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NOTES

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INTRODUCTION

Futures trading is a basic adjunct of the marketing of agricultural and other commodities, and a source of speculative activities by a growing number of American investors.¹

Due to the risk and complexity of commodity trading, even knowledgeable and experienced commodities investors frequently lose money through futures trading.² Since it is difficult to determine exactly why they lost money, investors often make easy targets for fraud by their brokers.

The focus of this Comment is on commodities fraud. One common type of commodities fraud is known as “churning.”³


² A “future” is a contract providing for future delivery of the actual commodity. A person desiring to trade in a given commodity buys or sells a future. R. Stevenson & E. Jennings, Fundamentals of Investments 445 (3d ed. 1984).

³ Commodities trading is accomplished through a series of steps. First, the customer places his order with a solicitor or account executive, who transmits the order to the exchange trading floor. Once the order is received on the floor, a runner carries the order to a floor broker located in the trading area (also called the “pits”).

The actual futures contracts trading occurs in a loud, active market similar to an auction house. The Commodities Exchange Act, as well as the rules and regulations of the individual commodity exchanges, require that the transaction occur in an open, competitive manner by “outcry or posting of bids and offers.” This requirement ensures that all trades are executed at competitive prices.

Once a trade is executed, it must be confirmed through a clearinghouse. The clearinghouse confirms the trade by “matching all buys and sells which are executed” on a particular day. Next, the clearinghouse becomes the seller of all orders to buy and the buyer of all orders to sell, and it is given legal responsibility for the opposite side of every transaction.

The clearinghouse also receives deliveries of futures contracts. When a seller is to make a delivery, he must file a delivery notice with the clearinghouse one day before the intended delivery. Then the clearinghouse assigns the notice of delivery to one of its members for trading. S. Rep. No. 1131, supra note 1, at 5856-58.

⁴ For examples of churning, see Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 F.2d 641, 644 (10th
Churning is defined by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (hereinafter CFTC) as “excessive trading of an account by a broker for the purpose of generating commissions, without regard for the investment or trading objectives of the customer.”

In 1936, the Commodity Exchange Act (hereinafter CEA) was enacted to regulate commodity trading. Section 4b is the general antifraud provision of the CEA. Section 4b reads in part,

> It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market in connection with any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery
> (A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
> (B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report or statement thereof;
> (C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person.

A customer or the CFTC may bring an action under Section 4b(1)(A) against a broker who engages in commodities fraud. It has been well established that two of the elements of a commodities fraud claim are control by the broker over the customer’s account and excessive trading in light of the customer’s investment.

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5 Bowley, 751 F.2d at 644; see also Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1203 (8th Cir. 1982) (the court noted several factors that evidenced control: plaintiff followed nearly all of the broker’s suggestions, lacked experience, and lacked understanding of the transactions); Khalid Bin Alwaleed Foundation v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 709 F Supp. 815, 816-17 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (the court stated that an excessive turnover ratio or commission-to-equity ratio must be determined to allege churning).
7 7 U.S.C. § 6b.
8 Id.
9 7 U.S.C. § 6b. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), the Supreme Court recognized that a customer has a private right of action against his broker for violations of § 4b of the CEA.
10 See Bowley, 751 F.2d at 644; Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services, 430 F.2d 132, 133-34 (8th Cir. 1970); Evanston Bank, 623 F Supp. at 1024.
11 “[T]he requisite degree of control is met when the client routinely follows the recommendations of the broker.” Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th
objectives.\textsuperscript{14} However, there has been much debate over whether the mental state required to support a commodities churning claim is scienter.\textsuperscript{15}

This Comment examines scienter as a required element of a commodities fraud claim. Part I defines commodities fraud, and in particular commodities churning, and explains how it is shown.\textsuperscript{16} Part II details a brief history of futures trading.\textsuperscript{17} Part III examines the legislative history of commodities fraud.\textsuperscript{18} Part IV presents an objective overview of the caselaw discussing scienter as an element of a commodities fraud claim.\textsuperscript{19} Part V presents an analysis of the legislative history, as well as a detailed analysis of the word "de-fraud" as used in Section 4b(1)(A) of the CEA.\textsuperscript{20} Finally, this Comment concludes that scienter is not required to support a commodities fraud claim.\textsuperscript{21}

I. WHAT IS COMMODITIES CHURNING AND HOW IS IT SHOWN?

Commodities churning occurs when a broker trades excessively in a customer's account, for the purpose of generating commissions

Cir. 1980); see also Bowley, 751 F.2d at 644 (jury instructions should focus on who was in control of the account).

One author noted that "the essential question to be resolved is whether the dealer occupied the status in respect to the customer that he may reasonably be held responsible for any of the excessive trading complained of." Shelly v. Noffsinger, 511 F Supp. 687, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Commodities Futures Trading Commission, 794 F.2d 573, 582 (11th Cir. 1986) (considerations to be examined are the intelligence of the client and the amount of trust he places in the broker). In general, control is clearly established where the account is discretionary, a power of attorney has been executed in favor of the broker, and the trades are completed without prior approval by the customer. Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983) (an action dealing with securities brokers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).

\textsuperscript{14} "The essential issue of fact is whether the volume of transactions, considered in light of the nature and objectives of the account, was so excessive as to indicate a purpose on the part of the broker to derive a profit for himself at the expense of his customers." Costello v. Oppenheimer, Inc., 711 F.2d at 1368; see also Bowley, 751 F.2d at 644 (excessive trading is an element of churning).

\textsuperscript{15} Scienter has been defined by the Supreme Court as a mental state embracing "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).

\textsuperscript{16} See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{17} Futures trading is synonymous with commodities trading. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{18} See infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{19} See infra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{20} See infra notes 81-106 and accompanying text.

for himself without regard for the investment goals of the customer. Since churning is one type of fraud,\(^2\) and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that allegations of fraud be "stated with particularity,"\(^2\) to satisfy Rule 9(b), the plaintiff must identify the commodities involved, the nature of the commodities, the amount and dates of the transactions in question, and produce evidence sufficient to show that the account was excessively traded.\(^2\)

The existence of excessive trading in a commodities account\(^2\) is a question of fact, not a question of law\(^2\) A universally precise formula for calculating excessiveness is therefore unavailable. "There are, however, indicia of excessive trading that 'may aid the fact-finder by introducing some measure of objectivity or certainty into an otherwise recondite subject. ' These indicia include the annualized commission to equity ratio, the turnover rate, and a pattern of in-and-out day trading."\(^2\) Additionally, an investor's

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\(^2\) Fed. R. Civ P 9(b).


\(^2\) The standard for excessive trading in the commodities fraud context is generally higher than the standard for excessiveness in the securities fraud context. See Gnswald v. E. F Hutton & Co., Inc., 622 F Supp. 1397, 1407 (D.C. Ill. 1985); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Serv., 430 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1970) (commodity accounts are heavily traded accounts as compared to investing accounts).

\(^2\) Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1369 (7th Cir. 1983); Booth, 430 F.2d at 135.


The "commission to equity" ratio is the commissions earned by the broker divided by the amount of equity in the customer's account.

The "turnover rate" of an account is "the ratio of the total cost of purchases made for the account during a given period of time to the amount invested. Whether a particular turnover rate is excessive depends on the objectives of a customer." Costello, 711 F.2d at 1369, n.11. While numerous courts have used the annual turnover rate of an account as an indicator of excessive trading, in In re Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc. of California, CFTC Docket No. 78-48 [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,147 (Jan. 31, 1984), the CFTC held that since commodities futures contracts are short-term instruments and have inherently fast turnover rates, and because of the
experience and sophistication are relevant factors in the determination of whether a broker has churned that customer's account. Once it has been established that the customer's account has been fraudulently managed, damages must be calculated. Ideally, damages should restore the customer to the position he would have achieved but for the defendant broker's misconduct. However, it is often difficult to determine accurately what results a properly managed account would have achieved.

Excessive commissions received by the broker and excessive decline in the value of the customer's portfolio are two types of damages that usually result from the churning of a customer's account. It is necessary to remedy both of these harms in order to fully compensate the victimized investor.

II. THE HISTORY OF COMMODITIES TRADING

Modern commodity exchanges trace their origin to the medieval trade fairs in Europe during the twelfth century. In the 1700's, volatility of commodity prices, "the length of time that a futures contract is held is not particularly revealing in determining whether a commodities account has been trading excessively." Id. at ¶ 28,247. Rather, the CFTC in *Lincolnwood* preferred to rely on the monthly commission-to-equity ratio as an indication of churning. Id. at ¶ 28,249.

"In-and-out" trading is defined as "the sale of all or part of a customer's portfolio, with the money immediately expended on other investments, followed shortly by the sale of the newly acquired investments." Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1203 n.11 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Note, *Churning by Securities Dealers*, 80 HARV. L. REV. 869, 876 (1967)). See Herman v. T & S Commodities, Inc., 592 F Supp. 1406, 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Gochnauer v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049 (11th Cir. 1987) (experience and sophistication of investors is relevant in determining the extent of the fiduciary duty of care in explaining contemplated securities transactions).

*Herman*, 592 F Supp. at 1421.


*Id.* To help simplify the calculation of damages, the Second Circuit proposed the following formula: (1) compute the market value of the customer's portfolio at the time the broker began to aid and abet the fraud and the market value when the fraud stopped, (2) subtract the value of the portfolio when the fraud stopped from the value of the portfolio when the fraud began to determine the customer's "gross economic loss", (3) reduce that loss by the average percentage decline in the value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Standard & Poor's Index or any other well recognized index during the period when the churning was taking place. If, during the relevant period of time, the stock market declined in value by 25 percent, then the gross economic loss should be reduced by 25 percent. Additionally, the customer is entitled to the return of commissions on the transactions falling within the period of time and interest on those commissions. *Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co.*, 570 F.2d 38, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1978).

following the example of European ancestors, American producers and merchants began to trade their commodities at the market.33 These trades were primarily "spot" deliveries34 for cash.35

"Spot" deliveries caused problems for both the farmer and the merchant buyer. The farmers all brought their commodities to the market at harvest time each year. This led to a supply greatly exceeding demand, which depressed the market price for the commodities. Because the commodities were perishable goods, this led to excessive waste. Months later, after the commodities were consumed or spoiled, demand exceeded the supply, prices skyrocketed, and people went hungry.36

These problems forced the emergence of future trading of commodities,37 which developed in the United States between 1850 and 1900. Future trading of commodities developed as a response to the increasing economic need for large scale risk bearing in the agricultural market.38 During the infancy of the futures market, market regulation was virtually nonexistent, and this led to irresponsible trading. Such irresponsibility led to repeated efforts to abolish futures trading altogether.40

III. THE HISTORY OF COMMODITIES FUTURES REGULATION

In 1844, the first bill to prohibit futures trading was introduced, followed by similar proposals over the next fifty years. From 1895 to 1920, the desire to abolish futures trading slowly gave way to efforts to regulate futures trading.41

33 Id. at 5853. The first trades were for items such as eggs, butter, vegetables and grains.
34 "Spot" deliveries occur when the merchants pay the full cash price "on the spot."
35 See S. REP. No. 1131, supra note 32, at 5853.
36 Id.
37 "Trading in futures provides not only the market of today, but of months ahead, and affords guidance to buyers and sellers of agricultural commodities in planning ahead, and in financing and marketing commodities from one season to another." Id. at 5854.
38 Id. at 5853.
39 Futures are current agreements to be performed in the future. The buyer and seller agree on the future date of delivery, the price to be paid at that date, and the quantity and quality of the commodity. Forward contracting of commodities solved the problem of availability and demand. However, it did not help to control the financial risk of loss that accompanied rapidly changing prices which resulted from bad weather, inadequate storage, and the poor economic conditions of the 19th century. Id. at 5854.
40 Id. at 5854.
41 Id.
A review of the legislative history of the attempts to regulate the commodities markets reveals that Congress' objectives were initially unclear as to antifraud measures.\textsuperscript{42} It is no wonder that there have been many interpretations of Congress' actual intentions.\textsuperscript{43} However, a close examination reveals that although initially hesitant, Congress later was intent on developing legislation that does not require scienter.\textsuperscript{44}

Regulation of future trading began in 1922\textsuperscript{45} with the Grain Futures Act,\textsuperscript{46} renamed the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936.\textsuperscript{47} In 1928, legislation was introduced to amend the Grain Futures Act to "insure fair dealings and to prevent fraudulent practices.\textsuperscript{48} Although the 1936 Act contained no antifraud provision, the amendment would have made it illegal to "knowingly" defraud a customer.\textsuperscript{49} The amendment was rejected, apparently

\textsuperscript{42} See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{43} See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{44} See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.

\begin{quote}
[T]he Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market or any other board of trade, exchange, or market. \textit{And provided further,} that, except as heretabové provided, nothing contained in this section shall (i) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities under the laws of the United States or of any State, or (ii) restrict the Securities and Exchange Commission and such other authorities from carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with such laws. Nothing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on the courts of the United States or any State.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{47} Grain Futures Act: Hearings on Amendments Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1928) (statement of Mr. J. W T. Dewel, Chief, Grain Futures Administration, Department of Agriculture).
\textsuperscript{48} S. 3575, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1928); H.R. 11952, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1928).
because Congress believed that prosecution under state laws was a sufficient deterrent for fraud.\textsuperscript{50}

In 1932, two amendments were introduced that again would have added antifraud provisions to the Grain Futures Act. The first bill was H.R. 7608.\textsuperscript{51} Section 4A of this legislation would have made it unlawful "knowingly and with intent to defraud any person, to fail truly, fully, and correctly to account to such, or to cheat or defraud any person in any manner whatsoever."\textsuperscript{52} This provision, which clearly would have required scienter, was rejected by the House Committee on Agriculture.\textsuperscript{53}

Instead, the Committee on Agriculture favored the second bill, H.R. 12287,\textsuperscript{54} which provided that it would be unlawful for a broker to commit any of the following acts:

(1) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such person [the broker's customer];
(2) willfully to make or cause to be made to such person any false report or statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person any false record thereof;
(3) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such person by any means whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract.\textsuperscript{55}

In 1936 Congress passed the Commodity Exchange Act,\textsuperscript{56} which contained language virtually identical to the language of H.R. 12287. The decision to include the language of H.R. 12287 and reject the language of H.R. 7608, which would have required scienter, reveals Congress' intent to exclude a scienter requirement from the Act.

When it amended the criminal provisions of the CEA in 1978, Congress again evidenced its intent to exclude scienter as a required element of civil claims.\textsuperscript{57} This amendment provided that a violation of section 6b\textsuperscript{58} would support a conviction only if committed "knowingly." The Conference Committee Report\textsuperscript{59} explained that

\textsuperscript{50} H.R. 1637, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 32 (1934).
\textsuperscript{51} H.R. 7608, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4A (1932).
\textsuperscript{52} Id.
\textsuperscript{54} H.R. 12287, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4b (1932).
\textsuperscript{55} Id.
\textsuperscript{57} Futures Trading Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 865 (1978). This amendment changed a § 6b violation from a misdemeanor to a felony.
\textsuperscript{58} 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
the word "knowingly" was specifically intended to require "scienter" as an element of a section 6b criminal violation. However, Congress did not amend the civil provisions of the CEA to include scienter. By failing to add scienter as an element of a civil violation of the CEA when it did so for criminal violations, Congress demonstrated that it intended to distinguish the two causes of action and exclude scienter from the elements of a civil violation.

IV CASES DISCUSSING SCIENTER AS A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF A COMMODITIES FRAUD CLAIM

A. Cases Requiring Scienter

Three lines of reasoning have emerged in support of scienter as a requirement for commodities fraud violations.

First, some courts include scienter as an element of commodities fraud as if there has never been any doubt that a commodities fraud violation requires intent to defraud.60 For instance, in Schindler v Chas. A. Stockley & Gabriel Brokerage, Inc.61 the court said "[t]he state of mind of the trader is of primary importance because the very definition of churning assumes that the purpose of the trading pattern is to generate commissions at the expense of the customer and without regard to the customer's trading objectives."62 The court, however, never actually defined churning; it simply assumed that the definition included scienter.

Second, some courts63 hold that if the words of a statute are clear, there is no need to look to the legislative history. Supporters of this line of reasoning assert that the words of Section 4b(1)(A) clearly require intent and thus no further analysis is required. The Eighth Circuit in McIlroy v Dittmer64 stated this reasoning:

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61 Schindler, No. 83 Civ. 2186, slip op.

62 Id.


64 McIlroy, 732 F.2d at 102.
Section 4b(A) prohibits "cheat[ing]," "defraud[ing]," and "attempt[ing] to cheat or defraud." The words of the statute themselves negate any inference that Congress meant to proscribe unintentional acts under section 4b(A). Indeed, the words "cheat" and "defraud" themselves imply a degree of intentionality that would probably render the inclusion of "willfully" in Section 4b(A) superfluous. Establishing a violation of Section 4b(A) requires proof of something more than mere carelessness.65

A close reading of the statute does not support this view because "scienter-type" language, such as "knowingly," or "intentionally," is excluded.

Third, at least one court has looked beyond the mere words of the statute and has compared commodities fraud to common-law fraud.66

A common-law action for fraud requires a false representation of a material fact with knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is false. The false representation must be made with the intent to induce the other party to rely upon that representation. A fraud action under Section 4b(A) of the CEA is substantially the same.67

B. Cases Not Requiring Scienter

Just as some cases fail to explain their inclusion of scienter as an element of a commodities churning claim, some other cases fail to explain their exclusion of scienter.68 The Third Circuit, in Bowley v. Stotler & Co.,69 simply held that the definition of churning "includes two elements: control of an account by a broker, and excessive trading."70

In Drexel Burnham Lambert v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission71 the D.C. Circuit held that "reckless inattention to obvious dangers to a client's interests in arranging a purchase or sale for the client's account triggers liability under section 4b."72

65 Id.
66 Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985).
67 Id. at 789.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 644.
71 850 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
In so holding, the court implicitly rejected the theory that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, as the Supreme Court defined scienter in *Hochfelder*, is required for a section 4b violation.

In *Sall v G. H. Miller & Co.*, the court found that section 6b of the CEA encompassed actual fraud as well as constructive fraud and therefore held that "Congress did not intend § 4b(A) to cover only actions taken with intent to defraud."

In *Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder*, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that scienter is a requirement for a securities fraud violation. In *Gordon v Shearson Hayden, Stone, Inc.* the CFTC applied the analysis used in *Hochfelder*, and found that scienter is not an element of a commodities fraud violation.

V APPLICATION OF THE *Hochfelder* ANALYSIS TO COMMODITIES CHURNING CLAIMS

In *Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder*, the Supreme Court held that scienter is a requirement of securities fraud. However, the Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue of scienter in the context of commodities fraud. Since commodities fraud is often compared to securities fraud, it is logical to believe that when the Supreme Court finally addresses the issue, it will use a method of analysis similar to the analysis the Court used in *Hochfelder*.

In *Hochfelder*, the Supreme Court used the following two-step analysis to reach its conclusion: (1) examine the language of the relevant statute, and (2) examine the legislative history and other relevant authorities. This two-step analysis is typical of that used by the Court for statutory construction when the intent of Congress is less than clear.

### A. Language of the Relevant Statute

The first part of the *Hochfelder* test requires an examination of the language of the statute. Section 4b(A) of the CEA makes it unlawful for a member of a contract market to "defraud" an-
other. The common law definition of "fraud" includes both actual fraud and constructive fraud. Actual fraud requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff. Constructive fraud, however, has been consistently held not to require such intent. Further, in Securities Exchange Commission v Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., the Supreme Court presumed that Congress has not adopted the "technical" definition of fraud, which includes only actual fraud; rather, fraud is presumed to include constructive fraud. As the CFTC noted in Gordon v Shearson, Hayden, Store, Inc., this construction of the term "defraud" is consistent with the definition of fraud as defined in

associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts owning or holding membership in, or admitted to membership representation on, a contract market or given members' trading privileges thereon. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).


"Actual fraud consists in deceit, artifice, trick, design, some direct and active operation of the mind; it includes cases of the intentional and successful employment of any cunning, deception, or artifice used to circumvent or cheat another." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 594, 595 (5th ed. 1979); see also Perkins School v. Freeman, 741 F.2d 1503 (7th Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Clevenger, 733 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1984); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102; Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1976).


"[C]onstructive frauds are such acts or contracts as, though not originating in any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate a positive fraud or injury upon other persons, are yet, by their tendency to deceive or mislead other persons deemed equally reprehensible with actual fraud." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 660, 661 (6th ed. 1979).

Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889); see also Brazee v. Morris, 204 P.2d 475 (Ariz. 1949); Arkansas Valley Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Morgan, 229 S.W.2d 133 (Ark. 1950) (constructive fraud is a breach of either a legal or equitable duty, and does not necessarily involve any guilt, intent to deceive, or actual dishonesty of purpose); In re Arbuckle's Estate, 220 P.2d 950 (Calif. App. 1950) ("In its generic sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence and resulting in damage to another."); Sioux City v. Western Asphalt Paving Corp., 271 N.W. 624 (Iowa 1937); Loucks v. McCormick, 424 P.2d 555 (Kan. 1967) (constructive fraud is a breach of either a legal or equitable duty, and does not necessarily involve any guilt, intent to deceive, or actual dishonesty of purpose); Fire Assoc. of Philadelphia v. Vantine Paint & Glass Co., 133 N.W.2d 426 (N.D. 1965); Bank v. Board of Education, 111 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1953); Maxwell v. Land Developers, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) ("Constructive fraud may be established where there is a breach of legal or equitable duty, whether or not fraudulent intent be present."); Purcell v. Robertson, 8 S.E.2d 881 (W Va. 1940).

375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). ("The foregoing analysis of the judicial treatment of common law fraud reinforces our conclusion that Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates 'as a fraud or deceit' upon a client, did not intend to require proof of intent to injure and actual injury to the client."). But see Greenwood, 776 F.2d 785 (Greenwood is not representative of the more prevalent traditional view and seems to be an isolated case).
1936 when the CEA was enacted. At least one court has held scienter is an element of common law fraud in a commodities context. However, the more widely held view seems to be that common law fraud includes constructive fraud and thus requires no scienter.

Constructive fraud, however, applies only to parties having a fiduciary relationship. For fraud to exist, there must be a breach of the fiduciary duty with ensuing harm to the plaintiff. The cases have repeatedly recognized that futures commission merchants stand in a fiduciary relationship with their customers. The language of section 4b(A) also supports this conclusion.

Further support for this construction of the term "defraud" is found by viewing section 4b in its entirety. Section 4b(1)(A) makes it unlawful to "cheat or defraud." Section 4b(1)(B) makes it unlawful "willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report or statement." Section 4b(1)(C) makes it unlawful "willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive." (emphasis added). The Supreme Court stated, in United States v. Atchison, T & S.F Ry Co., that when attempting to interpret a statute, "the presence of a provision in the one part and its absence in the other is an argument against reading it as implied."

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94 Webster's International Dictionary 332 (2d ed. 1936), defines "fraud," when used in a legal context, to include both actual fraud and constructive fraud. Webster's treats the term "cheat" as synonymous with "defraud."

95 Greenwood, 776 F.2d at 789.


97 Fiduciary relationships include trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward, agent and principal, and attorney and client. A fiduciary is "under a duty not to profit at the expense of the other and not to enter into competition with him without his consent."

98 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2b (1959).

99 The words "futures commission merchant" shall mean and include individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery.

100 Section 6(b) applies only to persons who act "for or on behalf of any other person" involved in the making of future contracts.


104 220 U.S. 37, 44 (1922); see also U.S. v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773-74 (1979).
In *Hochfelder*, when the Supreme Court held that scienter was required for a securities fraud violation, it placed heavy emphasis on the phrase "manipulation or deceptive device." Manipulation is defined as a "series of transactions involving the buying or selling of a security for the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading or to raise or depress the price to induce the purchase or sale by others." "Manipulation," by definition, includes the element of intent. "Manipulation" or similar language does not appear in Section 4b(A) of the CEA, thus providing more evidence that Congress did not intend for scienter to be a required element of a commodities fraud claim.

**B. Legislative History of the CEA**

The second part of the *Hochfelder* test is an examination of the legislative history. The legislative history behind the CEA indicates that Congress was unwilling to require scienter as an element of commodities fraud. The first piece of legislation enacted to regulate commodities trading contained no antifraud provision. Once the need for an antifraud provision became apparent, legislation was rejected that would have unmistakably required scienter for a commodities fraud violation. The antifraud provision that Congress finally enacted was void of any language promoting scienter as a requirement of a commodities fraud claim.

Congress, on several occasions, had the opportunity to amend the CEA to clearly require scienter as an element of commodities fraud but declined to do so. When it amended the criminal (but not the civil) provisions of the CEA in 1978, Congress most clearly indicated its intent to exclude a scienter requirement for civil claims. If Congress intended to add a scienter requirement for civil claims, presumably it would have amended the civil provision to include the word "knowingly."

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105 *Hochfelder*, 425 U.S. at 197. "Use of the word 'manipulation' is especially significant."

106 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (5th ed. 1979); accord WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 724 (9th ed. 1983). But see Thel, supra note 81 at 378.

107 See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.

108 Grain Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 331, 42 Stat. 998 (1922); see supra note 46 and accompanying text.

109 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.

110 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.

111 See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.


113 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
CONCLUSION

Whether scienter is a requirement of a section 4b(A) commodities fraud violation will remain unsettled as long as the courts fail to apply the Hochfelder-type analysis in a commodities setting. The cases that have held that scienter is a required element of commodities churning\textsuperscript{114} are based on faulty logic or no logic at all. A thorough examination of the legislative history of section 6b of the CEA indicates that Congress has repeatedly refused to include scienter as an element of commodities fraud.\textsuperscript{115} On several occasions, Congress has had the opportunity to set the required mental state at scienter, but has steadfastly refused to do so for civil claims. Further, a careful review of the wording of sections 4b(1)(A), (B), and (C) of the CEA provides evidence that the scienter element is not found in Section 4b(1)(A).

Although commodities trading is often compared to securities trading, they involve wholly distinct statutory restrictions. There are, however, similarities between the two that facilitate the use of the Hochfelder analysis for a determination of the elements of a commodities churning claim. The use of the Hochfelder test leads inescapably to the conclusion that scienter is not an element of a commodities churning claim.

Harry B. Borders

\textsuperscript{114} See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{115} See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.