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'WE ARE OBLIGATED TO THINK THAT THE STATE IS JUST:' THE AKP'S GEOGRAPHIES OF ISLAM AND THE STATE IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

W. Jefferson West II

The Graduate School
University of Kentucky
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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In the 2002 national elections in Turkey, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) won a majority of parliamentary seats and the leadership of all government ministries. Viewed by many voters as an alternative to both Turkey’s Kemalist establishment and the country’s Islamist political movement, this self described ‘conservative democratic’ party composed of former Islamist politicians and political neophytes sought to establish a Muslim political identity that was neither Islamist nor secular. This dissertation explores the discourse used by AKP politicians as they navigated several highly charged issues involving the religion-state relationship in Turkey. By examining what geographies AKP politicians articulated in discussing issues of religion and state, how they constructed Islam and the state through these articulations, and how these constructions compare to Kemalist and Islamist versions, this research strives to understand how these politicians are negotiating a moderate religious identity within a context of fundamentalist-secularist polarization. The research also presents an example of how recent changes observed in modern state spatiality are propagating beyond the economic dynamics usually studied.

Drawing on statements made by AKP politicians in newspaper reports, legislative debates, and individual interviews, this project examines issues such as imam hatip schools, headscarves, the role of the Directorate of Pious Works, and Turkey’s geopolitical relationships to suggest answers to its research questions. The project concludes that a combination of religious and neoliberal logics is operating within the statements of the AKP politicians studied. By appealing to the individuality of religious choice, these AKP politicians differentiated their party from the deadlock of the Kemalist-Islamist polarity. Their appeal to individual choice suggests that the answer to providing the best welfare for the population is to reduce the state’s involvement in normal processes of everyday space and allow for God and the market to work their respective magics. Within their statements, the state retains a position as a source of knowledge, supporter of research, provider of information, and protector of order. However, the state loses its position as visionary leader and social engineer.
KEYWORDS: Turkey, Islam, spatiality, state, AKP

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‘WE ARE OBLIGATED TO THINK THAT THE STATE IS JUST:’
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DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By

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Lexington, Kentucky

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Lexington, Kentucky

2008

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CHAPTER ONE

In the 2002 elections for the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Turkey’s national parliament, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) won enough seats to establish a single party government. This was an unusual moment in the recent political history of Turkey. The victory of the AKP itself was not wholly unexpected, but the fact that only one other party could pass the 10% threshold of the national vote needed to take gain seats in the TBMM did surprise many observers (Carkoglu 2002). It was the first time since 1987 that the party that won the national election did not have to negotiate a coalition with another party in order to form a government. What makes this situation particularly intriguing is that many members of the AKP had previously been members of the Islamist political parties Refah Partisi and Fazilet Partisi, each of which was banned and dissolved by Turkey’s Constitutional Court for “anti-secular activities.” The historical associations of its membership generated much suspicion and skepticism about the AKP despite its claims to be a “Muslim Democratic party” that respected the secular structure of the state. Some expected that it too would eventually be closed down.

Now, two years later, the AKP remains the governing party of Turkey. This project will examine how during its time in this position of leadership within the Turkish state party activities have functioned to define and shape the intersection between the spaces of Islam and the state. I explore how each is produced as a governable space through the efforts of numerous agents to promote, regulate, and direct each through the other. The discursive practices of the AKP and the repetitions, contestations, and related practices of other agents linked to the space of the state will serve as an entry point to these discussions.

Turkey’s 2002 Parliamentary Elections

National parliamentary elections in Turkey are to be held every five years. However, since 1983 there has not been a single occasion in which a full five-year period has elapsed before new elections were needed due to government instability. The 1999 national elections were no exception, as the results from these elections led to an awkward coalition government of left and right leaning parties. The arrangement was tenuous from the start, and a collapse seemed inevitable. The collapse came in early 2002. In finally pulling out of the government, the leaders of each coalition party thought a reshuffling of the parliamentary seats would improve their respective political fortunes. November 3rd was set as the election day.

As the 2002 campaign progressed it became apparent that the previous government officials had misjudged their individual popularities. Their poor judgment did not become clear until the campaigns were completed and the polls closed. With almost 35% of the popular vote, the clear winner of the November 3rd elections was a party that had not existed two years earlier: the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP). Led by a former mayor of Istanbul, the AKP was characterized by its members as the vanguard of a new political movement. They described its ideology as “conservative democracy.” The election campaign had done little to clarify this enigmatic phrase. Despite this lack of clarity – or maybe because of it – the AKP received the highest percentage of the popular vote given to a winning party in Turkey since 1987. The party’s newness, the inexperience of many of its politicians, and the presumed distance of its members from the corruption-stained activities of older
political parties presented an alternative to the established political patterns that was attractive to many.

That a newly formed political party running as an outsider to the establishment would obtain enough support to win a national election is not especially unusual or surprising. However, due to the requirements of Turkish election law, this election created two results that prompted one commentator to liken it to a tsunami (Ozel 2003). According to Turkish law, in order for a political party to take possession of seats won in a parliamentary election the party must attain at least 10% of the popular vote nationwide. This law was instituted with the hope that it would regularly create a parliament dominated by two national scale political parties. While it had worked well in keeping regional parties out of parliament, it had never created a two-party arrangement within parliament – until 2002. When the votes were counted, only one party besides the AKP had gained enough support to take seats in parliament. This was the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, CHP), with 19% of the vote. Every other party, including all the officials from the 1999 coalition government, failed to reach the 10% threshold. In all, five parties each gained at least 5% of the popular vote. One party even gained 9.55%. 46% of the votes cast in the 2002 national election went to parties that did not take a seat in parliament.

The first consequence of this two party parliament was that an entire generation of older politicians from the losing parties was shut out from having a role in the state. This included two former prime ministers and a substantial number of career politicians long familiar to the Turkish public. In their place, full control of the government was handed over to the AKP, a party of younger politicians, academics, and businessmen with little experience governing at a national scale. In addition, members of the CHP, the new party of opposition, were largely unfamiliar with the role that they had acquired. While the CHP is a party with historic links to the founders of the Turkish Republic, during the 1990s it had participated in parliament only as a minor party. In 1999 it had failed to gain any seats at all. Its politicians had little more legislative experience than those in the AKP. With the 2002 parliament in new and relatively inexperienced hands, established patterns of political engagement were now opened for renegotiation.

While this first consequence of the election results received significant attention in Turkey, a second consequence gained attention around the world. Before founding the AKP, several of the party’s top officials had been members of two Islamist political parties. The newly elected Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had been imprisoned and temporarily banned from politics for reciting a poem deemed by the courts to possess inflammatory anti-secular content. Following the results of the November 3rd elections, these politicians would now occupy positions of significant importance in a state that many saw as the most secular and westernized of the Muslim world. During the campaign, Erdoğan and others in the AKP made specific statements distancing themselves from past associations with Islamist political parties. They presented themselves as moderate and pragmatic politicians and not religious ideologues. Regardless, Turkey, with its secular ideology, North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership, and European Union aspirations, was to be led by a government containing several politicians with Islamist political roots.

In assuming government power in 2002, the AKP officials were confronted with divergent expectations. While making the pursuit of European Union membership a
primary focus of their campaign and rejecting any role for religion in politics or economics, AKP politicians did not hide their personal religiosity. As a consequence, they drew strong support from conservative Muslims. These voters expected the AKP to redress certain aspects of the state that they felt discriminated against and at times persecuted more religious members of Turkey’s population. On the other hand, secular oriented voters were highly skeptical that the AKP was using moderate rhetoric to disguise an Islamist agenda. Their concern was to limit the ability of the AKP to make significant changes in the existing arrangements of the state. Leading figures in the Turkish military and national judiciary maintained similar suspicions. These officials made clear that should the AKP violate or try to alter certain established aspects regarding the place of religion in state and society, the military would be compelled to intervene in the activities of the government. This was not an idle threat, as military officials had acted to depose civilian governments in 1961, 1972, 1980, and 1997.

Given these divergent opinions of the AKP, the party’s situation following the elections was tenuous. Maintaining this majority position required navigating a series of overlapping demands and oppositional expectations. A substantial loss on either side could mean the downfall of the government. How would these politicians attempt to negotiate these demands and keep the tensions involved in check? What choices would they make as they tried to maintain their electoral support and not provoke the interference of the army? What kind of relationship between Islam and the state would they pursue and how would they explain their policy choices? What would a moderate, pragmatic, and publicly devout leadership mean for the historical patterns of state and religious interaction in Turkey?

The State

The dominant socio-political entity of the past century, the territorially sovereign nation-state, is being reconfigured in the age of globalization (Brenner et al. 2003; Ikenberry 2003). The impact of economic liberalization, free market ideology, and globalized capital on this reconfiguration has garnered much attention from both scholars and politicians. The social and cultural forces also at work have received substantially less (Marston 2003; Painter 1995; Steinmetz 1999). The simultaneous appearance in the early 1970’s of uncertainties about the future of the state (Harvey 1989) and of politicized culture in forms like religious fundamentalism (Keddie 1998; Gulalp 1995) is not coincidental, and the role of such politicized cultures in producing these uncertainties demands study. The rise of religion as a political force is particularly important in the Middle East where Islam has become a critical node for exercising resistance to local state authoritarianism and a source of collective power for engaging the geopolitical might of Europe and the United States (Piscator 1986). While this engagement has been most infamously exercised in the form of terrorism, attempts to incorporate Islam within the state system are also critical to the reconstitution of the structure of geopolitical order.

This project focuses on the intersection between Islam and the state in Turkey as a method of examining how religion is participating in a modern state, the barriers and challenges it encounters, and the effects it is creating within the global system of states. Since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent increase in geopolitical focus on issues of the Muslim world, Turkey’s historical and geographical position as a bridge between Europe and countries of the Middle East has become an increasingly critical component of the state’s domestic and international relations. This has placed renewed emphasis on
Turkey’s Muslim identity in both arenas, creating something of an identity crisis for a state that for eighty years battled to build and maintain secular institutions acceptable to the West (Ergil 2000). This research project examines the representations and practices of Turkey’s Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), a self-identified Muslim Democratic political party that currently controls the country’s elected government, to explore how Islam overlaps, competes against, and operates within the traditionally secular parameters of the Turkish state and the global state system. It will explore how the AKP negotiates the expectations of the country’s predominantly Muslim population and the international pressures of linking the ‘West’ and the ‘Muslim World.’

The state is a complex and slippery concept. It is often used interchangeably to refer to the people and places of a country (English and Townshend 1999; Levi 2002), the institutions, organizations, and bureaucracy that govern and administer those people and places (Kirby 1983; Mann 1986; Tilly 1990; Weber 1946), or a harmonious union of the two (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Skocpol 1994). It may be more effectively conceptualized as the product of a complex accumulation of strategic projects that simultaneously seek to manage political, social, and economic structures within a designated territory and negotiate relationships with similar structures in other territories around the world (Abrams 1988; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Jessop 1990). These ‘state’ projects operate within a geographical and hierarchical division of global space in which the state has been the dominant unit of social, political, economic, and cultural reference (Agnew 1994; Jordan 1985). While recent studies have begun to address how this accumulation of strategic projects is a cultural product (Gupta 1995; Marston 2003; Mountz 2003), the role of religion in the production of the state has not been addressed in a substantive fashion (Kubalkova 2000). This is particularly true in the discipline of Geography where studies of religion have historically focused on the narrow context of previously defined sacred spaces and religious communities (Gay 1971; Levine 1986; Park 1994) and studies of the state on its political-economic aspects (Clark and Dear 1984; Johnston 1982; Kirby 1983). In addressing this deficiency, this research approaches the state as a collection of social spaces, which are both the medium, and the product of social relations (Lefebvre 1991; Soja 1989). In this way, religion’s influence on the spatiality of a state can be investigated through the “collective acts of those who inhabit [its social spaces] as well as through the practices of those for whom the spaces are merely abstract referents of power” (Delaney 2001; Jensen 2001).

Religion and the State

In the Middle East, modern states were constructed around different variations of secular nationalism (Brown 2000). Despite this, Islam remained a critical source of popular identity in these countries, and many state actors incorporated Muslim references, symbols, and practices into their institutional structures. In Egypt, selected Islamic laws were integrated into otherwise Westernized law codes, religious topics were incorporated into the public school curriculum, and the shari’a courts continued to handle family disputes (Esposito and Voll 1996; Rubin 2002; Saeed 1994). In Pakistan, state actors presented Islam as part of the national culture and certain references to it were included in the state’s constitution (Jawed 1999; Shafqat 2002). In Indonesia, large subsidies were paid to religious organizations that supported the state (Hefner 2000). In each of these countries, and many others, the symbols and tropes of Islam were also
deployed strategically to gain popular support for state projects (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Halliday 2000; Tripp 1996).

The 1960’s and 1970’s saw the appearance of large-scale movements against this subordination of Islam to the state (Keddie 1998; Piscatori 1986). Whether reflecting a dissatisfaction with the failure of ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism to bring substantive relief from autocratic regimes (Dabashi 1993; Moaddel 1993; Sayyid 1997; Sidahmed and Ehteshami 1996) or with the economic hardship and class conflict created by large-scale industrialization (Abrahamian 1982; Halliday 1979; Marty and Appleby 1991; Watts 2003) or with their inability to meet the level of expectations promised by their increasing education (Brown 2000; Yavuz 2002), the members of these movements turned their collective frustration into a rejection of the legitimacy of their state institutions and of the economic, political, and cultural intrusion of the West into their lives (Eisenstadt 2000; Jurgensmeyer 1994). At their most radical, these movements envisioned an economic, political, and social system built around the principles of Islamic law and practice that would be completely different from the capitalist world-system in which they were suffering (Gole 2002; Halliday 2002). Many writers believe that in the years since their initial surge these movements have lost some of their revolutionary steam (Kepel 2002; Takeyh and Gvosdev 2004; Zubaida 2000). They find that Islamists have incorporated certain tropes from European political theory into their philosophies (Zubaida 1993), withdrawn into a conservative moralism that preserves the structural changes against which they first reacted (Roy 1994), or are sustaining the state by taking on the provision of welfare services (Tripp 1996). Others are less dismissive of these movements and continue to see the potential for substantive change within their activities (Baker 2003; Sayyid 1997).

Territorial autonomy based in national sovereignty is an idea strongly embedded in the historical foundation of the Turkish state. The men who pieced together the Turkish state from the rubble of the Ottoman Empire were very concerned to preserve what they saw as the core of the empire’s territory from division and occupation by imperial-minded French, British, Italian, and Greek forces following the conclusion of World War I (Lewis 1961). According to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Republic’s first president and symbolic father, the only way to counter the division of this territory by European states was to become a European state (Jung and Piccoli 2001; Mango 2000). To him and others around him, this meant unifying the population around a Turkish national identity, building governing institutions not ‘corrupted’ by the Islam of the Ottomans, and creating political and economic structures that would justify Turkey’s inclusion as an equal in a world system dominated by Europe and the United States (Dumont 1984). This ideological link that the early state leaders forged between the unity of the nation and the preservation of territory still possesses such force that even in the 1990s protests against language restrictions by Kurdish minorities and headscarf bans by Islamists were treated as vital threats to territorial security by many of the country’s political and military leaders (Barkey 2000; Bora 2003; Houston 1999).

How to manage Islam is a difficult case for state actors in Turkey. From the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence in 1920, state leaders used Islam as an instrument of social consensus and popular legitimation (Gulalp 2002; Sutton and Vertigans 2002; Tugal 2002; Yavuz 2000; Zubaida 2000). In the early years of the state, they appealed to Islam as a social glue and foundational property of the national identity,
even while removing the institutions of Islam from the legal institutions of the state (Davison 2003; Shankland 1999). In the 1950’s, appeals to a shared Muslim identity were a significant element of the governing party’s political platform (Sakallıoğlu 1996; Jenkins 2003). Following a coup in 1980, a ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ was promoted by the military leadership to strengthen popular unity in the face of communism and the instability that was expected to accompany the country’s forthcoming economic liberalization (Birtok and Toprak 1993; Bugra 2002; Cinar 2002). Even the explicitly Islamist political parties of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were generally allowed to operate despite offering little in the way of substantive policy initiatives beyond a realignment of the country’s cultural orientation or a nostalgia for an Ottoman past (Bora 2003; Cinar 2002; Gulalp 1999; Ozbudun 1996).

However, there is a limit to this political use of Islam in Turkey, and, while leading the national government from 1996-1997, the Islamist Refah Partisi (RP) breached this limit. It is unclear what specific actions led to the RP’s forced resignation from its elected position in the legislature (Cizre and Cinar 2003; Heper and Guney 2000; Onis 2001). Refah’s downfall is variously attributed to its attempts to replace many state bureaucrats with its own people (White 2002), its attempts to shift Turkey’s foreign alliances away from Europe and towards Muslim countries (Onis 2000), its promotion of publicly funded religious high schools (Shankland 1999), or its encouragement of an increasingly Muslim identity for the military (Navaro-Yashin 2002). What is clear is that since that event, any deployment of Islam by a political or state actor is closely watched and carefully considered by both local and international observers.

It is within this context that the AKP was formed to contest the 2002 national parliamentary elections. The party’s candidates presented themselves as being a new entity that combined moderates from earlier Islamist parties with other center-right politicians to offer voters a ‘Muslim Democratic’ middle ground between secularists and Islamists (Cizre and Cinar, 2003). This appeal, in combination with popular frustration with older politicians and political parties, enabled the AKP to win the general election with 36% of the popular vote (Onis and Keyman 2003). As only one other party gained enough votes to be granted seats in parliament according to Turkish election law, the AKP also emerged from this election holding a majority of seats in the parliament and controlling the leadership of all the government’s ministries.

**Geography, Culture, and Politics**

The concern of AKP politicians to establish a Muslim identity within the state that is neither Islamist nor secular presents an opportunity to examine questions concerning the evolving spatialities/geographies of modern states. The state is being reconfigured in the age of globalization (Brenner et al. 2003; Ikenberry 2003). The increasing importance of supranational political and economic structures, the expanding privatization of state functions, and the large-scale reduction of trade barriers around the world have brought significant changes to the ways state actors seek to organize and direct social and economic relations within and across their territorial boundaries. Initial explorations into these changes by geographers and others sought to examine how the power and stature of the state might be dissolving (Harvey 1989; Goldmann 2001; Jessop 1994; Brenner 1997; Cameron and Stein 2000; Gualini 2004; Anderson, Korsun, and Murrell 1997; Herbert 1999; Kanin 1997; Murphy 1993; Simonis 1995). Subsequent study indicates that the deterritorialization of state economic functions within the era of globalization reflect a
reorganization rather than a dissolution of state territoriality (Yeung 1998; Brenner et al. 2003). This reorganization has largely been examined through the lens of welfare and social service programs (Barnett 1999; Peck 1995), economic development efforts (Docherty, Shaw, and Gather 2004; Glassman 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999), and the rescaling of selected aspects of political authority (Felholter and Noppe 2000; Heeg and Ossenbrügge 2002; Jones 1998, 2001; Lemon 1996; Rouhani 2003).

The intersections of culture and the state in this era have not been subjected to the same intensive scrutiny. The emergence of the various economic transformations ascribed to globalization has coincided with the appearance of new social movements and the rise of identity politics (Offe 1996; della Porta and Diani 1999). These movements have illuminated the error of analyzing political competition and the state separately from the cultural questions by emphasizing the relations of power at work between different subjects, identities, values, and claims to knowledge. The increasing importance of various socio-cultural identities in competitions for state power has made it difficult to maintain the idea of a unified nation-state as an analytical category.

This requires incorporating greater attention to the diverse attitudes, values, and knowledges operating within state structures. It also means recognizing the uneven spatialities at work within the conceptualization, implementation, and evaluation of state projects. How do state actors manage a territory in which the dominance of a homogenous cultural identification might no longer be assumed? What geographical patterns of intervention might emerge from such a situation? What capacity, limits, and responsibilities does the state acquire in this situation? How do these compare to the changes described for the state’s economic relations? Are they similar? Do they produce other patterns that have been overlooked? What routes might be open for societies facing the polarized paralysis of identity politics? Are there other possibilities beyond the eventual dominance of one over the rest?

The AKP’s situation in Turkey provides an opportunity to explore these questions. The party’s ascension to government came on the heels of a decade of open competition between Islamist and secularist over the state and religion. While this competition possessed its share of political and economic power games, the primary questions have focused on knowledge, values, and beliefs. In other words, they have been questions of culture. The role of the state in establishing, defending, evaluating, and changing this culture has been a fundamental question. The AKP’s attempt to navigate between the poles opens the questions to further negotiation. What role does the state take in these navigations? Where do they find its presence needed? Where do they find its presence a problem? How is religion conceived? What practices are considered religious? How should the state engage with those practices? How does this logic intersect with the shifting economic and political logics documented by others?

**Research Questions**

This project is guided by four interconnected research questions:

**Research Question 1:** What geographies do AKP politicians articulate when addressing issues of religion and state in Turkey?

The goal of this question is to investigate the spatial structure of the organizing narratives and discourses AKP politicians use in their engagements with issues of religion and state in Turkey. The world is organized both socially and spatially. Political work most often focuses on the social patterns. By coming at these issues from the angle of
spatial structures, this project seeks to flesh out the patterns upon which AKP strategies are built. By looking at how AKP politicians present the order and patterns of space, we can better understand the epistemological framework that shapes their choices and strategies.

Research Question 2: What constructions of Islam are produced by AKP politicians within these geographic articulations?

This question examines how Islam is characterized, addressed, and produced within the geographical articulations identified for research question 1. These examinations will focus specifically on the functional properties attributed to Islam by AKP politicians. They will be concerned with identifying the capacities for societal change that AKP politicians find Islam to possess and the corollary limitations that are attributed to Islam by AKP politicians.

Research Question 3: What constructions of the state are produced by AKP politicians within these geographic articulations?

In a similar way to question 2, this question explores what expectations of the state AKP politicians employ in articulating geographies of the religion-state relationship. Investigations of this question will focus on how AKP politicians characterize the capacities and limitations of the state in managing religious beliefs and practices. These investigations will not be specifically concerned with legal limitations. They will instead pay particular attention to the existential properties attributed to the state by AKP politicians.

Research Question 4: How do these geographies and the constructions of Islam and state articulated by AKP politicians compare to similar constructions produced by Islamists and Kemalists in Turkey?

This question explores how the geographies articulated by AKP politicians situate their party in relation to the polarized hegemony of Islamist and Kemalist positions. As discussed above, issues of religion and state in Turkey are highly charged. The events of the 1990s intensified the division between religious and Kemalist. This intensification makes the AKP's attempt to remain outside of this division very difficult. Examinations of this question will explore how the productions of AKP politicians compare to each side of the religious-Kemalist division and explore what differentiating structures AKP politicians seek to create.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter Two presents a framework for examining the geography of state and religion through the eyes of different actors. First, the state is conceptualized as a subject created through the actions and interactions of people, and constituted by its relationship to an object population and is characterized by a paternalism that sees the welfare of the population as the state’s responsibility. The geography of the state comes from state evaluations of welfare distribution and the geographic character of state activities that effect welfare. Second, one of the elements within population that the state interacts with is religion. The literature addresses issues of state and religion through four major themes of: 1) slippage between religion, culture, and state; 2) religion as a state tool for moral education; 3) religion as source of conflict the state mediates; and 4) religion as a tool to protest and resist the state. In addition, this chapter looks briefly at the constructions of two groups that dominate the state-religion literature: secularists and fundamentalists. While these positions have dominated academic and political discussion, they are not the
only two possible positions from which to pursue the construction of state and religion. One other position gaining prominence is a centrist position that seeks to synthesize religious and political identities.

Chapter Three contextualizes the AKP as one of these centrist parties by describing the history and context of the project’s fieldsite, Turkey. First, I argue that Islam was a critical element in the early formation of the Turkish state and remains closely linked to the notions of population welfare at work in the country. Second, I argue that for much of the republic’s history, the Kemalist ideology of secularist organization formed the hegemonic understanding of state-Islam relationship. However, since 1980 this hegemony has gradually fractured and been reorganized. A division between Kemalists and ‘conscious Muslims’ marks the hegemonic alignment within which the AKP was formed. The third point is that politicians from the AKP are seeking to rupture this hegemony by creating an identity for their party which does not conform to either pole. By using the language of human rights and democracy, engaging with the West, and maintaining certain codes from Islamic political discourse, these politicians are attempting to carve out a new path to power in Turkey. By avoiding a clear cut association with either established pole, AKP politicians are reworking the basic assumptions of political debate in Turkey. While they found success in the 2002 elections, the challenge is to determine how they plan to maintain this identity when faced with the multitude of issues and choices that come with governing.

Chapter Four explores the ways this dissertation connects with the theories and methodologies of geography. I introduce the geographies I examine in the negotiations by AKP politicians of the religion-state relationship in Turkey and how I can analyze the subjectivation of the state through these geographies. The chapter is presented in two parts. In the first part, I explain how identity theory builds upon the understandings of discourse developed by Foucault. I then incorporate the writings of Laclau and Mouffe to connect the discussions of discourse to those of identity. In the process, I draw out the spatial dimensions at work in these understandings and build a generalized framework through which to pursue the research questions. In the second part, I discuss how I applied the methodological framework outlined in the first part to the problem of religion-state negotiation by AKP politicians. I establish the terms of engagement with the problem, discuss where and how I collected data, and present the procedure used to analyze the data following its collection.

Chapter Five examines how AKP politicians articulate geographies of population welfare through their approach to the imam hatip schools and headscarf issues. I argue that they articulate a geography where a state directed exclusion of headscarves and imam hatip students from spaces of modernity creates problems for the welfare of the population. AKP politicians find this exclusion troubling because they do not understand the presence of Islam as dominating the social relations of a given space. In the presentation of these articulations, AKP politicians are constructing religion to be a universal human drive that is manifested in many different ways in different places. Consequently, they argue that the manner in which people choose to practice Islam is a matter of individual preferences possessed by independent Cartesian subjects. Out of these articulations constructions of Islam and the state emerge. Islam is produced as a local manifestation of a universal human desire for religious experience. This manifestation is one identity and practice among many in any space. The state is
produced as an agent of limited means which is best suited to respond to demands from society instead of trying to engineer societal order. These constructions of Islam and state position the AKP as separate from both Islamists and Kemalists. Islam is neither an agent of power as Islamists see it nor the source of harm that Kemalists describe. It is one identity and practice among many. Likewise, the state is neither as troubled as Islamists see it nor as powerfully righteous as Kemalists do.

Secularism and laicism are two terms that are often used interchangeably when discussing the relations of religion and state in Turkey, and is the focus of Chapter Six. Secularism is often presented in the American sense of a separation of church/religion and state. Employing this idea means attempting to draw very distinct social and geographic lines between the authority of religion and that of the state. Laicism is often associated with the French model of religion-state relations. Under laicism the state provides some administrative oversight of religion and religious practice. The Turkish constitution mandates that the state administer religious affairs in the country and make an appropriate religious education available to the population. The Turkish constitution mandates that the state administer religious affairs in the country and make an appropriate religious education available to the population, through the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Pious Works, DİB). By examining three issues related to the DİB, we uncover further answers to the project’s research questions. The geography of population welfare revolved around the presence or absence of the state in spaces where religious knowledge was being presented or taught. The absence of the state in mosques was viewed as a threat to the security and stability of the country. The logic of abhorrent vacuum was used to connect the state’s absence with the presence of undesirable interlocutors. The absence of the state in Alevi worship sites and Koran courses was characterized as less critical. Within these articulations, Islam was seen as an impulse for which people needed guidance and education in order to direct it into the proper practices. The state was constructed as the most trustworthy agent for providing this guidance due to its possession of objectivity and concern for security of the population as a whole. The combination of the concern for security and the emphasis on gaining proper religious knowledge represents an amalgamation of Kemalist and Islamist tropes that enable AKP politicians to speak to both positions and many in between.

In Chapter Seven, I explore how AKP politicians negotiate the relationship between religion and state at the geopolitical scale using ideas of civilizational order. These politicians articulate a geography in which Turkey sits on the border between two civilizational regions possessing historical antipathy. The tension observed by AKP politicians between these civilizations is magnified by their observations of a geography of welfare. These observations find the Islamic civilization lagging behind European civilization in key aspects of political and economic development. With its position on the border, AKP politicians present Turkey as a site for overcoming the civilizational tension through interaction and dialogue. In the process of articulating this geography, AKP politicians construct Islam as a teleological target and set of essentialized values to be pursued by the people of the Muslim world. These politicians also construct the Turkish state predominantly as an agent of civilizational education and dialogue directed towards reducing the observed tensions. This articulation of a geography based on the idea of civilizations and the respective constructions of state and Islam that emerge allow AKP politicians to negotiate the Kemalist-Islamist polarity by employing various aspects
of the vocabulary used by each side while avoiding a complete embrace of the discourse from either position. I argue that as part of this articulation, Islam was produced as an essence and a goal. The state was produced as an educational agent that facilitates dialogue and presents its own experiences for others to follow. This articulation of civilizational order allowed AKP politicians to use parts of Kemalist and Islamist discourse while remaining distinctive from either. They redefined the idea of civilization from that used by Kemalists. They used the utopian structure of Islamist discourse while proposing different methods for pursuing a Golden age.

Chapter Eight presents the conclusion to this dissertation research. The electoral victory of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in the Turkish national parliamentary elections of November 2002 placed the party’s politicians in a unique position. With full control over the parliament and all government ministries, the politicians in this newly established party held enough political power to formulate and pass whatever legislation they wished. Since many AKP politicians once belonged to the Islamist political parties of the 1980s and 1990s, their next moves in government became a source of interest. Some people saw in the AKP a new Muslim party that would act as the final rebuttal to those who questioned the democratic capacities of Islam. Others waited for the party to show its true Islamist colors and move Turkey’s laws and institutions towards those of an Islamic state. Either way, the strategic ambiguity employed by the AKP throughout the election campaign would be replaced by specific choices, decisions, policies, and legislation. The activities and the negotiations with which they are involved provide significant insight into the dynamics of the charged context they entered. This context included not only the polarized landscape of Turkey, but also encompassed an increase in the importance of religious politics around the world and the fluctuating fortunes of the state as a subject of power in a world being altered through the forces of neoliberalizing economic globalization. This chapter summarizes the uniqueness of this project and suggests questions for continued investigations.
CHAPTER TWO

This chapter presents a framework for examining the geography of state and religion through the eyes of different actors. First, the state is conceptualized as a subject created through the actions and interactions of people. This subject is constituted by its relationship to an object population and is characterized by a paternalism that sees the welfare of the population as the state’s responsibility. The geography of the state comes from state evaluations of welfare distribution and the geographic character of state activities that affect welfare. Second, one of the elements within population that the state interacts with is religion. The literature addresses issues of state and religion through four major themes of: 1) slippage between religion, culture, and state; 2) religion as a state tool for moral education; 3) religion as source of conflict the state mediates; and 4) religion as a tool to protest and resist the state. In addition, this chapter looks briefly at the constructions of two groups that dominate the state-religion literature: secularists and fundamentalists. It concludes by raising the question of how ‘moderate Muslims’ negotiate a position distinctive from these two groups.

Approaching the State

We have come to take the state for granted as an object of political practice and political analysis while remaining quite spectacularly unclear as to what the state is. We are variously urged to respect the state or smash the state or study the state; but for want of clarity about the nature of the state such projects remain beset with difficulties (Abrams 1988: 59).

‘What is the state?’ ‘Where the state can be found?’ and, ‘How can the state be differentiated from other phenomenon?’ Political geographers have generally answered these questions in one of three ways: 1) the state is a place or a community-territory combination; 2) the state is a ruling bureaucracy; or 3) the state is an ideological element by which people effect their own domination. In this section, I briefly review the composition of each answer and argue that Abrams’ claim for a lack of clarity in identifying the state is applicable in each case. Each answer provides a suggestion as to what the state is and where it might be found, but flounders when probed to differentiate the state from other entities.

The State is a Place

Political geographers have drawn heavily on the idea that a unique relationship between state and territory exists (Driver 1991; Mann 1986). This relationship is supposedly unique because, in the words of Michael Mann,

Only the state is inherently centralized over a delimited territory over which it has authoritative power. Unlike economic, ideological, or military groups in civil society, the state elite’s resources radiate authoritatively outwards from a centre but stop at defined territorial boundaries. The state is, indeed, a place – both a central place and a unified territorial reach (Mann 1986:198).

This notion of state as place is understood to provide state actors nominal autonomy from political, social, and economic interference by actors beyond the state’s territorial borders. Conversely, the linking of state power to a delimited spatial area allows state actors to employ various strategies of territorial manipulation for achieving social control. Such territoriality includes dividing space into small administrative groups, preventing access to particular spaces unless certain criteria of social behavior are met, and allocating resources within the territory according to various goals (Sack 1986). As a
result, social relations are molded by the boundaries of territory, creating alliances within and antagonisms across the boundaries (Taylor 1994; Johnston 1989; Poulantzas 1978).

The idea of the state as a place was central to understanding the state within early political geography (Natter 2005). Friedrich Ratzel described the relationship between state and territory as derived from the state’s unification of a section of land with a particular human community, most often through their natural or historical association (Ratzel 1923). In his wake, the major themes of political geographic interest were explored through a territorial lens. Scholars focused on determining the differing functions of a border and a frontier (Boggs 1940; Lattimore 1940; Kristof 1959), where political borders belong in relation to things like environmental or ecological boundaries (Alexander 1963; Fischer 1949), and the effects of borders in various places (Moodie 1945, 1950). When geopoliticians sought to compare the power of states they identified strategic military positions around the globe and the territories in which they were located (Mackinder 1904; Mahan 1890; Spykman 1944). They also determined the relative power of a state by tabulating the natural resources available within the borders of its territory (Meinig 1956; East 1950; Sprout 1963; Haushofer, Tambs, and Brehm 2002). Geographers interested in state formation explored the patterns and forces of territorial expansion and fragmentation (Whittlesey 1939; Hartshorne 1950; Jones 1954; Gottman 1951; van Valkenburg 1939).

However, identifying the state as a place does not resolve the theoretical question of which places are states and which are not. First, the territory-people combination and the use of territoriality are not qualities unique to the state (Sack 1986). Private corporations maintain infrastructural power within their own campuses. Disney World possesses its own police force, operates its own court system, controls entrance to its grounds, and regulates the accessibility of spaces within those grounds to encourage or discourage particular social behaviors. For the unknowing stranger, what distinguishes theoretically her experience of Disney World from her experience of a state? Second, the world is full of boundaries. There is little to theoretically separate the boundary of a state from the boundary of a suburban property line. Third, the locations of boundaries and the size of territories are relatively arbitrary. What theoretical qualities do the territories of Russia and Luxembourg share? Why are they identified as states and other places are not? The combination of territory and people is a significant component of the state. However, it is not enough to distinguish the state from any other entity.

The State is a Bureaucratic Agent

The second answer to the question ‘what is the state’ is represented by the work of Max Weber. While Weber paid some attention to the territorial aspects of the state (Brenner et al. 2003), he had a particular interest in the bureaucratization of social life in the modern era. For him, the modern state represented one of the most fully developed instantiations of this bureaucratization (Weber 1978). Additionally, he saw this bureaucracy as distinguished from all others by its presumed monopoly on the legitimate use of violence or physical force within a territory (Weber 1972). For many, the description of the state as a bureaucracy wielding legitimate violence has become the classic definition of the state.

Political geographers came to focus on the state as bureaucracy through an engagement with issues of urban political economy. The experiences of fiscal crisis and urban unrest in Europe and the United States during the 1960s and 1970s prompted a
reconfiguration of the scalar lens through which many geographers approached the state. David Harvey (Harvey 1973) and Manuel Castells (Castells 1977) brought to the discipline a focus on the city as the site and product of class struggles (Peet 1989). In these struggles, the state was not observed as a diffuse community-territory combination. Instead, the state was viewed as a participant in these struggles and an actor against which much of the unrest was directed. From this perspective, as Harvey writes in his 1976 review of Karl Marx’s writings on the state,

> The state should in fact be viewed, like capital, as a relation or as a process – in this case a process of exercising power via certain institutional arrangements (Harvey 1976:87).

Within this reconfiguration, the state came to be found in specific institutions and people intervening in an array of lives and spaces in various and often conflicting ways (Cox 2002; Clark and Dear 1984).

Political geography studies incorporating the state as bureaucracy follow two paths. The first was to focus on the functions, operations, and interventions of the state bureaucracy in social space. These studies examined the state role in such areas as regional economic development (MacLeod 2001; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999, 1999), welfare and workfare programs (Peck 1995, 1998), and public service provision (Kirby 1993). The results of these studies began to deconstruct a uniform understanding of the state that instrumentalist and structuralist state theorists employed by revealing the complicated, uneven, and local nature of exercises of state power (Duncan and Goodwin 1982; Dear 1981); (Harvey 1985). Geographers noted that states were organized and functioned differently from place to place at global and local scales (Taylor 1985). However, a certain uniformity remained in place as the variety of state functions were understood largely as securing the conditions for the accumulation of capital or legitimizing, maintaining, and enriching a particular set of elites.

The second route in the study of the state as a bureaucratic actor examined the development of the bureaucratic apparatus itself. These studies demonstrated that the actual apparatus of a given state varies according to historical and context-dependent formation processes (Driver 1991; Chouinard and Fincher 1987). The specific programs, policies, and projects pursued by state actors are critical to determine the actual form the state bureaucracy takes. As such, the state was posited as being a product of state projects as well as being a site and generator of these projects (Jessop 1990). These processes were found to be neither unitary nor holistic. Instead, they were observed to produce bureaucratic structures, policies, and objectives that overlapped, interfered with, and even directly contradicted one another (Clark and Dear 1984).

Despite leading to significant improvements in the conception of the state, focusing on the state as bureaucracy still brings two ambiguous properties. First, as with a place-based approach to understanding the state, the bureaucratic understanding of the state does not present any theoretical basis for identifying a state bureaucracy apart from any other bureaucracy. We can see this problem at work in Weber’s definition. While Weber distinguishes the state by the measure of legitimated violence, the question of whether bureaucratic violence is legitimate or not depends tautologically on whether that bureaucracy is recognized as part of a state. Second, the proliferation of public-private partnerships, the privatization of various state functions, and the distribution of certain powers such as trade regulation to non-state or multi-state bodies since the 1970s has
raised the question of what to include and exclude from a definition of the state. Attempts by state theorists to incorporate all appearances of the state into a bureaucratic definition have led to the breaking down of that definition. As Bob Jessop notes,

It follows that to talk of state managers, let alone of the state itself, exercising power is at best to perpetuate a convenient fiction that masks a far more complex set of social relations that extend far beyond the state apparatus and its distinctive capacities (Jessop 2002: 40).

*The State is an Ideological Object*

The third answer to the question ‘what is the state’ is provided by Abrams himself. Building from a Marxian theory of ideology, Abrams suggests seeing the state not as a material object but as something which veils, mystifies, and legitimates certain activities of political and economic domination. He writes,

The state… is not an object akin to the human ear. Nor is it even an object akin to human marriage. It is a third-order object, an ideological project (Abrams 1988: 76).

Abrams argues that approaching the state as a mystification or an ideological project does not mean that the state cannot be a target of investigation. As in social scientific studies of God or religious beliefs, the analysis that Abrams proposes does not require a presumption that the object of investigation actually exists. One can study others’ belief in the object of interest and how this belief organizes and shapes their choices, activities, and relationships. In other words, for Abrams, studying the state should mean studying the effects created by the presumption that the state power is present and active in a particular context.

This presumption of power has since been characterized in a variety of different ways: as a “structural effect” produced by the disciplined actions of individuals (Mitchell 1991); as an “imagined state” produced in various ways by those inside and outside state structures (Nugent 2001); and as a “fantasy” in which the state’s unreality is known but people act as if it is real (Navaro-Yashin 2002). Michael Taussig (Taussig 1997) has even compared the state with a ghost or a voodoo spirit that floats around and temporarily inhabits various bodies. Mountz (Mountz 2003; Mountz 2004) has employed a similar notion of embodiment to analyze how the practices, emotions, and choices of people working with a state bureaucracy come to create the state itself. All of these descriptions of the state seek to dissolve both the unity and the concrete materiality given to the state by the place-based and bureaucratic approaches. In their place, these theories each present the state fundamentally as an idea, a concept, or an illusion.

These approaches to the state as an ideological object tend to reiterate the issues of clarity raised for the place-based and bureaucratic conceptions. In particular, they fail to address what distinguishes state making acts from the non-state making acts. Mitchell (1991) speaks of the state as a structural effect of disciplined actions. However, he does not specify the actions to which he is referring nor how to identify actions that are not implicated in the state. A similar question can be raised with Hansen and Stepputat’s (2001) classification of ‘languages of stateness.’ What identifies a language of stateness as belonging to the state beyond its repeated use by agents of a state? How do we know they belong to the state or signal the presence of the state? Mountz avoids this question in part by focusing on state actors themselves, but this seems to slip back into the bureaucratic approach discussed above.
This leaves us with a fundamental uncertainty surrounding the state. What we have found is a tautological process whereby the state is recognized by the qualities a state possesses, but those qualities are defined only by looking first at a state. What does this mean for the state? It means at the very least that the state is an inconsistently defined working concept. It is inherently vague because the various aspects associated with it are always emerging in and through the material interactions of space. The state possesses no independent existence by which it can be recognized. The only way to find the state is to look at things that are associated with the state. In other words, paradoxically, the state does not exist until it is found.

In this respect then, I find the ideological approach to the state proposed by Abrams and others most useful for the study at hand. Taussig’s observation of the ghostly state captures this most poetically. He sees the state floating in and out of things as observers ‘discover’ it in temporary possession of various objects, sites, and people. This common observation of possession links these various elements together and provides a sense that there exists an independent thing called ‘the state.’

**The State as Subject**

In this section I argue that the state is not just an idea about which people think and talk. Instead it can be conceived as a subject, a node through which people incorporate their identities, structure their relations, and organize strategic negotiations of power. By conceptualizing the state in this fashion, I draw upon the insights of Foucault examining the composition and production of subjects. Thus, it becomes possible to identify ways in which geographies become embedded within the state. To move from the state as idea to the state as subject, I introduce the initial proposals of a state idea in political geography. I then connect these ideas to the general concept of interpellation developed by Althusser. Next, I present some alterations, complications, and improvements in this theory presented by Foucault. Finally, I will bring these generalities back to the issue of the state and the consequences such an approach has for understanding the state.

Richard Hartshorne, Stephen B. Jones, and Jean Gottman initially interrogated the notion of a state idea in political geography. For Hartshorne and Jones the relation between the state idea and the state was a relatively unproblematic subset of the relation between the imagined and the real. Hartshorne (Hartshorne 1950) posited the ‘state idea’ as being one of the main centripetal forces pulling diverse people and places together into a single territorial unit. He was especially interested to identify places in a state that were easily or naturally drawn into the unit and those brought into the unit by force. Jones (Jones 1954) incorporated the state idea into his all encompassing theory of politics by positing it as the ideological foundation and communal motivation for the creation and continued evolution of a material state. He presented the relationship between idea and real as a dialectical one in which each created changes in the other over time.

Jean Gottman theorized the state idea a bit differently. Gottman viewed space as a highly differentiated entity. Within those differences, he found the greatest discrepancies to be located “in people’s minds” (1951:164) and the most important organizing element to be “what people are taught to see” (1951:163). Gottman saw relations between elements of the world constantly formed through interactions created by what he referred to as their ‘movement’ or ‘circulation.’ Gottman argued that what kept those relations from instantly dissolving via the same forces was an integrating and stabilizing force he
labeled ‘iconography.’ As the “whole system of symbols in which a people believe,” iconography – according to Gottman – functions to hold relations static and to resist the changes created by movement. Because of this capacity to hold relations in place even temporarily, Gottman felt that iconography (i.e. language, symbols, etc) played an important role in shaping the motives of populations and provided an avenue for understanding political choices beyond the model of economic self-interest.

Gottman’s insistence on the importance of the differences in people’s minds and the work of language and symbols in bringing those differences into a temporarily stable relation with one another complicated the state idea concept as formulated by Hartshorne and Jones. Hartshorne and Jones both described the state idea as an integrating influence operating with relative autonomy. For them, the state idea was a metaphysical presence with its own distinctive properties. In this respect, they presented a literal interpretation of the state idea as a ghost. Gottman was more circumspect in his formulations. By arguing that people see what they are taught to see, he made the state idea one that is intrinsically bound to the actions of people. The state idea in Gottman’s schema would only be a ghost insofar as some people have been taught to see the state at work in a given situation and others have not. It would have no presence independent from this seeing. Gottman’s version of the state idea also implied that the ‘real’ state and the state idea could not exist as distinct entities. The two were interwoven in ways more complex than suggested by Hartshorne or Jones. Gottman was beginning to move from the state as idea to the state as subject.

The question of seeing or not seeing depending on what a person knows seems to presage a key idea in the work of Althusser. Althusser described the moment in which one sees what one was taught to see as the Althusserian moment in which a person occupies a subject position as defined by ideology. Althusser described this moment as the ‘interpellation’ of individuals into the existing ideological structure of society (Althusser and Balibar 1970). For Althusser, interpellation was the method by which relationships between people are formed, enacted, and perpetuated. In the example of the state, Althusser would argue that by seeing the state in some other person or thing, an individual establishes a relationship between himself and the state entity. By recognizing the state in something else and by recognizing himself as not containing the state, the individual has interpellated a non-state subject position that brings with it certain expectations of behavior and action with respect to the state entity or person (obedience, fear, respect, resistance, etc). For Althusser, these expectations are something that people are taught and forced into living out by the ideological context in which they live. Failing to operate within these expectations means living outside the realm of comprehension and intelligibility necessary for social interaction.

This structuralist view of Gottman read through Althusser raises a couple of questions. Where does the ideological context that people are taught to see come from and who is the teacher? What force establishes the dictates of comprehension and intelligibility? Gottman suggests answers to neither question. Althusser employs what Butler (1997) called the ‘divine model’ for an explanation. He claims the expectations derive ultimately from the relations necessary for the perpetuation of Capital and attributes much of the responsibility for imparting those expectations to the ‘Ideological State Apparatus’ (Althusser and Balibar 1970). This conceptualization presents a problem for understanding the state as idea because it leads back to the imagined versus
real dualism from which Gottman had departed. By looking to the Ideological State Apparatus as the final dictator of comprehension and intelligibility, Althusser slips the state back towards a grounding in some form of material bureaucratic agent.

The work of Foucault on subjects and subjectivity suggests another possible option to explain the source of the ideological context. His work builds on the following question: What if we think of subject positions and the ideas to which they are linked as being learned instead of taught? This shift in our angle of inquiry removes the divine or omniscient actor from the process of making subject positions and focuses attention instead on the material interactions of people. The idea of learning shifts from the teacher-pupil model in which knowledge is held and distributed by a teacher to the experiential model in which knowledge is created by people through action, reaction, experience, repetition, and memory. In this latter model, there is no teacher, only students experimenting with the world, communicating their results and experiences to each other, and attempting to reenact relations recalled from other times and places. The students become agents of their own world but can only learn through their interaction with other things in the world.

It is this model of knowledge production that Foucault draws upon in *Discipline and Punish* when he replaces the idea of interpellation with the concept of subjectivation. Subjectivation begins from the interpellation model. Foucault agrees with Althusser that an individual in a given situation is required to subordinate himself to already familiar subject positions in order to be intelligible to another or even himself. What Foucault then adds to this picture is the converse process. He argues that the subject position itself is not a fixed and static entity. He finds that it is also produced by the actions of the interpellated person and expectations of that subject are confirmed, altered, or ruptured in the process. Thus, Foucault finds that the subjection of an individual “is not only a subordination but a securing and maintaining, a putting into place of a subject…” (Butler 1997: 90-91).

Subjectivation is an important process in the model of the state I outline here. What subjectivation adds to our developing picture of the state is an element of history in the making. Unlike with the interpellation of Althusser, subjectivating the state implies the working of a constant process of subject positions becoming and being made. Relations are established through a multitude of individual experiments, strategic choices, and material experiences. For various reasons, people attempt to transfer these relations across space and time in order to reproduce them in other emerging contexts. When this transfer is accepted, unnoticed, or largely unchallenged, context specific relationships can appear as independent entities existing autonomously from the situated encounters that produce them.

This lack of meaningful differentiation between contexts is part of what Laclau and Mouffe sought to highlight in their reconceptualization of the idea of hegemony. Just as Foucault’s notion of subjectivation replaces Althusser’s interpellation, hegemony as conceptualized by Laclau and Mouffe seeks to replace Althusser’s understanding of ideological structure with a more fluid and decentered version. The term hegemony initially invoked the tactical manipulation of various identities by one group in order to create a unified alliance out of disparate people. Gramsci expanded this understanding to encompass the role of military, economic, and cultural leadership in the formation of class identity. Laclau and Mouffe broke the term free from Gramsci’s latent economism
in order to discuss how some ideas, identities, and relations but not others get perpetuated across space and time. They argued that the perpetuation of an idea, identity, relation, or subject requires people to constantly invoke old versions of these elements into newly emerging sets of relations. This invocation cannot produce a complete duplicate of the previous element because of the spatial and temporal differentiation at work between the old and the newly emerging contexts. The tension of this difference requires a certain amount of negotiation. While this negotiation can disrupt or prevent the element’s reproduction, more often the result is a less dramatic alteration in the element’s composition that maintains an accepted similarity to the previous version while operating in the newly emerging set of relations. In this way, Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of hegemony provides a sense of ideological structure that is simultaneously stable and fluid while also leaving open the possibility for dramatic and revolutionary change.

When we account for a hegemonic understanding of structure, the process of subjectivation gains another aspect of complexity. Foucault pointed out the variation in a subject position created by the actions and relations of the individual being subjectivated (doing the subjectivating). What Laclau and Mouffe’s version of hegemony adds is that a subject position is also never produced in the same context twice. This means that the expectations that come with subjectivation are not fixed either. They are constantly being adjusted according to the newly emerging sets of relations in which the subjectivated(ing) individual is participating. And so, the process of subjectivation becomes a matter of negotiation both by the person subjectivated into a subject position and by the reinscription of a subject position within a spatio-temporal context that differs from its original manifestation.

It may help to summarize the ideas I am discussing here by phrasing them in terms of a play. From an interpellation perspective, the playwright is the critical point of focus for analyzing a play. She sets the characters, the lines, and the scenes. Those engaging in the play – the director, the actors, and the audience – have no bearing on the meaning. The playwright sets everything and people just play out the assigned roles. It makes no difference where or by whom the play is produced. The actions and meanings are fixed.

If we look at a play from a subjectivation perspective, everything goes into flux. Directors stage and organize the action in various ways. The language in the script varies. Actors interpret roles differently. They bring different aspects to their performance each time. They make mistakes in different places. Audiences respond to the performances in various ways and in turn actors alter the way they perform. Nothing is completely fixed and stable. However, there is enough of an accepted similarity from night to night and place to place to consider each performance to constitute the same play. That acceptance in similarity may be an effect solely of using the same title or it may be found in the recognition of other components deemed to possess some equivalency across space and time. This recognition or acceptance of similarity should not be considered absolute across a population. Instead, it should be viewed as predominance created through communication, repetition, and shared experience among members of that population.

What does this mean for thinking about the state? Like a play, the state should not be thought of as a materially identifiable entity. Nor should it be considered as a completely imagined concept. The state is a subject in relation to which certain material and social interactions are organized and made meaningful. The interactions are known
and performed through the subjectivation of individuals into subject positions with respect to the state (Secor 2007). These subject positions and the relations of power that define them are not inherently stable. They change in sometimes dramatic but more often mundane ways through the performances of subjectivated individuals. The seeming stability of a subject position - and consequently the state as a locus of the power relations defining it - is a product of a hegemonic acceptance of similarity in the subject position across contexts differentiated by space and time.

What are some consequences of defining the state in this fashion? First, it means that the state is de-centered as an object of study. It is no longer privileged with the understanding of possessing a power and individual presence separate from other empirical objects of interest. The decentering of the state in this way changes the way power is studied. Power becomes a matter of social relationships and the negotiations of the hegemonic and the innovative as belonging to social relationships and not to any particular person or entity. Swyngedouw has termed this understanding of power ‘governance beyond the state’ (Swyngedouw 2005). The state itself is another piece of the negotiation of power instead of being the source of such differences.

Second, the state is historicized as an object of study. By thinking the state as a subject, it is emptied of all meaning outside of that provided by the expectations of those enacting its subjectivation. These expectations are created through various combinations of habit, experience, memory, and education. These expectations are built up over time. The relative similarity of such expectations across populations is a result of work that can be traced historically. It is not the consequence of some independent existence.

Third, as Bob Jessop has suggested, the existence of networks and relationships associated with the state prior to a particular subjectivation enacts a “strategic selectivity” with respect to the formulation, negotiation, and incorporation of new projects into the state (Jessop 2002). As Matthew Hannah summarizes the state,

…Although the interests and programs animating state activity are largely of external (“social”) origin, the state structures that have been left behind by previously important interests have a certain inertia to them, and thus end up inflecting (or in some cases deflecting) the project mediated through them (Hannah 2000: 33).

Jessop initially formulated this strategic-relational understanding of the state through a bureaucratic lens. He identified the institutional apparatus of the state as the state structures of importance in this process. However, the principle of strategic selectivity carries over into a theorization of the state as subject as well. If we look to the hegemonic logics, rationalities, and expectations associated with the state, the same sorting of new ideas and projects can be seen at work. New projects that employ existing logics at work in a state have a better chance of being incorporated into the networks associated with the state than ones that run contrary to established lines of thought. The result is that states are maintained and reproduced through what Marston et al call in a different context, “relative redundant orders and practices that are infrequently punctured by new, unique, or creative possibilities.

Fourth, understanding the state as a subject means approaching the state through a relational lens. Without any essential core of its own, the identity of the state becomes determined by the relationships it is considered to have with other entities of the world. Its tasks, its capabilities, and its limitations become a product of the way it is
subjectivated in relation to other things. In the next section I look to Foucault’s essay on Governmentality to argue that one of the most significant relations through which the state is constituted is with the entity that Foucault defines as ‘population.’ In this essay Foucault identifies the historical emergence of ‘government’ as logic of power in which the exercise of power is accomplished through the pro-active shaping of conditions and possibilities instead of the reactive application of force. Within this logic, the state becomes a subject in the exercise of power and population emerges as the object that state projects seek to manage. The legitimacy of the state subject’s position of power is connected to its assumed ability to protect and develop the welfare of its associated population.

The State and the Geographies of Population Welfare

Throughout its historical development, the state has not remained static with regards to the people residing within its territorial lands. In his essay on Governmentality, Foucault identifies a shift in this relationship from a relationship based largely on the logic of sovereignty to one that draws heavily upon the logic of government. This shift possesses two significant components. The first is the development of the people in a territory into the territory's population. The second is the assumption of the state as responsible for the welfare of the population. For Foucault, the combination of these transitions represents a significant change in the operating knowledge of the state subject and illuminates the intertwined dependencies at work in the structures of power.

The appearance of the concept of population is tied directly to the development of statistics as a method of observing and evaluating the world. Statistical analysis first migrated beyond theoretical speculation in the eighteenth century. It gained importance as a tool used by the bureaucratic agents of European states. As Foucault relates, the word 'statistics' literally means the 'science of the state.' Prior to the development of these tools, state actors undertook rule in a largely symbolic and anecdotal method. These tools enabled the observation, tracking, and analysis of trends and patterns in large amounts of people and things. They also enabled the conceptualization of projects that would seek to alter these trends and patterns.

Foucault argues that through the use of statistics the collectivity came to be treated as a fundamentally new object called population. Within the vocabulary of statistics, population refers to the total collection of items to be observed and evaluated. Very often the number of items in a population is very large or unable to be determined. In this situation, samples are taken to represent the population and calculations are undertaken using the samples to describe and compare various patterns in the population. As Foucault notes, with respect to the people of a territory, the application of statistics,

…Gradually reveals that population has its own regularities, its own rate of deaths and diseases, its cycles of scarcity, etc.; statistics shows also that the domain of population involves a range of intrinsic, aggregate effects, phenomena that are irreducible to those of the family, such as epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, ascending spirals of labour and wealth (Foucault 1991: 99).

In short, population becomes its own entity with laws and habits that are separate from the lives of individual people within the territory.

According to Foucault, the reliance of state actors upon the tools of statistics for gathering knowledge and observations about the people within a state's territory led to a transformation of the state's relation to those people. No longer did state actors interact
with people as individuals or even as symbolic representatives. Instead, state actors observed, evaluated, and interacted with people only insofar as they were part of the population. The result was a significant step in the abstraction of the state from the specificities of actual people.

As its dominant concern became an object with patterns and laws operating at a scale separate from that of individual people, the state itself became a subject that only existed and acted at that scale as well. No one person could claim, as Louis XVI did, that 'I am the state.' The state came to exist outside of the actual people who performed the roles and created the projects associated with the state.

The second aspect of the shift that Foucault identifies is concerned with the general logic motivating state activities. Prior to the sixteenth century, the ruler of an area viewed his or her territory and all things within it only as material resources for preserving power. Exercising rule focused on establishing obedience to the law and maintaining the social hierarchy into which all were understood to be born. A ruler paid scant attention to the wealth or productive capacities of the inhabitants of his or her land except as these capacities supported or posed a threat to the status quo. However, Foucault writes,

…From the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, there develops and flourishes a notable series of political treatises that are no longer exactly ‘advice to the prince’, and not yet treatises of political science, but are instead presented as works on the ‘art of government’ (Foucault 1991: 87).

These works on the art of government, according to Foucault, established an intimate connection between the amount of power possessed by the ruler and the levels of health, prosperity, industry, and ingenuity contained within his or her territory. These works proposed equating the prince’s method of ruling over his territory with the patriarch’s management of his family. For the family patriarch of the time,

Governing a household, a family, does not essentially mean safeguarding the family property; what concerns it is the individuals that compose the family, their wealth and prosperity. It means to reckon with all the possible events that may intervene, such as births and deaths, and with all the things that can be done, such as possible alliances with other families; it is this general form of management that is characteristic of government (Foucault 1991: 94).

Foucault argues that by the 17th and 18th centuries the relationship between ruler and ruled and between patriarch and family was widely accepted. The level of prosperity, health, and general well being of the people in their territories came to be known as the people's economy. It is this broad understanding of economy that was the subject of the early political economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

The full implementation of this logic of economy at the territorial scale did not follow immediately upon its acceptance. As Foucault notes, establishing governance for achieving this model of managing economy required establishing a “form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods” (Foucault 1991: 92). The tools for creating such a comprehensive form of surveillance and control for the people of a territory, however, did not emerge at the same time as the discussions of the art of government. It was not until the development of statistics that such surveillance and control of people and goods became possible. The final outcome
was a logic wherein the state came to be identified as the caretaker for the economy of the population.

As Mitchell describes, the economy becomes an object of state concern in the 1930s. This makes the use of economy to describe the characteristics of a population somewhat confusing. If we want to avoid confusion, we need to find a different term through which to refer to the concerns originally labeled economy. I suggest the term ‘welfare’ because, as Gupta notes,

Foucault argued that since the eighteenth century, population became the object of sovereign power and discipline in a new way, so that the growth of the welfare of the population within a given territory, the optimization of its capabilities and productivity, became the goal of government (Gupta 2001: 67).

Welfare captures the sense of prosperity, health, and general well being that was described as ‘economy’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Welfare also carries with it a similarly vague sense that an evaluation about the strengths or weaknesses of particular items has been made by the subjects under examination. This vagueness highlights the moment of evaluation at work in any political statement while leaving the exact parameters of that evaluation open to historical emergence. The question of what constitutes welfare within a population cannot be theorized. It is a matter of values and the historical development of what things matter to those engaging in the debate. It is these parameters that form the kernels of political debate in the competition for hegemony. Different parties present multiple understandings of what constitutes welfare in the population. The competition arises as each seeks to structure and organize relations according to its knowledge of welfare.

This vagueness and flexibility makes the population welfare model of government particularly useful for analyzing a broad spectrum of political practices. This model has been used to analyze different perspectives on the economy and brings to the fore various assumptions and values at work in various political identities. It has also been used to interrogate questions of public health and the various logics and assumptions at work in these initiatives (Gupta 1995). Foucault’s model provides a history of this formulation and theorizes the transition from particular to general. It focuses on how specific people become a population, how specific places come to be a territory, and ultimately which places and which people become these generalizations.

Understanding the relationship between state and population through the lens of welfare means recognizing an inherent paternalism working within the concept of the state. Population does not exist except through the (statistical) observations of the state. It is a creation of the state and the state is the only entity that can recognize it. A person can speak, but only the state can determine whether that voice is representative of the population or separate from it. Consequently, welfare is also not an independent property. It is a judgment made by the state about aspects of the population. Thus the state is making judgments about an entity that it creates. This fallacy of management is one of the critical dynamics that Foucault is seeking to draw out in his analysis of the logics of government.

Another consequence of this relationship is that a statement about population is also a statement about the state. As an entity created by the state through its statistical aggregation of people within its territory, any qualities attributed to population also indicate what the state can and cannot observe, effect, and alter. This dialectic quality
reveals important moments at work in the organization of the state and the strategic selectivity at work in the formation of state projects.

The question of welfare is the key component to picking apart the relationship between state and population. Within the logic of government, the state’s legitimacy is predicated on state actors being perceived as acting to enhance the welfare of the population. In areas of security and foreign affairs a state’s responsibility for population welfare is often pursued in terms of a monolithic and undifferentiated sense of population. This is made possible by identifying the competing Other as located external to the borders of the state. Domestically, this kind of deflection is much less tenable. The uneven distribution of resources and the varied historical experiences of people in different places within a country’s borders create internal differentiations that are difficult to mediate or ignore. A homogenous assessment of welfare is difficult to maintain under these conditions.

As part of its relationship to population, the state is expected to manage geographic difference. Understanding the state requires examining the various aspects of this management. However, if, as suggested above, we consider the state to be an idea, the researcher is faced with the problem of trying to find the state to observe these management activities. There are only different agents who subjectivate the state in various ways. Poststructural theory tells us the best we can do is focus our attention on these agents and the ways they construct the state. A complete picture of the state will not emerge from this analysis. It will be partial and open to contestation and contradiction by analyses of the constructions of other agents. However, this is an ontological condition of the world and should not dissuade one from pursuing such analyses. The state is constructed in contested and contradictory ways. Our best understanding of it as a whole entity comes from analyzing the constructions and frameworks through which various agents subjectivate the state, population, and their relationship.

Understanding the state in this way adds a second layer of observational uncertainty to any analysis. The qualities of the state that emerge from the management of geographic difference can be observed through an analysis of the frameworks and knowledge of the subjectivating agents, or what Gregory (1994) calls the ‘geographical imagination.’ Derived from the concept of ‘sociological imagination’ from C. Wright Mills, the geographical imagination refers to the mental images of the world that shape the actions and choices of various agents. It also encompasses a certain understanding of the role knowledge, norms, language, and socialized expectations play in the formation of these images and the strategies that follow.

In an analysis of the state as constructed through its relationship with population, one must address the geographical imagination of the agents of interest. This imagination covers two sets of questions. The first is the geography of welfare in the population. What do the agents of interest view as the spatial distribution of the properties of welfare within the population? This provides insight into what an agent of interest says the state can and cannot observe. The second set of questions revolves around the strategic geographies through which the state acts to manage the welfare of the population. This provides insight into the construction of the state’s capacities, limitations, and responsibilities by the agent of interest.
The State, Religion, and Geography

The state is a key subject through which various actors pursue modern organizations of space. Religion and the state have a long relationship in this regard. The idea that there exists a transcendental entity called religion which is distinct from the material world originated in Europe as part of the emergence of political authorities independent from the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church (Asad 2003). This idea spread and evolved from the sixteenth century onwards via the interactions of European colonists with populations in Asia, Africa, and the Americas (Thomas 2000; Mandair 2004; Esposito and Voll 1996). History has produced religion as an entity which exists as a property of population and consequently as something that the state tracks and attempts to manage. Related to the process of management, at least four common subjectivating situations involving the state-religion relationship have been regularly produced.

One situation is the attempt to create a slippage between the construction of the state and the construction of religion by subjectivating actors. In this situation, actors insert religious symbols and references into state places and/or insert state symbols and references into religious places in an attempt to construct religion and state as a unitary entity. In many instances this is a strategic attempt to either bolster support for state goals by appealing to a religious identity (Mitra 1991; Esposito and Voll 1996; Saeed 1994) or to bolster the influence of a religious identity by linking it to the state. Often times this process is mediated by overlapping religion and nation or religion and culture instead of religion and state. The nation’s special position vis-à-vis the modern state functions to strengthen the association between religion and state while not violating the secularist sensibility that dominates the global state system. Such moves are particularly prominent in the post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (An-Na'im 2000; Bacon 2002; Peyrouse 2004). These two strategies are not necessarily exclusive. The example of the Iranian state after the revolution suggests that as the idea of a unitary construction of religion and state emerges, the two strategies become dialectically intertwined.

A second situation is the attempt to use religious knowledge, teachings, or institutions to instill moral values and self-discipline into a population (Kong 2005). In this situation, the state is constructed as possessing a limited ability to shape the choices and decisions of individual people. The state can provide infrastructure to aid the communication, distribution, or practice of religion, but it does not have the capability to replace religion as a source of social order. This understanding of the state-religion relationship is a foundation of classical liberalism (English 2004). It is also a common framework in Muslim politics that sees fitna as a primary threat to the peaceful existence of society (Gilmartin 1998). Fitna, roughly translated as social chaos, is prevented by the proper embrace and practice of Islam. The state can facilitate this practice, but it cannot independently overcome the social tensions that lead to fitna.

A third situation presents religion and religious difference as the source of social turmoil that the state must work to prevent or limit. In this situation, religion is constructed as a field of competition that makes different religions a vehicle for bringing antagonism, imperialism, or violent conflict into a territory (Allievi 2002). In this subjectivation, the state is given the role of defusing these tendencies through such efforts as the promotion of dialogue (Esposito and Voll 2000), the patrolling of borders against 'foreign' religions (Bacon 2002; Yelensky 2002; Peyrouse 2004), and the secularization of public space. This can be seen in the efforts of European states to transform “Islam in
Europe” to “Islam of Europe” (Bowen 2004; Fernando 2005; Grillo 2004; Kastoryano 2003, 2004) and in the various US court cases that seek to parse when the demands of the state can supercede those of a religion (Herrera 2005; Stabile 2005; Judge 2002; Apanovitch 1998). Others have suggested that this competition is actually good for the state in the same way as market economics (Warner 1993). The idea of religion as market hypothesizes that religious participation increases with deregulation (Chaves, Schraeder, and Sprindys 1994) and supposes that the tensions and conflicts only make different faiths work harder to attract followers. From a liberal perspective, the increase in religious participation is desirable for the state because greater religious participation means less moral policing and required civic education (English 2004). However, this view overlooks the often bloody results of such competition and ignores the importance of identity and ethnicity in shaping levels of religious participation (Morier-Genoud 2000; Bruce 2000).

A fourth situation presents religion as a platform from which to launch protest, resistance, and reform. In some ways this is a variation of the previous situation where the state is directly or indirectly the target of competition instead of other identities in the population. Seeking to understand the state-religion relationship has become particularly prevalent in Muslim countries. In these countries, Islam functioned first as an anti-colonial organizational identity (Heristchi 2004) and has since become an identity through which state power is frequently questioned and challenged. Sayyid (1997) and Zubaida (1993) both argue that Islam is the only ideological position left with any credibility for large numbers of Muslims who are dissatisfied with their political, economic, or social positions. They argue that liberalism, socialism, Marxism, and other ideologies have either been repressed or co-opted by state actors. In addition, for many actors involved in this situation, Islam becomes the expression of locality, authenticity, and resistance to those viewed as attempting to impose an order from outside of the community.

Securalists and Fundamentalists

With the rise of religious politics since the 1960s, the study of religion and the state has come to largely focus on the dynamics of two sets of actors and the productions of religion and state groups and two geographies. We can call the first secularists and the second group fundamentalists.

The secularist groups often contain secularists, entrenched state actors, and established elite. Their secularism contains a mixture of two visions. One is a federalist approach to negotiating different religions in the same territory (Elazar 2001). By keeping religion outside of the state, no single faith group can dominate others. This falls into the classical liberal notion where religion is privately constitutive of a moral individual. The other vision is an anti-religious view that associates religion with areas containing backwardness, underdevelopment, and a lack of modern sophistication. This vision is an inheritance of the Enlightenment’s scientific rationalization of the world. It tends to point towards a total elimination of religion except as some individual personality quirk. In either case, religion is constrained to a limited geography such as the home or designated sites of worship. The state is considered an unbiased neoliberal subject adjudicating where and when religion helps or harms population welfare. Both see religion as having a dangerous power to create conflict and discord either through competition with other faiths or by organizing a rejection of the modern world.
There are also the fundamentalists, who we can generally think of as outsiders to the historical lines of state power. The outsider position makes them no less important as subjectivizers of the state. They have been very successful in spreading their views of the state and have forced state actors to react to them. For fundamentalists, religion serves as an alternative framework of political organization and identification that is seen particularly in the case of Islamist politics of the Muslim world. Islamist parties have appealed to people outside of power. Supporters are often those displaced or uprooted by industrialization, urbanization, and globalization. The oppositional version of Islam has a long history. Islam was an important identity in anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements throughout Africa and south Asia. After the failure of Marxism and liberalism to bring the kinds of economic and political successes they desired, it is seen by many as the only ideology with any remaining credibility. It is equated by many with a general goodness and its presence in a place makes that place good, while its absence means harm. Islamist politicians have appealed to this notion by focusing on bringing Islam into the state. In many cases, they do not seek to change the state subjectivity, they only want to make it more Muslim.

Since the 1990s, Muslim politics have become more dense, complicated, and diverse than this predominant focus on Islamist movements would suggest (Kadir 2004). Movements which seek to synthesize a specifically Muslim political identity with the principles of secularism or liberalism have gained a presence in Saudi Arabia (Lacroix 2004), Egypt (Akhavi 2003; Polka 2003), and Iran (Vahdat 2003). Indonesia possesses a political party some are labeling an “Islamic left” (Ken 2002). In Turkey, Central Asia, and elsewhere, the Turkish based Gulen movement has established numerous high schools and some universities that seek to blend a scientific education with Islamic morality. Some scholars have pointed to these examples to claim the emergence of a post-Islamist era (Dagi 2004).

While the designation of a new era of religious politics seems premature, ‘liberal Islamic’ groups have the potential to complicate the binary of religion versus secularism that has largely defined the relationship between religion and politics over the past twenty-five years. They disavow employing religious law as the legal structure of a state and are open to participating in established state processes with secular and western oriented political groups. At the same time, they continue to base their political framework in a specifically Muslim identity. This position tries to straddle both sides of the secular-religious binary and raises many questions in the process. If the Islamic political identity was largely tied to a position based in appeals to anti-westernism and sharia law, how do Muslim politicians abandon these and seek to maintain a definitively Muslim political identity? What sort of relation between religion and state do they pursue? In what spaces are they permitted? How are they expected to interact in public space? How do they seek to resolve the ambiguity between religion as an identity to be managed and religion as a logic of security?

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I developed a framework for studying the relationships between religion and state as they are produced through the subjectivations of different actors. The chapter began by outlining a theory of the state as a decentered and relational subject that is continually produced anew through social interactions but maintains a certain consistency through the processes of hegemonic reproduction. One of the key relations of
this subjectivity is the state’s claim of responsibility for the welfare of the population within its territory. This framework contains two significant geographies. One is the distribution of welfare observed within the population by the state. The other is the identification of sites through which actors find the state affecting population welfare. Both geographies are critical moments in the construction of the state subject and various aspects of the population. The chapter then turned to one aspect of population that has become increasingly important over the last few decades: religion. The religion-state relation has a long historical legacy and several different narratives through which it has been produced. The recent surge of religion as a political identity has led many to focus on two sets of actors: secularists and fundamentalists. While they have dominated academic and political discussion, these are not the only two possible positions from which to pursue the construction of state and religion. One other position gaining prominence is a centrist position that seeks to synthesize religious and political identities. In the next chapter, I set the context for examining the AKP as one of these centrist parties.
CHAPTER THREE

This chapter describes the history and context of the project’s fieldsite, Turkey. First, I argue that Islam was a critical element in the early formation of the Turkish state and remains closely linked to the notions of population welfare at work in the country. Second, I argue that for much of the republic’s history, the Kemalist ideology of secularist organization formed the hegemonic understanding of state-Islam relationship. However, since 1980 this hegemony has gradually fractured and been reorganized. A division between Kemalists and ‘conscious Muslims’ marks the hegemonic alignment within which the AKP was formed. Third, I suggest that the AKP represents the middle ground in this hegemonic divide. By avoiding a clear-cut association with either established pole, AKP politicians are reworking the basic assumptions of political debate in Turkey.

From Empire to Modern State

For almost four hundred years a single political order dominated the lands of the Balkans, Asia Minor, and much of the Middle East. From the early 15th century through the end of the 17th Century, the sultans of the Ottoman Empire maintained an intercontinental, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious empire that was largely unchallenged in terms of military and economic might. However, by the early 18th century, the increasing decadence of the House of Osman, the rise of European states as industrial, commercial, and military powers, the increasing intrusion by these states in the Ottoman Empire through their demands for economic concessions, and a growing sense of the Ottoman Empire’s failing capacity to confront these states on equal political, cultural, and intellectual terms created a motivation for reforming the empire’s political and social institutions (Berkes 1964). The first series of these reforms were pursued between 1718 and 1730. They began a period of westernizing efforts highlighted by the establishment of new schools of scientific and technical learning. One hundred years of successive periods of reform and reaction followed before a second series of reforms began in 1836. Referred to as the Tanzimat reforms, these initiatives focused on increasing the scientific and technological training of the military and the development of capitalist economic relations within the lands of the empire.

The westernizing impulses of the Tanzimat reforms were not pursued purely through a European framework. Importance was placed on integrating these scientific and technological advances with the traditional cultural foundations of the Empire. According to Kemal Karpat, one of the intellectual concepts to emerge from this consciousness was that of medeniyet (Karpat 2001). This neologism - which was built from the Arabic word for city (medina) - emerged as an Ottoman equivalent of the French term civilisation. In 18th century France, civilisation appeared as an upper class expression of difference from both foreign and domestic Others considered to be simpler and more primitive. Civilisation became a general descriptor of advancement in political, technical, and moral realms (Elias 1978) In the Ottoman Empire, medeniyet came to signify a similar notion of high intellectual, scientific, social, and political achievement. This achievement could be both individual and societal. By the mid 1800s, the pursuit of medeniyet in various forms became an accepted goal for political actors in the Ottoman Empire (Karpat 2001). The presence or absence of medeniyet was seen as a method by which to measure the welfare of a given person or society. This did not mean that there was broad agreement over what
properties constituted medeniyet. What was being measured and whether it constituted progression or regression was hotly debated among conservative and progressive actors.

Until the 1850s, most of the reforms and the related pursuit of medeniyet were confined to the Ottoman bureaucracy, military institutions, and a limited number of political and economic elite within the empire. This changed with the emergence of various nationalist movements within the territories of the Empire, particularly the Balkans. Christian communities in the Balkans, often encouraged by various European actors, began to identify themselves as nations that should be independent of Muslim imperial control. They saw their ability to achieve a civilization on par with Christian European states as being hindered by their submission to Muslim rulers (Karpat 2001). On the heels of these Christian independence movements, a counter movement emerged from certain intellectual circles promoting an Ottoman national citizenship that linked all the peoples of the imperial territory together as a sovereign unit. While this identity never gained the same traction within the empire as other national movements based in religious and ethnic identifications, it did provide a step towards re-imagining the various peoples occupying the lands of the empire as a single population instead of separate and distinct communities (millets).

Sultan Abdulhamid II was a key figure in consolidating the medeniyet project within the subjectivation of the state and establishing ‘the state’ as the primary agent through which to pursue it within a ‘population.’ Abdulhamid ruled the empire from 1876-1909. During this period, the Ottoman imperial state was transformed into a modern biopolitical and disciplinary state. The first census of the Ottoman territories was conducted and thus established a new basis for the observation and management of people and goods that for Foucault marked the emergence of ‘population’ in a modern state (Karpat 2001). Also, the Sultan’s administrative bureaucracy was reorganized and transformed from a body focused on addressing the needs of the Sultan to one administering the new patterns and laws revealed by the census. With this reorganization, the Ottoman state shifted from an idea supporting the maintenance of the status quo to an idea through which to manage and promote the ‘welfare’ of the ‘population.’ This administration was made more feasible as an expanding array of railroad and telegraph lines extended the scope of the Abdulhamid’s network by bringing more outlying areas and villages into close communication with the Sultan and his officials in the imperial capital of Istanbul (Karpat 2001).

The expansion of communication technologies also enabled the extension across a broader space of disciplinary technologies associated with the modern state. For example, during his reign, Abdulhamid cultivated a network of spies to keep watch on his officials in the provinces. The actual capacity of this spy network seems to have been limited, but its existence and the possibility of its functionality went a long way towards establishing the idea of the state as an omnipresent and omniscient entity (Jung and Piccoli 2001). This was a critical step in establishing people’s subjectivation of themselves as members of a population ruled by a state even in the absence of an identifiable and observable state subject.

**Islam, the State, and the Formation of the Kemalist Hegemony**

Abdulhamid is also a key figure in understanding the formation of a modern state within the Ottoman Empire as a result of the way he employed Islam to establish the legitimacy of the state as an agent of population within the social spaces of the Ottoman
territories (Karpat 2001). Following the defeat of the Sultan’s armies by Russia in 1878 and the shifting of British geopolitical interests away from alliances with the Ottomans, Abdulhamid was left in a position of political weakness. With his geopolitical support greatly diminished, he sought to consolidate his own position with the Muslim masses of the Ottoman territories by re-emphasizing the sultan’s claim to be the Caliph, or the leader of all Muslims. Ottoman sultans had sporadically used the title of Caliph since the caliphate was transferred from Cairo to Istanbul in the early 1500s. The reassertion of this office as a meaningful site of power and claim of loyalty by Abdulhamid marks a rearticulation of Muslim identity. Abdulhamid defined the Caliphate as an anti-imperialist rallying point against interference in and colonization of Muslim lands by European political and economic actors. As a consequence being Muslim became a way through which different experiences of European colonization in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia could be drawn together and made equivalent. For Abdulhamid, the embrace of the Caliphate enabled him to insert the temporal power of the Sultan and the state into any space where Islam was articulated. In this way, the state was bootstrapped to Islam in order to obtain greater legitimacy for the execution of state projects within the territories.

The combination of westernizing changes in political and economic organization and the close articulation of the transforming state with Islam has made Abdulhamid an ambiguous figure for many. The appeal to the Caliphate and the quilting of state to the established authority of Islam bolstered within the masses an acceptance of the state as the agent of population welfare. This appeal also positioned the Sultan and his officials as the legitimate representatives of the state. However, Abdulhamid also left a legacy of authoritarianism and what many believed was an exploitation of religion that was also harmful to the long-term prospects of the structures he formed.

This view of Abdulhamid became a critical piece in the second major event structuring the subjectivation of the state with respect to Islam in Turkey. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed following its defeat in World War I, much of the territory that had been controlled by the Ottomans prior to the war was divided among the victors. In the Ottoman heartland of Asia Minor – also known as Anatolia - the division and the prospect of further territorial losses to an invading army from Greece enabled nationalist leaders to mobilize the Turkish population to again take up arms and fight in what became known as the War of Independence. The successful expulsion of the Greek army from Anatolia and the subsequent renegotiation of the territorial division of the remains of the Ottoman Empire left Anatolia to be governed by a nationalist assembly headquartered in the central Anatolian town of Ankara.

The assembly was comprised of an antagonistic mixture of westernizers, Islamists, and traditionalists held together by a common anti-imperialist objective, which was the preservation of Anatolia as the territory for an independent state (Berkes 1964). Once this objective was secured political battles ensued over the formation and structures of the new state. From these political battles emerged a faction of military officers led by a former Ottoman general and key figure in the nationalist battle for independence named Mustafa Kemal. Trained in the westernized military academies of the former empire, Mustafa Kemal and his supporters possessed a great respect for what they saw as the scientific and technological achievements of European societies (Ahmad 1993). The Kemalists felt that the only way for the new republic to avoid the fate of the Ottoman
Empire and permanently secure its territorial integrity was to develop the territory of Anatolia into a state based on the models of Europe. They held in contempt previous attempts like those of Abdulhamid to synthesize European technology and traditional culture. They advocated fully embracing the European model as the best method of achieving medeniyet and welfare for the Turkish population.

For the Kemalists, completely embracing the European model of development was not just an ideological choice. It presented them with strategic advantages in the political competitions of the early state. First, this position separated the Kemalists from the traditionalists who sought to perpetuate the Ottoman dynasty. Second, this position provided the Kemalists with a justification for reducing the role of religious officials in the new state, thereby weakening the power of Islamic politicians in the new assembly. Third, this position provided a mechanism for disrupting established patterns of local authority and consolidating a subjectivation of the state in which Kemalists were the primary representatives.

The Kemalists were not revolutionaries. Many of their westernizing efforts either continued or extended the political and economic reforms undertaken by the later Ottoman administrations (Gulalp 2002). However, the Kemalists departed from the Ottoman precedent in the area of the population’s cultural orientation. Of particular interest for Mustafa Kemal was the reconfiguration of the relationship between state and Islam. He sought to replace the integration and dependence of the state upon Islam created by Abdulhamid with a more European oriented model of religious privatization (Berkes 1964). Much of the effort expended in this direction took the form of projects that purged established Islamic institutions from any association with the state. In 1924, the Caliphate was abolished, the office of the Şey-ül-İslam was closed down, and the Şeriat courts were eliminated. Civil law codes from Switzerland and Italy were imported to replace the family laws previously managed by the Şeriat courts. The medrese school system was dismantled and primary education was unified into a single state-supervised system. By 1925, most of the traditional institutional structures of Islam were abolished, disbanded, or disrupted.

Solely stripping away the traditional infrastructure was not the only pursuit of the early Kemalist leaders reconfiguration of Islam. In their place a new state institution was created: the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Sakallioglu 1996). While it could be argued that the Diyanet was merely the office of the Şey-ül-İslam with a different name, the intent of the Diyanet was for it to be an institution providing services and information according to public request instead of acting as a supreme spiritual leader and interpreter of Islamic law. It was given the task of making religious works available for public consumption by translating and publishing them. It was also given the responsibility of administering mosques and paying imams. However, all educational functions, including training imams, were placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. By titling this new institution, Diyanet İşleri or Pious Works, the Kemalists indicated what they thought Islam should represent a practice of individual piety.

The effect of these actions was to divide Islam into two state objects in Turkey (Sakallioglu 1996). One was Islam as a matter of personal belief and individual consciousness (Davison 2003). As Berkes writes,

The first approach was based upon a view shared by the Westernists and Islamists - the belief that Islam was a natural and reasonable religion. The idea of the
reasonableness of Islam became a deistic conviction in Mustafa Kemal's mind (Berkes 1964: 483).

A reasonable and rational Islam was the route to individual freedom necessary for reaching medeniyet. This contrasted against a second Islam, one that was the domain of religious exploitation and domination that led back to the problems of the Ottoman period. According to Berkes, Kemal saw a deep ignorance in the interpreters upon which the population depended to read the holy texts and provide guidance to living a proper Muslim life. Many of the Kemalist reforms aimed particularly at eliminating what they saw as the control of the ulema over the people and the institutionalized mechanisms of this control. Kemalists saw themselves as following in the footsteps of the Protestant Reformers of 17th century Europe (Shankland 1999).

The reformist mentality only lasted for a short period, and the removal of references to Islam from the constitution in 1928 marks the end of official attempts at creating an Islamic Reformation. Kemalist activities from this point forward reflect a greater interest in the consolidation of their control over the subjectivation of the state than in fundamentally changing social practice. For example, legislation was enacted to prevent the use of Islam to destabilize the established order through political agitation or criminal exploitation (Berkes 1964). To reinforce this order, in 1937 secularism was added to the constitution as a foundational value of the state. This became a key term in the reproduction of Kemalist ideology and state power across time and space.

The brevity of the reformist efforts and the shift towards consolidating power after Kemal’s death in 1937 provided ‘opportunity spaces’ for the continued practice of Islam (Yavuz 2002). However, it seems wrong to claim, as Lewis (Lewis 1961) does, that the Kemalists ultimately failed to create substantive change in Islamic practice. Certainly much of the obvious change occurring in Ankara and Istanbul did not happen in the periphery and these areas were not unaffected. The overwhelming support given to the Demokrat Parti in the 1950 elections has been attributed in part to the party’s promise to forgo certain religious reforms. Yavuz (2002) also argues that during this period emerged an inward migration of Islamic practice as people internalized and privatized their ritual practices. Lastly, the closing of tarikats, turbes, tekkes, and other religious places altered the practices of these groups by pushing them into peripheral areas and forcing them to go underground. Given these developments, it seems the Kemalists did create substantive changes in Islamic practice; they just did not achieve the kind of changes they originally hoped they would.

From Kemalist Hegemony to the Hegemony of Division

Around the same time, the country began making a transition from single party autocracy to multiparty democracy. Following the death of Mustafa Kemal and the emergence of a military standoff between Turkey’s historical enemy Russia and the United States after World War II, the Kemalists sought to protect Turkey from Soviet expansion by aligning with the United States. Among other factors, the development of multi-party government was seen as an important step in this process. Elections with limited party participation in 1946 returned the Kemalists to power but in 1950 the voters overwhelmingly supported the opposition Demokrat Partisi’s (Democrat Party, DP) call for less authoritarian state institutions and greater freedom of personal and religious practice. The Kemalists accepted the results of the election and took up the role of a minority party in parliament. Despite this electoral setback, the Kemalists still dominated
the military (Jung and Piccoli 2001). Over time the military became the main site for reproducing the tenets of the Kemalist ideology, especially the idea of a secularist state (Ahmad 1993). Military officers would intervene in civilian government three times between 1950 and 1980, and each time they sought to adjust the state’s management of Islam while also further integrating the military command into the daily processes of government policymaking and administration.

The ideas of Kemalism were reproduced most consistently in society through military education and officer selection system. Officers were trained in the Kemalist mentality and those who dissented did not move up through the ranks. The position of importance and prestige that the military holds for much of the Turkish population also helped to perpetuate Kemalism as the dominant political framework in Turkey through the 1970s.

In the 1970s, significant ruptures became noticeable in the Kemalist hegemony. Yavuz (2002) argues that while the 1950s and 1960s were Kemalist in tone these decades also witnessed a gradual expansion of ‘opportunity spaces’ for the practice of Islam in social and economic venues. The expansion of Islamic practice was paired with the influx of migrants and their traditional practices to the cities and a shift in the concern of state actors towards threats from leftists and communists. In 1970, a political party employing certain Islamic references was established and by the end of the decade its successor had participated as a minority member in multiple coalition governments.

The 1970s also brought large-scale economic turmoil to Turkey. Starting in 1960, the government had instituted an economic program of import substitution industrialization in which state actors subsidized the domestic production of finished goods instead of importing them from other countries. This strategy required significant monetary inputs from the state and led the Turkish government to accrue a significant level of international debt. The collapse of the gold standard and the effects of the 1973 world oil crisis exacerbated the level of this debt and pushed the country’s economy into crisis (Onis 2000). Inflation and unemployment shot upward. Industrial producers could not afford to operate at their capacity creating various shortages. The government was forced to devalue the currency in exchange for loans from the International Monetary Fund. This drove inflation even higher. The hopes and expectations of many Turks were crushed, and violence erupted throughout the country as rightist and leftist paramilitary groups fought each other in the streets (Heper and Toktas 2003).

At the same time, the state institutions were led by a fractious coalition of political parties that hampered the ability of state actors to take any decisive actions. This paralysis was highlighted by the inability of the parliament to elect a new president after Fahri Korutürk completed his seven-year term in office in April 1980. By this time, the idea of the state in Turkey was almost completely devoid of effectiveness. The vision of economic prosperity promised by state actors was shattered. Street violence continued with little concern for the actions of the state, as the state was losing its functionality as a mechanism for the exercise of power.

On September 12, 1980, after almost a year of planning, the top generals of the Turkish armed forces took over the government (Birand 1987). Parliament was dissolved and all political parties were closed. Over the next several months, the military sought to re-establish peace and civil order in the streets. Martial law was instituted; thousands of people were arrested and jailed. Leftist groups were particularly targeted but those on the
extreme right were pursued as well. Many innocent people were caught in the dragnet as Turkey’s prison population ballooned.

The leaders of this coup sought to accomplish three objectives. The first was to re-establish the state as a viable framework for exercising power (Bugra 2003). The second was to implement structural reforms necessary to transform the economy from the import substitution model to an export oriented, market driven model (Onis 2000). The third was to prevent the country from being taken over by leftists and communists (Barkey 2000). Islam was expected to play a significant role in the pursuit of all three goals (Yavuz 2002). The coup leaders felt it would provide legitimacy for the state idea as it had for Abdulhamid. The coup leaders also felt that a common commitment to Islam and Muslim morality would provide an antidote to the short-term continuation of economic travails the country experienced under a regime of liberalization. With respect to Communism, Islam was viewed as an effective counter-identity. Turkish and Western state actors considered it unlikely that observant Muslims would be drawn to the atheistic principles of communism.

To achieve these objectives, the coup leaders sought to strengthen Turkey’s Islamic identity in a number of ways. First, they sought to reshape the common understanding of the legacy of Mustafa Kemal. A three-volume analysis of his life and work put together under the military regime emphasized the piety and individual religiosity of the man who remained the iconic figure of the country. Second, they began promoting the idea of a ’Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.’ The core of this was to selectively revive references to Turkey’s Ottoman and Islamic past to create a social identity that crossed the boundaries of geography and social class. Third, when the coup leaders began to put together a new constitution, they also sought to more strongly intertwine the state in the production of religious knowledge and identification. They established the Dyane in the constitution with a specific and stated role. They also claimed “the religious enlightenment of the people” as one of the explicit duties of the state. Fourth, heavy emphasis was placed on the development of religious education in the country (Ahmad 1993). While imam hatip schools were already well-established, the coup leaders expanded religious education courses in public schools so that every child from fourth grade on would take a course entitled “Religious Culture and Moral Knowledges” (Yavuz 2002). These courses present Islam as similar to scientific practice while seeking to blend it with Turkish nationalism. They also brought all Koran courses under the supervision of the state.

The various appeals to Islam by the coup leaders effectively opened the state-Islam relationship for a complete renegotiation. It also signaled the death knell for the hegemony of the Kemalist version of the state-Islam relationship. In 1982, the new constitution was adopted via a popular referendum. In 1983, elections were held and a new government was formed under the leadership of Turgut Özal and the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP). Özal presented a new version of the state-Islam relationship by publicly demonstrating his personal practice of Islam (Yavuz 2002). He was the first prime minister of Turkey to participate in the hajj. He was also the first to make iftar - the evening meal breaking the day’s fast during Ramadan - a public event for

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1 The idea that communism was a threat to the existence of the country had grown consistently with the increasing violence. While the reality of this threat was probably overstated, the power of its possibility received much attention in the discourse of the coup leaders (Yavuz 2002).
state officials. Thus, Özal established new precedents for the subjectivation of the state and Islam in various places. Personal piety was not just a quality to be measured in the population; it was a quality to be found in state subjects.

The emphasis on Islam by the coup leaders and Özal’s public practice of Islam encouraged similar moves to make Islam more public in various economic, media, and political arenas. One of the most important occurrences in this vein was the emergence of what Saktanber (Saktanber 2002) calls the ‘conscious Muslim.’ The liberalizing reforms of the 1980s had created many opportunities for small businessmen, entrepreneurs, and merchants. Those who were successful began to accrue capital and assets, and a new middle class of culturally conservative businessmen and industrial professionals began to emerge in various smaller cities of Anatolia. This new middle class sought to improve their financial and educational situations while retaining their conservative Islamic values. It was from this combination of factors that the figure of the ‘conscious Muslim’ first appeared. While it was accepted that most of the population of Turkey was Muslim and that Turkey itself was a Muslim territory, the ‘conscious Muslim’ made Islam a part of his or her public life. The ‘conscious Muslim’ was educated and modern. He or she did not follow many traditional practices of Islam. They often found these to be backward or ignorant. Instead, he or she read the holy books and practiced Islam according to what was read. As a rising capital class and a new ideological position, ‘conscious Muslims’ came to challenge the positions of economic, political, and social preeminence held for so long by Kemalists.

The challenge came to be personified in the 1990s by the experiences of the Refah Partisi. After the death of Özal in 1991, several rightward leaning political parties sought to gain the support of the conscious Muslim constituency. The leader of this scramble by the mid-1990s was the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP). Refah was a descendent of the political parties from the 1970s that employed Islamic references as part of their identity. Refah took a more aggressive approach than previous parties by appealing to a common sense among many that Muslims and the neighborhoods, towns, and places of Muslims were discriminated against politically and economically by an insular secularist elite entrenched in the bureaucratic institutions of the state (Bugra 2002). Refah’s solution was a party program built upon the themes of identity and justice that held as its most basic axiom that justice was present wherever good Muslims were found (Yavuz 2002). This geographical vision was produced locally in the form of ‘Refah restaurants,’ ‘Refah coffeeshops’, and ‘Refah neighborhoods’ (Yavuz 1997) It was also found at a geopolitical scale in the party’s anti-western and anti-European Union foreign policy positions. This attitude permeated Refah’s idea of the state-Islam relationship as well. While there were some in the party advocating the creation of an Islamic state similar to the Iranian model, the majority argued that all that the necessary fix was to have good Muslims operating as state subjects (Cinar 2002). The spatiality of the state itself was not flawed. It was the people who acted as its representatives.

The Refah Partisi finished first in the 1995 national elections by garnering 20% of the popular vote. This result crystallized a new hegemony in which a polarization between Kemalist and conscious Muslim became the dominant narrative through which the relation of state and Islam was produced. On the one hand, conscious Muslims had come to hold considerable electoral power. Their demands and view of the world could not be ignored or pushed aside. On the other hand, Kemalist ideas of secularism remained
the dominant framework within the military and judicial elite. From their positions of power, the elite continued to command significant influence over the foreign and domestic policies of the state, resulting in a standoff in which neither side could muster the social power necessary to overwhelm the other.

The crystallization of this binary was further developed by the events of 1997. Following its victory, the RP was initially prevented from forming a governing coalition. Other parties in parliament were pressured by the military and various state elites to reject all RP overtures of cooperation. Eventually the RP was able to form a coalition with a party from the center-right, the Doğu Yol Partisi (DYP). While the RP-DYP government did not pursue dramatic changes, officers and generals in the upper ranks of the country’s armed forces were particularly concerned by the actions of certain Refah politicians and the growing importance of Islam in certain sectors of the economy and the media. They perceived this proliferation of Islamic frameworks to be a threat to the security and stability of the secular state. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council (NSC) issued a set of 18 directives to the Erbakan government. These directives included closing all imam hatip middle schools, purging the military of fundamentalist supporters, and bringing all media critical of the military under state control. They were presented as a challenge to the Erbakan government. Earlier in the month, an RP mayor in Sincan was arrested and tanks sent through the streets after an anti-Israeli protest in which the Iranian ambassador to Turkey called for Turks to live by the “precepts of Islam.” The directives were intended to close down much of the Muslim inflected economic, social, and civil activities that had blossomed with the liberalizing regime of the 1980s. It also sought to ultimately force the RP from the government while undermining its independence and in turn its popular support.

This process has been described as a ‘postmodern coup.’ The NSC did not use military force to directly depose the government. Instead it pushed the judiciary, big business, and certain media groups to create immense pressure on the Erbakan government. In April, the national security priority was changed from Kurdish nationalism to ‘reactionary Islam.’ The NSC also conducted regular briefings denouncing the Erbakan government. After protests against military actions raised the possibility for a violent intervention in the government, Erbakan resigned on June 17, 1997. In January 1998, the Constitutional Court officially closed the Refah Partisi for anti-secular activities. The remaining parties in parliament formed a government at the NSC’s urging and implemented the directives. In this way, the NSC sought to re-establish Kemalist authority over the official political and economic institutions of Turkey (Yavuz 2000). It was less successful in narrowing the range of Muslim activities appearing in social and political life.

What became known in Turkey as the 28 February process generated two major effects. The first is that by exerting dominance over the political and economic activities of the country, the military leaders exposed themselves to questions of credibility. The first challenge came in the form of an earthquake measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale that struck the İzmit area in 1999, killing at least 17,000 people. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the aura of the Turkish military was ruptured, as Turkish disaster response teams were woefully unable to manage such a catastrophe. Second, the Sursuluk affair revealed that politicians, the military, and police officers were working with organized crime figures and Kurdish paramilitary leaders to undertake various illegal activities. This
raised further questions about ethics and corruption among the established political and military leadership (Jung and Piccoli 2001). Lastly, 2001 brought an economic crisis in which inflation jumped dramatically and invoked concerns of a repeat of violence from the late 1970s. This raised questions about the military leadership’s capacity to manage the country’s economy (Onis 2006).

The second major effect of the 28 February process is that many conservative Muslims began to focus on social instead of political goals. Capturing control of the state was less and less important and an emphasis on allowing society to operate freely grew. This transition was particularly noticeable in the position that the RP’s successor party, the Fazilet Partisi, took with respect to Turkey’s long-running goal of joining the European Union. Refah was strongly opposed to this process, as it saw joining the EU as opening Turkey once again to pillage by the West. In the wake of the 28 February Process however, Fazilet found in the EU an ally. The EU’s insistence on administrative transparency, the protection of human rights including freedom of religious practice, and civilian oversight of the military provided a wedge and a hammer to use against the military’s dominance (Gulalp 2003; Insel 2003). During this period a split also developed in the party between older members and younger reformers looking to broaden the party’s electoral appeal by accepting the Islamic identity as one among several political identities instead of the sole identity of importance. The result of this division was the formation of two new parties following the closure of the FP in 2001. Erbakan’s old guard created the Saadet Partisi. The reformers led by Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan created the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi.

**Enter the AKP**

In Turkey, political parties are defined by their leadership. The party head usually maintains centralized control over the policies, activities, and strategies of the party. He or she is also the face of the party. The AKP was built around the figure of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan gained national prominence as mayor of Istanbul. He was elected to this position as a member of the Refah Partisi in 1994. His tenure was marked by a pragmatic focus on economic development and good management within the city administration. While devout, he largely avoided religious issues. When the split within Fazilet occurred, Erdoğan, Gül, and others formed their new party around this pragmatic identity and sought to create a new kind of political organization for Turkey.

The Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) represents a significant challenge to the polarized hegemony of Kemalist versus conscious Muslim. Erdoğan, Gül, and others in the AKP sought to create a party that could appeal to a broad segment of the Turkish populace without directly threatening Kemalist sensibilities regarding the role of religion in the state. First, they constructed an identity for the party based in strategic pragmatism instead of idealist politics (Cavdar 2006; Mecham 2004). Appeals to Islam were removed from their public discourse and replaced by a language of democracy and universal human rights (Tepe 2006; Dagi 2006; Smith 2005). The AKP accepted the military’s guardianship role over the state and showed a willingness to back away from Kemalist challenges (Cosar and Ozman 2004; Kuru 2006). Furthermore, they decided to engage the West in discussions of human rights, civil society, and democracy and made gaining entrance to the European Union one of the party’s top priorities (Ozel 2003; Dogan 2005). In addition to these measures, they worked very hard to distance the party from any religious label such as ‘Muslim Democrat’ or moderate Muslim. At the same time,
much of their rhetoric was touched by an “Islamist ethos” that appeared in the use of such discursive oppositions as “rightly guided” versus “unguided” and “believers” versus “nonbelievers” (Ayata 2004).

Conclusion

In this chapter I presented three key themes to contextual the Turkish state. The first is that Islam was a critical element in the formation of population and the state in Turkey. Turkish leaders involved in forming a modern state in this territory aligned themselves with Islam in order to gain legitimacy for the state. They also created state projects that sought to reshape the way Islam was practiced in the territory. These associations continue to create a strategic selectivity in the development of state projects today. The second point is that in the 1990s the hegemony of Kemalism finally cracked completely and was replaced by a hegemony of competition between Kemalism and the politics of conscious Muslims. The third point is that politicians from the AKP are seeking to rupture this hegemony by creating an identity for their party that does not conform to either pole. By using the language of human rights and democracy, engaging with the West, and maintaining certain codes from Islamic political discourse, these politicians are attempting to carve out a new path to power in Turkey. While they found success in the 2002 elections, the challenge is to determine how they plan to maintain this identity when faced with the multitude of issues and choices that come with governing. Subsequent chapters address how they pursue this and the results of their choices.
CHAPTER FOUR

The following chapter explores the ways that the concepts I have introduced connect with the theories and methodologies of geography. I introduce the geographies I examine in the negotiations by AKP politicians of the religion-state relationship in Turkey and how I can analyze the subjectivation of the state through these geographies. The chapter is presented in two parts. In the first part, I explain how identity theory builds upon the understandings of discourse developed by Foucault. I then incorporate the writings of Laclau and Mouffe to connect the discussions of discourse to those of identity. In the process, I draw out the spatial dimensions at work in these understandings and build a generalized framework through which to pursue the research questions. In the second part, I discuss how I applied the methodological framework outlined in the first part to the problem of religion-state negotiation by AKP politicians. I establish the terms of engagement with the problem, discuss where and how I collected data, and present the procedure used to analyze the data following its collection.

Examining Identity and Space

I identify, observe, and analyze the geographies at work in the subjectivation of the state by AKP politicians using frameworks of identity and space. Prior to the rise of postmodernism, post-structuralism, and identity politics, identities were generally considered a given characteristic of an individual (Pratt 2000). Examining an identity was generally a matter of checking off the race, class, gender, or ethnicity of an individual and then investigating how this impacted other variables. The rise of new social movements and the development of identity politics in the 1970s and 1980s demanded a new focus on the multitude of possible identities and the processes of their creation and reproduction. The static regularity of identification dissolved and was replaced by an awareness of the ephemeral, multiple, and changing nature of individual identification. Thus, identity shifted from being an explanatory category in research to an object of research. Furthermore, the connection between identity and space is not necessarily self-evident. Within the dominant frameworks of social science, they have been conceived largely as separate entities with identity being a property of people and with space as the stage and sets through which people move and act. Connecting the two requires reconceptualizing space as a significant and meaningful actor posed by geographers over the past twenty-five years.

The key methodological tool in identifying, observing, and analyzing identities is the concept of discourse. The postmodernist geographer Marcus Doel (2003) defines discourse as “…a specific constellation of knowledge and practice through which a way of life is given material expression” (Doel 2003). Cultural geographer Pamela Shurmer-Smith sees discourse as the “construction of bounded knowledge systems which encourage thought along approved lines” (Shurmer-Smith 2002: 44). Feminist geographer Gillian Rose describes discourse as “groups of statements which structure the way a thing is thought, and the way we act on the basis of that thinking. In other words, discourse is a particular knowledge about the world which shapes how the world is understood and how things are done in it” (Rose 2001: 136).

These definitions and many others employed by social scientists draw heavily on the work of Michel Foucault for their substance. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault pushed investigations of language and meaning beyond the advances made by Saussarian linguistics and the semiology of Roland Barthes. Like Saussure and Barthes,
Foucault placed great importance on the workings of language in his investigations of social forms. In contrast to Saussure and Barthes’ earlier writings, he did not try to dig out underlying patterns and laws by which statements became meaningful. Instead, he was interested in the materiality of the statements themselves, how they shaped relationships and action, how they made some choices possible and hampered others. For Foucault, statements came to constitute fields of meanings and relations instead of manifestation of deeper, essential knowledge (Dean 1994). They did not communicate the truth of the world, yet they were important in the making of the world.

In his text on discursive analytical strategies, Niels Andersen (2003) labels Foucault a “transformation structuralist,” meaning that while Foucault works within a structuralist framework, he conceptualizes the structures under investigation as possessing their own temporality. In other words, while the actions of people and their meanings are created through the context and the social relations in which people are embedded, Foucault does not see these social relations and their associated meanings as being fundamentally the same across time. Instead, in contrast to structuralists such as Althusser, Levi-Strauss, and Saussure, Foucault thinks of the structures he observes as modulating through time. These structures resemble a storyline or narrative rather than a static pattern. This gives the phenomenon under investigation a path-dependency instead of a path-determinacy. The prior step influences but ultimately cannot completely determine the following one.

Foucault’s approach to discourse analysis in The Archaeology of Knowledge encompasses three major pieces. The first piece is the statement. Andersen calls this the ‘atom of the discourse’ (Andersen 2003: 8). The statement is a singular event occurring in a unique time and space. Its presence finds meaning through metaphor by invoking the similarity of previous events with the present one. The second piece of Foucault’s analysis is discourse. This is a full bounded set of statements produced across multiple contexts which Foucault also calls the ‘archive.’ As with a historical archive, this set of statements does not include all statements ever made. It only includes the statements to which the observer, participant, or analyst has access through memory, experience, or records. The final piece of Foucauldian discourse analysis is the ‘discursive formation.’ The discursive formation is an observation of regularity in the dispersion of statements. Here again the observer, participant, or analyst plays an active role, as regularity is a matter of individual construction. For Foucault, the statements exist as independent entities. However, any pattern found in them is a construction of the finder and not a given and universal property of the dispersion of the statements themselves.

In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault maintained a separation between the real world and that produced through discourse. The world came to be known and lived through discourse, but it existed separately from discourse. The separation between discourse and practice reflected the influence of Saussure and his analysis of the distinction between signifier and signified. For Saussure, a signifier epistemologically represented some concept or signified of the ontological world. The two were understood to exist separately though the presence of a signified could not be known or communicated without using a signifier. Understanding language as representation led many to focus on the workings of texts, how they represented various aspects of the world, how they operated in social events, and how they conveyed meaning across different spaces (Fairclough 2003).
Focusing attention on context and the differing operations of representation in differing places opened the door to a geographical interrogation of meaning production and representation (Jones and Natter 1999). This is connected to the cultural turn discussed in Chapter 3 as geographers like Cosgrove, Duncan, and Schein transformed the approach to cultural landscapes from the Saurian model of naturalistic evolutionary development into a textual model emphasizing the constant negotiations of power and fluctuations of meaning at work in the interpretation of landscape. Many other geographers followed upon the interrogations of Derek Gregory (1994) into the “geographical imagination” to probe the ways the observation of and assignation of meaning to organizations of space influences the constitution and conduct of social relations. Gregory drew upon Henri Lefebvre’s investigations of differing aspects of representation and space. Lefebvre redefined spatiality as the combination of three elements: representations of space, spaces of representation, and spatial practice. Soja reworked these elements into what he called the trialectic of real, imagined, and lived space.

Turning towards cultural and interests in spatiality also marks the emergence of an additional methodological approach to geographical study. During the middle decades of the twentieth century, the study of human geography was dominated by the pursuit of scientific models and generalized laws. The goal was to develop human geography as a spatial science which would investigate the spatial ordering at work within various social, economic, and political phenomena using methodologies equivalent to those used at the time in physical geography, physical sciences, and other social sciences such as sociology and political science. Human geographers like Peter Gould (Berry 1989; Johnston 1984; Taylor 1989) sought to develop statistical and geometric models that could be tested using the increasingly sophisticated quantitative techniques being developed during the period. Geographers contributing to the emergence of the cultural turn presented a challenge to this approach. They began to draw topical and methodological inspiration from historians, social theorists, and literary theorists instead of the physical and natural sciences. Their projects did not seek to identify universal laws. Instead, they sought to identify and track the evolution of different geographically situated and spatially produced themes, narratives, and social relationships. These elements were multiple, complex, and contradictory. They required geographers to focus on the path and structure of situated narratives more than the general applicability of their spatial order. Foucault’s transformational structuralism and efforts to develop a methodology for investigating a “history of the present” formed a critical reference point for these works (Soja and Hooper 1993).

While discourse, representation, and the geographical imagination provided a range of new ways to approach questions of space and place, a closer look at the discussions of spatiality reveals a problem. If a signified cannot be known without a signifier or a space cannot be known without a representation, is there any reason to continue holding the two separate? To ask this another way, if a reader is required to identify a text as a text should they still be held as separate entities? Lacan argues that this distinction is difficult to maintain. He posits that there is no separate existence between signifier and signified. Instead, he claims that the production of a signifier is also the carving out of a signified from the flux and flow of the world and placing it into relations of similarity and difference with other signifier-signified pairs (Sayyid 1997).
Ontologically, reality still maintains an independent existence. However, now discourse was more than an interpretation of this existence. The division of the world into things, concepts, elements, and statements was tied directly to the production of discourse. Lacan labeled this process of producing signifier and signified together ‘articulation.’

Ernesto Laclau and Chantall Mouffe employed the idea of articulation to stretch Foucault’s discourse analysis into the realm of practice and resolve the question of identity stuck between signifier and signified. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Laclau and Mouffe transform Foucauldian statements into Lacanian articulations. The situated event that for Foucault constituted the statement becomes in the work of Laclau and Mouffe the production of meaning through the establishment of relationships between elements. Laclau and Mouffe also combined the Foucauldian ideas of discourse and discursive formation to define discourse as the attempt to fix a series of articulated relations into an orderly pattern (Andersen 2003). This process is both a necessary and impossible task of social life. It is necessary to determine some orderly pattern in relations across space and time in order to make communication and social interaction possible. At the same time, this process can never be fully closed or completed as the complications and fluctuations of social life ultimately overwhelm the capacity of any linguistic system to fix all of reality into a permanent set of relations. As such, “The practice of articulation… consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 113). For Laclau and Mouffe, nodal points are the privileged signifiers or reference points for the structuration of elements into meaningful systems of relations or more succinctly into discourse (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). The partial nature of these fixations means that discourse is a product of political struggle. An interest in this struggle was at the center of Foucault’s shift in focus from an archaeology that sought to explore the patterns to a genealogy interested in the historical creation, maintenance, and change of these patterns. Laclau and Mouffe’s concern with hegemony comes from the same interest. Hegemony as a concept was first employed by Lenin to describe the cultural influence of the intellectual vanguard employed to create and direct class alliances. Gramsci released this sense of cultural power from its specifically instrumental character. He characterized it as a more general political power involving the construction of ‘common sense’ within the system of production. Laclau and Mouffe stripped the last elements of economism from hegemony. They viewed hegemony as a project which seeks to “construct and stabilize nodal points that form the basis of concrete social orders by articulating as many available elements – floating signifiers – as possible” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000).

Geographers have started to employ an articulation approach in their investigations of space, place, and scale. To take an example, questions of globalization have raised many issues about the relationship between the local and the global. This has prompted a need to determine what is local and what is global in a given place. The result of these efforts to parse the local from the global and vice versa was the conclusion that scale itself was a matter of situated observation and not a pre-existing condition of reality (Marston 2003). In other words, the global was found to be in the local and the local was found to be in the global. The observation of scale was an act that established relations of equivalence and difference between various elements across space and time. This is the same as articulation. The point of this is not that we just make up differences through the
process of articulation. The point is that the world is full of similarities and differences, and it is through the process of articulation we designate which differences matter.

To this point, discussions of language, discourse, signifiers, signifieds, and spatiality has remained mostly disconnected from the question of identity and identity formation. To bring these together requires us to return to the moment of articulation. The articulation of a signifier-signified pair does not happen on its own. Some agent is required to enact the articulation. This agent is the geographically and historically situated subject (Titscher et al. 2000). To be clear, the subject being invoked here is not the existential subject of Descartes. It is not equivalent to the autonomous human. Instead, as Judith Butler notes,

The genealogy of the subject as a critical category... suggests that the subject, rather than be identified strictly with the individual, ought to be designated as a linguistic category, a place-holder, a structure in formation. Individuals come to occupy the site of the subject (the subject simultaneously emerges as a "site"), and they enjoy intelligibility only to the extent that they are, as it were, first established in language. The subject is the linguistic occasion for the individual to achieve and reproduce intelligibility, the linguistic condition of its existence and agency (Butler 1997: 11).

In other words, the articulation of a signifier-signified pair also produces a site through which the articulation is made.

If this statement seems paradoxical, it is. The lineage by which this paradox came to be recognized begins from the work of Althusser. In his work on ideology, Althusser labeled the site of articulation the ‘subject position.’ The subject position was a role through which a person entered into and became visible within the established structure of social relations. Althusser called this entering into the structure ‘interpellation.’ He theorized the operations of interpellation through the example of a person being hailed by a policeman and turning around in acknowledgement of the hailing. As I discussed in Chapter Two, while the hailing example demonstrates the presence and interpellation of subject positions, it does not provide us access to how these subject positions were formed and how they might change through the interactions of a particular instance of hailing. Here Foucault’s transformational structuralism comes into play. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault examined the prison as a site of the making of subjects. He noted that in the case of the prisoner, as Althusser theorized, the occupation of a subject position by an individual is a subordination of that individual to power. However, Foucault also noted the process of interpellation marks the emergence of the same subject. In other words, while an individual occupying a subject position in order to participate in the social world is constrained in part by that subject position, the subject position itself is also altered by the occupation of that individual. The multitudinous complexity of a particular individual cannot be completely fixed within the established subject position. This opens the possibility for change in that subject position. Thus, using the terms of Butler, the “linguistic occasion of intelligibility” – i.e. the subject – is constantly altered by its becoming in particular contexts through particular individuals.

How are discourse and identity linked to space? For my purposes a subject position and the identity of a person in a given moment are one and the same thing. What the articulation of the signifier-signified-subject configuration suggests is the full imbrication of the production of space with the production of meaning, identity, and
subjectivity. It is not a dialectical or a trialectical relationship of separate entities as Soja has suggested. Instead, space and subject are produced simultaneously in the moment of the articulation. What this means is that any construction of space is also the construction of a subject observing and engaging that space. As such, studying the spatiality of a subject can tell us about the constitution of the subject, its capacities, its limitations, and the political conflicts involved in its operation. There is no subject separate from these. By looking at such things as the spatial patterns within articulations, the regularly deployed nodal points, the hegemonic relations between them, and the lines of contestation and dislocation that strain this hegemony, we gain significant insight into the subject’s capacities, limitations, and possibilities.

An issue raised by the use of articulations is that it reinforces an awareness of the positionality of the researcher and the choices made throughout the process of conceptualizing a project, undertaking it, and presenting the results. Observing is not a neutral process. It is creative. Social science research relies upon the actions of the researcher with regards to observation, judgment, and presentation. Each research action functions in conjunction with the audience to articulate the topic under examination. When dealing with discourse, repeatability becomes difficult because of the numerous variations of statements and meanings that are possible. This makes transparency and comprehension even more important. The legitimacy of research employing methods of discourse analysis and historical analysis more broadly is based in the credibility of the argument and evidence in relation to what is previously known.

**Methodologies**

How did I apply these ideas to examining the negotiation of state and Islam by AKP politicians? I sought to analyze various articulations of state and Islam through an analysis of AKP politicians to determine the theories of space at work within them and how the state fits in those theories. While this is a question of the AKP’s identity in many respects, my concern is less to examine the AKP identity and more to illuminate how these politicians both reproduce and create the state as an agent of social organization within Turkey. Here Foucault’s identification of population health as the constitutive object of the modern state subject becomes important. It becomes the reference point through which to explore the logics of observation and evaluation that AKP politicians articulate while negotiating the state-Islam relationship.

This generated an interest in the articulation of two sets of geographies by the AKP. The first are the correlations made between the presence and absence of Islam and the presence or absence of population health in various locations. Are areas of strong Islamic presence associated with strong population health? Are areas of weak religious presence correlated with areas of poor population health? What measures of population health are associated with the presence and absence of Islam? The second geography of interest is the geography of state tactics related to the Islam-health correlation. What can the state do about managing Islam to improve population health? How much of the correlations between Islam and population health can the state control? In what ways should state subjects go about this? What kinds of interventions in social space can state subjects perform in pursuing this control?

In order to answer these questions I collected articulations related to the nodal points ‘state’, ‘Islam’, and ‘population health’ by AKP politicians and explored the spatiality at work within these articulations. My preliminary research raised a host of
potential debates in which the Islam-health correlation and the geography of state tactics were considered. From these debates, I selected seven topics that were particularly significant in the history of the state-Islam relationship in Turkey and that would be regularly faced by the AKP during its time in government.

The first two topics I collected data about are the articulations of AKP politicians as they related to state-imposed restrictions on the access of conscious Muslims to spaces of power and status. These restrictions took the form of a ban on headscarves in state buildings or on university campuses and a limitation on the entrance of imam hatip students to state universities. As discussed in Chapter Three, both issues are historically important in creating the polarization between secularist and Islamist. This imbrication leaves little middle ground for a politician to occupy in dealing with either issue. By supporting changes to these restrictions, he or she favors religion. By letting the status quo remain, he or she favors the secularists. Given the AKP’s lineage and its electoral base, many expected the party would seek to lift both sets of restrictions. I wanted to ascertain if the AKP would act with respect to these issues, how they would go about it, and how AKP politicians would explain their party’s choices.

The next three articulations by AKP politicians I examined are related to the management of Islam in Turkey by the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DIB). As discussed in Chapter Three, the DIB is the state’s official body for dealing with all issues of religion within its purview. It was anticipated that the role and expectations assigned to it by AKP politicians would represent the general role for the state as a whole. Preliminary research also indicated AKP politicians would face issues regarding two particular areas within the responsibilities of the DIB. The first is the provision of Koran courses and whether private agents should be allowed to take part. This topic touched on the question of state versus private agency with respect to religion. The second issue was the request of some Alevi groups for financial support from the DIB for their worship places in levels equaling that provided to the country’s mosques. This topic opened the possibility for exploring how AKP politicians address minority rights and protections. It also provides an opportunity to see how AKP politicians define and police boundaries/differences within Islam.

The sixth and seventh issues of interest for this project are the AKP’s dealings with the European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. As discussed in chapter 2, an investigation into the spatiality of the state cannot overlook the role of geopolitical questions in the production of the state. Since the later Ottoman era, state actors have negotiated a position between the worlds of Europe and Islam. The Kemalist program favored a European orientation at the expense of relations with other Muslim dominated countries. In the 1990s, the possibility of Turkey’s EU membership became a critical debate. Between 1995 and 1997 the Erbakan government sought to slow down EU talks and improve Turkey’s relations with Muslim countries through such efforts as greater participation in the OIC. The AKP made gaining EU membership the primary focus of its 2002 election campaign while also promising in its party platform to get Turkey more involved in the OIC (AKP Party Program, 2002). Exploring the AKP’s engagement with these two organizations could provide insight into the geography of Islam and population health at an international scale and a sense of what state actors feel they can do with respect to this geography in the international arena.

Data Collection Tasks
There are three major sources from which to obtain articulations of the relation between state and Islam by national politicians in Turkey: the media, government documents, and personal interviews. I collected data from each of these sources through the completion of three tasks: 1) a survey of statements from AKP politicians about the designated topics in Turkish newspapers and in press releases on the party’s website; 2) the collection of statements made by AKP politicians about the designated topics during debates in the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Turkey’s national legislature; and 3) the conduct of interviews with AKP politicians. Drawing data from each of the sources allowed me to “triangulate” an articulation from one source by cross-referencing it and contextualizing it using the other two sources. This process of triangulation enabled the production of more precise and credible understandings of the research questions than could be gained from any single source (Baxter and Eyles 1997; Flick 1992; Knafl and Breitmayer 1989; Krefting 1990).

The first task of this research was to survey statements made about the identified topics by AKP politicians in Turkish newspapers and in press releases distributed through the AKP’s website (www.akparti.org.tr). The news media is a critical vehicle for tracking political statements as it plays a substantive role in publicizing and disseminating information about the state and the practices of actors identified with the state (Barnett 2003; Morley and Robins 1995; Wilson 2004). The news media delivers the ideas and actions of widely disbursed places and times together into an easily accessible form and, consequently, is an instrumental source for the development of common understandings about what the state is and what it does (Gupta 1995). Like most political parties, the AKP directs most of its interaction with the media through a select group of officials. Consequently, the statements collected in this survey were understood as providing data that reflects how the AKP leadership articulates the intersection between state and religion in Turkey.

In order to achieve a wide breadth of coverage, three national newspapers reflecting the range of ideological opinion in Turkey were surveyed: Cumhuriyet, a newspaper that supports the political left; Milliyet, a centrist newspaper with connections to Turkey’s military; and Yeni Şafak, a conservative newspaper written specifically for a conscious Muslim audience. Each of the newspapers possessed an online archive that could be accessed via the World Wide Web and searched using a web-based search engine. A search rubric was developed using key words associated with each issue of interest, common party identifiers, and the names of significant figures within the party such as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül. Each of the sources was scanned using the search engine Google and all results published between November 4, 2002 - the day after the AKP’s national election victory – and October 3, 2005 – the date Turkey began membership talks with the EU – were collected, saved, and incorporated as data.

The second task of this research was to collect AKP politicians’ discussions of the designated topics within the institutional and administrative structure of the state. The floor debates of the TBMM presented an excellent resource for this task. As the location of the processes of law-making function, the TBMM is an important site for the authorization and institutionalization of state projects in Turkey (Tanor 1990). It also provided two opportunities for expanding the data found in the media survey. First, it allowed for access to the full transcripts of speeches in the TBMM, where the newspapers
only provide brief summaries and short quotations. Second, it enabled access to first-hand statements from politicians within the AKP not usually quoted or mentioned by the popular media. As with the popular media database, the floor debates of the TBMM are stored in a web-accessible and keyword searchable archive. For searching this archive, a rubric only containing key words was constructed. The archive was scanned using the search engine Google. All results between November 3, 2002 and October 3, 2005 were saved. As with the media, relevant speeches and debates were then identified and saved for analysis.

Another source incorporated into the data collection processes were parliamentary questions. Parliamentary questions are official inquiries submitted in writing to a specific minister within the government. These questions are answered by a representative of the government either in writing or during sessions of the TBMM. The questions are usually oriented towards data provision or issue clarifications and not direct political challenges. A search of questions related to the topics of interest was also conducted.

The third task of this research was to conduct interviews with politicians from the AKP. Interviews with elites provide an opportunity to directly probe the reasoning and logics within strategic decisions and policy choices that secondary material can often only suggest (Mullings 1999; Schoenberger 1988). They also allow a researcher to explore the variety of individual understandings and potential contestations that exist within an organization, corporation, or political party (Herod 1999). The interviews conducted for this research expanded and clarified the themes found in the articulations collected from the popular media and TBMM archives. Two research trips were made to Turkey to conduct the interviews. The first was in August 2005 and the second was in May 2006. Interviews were conducted with 3 AKP national parliamentarians and 17 party officials representing districts of the greater Istanbul area. Interviews were arranged through the respective offices of the interview subjects and conducted in places of their choosing. This was usually the national or district party office in which they worked. Some interviews were conducted in English. Others were conducted in Turkish with the aid of an assistant. All interviews were recorded with a digital voice recorder. Following transcription by a native Turkish speaker, all the Turkish responses were translated into English for the purposes of analysis and presentation.

I had hoped for more interviews in total and more interviews with parliamentarians generally. However, the struggles of gaining access to parliamentarians were greater than my preliminary research experience suggested. In particular, my established contacts failed to provide the kind of help they had led me to expect from them. However, as the interviews were one part of a three-part data collection methodology and the results were not designed to draw statistical conclusions about a general population, this setback did not undermine the project as a whole.

Interview questions were drawn from the findings of my preliminary research and the initial collection and sorting of articulations from the TBMM and media archives. The interviews were semi-structured in that informants were asked questions from a prepared list and then encouraged to clarify their initial responses and provide specific examples. In this way, the interviews provided details, explanations, and a further diversification of positions not available in the previous two tasks. The interview questions asked subjects to evaluate state policies with respect to the topics identified above, to identify things that they thought were well done and others that created problems, and to provide reasons for
their opinions. In this way the interviews provided a picture of some of the repeated logics at work within the party’s approach to the topics of interest.

Data analysis

Once all the archival searches and interviews were completed, the articulations from each group of topics were divided into two sets. The first set contained discussions of the relationship between Islam and population health. Statements in this set were analyzed for articulations that correlated the presence and absence of Islam to the presence and absence of various aspects of general well being in the population. The second set contained statements regarding the state’s capacity for, responsibility, and limitations on intervention with respect to the correlations discussed in the first group. These statements were analyzed for how they articulated the state as a subject and an instrument for improving population health and the particular social spaces through which they identified the state as being capable of acting. In both groupings, I sought common logics or narratives that cut across various temporal and spatial sites and were presented by more than one person. I then used individual articulations that highlighted, clarified, or cut against certain aspects of these logics to further analyze the theories of religion, state, and space at work within them.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I accomplished two tasks. I established a general understanding of spatiality and connected this framework to the empirical world. I did this by probing the connections between discourse, identity and the production of space. Drawing on social theoretic analyses of meaning, I argued that while there is a reality independent from human consciousness its shape could only be known and communicated through an action that produces a signifier, a signified, and a subject simultaneously. Following Lacan, I labeled this action articulation. I then claimed that by studying the articulations of a particular actor we learn about the spatiality of the subject positions such as the state. In the second part of the chapter, I discussed how I applied these ideas to the research methodology. I explained how the tasks fit into this research model and how the model guided the analysis of statements collected from AKP politicians. In the following three chapters, I will present the results of this analysis.
CHAPTER FIVE

Political battles between ideologies and identities often become consolidated around a few highly polarizing issues. These issues are so charged with meaning that any invocation of them immediately organizes the world into a binary “us versus them” order. In most cases, neither side possesses enough power to gain hegemony over the other, but their confined vehemence greatly limits the possibility for pursuing alternative meanings or nuanced positions. As a result, this condition of binary opposition itself becomes hegemonic. Currently in the United States, gay marriage and abortion are two such issues. They organize the political spectrum neatly into liberals and conservatives. All other details of these political identities get lost the moment either issue becomes part of the discussion. In Turkey the role of imam hatip schools and the use of headscarves are two such issues.

Imam hatip schools are state-run schools that train students to become religious officials in Turkey’s mosques and religious institutions. The Kemalist leadership of the early republic treated them to replace the religious schools of the Ottoman era (Berkes 1964). In the 1970s, the number of imam hatip schools was greatly increased and their curriculum expanded to include both secular education and religious training. In 1983, the military government opened universities to graduates from imam hatip schools. The expansion of the schools and their normalization made them an attractive choice for religious families. Their increasing popularity made them a political target. Religious politicians viewed imam hatip schools as providing a constituency and site for furthering their political support. Refah leader Necmettin Erbakan once referred to them as his party’s backyard. Kemalists viewed the proliferation of imam hatip students into areas outside the religious institutions of Turkey as a perversion of their purpose and a threat to the secularism of the country. This divide was crystallized by a 1990 report sponsored by an influential business association which raised the specter of a dissolution of national unity due to the growth of imam hatip schools (Kaplan 2006). The February 28 process intensified this divide. Imam hatip schools were a major target. All middle school level imam hatip schools were eliminated by raising the number of years a student was required to attend school from 4 to 8. The number of high school level imam hatips was also greatly reduced. Other restrictions have also since been added that limit the ability of imam hatip graduates to attend universities. In 1999, a reduction coefficient for all vocational students was added to the Öğrenci Seçme Sınavı (Student Selection Test - ÖSS), the national standardized test used to determine which universities a student can attend. This coefficient reduced the scores of all vocational students by 20% compared to the scores of students from other high schools. This reduction has effectively prevented imam hatip and other vocational students from attending Turkey’s top-tier universities and often kept them from gaining entrance to any university at all.

In the case of headscarves, a conflict arises from a ban on wearing headscarves in universities and other state institutions. During the late 1970s, a rise in the number of covered women in universities and a growth in the political significance attached to headscarves raised concerns among state officials. Officials working for the military government between 1980 and 1983 imposed a ban on headscarves and other coverings in state institutions. This move generated significant public protests and turned the headscarf into a key organizing issue for religious and secular politics alike. Between the return to civilian control in 1983 and the postmodern coup of 1997, enforcement of the
ban varied greatly depending on the affiliations of local officials and the current political climate. The importance of the headscarf as a political question varied similarly. Following the deposition of the Refah government in 1997, enforcement of the ban became much stricter. This made the headscarf once more into an overdetermining issue.

In this chapter, I examine how AKP politicians articulate geographies of population welfare through their approach to the imam hatip schools and headscarf issues. I argue that they articulate a geography where a state directed exclusion of headscarves and imam hatip students from spaces of modernity creates problems for the welfare of the population. AKP politicians find this exclusion troubling because they do not understand the presence of Islam as dominating the social relations of a given space. In the presentation of these articulations, AKP politicians are constructing religion to be a universal human drive that manifests in many different ways in different places. Consequently, they argue that the manner in which people choose to practice Islam is a matter of individual preferences possessed by independent Cartesian subjects. AKP politicians in turn construct the state as an entity largely incapable of directly organizing religion. They find Kemalist attempts to do so clumsy and unproductive. Interestingly, their failures are presented as a failure of state actors and not the state itself. In this way, AKP politicians attempt to carve out some wiggle room between Islamist and Kemalist on the issues of imam hatip schools and headscarves.

**Geography of Population Welfare: The Effects of Exclusion**

In AKP statements about headscarves and imam hatip students, AKP politicians articulate two patterns related to the geography of population welfare. Both sets of articulations are in response to state policies which prohibit the use of headscarves in state institutions and hinder the educational opportunities of imam hatip students. One observes how these policies are harming the welfare of the population. The other observes how welfare might improve if these policies are changed.

The established policies on headscarves and imam hatip students are grounded in a framework established by the early Kemalist leadership of Turkey. In crafting the official relationship between Islam and state, these early leaders drew on a organizational framework that views religion as an agent of population welfare in private spaces and a harm to population welfare when involved in the state (Davison 2003). These leaders blamed Islam’s infiltration of the state for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the traditionalism, backwardness, and absence of individual enlightenment in their country (Shankland 1999). These leaders sought to restrict the overt practice of Islam to spaces they were considered separate from the state or those that were considered specifically religious like mosques. The state was to be the administrator of Islam and not an agent of it. Over time, spaces such as public schools, state courts, government buildings, law offices, and medical facilities were targeted and patrolled in order to keep them free of Islamic symbols and practices (Navaro-Yashin 2002).

Starting from their 2002 campaign, AKP politicians made it clear that they oppose the state’s policies for imam hatip students and headscarves. In their speeches during the campaign, their declarations while in power, and in their interview responses, various AKP politicians characterized the prohibition of headscarves from state locations and the educational restrictions placed on imam hatip students as excluding religious people from accessing a university education. As Mehmet, a politician from a relatively conservative district, puts it simply,
My wife left her third university [because of her] headscarf. My wife at the moment could be a very good computer engineer, she could be a very good mathematician. My wife is sentenced to do housework at home. Mehmet argues that due to her headscarf, the state excludes his wife from gaining the education she wishes to receive. He characterizes this exclusion as wasting her potential. She could have a productive career. Instead, she is ‘sentenced’ to a life of housework. She, like many other religious people, is prevented from pursuing the kind of life and career that she wants. In their characterization of her situation, she is forced to choose between living her religion and living a modern life.

This is a choice that AKP politicians say people feel they should not have to make. People describe making such a choice as the source of much frustration and anger. An example of this anger comes out in an interview with Barış, a politician from a wealthy area on the outskirts of Istanbul. In response to a question about headscarves he said,

It is an unnecessary prohibition. Before people could go to university with a headscarf. It was not a problem. For example, my sister went; now her children cannot go. By prohibiting the headscarf you do not reduce the number of those wearing headscarves, you only belittle people. In my niece’s graduation ceremony, she received her diploma while wearing a wig. I cried my heart out.

People do not change. You cannot change people with prohibitions or pressure. On the contrary, pressure and prohibition sharpens the extremes of opinion regarding the state elite. …The same thing happens with the OSS coefficient. People pass the test, they should go to university. Compelling people to be ignorant does not make sense.

The state says ‘headscarved women do not study.’ This is more dangerous. Those people study, they figure things out. Perhaps they will come to the position that what the state says, with reason, is right. The state should not fear the education of these people...

Barış’s anger and frustration can be seen in his statements that the headscarf ban only reduces people and that he cried when his niece had to go to her graduation ceremony wearing a wig in place of a headscarf. He blames the entrenched Kemalist elite for this ridiculous situation. He characterizes the headscarf ban and the imam hatip limitations as ‘compelling people to be ignorant.’

Barış also cuts right to the heart of why many AKP politicians characterize this geography of exclusion as being harmful for population welfare. He observes that the state is playing a dangerous game. Religious people are not stupid. They study. They reason out their situations. If something is important enough, they will fight for it. If the state does not acknowledge this, their ideas will become sharpened and extreme. By extremism, Barış is referring to a possible radicalization of the population in support of Islamist politics, a concern that is front and center in the minds of Kemalist actors. Given the current global discourse on terror and Islam, one can also read a hint of the possibility of violence as part of that extremism. Either way, the sharpening feelings of those excluded from universities by these policies is harmful to a population far beyond those immediately affected.

The second geography articulated by AKP politicians around these issues acts as a counterpoint to the vision of a radicalized population suggested by Barış. In the speeches...
and interviews of several AKP politicians, Islam itself is not evaluated as automatically changing the dynamics or social relations of a given space. Its presence is described as more circumspect and variable. Orhan, a politician from a wealthy district in the center of the city draws upon this idea in his reply to a question about imam hatips,

In the student years whether families or children, they choose imam hatip schools according to their knowledge. If people coming from these schools want to go to various universities and be a doctor or lawyer – and if they have the talent – there is no concern for me. A person graduating from a business high school has become a doctor…Those graduating from vocational high schools, if they are not going on to university, they encounter [only] low level employment options. Of course, understanding this is necessary, what harm has an imam hatip student being a lawyer, prosecutor, or engineer brought to anyone. Statistically, we can see that these people are not involved in any illegal activities. As I said before, religion does not equal bad. To study in an imam hatip school and in the end become a doctor, lawyer, or engineer, it is necessary to ask if this person was successful in the job. …It is necessary to look to the competence and success of a man in his duties.

In this answer Orhan names three jobs - lawyers, doctors, and engineers – whose proliferation is considered a hallmark of modernity. In his appeals to competence and success in job performance, he is raising the question of why the presence or absence of Islam would matter. For him, if people do not measure up on the ÖSS exam then they should do work not requiring a university degree. If they do well, they should be allowed into universities. Whether some have a broader religious education than others does not matter to the question of whether they will perform their jobs well.

It is worth noting that Orhan only points out that religious people in these places have not brought harm. He does not argue that their presence automatically brings good. Other AKP politicians were less circumspect in their evaluations of the role Islam can play in social space. As Hikmet, another local politician, replied to a question about religious education and social problems,

Religious education is like a weapon in the heads of children. It argues in their heads, it does not approach anything in a way contrary to religious belief. For me, it is very easy for religious believers to not do evil things. These people do not murder, do not rob. They believe such things are sins. Religion poses an obstacle, an opposition to evil.

For Hikmet, the presence of individuals adhering to Islam has the power to benefit population welfare. It has the influence to counteract the temptation towards egregious sins like murder and robbery. These sins are ones that profoundly harm society as they constitute violence perpetrated on others. These grievous sins are usually invoked in talking about the benefits of Islam. Sins of personal failure such as jealousy, laziness, or sloth were generally absent.

While they often find the presence of Islam associated with certain benefits, in several of the interviews conducted, AKP politicians described these benefits as something that has to happen on its own. Nuri states,

Everyone that I know should live religion free, without restriction, without pressure. If he does not want to live religiously, he should be able to do this; it is
not an obligation to live religiously. If I was pressured to perform prayers, perhaps I would not pray. Such pressure can create opposite reactions. Nuri displays a sense of human nature as stubbornly independent and resistant to social pressure. As such to gain the benefits of Islam in a place, people have to be allowed to make the choice to practice Islam on their own. It is also necessary to allow those who do not want to practice Islam to do as they wish. If either set of people is forced by state or society to adhere to Islamic principles, Nuri foresees the appearance in them of ‘opposite reactions’ rejecting Islam. Whether these reactions are overt or subtle, their appearance diminishes the possibility for obtaining the beneficial results of Islam’s presence.

The implication of the observations made by Cemal, Hikmet, and Nuri about the role of Islam, its benefits, and its management is that the practice of Islam is articulated as a relatively individualized endeavor. Orhan specifically articulates this notion. When asked about the place of headscarves, he replied,

You can see photographs of Turkey – the world even – when you go out on the streets in Beyoğlu. Women wearing headscarves are there. You can see a cigarette in the hand of a headscarved woman. You can also see that a woman in a headscarf drinks tea or coffee with a young man in a café….When you go out to İstiklal Caddesi, there is every kind of person.

Here Orhan takes us out on to the streets in the heart of Istanbul. Historically, Beyoğlu was the residence of foreigners, particularly European merchants. Situated across the golden horn from the grand buildings of first the Byzantine and then the Ottoman capital, Beyoğlu was the cosmopolitan mixing bowl of the city. It continues to be the area where most European consulates are located and contains İstiklal Caddesi, Istanbul’s main thoroughfare for tourist oriented shopping, dining, and entertainment. It is not a conservative or traditional part of the city. Orhan depicts the presence of a covered woman in this district as part of the everyday picture. She smokes a cigarette and talks with a man in a café. She participates in the social activities of Beyoğlu just as any other woman. Her headscarf does not isolate her or enforce a particular set of relations around her. In this moment, Islam may not be the most significant identification for her. At the very least, it is intermixed and cross-cut with many other identities, and practices. In this quote, Orhan depicts the headscarved woman as normal, as another person living and interacting with the social world.

Constructing Islam

In presenting these two geographical articulations in their discussions of the headscarf and imam hatip issue, AKP politicians are producing a fairly consistent construction of what Islam is and how it operates. This construction is formed through a two-step logic. The first step provides a basis of Islam as a general category. The second step brings it into the lives of people. The combination presents Islam as one iteration of a universal religious desire possessed and lived out by people who are viewed as subjects operating through a Cartesian framework of rational independence.

The first step in the construction of Islam presented by many AKP politicians is a presumption that religion is a universal property of humanity. In the words of Şevket,

People have a need to believe just like their need to eat or drink. Şevket describes the pull of religious belief as a physical demand akin to hunger or thirst. He frames this property in such a way that it can refer to Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus, and any other group categorized as ‘religious’. Despite differences in texts,
rituals, theology, and practices, they are all understood by the AKP politicians observed in this project to derive their importance from a biological will to religious belief. This biological will is common to all these groups, and all people, across space and time.

When faced with a person who does not identify with any known religious category, the AKP politicians observed work to incorporate that person into this framework of knowledge. This is seen at work in a statement made by Orhan. In part of his response to a question about religious education and globalization, he said,

I believe that religion has importance. An atheist says ‘I am without belief,’ but this is a thing like religion. Unbelieving religion…it is necessary to look to this as it is and to respect it.

Here Orhan calls atheism ‘unbelieving religion’ and a ‘thing like religion.’ In doing so, he reproduces religion as a universal feeling or experience: even those who do not identify as part of a religion possess some kind of belief. In this framework, atheism as belief-in-not-believing enables all to be inscribed one way or another within the category of religion as biological drive or will.

The second step in the construction of Islam by AKP politicians when addressing the issues of imam hatip schools and headscarves is that the ways in which the biological drive of belief is manifested are individualized. So while all Muslims practice Islam, some Muslims choose to engage with the demands of Islam more deeply than others. The mechanism by which such engagement is pursued can be seen in the answer of Selma Kavaf, the head of the AKP’s women’s division, during a press conference in June 2005. In response to a question asking whether the AKP was planning to submit any headscarved candidates for parliament, Kavaf replied,

There is not a section, a statement in the laws indicating that headscarved women are blocked [from running for parliament]. In this respect, there is a worry about the rights and freedoms of headscarved women. It is very clear that they encounter an injustice because they are not able to exercise [these rights]…There are precedents in Turkey, but, of course, headscarves are also a problem that must be resolved. This is because sixty percent of women in Turkey wear headscarves. It is a form of dress that women choose themselves according to their individual preferences, due to their beliefs and individual preferences. I do not find it right for them to be discriminated against because of this (AKP 2005).

In repeating the phrase ‘individual preferences,’ Kavaf stresses that the wearing of a headscarf is a choice made by autonomous subjects about how to perform their belief. According to her observation, covered women are operating on their own free wills. They think and decide on their own. Social or external pressure is not coercing them. They are making this choice because of their internal beliefs and relationships with God.

Other politicians also added that these choices are not made from a position of ignorance. Prime Minister Erdoğan made this point in January of 2004 during an interview by the German magazine Welt am Sonntag. When asked whether headscarves represent an oppression of women, Erdoğan replied,

I am not thinking about this in the same way as you…My wife and daughters all wear headscarves. They do not do this from my pressure. My daughters finished university. They made their headscarf decisions as educated people…Women wear headscarves because their religion commands it…It is necessary that
pressure is not placed on anyone in the topic of wearing or not wearing a headscarf (Çalabakan 2004).

According to Erdoğan, his wife and daughters are fully cognizant of the choices they are making. They are not wearing headscarves because of a lack of knowledge or experience of the world. They have university degrees. They are educated and worldly. They have evaluated what their religion commands and are acting as they feel they should. As such, in addition to being autonomous subjects, those practicing Islam are doing so in accordance with the principles of rationality. They have made an educated choice.

The construction of religion as a universal property that is practiced according to individual and personal preferences is also at work in the arguments AKP politicians present for imam hatips. One example can be found in the following passage from a May 2004 speech to the TBMM given by AKP MP Tayyar Altikulaç. This speech was part of the debate over a bill presented by the AKP government that would eliminate the reduction coefficient. While most of the speakers from the side of the AKP talked about vocational schools in general, Altikulaç attacked the imam hatip issue head on.

In this topic our producing a solution is necessary. Everyone knows that all of those going to these schools are not going in order to become imams and preachers; they are going in order to obtain a sufficient religious education – not the required course of religious training from normal high schools, an education…

In a country that is ninety-nine percent Muslim, if a citizen does not find the required courses sufficient for gaining a deep religious knowledge, is it not a right [for him to receive more education]? It is necessary to sit down and reach an answer for this question. The nation awaits this from us.

2.5 million children receive religious training, but is this training sufficient? Honestly, people not knowing how to read or write are giving religious training in their homes, is this right? If citizens who give importance to religious training want their children to become a doctor or a lawyer, they have one address: imam hatip schools.

He presents the choice for religious education as a personal and individual one. Altikulaç finds the demand for religious education to vary among the population. He argues that imam hatips operate to serve those who desire a more intense engagement with their religious belief. This is not for everyone, but he feels the state has a responsibility to serve the differences.

Constructing the State

In articulating the relationship of the state to Islam in their discussions of headscarves and imam hatips, AKP politicians focus significant attention on the state as a highly limited agent. The state’s limitations are both technical and ontological. They present the state through a variation of neoliberal discourse in which religion operates similarly to the market. State attempts to control it only create more problems. The overreaching of state actors creates a problem for AKP politicians in participating in the operations of the state. They work to alleviate these problems by replacing state actors while maintaining the existing subjectivity of the state.

The first problem AKP politicians identify in the state’s relationship with Islam is that the tools available to the state for controlling Islam are clumsy. Cemal touches upon this topic in his response to a question about the headscarf ban.
The headscarf ban is wrong, it is an idea that I cannot accept. Turkey does not have a problem (with headscarf). Almost seventy-five percent of the women in Turkey wear headscarves. They are working to bring this ban and create a separation in society, but there is not in society such a separation. I do not know where you stand, but for me, if you are not living in a very wealthy place like Besiktas, there are those who wear headscarves together with those without headscarves and there are no concerns. Those who wear headscarves are inside of every type of activities. Why are they attached to a scarf? How will they ban only those wearing headscarves when men have the same mentality. A ban on [Islamic] beards is not the same thing. The man goes and cuts his beard. A headscarf ban is an injustice and a negative discrimination.

Cemal observes that in creating a headscarf ban in universities state actors were trying to control something that does not necessarily have a material manifestation. Many religious women wear headscarves, but not all. More importantly, religious men do not generally look different from non-religious men. Regulating access to spaces of power according to a headscarf fails to accomplish its intended effect. Religious people still get in to universities. Only fewer of them are women. The result is discrimination and injustice.

The state invoked by Cemal does not have the ability to actually control the thing state actors wish to control. The state possesses sovereignty over space and can exercise its territoriality to compel certain behaviors in exchange for access to particular spaces. However, in the case of Islam, the state is unable to perceive accurately whether religious people are accessing university campuses or not. The state can only identify visible signifiers and material manifestations of the qualities state actors may wish to regulate. In the case of Islam, this property of the state warps the processes of territorial regulation creating a situation that fails to accomplish the intended goal.

The second limitation of the state identified by AKP politicians is a problem in defining the spaces to be controlled. The state secularism of Turkey is constructed around the idea that Islam should not be permitted an active role in public space. AKP politicians draw attention to an important ambiguity in this idea. As AKP MP and general advisor Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat is quoted as saying in a July 2004 newspaper article,

> Everyone argues that the parliament is a public space, the cabinet is a public space. This is one of the greatest confusions. A park, a road is public space. As a lawyer, I see this. Places that are beneficial to the environment are public space. We are experiencing conceptual turmoil…From my view of this, especially, it is necessary for universities, scientists, and lawyers to undertake work defining where public space is (Kaplan 2004).

This response was in reaction to President Sezer’s refusal to allow headscarves in the presidential residence. Sezer claimed that the residence is part of the public sphere and thus headscarves do not belong there. Firat raises the question of what actually constitutes the public sphere. Parks and road are usually considered part of the public sphere, thus headscarves are permitted there.

What AKP politicians are describing in raising this question about the definition of the public sphere is a disjuncture between the legal logic and the logic of state actors. This illuminates murkiness in the state’s definition of public space, private space, and the logic of headscarf bans. In the comments of the AKP politicians, this contradiction undermines the state’s ability to provide coherency to its interactions with the country’s
population. This absence of coherency presents a threat to the legitimacy and viability of the state subject.

The fact that state actors have intervened in this unjust way poses a particular problem for many AKP politicians with respect to their articulations of the state. As Orhan commented in response to a question about the state’s treatment of headscarved women and imam hatip grads,

We are obligated to think that the state is just. It is necessary to trust to the justice of the court, especially of the state…basically this feeling should be within you: my state is just…when people receive a service from the state, they trust it. It is necessary to not harm this trust. When we look from this viewpoint, it is necessary to believe that the state is just.

The solution to this comes from looking at the state from another angle. Orhan continues his line of thinking this way:

At the level of action, injustice can be found originating from officials or functionaries…In the end, a certain number of functionaries can bring injustice upon people…It is necessary to evaluate separately the difficulties arising from functionaries.

Orhan shifts the fault for the injustice from the state itself to people occupying positions in the state. In this logic, the subject position of the state and its relationship to the population object remains unscathed as the unjust practice of excluding headscarved women and imam hatip graduates from universities is the work of dogmatic people and not the state itself.

What the AKP as a party is doing discursively is preserve the state subject for subjectivation while changing the people who are authorized to undertake the subjectivation. Whether intentional or not, many of the proposed legal changes reflect this logic. During the time period studied, the AKP proposed bills that would retire current members of Council of Higher Education and the Constitutional Court and allow the parliament to appoint new members. As such they would preserve the structure and the legitimacy of these institutions while changing the people occupying positions of power within them. These changes would certainly open the way to headscarves and imam hatip students in universities. Whether it would mean further changes in the state is difficult to know.

The third problem that AKP politicians raise in the state’s relationship with Islam is that the state cannot achieve the changes Kemalist state actors are seeking in religious practice. In the first section of this chapter, Barış stated that people do not change from outside pressure. In making this statement, Barış is also suggesting that the state does not possess the capability to alter religious belief. It can try to control certain practices but these practices are not the core of belief. The state cannot reach that core. Attempts by state actors to do so have only created social tensions.

In this line of argument, a neoliberal structure runs through each of the problems. This is not unexpected. The economic strategies of the AKP reproduce several hallmarks of neoliberalism including privatizing state enterprises, easing restrictions on the movement of capital in and out of the country, and addressing poverty by promoting economic growth (Onis 2003; Tepe 2005). In the logic discussed above, people practice Islam as the local permutation of a universal religious impulse. This impulse drives the pursuit of religious knowledge and the ardor of religious practice. It is a natural and
biological property. It varies according to its own laws and patterns. The attempts of Kemalist state actors to shape and control this impulse have largely failed. The state does not have the capacity to successfully undertake such projects. If one replaces ‘religion’ with economy in each of these statements, one would find the core claims of the neoliberal framework for state-economy relations. AKP politicians are reproducing the same logic with state-religion relations.

In some respects, the neoliberal logic automatically positions religion as a site of challenge, resistance, and protest. Within neoliberal logic, the state is an agent considered largely harmful to whatever societal entity it attempts to control. Beyond the provision of defense and policing, neoliberal thinking views the state as an interfering agent needing constant restraint. This makes the societal entity an object of oppression and also a site of challenge and resistance to the state. In this way, religion becomes structurally positioned as an object upon which the state attempts to act but also as a force of resistance to the state. Religious identity becomes a site of challenge, resistance, and protest against the state.

Navigating Between Kemalism and Political Islam

The use of neoliberal logic for the issues of headscarves and imam hatip students by AKP politicians opens some space of operation for them between Kemalists and the political Islam of Refah/Fazilet/Saadet. This space can be seen in the ways the construction of Islam presented by AKP politicians varies from both the Kemalist and the political Islamic versions. AKP politicians articulate Islam as a particular instantiation of a universal religious drive. However, they do not characterize the invocation of Islam in a given space as dominating all other identities within that space. As Orhan said in recalling the streets of Beyoğlu, there are many different choices and identities at work in a given space and time. Islam is just one of them. This characterization ascribes much less power to Islam than Kemalists give it. Kemalist attempts to confine Islam to spaces considered private or designated as specifically religious suggest that for them Islam possesses the power to overwhelm all other identities in a given space. This makes keeping Islam out of public space an important criteria for maintaining a secular state. The political Islam of Refah/Fazilet/Saadet reproduced an understanding of Islam similar to that of the Kemalists. The parties’ emphasis on Islamic morality as the key organizing principle for society suggests that Islam itself possesses the power to override various injustices of economic, social, and political organization (Gulalp 1999; Bugra 2002). The portrayal of Islam by AKP politicians undercuts the absolute power of Islam ascribed to it by both the Kemalists and the Refah/Fazilet/Saadet parties. By arguing that the presence of Islam in a space does not change the evaluations of competence or the basic patterns of social interaction, AKP politicians are seeking to cut across both positions. Their statements characterize the presence of Islam as not a threat to overwhelm all other things in a space and thus acceptable in all spaces.

The constructions of the state presented by Kemalists and the Refah/Fazilet/Saadet parties provided AKP politicians with another opportunity to rupture the Kemalist-political Islamist binary. The Refah/Fazilet/Saadet parties took the secularist repression of Islamic practice by the state as a primary target of political opposition (Cizre and Cinar 2003). They argued that these actions not fit the culture of Muslims and thus should be transformed through a greater incorporation of Islamic principles within the state subject. Kemalists describe the state subject as the vanguard of
modernity. Early Kemalists sought to completely transform the Turkish population through the institution of clothing laws, purging of the language, presentation of a new alphabet, the reconstruction of the relationship between state and religion. State actors were the representatives of modernity. They wore European clothes, drank alcohol, and prayed in private. They sought to lead the Turkish population into modernity through education, industrialization, and westernization. The state was their tool for this.

AKP politicians employ some segments and oppose other segments of each position. AKP politicians reproduced the concern of Refah/Fazilet/Saadet with the repressive activities of the state. However, AKP politicians locate the problem within the people occupying state positions instead of with the state subject itself. Many of their initiatives have sought to maintain existing state structures while replacing the people operating within these structures. AKP politicians also share the Kemalist interest in developing the population while differing in what they find the state capable of achieving. In many respects, this interest in population development is inherent to the subjectivity of the modern state. As the basic structure of the modern state idea is built upon the state’s responsibility for the welfare of its population, any politician who does not employ a discourse of population development runs a strong possibility of being considered incomprehensible or completely illegitimate. However, the roles assigned to the state in facilitating this population development are open to variation and debate. In contrast to the Kemalists, AKP politicians find the state to currently be more of a hindrance than an aid to this development (Cinar 2005). AKP politicians do not characterize the state as capable of making direct changes in the everyday choices of people. Instead, they describe the state as better suited for making available information and services to people (Yavuz 2006). The state cannot compel people to make use of these nor can it control how people use them. It can only provide them should people want to use them. This description comes out particularly strong in the arguments for imam hatip schools. These schools were originally created to train religious officials. People have used them for other purposes. In arguing that these alternative uses are fine, AKP politicians construct a state which is more a reactionary agent and service provider than a vanguard for the future of society.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that in addressing issues of headscarves and imam hatip students, AKP politicians articulate a geography of population welfare in which attempts to exclude religious people from universities creates social tension in the population. Out of these articulations constructions of Islam and the state emerge. Islam is produced as a local manifestation of a universal human desire for religious experience. This manifestation is one identity and practice among many in any space. The state is produced as an agent of limited means which is best suited to respond to demands from society instead of trying to engineer societal order. These constructions of Islam and state position the AKP as separate from both Islamists and Kemalists. Islam is neither an agent of power as Islamists see it or the source of harm that Kemalists describe. It is one identity and practice among many. Likewise, the state is neither as troubled as Islamists see it nor as powerfully righteous as Kemalists do.

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CHAPTER SIX

Secularism and laicism are two terms that are often used interchangeably when discussing the relations of religion and state in Turkey. This promotes a certain level of confusion about the structure of these relations. Secularism is often presented in the American sense of a separation of church/religion and state. Employing this idea means attempting to draw very distinct social and geographic lines between the authority of religion and that of the state. Laicism is often associated with the French model of religion-state relations. Under laicism the state provides some administrative oversight of religion and religious practice. Turkey more closely resembles the French model. The Turkish constitution mandates that the state administer religious affairs in the country and make an appropriate religious education available to the population. The agency tasked with this responsibility is the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Pious Works, DİB). This directorate is considered to be an apolitical bureaucracy that provides unbiased religious educational materials for the religion courses of the Education Ministry, undertakes research on religious topics, and manages mosques and other worship sites around the country.

When it gained full control over the government, the AKP also gained supervisory authority over the DİB. This required party politicians to directly address questions about the relationship between religion and the state as they pertained to the activities of the DİB. In this chapter, I will draw upon the statements of AKP politicians about three DİB issues to suggest more answers to this project’s research questions about the geographies involved in the relation of state and Islam in Turkey. With regards to the DİB’s administration of worship sites, AKP politicians articulate a geography in which the state’s inability to fully staff these sites presents a threat to the welfare of the population. Within these articulations, Islam is constructed as both an impulse and a series of practices. This is similar to the constructions discussed in the previous chapter. The state is constructed as an arbiter of knowledge and provider of security. Further insight into these constructions of the state can be found in the ways AKP politicians address questions of Alevi worship sites and illegal Koran courses. The final result of the efforts of AKP politicians is a presentation of the state-Islam relationship that combines a Kemalist concern for security with an Islamist language of overcoming religious ignorance.

Geography of Population Welfare: The Absence of the State

Soon after taking control of the government, AKP leaders identified a geographical issue within the purview of the DİB that they considered to be a problem. This problem is recalled by AKP MP Mehmet Çicêk in a 2005 speech from the podium of the TBMM. In arguing for increasing the budget of the DİB, Çicêk proclaimed,

Since 1999, no staff positions have been added. Staffing needs are growing by the day, the number of unstaffed mosques increases rapidly. 13,717 imam hatip staff positions are not empty…There are no officials in 23,542 mosques and 9,825 mosques that are open for worship do not have enough staff. This means that the state is not represented in 23,542 mosques. This emptiness makes possible the desires of our domestic and foreign enemies to split our country and degenerate our religion.

Here Çicêk raises the issue of emptiness, more specifically understaffed and unstaffed mosques. In Turkey, mosques are usually built by communities, private individuals, and
other non-state agents. One of the responsibilities of the DİB is to hire, supervise, and pay salaries for imams and other officials working in these buildings once they have been constructed. According to AKP politicians, in recent years, the number of mosques has grown while the budget for the DİB has remained relatively stable. The result has been an increasing number of mosques which are only partially staffed by the DİB.

The construction of mosques is characterized by AKP politicians as driven by demand. Barış explains this demand in this way,

…for years in this country a mosque in Taksim Square was debated. Those who feel the need to go to a mosque argued for a mosque in Taksim Square. If you do not go to a mosque, for you, a mosque in Taksim does not mean much. In Sultanbeyli, a church does not matter to the Sultanbeyli people. I know that in Taksim there is no mosque other than the Ağa mosque. In Taksim, a mosque is needed. I cannot find a mosque when I feel the need to go to mosque…There is no mosque from Taksim to Şişli. There is no mosque along Baghdad Caddesi except Erenköy. These are big places. There is a need for mosques in them.

Turkish cities have experienced significant population increases over the last couple of decades. According to AKP politicians, more and more people are living in areas that do not have enough mosques to service their needs. Also, in Turkey, the cities were the core areas of Kemalist power. Here the issue of placing a mosque in Istanbul’s Taksim square is raised. Taksim Square is the commercial and transportation hub for Istanbul’s European side. It is also the site of a monument to the republic’s founders. The square is the symbolic heart of the city. It is the prime site for holding large-scale protests and the backdrop for national celebrations. As Barış notes, there is no mosque in this square. Significant political battles have taken place over whether there should be one in the square or not. The symbolism is significant for each side. Barış avoids the question of a mosque’s symbolism. Instead he argues for a mosque on the functional grounds that a demand for a mosque exists and a supply should be made available. This is no different for Taksim than for Şişli or Erenköy. Demand is driving the construction of new mosques.

The absence of the state from some of these sites – the numbers cited vary – is characterized by many AKP politicians as a significant problem for the continuing welfare of the population. Çiçek’s presentation is somewhat hyperbolic in this respect. However, his claim that the absence of the state from these sites constitutes a potential threat to the unity, harmony, and stability of the country is echoed in more moderate versions by many others. Cemal presents one of the mechanisms that make this emptiness of such concern here,

When personnel are under control of the Diyanet, they are not a problem. But worship that the Diyanet cannot reach are worrisome…by not doing the necessary job assignments, you are inviting troubled ones to take responsibility for the people.

According to Cemal and others, in mosques where the DİB does not have enough staff, private individuals will take on the duties of guiding prayers and providing religious direction to those who come to the mosque. This situation for AKP politicians raises the possibility that ‘troubled ones’ could come to positions of supervision and leadership in the religious practice of these underserved communities.
The phrase ‘troubled ones’ slides between at least two different meanings in Turkey. Historically, the reference of ‘troubled ones’ is to the members of Islamic brotherhoods which were officially abolished by the early republican leaders. The banishment of these groups was part of the consolidation of power in Kemalist hands. By replacing traditional sources of religious guidance with information and administration provided by state, Kemalist leaders sought to prevent independent religious figures from influencing the pursuits of the population. Despite the ban, several associations have continued to operate though with a somewhat lower profile. Their demonization by the Kemalist leadership and the necessarily secretive manner of their activities contributes to a strong suspicion of them by many in Turkey. This includes some, but certainly not all, AKP politicians.

Since at least 2001, the phrase ‘troubled ones’ also invokes a more globally familiar image: the Islamic terrorist. The September 11 attacks in the United States and the 2003 bombings in Istanbul have brought the language of terrorism to the forefront of Turkish political discourse. Terrorism has become the language through which the Kurdish independence groups are described. Terrorism is the language through which religious extremists are discussed. The slippage between terrorists and tarikats as the reference of ‘troubled ones’ allows Barış to speak both locally and globally at the same time.

The prospect of ‘troubled ones’ taking on a local leadership role in place of the state is not the only concern AKP politicians raised about the problem of ‘emptiness.’ AKP politicians also do not find this ‘emptiness’ to be evenly or randomly distributed across the country. As can be seen in the following response to an interview question about empty mosques from Barış, many observe a particular pattern at work,

At the moment in Turkey, there are about 90,000 mosques and 16,000 open staff positions. But in almost fifty percent of Turkey, people do not want to work in villages. In these places, the most capable person finished primary school or middle school. If this person has some religious knowledge, they perform the duties of the imam. People in villages obtain a simple education. The very biased religious information that they learn when moving to the cities immediately brings them into conflict with people. This is a barrier to their living in a harmonious way. Naturally, this is also a reason for social strife and social explosions. It is a reason for the intolerance of people. I was born in Istanbul. I consider myself lucky to be a person who was educated here. Our thresholds of tolerance are highest here because the place requires this. But, if you did not receive your education from a completely sufficient person, if you could not find an opportunity to educate yourself, real explosions are a possibility. At the moment in Turkey, the lack of sufficient education is the source of many worries in our urban centers.

Here Barış observes that rural villages are particularly suffering from the absence of well-educated DİB staff in their mosques and religious sites. However, what Barış has outlined is not just a pattern of empty mosques. He is observing a resulting unevenness of knowledge about Islam across the territorial lands of Turkey. People in these villages are not gaining a ‘sufficient education’ in the practices, commands, and values of Islam. This unevenness is not problematic for population welfare in itself. It only becomes
problematic with the movement of people from rural areas to the cities. In this area, the fixed geography of the state has difficulty matching the fluid geography of its population.

**Constructing Islam**

In articulating this geography of population welfare, AKP politicians are constructing understandings of Islam through a relatively consistent logic. This logic can be seen above in the Barış’s justification of a mosque in Taksim and Cemal’s concern for the influence of ‘troubled ones’ on the religious life of Turkey. This logic was also explicated directly by Mehmet. When asked why empty mosques are a problem, Mehmet replied,

> When people want religious instruction, others will provide the education if you do not.

Barış, Cemal, and Mehmet are all invoking the idea that with respect to religion people will seek to learn things from any source available. They argue that if the state does not provide enough religious instruction and guidance, people will seek out other resources from which to obtain the knowledge they desire.

This idea replicates a logic which is frequently applied in both the physical and social sciences. This logic states that nature abhors a vacuum. One of the basic principles students learn in high school chemistry is that interconnected spaces possess a constant air pressure. If you take some air out of an enclosed space from one point, air will be drawn in to that space from all other open points. In the social sciences, political analysts and geopoliticians often observe the properties of a ‘power vacuum.’ This occurs when a set of hegemonic relations between states or other agents begins to fracture and competition to establish a new structure of relations breaks out. Economic observers use a similar model to explain the appearance of new businesses in a market economy. When a demand has emerged or has been previously undersupplied, the laws of market economics state that the formation of new businesses should occur to profit from this demand.

AKP politicians appeal to the abhorent vacuum logic to explain the effects of the state’s absence from mosques. When the state is present in mosques and is providing sufficient instruction and guidance, communities operate smoothly. For AKP politicians, when state representatives are absent, a vacuum of knowledge is created. People’s desire for knowledge is not fulfilled, and they begin drawing instruction and guidance from any available points of information. The results of this decentralized learning, AKP politicians fear, are inconsistency, confusion, exploitation, and social tension. In the words of Barış,

> First, if these questions are not overcome, it is a very big danger because religious interpretation is very open. If information related to religion, to the principles of Islam is being interpreted by people who do not possess the proper training – and if people follow their example – the result of various practices is the immediate appearance of chaos and quarrel.

The use of this abhorent vacuum logic by AKP politicians in their statements regarding the DİB adds to the construction of Islam described in the previous chapter. When addressing headscarves and imam hatip students, many AKP politicians construct Islam as the combined product of a two step process. First, there exists a universal impulse towards religious feeling and belief. Second, this universal impulse is fleshed out according to individual and personal choices. What the abhorent vacuum logic adds to
this understanding is that the variations in the way the impulse becomes manifest are the result of local conditions. In discussing headscarves and imam hatip students, ‘individual preferences’ governed the intensity of a person’s impulse. In discussing the DİB, local conditions govern the fulfillment of the impulse.

**Constructing the State**

The logic of abhorent vacuum through which AKP politicians are framing the geography of empty mosques also carries with it certain constructions of the state. These constructions are built around the idea that the state is responsible for sufficiently satisfying the demands of the religious impulse. In satisfying these demands, the state must negotiate a fine line. As Ahmet said in answering a question about the role of the DİB,

…the Diyanet only provides explanations related to religious laws, presents opinions, and passes along the conditions that Islam demands. For citizens, to follow or not follow these directions is their own decision; no one has the right to oppose this.

In the framework presented by Ahmet, the state does not have an agency or conscience of its own. The state’s responsibilities are to act as a guide for the population with respect to the labyrinth of laws and opinions that govern the correct practice of Islam. It can respond to the questions of citizens. It can identify applicable laws and dictates from the Şura and other sources. It can forward these back to the questioner. It cannot dictate what citizens do with the information provided. It cannot enforce religious practice or advance adherence to religious law. In this respect, the state is conceptualized much like a computer. It has no agency of its own. It can respond to requests by drawing upon a pre-existing database of information. It can select the proper information to return to the person issuing the request. It has little power beyond this service function.

Within the use of the logic of abhorent vacuum by AKP politicians, the state is the most trusted instrument for providing this guidance and religious information. Other sources of this information and guidance are projected as biased in some way either due to the limitations on the amount of knowledge they possess or due to the intent to manipulate and exploit a citizen’s religious impulse for political ends. The state is considered to possess both the financial and analytical resources necessary to find the applicable interpretations or opinions and the remove necessary to be objective in the selection and presentation of those interpretations appropriate to a given situation.

This mechanistic understanding of the state’s service to religion also includes an assumption of uniformity in its treatment of the population’s religious requests. The nature of this expectation is revealed in the manner which AKP politicians address the DİB’s treatment of Alevi worship sites. This question was brought to the foreground by an AKP MP following early debates over increasing the staffing of the DİB. In September 2003, AKP MP Mehmet Melik Özmen suggested that some of the new staff positions go to Alevi leaders and that Alevi worship places receive some financial support from the DİB (AKP, 'Alevi’ düzenlemesine soğuk 2003). At the time, Alevi worship sites, known as cemevis, received none of the financial and infrastructural aid that the DİB provides to Sunni mosques. Özmen’s proposal to change this situation placed the AKP in the middle of a debate within the Alevi community itself over whether to work for the inclusion of Alevis in the DİB or to work for the abolition of an institution that many believe pursues a Sunni assimilationist program.
AKP politicians generally addressed this question in two ways. The first was to deny Alevi claims to support because cemevis are cultural and not religious places. This was Erdoğan’s response when asked about this by Alevi representatives in Germany. He said,

Alevism is not a religion. Mosques are places of worship, cemevis are culture centers. The aid provided to mosques cannot be provided to cemevis. However, if there are people who want to aid cemevis, this is not prohibited (Türkler'e çağrı: Alman vatandaşlığına geçin 2003).

Here the construction of the state as a neutral and omniscient agent is drawn upon to provide a definitive categorization of cemevis as cultural centers and not worship places. This declaration is given authority by coming from a state official. It also reinforces the construction of the state as the agent that possesses the authority to make such definitive statements and the resources to substantiate these declarations. Finally, it maintains the state’s presumptive uniformity in the treatment of religion by declaring those claiming discrimination as not being religious.

The second way in which AKP politicians addressed the question of cemevis provides a different sense of what this uniformity might mean. Mehmet Aydın provides an example of this approach in the answer he gave to a parliamentary question about this topic,

In an iftar meal given by the Diyanet, in responses given to questions of reporters, the Diyanet expressed that our Alevi citizens are Muslim, that they are not a religious and ethnic minority, that Alevism is a subcategory of Islam, that the Islamic religion presents commonly shared directions related to the belief, worship, and moral foundations appearing in the basic texts, that the Diyanet carries out service for all without seeing a difference among sects and interpretations, and that outside of this service differences were left to the preferences of the people…It was also stated that the Diyanet is responsible for serving all citizens equally in accordance with section 136 of the Constitution, that separating according to belief group would be contrary to the basic principles of the republic, that it would break national unity, that in following such a path other groups, not just Alevis, would be able to be make demands, and that consequently a path would be opened to new problems and tensions.

Here Aydın basically claims that Alevis are Muslims and the state serves Muslims. The state is not permitted by the constitution to observe any further differences. It can only see Islam and not any division within Islam. In this logic, the state’s presumed uniformity of treatment is not a circumstance of its ability to see all and properly serve all equally. Instead, the state is impaired by legal and budgetary reasons from seeing any difference. The objective vision of the state in providing information and service to the population turns out to be rather blurry.

The result of AKP politicians constructing the state’s provision for religion through the logic of abhorrent vacuum is that they have made the provision of religious information into a security issue. Beginning from the Kemalist era, Islamic groups outside of state management have been considered threats to the objectives of the state. The nature of this threat has varied over time within this, but the basic discourse of unobserved Islamic threat has remained unchanged. This was part of the justification for the closure of tarikats and Islamic brotherhoods in the 1920s, the increased emphasis on
the state provision of religious education and services by the 1980 military government, and the closure of Islamic social and economic enterprises as part of the February 28 process in 1997 and 1998. This state discourse regarding the workings of Islam in unobservable places was reinforced by increased global concerns about terrorist acts undertaken in the name of Islam since 2001.

AKP politicians turned this securitization discourse into a reason to support the increase in staff. The state’s role was not just to provide religious services because of a social contract between the state and its population. By placing these services in the context of a demand that will be filled one way or the other and then invoking the amorphous possibility of threat, they turned this responsibility into a question of national security. The rationale of progress and civilization used by the Kemalists in creating the DIB is replaced by a concern for preventing possible terrorists from taking advantage of the population’s natural desire to gain more knowledge about the things it believes. Here security trumps civilization as the justifying logic of the state subject. But also, there is a reconfiguration of how security must be accomplished. It cannot come from purging religion from places. This is impossible. People believe things and they will seek to learn more about them. Instead, security comes from people knowing religion correctly and thus being capable of determining right from wrong on their own. The state ultimately cannot control the choices of every individual in the moment those choices are made. What it can do is provide people with the most correct and true knowledge so that they will not be misguided by those who wish to exploit their beliefs for political or extremist purposes.

This conceptualization of the link between proper knowledge and security creates an ambiguous situation for AKP politicians when it comes to the issue of privately run Koran courses. Koran courses in Turkey were brought under government control following the 1980 coup. Any Koran course held outside the auspices of the state are considered illegal. If caught, the teachers of such private courses can receive from 6 months to 3 years in prison. Many of the politicians interviewed described this as the proper arrangement for Koran courses. As Ayşê says,

> When private interests become a part of the work, they can direct things to very different places; this should not be. If a course opens, it should be in state control. Ayşê’s statement repeats the dominance of the abhorant vacuum logic in AKP presentations of issues related to the DİB. It also appeals to the need for proper, even religious knowledge provision. Differences are a problem for the reasons stated above.

However, many politicians were also sympathetic to privately run Koran courses. In my interviews, many expressed frustrations with the various limitations and restrictions placed on attending such courses. The frustrations led to an attempt to change the law. In the fall of 2003, as part of the reform of the Turkish Criminal Code required by the European Union harmonization process, AKP politicians added an amendment reducing the penalty for conducting an illegal education course to no more than one year in prison. Another amendment in the same bill enabled all prison sentences of less than a year to be converted into a fine. In this way, the AKP government sought to alter the punishment for operating illegal Koran courses from a prison sentence to a fine.

Opposition politicians from the CHP challenged this amendment by raising the same security concerns that AKP politicians had expressed about empty mosques. The CHP politicians argued that Koran courses can be a source for terrorism and the
exploitation of people’s religious beliefs. Some described this as true even when the courses are run by the state. Reducing punishments on the teachers of private Koran courses was described by CHP politicians as tantamount to allowing these private courses to push state courses out from the market. CHP politicians warned of the dire consequences the proliferation of this difference might create.

AKP politicians responded in two ways. First, they challenged the idea that the courses produce terrorists. As AKP Ağrı MP Halil Özyolcu said during an April 2004 speech in the TBMM,

What is there in this that you oppose? They teach morality, goodness. Fethullah Hoca does what the state cannot do, he opens training schools in places that the state cannot. From which institutions did Apo, Yeşil come? They did not come from these. You are opposing a segment of society. You are discriminating against them. Terrorists do not come from this segment.

Özyolcu highlights a couple of contrary examples to the idea that Koran courses produce terrorists. On the positive side, he invokes the name of Fethullah Gülen, a former religious official who created a sophisticated network of educational and business ventures drawing on Islam as the dominant framework of values. Özyolcu then points to two notorious figures from recent years. Apo refers to Abdullah Öcalan who founded and lead the Kurdish nationalist group known as the PKK. The PKK was responsible for numerous bombings and acts of violence since the early 1990s. Yesil is the name used by a man who the Turkish intelligence agency and other state actors employed for carrying out targeted killings and other illegal activities. This relationship between Yeşil and state actors was exposed in 1999. As Özyolcu points out neither man was an Islamic extremist.

Second, AKP politicians argued that learning the Koran is a safe way to gain proper religious knowledge. Erdoğan in a May 2005 press conference discussing the changes in the criminal code said this:

In this topic, it is a message to those using the wrong approach; to wrongly evaluate these courses as being a mechanism of a terror organization is disrespectful to Muslims in this country. At no time can you evaluate learning the Koran in this country as a mechanism for a terror organization or as a mechanism for exploitation (Aydın 2005).

In making these very direct statements about the value of learning the Koran, Erdoğan is establishing the Koran as a source of good regardless of the local conditions involved in its learning. A Koran course is presented as qualitatively different from empty mosques. It is not susceptible to exploitation by ‘troubled ones.’ The text itself does not suffer the same interpretative openness that was of concern when empty mosques were the topic. It is an absolute entity without geographic variation. This made illegal Koran courses much safer than the empty mosques. The absence of the state from these spaces should not be considered a cause for significant concern.

The link made by AKP politicians between popular religious knowledge and security also suggests another set of conclusions about their constructions of state in relation to Islam. With their use of the abhorrent vacuum discourse in their characterization of religious belief and their emphasis on the state’s responsibility for filling this vacuum, AKP politicians invoke two of the religion-state relations discussed in Chapter Two. First, AKP politicians present Islam as providing a moral direction and social stability that the state cannot establish on its own. AKP politicians justify their
concern with educating the population in the principles of Islamic practice by linking this practice to the maintenance of state security and domestic harmony. In doing so, they imply that the state is incapable of providing security and harmony on its own. They infer that the population’s devotion to the principles of Islam is the main actor in achieving security and harmony. Second, the concern of AKP politicians with educating the population in the correct principles of Islam invokes the relation from chapter 2 in which differences in religious belief and practice are considered a potential source of social conflict that the state must mediate. AKP politicians observe that the knowledge of Islam within the Turkish population varies. They evaluate this variation in religious knowledge as a source of tension. They argue that the state can reduce this tension through a better response to the demands of people for religious knowledge.

Navigating Between Kemalist and Political Islam

The effect of these two constructions of the state-religion relationship may aid AKP politicians in their attempt to navigate the Kemalist-political Islam binary. This help comes from the notion that the second construction may be considered the inverse of the first. In the first case, the state depends on Islam to achieve harmony and security. In the second, Islam’s functionality breaks down without the state providing an even distribution of religious knowledge across the country. This logic establishes a dialectical dependency between Islam and the state in which neither can properly operate without the other. While Islam is not fully subjectivated as part of the state and vice versa, a connection is established between the two entities that implies their inseparability. This move allows for AKP politicians to avoid violating the Kemalist demand of separation between religion and state while also speaking to the idea of conscious Muslims that Islam is a critical component in the organization of their society and their state.

In issues related to the DİB AKP politicians are also drawing upon the existing discourses of both the Kemalist and the political Islamist identities to express their concerns over population welfare. Instead of trying to carve out a differentiating position between the two, AKP politicians strategically employ various discourses already in circulation. In this way, they provide an opportunity for both Kemalist and Islamic oriented people to hear ideas acceptable to them at work within the AKP’s party discourse.

For Kemalists, the familiar words are those of security concerns with relation to Islamic extremism. The logic of abhorrent vacuum used by the AKP is built on the idea that when the state is not present, the opportunity is open for religious extremists to infiltrate. This logic was used by Kemalists in shutting down Islamic brotherhoods and bringing mosque administration under state control. AKP politicians are generally echoing these same worries and suspicions in their present discussions of the DİB. AKP politicians differ from the Kemalists in the solution to this security concern. For Kemalists, the answer is to keep religion in the private sphere. By making religion a personal and individual concern, its significance as a political identity and its threat to the existence of the state is greatly restricted. For AKP politicians the answer is to provide the population with a proper religious education. If people know their religion well, they will not feel threatened or be a threat. A proper grounding in Islam means obtaining a value for harmony, unity, and peace.

The focus on ignorance about religion echoes one of the themes used in more extreme ways by Islamists in Turkey and elsewhere. One of the key intellectual sources
of Islamist movements in the Arab world, Sayyid Qutb, posited that contemporary Muslims live in ignorance of the correct way to live Islam (Zubaida 1993). This state, which he labeled *jahilliya*, can only be overcome by returning to the key texts of the faith and embracing a strict version of religious law. This ignorance is identified as one of the main reasons for the problems and backwardness of the Muslim world.

In their presentations regarding the DİB, AKP politicians employ a similar notion in their concern with achieving a sufficient education and proper religious knowledge. In fact they sometimes use a similar word, *cahil* (ignorance), to identify the absence of knowledge that needs to be overcome by religious education. Where they depart from the Islamist version of this ignorance is in how it should be overcome and what this would achieve. Many Islamists argue that only the use of religious law based strictly on the Koran and Shura can lead people out of ignorance. This would achieve a return to the Golden Age of Islam during which Muslims lived in true harmony with God and dominated the earth. AKP politicians do not present this strong a vision. They describe the provision of religious education as a method of promoting unity, harmony, and peace in their country. This education is not intended to overcome all other knowledge. It is intended to provide Muslims with a self-confidence about their own identity which will enable them to prosper and succeed in the modern world.

This position is emblematic of what some commentators see as a general pragmatism that runs through the discourse of the AKP (Cavdar 2006). Mechem (Mecham 2004) claims that this pragmatism is indicative of the AKP’s political sophistication, strategic thinking, and capacity to operate within the confines of normal politics. Pragmatism usually invokes a willingness to accept certain conditions as difficult to change and a flexibility to work within those conditions. It suggests that a level of strategic restraint and sacrifice is at work in the choices made by the AKP. For example, AKP politicians have sought to pacify Kemalist worries regarding the secularism of the state and avoid direct confrontation with the military as part of their identity as ‘conservative democrats.’

What their appeal to the idea of abhorent vacuum suggests is that a pragmatic identity is also useful for AKP politicians. The logic of abhorent vacuum posits that the world holds certain demands that must be fulfilled. Some choices can be made about how these demands are filled, but ultimately there is no choice about whether or not something will happen. This limited choice framework mirrors the logic of pragmatism. By setting issues of the DİB within the abhorent vacuum framework, AKP politicians are drawing upon and reinforcing the idea of their party as a pragmatic actor. Their consistency of argumentation lends legitimacy to the claims they make about the limited options and necessary steps the state faces when managing Islam. This legitimacy is critical to carving out an identity that separates the party from the poles of religious debate in Turkey.

**Conclusion**

In this Chapter, I have examined AKP statements on three issues related to the DİB in order to suggest further answers to the project’s research questions. The geography of population welfare revolved around the presence or absence of the state in spaces where religious knowledge was being presented or taught. The absence of the state in mosques was viewed as a threat to the security and stability of the country. The logic of abhorent vacuum was used to connect the state’s absence with the presence of
undesirable interlocutors. The absence of the state in Alevi worship sites and Koran courses was characterized as less critical. Within these articulations, Islam was seen as an impulse for which people needed guidance and education in order to direct it into the proper practices. The state was constructed as the most trustworthy agent for providing this guidance due to its possession of objectivity and concern for security of the population as a whole. The combination of the concern for security and the emphasis on gaining proper religious knowledge represents an amalgamation of Kemalist and Islamist tropes which enables AKP politicians to speak to both positions and many in between.
CHAPTER SEVEN

In traditional studies of states and politics, there are two distinct realms of issues and analysis. These realms are divided according to a spatial demarcation (Agnew 1995). Domestic issues are those which fall within the domain of the state’s territorial sovereignty. Geopolitical issues are those which extend beyond the boundaries of a state’s territory and for which the state must negotiate with other agents or sovereign states. Despite including practices, identifications, and territorial spans that cross-cut the borders of the modern state system, issues of religion are generally examined as a domestic concern. This practice results from a combination of the predominance of state-centered approaches to politics in social scientific study and the hegemony of Euro-American secularist ideology within the state system in general (Chan 2004). Over the last two decades, this domestication of religion as a political issue has been challenged by at least two phenomena. The first is a growing awareness of the many social and political identifications that slice across national boundaries. The second is the explosion of religious based politics in various countries. This explosion has brought religious concerns to the fore in several states and consequently incorporated these concerns part of the geopolitical landscape. The increasing importance of non-state groups organized around religious identities also contributes to the necessity of examining state dealings with religious identifications beyond their own territories.

In this chapter, I explore how AKP politicians negotiate the relationship between religion and state at the geopolitical scale. I argue that AKP politicians organize the state-Islam relationship at the geopolitical scale using ideas of civilizational order. These politicians articulate a geography in which Turkey sits on the border between two civilizational regions possessing historical antipathy. The tension observed by AKP politicians between these civilizations is magnified by their observations of a geography of welfare. These observations find the Islamic civilization lagging behind European civilization in key aspects of political and economic development. With its position on the border, Turkey is presented by AKP politicians as a site for overcoming the civilizational tension through interaction and dialogue. In the process of articulating this geography, AKP politicians construct Islam as a teleological target and set of essentialized values to be pursued by the people of the Muslim world. These politicians also construct the Turkish state predominantly as an agent of civilizational education and dialogue directed towards reducing the observed tensions. This articulation of a geography based in the idea of civilizations and the respective constructions of state and Islam that emerge allow AKP politicians to negotiate the Kemalist-Islamist polarity by employing various aspects of the vocabulary used by each side while avoiding a complete embrace of the discourse from either position.

Religion and State at the Geopolitical Scale

In the AKP’s 2002 party platform statement, the party’s membership presented two geopolitical strategies that over the period studied directly addressed the relation of Islam and the state. The first strategy was intensifying efforts to join the European Union (EU). The question of whether and how a predominantly Muslim country would fit in the EU had been debated strenuously in Turkey and Europe for a number of years. The choice of AKP politicians to make gaining EU membership for Turkey one of their primary campaign promises brought a new immediacy to the discussions. It also helped
some AKP politicians to break with their Islamist past and buttress the sincerity of their claims to a reformed political identity.

The second strategy described in the AKP’s 2002 party program with relevance to the relation of Islam and state was a proposal to expand Turkey’s involvement with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC is a multi-national institution of predominantly Muslim countries initially formed in the 1960s to address questions arising from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While Turkey has long been a member of the OIC, the participation of Turkish state actors in the activities of the OIC had been limited. By proposing to enhance Turkey’s role in this organization, AKP politicians sought to emphasize the importance of Turkey’s Muslim identity in its geopolitical activities and to build closer working relationships with the states of the Arab and Muslim world.

The geographical articulations of AKP politicians related to these two endeavors reveal the presence in their discourse of a particular vision of global organization. This organization can be seen at work in a speech given in December 2003 by Prime Minister Erdoğan. Following bomb attacks that targeted three synagogues, a British bank, and the British Consulate in Istanbul, Erdoğan talked about Turkey’s place in the world,

Turkey is the owner to the terrible privilege of being the sole people representing Islamic culture at the border of western geography and representing western culture at the border of Islamic geography. For this reason, the exploding bombs were directed, in truth, not only to Istanbul and Turkey, but at the same time to the foundations of ethnic, religious, and cultural tolerance, modernism, and the dialogue between civilizations (AKP 2003).

In this speech, Erdoğan articulates a geopolitical order in which Turkey sits at the crossroads of a geographic block defined by western or European culture and a geographic block defined by Islamic culture. In this position, Turkey is characterized as a site of overlap or a bridge where the two otherwise exclusive blocks come together and interact. This idea of Turkey as a site of connection, intermixing, and dialogue between ethnic, religious, and cultural blocks is repeated over and over in arguments by AKP politicians for Turkey’s importance to the EU and the OIC. In discussions of the EU, Turkey’s bridging nature becomes characterized as a way for Europe to reach out to the Muslim world. When talking about the OIC, this overlap is presented as a model for other Muslim states to follow.

By invoking geographies defined by regional cultures and employing the phrase ‘dialogue between civilization,’ Erdoğan’s statement also suggests an understanding of geopolitical order based in a division of the world into civilizations. The idea of sorting people and places around the globe and across time into civilizations possesses a long provenance in the social sciences. It has been used by figures ranging from Weber to Durkheim to Wallerstein to Braudel for comparing different aspects of social organization across time and space. While the definitions of civilization vary among these different writers, some common elements in their usage of the term can be observed. Civilizations are hazy concepts. They possess a geographic location, but the spatial boundaries are usually left undefined. The temporal extent of their existence is measured in centuries or millenia and is often detached from specific events. Instead of specific spatial or temporal parameters, a civilization is usually defined by the perception of a common culture present within vague boundaries of time and space. This culture is posited as the core identity of the civilization. This identity is seen as traversing the
variety of existing social, political, and economic organizations to create a coherent unity that can be compared with other similar entities.

The dependence on culture as a distinguishing element makes civilizational models problematic. These models are rightly criticized for their homogenizing and essentializing operations (Said 1979). These models are also problematic for the Eurocentric hierarchy which the concept of civilization has helped to perpetuate. The concept of civilization developed in Europe as a signifier of sophistication and advancement. This concept was spread beyond Europe and employed by many as a justification for the development of modernization projects modeled on European norms. As discussed in chapter 3, civilization became a significant term in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. It was a prominent concept for the Kemalist leadership of the early Turkish state and it remains an important discursive moment in the discussions of modernity and westernization within the country (Cinar 2005).

One recent version of civilizational thinking is the model of civilizational conflict proposed by Samuel Huntington. What Huntington sought with his thesis on civilizations was the ability to identify potential sites of violent conflict around the world. He viewed the differences between civilizations as being a source of significant strife in the post-Cold War world. Consequently, he hypothesized that many sites of conflict should occur along the boundaries between civilizations where these differences would most often come into contact. For this reason, he argued that these boundaries should garner particular attention from policy makers, political analysts, and military planners. His particular focus was on conflicts between ‘the West’ and the Islamic world. While his analysis was neither original nor unique his phrase ‘clash of civilizations’ achieved iconic status. The phrase appeared in numerous discussions of foreign policy by AKP politicians.

As part of his examination of these boundaries, Huntington identified several ‘torn’ countries. These were countries that were located on a border between two civilizations and within which a struggle for civilizational identity was presently at work. With its position astride the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, its Muslim population, and its historical embrace of a French-style secularism, Turkey was one of the states identified by Huntington as a ‘torn’ country. Huntington argued that Turkey’s position between a ‘Western civilization’ encompassing Europe and the United States and the ‘Islamic civilization’ of North Africa and southwest Asia made it a prime site for future competition between the two civilizations.

In their speeches and interviews, AKP politicians generally replicate Huntington’s assessment of Turkey’s geographic and political location within civilizational divisions. However, they depart from Huntington’s version of Turkey’s position in two minor ways. While they do see Turkey as located at the border between Western and Islamic civilizations, they do not characterize Turkey as torn. They describe the country’s border position in more positive language such as Erdoğan’s description of Turkey as a “ground of ethnic, religious, and cultural tolerance, modernism, and dialogue between civilizations.” Second, they do not describe Turkey as occupying a space between Western and Islamic civilizations. As Orhan remarked in answering a question about Turkey and the EU,

Turkey is a Muslim country. Those in the EU are very much Christian countries. I think that it will provide a dialogue in this way: it will provide contact between
European countries and Islamic countries. We are a country connecting Europe with Asia. Because of this, we possess geopolitical importance. Orhan describes Turkey as being a contact between the West and the Muslim world but firmly establishes Turkey’s location on the Muslim side of the border. This position holds across all AKP politicians that were observed and interviewed. Whereas Huntington describes a Turkey that is balanced precariously on a fence between two fields, AKP politicians consistently assert their country’s location within the geography of Islam. It is from that position inside the borders of the Islamic world that they see Turkey acting as mediator, mixer, and site of dialogue.

More generally, the civilizational discourse of AKP politicians also emphasizes current social and economic differences between civilizations in addition to the cultural divisions. As such they articulate a geography of civilizational welfare which extrapolates the notion of population welfare to a geopolitical scale. As with population, civilization operates as its own reality with its own laws, processes, and qualities. The same tools that created population, namely statistical analysis, also play a significant role in the observation, evaluation, and management of civilization. The one difference is whereas a population is observed in one-to-one correlation with the boundaries of a state, in the case of civilization there are no definite subjects claiming responsibility for or power over it. I discuss the impact of this on the construction of the state subject later in the chapter.

When AKP politicians talk about Europe, the Muslim world, and Turkey, they characterize the Muslim world as being a civilization whose level of welfare is lower than that of other civilizations. While participating in functions of the OIC, both Foreign Minister Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan spoke very directly about this. For example, in conversations with reporters while flying back to Turkey from an OIC meeting in Saudi Arabia, Erdoğan was asked what he thought about the stature of the Islamic world. He replied,

In this topic we need to assimilate three things. In matters of politics and economics, the number one element is people, the number two element is information, and third in line is money…In the people direction, the information direction, and the money direction…when you succeed with these things, you have arrived. The Islamic world, after reaching a certain tiring point…, began to fall behind the process in these topics. This is an offense of us who make up the Islamic world. We broke from the race in these topics. In past centuries, the Islamic world held the lead in this race. After breaking from it, the Islamic world is paying the price (AKP 2004).

In this reply, Erdoğan presents three elements that he finds contributing to the lower level of welfare in the Islamic world. He attributes the lack of success in these areas to the Islamic world’s exhaustion in a ‘race’ towards development. This lack of success has both political and economic manifestations. When the Foreign Ministers meeting was held in Istanbul in 2004, then Foreign Minister Gül used his opening speech to offer sharp criticisms of the political systems that dominate Islamic countries,

Today the reason that Islamic countries remain behind is the regimes. Closed regimes like a kingdom or emirdom that support dictatorship are the real barriers to the development of Islamic countries. It is necessary for the leaders guiding countries toward this circumstance to understand this (Gül ve İslam demokrasisi! 2003).
Gül followed this with a strongly worded call for greater democratization in these countries. Later in November 2004, Prime Minister Erdoğ an spoke at the opening of a Work Forum organized by the OIC’s Economic Conference. In this speech he pointed to some of the basic social and economic problems he observed within Muslim countries,

We possess rapidly increasing populations that we neither educate sufficiently nor provide employment. Islamic countries contain almost twenty percent of the world’s population but only five percent of the world’s economic production. While per capita income in the world is around $5,700, in Islamic countries it is $1,200. Twenty-two of the fifty-seven OIC member countries have a [per capita] income less that $750 and are in the status of least developed countries.

Commercial volume among Islamic countries lags significantly. The social living standard of OIC member countries has also fallen. Solutions to such problems will come from pure heartfelt criticism (İslam dünyasına 'değişim' reçetesi 2004).

In their characterization of the Muslim world and its problems, Gül, Erdoğ an, and other AKP politicians employ a classic developmentalist framework. They consistently describe the Muslim world as being ‘behind’ and in need of ‘catching up.’ The language of backwardness and the characterization of political and economic development as a linear process predominate in the “developmental discourse” of global financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF as well as the aid programs of countries like the United States. This discourse tends to approach different locations throughout the world as basically the same place at different stages of a development progression. The progression begins in poverty, despotism, and ignorance and ends in wealth, enlightened government, and technological sophistication. This Rostovian progression is particularly suggested by Erdoğ an’s description of the Islamic world’s failure to keep up in the ‘race’ to development.

At the same time that they employ a developmentalist framework in articulating the Muslim world’s position in their geography of civilizational welfare, AKP politicians deploy other statements that challenge one of the other assumptions of this framework. This challenge was laid forth most distinctly by Gül in a 2003 OIC meeting in Malaysia. During a speech to the gathering he argued,

We set in front of us the goal that an Islamic society can change itself, can be reformed, and while doing these things also retain its own tradition, values, and identity (Demirtaş 2003).

What Gül is taking on in this speech is the developmentalist idea that countries identified as ‘underdeveloped’ are unable to overcome their problems on their own. In development practice, the label ‘underdeveloped’ has come to justify the intervention of ‘developed’ states in other countries through the tailored provision of money, equipment, and expertise (Ferguson 1994). This intervention is accepted due to the assumption that ‘underdeveloped’ countries do not have the finances, institutions, and experience to do this on their own. Gül’s statement acknowledges the common acceptance of this assumption, and he challenges Muslim countries to prove that assumption wrong.

Within the developmentalist framework the targets, goals, or objectives of the race to development are identified as political, economic, and social qualities possessed by countries in the West. It is not surprising then that within the geography of civilizational welfare articulated by AKP politicians Europe displays a high level of welfare. While this welfare is usually discussed in economic and political terms, AKP
politicians look beyond those as well. As Ahmet said in answering a question about state regulation of religion in Turkey,

I have friends in Europe…there is a clearer, more beautiful air in Europe.
Everyone - Christian, Muslim, Jew - lives within, lives religion comfortably.
There are those living [religiously] and there are those not living [religiously].

From the earliest days of the republic, Turkey’s leaders have looked towards Europe both for examples of what a state should be and for recognition of Turkey as a modern state of the highest order. In 1959 Turkey applied to become a member of the fledgling European Economic Community, and it has continually sought inclusion in the differing permutations of the trans-European political and economic organizations that have followed. The choice of the AKP leadership to make pursuing full membership in the EU their primary political focus continues the reproduction of the idea of Europe’s high status.

However, in articulating Turkey’s relationship with Europe AKP politicians also twist the developmentalist logic to some extent. In AKP characterizations of Europe, the race to development is not yet finished. Europe represents the leading location, but it has not reached the end. There are still things to be done and potential to be realized. This idea forms a key component of the argument presented by AKP politicians for Turkey’s inclusion in the EU. As a consequence, it is repeated over and over in newspapers and interviews. One example can be drawn from a 2003 press conference Erdoğan held with then Foreign Minister of Germany. In talking about Turkey and the EU, Erdoğan said,

Today there are those who see the European Union as only a cultural union, a Christian union, a geographic union, or an economic union. However, for us, this is a civilizational project and a great success will be achieved with Turkey’s membership to the EU. Additionally, Muslims of the world will hold the EU in higher regard (AKP 2003).

As he does here, Erdoğan often presented denials or negations of the ideas that the EU is an exclusive and limited body whose properties have not yet reached universal status. In many respects these negations work to reinforce an idea that in the present Europe is very much an entity limited to a particular culture, religion, geographic location, or economic type. At very least he calls forth a perception that the EU is limited and exclusive and evaluates this perception as being problematic for the future goals of the EU.

When discussing the issues within both the EU and OIC, AKP politicians call for an engagement with Turkey to be part of the solution. They justify this by appealing to Turkey’s geographic position. With respect to the EU, they argue that the key for getting Europe over the last barrier to its universalization is bringing Turkey into the union. They frequently describe Turkey as a bridge opening Europe to the Islamic world and fulfilling Europe’s potential as a place of cultural dialogue and civilizational reconciliation. With respect to the OIC, they argue that Turkey’s Muslim population and successful embrace of political and economic models dominant in Europe makes it a model for other Muslim countries seeking to catch up in the race to development.

When taken together the usage of these two arguments by AKP politicians begins to suggest the emergence of a different framework for Turkey’s location in the geopolitical order. This alternative framework can be found articulated in the following excerpt from a speech given to parliament by Prime Minister Erdoğan in June 2004. While discussing the international endeavors made by his government, Erdoğan said,
During the G-8 summit…we made efforts to communicate an understanding of Turkey’s importance in connecting together three continents through geographical, historical, and cultural links. For the health and peace of these three continents, Turkey owns advantages and opportunities unequaled in the world. Turkey holds a place of note as a touchstone set in the middle of a geography which stretches from European countries of which it was a part, to Balkan countries with which it was connected through historical ties, to the Islamic world with which it shares a legal brotherhood, until the countries of Asia of which Turkey is mostly of the same race. Turkey is the sole middle point of this huge geography (AKP 2004).

Geopolitical discourse in Turkey has frequently carried with it a sense that Turkey, once the center of an empire spanning across the Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East, currently resides at the periphery of two geographic regions. This sense of peripheralization has been nurtured by the EU’s hesitant engagement with Turkey and Turkey’s complicated relations with various states of the Middle East. What Erdoğan is articulating in the quotation above is an inversion of these relationships. In his presentation he is placing Turkey at the center of the world. This position as the touchstone of three continents takes on particular importance in a world in which globalization is dissolving established boundaries of politics, culture, and geography. Other AKP politicians presented a similar framework using economic examples such as transportation networks and oil pipelines. Erdoğan takes this physical connectivity a step farther by articulating an idea that all the world can be found in Turkey. In some respects, Erdoğan and others are carving out Turkey as the Archimedean point of Europe, Asia, and Africa and consequently laying claim to a position of unparalleled knowledge in the post-Cold War world.

Constructing Islam

The great Islamic geography spreading over continents, what a pity it comes to the situation of a bloody and poor geography in which the existence that is lived does not approach the glory of the religion whose name it carries (AKP 2004). In articulating a geopolitical order consisting of a European civilization and an Islamic civilization connected in various ways by Turkey, AKP politicians employ Islam mostly as a geographic category and identifier. It does not have any specific functions, agency, or properties beyond serving as a collective name. However, as the quote above from Erdoğan’s June 24, 2004 speech to the nation suggests, this geographic category is constantly in tension with the “religion whose name it carries.” The slippage between religion and geographic category is such that it is difficult to read the two separately. Many AKP politicians reinforce this difficulty by making strategic choices about when to articulate the separation. In challenging Muslim countries to democratize their governments and liberalize their economies, Erdoğan and Gül make clear the distinction of religion from these problems. In other instances, the distinction is omitted. Such is the case in this speech by Erdoğan to the Eurasian Islam Council in September 2005,

Our human values emerging throughout history from our belief system carried peace, diversity, tolerance, and brotherhood into the places through which they moved. In the period of worry in which the world is found today, in our opinion, humanity should look once more to the universal message of all cosmic religions, especially our religion. We are coming from a civilization that before everything
elevates right in place of force, peace in place of battle, justice in place of cruelty, spiritual values in place of materialism, enlightenment and understanding in place of ignorance, consciousness and morals in place of passion, and sharing in place of opportunism. At the same time, let’s also consider the illnesses of the time in which we are living because only then will it be better understood why we should keep in mind the universal message of divine religions. Because we are departing from our basic civilizational values… we are subject to these illnesses. In the world of today, force, passion, opportunism, and battle have come to the status of wide acceptance (AKP 2005).

Here Islamic religion and Islamic civilization are intimately intertwined. The religion is integral to making the geography. The civilization embraces fully the religion. In this context, Islam takes on a utopian aspect. It was the source of greatness in the past and the Muslim world’s moving away from it is a significant reason for the presence of illnesses within the boundaries of their civilization.

In other words, in the articulations of AKP politicians Islam is the ideal and endpoint of development for the Islamic civilization. In many of the discussions of civilizational welfare and geopolitical order by AKP politicians, the ‘race’ to development comes to possess a different endpoint from that usually assumed within by the developmentalist framework. In the quotation from Erdoğan, development is not reached by becoming European or Western. Development is reached by achieving ‘right’ based in the “universal message of divine religion.” This “glory” of Islam ruled in the past and embracing it again is the key to the future. In the process, Islam becomes a utopian ideal.

**Constructing the State**

In articulating a geopolitical order of European and Islamic civilizations with Turkey bridging the two, AKP politicians are producing the state as a relatively limited geopolitical actor when it comes to religion. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, in the articulations of civilizational order by AKP politicians the state is geographically internal to the civilization. This means that the state does not have the same relationship to a civilization that it does to a population. There is no territorial control. There is no police force. There is no regulatory power. Without these core capabilities, state actors have a limited number of operations they can employ. Second, AKP politicians do not advocate a missionary role for the state. They do not characterize its role as actively spreading Islam, democracy, or any other domestic order to places beyond its territory. The importance given in their statements to territorial sovereignty and to solving problems internally reinforces the relatively small role they see for the state in affairs beyond its borders.

The geopolitical capabilities with respect to religion that AKP politicians do attribute to the state are largely confined to educational activities. These educational activities take two forms. The first is establishing opportunities for and supporting the pursuit of dialogue across civilizations. The view that European and Islamic civilizations meet with some kind of tension suggests the need to dissolve this tension. Working towards this dissolution is the role AKP politicians assign to the Turkish state. The second form of education presented by AKP politicians is presenting Turkey as a model for others to follow. This is directed mostly at other countries within the Islamic civilization which AKP politicians describe as failing due to a lack of democracy and
economic development. In direct and indirect ways, AKP politicians point to their country as the model of what other Muslim countries and what the Islamic civilization should be pursuing. This form of education assigns little geopolitical responsibility to the state. Being a model only requires the state to manage its internal affairs correctly.

This production of the state by AKP politicians overlaps with their internal version of the state’s relationship to Islam. By emphasizing an educational function for the state, AKP politicians are making aspects of the state available for use by others. As in the previous chapter, AKP politicians are presenting the state as an entity that provides opportunities for other actors instead of engaging in activist leadership. At a geopolitical scale, this means the role of the state is to provide the opportunities for states within the Islamic civilization to follow Turkey’s lead or to create environments where Islamic and Western civilizations can come together and resolve their conflicts. In many respects AKP politicians are mainly reproducing the logic that dominates the international state system. The idea of territorial sovereignty hinders the amount of direct action state actors can engage in beyond their borders. This is especially true in the case of religious identifications. As such, a certain liberal individualism pervades the geopolitical discourse of AKP politicians. Civilizations will act according to their own rules and needs. States can only provide opportunities to nudge them in particular directions.

This setting of the Turkish state as an actor within an Islamic civilization by AKP politicians also reproduces the first of the four main constructions of religion and state discussed in Chapter Two. By internalizing the Turkish state within a larger geopolitical entity linked to Islam, AKP politicians are encouraging a slippage between the state and Islam. In a geopolitical system in which the state is considered the dominant organizing construct, the state can stand above a religious identity or any other identity. This is what the early Kemalists sought to do by abolishing the Caliphate. They removed a potential geopolitical organizing point based in Islam and emphasized the position of the state as the dominant geopolitical actor. The employment of civilizational discourse by AKP politicians reduces the dominance of the state by dissolving it into a larger scale entity. When they associate this larger scale entity with Islam, this association also colors the state and activates the slippage between state and religion.

Navigating Between Kemalists and Political Islam

The use by AKP politicians of the combination of a civilization model with a developmentalist framework to deal with the question of religion at a geopolitical scale has provided key opportunities for the party to navigate between Kemalist and political Islamist positions in Turkey. With respect to the discourse of political Islam in Turkey, the use of a civilization model legitimates the attempts by AKP politicians to present a moderated version of previously deployed Islamic ideas. First, the civilizational model calls into being the kind of multi-country Islamic identity pursued by Erbakan in his call for Turkey to initiate an Islamic version of the European Union (Navaro-Yashin 2002). However, since it is a cultural identification that is separate from politics and economics, Islam is not the center of a political order transcending current states. Second, the language of the Islamic world’s past and future glory sandwiching a less glorious present draws directly from Islamist notions of salafiyya. Salafiyya refers to the age of ignorance in which Islam is not lived correctly. As mentioned in Chapter 6, many Islamists see the present age through this lens and make calls to return to the Golden Age of Muhammad by returning to the proper practice of Islam. For many of them this includes some form of
governance based in Islamic law. As seen above, AKP politicians invoke a past and future utopia based in the principles of Islam. However, AKP politicians do not take the next step of calling for an Islamic state or Islamic economic order. Instead, they synthesize the discourse of salafiyya with calls for democratization, privatization, and education. Ultimately, the language of returning to the Islamic civilization to a position of world prominenence is the same as that used by Islamists. However, the methods AKP politicians attach to this language is different.

Also, what the use of a civilizational model enables AKP politicians to do is to employ and draw upon the Ottoman and Kemalist discourse of medeniyet while pluralizing its historio-geographical reference points. As discussed in Chapter Three, medeniyet was a central aim of both later Ottoman officials and the Kemalists. For both the Ottomans and the Kemalists, civilization was a singular property found in Europe. It was marked by industry, science, military power, and cultural sophistication. All of this was considered to be largely absent from the lands that became the modern territory of Turkey. The drive for medeniyet has motivated numerous westernization projects and the country’s persistent applications for membership within the evolving institutions of greater Europe. By using the civilizational model of world geography, AKP politicians remove the West from the center of world order. Civilization becomes a quality that can be found in the Muslim world instead of an external entity located solely in Europe. Additionally, by identifying a specifically Islamic civilization, AKP politicians also bring Islam to the center as an organizing theme instead of something that has to be integrated somehow into the already established system of European knowledges and relations to which the Kemalist version of medeniyet originally referred.

This maneuvering between Islam and the west has prompted Dağ (Dagi 2004, 2005) to describe the AKP as a post-Islamist party. Dağ argues that the AKP is post-Islamist because it has abandoned Islam as a political framework while maintaining ties with Turkey’s Islamic social networks. However, the use of the civilizational model by AKP politicians suggests something slightly different. It suggests that AKP politicians have not so much abandoned Islam in their politics as reconfigured what Islam refers to in their political language. Islamist politics in Turkey was built on creating an opposition to the intrusions of Europe into the social, political, intellectual, and economic structures of Muslim lands. Islamism’s identity and popularity was grounded in the idea that an embrace of Islam equaled a rejection of the dominance of the West (Sayyid 1997).

Geopolitically, AKP politicians put aside this stark binary by insisting on Turkey’s place in an Islamic civilization while also pushing strongly for Turkey’s membership in the European Union. Their choices define post-Islamism as something more complicated than a separation between the social and the political. They set Islam as a context which informs the political in a broad and general way while remaining outside the specifics of policy choices, legislative negotiations, and state functions.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that AKP politicians are articulating a geopolitical order in which Turkey sits on the border between two civilizations. They treat a civilization as a geographically defined area possessing a common historical and cultural identification. Civilizations also possess an inherent tension with other civilizations. Drawing on a developmentalist framework, they articulate a geography of civilizational welfare in which the Islamic civilization lags behind in the race to become developed.
They locate Turkey within the Islamic civilization but argue its position at the edge of Islamic geography leading into Europe makes it an ideal conduit for negotiating and deflecting these tensions. I then argued that as part of this articulation, Islam was produced as an essence and a goal. The state was produced as an educational agent who facilitates dialogue and presents its own experiences for others to follow. This articulation of civilizational order allowed AKP politicians to use parts of Kemalist and Islamist discourse while remaining distinctive from either. They redefined the idea of civilization from that used by Kemalists. They used the utopian structure of Islamist discourse while proposing different methods for pursuing that Golden age.
CHAPTER EIGHT

The electoral victory of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in the Turkish national parliamentary elections of November 2002 placed the party’s politicians in a unique position. With full control over the parliament and all government ministries, the politicians in this newly established party held enough political power to formulate and pass whatever legislation they wished. Since many AKP politicians once belonged to the Islamist political parties of the 1980s and 1990s, their next moves in government became a source of interest. Some people saw in the AKP a new Muslim party that would act as the final rebuttal to those who questioned the democratic capacities of Islam. Others waited for the party to show its true Islamist colors and move Turkey’s laws and institutions towards those of an Islamic state. Either way, the strategic ambiguity employed by the AKP throughout the election campaign would be replaced by specific choices, decisions, policies, and legislation. The activities and the negotiations with which they are involved provide significant insight into the dynamics of the charged context they entered. This context included not only the polarized landscape of Turkey, but also encompassed an increase in the importance of religious politics around the world and the fluctuating fortunes of the state as a subject of power in a world being altered through the forces of neoliberalizing economic globalization.

Summary of Dissertation

In tracking the negotiations of AKP politicians, I chose to focus specifically on their engagement with issues connected to the Islam-state relation in Turkey. The questions were broader than investigating the meaning of “being secular” in Turkey. Studies of secularism tend to define the kind of threat religion poses and how this threat should be managed. Furthermore, the questions did not solely seek to decide whether or not the AKP was really Islamist. This exercise is more a matter of politics and polemics than analysis. Instead, I have analyzed the products created by AKP politicians in their various negotiations of the relationship between state and Islam. By employing a transformation structuralist approach to this study, I avoided making claims about what these politicians thought as autonomous agents and focused instead on the discursive elements that they presented as the product of their situated autonomy.

This project was constructed around four questions. The first addressed how AKP politicians invoked geographies of population welfare in their engagement with various religious issues. The results of this question served as the foundation for the three that follow, specifically the pervasiveness of the notion that a responsibility for maintaining and improving the welfare of a population is the key organizing principle of the modern state. Thus, the first question explored the geographies AKP politicians observed and deployed in their engagement with religious questions. The second examined what constructions of Islam emerged from these geographies, and draws attention to the specific acts contributing to a general understanding of what Islam is and does. Similarly, the third question interrogates what constructions of the state emerged from these geographies and probed what relations and expectations were produced by the subjectivation of the state in these acts. The final question examined how these geographies and their associated constructions compared with those produced by Kemalist and Islamist figures. This final question explored how AKP politicians negotiated and attempted to carve out an identity and political positions that were distinct
and separate from both Kemalists and Islamists. In the next section, I summarize the results of each question and draw further conclusions.

**Geography of Population Welfare**

In the past three chapters, several different geographies were found to be at work in the discussions of religion and state among AKP politicians. In Chapter Six, AKP politicians invoked two different geographies while engaging state policies that prohibit the use of headscarves in state institutions and hinder the educational opportunities of imam hatip students. First they argue that these policies amount to an exclusion of religious people from sites of power in Turkey. According to the politicians I observed, this exclusion is detrimental to population welfare as it generates significant anger and frustration among religious people. They then argue that this is a needless and ineffective policy, as the presence of Islam in a space does not inherently alter the social relations of that space. Islam is articulated as an individual endeavor that may not necessarily be the most important identity assumed by a Muslim in any given space and time. Attempting to limit this articulation to particular spaces only damages population welfare by creating the potential for a frustrated explosion among religious people.

In Chapter Seven, I show that AKP politicians believe that the absence of the state from a number of religious sites is a source of potential harm to population welfare. This absence creates the possibility that different groups around the country will be manipulated or left uneducated in the tenets of their belief. The unevenness of knowledge creates the potential for conflict as people move and interact. This is seen as particularly problematic for rural migrants faced with the diversity present in Turkey’s largest cities.

In Chapter Eight, we learn how AKP politicians frequently deploy a geopolitical framework in which population welfare is replaced by civilization welfare. Building from Samuel Huntington’s division of the world into geographically distinct civilizations, AKP politicians present a developmentalist framework that places the Islamic civilization behind the West in the race for political and economic development. However, they realign this framework to shift Turkey from a location at the peripheries of both Islamic and western civilization towards location at the center of three continents and thus the world.

In each of these three chapters, AKP politicians argued that the mere presence of Islam in a space was not enough to improve or harm welfare in that space. In their statements, they claimed that headscarved women and imam hatip graduates in professional offices and state institutions would not threaten the secular character of the Turkish state; the provision of religious education and religious services cannot be trusted to anyone (though certain things – like Koran courses – carry less potential for exploitation than others); and despite the teachings of Islam, much of the potential of the Muslim world is diminished by its anti-democratic character and conflicts both internal and external. Embedded in their statements is a sense of spatiality that recognizes the impossibility of a ‘pure’ space. In other words, space contains difference and brings differences into contact. At a local scale, this spatiality is articulated by AKP politicians through the argument that people believe different things and practice their beliefs in various ways. At a geopolitical scale, these politicians describe a world composed of different civilizations possessing equivalent beliefs and practices. Interactions between
these civilizations are not necessarily good or bad depending on the presence or absence of Islam. Other elements of this difference must be negotiated.

**Constructing Islam and the State**

As AKP politicians observe these geographies, they also work to produce understandings and expectations of Islam. In Chapter Six, Islam emerges as one outcome of the activities pursued by people seeking to satisfy a universal religious desire. It is described as a biological drive like hunger or thirst. Also like hunger and thirst, the satiation of this desire is pursued and practiced in many different ways. These differences are not just a matter of religious difference, they include individual preferences and knowledge regarding the practices expected of the believer. In Chapter Seven, this biological property is expanded upon to provide a more complete picture. In the presentations of AKP politicians, the religious impulse demands knowledge and information. This must be harnessed through proper education. If not, this impulse may be exploited with problematic results. In Chapter Eight, Islam becomes a utopian ideal. It is something that the Muslim civilization must pursue as well as Muslim individuals.

The geographies articulated by AKP politicians with respect to the state-Islam relationship also contribute to the production of the state. In Chapter Six, the limitations of the state as AKP politicians understand them come to the fore. For AKP politicians, the state can organize and control material things. Islam, however, is not a material entity. This makes it very difficult for the state to apply force or exercise control over it. The state does not possess the necessary tools. In Chapter Seven, attention turns to a major tool that AKP politicians find the state possesses for influencing the practice of religion: the provision of guidance and education to satiate the demands of the population’s religious impulses. For AKP politicians this capacity is a critical component to protecting the security of the population. It has no regulatory or missionary role. It is limited to activities that promote dialogue among different agents or that present Turkey as a model for others to follow.

The observations presented by AKP politicians in the previous chapters address all four of the common situations discussed in Chapter Two through which the state-religion relationship is constructed. AKP politicians directly invoke two of the situations by using the “abhorrent vacuum discourse” in their characterization of religious belief and their emphasis on the state’s responsibility for filling this vacuum. The consequences of failure described by AKP politicians invoke the situation of religion providing moral direction that the state cannot do on its own. It also invokes the situation where differences in religious belief and practice are a potential source of social conflict. Another of the situations appears in the framework of civilizations that dominates the geopolitical discourse of AKP politicians. In embracing Huntington’s civilizational schema, AKP politicians are facilitating a slippage between cultural and geographic identities and religious identity. They also augment already existing slippages between religion and the state by focusing attention on the religious responsibilities of the state that are enumerated in the Turkish constitution. Finally, they invoke religious identity as site of protest and resistance in their presentations of the imam hatip and headscarf issues. Religious people perceive the anger among AKP politicians around these issues as a potential challenge to the state’s validity.
On the state side of the relationship, AKP politicians employ the existing institutions and discourses of the state in a way that moves towards a further governmentalization of the state-religion relationship. The governmentalizing logic is found operating in the claims for removing obstacles for religious people, the positioning of the state as provider of service to the population instead of as the leader of the population, and the characterization of the state as a facilitator of dialogue between civilizations. Each of these removes state actors from a position of primary agency. They accentuate the already established processes of education and service while limiting the sovereign activities of state agents. They locate agency within the population. As a result, the state – at least in its relations with religion - should be considered a mechanism for responding to that agency. In other words, it should have no subjectivity of its own. This is much like the reorganizations of state-economy relations identified by Jessop, Brenner, and others in that the AKP brings a localization and individuation to the state’s relationship with Islam. The focus is on providing what people request in the way of education, information, and training while remaining aloof from interfering in the processes of everyday life.

The fracturing of Islam’s identity across different spaces and the state focus shift towards education over legal action may be the real basis for movements in moderate Islamic politics. Fundamentalism is characterized by its rigid adherence to a set idea of what Islam is and does. It does not vary across space and time. This invariance, or a stubborn consistency as Emerson called it, is the key property of an ideology. Moderate Islamic politicians, like those of the AKP, are moving outside of ideology and embracing a certain level of variation and differentiation in the functions and expectations of Islam across space and time. The acceptance of variation is not absolute, but the absence of rigid ideology separates them both from Islamist groups and many secularist frameworks.

The evidence presented in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight also suggest directions for thinking about religious politics in other countries. First, like the other liberal Islam and liberalized fundamentalist movements, the AKP politicians have rejected one of the major quilting points of Islamism’s emergence: opposition to the West. These politicians instead offer a universalization of certain liberal discourses employed in Europe and the United States, such as human rights and democratization. In addition, they offer the parochialization of the West as a cultural model by dividing the world into civilizations. In this way, a Muslim political identity can be maintained as an equivalent to a western political identity. The AKP politicians shift Muslim politics from a Schmittian friend-enemy model of political interaction to what Laclau and Mouffe call an agonistic model of political interaction. In the agonistic model, identities can be different without being in immediate existential conflict. Party politicians emphasizing the Muslim world solving its own problems suggest continuity with the Islamist suspicion of Western intentions for the Muslim world. However, their acceptance of the idea of a world divided into multiple civilizations and their emphasis on creating dialogue between those civilizations departs from the Islamist framework by avoiding the question of ultimate right and wrong and embracing an engagement with the world’s differences.

Thus, the data is applicable beyond the Muslim world. As a starting point, the AKP politicians accepted the positioning of religion as an object of security within the domain of the state. As discussed in Chapter Three, the principle of the historical relationship between religion and the modern state was opened for possible renegotiation
in various countries by the rise of religious politics. The results of this opening have been mixed. The establishment of an Islamic state in Iran represents the replacement of religion as object of security with religion as foundation of the state. Elsewhere, this opening has created polarized politics between proponents and opponents of the renegotiation. The AKP politicians’ acceptance of religion as an object of security within the state has resolved to some extent the crisis created by the opening of this renegotiation.

**The Negotiations of the AKP**

In presenting the various geographies of the state-Islam relationship, AKP politicians drew upon discourses used by Kemalists and Islamists without fully embracing one or the other. Chapter Six discussed some the differentiating moments employed by AKP politicians. Islam was constructed as a less dominating entity than either the Kemalist or Islamist understanding. In the case of the state, AKP politicians did not reject the foundations of the present state framework as many Islamists do. However, they strongly criticized the actions undertaken by many working within state offices. Chapter Seven discusses areas of overlap in the discourse of AKP politicians and those of Kemalists and Islamists. The AKP concern over Islam and security has been a constant theme of Kemalists since the formation of the Turkish Republic. An AKP interest in providing proper religious knowledge to an ignorant population fits neatly in with Islamist discussions of bringing about a return to the Golden Age through enlightenment of the people. In Chapter Nine, a similar slippage emerges. In their civilizational discourse, AKP politicians echo the developmentalist language of Kemalists while pluralizing its reference points. They also use this civilizations discourse to embrace Islam as an overarching identity while keeping it ‘cultural’ instead of political and economic. In many respects, they are using the same framework as Islamists excepting an appeal to Islamic law.

So what does this dissertation tell us about how AKP politicians are negotiating the religion-state relationship in Turkey’s polarized environment? I suggest that AKP politicians are seeking to depoliticize Islam without removing it from the public sphere. In hegemonic terms, they are working to disrupt the accepted notion of competition between religious and secular in the public sphere and replace it with a general acceptance of Islam’s presence as a normal and common expectation. By positing Islam as possibly present in every space yet not inherently dominant over these spaces, they are challenging the either-or dichotomy that has become a largely accepted way of understanding local, regional, and national spatial divisions. Furthermore, by emphasizing the state as a service provider to people over its position as the agent of the people, they are pushing religion-state relations into administrative instead of political spheres. Lastly, they are emphasizing Turkey as a ‘Muslim’ country through constant descriptions of the population as 95% Muslim and deploying a civilizational division of the world as their geopolitical framework. This division of global space contains no civilization identified as secular. It also grounds Turkey’s Muslimness in historical ‘fact.’ All three presentations function to remove the ideological associations from a specifically or consciously Muslim identity and position this as a natural identity within Turkey’s territory.

This corresponds with the party’s general move to avoid associations with an identifiable ideology. The ‘conservative democrat’ identifier employed by the party is an
ambiguous category that disconnects the party from associations that come with the established categories of the political spectrum. For example, party leaders were adamant to avoid the label ‘Muslim Democrat’ for its potentially religious associations but also because it recalled Christian Democratic parties of Europe. The party has also largely avoided creating major legislative initiatives while undertaking reforms dictated by the European Union. In this respect, the EU temporarily eliminated the need for defining an independent policy program. Erdoğan’s service-oriented understanding of politics developed from his experience as the mayor of Istanbul also places the autonomy of an ideological program aside in favor of “responding to needs of people.”

This is not to say that an ideological positioning cannot be identified for the AKP. It has tended towards a neoliberal approach of reorganizing state power through privatization of state owned industries and decentralization of state functions to local governments. Yet, the party itself has managed to avoid being linked to an immediately identifiable label. This ambiguity is strategically beneficial for the party. The party contains a collection of established and neophyte politicians with differing ideas about a range of issues. The absence of a well-established ideological position facilitates the maintenance of this coalition. It also enables party politicians to present many of their choices and positions as natural, administrative, or pre-determined by agents other than the party. In this way, the party can be considered pragmatic and moderate.

Sultan Tepe (2006) argues that the AKP presents a contradiction in its claims to establish both a neoliberal economic program and a socially conscious Muslim population. The competitive individualism and materialism of one seems to clash with the communalism of the other. David Harvey has noted this as a common disjunction of neoliberalism. He argues that the combination of neoliberal economic policies and religious consciousness in conservative political parties is a consequence of the need for economic elites to foment community within the targets of exploitation. This community supposedly softens the disruptive effects of this exploitation. After examining the data from the AKP, I would argue that there is less contradiction in the combination of neoliberalism and religious consciousness than either Tepe or Harvey assumes. What the experience of the AKP suggests instead is a sliding of logics back and forth between the two. Within both logics the state has failed in various ways to fulfill its promises. The answer to providing the best welfare for the population is to reduce the state’s involvement in normal processes of everyday space and allow for God and the market to work their respective magics. The state retains a position as a source of knowledge, supporter of research, provider of information, and protector of order. It loses its position of visionary leader and social and economic engineer.

**Looking Beyond this Project**

The results discussed above suggest many possible avenues for extending the project and undertaking further study. First, this project is more history than science. The narratives and structures it analyzes were collected through a series of qualitative means that do not support claims to general theory. Having determined some of the most important themes at work in the presentations of particular members of the AKP, it would seem useful to engage in a more survey based, quantitative study to investigate whether these themes are found within the broader populations in the party and the country as a whole. In this way, we can continue to further our understanding of the significance these different themes and structures possess.
Second, continued work on religion in moderate politics is important. Examining how the conclusions drawn from this project compare to similar situations in other places can provide a broader understanding of the role religion plays in the contemporary constitution of the modern state. It can also provide a mechanism to trace the intersections and borrowings of religion and state as the former has become more significant and the latter has faced challenges.

The third potential extension of this research is a continued evaluation of the AKP as it ages. In July 2007, the government was re-elected with a larger proportion of the popular vote than it gained in 2002. This election victory solidified the party’s position in parliament and enabled the party’s nominee for president to secure the office. How the party’s approach to issues of religion and state will change or remain the same with a more supportive president is worth scrutiny. It can provide a sense of whether the liberalism of the AKP’s discourse in the first term was purely strategic or reflective of a commitment to such values.
## APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW SUBJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Interview Date</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>11/18/2005</td>
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<td>2. Abdullah</td>
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<td>member of parliament</td>
<td>12/01/2005</td>
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<td>4. Barış</td>
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<td>05/29/2006</td>
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<td>7. Cumhur</td>
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<td>05/30/2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Nuri</td>
<td>local district politics and law section chair</td>
<td>06/03/2006</td>
</tr>
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<td>9. İstiklal</td>
<td>local district organization chair</td>
<td>06/03/2006</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13. Fulya</td>
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</tr>
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<td>16. Ömer</td>
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<td>06/09/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Mustafa</td>
<td>local district organization chair</td>
<td>06/09/2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Ayşe</td>
<td>local district women’s section chair</td>
<td>06/10/2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW SCRIPT

1. Do you think the Diyanet does a good job of serving the religious needs of Turkey? Why/Why not?
- What can be improved in its services? Why should these things be improved? What are the consequences of not improving them?

Topics:
- understaffed and unstaffed mosques, particularly in villages
- the lower (non-university) education level of mosque officials
- serving women and children
- serving people outside of Turkey

1a. Are there aspects of life in Turkey where the Diyanet should be more involved?
- What are some of these aspects?
- What would Turkey gain by this greater involvement?

Topics:
- using Friday sermons to promote morals, cultural values, families
- collecting and distributing zakat
- sponsoring cultural activities
- explaining Muslim values in the West

1b. Are there aspects of life in Turkey where the Diyanet should be less involved?
- What are some of these aspects?
- Why should the Diyanet be less involved in them?

Topics:
- Bülent Arınç’s recent statement questioning the need for a religious affairs ministry in a secular state
- difference with American model - community instead of state administration, funding, and upkeep of worship places

1c. Should the Diyanet provide the same money and services to Christian churches and Jewish synagogues that it does to mosques? Why/why not?
- What about the cemevs of Alevi? Why/Why not?

Topics:
- development law code changes ‘mosque’ to ‘worship houses’ in 2003
- how to serve multiple interpretations of Islam
- Alevi claims regarding Sunni control of Diyanet

1d. Do you think the Diyanet or other state institutions should be concerned about the activities of Christian missionaries in Turkey? Why/why not?
- What steps should be taken to address?
- Why these steps?
- What might happen to Turkey if such steps are not taken?

Topics:
- freedom of religion?
- possible actions for state
  - legal action – surveillance, arrests?
  - increased religious education?
  - increased publishing and distribution of religious materials (“A Koran in every home” - Yazıcıoğlu)?

2. How important do you feel religious education is for Turkey’s social well-being? What are the benefits for Turkey of students receiving a standardized education in religious topics? What are the consequences of not providing such religious education?

Topics:
- supposed effects of promoting moral development – lower crime, drug use, etc.
- the unity of the country in face of global economic changes
- religion as source of peace/strife in the world

2a. How would you evaluate the state’s program of religious education for the general population? Are there things that can be improved? Are there limits to what the state can do?

Topics:
- religion and morals course
- age/grade limits on Koran courses

2b. Should the state provide different educational opportunities for children from more religious families? Why/why not?

Topics:
- purpose of imam-hatip schools – training religious officials or providing a separate educational track for children of religious families
- decline in enrollment of imam-hatip schools in recent years
- should regular schools be more accessible?
- should religious families be less protective?

2c. Are there aspects of religious education that are better provided by private individuals, families, or groups not that are not part of the state? Why/why not?

Topics:
- Koran courses
3. Do you feel that religious people are treated justly by the state? Why/Why not? Can you provide some examples of unjust treatment? Why is this treatment unjust?

Topics:
- headscarf ban in universities
- ÖSS coefficient for imam-hatip lise graduates
- periodic purges of religious people from military (irtica)

3b. Do you believe that Turkey's joining the European Union will change the state's treatment of religious people in any way? Why/Why not?

Topics:
- Leyla Şahin case at the European Court of Human Rights
- treatment of non-Muslim minorities
- opening of Greek Orthodox Theological School on Heybeliada

4. Do you believe that Turkey's joining the European Union will help to change the international stature of Muslim countries? Why/why not?

Topics:
- Erdoğan rhetoric of bridging the West-East divide
- improving Muslim-Christian interactions in wake of terrorism

4a. Can Turkey’s engagement with the EU compensate for the absence of a Muslim country within the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the general ineffectiveness of the İslam Konferansı Örgütü as an international actor? How?

Key topics:
- Gül’s speech at the İslam Konferansı Örgütü calling for reform in Muslim countries
- Turkey as model for other Muslim countries?
APPENDIX C: ARCHIVAL SEARCH RUBRICS

Legislative archive of the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi – 22nd Term website: www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/

Search Terms Used for:

1. Headscarf
   - (türban OR türbana OR türbani OR tessettür OR tesettürlü OR tesettürü OR başörtüsü)
   - AİHM AND (türban OR türbana OR türbani OR tessettür OR tesettürlü OR tesettürü)

2. Imam hatip schools
   - imam hatip

3. Department of Pious Works
   - Diyanet

4. Alevi
   - (Alevi OR Alevilik OR Aleviliği OR Aleviliğin OR Aleviler OR Alawi OR Bektaşılık OR Bektaşi OR Bektaşiler OR Alevi OR Aleviler OR Bektaşi OR Bektaşiler OR Alevileri OR cemev OR cemevler OR cemevlerine)

5. Koran courses
   - Kuran

6. European Union
   - Müslüman AND Avrupa
   - İslam AND Avrupa

7. Organization of the Islamic Conference
   - “İslam Konferansı” OR İKÖ

Press Release Archive from AKP website website: www.akparti.org.tr

Search Terms Used for:

1. Headscarf
   - (türban OR türbana OR türbani OR tessettür OR tesettürlü OR tesettürü OR başörtüsü)
   - AİHM AND (türban OR türbana OR türbani OR tessettür OR tesettürlü OR tesettürü)

2. Imam hatip schools
   - imam hatip

3. Department of Pious Works
   - Diyanet
4. Alevis
- (Alevi OR Alevilik OR Aleviliği OR Aleviliğin OR Aleviler OR Alawi OR Bektaşılık OR Bektaşı OR Bektaşiler OR Alevi OR Aleviler OR Bektaşı OR Bektaşiler OR Alevileri OR cemev OR cemevler OR cemevlerine) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

5. Koran courses
- Kuran

6. European Union
- Müslüman AND Avrupa
- İslam AND Avrupa

7. Organization of the Islamic Conference
- “İslam Konferansı” OR İKÖ

Cemhuriyet
website: www.cumhuriyetim.com.tr

Search Terms Used for:

1. Headscarf
- (türban OR türbana OR türbanı OR tessettür OR tesettürlü OR tesettürü OR başörtüsü) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)
- AİHM AND (türban OR türbana OR türbanı OR tessettür OR tesettürlü OR tesettürü) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

2. Imam hatip schools
- imam hatip AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

3. Department of Pious Works
- Diyanet AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek Aydın Bakan Bakanı Arınc)

4. Alevis
- (Alevi OR Alevilik OR Aleviliği OR Aleviliğin OR Aleviler OR Alawi OR Bektaşılık OR Bektaşı OR Bektaşiler OR Alevi OR Aleviler OR Bektaşı OR Bektaşiler OR Alevileri OR cemev OR cemevler OR cemevlerine) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

5. Koran courses
- Kuran AND (kursu OR kursları OR kurslarını OR kurslarına OR kurslarının) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

6. European Union
- Müslüman ve Avrupa AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)
- İslam ve Avrupa AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)
7. Organization of the Islamic Conference
- (“İslam Konferansı” OR İKÖ) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

Milliyet
website: www.milliyet.com.tr

Search Terms Used for:

1. Headscarf
   - (türban OR türbana OR türbani OR tessettür OR tesettürlü OR tesettürü OR başörtüsü)
   AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)
   - AİHM AND (türban OR türbana OR türbani OR tessettür OR tesettürlü OR tesettürü)
   AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

2. Imam hatip schools
   - imam hatip AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

3. Department of Pious Works
   - Diyanet AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek Aydın Bakan Bakanı Arınç)

4. Alevis
   - (Alevi OR Alevilik OR Aleviliği OR Aleviliğin OR Aleviler OR Alawi OR Bektaşilik
   OR Bektaşi OR Bektaşiler OR Alevi OR Aleviler OR Bektaşi OR Bektaşiler OR
   Alevileri OR cemev OR cemevler OR cemevlerine) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

5. Koran courses
   - Kuran AND (kursu OR kursları OR kurslarını OR kurslarına OR kurslarının)
   AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

6. European Union
   - Müslüman ve Avrupa AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)
   - İslam ve Avrupa AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

7. Organization of the Islamic Conference
   - (“İslam Konferansı” OR İKÖ) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

Yeni Şafak
website: www.yenisafak.com.tr

Search Terms Used for:

1. Headscarf
   - (türban OR türbana OR türbani OR tessettür OR tesettürlü OR tesettürü OR başörtüsü)
   AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)
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2. Imam hatip schools
- imam hatip AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

3. Department of Pious Works
- Diyanet AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek Aydı'n Bakanı Arınç)

4. Alevis
- (Alevi OR Alevilik OR Aleviliği OR Aleviliğin OR Aleviler OR Alawi OR Bektaşilik OR Bektaşi OR Bektaşiler OR Alevi OR Aleviler OR Bektaşi OR Bektaşiler OR Alevileri OR cemev OR cemevler OR cemevlerine) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

5. Koran courses
- Kuran AND (kursu OR kursları OR kurslarını OR kurslarına OR kurslarının) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

6. European Union
- Müslüman ve Avrupa AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)
- İslam ve Avrupa AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)

7. Organization of the Islamic Conference
- (“İslam Konferansı” OR İKÖ) AND (AKP AK Erdoğan Çelik Gül Çiçek)
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Publisher: Cambridge, UK: Polity; Malden, MA: Distributed in the USA by Blackwell, 2002.


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2001-04  University of Kentucky Department of Geography Daniel R. Reedy Quality Achievement Award

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