and 18 percent of trade-unions council chairmen have amassed a minimum bureau tenure of fifteen years. By age, the three cadre and indoctrination officials average approximately three to eight years older than the agricultural and industrial specialists, and twenty of the thirty-four trade-unions and control committee chairmen are at least 55.

The almost complete absence of young recent bureau members in cadre, indoctrination, and secret police positions indicates an abiding distrust of younger functionaries. Some of these positions, especially the heads of the secret police or trade-unions council, may be considered extremely sensitive in the level of unquestioned commitment to conventional practices required of their holders; and younger functionaries may be suspected of lacking the required emotional "maturity" until satisfactorily demonstrating it through long apprenticeships at lower levels or through attaining some minimum-age qualification. What other logical reason could explain why only five of 117 KGB chiefs and chairmen of control commissions and trade-unions councils throughout the Russian Republic in 1973 are under 46 and why only one is under 40? The retention of the older and (possibly) more doctrinaire officials in these local positions also may have been deliberately instituted to offset any excessive pragmatism in local
decision-making by the stratum of "political managers" co-opted as the bureau's industrial and agricultural specialists.

**Ages of Middle Elite and Functional Specialists**

If career mobility in the Russian bureaus by 1973 must be differentiated carefully by administrative position, region, and functional role, the same three factors must also be considered to explain differences in career advancement even among the various positions defined as the lower-ranking middle elite in the forty-five Russian locales.

In Table 1.7 I have categorized the ages of 1,814 middle-elite officials in 1973 by their identical administrative-bureaucratic positions throughout the Russian Republic. Like the age data of Russian bureau members in 1973, the ages of the Russian middle elite evidence contradictory trends. The first is that the middle elite as a group are quite similar in age to those holding positions on the Russian bureaus in 1973. This similarity was especially unexpected, as the common assumption would have been that bureau members, as a higher political rank, should be older than the younger middle-elite officials. An inherent flaw of that assumption is apparent in the column of total middle-elite officials shown in Table 1.7. By average age, the middle elite are but a half year younger than all Russian bureau members in 1973 (48.9 to 49.4); almost an equivalent percentage of officials in both political ranks are under 46 (29 and 32 percent); and, while a higher 10 percent of all bureau members are over 54, the relative percentage of bureau members under 40 is actually higher (10 to 6 percent). The potential opportunities for career promotion among the middle elite (1.71) are comparable to those for entry into the Russian bureaus (1.01). Any generational gap in Russian locales cannot be attributed simply to the formal differences in rank between bureau and middle-elite officials in 1973.

Yet, just as we have previously observed for Russian bureau members, important and rather consistent age differences have emerged within the middle elite. The variations by age among the five categories in Table 1.7 clearly illustrate this trend. Deputy chairmen of the obispolkom, heads of obispolkom departments, and heads of urban-capital state
TABLE 1.7: Average Ages and Age Distribution of Nonbureau Officials, 1973, Forty-five Russian Regions and Areas*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officier</th>
<th>Regional-Area Ispolkom</th>
<th>Heads of Regional-Area State Apparat</th>
<th>Heads of Obkom-Kraikom Departments</th>
<th>Urban-District Party Secretaries</th>
<th>Heads of Urban-Capital State Apparat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chairmen</td>
<td>50.6 (161)</td>
<td>50.3 (962)</td>
<td>46.9 (144)</td>
<td>45.9 (494)</td>
<td>49.8 (53)</td>
<td>48.9 (1,814)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>55+ years old</td>
<td>27% (4%)</td>
<td>25% (4%)</td>
<td>10% (3%)</td>
<td>5% (1%)</td>
<td>30% (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45- years old</td>
<td>22% (3%)</td>
<td>24% (3%)</td>
<td>51% (8%)</td>
<td>48% (11%)</td>
<td>26% (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of Regional-Area State Apparat</td>
<td>50.1 (92)</td>
<td>50.1 (559)</td>
<td>46.7 (74)</td>
<td>45.8 (213)</td>
<td>49.5 (4)</td>
<td>48.9 (942)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>55+ years old</td>
<td>21% (4%)</td>
<td>24% (4%)</td>
<td>9% (5%)</td>
<td>4% (1%)</td>
<td>50% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45- years old</td>
<td>25% (3%)</td>
<td>26% (4%)</td>
<td>53% (7%)</td>
<td>49% (12%)</td>
<td>50% (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of Obkom-Kraikom Departments</td>
<td>46.9 (69)</td>
<td>47.2 (403)</td>
<td>47.2 (70)</td>
<td>46.0 (281)</td>
<td>49.9 (49)</td>
<td>48.8 (872)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>55+ years old</td>
<td>35% (3%)</td>
<td>27% (4%)</td>
<td>11% (1%)</td>
<td>6% (1%)</td>
<td>29% (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45- years old</td>
<td>19% (3%)</td>
<td>20% (3%)</td>
<td>49% (10%)</td>
<td>48% (10%)</td>
<td>24% (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In the analysis, the region of Amur was substituted for Saratov and classified as urban.
departments consistently form the very oldest leadership subgroups active within the middle elite of the Russian Republic. Approximately 25 to 30 percent of the officials in all these three state sectors are at least 55 (one-fourth of all urban-capital officials are over 60), and the proportion of junior to senior officials in each of the three subgroups is less than one. The ratios for the three subgroups suggest that a younger party functionary has less than an equivalent opportunity for promotion into any of the state sector positions. The advanced age of officials in the state sector stands in marked contrast to the relative youth of officials who have been promoted to positions in the party apparat of Russian locales. Both urban-district party secretaries and heads of the party departments are approximately five years younger than officials in the state sector; a small 5 and 10 percent of the party apparatchiki are over 54; and almost one-half of all 638 party officials are under 46. Career opportunities have become particularly advantageous for any prospective urban-district party secretaries. Eleven percent in 1973 are under 40, with the ratio of junior to senior party secretaries at 9.2:1.29

As an unintended consequence, the reduced turnover and aging since 1964 in all Soviet leadership positions actually may have redounded to the benefit of the party bureaucracy and its enhanced image in Russian locales. While state sector officials now personify the older elite in Russian locales, the party bureaucracy has continued to be staffed with a high proportion of younger and (possibly) more competent technical-administrative functionaries. Almost by default, the relative youth of party officials projects an image of the party bureaucracy as the dynamic and innovative political force in the Russian locales; and the most industrious and ambitious young functionaries would be more likely to desire a position in the party bureaucracy than in the state sector. In this light, the sharp contrast between party and state officials in the middle elite mirrors the difference in ages of Russian bureau members in 1973. The oldest bureau members more typically are those holding leadership positions in the state sector or in the mass organizations, while the emerging stratum of younger “political managers” have been conspicuously assigned to
leadership roles in the party as obkom agricultural and industrial secretaries or as capital gorkom first secretary. Furthermore, at least some variation in age among middle-elite officials appears to be associated with differences in the nature of the locale. The oldest leadership group for each of the five categories in Table 1.7 has been recruited in the urban locales, the very same distinction previously found for Russian bureau membership in 1973.

Attractive as the current positions in the party bureaucracy may have become for younger functionaries, the most typical functionary must reasonably expect to be reassigned frequently to comparable policy-leadership roles in different bureaucracies during the span of his career in a region or area. At times, election to the regional (area) bureau may only represent a transitional stage in the career of a local official, who may then be reassigned to a position in the middle elite and, perhaps, returned to the bureau at a later period. Importantly, however, the positions assumed as bureau members often bear a close logical relationship to both his previous and future career assignments or specializations in the middle elite. At least six fairly distinct subgroups of functional specialists interchangeably reassigned to the same kind of positions can be identified within the leadership of any Russian region or area: agricultural, industrial, social welfare, cadre, police-judicial, and ideological specialists.

As a consequence, the distinction between bureau members and the middle elite or the formal differences between state and party officials may not be the only valid bases on which to distinguish career advancement in Russian locales. Rather, the most important may be the association of any younger functionary with a particular functional specialization and the related opportunities for advancement within this specific career track in either rural or urban locales. Bureau and middle-elite officials should be logically considered together by their similar career specializations, and differences in career advancement could be inferred from the comparable ages of all bureau and middle-elite officials simultaneously identified with any one of these six career tracks in the Russian Republic.
In order to estimate the potential importance of career specialization on career advancement, in Table 1.8 I have grouped bureau and middle-elite officials together by their 1973 ages into the six defined areas of functional specialization. The 1,753 officials in Table 1.8 were classified into the six categories relative to their particular formal titles or the actual nature of their policy responsibilities in the Russian locales in May and June of 1973. It was assumed that the 1973 positions or responsibilities correspond to the long-term career specializations of all 1,753 officials; that is, agricultural officials in 1973 were assumed to be the identifiable agricultural specialists in any region or area, the social welfare officials in 1973 to be the identifiable social welfare specialists, and so on.\(^3\)

By comparison in Table 1.8, agricultural specialists would appear to have a much better opportunity for leadership recruitment at a younger age than would any of the other five distinguishable subgroups. Whether as a party or state official, the typical agricultural specialist in the Russian bureaus and middle elite in 1973 is under 46 (44 percent of the 340 officials), and the age ratio of 2.2 for young agricultural specialists is more than twice that for young specialists in any of the other five subgroups.\(^3\) Quite an opposite trend to leadership stability can also be verified by the age data in Table 1.8. Officials associated with cadre and police-judicial responsibilities in 1973 form the oldest leadership subgroups in the republic. This finding was anticipated in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 by the ages of cadre and secret police heads in the Russian bureaus, but we can now generalize to include all cadre and police-judicial specialists even in the Russian middle elite. The two functional subgroups average three to four years older than all agricultural specialists; only 14 and 8 percent are under 46; and their relative age ratios of 0.41 and 0.29 suggest little opportunity for younger functionaries to assume major leadership roles. Younger functionaries in the other three subgroups would seem to have fared slightly better. Approximately one-fourth of all ideological, industrial, and social welfare specialist are under 46, and their age ratios from 1.03 to 1.06 reflect at least an equivalent opportunity for the early
TABLE 1.8: Average Ages and Age Distribution of Functional Specialists, 1973, Forty-five Russian Regions and Areas*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Cadres</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Social Welfare</th>
<th>Police-Judicial</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all regions</td>
<td>(340)</td>
<td>(184)</td>
<td>(282)</td>
<td>(374)</td>
<td>(404)</td>
<td>(169)</td>
<td>(1,753)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+ years old</td>
<td>20% (3%)</td>
<td>35% (4%)</td>
<td>25% (4%)</td>
<td>27% (6%)</td>
<td>24% (4%)</td>
<td>28% (1%)</td>
<td>25% (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45- years old</td>
<td>44% (6%)</td>
<td>14% (3%)</td>
<td>26% (13%)</td>
<td>28% (5%)</td>
<td>25% (5%)</td>
<td>8% (1%)</td>
<td>27% (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural regions</td>
<td>(202)</td>
<td>(113)</td>
<td>(157)</td>
<td>(206)</td>
<td>(230)</td>
<td>(102)</td>
<td>(1,010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+ years old</td>
<td>19% (3%)</td>
<td>31% (4%)</td>
<td>27% (4%)</td>
<td>22% (6%)</td>
<td>21% (4%)</td>
<td>28% (2%)</td>
<td>24% (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45- years old</td>
<td>45% (5%)</td>
<td>13% (5%)</td>
<td>27% (15%)</td>
<td>28% (5%)</td>
<td>27% (6%)</td>
<td>8% (2%)</td>
<td>27% (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban regions</td>
<td>(138)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
<td>(125)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
<td>(174)</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(743)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+ years old</td>
<td>20% (2%)</td>
<td>41% (4%)</td>
<td>22% (2%)</td>
<td>32% (7%)</td>
<td>27% (4%)</td>
<td>28% (0)</td>
<td>28% (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45- years old</td>
<td>41% (7%)</td>
<td>15% (0)</td>
<td>25% (11%)</td>
<td>27% (4%)</td>
<td>22% (5%)</td>
<td>9% (0)</td>
<td>25% (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The 1,753 officials include both bureau and nonbureau positions under each functional category. In the analysis, the region of Amur was substituted for Saratov and classified as urban.
promotion of younger functionaries. The source of any age variation between rural and urban leadership can also be specified more exactly by the particular functional subgroups in urban locales, where cadre and industrial specialists are older than in agricultural locales.

CONCLUSION

It should be unnecessary to add that even very tentative conclusions on political integration and leadership trends in the Soviet Union must be highly qualified. Turnover rates or ages by themselves do not prove anything about the potential capability or attitudes of officials recruited to leadership positions. In particular, western political scientists have found an inverse relationship between the rates of elite turnover in any political system and the resulting level of competence among the nation's political elites. It has been hypothesized by one prominent western scholar of elite analysis that the "higher the degree of elite turnover, the lower the average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness" in a political system. Typically subject to rapid turnover and reassignment, political leaders in a nation like Mexico are unlikely to develop skills in policy analysis or feel the necessity of undertaking long-range planning during their brief tenure in any one position. In contrast, one could cite the examples of Great Britain, France, and Japan, where established senior civil servants are guaranteed their same political positions, motivated to take a long-range view of their policy concerns, and provide clear evidence of an association between low elite turnover and the accumulation of leadership expertise in a political system.

In the Soviet Union, lengthy tenure for party officials at the local level may have been projected as a greater necessity by central authorities for many of the same reasons, with the increased commitment to long-term comprehensive planning throughout the Soviet economy. Major policy proposals by General Secretary Brezhnev and other central authorities over recent years have envisaged massive long-term interregional planning of agriculture in the Non-Black Earth Zone of
the Russian Republic and comprehensive urban planning for major industrial centers throughout the USSR. Thus, central authorities may have calculated that only by retaining the same local officials for a long time period could the party generate both the administrative expertise and political self-confidence among local officials to initiate long-term policies and to make sure that the policies were actually implemented as intended. Internal integration, as I have narrowly defined it in this paper, may have declined in recent years, with a resulting demoralization of younger party functionaries; but that trend may be offset by the increasing number of seasoned party officials in top bureau positions, with a mandate to reverse the short-sighted bureaucratic conflicts typical of Soviet economic performance at the local level.

Even the overall decline in leadership turnover and the advanced aging of local Russian officials since 1964 do not lead to any simple conclusions. True, the opportunities for career advancement among younger party functionaries have undoubtedly declined since the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964. By 1973 the typical bureau member in the Russian Republic has remained three to four years longer in the local leadership than his counterpart might have expected in 1962-1964; and the percentage of bureau members over a decade in leadership tenure exceeds by two to three times the comparable percentage of bureau members in 1962-1964. By age, the typical bureau member is six to seven years older than bureau members first elected in 1955-1964; and the number of personnel changes and new officials elected to the seven major bureau offices in 1969-1973 are less than half the comparable proportions during the 1960-1964 period. Officials identified with the Russian state bureaucratic sectors or with cadre-police responsibilities throughout the political hierarchy by 1973 clearly form entrenched elite subgroups, ranging in age between 51 and 55.

Yet concepts like "oligarchic degeneration" or "petrification" offered by some western scholars to characterize the Soviet political leadership would seriously underestimate the complexity and inconsistencies found within the local leadership of the Russian Republic. Increased tenure
and advanced aging do not constitute uniform elite patterns. Something of a "safety valve" for the career aspirations of any disgruntled younger functionary has been provided in terms of elite access at an early age into certain kinds of leadership positions. Leadership positions in the agricultural locales of the republic have continued to be delegated to young and recently promoted party functionaries. Officials assigned to key industrial or agricultural policy roles in the Russian bureaus almost as a rule are in their early forties; and almost half of all state and party agricultural specialists in the republic by 1973 are under 45. In particular, rejuvenation would appear to be the most accurate description of the leadership in the local party apparat, evident by the comparatively youthful ages of local urban-district party secretaries and full-time staff officials in the regional and area party committees.

Finally, although I have limited my analysis to data through 1973, the convening of the Twenty-fifth All-Union Party Congress three years later on February 24, 1976, found General Secretary Brezhnev increasingly concerned with the problems of internal integration. In his Central Committee Report to the congress delegates, Brezhnev once more prominently applauded the ending since 1964 of "unjustified reassignments and the frequent replacement of Party workers"; and Brezhnev appeared to go out of his way to assure senior local officials that the transfer of cadres will now occur "only when this is called for by the interests of the situation or by the necessity of strengthening these or any other areas of work." But Brezhnev also recalled that, in the interim since the last congress, "many young and promising comrades had been assigned to different leadership positions"; and he concluded his discussion of cadre policy in the report with tough language directed to unspecified party leaders whose long periods in power may have gone to their heads:

This policy, however, does not totally mean that, under the pretext of the stability of cadres, one can leave in directing posts those who, as it is said, are not pulling their load and are not coping with their obligations. Moreover,
one cannot leave people in directing work who display irresponsibility and live off their past accomplishments, believing that their position in and by itself should assure them of authority and respect. It is impossible to retain a Party leader who loses his ability to evaluate critically his activity, who has become isolated from the masses, who produces flatterers and toadies, and who has lost the trust of communists.\textsuperscript{35}

Brezhnev did not specify whom he meant; but, based on those attending the congress as delegates from the eighteen Russian regions in my original sample, I have calculated the average tenure and age for the same four major officials in all eighteen regions through 1976.\textsuperscript{36} The four major officials are the obkom first and second secretary, the oblispolkom chairman, and the capital gorkom first secretary. Through 1976, the four major officials together have remained an average of 10.7 years in leadership positions on the same obkom bureaus; 30 percent of them alone have attained a minimum of fifteen years on the same bureaus; and only seventeen have been appointed to the bureaus for the first time since the last party congress in 1971 (with a ratio of junior to senior-tenured members of 0.32). Their cumulative average age in 1976 has risen to 54, 26 percent are past the formal retirement age of 60 (including 61 percent of the obkom first secretaries), and only six are known to be under 46 (with an age ratio of 0.23). The only contrast among the four positions is capital gorkom first secretary, thirteen of whom were first elected to their current positions and simultaneously bureau members since 1971, and five of the nine for whom birthdates could be found younger than 50.

To reconcile these apparent differences between an aging elite and younger officials in specific positions of the Russian Republic, cadre officials in the Soviet Union may not be totally misleading when they describe cadre policy as the “combination of old and new leadership.” It remains to be seen whether this delicate balancing of age cohorts and the career “safety valve” for younger functionaries prove sufficient to sustain internal morale and motivation. Policy failures at
home or abroad by the central leadership in the Soviet Union or the death of Brezhnev could set the stage for a massive leadership change, in which an opportunistic Politburo member would pose as the champion of younger party functionaries at lower levels. The potential of such a Politburo member, playing upon the career frustrations of younger functionaries to serve his own political ends, has ample precedent in Soviet history and can never be discounted. In the near future, the general decline in internal integration since 1964 at the local political level may yet come to upset the delicately wrought stability of the Brezhnev regime at the center of the Soviet political system.

NOTES


5. See the related critique of allegedly "bourgeois" and "Trotskyite" views of representation in political parties and political leadership in I.N. Iudin, Sotsial'naia baza rosta KPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1973), pp. 46–72.


10. For a recent analysis that assesses the role of ethnic native leaders and their career aspirations in the general context of ethnic nationalism in the USSR, see Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," Problems of Communism 23, no. 3 (May-June 1974): 1–22.

11. L.S. Kulichenko, the obkom first secretary of Volgograd and himself a regional native. See Moses, Regional Party Leadership pp. 69, 144–45, 231–34.

12. For specific citations of these views expressed by cadre officials and an analysis of their potential significance, see ibid., pp. 98–101, 173–93.

13. According to Kadeikin et al. (Voprosy vnutripartiinoi zhizni, p. 187), a very positive trend in cadre policy since 1964 has been the reduced turnover of urban-district party secretaries to an average annual rate of 10–14 percent and the turnover of primary party secretaries to a maximum two-year rate of 25 percent. This positive trend was contrasted with the more negative one under Khrushchev, when two-thirds of all secretaries were typically replaced every election.

14. As examples from Partiinaia zhizn', the biweekly house organ of the All-Union Central Committee, see Iu. Litvintsev, "Zabotimsia o stabil'nosti ideologicheskikh kadrov," 12 (June 1975): 64–69; M. Zimenkov, "Zamestitel’ sekretaria partkoma," 18 (Septem-


21. In Belyi svet, a fictionalized account of a retired obkom first secretary in the Russian Republic which appeared as a serialized novel in the Soviet literary journal Oktiabr' in 1967-1968, the novelist Semën Babaevskii depicts at several points the close personal interaction of regional bureau members and lower political functionaries as portrayed through the major protagonist Aleksei Kholmov, the retired first secretary. See, in particular, the scene of the reunion of Kholmov with regional party officials whose political careers he had influenced in Oktiabr' 3 (March 1967): 84-88.


23. Among my other published studies based solely or in part on this cumulative data, see "Indoctrination as a Female Political Role in the Soviet Union," Comparative Politics 8, no. 4 (July 1976): 525-47, "Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR: The Case of Dnepropetrovsk," Soviet Union 3, no. 1 (August 1976): 63-89, and Regional Party Leadership. My original sample of regional leadership included officials in seven Ukrainian regions, but I have excluded them from this study.

24. Jerry F. Hough of Duke University originally compiled the lists of regional and area officials, and I am greatly indebted to Pro-
fessor Hough for permission to use and analyze the lists of names. I bear sole responsibility for the actual categorization of officials in the tables, the numerical analysis, and the interpretation.

25. I chose the period 1962–1964 for comparison with 1973 because the period coincided with the implementation of Khrushchev’s party-leadership reforms at the regional level. Therefore, I assumed that the composition of bureau members elected in the period 1962–1964 should have reflected a high level of internal integration. I counted the last year of the three in which individuals held bureau positions in 1962–1964 in determining their total bureau years.


27. The positions compared in Tables 5 and 6 were selected somewhat arbitrarily only because they represented the extremes in tenure and age among all bureau officials in 1973.

28. According to one official who has defended the policy of “stabilization,” “At times they [younger functionaries] lack the ability to generalize and conceive of the appearances and facts of social life in all their interdependency, always and in every instance relying on the creativity and experience of the masses. And that is why that here and there senior cadres have been required—those who are wise in life, in the maturity of their intelligence, and in their ability to work with people accumulated over years.” Tabeev, “Vazhnaia zadacha,” p. 25.

29. In addition, the period since 1964 has found a significant increase in the number of urban and district party secretaries promoted directly into various positions of the obkom bureaus. See Moses, Regional Party Leadership, pp. 219–21, and A. Kandrenkov, “Zabotlivо rastit’ kadry,” Kommunist 9 (June 1976): 72.


31. Space limitations prevent me from citing a full and detailed listing of positions included under each of the six functional specializations in Table 8. As one example, however, the positions assumed to be agricultural included the obkom agricultural secretary, the oblispolkom chairman and the deputy chairman responsible for agriculture, heads of the party and state agricultural departments, first secretaries of predominantly rural districts, and heads of party and state specialized agricultural subdivisions (forestry, grain products, inter-kolkhoz construction, land reclamation and water resources, and so on).
32. Early career advancement has been particularly prevalent among agricultural specialists in the rural region of Kursk. All ten of the major party-state agricultural officials in Kursk by 1973 were 40–44 years old, and all of them first assumed their current leadership positions since 1970 and since the election as obkom first secretary that year of A.F. Gudkov, only 43 himself and a native Kursk agricultural specialist. On the factors surrounding Gudkov’s election in 1970, see Moses, *Regional Party Leadership*, pp. 76–81; on Gudkov’s assessment of the recent rejuvenation of Kursk agricultural officials, see “Doverie i strogii spros,” *Sel’skaia zhizn’*, May 6, 1975.


35. Ibid., p. 96.

36. I was able to determine the individuals actually holding these four offices in 1976 on the basis of the names and positions of officials included in the alphabetical list of the 5,000 delegates attending the Twenty-fifth All-Union Party Congress in Moscow. The second volume of the published stenographic report of the congress included on pages 329–596 an appendix in which the names, geographical party organization, and positions or occupations of all delegates were listed. I cross-checked the names and positions of delegates identified with these four regional offices against information available on office-holders through 1974–1975. With specific exceptions, I included the year 1976 in computing the total bureau tenure for each official.

37. Like Aleksandr Shelepin, who was removed from the All-Union Politburo in April of 1975 amid rumors that he had unsuccessfully attempted to mobilize opposition against Brezhnev, including opposition based on the career frustrations within the lower party ranks.
2. Evaluating Citizen Performance at the Community Level

*The Role of Party Affiliation in Yugoslavia*

The purpose of this essay is to compare the difference between the is and the ought-to-be in present-day Yugoslav public life: what is the variance between the official norms governing the civic behavior and attitudes of Yugoslav citizens and the citizens' actual behavior and attitudes in their everyday sociopolitical lives?

Of the several types of political systems within which one may wish to explore this question, Yugoslavia is of particular interest. A one-party system aiming at socialist transformation via widespread sociopolitical activity of its citizens, Yugoslavia has led other countries in the design and development of innovative political structures and imaginative participatory institutions. Moreover, such self-governing bodies as workers' councils, councils of producers, economic cooperatives, self-managing interest communities, and other organizations of social management foster decentralized, active participation of Yugoslav citizens in political decision-making.
For the normative behavioral codes, we used the Yugoslav Constitution, the Program of the League of the Yugoslav Communists, and the Statutes of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. There are other important Yugoslav documents from which we could have extracted the official norms, just as there are, in addition to the League and the Alliance, other important sociopolitical organizations, such as the Federation of Yugoslav Labor Unions, the Federation of Young People of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Yugoslav Veterans, and vocational, cultural, scientific, artistic, and other social organizations. Though intrinsically significant in their own right, however, not one of these organizations equals either the League in its exclusively leading political role or the Alliance in its mass inclusiveness. As a consequence, the three texts possess the highest authority and are thus eminently suitable for our purpose.

The empirical data that tell us about citizen political attitudes and how much active citizen political participation there actually is come from a research project entitled “Citizen Participation in Community Decisions,” which we initiated and in which we have been engaged, off and on, since 1969. It is a survey study exploring sociopolitical attitudes and activities of citizens under the specific conditions of Yugoslav socialism and its one-party system. We wanted to know how, in fact, the system works on the local level and whether we can evaluate its performance in terms of the citizens’ civic awareness, their political attitudes, their views of government, and their participatory activities—in civic matters, in local government, in organs of social management, and in workers’ self-management. How and how much do the citizens avail themselves of this new opportunity, the several participatory mechanisms? And do the citizens think their civic activities really matter—do they in fact have any effect, in the citizens’ opinion, on public policy decisions?

Article 104 of the Yugoslav Constitution deals with self-management in local communities:

Article 104. In local communities, as autonomous communities of citizens in rural and urban localities, citizens
shall exercise direct self-government in the spheres of activities associated with the direct satisfaction of the needs of the working people and their families.

Under commune by-laws local communities may also be empowered to take charge of other affairs concerning the satisfaction of communal, social and other common needs of the citizens, and to determine the mode of financing these activities.³

Chapter 1 of the Program of the League of the Yugoslav Communists (formerly the Communist party of Yugoslavia) sets the behavioral norms of its members in greater detail and stringency. It states that the members should "struggle for construction of socialism" by "setting the personal example . . . how to carry out tasks of socialist construction," in "being active in places where working people live and work," "working with the organs of government," and "developing many-sided activities in organs of workers and social management" on all levels. As "the representatives of the interests and aspirations of the working class and all other working people," the League members should "actively influence the development of the socialist consciousness of the masses" and make the organs of workers and social management "a mass school of socialism."⁴

The mass political organization, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (formerly the Liberation Front of Yugoslavia), which, according to the League Program, "is developing into an all-national socialist parliament and represents the most adequate form of political linking of the real social factors of socialist democracy in Yugoslavia, 'should' enable every citizen who in principle is for socialism to be politically and socially active." As the Alliance "best corresponds to the political system characterized by the growing application of the methods and forms of direct democracy," it must assist in "increasingly direct participation of citizens in managing society." Thus, as "the political basis of the system," the Alliance, of which the League is a part, "receives from the Communists the strength of socialist con-
viction" and in turn "transforms it into the broad socialist consciousness of the working people." At the same time, the Alliance keeps the League members "under constant judgment and evaluation on the part of the working people."\(^{15}\)

The behavioral standards set by the three documents thus call for citizen self-government and other citizen activities to satisfy the citizens' own interest and needs (the Constitution); for citizen participation and activism in sociopolitical and economic management of the society (the Alliance); and for construction of socialism by helping to develop universal citizen socialist consciousness through quality leadership, teaching, personal example, and sustained activist participation in all citizen organs and organizations (the League).

In order to be able to perform these demanding, responsible tasks, we submit, Yugoslav citizens must be highly interested, first of all, in their own country's political affairs, what they are and what they ought to be. For this reason, the citizens should be well informed about such matters and should also know what is going on abroad. And they should know something about their own political leaders at the several governmental levels—if for no other reasons than to be able to identify, reach, and influence the pertinent decision-makers when the time comes. To find out whether Yugoslav citizens are indeed interested in these matters, how well informed they are, and whether they know their leaders, we included specific and detailed items on these matters in the questionnaire. Here, we subsume the data we obtained from the answers under the heading "Civic Awareness."

To be willing to spend time, energy, and resources in active participation in building socialism set by the norms, citizens must be properly motivated. They must assume that such participation is indeed worth their while, that it matters, and that their efforts will bring results. For that reason, we asked the respondents whether they think that citizens can influence governmental and self-management organs, and how much. We include the resulting data under "Citizen Perception of Efficacy."

How much do Yugoslav citizens actually participate in
Yugoslav public life? How much work do they put in—in self-management (social self-management and workers' self-management); in electoral activities (on nominating committees and in preelectoral meetings); and in community activities (on social contacts, in citizen meetings, and in community actions)? Our data reveal answers to these questions in the section "Citizen Participation."

And finally, in terms of the expectations contained in the official norms, what and how much remain to be done? What do citizens think of the present governmental performance on the communal, republican, and federal levels? How good a job does each (commune assembly, the republican government, and the federal government) do in dealing with major needs and problems of the commune, the republic, and the state? We introduce the data concerning this matter under "Citizen Evaluation of Government Performance."

A comparison of the data with the norms, we think, should permit us to determine the differences between the two sets.

**ALL CITIZENS**

**Civic Awareness**

How much interest do citizens in Yugoslavia display in domestic political matters? How well informed are they about politics, at home and abroad? And how well do they know who is who in Yugoslav politics on the several levels?

Thirty-two percent of the respondents expressed a high degree of political interest; 26 percent, moderate; 18 percent, low; and 24 percent, none. In terms of political information, 19 percent of the respondents displayed outstanding knowledge about politics at home and abroad; 26 percent, moderate; 17 percent, low; and 39 percent, none. And as to knowing political leaders, 6 percent of the respondents knew five or six leaders (i.e., all we asked about); 18 percent, three or four; 36 percent, one or two; and 40 percent, none. In other words, 76 percent of the respondents expressed at least minimal interest in politics, 62 percent showed at least minimal political information, and 60 percent knew at least one political leader."
TABLE 2.1: Citizen Efficacy in Self-management Bodies (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At Work Place</th>
<th>At Commune</th>
<th>At Republic, Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not allowed, no influence</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed, no influence</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed, some influence</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed, a lot of influence</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(4,885)</td>
<td>(4,889)</td>
<td>(4,898)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Perception of Efficacy**

When we asked the respondents "How much influence do you think citizens have on communal, republican, and federal governments?" 29 percent thought that citizens, indeed, have a great deal of influence, 50 percent answered that the influence is moderate or low, and 4 percent doubted that citizens have any influence at all; the rest had no opinion. However, when we asked the same question as to the respondents' own influence, or their own political efficacy ("Could you prevent a harmful decree from being passed by the Communal Assembly?"), their answers were much more circumspect. Three percent said that they could, 7 percent said they might, 6 percent thought rather not, and the great bulk, 84 percent, thought that they could not.

Then we asked about self-management. Does the institution increase the influence of the working people at the job level, in the communal, the republican, and federal self-management organs? Table 2.1 shows the distribution of the answers. The respondents displayed almost the same confidence in self-management at the republican and federal level as they did at the job level and at the communal level.

In comparison, then, the respondents thought that citizens have greater influence on decisions of the several government agencies than they have on the decisions of self-manage-
ment organizations. But they thought very little of their own ability to influence decisions.

**Participation**

Participation activities can be arrayed along several dimensions: how difficult they are to perform, how much initiative they require, how far removed they are from the immediate citizen concern, whether they are limited to elected representatives only, how much involvement and activism they require.\(^7\) Participatory acts can be perceived either separately, along the dimensions listed above, or grouped within broader categories of participatory modes. Thus, for example, social contacts, citizen meetings, and community actions can be grouped together in community activities; participation in nominating committees and preelectoral voters' meetings, in electoral activities; and social and workers' self-management, in self-management.

Here we were interested in finding out how much Yugoslav citizens participate in the community life. We hypothesized that fewer citizens would participate in difficult, initiative-requiring, elective, time-consuming, removed, and involved activities, and more would opt for easy, passive, and less-involved participatory acts close to their immediate concerns. Thus, representatives to the local community and commune social self-management organs have to be elected; but it is easier to be elected to the local community council than to the communal assembly or council for the simple reason that there are more local communities than there are communes. Members of nominating committees have also to be elected, but there are more slots on the nominating committees than in the local community council. Moreover, members of the nominating committees serve for a specific election only, while members of the local community councils serve for a definite term (two years). Members of workers' councils have also to be elected, and they serve for a period of time as well, but there are more places of work than local communities, and many of them are small. On the other hand, contacting officials on community problems is open to all citizens, but it requires initiative and involvement to do so.
Preelectoral voters' meetings involve three levels of participatory intensity. Citizens may attend, or discuss matters, or they may nominate, introduce, argue, and fight for candidates. Thus they may be passive, active, or initiating participants in the preelectoral process.

From time to time, citizens' meetings are called together to discuss community affairs. Citizens may be passive or active at those meetings, which do not operate regularly in all communities. And citizens have a vested interest in local actions through which they attempt to solve their immediate, pressing, and often vital needs (housing, child care, recreational facilities, schools, roads, water supply, unemployment, sanitation). Citizens are almost required to participate in them for their own and their neighbors' sake.

Our data confirmed our hypotheses. Four percent of the respondents have served in the communal self-management organs, the assembly, or the council, either as representatives of their respective communities or as representatives at large, while 6 percent of the respondents served as members of local community councils. Nine percent were elected to nominating committees, the only elective organ among the preelectoral activities, and 11 percent of the respondents have attempted to influence officials on community problems by directly contacting them. Twenty percent of them served on workers' council in their respective places of work but 45 percent have attended preelectoral voters' meeting (16 percent regularly) as they have citizens' meeting (13 percent regularly). And 56 percent of the respondents participated at one time or another in local community actions (but only 16 percent initiated community actions).

We can conclude that citizen participation depends on the political activity concerned: the more limited, difficult, removed, initiative-requiring, time-consuming, and involved the activity, the fewer citizens participate, and vice versa.

**Evaluation of Government**

We asked the respondents what they think of their governments at communal, republican, and federal levels ("How well do you think the communal [republican, federal] govern-
ment takes care of the needs and problems of the people? Does it do a good, adequate, or poor job?

(There is no governmental structure on the local community level, for local community is a self-managing unit within the commune.) Are they getting their fair share?

Almost half of the respondents thought well of their government on all levels—communal (52 percent), republican and federal (58 percent). But more of them thought especially highly of the republican and federal government (13 percent) than about communal government (4 percent). This was, perhaps, to be expected. Citizens tend to know more about republican (state) and national governments (only 21 percent of the respondents said that they could not evaluate their performance) than they know about communal (district, regional) government (36 percent of the respondents said they did not know anything about it).

Yugoslav citizens, our data show, tend to be interested in politics (76 percent of the respondents), know at least something about national and international affairs (64 percent), and tend to know some of their political leaders on the three levels of government (60 percent). They think that citizens can influence government somewhat (79 percent), and they believe in self-management (59 percent in communal, 54 percent in republican and federal, 61 percent in workers' councils), but less so than in the government. The citizens participate in community activities, though more in those which are easy than in those which are difficult (56 percent to 4 percent); 22 percent of the respondents have never participated in any community activity at all. And they tend to evaluate positively their government performance, though somewhat more so on the republican and federal levels (58 percent) than on the communal level (52 percent). The figures are relatively high, all above the fiftieth percentile, oscillating between a low of citizen evaluation of communal government (52 percent) and a high of some citizen influence on government (79 percent).

The only exception in the total of ten figures appears to be the low citizen evaluation of their own influence on governmental decision (16 percent of the respondents). This may have been at least in part a function of the kind of question
we asked ("Could you prevent a harmful decree from being passed by the Communal Assembly?"); who but a few citizens could influence that Assembly? When we asked about citizen influence rather than the respondents' own personal influence, the percentage difference jumped from 16 percent to 79 percent. We would conclude, therefore, that individual citizens, as contrasted with citizens as a group, appear to feel relatively powerless, passive participants in the political process. To acquire influence, to become personally influential, a citizen, it would appear, would need to get organized. And to that question we turn next.

**LEAGUE MEMBERS, ALLIANCE MEMBERS, AND OTHER CITIZENS**

Here we divide the total population of the sample into three groups: the members of the League of the Communists, the smallest group (14 percent); the members of the Socialist Alliance, which is a much larger group (40 percent); and the largest group, the rest of the citizens (46 percent). How far apart from each other are these three sections of the population in terms of political attitudes and participatory activities of citizens? The official normative prescriptions would lead us to believe that, in terms of citizen political attitudes, the League members would be the most positive, the citizens at large the least, and the Alliance members would be located somewhere between the two. Similarly, in terms of citizen participation, we would assume that the Communists would participate the most, the citizens at large the least, and that the Alliance members would be found somewhere between the two. Tables 2.2–2.5 include the comparative data. They are entirely persuasive. League members lead in all categories.

What is more interesting, however, is that the more demanding a political activity or the stronger an attitude, the closer are the Alliance members to the rest of the citizens and the farther away from the League members, while the less demanding a political activity or the weaker an attitude, the closer the Alliance members are to the League members and the farther away from the citizens at large. The examples of
participation in the organs of self-management in preelector- al voters' meetings (nominating candidates), social contact- ing, and citizen evaluation of their own political influence are telling in this respect. What does it mean? It means, we think, what the norms say it means; namely, that although the League is the leading political force in the country, the Alliance is the principal organizational basis of the political sys- tem. Its societal role brings the Alliance politically closer to the unorganized citizens. A trend analysis would probably show that the Alliance makes a conscious, sustained effort to lift itself politically closer to the League; in any case, the norms prescribe this effort.

TABLE 2.3: Citizen Efficacy by Three Groups (High) (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General citizen influence on government</th>
<th>League</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One's own influence</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1,404)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-management as influential channel</th>
<th>League</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At work place</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(832)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At commune</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(679)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At republic, federation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(565)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A second important observation is that the pattern of political attitudes and behavior displayed by all citizens is replicated in all three respective groups. Thus, members of the League of the Communists, as with citizens and Alliance members, are most active in the least demanding activities and positive in the weakest attitudes. The comparative percentages are unequivocal. Of course, as a group, the League is the most active and positive, the rest of the citizen are the least active and positive, and the Alliance members stand almost exactly in the middle.

**LEADERSHIP INDICATORS IN THE LEAGUE**

The official norms demand most from the members of the League of the Communists. Our data show that without exception, the League members are the most politically aware, influential, active, and satisfied with the performance of the several governments—communal, republican, and federal. In this section we will focus on the question of how much is "most."

Of the three variables—political interest, political infor-
TABLE 2.5: Citizen Evaluation of Government Performance by Three Groups (Very Good) (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>League</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communal government</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican and federal government</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(647)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information, and knowledge the political leaders—the more telling are political information and knowledge of the leaders. It is relatively easy for a respondent to claim that he has high political interest. But when it comes to the ability to name leaders at several governmental levels and to display actual knowledge about recent domestic and foreign political events, the respondent cannot pretend even if he wanted to. The percentage of respondents who know the names of political leaders and possess political information are thus endowed with hardness which those concerning political interest do not possess. Since the percentages of these variables are quite similar, we are including only data for political information in Table 2.6. It shows that over half of the members of the League in the sample possess a great deal of solid information about political events in Yugoslavia and the world, while only over one-fifth of the Alliance members and a few of the other citizens do. Among the League members, an additional 30 percent of the sample knew answers to half of the questions; the rest, or 16 percent, knew little or nothing.

TABLE 2.6: Political Information by Three Groups (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>League</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,853)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(816)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(944)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Under the category of perception of efficacy, we will discuss here only two of five variables: citizens’ own influence ("Could you prevent a harmful decree from being passed by the Communal Assembly?"), and the workers’ councils’ influence at place of work. We omit the citizens’ general influence because all three groups have similar distributions as reported above, and we do not include self-management, communal, republican, and federal levels because figures are similar to those concerning self-management at the places of work.

As Table 2.7 shows, even members of the League are uncertain about their own influence on decisions of the Communal Assembly. Over 50 percent of the sampled League members thought they could not do much as individuals, and only 9 percent were certain that they possessed the necessary power.

Comparing Tables 2.7 and 2.8 one realizes that all three groups in the sample are much more confident about the influence citizens possess on decision-making through the organs of self-management than about their own political influence. The League members are, of course, the most confident.

Still, while 13 percent of the League of the Communists do not believe in self-management as the channel of citizen influence, 11 percent appreciate the existence of self-management but do not believe in its capacity to influence decisions.

Participation is a complex category. As we pointed out earlier, it consists of three modes of participation and eight activities. For that reason, although our concern is with the participation of the League members, we will approach this concern here in a different way. We will focus on the participatory distance between the League and the Alliance on the one hand and the rest of the citizens and the alliance on the other. Accordingly, we will group the citizen participatory activities in three categories: a) where the Alliance is closer to the unorganized citizens, b) where the Alliance is closer to the League of Communists, and c) where the Alliance is approximately in the middle between the two.

The largest category is the participatory activities in
TABLE 2.7: Citizens' Own Influence on Political Decisions by Three Groups (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>League</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4,111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(318)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(352)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(154)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

which the Socialist Alliance is closer to the citizens at large than to the League. It includes all three levels of self-management (at the working place, at the commune, and at the republican and federal levels), contacting officials on community problems, and community actions.

For purpose of illustration, we selected citizen participation in self-management at the communal level because the Alliance members here differ very little from the citizens at large. Ninety-five percent of the Alliance members and 99.5 percent of the rest of the citizens have never been elected to communal self-management organs. (Eighty-three percent of the League members have never been elected.)

Although the difference between the Alliance members and the rest of the citizens is greater in contacting officials on community problems than in self-management, the difference between the two is still small. Twice as many League members have made such contacts three times or more than the Alliance members have ever done. On the other hand, however, 72 percent of the League members have never contacted anybody (compared with 88 percent of the Alliance members and 94 percent of the rest of the citizens).

Even at the easiest participatory level, communications, the Alliance members in the sample are closer to the rest of the citizens than to the members of the League. This does not mean that the League members do all the community work. But it does mean that a League member is much more likely to initiate such work. Still, 27 percent of League members in
TABLE 2.8: Workers' Council's Efficacy at Work Places by Three Groups (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>League</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not allowed, no influence</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,908)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed, no influence</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(780)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed, some influence</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed, a lot of influence</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(832)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the sample have never participated in local activities and 34 percent have never initiated ideas for such work.

The second category is the participatory activities in which the Socialist Alliance is closer to the League of the Communists than to the citizens at large. Only in preelectoral voters' meetings, by itself a rather easy participatory activity, is there a disproportionately greater Alliance members' participation than among the rest of the citizens, and the Alliance members are closer to the League members in that respect. Once we introduce the distinction between those who participate passively and those who nominate candidates, however, this distance between the Alliance and the League increases considerably. Forty-four percent of League members in the sample have nominated a candidate, while 33 percent participated only passively. On the other hand, 37 percent of the Alliance members participated passively and only 18 percent have nominated a candidate.

The final category is the participatory activities in which the Socialist Alliance is approximately in the middle between the League members and the rest of the citizens. Two participatory activities are involved: participation at citizens' meetings and in nominating committees. Together with preelectoral voters' meetings, these two activities are the sole organizational responsibility of the Alliance. (Since the attendance at the citizens' meetings is similar to that of the preelectoral voters' meetings, we will limit ourselves here to the nominating committees.)
Members of nominating committees are elected at pre-electoral voters' meetings; the election process makes access to this activity limited primarily to members of the Alliances. This is why 95 percent of the unorganized citizens have never been members of nominating committees. League members, on the other hand, as members of the Alliance, have ready access to the nominating committees. Twenty-three percent of League members and 12 percent of Alliance members have served in this capacity. Still, more than three-fourths of the League members, or 77 percent, have never so participated.

How well do the citizens in the three groups think the government takes care of their interests and demands? Since the citizen evaluation of republican and federal governments is described above, we will focus on the communal level. Citizens in the three groups tend to agree that the communal government performance is adequate but not much more than that. Still, the League respondents are a bit more positive than the members of the other two groups. The margin is slim, however, with only 8 percent considering the performance good while 17 percent consider it poor.

We can now answer the question: how much do the League members lead the rest of the Yugoslav citizens? The answer is that "it depends." They lead the most in political awareness—they are by far the most interested in and informed about politics at home and abroad. Our data show that they are the knowledgeable leaders and informed teachers of the masses. And they lead the least in evaluation of their own personal influence on governmental decisions. Only 9 percent of the League respondents claim high, and 19 percent medium, personal influence, while 58 percent admitted no personal influence whatsoever. True, this is almost double the amount of personal influence on governmental decisions professed by non-League members. If all the other citizens feel almost powerless in this respect, the League members, feeling only slightly more influential, do not feel exactly powerful. Organization, we submit, even membership in the League of the Communists, is not in itself a simple key to influence.
The rest of the leadership indicators of the League members in the sample is scattered between these two poles. The League members think that the workers' councils are quite influential, and they participate actively in preelectoral voters' meetings. Their other attitudes and activities, though leading and positive, are middling. Our data show that membership in the League guarantees no instant civic excellence, nor is membership there as homogeneous as we thought. Some members are clearly very close to the norms set in the Program of the League of the Yugoslav Communists (YCL); others are not. The percentages introduced above are quite revealing in this respect.

What makes for the difference between the outstanding members of the League and those whose performance is less notable? That issue will now be addressed.

**OUTSTANDING LEAGUE MEMBERS COMPARED TO OTHER MEMBERS**

The League members are relatively young: almost two-thirds, or 62 percent, cluster in the 25-44 age category. The unorganized citizens (44 percent in that age group) and members of the Alliance (49 percent) are older. They are well educated: 70 percent of the League members went beyond primary (8 years) education, and 23 percent have a college degree. The comparable figures for the unorganized citizens are much lower: only 17 percent went beyond primary school, and only 2 percent have a college education, while for the Alliance members, the figures are 37 percent and 6 percent respectively. Seventy-eight percent of the League members are men; the majority or 60 percent of the unorganized citizens are women, while the Alliance members are 56 percent men and 44 percent women. The League members' income is relatively high: 56 percent are in the two top income categories, with monthly household income between 1,600 and 10,000 dinars (about $100-625). Only 19 percent of the unorganized citizens and 36 percent of the Alliance members fall in these two top income categories. In fact, the bulk of the unorganized citizens, or 69 percent, earn less than 1,000 dinars (about $62.50) per month.
Over half, or 51 percent of League members are “working people,” i.e., white-collar employees, while over one-fourth, or 26 percent, are workers, and only 7 percent are farmers. In the last four years, the League leadership has attempted to recruit more workers into the League. Fortunately, the Alliance, where there are more workers (28 percent) than “working people” (13 percent) is a good recruiting ground for that purpose. (There are also 29 percent of farmers in the Alliance.) Of the unorganized citizens, 52 percent are farmers, 15 percent are workers, and 6 percent are “working people.” The League members live mostly in cities (62 percent). Over half or 54 percent of unorganized citizens live in the country, while the Alliance members are equally distributed between urban (43 percent) and rural areas (43 percent). Almost half, or 47 percent, of the League members live in communities with high migration rates (compared with 42 percent of unorganized citizens and 47 percent of Alliance members living in communities with migrational stagnation).

As a group, then, the League members tend to be young/middle-aged, well-educated, well-paid, male white-collar employees living in cities with high migration rates. But League members display neither uniformly positive political attitudes nor uniformly high participatory spirit. Citizen participatory activities were reduced to a six-point intensity scale, from none to very high in terms of both quantity and quality. While “no participation” indicates zero political participation, “very high participation” stands for high quality/quantity political participation, i.e., participation that is difficult, involved, removed from the respective citizens’ concern, time-consuming, initiative-requiring, and with limited access to it. Table 2.9 shows the distribution of the sampled League members along the six-point participatory intensity scale. 10 Forty-six percent of the League members in the sample are shown to be low/moderate participants, 31 percent high/very high, and the rest, 22 percent, participate either not at all (6 percent) or very little (16 percent). Looking for an explanation, we cross-tabulated the six-point participatory scale with the most telling variable included earlier under civic awareness (political information), citizen efficacy
(workers' councils as channels of citizen influence), citizen evaluation of governmental performance (communal government performance), demographic characteristics (sex, age, education, occupation, income), and ecological factors (the respective community's rate of economic growth, rates of migration, urban-rural continuum, and principal section of employment).

Although important, political information does not explain the intensity of the League members' participation. True, possession of outstanding amount of information correlates highly with outstanding participation: the more informed the members, the more they participate in the political life of their community (13 percent), while over half (55 percent) of those who participate less (high, moderate, and low participants) are also very well informed. But even members who do not participate at all are quite well informed about domestic and foreign politics (41 percent of no participants).

The relationship between intensity of political participation and perception of workers' councils as channels of citizen influence is not very helpful either. Thirty-five percent of the most participating League members think very highly of workers' councils, but so does one-fourth (25 percent) of those who do not participate at all.

Evaluations of communal government performance help explain intensity of political participation more than either of the two preceding variables. Although the high and moderate participant-members of the League (41 percent) are some-

---

**TABLE 2.9: Intensity of YCL Members' Political Participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very low</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very high</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
what more satisfied with the communal government performance than the highest participants, the nonparticipants think very little of that performance. In other words, while more than two-thirds of the high participants consider communal government performance adequate and good, the low participants do not. Obviously, the low and nonparticipants are not satisfied with communal government but doubt that their own participation would improve its performance. The highest participants, on the other hand, are also the most critical of that performance.

As men predominate in the League, they also predominate on all levels of the participatory scale, e.g., one finds the highest participatory category to be 90 percent male. Generally, the higher the intensity of participation, the greater the male predominance over the female, and conversely, the lower the intensity the lower the male predominance.

The League members most engaged in political participation have reached early middle age (35–44 years). Fifty percent of the highest political participants are from this age group. And, since 35 percent of the second highest participatory group are also in this age category, we must conclude that early middle age makes for the heaviest political participation of League members. The age group closest to this group are the young League members (age 25–34), 27 percent of whom are high or very high political participants.

Education also plays a role in explaining participation. The members of the League who are high-school and technical-school (twelve years) graduates are high political participants. They score highest on all the respective participatory levels with the exception of the top level which is composed predominantly of college-trained League members (27 percent high-school graduates compared to 38 percent college graduates).

Among the highest participants, the "working people" (51 percent) score the highest, especially those with college education (35 percent). They are followed by workers (26 percent), especially those with skills (15 percent). While the farmers participants less (20 percent), their high (20 percent of farmers) and moderate (22 percent of farmers) participation is
considerable as well. Moreover, comparing nonparticipation, we find that fewer farmers (6 percent) than workers (11 percent) or “working people” (19 percent) do not participate at all.

In general, it may be said that the higher the income, the greater the League members’ participation. Among the highest participants, those with the highest income participate the most (32 percent), followed by the next highest income group (28 percent). In particular, however, there are exceptions. Among the high and moderate participants, there are more participants in the second-highest income category (32 percent) than in the top income category (18 percent). Even more surprising is the number of nonparticipants among the low income groups which is between twice and three times smaller than that among the top three income groups.

Almost half (46 percent) of the very high participants in the sample live in the countryside, 44 percent in cities, and the rest, or 11 percent, in suburbs. But most of the high participants (58 percent) live in cities and 34 percent in rural areas. Most of the low and no participants, on the other hand, live in cities.

Living in localities with high rates of migration and/or undergoing rapid economic growth is not significantly related to League members’ intensity of political participation. Communities with high rate of employment, though significantly related to intensity of participation, only confirm the education- and occupation-intensity of participation relationship discussed above.

It appears then that, according to our sample, sex, age, education, occupation, and income/residence explain a great deal why some League members participate in politics of their communities more than others. The correlations are high, as is the level of significance.

League members who are male white-collar employees in their early middle age with high-school technical-school or college education, and with relatively (but not absolutely) high income and who consider their government performance good, are among the highest political participants in Yugoslavia. In turn, female League members (mostly housewives)
over forty-five years of age with limited education who are unskilled and have low or no individual income and do not consider government performance any good, our data show, are the low or no participants among the League members.

The most powerful explanatory variable appears to be education: broadly speaking, the higher the education, the higher the political participation. Thus, the characteristics that distinguish the active members of the League from the less-active members tend to distinguish League members from the rest of the population. In other words, the League activists in the sample are more upper-educated than the League nonactivists, and League members in general are more upper-educated than other members of the society.

**LEAGUE MEMBERS COMPARED TO OTHER CITIZENS**

Our sample shows that the League members are, without fail, the leading political activists who hold highly positive attitudes toward the political system. However, this is not true for all of them, and neither is it true only for them. As Table 2.10 shows, 6 percent of the League members do not participate in political activities at all, 16 percent very little, and 23 percent are low participants. At the same time, the data reveal that in absolute numbers of respondents there is one third more high-participants among the non-League members in the sample than among the members and more than twice as many nonmembers are located in the moderate participation category than members.

Similarly, our data indicate that 16 percent of the League members in the sample possess either no or little political information. True, 84 percent are well informed or extremely well informed politically, but in absolute numbers of respondents almost three times as many non-League members display as high a degree of political information as do the League members.

According to Table 2.11, 32 percent of the League members in the sample think that workers' councils are an important channel of citizen influence while only 15 percent of the
non-League members think so. And yet, in absolute numbers of respondents, almost three times as many non-League members think so (and 24 percent of League members do not think much of workers' councils as channels of influence).

Table 2.12 makes a strong argument as well. While 16 percent of the League members in the sample consider the communal government performance poor, 8 percent consider it good, but compared with 4 percent of non-League members who also consider the government performance good, there are almost three times as many non-League members as League members who think so.

There are no significant exceptions to the rule. Over half

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**TABLE 2.10: Intensity of Participation by League Members and Others (percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>League</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>6 (44)</td>
<td>28 (1,189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>16 (112)</td>
<td>37 (1,576)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>23 (163)</td>
<td>20 (859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>23 (157)</td>
<td>8 (333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>15 (107)</td>
<td>4 (160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>16 (114)</td>
<td>2 (82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(697)</td>
<td>(4,199)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**TABLE 2.11: Perception of Workers' Council as Influential Channel by League Members and Others (percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>League</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not allowed, no influence</td>
<td>13 (94)</td>
<td>43 (1,814)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed, no influence</td>
<td>11 (78)</td>
<td>17 (700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed, some influence</td>
<td>44 (307)</td>
<td>25 (1,056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowed, a lot of influence</td>
<td>32 (222)</td>
<td>15 (610)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2.12: Evaluation of Communal Government Performance by League Members and Others (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>League</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>16 (114)</td>
<td>12 (502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>64 (451)</td>
<td>44 (1,881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>8 (55)</td>
<td>4 (154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>12 (83)</td>
<td>40 (1,678)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the League members are outstanding/good citizens but the rest are not. And non-Communists are certainly not locked out from the Yugoslav public life. In fact, there are often twice or even three times as many individuals who are as fine citizens as the outstanding members of the League, and their political attitudes and behavior are as exemplary as those of the best League members. While our data refer to local politics, several items in our questionnaire reflect more than that; for example, citizen evaluation of republican and federal self-management and governmental bodies, contacting republican and federal officials on community problems, knowing leaders on the several levels.

CONCLUSION:
BEHAVIOR, ATTITUDES, AND AFFILIATION

We began this essay by asking “What is the difference between the official norms prescribing the civic behavior and attitudes of Yugoslav citizens and the citizens’ actual behavior and attitudes in their everyday sociopolitical lives”? Our data provide an opportunity to answer this question with a high degree of confidence.

The group of citizens in our sample described in Table 2.13 scored high and very high in all the behavioral and attitudinal variables. This is the group closest to the official norms, the exemplary Yugoslav citizens, whether members of the League, the Alliance, or neither. Proportionately, the
### TABLE 2.13: Citizens Who Score High/Very High by Three Groups (percentage)

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<th>Others</th>
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<tr>
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<td>(368)</td>
<td>(446)</td>
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<td>(967)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(177)</td>
<td>(269)</td>
<td>(201)</td>
<td>(674)</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(116)</td>
<td>(89)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen Evaluation of</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Communal government performance</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>(74)</td>
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<td>Republican and federal government performance</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(177)</td>
<td>(269)</td>
<td>(201)</td>
<td>(674)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
League members in our sample, without a single exception, score the highest. Alliance members follow League members who, in turn (again without a single exception), are followed by the unorganized citizens. In absolute numbers of respondents, however, the Alliance members lead the League members. They score higher in fifteen out of the eighteen variables: only in evaluation of their own political efficacy, social contacting, and membership in the Communal Assembly or council or both do the League members surpass the Alliance members. And in six cases, the unorganized citizens surpass the League members in areas having to do with citizen influence on governmental and self-management decisions as well as in those areas having to do with citizen evaluation of governmental performance. (In both sets, the unorganized citizens appear to be more positive than the League members, though they are still behind the Alliance members.)

Otherwise, the top citizens in the three groups in our sample—the League members, the Alliance members, and the unorganized citizens—vary according to given variables. In what we call civic awareness, they oscillate from 54 to 69 percent for the League members; 22 to 28 percent for the Alliance members; and 6 to 16 percent for the rest of the citizens. In citizen perception of efficacy (citizens influence on governmental and self-management decisions), the scores range from 21 to 44 percent for the League members, 13 to 32 percent for the Alliance members, and 1 to 21 percent for the rest. In political participation they range from 17 to 44 percent for the League members, 5 to 23 percent for the Alliance members, and 1 to 7 percent for the unorganized citizens. As far as citizen evaluation of governmental performance is concerned, the respective percentages are 8 to 25 for the League members, 4 to 14 for the Alliance members, and 3 to 9 for the rest of the citizens. Thus, while the League members are well up-to-date on political information, display high interest in politics, and know many political leaders, their evaluation of governmental performance is relatively low: they are critical. The Alliance members, on the other hand, while following essentially the same pattern, score relatively low on political participation. And so do the rest of the citizens, whose political partici-
TABLE 2.14: Citizens Who Score Moderate by Three Groups (percentage)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>League</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
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<td>Civic Awareness</td>
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<td>Political interest</td>
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<td>(362)</td>
<td>(953)</td>
<td>(901)</td>
<td>(2,216)</td>
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</table>

* Since four participatory variables are simple dyads, they have no medium value.

The citizens identified in Table 2.14 fall between the top citizen group in Table 2.13 and the bottom group of Table 2.15. They score somewhere in the middle between the high/very...
TABLE 2.15: Citizens Who Score Low/Zero by Three Groups (percentage)

<table>
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<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>(15)</td>
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<td>(1,033)</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>(866)</td>
<td>(1,691)</td>
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<td>(2,249)</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>(116)</td>
<td>(260)</td>
<td>(242)</td>
<td>(618)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican and federal government performance</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>(138)</td>
<td>(432)</td>
<td>(437)</td>
<td>(1,008)</td>
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</table>
high and low/zero. Medium-active political participants tend to express what might be called the Yugoslav attitudinal mean in local politics. Their group is larger (by more than one-third) than that of the high scorers in relative as well as in absolute numbers but much smaller than the low/zero group. (The lowest group is two and one half times larger than the medium group.)

The comparative percentage differences between the groups of citizens in Table 2.14 are not as clear and sharp as they are in Table 2.13. Proportionately, the League members still score the highest but only in twelve out of eighteen variables. They are surpassed in six cases by the Alliance members (in civic awareness—political interest, political information, and knowledge of political leaders; in perception of citizen influence on governmental decisions; in participation in electoral voters' meetings and in community actions), and in three cases by the rest of the citizens (in political interest, knowledge of political leaders, and community actions). In absolute numbers, the Alliance members are the largest group here again—but this time, two to three times as large as the League group and only somewhat larger than the rest of the citizens, who also clearly and with only one exception (efficacy) surpass the League members in numbers.

The low/zero group identified in Table 2.15 is the largest of the three groups. The civic behavior and attitudes of these citizens are very low, sometimes zero. Table 2.15 encompasses citizens from all three groups but the order is reversed: the percentages and absolute numbers for the League members are the smallest; for the rest of the citizens, the largest; and for the Alliance members, between the two (the exception is again citizen evaluation of governmental performance). Also, the differences between the three groups (and especially between the League members and the other two groups) are sharp and considerable in both relative and absolute terms.

Overall, most of the citizens score low (Table 2.15), fewest score high (Table 2.13), and the rest are in the middle (Table 2.14), both relatively and absolutely. However, this is not true for the League of the Communist. There, the order is re-
versed: most of them score high (Table 2.13), fewest score low (Table 2.15), and the rest are in the middle (Table 2.14).

The difference between the official norms and the citizen political behavior and attitudes on the community level varies considerably from group to group as well as within the groups. Having acquired a considerable feel for these data over several years, we also offer here our considered estimate of who stands where in political behavior and attitudes on the community level in Yugoslavia. In terms of totals, less than one-fifth of the legitimate voters score high, about one-fourth score medium, and over half score low. While Alliance members as well as the unorganized citizens follow this total pattern, the former excel over the unorganized citizens. But the distance between the two groups is not as considerable as is the distance between the League and the Alliance. The League members, the numerically smallest group, show a reverse pattern. They score the most in the high category (well over one-third), about one-third score medium, and less than one-third are in the low category.

Put differently, party affiliation does make a difference regarding citizen performance at the community level. But this difference is not made by simple party affiliation only. Instead, it is made by those outstanding party members who closely resemble the official norms—and there are over one-third of them in the League of the Yugoslav Communists.

Overall, we conclude that the League members tend to lead more in civic attitudes (civic awareness, citizen perception of efficacy, citizen evaluation of government performance) than in behavior (citizen participation), the Alliance members tend to translate attitudes into actions, and the rest of the citizens, in a broadly supportive but generally passive spirit, follow suit.

NOTES

1. The project has been conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Sociology and Philosophy of the University of Ljubljana in
collaboration with the Institute of Political Studies of Stanford University and the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The field work in Yugoslavia has been funded by a grant to the Ljubljana Institute from the Federal Fund for Scientific Research of the Yugoslav government. NSF Grant No. 29923 supported preliminary data processing and analysis as did two Ford Foundation grants and a grant from the Center for Research in International Studies at Stanford University. After preliminary work during 1969 in Slovenia, the Ljubljana group prepared a pilot study which was discussed at an international conference in Bled, Yugoslavia, in August–September 1969. The Ljubljana social scientists then formed an all-Yugoslav team, which developed the study for the whole country, substantially modifying the project in the process. Because of organizational and financial considerations we decided to sample Yugoslavia as a whole but within four republics only: Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia.

The results were questionnaires designed for administration to a cross-section sample of the citizenry and local leaders. The communes, communities, and citizens were chosen on the basis of a three-step stratified systematic sample. In the spring of 1971, field work was conducted in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. Data were coded, placed on punch cards in the late spring and summer of 1971, and later processed in Yugoslavia and the United States.


2. The research design includes three sets of population: communal leaders, community leaders, and legitimate voters. The sampling units are thus communes, communities, and citizens. Because of substantial intraclass correlations for all questions, we deemed it necessary to consider as many communes as possible. For this reason, we included one-third, or 125, of Yugoslav communes (total of 374). In each commune we selected three communities, and in each community eight voters. Since Macedonia and Slovenia are geographically smaller than Croatia and Serbia, the problem of distribution of inter-
views arose. For this reason, the sample for Macedonia and Slovenia was weighted twice; the number of respondents in our tables is therefore in excess of the actually sampled 2,995 citizens. Percentage of the agricultural population, one of the indicators of the communal development, was introduced into the sample as a stratification factor by a systematic selection of communes. These were first placed into a rank order by each republic according to the proportion of the agricultural population. In order to obtain an overall estimation by sampling of all categories, the selection of categories was made by probabilities which were proportional to the number of units in the last category, i.e., to the number of legitimate voters. From the list of communes, ranked by the proportion of the agricultural population, cumulative distributions were calculated from the number of voters.

Then we systematically selected communes for the interviews. The selection of a systematic sample was made on the basis of unequal probabilities which were calculated for the republic "r" from total number of voters in the republic \( N_r \) and from the number of communes in the republic sample \( o_r \) with the following equation:

\[
K_r = \frac{N_r}{o_r}
\]

A similar selection approach, which was used with reference to the commune-republic relation, was also used with reference to the local community-commune relation, while the respective number of voters was selected from the list of units in the last category by random. Thus, the 2,995 (and 482 communal and community leaders) interviewed represent 88 percent (10,441,000 citizens) of the total Yugoslav population above the voting age of eighteen).

Interviews by Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of communes in the sample</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of the local communities in sample</th>
<th>87</th>
<th>54</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>162</th>
<th>375</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Number of completed questionnaires (legitimate voters) | 696 | 432 | 576 | 1,291 | 2,995 |


3. *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, 1969), p. 78. This Constitution was in force when we gathered our data. Since then, a new Constitution was enacted (*The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, 1974)). The relevant provisions of the new Constitution read in part as follows (pp. 147-49):
Article 114. It shall be the right and duty of the working people in a settlement, part of a settlement or several interconnected settlements to organize themselves into a local community with a view to realizing specific common interests and needs.

Working people and citizens in a local community shall decide on the realization of their common interests and the satisfaction, on the basis of solidarity, of their common needs in the fields of: physical improvement of their settlement, housing, communal activities, child care and social security, education, culture, physical culture, consumer protection, the conservation and improvement of the human environment, national defence, social self-protection, and in other spheres of life and work.

To realize their common interests and needs, the working people and citizens, organized in a local community, shall through self-management agreements and in other ways establish links with organizations of associated labour, self-managing communities of interest and other self-managing organizations and communities, within or outside the territory of their local community, which have an interest in, and the duty to take part in the satisfaction of, these interests and needs.

The working people and citizens in a local community shall take part in the conduct of social affairs and in decision-making on questions of common interest in the Commune and the broader sociopolitical communities. . . .

Article 115. The by-laws of a local community shall be passed by the working people and citizens of the local community.

The rights and duties of a local community, its organizations, its bodies, its relations with organizations of associated labour and other self-managing organizations and communities, and other questions of concern for the work of the local community and the life of the working people in it, shall be laid down by the by-laws of the local community.

Chapter III of the Constitution, which deals with the freedoms, rights, and duties of citizens, provides in Article 158 that "Everyone shall be bound conscientiously and in the interest of socialist society based on self-management to exercise self-management, public and other social functions vested in him."


6. We asked the respondents what was the degree of their interest in politics: no, low, middle/average, high or very high? In terms of political information, we asked specific questions about the relations
between the People's Republic of China and the United Nations; President Tito's suggestion that a presidency should replace the president in Yugoslavia; the changes in leadership in Poland; President Gamal Abdel Nasser; and President Charles de Gaulle. And we asked for the names of the following current political leaders: 1) the local community representative in the commune assembly; 2) the representative in the republican assembly; 3) the president of the republican executive council; 4) the president of the republican assembly; 5) the representative in the federal assembly; 6) the president of the federal executive council.


8. The League of the Communists is part of the Socialist Alliance: only 2.5 percent of the League members are not members of the Alliance, while 14 percent of the Alliance members are communists. In this paper, however, we exclude the communists from the Alliance and treat them as a separate group. Still, the communists tend to be overrepresented in the sample. See Statistični godisnjak Jugoslavija [Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook], (Belgrade, 1972) pp. 101-10, 201-2.

9. This may be too harsh a statement. Our data here do not measure the respondent's actual influence (except in those few cases when the respondents have served in communal assemblies) but rather than perceptions of potential influence in a hypothetical situation and in general.

10. The scale of participation intensity was constructed in the following way: On each of the eight participation variables, respondents received 0 point for nonparticipation; 1 point for membership on a nominating committee, self-management body at the local community level, or workers' self-management body. Respondents also received 1 point for active participation. Thus in preelectoral voters' meetings they received 1 point for attendance and 2 points for nominating a candidate; in citizens' meetings, 1 point for occasional attendance and 2 points for regular attendance; in social self-management bodies at the commune level, 1 point for being a member of one and 2 points for being a member of two such bodies; for participation in local actions, 1 point for joining the action and 2 points for offering ideas for such an action; for contacting officials on common problems, 1 point for such contact, 2 points for two or more contacts.

The possible eighteen points were then categorized into a six-point scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-no participation</td>
<td>0 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-very low</td>
<td>1-2 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-low</td>
<td>3-4 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-average (medium)</td>
<td>5-6 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-high</td>
<td>7-8 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-very high</td>
<td>9 points</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. Edvard Kardelj put it this way: "We have to admit, without being dramatic about it, that there is no agreement about certain views within the League of the Communists. The reason for this situation is that the League is not separated from the society. What is going on in the society has to be somehow reflected also in the League of Communists" ("Razvoj samoupravljanja in družbenopolitickega sistema v komuni" [The Development of Self-Management and the Sociopolitical System in the Commune] Delo [December 14, 1970], p. 1)
3. Citizen Participation in Romania

*The People's Council Deputy*

How and why certain people become political participants in communist states are topics infrequently studied, since appropriate information-gathering techniques such as survey questionnaires and elite interviews are often denied to the researcher. This paper, however, reports on part of a larger research project conducted in Romania, during which I had opportunities for extensive interviews with deputies of local assemblies called people's councils. From over 250 interviews with deputies and local elites, I obtained information regarding the political backgrounds of citizens who had become deputies (see Tables 3.2-3.4), as well as how and why they had become involved in subnational political life. My effort here will be to explain those findings and to offer some tentative generalizations.

Four of Romania's thirty-nine counties (județe) were chosen for research—Timiș, Cluj, Brașov, and Iași. They were selected not only for their geographic separation but also for their contrasting socioeconomic levels and rates of change,
which I have described at length elsewhere. My thought in choosing such regions for investigation was that I would gain data from which I could more legitimately make generalizable conclusions (i.e., conclusions not produced by intercounty similarities). Nevertheless, I wanted to record any intranational diversity that exists in this form of participation in politics.

Deputies constitute, symbolically at least, the broad contact with the masses necessary for ideological consistency in Communist party states; they allow the claim from party leadership that centralism is pursued and maintained only from a democratic “base.” The participation of citizens in people’s councils as deputies, in other words, is necessary for not only the Romanian regime but other communist governments as well, as long as the image of representative assemblies is useful for the party. The following analysis, then, probes the relationship of a communist government with the citizens it rules.

**BECOMING A DEPUTY**

Elections for deputies at all levels are carefully planned by the Romanian Communist party (PCR). The links between the party’s leadership and election outcomes are not difficult to follow. The principal medium for party control of electoral politics is the Socialist Unity Front (Frontul Unitații Socialist or FUS). In October 1968 this organization was inaugurated by the PCR’s national leadership (and legally confirmed by the Grand National Assembly in November of that year) as a revitalized coalition of all mass organizations in Romania, of which there are a great number. FUS replaced the People’s Democratic Front, which had been a creation of the early communist years, originally designed to amalgamate all anti-fascist parties and later to siphon off the political influence of labor unions, cooperatives, scientific, professional, or cultural organizations, religious groups, ethnic councils. Over the years, the Democratic Front had atrophied, unneeded by the PCR for anything more than appearances.

One effect of territorial-administrative reorganizations
TABLE 3.1: Deputy Interviews: Distribution of Sample by Type of Location (percentage of county total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Timiș</th>
<th>Cluj</th>
<th>Brașov</th>
<th>Iași</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County (județ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>8.1*</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(județ)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town/City (oraș/municipiu)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town/City</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(oraș/municipiu)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commune (comuna)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commune</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(comuna)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(198)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All percentages reported in this and subsequent tables are weighted to correct for the urban bias of the sample, a procedure fully described in Daniel N. Nelson, "Local Politics in Romania."

in 1968, however, was to impress upon the party leadership the need for an electoral control mechanism to assure that subnational political change would not portend a movement away from party control. There was, moreover, an advantage from the party’s perspective for a renewed front organization; the changes of 1968 could be given more the appearance of genuinely democratic transformations if new elections in early 1969 passed through an entity that somehow subsumed Romania’s many mass organizations. Again, one sees an attempt by a ruling Communist party to create political institutions that foster the illusion of party unity with a “general will” or public interest.

Thus, FUS was created around a “national council” in Bucharest, with Nicolae Ceaușescu as its chairman and Gheorghe Maurer its first vice-chairman. From its inception, FUS was an appendage of the party, powerless, really, apart from the PCR. While subnational FUS organizations (called councils at the county, municipal, town, and communal levels) were once less integrated with the party leadership, there was never any question that the front’s chairman and council have always been responsible to the Party chairman is each locality. (As of 1975, the party first secretary in each locale became FUS chairman as well.)
al-administrative unit is intertwined by its membership with both the people's council permanent bureau and the party's bureau. Thus the requirement that every candidate for deputy must obtain an official nomination from FUS (at the level at which he is a candidate) means, in practice, total party control over who is to become a deputy. No matter which organization, group, or individual suggests a person as a potential candidate, an initial process that is itself restricted by PCR control over other mass organizations, the FUS nomination is a prerequisite for being placed on the ballot. And, since the Socialist Unity Front offers the only ballot, endorsed or not, there is no way of becoming a deputy without the front's (i.e., party's) acceptance.

Beginning in județ elections of 1975, and expanding during oraș and comuna elections of 1977, the practice of nominating at least two people for each district has been generalized. But FUS has lost no control. Both candidates always have the same backgrounds (profession, education, sex, nationality) and, of course, platforms never differ. There is, in fact, no alternative for voters. Moreover, the system of casting votes precludes competition as western democracies know it. Voters in Romania cast ballots for both candidates in their district, i.e., "pro" or "contra" candidate X, and "pro" or "contra" candidate Y. This means that in all districts both candidates have a majority "pro," and the person with fewest "no" votes is victorious. But there is no way to ascertain how candidate X would have fared in a direct contest with candidate Y—where voting for one person meant you could not vote for the other individual as well.

Were such an electoral system the only factor to be considered when assessing a deputy's position in Romanian politics, his independence might seem to be compromised but not eliminated. Once having become a deputy, however, an individual has few opportunities to express any differing ideas he might have about public policy, and the pressures against doing so are, in most cases, overwhelming.

In the first place, the people elected to be deputies are usually, but not always, party members. Hence, the onus of party discipline is enough to convince most deputies that at-
tempts to alter what they might consider to be bad public policies are counterproductive in terms of one's career or standard of living. A similar cost-benefit analysis probably suffices to reduce the independence of even those deputies who are not party members. The second inhibitor to a deputy's independence is, quite simply, the lack of opportunities to voice ideas. As a member of a state organ that meets for perhaps eight hours annually, there is little chance to do more than listen to a few reports or cast assenting votes to decisions previously made by the permanent bureau of the people's council (which, for the most part, overlaps in membership with the local party bureau).

Thus, the mechanisms extant today seemingly have been constructed, first, to screen our potentially restive individuals and, second, to restrict the channels available for anything more than quiescent political behavior on the part of people's council deputies.

The composition of each people's council is determined so that they are mirror images of the local populations, particularly with respect to ethnic background and occupation. Age and sex are criteria less rigidly adhered to in molding the composition of people's councils, but they also play a role. Thus Romanian people's councils are not merely nonrandom in their membership—a common phenomenon in legislative bodies where overrepresentation of some social groups is present (lawyers, for instance, in the United States Congress). In Romania, like other Communist party states, there is a quota-type of nonrandom selection for people's council membership.

Local party leaders' control of a council's membership is most far-reaching through such a quota arrangement. Electoral procedures dominated by FUS screen potential deputies, and the party disciplines deputies once they are "elected." Prior to reaching FUS for nomination, however, the proposal of an individual to FUS involves a detailed consideration of the candidate's political acceptability and whether or not the person in question would fit into the quota. For example, between elections, a certain people's council might need a female intellectual over forty years of age of Hungarian descent
to replace a deceased council member, in the sense that such a new member would bring proportions of those characteristics in the council’s overall composition closer to the proportions held by those same characteristics in the population.

People’s council deputies in Romania, then, are constrained by a quota selection system, FUS nominating monopoly, and party discipline. Taken together, these mechanisms constitute formidable obstacles to the expression of diverse or conflicting viewpoints from deputies.

Asking deputies questions about how they came to be selected for that position, however, elicited diverse responses, which ran counter to my general expectations. I had expected, in a unitary Communist party state (given the circumstances described above), that both the reasons for certain people becoming deputies and the actual procedures through which that process is carried out would exhibit greater consistency than I found to be the case. In my discussions with deputies, I was able to get their opinions as to why they were nominated and, second, how they were informed of their selection.

On the first question, a tendency was revealed for Brașov deputies more than deputies in other counties, and Cluj and Timiș deputies more than those in Iași, to think that their party or front-organization activities brought about their nomination. Iași had proportionately the most deputies who indicated that they thought their expertise or some specific skill had gained the nomination. Meanwhile, both Cluj and Timiș counties’ deputies seemed to lay greater stress on having been a good worker or a good “gospodar” as the reason for their selection.

One cannot, of course, infer that Iași deputies are any less loyal or obedient to the party simply because more of their number tend to think their selection as deputy candidates was due to some skill or knowledge they had demonstrated instead of their party-related activity. Discovering such a difference did not immediately suggest an independent variable that might correlate with the lesser party control of political processes implied by Iași deputies’ responses. I did recognize, however, that the socioeconomic setting in Iași County was changing most rapidly from a lower level, relative to the
other researched countries, while Brașov was changing most slowly from the relatively highest socioeconomic level. As research progressed, the explanatory potential of this variable was reinforced via other deputy responses. I will, therefore, return to the apparent covariance between socioeconomic rates of change and the party’s control of local politics later in this essay.

When asked how they found out that their names had been proposed for deputy, a large majority in all four counties said that either a delegation or an individual from the Socialist Unity Front had notified them. Naturally, this is only part of the story, since FUS, in effect, provides only a formal notification. Usually, deputies-to-be hear from other sources earlier, depending on their prior status. Almost all are told by other citizens, that his name had been brought up in a citizen’s committee meeting as a good prospect for deputy from that district. But there are other echelons of deputies, some of whom are sufficiently important to be approached directly by a party official (from the local party bureau) or by an officer in the people’s council. Brașov County led other counties in this last respect.

More generally, I wanted to learn if becoming a deputy involved one process or many within Romania. There are, I found, certain formal touchstones that each deputy-to-be is put through. Nevertheless, considerable differences in the operational procedures exist which seemed to be determined by the importance of a deputy-to-be.

For want of better terms, one can divide deputies into three groups by virtue of their importance—the local political elite, the “needed,” and the “fillers.” A very few deputies are members of the permanent bureau of each people’s council. Contrary to the People’s Council Law of 1968, the permanent bureau and/or executive committee (only județ-levels have a bureau) are not elected in any competitive way from the body of deputies, since the former are handed deputies’ posts by virtue of their elite status.

As part of the local political elite, their nomination and election as deputies are pro forma—clearly secondary to established high party position and/or high state office in the
local organs. The secretary of the people's council, the first vice-president, and sometimes one vice-president (in larger councils) enter the local political elite through state channels and have somewhat lower party positions than other vice-presidents and, of course, the council president who is the party chairman (first secretary). For all these individuals, no one decides whether or not they should become deputies.

If a man is one of the local party secretaries of a municipality who fills a vice-presidency of the people's council, there is no discussion as to whether or not he would make a good deputy—not by the party leadership and probably not by the citizens in the district allotted to him, for the residents are certainly astute enough to recognize the benefit of having a party secretary as deputy from their locale. If a new party secretary is to become a council vice-president, connoting a personnel change in the local political elite, the announcement that a party secretary is a deputy nominee indicates that he will be elected as a council vice-president at the first meeting after elections.

When a people's council first vice-president or secretary position must be filled (for whatever reason), the source of replacement is not the highest echelons of the local party, but mid-level party activists whose expertise (as a lawyer or economist in cities, or other specialties in rural areas) would be essential for governmental administration at that level and location. While the entrance of such individuals into the local political elite is certain to be a matter of discussion for the party's bureau and among party secretaries, the following allocation of deputy posts to new members of the political elite is of minor significance, and arrangement can be made to introduce districts' citizens to their soon-to-be deputy on short notice (e.g., by sending him to speak before a citizen's committee or two). At the commune level, the proportion of nonprofessional party members in the executive committee increases for the simple reason that fewer full-time party workers are available for top people's council posts.

Even in the smallest people's council, however, the political elite are but a few deputies among many. A second and larger group of deputies is what I have labeled as the
"needed," i.e., functionaries needed by the state to administer and, by the party, to advise in decision-making. Again, these people are in the councils primarily as a recognition of their positions in state organs or in their careers, since they (in most cases) hold no post of responsibility in the party. These are the educated, the expert, and the loyal; managing and directing developmental/modernization efforts, their integration into local political institutions is essential. Partly co-opted by their very membership in the party (seen by most as necessary for career and job security), the "needed" are advanced on the basis of their talents and subservience; they are not party activists but party servants. Such promotions bring the "needed" nearer the political elite in posts where they head departments of the local state bureaucracy, administer schools, preside over courts, direct banking and finance, supervise health and sanitation.

Promotion to these types of posts virtually obliges an individual to become a deputy. A doctor, upon becoming a community's sole physician, becomes a deputy immediately. In these instances, as one county deputy in Iași told me, "it is assumed by everyone" that he would be a deputy. For a person "needed" by the political elite, this is usually accomplished through recommendation from a relevant group of professionals to FUS, which, in turn, proposes that individual to the voters of a certain district. Particularly in the case of deputies for districts in a county-level people's council, the proposed individual need not be a resident of the district he represents. For people in the "needed" category, whose specialty usually requires living in the city, deputies are, at best, relatives of someone in the commune they represent; often there is no connection at all. In communes or smaller towns, there is, of course, a much greater correlation between a deputy's residency and the district he represents.

Some of the "needed" become members of the județ people's council executive committee (but not bureau) and, in that capacity as well as in their day-to-day duties heading local enterprises and agencies, provide the expertise (technical or social) that the political elite require for rational decision-making and administration of centrally decreed policies.
There are other “needed” individuals, however, who might not hold top posts in the local economy, administration, or culture but who have that potential. Party membership, of course, comes first for these individuals, but becoming a deputy usually follows shortly.

A final category of deputies constitutes the “fillers,” needed by the local political elite as a group but not as individuals. Abstractly, they partly fulfill a requirement of governments everywhere—to legitimate rule through the representation of a broad popular base. Actually, this group of deputies is not representative of the masses of Romanians in significant respects. This is particularly true when considering the party membership and educational levels. Typically, 80 to 90 percent of a municipality’s deputies are party members, while in rural communes the proportion of party members is usually around two-thirds of the council. In either case, deputies are hardly representative, in that regard, of a population in which only 11 percent are party members. Moreover, far more deputies have completed their education through secondary levels and university than the entire population. In the general population, the ratio of lyceum (high school) to elementary school (eighth grade) graduates is usually one to four or one to three; among deputies, except in rural communes, that ratio is often reversed.

When election time arrives, or when a vacancy exists between elections, deputies of this last category are proposed, nominated, and then elected through mechanisms that are formally similar to those of the “needed” and elite deputies but in ways in which some interplay exists between popular sentiment and the party’s wishes—more so in some regions than in others. This, I believe, can be inferred from the more specific answers to my question already reported where differences were seen between Iași and Brașov counties; Iași deputies tended to think that their skills or expertise were most responsible for their selection, whereas Brașov deputies answered most often that party or front-organization activities brought about their nomination. This may indicate that in Iași, expertise or skills impress citizens and party alike more than activism in the party or related organizations. On
the other hand, such responses might indicate that the political elite can less effectively procure deputy candidates who are active in the party or its front organizations in a locality where the party has promoted modernization and development at a rapid pace from a lower socioeconomic level.

There are indications that the latter might hold true for Iași and perhaps in less-developed/modernized areas generally that are changing faster. Deputies seem to enter public life for different reasons in Iași (i.e., a public "need") and somewhat later than in Brașov, while Iași deputies were less active in the party or front organizations prior to becoming deputies than their Brașov counterparts but were more active in nonpolitical organizations. Information from this inquiry, I think, will fall into place with other more quantifiable measures, suggesting that local politics in Romania (at least insofar as the selection of deputies is concerned) is diverse in ways somewhat corresponding to differences in the rapidity of modernization and development.

Aside from such considerations, it is true that a constant effort is exerted by the local political elite to assure the appearance of representativeness in the people's council on occupations, sex, and particularly nationalities. The local party bureau and people's council permanent bureau, together and separately (they often meet as one body), consider the council's membership and, from lower party activists, receive recommendations as to which individuals would be best to fill the less-important council vacancies. The county-level political elite, for example, is informed by town, city, and commune elites of deputy candidates to the county level.

In communes, such a recommendation procedure often does not exist, since the political elite has at its disposal fairly complete knowledge of potential deputies. Meetings of "organizations of working people" are then held, where individuals are proposed verbally as potential candidates for deputy. In effect, an organization endorses someone at such meetings and, for any given constituency, different meetings may propose different candidates. Much more often, two and more organizations will propose the same person for a constituency—not surprising, since party activists at all such meet-
ings convey the party's judgments regarding potential candidates. In this way, two or three names in each district reach FUS for its nomination.

Discussion at such meetings is allowed and does take place but only in exceptional circumstances is serious objection made to proposed individuals. If not themselves present at such a meeting, less-important candidates are subsequently told of their proposal, and are often genuinely surprised. The citizens' proposal is then considered by the executive bureau of FUS and, finally, by the local council of FUS. Once nominated by the Socialist Unity Front (at least thirty days before the election), the candidate must officially accept the nomination in writing at the electoral commission for his constituency.

The electoral commission of the constituency then introduces the nominee to the public via posters, newspaper announcements, or mass meetings. In the subsequent few days, it is legally possible for any organization of the working people or any citizen to "lodge a complaint against the acceptance or rejection" of a candidate. While this has been done occasionally, necessitating new nominations, citizens almost always choose not to do so.

As a sidelight to all of this, one is led to ask why any politically less-than-active Romanian citizen would want to be a deputy. In some of the discussions growing out of interviews, I gained a few insights into the attitude of deputies about their position. First, deputies experience an increase in status. While most Romanians recognize, I think, the limitations under which a deputy assumes that post, most subjects interviewed said being a deputy gained them respect in their neighborhood and community.

A significant proportion of deputies emphasized the "moral" rewards they received from their job—that is, the sense of personal accomplishment. One might doubt that this sense of accomplishment, among deputies outside the political elite, could be derived from any influence on policymaking. Nevertheless, it was apparent that all deputies serve their constituency in some, though perhaps small, ways.

Relatively few deputies mentioned other reasons for
wanting to be elected. Yet, the few who told of other enticements for being a people’s council member indicated to me evidence of what I had already suspected. While deputies are not paid salaries (unless they are people’s council officers), there are remunerations of sorts. First, housing is more easily obtained by deputies than by other citizens. In Romania, as in most socialist countries, housing continues to be a critical problem, and waiting lists exist for apartment buildings that are only in the planning stages. Being a deputy often (but not always) enables one to circumvent those lists and to obtain new apartments in more desirable locations. I found this practice more prevalent in some areas than in others. In Braşov County, to cite an example, the practice is sufficiently entrenched that an unmarried deputy, without dependents, was able to procure a new apartment of five rooms. For many Romanians, five rooms would suffice for a family of four with grandparents.

In Cluj, deputies indicated that preferential treatment at food stores was common (better produce, quicker service). One Timiş deputy told of tax reductions possible for deputies, since any awards or medals from the state, often given to deputies, reduce one’s payments. Meanwhile, it is possible for the children of deputies in Iaşi County, said a deputy there, more easily to gain university admission and to find a better job upon graduation. Since so few deputies gave these responses, I cannot say how general these remunerations are for deputies. That they exist at all, however, is some indication that being a deputy is not without its benefits.

**THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF DEPUTIES**

In deputy interviews, four questions were meant to ascertain the backgrounds and experiences of people’s council members. I sought an indication of deputies’ first interest and involvement in politics by asking, “When did your interest in public life begin?” Because voting and other “passive” political behavior is routinized in Communist party states, the question sought a measure of the onset of “active” political behavior.¹¹ If the subject did not immediately offer a response
denoting a particular age at which first interest or involvement occurred, an additional question was asked to elicit a precise answer. Conversely, if a deputy stated an age, I would follow with an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding that first interest. Using this response-keyed procedure, I gained structured data on the ages at which deputies first became politically interested and unstructured information on how or why that came about.

Table 3.2 summarizes the structured responses given by deputies. The clear tendency is that present-day deputies began active political involvement as young adults. Relatively few, then, had noteworthy political experience in their high-school years.

Nothwithstanding such a central tendency, differences among counties are apparent; Brașov shows a markedly high percentage in the adolescent category, while Iași is high in the "mature" classification. Meanwhile, both Timiș and Cluj evidence a central tendency toward the 20- to 30-year-old category. One can infer that political interest and involvement generally begin earlier in Brașov County for individuals who later become deputies than in Iași where the tendency is to recall a later beginning to political interests. In Timiș and, particularly, Cluj counties, there is greater uniformity as to the onset of political interests and involvement, with a considerably larger percentage of the weighted sample in those two counties citing their young adult years (20-30) as the period of first political interest than in either Brașov or Iași.
Any expectations one might have had about uniform political backgrounds and experiences among deputies in a Communist party state are, therefore, contradicted by these data which, at least, suggest the inverse. Seeking an explanation for these differences, one could argue that high socioeconomic levels yield complex socioeconomic institutions which, in turn, allow a greater number of channels for political involvement; such seems to be the case with Braşov County. In Iaşi, conversely, political involvement can be said to have been delayed until later ages for many deputies because of that region's relative underdevelopment.

Nevertheless, the idea that politicization processes reach people earlier in more developed and modernized places might be only half of the story here, for we have yet to examine the effect of Iaşi's recently increased rate of change may have had on initial political interest or involvement. I think one should be skeptical that such an independent variable (the level of socioeconomic advancement) is necessarily the only predictor of political participation.

Many authors (Deutsch, Lerner, Nie, Powell and Prewitt, Lipset, and others) have argued, generally, that political participation grows when the socioeconomic level is higher, even though specific components of that position vary. Yet, data available here indicate that for Iaşi—a region where socioeconomic levels are lower—a higher rate of entry into public life is evident during recent periods. Such an inference can be made, since, while the mean and median ages of deputy samples are approximately the same from county to county, many more Iaşi deputies indicated that their first political involvement occurred at a mature age. Precisely why this apparent "rush" to public life could have taken place in Iaşi during the 1960s is intriguing.

Perhaps questionnaire responses result from more successful party co-optation in the Iaşi area—co-optation being, inherently, a process directed at older "needed" people with skills and developed expertise. But Iaşi's position might also be attributable to its high rate of change from a lower socioeconomic level. Any definitive interpretation, however, is
especially difficult because participation in a closed political system usually is not based upon a clear-cut individual choice; a deputy in Romania might not have independently decided when and if to be politically active, or where and how activities on behalf of the party are performed.\textsuperscript{12}

One potential intervening variable can be eliminated. We know that the Iași population did not suddenly develop a sense of involvement during the 1960s from seeing decision-makers in action. Romania and other Communist party states have, to be sure, continued to be too autocratic for a major opening of policymaking to public view.

We can be assured, moreover, that the differences among counties are not a function of another variable, i.e., that the sample from one county is older or younger than the sample from another county. This would have been indicated if, for example, an unexpectedly large part of the Brașov sample were very young (in their twenties) such that initial political experiences necessarily occurred in adolescence. This was not the case, however. Indeed, the four counties' samples are not significantly different from one another with respect to occupation, age, or sex distribution (P > .10 in all cases). Only with respect to nationality does a significant difference exist (as expected) among the four samples (P < .0001). Additionally, one cannot assume that political involvement comes to people later in relatively rural areas (such as Iași) because of less inclination to participate. Research in Western Europe has found that peasants participate in politics, in some respects, as much if not more than their urban counterparts.\textsuperscript{13}

There has been, on the other hand, a relative and absolute increase in living standards in Iași County.\textsuperscript{14} Such developments replicate or correspond to the findings by Nie, Powell, and Prewitt.\textsuperscript{15} We cannot, therefore, decide whether a county's socioeconomic level or rate of modernization and development holds the key to explain findings mentioned here. Yet, at least coincidentally, this evidence suggests that the political goals set by the Romanian Communist Party for modernization and development meant expanded political involvement, planned or unintentional, for those areas where
such socioeconomic change would be relatively greatest (i.e., where either the pace of change would be highest or the amount of change is relatively the most significant).

This is not to say, of course, that political participation grows, in the sense of western democracies. Indeed, the influence of "public opinion," interest groups, and so on, might be siphoned off through a process of co-optation into the political system, the net result of which could be a decline in influence.\textsuperscript{16}

Open-ended answers were also solicited regarding the beginning of deputies' political involvement. In Timiş, the great majority of deputies referred to their first political interest and involvement in terms of their career or place of work—that is, that an interest in public welfare prompted their awareness of a need for political activity—with fewer responses mentioning student experiences, personal motivations, neighborhood requests.

In the city of Cluj, most deputies with whom I spoke mentioned the 20 to 30 age group as the period for their initial interest in political life. Although the circumstances surrounding that first active involvement varied considerably, comments I recorded contained a certain theme:

a) "... since I first worked in the factory and recognized the needs of my fellow workers." b) "As a woman, I saw the need for a strong women's movement in 1945, and became an activist." c) "Because of my work with young people (as an athletic coach) I came into contact with educational problems. ... It was a very difficult period that needed serious efforts. ... I felt obligated as a citizen to do more than vote." d) "Until 1948 I was a prisoner of the Russians ... I had time to see that no citizen should take his citizenship lightly." e) "As a pupil (in high school) I was active in the Communist youth as a volunteer, as I realized the party could do most for our country."

Deputies at the county level in Cluj tended to give this type of response too—that a concern for public welfare created a "need" for their activity—which is not altogether different
from what an American politician might answer if asked why he was a candidate for public office.

In communes of Cluj County, however, many deputies seemed unclear as to the circumstances of their first political activity, except in the case of teachers who related their careers to obvious public commitment. There were no answers indicating adolescent political interest and involvement in communal Cluj, which tentatively indicates a later arrival of Communist party political institutions in rural areas. Despite a lack of responses in the adolescent category, however, there was no clear consensus among communal deputies in Cluj as to how they became involved, over half of them asserting that there was no reason in particular.

The pattern evident in Cluj was strengthened by the general nature of unstructured responses in Brașov County; namely, that in urban areas, a motivation of “need” for political activity was usually cited, whereas in rural areas this rationale was rarely mentioned. As was the case in Cluj, few rural deputies gave a clear-cut answer as to how they became interested in public life at the age they had indicated.

In Iași County, by contrast, a significant proportion (about 50 percent) of county deputies from rural localities and communal deputies evinced alleged motivation from “public need” for their initial political interest and involvement—all as much as the urban sample.

This difference among counties is not easily explained. Superficially, my conversations with deputies indicated that in Brașov and Cluj counties (and probably Timiș), urban-based deputies were thoroughly “socialized”; either their interest and involvement in local politics truly stemmed from a greater public-mindedness or their answers were modified for my benefit to reflect what they thought the motives for a deputy’s political involvement ought to have been. In either case, the term socialization seems to cover the possibilities. In Iași, however, either deputies are more uniformly socialized (to include many rural deputies as well) or else there is genuinely wider concern among deputies for public needs. Because of Iași’s lower socioeconomic levels, I am led to doubt the former, which leaves us with the real possibility
that deputies in Iași County did enter public life for the latter motive.

My probe into the background experiences of people's councils deputies continued by asking, "Are you a member of the Romanian Communist party?" Again, I used a response-keyed procedure whereby if the subject answered "yes," I would ask when he had become a party member.

There are several noteworthy patterns in these responses for deputies in general. First, it is apparent that very few people who joined the party between 1950 and 1954 are deputies in the 1970s. This is, historically, a logical finding. Gheorghiu-Dej's purges of postwar members were closely related to his victory over the "muscovite" faction. These purges of 1950 slowed the party's recruitment during the following period through an insistence that all new members have certain social origins—namely, that of a proletarian, not a bourgeois or an aristocratic, background.\(^{17}\) It is also clear that deputies with party membership dating from the decade between 1955 and 1965 constituted the majority of people's councils in three of the four researched counties in 1973 and a plurality in the exception—Brasov. Subsequent research in 1978, with a reduction in the number of deputies by over 50 percent, revealed no significant change save for the obvious entry of people (via 1975 and 1977 elections) who had joined the party in the 1970s.

In other respects, however, responses to my inquiry about party membership revealed some significant differences among the four counties. A simplified way to present the nature of such differences is to separate the periods into two general categories—"recent" and "not recent." For the moment, then, we can think of the years through 1954 as "not recent," and the later years as "recent." Putting response data into such a configuration reveals more clearly, I think, the considerable diversity among counties (see Table 3.3).

The magnitude of the difference between Iași and Brasov results tends to suggest agreement with responses from the previous question. An earlier politicization of deputies in Brasov, in other words, corresponds with a smaller percentage of recently joined party members in the sample. Like-
TABLE 3.3: Party Membership Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date*</th>
<th>Timiș</th>
<th>Cluj</th>
<th>Brașov</th>
<th>Iași</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1945</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1949</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1954</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1959</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1964</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1969</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1973</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage not recent</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total percentage recent</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Number)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(.05 > P > .01) with answers dichotomized
* Nonparty responses excluded.

...wise, an apparent later politicization in Iași corresponds with a higher percentage of more recently joined party members among deputies interviewed.

There is more to the data here, however, than indicated above. In Iași County, for instance, where over 80 percent of interviewed deputies (weighted sample) told of joining the party after 1954, a correspondingly high percentage of young deputies does not exist. This, necessarily, means that a higher percentage of older deputies in Iași are “recent” party joiners than in Brașov, Cluj, or Timiș. An example explains this situation in another way; if the subject in an interview were a fifty-year-old deputy in Brașov County, a researcher could assume more confidently that the deputy had joined the party before 1955 than if he were interviewing in Iași County, where many more deputies of that age have recently joined the party (as compared with their Brașov counterparts).

In that regard, the similarity between Timiș and Cluj is, again, striking. Neither county deviates from the other by more than a few percentage points in any category along the continuum of party membership dates, save for the “before
1945" and "post 1970" periods. In those latter cases, it appears that there is less dispersion of party-membership dates in Timiș than in Cluj.

Both questions about the political backgrounds of deputies have thus far offered an indication of a pattern that, while not firmly established, has an obvious implication: political life in Romania is not uniform. As we have inferred from deputies' responses, neither political interest in an active sense nor entrance into the Communist party occurs similarly from county to county in Romania. Furthermore, the manner in which diversity occurs is at least coincident with the comparative levels of development and modernization.

At this point, however, we need to know more about deputies' background experiences that reflect on the importance of the party and its front organizations in their political life prior to being elected. Thus, a third question was posed: "What other activities have you performed in public life before you were elected as a deputy?" Here, I wanted deputies to recall their earlier principal public-political activities. My interest was not in what deputies had done per se, but rather under whose auspices public-political actions had been performed. The phrase "public life" as opposed to "political life" was used in this question, first, to avoid connotations of party activity that might have narrowed the scope of deputies' replies, canceling out their consideration of other non-party experiences about which I wanted information, and second, to ascertain the way in which the individual deputies interpreted the phase "public life."

It became evident that responses would be classified despite their unstructured nature. These categories were as follows: 1) Party-UTC; 2) front organizations; 3) nonvolunteer career-related; 4) quasi-volunteer; 5) volunteer; 6) student or women's organizations; 7) none; 8) other.

The Communist party and the Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist or UTC) seemed to coalesce. For instance, if the UTC had been a principal form of public-political involvement, the party was usually cited along with it, or vice versa. Indeed, this is as it should be be-
cause, since the Tenth Party Congress in 1969, party membership has been contingent on prior UTC participation.

The party-UTC category can and must be differentiated from its primary front organizations. Moreover, such subsidiary bodies cannot be classified together. The Sindicat, or General Union of Trade Unions by its more formal title (Uniunea Generala a Sindicatelor), and FUS are both mass organizations, for example, of a nature that makes them integral parts of the party's rule, and almost universal in their membership. The Sindicat is, in effect, a nationwide trade union, encompassing workers of all types—factory or office, white-collar or blue-collar. Since FUS is meant to amalgamate all Romania's mass organizations, its largest component is the Sindicat, in which there are almost five million members (nearly a quarter of the Romanian population).

Romania's National Council of Women and Union of Student Associations are also part of the network of party-related mechanisms. Nevertheless, in terms of their membership, they are smaller. Furthermore, neither the Council of Women nor the Student Association has direct ministerial representation in Bucharest, like the Sindicat and the UTC. Therefore, a separate category was needed for responses indicating activities of these types.

Many deputies responded by citing a nonvolunteer, career-related involvement as their principal contact with public life prior to their being elected. This category covered a wide span of answers to include functionaries in the state bureaucracy, teachers, doctors, lawyers.

What one can call "quasi-volunteer" involvement in public life was also cited—patriotic work and participation in citizens committees for a street or apartment building were most often mentioned. The first of these two answers, patriotic work, refers to labor battalions recruited at one's place of work or residential area for such purposes as construction, harvesting, and the like. Volunteer activities, as such, do exist, of course; involvement of this sort, as in the Red Cross, can be considered as another classification.

Particularly in these latter three instances, public rather
TABLE 3.4: Deputies' Prior Public Political Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timiș</th>
<th>Cluj</th>
<th>Brașov</th>
<th>Iași</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Party-UTC</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Front organizations</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nonvolunteer, career-related</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Quasi-volunteer</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Volunteer</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Student or women's organization</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. None</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Other</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Number)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\((P = .0001)\)

than political activity is stressed by the respondents. Either the subjects who gave such answers had no political activity before becoming a deputy or they wished to conceal the nature of that involvement. Such an interpretation of the question, I think, indicates a differentiation on the part of the deputy between mass organizational membership (as political) and individual action in the public sphere, whether as part of one's career, by volunteering, or through some type of virtually mandatory participation.

Finally, many subjects answered that they had had no public-political activity prior to becoming a deputy, while a significant number gave other responses—the military, avocational-cultural associations, or professional organizations comprising the latter category.

Table 3.4 presents responses using the categories discussed above. These data are important in several respects. The Iași responses in Categories 1 and 2 indicate that a very small percentage of that county's deputies regard the party or its primary front organizations as a principal activity before being elected. In a finding with related implications, a very large percentage of Iași deputies said that they had no prior public-political experiences before being elected (Category 7). In these same categories, Brașov deputies gave the opposite responses; that is, Brașov has the largest combined percent-

age for Categories 1 and 2 among the four counties, and the lowest percentage for Category 7. Some qualifications make this result less-perfectly dichotomous. In this case, for instance, Braşov County was exceeded slightly by Cluj in the extent to which deputies cited the party as an activity prior to being elected. Braşov, however, totals more than Cluj by a relatively small margin when front-organization percentages (from Category 2) are combined with prior party experiences.

Iaşi was also the county where the highest percentages were scored in Categories 3 and 5 (career-related and volunteer). Braşov, meanwhile, scored lowest in both. If it is true that Iaşi deputies volunteered for public-serving activities and participated in public-related activities through careers more than deputies in other counties, then the tentative inference made from unstructured responses to my first question of deputies may be supported here. That inference was that Iaşi deputies more often than in other researched counties enter political life out of concern for public needs. At the least, Iaşi's lead in these two response categories suggests an entry into political life through channels not dependent on mobilization by the party or its organizational agents.

Braşov scored highest in what I have called the "quasi-volunteer" category (4). From responses in this classification, one can infer some indication of the degree to which each county's deputies have been brought into public life through mobilization techniques—a higher percentage suggesting a greater presence of mobilization efforts. Involvement in patriotic work brigades is, perhaps, the most blatant form of "mobilization," although participating in citizens' committees is not entirely by one's own volition either. In both cases, social pressures and a personal "cost-benefit analysis" usually dictate nominal participation. Timiş and Cluj counties both scored higher in this regard than did Iaşi, but neither exceeded Braşov.

Timiş County's unexpectedly large score in the "student and women's organization" category (6) is not easily explained. Partly responsible could be a significantly better organized women's association in Timiş. The magnitude of difference among counties in the sixth category of responses,
however, clearly exceeds the explanatory power of this factor alone.

Finally, in the general category (8), there seems to be a similarity among counties with the exception of Brașov, which has the smallest percentage. Within Brașov, then, there is less diversity of activities in the public sphere prior to an individual's becoming a deputy.

These data point, once again, to subnational political diversity in Romania. In this case the extent to which the party and its front organizations were part of deputies' activities before being elected increases as a county's level of development and modernization increases.

A fourth question was put to deputies during interviews that asked: "Are you a member of the following organizations," and then listed possible answers. My intention was to obtain a comparative measure of how active people's council deputies are during their tenure in that position. This item produced a quantitative measure so that each deputy could be rated on the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Organizations Mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very active</td>
<td>4 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderately active</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nominally active</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minimally active</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inactive</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such a scale, of course, lacks qualitative indexes. For example, belonging to the Sindicat does not indicate the extent of one's involvement. Indeed, a deputy could be extremely active in the Sindicat and nothing else, yet be rated lower in the foregoing scale than another deputy who, nominally at least, is a member of two or three organizations. Recognizing this, I attempted to gain another measure of the degree of participation by inquiring: "How have you participated in one or more of the organizations previously mentioned—always, occasionally, or never?" This inquiry, however, met with unenlightening results. Deputies, almost without exception, an-
answered that they always participated in each organization where they held membership. Therefore, we are left with a one-dimensional picture of deputies' present outside activities.

There are several principal conclusions that one might make from these data. First, a simplified graph of responses (see illustration) indicates that over one-quarter of deputies in Iași County are above average in the number of nonparty organizations to which they belong, whereas only 18 percent of Brașov deputies are as involved. Second, Brașov has a slightly larger percentage of deputies relative to other researched counties who are nominally involved, i.e., having two nonparty organizational memberships. Third, both Iași and Brașov counties have proportionately fewer deputies than either Cluj or Timiș who are only involved minimally or not at all and therefore below average in their nonparty organizational membership.

Here, one discovers that “above average” nonparty organizational involvement does not increase among deputies as the level of a county’s development and modernization increases—as one might have otherwise expected. (The data are not, however, significant at a level ≤ .05 which means that we cannot confidently accept these findings.) Indeed, there is somewhat an inverse tendency. Iași County, with the lowest socioeconomic level of the four researched districts, has both the highest “above average” score of organizational membership and the lowest “below average” score. Taken together, these scores imply rather clearly an overall nonparty involvement greater among Iași deputies than in the other three counties. This information supports inferences made from data cited earlier, where it was suggested that comparatively few Iași deputies recalled the party or its front organizations as principal activities before becoming council members. Furthermore, Brașov County’s responses to this fourth question were unexpected—if, that is, one’s expectations were based on responses from each of the previous questions. Brașov, indeed, might have been the most likely candidate for the scores that we find Iași to have achieved on this final inquiry.

Because these data measured the extent of nonparty orga-
Deputies' Current Nonparty Organizational Activities (percentages weighted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Above Average (3-4+)</th>
<th>Average (2)</th>
<th>Below Average (0,1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timiș</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluj</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brașov</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iași</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 198  (P > .10)
nizational membership among deputies, it is particularly im-
portant that Iași should be found leading the other three
counties. Iași's higher nonparty activity among deputies may
constitute evidence that a greater rate of socioeconomic
change is inversely related with party-dominated political
life. One cannot say with assurance that rapid modernization
and development promote organizational activity outside the
Communist party in Romania, but we can say that these two
phenomena are coincident. Coincident as they are, then, it is
possible that more rapid socioeconomic change fosters (and,
indeed, necessitates) social mobilization and group conscious-
ness before the party has succeeded in establishing its own
channels for activity.\textsuperscript{18}

It is not a new notion, of course, that rapid growth in-
creases the propensity for group organization in a social sys-
tem.\textsuperscript{19} Yet, if deputies join more groups outside the party in a
rapidly changing locality than elsewhere, this information
could put a new twist to an old idea. The development and
modernization sought by the party might, then, promote
deputies' activities away from the party in places where so-
cioeconomic change is relatively most rapid.

The contrast provided by these last responses illuminates
a distinction suggested earlier—what a socioeconomic level
might connote for political life as opposed to a rate of socio-
economic change. Answers to the first three questions are, in
general, mutually supportive. Together they suggest a direct
relationship between such qualities as active interest or in-
volve ment in politics, party membership dates, and prior
public and political activities and the level of development
and modernization. Data generated by the last item, on the
other hand, point to a relationship between the rate of socio-
economic change and nonparty organizational membership.

**CONCLUSION**

From this limited survey of deputies, we can conclude
that the manner in which citizens become deputies is quite
uniform throughout Romania, as the electoral process is
monopolized by the party through the Socialist Unity Front.
Recruitment of deputies follows a quota-type, nonrandom selection at all levels of local Romanian politics, so that deputies collectively mirror the ethnic and occupational mixture that exists in the entire population for a particular territorial unit. Procedural differences involved in becoming a deputy seem to be a function of citizens' prior status, rather than any regional variation. Politicization occurs earliest in the most developed and modernized county and such politicization corresponds to early party membership. The party and its front organizations, therefore, might be expected to be most pervasive in Brașov and least so in Iași.

Data from questions three and four imply that deputies in Iași were, and are, more active outside the party than their counterparts in other countries. Because Iași, as a less developed and modernized area of Romania, would likely have fewer channels for such involvement, such as indication of greater nonparty activity there is intriguing. One is led to suspect that it is not in spite of its underdevelopment but because of its rate of change that Iași deputies are members of more organizations outside the party than deputies in other, more advanced regions of Romania.

If these measurements accurately portray aspects of citizen participation in local politics of a communist state, then changes inaugurated by the party to strengthen its rule (i.e., socioeconomic development or modernization) may be contributing to conditions antithetical from the perspective of a ruling party—more nonparty organizational activity, for example.

It does not follow, of course, that the regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu or communist rule in Romania faces its own demise by continuing to push for development and modernization. Political decisions seeking to "rearrange reality" may well yield some antithetical results, as this research suggested. Nevertheless, this study also pointed to aspects of citizen participation still manipulated by the national leadership through mechanisms such as the Socialist Unity Front. Such control, in combination with judicious flexibility, are sources for the regime's continued viability.

Even without overt coercion, then, Communist party re-
gimes have means at their disposal to constrain citizen participation. Deputies will not likely become a channel for meaningful input into policymaking. Yet diversity in subnational participation exists despite procedural uniformity and quota-type recruitment. Most important, the nature of that diversity implies a tentative relationship between the rapidity of socioeconomic change and the degree to which deputies identify with the party. Were further empirical tests to verify such a relationship, an important step could be taken in understanding not only citizen participation in communist states but political change in such systems as well.

NOTES

1. Research for this paper was made possible through an exchange program administered by the International Research and Exchanges Board.


4. See the list of organizations included in FUS in Scintea Tineretilui, December 20, 1968, p. 1.

5. In 1968 Romania returned to a more traditional territorial-administrative structure with județe, ending a twenty-year experiment with Soviet-style regions and raions. Announced by General Secretary Ceaușescu at the December 1967 National Party Conference, the new organization was enacted into law in 1968; see Lege de Organizare și Funcționare a Consiliilor Populare (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1968).

6. Gospodar is a Romanian noun (derived from gospodarea) which has no English equivalent but can be approximated by the phrase "household manager"; when applied in a civic sense, gospodarea becomes "public service and maintenance."


8. From statistics provided to me by officials of the Cluj Municipal People's Council.


10. The genuine surprise of which I speak was revealed to me in
many interviews with deputies who were outside both the local political elite and an important circle of deputies.


19. Ibid., p. 50, for example.
In the post-Stalin era, the Soviet citizen participates in social and political activities on a large scale, but is it accurate to call this participation "political"? In this study, I will examine one kind of participant activity, the work of today's almost ubiquitous public inspectors, and will show that the public inspector's activity, when viewed in the context of the Soviet political system as a whole, does constitute genuine political participation. More specifically, I will argue that today in the USSR the volunteer inspector performs three major political functions: He serves as an extension of government agencies in carrying out a number of administrative tasks, including monitoring the work of local government agencies; he acts as a safeguard for citizens against local abuses of power, helping personally to process citizen demands; and he directly influences political decision-making at both local and national levels.

Fundamental to this argument is the question of how the political system as a whole should be described most accu-
rately. This is an issue that continues to engage students of Soviet affairs in a hotly contested and important debate—important because the positions taken in the debate profoundly affect our understanding of contemporary developments in the Soviet system. In addressing this question, therefore, I intend to survey the debate briefly, to identify the model of the Soviet political system adopted here, and to indicate why this model provides the most adequate explanation of present Soviet political reality.

Jerry Hough has summarized the opposing positions in the debate by setting forth three models of the Soviet system which he calls the "directed society," the "oligarchic petrification," and the "institutional pluralist." The directed society and oligarchic petrification models share two features of special relevance to the present discussion: both assume the existence of an authoritarian power structure that is rigid and permanent, and both emphasize that influence, demands, and information flow one-way, from the top down. The institutional pluralist model, on the other hand, while acknowledging the persistence of authoritarian features and the dominant flow of power and ideas from the top down, maintains that the Soviet system has evolved toward what Robert V. Daniels calls "a new kind of politics, participatory bureaucracy," in which there also exists a flow upwards of "all manner of influences—recommendations, problems and complaints," to which the bureaucracy must be responsive.

Of these three models, the directed society and oligarchic petrification models largely ignore or derogate the importance of the voluminous evidence of Soviet mass participation. The institutional pluralist model, however, provides a framework of analysis which readily accommodates itself to the propositions about mass participation advanced in this study and shares the assumption, crucial to these propositions, that the Soviet system today experiences an important flow of information and influence from below to responsive authorities in the bureaucracy. With only a slight modification, the institutional pluralist model can be expanded to provide a meaningful interpretation of the functions of mass participation without rejecting the existence of the authoritarian
aspects of the Soviet system. What is required is simply to enlarge Daniels's concept of bureaucracy. Citizen participation thereby becomes an integral part of the model.

Alfred G. Meyer anticipated such a formulation when he labeled the activism of Soviet citizens "people's bureaucracy." In the present discussion the "people's bureaucracy," i.e., the various groups of citizen volunteers, is viewed as a participant in the new kind of politics described by the institutional pluralist model. Thus the individual public inspector becomes an actor in the new politics by virtue of his relationship to the Soviet bureaucracy.

PUBLIC INSPECTORS

Public inspectors are Soviet citizens who devote time and effort without pay to some kind of inspection or monitoring activity. They appear in many different organizational settings. By far the largest groups are attached to one of four major state or public organizations: the People's Control Committee, the soviets, the trade unions, and the Komsomol. In addition, volunteer inspectors work for the newspapers and the party, and there are many small, specialized volunteer associations, such as the Scientific-Technical Society, the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers, the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Nature and Forests, and the Red Cross, whose missions include monitoring tasks.

An impressive number of public inspectors is enlisted in the Soviet volunteer army. There are, for example, 9.5 million people working as volunteers in the USSR People's Control Committee (Komitet narodnovo kontrolya, or KNK). Trade unions claim a membership of 10 million inspectors, not counting the 100,000 trade unionists who participate directly in the agencies of the KNK. The inspection branch of the Komsomol, known as the Prozhektor (Searchlight) numbers 3.5 million. And it is a reasonable assumption that some 13 million activists attached to soviets or serving as soviet deputies engage in monitoring of various kinds. This grand total of 36 million public inspectors amounts to 22 percent of the adult population (1975 figures), meaning that one out of
every five Soviet adults participates in some form of social or economic public-control activity.

Its formidable size is not the only striking characteristic of this volunteer army. A surprising feature, considering the dominant monolithic nature of the Soviet polity, is the relative lack of coordination and cohesiveness of the overall public-control effort. It does not constitute a single, unified system. Each public-control group is institutionally and to a large degree operationally independent of the others, its missions largely shaped by the special interests of its parent organization. For example, monitoring agencies of the Soviets are distinguished from other public inspectorates by their obligation to supervise the work of their respective soviet and its apparatus and to see that all organizations and individuals within the territorial jurisdiction of the soviet are properly carrying out the soviet's orders.

Trade union inspectors operate primarily within the parameters of the work site, where they are concerned with production goals and with the worker's welfare and living conditions. The union inspector pursues the four categorical imperatives for improving production: raising labor productivity, improving quality of product, saving resources, and introducing advanced technology into production processes. What distinguishes his work from that of other public inspectors is his special concern with the fulfillment of labor laws—with how well the enterprise observes safety measures, applies salary scales, and provides for the workers' rest, recreation, and welfare.11

From an operational perspective, the Komsomol Prozhektor is a more versatile compliance instrument than the others. A small, select group, it is systematically organized to respond to monitoring needs in any situation where young adults are found, i.e., in urban and rural economic organizations and in educational and military settings. In the economy Prozhektoristy concentrate primarily upon production goals and the welfare of young workers, who are entitled to special consideration with respect to working hours, vacation, and health care.
The last of the four groups, the "People's Controllers" (NK), are organized in Groups and Posts in enterprises, on farms, at construction sites, and in transportation, trade, and communal-service organizations, ministries, military units, and rural soviets. Their primary mission is to seek the efficient achievement of organizational goals in all these settings.

Though the four major volunteer inspectorates operate for the most part independently, their missions tend to overlap. In the case of the Soviets, for example, the magnitude of their mandate ensures that soviet inspectors share the compliance objectives of many other public inspectorates. Soviet inspectors, trying to determine how well local enterprises are responding to government directives, check on such economic matters as the quality of production, service to customers, the husbanding of resources by enterprises, and the efficient operation of farms—objectives that parallel the control interests of the trade unions, the Komsomol, and the People's Control Groups and Posts. There is, as well, a major duplication of effort, especially between soviet inspectors and trade union activists, in the fields of housing construction and allocation, public health, trade, public dining, and communal services.12

While an individual inspector in any of these control groups may receive occasional assignments directly from the party or a People's Control agency, he is generally guided in his day-to-day tasks by his parent organization. Where cooperative efforts by several inspectorates are called for, public groups are apt to combine in a random manner. As a result, the volunteer control system as a whole, while providing for a great deal of useful flexibility and improvisation in the pursuit of specific goals, is also characterized by a plethora of overlapping missions, which may sometimes prove dysfunctional, and by an absence of overall systemization and unified direction. The chief force for integration comes from outside the system, from the party, whose formal and informal roles of leadership are as important here as in all other areas of Soviet organizational life.13 In sum, the macroview of the
public inspector’s domain reveals it to be extensive, variegated, and pluralistic, the result of the forced growth in the post-Stalin years of a profusion of parallel agencies.

**INSPECTOR-ADMINISTRATOR**

In an assessment of the importance of the individual public inspector’s role, a major factor to consider is his attachment to an official organization. While this attachment provides constraints to his field of action, the inspector’s organizational affiliation can also substantially enlarge the impact of his work.

The constraints on the inspector’s field of action are undeniably real; his personal authority to take action against violations and violators is severely restricted, and his monitoring activities are largely assigned and carefully guided and supervised by his parent organization. Despite these limits on the inspector’s scope of action, however, his formal ties to an official organization permit him to play a larger political role than might be expected. While it is true that certain inspectorates are favored in this regard—the standing commissions of the Soviets and the inspectorates of the KNK, for example, possess rights and a potential political leverage not enjoyed by other volunteer inspectorates—any public inspector, by virtue of his contribution to the work of his organization, becomes an inspector-administrator. This role gives him access to the processes of bureaucratic politics described by the model of institutional pluralism.

There are three political functions that the public inspector as an inspector-administrator may perform. First, the very essence of the inspector’s work—monitoring the implementation of party and government directives, i.e., monitoring policy outcomes—is, owing to the special nature of the Soviet political system, an integral part of the policymaking process. Second, all the organizations to which the public inspector belongs are adjuncts either to the formal government structure (the Soviets and the People’s Control Committee) or to government- or party-sponsored agencies (the trade unions and the Komsomol). To the extent that the public inspector
shares in the work of these various organizations, he performs a wide range of administrative-political tasks at the local level. Third, although the individual inspector has limited power to take personal action in cases of abuses, his access to the official hierarchy of his inspectorate may, and frequently does, allow him to trigger effective political action by higher authorities. This ability to mobilize the official hierarchy to take action which he cannot take himself endows the inspector with significant political leverage.

By general consensus, political scientists in the West define political participation as "political behavior relevant to the functional inputs of the policy-making process."\(^{15}\) This definition is accepted here, despite the argument of some scholars that "this 'democratic' concept . . . has neither empirical referent in nor theoretical significance for the Communist political systems."\(^{16}\) The main support for their argument is the fact that public participation in the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly concerned with policy outputs, with the implementation of policies handed down from above.

Certainly the work of the public inspector is concerned with implementation. His basic task is to monitor the fulfillment of government and party directives. Where possible, public inspectors also suggest, or take, actions to achieve the policy outcomes prescribed by the authorities. All this clearly has to do with policy outputs, as opposed to policy inputs. But is the policymaking process in reality so simple?

On these questions the position taken by Peter Juvelier and Henry Morton is unquestionably sound: "Implementation is often the heart of the policy-making process. Laws and Party resolutions (the results of decisions) are merely plans of action. They are theoretical solutions until proven in application. Soviet policy, although decided at the highest levels, may be distorted in application. . . . The imperfection of a decision will stimulate new attempts to resolve the issue. . . . Thus most decisions in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, become a series of stop-gap measures where the proposed solution falls short of the mark and requires rethinking and new application."\(^{17}\)

Decision-making thus conceived is an interlinking series
of past and present decisions, in which the partial realization of past decisions provides the premises for new decisions. The degree of implementation of past decisions therefore becomes an input into future decision-making. To the extent that the work of the inspector alters policy outcomes—to the extent that it reduces the "distortion in application of Soviet policy"—it thereby alters the conditions for ensuing decisions in this endless process whereby old policy outcomes are converted to new policy inputs.

Soviet press accounts of the work of the public inspector provide countless illustrations of the impact of inspections on the degree of fulfillment of production assignments and the consequent revision of plans. Writing in Pravda, February 3, 1977, about the work of People's Controllers in Minsk, V. Lepeshkin, the city party committee's first secretary, specifically addressed this point: "In the struggle to achieve assigned goals... we value the effective participation of the People's Controllers... [Their work] in 1976 helped to reveal additional reserves and increased the planned growth rate of production by 2.5 percent." In addition, these inspectors, "by disclosing unused production possibilities in local manufacturing industries," persuaded the Ministry of Local Industry to revise the production plans in these enterprises upward. Finally, proposals of people's controllers based on inspections of the mechanization of loading operations in Minsk enterprises resulted in raising the overall mechanization of these operations from 77 to 85.2 percent, with the release of "thousands of workers."

As these examples show, while the inspector's immediate objective is the implementation of current plans, his inspections may alter the conditions on which policymakers base future plans, or they may reveal new facts about ongoing operations and resources and suggest work strategies that open unanticipated opportunities for achievement. In this sense, the public inspector's work becomes "relevant to the functional inputs of the policy-making process"; in short, it must be accounted "political," as western political theorists define this term.

The volunteer inspector also serves as an adjunct to the
soviet and the People's Control Committee and, in so doing, frequently carries out local government functions. He operates as part of the government hierarchy, prepares reports and offers advice to superiors, acts as a watchdog of local government and economic management, and processes citizen demands.

The group of inspectors with the most formidable statutory rights and responsibilities related to monitoring the performance of local government is the standing commission of the local soviet, made up entirely of volunteers, including some of the soviet's own deputies. At the local level the standing commission has the right (and duty) to check "systematically the work of departments and administrations of its ispolkom [soviet executive committee] and of enterprises, establishments, kolkhozy, sovkhozy, and other organizations subordinate to . . . [its soviet], to disclose shortcomings in their work, and to help eliminate them."

Government officials are obliged by statute to answer fully questions of the standing commission, to provide all relevant materials requested, and to respond to recommendations of the commission by giving evidence of compliance within a specified term. At the republic level this period varies according to separate statutes from two weeks to two months.

In 1967 a new statute set forth measures intended to increase the independence of standing commissions of local soviets vis-à-vis their soviets and executive committees. Standing commissions were granted the right to make binding decisions without having to clear these decisions with their soviets or their executive committees. In addition, the new statute enlarged the powers of the commission: "to enunciate public censure of or warnings to those leaders of enterprises and organizations who fail to implement the directives of the soviet or the orders of the commission itself" and even to take over functions of some departments of the executive committee.

Unquestionably, these statutory powers of volunteers in the standing commissions are substantial. It cannot be claimed, however, that they are being fully exploited. Ac-
According to Theodore Friedgut's study of local government in the Georgian city of Kutaisi, the standing commissions of the city soviet, when he observed them in 1969, were failing to exercise their new authority and independence: "the standing committees are functionally oriented and staffed in keeping with their areas of activity, acting primarily as ancillaries to the Executive Committee, providing legislative proposals and information for decision making rather than acting in any independent capacity as a counter weight to industrial enterprises or administrative departments. Where the standing committees in Kutaisi do take action, it is likely to be oriented toward mobilization of the citizens into a current campaign."\(^{21}\)

In other words, despite the statute of 1967, the situation in 1969 had changed very little since the early 1960s when Robert Wesson, writing about volunteers in the soviets, observed: "[The volunteer] organizations do not take over significant official functions, but assist in carrying them out. They do not decrease but in effect increase the authority of the center."\(^ {22}\) Soviet authorities, too, repeatedly criticize public inspectors in the standing commissions for failing to exploit the legal rights assigned to them.\(^ {23}\) In sum, the general consensus among informed scholars in East and West with respect to the effectiveness with which these inspectors act as independent monitoring agents of local government is that although sufficient statutory powers exist on paper, the standing commissions have as yet failed to exploit them with sufficient vigor.

Yet the evidence with respect to how effectively soviet volunteers monitor the bureaucracy is not entirely negative. Robert Wesson made this positive assessment of their work:

It is possible that volunteers are most useful in checking the bureaucracy. Amateurs seemingly may be sometimes more zealous than professionals in peering into dark corners. They may also be more honest, relatively immune to bribes and stricter in censure of the cheaters. It is not surprising that they should be, so far as they have different interests and attitudes from those whom they are set to control. Pensioners in particular are less subject to repri-
sals and devoid of careerist motives, hence readier to uncover corruption and misdeeds.

A volunteer staff of critics and controllers must thus be a nuisance if not a threat to careerist and self-seeking office-holders.²⁴

The importance of the legislative efforts to strengthen the supervisory role of standing commissions in monitoring local state and economic institutions should not be underestimated. The step taken in 1967 to endow these participatory organizations with the legal right to take independent action in supervising the local government apparat was an advance of great potential import. Meanwhile, in 1972, a new statute, "On the Status of Deputies of Soviets in the USSR," enhanced the independent authority of soviet deputies. This law strengthened the deputy's position in economic and cultural spheres and specifically called for "strict observance of the authority of deputies." Since 80 percent of the deputies are members of standing commissions, this action in effect further bolstered the statutory powers of the standing commissions vis-à-vis the soviet apparat.

Each statutory advance of this kind, though incremental in nature, multiplies certain tendencies toward more substantial systemic change in the future. Though the advances registered thus far are only partially realized in practice, they are important signals in the direction of possible future change. For the present, therefore, it is of great significance that sizable statutory powers are assigned to citizens' volunteer groups on paper, even though Soviet citizens do not yet take full advantage of them.

The public inspector's institutional affiliation offers him a chance to activate a response on the part of authorities which far exceeds his own limited powers to take action. The organization that most dramatically illustrates this point is the People's Control Committee, which unites its massive, grassroots membership with an all-union hierarchy of professional NK committees. Members of People's Control Groups and Posts are obligated by statute to report major offenses and problems to their local NK committee and to suggest ap-
propriate remedial actions, such as rescinding the illegal orders of officials and fining or removing negligent officials. They cannot take such action themselves, but they can trigger this response by authorities from the district level right up to the all-union committee in Moscow. In other words, behind each People's Controller there stands a huge bureaucratic organization with the kind of resources and authority that can find solutions for those intransigent problems that require high-level attack or the ability to transcend ministerial and regional boundaries.²⁵

The report of an individual NK inspector passed along to his local People's Control Committee may even mobilize action on the part of the USSR KNK. Following the guidelines of the People's Control Statute, "district, city, okrug, regional, territorial, and republic NK Committees... bring the most important questions... in necessary cases, to the attention of central institutions and organizations."²⁶ Frequently, the USSR KNK, alerted in this way by signals that originate with local inspectors, steps in to straighten out local problems. The following is a typical example. In 1969 an oblast soviet executive committee in Rostov was involved in the illegal practice of, in effect, levying taxes upon local industries to support unauthorized civic projects. The irregularities, discovered by local inspections of the People's Controllers, were brought to the attention of the USSR KNK official who headed the Department of Planning and Finance Agencies at the time. He described the situation as follows:

Exceeding their rights, individual local soviets adopt decisions obliging the directors of state enterprises and organizations, including those of union and republic subordination, without compensation to allocate cash to urban construction projects, to give them transportation, provide them with free materials and assign to them workers, engineers, and technicians, paying for their labor out of production.

Such demands do not fit into the financial plans of the enterprises, in which every ruble has its strictly defined purpose. Let us cite one of many similar examples. In
Rostov it was decided to build a canal for the sport of rowing at a cost of 4.5 million rubles, although there was no particular need for it. No funds had been earmarked for this purpose in the city's budget. The oblast soviet executive committee made the enterprises responsible for expenditures on the canal's construction. \textit{It was only after the intervention of the USSR People's Control Committee that the erroneous demands were canceled.}^{27}

Standing commissions of the Rostov Oblast Soviet should have reprimanded their executive committee for the illegal actions cited. They may have failed to do so because they themselves favored the construction of the local rowing canal, or because the standing commissions are simply not aggressive enough in curbing actions of their executive committees. For whatever reasons, in this case local problems proved intractable to local solution.

The situation is familiar enough in the Soviet Union and demonstrates an administrative problem-solving technique frequently used: central officials, informed about local problems, effect a solution by bringing to bear the overwhelming weight of their authority. While the individual public inspector obviously is not the problem-solver, he does play a crucial role by instigating the required action. Thus, the inspector's formal access to a channel of communication which reaches from his locality all the way to Moscow and which can activate Moscow officials gives him very significant, if indirect, political influence.

**SAFEGUARD OF CITIZEN INTERESTS**

Most theories about political participation fall into one of two categories with respect to the intended goals of participation; they are "instrumental" or "developmental." In the words of Geraint Parry: "'Instrumental theories' treat political participation as a means to some more restricted end such as the better defense of individual or group interests. 'Developmental' theories see political participation as an essential part of the development of human capacities.'"^{28}
Soviet theories of participation are predominantly developmental; they stress, above all, the educational value of participation. However, the instrumental theory that treats participation as a means of safeguarding citizen interests is also found in Soviet political thought. It was Lenin himself who formulated the proposition that workers’ participation in government and management should serve to keep the immense Soviet bureaucracy in line. His prescription in 1919 was to introduce workers and peasants into the state inspectorate inherited from the tsars by creating the “Commissariat of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate” (Rabkrin), the prototype for today’s People’s Control Committee.

More precisely, it was a subunit within Lenin’s Rabkrin, the Bureau of Complaints and Proposals, that was devised as the special recourse of the citizen in cases of bureaucratic mistreatment or mismanagement. In 1919 the first bureaus were instructed to struggle against the illegal activities and transgressions of officials and to be “near to and accessible to the broad masses of the public.” At the present time, Bureaus of Complaints and Proposals are attached to all People’s Control Committees. The USSR KNK’s bureau over a period of eighteen months receives more than a million letters and visits. At least 37 percent of this input is related to the improvement of trade, living conditions, and transportation—matters directly tied to the personal needs and demands of citizens. During the first half of 1972 bureaus attached to the People’s Control committees across the country reported more than 55,000 demands dealing with questions of housing construction, trade, and consumer and cultural services.

In the Soviet political system, where there are no autonomous organizations to represent citizen interests or to formulate them into demands, citizens submit their requests directly to government agencies or authorized representatives of these agencies. This is a political process, and by sharing in it the KNK’s local Bureaus of Complaints and Proposals become politically active. The bureaus share in the process two ways. First, they assist citizens in articulating their demands for governmental actions to improve services (health, con-
sumer, civic, and cultural), to redress economic and social grievances, to upgrade the quality of consumer goods, and so on. Second, the bureaus take action to process these demands, and in this capacity they act as a semiofficial extension of local government. They may actually satisfy citizen demands themselves when it is within their power to do so or they may serve as intermediaries and thereby seek a resolution of the citizens' problems at higher levels by asking their own NK committees to intervene or by prodding responsible officials to take action.

How the public inspector performs in the local KNK bureaus is illustrated by the operations of the Zhdanovskii Raion Bureau in Moscow. In December 1975, when I visited this raion NK committee, its bureau consisted of fifteen volunteer inspectors, all pensioners. Their supervisor was an impressive man, a former engineer who had spent all his life in production enterprises. The bureau was open daily. Visits and letters were recorded on printed forms and discussed with the chairman of the raion KNK to determine who should handle them and what action should be taken. Initial responses were made within two weeks, although urgent cases presented to the bureau in person were taken up immediately. According to a 1968 Ukaz of the Supreme Soviet, cases were to be settled within two months. Where settlement of a complaint required action by some economic or administrative agency, it was the bureau's responsibility to ensure that this action was taken.

The public inspector's role here is an important one. He may go beyond simply hearing the complaint; he may personally follow the complaint through to a settlement. In this work, it is not surprising that pensioners have shown themselves to be especially effective. As one USSR KNK official put it, pensioners excel because "they have plenty of time at their disposal, they are frequently experienced, well educated, and intelligent, they are fearless and independent, being under no one's thumb, and they are tireless in tracking down the facts of a case." For the most part the interests of the pensioner no longer coincide with those of the bureaucracy and he tends,
therefore, to be a just and stern defender of the interests of the petitioners.

In addition to responding to citizen requests directed to them, the KNK Bureaus of Complaints also monitor the processing of citizen demands by ministries, administrations, and enterprises. Over a five-year period (1968-1973), 40,000 inspectors of the KNK bureaus carried out more than 250,000 inspections into how well the demands of workers were being satisfied by officials in ministries, enterprises, farms, and other organizations throughout the country.34

It should be noted that the bureaus of the People’s Control Committees are only one channel by which the Soviet political system permits the spontaneous expression of citizens demands. The local soviets, too, receive a steady stream of petitions,35 and Soviet citizens flood their local and central newspapers with mail. The editor of Izvestiya’s Department of Letters, commenting to me on the half million letters she received and processed each year, revealed the great political importance she personally attached to this process when she said, “I consider this one of the brightest aspects of Soviet democracy!”36 As this comment illustrates, the theory that the citizen should be guaranteed some means of protecting himself, or of eliciting response, from the bureaucracy remains very much alive in the Soviet Union. To the extent that the public inspector becomes involved in activities that sustain this theory, he thereby serves in a political capacity as a champion of the citizen’s interests versus a bureaucracy that tends to ignore those interests.

THE INSPECTOR’S INFLUENCE

In the post-Stalin era, Soviet policymakers have responded to the pressures of the post-mobilization stage of development by vigorously seeking to widen the range of available sources of objective information as a basis for determining which of the nation’s problems require attention and how they may be solved. This has led to a change in the style of Soviet policymaking, which has been described by Juvalier and Morton as follows:
In the Stalin era Russia's regime was like a giant that possesses great strength, a long reach, but dulled senses. . . . The giant's senses are keener now. Feedback from professional experts and the creative intelligentsia and the sounding out of popular attitudes play an incomparably greater role than they did under Stalin in the regime's attempt to understand what the problems are and how to solve them.

. . . doors have opened in the Kremlin walls to admit warnings, suggestions, and demands from administrators, experts, intellectuals, and an awakened public opinion. This revived feedback helps to shape Party policy.37

Here, Juviler and Morton are echoing Daniels's thesis concerning the flow upwards of "all manner of influences," and although they are speaking about the shaping of policy at the all-union level, their observations apply to the policymaking process generally.

The impact of the KNK inspector upon the policymaking process at all levels is exercised in a variety of ways. A major function is to provide policymakers with information. At local levels, the Bureaus of Complaints and Proposals provide the KNK with "warnings, suggestions, and demands" from Soviet citizens. In addition, every local inspection of NK Groups and Posts results in a report that may describe some particular situation or problem needing attention. Information about important matters is passed along the committee hierarchy, as each committee in turn consults with its superior committees on problems and problem areas that require action. This officially prescribed procedure of "securing an uninterrupted flow of information from below" is a regular feature of the agency's operation.38 It is chiefly in this way that problems at the local or enterprise level "that must be solved on a nationwide scale"39 are brought to the attention of the all-union KNK.

When this information is forwarded to policymakers, it is invariably accompanied by advice and suggestions for policy action. Thus in 1971 the USSR KNK culminated its lengthy probe of the fulfillment of the November 4, 1968, USSR Coun-
Council of Ministers' decree, "On Improving Planning, Raising Technology and the Specialization of Production of Consumer Goods," by presenting a number of concrete proposals to the USSR Council of Ministers for follow-up legislation.

Policy formulation is, in fact, an important and formidable responsibility of People's Controllers at all levels. Inspections are often immediately followed by management decisions within the enterprise, NK committee decrees, soviet legislation, or party resolutions that incorporate the solutions devised by People's Controllers for the problems they have investigated. Illustrating this point at the enterprise level is the NK inspector in the Leningrad Elektrosila Association who, in 1975, insisted that decisions in his firm were frequently influenced by the proposals of his NK Group based on plant inspections. At the city level, the Leningrad KNK that same year was conducting follow-up investigations into how well 204 Leningrad firms were complying with official regulations enacted on the basis of earlier NK surveys of water and air pollution in Leningrad. After the first inspections the firms had been required by government decree to install anti-pollution equipment at a total cost of 50 million rubles. By 1975 all but four firms were in compliance. An example at the republic level comes from the Turkmen Republic KNK in 1971. On the basis of some 8,000 letters received by its complaints bureaus over the period of a year, the committee drew up eighteen detailed legislative proposals which it presented to officials of the Turkmen Communist party and the Republic Council of Ministers. Among those proposals, in response to consumer demands, was a plan to establish a chain of food-industry enterprises. Turkmen officials, acting on this plan, authorized as a first step the construction of two bakeries in Ashkhabad and Krasnozavodsk.

The role of KNK agencies in formulating policy proposals has become so well established that it is not unusual to find party officials publicly demanding this service. The Georgian party secretary, V. P. Mzhavanadze, addressing a plenary session of the Georgian Central Committee in 1970, called upon the People's Control agencies to come up with advice for gov-
ernment action to combat losses of arable land due to soil erosion, failure to restore lands after strip mining, industrial and urban building, and use of collective lands by private plots. As Mzhavanadze put it, “Clearly the People’s Control Committee should study this question and submit proposals to the Council of Ministers, so that decisive steps may be taken to eliminate the major shortcomings in this matter of state importance.”

At the all-union level, while it is possible to describe a number of important ways by which the USSR KNK participates in high-level decision-making, it is not clear to what extent volunteer inspectors take part in these activities. There are numerous examples of the all-union KNK asking ordinary People’s Controllers from enterprises and ministries for information and advice but when members of the all-union KNK itself are consulted by party or government bodies about forthcoming legislation, the consultants are presumably the professional staff members of the KNK. And when government legislation is submitted to the USSR KNK for examination prior to its enactment, this examination is the responsibility of staff departments of the KNK. On the other hand, these staff departments contain large numbers of nonstaff assistants. Thus, in the all-union committee apparat, the 350 staff members are outnumbered by 400 nonstaff volunteers. Furthermore one of the three members of the seventeen-member USSR KNK who were appointed to standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet in 1974 (the trade union representative) was at least nominally an elected “volunteer” member of the KNK. In sum, volunteer public inspectors share at least some of the legislative labors of the all-union committee.

Finally, public inspectors belonging to People’s Control Committees at all levels regularly take part in revising economic plans at the formative stage. When they do this they are participating directly in decision-making. The assignment of the committees in this regard is to make a thorough analysis of plan indexes, bringing to their analysis the special perspective they have derived from their previous investigations. Their ultimate objective is “to prevent deficiencies.”
When they discover errors in calculation they are expected to see that the plan is corrected so that production levels are increased.

The way NK inspectors proceed at the local level is shown by the case of the Proletariate Plant in Leningrad. Here, in late 1971, People's Controllers discovered that the firm had inflated its report of production by distorting certain elements of the unit-cost of the product, jacking up wholesale prices, and concentrating on the production of those articles that brought the highest return. Contrary to the plant's official report, the NK investigation revealed that commodity output had actually declined over the previous two years, labor productivity had grown at 8.9 percent, instead of 19.2 percent as had been claimed, and the company's wage fund had been overexpended. The Leningrad City KNK fined the plant 78,000 rubles and called for a revised plan based upon NK calculations.48

In sum, public inspectors of the USSR KNK provide substantial input into the policymaking process at all levels. The inspector does more than supply policymakers with information, demands, and suggestions. In many cases he is directly involved in formulating public policy. In less than two decades, these functions of the public inspector have, in fact, become a well-established and accepted feature of the Soviet political system.

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented in this study of the public inspector's growing political role brings into sharp focus an evolutionary process which has already transformed Soviet society to a remarkable degree and which promises to work more definitive change in the future. In the forefront of this process has been the shift during the post-Stalin era from coercive methods of mobilizing Soviet citizens in the pursuit of state objectives to enlisting the voluntary participation of citizens.

Today's volunteer inspector is a symbol of a significant transformation that has taken place in Soviet society. The inspector is evidence of the recognition by party-state authori-
ties of the growing need of their evolving system for more inputs, greater initiative, and more active control from below. Today the volunteer is being asked to exercise his own initiative, to be concerned about local problems, to speak out in the general interest, and to act as the observer, the consultant, and the watchdog of the local political bureaucracy. In some cases, as in the standing commissions, the volunteer is even exhorted by new statutes to play all these roles with greater boldness and independence. Input from below is more and more determining the parameters of decision-making. Thus, while it remains true that the party still leads the masses, it is also true that today the party is being more fully informed and more strongly influenced by the masses.49

The activity of the public inspector adds its own impetus to this process of change. Soviet citizens are becoming accustomed to their participatory roles, to seeking solutions for problems that they identify and formulate, to calling for specific actions by authorities. Over time this activity must exert growing pressures upon Soviet policymakers to be more responsive to grassroots demands. While the future course of developments cannot be predicted with accuracy, present trends, calling for more and more citizen participation, appear irreversible. It is highly probable, therefore, that the kind of participation by Soviet citizens that has been examined here is contributing to a gradual but fundamental transformation of the Soviet state system.

NOTES

1. The controversy over what constitutes "genuine" as opposed to "sham" participation is raised in the exchange by Donald Barry and Jerry F. Hough in Problems of Communism 25 (September-October 1976): 93-95.


10. N. Lomakin, “Partiya i massovye organizatsii trudyashchikhsya” [The Party and Mass Organizations of Labor], Partiinaya zhizn, No. 13 (July 1970): 9; Izvestiya, June 21, 1975. Pravda, on September 26, 1975, claimed that “the army of the soviets’ aktivos of public-spirited citizens now contains more than 30 million people.” At the same time 80 percent of the 2,210,824 deputies, or 1,768,659 of them, were members of the standing commissions, whose principal function is monitoring the implementation of local government directives and operation. Since the deputies and the aktivos of the soviets carry out many different tasks besides inspection, an arbitrary figure of 13 million (well under half of the total of 31,768,659) is postulated here as a fair estimate of the size of the public-control contingent of the soviets.

11. Trade-union objectives are well illustrated by the following list of the twelve permanent trade union commissions active in Moscow’s Kirov Watch Factory in 1975: Production, Organization, Social Insurance, Housing Construction and Allocation, Wages, Children, Youth, Pensions, Labor Safety, Labor Disputes, Trade and Public Dining, and Cultural Affairs; Interview with the trade union representative, Aleksandr Matveev, at the Kirov Watch Factory, December 11, 1975.


13. For example, the party uses two chief methods of exerting local control over People’s Control Groups: 1) party members make
up over one-third of the membership of NK Groups ("Party Organizations and People’s Control), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 22 (November 1975): 49; and 2) "more than 80 percent of the chairmen of NK Groups are members of party bureaus, party committees or deputy secretaries of party organizations" ("Otchety i wybory," Partiinaya zhizn No. 8 [1976]: 28).


16. Ibid., p. 248.

17. Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, Soviet Policy-Making (New York, 1967), pp. ix–x; see also Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington (Political Power: USA/USSR [New York, 1965], p. 220): "The post-decision struggle over policy may be less visible than that which precedes decision, but it is no less real. In the long run, it is often more important."


20. Ibid., p. 156.


23. Turovtsev, Gos. i obshch. kontroli, p. 156.


25. Other public inspectors, by cooperating with KNK inspectors have benefited from this relationship. See B. Surovtsev and A. Shevtsov, Komsomolskii proshkektor [The Komsomol Searchlight] (Leningrad, 1966), pp. 12–16; and V. I. Turovtsev, Narodnyi kontrol v sotsialisticheskom obshestve [People’s Control in Socialist Society] (Moscow, 1974), p. 142.


27. V. Babushkin, “Kazhdyi rubl—po naznacheniyu” [Every Ruble to Its Purpose], Pravda, August 27, 1969, p. 3.


30. Over a period of eighteen months in 1974–1975, 430,000 letters and 580,000 personal requests were received by the USSR KNK; interview with Ivan Petrovich Burmistrov, Deputy Head, Organization Department, USSR KNK, in Moscow, December 9, 1975.


32. Interview with members of the Zhdanovskii Raion KNK, Moscow, December 10, 1975.

33. This point was brought out by Vladimir T. Stepanov, Deputy Head, Information Department, USSR People's Control Committee, in an interview with me in Moscow, July 1973.

34. Turovtsev, Narodnyi kontrol v sots. obshch., pp. 192, 194.


40. Turovtsev, Narodnyi kontrol v sots. obshch., p. 141.

41. Interview at the Elektrosila Production Association, Leningrad, December 17, 1975.

42. Interview with officials of the Leningrad City People's Control Committee, Smolny, Leningrad, December 16, 1975.

43. Turovtsev, Narodnyi kontrol v sots. obshch., p. 196.

44. Zarya Vostoka, April 7, 1970, pp. 1–2; italics added.

45. For example, see “Proverka ispolneniya ministerstva,” Izvestiya, January 15, 1976, p. 3.

46. On July 26, 1974, A. I Shitov (first deputy director of the USSR KNK) and V. S. Kutsevol (chairman of the Ukrainian KNK), members of the USSR KNK, were elected to the newly formed Standing Commission for Consumer Goods of the Council of the Union. A.V. Viktorov, a secretary of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, was elected to the Legislative Proposals Commission of the Council of the Union.

47. Turovtsev, Narodnyi kontrol, p. 42; see also Turovtsev, Narodnyi kontrol v sots. obshch., p. 138.

48. V. Egorov, “Vse li zalozheno v plan?” [Has Everything Been Put into the Plan?], Pravda, November 16, 1971, p. 3.

49. Concerning this point, Oliver contends: “Whatever demands come from the intra-societal environment are . . . largely grassroots demands from the populace, and there is reason to doubt that Soviet authorities feel compelled to heed such demands when formulating policy. . . . The Party leads the masses, and not the masses the Party” (“Citizen Demands,” p. 465). However, this is the kind of relationship that participatory mechanisms, activities, and habits are slowly eroding.
Part II

The Role of Subnational Institutions in the Making and Implementation of Policy

While the totalitarian model was dominant within communist studies, local units were regarded as only serving to implement the commands of national leaders and central bureaucracies. Any role for subnational political institutions, or the activities of individuals or groups at those levels, was viewed as minimal, so that potential powers of local state and party bodies vis-à-vis the center were all but ignored, as were determinants of such power.

During the 1960s and 1970s, field research became possible in most communist states, after which the images of monolithic policy-processes abated (or, in situations where that model had some validity, it was refined). Researchers have found considerable regional variations in terms of public policies, as is evidenced in the distribution of resources, and many intra-national distinctions and cross-national differences regarding the relationship between a local unit and the central regime. The presumed goals of communist public policies—to eradicate inequalities among localities and to en-
force centralized planning in all socioeconomic spheres—are, then, being subjected to significant reevaluation by western social scientists.

Comparing Yugoslavian communes, Cal Clark offers an empirical assessment of the redistributive effect of central policies in the face of local socioeconomic differences. Using published Yugoslavian statistics, Clark seeks not only to “measure the degree of inequality among Yugoslav communes” but also to evaluate the role of communal initiative (the latitude of its budgetary autonomy) for promoting local development and the relationships between a commune’s initiative and its quality of life. Since all communist states advocate ameliorating regional inequalities, Clark provides an important vantage point from which to see policymaking—one that indicated the degree to which Titoist resource-allocation policies have or have not transformed Yugoslavia in the direction of intranational equality. At the same time, Clark’s analysis demonstrates the significance of long-standing socioeconomic difference as determinants of a commune’s quality of life and its ability to act in its own behalf in making policies.

The Piekalkiewicz chapter concerns the Polish subnational reforms of the early- to mid-1970s and particularly the central-local relationship before and after those changes. Because Poland has been one of the least quiescent communist states, it is of great importance that we understand both the intent and impact of the 1972–1975 local government alternations. Piekalkiewicz provides an overview of those changes and follows with an insightful evaluation of both the motives for, and results of, the reforms. Contrasts are drawn between the official rationales for changing local political structures as opposed to the policy implications, i.e., how the central-local relationship was dramatically shifted in favor of the former.

Returning to the question of local-central relations, Victor C. Falkenheim considers how Chinese leaders have attempted to balance their desire to enhance central control while devolving (and even requiring) some limited policymaking roles to subnational levels through what Falkenheim
calls the "prefectoral" function of local party committees. The administrative, planning, and coordinating activities of such prefects at all subnational levels are vital to the "implementation of national policy," argues Falkenheim, and have theoretical underpinnings in Mao's writings on local leadership. The key question with which Falkenheim deals, of course, is how much real local innovation occurs in the People's Republic of China and what promotes or impedes local autonomy in the making of public policy. Given Mao's concern for local innovation and initiative, Falkenheim's assessment of subnational leaders' responses is particularly enlightening as is his account of reforms designed to redefine the role of local leaders in the policy process.

Subnational institutions and political participation at that level are, then, regarded by the three authors as, in different ways, crucial to policymaking and implementation in communist systems. In some cases, the national leadership struggles with degrees of subnational autonomy, trying to find a balance between local initiative and necessary limits to local influence. Elsewhere, communal inequalities and citizen inactivity play determining roles in local policy processes.
5. Commune Policies and Socio-economic Parameters in Yugoslavia

The study of communist politics recently has paid increasing attention to subnational units in order to illuminate the central elements of these political systems. One prominently proclaimed goal of many communist regimes has been the promotion of regional equality in states where substantial regional disparities have long existed; and several imaginative analyses have empirically evaluated the success of such policies.¹ This paper examines aggregate data on Yugoslav communes—the basic unit of local government there—to assess policies effecting regional equality in that country. Three broad areas of commune characteristics—the general socio-economic environment, commune activities promoting the citizenry's welfare in health, education, and housing, and "quality of life" factors indicating policy outcomes in the commune—will be examined; and the analysis will address three major questions: How great are the differences among local governmental units? How much of this difference is explained by normal developmental factors? Is there any evidence of governmental policies stimulating regional redistribution? Yugoslavia should provide a good context for such a
study since the Tito government has consistently tried to ameliorate the great developmental differences that exist among Yugoslav regions.

THE YUGOSLAV SETTING

Yugoslavia is a multinational state with a federal system basically structured on national groups. Five of the six component republics—Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia—are based upon their respective South Slav national groups. The sixth, Bosnia-Hercegovina, is populated by a combination of Moslems, Serbs, and Croats; and, in addition, there are two Autonomous Provinces within Serbia—Vojvodina and Kosovo which are the administrative-territorial centers for the Hungarian and Albanian minorities respectively. Development level, western culture, and political liberalism generally follow a northwest-southeast gradient from Slovenia and Croatia through Vojvodina and Serbia to the other less-developed regions.²

These regional differences have remained quite pronounced during the postwar period, especially in the economic realm. Despite heavy government investment in the less-developed regions both before and after the decentralization of investment in the mid-1960s, the gap between the rich northwest and poor southeast widened significantly after World War II as indicated by the data in Table 5.1.³ These economic differences among the republics, furthermore, are widely perceived as a salient political issue. On the one hand, the better-developed areas advocate a more rational distribution of economic investment and resources which would benefit their more productive economies; while, on the other hand, the poorer regions argue that substantial redistributive policies are necessary to promote the socialist goal of an egalitarian society.⁴

The Tito government inherited a cauldron of national hostilities and conflicts, especially between the two largest national groups, the Serbs and Croats; and, at least after the period of "administrative centralism," a continuing series of reforms implementing economic and political decentraliza-
TABLE 5.1: Per Capita Income by Republic*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia Proper†</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In relation to an all-Yugoslav average of 100 for each year.
† Excludes Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.


...tion were used to assuage national/republic fears of domination and exploitation.⁵ These reforms culminated in the late 1960s in a system in which the primary decision-making style became negotiations among republic representatives. Conflict among republic leaders, particularly associated with Croat nationalism and intransigence, however, led to immobilism in the face of growing economic problems and stimulated nationalist unrest as some leaders appealed for mass support. This political crisis was resolved in the extensive purges of 1971-1972 and brought a new policy calling for increased party control and centralization.⁶ Comparative data further underscore the extent of Yugoslavia's fiscal decentralization as that country had by far the lowest proportion of central expenditures for the categories included in Pryor's sample of both communist and noncommunist nations as early as 1956.⁷

In sum, two basic components may be seen in Yugoslav efforts to dampen nationality conflicts by narrowing the economic differences among the national homelands: 1) political and economic decentralization to assuage fears of domination and exploitation and 2) the promotion of rapid economic...
growth to overcome the backwardness of the less-developed areas. The nationality conflicts that erupted in the late 1960s and early 1970s certainly indicate that neither was completely successful. In addition, these two policies are somewhat contradictory in that decentralization inhibits the ability of development policies to effect regional redistribution.

**DATA AND METHODS**

Communes, which form the unit of analysis here, are the basic territorial units of government in Yugoslavia. They have been granted substantial political, economic, and social power and autonomy and are fairly small and homogeneous entities. It seems probable, therefore, that the communes present the most relevant developmental context in Yugoslavia and that they should have the power to manifest their own distinctive political styles. Extensive aggregate data are published on the communes; and the data on the 500 Yugoslav communes for this study are taken from the principal Yugoslav statistical yearbook—*Statisticki Godisnjak Jugoslavije, 1970*. The zenith of the Yugoslav decentralist reforms, 1969–1970, was chosen as the time period for the analysis, since this brought the greatest potential for regional differences and for conflicts between the redistributive effects of the development and decentralization policies. For an examination of regional variations, nine territorial subgroups were delineated: the five republics except Serbia and, within Serbia, the two Autonomous Provinces, the thirteen communes in the city of Belgrade, and the remaining portions of Serbia.

The objectives of this study are to measure the degree of regional inequality among Yugoslav communes, to estimate how much of these differences can be explained by normal developmental factors, and to gauge how much residual variation might derive from political efforts at redistribution. Analysis of variance will be used to assess the degree of inequality among the nine regions. This technique is the best method for relating a nominal variable such as regional location, i.e., one that does not follow the order of a real number scale, to an interval one, i.e., one whose values are nonar-
bitrary real numbers. For this analysis of Yugoslavia, this statistical model separates the squared deviations of each commune's score on a particular item from the overall Yugoslav mean (or average) into two components: 1) the differences between the individual regional means and the overall Yugoslav mean which is termed the "explained sum of squares" because this variation is explained by the categorization of communes into territorial units and 2) the differences between each commune score and the mean of the region in which it is placed which remains "unexplained" by the classification scheme. The ratio between the explained and unexplained sums of squares is then used to calculate an F ratio showing the statistical significance of the differences among categories and a correlation coefficient, eta square, which represents the variance in the item being considered that is accounted for by the division into territorial units.\(^\text{10}\)

When developmental factors are used to explain commune differences, all the variables in the analysis become interval ones, and multiple regression is applied. In multiple regression, a "dependent variable," i.e., the one being explained or predicted, is related to a group of "independent" or explanatory variables. A Pearsonian multiple correlation coefficient \(R\) is computed whose square represents the amount of variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the explanatory factors in an additive or "linear" relationship. The relative explanatory importance of each independent variable is indicated by its "standardized regression coefficient" or "beta weight" which shows how much change in the dependent variable results from a unit change in the explanatory one when all the effects of the other predictor variables are taken into account. The beta weights are positive when high values of the independent variable are associated with high values of the dependent one and negative when high values of one are associated with low scores of the other.\(^\text{11}\)

**DEVELOPMENTAL CONTEXT**

The first set of variables considered here describes the developmental context of Yugoslav communes. The eight items
included in the analysis use various aspects of commune wealth, urbanization, industrial development, and agricultural productivity. The general wealth of an area, indicated here by per capita national income, is generally taken as the central indicator of development. The change in economic activity from agricultural to industrial to tertiary service occupations and the accompanying urban concentration of citizens are considered central to generating the increased wealth of development. Population density is used to measure urban concentration, and the percentage of population in agriculture describes employment patterns. The importance of secondary and tertiary economic activities is measured by the proportion of national income derived from industry and mining and from trade and catering, respectively. Per capita basic capital and railroad freight indicate two other aspects of urban and industrial development. Finally, because great variations exist in the modernization of Yugoslavia’s agricultural sector, wheat yield per hectare is applied as a rough indicator of differing agricultural conditions.

An analysis of variance tests the extent of regional differences in these facets of development. The F scores in Table 5.2 demonstrate that all these regional variations are highly significant statistically. Yet the eta squares show that these relationships are, in fact, only moderate in strength. Besides wheat yield, which indicates the wide regional variation in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>F Score*</th>
<th>Eta Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita</td>
<td>30.95</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage income from industry</td>
<td>9.37</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic capital per capita</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>14.06</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage agricultural population</td>
<td>24.75</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad freight per capita</td>
<td>3.01†</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage income from trade</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat yield per hectare</td>
<td>38.29</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at the .001 level.
† Statistically significant at the .01 level.
### TABLE 5.3: Regional Differences for Development Indicators*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgrade</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Rest of Serbia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Bosnia-Hercegovina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade income</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic capital</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>2,077</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural population</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rail freight</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat yield</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In relation to an all-Yugoslav average of 100.
natural endowment, the eta squares surpass .2 for only in-
come per capita and percentage of agricultural population
among the seven more direct indicators of development. The
much lower regional differences for the four indicators of eco-
nomic activities—percentage income from industry, percent-
age income from trade, basic capital per capita, and rail
freight per capita—than for per capita income strongly sug-
gest efforts to use investment and industrialization to amelio-
rate differences in wealth.

Table 5.3, which presents regional indexes of the Yugo-
slav mean similar to those in Table 5.1, provides a more de-
tailed picture of regional developmental differences. It should
be noted that the regional totals are averages of the commune
values and, thus, might depart from the true regional figure
because of differences in commune population or national in-
come. The relative positions of the republics and regions
generally follow the pattern of Table 5.1. The “northwest” of
Slovenia and Croatia hold an advantaged position on almost
all these variables; and the special nature of Vojvodina’s
above-average wealth is also indicated. The Vojvodina has by
far the highest wheat yield; and the agricultural profits that
this implies evidently more than offset the Autonomous Pro-
vince’s lower-than-average scores on industrial income, trade
income, and basic capital. Belgrade’s high level of develop-
ment is readily apparent; and removing the federal capital
and the agriculturally prosperous Vojvodina from Serbia sig-
nificantly reduces that republic’s relative rank. The service
emphasis in Belgrade’s economy is evident, while the growth
and importance of the tourist industry in the relatively poor
Montenegro is indicated by the trade income and basic capital
data. Finally, the very backward position of Kosovo, espe-
cially in per capita income and basic capital, is most appar-
ent.

These data, furthermore, provide some evidence that Yu-
goslavia’s policy of industrialization and investment has
been directed at ameliorating the great regional differences
in wealth. The variations in the ratios to the Yugoslav mean
in Table 5.3 are much less for percentages of national income
from industry or trade and percentage of agricultural population and slightly less for basic capital per capita than for income per capita. Governmental policy, hence, has had some tendency to concentrate investment and industrial growth in the poorer regions and communes in the evident hope of narrowing the drastic differences in wealth between the advantaged and disadvantaged parts of Yugoslavia.

An examination of Yugoslav communes, therefore, does find large developmental differences among regions which generally follow the expected northwest-southeast gradient. The data on each variable's relative amount of regional inequality also provide some subtle evidence that a policy of investment and industrialization has been applied in an attempt to narrow some of these differences in wealth. Most direct evidence about this hypothesis, though, can only come from an analysis of the actions of the communes and the quality of life afforded their citizens; and it is to this task that I now turn.

COMMUNE INITIATIVE

The variables included in this section are somewhat constrained by the data availability in the Statisticki Godisnjak. The resources of communal governments are measured by commune revenues per capita and by an indicator of "revenue effort," i.e., the ratio between commune revenues and total national income in the commune. Three measures of sociopolitical expenditures in the communes are available: total expenditures of noneconomic activities, educational expenditures, and health expenditures. These data encompass not just the expenditures of the commune government but also those of various "interest communities" which have been established to administer certain social services (e.g., education and health care). There is substantial variation in the ratio of noneconomic expenditures to commune revenues (for Yugoslavia as a whole, the average of this ratio is 1.4), so that this expenditure/revenue ratio is used as a separate item. Housing and nonhousing construction in the commune (measured here in monetary terms) are two other measures of com-
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TABLE 5.4: Interregional Variance of Initiative Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative Item</th>
<th>F Score*</th>
<th>Eta Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue per capita</td>
<td>16.61</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue effort</td>
<td>12.83</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure/revenue ratio</td>
<td>24.23</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noneconomic expenditures per capita</td>
<td>13.21</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational expenditures per capita</td>
<td>16.73</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditures per capita</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing construction per capita</td>
<td>15.29</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonhousing construction per capita</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at the .001 level.

mune initiative that combine both government and private investment.

As with the development indicators, all the commune initiative items exhibit highly significant regional differences, but their degree of variation is much more uniform as five of the eight variables in Table 5.4 have eta squares between .17 and .21. The expenditure/revenue ratio has the strongest relationship with region with an eta square of .28, while only 12 percent of the variance of communal health expenditures and nonhousing construction is explained by regional location. The regional inequality is significantly less than for overall wealth, which has an eta square with region of .34, but greater than for the four economic activities included in Table 5.2 whose eta squares vary between .05 and .13. These differences are consistent with the previously hypothesized limited redistributive efforts by the Yugoslav regime. Given the relatively decentralized nature of the Yugoslav system, the ability to effect local revenues and expenditures is severely constrained. Still, regional variation in the budgetary items is substantially less than for overall wealth. The investment and industrialization policies of the 1950s and 1960s, in contrast, have brought much more similarity in these economic activities, although this has not resulted in a similar equalization of regional wealth and life-style. This suggests that Yugoslavia may well have fallen prey to the “north-south”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgrade</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Rest of Serbia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Bosnia-Hercegovina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revenue effort</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure/revenue ratio</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noneconomic expenditures</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education expenditures</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditures</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing construction</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonhousing construction</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In relation to an all-Yugoslav mean of 100.
differentiation of development patterns in which industrialization in the poorer areas fails to generate the well-rounded development of earlier growth in the more advanced regions.\textsuperscript{14}

In the more detailed data in Table 5.5, there generally are less extreme regional deviations from the Yugoslav average for the commune initiative items than for wealth. Regional differences in the communes' own revenues per capita, as indicated by the regional indexes of the all-Yugoslav mean, are much less than for wealth because the poorer regions, especially Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro, exert a much greater revenue effort than the rest of the country. The much higher revenue effort of Kosovo, compared with the other three divisions of Serbia, additionally demonstrates that revenue effort is probably determined by local needs rather than by general republic policy. The evidence concerning nongovernmental expenditures in the communes is more ambiguous, though. On the one hand, Belgrade's index of the Yugoslav mean of 731 on the expenditure/revenue ratio is by far the highest one for any variable in this study except for population density. Slovenia too scores well above any other region, but its index of the Yugoslav mean is much lower for the expenditure/revenue ratio than for per capita income (130 versus 200). On the other hand, there is little variation of the index scores for this ratio of the other seven regions; and the fact that Kosovo and Montenegro have the third and fourth highest means on this variable indicates that, to a limited extent, nongovernmental "interest communities" in the poorer regions, as well as the communal governments, are forced to exert greater "revenue efforts."

As a result of these revenue efforts, the range of regional differences (excluding Belgrade) in the noneconomic expenditures and construction activities was generally less than for overall wealth. While the poorest region of Kosovo also has abysmally low indexes of the Yugoslav mean for nonhousing construction, its scores for total noneconomic expenditures, educational expenditures, and housing construction are much more respectable. At the upper end of the wealth scale, Slovenia averages slightly lower scores on expenditures and con-
struction than on wealth. Belgrade forms one exception to this pattern of lessened regional differences, however, since it is relatively more advantaged than for income per capita in all five expenditure and construction items because of its extremely high expenditure/revenue ratio.

In the specific fields of initiative in the communes, educational expenditures are more evenly distributed than wealth, indicating a definite effort to promote greater equality in education and the life opportunities afforded by educational achievement for the residents of the less-developed regions. In contrast, a clear gap exists in health expenditures between the northwest of Belgrade, Slovenia, and Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia, with these advanced regions being much more supportive of health care. While housing and nonhousing construction differ radically in financial source (47 percent of the former as opposed to 99 percent of the latter are funded by the social sector), the only major regional difference between them is that Belgrade puts much more emphasis upon housing, and Montenegro upon nonhousing, construction. Table 5.5 also shows another facet of developmental activities in Montenegro as this fairly underdeveloped republic ranks a close second to Belgrade in nonhousing construction and third in housing construction, probably in conjunction with the building up of the tourist industry there. Despite being about half financed by private initiative, housing construction per capita displays less extreme regional variation than wealth if Belgrade is excepted, suggesting a diminishment of regional inequality in this area too.  

The redistributional effect, if any, of these communal activities can be tested more directly by applying multiple regression to examine the specific effects of development context upon communal initiative. Six of the socioeconomic environment variables are used as potential predictors of commune initiative: 1) income per capita, 2) percentage of national income from industry and mining, 3) basic capital per capita, 4) population density, 5) percentage of agricultural population, and 6) percentage of income from trade and catering.

The results of these regressions are presented in Table 5.6. The first column in this table reports the variance explained
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(multiple R squared) in each commune initiative item by the six explanatory variables. This is followed by two summary figures for each of the six predictors. The first is the beta weight for the independent variable which measures its relative impact upon the initiative item in question; and the most important influence or influences (when the two highest beta weights are within .10 of each other) are denoted by italics. The second figure which follows the slash is the simple bivariate correlation between the dependent and independent variables.

Developmental factors are significantly better predictors of these eight items than is regional location. The six development indicators in combination account for at least 30 percent of the variance in all these commune initiative variables except for per capita health outlays; and total noneconomic and educational expenditures reach a fairly high 60 percent of explained variance. Normal developmental differences, hence, appear to offer the major explanation for differences in communal efforts to provide for the well-being of their residents.

Table 5.6 clearly demonstrates that commune budgetary operations are not bringing substantial equalization between the richer and the poorer local governments in Yugoslavia as a whole. Despite the preceding evidence of muted improvements for the poorer communes in terms of commune initiative activities as compared to just wealth, overall the more prosperous areas definitely reap the greatest benefits from these activities as high levels of commune initiative are unambiguously associated with wealth. Income per capita has strong positive correlations with all these items except revenue effort; and the positive beta coefficients demonstrate that this relationship remains even after taking into account other facets of development. Moreover, wealth is more strongly associated with expenditures than with revenue which is exactly the opposite of what would occur if the actions of commune governments were being used to narrow quality of life differences resulting from income inequality. That this strong relationship emerges between wealth and commune initiative, despite the indications of some redistributional activities discussed above, suggests the predom-
**TABLE 5.6: Development as an Explanation for Commune Initiative***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explained Variance</th>
<th>Industrial Income</th>
<th>Basic Capital</th>
<th>Population Density</th>
<th>Agricultural Population</th>
<th>Trade Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R²</td>
<td>β r</td>
<td>β r</td>
<td>β r</td>
<td>β r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.57/.57</td>
<td>-.08/.22</td>
<td>-.11/.38</td>
<td>-.00/.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue effort</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>-.52/-53</td>
<td>-.27/-41</td>
<td>-.06/-34</td>
<td>-.07/-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure/revenue ratio</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.20/.46</td>
<td>-.08/-00</td>
<td>.38/.50</td>
<td>.31/.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education expenditures</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.61/.78</td>
<td>-.07/.21</td>
<td>.16/.64</td>
<td>.00/.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health expenditures</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.15/.33</td>
<td>-.02/.07</td>
<td>.33/.40</td>
<td>-.02/.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing construction</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.53/.49</td>
<td>-.10/.20</td>
<td>-.19/.27</td>
<td>-.18/.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonhousing construction</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.50/.49</td>
<td>-.16/.12</td>
<td>-.11/.34</td>
<td>-.20/.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The first figure under each predictor variable is its beta coefficient, and the second is its bivariate correlation with the dependent variable. The highest beta coefficient (or coefficients if the difference between the largest two is less than .10) is in italic.
inance of intrarepublic over interrepublic redistribution. If this is indeed the case, republic and regional attempts to re-
dress inequalities are simply not sufficient to offset the large
developmental differences among regions.

International comparison with the seven countries in
Echols's study produces ambiguous results. On the one hand,
the Yugoslav correlation of wealth to local revenue and
health expenditures is below the average of these other coun-
tries. On the other, the wealth-education correlation is higher
than average, and the negative relationship between revenue
effort and income is worse than for any of the other seven
states.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, the process of local budgeting in Yugoslavia
appears regressive but not substantially more so than in
other states. Given Yugoslavia's comparatively great decen-
tralization, this might well reflect some official effort toward
ameliorating differences in development context.

Regarding the individual impacts of the development in-
dicators on commune initiative, the standardized regression
coefficients show that per capita income is the key determi-
nant of commune initiative among the development indica-
tors as it has decidedly the most influence on all but health
expenditures and the expenditure/revenue ratio. The data
also indicate the advantage of communes whose economies
stress the tertiary service sector in comparison to those hav-
ing more industrially oriented ones, since the former's beta
coefficients are much higher than the latter's. There are some
subtle indications of redistribution, though. First, the beta
weights of basic capital and population density for both hous-
ing and nonhousing construction are negative, indicating that
new construction is being concentrated in the less built-up
areas which may be considered evidence of a small step to-
ward equalizing living conditions. Second, while the propor-
tion of agricultural population has fairly strong negative cor-
relations with commune initiative, its beta coefficients for
revenue effort, the expenditure/revenue ratio, and two of the
three expenditure items switch signs. Thus, there is again evi-
dence of limited redistribution, this time toward the agricul-
tural areas that are generally acknowledged to be the most
backward in Yugoslavia.
For the two expenditure items on which wealth does not exert the most important influence, basic capital has by far the strongest influence on health expenditures; and it has a slightly stronger effect than population density on the expenditure/revenue ratio. The evident central role of health facilities in commune variations in capital stock devoted to public services is logical, since health expenditures probably vary greatly depending upon the extent of a commune’s medical facilities. Since basic capital and population density connote urbanized areas, their major explanatory power regarding the expenditure/revenue ratio implies that the various public services performed by local nongovernmental actors are disproportionately concentrated in urban areas—a finding consistent with the nearly universal tendency for urban public services to be more extensive and expansive. A large basic capital stock also connotes industrialization and the existence of economic enterprises able to contribute to the budgets of the interest communities.

In sum, substantial regional differences in commune initiative exist in Yugoslavia. They are somewhat less pronounced than for wealth but greater than for the indicators of types of economic activities. In several instances, the data presented in this section imply that some limited redistribution has occurred, especially through narrowing the gap between the richest and the poorest regions. Nevertheless, because of the decentralized nature of the Yugoslav fiscal system, most of this communal budgetary redistribution appears to be intrarepublic in nature and, thus, is limited by the large differences in the republics’ levels of prosperity.

QUALITY OF LIFE

A somewhat mixed bag of nine indicators of the quality of life afforded a commune’s citizenry are available in the Statisticki Godisnjak. Retail trade per capita describes the relative availability of goods and services in a commune, as well as the residents’ purchasing power. Passenger automobiles per capita indicate the dispersion of what is still something of a luxury, although Yugoslavia has more personal
TABLE 5.7: Interregional Variance of Quality-of-Life Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>F Score</th>
<th>Eta Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade per capita</td>
<td>21.14</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger automobiles per capita</td>
<td>56.67</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios per capita</td>
<td>24.76</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televisions per capita</td>
<td>12.81</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary teacher/student ratio</td>
<td>58.31</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors per capita</td>
<td>13.32</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds per capita</td>
<td>2.30†</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>49.20</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of assisted births</td>
<td>109.73</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at the .001 level.
† Statistically significant at the .05 level.

cars than other communist countries; and per capita radios and televisions represent two other personal consumption items as well as exposure to the broader Yugoslav communications network. The teacher/student ratio in elementary schools is one aspect of the quality of education. There are also four indicators of health care. Doctors and hospital beds per capita measure the availability of health services, while infant mortality and percentage of births with professional assistance more directly indicate the impact of health care upon commune residents. None of the Belgrade communes provide data on their number of passenger automobiles; and television and radio data are available for only eight of the thirteen Belgrade communes making the capital's regional coefficients questionable for these two items.

It might be hypothesized that there should be greater regional variance for these items than for the commune initiative activities and that these regional differences should be most pronounced for personal consumption and least for the indicators most directly subject to government control. The first hypothesis generally holds true. The four highest eta squares for any of the twenty-five variables in this analysis appear in Table 5.7; and two more approximate the highest ones for the commune initiative items. The results of the anal-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgrade</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>Rest of Serbia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Bosnia-Hercegovina</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televisions</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher/student ratio</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted births</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In relation to an all-Yugoslav mean of 100.
ysis of variance, however, contradict the second prediction at first glance, since the two indicators of health services actually performed and the teacher/student ratio have three of the four highest eta squares. Some support is tendered to the second hypothesis, though, by the fact that hospital beds per capita, the variable most subject to government influence in Table 5.7, has by far the least degree of regional variation. Furthermore, the more detailed data on the regional indexes of the Yugoslav mean in Table 5.8 suggest that the discrepancies in the analysis of variance results may be something of a statistical artifact caused by low intraregional variations in the two health and the education variables.

This suspicion is confirmed by an analysis of the spread among regional means. While the teacher/student ratio has a high eta square, it has by far the narrowest range among the twenty-five variables analyzed here in the indexes of the Yugoslav mean from a high of 119 for Slovenia to a low of 80 for Bosnia-Hercegovina. For the eight regions besides Belgrade, which understandably acts as a magnate for the Yugoslav medical profession, the spread in the regional indexes of the mean for hospital beds and doctors per capita is much less than for wealth and personal consumption. The range is significantly greater for the two direct indicators of health outputs, in line with their much higher eta squares. With the exception of Kosovo's woeful condition, however, the ranges of the regional means on these two variables is significantly less than for wealth and the consumption items. After a second look, hence, the hypothesis that regional variation should be least in those items most subject to government control does receive goodly support.

These differences among the quality-of-life variables become clearer when development context and commune initiative are used to explain them. Table 5.9 summarizes these results by presenting four correlation coefficients from such an analysis: 1) the bivariate correlation of each variable with income per capita, 2) their multiple correlations with the six development items, 3) their multiple correlations with four aspects of commune initiative—total noneconomic expenditures, the expenditure/revenue ratio, revenue effort, and
TABLE 5.9: Predictors of Quality of Life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Correlation with Wealth</th>
<th>Correlation with Development Context</th>
<th>Correlation with Commune Initiative</th>
<th>Correlation with Development and Initiative Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televisions</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher/student ratio</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted births</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

housing construction, and 4) their multiple correlations with these two sets of explanatory factors combined.

The correlations with wealth alone are consistent with the previous evidence that governmental policy has played an ameliorative role in response to the vast differences in commune wealth. The four consumption items generally have the highest correlations with income per capita as physicians barely edge out radios for fourth place. The teacher/student ratio and the other three health indicators, in contrast, have much lower correlations with wealth. The other five development indicators add little explanatory power except for doctors and hospital beds and, to a lesser extent, for retail trade. This general division between the health and consumption items also exists for a comparison of the relative aggregate impact of development context and commune initiative upon a district’s quality of life. The developmental indicators have a higher multiple R than the commune initiative items with the four aspects of personal consumption, while the reverse is true for health care. Also, adding the latter set of variables to the initial regression of quality of life on development context produces a larger increase in the multiple R for health care than for consumption, although the actual relative impact of these two sets of independent variables can only be as-
certained from the regression coefficients. The teacher/student ratio forms an exception, though, as it follows the pattern of the consumption items.

Table 5.10 presents the beta coefficients for the regression of the quality-of-life indicators on the development and initiative items combined. The initiative items should have a stronger impact on health care than consumption; and this hypothesis is generally supported with the exception of the teacher/student ratio's again following the pattern of the consumption variables.

Income per capita does remain the primary influence over the four consumption items, but several of the commune initiative variables exert a surprisingly strong independent influence. The expenditure/revenue ratio is the most important of these. By itself it has a low to moderate positive bivariate correlation with the four personal consumption items. When the effects of the other nine independent variables are controlled, however, fairly strong negative regression coefficients result, almost reaching the magnitude of wealth's in the case of televisions. Thus, the efforts of interest communities to provide public services, as indicated by the expenditure/revenue ratio, are directed toward low consumption areas in a redistributive manner. Commune wealth and several other factors must be controlled before this relationship emerges, though; and this again underlines the strong constraints of Yugoslavia's highly decentralized fiscal system upon redistributioal efforts.

The beta coefficients show that housing construction exerts an appreciable independent impact only upon the possession of passenger automobiles. Since much of the new housing in Yugoslavia is privately financed, the availability of disposable personal income which it requires probably explains the independent relationship of housing construction to automobiles which rate as a luxury acquisition. The proportion of income from trade and catering not surprisingly has an additional impact upon retail trade per capita beyond simply the level of wealth. Finally, the low to moderate positive regression coefficients of population density for consumption indicate the greater availability of goods and ser-
TABLE 5.10: Development and Initiative as Explanation for Quality of Life*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explained Variance</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Basic Capital</th>
<th>Noneconomic Expenditures</th>
<th>Expenditures/Revenue Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.58/.85</td>
<td>-.07/.61</td>
<td>.37/.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.65/.85</td>
<td>-.06/.55</td>
<td>.13/.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.73/.64</td>
<td>.12/.45</td>
<td>.22/.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televisions</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.57/.68</td>
<td>.10/.21</td>
<td>-.05/.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher/student ratio</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.52/.37</td>
<td>-.17/.21</td>
<td>-.4/.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.06/.66</td>
<td>.29/.70</td>
<td>.41/.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>-.07/.44</td>
<td>.24/.54</td>
<td>.43/.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.35/-34</td>
<td>.06/-18</td>
<td>.16/-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted births</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.39/.49</td>
<td>-.21/.26</td>
<td>-.07/.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue Effort</th>
<th>Housing Construction</th>
<th>Industrial Income</th>
<th>Trade Income</th>
<th>Agricultural Population</th>
<th>Population Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>β r</td>
<td>β r</td>
<td>β r</td>
<td>β r</td>
<td>β r</td>
<td>β r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>-.03/-0.35</td>
<td>-.08/.37</td>
<td>-.13/.17</td>
<td>.25/.61</td>
<td>-.17/.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>.09/-0.37</td>
<td>.30/.65</td>
<td>.09/.36</td>
<td>-.02/.35</td>
<td>-.06/.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>.10/-0.28</td>
<td>.00/.34</td>
<td>-.03/.28</td>
<td>-.13/.17</td>
<td>-.15/.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Televisions</td>
<td>.13/-0.27</td>
<td>.09/.40</td>
<td>.03/.28</td>
<td>-.10/.25</td>
<td>-.07/.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher/student ratio</td>
<td>-.16/-0.25</td>
<td>-.10/.11</td>
<td>-.23/.03</td>
<td>.11/.20</td>
<td>.03/.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>-.02/-0.30</td>
<td>.04/.31</td>
<td>-.01/.12</td>
<td>.05/.40</td>
<td>.00/.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds</td>
<td>-.02/-0.15</td>
<td>-.06/.16</td>
<td>-.06/.04</td>
<td>.15/.38</td>
<td>-.08/.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>.31/.37</td>
<td>-.02/-0.19</td>
<td>.06/-12</td>
<td>-.16/.17</td>
<td>-.08/.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted births</td>
<td>-.42/-0.49</td>
<td>-.05/.25</td>
<td>-.21/.18</td>
<td>.17/.24</td>
<td>-.25/.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The first figure under each predictor is its beta coefficient; the second is its bivariate correlation with the dependent variable. The highest beta coefficient (or coefficients if the difference between the largest two is less than .10) is in italic.
vices in urban areas even after their greater wealth is taken into account.

As hypothesized, the commune initiative items have much greater independent impact upon health care. Total noneconomic expenditures per capita are the most important determinants of both hospital beds and doctors, with basic capital rating a distinct second. This again suggests that the wide variations in the availability of funds for health can significantly influence the scope of health facilities and, indirectly through this, the quality of health care. Unlike doctors and hospital beds for which wealth’s beta weights are nearly zero, infant mortality and percentage of births with professional assistance remain under a fairly strong independent influence from per capita income. This incongruity between wealth’s relative impact on communal health facilities and their actual use by the commune’s population implies that health facilities in the poorer regions are not as widely used or available to the commune’s residents as those in more developed settings. Revenue effort, though, has approximately equal regression coefficients to wealth’s for these two health output indicators. Thus, inadequate health service appears a significant stimulus to communes’ raising revenues from their own resources, presumably to increase the quality and availability of health care and other services to all citizens in the commune. In addition, while population density has a slight positive independent relationship with consumption, its beta coefficients for the health and education items are negative, suggesting a slight governmental initiative to bring greater equality in the delivery of these public services to communes having lower levels of urbanization.

The quality-of-life indicators, in sum, fit the general pattern of the previous analysis in that they exhibit marked regional variation but also suggest some governmental attempts to ameliorate extreme differences in regional wealth. Personal consumption appears primarily a function of an area’s wealth, while the health and education indicators, which are more directly subject to the influence of commune spending, show some signs of redistributive initiative. However, the data also clearly demonstrate that Yugoslavia’s de-
centralized fiscal system and regional inequality in wealth and natural endowment greatly circumscribe efforts to use commune and interest community budgets for redistributive purposes.

**SUMMARY**

This overview of the aggregate characteristics of Yugoslav communes has found, as expected, extreme variations among these local governments in their levels of development, commune initiative activities, and quality of life afforded their residents. Regional location significantly influences all these differences, but development itself appears the primary determinant of commune initiative and quality of life. Still, the proclaimed attempts of the Tito regime to ameliorate the great differences in regional wealth do find some support in the aggregate patterns described here.

These data point to two different types of redistributional efforts, but neither as yet has been overwhelming in its aggregate results. First, the long-term central policy of promoting industrialization in the poorer regions has brought much greater regional similarity in the overall forms of economic activity as indicated by percentage of income derived from trade and industry and per capita basic capital and rail freight. This has not brought regional equalization in wealth and communal quality of life, however; and, as seen in Table 5.1, differences in per capita income among the republics actually grew during the 1950s and 1960s.

The second potential redistribution method is through commune initiative in which the budgets of communes and interest communities are used to promote greater equality in sociopolitical conditions. Thus, there is generally much more regional variation, especially at the extremes, for wealth and personal consumption than for the commune initiative items and the health and educational outputs most directly susceptible to governmental policy. Furthermore, wealth is more strongly associated in a causal sense with consumption than with the latter set of variables. Several of the factors indicating such redistributional efforts, however, only emerge after
the developmental variables, most notably income per capita, are controlled, indicating sharp constraints on the ability of local budgets to provide social equality. A definite contradiction exists, hence, between the two policy goals of decentralization and equality in Yugoslavia as socioeconomic parameters gravely constrain local policy initiatives. Whether the tensions inherent in this contradiction are amenable to a dialectic transcendence is an open question, just as with several other important aspects of Yugoslav society.  

NOTES


11. Ibid., Chaps. 17-19 discuss bivariate correlation and multiple regression.

12. For example, the aggregation of some of Croatia's richest areas into one very populous Zagreb commune, whose population is more than three times larger than any other Croat commune, means that Croatia's true per capita income is significantly understated, as a comparison of Tables 5.1 and 5.3 demonstrates.


15. Overall, total housing area per capita is more equal among Yugoslav republics than is almost any other socioeconomic or quality-of-life indicator. See the data in "Politika Regionalnog Razvoja," in *Ekonomika Jugoslavije*, ed. Vladimir Farkas et al. (Zagreb: Novinsko-Izdavacki, Stamparski, i Birotehnicki Zavod, 1970), p. 444.

16. In contrast to the correlations with income per capita reported in Table 5.6, per capita revenue's correlations with the other commune initiative items are -.15 with revenue effort, .02 with the expenditure/revenue ratio, .34 with total noneconomic expenditures, .57 with educational expenditures, .23 with health expenditures, .44 with housing construction, and .53 with nonhousing construction.

17. Echols, "Politics, Budgets, and Regional Equality."

18. Since the analysis of variance test is based on the ratio of between category to within category variance, a marked decrease in the latter would greatly increase the significance of the results. In actual-
ity, when coefficients of variability are computed to compare and standardize the variation of the quality-of-life indicators, the teacher/student ratio, percentage of assisted births, and infant mortality are shown to have by far the least degrees of intraregional variance.

19. See, for example, the analysis of Oskar Gruenwald, "Yugoslav Self-Management after Tito: Quo Vadis?" _Self-Management_ 5 (Spring 1978).
The uprising of workers which brought Edward Gierek to power introduced a new era of Polish postwar politics. The immediate cause of the upheaval was the attempt of the previous administration of Władysław Gomułka to raise prices of food and to increase the productivity of labor by administrative measures. These policies stemmed from long-lasting economic difficulties, which were not in any way eliminated by the change in the person of the first secretary of the Polish United Workers' party.

Poland, like other socialist countries of East-Central Europe, was industrialized in accordance with the Soviet model, which was not well suited to Polish cultural, political, or economic conditions. The accelerated industrialization was achieved by extensive and continuous investment in heavy industry with disregard for the development of the infrastructure, consumers' goods industry, and for modernization, repairs, and replacements. By the 1960s it was obvious that further economic growth would depend on diversification and
modernization of industry and on development of the kind of industries for which Poland had ample natural resources (such as the chemical industry). All these required massive importation of foreign technology and machinery, some from the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia, but the majority came from the West. Naturally, the imports of technology would be possible only if Poland could increase substantially its exports, especially to the West. But even disregarding the difficulties resulting from the lack of commercial and distributive facilities, the Polish goods were grossly outdated and of low quality. The low standards of Polish industrial products were directly related to the negligence of the Polish working force and the bureaucratization of the whole production process. The only products for which there was a ready market and which were of superb quality were the agricultural commodities; hence, Gomułka's attempt to curtail internal consumption of food by the increase in prices. The decision, while economically sound, was a political disaster.2

The new Gieriek administration was faced with exactly the same dilemma as the previous one of Gomułka's. It could not enforce a greater and better productivity of labor or save more agricultural products for export for fear of yet another workers' explosion. And indeed its own attempt to raise prices of food met with exactly the same workers' response.3 It could not initiate far-reaching political reforms of liberalization and democratization, designed for the greater mobilization of the population through political involvement which could have conceivably improved the productivity, for fear of Soviet intervention. The example of Czechoslovakia could not be forgotten. Balancing between the newly acquired power of the workers and the restraints exercised by the Soviet Union, Gieriek was left with half-measures. The importation of western technology, already begun under Gomułka, was greatly accelerated and although Polish exports increased, the total indebtedness to the countries in the West climbed to the staggering figure of between eight and ten billion dollars.4 In many cases the new technology did not produce the desired results of increased output and better
quality due to the continuous low productivity and carelessness of labor.

One sector that Gierek could reform with relative impunity was local government. The significance of local government lies in the fact that the communist system of administration operates within the framework of the unified state administration. The central government forms one structure with the local government and it functions exclusively through the local bodies which act as its agents. The reforms of local government had impact directly on the efficiency and the controls of the whole political and administrative system. In specific terms, the reforms altered considerably the structure and the spirit of the existing system. The three-layer structure (provinces, counties, and communes) was changed to a two-layer one (provinces and townships) with an increase in the number of the top units—the provinces (województwa)—from twenty-two to forty-nine and a resulting decrease in their individual sizes. Second, the local executive branch and hence the unified state administration was separated from the local legislature—the council. The council itself was subjected to the closer control of the party by the political decision of appointing the first secretary of the local party organization to the office of the chairman of the council. The reforms have had far-reaching political, administrative, and economic implications.

POLITICS OF THE REFORMS

The territorial changes not only altered the administrative divisions but also changed the Communist party organizations which duplicated the new territorial structure of the country. Before the reforms, the provinces were powerful political and administrative units with a certain degree of practical autonomy. The leaders of the provinces, the first secretary of the party as well as the chairman of the Presidium of the Province Council, were few in numbers. They controlled the implementation of central policies and the channels of information on which these policies had to be based. Their power was sufficient, at least, to delay the implementation of
those policies which they deemed contrary to their interest. One of the most striking examples was the failure of the Gomułka administration to enforce the implementation of local government deconcentration from the provinces to the counties. The provincial leadership effectively blocked the reforms for over ten years, since it rightly regarded them as undermining its own authority. The power derived from the control of the population of an average of between one and two million and the territory of 9,000 to 15,000 square miles, with considerable economic resources, especially in some provinces such as Katowice, Poznań, or Gdańsk, could have been used as a stepping-stone to national prominence. Indeed, the present first secretary, Gierek, created his power base in the province of Katowice, the major industrial center of Poland, which he ran with a considerable degree of efficiency and with some disregard for the central directives. Many of his future policies were tried successfully in his province. He was able to assemble a staff whose loyalty was more to himself than to the central leadership. There was a grain of truth in the popular saying in the late sixties that Katowice province was an independent principality loosely attached to the Kingdom of Poland. Eventually the prince took over the kingdom, placing the members of his Katowice group in most of the important positions. One wonders if the destruction once and for all of the importance of the provinces was not a direct result of Gierek's own political experience. His reforms removed, effectively, one of the sources of challenge to his supreme authority and as such they are a prime example of gerrymandering in a communist political system.

On the other end of the scale, the elimination of the commune, the lowest level of the territorial division, by the merger of the 4,313 communes into 2,365 townships removed from the Polish scene the important political and administrative irritant. The communes, which operated in close proximity to the ordinary people and in which, especially in rural areas, the party organization was usually the weakest, provided the greatest potential and opportunity for criticism of the central government. The minority communist representation resulting from the lack of party members at this level, could not al-
ways restrain the relatively free debates. This political weakness was one of the reasons why the communes were not allocated any real prerogatives as should have been the case if the letter and the spirit of Karl Marx's theory of representation were taken seriously.\textsuperscript{11} In fact, the communes' lack of administrative importance was used as an argument for their elimination as superficial units of the territorial division. The reforms separated local government from the people and hence brought it under closer control of the central authority. The communist majority in the township councils could be assured without much problem.

The representative function of the councils was also emasculated by the separation of the local executive from the local legislative body. The previous system of the executive, elected by the council, mostly from among its members, and directly participating in the council work by serving as its presidium, assured at least some semblance of representation of local interest in the implementation of the central directives. Although the presidium was chosen in the election controlled by the party, nevertheless, its members were professional politicians, who had to pay some attention to the local issues and were subject directly to local pressures. Since under the system of the unified state administration the local executive was at the same time the representative of the central authority and the locality, the success of local leaders depended to a large degree on their skill in balancing demands from the center with the expressions of local interest. The new system of professional province and township managers appointed by the prime minister or on his authority and serving at his pleasure effectively removed the territorial executive from direct local politics. The local council itself was relegated from the previous position of "local parliament" to the status of a debating society empowered only to inspire in broad terms and to supervise indirectly the activities of the local executive.\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, the decision of the Communist party, which allocated the chairmanship of the local council and its presidium to the first secretary of the local party organization, brought the council under direct administrative control of the party and removed even the slightest
possibility that the leaders of the other two minor parties would occupy that office. The chairman who was to coordinate all the political activity of the council assumed a dictatorial position within the whole council organization. Reviewing the above arguments, I do not want to create an impression that the previous system was truly representative. It was not. The representatives would be a contradiction to the political hegemony of the Communist party. However, the system was responsive to some degree to local interests, demands, and pressures. The reforms shifted the balance of responsiveness from the locality to the central power. It seemed that the central leadership decided to end the whole charade of representation, in reality not very meaningful anyway and only adding to the administrative confusion. The leadership reduced the institution of local representation as much as it thought permissible under its own ideological restraints. In place of the system of interlocking institutions which provided for a certain political pluralism, the reforms created two separate monolithic channels, one political through the party and one administrative through the local managers, both subject to the well-defined descending hierarchy. The effect is without any doubt the concentration of political power in the central institutions of the party and the government.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

The declared purpose of the reforms was the creation of effective and efficient state administration. The reforms followed the general pattern of replacement through retirement and demotion of the older managers without education with the new university-educated individuals. The new managers, the professional state administrators, were allocated extensive prerogatives as the only representatives of the state within the locality. Previously that power was lodged in the whole presidium as a collegial body, rather than in its chairman, even if his position was somewhat elevated in relationship to the other presidium members. The present manager does not share power with anybody and he is even re-
moved from direct control of the local council. In practice he is answerable only to the higher level in the administrative structure. Furthermore, the creation of the Ministry of Administration, Territorial Economy and Protection of the Environment streamlines the channels of responsibility and commands, although some conflict can still arise between this ministry and other ministries which act through the corresponding departments of the local bodies. The professionalism of the managers and the concentration of power in their hands definitely strengthens the unified state administration versus the local political centers. The theory of public administration tells us that such a definite concentration of authority and responsibility in single hands should improve the effectiveness of administration. However, the net result of the reforms is the shift of the decision-making process upwards, which may lead, in view of the lack of true representation, to further bureaucratization of the system with a growing disregard for adjustment of central policies to the local needs. It seems that the principle of responsiveness of local bodies to the local constituency was once again sacrificed to bureaucratic efficiency.

The argument in favor of the two-layer administrative structure was twofold. The elimination of the communes was justified by their lack of real functions and their inability to attract trained administrative personnel. This was undoubtedly true, but only because the central authority was unwilling to give real power to these politically unreliable units. The personnel could have been provided, either by retraining the existing administrators or by allocating new and better staff to this level of local government. The ideal solution would have been the improvement of the general efficiency of the communes and the allocation of more functions to them. They were closest to the population and would have been the most suitable unit for supplying basic services to their small communities. The townships, while smaller than the previous counties, cannot maintain the direct personal relationship which the commune administrators had with the population. Of course, the argument that the general improvement in transportation and communication made the
communes superficial cannot be completely disregarded.\textsuperscript{17}

The dwarfed province, practically reduced to the level of a glorified county but retaining its earlier functions, brought the state bureaucracy closer to the citizen. This change, to a degree, counterbalanced the effects of the elimination of the communes.

The territorial changes not only affected the general administration but also created the need for a new territorial division of specialized administrations such as the courts, the procuracy, the state control boards, the offices of the Control of Press, Publication and Public Spectacles (Censorship), the Territorial Army Command, the Citizens Militia (Police), and the Security Offices (Political Police). Some of them follow the new territorial division, others formed larger regions encompassing a few townships and even a few provinces. In the latter case (such as the courts and the procuracy) the territorial unity of all administrations is lost and hence one can expect a decline in the effectiveness of coordination among these various units of the state.

The immediate results of the reforms is considerable chaos. New offices are created in new localities, new functions are assumed by new officials and departments. In view of the serious housing and personnel shortage, the more than doubling of the provinces and other specialized administrative services created often unbearable stress on the existing resources. New apartment buildings are converted to offices, depriving the population of housing. It is common for the new local administrators to commute from the old seat of the province or county to their new administrative centers either because they are reluctant to leave the confines of the bigger city or because they cannot obtain adequate housing. In either case this creates a transient administrator who does not set roots in his new locality and cannot integrate fully with the community in his charge.

\textbf{THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS}

One goal that was continuously stressed in all the stages of the reforms was the creation of territorial units corre-
sponding to the economic regions of the country. During the parliamentary debate in May 1975, the prime minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz, stated: "We began with the proposition that the administrative structure of the country should be to a maximal degree adjusted to its economic structure." The new townships were to be socioeconomic microregions, self-contained in their production, services, social, cultural, and educational functions. The role of the province, which should also be an integrated economic unit but to a lesser degree than a township, was to coordinate the economic and social activities of the townships. Some attention was paid to the historical regional divisions of Poland, and the new provinces emphasize this cultural particularism going back to the medieval times.

In general terms, the provinces are assigned the task of industrial development, while the townships are charged with supervision, coordination, and stimulation of agricultural production. The town, the administrative center of the township, is to serve as the focal point for the agricultural community, providing all the economic and social services to the surrounding countryside. Previously that role was played by the communes. Their effectiveness in stimulating agricultural production was regarded as insufficient mostly due to the weakness of the party and the lack of trained administrative personnel at this level. Polish agriculture is predominantly privately owned, and the coordination and stimulation of its production must rely exclusively on economic incentives and the mobilization ability of local party and state leadership. The new territorial division reflects the concern of the government with agriculture as the leadership realizes the economic imperative of increasing the agricultural outputs. The government expects that the aggressive campaign of the new professional administrators together with the increased direct involvement of the party, combined with a number of economic incentives, will finally convince the private farmer of the permanency of his ownership and his immunity from collectivization. This should encourage him to increase investment in his land.

Starting with the cancelation of the compulsory deliv-
eries in January 1, 1972, the government continues to enact policies favorable to agriculture and especially to private farming, which was previously discriminated against in favor of state and collective ownership. These policies include increases in prices paid by the state for agricultural commodities, increase in production and enlargement of distribution facilities of agricultural inputs (fertilizers, machinery), increase of loans granted to the farmers, and encouragement of successful private farmers to enlarge their land holdings by allocation of land from the state land bank and by long-term loans. The township administrators are to play a decisive role in informing the farmer of the new opportunities, in mobilizing him into taking advantage of them, and in deciding on the distribution of benefits of the new policies. They are regarded as crucial to the overall improvement in agriculture.

The economic function of the new provinces is the coordination of agricultural production through townships and direct supervision of territorial industries. The decreased size of the provinces and the creation in some industries of Large Economic Organizations (WOG) diminished the administrative role of the provinces. The industry tends toward centralization at the expense of local administration, obtaining, however, at the same time a greater degree of autonomy versus the economic ministries and the Central Planning Board.

As far as possible the reforms attempted to create two distinct economic types of provinces: industrial-urban and agricultural. Altogether there are twenty-three agricultural provinces, eleven industrial-urban provinces, fourteen mixed provinces, and one predominantly tourist province. The same pattern of economic division is observable at the township level. Predominance of one type of economic activity should permit a more concentrated effort in long-term development of a given province or township. The obvious danger is the permanent reinforcement of Poland A and B: A—industrial, modern, and urbanized; and B—agricultural, traditional, and backward. However, the recent policies of the Polish government favoring agriculture indicate that perhaps finally the Polish communist leadership understands the growing importance and profitability of food production and that it will
continue with larger investments of capital, political mobil-
ization, and administrative effort in the agricultural prov-
inces.

The provinces and townships divide their responsibilities on services. The most immediate and local services, such as retail trade, are in the hands of the townships, while wholesale trade and the transportation business are operated by the provinces and even by the larger regional organizations. Here the reforms changed little. The reforms put emphasis on the role of the territorial administration in agricultural produc-
tion and at the same time they increased the independence of industries from local government.

EVALUATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM

The impact of the reforms must be examined within the context of the whole Polish system: political, social, and eco-

nomic. In many ways, the alteration of the structure of the territorial administration, and thus the administration of the state and the party, was undertaken because of serious in-
ternal problems. The upheavals in 1970 convinced Gierek and his closest advisers that the stability of the political system requires increased control by the central authority. This was accomplished by the elimination of the powerful provincial party and the state administration, by the separation of the legislative and the executive functions of the local govern-
ment, and by the creation of the corps of professional admin-
istrators. All these reforms markedly shifted the power to-
ward the center and effectively destroyed any future possibil-
ity of challenge to the central authority by the local bodies. The elimination of the communes removed one of the sources of potential political opposition and permitted the more total integration of the political and administrative systems. It is assumed by the central authority that the new system of pro-
fessional local administrators and secretaries of the party can mobilize the local human and physical resources more effec-
tively than could the previous “political-administrative” leadership.
In their drive for centralized control, the reformers further emasculated the representative character of the local councils. Their separation from the local executive in practice means an end to their previous influence on the execution of central policies at the local level. Although that influence was not excessive and was not free from the central control through the party, it nevertheless provided a vehicle for articulation of local needs. The very fact that the local executive was part of the local council insured its responsiveness to the local issues. The present executive existing alongside the council and only vaguely under its general supervision is more likely to ignore the council. It is definitely more removed from the local inputs. Apart from the fact that the present structure departs even more from Marx's theory of popular participation, the separation of the executive would impair its ability to mobilize the local community, whose impact on the decision-making process would thereby become, in fact, practically nonexistent. The executive itself will find it more difficult to assess local public opinion, which in the long run may increase the potential for political violence.

The increased role of the party, the first secretary of which assumed the permanent function of the leader of the council, adds considerably to the monolithic character of the system. The secretary's ability to mobilize the local community is now directly tied to the general popularity or distrust of the policies of the national Communist party. Previously the mobilization for local issues could be separated from the national policies and executed through various organizations other than the Communist party. The reforms that should be aiming at the greater mobilization potential of an apathetic population are most likely to achieve just the opposite results.

The professionalization of the local executive could have two effects. On the positive side, it should increase in the strictly technical sense the administrative efficiency of the local bureaucracy. The previous executive was often overburdened by its political role and could not pay sufficient attention to the administrative matters. Also, the politicians
lacked the necessary training in public administration and in many cases had only a rudimentary general education. The negative effect of the professionalization is the danger that the system will become even more bureaucratized and less responsive to the needs of the local population. Professional bureaucrats tend to develop their own interpretation of public welfare, which they equate with their own and their agency's interests. In the Polish system, in which the ordinary citizen has limited avenues of redress, the increased bureaucratization creates a further tendency for administrative abuse of power.

The economic results of the reforms, along with the increased local government role in agricultural production and services and its diminishing function in the administration of industry, should be beneficial to the overall performance of the economy, providing that the township administration can better mobilize the private farmers. The creation of the independent large economic units (WOG) simplifies the economic administration and should stimulate efficiency of industrial production.

The final evaluation of the reforms must await the test of time. At present the local administration is generally in a state of chaos, which normally follows any extensive changes in the administrative structure. This confusion is magnified by a certain variety of territorial divisions in which local government territory does not necessarily correspond to regions of the specialized administration. Also, the new political hierarchy of authority and responsibility was created in which some power-holders were demoted while others were promoted. Their mutual relationships as well as their relationship toward the power center must develop new interdependent structures.

Finally, the reforms of local administration can be viewed in the broader context of the ideocratic model in which the erosion of the 1970 period is followed by attempts at consolidation. In view of the constant threat of violence the only possible policy of consolidation was the reform of the state administration designated toward concentration of the central power.
NOTES

1. The December 1970 uprising involved the coastal cities of Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin and sparked strikes in other parts of the country.


3. The strikes in June of 1976 occurred in the cities of Radom and Ursus.

4. These figures were quoted to me in December 1976 by a Polish economist.


8. For elaboration see Piekalkiewicz, Communist Local Government, p. 179, and passim.

9. Ibid., p. 31.


13. “Deklaracja I Krajowej Konferencji PZPR.” Poland has two minor parties in addition to the Communist party: the United Peasant party and the Democratic party. Both of the minor parties accept the political hegemony of the communists.
15. "Deklaracja I Krajowej Konferencji PZPR."
20. There is private ownership of 80.2 percent of land in agricultural production, while state farms compose 17.5 percent and collective farms only 1.5 percent—*Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1975, p. 244, table 16.
21. For the economic and political implication of this point see Piekalkiewicz, "Polish Politics since the 1960's."
22. For elaboration on the ideocratic model see ibid, p. 364, and passim.
7. Decentralization and Control in Chinese Local Administration

For a number of years, students of Chinese local administration have been divided in their assessments of the degree of effective central control over the regions and consequently of the extent of real local autonomy. While in retrospect, this may not have been the most fruitful possible analytic problem, it did generate sufficient research substantially to advance our understanding of subnational administration in China. Not only has the nature of local and regional institutional structures been clarified, but we now have a basic grasp of the communications processes which link these various levels of subnational administration. Further, detailed studies of policy formulation and of local administrative compliance patterns have illuminated the way these networks of information and control have functioned in practice.¹

What these studies make clear is that the Chinese leaders in coping with a pressing need for some form of areal division of labor have adopted a form of structural devolution—deconcentration—designed to strengthen flexibility and enhance central control. In this system, policymaking authority is
tightly centralized (chi-chung ling-tao) while operational administrative control is assigned to appropriate levels of the system (fen-tseng kuan-li). This technique of assigning restricted decisional authority to local prefectural agents of the central government is a familiar device in hierarchical political systems, whose intent in the words of a minister of Napoleon III, is "to strike with the same hammer, after shortening the handle." Significantly, studies of compliance patterns, policy outputs, and fiscal redistribution since 1949 suggest that the system has worked largely as designed.

While the cumulative thrust of research has thus tended to affirm the effectiveness of central control, it has, at the same time, also highlighted continuing unresolved problems at the local level. Not only does the control system fail to produce perfectly compliant behavior on the part of regional authorities, but more damagingly, the very strength of the control system creates pressures toward rigid, conservative, and often coercive forms of leadership.

The main focus of this paper is on the nature of these problems and the efforts of the Chinese leaders to overcome them. My analysis will suggest that a significant source of the unresolved tensions at the local level can be found in the ambiguities of the "prefectoral role" itself. I will begin with a discussion of the prefectural role in China, drawing primarily on the writings of Mao Tse-tung. Then I will analyze that role in practice, drawing on Mao's writings and on discussions in the press during campaigns in 1965 and 1972 to reform local leadership, and, finally, will briefly assess the success of efforts by the leadership to resolve these tensions.

THE PREFECTURAL ROLE

The suggestion that local party committees play a broadly prefectural role as field agents of the central leadership needs little elaboration. At all levels of subnational administration (province, administrative district, county, and commune) party committees fulfill essentially three similar prefectural functions. First, they are responsible for directly managing and administering (kuan li) a specified number of
offices and enterprises directly under their control. Second, they lead (ling tao) in a more indirect planning and supervisory fashion the work of party and government organs at the next lower level. Third, they coordinate and schedule the work of local branch agencies in the light of national as well as regional priorities. Though local leaders thus have multiple functions, the essence of the prefectoral role (justifying the singular term role) is to reconcile interbranch pressures in such a fashion as to produce faithful yet flexible implementation of national policy across a broad range of programs which compete for scarce manpower and resources. While the specific tasks at each level are often different, the nature of the broad problems facing local and regional leaders are similar. It is this similarity that justifies abstracting the “prefectoral role” from its concrete, planning, administrative, and fiscal context at each level for purposes of analysis.

A useful point of departure for a consideration of the prefectoral role is Mao Tse-tung’s extensive writings on local leadership, a subject to which he gave careful thought. Generally speaking, Mao was an advocate of a substantial discretionary role for local party committees and leaders, and his views were not only influential in shaping that role but also offer insights into the party’s problems in defining that role over time. It is difficult to separate Mao’s view of leadership from his views on structural issues such as centralization and decentralization, but the two aspects are indeed separable.

DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL AUTONOMY

When Mao called for a full-scale debate on the question of decentralization in 1956, his initial position was not dogmatic. “How much autonomy should individual plants, villages, coops, localities have . . . over what matters should they have jurisdiction, how much power should they have?” He was uncertain. “Should we allow the county (hsien) 90% flexibility?” Mao asked. “I think we should,” he suggested, “but don’t form any conclusion, give the suggestion your consideration.” Party history, Mao noted, offered little concrete guidance. The independence (tu li hsing) of the base areas dur-
ing the Anti-Japanese War had led to dispersed authority (fen-san chu-i) which in turn had been corrected by strengthening party discipline (tang-hsing). Similar problems during the War of Liberation had been corrected by the adoption of a new system of reports for guidance (ching-shih pao-kao chi-tu). Since the 1950s there had been “more centralization,” but how much autonomy should be encouraged was a question on which, Mao noted, “the Politburo and the State Council have been unable to reach a decision.” Since in his view the Soviet Union had “little experience” to assist the Chinese, Mao requested guidance from the local governments: “If the localities want a division of power they should not be fearful of talking up independence, since the central government has not made a decision.” In general he left little doubt about his preference in 1956: “When we encourage the independence of the localities, we must not lean to one side, but now it is necessary to stress independence.”

Mao’s justification for enlarging the decision-making sphere of the localities was threefold. First, excessive constraints on local decision-makers restricted their initiative. “Concentrating everything at the central level,” he argued, was like “draining the pond to catch fish.” Specifically it impeded the full “mobilization of power for large scale economic construction.” Mao summed up the opportunity costs of neglecting the potential of the regions, in a contrast between Europe and traditional China: “One good thing about Europe is that all its countries are independent. Each of them does its own thing, which makes it possible for the economy of Europe to develop at a fast pace. Ever since China became an empire after the Chin Dynasty, our country has been for the most part unified. One of its defects has been bureaucratism, and excessively tight control. The localities could not develop independently . . . and economic development was slow.”

Second, there were high costs attached to a central monopoly on decision-making. “The center can not firmly administer everything,” he noted. “When the localities come to the center and cannot see the people in charge . . . and there is a delay of one or two years in handling problems,” there
are serious consequences. But the issue was not simply administrative congestion at the center. The central government itself under any condition was far from infallible. It was on occasion guilty of "thoughtless leadership," of issuing "subjectivist" directives, of "squeezing" the localities. Enlarging local authority would provide a partial corrective to poor and bullying national leadership. Under certain circumstances the localities were even authorized to disregard central directives altogether. In 1956 Mao wrote, "The localities have the power to resist all inoperable, impractical and subjective orders, directives, and forms which the central government issues to the localities." Interestingly this right was granted differentially: "This power [above] is only given to provincial and municipal committee which are comparatively mature politically, and yet is not given to the committees of the Administrative Districts and the counties." After 1958 when even the "politically mature" party committees jumped on the "Great Leap" bandwagon, Mao extended the right of resistance down to the production-team level.

Third, and most important, Mao conceived of policy formulation as a cooperative process requiring active local participation. "Lines and policies," he wrote, "are not produced in a vacuum," and "opinions do not come from Peking." Writing of the Socialist Education Campaign, he noted, "Nothing was engendered in our brains. The 'four cleans' were proposed by the Pao Ting Administrative District Party Committee. Of the eight Administrative Districts in Hopeh, only Pao Ting proposed it." Enlarging on this input function of local committees, he wrote: "In economic matters each provincial and municipal committee should work up some models. We have not had experience [in economic matters] and must find some departments, areas, plants to study. Some people say that the central government has brilliant leadership. We know some things, but not others."

During the debate over fixing an appropriate level for rural accounting and management in 1960, Mao wrote, "Honan and Hunan are advocating the production brigade, Hupeh and Kwangtung the production team. Which is better? How about both?" Later in the same correspondence he
called for a debate between commune- and county-level leaders on the same question.

Mao broadly characterized the ideal relationship between the regions and the center as "consultative," particularly with respect to "important issues" requiring "joint action." While in theory the center reserved to itself the broad powers (ta ch'uan) of policy formulation, and the localities were assigned the more restricted function (hsiao ch'uan) of implementation, Mao noted that "carrying out decisions is also a form of power." Further, the policies themselves came out of local conflict, "local blooming and contending." The role of the central government was that of a "processing plant." The "raw material" for this processing plant was provided by the localities. Mao argued, "Provinces, districts, cities and counties have to produce before the central government can process."

While urging an expanded local role, Mao was sensitive to the potential threat such a role posed to central priorities and controls. "Between the center and the localities," he wrote in 1959, "the center is the foundation." While all areas were to have the "appropriate degree of independence," the assertion of local interests had to proceed "from the interests of the whole country." Only independence "sanctioned by the center" was to be considered "proper independence." Where local initiative threatened central policy objectives the latter took precedence. "Local independence," Mao contended, "should not obstruct national balance," and comrades at "the lower levels" were enjoined "not to act wildly."

Yet within the limits laid down, this reliance on locally generated policy options implied a considerable potential for local innovation. Mao praised the deputy secretary of one county before a party gathering: "A deputy secretary bought a hoe and 80% of the people bought hoes." On another occasion he commented, "I thank the First Secretary of Chang ko County Honan for his report [on deep plowing] . . . can all the counties do it? . . . Do you mean to say that if Chang ko can do it others cannot?" He urged the localities to assume more independence: "You rely upon the central government, but the
Mao's thinking on the prefectoral role was also shaped by his view of the policy process. Since his preferred mode of policy determination was broadly experimental, Mao appeared to favor open-ended and unrestricted local innovation in the early phases of policy development. The process of groping for optimality dictated against any premature crystallization of policy options. For example, in defining the scope of the rural Socialist Education Movement of the 1960s, Mao cautioned, "Don't announce it to the lower echelons that the toothpaste should not be squeezed too clean." It was evidently preferable that guidelines be issued not a priori but post hoc. Ordinarily at later stages of policy development, guidelines tended to be drawn more tightly. In asking for clearer guidelines in 1958 regarding commune policy, Mao cautioned that without them "the provinces will not be able to control the counties, and the counties will not be able to control the communes. It will be like a horse without reins."

Not only did Mao's views vary with the phase of the policy process, but they were modified by experience particularly with the decentralization of 1958. He observed in 1958: "Regarding the form of government, there is now semianarchism. We have granted too much of the four powers and too soon. . . . We should now emphasize unified leadership and centralization of power. Powers granted, should properly be retracted. There should be proper control over the lower levels."

Mao similarly described the formation of the "economic cooperation regions" in 1958 as the "negation of a negation." He called upon provincial party secretaries to "consider all angles" with "consideration for the whole" as the "supreme ethic." If one of the consequences of overall coordination was that some provinces remained poor, he suggested that since "China had been backward" for a long time, it would not matter if the poor provinces "remained poor for another few decades."

While there was a dialectical character to his views on the
expansion and contraction of local authority, over time Mao appeared increasingly to favor broader powers at the regional level. In part this appeared to be a function of acquired experience and confidence. For example, in urging individual provincial industrial development in the early 1960s, he said: "We are advocating that under a plan of unification for the whole country, each province does as much as possible. As long as the raw materials are there and the market conditions are there, as long as they can obtain raw materials they are able to do. Previously we were afraid that after the various provinces developed all kind of industry, industrial products would find no buyers, like in such cities as Shanghai. Now, it does not appear to be the case."  

By the mid-1960s Mao no longer perceived any antagonism in the economic relationship between the localities and national government. He urged the local areas to "pay attention to capital accumulation," since now "everything belongs to the state treasury." Similarly he urged the increasing transfer of industry to local management, including national defense. On the precise breakdown of control between provincially managed and municipally managed industry, he offered no guidance: "The method practiced in Kiangsu is good, i.e., the province has no control in managing industry. It is down in Soochow and Nanking. The other method in Tsinan is good. The province manages the large industries, the municipality the small industries." The general policy direction, however, was clear: "It is fine to let the central government exercise control in name but not in fact. . . . Those who run the factories for the central government should be told to get out of the central government and go over to the local areas, lock, stock and barrel."  

THE PREFECTURAL ROLE IN PRACTICE  
The prefectoral role implied by Mao’s inviting mandate to local leaders to assist in policy formulation and adaptation, though a broad one, was ambiguous, and the response of local leaders was predictably diverse. The wide range of responses
to central expectations is well captured in Mao's appraisal of local leaders contained in the *Wan Sui* volumes.

Predictably some local leaders responded positively and vigorously to the call for innovative leadership. The case of Wu Chiao County, for example, was cited by Mao as exemplifying the principle that "high enthusiasm is the key to it all." As Mao noted, "There are some counties which are always struggling to be first." Others exhibited less laudable qualities. Some leaders tended to procrastinate, "feeling that this or that can't be done, that there are multiple difficulties." Others tended to abstain from policy debate and wait for the crystallization of a clear policy at the center. These "tidewatchers" defined their jobs narrowly in terms of implementation alone and preferred to let the "centre define the line and policy"; "We carry it out," i.e., they preferred clear-cut directives and limited input functions. Still others followed the risk-averting strategy of abandoning their own judgment in favor of "carrying out the instructions of higher levels," at any cost. The resulting "coercion" or "commandism" was seen as preferable to noncompliance, often expressed in the formula "better left than right." False reporting of compliance represented an alternative strategy on the part of local leaders. Mao's own estimate of the frequency of such behavior in 1958 was 1 to 5 percent of local leaders at county and commune levels.

Most reprehensible of all appeared to be the determined espousal of a particular policy after national policy changed. "Some comrades delight in excessive decentralization," Mao wrote. "[They] do not like to confer with other people . . . cannot sense the political climate . . . and are likely to catch a political cold."

**CAUSES AND REMEDIES**

Mao's analysis of the basic sources of deviant behavior was balanced. He did not evade the issue of central responsibility and conceded that the central government, with its of-
ten inadequate planning, inflexibility, excessive demands, and powerful political pressures, were in part responsible for such deviations. On the other hand, equal if not greater blame was attached to local leaders, whose unsatisfactory response to those pressures was at issue. Mao observed that as people began to assume positions of responsibility, "they often become confused and nervous."\(^{49}\) "Those who are afraid to speak out," Mao observed, "are afraid of being called opportunists, afraid of getting the sack, afraid of being expelled from the Party, afraid of being divorced by their wives [and thus losing face], afraid of being confined to the guard room, afraid of having their heads chopped off."\(^{50}\) Speaking scathingly of leaders who behaved toward the upper echelons in the fashion of "a mouse when it sees a cat," he asserted, "It is as if their souls had been eaten away."\(^{51}\) Yet careerism was not the only problem and certainly not the fundamental one. The political standpoint of local leaders also affected their response to central programs. In 1956, 1958, and 1963 Mao identified over half the provinces, administrative districts, and counties as having "political problems" which affected their work.\(^{52}\) This was in Mao's view a "normal part of the class struggle" which reflected the diversity of ideological orientations within the party. In 1958 he spoke of provincial leaders in terms of a left-right spectrum in which he described himself as a "middle of the roader" with Hunan, Hupeh, and Kwangtung to the left."\(^{53}\) Local leaders guilty of commandism, he wrote in 1958, fell into two groups: "alien class elements" and "idiots."\(^{54}\)

In general, the remedies Mao prescribed reflected his sense of the problem. To encourage local leaders to speak out and to act boldly, an appropriate atmosphere of "democracy" had to be created. Leaders had to be assured that no penalties would be incurred for frank "airing of views" (nao wen-t'i).\(^{55}\) Yet Mao also thought that a bit more courage on the part of leaders was in order as the following rather chilling encouragement suggests: "I feel that as long as you are prepared for these eventualities and are able to see through the vanities of this world, you need be afraid of nothing. If you make no psychological preparation, you will not dare to speak. But
should fear of martyrdom seal our lips?" Mao also called for central planners to allow "more leeway," "more initiative to subordinates." But equally, it was important for local leaders to get out of their offices, do more investigation, cease their complete preoccupation with detailed policy, consult more with their colleagues and the masses. At the higher levels it was crucial for national and provincial leaders to control the tempo and content of programs by supplying appropriate cues. For example, Mao chided the zealous pacesetting counties who sought to "enter communism first" reminding them that the honor really belonged to "Anshan, Liaoning, and Tientsin." Similarly, when Honan was pioneering more advanced forms of collective agriculture in 1958, Mao suggested that it was not necessary for everyone to emulate the zeal of Honan. "If everyone is trying to surpass everyone else, the country may be thrown into confusion as a result. The thing is to go ahead and carry it out energetically." For those who were unable to respond to national cues, or education, removal from office was a clear final resort.

LOCAL REFORMS: 1965 AND 1972

Despite Mao's accurate diagnosis of these common administrative problems at the local level, they have not proved easy to remedy. Their persistence is particularly evident if one compares two campaigns to reform local leadership, one mounted in the last years of the Socialist Education Movement, in 1965-1966, and a later campaign mounted after the Cultural Revolution, in 1972. Despite very significant substantive differences in the nature of these two campaigns, the earlier campaign stigmatizing "conservative" orientations and the latter critical of "leftism," the similarities in the problems they attacked are even more striking. In both campaigns bureaucratic timidity came under harsh attack. The practice criticized in the 1965 campaign of "doing everything that is ordered by the upper level, nothing that is not ordered, and always waiting for directives from above" came under attack again in 1972. The allied attitude manifest in 1965 of
seeking "not to pioneer," "not to excel" but always to "aim for the middle reaches" was anathematized again in 1972. As one report put it: "When some comrades come across concrete questions involving policy they always want to let the higher level set the tune. They always declare, it is not so easy to measure things accurately and to draw the line of demarcation. It is safer for us to wait and see." 60

Problems of "commandism," arrogance, complacency once again appeared despite the longstanding stress on consultation with the masses. During the 1965 movement a county leader had confessed that while "everyone knows in principle that the leading officials of the county should serve the people, things were often upside down." 61 Seven years later a People's Daily editorial attacked those who felt that "work could be carried out just the same without heeding what the masses say" and who "regarded normal democratic life as an obstacle to centralism." 62 A county leader in Kiangsu in 1965 admitted to being more concerned with plans, targets, and output per acre than with issues of peasant income. 63 In 1972 a local leader criticized himself for applying "heat" and "pressure" during a campaign in violation of consultative norms. In both periods local leaders confessed to feeling "greatly shocked," when reading Chairman Mao's teaching "that to carry out directives from the upper levels blindly and with no objections is the most subtle way of opposing or sabotaging those directives." 64

What explains the persistence of these problems? On the most obvious level the problems appear to stem from continuing fear of administrative sanctions for nonfulfillment of priority targets and objectives. More important, the failure of efforts to reform this erroneous "world outlook" suggests that the problems defied efforts at education because they remained anchored in the administrative reality with which all local leaders had to cope. Exhortation and education were less persuasive than painful experience. Efforts in 1965, for example, to encourage revolutionary innovation fell afoul of the traumatic legacy of the Great Leap Forward. A county party secretary in Shansi referred obliquely to the "trouble in Party work several years before," adding that "it was no
easy job to turn the tide . . . and we must make no further mischief.”
More graphically another county leader wrote: “Once bitten by a snake, for ten years we were afraid of the
sight of a rope in the well. As a result we began to form the
idea that we might bring trouble on ourselves by striving for
the upper reaches, that it would be wrong to stay in the lower
reaches, but it was safe to be in the middle.”
Similar concerns were evident in 1972. Despite Mao’s injunction that
cadres who made mistakes should be patiently educated and
then restored to office, the process was sufficiently traumatic
as to affect subsequent behavior. As one People’s Daily edito-
rial put it in 1972, “Some comrades who had committed right
deviation mistakes in the past,” erroneously thought that it
was “safer to be a leftist than a rightist.” Such attitudes evi-
dently could only be ameliorated by consistent, reasonable
personnel policies over time.

In addition to such attitudinal problems, there were also
structural factors which made it difficult for local leaders to
respond creatively to higher-level demands. First, local lead-
ers were subject to chronic overloads. As one county party
secretary put it, “We were always called upon to solve all
problems big and small” and thus “became entangled in pro-
duction and administrative affairs day and night.” The time
pressures on local leaders were neatly summarized by one
county leader as the “five-too-many”: “too many meetings,
too many organizations demanding attention, too many con-
current posts, too many documents and too many depart-
ments.”
This led officials in turn to becoming desk-bound
and to exhibiting a style of leadership which was described as
“generalized leadership,” “simply transmitting the party’s
policies to lower level units by means of circularizing them.”
The result was lack of concrete guidance to basic-level cadres
(which often permitted commandism by default). Busy offi-
cials visiting local units were described by peasants as “drag-
on flies on water” because of the short durations of their
stays or as “birds which fly only to bright places” because of
their preference for visiting close and accessible model units.

A far more fundamental factor, however, was the basic,
continuing ambivalence of the center toward local innovation
and adaptation. Even while urging flexible adaptation, the party warned against modifying correct decisions of the party. In 1972, for example, the party reaffirmed the reporting system adopted in 1948 whereby approval requests must be filed for any policy modifications proposed. This preclearance procedure was described as an "important guarantee of centralized leadership," to be implemented not only "when difficulties are encountered" but also "when there is plain sailing"; not only in "busy periods" but also in "normal periods." Similarly, while local party leaders were urged to "heed the masses," they were cautioned against using the "interests of the masses [as a] pretext for refusing to carry out instructions from higher levels." One can easily understand why a county leader might query: "In listening to the opinions of the masses it is first necessary to listen to the correct opinions. Yet how can we tell whether an opinion is correct or not?"

The tendency of local officials to query the validity of mass sentiment is illustrated in the response of Ch'eng tung Commune leaders in the spring of 1970 to a directive from the county to "transform upland fields into paddy fields." The Commune Party Committee arbitrarily specified the acreage to be shifted to paddy rice production, despite the fact "that a section of the masses were unable to arrive at a right perception of things." Anyone who demurred was accused of "not obeying the instructions of the higher level" and was "subjugated." The problems involved for local leaders in distinguishing between conscientious and arbitrary efforts at task fulfillment are clearly illustrated in a revealing self-criticism by a county party secretary who reported his experience with the local program for fertilizer accumulation in 1972. Distressed at the local custom of letting the pigs roam loose, he ruled that the "masses should be required to build pigsties for accumulating manure." Other county leaders objected that this "was a problem that the past secretaries of the county had been unable to solve," but he countered, "If even the building of pigsties cannot be accomplished, why talk about learning from Tachai and changing the world."

Great efforts appear to have been made to deal with these
ambiguities and conflicting role demands. First, editorials and directives have sought to define the role of the leading secretary at each level more clearly. The job was described as combining the functions of both "political commissar and commander." To discharge these joint functions top leaders were to be freed from "mere production affairs" by a greater delegation of responsibility to deputy secretaries. This would permit top leaders to spend more time in meaningful contact with problems at the basic level leading to more effective leadership and a "mass line" working style. It would also free them for reflection, fostering more conscious, principled leadership on broader policy issues.

A particularly crucial area of reform lay in the effort to encourage a more responsive environment for mass participation, which was visualized as an essential corrective to inflexible leadership. Despite exhortations to observe "mass line work style," local leaders obviously felt constrained to give priority to implementing directives from above. County leaders in fact referred to a conventional administrative distinction between "hard and soft tasks." The latter were essentially constituency demands and might or might not be fulfilled, depending on circumstances, but the former (upper-level demands) were clearly to be "firmly fulfilled." Given this tendency and given the related danger that legitimate and constructive local criticism might be misconstrued as backward thinking by local leaders charged with a vanguard role, it was clearly desirable to strengthen countervailing pressures from below by according a more active watchdog role to local citizens. This required educating local leaders to pay attention to mass views; it also involved creating organizations and an atmosphere in the countryside and cities where peasants and workers were willing to speak out. In 1965 Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations were assigned the responsibility for mass supervision. After 1969 this role was more widely diffused among the population. Various forms of open-door policymaking would produce the desired flexibility in policy adaption. In theory, to the extent that such reforms worked they would obviate the need for close discipline from above. One local advocate went so far as to ques-
tion the need for constant consultation with the upper level on the optimistic grounds that "since we are guided by Chairman Mao's revolutionary line from above and are supervised by the broad masses from below, there will be no problems."77

One model case intended to illustrate the desired form of cadre-citizen interaction was the response to the decision in 1971 of the P'ing T'an County Party Committee to unify the economic accounting systems for fishing and farming work. A county leader was sent to Lienchung Brigade to mobilize the masses for this work. The masses, however, "objected that if the basic unit for accounting is extended blindly, it will affect the activism of the commune members and the public accumulation funds." After discussion, the County Party Committee revised the original resolution and called on brigade officials to arrange accounting methods "in the light of majority opinion and actual circumstances in each brigade."78

THE SUCCESS OF THE REFORMS

In the absence of quantitative data it is difficult to assess the success of some of these specific efforts at redefining the role of local leaders. Certainly the impression of observers in the 1970s is that to a degree local leaders had become relatively more responsive to mass input.79 This is a view that receives guarded support from interview data collected in 1975.80 In this study, most informants held generally positive views on the quality of local administration. Local leaders were generally characterized as flexible and responsive, with "little reliance on commandist methods." Most brigade and commune cadres, it was asserted, had learned how to adapt central policies to local conditions. The kind of "blind and coercive leadership" which occurred during the Great Leap Forward, another respondent commented, "is seldom seen today." Of course, most informants could cite individual instances of cadre arrogance and inflexibility and personally knew cadres "who did not modestly accept supervision by the masses." Significantly, such forms of behavior were seen not
only as illegitimate but as atypical. One representative view of the leadership success in eliciting participation was that "the masses do not fear retaliation in expressing opinions on production matters." Interestingly, many respondents tended to view pressure for innovation and change from above as legitimate. They regarded central initiatives as frequently beneficial to local welfare, particularly when modified by the older experienced peasants. Further, they were willing to risk short-run losses on the grounds that the state would not "let them starve."

These results are impressive evidence of the party's success in mitigating many of the problems discussed above. However, it is also clear from the same interviews that the problems were only ameliorated and not eliminated. The campaign launched in 1978 to study the experience of Hsiang-hsiang County, Hunan, has turned up evidence of widespread bureaucratic abuses of power in the late 1970s which indicate a recrudescence of many of the problems discussed above. Bureaucrats once again came under attack for "never being first to do anything," for "ordering around lower units without knowing their specific problems," and for placing "blind trust in administrative power," thus infringing on the appropriate autonomy of peasant production collectives and legitimate peasant material interest. The reforms being advocated are identical to those set forth by Mao and implemented in 1965 and 1972. Thus efforts are being made to stress democratic consultation as the basis for local decision-making. The autonomy of the production team is once again being emphasized to provide an institutional basis for peasant rights of resistance, petition, and criticism. People's Daily has praised the "millions of peasants who are rising up to safeguard the rights of the production teams of self-determination and to their own legitimate rights and interests," in response to these reforms.

Cadre reactions to the reforms have been particularly revealing. Cadres have expressed the conviction that their capacity to lead the peasants in the ambitious new programs of agricultural modernization will be imperiled by the new policies. People's Daily, in noting the "rather influential view"
among cadres that the new rural reforms were "incompatible with the implementation of rural reconstruction," has countered that "while nothing can be accomplished without drive . . . revolutionary drive should not be confused . . . with coercion and commands." Further, in drawing out the implications of the fall of Gang of Four," the party journal has announced that officials should be less concerned with failure, that "we should no longer feel as though we are skating on thin ice."

This clash of views in the context of the reemergence in the later 1970s of an earlier administrative syndrome, suggests several conclusions. The first is that there exists a permanent set of tensions inherent in the discretionary role of local leaders. These tensions are not only implied by the theory of contradictions but are inherent in the dialectical relationship between central pressure and local deviation. Further, while the tensions undoubtedly arise from the ambiguities in the prefectoral role described above, the crucial point is that these ambiguities are deliberately preserved. This suggests that leadership perceives the costs of such deviations as a tolerable price to pay in maintaining a fruitful tension between change-oriented local administrators and the inertia of the rural setting. The main thrust of reforms is not to eliminate that tension but periodically to reduce its costs. In a longer-term view, these tensions will persist as long as the leadership remains committed to programs of rapid change and development. They are likely to abate naturally, however, as China's four modernizations are gradually realized in this century.

NOTES


4. Falkenheim, "County Administration."


338. 27. Ibid., p. 379. 28. Ibid., p. 194. 29. Ibid., p. 33.
32. Ibid., p. 103. 33. Ibid., p. 46.
184. 38. Ibid., pp. 122, 138. 39. Ibid., p. 139. 40. Ibid.,
p. 296. 41. Ibid., p. 379. 42. Ibid., p. 379. 43. Ibid., p.
173. 44. Ibid., p. 145. 45. Ibid., p. 173.
41. 54. Ibid., p. 134. 55. Ibid., p. 176.
56. Mao Unrehearsed, PRL 122.
57. Miscellany, p. 176. 58. Ibid., p. 145.
62. Ibid., February 20, 1972. 63. Ibid., October 25, 1965. 64. Ibid., October 18, 1965, September 8, 1972. 65. Ibid.,
79. See for example, Marianne Bastid, "Levels of Economic Decision-Making," in Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in
80. The "official" class origin of the respondent group was as follows: nine poor peasants, three lower middle peasants, one middle
peasant, two rich peasants, three landlords, two artisans, four workers, one petty bourgeois, one overseas Chinese, two office workers,
one unknown. The interview schedule and responses are available on request.
Conclusion: Participatory and Policymaking Dilemmas in Local Communist Politics

Because subnational political phenomena in communist states were, for many years, ignored in favor of a focus on institutions and individuals of central governments, we can offer only tentative conclusions about participation in, and the policymaking role of, local political institutions in such systems. Notwithstanding the relatively short period of time during which scholars have devoted attention to politics in communist communities, our understanding of political structures, events, and behaviors at these levels in communist states has improved significantly, in part due to the attention by scholars included in this collection.

In this summary chapter, I will use data and interpretations from the papers in this volume as the basis for comparative inferences about the functions and problems of local politics in communist systems. My subject will be the problems which confront communist systems related to local politics as discussed in earlier chapters.
PARTICIPATION AND ITS LIMITS

At the core of problems faced by communist leaders arising from the community level is, ironically, their own effort to promote involvement in, and expand the statutory responsibilities for, local political institutions, while trying to limit politicization which occurs in and around those institutions. Ideally for a communist party’s rule the leadership could have it both ways, with the result that local party units, people’s councils, and adjunct organizations would involve the masses, communicate the party’s program, educate participants and the general public to new socialist values, supervise the recruitment and training of cadres, and implement centrally decreed policies.\footnote{But, as the first four chapters in this volume have suggested, there is ample evidence of the tightrope these systems walk concerning political involvement at the local level, among both the elites and the general citizenry. Closely related are dilemmas regarding the policymaking role of local institutions, a matter to which I will return later.}

The clear-cut need of central authorities in communist states to have reliable and experienced local leadership was evidenced by Joel Moses’ research in the Soviet case. In what has been an ongoing policy since the demise of Khrushchev, subnational Soviet leaders (party bureau members) have become a cohort characterized by older members with longer tenure. The aging and decline in turnover of such a stratum of participants in the USSR—if we are careful to note exceptions among the local party apparat and specialized fields such as agriculture where “comparably more youthful ages” are present—suggests underlying tensions within the Soviet polity. Moses cites, for instance, Brezhnev’s remarks at the Twenty-Fifth All-Union Party Congress in 1976 to the effect that local party bureau members were allowing their longevity to deplete their enthusiasm for “pulling their load” and to become “isolate[d] from the masses, [which] produces flatterers and toadies, [losing] the trust of communists.”

There are, then, striking flaws in the relationship between central leaders and local elites. The kind or degree of
participation for local leadership Moscow wants is that which is characterized by efficiency, experience, and stability. Tried and tested, such local leaders are expected best and loyally to implement centrally decreed policies. But in doing so, Brezhnev’s regime has enhanced the potential for disaffection among the younger functionaries for whom career paths are blocked by aging local party bureau members. While making no move to abandon the policy of stabilizing the stratum of subnational political elites, the Moscow leadership is certainly aware that this practice has engendered some undesirable consequences including that which Brezhnev observed of declining enthusiasm among local leaders who are now less challenged by younger functionaries for their position. It is unclear, however, whether or not the central leadership of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has recognized the deeper and more problematic consequences of the post-Khrushchev effort to manipulate local participation in the elite stratum.

If the only negative consequence of a policy to enforce leadership stability was to lessen the degree to which such individuals were conscientious, one might term the situation “disadvantageous” to the Soviet polity but no more. Moses argues, however, that the situation could well be more damaging. If the frustration of younger functionaries spreads through their daily contacts and over time, then the party risks a decline in its “image as a meaningful channel of participation.” In short, failing to sustain symbolic representation of societal groups in local leadership, thereby denying large portions of the citizenry even an indirect sense of participation in party channels, risks “resentment or outright hostility from local population groups.”

Comparing participation and attitudes about such involvement among three echelons of people at the local level in Yugoslavia, Jan Triska and Ana Barbic found a gap between the civic attitudes and behavior of party members (i.e., League of the Yugoslav Communists) vis-à-vis broader categories of citizens. A “broadly supportive” but less participatory citizenry follows the Socialist Alliance members and
League members by wide margins in most categories of behavior and attitudes.

These and other specific findings of the Triska-Barbic research suggest close ties to the work of Joel Moses. Even in Yugoslavia, most oriented toward citizen participation via workers' self-management and other mechanisms and most committed of all communist states to decentralization, the public has become neither enthusiastic about nor active in its support of the regime. There are in communist states, then, "peripheral publics" (Richard Rose's term) which passively accept the governance communist parties impose, while at the same time recognizing their own lack of efficacy and civic awareness more than party members. Just as Moses discovered a cause for disaffection within the ranks of the CPSU between older and younger members, Triska and Barbie identify further stratifications among citizens of communist states regarding their participation in the system. Within the stratum of local elites, or comparing that echelon to other categories of citizens, one can conclude that participation in and commitment to the system of Communist party states varies greatly within all such countries, that the leadership of communities is beset by conflicts related to career advancement, and that party members share little of their awareness and sense of efficacy with the nonparty citizenry. Unquestionably, the demise of a totalitarian model of communist polities (often portrayed in terms of a monolithic party) is supported by these analyses of participatory dynamics in such states.

Specific roles created for citizen involvement, examined in both the Nelson and the Adams papers, can be seen in light of the participatory dilemma in communist states as well. In over sixty years of party rule in the USSR and thirty-five in Romania, filling a position in a state organ meant little for the citizens recruited to play such roles and probably less for their supposed constituency. The important questions are, of course, whether or not the constraints on citizen participation are being lifted incrementally and, if so, why? In the judgments of both Nelson and Adams, Communist party states are undergoing changes with respect to the participation of their
citizens, changes that have the potential for long-term systemic impact.

Deputies of people’s councils provide data which help to discern political variations within communist states. Moreover, from such information we may infer that several conditions, likely to be regarded as negative by central authorities, are coincident with their drive to develop most rapidly regions with low socioeconomic levels. Thus one finds, notwithstanding procedural uniformity, that local political life is not identical from one unit to another in communist systems, and that socioeconomic development may be contributing “to conditions antithetical from the perspective of a ruling communist party,” such as more nonparty organizational activity. Nelson makes it clear that citizen participation via the role of deputy in people’s councils is not likely to overwhelm communist regimes soon, if ever, since central leadership can manipulate the mechanics of community government as well as the selection of people to fill local organs. But the question with which Nelson concludes his article looms as a serious dilemma to ruling communist parties, i.e., does the degree to which citizens who participate in the system identify with the party diminish when the party decides to pursue socioeconomic development most rapidly in the poorest regions? Since Nelson’s tentative inference is that such a relationship does exist, we cannot rule out increasing challenges to the uniform authority of communist regimes from local units.

If communist regimes must now be cognizant of potentially troublesome deviations among citizen participants in the role of deputies, so too do other means of involvement conceal participatory dilemmas. The evolutionary process, part of which Jan Adams has documented in the Soviet case, toward more frequent and more diverse citizen inputs must vex communist leaders. Quite understandably, it is in the interest of any leader or group of national elites in the last decades of the twentieth century to create an aura of public involvement in the governance of the country; willing obedience, as opposed to enforced mobilization, offers greater efficiency all around and the potential (perhaps slim in today’s communist states)
for genuinely enthusiastic participation. Thus, the CPSU seeks greater efficiency and, perhaps, enthusiastic support via the activities of volunteer inspectors of the KNK, Kom- somol, and so on. It is not improbable that the Moscow leadership views the millions of inspectors as a means by which not only to further the legitimacy of party rule (by the appearance of responsiveness) and to shoulder administrative tasks but also to socialize the people who fill such roles, convincing them of the value of their own participation. Creating a supportive, attentive echelon of public opinion can be a long-term utilitarian rationale for promoting such a participatory behemoth.

The irony of that effort, however, is that (in the Soviet case) roles created for citizen involvement now add their "own impetus to [the] process of change." If Jan Adams is right in her assessment, and Soviet citizens are in fact "becoming accustomed to their participatory roles" so that "growing pressures" are being exerted upon Soviet policymakers, we need to ask what lies ahead for the CPSU and other ruling communist parties. Whether people's council deputy or volunteer inspector, exhortations that participating citizens should be concerned, should speak out, and ought to take initiatives are now creating new wrinkles in the party's "monohierarchy" (Roy Laird's term). There exists momentum for significant alterations in the way communist parties govern, arising, in ways observed by Nelson and Adams, from the very participatory roles maintained and promoted for citizen involvement at the community-level.

POLICYMAKING AND ITS CONSTRAINTS

Although local political institutions can be valuable for administrative tasks, to socialize participants and so on, leaders in Moscow, Peking, or Warsaw would not, one might reason, risk limiting their own authority by giving communities more control over resource allocation unless strong pressures existed for such decentralization. In such a view, communist governments are being pushed unwillingly toward a diffusion of authority. But such reasoning, as articles from
this volume's second half demonstrate, would be faulty. We find, instead, that central regimes have often inaugurated certain kinds of decentralization in order to pursue socioeconomic goals they regard as politically necessary either because of an ideological heritage or because of specific conditions incompatible with socialism.

The impact of subnational units on national policy, or such units' control over resource allocation within their boundaries, can also be evaluated from different perspectives. In the view once commonly accepted among western scholars, the monolithic nature of the party precluded any assertion of local identity or needs in policymaking; while the USSR might have fifteen different union republics, the CPSU's Leninist nature would not tolerate localism. We have begun to find, however, that once the "form" of decentralization has been set into motion, social and political momentum build for the "substance" to follow. Clark, Piekalkiewicz, and Falkenheim address the interplay between central and local authorities regarding policymaking in Yugoslavia, Poland, and China respectively. While their methodologies and emphases differ, all three suggest that community-level variables cannot be ignored when trying to understand how public policies are made or implemented in communist states.

In Yugoslavia, where decentralization has played the most important ideological role among communist states, the central government has struggled to keep decentralization under control while developing—accepting (particularly before 1971) the devolution of authority required in multinational Yugoslavia while trying to pursue an equalization of socioeconomic levels through resource redistribution. As Clark found, Yugoslavia has been decentralized to the point where long-standing differences in wealth among the republics and their communes mitigate the effect of central plans to equalize socioeconomic levels. The hope that commune-level budgetary initiatives would "promote greater equality in sociopolitical conditions" has not been fulfilled. Per capita income and other variables Clark labels as developmental indicators "offer the major explanation for differences in communal efforts to provide for the well-being of their residents."
The price to pay, then, for decentralization before intranational equality is close at hand is to perpetuate the inability of poor areas to improve their standard of living while the rich get richer. While Belgrade's policy remains to ameliorate regional variations in living standards, the central leadership (most obviously in the 1960s) has been unable to overcome long-standing inequalities among republics and communes within them. Ironically, the principal reason for this failure of policy-implementation has been the League's commitment, seen as necessary in multinational Yugoslavia, to local initiative, self-management, and related ideals.

Being caught between the horns of decentralization and inequalities calling for resource redistribution is not a dilemma confined to Yugoslavia among communist states, nor to communist states among less-developed countries. But for ruling communist parties, organized along Leninist lines, the policy weakness of central authorities must be particularly troublesome. The command-type organization of a Leninist party cannot fit readily into a nation-state where local power accretion is rampant. Some communist parties have no choice, however, than to accommodate themselves to the economic autonomy, ethnic identity, or cultural rivalry of subnational units. The amount and kind of accommodation varies among communist states, but a residue of tension will remain because the party in power is based on centralist principles. Decentralizing a proletarian dictatorship poses many problems that federalism does not imply for pluralistic parties in competitive political systems.

More speculative, but intriguing nonetheless, is the dialectic between a central regime's policies which aim toward development, modernization, and decentralization. Development, if it means anything in socioeconomic terms, suggests redistributing resources within a country. To develop, then, means taking existing resources (manpower, cash, land, minerals) to promote or create new resources. If a country has lived on its sugar crop, resources from that crop and industry will have to be used as a major part of the stepping-stone to a better life. If the principal resource is manpower, then labor-intensive development will have no ready alternative. No
matter the specifics of a country's plans, developmental momentum will begin in relatively well-to-do regions, while poor areas must be raised to the standards of the former by being recipients of redistributed resources. Most less-developed countries, communist or not, have adopted this strategy involving the expropriation of existing wealth, confiscation of private land, agricultural collectivization, and other measures. But extracting resources from some regions and injecting funds into the economy of other communities can politicize the environment of both locales. For a well-to-do area, where growth is slowed or reversed because its higher productivity is siphoned off for the benefit of poorer regions, antagonism against central authority may grow. Investing heavily in underdeveloped locales may politicize the environment in such a poor community in a different, but no less negative, way insofar as local political actors increasingly conflict over the priorities for local development and modernization (e.g., instead of building a new factory, monies for a school may be seen as desirable). Thus, the potential exists for the very socioeconomic goals of a communist system to encourage the decentralization which can impede the achievement of developmental policies. Even where devolving authority has the ring of ideological acceptability, as in Yugoslavia, too much is vigorously opposed by central leaders.

As Piekalkiewicz describes, the Polish case embodies this dialectic in no uncertain terms. Unable to pursue the most rational policies for modernization and development, partly because of international factors and workers' antipathy, Gierek moved against what Warsaw leaders viewed as the one impediment to the regime's socioeconomic goals subject to their counteraction, i.e., local government. Related to the "efficiency and . . . controls of the whole political and economic system," subnational units and their political organs became the targets of extensive reforms from 1972 to 1975, the upshot of which was to lessen their potential for challenging central authority and to reassert party dominance in all local political institutions. In the background of such actions, of course, are questions as to why subnational politics had come to be seen as an impediment to centrally decreed policies and why
Gierek's regime thought that weakening local capabilities would better enable the center efficiently to implement its policies.

These questions can be answered quickly; Gierek himself had risen to prominence via a provincial (wojewodztwo) party chairmanship and recognized the threat such power represented. When only seventeen provinces and five major cities existed beneath the national level, several, such as Katowice, Poznań, and Gdańsk, had enormous economic and political clout. Katowice, perhaps more than any other area, possessed the resources and had reasons to oppose central policies—particularly any that would have decelerated investments in the heavy industry upon which it thrives. Forty-nine less-independent provinces clearly present a different view from that of Warsaw. Making the first secretaries simultaneously people's council chairmen reinforced party control further, and denying the councils oversight for administrative functions by creating a separate hierarchy of authority for state administration minimized local influence on policy implementation.

That local units and political institutions at such levels were viewed as threatening to Warsaw does not suggest that they were, in fact, a significant challenge to the day-to-day authority of central Polish United Workers' party leaders. Instead, Gierek appears to have recognized, in part from his own political career as a provincial chief, that the pursuit of development and modernization in Poland, bringing with it the redistribution of resources, could only exacerbate central-local tensions; in all likelihood, he was less motivated by past events than by the suspicion that things could get worse. Since outbreaks in 1970 had occurred in communities of high socioeconomic standards (as in 1976), Poland's recent history could only bear out the worst suspicions of new central leaders in early 1971. Moreover, there had been ample evidence during the Gomułka years that provincial leaders could and would use their party positions to oppose any diminution of their prerogatives, most successfully in the provinces with greatest economic autonomy. Viewed in that light, local political institutions needed reform; the making of policies in War-
saw which required resource redistribution was seen as an exercise in futility when faced by recalcitrance from a position of strength among subnational units. As long as local power accretion was unchecked, the politicization of communities in Poland was too often prompting an assertiveness, i.e., "localism," obstructing the pursuit of socioeconomic development from a central perspective.

Mao Tse-tung, somewhat like Tito, sought to encourage local initiative, but recoiled from localistic "excesses." The central-local tensions which have been identified in European communism are no less evident in China, according to Falkenheim's analysis. In China, as in other political systems where the Marxist call for regime-mass intimacy mixes poorly with Leninist centralism, national leaders struggle to find solutions to the vexing problem of how their policies can be implemented with confidence through subnational authorities who are less than "perfectly compliant."

For the Chinese case, provincial, district, county, and communal party committees were to assure policy performance of their subnational units by playing a prefectural role, i.e., "as field agents of the central leadership." At the same time, however, neither Mao nor Chinese tradition offered clear indications as to the boundaries of local independence. While Mao thought economic development had been slowed by the bureaucratism of central government and stated that he wanted community input into policymaking, he was unwilling to condone local challenges to Peking's decisions; policy options could be generated at the local level, but once central decisions had been made, he expected obedience. Mao, quite clearly, learned during the Great Leap Forward that the reins over subnational units must not become too loose. Although the daily operation of factories could not be run from Peking, the prefectural role of committee members gave them the responsibility to assure that broad lines of central policies were, in fact, implemented. But as in Yugoslavia and Poland, those assumed to be prefects of the national party often "delight in excessive decentralization" (Mao's phrase).

The ongoing ambivalence of the Chinese Communist par-
ty leadership toward local innovation is symptomatic of the broad dilemma to which all three papers in this volume's final section have been addressed. While needing policy suggestions from below and inventiveness that will increase efficiency, no Leninist party can accept challenges to central authority after decisions have been made. As Falkenheim notes, instructions from higher authorities must be carried out, and no excuse using the "interests of the masses" will suffice for obstructing centralism. But insisting that local elites offer creative and stimulating leadership, while failing to make it clear that such behavior will not result in martyrdom at some latter point, has engendered systemic ambiguities that are present in all communist states.

SUMMARY

Participatory and policymaking dilemmas should not, of course, obscure the positive features of community-level politics for communist systems, i.e., the extent to which local institutions help to maintain party rule. Neither should we fail to recognize the dependence of local units on national resources which usually helps to mitigate any problems arising from either the participation in, or policy role of, subnational organs. The thrust of articles in this volume has not been, in fact, to portray political systems on the verge of decay or collapse. Instead, each author has documented what he or she has found that contributes a dynamic element within communist politics at levels beneath the nation-state.

Taken together, the message of these research endeavors is quite clear. Both in terms of political participation at subnational levels and the role of such units and their institutions in policy processes, ruling communist parties face serious dilemmas. Any effort to explain or predict the behavior of communist regimes or leaders within them cannot be accurate without an analysis of central-local dynamics. We should, for example, look at the tensions that arise when central leaders try to manipulate local participation in order to produce an experienced, loyal subnational elite stratum by denying the promotion of younger functionaries. When turnover de-
clines and mean age climbs among local elites, the frustration of younger, well-educated party functionaries for whom career advances have been prevented due to the central leadership’s policy may give rise to broader dangers. If the CPSU, or any other communist party, no longer appears willing to provide mobility or to respond to societal groups by advancement in the “monohierarchy,” a negative reflection on the party’s legitimacy cannot be avoided. But trying to promote participation by citizens in specific roles such as people’s council deputies or volunteer inspectors does not offer a panacea either, for in both Romania and the Soviet Union citizen participation exhibits tendencies not altogether reassuring for the national leadership. The extent of nonparty identification among deputies in Romania and the degree to which Soviet volunteer inspectors now provide input into policy alternatives give evidence that the limits of participation are not well defined or maintained.

The concern and ambiguity of central authorities toward local units is also evident when one considers the efforts of the former to make and apply policy. In Yugoslavia, commitments to decentralization have fit uncomfortably with developmental plans entailing a redistribution of resources. In Poland, opposition from provincial and lesser authorities to Warsaw’s decisions was a significant part of the unstated rationale for 1972–1975 reforms, while Maoist China walked a line between advocating local initiatives and insisting on obedience to central decisions.

In a sense, then, this volume has pointed to dynamic elements of communist politics too often ignored because of the centralist exterior of ruling communist parties, i.e., those found in the central/local relationship. But the reality of their rule is quite different. In all such systems, Marxist-Leninist regimes govern through a structurally complex hierarchy of subnational authorities. As reported in these papers, the national leaders of communist systems must accommodate themselves to participation in, and the policy influence of, local institutions. To be sure, the balance of power is heavily tipped on the side of central institutions and elites. If research such as reported in this volume says anything, how-
Conclusion

ever, it is that the behavior of those central institutions and leaders in communist states will be strongly affected by participatory and policy dilemmas which arise from local politics, an influence we can ill-afford to ignore when we analyze such regimes.

NOTES

1. For an elaboration of this point, see Daniel Nelson, "Dilemmas of Local Politics in Communist States," *Journal of Politics* 41 (February 1979).

2. Local power accretion can be defined as the incremental growth of a subnational unit’s ability to exert countervailing influence vis-à-vis central authorities and/or to avoid dependency on national resources. This is discussed further in the above article.
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