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The Americans with Disabilities Act and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable Accommodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts?

By Mary K. O’Melveny*

INTRODUCTION

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),¹ which took effect on July 26, 1992,² promises to significantly enhance employment opportunities for people with disabilities. The ADA has received broad support from both individuals³ and organizations⁴ working to remove barriers to the full employment of the disabled and includes many of the statutory protections for disabled workers contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.⁵ The ADA, however, is intended to reach more broadly than the

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² Id. at § 12111(5) (Employers with twenty-five or more employees are covered by the ADA as of July 26, 1992. Employers with fifteen to twenty-four employees have until July 26, 1994, to comply with the ADA.).


Rehabilitation Act by providing a "clear and comprehensive national mandate" 6 to eliminate discrimination against disabled workers and by setting forth "clear, strong, consistent and enforceable standards" 7 for equal treatment. In order for these standards to be met, the federal government must play a "central role" 8 in the enforcement of the ADA. 9

Labor unions 10 have been among the most vocal supporters of the ADA and the added benefits that the Act brings to their members. Unions recognize that the sweeping benefits contained in the ADA are consistent with the interests of all of the employees that they represent. Prior to the ADA's enactment, unions often sought improved health and safety protections in the workplace through the well-established collective bargaining process. Traditionally, unions used prohibitions against discrimination contained in their collective bargaining agreements and their contractual grievance procedures to protect the rights of employees with disabilities. The ADA provides an enhanced opportunity to continue these efforts by adding new statutory requirements designed to compel reluctant employers to provide equally safe and healthy working conditions for the disabled. As the number of workers with disabilities continues to grow, 11 these added requirements have become increasingly significant.

ADA. ADA specifically provides that, at a minimum, its protections shall be as substantial as those required by the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, the ADA does not preempt any federal, state or local law which provides equal or greater rights for individuals with disabilities than those established by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b).

6 H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 22; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (explaining the purpose behind the ADA).

7 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).

8 Id.

9 Id. § 12101(b)(3).

10 The AFL-CIO, for example, has been a major labor union proponent of the ADA. See AFL-CIO & GEORGE MEANY CENTER FOR LABOR STUDIES, INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE FOR TRAINING REPRESENTATIVES ON APPLICATION OF THE ADA 1 (1992).

11 During Congressional hearings on the ADA, it was recognized that the number of people with disabilities is steadily growing, and that many of these individuals suffer frequent job discrimination. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 30-34. The statute recognizes that 43 million people suffer from disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). The ADA protects not only those who are actually disabled, but also those who are "regarded" as having a disability, thus substantially increasing the number of individuals protected. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The number of workplace injuries is also dramatically increasing, causing many employees to join the ranks of the disabled. Each day 11,000 workers lose work time or must restrict their work activity due to serious injuries on the job. Charles Noble, Keeping OS HA's Feet to the Fire, TECHNOLOGY REV. 43, 44 (Feb-Mar. 1992). A recently released Public Health Service study documented job-related injuries in 1988 affecting one of every 15 U.S. workers. PHS Releases Report on Job-Related Injuries, 145 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D23 (DLR 1993), available in Westlaw, BNA-DLR databases (citing conclusions set forth in National Center for Health Statistics, HEALTH CONDITIONS AMONG THE CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, UNITED STATES 1988 (1993)).
Unfortunately, neither the language of the ADA itself nor the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s guidance on the ADA’s enforcement explicitly acknowledges the existence, or the possible importance, of the collective bargaining process as a way of maximizing the effectiveness of the Act. As a result, there has been a tendency on the part of some labor organizations, disability rights lobbyists and employers to assume that the interests of nondisabled and disabled union members are in conflict.\(^2\) Indeed, several areas of tension appear to exist between the obligations imposed by the ADA and the union’s role as a collective bargaining representative.

Congress gave virtually no guidance concerning how potential conflicts between the ADA and other labor relations statutes, such as the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),\(^3\) should be resolved. Furthermore, the regulations and technical assistance materials issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") since the ADA’s enactment have shed little light on the appropriate resolution of such conflicts.\(^4\) Following the passage of the ADA, the EEOC issued notice of proposed rulemaking on the relationship between the requirements of Title I of the ADA and the NLRA.\(^5\) In response, comments were received from the labor, employer and disability communities.\(^6\) When the EEOC issued its first set of regulations and interpretive guidance on the ADA, however, it deferred taking a position on this issue. In the preamble to its final rule, the Commission stated:

The comments that we received reflected a wide variety of views. For example, some commentators argued that it would always be an undue

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\(^2\) Such assumptions are based upon a lack of understanding of the ADA or on a lack of understanding of the historical efforts by organized labor to expand protections for disabled workers, as discussed above. Commentators from the differing perspectives have suggested varying means of resolving this debate. See, e.g., Eric H. Stahlhut, Playing the Trump Card: May an Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate under the ADA by Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obligation?, 9 THE LABOR LAWYER 71, 93-96 (Winter 1993); Joanne J. Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective Bargaining Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, DET. C. L. REV. 925, 954-71 (1991).


\(^4\) See ADA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 4, at III-16 (discussing the possibility of union and employer conflict but suggesting only that the union allow the employer to do whatever is required).


\(^6\) Id.
hardship for an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation that conflicted with the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Other commentators, however, argued that an accommodation's effect on an agreement should not be considered when assessing undue hardship.

Subsequently, the EEOC and the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") attempted to address these issues by working to draft and adopt a substantive "Memorandum of Understanding" that would provide the needed guidance. These efforts failed, however, and the NLRB General Counsel issued its own Memorandum to its field personnel on August 7, 1992. This Memorandum detailed some of the potential conflicts between the ADA and the NLRA and directed that any unfair labor practice charges raising ADA-related issues should be referred to its Division of Advice for review. The EEOC, while continuing to study the problem, has not yet issued any policy statements or other documents that would assist in resolving the identified areas of potential conflict.

The premise of this Article is that it is both possible and desirable to reconcile the tensions which exist between the ADA and the National Labor Relations Act, and its various state and local counterparts. Indeed, this Article will argue that the best, most readily available vehicle for doing so already exists—the labor-management relations dialogue known as the collective bargaining process.

I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADA AND EXISTING LABOR LAWS

The existence of potential conflicts between state and federal labor laws and the ADA stems from the failure of the drafters of the ADA to give adequate recognition to the unique role that unions play in the

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18 Id.

19 A draft of an enforcement guide was prepared by the EEOC staff at the end of 1992, however, and has been circulating as part of the EEOC's internal review process. Letter from Evan Kemp, Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, to Justin W. Dart, Jr., Chairman of the President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities (Nov. 25, 1992) (on file with author).
workplace. This role requires that each union take actions that advance the interests of all members of the bargaining unit while, at the same time, ensuring that the rights of individual employees are adequately protected.

Much state and federal legislation governing labor-management relations has recognized and defined this role of unions, as well as the employer's corresponding duties and obligations. The principal federal statute on collective bargaining is the NLRA, although other federal legislation, such as the Railway Labor Act and the Federal Labor Management and Employee Relations Act, also regulates labor-management relationships and the rights of represented employees. Additionally, many states have enacted legislation patterned after the NLRA in order to include state or local government workers whom the NLRA does not cover.

This Article will examine several ADA provisions which arguably conflict with the statutory requirements of the NLRA and with parallel state and local labor relations enactments. Although limited guidance exists to resolve these potential points of conflict, it should be obvious that Congress did not intend to silently overrule large segments of long-standing and crucial labor legislation in its efforts to accommodate disabled individuals in the workplace.

EEOC Regulations issued early in 1992 provide that one defense against a charge of ADA-prohibited discrimination will be to assert that the action was required by "another Federal law or regulation [that] prohibits an action (including the provision of a particular reasonable accommodation) that would otherwise be required." Since Congress

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20 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, §§ 1-10 (West 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.01-111.19 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.01-17 (West 1993).
22 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1988). "Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." Id. § 152.
23 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988). "Each employee shall have the right to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain without fear of penalty or reprisal and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right." Id. § 7102.
24 Some state employees are also covered by executive orders. Furthermore, many county and local government employees are covered by local ordinances. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 030(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993) (Kentucky Fire Fighters Collective Bargaining Act permitting fire fighters in cities with population over 300,000 to engage in collective bargaining and those in cities with lesser populations to petition for collective bargaining authority).
was aware of the existence of statutes such as the NLRA when it enacted the ADA, the NLRA should arguably be included in the "federal laws" defense category. Such a "federal laws" defense would recognize those limited situations where employers and union representatives will have to violate either the NLRA or the ADA because it will be impossible to comply with both.

Recognition of the NLRA's important protections in evaluating ADA rights and obligations is particularly important because of the unique role played by unions as the employees' agent on matters affecting terms and conditions of employment. This role leads to a corresponding duty of fair representation. Collective bargaining representatives owe a duty to each member of the bargaining unit to "serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise their discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." This duty exists at all stages of the collective bargaining process—negotiation, administration and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.

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26 The Union comments presented to the EEOC on this topic specifically recommended that § 1630.15(e) "make clear that an obligation to comply with, among other laws, the national labor relations act, would also be a defense to a charge of discrimination [under] the ADA. The national labor relations act [sic], of course, requires employers and bargaining agents to negotiate over the terms and conditions of employment." See Report of the Labor and Employment Law Section of the American Bar Association on the Proposed EEOC Rules on the Americans With Disabilities Act, April 12, 1991, pp. 70-71 [hereinafter Labor and Employment Law Section Report]. This position, in fact, has been advanced by the NLRB General Counsel. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *2 (explaining that actions required by other federal laws would be a defense to an ADA challenge).


28 See Electrical Workers (IBEW) v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979) ("A union must represent fairly the interests of all bargaining-unit members during the negotiations, administration, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements."); see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1991) ("Indeed, we have repeatedly noted that the Vaca v. Sipes standard applies to 'challenges leveled not only at a union's contract administration and enforcement efforts but at its negotiation activities as well.'" (quoting Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 743 (1988)); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 568-69 (1976).

In Vaca "we accept[ed] the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion," and our ruling that the union had not breached its duty of fair representation in not pressing the employee's case to the last step of the grievance process stemmed from our evaluation of the manner in which the union had handled the grievance in its earlier stages. (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191).
In the context of the ADA, this judicially imposed obligation means that a union may not arbitrarily pursue the rights of a disabled member in a manner that ignores the interests of nondisabled members. Likewise, the union may not discriminate against a member with a disability merely because other members are antagonistic to that individual. Presumably, if a union's actions are fair, impartial and taken in good faith, relatively wide discretion will be given to its ADA-related efforts.

The NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum asserts that the NLRB plans to analyze employees' unfair labor practice charges that implicate the ADA by using "traditional principles" governing the duty of fair representation. Any union faced with a member's demand for an accommodation under the ADA must not pursue the rights of a disabled member in a manner that ignores the interests of nondisabled members. The union may not discriminate against a member with a disability merely because other members are antagonistic to that individual. Presumably, if a union's actions are fair, impartial and taken in good faith, relatively wide discretion will be given to its ADA-related efforts.

The NLRB has issued two rulings on requests for advice in unfair labor practice charges involving a union's opposition to a proposed accommodation under the ADA since issuance of the General Counsel's Memorandum. The first, Local 876, United Food and Commercial Workers (The Kroger Company), Case 7-CB-9518 (June 23, 1993) (on file with the National Labor Relations Board), held that the Railroad Labor Act "expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining representative of a craft or a class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them." See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 343 (1964) ("If the action is one arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and is a case controlled by federal law."); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953) ("That the authority of bargaining representatives, however, is not absolute is recognized in Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co. in connection with comparable provisions of the Railway Act."); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemens, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944) ("The right asserted by Petitioner which is derived from the duty imposed by the Railway Labor Act as a bargaining representative, is a federal right. The case is therefore one arising under a law regulating commerce of which the federal courts are given jurisdiction."); cf. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local No. 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1956) (ruling that employees' challenge of collective-bargaining agreement provisions concerning seniority that had been agreed to by union representatives was based upon breach of contract and did not involve the NLRA or any federal law).

Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 111 S. Ct. at 1130 ("If the union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a 'wide range of reasonableness' as to be irrational."). Thus, mere negligence is not sufficient to charge a union with breach of its duty of fair representation. See United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990) (stating that "mere negligence, even in the enforcement of a collective-bargaining agreement, would not state a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation.").
accommodation under the ADA that would impair the rights of other members in the unit is placed in a difficult, though not an impossible, position. The best way to “accommodate” the competing and conflicting interests involved is to insure that full communication exists at all points in the ADA dialogue process, so that the union can play a constructive role in suggesting alternative accommodations while limiting adverse effects on the interests of the other workers. Resolving ADA issues in ways that are in harmony with collective bargaining rights and that result in solutions that will have the support of all members of the collective bargaining unit enables all employees to receive the maximum protection of both the ADA and the NLRA collective bargaining process.

In order for a union to carry out its fair representation duties, the NLRA ensures that the union will be able to elicit information from, and insist on dialogue with, the employer whenever terms and conditions of employment are at issue. Without these crucial communications, the union cannot fulfill its obligations to the workers it represents, including those workers with disabilities.

II. THE AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ADA AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTES

Hiring and personnel practices which discriminate against qualified individuals with mental or physical disabilities are unlawful. Employ-
ers must make “reasonable” efforts to accommodate such disabled workers so that they can perform the “essential functions” of a position unless doing so would constitute an “undue hardship.” Required accommodations may involve changes in job structure, work procedures, or workplace environment that will enable disabled employees to enjoy the same work opportunities that are available to nondisabled employees. While each potentially “reasonable” accommodation will vary according to the employee’s individual circumstances and the nature of the work, virtually every proposed accommodation will effect some change in the working conditions for the disabled employee and often for other employees as well.

A. Proposed Accommodations Affecting Terms and Conditions of Employment Within the Bargaining Unit

The NLRA imposes upon employers a duty to bargain with the union over “wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.” This duty is the crucial component of the collective bargaining relationship. Collective bargaining assumes an ongoing, cooperative relationship and is premised upon a good faith willingness to reach agreement on employment matters. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA requires an employer to notify the union of any proposed “material, substantial or significant” changes in working conditions and to bargain with the union over such proposals. Failure to do so constitutes a refusal to bargain and a

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35 Id. § 12111(9).
36 This language is set forth in § 8(d) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). Section 9(a) also delineates “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment” as mandatory bargaining subjects. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). In NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958), the Court concluded that § 8(d) and § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), were to be read together to establish a mandatory bargaining obligation whenever wages, hours, or conditions of employment were at issue. The Court also recognized an area of “permissive” bargaining subjects, about which the parties were “free to bargain or not bargain, and to agree or not to agree.” Wooster, 356 U.S. at 349.
37 [The NLRA] does not require that the parties agree; but it does require that they negotiate in good faith with the view of reaching an agreement if possible; and mere discussion with the representatives of employees, with a fixed resolve on the part of the employer not to enter into any agreement with them, even as to matters as to which there is no disagreement, does not satisfy its provisions. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 1940) (emphasis added).
38 NLRB General Counsel’s Memorandum, supra note 17, at *2 (citing Lamousse, 259 N.L.R.B. 37, 48-49 (1981)).
violation of the NLRA, regardless of the employer's good faith. Regardless of the employer's good faith. Whenever proposed changes will "vitally affect" the terms and conditions of the employee's employment within the bargaining unit, these changes must be presented to the union for negotiation.\(^3\) Normally, the courts will defer to the judgment of the National Labor Relations Board in determining if a statutory duty to bargain exists.\(^4\) Bargaining history and current industrial practices are among the areas scrutinized in determining this duty.\(^2\)

When a statutory duty to bargain exists, an employer cannot make any changes in the terms and conditions of employment that would constitute labor contract "modifications" without the consent of the union.\(^5\) Failure to obtain the union's consent to such changes violates section 8(d) of the NLRA.\(^6\) The NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum soundly reaffirms the employer's duty to bargain with the union when proposing ADA accommodations that would effect any significant change in working conditions:

> [I]f an employer unilaterally implements a "reasonable accommodation" for a disabled employee or otherwise alters its employment practices so as to change wages, hours or other working conditions, its action may give rise to a Section 8(a)(5) charge.\(^7\)

Thus, any "change that is inconsistent with an established employment practice such as a seniority system, defined job classifications or a disability

\(3\) See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). "A refusal to negotiate in fact as to any subject which is within § 8(d), and about which the union seeks to negotiate, violates § 8(a)(5) though the employer has every desire to reach agreement with the union upon an over-all collective agreement and earnestly and in all good faith bargains to that end." Id.

\(4\) See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971) (affirming the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the NLRB's holding that changes in an employer's unilateral modification of retired employees' retirement benefits, which are embraced by the bargaining obligation, constitutes an unfair labor practice).

\(5\) See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 501 (1979) ("[A]s for the argument that m-plant food prices and services are too trivial to qualify as mandatory subjects, the Board has a contrary view, and we have no basis for rejecting it.").

\(6\) Id. at 499-500 (1979).

\(7\) Katz, 369 U.S. at 743; Allied Chem., 404 U.S. at 179.

\(8\) NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *1 ([N]either party may alter terms and conditions in the agreement without the consent of the other party. Moreover, section 8(d) specifically authorizes parties to refuse to ‘discuss or agree to any modification’ during the term of the contract.").
There are a few accommodations which are not generally thought to constitute a substantial change in working conditions. These "non-substantial" changes involve an employer's expenditure of funds to make minor additions to, or alterations of, work space or equipment in order to enable the disabled individual to perform the essential functions of the position.\(^47\) Specific examples provided by the NLRB General Counsel include posting notices in braille and putting a desk on blocks.\(^48\)

Although such purely physical, individual accommodations may have little to no effect upon the rights of the other workers or upon general working conditions within the bargaining unit, they do affect the terms and conditions of employment of the worker with a disability. Thus, the union should still be included in discussions about such proposed accommodations in order to ensure that the employee's rights are protected and to reduce the chance for conflict. Such ongoing dialogue best serves the purposes of both the NLRA and the ADA.

Moreover, individualized negotiations between the employer and an individual employee over even minor changes that involve a mandatory bargaining subject require negotiation with the union and are precluded by section 9(a) of the NLRA.\(^49\) Thus, even if the proposed accommodation does not affect other members' interests, the union should be allowed the opportunity to participate in the discussion in order to reduce any possible conflicts which may otherwise arise.\(^50\)

\(^{46}\) Id. at *2.

\(^{47}\) Id.

\(^{48}\) A unilateral "reasonable accommodation" would violate Section 8(a)(5) only if it affects a "material, substantial or significant" change in working conditions. Accommodations such as putting a desk on blocks, providing a ramp, adding braille signage or providing an interpreter, which allow disabled employees to perform the same job in a fashion different than other employees, generally would not be changes in terms and conditions of employment. In that case an employer would have no duty to bargain over the implementation of such accommodations.

\(^{49}\) Id. at *3 (An employer and employee are authorized to adjust grievances "but only as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract [and] the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present to such adjustment." (quoting § 9(a) of the NLRA).

\(^{50}\) The benefits of this cautious approach are evidenced when considering the pre-employment selection process. The ADA, of course, protects applicants for employment as well as existing employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. III 1991). With the exception of the hiring hall arena, where the pool of prospective employees are already in the union,
tion by the union may help to ensure that the accommodation is adequate while not placing an undue burden on other workers.

B. "Direct Dealing" Between the Employer and the Disabled Employee

The EEOC Regulations interpreting the ADA describe the accommodations process as an ongoing "interactive" dialogue between the employer and a disabled worker that is aimed at developing alternative ways ("reasonable accommodations") for that employee to perform the essential functions of a particular job without causing undue hardship for the employer. In a unionized workplace, such a worker-employer dialogue is not permitted unless the collective bargaining representative has declined the opportunity to participate in the process. The rationale is simple—if an employer were free to make "special deals" with individual employees, the collective bargaining process would quickly be undermined.

Direct dealings between an employer and a represented employee are subject to both the NLRA and the applicable collective bargaining agreement. Thus, an employer who deals directly with a represented employee about terms and conditions of employment violates sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the NLRA. Moreover, an employer cannot reach an agreement with an individual employee that would result in a violation of the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement. There is no reason to treat the ADA's passage as requiring a different rule, and there are many reasons not to do so. Thus, the employer needs to deal with

an employer's duty to bargain with the union over terms and conditions of employment is far more limited when would-be employees are involved. However, if the selection process includes a proposed accommodation which would "impact on members of the bargaining unit," failure to bargain with the union about it may lead to a § 8(a)(5) violation. See id. at *4 n.5.

EEOC regulations encourage the employer to "initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(c)(3) (1992).

NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *3; see, e.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1944) (agreeing with the NLRB that Medo Photo violated the essential principles of collective bargaining and engaged in unfair labor practices by negotiating directly with the employees and disregarding the bargaining representative); Standard Fittings Co. v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 1311, 1319 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Standard Fittings has committed unfair labor practices in refusing to bargain with the union and in appealing directly to its workers.").

An individual employee negotiating on her own may not possess the familiarity
the employee through his union when searching for a reasonable accommodation that might impact on the terms and the conditions of employment. Otherwise, any "dialogue" about matters covered by the ADA that excludes the employee’s collective bargaining representative will run afoul of the NLRA. The NLRB General Counsel’s Memorandum acknowledges the importance of union involvement: "[A]n employer that arranges a reasonable accommodation with an employee which would change working conditions without negotiating with the affected union may be liable for ‘direct dealing’ with the employee” in violation of the NLRA.

Involving the union in the accommodations discussion can significantly increase the likelihood that the selected accommodation will be the most reasonable under the circumstances. Union involvement neither prevents nor discourages the employee from active participation in the dialogue. Indeed, the employee seeking an accommodation should be involved as well. However, the assistance and involvement of a collective bargaining agent empowered to act on the employee’s behalf will likely increase the significance of the accommodations request in the eyes of the employer and place additional pressure on the employer to find the most reasonable solution.

To facilitate the union’s participation in the accommodations discussion, unions and employers might establish joint task forces or committees that focus specifically on ADA issues and routinely discuss facts and likely solutions whenever an employee requests an accommodation. Such committees would quickly develop

with the bargaining unit or the knowledge of past grievances or settlements which might apply to the accommodation being requested. The individual does not have the same authority to request relevant information from the employer to aid in reaching agreement and lacks the standing to seek NLRB enforcement of such requests. NLRB General Counsel’s Memorandum, supra note 17, at *3.

There is a substantial body of precedent establishing that an employer cannot exclude the union from conferences regarding employee grievances and complaints. See, e.g., Carbonex Coal Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1313 (1982) (holding that changing hours pursuant to an employee request without giving the union notice or an invitation to bargain violates the NLRA).

Id. at *3; cf. NLRB v. American Mfg. Co. of Tex., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965) (affirming the NLRB’s ruling that the employer violated the NLRA by failing to bargain and by making unilateral changes.).

As noted in the General Counsel’s Memorandum and the EEOC Regulations, the ADA does not require selection of the “best” accommodation, only one which is reasonable. NLRB General Counsel’s Memorandum, supra note 17, at *5 n.17; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1992) (an employer must make a reasonable accommodation unless the accommodation creates undue hardship); 29 C.F.R. § 1630(o) (1992) (defining the term “reasonable accommodation” and providing examples).
"expertise" in evaluating and recommending particular accommodations and in searching for the solution that would have the least disruptive impact on other contractual rights or existing workplace practices. Furthermore, the establishment of such committees would demonstrate to all workers a firm commitment by management and the union to make the needs of workers with disabilities a paramount concern in the workplace.

C. Proposed Accommodations Adversely Affecting the Rights of Other Bargaining Unit Members

The most difficult conflict between obligations and rights established by the ADA and the NLRA will occur where a proposed accommodation has consequences for the rights of the other bargaining unit members. Proposed accommodations which may affect rights guaranteed by an existing collective bargaining agreement can take several forms. There is no question that the NLRA requires that such accommodations be the subject of discussions with the union. If the rights of the other bargaining-unit employees will be adversely affected, the union cannot agree to such a proposal without violating its duty of fair representation to those workers under the NLRA.

1. The Role of Seniority

Traditional collective bargaining agreements provide that seniority rights may determine, or play a significant role in determining, an employee's eligibility for particular jobs, assignments, schedules, transfers and promotions. Any proposal to accommodate a disabled employee by providing a job or benefit that would normally go to the most senior employee will likely infringe upon rights guaranteed by the collective bargaining contract to another member of the bargaining unit.

57 Present EEOC Regulations state that reasonable accommodations under the ADA may include, but are not limited to, "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modifications of equipment or devices; appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies; the provision of qualified readers or interpreters; and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(o)(2)(ii).

58 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) ("For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. ")

Seniority rights are some of the most historically significant rights enjoyed by union-represented employees because they often guarantee job security. Seniority rights provide a crucial protection in the face of "downsizing" or plant closings by ensuring that an employee is protected against layoffs or is permitted to transfer to another position or location rather than face unemployment. In addition, seniority rights offer a neutral, predictable vehicle for making employment decisions when competing needs or interests are involved. A seniority system provides all employees, including employees with disabilities, with important protections from management's favoritism, bias or arbitrariness on matters such as promotions, assignments, or other opportunities. Because seniority protections play such a central role, accommodations that threaten or impair seniority rights could disrupt the entire collective bargaining relationship. Additionally, pitting worker against worker fails to promote the goals of the ADA or serve the needs of the employees that the ADA was intended to protect.

2. Areas of Friction

The most likely areas of conflict between ADA compliance obligations and the rights established by the collective bargaining process concern the following ADA-endorsed accommodations. First, the employer could assign the disabled worker to a "vacant" position to which more senior employees would have bidding rights or to which employees on layoff status would have recall rights. Second, the employer could create a "new" or "restructured" position without bargaining with the union about duties, performance standards, benefits, or similar matters. Third, the employer could offer the disabled worker

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59 This accommodation is discussed in the House Report on the ADA, which notes that an employer can accommodate a disabled employee through reassignment to a vacant position but need not "bump" another employee from the job to create a vacancy. H.R. Rep. No. 485, pt. 1, supra note 3, at 63.

60 Job restructuring was discussed extensively by Congress as a means of providing a reasonable accommodation. See S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1989) (Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources) (defining job restructuring as "modifying a job so that a person with a disability can perform the essential functions of the position"); H.R. Rep. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 62 (means of job restructuring include "eliminating nonessential elements of the job; redelegating assignments; changing assignments with another employee; and redesigning procedures for task accomplishment"). Previously, employers had not been required to create "new" positions as an accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.701-709 (1992), which applies to federal agencies and defines a "qualified handicapped person" as one
a different position with, for example, more favorable hours, schedules, or "light" duty assignments that would normally be open to bidding based upon seniority status. Finally, the employer could reassign job duties to other bargaining-unit employees in a way that would increase their workload or otherwise effect a substantial change in their working conditions.

In addressing potential conflicts between proposed accommodations and existing collective bargaining agreement provisions under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the courts generally ruled that modification of contract provisions was not required if the provisions were the result of a bona fide seniority system. It is unclear, however, whether the ADA contemplates similar deference, particularly since the ADA provides as examples of accommodations types of accommodations governed by traditional seniority criteria.

who can, with or without reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f). Thus, this area of the debate will focus on when a restructured job becomes a "new" position.

An employer is not required to promote an employee into a vacant position. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 60, at 31-32 ("[B]umping another employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not required."); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 63.

See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 3, at 62 (discussing various approaches to job modification, including eliminating nonessential assignments, redelegating tasks, exchanging assignments with other employees and redesigning job procedures); see also Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 (D. Md. 1985) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not require job reassignment). An argument that the ADA does not require job reassignment will not succeed because the statute specifically suggests reassignment as an example of a reasonable accommodation.

These decisions involved proposed assignments to light duty jobs or other positions that the collective bargaining agreement required to be given to employees with more seniority. See, e.g., Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that a light duty assignment would conflict with bona fide seniority provision reserving jobs for employees with five years of seniority); Daubert v. United States Postal Service, 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that an employee who did not qualify under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act could be discharged pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement); Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1250-51 (6th Cir. 1985) (job restructuring); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 789-80 (1st Cir. 1989) (reassignment to vacant position).

Congress used the term "undue hardship," taken from the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988), to define a defense to the ADA's reasonable accommodation duty. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The concept of "undue hardship" in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act has been given a significantly broader interpretation than, for example, its use in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988), to describe a "de minimus" defense as failure to make an accommodation on religious grounds. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that an employer was not required to accommodate a Jewish employee by giving him Saturday off, because it was more than
Although the House and Senate committee reports suggest that the terms of collective bargaining agreements are "relevant" to the determination of whether an accommodation is "reasonable," Congress did not address this issue directly. Instead, the reports suggest that employers and unions agree to the ADA "override" language, which would vest the employer with the discretion to "take all actions necessary" to comply with the ADA. This simplistic proposal, however, would be a poor and problem-ridden substitute for an ongoing dialogue between all of the parties affected by an ADA accommodation request.

D. The Duty to Provide Information versus the ADA's "Confidentiality" Provisions

The ADA has various confidentiality provisions that could create potential conflicts with the rights guaranteed by the NLRA. For example, as the bargaining representative, a union is entitled to all "relevant" information that impacts on its bargaining duties. Such information is deemed to be an essential part of the collective bargaining process. The ADA, however, prohibits an employer from releasing medical information concerning an employee's disability to anyone outside a very a "de minimis cost"). Congress specifically stated that "undue hardship in the ADA is intended to convey a significant, as opposed to a de minimis or insignificant obligation on the part of employers." H.R. Rep. No. 485, pt. 3, supra note 3, at 40.

66 Id.
67 Failure to furnish such information to the union is an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1947) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees "). See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956) (stating that employers have an obligation to furnish relevant information to a union during contract negotiations); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967) (noting obligation to furnish information extends past contract negotiations to all "labor-management relations during the term of an agreement").
68 See NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F.2d 593, 594 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955) (noting unions cannot represent employees effectively without information that is "necessary to the proper discharge of the duties of the bargaining agent"). If the employer's refusal to provide information prevents the union from being able to represent its members, the employer is preventing the operation of the collective bargaining process. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967) (holding that an employer has a general obligation to provide relevant information that is needed by a bargaining representative). But see Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 317-20 (1979) (stating that a union's request for relevant information does not always predominate over other legitimate interests).
limited "need to know" group.\textsuperscript{69} Such information must be maintained in segregated files.\textsuperscript{70} A literal interpretation of these provisions will not allow a union to effectively carry out its function of processing grievances on behalf of represented employees, including the disabled worker. Absent such information, the union might be unable to determine whether, or how, a proposed accommodation might affect other employees in the unit, or whether an employer's refusal to provide an accommodation was based on justified, ADA criteria. This information will clearly be important if the union intends to assert that a failure to accommodate is a violation of a contractual nondiscrimination clause.

An employer's refusal to provide the information to the union hampers the union's ability to pursue the grievance process and arguably violates the NLRA. In considering this issue, the NLRB General Counsel concluded that the NLRB would balance a union's request for "relevant" information against an employer's "legitimate claim" of confidentiality.\textsuperscript{71} The NLRB "will direct the parties to bargain over means to accommodate both interests."\textsuperscript{72}

Absent the ADA's restriction on the release of medical or other disability-related information, several factors would operate to determine the balance between the competing demands of statutory entitlement and privacy rights: (1) an employee may affirmatively "waive" her privacy rights and consent to the release of confidential data; (2) such a waiver may be implied whenever an employee has placed her medical condition

\textsuperscript{70} 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14.
\textsuperscript{71} NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *3.
\textsuperscript{72} Id. The Board already engages in such balancing when considering unfair labor practice charges involving information requests that allegedly involve confidential matters. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314-20 (1979) (holding that a company does not always have to disclose relevant, requested information when bargaining in good faith with a union). The burden is on the employer to demonstrate that specific harm will result from disclosure of otherwise relevant records. An employer may not simply refuse to disclose records because it prefers to keep them confidential, or because it sets forth a blanket assertion of privilege. See WCC Radio, Inc. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 511, 515 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) (enforcing 282 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1987) and holding that a court must "weigh the competing interests of the employer and union in the requested information"); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418 v. NLRB (Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.), 711 F.2d 348, 358-63 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that an appropriate balance must be struck between the interests of employers and unions); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 474-76 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that a union can waive its right to relevant information during settlement negotiations and thus be estopped from prosecuting an alleged violation when the company refuses a later request).
at issue in challenging some action or omission by the employer; and (3) the union representative may agree to limited confidentiality restrictions on the use of the information released in order to assure that it can pursue its statutory obligations, while at the same time avoiding unnecessary disclosure.73

The EEOC’s Technical Assistance Manual has specifically noted that the ADA’s limitations on the release of confidential information do not apply in circumstances where “other” federal laws “require disclosure of relevant medical information.”74 Including the NLRA and related labor statutes within this category of “other” federal laws would result in the harmonious interpretation of both statutory schemes. By allowing union representatives to actively participate in the accommodation decision, the employer and the disabled worker will receive the advantage of additional input and guidance in selecting the most reasonable accommodation. This participation should also significantly reduce the number of grievances, legal disputes and unfair labor practice charges.

E. Determinations of “Essential” Job Functions

Collective bargaining agreements sometimes contain negotiated job descriptions. To be “qualified” under the ADA, however, an employee with a disability need only be able to perform the “essential functions” of a position, not every function.75 The requisite reasonable accommodation which must be provided is only directed to the key functions, as defined in the ADA, not to the ancillary duties of the position, regardless of whether or not the job has traditionally involved additional duties.76

73 The NLRB has held, for example, that medical information must be released when it is to be used in processing grievances. See Howard Univ., 290 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1988); LaGuardia Hosp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1455 (1982). The Board has also upheld the release of redacted files and files that have been the subject of a specific employee waiver of any privacy interests. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 368, 378 (1980).

74 ADA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 6.5, at VI-12. EEOC Regulations provide that confidential medical information may not be used for any purpose “inconsistent” with the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(2) (1992). Several unions submitted comments on the EEOC’s proposed Regulations and specifically recommended the addition of specific language recognizing the right of collective bargaining representatives to gain access to such data “where it is necessary for purposes of representing members of the collective bargaining unit, including any disabled employee hired by the employer.” Labor and Employment Law Section Report, supra note 26, at 66-67.

75 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), (n).

76 Essential functions are “fundamental job duties,” excluding “the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).
Congress cautioned that the terms of applicable collective bargaining agreements may be "relevant" to the determination of a job's "essential functions." Thus, any process to change job descriptions contained in collective bargaining agreements or job functions traditionally subject to negotiations between the union and the employer must result from discussion and agreement between the union and employer.

Presumably, if an employer planned to evaluate or reassess its collectively bargained job descriptions in order to determine "essential functions" for purposes of ADA compliance, the new evaluation would not be binding on the union unless the union agreed to any change. Moreover, to the extent that negotiated job descriptions have been used to establish wages, benefits, or other terms and conditions of employment, potential difficulties arise in accounting for duties or responsibilities that have been added to the load of the nondisabled workers in order to accommodate the disabled employee. As noted earlier, any significant alteration of such duties would constitute a change in employment terms and conditions, which must be bargained for with the union.

III. THE "UNDUE HARDSHIP" DEFENSE

An employer is not required to accommodate an employee if doing so would create an "undue hardship." An undue hardship is defined as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense" when considered in light of its overall cost, the financial resources of the employer, and the nature of the business. Citing House and Senate reports, EEOC Regulations define an undue hardship as any action that would be

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78 The NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 19, at *3 cites an employer's change in "defined job classifications" as an example of a change which must be the subject of bargaining under Section 8(d) of the NLRA.

79 Problems may also arise if an evaluation is conducted by interviewing individual employees without informing the union of the discussion, particularly if the employer plans to use the results of the survey to change terms and conditions of employment. See, e.g., Marriott Corp., Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurant Div., 264 N.L.R.B. 432 (1982).


"unduly costly, extensive, substantial or disruptive or that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business." The burden of proof clearly lies with the employer to show undue hardship.

Arguably, an undue hardship exists when the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement clash with a proposed accommodation. Congress explicitly recognized that collectively bargained rights may help in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable or poses an "undue hardship." Thus, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources Report on the ADA states:

The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant in determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable. For example, if a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to that job.

Additionally, EEOC Regulations recognize that "an employer could demonstrate that a particular accommodation would be unduly disruptive of its other employees or the functions of its business [and that] [t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant to this determination." The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual, for example, gives an illustrative scenario involving a worker with a deteriorated spinal disc condition who seeks reassignment to a vacant clerical job. "If the collective bargaining agreement has specific seniority lists and requirements governing each craft, it might be an undue hardship to reassign this person if others had seniority for the clerk's job."

29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p). Obviously, such matters may be substantially interrelated.


See id., see also H.R. Rep. No. 485, pt. 1, supra note 3, at 63 (containing identical language, but adding that "the [collective bargaining] agreement would not be determinative on the issue").


ADA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 3.9, at III-16.
consult with the union and try to work out an acceptable accommodation.”  

Congress also noted that any terms of a collective bargaining agreement that are “inconsistent” with the obligations of the ADA should neither affect the employer’s duty to comply with the ADA, nor be used to accomplish what the ADA would otherwise prohibit the employer from doing. The NLRA does not protect contract terms that violate the ADA on their face. Few collective bargaining agreements, however, contain provisions that would directly discriminate against employees protected by the ADA. Thus, the ADA-NLRA tension will likely arise where the proposed accommodation conflicts with “neutral” contractual rights.

It is not likely that Congress intended to ignore or override long-established, facially neutral worker protections, such as seniority rights, by including the language concerning discriminatory contract provisions in the ADA. Such a conclusion is at odds with Congress’ explicit recognition that such rights must be factored into the “undue hardship” determination. Neither seniority rights nor other collectively bargained rights can fairly be said to be the “cause” of any act which violates the ADA. At most, the existence of such rights requires that the parties return to the “drawing board” to consider accommodations that will be less disruptive of existing labor and employee relations.

An accommodation that alters or impairs seniority-based decisions such as shift assignments, transfers, or promotional progression can potentially impact on every employee at a work site or in a job group. While the ADA does not contain any specific protection for bona fide

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87 Id. This suggestion is offered “since both the employer and the union are covered by the ADA’s requirements.” Id. However, it is followed by the note that “employers may find it helpful” to negotiate ADA override provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Id.

88 S. Rep. No. 116, supra note 60, at 32. EEOC Regulations explain that “contractual or other arrangement[s],” including collective bargaining agreements, may not be used to subject a “qualified applicant or employee with a disability to discrimination” that the ADA prohibits. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6(a) (1992).

89 NLRB General Counsel’s Memorandum, supra note 17, at *3.

90 A party would have no right under the NLRA to insist on adherence to contract terms that are, on their face, violative of the ADA. On the other hand, if the contract provision relied on is neutral on its face, a party may argue that it should be entitled to rely on its Section 8(d) right to refuse to discuss or agree to a proposed accommodation, inconsistent with that provision, if an adequate alternative arrangement existed that would not conflict with the collective bargaining agreement.

Id.

91 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
seniority systems, the ADA also does not provide for any "affirmative action" obligations on the employer, such as hiring preferences or goals. An employer is not required to "prefer applicants [or employees] with disabilities over other applicants [and employees] on the basis of disability." Instead, the employer simply must ensure that a disabled employee does not suffer job discrimination because of the disability. Thus, to the extent that a proposed accommodation results in preferential treatment for the disabled employee over the long-established rights of other, nondisabled employees, such an accommodation poses an "undue hardship" and is not required by the ADA.

Congress was clear that an employer could continue to establish job and performance standards, impose discipline, and take any other employment-related actions as long as the result of those actions did not disadvantage the disabled worker because of her disability. Contractually and statutorily mandated collective bargaining rights should be considered to be of equal importance. In the absence of any statutory obligation to "prefer" disabled employees or applicants over other employees, seniority rights can frequently be demonstrated to be directly related to job qualifications. As noted by the EEOC in its Interpretive Guidance to its implementing regulations: "[The regulations are] not intended to limit the ability of covered entities to choose and maintain a qualified workforce. Employers can continue to use job-related criteria to select qualified employees, and can continue to hire employees who can perform the essential functions of the job."

Longevity is a common, legitimate qualification for a position and may, at least, bear a significant relationship to an employee's ability to perform a job. A proposed accommodation that will potentially place an employee with a disability in a position normally held by the most senior employees may, in fact, indicate that the employee is not "qualified" for that job due to an insufficient level of skill or experience to perform it. Even if seniority were not deemed to be an "essential" or job-related criterion, there is no doubt that reaching an accommodation with a disabled employee by ignoring seniority rights will cause a deterioration in co-worker relationships with possible, corresponding, adverse effects on morale, productivity, and efficiency. There is no reason to risk such

93 Id. at 55-56.
94 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.4 ("Interpretative Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act").
95 EEOC Regulations reject the defense of undue hardship where "disruption" to employees results from "fear or prejudice" rather than the result of the accommodation,
results when it is possible, through use of the established collective bargaining process, to negotiate an accommodation that will have the full support of co-workers and will serve the needs of the disabled employee.

That the ADA is not an "affirmative action" statute in the traditional sense is significant when evaluating the potential conflicts between collective bargaining rights and the employer's accommodation duty. While employers should certainly evaluate their workplaces and job definitions with a view toward ADA compliance issues, no particular actions need be taken in advance of the time that a disabled employee makes known her need for a reasonable accommodation. For example, there is no requirement that the employer "set aside" certain jobs or groups of jobs for occupancy by workers with disabilities. In fact, such an action might itself violate the ADA by resulting in the "classification" of jobs based upon disabilities or the "segregation" of disabled workers into particular work areas or lines of progression.

Reasonable accommodation, however, is an affirmative obligation under the ADA. This obligation is situation-specific, though, in that the accommodations should be made on an individual basis. Providing an accommodation that is reasonable under the particular circumstances will involve time, attention and probably the expenditure of funds, yet the result of these efforts will not necessarily be applicable to any other situation. This individualized process underscores the need to carefully consider every aspect of the proposed accommodation, including its impact on the rights of other workers in the facility. Such careful consideration will ensure that the final decision achieves the purposes of the ADA, including the avoidance of "undue hardship."

or where a "negative impact" on co-worker morale is not related to the co-workers' ability to perform their jobs. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d). See also ADA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 3.9.5, at III-15 (stating that restructuring of a job which results in a "heavier workload" for co-workers may constitute an undue hardship, but that objections based on "feel[ing] uncomfortable" around the worker with a disability would not).


The ADA prohibits "limiting, segregating or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities, or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1).
IV COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT LANGUAGE

The legislative history of the ADA suggests that Congress believed that conflicts between ADA obligations and other statutory obligations, such as those imposed by the NLRA, could be resolved simply by adding language to the contract granting the employer the right "to take all actions necessary to comply with [the ADA]."\(^{98}\) Unfortunately, such an ADA "override" proposal fails to offer a solution to the conflicts which have been discussed above. Such a proposal could significantly hinder the collective bargaining process by exacerbating, rather than resolving, tensions in the workplace.

The NLRB General Counsel discussed this issue in the context of obligations that intervening law imposes on the parties to a collective bargaining agreement and that the employer then asserts as a defense to charges that the employer has changed the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Noting that an employer "may argue that its obligation to comply with the ADA privileges it to act unilaterally,"\(^{99}\) the General Counsel emphasized the discretionary nature of ADA compliance.\(^{100}\) "[W]here the change in law leaves the employer with some discretion with regard to compliance," an employer would violate section 8(a)(5) "by unilaterally changing terms and conditions to bring itself into compliance" with the law.\(^{101}\) An examination of the case-by-case nature of the ADA's reasonable accommodation burden and the existence of the "undue hardship" defense clearly demonstrates that "an employer has sufficient discretion under the ADA to warrant requiring it to afford a union notice and an opportunity to bargain about a proposed accommodation."\(^{102}\) Each NLRB Region has been advised that, before submitting any case raising an undue hardship defense to the Division for Advice,

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\(^{98}\) See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 61, at 32: "Conflicts between provisions of a collective bargaining agreement and an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodations may be avoided by ensuring that agreements negotiated after [July 26, 1992] contain a provision permitting the employer to take all actions necessary to comply with this legislation."

\(^{99}\) NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *2.

\(^{100}\) Id.

\(^{101}\) Id.

\(^{102}\) Id. at *2; The EEOC's Regulations also make clear the highly discretionary nature of the accommodations process. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) ("Whether a particular accommodation will impose an undue hardship for a particular employer is determined on a case by case basis. Consequently, an accommodation that poses an undue hardship for one employer at a particular time may not pose an undue hardship for another employer, or even for the same employer at another time.").
it should investigate whether each element of the defense is present. That is, it should attempt to ascertain all parties' positions as to whether the proposed accommodation was the only one that would be effective in the circumstances and whether that accommodation posed no undue hardship.\textsuperscript{103}

Most collective bargaining agreements already contain prohibitions against discrimination, including specific references to "disability" as a category of protection. Even if the contract is silent on this point, anti-discrimination laws apply to employers and unions regardless of whether reference is made to them in a particular contract. Thus, such language is not required in order to impose an obligation on the employer to comply with the ADA. A union which agrees to vest such power in the employer through the addition of unilateral action language runs the risk of "endorsing" that employer's actions, or failure to act, and potentially could be seen as jointly liable for the employer's decisions.\textsuperscript{104}

In addition, such override language is contrary to the usual rules of labor-management relations, which encourage ongoing discussion and agreement by the parties on issues impacting the rights of employees, not unilateral action by one party. Yet, the ADA places the burden of finding a reasonable accommodation that does not pose an undue hardship only on the employer, not on the union or on the two jointly. Still, unions must be prepared to cooperate with the employer to help come up with accommodations that satisfy the statutory requirements. Simply relying upon override language is an abandonment of the entire process.

It is a regrettable fact that greater numbers of the workforce are becoming disabled each year.\textsuperscript{105} Collective bargaining agreement protections such as seniority rights are thus more important than ever as a potential vehicle for protecting this expanding group of employees. In addition, as greater numbers of employers are forced to reduce their workforces, or shift their operations to non-union contractors, seniority rights become more crucial in protecting existing union employees from the loss of their jobs. An assumption that the ADA should "override"

\textsuperscript{103} NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 17, at *2 n.16.

\textsuperscript{104} See, e.g., Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding union can be held jointly liable for promotion system contained in collective bargaining agreement which had a racially discriminatory effect even though union had no responsibility for promotional decisions). See Note, Union Liability for Employer Discrimination, 93 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1980).

\textsuperscript{105} 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
such rights contained in existing collective bargaining agreements could significantly undercut important worker protections at a time when they are increasingly necessary. Effectuating the purposes of the ADA should involve all interested and knowledgeable parties. There is no sound reason to reduce the input and problem-solving ability of one of the key players through such override language.

V ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The ADA provides that alternative means of dispute resolution should be utilized to resolve disputes arising under the Act "where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law." The statute lists various Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") methods, including mediation, conciliation, facilitation, fact-finding, mini-trials and settlement negotiations. Elevating ADR as a statutorily endorsed alternative to litigation undoubtedly reflects a growing Congressional concern over expensive and lengthy court proceedings. Congressional encouragement of such nonlitigation measures, however, should not be viewed either as a requirement that such measures be used, or as a "green light" for bypassing traditional grievance and arbitration procedures contained in collective bargaining agreements.

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., employers have increasingly sought agreements from workers to arbitrate, rather than litigate, employment discrimination claims. In workplaces governed by collective bargaining agreements, grievance and arbitration clauses have traditionally paralleled litigation remedies. ADR methods have not been held to be the exclusive forum for redress of discrimination complaints, however, since the Supreme Court's ruling nearly twenty years ago in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.

107 Id.
108 Id.
109 For example, the author of the amendment which eventually became 42 U.S.C. § 12212 argued that "rights and litigation are not one and the same. There are better ways to achieve the goals of the ADA than litigation and we should encourage cooperation in achieving those goals, not confrontation." 136 Cong. Rec. H2431 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
110 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (holding that a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 can be subjected to compulsory arbitration).
111 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that federal civil rights plaintiffs could not be precluded from pursuing Title VII claims even though those claims had previously been arbitrated under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement).
Congress was not mandating ADR as a means of resolving ADA claims. Joint conferees agreed that ADR was “intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by this Act.” Thus, any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement, or in an employment contract, does not prevent the complainant from seeking relief under other enforcement provisions of this Act. The Committee believes that the approach articulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. applies equally to the ADA and does not intend that the inclusion of Section 513 be used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities.

While Congress was preventing employers from making ADR the exclusive remedy for ADA violations, it did not address what might happen if an employer decided to bypass existing collective bargaining agreement grievance mechanisms and directly resolve an accommodation dispute with the employee. Such an effort would certainly run contrary to sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the NLRA if it permitted “direct dealing” with the represented worker on terms and conditions of employment. Thus, it would be neither “appropriate” nor “authorized by law” for ADR to supplant the grievance process available to a worker under a collective bargaining agreement. Should an employer decide to set up a “special” ADA claims resolution process, it must obtain the union’s agreement and permit it to be a participant in that process.

CONCLUSION

We need not assume that there cannot be a “reasonable accommodation” between the ADA and collectively bargained employment contracts.

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116 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (employer may not interfere with employee exercising rights under the NLRA).
117 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (employer may not refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of employees).
118 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (union representatives are exclusive representatives of all employees).
There is every reason to expect unions to support ADA-mandated accommodations and its protections of their disabled members. The reality of most labor settings is that workers try to help each other on the job. Therefore, it is unlikely that unions will oppose the providing of full opportunities for qualified disabled workers. Instead, they will most likely cooperate fully in the effort to help such workers function effectively in the job.

In fact, union demands for significant health and safety changes in the workplace have often met resistance from employers reluctant to expend funds in a shrinking economy. The ADA provides an avenue for the union to renew those demands on behalf of disabled individuals, while actually improving the worksite conditions for all its members. Many unions already have committees in place that are knowledgeable about medical and other health problems affecting represented workers. Thus, the unions are in a position to press the needs of disabled workers and to maximize the benefit to all of their members, using the ADA to give added support to these efforts.

Unions have also been involved in the process of developing accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 since its passage over twenty years ago. The negotiations and grievance processes have been utilized to resolve issues for temporarily disabled workers in need of “light duty” assignments or similar assistance in protecting their jobs. In particular cases, union representatives might be willing to endorse, on a non-precedential basis, specific contract modifications to protect or enhance opportunities for a disabled individual. In other cases, alternative means can be developed, such as the purchase of equipment to assist with heavy lifting tasks, which achieve that result in a less burdensome manner. Such problem-solving approaches will enhance the ADA’s new protections for disabled workers, not impede them.


120 Some unions have established separate entities which focus exclusively on providing retraining and related assistance to workers with disabilities. One example of this approach is “IAM Cares,” sponsored by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”), in conjunction with employers with whom IAM has a collective bargaining relationship. Another variation on this theme is a joint effort between IAM and Boeing Aircraft known as the IAM/Boeing Health and Safety Institute which develops programs to bring occupationally injured and ill employees back to work.

121 Unions can also conduct ADA education and training programs or negotiate with the employer for such employee training opportunities. The enhanced dialogue and understanding which can result from such efforts will encourage flexibility when individual accommodation issues arise.
The fundamental principle of negotiation can enable employers to effectively achieve ADA compliance in a workplace governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Only through an ongoing dialogue between all affected parties—the disabled individual, the union, and the employer who has the burden to provide a reasonable accommodation—can the objectives of the ADA be effectively realized.

Thus, even if crafting an accommodation which impairs seniority rights of co-workers appears to be the quickest or cheapest solution, it is also the most disruptive and least desirable. For this reason, both Congress and the EEOC recognized that solutions such as “reassignment” should only be measures of last resort. By looking carefully at the impact which a proposed accommodation will have on the entire work environment, as contemplated by the “undue hardship” defense built into the ADA, the solution reached will most likely be accepted by everyone affected.

The ADA’s affirmative obligations require thought, time, and funds to enhance opportunities for workers with disabilities. The most “reasonable” accommodation in each unique case will require an evolutionary process which carefully evaluates, balances, and refines proposals. Effective achievement of ADA objectives requires harmonizing two statutory schemes, both of which have the needs and benefits of workers at their core. Potential conflicts can be “reasonably accommodated” if the time-tested collective bargaining process becomes part of the day-to-day experience of the ADA’s protections.

The collective bargaining process involves an ongoing dialogue and commitment to problem solving. It is a natural vehicle for working through existing tensions or potential conflicts in the employment arena, or at least greatly lessening them. By including the union as an active member of the “team” which makes the ADA decision, the potential for conflict, including litigation, is reduced. Open and ongoing communication and dialogue between the employer and the union on all issues relating to ADA compliance will most effectively serve the goals of the ADA.