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REGULATION OF ONLINE ADVERTISING EVALUATED THROUGH YOUTUBE’S MONETIZATION PROBLEM

Nicole E. Pottinger

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1 J.D. expected Spring 2019, University of Kentucky College of Law. Online Content Manager, KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL, Volume 107. Many thanks to University of Kentucky College of Law Professors Brian L. Frye, Andrew K. Woods, and Christopher W. Frost for their assistance and guidance.
INTRODUCTION

Every time a consumer accesses the internet, it is inevitable that they will come across some form of online advertising. This ad may be in the form of a banner, a video, a pop-up, or a piece of content that was sponsored by an advertiser.2 These advertisements generate millions of dollars per year for the advertising companies, the brands sponsoring the advertisement, the websites hosting the advertisement, and the creators contributing content on the websites. In June of 2017 alone, 253 million individuals (a staggering 78% of the U.S. population) accessed the internet via a computer or mobile device.3 This audience spent 1.3 trillion minutes online during the month, generating $40.1 billion of overall digital ad revenue in the first six months of 2017.4 These online advertisements were effective: 39% of U.S. adults said their electronics purchases were influenced by internet advertising.5

Online advertising comes in a variety of formats, but video advertising has experienced significant growth.6 In June 2017 alone, 221 million Americans streamed digital video and spent 170 billion minutes watching streaming video.7 During that time, a total of 46 billion videos were streamed, resulting in 23 billion video ads.8 More than half of the dollars spent on digital video advertising in 2017 were traded using programmatic advertising, and that number is expected to grow to three-quarters in 2018.9

Programmatic advertising, which pairs users and advertising in an automated “ad auction,” is becoming the dominant force in online advertising.10 It is also the reason many prominent brands have pulled advertising from YouTube.com, resulting in the “Adpocalypse” of March, 2017.11 Though almost two years have passed, there has not been a viable solution and many content creators on YouTube are still unsatisfied in how YouTube has addressed this problem.12

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4 Id.

5 Id. of course, internet advertising does not only affect electronics purchases. 32% of adult clothing and 16% of medicine purchases were influenced by internet ads. Id. at 12.

6 Id. at 39.

7 Id. at 40.

8 Id.


11 See infra Part II.

12 See infra Part II.
Despite calls for regulation of online advertising, there has been little regulation accomplished by either Congress or the Federal Trade Commission.\textsuperscript{13} While the Federal Trade Commission is largely responsible for regulation of online activity,\textsuperscript{14} the FTC has chosen to not promulgate many rules on the topic of online activity.\textsuperscript{15} Those in the advertising industry must follow a set of voluntary guidelines posted by the Interactive Advertising Bureau.\textsuperscript{16} Further, it is unclear which government body should regulate online advertising and what type of regulation should be enacted in order to "effectively protect consumer privacy while still allowing flexibility for ongoing technological advancements."\textsuperscript{17}

Due to this lack of regulation, a variety of issues have come to fruition, including concerns about consumer privacy, fraud, and a lack of transparency.\textsuperscript{18} This Note seeks to evaluate whether regulation of digital video online advertising is necessary or appropriate for consumer protection through the lens of YouTube’s advertising model. Part I will evaluate different methods of online advertising, focusing on digital video advertising and its impact on consumers. Part II will look specifically at the issues created by YouTube’s advertising methods in the eyes of the different parties involved. Part III will survey viable solutions and their impact on all parties, and Part IV will lay out this Note’s solution to this problem, which is a set of mandatory guidelines to be promulgated and policed by the FTC.

I. ONLINE ADVERTISING METHODS AND PRACTICES

In order to understand the legal problems at hand, it is important to have a general understanding of the methods and practices used in the online advertising industry. These methods and practices are directly at issue in YouTube’s brand safety issue and would be the subject of any potential regulation. This section will briefly review the progression of online advertising, evaluate general online advertising methods, explain how digital video advertising works, and then look at the impact of digital video advertising and its importance in today’s society. This background information is essential to understanding how online advertising affects users and will be vital to understanding YouTube’s advertising problem.

\textsuperscript{13} See Laura J. Bowman, Pulling Back the Curtain: Online Consumer Tracking, 7 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 721, 730, 744 (2012).

\textsuperscript{14} See Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2042 (2000).


\textsuperscript{17} Bowman, supra note 13, at 730.

A. Early Online Advertising Methods

Online advertising is a distinct market from offline advertising. The online advertising industry has evolved so as to create its own toolbox full of distinct methods and practices that are inherently different from traditional advertising practices. Online advertising began in 1978 with advertisements sent over email. Online advertising as we know it today did not develop until 1994, when online magazine HotWired sold a banner ad to AT&T and displayed the ad on the top of its webpage.

"By 1998, over $1 billion [was] spent [on] Internet advertising" consisting primarily of the banner ad. The late 1990s brought the introduction of pop-up advertisements, which proved to be thirteen times more effective than banner ads. However, pop-up advertisements were seen as a nuisance to users, and have since largely disappeared from the modern internet in their traditional form.

In 1998, sponsored searches, which show ads connected to certain keywords, gained popularity as search engines such as Yahoo and MSN grew. Sponsored searches became even more popular after the rise of Google in the early 2000s. Today, sponsored searches account for nearly half of all online ad purchases and are especially effective for smaller businesses that do not have an established brand.
Traditionally, ads based on brands were sold based on the number of “impressions” or times an individual saw an ad.29 Web ads were sold based on “cost per mille” or “CPM” which sold ads based on per thousand views.30 In 1996, the CPM advertising model was abandoned in favor of the “cost per click” or “CPC” model.31 The CPC model originated from a deal made between Proctor & Gamble and Yahoo!, where Yahoo! was compensated per click of the user’s mouse on an advertisement.32 The CPC model more closely resembles traditional advertising methods, such as mail and telephone advertising campaigns, because the advertiser can guarantee the user had to respond to the ad.33

Rich media, such as video, audio, photos, and animations transformed online advertising “from a direct response model to a brand marketing model.”34 As a result, advertising companies began focusing on building a client’s brand.35 In the early 2000s, larger companies such as Toyota, American Express, and Sony began utilizing rich media to “showcase” their respective brands.36 The modern approach to online advertising, detailed below, ultimately grew out of rich media and brand advertising.

B. Modern Advertising Practices

Modern online advertising is fundamentally different than traditional advertising because “publishers and ad networks [are able] to learn considerably more about online users” than they could have in “traditional media [forms] such as print, radio, and television.”37 This section seeks to explain what behavioral tracking is, how it works, the privacy considerations, and how this fits into the larger picture.

“[Online behavioral advertising] generally seeks to increase the relevance of advertising displayed to the user, based on data collected about the user, with the aim of increasing the strength of the connection between advertising efforts and purchasing behavior.”38 Ad networks, through online resources, are able to know when a user is viewing an ad, in many cases what the user’s zip code is, and what other sites the user may have visited to learn other details.39 Additionally, other websites that collect user information, such as social media networks, may use or

https://ssm.com/abstract=2847084 [https://perma.cc/UL34-6UZK]. Researchers found that sponsored searches were less effective for larger brands such as eBay. Id. at 3.


34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Boorne, supra note 2, at 244.
41 See id. at 245
42 Id.
43 Evans, supra note 29, at 42.
44 Steven C. Bennett, Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising, 44 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 899, 899 (2011).
45 Evans, supra note 29, at 42. This is possible through technology such as cookies and IP (Internet Protocol) addresses. Id. at 55.
sell that information to advertise to consumers.  

By 2005, services such as Google developed technology called “behavioral targeting” to “personalize advertisements” to specific consumers “based on ‘prior search queries, search results, [and] demographic, geographic, psychographic and activity information.” Google collects this information and creates a profile of each user’s interests using its service AdSense. Google then “uses this profile to tailor the ads delivered on the Google Content Network,” which includes YouTube, to each individual user.

These practices are different than traditional advertising because ad networks know which advertisements are likely to be effective to specifically tracked demographics. A TV station has no way to know when a consumer is watching an advertisement or went to the kitchen for a snack. This is true for all forms of traditional media, including radio or newspaper advertisers.

There are, however, downsides to behavioral targeting. First, because the advertisements are meant to target a smaller audience, there must be a higher rate of return for advertisers to invest. Only about 1 in 400 consumers clicks an advertisement, and the rate of purchasing the advertised product is even slimmer. Due to these statistics, advertisers may prefer to cast a broader net to reach as many consumers as possible. This broader net approach, while cheaper, is reminiscent of traditional advertising techniques and is not the most efficient way to utilize modern technology.

Second, behavioral tracking campaigns are expensive. The advertiser must have access to a large enough population of consumers in order to make the advertising campaign worthwhile. If only 20% of individuals reached results in a consumer purchase, then an advertiser would need access to 2,500,000 people to reach 500,000 people via targeted advertising.

Finally, many consumers have begun implementing ad blockers: browser extensions that block ads from being displayed on your browser window. In 2015, ad blockers cost the global advertising industry $22 billion dollars in revenue. It was expected that by 2017 at least one in three internet users would have an ad blocker installed. The installation of ad blockers was thought to have a significant

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40 Id. at 40–42.
42 Bowman, supra note 13, at 748.
43 Id. at 748–49.
44 Evans, supra note 29, at 42.
45 Id. at 51.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
impact on where online advertising was to go in the future, but this impact appears to be negligible as the prevalence of online advertising continues to grow.52

Regardless of these downsides, behavioral tracking does not appear to be disappearing. Quite the opposite—the Wall Street Journal has called behavior-tracking practices one of the largest growing internet businesses.53 According to a TRUSTe report, at least 1,300 third-party firms are monitoring the top 100 visited websites to identify what websites users have visited, as well as information such as what zip code they live in and what they have shopped for.54 Search advertising, a form of behavioral advertising, accounted for nearly half of digital ad revenues in 2008, which was 12% of the overall advertising market in the United States.55

Unsurprisingly, behavioral tracking has raised a number of legal concerns. Primarily, many consumer privacy advocates argue that behavioral tracking is a violation of consumer’s privacy rights.56 Advocates for consumer privacy, however, also argue that behavioral tracking can be used to take advantage of vulnerable customers, unfairly discriminate, and be used “beyond commercial purposes” such as for “warrantless searches and attacks from identity thieves.”57

There has been remarkably little regulation in this field, much to the chagrin of privacy advocates and legal scholars.58 Regulation of online advertising will be discussed in much greater detail in Part II.

C. Digital Video

When it comes to digital video advertisements, “targeting and personalization” are the most important aspects to brands and advertisers.59 There are two formats of digital video ads: linear and non-linear.60 Linear, in-stream ads are video advertisements that play before, during, or after the content the user wished to view.61 In contrast, non-linear ads are images, text, interactive media, or videos that “overlay” the desired content, and are typically small enough to allow a “relatively

52 See INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, supra note 3, at 2.
56 See, e.g., CTR. FOR DIG. DEMOCRACY ET AL., supra note 18, at 3; Online Tracking and Behavioral Profiling, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/consumer/online-tracking/ [https://perma.cc/3TEA-2ENJ].
57 CTR. FOR DIG. DEMOCRACY ET AL., supra note 18, at 3–4.
58 Bowman, supra note 13, at 730.
59 See INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, supra note 19, at 20. The concept of “targeting and personalization” can be simplified to “delivering fewer ads, to the right people, at the right time.” Id.
60 Id. at 17.
61 Id.
Both linear and non-linear ads may be complemented by a “companion ad,” which is text, video, rich media, or a “skin” that wraps around the video player. Companion ads offer “sustained visibility” of the sponsoring brand and are always paired to a linear or non-linear ad.

Ad units, which are purchased by the advertisers, may be divided into two categories: in-stream and out-stream. In-stream ads are videos that are played before, during, or after the content the user wanted to view. Out-stream video ads are ads that appear outside of the video content and “are not the primary focus of the page.”

Each of these advertising methods are used on digital video across multiple platforms including Facebook and, more importantly for this Note, YouTube. By far the most controversial method of online advertising, as well as the root of YouTube’s advertising problem, is the implementation of programmatic advertising.

**D. Programmatic Advertising: The Ad Auction**

Programmatic advertising is “the algorithmic purchase and sale of advertising space in real time.” This means instead of humans, software buys, places, and matches advertising spaces with advertisers in real time via a bidding system. This process is sometimes referred to as the “Ad Auction.” Programmatic advertising is based on the information gathered through behavioral targeting practices. Essentially, the advertiser is able to tailor a specific advertisement to a specific person at the correct time and in the right format using the information the advertiser has gathered about the individual.

Programmatic advertising works by pairing a user profile with relevant advertisement using bots. Imagine a user goes to an advertiser’s website and leaves before they make a purchase. The advertiser’s “data management platform (DMP) collects data about [that] user . . . , then warehouses and processes it . . . to inform future . . . online advertising decisions.” The advertiser’s DMP works with a
demand side platform (DSP) bot that bids on behalf of the advertiser for an advertising slot that may appeal to a future customer.\textsuperscript{75} This slot may be in front of a video on a certain social media platform or on the side of a website. The buyers and sellers “meet’ at a real-time auction to negotiate the sale of [the advertising] slot.”\textsuperscript{76} The DSP is typically sponsored by an advertiser, as opposed to the supply side performer (SSP), which works with the publisher service that is trying to sell advertising spaces on different types of websites.\textsuperscript{77} The SSP will have these slots broken into categories that reflect the needs of a specific demographic the DSP will want to target.\textsuperscript{78} The SSP that wins the ad auction later distributes the advertisements to the website that it negotiates with.\textsuperscript{79} 

This entire process occurs in milliseconds. The instant a page with a space for advertising is loaded, the information is gathered about the user and the page it is to be placed on. This information is then exchanged between the platform and the ad exchange.\textsuperscript{80} The space is “auctioned off to the highest bidder and the ad is placed in the space” by the time the webpage is fully loaded.\textsuperscript{81}

Programmatic advertising is used on websites such as YouTube because there is simply too much content being uploaded to the website to have ads hand-picked for each video.\textsuperscript{82} It also means that humans are no longer needed to complete this essential task; it can be completed much faster and with fewer resources via automation.\textsuperscript{83} Further, according to an individual working in online digital advertising, in one case programmatic advertising was five hundred eight percent more effective than traditional pay-per-click advertising.\textsuperscript{84} Programmatic marketing, however, is not only used online; it is slowly being implemented in TV, radio, and larger marketing channels.\textsuperscript{85}

Programmatic advertising has been called the “wild west” of advertising in 2017.\textsuperscript{86} As a result, there is no substantive regulation of programmatic advertising, despite being critiqued for consumer privacy issues, fraud, and issues surrounding brand safety.\textsuperscript{87} The FTC has not promulgated any regulations surrounding

\textsuperscript{75} Id.
\textsuperscript{76} Id.
\textsuperscript{77} Id.
\textsuperscript{78} See id.
\textsuperscript{80} O’Sullivan, supra note 68.
\textsuperscript{81} Id.
\textsuperscript{82} CGP Grey, supra note 79.
\textsuperscript{83} O’Sullivan, supra note 68.
\textsuperscript{84} Kloefkorn, supra note 10.
\textsuperscript{85} O’Sullivan, supra note 68.
\textsuperscript{87} Julian Millstein et al., \textsc{Doing Business on the Internet Forms and Analysis § 1.08(g)} (2014) (“Some legal issues associated with programmatic advertising include data ownership and usage;
programmatic advertising or the use of consumer data; in fact, the House of Representatives rolled back consumer privacy protections enacted by the Federal Communications Commission that required transparency and user consent before taking data. Programmatic advertising is the primary tool YouTube uses to pair video content with advertising. At the time of this writing, there has not been any indication of regulatory action in sight. This lack of regulation of programmatic advertising has caused YouTube’s “Adpocalypse,” which does not appear to have any meaningful solution in sight.

II. YOUTUBE AND THE “ADPOCALYPSE”

A. Introduction

YouTube is a video sharing platform worth $75 billion as of 2017. It has over a billion users, who watch a billion hours of videos each day. YouTube mobile alone reaches more 18-34 and 18-49 year-olds than any cable network in the United States. Google Sites, which includes YouTube, was the top visited video property in 2017, garnering 142,607,000 unique visitors in June of that year. In 2015, YouTube maintained the largest share of U.S. video ad revenue. YouTube’s business model is based on advertising, as well as their monthly subscription service ‘YouTube Red,’ so it should come as no surprise that advertisers want to take advantage of YouTube’s audience. This is exacerbated by the rapid decline of

the transparency of pricing and the number of parties that leverage fees in the programmatic ‘stack’; transparency of ad placements; audit rights; online advertising fraud; viewability standards; measurements of success and credible metrics; and privacy issues and compliance with industry standards relating to online behavioral advertising.”


CGP Grey, supra note 79.


Id.; Lorenzo Ligato, YouTube is Crushing Cable TV, According to Google, HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/youtube-vs-cable_us_55af44fe4b0d2dec39f5370 [https://perma.cc/YQSF-LFJP].

INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, supra note 3, at 41.


traditional cable television\textsuperscript{96} and the development of YouTubeTV, which streams live TV through YouTube and bypasses traditional cable TV altogether.\textsuperscript{97}

When a video is uploaded to YouTube, it must go through two algorithms. The first determines whether or not the video meets YouTube's community standards and is allowed on the website at all, and the second determines whether or not the video is eligible for YouTube's monetization program.\textsuperscript{98} In order to be eligible for monetization, the video must meet a certain set of qualifications. For every 10,000 views, the content creator gets about sixty percent of ad revenue generated, while YouTube gets the other forty percent.\textsuperscript{99} It is unclear exactly how much each individual creator makes per 10,000 views; YouTube does not allow its creators to disclose this exact amount.\textsuperscript{100} Regardless, popular YouTube content creators (called "YouTubers") can make millions of dollars per year making videos that appeal to a wide audience.\textsuperscript{101}

Traditional advertising agencies have begun to realize the power behind YouTube's viewing audience. Unfortunately, these agencies are attempting to utilize old models of marketing rather than adapt to a new medium.\textsuperscript{102} In the past, through traditional advertising mediums, advertisement agencies have been able to dictate the type of content their advertisements appear on.\textsuperscript{103} Due to YouTube's advertising model, which relies primarily on programmatic advertising by way of algorithm, this is much harder to facilitate.\textsuperscript{104} As a result, ad agencies are now unable to dictate what type of content their advertisements appear on.\textsuperscript{105} This concern for brand safety on YouTube came to a head in March 2017.

\textbf{B. "Adpocalypse" and Fallout}

In March, 2017, YouTube's use of programmatic advertising put ads for major brands, including Coca-Cola, Amazon, and Microsoft, on videos that promoted

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{96} See Ligato, supra note 92.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Hank Green, \textit{35 Minutes on Demonetisation}, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ouMeAaAWUEg [https://perma.cc/BA3M-XWPM].
\item \textsuperscript{99} CGP Grey, supra note 79.
\item \textsuperscript{100} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Green, supra note 98.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{104} CGP Grey, supra note 79.
\item \textsuperscript{105} See id.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
As a result, major brands began pulling their advertisements from YouTube videos altogether. Google, as YouTube’s parent company, immediately began reviewing their advertising policies, but this was not enough for some brands. Financial analysts predicted that the ad boycott of March 2017 could cost Google up to $750 million. YouTube’s most popular content creator, Felix Kjellberg, declared this phenomenon the “Adpocalypse” because content creators were losing significant amounts of money as a result of the brand boycott.

While many brands have still not returned to YouTube, some have: Verizon re-introduced advertisements in August of 2017 and Proctor & Gamble updated their policy in April 2018. Despite predictions of major losses, Google’s bottom line actually showed twenty one percent growth over the previous year in digital advertising. It is not insignificant, however, that digital video streaming increased to 31.1% in 2017 from 22.3% in 2012, and that Google owns 75.8% of the global advertising market in 2016. It may not be a question of how much their bottom line shrunk, but how much it did not grow.

The controversy did not end there. In late November 2017, brands found their advertisements on videos frequented by known pedophiles. Google once again
began to review their monetizing policy in the wake of another YouTube boycott. This boycott found Adidas, Mars, Inc., and HP pulling advertising from YouTube. \(^{117}\) In response, CEO Susan Wojcicki released a statement that to the community in which she said: “We are planning to apply stricter criteria and conduct more manual curation.” \(^{118}\) This was done by adding 10,000 jobs for ad reviewers to ensure ads are only playing where they need to and no videos were accidentally being demonetized. \(^{119}\)

As of early 2018, YouTube has created a new bracket of advertising, called “reserved inventory,” that ensures brands will have their advertisement placed over specific programming. \(^{120}\) “Reserved inventory” functions like the traditional ad model in that advertisers and brands are able to purchase specific space ahead of time over specific programming. \(^{121}\) The new bracket will likely feature content created by large, established media companies, rather than videos uploaded by users or even big-name YouTube stars. \(^{122}\) While this seems like a viable solution, “reserved inventory” costs 20% more than regular programming. \(^{123}\) YouTube is also utilizing third-party partners to help review content that has been flagged and determine which videos are safe for advertising. \(^{124}\)

These changes have had, and will continue to have, a profound effect on content creators, users, advertisers, and the online advertising market as a whole. Despite promises from Google to change YouTube’s ad policies, and major brands pulling advertising funding from YouTube, Google has not created a real solution to this problem. \(^{125}\) As a result of YouTube’s inaction, interested parties have begun to adapt to this problem on their own.

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C. Effects on Interested Parties

Programmatic advertising on YouTube affects all parties to this online transaction: creators suffer from YouTube’s monetary guidelines, consumers suffer because the content is not as varied as it could be, and the online market itself may be changing as Google is the currently largest online ad provider—but may not be for long.

i. Advertisers

Advertisers are not happy with YouTube’s “solution.” As of 2018, most brands have not returned to YouTube, including AT&T, Priceline, and Squarespace. The CEO and co-founder of MediaRadar told Business Insider that “the perception is that YouTube is struggling to solve this problem.” P&G’s spokesman stated that “the days of giving digital a pass are over” and the company laid out its own strategy for online advertising, which includes contract transparency and a crackdown on digital ad fraud. Many brands are outraged at YouTube’s “solution” of a new ad tier at a higher price, calling it “absurd.” It is clear that advertisers are not happy with YouTube’s solution, especially following the second round of brand boycotts in November.

In fact, some advertisers are developing solutions without YouTube’s involvement. JP Morgan, tired of YouTube’s inaction, went so far as to develop its own in-house algorithm. The algorithm contains seventeen different layers to determine “safe” channels for its advertising. This response indicates how little advertisers trust YouTube’s ability to solve their self-imposed problem. It also begs the question: If JP Morgan can create a solution, why can’t YouTube?

ii. Content Creators

There are many content creators on YouTube whose primary job is to make YouTube videos for an audience. As of 2013, the top one thousand YouTube

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100,000 employees to ensure its algorithms are more effective in determining whether content is allowed on YouTube and whether it is able to be monetized. iyengar, supra note 119.


127 Id.


129 Dua, supra note 126.

channels bring in around $23,000 per month. YouTube creators, or “Youtubers” are incredibly influential both online and offline; seventy percent of subscribers say that YouTube creators “shape the pop culture”, and sixty percent of subscribers said Youtubers, rather than a TV or movie star, would influence their buying decisions.

Content creators on YouTube are a strong part of the YouTube community, and have a lot of influence over any policy changes YouTube implements. As a response to “Adpocalypse,” YouTube tightened their algorithm to ensure a smaller amount of videos with certain subject matter would receive monetization status. This resulted in thousands of creators’ videos being unnecessarily demonetized because their older content was deemed “not advertiser friendly” or “NAF.” Creators were only receiving fifteen to thirty percent of their original revenue pre-demonetization, and many creators were not notified that their video had been demonetized. Further, in April of 2017, YouTube implemented a new policy: in order to be monetized, a creator must have 10,000 lifetime views.

The tightened algorithm also disproportionately demonetized videos that focused on LGBTQ issues, which sparked a controversy about YouTube not even-handedly applying their algorithm. Some creators called this demonetization a form of censorship. Certain videos about social issues on both sides of the political fence were demonetized. Creator Phillip DeFranco argued that the new community

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134 Hannah Kuchler, YouTube Tightens Rules for Video Creators to Make Money from Advertising, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/49304588-fb24-11e7-a492-2c9be7f3120a [https://perma.cc/P79E-9TP9].

135 What’s Trending, YouTube SUED By Creators in Class-Action Lawsuit | What’s Trending Now!, YOUTUBE (July 18, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35M710b89gw&t=3s [https://perma.cc/UPE8-YUM5].


139 See, e.g., Phillip DeFranco, YouTube Is Shutting Down My Channel and I’m Not Sure What to Do, YOUTUBE (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gbpp5or0NuM [https://perma.cc/2BP6-FKST].

guidelines should be considered censorship because YouTube took away money because creators said things that YouTube did not deem “okay.” While he argued that this was within YouTube’s rights as a private entity, he did deem the censorship “concerning” because either YouTube intentionally discriminated between videos or was “asleep at the wheel.”

This new algorithm caused outrage in the creator community and even spawned a class-action lawsuit, filed on behalf of one of YouTube’s most popular channels, against YouTube. The complaint alleges that YouTube has “economically stifled the pursuits of enterprising and creative content providers, causing significant loss of revenue and profit” through the use of its algorithms, which “under-inclusively failed to capture and demonetize content that was sexually explicit, racist or otherwise not in compliance with the spirit of the guidelines, while over-inclusively demonetizing content that did not violate the spirit of the guidelines and was not objectionable to advertisers (such as Plaintiffs’ videos).” Subsequently, YouTube filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted on March 7, 2018.

Despite the lawsuit, many content creators have expressed concern over YouTube’s response to this problem. YouTube has implemented an appeals process to any video that has been demonetized. An appeal ensures that instead of an algorithm, a human will review the video to see if it qualifies for monetization status. However, it is unclear how long the appeal process takes. Creators are now calling for more transparency and oversight in how YouTube functions in relation to its advertising partnerships in the wake of the Logan Paul scandal.

As of January 16, 2018, YouTube implemented a new monetization policy that has caused distress among smaller creators. In order to be monetized, a creator must fulfill two requirements: “4,000 hours of watchtime within the past 12 months and 1,000 subscribers.” This means that any channel under 1,000 is ineligible for monetization. Many smaller creators found the prioritization of bigger channels to

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141 DeFranco, supra note 139.
142 Id.
143 What’s Trending, supra note 135.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See Dunphy, supra note 136.
151 Julia Alexander, YouTube Creators Demand Transparency After Re-Uploads of Logan Paul’s Video Appear, Polygon (Jan. 4, 2018, 150 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2018/1/4/16849046/youtube-trending-logan-paul-defranco-keemstar-pyrocyonial [https://perma.cc/Q6FW-MN6X]. Logan Paul is one of YouTube’s biggest names. Id. He uploaded a video of a recent suicide victim and was promoted to the ‘trending’ list, despite many people flagging the video as inappropriate. Id. Many creators are calling for transparency and criticizing YouTube for lack of oversight. Id.
152 Mohan & Kyncl, supra note 137.
be discouraging, especially as a large part of the YouTube community is made up of smaller creators. This policy was safer for YouTube because it can guarantee the production quality and large viewership from larger channels. Additionally, any misbehavior from a creator would result in greater public accountability.

Content creators are not satisfied with the way YouTube has addressed the “Adpocalypse” issue. This is not YouTube’s first spat with its creators; many are unsatisfied with the way YouTube handles its Copyright disputes, false flagging, and oversight over its personalities.

iii. The Online Video Streaming Market

Due to YouTube’s domination of the user-uploaded, video-streaming market, it is improbable that content creators will leave the platform to create their own websites. This may be a bold tactic, but it is not out of the realm of possibilities. Phillip DeFranco, one of YouTube’s biggest personalities, has started using Patreon, where his fans can directly fund his videos as an alternative to YouTube for monetization.

Many creators who engage in “Let’s Play” videos, which are videos of personalities playing video games in real time, have utilized Twitch to supplement
their YouTube channel. This includes Felix Kjellberg, previously YouTube’s biggest personality, who has started his own channel on the video game streaming website.

While leaving YouTube may be a viable solution for the biggest names on the platform, it is certainly not a solution for the smaller names. It is unclear, however, what the impact will be on Google and its shareholders, and whether Kjellberg’s use of Twitch will have any effect on YouTube’s advertising strategy and the market of online video streaming. This problem is nearly a year old, yet YouTube has been unable to come up with a solution that meets all parties’ needs.

This problem is not exclusive to YouTube. Advertising on social media has many similar consequences because online advertising is still considered “The Wild West.” Many problems on other social media platforms, however, concern brand advertising, which the FTC has recently regulated to some extent. The next section will review the current solution to online and programmatic advertising, discuss proposed solutions, and lay out this Note’s ideal solution.

III. SOLUTIONS

Technology is rapidly evolving, and in order to protect consumers, regulation of online advertising must balance consumer privacy while “still allowing flexibility for ongoing technological advancements.” This notion that any direct regulation of online activity would inhibit technology is the most common argument against regulation and is a major culprit for why there has not been any legislation regarding online data privacy. Completely forgoing consumer privacy in the name of technological advancements, however, is not acceptable.

YouTube’s advertising problem is a direct result of its algorithm and use of programmatic advertising. YouTube is the biggest online video streaming platform, and an inability to properly respond may hurt its ad revenue and bottom line as more advertisers boycott YouTube. Google recognizes that there is a brand-safety problem

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159 Tamburro, supra note 158.

160 See Remy Smidt, This Mom’s Full-Time Job Is Posting to Instagram and This Is What It’s Like, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 25, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.buzzfed.com/remysmidt/mila-emma-katie-stauffer?utm_term=.ic9p3R89y/kcyALaeexYo [https://perma.cc/PPF8-6P65].


162 Bowman, supra note 13, at 723.

163 See id. at 750–51.
here, and that it has not done enough to address it. But this problem extends beyond YouTube: there is a brand safety issue when advertisers rely on automation and computers to perform a task that was previously accomplished by humans. Programmatic advertising, and the algorithms that drive it, is the means by which videos are able to be monetized.

The inability to control programmatic advertising, and consequently monetization of video, has staggering consequences. Many digital news companies are being forced to scale back their digital video production, which has resulted in significant layoffs. Vox Media is laying off about five percent of its total workforce, CNN just went through restructuring of its digital news operation, and Vice and BuzzFeed went through similar cutbacks in 2017. These types of cutbacks are a result of pressure from companies such as Google and Facebook, which dominate the digital advertising field. The CEO of one such company, Medium, explained a 50-person layoff from his own company by stating: "The current system causes increasing . . . pressure to put out more content more cheaply—depth, originality, or quality be damned. It’s unsustainable and unsatisfying for producers and consumers alike." YouTube’s inability to provide its advertisers an efficient monetization method is directly affecting the structure of the digital advertising market. If YouTube is unable to provide a stable solution to its problem, it is entirely possible that the digital advertising market will evolve without it. Ultimately, the lack of regulation regarding programmatic advertising has resulted in a multi-billion-dollar brand safety problem that could shape the way the digital advertising market functions.

Failure to regulate user data collection allowed for the development of online behavioral tracking. From online behavioral tracking came programmatic advertising, which evolved into the monetization of digital video. Now, an entire industry is being forced to re-structure as a result of this failure to address online data privacy. YouTube must address online data privacy to find a solution to its monetization problem.

There are four solutions to this problem, each of which will be described below: self-regulation, regulation by agency, regulation through legislation, and intervention by courts. Finally, this Note will propose a fifth solution: promulgation of FTC regulations that are legally enforceable and binding.

165 See id.
167 Id.
169 See Section I.B.
170 See Section I.B.
Currently, online advertising is governed by self-regulation within the industry.\textsuperscript{17} Despite nearly thirty years of self-regulation, scholars argue that self-regulation is no longer adequate based on the mounting concerns regarding privacy.\textsuperscript{172} John Villafranco and Katherine Riley explained that “[i]n the 1990s, the Online Privacy Alliance (OPA) issued Guidelines for online privacy as a response to an FTC demand for industry self-regulation.”\textsuperscript{173} There was very little participation in the industry—only 100 companies subscribed to the Guidelines, and “big players” in the industry, such as Amazon, were “notably absent.”\textsuperscript{174} Further, the Guidelines did not have any framework “for monitoring and disciplining non-compliant members.”\textsuperscript{175}

In July of 2009, a variety of trade associations developed a set of online advertising self-regulatory guidelines.\textsuperscript{176} These Industry Guidelines were released in conjunction with the FTC’s guidelines.\textsuperscript{177} The Industry Guidelines set forth seven core principles: (1) transparency; (2) consumer control; (3) data security; (4) notification of material changes in privacy practices; (5) enhanced protection of sensitive data; (6) consumer education; and (7) accountability.\textsuperscript{178} Five of these Guidelines correspond to the FTC Guidelines: Transparency and Consumer Control Principles, the Data Security Principle, the Material Changes Principle, and the Sensitive Data Principle.\textsuperscript{179}

In 2010, after the introduction of the Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft and the BEST PRACTICES Act,\textsuperscript{180} several advertising industry trade associations announced the creation of the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA).\textsuperscript{181} The DAA was formed to oversee self-regulation in the industry.\textsuperscript{182} This was done by displaying the

\textsuperscript{17} See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{174} Id. at 83.
\textsuperscript{175} Id.
\textsuperscript{177} Id. at 1.
\textsuperscript{178} Id. at 2–4.
\textsuperscript{179} Id.
\textsuperscript{180} See infra Part II.C.
\textsuperscript{182} Id. The “Digital Advertising Alliance” is currently comprised of seven trade associations, including the Interactive Advertising Bureau, American Association of Advertising Agencies, American Advertising Federation, Association of National Advertisers, Better Business Bureau, Direct Marketing Association, and the Network Advertising Initiative. Id.
Industry Guidelines, offering information to companies, and educating consumers about what online behavioral advertising is and how to control the use of their data.\footnote{183} The DAA is only one of several groups that attempts to ensure industry compliance with the FTC and Industry Guidelines.\footnote{184}

In 2000, the Network Advertising Initiative ("NAI") introduced a Code of Conduct, which is another set of self-regulatory principles that require NAI member companies to provide notice and choice regarding Interest-Based Advertising and Ad Delivery and Reporting activities.\footnote{185} Opt-in consent is required to collect sensitive data, such as names, addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, financial account numbers, government-issued identifiers, and any other data used or intended to be used to identify, contact or precisely locate a person.\footnote{186} The online behavioral advertising segments may only be used for marketing purposes, but there is no limitation on the creation or use of other sensitive marketing segments and no limit on assigning consumers to certain advertising segments based on their profile.\footnote{187} Further, the Code of Conduct does nothing to restrict members from engaging in unfair and discriminatory profiling.\footnote{188}

B. Agency Regulation

Rather than promulgate regulations, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has relied on the industry to police itself. Since the mid-1990s, the FTC has had a part in overseeing online advertising practices.\footnote{189} Between 1995 and 1997, the FTC held public workshops that explored consumer data privacy issues.\footnote{190} Unsurprisingly, those in the online advertising industry advocated for self-regulation, while those in favor of privacy pressed for prior affirmative consent and emphasized that self-regulation is only possible with the foundation of "legally enforceable rights to

\footnote{186} Id. at 10, 16-17.
\footnote{187} See id. at 11, 22.
\footnote{188} See id.; see also Nancy J. King & Pernille Wegner Jessen, Profiling the Mobile Customer—Is Industry Self-Regulation Adequate to Protect Consumer Privacy When Behavioral Advertisers Target Mobile Phones?—Part II, 26 COMPUTER. L. & SEC. REV. 1, 10–11 (2010), https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/19453/KingJessenProfiling.PartII.PoS
tPrint2010.pdf?sequence=5 [https://perma.cc/S75A-SXLL].
\footnote{189} See Bennett, supra note 38 at 904–07.
information privacy."191

In 1998, the FTC undertook a comprehensive review of commercial website disclosure, and laid out the "Fair Information Practice Principles."192 These principles, which have since been updated, focus on "notice/awareness," "choice/consent," "access/participation," "integrity/security," and "enforcement/redress."193 The FTC relied on a "notice and choice" model of regulation, where online companies are required to post privacy policies that describe their information collection and use practices.194 In rare cases, failure to post privacy policies constituted a deceptive act or practice, which then became actionable by the FTC.195

In 2000, the FTC recommended Congress pass online privacy legislation to create a basic level of data privacy protection for consumer-oriented commercial websites.196 A few months later, the FTC further recommended including online profiling in any online privacy legislation.197 Under the FTC’s 2000 recommendation, all online advertising networks and websites that collected information from or about consumers would be required to implement and comply with the Fair Information Practice Principles.198

Between the years 2000 and 2007, the FTC turned away from further attempts to regulate online privacy and online behavioral advertising, instead relying on existing legislation.199 FTC Commissioner Timothy Muris justified this change stating: "[T]he slowing of the growth of the Internet emphasizes the need to understand the cost of online privacy legislation. . . . At this time, we need more law enforcement, not more laws."200 Contrary to Muris’ belief, the Internet only grew larger and more prevalent in everyday life.

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193 Id. at 7-10.


195 See id. at 14.


197 Id. at 22.

198 See id. at 19–21.


200 Timothy J. Muris, Former Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at The Privacy 2001 Conference, Protecting Consumers’ Privacy: 2002 and Beyond, Remarks delivered at the Privacy


204 Id. at 1.

205 Id. at 11–12.

206 Id. at ii.

207 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 194, at iv–viii.

208 The FTC report noted that “the notice-and-choice model, as implemented, has led to long, incomprehensible privacy policies that consumers typically do not read, let alone understand.” Id. at iii.

209 Id. at 52–53.

210 Id. at 53.
prevention,” “legal compliance,” “first-party marketing,” and “contextual marketing.”

As a part of the 2010 report, the FTC proposed “Do Not Track,” which was to serve as a “uniform and comprehensive consumer choice mechanism.” The Do Not Track feature would allow consumers to easily indicate they are not willing to be tracked or receive targeted advertisements.

In 2011, representatives of the FTC appeared before the United States Senate Commerce Committee to recommend imposing more stringent measures to protect Internet users against unauthorized tracking, including the Do Not Track feature. The same Senate hearing also saw the Obama administration call for a new “Internet user’s bill of rights” that would ultimately grant the FTC authority to regulate online behavioral advertising.

In late 2017, the FTC ran an Informational Injury Workshop to learn more about how consumers suffer if their information is misused. This indicates that the FTC may be considering extending the current legal framework that only allows for standing in court for informational injuries if the injuries are concrete. The Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) published a memo including comments from advertising trade associations, vehemently discouraging the FTC from changing the current legal framework because it would cause “uncertainty in the market” and may inhibit economic growth. Ultimately, it is unclear whether the FTC will attempt to address behavioral advertising in the context of consumer privacy in the future. The FTC has a Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, which aims to protect online consumer privacy, ensure information is secure, and combat identity theft. This makes the FTC an ideal candidate for the promulgation of rules regarding online behavioral tracking and user data.

The FTC is not the only agency concerned with the collection of consumer data. In 2010, the Department of Commerce released a green paper on commercial data

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211 Id. at 53–55; see also id. at 55 n.134.
212 Id. at 66–69.
213 Id.
215 Id.
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privacy.220 It stated: “From the consumer perspective, the current system of notice-and-choice does not appear to provide adequately transparent descriptions of personal data use, which may leave consumers with doubts (or even misunderstandings) about how companies handle personal data and inhibit their exercise of informed choices.”221 The Department’s green paper provides suggestions for the establishment of a new framework for Internet policy, including a guide of possible legislative schemes.222

There have been many attempts at legislation in online advertising in the last decade, but none of them have come to fruition.223 Extensive scholarship on the subject contains many proposals for regulation, varying from very broad guidelines to specific regulations.224 At least one writer has argued that “[t]he unregulated collection and use of consumer information may result in discriminatory practices, security breaches, and damage to the concept of liberty at the very core of American society.”225 While this may seem dramatic, it is not untrue. The right to exclude is fundamental to property’s common law “bundle of rights.”226

C. Congress

Congress has failed to enact any substantive legislation concerning consumer privacy, despite ample opportunity to do so. In May of 2010, the Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft was released to the public.227 The Draft expands responsibilities regarding online advertising and additional privacy rights for individuals.228 The Draft requires companies that collect information about consumers to display a “clear and conspicuous” and easily understandable privacy policy.229 Although the Draft expands the FTC’s enforcement authority, it explicitly precludes a private right of action.230 Unfortunately, the sponsoring Congressman lost his seat in 2010, and the Draft did not become law.231

221 Id. at 22.
222 Id. at 20–66.
223 See supra notes 196–198, 207 and accompanying text.
225 Bowman, supra note 13, at 722.
226 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. (1998) (discussing the right to exclude and how it should be used to define property).
228 See id. at 452–53.
229 Id. at 453.
231 Catherine Schmierer, Better Late than Never: How the Online Advertising Industry’s Response to Proposed Privacy Legislation Eliminates the Need for Regulation,
In July of 2010, the BEST PRACTICES Act was introduced on the House floor.\textsuperscript{232} It aimed to regulate the collection and use of consumer information by online behavioral advertisers and other media providers.\textsuperscript{233} The BEST PRACTICES Act addresses concerns such as data brokers, consumer security, and includes several accountability provisions.\textsuperscript{234} The BEST PRACTICES Act was met with support from members of the online industry and from both parties.\textsuperscript{235} Despite this support, many companies were concerned about the Act’s private right of action.\textsuperscript{236} The BEST PRACTICES Act, despite its support, was not enacted.

In 2011, a Do Not Track Internet privacy bill was introduced into Congress. This Act would create a Do Not Track registry, similar to the Do Not Call registry implemented in 2003.\textsuperscript{237} The bill did not pass in 2011, was re-introduced in 2013, but still did not find enough support to get off the Senate floor.\textsuperscript{238} A third ‘Do Not Track’ bill was introduced in 2015, which would require the FTC to promulgate regulations that established greater transparency and opportunity for individuals to opt-out of data collection, and rules that prohibit collection of data after a user has opted out.\textsuperscript{239} In line with its precedents, this bill did not gain any traction in the Senate and ultimately died on the floor.\textsuperscript{240}

Representative Jackie Speier, who sponsored the bill, stated that the “bill[] sends a clear message” that the government prioritizes “privacy over profit.”\textsuperscript{241} There was a lot of pushback that argued any regulation would inhibit technology and the availability of free content that is funded by advertisers.\textsuperscript{242} Others argue that the implementation itself would be tricky because browser makers must build the feature and it would only work if tracking companies would agree to honor the user’s request.\textsuperscript{243}

\textsuperscript{17} RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 39 (2011).
\textsuperscript{232} Also known as the Building Effective Strategies to Promote Accountability Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards Act. BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010).
\textsuperscript{233} See id.
\textsuperscript{234} See id.
\textsuperscript{235} Catherine Schmierer, supra note 231, at 40–41; Privacy Bills Comparison Chart, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., 1-12 (2010), http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/Privacy bills comparison chart CDT 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6MG-FFWL].
\textsuperscript{236} Schmierer, supra note 231, at 41.
\textsuperscript{240} Id.
\textsuperscript{241} Sarno, supra note 237.
\textsuperscript{243} See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 194, at 66.
A variety of federal privacy bills were introduced in 2015, including the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, the Student Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act, and the Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act. Not one of the three bills passed.

The Consumer Privacy Protection Act would have provided protection for many types of data, including social security numbers, financial information, online usernames and passwords, biometric data, information about a person’s physical and mental health, geo-location, and access to private digital photographs and videos.

The Student Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act would have prohibited operators of websites, apps, and other online services, from selling students’ personal information to third parties and using or disclosing students’ personal information for targeted advertising. Further, the bill would have given parents access to collected information about their child and allow them to correct and/or delete information. Finally, parents would have the ability to download any material their child has created.

The Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act explicitly provided limitations on how data brokers are able to get their information, and the limits of what they can do with it. The Act prohibits data brokers from collecting information under false pretenses, the solicitation of information from consumers, and requires data brokers to take reasonable measures to ensure any information they collect is correct. There is also a provision that allows consumers to review and correct the information collected at no cost. Most significantly, the Act lays out methods by which victims of data brokers may enjoin the company, recover damages, or enforce civil penalties.

The inability of Congress to pass privacy legislation in 2015, especially as it pertains to consumer privacy and online advertising, appears to have been prophetic, as no legislation has been promulgated since. In October of 2016, the Federal Communications Commission imposed regulations on Internet providers that required providers “to get permission from customers before sharing or selling personal information such as web browsing history, geographic location, financial information, and children's information.” These provisions seemed like a step forward, but in March of 2017, the House of Representatives voted to roll back these protections.
This decision was not without controversy. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit dedicated to protecting Internet users, declared that the decision to roll back regulations "would erase privacy protections and harm cybersecurity." On the other hand, US Telecom, a trade group for major telecommunications companies, argued that rolling back these regulations "would simply maintain the status quo." US Telecom’s CEO further stated that US Telecom would "continue to support the FTC privacy framework."

The privacy framework supplied by the FTC, however, is quite bare. The only statute that is explicitly for the protection of consumers online is the U.S. Safe Web Act, enacted in 2012, which "provides the FTC with a number of tools to improve enforcement regarding consumer protection matters."

In January 2017, the FTC released a Staff Report addressing "Privacy & Security in a Connected World." This report recommended that industries develop self-regulation techniques and that any legislation would be "premature" because this industry is still in its early stages. The only recommendation regarding legislation of data security was in the context of cybersecurity.

An argument exists that the FTC is able to regulate online behavioral advertising to some degree, because it is able to police unfair advertising practices. To date, the FTC has only brought one enforcement action that is specifically related to online behavioral advertising. This scant enforcement is for two reasons. First, the agency cannot bring an enforcement action for a deceptive practice if advertisers fully disclose their data collection practices in online privacy policies or a website’s terms of use. Second, the FTC is unable to fulfill the second prong of the requisite test because although the collection of data may “harm” consumers, they obtain an off-setting benefit because they receive free access

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257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
262 Id. at 48–49.
263 Id. at 49.
to online content. The FTC, without a statute from Congress to follow, is powerless to meaningfully regulate online behavioral advertising.

D. Judicial Interference

It does not appear that courts are willing to change the status quo regarding collection of consumer data. In November, a California district court judge threw out a $15 billion lawsuit that accused Facebook of unlawfully tracking users’ internet browsing activity using third-party websites after the user had logged out of the site. The Court ultimately granted Facebook’s (third) motion to dismiss the claims for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Court ultimately dismissed the Plaintiff’s resulting claims for breach of contract and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing.

The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to show they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the URLs of the pages they visit in order to support claims for invasion of privacy. Further, Judge Davila noted that Plaintiffs could have taken steps to keep their browsing histories private, and that Facebook’s intrusion could have been easily blocked, had Plaintiffs chosen to do so. The Court also stated that Facebook’s requests are “part of routine internet functionality and can be easily blocked.”

The Court is placing the onus of responsibility on the user, rather than on the intermediary platform that is utilizing the data. This directly contradicts the FTC’s guidelines, which places the responsibility of consumer data privacy protection on the platform, as opposed to the consumer. Rather than expecting the user to take actions, the responsibility should be placed on the platforms that are engaging in data collection. The platforms, such as YouTube or Facebook, have the upper hand in drafting the contracts and privacy statements, and should be required to disclose their activity or halt data collection altogether.

The Court’s point of view is not conducive to the promulgation of rules that regulate behavioral tracking and online advertising. Further, the Court’s unsympathetic attitude towards the Plaintiffs’ arguments indicates that judicial action may be a nonstarter for change in privacy law, especially as it pertains to regulation of online advertising. This type of ambivalence reinforces the need for congressional action.

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267 Id. at 10.
269 In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litigation 290 F. Supp. 3d at 918, 923.
270 See id.
272 See id.
The online advertising market has been largely self-regulated since its advent in 1998. This lack of regulation is the reason the biggest video-streaming platform on the Internet is having a litany of social and legal issues. Additionally, the government’s “piecemeal approach” to protecting online privacy has been called inadequate by scholars and privacy advocates.

This Note advocates for a solution that is one step above self-regulation: FTC regulations that are broad enough to encourage technology while maintaining a consumer’s right to privacy. These regulations should mirror the FTC’s self-regulatory guidelines from 2009 while adding more updated provisions. The updated provisions should reflect the sophistication of online advertising technology, primarily behavioral tracking and programmatic advertising.

Ideally, users should be able to opt-out of tracking without downloading additional software. This regulation should include a prohibition on cross-tracking (tracking a single user across multiple devices) without user’s knowledge.

The type of information collected should be limited to non-sensitive information. “Sensitive information” would need to be defined by the FTC, but it should include at least information regarding health, finances, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, personal relationships, and political activity. As it stands now, most of this data is able to be collected and used for “commercial purposes.”

The most important aspect of the FTC’s regulations should be transparency on the part of advertisers. Many users do not know what data is being collected, how it is being used, or what the effects of this collection on their privacy may be. It is imperative that the FTC implement safeguards for the consumers that force advertisers to clearly lay out how information is collected and for what purpose. Simply hiding the information in the lengthy terms and conditions is not enough in an age where only lawyers read the terms and conditions.

Finally, there must be a method of enforcement in place. This would ensure accountability for all parties involved in the transaction of data. Ideally, in the event of violating the regulation, the party must pay a fine to be determined by the FTC. The FTC should provide a private cause of action against advertisers and brands for the use of their data without permission. This may require a change in how courts view the informational injury, and perhaps expanding our current understanding of what an ‘informational injury’ encompasses.

In the current political climate, it seems unlikely that Congress will pass a statute.

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275 This includes copyright issues, advertising fraud, control over its personalities, as well as limiting its monetization process. See supra Part II.
276 Bowman, supra note 13, at 730.
277 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 203.
279 See CTR. FOR DIG. DEMOCRACY ET AL., supra note 18.
280 Id. at 4, 6.
requiring the FTC to promulgate regulations regarding online consumer privacy, especially in light of Congress’ rolling back of online privacy protections in March of 2017.\textsuperscript{281} However, such regulations are necessary in order to protect consumers and try to prevent further advertising issues on prominent social media platforms.

CONCLUSION

Programmatic advertising and its effect on brand safety and consumer privacy is a significant problem in the current online advertising industry, and it does not appear to be going away.\textsuperscript{282} Self-regulation isn’t effective, and while technology is continuing to grow, the best solution for all parties is for the FTC to promulgate regulations regarding behavioral tracking. This note proposes mandatory regulations and enforcement by the FTC in order to limit large companies’ power over content creators and interference with user’s online privacy. These regulations should seek to prevent harmful behavior while simultaneously promoting technological advancement.
