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Haynsworth and Carswell: A New Senate Standard of Excellence

Mitch McConnell
United States Senate

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All politicians have read history; but one might say that they read it only in order to learn from it how to repeat the same calamities all over again.

Paul Valery

With the confirmation of Judge Harry A. Blackmun by the United States Senate on May 12, 1970, the American public witnessed the end of an era, possibly the most interesting period in Supreme Court history. In many respects, it was not a proud time in the life of the Senate or, for that matter, in the life of the Presidency. Mistakes having a profound effect upon the American people were made by both institutions.

The Supreme Court of the United States is the most prestigious institution in our nation and possibly the world. For many years public opinion polls have revealed that the American people consider membership on the Court the most revered position in our society. This is surely an indication of the respect

Author's Note. This article represents the thoughts and efforts of over a year's involvement in the Senate with three Presidential nominations to the Supreme Court. The experiences were possible only because of the author's association with the Junior Senator from Kentucky, Marlow W. Cook, and the conclusions drawn and suggestions made, many of which may be found in a speech by the Senator of May 15, 1970, represent, in large part, a joint effort by the two of them to evolve a meaningful standard by which the Senate might judge future Supreme Court nominees.

Only rarely does a staff assistant to a Member of Congress receive the opportunity to express himself by publication or speech on an issue of public significance. For the freedom and encouragement to do so in this instance, the author is grateful to Senator Cook.

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our people hold for the basic fabric of our stable society—the rule of law.

To the extent that it has eroded respect for this highest of our legal institutions, the recent controversial period has been unfortunate. There could not have been a worse time for an attack upon the men who administer justice in our country than in the past year, when tensions and frustrations about our foreign and domestic policies literally threatened to tear us apart. Respect for law and the administration of justice has, at various times in our history, been the only buffer between chaos and order. And this past year this pillar of our society has been buffeted once again by the winds of both justified and unconscionable attacks. It is time the President and the Congress helped to put an end to the turmoil.

The President's nomination of Judge Harry Blackmun and the Senate's responsible act of confirmation is a first step. But before moving on into what hopefully will be a more tranquil period for the High Court, it is useful to review the events of the past year for the lessons they hold. It may be argued that the writing of recent history is an exercise in futility and that only the passage of time will allow a dispassionate appraisal of an event or events of significance. This may well be true for the author who was not present and involved in the event. However, for the writer who is a participant the lapse of time serves only to cloud the memory. Circumstances placed a few individuals in the middle of the controversies of the past year. In the case of the author the experience with the Supreme Court nominees of the past year was the direct result of Senator Marlow W. Cook's election in 1968 and subsequent appointment to the powerful Senate Judiciary Committee. This committee appointment by the Senate Republican leadership, and Supreme Court nominations by President Nixon, brought about an initial introduction to the practical application of Article II, section 2 of the Constitution which reads, in part, that the President shall "nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . judges of the Supreme Court."

The purpose of this article is to draw upon the events of the past year in suggesting some conclusions and making some recommendations about what the proper role of the Senate
should be in advising and consenting to Presidential nominations to the Supreme Court. The motivations of the Executive will be touched upon only peripherally.¹

Initiated by Senator Robert P. Griffin, Republican of Michigan, the senatorial attack upon the Johnson nomination of Justice Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice which resulted in blocking the appointment had set a recent precedent for senatorial questioning in an area which had largely become a Presidential prerogative in the twentieth century. The most recent period of senatorial assertion had begun. But there had been other such periods and a brief examination of senatorial action on prior nominations is valuable because it helps put the controversial nominations of the past two years in proper perspective.

Joseph P. Harris, in his book, The Advice and Consent of the Senate, sums up the history of Supreme Court nominations by pointing out that approximately one-fifth of all appointments have been rejected by the Senate. From 1894 until the Senate's rejection of Judge Haynsworth, however, there was only one rejection. In the preceding 105 years, 20 of the 81 nominees had been rejected. Four of Tyler's nominees, three of Fillmore's, and three of Grant's were disapproved during a period of bitter partisanship over Supreme Court appointments. Harris concludes of this era:

Appointments were influenced greatly by political consideration, and the action of the Senate was fully as political as that of the President. Few of the rejections of Supreme Court nominations in this period can be ascribed to any lack of qualifications on the part of the nominees; for the most part they were due to political differences between the President and a majority of the Senate.²

The first nominee to be rejected was former Associate Justice John Rutledge, of South Carolina. He had been nominated for the Chief Justiceship by President George Washington. The eminent Supreme Court historian Charles Warren reports that Rutledge was rejected essentially because of a speech he had

made in Charleston in opposition to the Jay Treaty. Although his opponents in the predominantly Federalist Senate also started a rumor about his mental condition, a detached appraisal reveals his rejection was based entirely upon his opposition to the Treaty. Verifying this observation, Thomas Jefferson wrote of the incident:

The rejection of Mr. Rutledge is a bold thing, for they cannot pretend any objection to him but his disapprobation of the treaty. It is, of course, a declaration that they will receive none but tories hereafter into any department of Government.³

On December 28, 1835, President Andrew Jackson sent to the Senate the name of Roger B. Taney, of Maryland, to succeed John Marshall as Chief Justice. As Taney had been Jackson's Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General, the Whigs in the Senate strongly opposed him. Daniel Webster wrote of the nomination: "Judge Story thinks the Supreme Court is gone and I think so, too."⁴ Warren reports that

... the Bar throughout the North, being largely Whig, entirely ignored Taney's eminent legal qualifications, and his brilliant legal career, during which he had shared ... the leadership of the Maryland Bar and had attained high rank at the Supreme Court Bar, both before and after his service as Attorney General of the United States.⁵

Taney was approved, after more than two months of spirited debate, by a vote of 29 to 15 over vehement opposition including Calhoun, Clay, Crittenden, and Webster. He had actually been rejected the year before but was re-submitted by a stubborn Jackson.⁶

History has judged Chief Justice Taney as among the most outstanding of American jurists, his tribulations prior to confirmation being completely overshadowed by an exceptional career. A contrite and tearful Clay related to Taney after viewing his work on the Court for many years:

⁵ Id. at 12.
⁶ Id. at 13-15.
Mr. Chief Justice, there was no man in the land who regretted your appointment to the place you now hold more than I did; there was no Member of the Senate who opposed it more than I did; but I have come to say to you, and I say it now in parting, perhaps for the last time—I have witnessed your judicial career, and it is due to myself and due to you that I should say what has been the result, that I am satisfied now that no man in the United States could have been selected more abundantly able to wear the ermine which Chief Justice Marshall honored.7

It is safe to conclude that purely partisan politics played the major role in Senate rejections of Supreme Court nominees during the nineteenth century. The cases of Rutledge and Taney have been related only for the purpose of highlighting a rather undistinguished aspect of the history of the Senate.

No implication should be drawn from the preceding that Supreme Court nominations in the twentieth century have been without controversy because certainly this has not been the case. However, until Haynsworth only one nominee had been rejected in this century. President Woodrow Wilson's nomination of Louis D. Brandeis and the events surrounding it certainly exhibit many of the difficulties experienced by Judges Haynsworth and Carswell as Brandeis failed to receive the support of substantial and respected segments of the legal community. William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, and three past presidents of the American Bar Association signed the following statement:

The undersigned feel under the painful duty to say . . . that in their opinion, taking into view the reputation, character and professional career of Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, he is not a fit person to be a Member of the Supreme Court of the U.S.8

Hearings were conducted by a Senate Judiciary subcommittee for a period of over four months, were twice-reopened, and the record of the hearings consisted of over 1500 pages.9

The nomination of Brandeis, like the nomination of Haynsworth, Carswell and to some extent Fortas (to be Chief Justice)

7 Id. at 16.
8 J. Harms, supra note 2, at 99.
9 Id.
quickly became a *cause celebre* for the opposition party in the Senate. The political nature of Brandeis' opposition is indicated by the fact that the confirmation vote was 47 to 22; three Progressives and all but one Democrat voted for Brandeis and every Republican voted against him.¹⁰

The basic opposition to Brandeis, like the basic opposition to Haynsworth and Carswell, was born of a belief that the nominee's views were not compatible with the prevailing views of the Supreme Court at that time. However, the publicly stated reasons for opposing Brandeis, just as the publicly stated reasons for opposing Carswell and Haynsworth, were that they fell below certain standards of "fitness."

Liberals in the Senate actively opposed the nominations to the Court of Harlan Fiske Stone in 1925 and Charles Evans Hughes five years later, for various reasons best summed up as opposition to what opponents predicted would be their conservatism. However, it was generally conceded by liberals subsequently that they had misread the leanings of both nominees, who tended to side with the Progressives on the Court throughout their tenures.¹¹

No review of the historic reasons for opposition to Supreme Court nominees, even as cursory as this one has been, would be complete without mention of the Parker nomination. Judge John J. Parker of North Carolina, a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, was designated for the Supreme Court by President Hoover in 1930. Harris reports that opposition to Parker was essentially threefold. He was alleged to be anti-labor, unsympathetic to Negroes, and his nomination was thought to be politically motivated.¹²

Opposition to Haynsworth and Carswell followed an almost identical pattern except that Judges Parker and Carswell were spared the charges of ethical impropriety to which Judge Haynsworth was subjected. All three nominees, it is worthy of note for the first time at this point, were from the Deep South.

As this altogether too brief historical review has demonstrated, the Senate has in its past, virtually without exception, based its

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¹⁰ Id. at 113.
¹¹ Id. at 115-27.
¹² Id. at 127-32.
objections to nominees for the Supreme Court on party or philosophical considerations. Most of the time, however, Senators sought to hide their political objections beneath a veil of charges about fitness, ethics and other professional qualifications. In recent years, Senators have accepted, with a few exceptions, the notion that the advice and consent responsibility of the Senate should mean an inquiry into qualifications and not politics or ideology. In the Brandeis case, for example, the majority chose to characterize their opposition as objecting to his fitness not his liberalism. So there was a recognition that purely political opposition should not be openly stated because it would not be accepted as a valid reason for opposing a nominee. The proper inquiry was judged to be the matter of fitness. In very recent times it has been the liberals in the Senate who have helped to codify this standard. During the Kennedy-Johnson years it was argued to conservatives in regard to appointments the liberals liked that the ideology of the nominee was of no concern to the Senate. Most agree that this is the proper standard, but it should be applied in a nonpartisan manner to conservative southern nominees as well as northern liberal ones. Even though the Senate has at various times made purely political decisions in its consideration of Supreme Court nominees, certainly it could not be successfully argued that this is an acceptable practice. After all, if political matters were relevant to senatorial consideration it might be suggested that a constitutional amendment be introduced giving to the Senate rather than the President the right to nominate Supreme Court Justices, as many argued during the Constitutional Convention.

A pattern emerges running from Rutledge and Taney through Brandeis and Parker up to and including Haynsworth and Carswell in which the Senate has employed deception to achieve its partisan goals. This deception has been to ostensibly object to a nominee's fitness while in fact the opposition is born of political expedience.

In summary, the inconsistent and sometimes unfair behavior of the Senate in the past and in the recent examples which follow do not lead one to be overly optimistic about its prospects for rendering equitable judgments about Supreme Court nominees in the future.
CLEMENT F. HAYNSWORTH, JR.: INSENSITIVE OR VICTIMIZED?

For the great majority of mankind are satisfied with appearance, as though they were realities, and are often more influenced by the things that seem than by those that are.

(Author unknown)

The resignation of Justice Abe Fortas in May of 1969 following on the heels of the successful effort of the Senate the previous Fall in stalling his appointment to be Chief Justice, (the nomination was withdrawn after an attempt to invoke cloture on Senate debate was defeated) intensified the resolve of the Senate to reassert what it considered to be its rightful role in advising and consenting to presidential nominations to the Supreme Court.

It was in this atmosphere of senatorial questioning and public dismay over the implications of the Fortas resignation that President Nixon submitted to the Senate the name of Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to fill the Fortas vacancy. Completely aside from Judge Haynsworth’s competence, which was never successfully challenged, he had a number of problems from a political point of view, given the Democrat-controlled Congress. Since he was from South Carolina his nomination was immediately considered to be an integral part of the so-called southern strategy which was receiving considerable press comment at that time. His South Carolina residence was construed as conclusive proof that he was a close friend of the widely-criticized senior Senator from that state, Strom Thurmond, whom, in fact, he hardly knew. Discerning Senators found offensive such an attack against the nominee rather than the nominator, since the southern strategy would be only in the latter’s mind, if it existed. Nevertheless, this put the nomination in jeopardy from the outset.

In addition, labor and civil rights groups mobilized to oppose Judge Haynsworth on philosophical grounds. Some of the proponents of the Judge, including their acknowledged leader Senator Cook, might have had some difficulty on these grounds had they concluded that the philosophy of the nominee was relevant to the Senate’s consideration. Senator Cook expressed the proper role of the Senate well in a letter to one of his constituents, a black student at the University of Louisville who was
disgruntled over his support for the nominee. It read in pertinent part as follows:

... First, as to the question of his [Haynsworth’s] view on labor and civil rights matters, I find myself in essential disagreement with many of his civil rights decisions—not that they in any way indicate a pro-segregationist pattern, but that they do not form the progressive pattern I would hope for. However, as Senator Edward Kennedy pointed out to the conservatives as he spoke for the confirmation of Justice Thurgood Marshall,

'I believe it is recognized by most Senators that we are not charged with the responsibility of approving a man to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court only if his views always coincide with our own. We are not seeking a nominee for the Supreme Court who will express the majority view of the Senate on every given issue, or on a given issue of fundamental importance. We are interested really in knowing whether the nominee has the background, experience, qualifications, temperament and integrity to handle this most sensitive, important, responsible job.'

Most Senators, especially of moderate and liberal persuasion, have agreed that while the appointment of Judge Haynsworth may have been unfortunate from a civil rights point of view, the ideology of the nominee is the responsibility of the President. The Senate’s judgment should be made, therefore, solely upon grounds of qualifications. As I agree with Senator Kennedy and others that this is the only relevant inquiry, I have confined my judgment of this nominee’s fitness to the issue of ethics of qualifications?13

The ethical questions which were raised about Judge Haynsworth were certainly relevant to the proper inquiry of the Senate into qualifications for appointment. Also distinction and competence had a proper bearing upon the matter of qualifications, but Judge Haynsworth’s ability was, almost uniformly, conceded by his opponents and thus was never a real factor in the debate. A sloppy and hastily drafted document labelled the “Bill of Particulars” against Judge Haynsworth was issued on October 8, 1969, by Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, who had become the

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“de facto” leader of the anti-Haynsworth forces during the hearings on the nomination before the Judiciary Committee the previous month. This contained, in addition to several cases in which it had been alleged during the hearings that Judge Haynsworth should have refused to sit, several extraneous and a few inaccurate assertions which were swiftly rebutted two days later by Senator Cook in a statement aptly labelled the “Bill of Corrections.” This preliminary sparring by the leaders of both sides raised all the issues in the case but only the relevant and significant allegations will be discussed here, those which had a real impact upon the Senate’s decision.14

First, it was essential to determine what, if any, impropriety Judge Haynsworth had committed. For the Senator willing to make a judgment upon the facts this required looking to those facts. The controlling statute in situations where federal judges might potentially disqualify themselves is 28 U.S.C § 455 which reads:

> Any Justice or Judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein. [Emphasis added.]

Also pertinent is Canon 29 of the American Bar Association Canons of Judicial Ethics which provides:

> A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved.

Formal Opinion 170 of the American Bar Association construing Canon 29 advises that a judge should not sit in a case in which he owns stock in a party litigant.

The first instance cited by Judge Haynsworth’s opponents as an ethical violation was the much celebrated labor case, Darling-

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ton Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB,15 argued before and decided by the Fourth Circuit in 1963. The Judge sat in this case contrary to what some of his Senate opponents felt to have been proper. The facts were that Judge Haynsworth had been one of the original incorporators, seven years before he was appointed to the bench, of a company named Carolina Vend-A-Matic which had a contract to supply vending machines to one of Deering-Milliken's (one of the litigants) plants. In 1957, when Judge Haynsworth went on the bench, he orally resigned as Vice President of the Company but continued to serve as a director until October, 1963, at which time he resigned his directorship in compliance with a ruling of the U.S. Judicial Conference. During 1963, the year the case was decided, Judge Haynsworth owned one-seventh of the stock of Carolina Vend-A-Matic.

Suffice it to say that all case law in point, on a situation in which a judge owns stock in a company which merely does business with one of the litigants before him, dictates that the sitting judge not disqualify himself. And certainly the Canons do not address themselves to such a situation. As John P. Frank, the acknowledged leading authority on the subject of judicial disqualification testified before the Judiciary Committee:

> It follows that under the standard federal rule Judge Haynsworth had no alternative whatsoever. He was bound by the principle of the cases. It is a Judge's duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified, but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason not to . . . I do think it is perfectly clear under the authority that there was virtually no choice whatsoever for Judge Haynsworth except to participate in that case and do his job as well as he could.16

This testimony by Mr. Frank was never refuted as no one recognized as an authority on the subject was discovered who held a contrary opinion.

The second situation of significance which arose during the Haynsworth debate concerned the question of whether Judge

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15 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
16 Hearings on Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. of South Carolina to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 115-18 (1969).
Haynsworth should have sat in three cases in which he owned stock in a parent corporation where one of the litigants before him was a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent corporation. These cases were *Farrow v. Grace Lines, Inc.*,17 *Donohue v. Maryland Casualty Co.*,18 and *Maryland Casualty Co. v. Baldwin.*19

Consistently ignored during the outrage expressed over his having sat in these cases were the pleas of many of the Senators supporting the nomination to look to the law to find the answer to the question of whether Judge Haynsworth should have disqualified himself in these situations. Instead, the opponents decided, completely independent of the controlling statutes and canons, that the Judge had a “substantial interest” in the outcome of the litigation and should, therefore, have disqualified himself. Under the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, Judge Haynsworth clearly had no duty to step aside. Two controlling cases in a situation where the judge actually owns stock in one of the litigants, not as here where the stock was owned in the parent corporation, are *Kinnear Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil and Refining Co.*20 and *Lampert v. Hollis Music, Inc.*21 These cases interpret “substantial interest” to mean “substantial interest” in the outcome of the case, not “substantial interest” in the litigant. And here Judge Haynsworth not only did not have a “substantial interest” in the outcome of the litigation, he did not even have a “substantial interest” in the litigant, his stock being a small portion of the shares outstanding in the parent corporation of one of the litigants. There was, therefore, clearly no duty to step aside under the statute. It is interesting to note that joining in the *Kinnear Weed* decision were Chief Judge Brown and Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit whom Joseph Rauh, a major critic of the Haynsworth nomination, had stated at the hearings on the nomination “would have been heroic additions to the Supreme Court.”22

But was there a duty to step aside in these parent-subsidiary cases under Canon 29? The answer is again unequivocally No.

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17 381 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1967).
18 363 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1966).
19 357 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1966).
20 403 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1968).
22 *Hearings on Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.,* supra note 15, at 469.
The only case law available construing language similar to that of Canon 29 is found in the disqualification statute of a state. In *Central Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court*, the state court held that ownership of stock in a parent corporation did not require disqualification in litigation involving a subsidiary. Admittedly, this is only a state case, but significantly there is no federal case law suggesting any duty to step aside where a judge merely owns stock in the parent where the subsidiary is before the court. Presumably, this is because such a preposterous challenge has never occurred even to the most ingenious lawyer until the opponents of Judge Haynsworth created it. Therefore, Judge Haynsworth violated no existing standard of ethical behavior in the parent-subsidiary cases except that made up for the occasion by his opponents to stop his confirmation.

There was one other accusation of significance during the Haynsworth proceedings which should be discussed. It concerned the Judge's actions in the case of *Brunswick Corp. v. Long*. The facts relevant to this consideration were as follows: on November 10, 1967, a panel of the Fourth Circuit, including Judge Haynsworth, heard oral argument in the case and immediately after argument voted to affirm the decision by the District Court. Judge Haynsworth, on the advice of his broker, purchased 1,000 shares of Brunswick on December 20, 1967. Judge Winter, to whom the writing of the opinion had been assigned on November 10, the day of the decision, circulated his opinion on December 27. Judge Haynsworth noted his concurrence on January 3, 1968, and the opinion was released on February 2. Judge Haynsworth testified that he completed his participation, in terms of the decision-making process, on November 10, 1967, approximately six weeks prior to the decision to buy stock in Brunswick. Judge Winter confirmed that the decision had been substantially completed on November 10. Therefore, it could be strongly argued that Judge Haynsworth's participation in *Brunswick* terminated on November 10. However, even if it were conceded that he sat while he owned Brunswick stock it is important to remember

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23 *P. 883 (Cal. 1931).*
24 *392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968).*
25 *Hearings on Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., supra note 15, at 238.*
that neither the statute nor the canons require an automatic disqualification, although Opinion 170 so advises. And the facts show that his holdings were so miniscule as to amount neither to a "substantial interest" in the outcome of the litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 455 or to a "substantial interest" in the litigant itself. Clearly, once again, Judge Haynsworth was guilty of no ethical impropriety.

As mentioned earlier there were other less substantial charges by Haynsworth opponents but they were rarely used by opponents to justify opposition. These which have been mentioned were the main arguments used to deny confirmation. It is apparent to any objective student of this episode that Haynsworth violated no existing standard of ethical conduct, just those made up for the occasion by those who sought to defeat him for political gain. As his competence and ability were virtually unassailable, the opponents could not attack him for having a poor record of accomplishment or for being mediocre (an adjective soon to become famous in describing a subsequent nominee for the vacancy). The only alternative available was to first, create a new standard of conduct; second, apply this standard to the nominee retroactively making him appear to be ethically insensitive; third, convey the newly-created appearance of impropriety to the public by way of a politically hostile press (hostile due to an aversion to the so-called southern strategy of which Haynsworth was thought to be an integral part); and fourth, prolong the decision upon confirmation for a while until the politicians in the Senate reacted to an aroused public. Judge Haynsworth was defeated on November 21, 1969, by a vote of 55-45. Appearance had prevailed over reality. Only two Democrats outside the South (and one was a conservative—Bible of Nevada) supported the nomination, an indication of the partisan issue it had become, leading the Washington Post, a lukewarm Haynsworth supporter, to editorially comment, the morning after the vote:

The rejection, despite the speeches and comments on Capitol Hill to the contrary, seems to have resulted more from ideological and plainly political considerations than from ethical ones. It is impossible to believe that all Northern liberals and all Southern conservatives have such dramatically different ethical standards.
Even if he was mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises and Cardozos and Frankfurters and stuff like that there.

Senator Roman Hruska
March 16, 1970

The United States Senate began the new year in no mood to reject another nomination of the President to the Supreme Court. It would take an incredibly poor nomination, students of the Senate concluded, to deny the President his choice in two successive instances. Circumstances, however, brought forth just such a nomination.

Subsequent to the defeat of Judge Haynsworth, President Nixon sent to the Senate in January of 1970 the name of Judge G. Harrold Carswell, of Florida and the Fifth Circuit. Judge Carswell had been nominated to the Circuit Court by President Nixon the year before, after serving 12 years on the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida at Tallahassee to which he had been appointed by President Eisenhower.

He, too, faced an initial disadvantage in that he came from the south and was also considered by the press to be a part of the southern strategy. This should have been, as it should have been for Haynsworth, totally irrelevant to considerations of the man and his ability, but it was a factor and it immediately mobilized the not insignificant anti-south block in the Senate.

Many were troubled at the outset of the hearings about reports of a "white supremacy" speech Carswell had made as a youthful candidate for the legislature in Georgia in 1948, and later by allegations that he had supported efforts to convert a previously all-white public golf course to an all-white private country club in 1956, thus circumventing Supreme Court rulings.26 There were other less substantial allegations including lack of

candor before the Senate Judiciary Committee (which had also been raised against Judge Haynsworth) but all of these were soon supplanted by what became the real issue—that is, did Carswell possess the requisite distinction for elevation to the High Court.

In attempting to determine by what standards Judge Carswell should be judged, some who had been very much involved in the Haynsworth debate attempted to define the standards which had been applied to the previous nominee. Kentucky's Marlow Cook called his standard the "Haynsworth test" and subsequently defined it as composed of essentially five elements, (1) competence; (2) achievement; (3) temperament; (4) judicial propriety and (5) non-judicial record.

Judge Haynsworth himself would not have passed this test had he in fact been guilty of some ethical impropriety—that is, if his judicial integrity had been compromised by violations of any existing standard of conduct. His record of achievement was only attacked by a few misinformed columnists and never really became an issue. And his competence, temperament and the record of his life off the bench was never questioned, but a breakdown in any of these areas might have been fatal also.

The judicial integrity component of the "Haynsworth test," previously described as a violation of existing standards of conduct for federal judges, was never in question in the Carswell proceedings. It was impossible for him to encounter difficulties similar to those of Judge Haynsworth because he owned no stocks and had not been involved in any business ventures through which a conflict might arise. Certainly, his non-judicial record was never questioned, nor was it a factor raised against any nominee in this century. Disqualifying non-judicial activities referred to here could best be illustrated by examples such as violations of federal or state law, or personal problems such as alcoholism or drug addiction—in other words, debilitating factors only indirectly related to effectiveness on the bench.

However, all the other criteria of the "Haynsworth test" were raised in the Carswell case and caused Senators seeking to make an objective appraisal of the nominee some difficulty. First, as to the question of competence, a Ripon Society Report and a study of the nominee's reversal percentages by a group of Columbia
law students revealed that while a U.S. District Judge he had been reversed more than twice as often as the average federal district judge and that he ranked sixty-first in reversals among the 67 federal trial judges in the south. Numerous reversals alone might not have been a relevant factor; he could have been in the vanguard of his profession some argued. This defense, however, ignored simple facts about which even a first year law student would be aware. A federal district judge's duty in most instances is to follow the law as laid down by higher authority. Carswell appeared to have a chronic inability to do this. No comparable performance was ever imputed to Judge Haynsworth even by his severest critics.

Second, in the area of achievement, he was totally lacking. He had no publications, his opinions were rarely cited by other judges in their opinions, and no expertise in any area of the law was revealed. On the contrary, Judge Haynsworth's opinions were often cited, and he was a recognized expert in several fields including patents and trademarks, habeas corpus cases, and labor law. In addition, his opinions on Judicial administration were highly valued; he had been called upon to testify before Senator Tydings' subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery on this subject in June of 1969.

In addition to his lack of professional distinction, Judge Carswell's temperament was also questionable. There was unrebutted testimony before the Judiciary Committee that he was hostile to a certain class of litigants—namely, those involved in litigation to insure the right to vote to all citizens regardless of race pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. There had been testimony that Judge Haynsworth was anti-labor and anti-civil rights, but these charges alleged not personal antipathy but rather philosophical bias in a certain direction such as Justice Goldberg might have been expected to exhibit against management in labor cases. Such philosophical or ideological considerations, as pointed out earlier, are more properly a concern of the President and not the Senate, which should sit in judgment upon qualifications only.

And finally, a telling factor possibly revealing something about both competence and temperament was Judge Carswell's inability to secure the support of his fellow judges on the Fifth Circuit. By contrast, all Fifth Circuit judges had supported Judge
Homer Thornberry when he was nominated in the waning months of the Johnson presidency, even though that was not considered an outstanding appointment by many in the country. All judges of the Fourth Circuit had readily supported Judge Haynsworth’s nomination. Therefore, it was highly unusual and significant that Judge Carswell could not secure the support of his fellow judges, especially when one considers that they must have assumed at that time that they would have to deal with him continually in future years should his nomination not be confirmed. His subsequent decision to leave the bench and run for political office in Florida seeking to convert a wave of sympathy over his frustrated appointment into the consolation prize of a United States Senate seat only tended to confirm the worst suspicions about his devotion to being a member of the Federal Judiciary.

Judge Carswell, then, fell short in three of the five essential criteria evolving out of the Haynsworth case. This compelled a no vote by the junior Senator from Kentucky and he was joined by several other Senators who simply could not, in good conscience, vote to confirm despite the wishes of most of their constituents. Of the southern Senators who had supported Haynsworth, Spong, of Virginia, and Fulbright, of Arkansas, switched. Gore, of Tennessee and Yarborough, of Texas, voted no again and the only Democrat outside the south of liberal credentials who had supported the Haynsworth nomination, Gravel, of Alaska, joined the opponents this time.

Judge Carswell was defeated 51-45 on April 8, 1970 by essentially the same coalition which had stopped Judge Haynsworth. The justification for opposition, however, as this article seeks to demonstrate, was much sounder. Some undoubtedly voted in favor of Carswell simply because he was a southern conservative. Others, no doubt, voted no for the same reason. The key Senators who determined his fate, however, clearly cast their votes against the Hruska maxim that mediocrity was entitled to a seat on the Supreme Court.

**HARRY M. BLACKMUN: CONFIRMATION AT LAST**

*The political problem, therefore, is that so much must be explained in distinguishing between Haynsworth and Black-*
mun, and when the explanations are made there is still room for the political argument that Haynsworth should have been confirmed in the first place.

Richard Wilson
Washington Evening Star
April 20, 1970

President Nixon next sent to the Senate to fill the vacancy of almost one year created by the Fortas resignation a childhood friend of Chief Justice Warren Burger, his first court appointment, Judge Harry A. Blackmun, of Minnesota and the Eighth Circuit. Judge Blackmun had an initial advantage which Judges Haysworth and Carswell had not enjoyed—he was not from the South. Once again, in judging the nominee it is appropriate to apply Senator Cook's "Haynsworth test."

Judge Blackmun's competence, temperament, and non-judicial record were quickly established by those charged with the responsibility of reviewing the nomination, and were, in any event, never questioned, as no one asked the Judiciary Committee for the opportunity to be heard in opposition to the nomination.

In the area of achievement or distinction, Judge Blackmun was completely satisfactory. He had published three legal articles: "The Marital Deduction and Its Use in Minnesota;" "The Physician and His Estate;" and "Allowance of In Forma Pauperis in Section 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases." In addition, at the time of his selection he was chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Judge's Function of the American Bar Association Special Committee on Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice. Moreover, he had achieved distinction in the areas of federal taxation and medico-legal problems and was considered by colleagues of the bench and bar to be an expert in these fields.

The only question raised about Judge Blackmun was in the

27 See Hearings on Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun of Minnesota to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
29 Blackmun, The Physician and His Estate, 36 MNN. MED. 1033 (1953).
30 Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis in Section 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343 (1968).
area of judicial integrity or ethics. Judge Blackmun, since his appointment to the Eighth Circuit by President Eisenhower in 1959, had sat in three cases in which he actually owned stock in one of the litigants before him: Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., and Mahoney v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. In a fourth case, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Insulating Co. Judge Blackmun acting similarly to Judge Haynsworth in Brunswick, bought shares of one of the litigants after the decision but before the denial of a petition for rehearings.

As previously mentioned, Judge Haynsworth’s participation in Brunswick was criticized as violating the spirit of Canon 29 and the literal meaning of Formal Opinion 170 of the ABA, thus showing an insensitiveness to judicial ethics, but Judge Blackmun acted similarly in the 3M case and was not so criticized. Except as it could be argued in Brunswick, Judge Haynsworth never sat in a case in which he owned stock in one of the litigants but, rather, three cases in which he merely owned stock in the parent corporation of the litigant-subsidiary, a situation not unethical under any existing standard, or even by the wildest stretch of any legal imaginations, except those of the anti-Haynsworth leadership.

Judge Blackmun, on the other hand, committed a much more clear-cut violation of what could be labelled the “Bayh standard.” Senator Bayh, the leader of the opposition in both the Haynsworth and Carswell cases, ignored this breach of his Haynsworth test with the following interesting justification:

He [Blackmun] discussed his stock holdings with Judge Johnson, then Chief Judge of the Circuit, who advised him that his holdings did not constitute a “substantial interest” under 28 USC 455, and that he was obliged to sit in the case. There is no indication that Judge Haynsworth ever disclosed his financial interest to any colleague or to any party who might have felt there was an apparent conflict, before sitting in such case. [Emphasis added.]

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31 273 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1960).
32 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964).
33 377 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1967).
34 284 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1960).
Judge Haynsworth did not inform the lawyers because under existing Fourth Circuit practice he found no significant interest and, thus, no duty to disclose to the lawyers. In any event, Judge Blackmun did not inform any of the lawyers in any of the cases in which he sat, either. Judge Blackmun asked the chief judge his advice and relied upon it. Judge Haynsworth was the chief judge.

Chief Judge Johnson and Chief Judge Haynsworth both interpreted that standard, as it existed, not as the Senator from Indiana later fashioned it. That interpretation was, as the supporters of Judge Haynsworth said it was, and in accord with Chief Judge Johnson who described the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 455 to be "that a judge should sit regardless of interest, so long as the decision will not have a significant effect upon the value of the judge's interest."\(^\text{36}\)

In other words, it is not interest in the litigant but interest in the outcome of the litigation which requires stepping aside. But even if it were interest in the litigant, the interests of Blackmun were *de minimis* and the interests of Haynsworth were not only *de minimis*, but were one step removed—that is, his interest was in the parent corporation where the subsidiary was the litigant. Furthermore, the case law, what little there is, and prevailing practice dictate that in the parent-subsidiary situation there is no duty to step aside.

As John Frank pointed out to the Judiciary Committee during the Haynsworth hearings, where there is no duty to step aside, there is a duty to sit. Judge Haynsworth and Judge Blackmun sat in these cases because under existing standards, not the convenient *ad hoc* standard of the Haynsworth opponents, they both had a duty to sit. But it is worth noting that if one were to require a strict adherence to the most rigid standard—Formal Opinion 170, which states that a judge shall not sit in a case in which he owns stock in a party litigant—Judge Haynsworth whom Senator Bayh opposed had only one arguable violation, *Brunswick*, while Judge Blackmun whom Senator Bayh supported had one arguable violation, *3M*, and three clear violations, *Hanson, Kotula* and *Mahoney*.

The Senator from Indiana also argued that since Judge Black-
mum stepped aside in *Bridgeman v. Gateway Ford Truck Sales*,\(^{37}\) arising after the Haynsworth affair, a situation in which he owned stock in the parent Ford which totally owned one of the subsidiary-litigants, he “displayed a laudable recognition of the changing nature of the standards of judicial conduct.”\(^{38}\) Of course, Judge Blackmun stepped aside after seeing what Judge Haynsworth had been subjected to. Haynsworth did not have an opportunity to step aside in such situations since this new Bayh rule was established during the course of his demise. Certainly Judge Haynsworth would now comply with the Bayh test to avoid further attacks upon his judicial integrity just as Judge Blackmun wisely did in *Bridgeman*.

It is clear, then, to any objective reviewer, that the Haynsworth and Blackmun cases, aside from the political considerations involved, were virtually indistinguishable. If anything, Judge Blackmun had much more flagrantly violated that standard used to defeat Judge Haynsworth than had Judge Haynsworth. However, Judge Blackmun violated no existing standard worthy of denying him confirmation and he was quite properly confirmed by the Senate on May 12, 1970 by a vote of 88 to 0.

**A New Test: Can One Be Codified?**

*Bad laws, if they exist, should be repealed as soon as possible, still, while they continue in force, for the sake of example they should be religiously observed.*

Abraham Lincoln

It has been demonstrated that Judges Haynsworth and Blackmun violated no existing standards worthy of denying either of them confirmation. Judge Carswell’s defeat, like Judge Haynsworth’s, was also due in part to the application of a new standard—it having been argued that mediocre nominees had been confirmed in the past, *a fortiori* Carswell should be also. Yet, certainly achievement was always a legitimate part of the Senate’s consideration of a nominee for confirmation just as ethics had

\(^{37}\) No. 19, 749, (February 4, 1970).
always been. The Senate simply ignored mediocrity at various times in the past and refused to do so in the case of Carswell. And in the case of Haynsworth it made up an unrealistic standard of judicial propriety to serve its political purposes and then ignored those standards later in regard to Judge Blackmun because politics dictated confirmation.

Possibly, new standards should be adopted by the Senate but, of course, adopted prospectively in the absence of a pending nomination and not in the course of confirmation proceedings. In this regard, Senator Bayh has now introduced two bills, The Judicial Disqualification Act of 1970 and the Omnibus Disclosure Act which, if enacted, would codify the standards he previously employed to defeat Judge Haynsworth. This legislative effort is an admission that the previously applied standards were nonexistent at the time. Those bills are, however, worthy of serious consideration in a continuing effort to improve judicial standards of conduct. Some standards have been suggested here and will be recounted again but first some observations about the body which must apply them.

First, it is safe to say that anti-southern prejudice is still very much alive in the land and particularly in the Senate. Although this alone did not cause the defeats of Haynsworth and Carswell, it was a major factor. The fact that so many Senators were willing to create a new ethical standard for Judge Haynsworth in November, 1969, in order to insure his defeat and then ignore even more flagrant violations of this newly established standard in May of 1970, can only be considered to demonstrate sectional prejudice.

Another ominous aspect of the past year's events has been that we have seen yet another example of the power of the press over the minds of the people. As Wendell Phillips once commented, "We live under a government of men and morning newspapers." Certainly, one should not accuse the working press of distorting the news. The reporters were simply conveying to the nation the accusations of the Senator from Indiana and others in the opposition camp. These accusations were interpreted by a misinformed public outside the south (as indicated by prominent public opinion polls) as conclusive proof of Judge Haynsworth’s impropriety and Judge Carswell’s racism, neither of which was
ever substantiated. The press should remain unfettered, but public figures must continue to have the courage to stand up to those who would use it for their own narrow political advantage to destroy men's reputations, and more importantly, the aura of dignity which should properly surround the Supreme Court.

Some good, however, has come from this period. Senatorial assertion against an all-powerful Executive, whoever he may be, whether it is in foreign affairs or in Supreme Court appointments, is healthy for the country. Such assertions help restore the constitutional checks and balances between our branches of government, thereby helping to preserve our institutions and maximize our freedom.

In addition, the American Bar Association has indicated a willingness to review its ethical standards and has appointed a Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct, under the chairmanship of Judge Traynor, which issued a Preliminary Statement and Interim Report which would update the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics. This report was discussed in public hearings on August 8th and 10th, 1970 at the Annual Meeting of the ABA in St. Louis and may be placed on the agenda for consideration at the February, 1971, mid-year meeting of the House of Delegates. Both supporters and opponents of Judge Haynsworth agreed that a review and overhaul of the ABA's Canons of Judicial Ethics was needed. This should be valuable and useful to the Senate as the Judiciary Committee under Senator Eastland has made a practice of requesting reports on Presidential nominees to the Supreme Court by the Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the ABA. This practice probably should be continued as the Senate has not, in any way, delegated its decision upon confirmation to this outside organization. Rather, it seeks the views of the ABA before reporting nominees to the Judiciary to the floor of the Senate just as any committee would seek the views of relevant outside groups before proposing legislation.

Although not central to the considerations of this article, it should be noted what the Executive may have learned from this period. President Johnson undoubtedly discovered in the Fortas and Thornberry nominations that the Senate could be very reluctant at times to approve nominees who might be classified
as personal friends or "cronies" of the Executive. It was also established that the Senate would frown upon Justices of the Supreme Court acting as advisors to the President as a violation of the concept of separation of powers. This argument was used very effectively against the elevation of Justice Fortas to the Chief Justiceship as he had been an advisor to President Johnson on a myriad of matters during his tenure on the Court. President Nixon learned during the Carswell proceedings that a high degree of competence would likely be required by the Senate before it approved future nominees. He also learned during the Haynsworth case that the Senate would likely require strict adherence to standards of judicial propriety.

Unfortunately, as a result of this episode, the Administration has adopted a very questionable practice in regard to future nominations to the Supreme Court. Attorney General John N. Mitchell announced on July 28, 1970 that the Justice Department would adopt a new procedure under which the Attorney General will seek a complete investigation by the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary before recommending anyone to the President for nomination to the Supreme Court. This Committee has already enjoyed virtually unprecedented influence in the selection of U.S. District and Circuit Judges as this Administration has made no nominations to these Courts which have not received the prior approval of this twelve man Committee. In effect, the Administration, after delegating to this Committee veto power over lower federal court appointments, has now broadened this authority to cover its selections to the Supreme Court. Complete delegation of authority to an outside organization of so awesome a responsibility as designating men to our federal District and Circuit Courts is bad enough, but such a delegation of authority to approve, on the Supreme Court level, is most unwise. Far from representing all lawyers in the country, the ABA has historically been the repository of "big-firm," "defense-oriented," "corporate-type lawyers" who may or may not make an objective appraisal of a prospective nominee. If President Wilson had asked the ABA for prior approval of Brandeis, the Supreme Court and the nation would never have benefitted from his great legal talents. The presumption that such an outside organization as the American Bar Association is
better able to pass upon the credentials of nominees for the federal courts and especially the Supreme Court than the President of the United States who is given the constitutional authority is an erroneous judgment which the passage of time will hopefully see reversed.\textsuperscript{39} This is not to imply that ABA views would not be useful to the Executive in its considerations just as they are useful to but not determinative of the actions of the Senate (the Senate having rejected ABA approved nominees Haynsworth and Carswell).

What standard then can be drawn for the Senate from the experiences of the past year in advising and consenting to Presidential nominations to the Supreme Court? They have been set out above but should be reiterated in conclusion. At the outset, the Senate should discount the philosophy of the nominee. In our politically centrist society, it is highly unlikely that any Executive would nominate a man of such extreme views of the right of the left as to be disturbing to the Senate. However, a nomination, for example, of a Communist or a member of the American Nazi Party, would have to be considered an exception to the recommendation that the Senate leave ideological considerations to the discretion of the Executive. Political and philosophical considerations were often a factor in the nineteenth century and arguably in the Parker, Haynsworth and Carswell cases also, but this is not proper and tends to degrade the Court and dilute the constitutionally proper authority of the Executive in this area. The President is presumably elected by the people to carry out a program and altering the ideological directions of the Supreme Court would seem to be a perfectly legitimate part of a Presidential platform. To that end, the Constitution gives to him the power to nominate. As mentioned earlier, if the power to nominate had been given to the Senate, as was considered during the debates at the Constitutional Convention, then it would be proper for the Senate to consider political philosophy. The proper role of the Senate is to advise and consent to the particular nomination, and thus, as the Constitution puts it, “to appoint.” This taken within the context of modern times should

mean an examination only into the qualifications of the President's nominee.

In examining the qualifications of a Supreme Court nominee, use of the following criteria is recommended. First, the nominee must be judged competent. He should, of course, be a lawyer although the Constitution does not require it. Judicial experience might satisfy the Senate as to the nominee's competence, although the President should certainly not be restricted to naming sitting judges. Legal scholars as well as practicing lawyers might well be found competent.

Second, the nominee should be judged to have obtained some level of achievement or distinction. After all, it is the Supreme Court the Senate is considering not the police court in Hoboken, N.J. or even the U.S. District or Circuit Courts. This achievement could be established by writings, but the absence of publications alone would not be fatal. Reputation at the bar and bench would be significant. Quality of opinions if a sitting judge, or appellate briefs if a practicing attorney, or articles or books if a law professor might establish the requisite distinction. Certainly, the acquisition of expertise in certain areas of the law would be an important plus in determining the level of achievement of the nominee.

Third, temperament could be significant. Although difficult to establish and not as important as the other criteria, temperament might become a factor where, for example in the case of Carswell, a sitting judge was alleged to be hostile to a certain class of litigants or abusive to lawyers in the courtroom.

Fourth, the nominee, if a judge, must have violated no existing standard of ethical conduct rendering him unfit for confirmation. If the nominee is not a judge, he must not have violated the Canons of Ethics and statutes which apply to conduct required of members of the bar. If a law professor, he must be free of violations of ethical standards applicable to that profession, for example plagiarism.

Fifth and finally, the nominee must have a clean record in his life off the bench. He should be free from prior criminal conviction and not the possessor of debilitating personal problems such as alcoholism or drug abuse. However, this final criterion would rarely come into play due to the intensive personal investi-
gations customarily employed by the Executive before nominations are sent to the Senate.

In conclusion, these criteria for Senate judgment of nominees to the Supreme Court are recommended for future considerations. It will always be difficult to obtain a fair and impartial judgment from such an inevitably political body as the United States Senate. However, it is suggested that the true measure of a statesman may well be the ability to rise above partisan political considerations to objectively pass upon another aspiring human being. While the author retains no great optimism for their future usage, these guidelines are now, nevertheless, left behind, a fitting epilogue hopefully to a most unique and unforgettable era in the history of the Supreme Court.