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An Unusual and Valuable Opportunity

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We desire to call the attention of the bench and bar of Kentucky to the courses offered by the Summer Law School in this issue. In addition to the regular courses in law, a special course in the critical analysis and discussion of the Common and Statute Law of Kentucky is offered for the benefit of lawyers, officers and business men who desire a knowledge of the Kentucky Statutes and the Common Law of the State. This work will undoubtedly prove to be invaluable to every one who takes advantage of this unusual opportunity. Judge Lyman Chalkley, who will conduct the special course, has so well stated its purposes in the Summer Law School advertisement printed in this issue as to leave very little room for comment.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WEBB ACT.

A nice point in constitutional law will undoubtedly soon be brought before the Supreme Court for decision as a result of the passage of the Webb Act over the President's veto. The President gave as his reason for his veto that he believed the act "a violation of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, in that it is in substance and effect a delegation by Congress to the States of the power of regulating interstate commerce in liquors, which in vested exclusively in Congress."

In the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, it was held that Congress cannot delegate its power to regulate interstate commerce in liquors to the States. The question is, then, does the Webb Act "in substance and effect" delegate power to the States to regulate interstate commerce.

It was also decided in the Rahrer case that power was not delegated by