Kentucky Law Survey: Taxation

Kathryn L. Moore
University of Kentucky

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Taxation

BY KATHRYN L. MOORE*

INTRODUCTION

Certainly the most publicized development in Kentucky tax law during the last five years was the series of decisions in *St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet*,\(^1\) striking down two of Kentucky’s intangibles taxes.\(^2\) The *St. Ledger* decisions, however, were not the only tax law development to receive attention.

There were a number of legislative developments of some significance. Specifically, Governor Brereton Jones formed a Tax Policy Commission that comprehensively reviewed Kentucky’s tax structure.\(^3\) Although the 1996 General Assembly did not fully embrace the Commission’s recommendations over the last five years, the General Assembly did enact some significant legislation. For example, the General Assembly enacted legislation permitting affiliated corporations to choose between filing their income tax returns on a separate or consolidated basis.\(^4\) In addition, it replaced Kentucky’s century-old bank shares tax with a franchise-based tax.\(^5\) Finally,

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* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1983, University of Michigan; J.D. 1988, Cornell Law School. The author is grateful to Timothy Gillis and Mark F. Sommer for their comments and to Stacie Turner and Carol Parris for their research assistance. The author is also grateful to Eileen Black and Professional Education Systems, Inc. ("PESI") for the use of PESI’s seminar materials in the preparation of this update.


3 See Part I.A.


the General Assembly enacted legislation phasing out much of the inheritance tax.\(^6\)

On the judicial side, a number of unreported decisions also received a good deal of attention. For example, in a decision that has yet to become final, the Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld the constitutionality of the Revenue Cabinet's interim method of assessing unmined coal for tax years 1989 through 1991.\(^7\) In an unpublished opinion that subsequently was withdrawn, the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied a foreign holding company a remedy for unconstitutional discrimination imposed by a preferential license tax scheme.\(^8\)

This Article discusses the legislative and judicial developments described above. In addition, it discusses a few other developments that may be of interest to tax practitioners.\(^9\)

I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A. Tax Policy Commission

In February 1995, Governor Brereton C. Jones created the Kentucky Commission on Tax Policy.\(^{10}\) The Commission, composed of representatives from private enterprise, the General Assembly, and state government, was charged with comprehensively reviewing Kentucky's tax structure with a focus on (1) fairness, (2) simplicity, (3) adequacy, and (4) competitiveness.\(^{11}\)

On November 15, 1995, the Commission issued its final report recommending a number of significant changes in Kentucky tax law.\(^{12}\) For example,

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\(^7\) See Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gillig, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 91 (decision not final) (discussed in Part II.B).


\(^9\) This survey is not intended to provide an exhaustive listing of all developments in Kentucky taxation in the last five years. For more comprehensive coverage, see TERRY F. CONLEY ET AL., KENTUCKY STATE TAX ISSUES UPDATE (1997) [hereinafter 1997 UPDATE]; BRUCE F. CLARK ET AL., KENTUCKY STATE TAX ISSUES UPDATE (1996) [hereinafter 1996 UPDATE]; 1995 UPDATE, supra note 8.

\(^10\) See Executive Order 94-129 (Feb. 6, 1995).

\(^11\) See id.

\(^12\) See KENTUCKY COMMISSION ON TAX POLICY, A BLUEPRINT FOR COMPREHENSIVE REFORM (Nov. 15, 1995) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT].
the Commission proposed eliminating the preference given to Kentucky domestic corporations under the license tax and extending the sales tax to new services. In addition, the Commission proposed a constitutional amendment to eliminate all property taxes on tangible and intangible property.

Although the efforts of the Commission were praiseworthy, the 1996 General Assembly followed through on few of the Commission’s recommendations. The General Assembly’s failure to embrace fully the Commission’s recommendations may be attributed to a number of factors. First, the Commission was formed by Governor Brereton Jones, who was no longer in office when the 1996 General Assembly convened. Second, the General Assembly reformed inheritance and pension taxation in a 1995 Special Session, so those critical areas were removed from the Commission’s review. Finally, in 1996, new taxes were highly objectionable given the political environment in Kentucky, as throughout most of the nation. Because the Commission was charged with revenue neutrality, any reduction in taxation in one area had to be replaced with an increase in taxation in another area, and the political climate simply did not support any new taxes.

Despite the fact that the 1996 General Assembly did not wholly embrace the Commission’s recommendations, the General Assembly did enact some noteworthy legislative changes over the last five years. Those changes are discussed below.

B. Consolidated Income Tax Returns – House Bill 599

Before House Bill 599, there had been extensive litigation and uncertainty regarding the proper method of filing and reporting Kentucky income

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13 See id. at 5, 58.
14 See id. at 7-8, 64-65.
15 See id. at 5-6, 58-61.
16 The 1996 General Assembly did not disregard all of the Commission’s recommendations. For example, the Commission recommended that the health care provider tax, as applied to physicians, be eliminated, see id. at 7, 62-63, and the 1996 General Assembly enacted legislation phasing out the provider tax as applied to physicians, see infra Part I.F.
17 See 1996 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 1-2.
18 See id. at 1.
19 See infra Part I.D.
20 See infra Part I.I.
21 See BLUEPRINT, supra note 12, at 1.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 1-2.
24 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 239.
tax for multi-corporate groups. In 1972, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet began to rely on section 141.120 as authority for the filing of combined income tax returns for unitary multi-corporate businesses. Under the unitary combined reporting method, each member of a "unitary business computes its individual taxable income by taking a portion of the combined net income of the group." This method of tax accounting is designed to "insure that the income of a business that is conducted partly within and partly without a taxing state is determined and apportioned in the same manner regardless of whether the business is conducted by one corporation or two or more affiliated corporations."

Traditionally, a three-unities test was used to determine whether a multi-corporate group constituted a unitary business. Under that test, a business is unitary if there is "(1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of operation as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions; and (3) unity of use of its centralized executive force and general system of operation." The test had to be applied on a taxpayer-specific basis...

25 See 1996 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 11.
26 See G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. 1994).
28 Keesling, supra note 27, at 106.
29 In 1995, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet proposed a regulation, which, among other things, would have adopted the three criteria of functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale to determine when a business is unitary. See proposed 103 K.A.R. 16:190(1)(26), in 4 K.A.R. 761 (Oct. 1, 1995). These three criteria were emphasized by the United States Supreme Court in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982), and F.W. Woolworth v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982). Following numerous hearings and a great deal of comment by the tax bar and private industry, the Revenue Cabinet withdrew the regulation. See 22 K.A.R. E3 (Nov. 1, 1995).
30 See, e.g., G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Ky. 1988); Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 748 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Ky. 1988).

"[T]he unitary business concept is . . . not, so to speak, unitary: there are variations on the theme." Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 167 (1983). For an extensive discussion of alternative methods to determine whether a multi-corporate group constitutes a unitary business, see, for example, 1110 Tax
and required a specific factual determination as to whether a particular taxpayer constituted a unitary business.\textsuperscript{32}

In two reported decisions in the 1980s, \textit{Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet} and \textit{Kentucky Department of Revenue v. The Early & Daniel Co.},\textsuperscript{33} the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the Revenue Cabinet's requirement that a multi-corporate group that constituted a unitary business file a combined income tax return. In both of these cases, the unitary group included a domestic international sales corporation ("DISC").\textsuperscript{34} The DISCs owned no property, retained no employees other than their officers and directors, and made no sales themselves.\textsuperscript{35} Following these cases, the Revenue Cabinet issued Revenue Policy 41P225 interpreting the cases\textsuperscript{36} as limiting combined income tax reporting to unitary groups that include sham or paper corporations.


\textsuperscript{32} See \textit{1996 UPDATE, supra} note 9, at 2.

\textsuperscript{33} Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 748 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1988); Kentucky Dep't of Revenue v. The Early & Daniel Co., 628 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1982).


\textsuperscript{35} See \textit{Armco, Inc.}, 748 S.W.2d at 375; \textit{Early & Daniel Co.}, 628 S.W.2d at 631.

\textsuperscript{36} The Revenue Cabinet also relied on similar decisions by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals and an unreported decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court, V.E. Anderson v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 87-SC-122-DG (Ky. Nov. 5, 1987) (citing Revenue Policy 41P225). See G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d 788, 790-91 (Ky. 1994) (discussing \textit{V.E. Anderson}).
In *G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet*, the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down Revenue Policy 41P225 and held that a multi-corporate group that constituted a unitary business had the right to file a combined income tax return even if the group did not contain any sham or paper corporations. Following this decision, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet proposed a regulation, 103 KAR 16:190, that would have mandated combined reporting for broadly defined unitary groups. The proposed regulation engendered so much opposition from the Kentucky corporate community that the Revenue Cabinet withdrew the regulation.

The Revenue Cabinet and the Kentucky business community then worked together for a legislative compromise. That compromise, contained in House Bill 599, permits affiliated corporations to choose between filing their income tax returns on a separate or consolidated basis, while prohibiting them from changing that basis from year to year depending on which is more advantageous in a particular year. Thus, effective for tax years beginning on or after December 31, 1995, House Bill 599 amended sections 141.120 and 141.200 to allow members of an affiliated group to elect to file a consolidated Kentucky income tax return regardless of whether the group filed a consolidated federal income tax return. If an election is made to file a consolidated return, the statute requires that the election remain in force for an eight-year period.

The statute should eliminate much of the uncertainty in the corporate income tax area by replacing combined reporting with the option of filing

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37 *G.T.E. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet*, 889 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1994).
38 See supra note 6.
42 See id.
43 See Cabinet Withdraws Proposed Reg, supra note 40.
45 See id. § 141.200(3)(d).
consolidated income tax returns. As noted above, combined reporting applies to unitary businesses, and determining whether a multi-corporate group constitutes a unitary business requires an intense factual determination that must be applied on a taxpayer-specific basis. Consolidated income tax returns, in contrast, may be filed by "affiliated groups," and affiliated groups are determined simply by applying clear and well-established common ownership rules.

The statute does not, however, eliminate all uncertainty. For example, it does not apply to tax years beginning on or before December 31, 1995. Moreover, it does not address issues such as net operating losses, capital gains, and contributions made by members of the consolidated group.

C. Bank Franchise and Local Deposit Tax Act—House Bill 416

Effective July 15, 1996, House Bill 416 repealed Kentucky's century-old bank shares tax and replaced it with a franchise-based tax. The franchise tax is imposed on every financial institution regularly engaged in business in the Commonwealth at any time during the taxable year. Generally, an institution is presumed to be regularly engaged in business in the Commonwealth if it solicits business from twenty or more persons in the state or it has

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46 See id. § 141.120(11) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed as allowing or requiring the filing of a combined return under the unitary business concept or a consolidated return."). Nevertheless, the Revenue Cabinet may maintain that Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 748 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1988), and Department of Revenue v. The Early & Daniel Co., 628 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1982), provide it with the discretionary authority to require unitary combined reports. See KPMG Survey Probes State, Local Business Incentives, 95 STN 222-46 (November 17, 1995) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, STN File) (daily on-line version of STATE TAX NOTES).

47 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.

48 See K.R.S. § 141.200(1)(a) (defining affiliated groups with reference to section 1504(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations).

49 See 1995 UPDATE, supra note 9, at 10.


52 The provision applies retroactively to January 1, 1996, for financial institutions doing business in Kentucky on the effective date of the legislation. See Mark F. Sommer, Bank Tax Rewrite Becomes Law After Lobbying Blitz, 12 STATE TAX NOTES 1357, 1358 (May 6, 1996).

53 See K.R.S. § 136.505(1).
receipts from Kentucky sources of $100,000 or more during a taxable year. The franchise tax is imposed at the rate of 1.1% of net capital (after apportionment if the institution does business both within and outside the state), with a minimum tax payable of $300 per year.

Net capital is determined over a five-year period by adding together paid-in capital, surplus, undivided profits and capital reserves, net unrealized gains or losses on certain securities, and cumulative foreign currency translation adjustments, and then deducting from the total an amount equal to the same percentage of the total as the book value of United States obligations bears to the book value of the total assets of the financial institution. Net capital includes equity related to investment in subsidiaries.

The franchise tax is assessed in lieu of all other city, county, and local taxes, except the real estate transfer tax, real and tangible personal property taxes, utilities taxes, and local deposit franchise taxes. A "little-noticed" provision authorizes cities, counties, and urban-county governments to impose a tax on any bank having a branch located within the jurisdiction's limits. The rate imposed by cities and counties may not exceed .025% of the deposits held by the financial institutions located within their jurisdiction, while the rate imposed by urban-county governments may not exceed .050% of deposits. As of early 1997, only a few Kentucky municipalities had enacted the tax, but numerous others were either considering it or taking steps to implement it.

See id. § 136.520(1). Receipts from interests in certain types of property, such as real estate mortgage investment conduits and real investment trusts, are excluded in determining whether an institution is regularly engaged in business in Kentucky. See id.

See id. §§ 136.525-.540.

See id. § 136.510.

See id. § 136.515.

See id. § 136.515(2)(b).

See id. § 136.505(2).

Mark F. Sommer, Cities Move to Adopt Local Bank Taxes, 12 STATE TAX NOTES 578 (Feb. 24, 1997).

See K.R.S. § 136.575.

See id. § 136.575(2).

See Sommer, supra note 52, at 578. Although the local deposits franchise tax was intended to replace the Kentucky bank share tax, the new tax may be imposed by local governments that did not formerly levy the bank shares tax. Conversely, local jurisdictions that imposed the bank shares tax may elect not to impose the franchise tax, or impose a different tax rate, so long as the maximum rate is not
A "potentially troublesome" provision of the Act may prohibit financial institutions from seeking to enforce security interests or collect on loans in Kentucky courts until the financial institutions pay franchise taxes and file appropriate franchise tax returns:

Any financial institution subject to the annual franchise tax imposed by KRS 136.505 that fails to file a return as required by KRS 135.545 or that fails to pay the tax as listed on the return shall not maintain an action, suit, or proceeding in any court or before any agency in this Commonwealth or enforce in any way any obligation of any debts until the return is filed and the tax listed on the return is paid.

As noted above, the Act sets forth extremely broad nexus standards. It subjects "every financial institution regularly engaged in business" in the Commonwealth to the franchise tax and presumes that an institution is regularly engaged in business in the Commonwealth if it solicits business from twenty or more persons in the state or has receipts from Kentucky sources of $100,000 or more during a taxable year. Thus, under the Act, a financial institution located in Miami, Florida, that simply mails credit card applications to twenty Kentucky residents is presumed to be regularly engaged in business in the state even though it has no physical presence in the state.

Although the Act provides that its nexus provision is to "be interpreted to reach to the limits permitted by the United States Constitution," it may in fact exceed federal constitutional limits. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause requires that an out-of-state seller have some physical presence in the state before the state can impose use tax collection responsibilities on that seller. If Quill's physical-presence standard applies to the franchise tax,
then the Act’s nexus provision clearly violates the United States Constitution.

Whether Quill’s physical-presence requirement applies to the Kentucky bank franchise tax, however, is not entirely clear. Quill left open the question whether its physical-presence standard applies to taxes other than sales and use taxes.\textsuperscript{72} The Court noted that it had not, “in [its] review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence requirement.”\textsuperscript{73}

Thus, opinion as to Quill’s reach has been divided. In Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,\textsuperscript{74} the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the state could tax the income of a corporation that had no physical presence in the state where the income was derived from intangible property owned by the corporation and used within the state.\textsuperscript{75} In contrast,

\textsuperscript{72} See Michael T. Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional Nexus, Intangible Property, and the State Taxation of Income, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 407, 407 (1994) (“Quill left unanswered whether a state can tax the income of a corporation which is not physically present in the state where the income is derived from intangible property owned by the corporation and used within the state.”);

Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, II State Taxation: Sales and Use, Personal, Income, and Death and Gift Taxes \S 6.08[1], at S6-6 (1996/1997 Supp.) [hereinafter Hellerstein & Hellerstein, State Taxation] (“A major unresolved question left unanswered by the Supreme Court’s holding in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota is whether the physical presence requirement of the vendor in the State as a sine qua non of the State’s constitutional power to require the vendor to collect its use tax on sales of property delivered to the purchaser in the State applies to other taxes, particularly to corporate franchise and income taxes.”).


\textsuperscript{73} Quill, 504 U.S. at 314.


\textsuperscript{75} See id. at 23-24. Even if a Kentucky court were to follow Geoffrey, it appears that a foreign corporation with only intangible property in the state would not have to pay Kentucky income tax. Every corporation with property located in the state is subject to state income tax. See K.R.S. \S 141.040 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1996).
Cerro Copper Products, Inc. v. Department of Revenue rejected Geoffrey's Commerce Clause analysis and held that the Commerce Clause requires that before the state can impose income tax on a corporation, it must have a physical presence in the state. Similarly, commentators have disagreed as to whether the Quill's physical-presence requirement should extend to other taxes. Thus, the constitutionality of the bank franchise tax's nexus provision is in doubt.

D. Inheritance Tax – House Bill

Before January 1995, Kentucky's inheritance tax was one of the most burdensome taxes imposed by the state. The tax applied to estates valued at less than $600,000 even though most states and the federal government did not impose taxes on such estates. In January 1995, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted House Bill 2, which phased out the inheritance tax, allocated only real and tangible personal property located in the state. Id. § 141.120(8)(a) (Supp. 1996). Thus, even if the state had the nexus to tax the foreign corporation with intangibles in the state, no income would be allocated to the state through the state's allocation formula.


79 See K.R.S. §§ 140.010 - .120 (Michie 1995).

80 See generally John S. Lueken, Kentucky Inheritance Tax Update, in 1997 UPDATE, supra note 9, at V1; see also CCH Tax Day: State, Mar. 9, 1995, available in Westlaw S95-068-012 (then-Kentucky Governor Brereton C. Jones noted that Kentucky's inheritance tax is highest state inheritance tax in the country).

81 See Lueken, supra note 80, at V1.
tax as applied to "Class A" beneficiaries over a number of years ending on
July 1, 1998.\textsuperscript{82}

Class A beneficiaries include any

- parent, surviving spouse, child by blood, stepchild, child adopted during
  infancy, child adopted during adulthood who was reared by the decedent
  during infancy or a grandchild who is the issue of a child by blood, the
  issue of a stepchild, the issue of a child adopted during adulthood who
  was reared by the decedent during infancy, the issue of a child adopted
  during infancy, brother sister, or brother or sister of the half blood.\textsuperscript{83}

For beneficiaries of decedents dying after June 30, 1998, no Kentucky
inheritance tax is imposed on inheritable interests passing to Class A
beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{84}

The Kentucky inheritance tax, however, remains in effect for Class B
and Class C beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{85} Class B beneficiaries include any "nephew,
niece, or a nephew or niece of the half blood, daughter-in-law, son-in-law,
aunt or uncle, or a great-grandchild who is the grandchild of a child by
blood, of a stepchild or of a child adopted during infancy."\textsuperscript{86} The first
$1000 received by a Class B beneficiary is exempt from tax.\textsuperscript{87} After that,
an inheritance tax ranging from four percent on inheritable assets valued
at no more than $10,000 to sixteen percent on inheritable assets valued
at more than $200,000 is imposed on inheritances by Class B
beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{88}

Class C beneficiaries include any educational, religious, or other
institutions, societies, or associations; any cities, towns, or public

\textsuperscript{82} 1995 Ky. Acts ch. 2 (codified in K.R.S. §§ 140.070 and 140.080 (Michie
Supp. 1996)).

\textsuperscript{83} K.R.S. § 140.070(1) (Michie Supp. 1996). House Bill 2 amended section
140.070 to expand Class A beneficiaries to include brothers, sisters, and brothers
and sisters of the half blood. Before House Bill 2, brothers, sisters, and brothers
and sisters of the half blood qualified as Class B beneficiaries.

\textsuperscript{84} See id. § 140.080(1)(c)(4).

\textsuperscript{85} Unlike the federal estate tax, which is a tax imposed on the estate's right to
transfer wealth to designated beneficiaries, the Kentucky inheritance tax is a tax on
the right to receive assets and is imposed on the value of property passing to
individual beneficiaries. See Lueken, supra note 80, at V-2.

\textsuperscript{86} K.R.S. § 140.070(2). Before House Bill 2, brothers, sisters, and brothers and
sisters of the half blood qualified as Class B beneficiaries.

\textsuperscript{87} See id. § 140.090(1)(d).

\textsuperscript{88} See id. § 140.070(2).
institutions not exempted by section 140.060; or any person not included in Class A or Class B. The first $500 received by a Class C beneficiary is exempt from tax. After that, an inheritance tax ranging from six percent on inheritable assets valued at no more than $10,000 to sixteen percent on inheritable assets valued at more than $60,000 is imposed on inheritances by Class C beneficiaries.

E. Use Tax Nexus – House Bill 617

As noted above, in Quill the United States Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause requires that an out-of-state seller have some physical presence in the state before the state can impose use tax collection responsibility on that seller. Although it described the physical-presence requirement as a “bright-line rule,” the Court never precisely defined the physical presence necessary to satisfy the Commerce Clause substantial nexus requirement.

89 Id. § 140.060 (Michie 1991). This section provides:
All transfers to educational, religious or other institutions, societies, or associations, whose sole object and purpose are to carry on charitable, educational, or religious work, all transfers for or upon trust for any charitable, educational, or religious purpose, and all transfers to cities, and towns or public institutions in this state for public purposes shall be exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter . . . .

90 See id. § 140.090(1)(c) (Michie 1991).
91 See id. § 140.070(3) (Michie Supp. 1996).
92 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
96 See id. at 315 n.8 (concluding that Quill’s licensing of software in the state failed to constitute a “substantial nexus” but declining to define what contacts would in fact constitute “substantial nexus”); see also Laura A. Kulwicki, Continuing State Trends in Nexus Enforcement after Quill: The Struggle To Define “Substantial Nexus,” 6 STATE TAX NOTES 345, 345 (Feb. 7, 1994) (“[T]his ‘bright line’ is not quite as bright as it first seems.”); Direct Marketing Association Official Speaks on the Quill Victory at Tax Administrators’ Meeting, 92 STN 125-22 (June 29, 1992) (LEXIS, Fedtax Library, STN File) (daily on-line version of STATE TAX NOTES) (noting that although the Bellas Hess physical-presence test was called a “bright line” test, this is a relative term).
Accordingly, states and courts have since struggled with the parameters of the physical-presence requirement.\textsuperscript{97}

On December 20, 1995, the Multistate Tax Commission, working with twenty-five states and the District of Columbia,\textsuperscript{98} issued National Nexus Program Bulletin 95-1\textsuperscript{99} to provide some content to the standard.\textsuperscript{100} The bulletin provides that an out-of-state computer vendor generally has nexus with the market state for purposes of both sales and use tax collection and income tax if the vendor contracts with a third party to provide buyers with repair services for their computers under the vendor’s warranty.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{97}See Kulwicki, supra note 96, at 346-47 (discussing then-pending litigation regarding the meaning of the substantial nexus requirement); Kim Marshall & Marc Lewis, What We Know Today About Substantial Nexus, 13 STATE TAX NOTES 967 (Oct. 13, 1997) (discussing current state legislation and case law on Quill’s substantial nexus requirement); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 330-31 (White, J., dissenting) ("It is a sure bet that the vagaries of ‘physical presence’ will be tested to their fullest in our courts."); Charles Rothfeld, Quill: Confusing the Commerce Clause, 3 STATE TAX NOTES 111, 111 (July 27, 1992) (stating that taxpayers and taxing officials will not be able to determine adequacy of physical presence because it is not based on clear principle). Compare Michael C. Hamersley, Note, Will the Bellas Hess Physical Presence Requirement Continue to Protect Out-of-State Mail-Order Retailers from State Use Taxes in the Quill Era? Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 46 TAX LAW. 515, 521-23 (1993) (contending that Quill requires “substantial physical presence”); with Alice J. Davis, How Much Is Too Little? Defining De Minimus Substantial Nexus, 7 STATE TAX NOTES 1983, 1985-86 (Dec. 26, 1994) (criticizing recent New York decisions that relied on Hamersley’s Note in finding that Quill’s nexus requirement demands “substantial physical presence”).

\textsuperscript{98}Kentucky was not one of those states, as it is not a member of the Multistate Tax Commission.


\textsuperscript{101}The bulletin is simply a refinement of the Multi-State Tax Commission’s “long-standing position that a mail-order seller has nexus with a state and may be required by a state to collect the use tax if it has a service representative in that state who regularly acts on its behalf.” \textit{Id.}
Although MTC Bulletin 95-1 has been controversial, and one of the original twenty-five states supporting the bulletin, California, has since withdrawn its support, Kentucky adopted MTC Bulletin 95-1's nexus standards for use tax purposes in House Bill 617. Effective July 15, 1996, House Bill 617 amended section 139.340 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to extend use tax collection responsibilities to retailers soliciting orders for tangible personal property from residents of the state "if the retailer benefits from an agent operating in this state under the authority of the retailer to repair or service tangible personal property sold by the retailer."

F. Health Care Provider Taxes – House Bill 1 and House Bill 397

In 1993, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted House Bill 1, which imposed health care provider taxes on various health care groups. First, it imposed on hospitals a 2.5% tax on gross revenues for the provision of health care items or services or hospital services. Second, it imposed a 2% provider tax on gross revenues for the provision of nursing facility services, intermediate care facility services for the mentally

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103 See Marshall & Lewis, supra note 97.


105 K.R.S. § 130.340(2)(e).


Finally, it imposed a tax of $0.25 per prescription on pharmacies.112

In 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly repealed and replaced the health care provider taxes imposed in House Bill 1113 with a new set of health care provider taxes under House Bill 250.114 The health care provider taxes under House Bill 250 are substantially similar to those under House Bill 1, with one exception. House Bill 1 permitted pharmacies to pass the $0.25 per prescription tax on to insurers, health maintenance organizations, and non-profit hospital, medical-surgical, dental, and health service corporations, but did not permit the latter groups to pass on the tax.115 House Bill 250, in contrast, does not permit pharmacies to pass the prescription tax on to third-party payers.116

Shortly after the provider taxes were enacted, physicians filed suit claiming that the 2% provider tax impermissibly singled them out in violation of section 59(15) of the Kentucky Constitution.117 Although the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the tax against the physicians’ challenge in Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Smith,118 the General Assembly was receptive to the physicians’ complaints. In 1996, it enacted House Bill 397,119 which phases out the 2% provider tax (as applied to physicians) over a four-year period.120 The amendment does not affect the 2.5% provider tax on hospital services,121 the 2% tax on other providers of health care services,122 or the $0.25 per prescription tax on prescription drugs.123

117 See Mark F. Sommer, Physicians Group Sues Over Health Care Provider Tax, 5 STATE TAX NOTES 185 (July 26, 1993).
120 See K.R.S. § 142.309.
121 See id. § 142.303.
122 See id. § 142.307.
123 See id. § 142.311.
G. Unmined Minerals – House Bill 84

In 1976, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted a statute classifying unmined coal separately from other real estate. Two years later, the General Assembly enacted a statute taxing unmined coal at the rate of one-tenth of one cent ($0.001) per one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed value. In Gillis v. Yount, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that classifying unmined coal separately from other unmined minerals violated section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution.

In 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted House Bill 84, which requires that the Revenue Cabinet value and assess unmined coal, oil, and gas reserves that have been severed from the surface estate at no more than fair market value in place, considering all relevant circumstances. The Act further provides that unmined coal, oil, and gas reserves, as well as other mineral or energy sources, are to be valued and assessed as separate interests in real property, distinct from the surface estate.

H. Repair, Replacement, or Spare Parts – House Bill 455

Section 139.480 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes exempts from sales and use taxes purchases of machinery for new and expanded industry. To qualify for this exemption, the machinery or equipment must be used directly in the manufacturing or production process, and either must not replace machinery or must replace machinery that will increase the consumption of recycled materials at a facility by not less than ten percent. In Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Armco,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a spare part that the vendor required the manufacturer to purchase with the original machinery was exempt machinery for new and expanded industry. The court also held that ball bearings Armco used were exempt industrial supplies.

In 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly overruled Armco, Inc. by enacting House Bill 455, which amends section 139.170 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to provide that "‘machinery for new and expanded industry’ does not include repair, replacement, or spare parts of any kind regardless of whether the purchase of repair, replacement or spare parts is required by the manufacturer or vendor as a condition of sale or as a condition of warranty." House Bill 455 also amended section 139.170 to provide that "‘repair, replacement, or spare parts’ does not include machine oils, grease, or industrial tools." Finally, House Bill 455 amended section 139.470, which exempts, among other things, supplies from sales and use tax. As amended, section 139.470(11)(a)(2) concludes that "[s]upplies [do] not include repair, replacement, or spare parts of any kind."

(2) It must be used directly in the manufacturing process.
(3) It must be incorporated for the first time into plant facilities established in this state.
(4) It must not replace other machinery.


In Camera Center, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS 1, the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals held that photographic processing equipment used by a retailer of cameras, film, and other photographic supplies did not qualify as exempt machinery for new and expanded industry because it was not incorporated into the plant facilities in the state for the first time.


135 See id. at 402.
136 See id.
137 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 501, § 1(1) (codified at K.R.S. § 139.170(1)).
139 Subsection (b) of this section provides:
It shall be noted that in none of the three (3) categories is any exemption provided for repair, replacement, or spare parts. Repair, replacement, or spare parts shall not be considered to be materials, supplies, or industrial tools directly used in manufacturing or industrial processing. Repair, replacement, or spare parts shall have the same meaning as set forth in K.R.S. 139.170.

Id. § 139.470(11)(b).
I. Taxation of Retirement Income – House Bill

In *Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury*, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Michigan statute that imposed state income tax on federal pensioners while exempting state pensioners from that tax. The Court found that the scheme violated the federal constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. In 1990, the Kentucky legislature amended section 141.021 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to exempt federal retirement benefits from state income tax in order to correct its prior taxing scheme, which, like the Michigan scheme, had exempted state pensioners while taxing federal pensioners.

Following the *Davis* decision, federal pensioners in Kentucky filed suit, claiming a refund of taxes they had paid under the pre-1990 scheme. The Revenue Cabinet conceded that the old statutory scheme was invalid, but contested the refund claim by claiming that the decision was not retroactive. In *Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum*, the Kentucky Supreme

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142 See id. at 817.
143 For a more detailed discussion of the *Davis* decision, see, for example, HELLESTEIN & HELLESTEIN, STATE TAXATION, supra note 72, ¶ 22.04[3]; Corinna L. Eckl et al., *State Taxation of Public Pensions: The Impact of Davis v. Michigan*, 47 TAX NOTES at 1119 (May 28, 1990).
144 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 305, § 1 (codified at K.R.S. § 141.021 (Michie 1991)).
145 In *Finley v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet*, 1996 Ky. Tax LEXIS 373, *3 (Ky. Bd. Tax App.), the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals found that the post-1990 scheme did “not exempt from tax retirement income received from a retirement or pension plan of a state other than the Commonwealth of Kentucky.”
146 See *Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum*, 887 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1994).
148 Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gossum, 887 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1994).
Court held that the *Davis* decision applied retroactively\textsuperscript{149} and that federal pensioners in Kentucky were entitled to a refund of income taxes paid under Kentucky's similar unconstitutional scheme.\textsuperscript{150} The court further held that Kentucky's two-year statute of limitations for refunds of unconstitutional taxes, found in section 134.590 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, applied, rather than the four-year statute of limitations for refunds of taxes other than ad valorem and unconstitutional taxes found in section 134.580.\textsuperscript{151} Finally, the court held that the two years began to run from the date the tax involved was paid, rather than from the date the complaint was filed or the decision was finalized.\textsuperscript{152}

In *Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Cope,*\textsuperscript{153} private pensioners brought a challenge under section 59(15) of the Kentucky Constitution\textsuperscript{154} to the post-1990 scheme that exempted the pensions of public sector employees while taxing private pensioners. The court found that the distinction between governmental and private sector employees was not unreasonable or arbitrary, and therefore upheld the statutory scheme.\textsuperscript{155}

Notwithstanding the court's decision in *Cope,* the Kentucky General Assembly again amended its income taxing scheme in 1995 to equalize

\textsuperscript{149} See id. at 332 ("Harper is unambiguous in its holding that Davis applies retroactively . . . ").

\textsuperscript{150} See id. at 333.

\textsuperscript{151} See id. at 333-35.

\textsuperscript{152} See id. at 335. The trial court had held that claims must be made within two years from the date the amount due was determined through litigation. See id. at 331.

\textsuperscript{153} *Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Cope,* 875 S.W.2d 87 (Ky.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 931 (1994).

\textsuperscript{154} Section 59(15) prohibits "local or special acts" that are "to authorize or to regulate the levy, the assessment or the collection of taxes, or to give any indulgence or discharge to any assessor or collector of taxes, or to his sureties." The pensioners in *Cope* also challenged the statutory scheme under section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution, but the court quickly dismissed that challenge. See id. at 92.

\textsuperscript{155} See id. at 90. Pointing to the lack of profit motive in the public sector, the restrictions imposed on the government in setting pay, and the lower pay scale of governmental employees, the court noted that the statute would have survived even a more rigorous standard of review. See id. at 90-91. For an editorial criticizing the court's decision, see *Injustice on Pensions: Decision Leaves Equal Protection Intact,* LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Feb. 2, 1994, at A10; see also Jack Brammer & Chad Carlton, *Pension Tax Ruling Saves State Millions,* LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Feb. 1, 1994, at A1; *Pension Ruling a Slap in the Face, Private-sector Retirees Say,* LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Feb. 1, 1994, at A6.
prospectively the treatment of pension benefits received by public and private pensioners.\textsuperscript{156} It phased in, over a several-year period ending on January 1, 1998, a $35,000 exclusion, adjusted for inflation,\textsuperscript{157} for distributions\textsuperscript{158} from pension plans, annuity contracts, profit-sharing plans, retirement plans, and employee savings plans.\textsuperscript{159} For state and federal retirees, it grandfathered in the taxation of pension benefits so that pension benefits that exceed the $35,000 exclusion are taxable only to the extent they are attributable to earnings after January 1, 1998.\textsuperscript{160}

II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Intangibles Tax

In \textit{St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet},\textsuperscript{161} the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed challenges to two Kentucky taxing statutes: section 132.030 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which taxed out-of-state bank deposits at a higher rate than in-state deposits; and section 136.030(1), which exempted from taxation the stock of corporations that paid taxes to the state on at least seventy-five percent of their total property. The court held that section 132.030 impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause and thus struck down the taxing statute. With respect to section 136.030(1), however, the court found that despite the fact that it facially discriminated against interstate commerce, it did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was a valid compensating tax under \textit{Darnell v. Indiana}.\textsuperscript{162}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{156} See 1995 Ky. Acts ch. 1 (2d Ex. Sess.) (codified at K.R.S. §§ 141.010 & 141.010(5) (Michie Supp. 1996)).
\item \textsuperscript{157} See \textit{id.} at ch. 1, § 10 (2d Ex. Sess.) (codified at K.R.S. § 141.010(5)).
\item \textsuperscript{158} Distributions are defined to include any lump-sum distribution from pension or profit-sharing plans qualifying for the income tax averaging provisions of section 402 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"); any distribution from any individual retirement account as defined in section 408 of the IRC; and any disability pension distribution that is taxed as pension and annuity income for federal income tax purposes. See K.R.S. § 141.010(10)(i)(3)(a).
\item \textsuperscript{159} 1995 Ky. Acts ch. 1, § 1 (2d Ex. Sess.) (adding K.R.S. § 141.010(10)(j)).
\item \textsuperscript{160} See K.R.S. § 141.0215 (Michie Supp. 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{161} St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 912 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1995), \textit{vacated and remanded}, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996), \textit{on remand}, 942 S.W.2d 893 (Ky.), \textit{cert. dismissed}, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
\item \textsuperscript{162} Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U.S. 390 (1912).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Following the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in St. Ledger, the United States Supreme Court decided Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner.\footnote{Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996).} In that case, the Court held that a North Carolina intangibles taxing scheme that was substantially similar to the Kentucky scheme violated the Commerce Clause.\footnote{See id. at 327. The North Carolina intangibles tax was imposed on “a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation’s exposure to the State’s income tax.” Id.} In striking down the North Carolina taxing scheme, the Court declared that Darnell no longer represented good law under the Commerce Clause.\footnote{See id. at 346.}

After deciding Fulton, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Kentucky Supreme Court’s judgment in St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet\footnote{St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996).} in light of Fulton.\footnote{See id. at 1821.} On remand, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that both parties agreed that section 136.030(1) violated the Commerce Clause in light of Fulton.\footnote{See St. Ledger v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 942 S.W.2d 893, 896 (1997).} The court then held that section 136.030(1) could not be severed from section 132.020 and that the appellants were entitled to a refund of the unconstitutional taxes paid for two years before filing of their refund applications.\footnote{The court also let its decision striking down the bank deposit tax stand. See id. at 903.} The intangibles tax dispute is discussed in more detail in a Note in this issue.\footnote{See Alsip et al., supra note 2.}

B. Unmined Minerals Tax

Before 1988, section 132.020(5) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provided a taxing scheme for unmined coal by classifying it separately from other real property and taxing it at the rate $.001 per $100 of assessed value.\footnote{See Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Ky. 1988).} In Gillis v. Yount, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that this de facto tax exemption violated section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution, which requires uniformity in property taxation. Following the court’s decision, the property valuation administrators in each county began to
assess unmined coal for property tax purposes.\textsuperscript{172} In 1988, the Franklin Circuit Court entered a temporary injunction requiring the Revenue Cabinet to centralize the assessment of unmined coal.\textsuperscript{173} Pursuant to the temporary injunction, the Cabinet decided to adopt and implement a Geographic Information System ("GIS") to assess unmined coal.\textsuperscript{174} Because the GIS was very complicated, costly, and time-consuming, the Cabinet adopted an interim method to assess unmined coal for tax years 1989 through 1991.\textsuperscript{175}

Under the interim method, the Cabinet mailed an information return form to owners of unmined coal, coal operators, lessees, and permit holders.\textsuperscript{176} Taxpayers were asked to report on the forms “ownership information, the number of acres of minable and merchantable coal, the average seam thickness, the location of the coal by county, and whether the coal was idle, permitted or permitted and producing.”\textsuperscript{177} Taxpayers also were asked to provide any additional information that would aid in valuing the coal resource.\textsuperscript{178} The Cabinet applied a formula to the information obtained from the returns to value the unmined coal and did not independently survey or inspect any property in making valuations.\textsuperscript{179}

Owners of tracts of coal filed suit claiming the interim method violated the Kentucky Constitution because it did not consider certain individual characteristics of the property that could affect the property’s value.\textsuperscript{180} In Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Gillig, an opinion that has not yet become final,\textsuperscript{181} the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the interim method. The Court held that for tax purposes, a tax assessor is allowed to use mass appraisal techniques to value property.\textsuperscript{182} Under the mass appraisal approach, all the individual characteristics of property need not be considered so long as those factors that allow the assessor to make a logical estimate of the property’s value are taken into account.\textsuperscript{183} Section

\textsuperscript{173} See id. at *2.
\textsuperscript{174} See id.
\textsuperscript{175} See id. at *2-4.
\textsuperscript{176} See id. at *2-3.
\textsuperscript{177} Id. at *3.
\textsuperscript{178} See id.
\textsuperscript{179} See id. at *3-4.
\textsuperscript{180} See id. at *4.
\textsuperscript{181} See id. at *1.
\textsuperscript{182} See id. at *8.
\textsuperscript{183} See id.
172 of the Kentucky Constitution requires that fair cash value be "estimated" and does not require that a tax assessor achieve the level of accuracy of private fee appraisers.\textsuperscript{184}

C. License Tax

Section 136.070 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes imposes, with specific enumerated exceptions, an annual license tax on "every corporation organized under the laws of this state, every corporation having its commercial domicile in this state, and every foreign corporation owning or leasing property located in this state or having one (1) or more individuals receiving compensation in this state."\textsuperscript{185} The license tax is imposed at the rate of $2.10 on each $1000 of capital employed in Kentucky,\textsuperscript{186} and defines capital as "capital stock, surplus, advances by affiliated companies, intercompany accounts, borrowed moneys or any other accounts representing additional capital used and employed in the business."\textsuperscript{187} Section 136.071 permits domestic holding companies to eliminate capital invested in subsidiaries from the calculation of the license tax.\textsuperscript{188}

In an unpublished opinion that subsequently was withdrawn, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that USX, a foreign holding company that satisfied the requirements of section 136.071, but for the fact that it was not domiciled in the state, was not entitled to rely on the statute to calculate its license tax liability.\textsuperscript{189} Although the trial court had held the preferential tax scheme unconstitutional and the Revenue Cabinet did not appeal that portion of the judgment, the court of appeals held that USX was required to base its license tax liability on the higher section 136.070 calculation rather than the lower section 136.071 liability.\textsuperscript{190} "A court may not strike down a statute and then grant a remedy based upon the same statute."\textsuperscript{191}

In 1996, legislation was introduced to extend the favorable tax treatment accorded by section 136.071 to all holding corporations,\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{184} See id. at *9.
\textsuperscript{186} See id.
\textsuperscript{187} Id. § 136.070(2)(a).
\textsuperscript{188} See id. § 136.071.
\textsuperscript{190} See id. at 125.
\textsuperscript{191} Id.
regardless of their domicile, but the General Assembly did not enact it.192 USX has since filed a second action challenging the preferential tax treatment afforded by section 136.071.193

In Kroger Co. v. Kentucky Department of Revenue,194 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a positive balance in a deferred tax liability account was includable as capital for purposes of the license tax because it represented surplus that was available to the corporation for use in its business. Including the positive balance in capital had the effect of increasing capital subject to taxation. In the unpublished and subsequently withdrawn USX decision, the court of appeals extended that treatment to a negative balance in a deferred tax liability account because it represented funds that were not available to the corporation for use in its business.195 Extending inclusion in capital to negative balances in deferred tax accounts had the effect of decreasing total capital subject to taxation. On December 1, 1995, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet formally adopted the USX decision by revising Revenue Policy 41P520 to provide that both receivable and payable balances in intercompany accounts and deferred tax benefits and liabilities qualify as capital for purposes of section 136.070.196

Finally, in the unpublished and subsequently withdrawn USX decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that capital invested in USX's nonunitary subsidiaries was includable in its capital for purposes of the license tax.197 Relying on Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet,198 which held that capital invested by a corporation in a subsidiary was includable capital for purposes of the license tax,199 the court rejected USX's claim that the subsidiaries should not be includable in capital because they were nonunitary.200 The court further rejected USX's claim

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192 See Timothy C. Kimmel, Corporate License Tax and Bank Franchise Tax, 1997 UPDATE, supra note 9, at IV-5.
193 See id.
196 See Revenue Policy 41P520 (Revised Dec. 1, 1995).
198 Armco, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 748 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1988).
199 See id. at 376.
200 See USX, No. 93-CA-000072-MR and No. 93-CA-000123-MR, reprinted in 1995 UPDATE, supra note 8, at 130. In Armco, the court made no mention of
that the subsidiaries did not add value to USX. The court declared, "USX may use and invest its capital in many ways, all of which are calculated to bring USX a profit. The investment vehicle chosen by a corporation for its capital does not determine the applicability of the corporate license tax."202

D. Taxation of Cellular Telephone Companies

In Central Kentucky Cellular Telephone Co. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet,203 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that cellular telephone companies are telephone companies for purposes of section 136.120.204 The court declared that the fact that the cellular telephone companies operate with technology that did not exist when the statute was adopted does not prevent them from qualifying as telephone companies for purposes of the statute.205 Rather, the term "telephone company" for purposes of the statute is to be construed according to its general and common usage, and cellular telephone companies are commonly understood to be telephone companies.206 Thus, cellular telephone companies are subject to state taxation on their operating property pursuant to section 136.120.207

whether the subsidiaries were part of the company's unitary business. See Armco, Inc., 748 S.W.2d at 376. In discussing whether Armco had to include its domestic international sales corporation ("DISC") income for purposes of income taxation, however, the court noted that Armco and its DISC operated a unitary business. See id. at 375. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.

202 Id.
204 See id. at 603. Section 136.120(1) lists several public service corporations, including telephone companies, and requires that each of the listed corporations "'annually pay a tax on its operating property to the state and to the extent the property is liable to taxation shall pay a local tax thereon to the county, incorporated city, and taxing district in which its operating property is located.'" See id. (quoting K.R.S. § 136.120(1)).
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See id.
E. Apportionment Formula

Kentucky, like most states that have a broad-based corporate income tax, uses a three-factor apportionment formula to apportion or divide the taxpayer’s business income among the states where it does business. Specifically, Kentucky apports the taxpayer’s income to the state based on the percentage of its property, sales, and payroll attributable to the state.

Like all states that have a broad-based corporate income tax, Kentucky uses a destination rule to attribute sales to the state in which the goods are shipped to the customer or to the state in which they are

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208 See 1 State Tax Guide (CCH) ¶ 10-110, at 2582-83 (1997) (listing the apportionment formulas in each state).
209 See K.R.S. § 141.120(8).
210 Section 141.120(1)(a) defines business income as “income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of a trade or business of the corporation and includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, or disposition of the property constitutes integral parts of the corporation’s regular trade or business operations.” Id. § 144.120(1)(a). For a discussion of the varying ways in which this language may be interpreted, see Harriet Hanlon, Fairness, Simplification, Business Income, Open Meetings Highlighted at MTC, 11 STATE TAX NOTES 474, 466-77 (1996) (describing four interpretations of the business income definition in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (“UDITPA”)).
211 Formula apportionment proceeds from the theory that certain factors or elements “measure the income creating activities of the corporation in a particular taxing jurisdiction.” Arthur D. Lynn, Jr., Formula Apportionment of Corporate Income for State Tax Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltum, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 84, 89 (1957); see also JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 410 (6th ed. 1997) [hereinafter HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION]. For a more detailed discussion of apportionment formula, see, for example, Symposium, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 TENN. L. REV. 239, 251-57 (1960); Donald K. Barnes, Prerequisites of a Federal Statute Regulating State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 46 VA. L. REV. 1269, 1276-82 (1960).
212 See K.R.S. § 141.120(8). Kentucky’s apportionment formula gives double weight to the sales factor. See id. Thus, if a corporation has 15% of its sales, 35% of its property, and 40% of its payroll attributable to Kentucky, then 26% (or [15 + 15 + 35 + 40] / 4) of its income will be apportioned to the state under Kentucky’s apportionment formula.
delivered to the customer.\textsuperscript{214} Specifically, section 141.120(8)(c)(2)(a) provides that sales of tangible personal property are attributable to the state if "[t]he property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the United States government, or to the designee of the purchaser within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale."\textsuperscript{215}

There are three justifications for this destination rule. First, it balances against the property and payroll factors. "To localize sales in the state from which the goods are shipped would, in many instances, duplicate the property and payroll factors."\textsuperscript{216} Second, attributing sales to the destination state recognizes the consumer state's role in the production of income. Finally, allocating sales to the destination state is easy to administer.\textsuperscript{217}

In \textit{Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Rohm and Haas Kentucky, Inc.},\textsuperscript{218} the court addressed the question of whether products sold to a nonresident parent that are picked up at the taxpayer's dock in Kentucky in the parent's trucks and shipped to customers and locations outside of Kentucky are attributable to Kentucky under section 141.120(8)(c).\textsuperscript{219} Following the lead of all other state courts that have interpreted similar language,\textsuperscript{220} the court held that the words "within this state" modify the word "purchaser" rather than the word "delivered," and thus the sales were attributable to the state of their ultimate destination rather than their state of delivery, Kentucky.\textsuperscript{221}

Like most states that have a broad-based corporate income tax,\textsuperscript{222} Kentucky has a "throwback rule" that throws back to the state of origin

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{214} See K.R.S. § 141.120(8)(c)(2).
\item \textsuperscript{215} Id. § 141.120(8)(c)(2)(a).
\item \textsuperscript{216} Symposium, supra note 211, at 256.
\item \textsuperscript{217} See id.; see also Lynn, supra note 211, at 50-51.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Rohm & Haas Ky., Inc., 929 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{219} See id. at 742.
\item \textsuperscript{220} This statutory language comes almost verbatim from the UDITPA. See id. at 742-43.
\item \textsuperscript{221} See id. at 743-45. Jerome and Walter Hellerstein note that the Multistate Tax Commission regulations and the New York franchise tax regulations take a contrary position and contend that whether dock sales to out-of-state purchasers should be attributed to the ultimate destination or the place of delivery is a close question. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra note 211, at 619-21.
\item \textsuperscript{222} See 1 State Tax Guide (CCH) ¶ 10-110, at 2584-85 (1997) (listing each state's position on the throwback rule).
\end{footnotes}
sales to the United States government. Section 141.120(8)(c)(2)(b) provides that sales of tangible personal property are attributable to the state if "[t]he property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, or other place of storage in this state and the purchaser is the United States government." The principal purpose for this throwback rule is that the place of delivery in the case of sales to the United States government may be entirely casual and may not be related in any way to the business activity conducted in the state. Sales to the United States government are frequently made to a single large purchasing facility and subsequently shipped throughout the United States for consumption. It would be unfair to have sales attributed to the state of delivery when the goods would not necessarily be consumed in that state.

In Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals held that sales of distilled spirits to overseas military clubs did not constitute sales to the United States government within the meaning of section 141.120(8)(c)(2). The sales in that case were ordered by and delivered to specific military clubs, where the whiskey was consumed by third parties. Once shipped out of the United States, the distilled spirits could only go to the military clubs that ordered them and could not be diverted to any other location. The Board found that the reason for the government throwback rule did not apply, so the throwback rule should not apply. The destination of the sales was not entirely

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224 Id.
225 See Symposium, supra note 211, at 256; see also Lynn, supra note 211, at 50-51; UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 16 cmt., 7A U.L.A. 354 (1985) (holding "sales to the United States government are treated separately because they are not necessarily attributable to a market existing in the state to which the goods are originally shipped").
226 See Kimmell, Corporate Income Tax, 1997 UPDATE, supra note 9, at III-4.
228 See id. at *7.
229 See id. at *2.
230 See id. at *2-3.
231 See id. at *5 ("The United States throwback rule was intended in part to prevent the normal destination rules of K.R.S. 141.120(8)(c) from being manipulated. Sales by Beam to overseas military installations are not capable of such manipulation.").
fortuitous but instead was directly related to activity conducted at the destination.

F. Use Taxation of Newspaper Preprints

Section 139.310 imposes a use tax on the storage, use, or other consumption in this state of personal property purchased for storage, use, or other consumption in the state.\(^2\) For approximately thirty years, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet did not assess a use tax on advertising preprints\(^3\) purchased from out-of-state printers and shipped to Kentucky newspaper publishers for insertion in and distribution with newspapers. Then, in audits beginning in 1990, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet began to assess use taxes on advertising preprints.\(^4\)

In two recent cases,\(^5\) the Board of Tax Appeals held that the Revenue Cabinet was prevented from assessing a use tax on advertising preprints purchased outside of the state and distributed in Kentucky newspapers because it had a long-standing practice of not imposing a use tax on such transactions.\(^6\) The Board's opinions, however, were not entirely clear as to whether the policy could be changed simply by an administrative regulation promulgated by the Revenue Cabinet pursuant to the

\(^{223}\) See K.R.S. § 139.310 (Michie 1991).
\(^{223}\) See id. at *6.
\(^{226}\) See Lazarus, Inc., 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS 338, at *1; Dayton Hudson Corp., 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS 203, at *6-7. The Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals applied similar reasoning in Humana, Inc. v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, 1996 Ky. Tax LEXIS 552 (Ky. Bd. Tax App., Mar. 11, 1996), to prohibit the Revenue Cabinet from assessing sales and use taxes on prescription medicine and prosthetic devices and physical aids purchased by five health care companies. In that case, the Revenue Cabinet announced in correspondence with the companies and in a circular letter the change in its 18-year-old policy. See id. at *2-3.
procedures provided in section 13A or only be a legislative amendment.

This Board concludes that the Cabinet's position that newspaper preprints are subject to use tax is a 'statement of general applicability ... that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy' and therefore is properly the subject of an administrative regulation. KRS 13A.010(2). KRS 13A.130 prohibits an administrative body from modifying, expanding upon, or limiting a statute by internal policy, memorandum, or other form of action, and declares any such action to be null, void, and unenforceable. Because the Cabinet did not follow the mandatory KRS 13A procedures governing the promulgation of administrative regulations but instead proceeded to change its policy concerning the assessment of use tax on newspaper preprints, this Board concludes that the Cabinet's policy change is null, void, and unenforceable pursuant to KRS 13A.130.


In *Lazarus, Inc.*, the Board provided:

To the extent the Revenue Cabinet has the authority to interpret the Kentucky sales and use tax statutes to require a use tax assessment against newspaper supplements, that authority must be exercised in the form of a duly promulgated and adopted administrative regulation. The Revenue Cabinet made no effort to comply with KRS Chapter 13A in this case and is therefore precluded from assessing use tax against newspaper preprints.


See *Dayton Hudson Corp.*, 1997 Ky. Tax LEXIS, at *6 ("Because the Cabinet did not previously assess a use tax against Target for newspaper preprints, it cannot now be permitted to impose a use tax on Target without statutory authority."). The Board noted in *Lazarus, Inc.*:

Because the Revenue Cabinet routinely and consistently treated preprinted supplements as part of the newspaper and/or found them not subject to use tax because they were not used, stored, or consumed in Kentucky, the Revenue Cabinet is precluded from abandoning that long-standing interpretation without specific statutory authority.
