Social Theorizing: An Interview with Professor Margaret Archer

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disClosure Interviewers: Grace Cale and Lydia Shanklin Roll

DC: Thank you for coming. We thought it would be good to begin by asking you a very simple question. How would you define social theory?

MA: Well, social theory is something you can’t get away from. It’s indispensable. People in the street are social theorists. They don’t know it, they wouldn’t appropriate the label, but what they’re doing is social theorizing. They do that every time they say things like, “Well, there wouldn’t be any benefits from doing that, would there?” Or, “That’s just how you would expect the bankers to behave, isn’t it?” It’s social theorizing. It may be crude. Quite often you can find that sociologists, really well established names, are saying very much the same thing. It’s just that their language is more technical or sometimes it’s just more pretentious than lay or folk social theorizing. We should respect lay social theory, not just because we are respecting the people who voice it, which we should do, but because this is what prompts their action. So, whether they’re right or wrong in what they say, that’s why, that’s their motive for acting. It’s usually a lot more interesting than the alternative. Namely, because we can’t get away from talking about human motives, we, the investigators, impose our own interpretations on them; our beliefs about why they’re doing what they’re doing, and these can be wildly wrong. May I give you an illustration?

DC: Absolutely.
MA: This is one I use with first years, because for 15 years I used to teach the foundation course in social theory. The most important thing in the first year was to try and convey to them that theorizing is not an option. It’s indispensable and unavoidable. Whether you call it theorizing or not, you are theorizing. So, we’ve got to know what theory is doing and how it’s related to action, and then we can get into discussing the founding fathers. Not because they have the best answers. They didn’t, but they certainly had some of the best questions. So, you’ve got to come to grips with theory because you may think you’re just writing something entirely descriptive and objective. This is something that first year students often think about ethnography, for example. That you can just give a neutral ‘view from nowhere’, as Thomas Nagel put it; be it a descriptive account of a farmer in Wyoming or wherever, a horse breeder in Kentucky, how to raise the next winner for the Kentucky Derby. There are theories galore about that out there in the Kentucky countryside. We want to understand what they’re doing when they’re taking their own theories on board.

So, one example I give them is a PowerPoint. It’s just meant to be an absolutely average, quite elderly couple. Maybe in their early 80s, or maybe they’ve had a hard life and are in their mid-70s. They’re talking to one another, perhaps making plans and you need to know about their context to understand what they are saying and going to do. Well, there are some objective things. They’ve got x dollars in the bank, and they’ve got y dollars coming in each week, each month, from a variety of possible sources: the state, their occupational pension, if they have one, or sometimes their family makes regular payments to see that they’re okay. So, that’s their objective base, if you want to know things about how they are living.

Now, for example, when the 2008 economic crisis came, the response was largely, in every country in the world, austerity measures of one kind or another. They varied, but they all meant people were worse off, apart from the 1%, than they were before. Now, what I just gave is an objective statement, and it’s a perfectly correct one. On the money they’ve got they can buy less than they bought previously. That’s the ultimate truth of this. But, what do they buy less of? There’s been a tendency in social theorizing for the investigator, then, to become all knowing, the fount of wisdom. This old couple has to be doing things like trading heating off against eating. Well, you can see the logic to that. If you’re eating gourmet meals, you’ll have difficulty paying the public utility bills. But, the underlying assumption made by most economists, for example, would be that the things they cut are luxuries. Okay, perfectly logical on the surface of it. Until you ask, what is a luxury?

There’s a British survey, for example, in which a luxury was defined, in Britain by these particular researchers, as “We’ll get rid of the land line phone because it’s expensive” (and they’re not the generation that needs it for internet
access). These are not the big Internet users, though we’re breaking the silver barrier, or the blue rinse barrier, or whatever you want to call it. So, the landline will go because it’s a luxury. I just want to take a closer look at imputing this to our anonymous old couple because I think it’s a really good illustration. My book, *Being Human* argues that who we are, what our identities are, is a matter of what we care about. I call them our ‘concerns’. It’s just meant to be a neutral word for the things that matter to us.

Well, back to this old couple. They have kids. Those kids, for reasons that could be psychological, wanted to get away from where they were brought up for whatever reason. The reason could quite simply be that they met a partner who came from somewhere else and the partner was more determined to stay close to where they were raised than they were. Or, with great reluctance, the kids could have left because far away was the only place they could get the kind of job that they were after. We’re all getting more and more mobile, within the country and internationally. May not be for life, but changes of address are much more common for your generation than they were for my generation, and certainly for my grandparents’ generation, who I don’t think changed address. Certainly didn’t change the village they lived in. Now, if that’s the case, and if this couple is very fond and attached to their kids and want to know about their grandkids, if there are any, that phone would be a lifeline for their concerns. It’s not a luxury in their book. They might trade, if we want to be an economist about it, they might trade both the heating and the eating in order to stay in touch with their children, grandchildren, and so on. So, that’s where their personal subjectivity comes in, but it’s not free and unconstrained. It’s very constrained, because they have to live within their means, which are less than they were. But, within those constraints they do have degrees of agential freedom, and it’s what they care about most which will be their top priority and the thing they let go of last. Does that begin to answer “why theory”? And then we might be prompted, through our findings, to go on and theorize some more, linking up with other theories that people have put forward.

We might want to ask a very simple additional theoretical question: simple to ask, but not to answer. Well, is this practice engendered? Do women want to keep in touch with their kids and grandkids more than men do? Now, it’s not as simple as it sounds because it may be that this has just become a convention. It’s the female that talks to the kids and it’s the male who makes other sorts of decisions. Then, you might want to go down that trail. Where did that come from? Why did that become the established practice, if it’s the case that it is? It might be the case in Britain, but it might not be the case here? Here, it might be the case in some groups of one ethnic origin and not in groups of a different one. There might be geographical variations for all sorts of reasons. One of them could be, for example—it’s just a hypothesis; once you start theorizing you can go on forever
because one question and the answer to it leads on to the next one—it might be that if one of this now elderly couple had worked much further away from the family home, and it will probably have been the male, given traditions in the past about child rearing and gender roles, that he was just not there to place these phone calls or receive them. Maybe it was something as simple as that, but ultimately nothing is simple. Why was it the male who was doing the work that was a long way from home, rather than the female?

So, we just can’t stop being theorists. It’s not an option in life. All that’s optional is which kind of theory you advance and on what grounds are you selecting one kind of theoretical position over another.

DC: That’s fantastic. I feel like I may have to share that with 101 students.

MA: Well, it came out of 101. Some of them found that incredibly difficult because they thought, well you know, it all is objective and the investigator is going to be much less biased and subjective about it than the subjects are themselves. But, actually it’s the subject, it’s his or her subjectivity, that makes them act. It’s not my theory about what is making them act that has any effect upon them whatsoever. I could have a crazy theory about sun spots and occult influences. That’s not going to change their behavior at all, but their own ideas are.

DC: So, that kind of makes an interesting segue then, because from there we would ask, what brought you personally into social theory? What brought you to this place and this kind of work?

MA: I was not intended to by my very selective single sex, school. There was no preparation in my day, we’re talking early-60s, for people to go and do degrees like sociology or anthropology, which has a much longer history in Britain than sociology does. So, I was being prepared to be what they call a “Girton girl,” Girton College, Cambridge, or a “bluestocking,” and go and do English Literature. I love English Literature, I’m a voracious novel reader to this day and have always got one that I’m reading. But, the idea that a fulfilled life, a morally justifiable life, consisted in deconstructing Beowulf or Chanson de Roland, as we put it, “until the cows come home,” didn’t seem to me like a well-spent life. So, much to my school’s annoyance I applied to London School of Economics to read sociology and got in there. I had one hell of a dressing down from the headmistress, “Girls from this private school don’t go near places like LSE, let alone subjects such as sociology.”

Well, the second thing that brought me into it was, whilst at school, age 15, I got involved in the peace movement, CND (Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament), and that was also allied to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. The wonderful unintended consequence of that, because you really do go in for these things hoping to make some change and do some good, not to get something out of it personally, but I really did because there were full-time assistant, associate, full professors marching along beside us. We did a thing in England called the Coast to Coast March, which isn’t as terrifying as if you tried to do it here. It’s not a big walk there, the only trouble is you actually meet more sheep than you do people. So, we had long conversations with these academics and that’s where I first heard the words Max Weber (who at that age I thought was spelled with a V) and that fuelled the interest a lot more. Many of these Profs were Marxists of one kind or another, so they were theorizing, not just in an abstract way, but theorizing, as they saw it, for a better society. I don’t think that theme has ever gone away from my work, but it’s never been distinctively Marxist. I thought that far too formulaic and times had changed. Some of the concepts needed changing. We have no proletariat now, the poor are a heterogeneous category, the main thing they have in common is their poverty, not being members of the proletariat, and so on. No, I would never describe myself as a Marxist, but never deny that it was a powerful formative influence. So, that was really part one of your question.

Why social theory? Well, before these terrible days, and I don’t really know the States well enough to say whether it’s as bad here as it is in Europe (the curriculum is restricted, each module is evaluated, there are league tables, research is evaluated etcetera). They’re just trembling in fear in England at the moment because in three days’ time the Research Evaluation Exercise results will be published for each university and each department within each university, and it’s cash-driven. So, it’s not just about repute, it’s about your budget. Those are constraining factors in all sorts of ways. Very, very destructive, in my book. You’ll find a little paragraph at the end of that first article we were discussing this afternoon that just sums it up; about how collegiality turns into competition, student care turns into keeping your office hours, and publications become a constrained matter of only publishing in particular quality journals. The rest doesn’t count.

During my first degree time, we had a loose curriculum and syllabus, with many choices in every year and at different points. I was just incredibly lucky, because it was the time at LSE where some of the all-time greats were giving their last courses. Oh, you weren’t confined to your department, so, in my second year, I did nothing but philosophy of science with Karl Popper and his colleagues. It was, literally, the last undergraduate series of lectures he was going to give, although he lived many years after that, but he taught graduates and gave public lectures and that sort of thing. A very obese lady with a huge cassette recorder came up onto the stage of the main lecture theatre, and he said, “No, no, go
away!" “But, it’s your last lectures, Sir Karl,” she said and he replied “Oh, no it’s not.” So, there was Popper, there was Imre Lakatos, there was John Watkins, who was perhaps the doyen of methodological individualism. It was a really rich year, and a very formative one. It was a great experience, a real privilege. In many ways we really did have it, not just easier, but it was richer, more sparkling than it is now. We’ve all been dumbed down into bureaucratic academics.

DC: How would you feel that your theoretical work fits into the broader social theory narrative?

MA: Okay, point one: I think in both of our countries there’s been a huge domination by empiricism. There’s absolutely nothing wrong, but everything right about doing empirical work, but not empiricism where the data supposedly speaks for itself. Theorizing to an empiricist is just like a kid taking a bucket along the seashore, filling the bucket up with pebbles, bringing it back home, and tipping it up. The data will speak for itself, the pebbles will form a pattern. There’s really not much to this theorizing job. Patterns can be complicated, that’s as tough as it gets.

I’ve told you the really good side of my undergraduate career, which was the second year and its freedom. The really bad side was when I came to do my Ph.D., and I’d rather not say under whom, because he was a nice guy but he was one of Britain’s leading empiricists and he wanted me to be the same. I expressed a kind of interest in sociology of education. What really intrigued me was what did account for those inequality facts in outcome, in opportunity, which became much more interesting to me than outcome because I thought that depended on opportunity. He didn’t want me to talk about education as a social institution. I could talk about schools, I could talk about exams, I could talk about teacher assessments, but I couldn’t talk about the structure of the educational system as centralized, decentralized, which determined the national curriculum, or allowed/forbad local variations, all of which I thought were hugely important. But, no. Out, out, out. So, the whole thing ended up as the only piece of work, quite honestly, I have ever done that a) I never published, and b) I’m pretty ashamed of. So ashamed that it got me out of England and into France, to try and get away from empiricism by working with Pierre Bourdieu.

I think, for an awful lot of theorists, we are as much shaped by those theories that we’re trying to get away from as we are by those that we are attracted to. So, my very close friend and co-author, Pierpaolo Donati, has had to fight all his life with the ghost of Talcott Parsons and the additional ghost of Luhmann. For me, it was not functionalism. That never even featured very heavily in anything that we were taught or made to read. It was empiricism. For me, theory was to stop being empiricist, stop working all on one level, stop
dealing in terms of observables, stop thinking that the answer to theoretical questions was to run a regression or perform correlations or do multivariate analysis. In fact, these are what set the theorists problems; they’re not the answers to problems.

So, if you find there’s a high correlation between a family’s income and any measure of school success of the child or children, well that’s a problem for you to explain because you can’t account for the outcome just in terms of parents’ spending money, either on a private school or a load of books or a lot of educational experiences, trips to museums, or private tutors, and so on. You very rapidly run out of the families that spend a lot of money on their kids’ early education. In fact, what they’re doing is something that that’s income related and income dependent, but it’s not income explained. It’s still a conversation we have with American colleagues with young children about to start school. They would put a lot of effort into sussing out which are the best zones, catchment areas, for them to live in in order for their young kids to get the best education available in that area surrounding the university in which they work. Well, that’s one way of playing the game, and that’s the way people know to play the game. That makes you think about multiple strategies and whether other factors play a role for people with occupations that pay less well and, in those days, had less access to support services. So, did people who were dependent upon their proximate family network stay in an area, an educational catchment area, close to where they could get childcare for their other kids from a grandmother, an aunt, whatever? Has this now gone? Was this what happened in the 60s but no longer happens 50 years, half a century, later?

DC: Could you give us a brief description of what you feel the main thrust of your work has been, possibly for a non-sociological or a non-philosophical audience?

MA: The elevator version, which is absolutely true, is that one book led directly to the next always, and still does. When you finish a book, as far as I’m concerned, I hope I’ve answered some questions, but I have probably posed more than I answered, hence the next book. Okay, the next postcard version is, what’s it all about? It started with this experience of going to France and living there for the first time, and appreciating how totally different French education and its structure were from the British. In this connection you could say British and American. I mean, certainly you’re federal and Britain isn’t, but we both have decentralized educational systems. I’ve never written about American education because you’d have to write a separate history for every state. You’d need a research team to do that. But, what came to the surface was that centralization was crucial in accounting for what had happened in French education. Decentralization was vital for what happened in British. And so, my first book,
Social Origins of Educational Systems, was about how did one get to be centralized, the other to be decentralized? And then, what were the consequences of this difference in structure? Now, in theoretical terms, centralization and decentralization are emergent properties. The ways the different parts of the system are, literally, linked together. The top-down, rather streamlined centralized system, versus the messy decentralized situation that we live with on both sides of the Atlantic, but which is actually creative, whereas the centralized system is very constraining because of national curriculums, set textbooks and so forth. A Minister of Education who is probably apocryphal, is supposed to have gone into a classroom and said, “Ah! 3:15. every pupil in France in lycée grade (whatever) will be construing page 94 of Virgil.” He could never make that statement in the U.S. of A. or in G.B.

DC: How might you characterize the connection, if any, between your theoretical work and that of Pierre Bourdieu?

MA: Sadly, because he was a good friend. He was very good to me, indeed. This was a not a common experience, for important French professors to be kind to little foreign visiting post-docs. It really wasn’t. So, he was an exception in that sense, and I kind of like put it on record. Therefore, it hurt me, as it hurt many of his research team - people like Luc Boltanski and later Laurent Thévenot, when we came to the parting of the ways. You see, Bourdieu thought, he maintained until he died—and we were good friends, he used to come and stay at my place in London in the 70s and early 80s—he thought that he was putting forward a general theory; general in the sense that it worked everywhere. I wrote an article, which you can check out if you like, in the European Journal of Sociology in 1982, called “Process without System.” Fundamentally, he was very acute in analyzing the processes of French education, but then he wrongly universalized this by saying that that process was the same anywhere, regardless of the structure of that system. I said, no, I can’t agree. I think the kind of standardization he was talking about was something that a centralized structure monumentally reinforced, whereas in a decentralized structure you could have all sorts of people who didn’t like it, for one reason or another but they could do something about it. Plenty didn’t like it in France either, but could do nothing. Particularly the French industrialists who were coming on the educational scene in the latter part of the 19th century and were finding a very intellectualized syllabus that didn’t help them produce engineers. Conversely, in England, if you wanted to found what was the beginning of our polytechnics and if you had the money, you just founded one. It could be a school for auto manufacturing or refrigeration. The area where I was brought up, it was manufacturing cement. Well, let’s have a part of the curriculum that is about the chemistry of cement making, then how to make
reinforced concrete, so on and so forth. That was why the parting of the ways came. It came over the sociology of education, but more generally it was over the effect of structure on agency. That’s what led on to the next work, which is usually associated with Anthony Giddens.

DC: We know graduate students often wrestle with working with theory, including this interplay between structure and agency. What might you say to help those who are struggling to find a way to really use theory in their research?

MA: I’ve said it many times, but I found a way of saying it a couple of years ago, in print, in a little acronym, SAC. All sociological explanation comes in a SAC. Meaning, there is no good sociological explanation that doesn’t make reference to structure, agency, and culture. Now, they don’t all need be of equivalent importance in every piece of work that you do, but unless you have structure there, you can’t describe the context of what it is that you’re studying. It doesn’t matter what it is. Everything has a context and that context was developed before whatever problem the researcher is looking at developed. There is no such thing as decontextualized action or situation-less action. So, we’ve got to theorize somewhat about the structural context in which things happen and how it came to be.

Equally, Agents are not just billiard balls that are pushed around by social forces. There are things that go on in here (in the head) that are just as important as some of the things that go on out there (in the outside world). That’s a gross generalization; they’re not always as important, sometimes they’re more important. Depends what we’re looking at and when we’re looking at it. So, that’s the second one: Activity dependence. Nothing happens by itself; elections aren’t won, fortunes aren’t lost, firms don’t go bust unless people do something. So, we’ve always got to have activity dependence.

Then, we have concept dependence, which is where the culture comes in. We had a good example in our discussion earlier, with people, quite rightly, really deeply regretting that the Occupy movements had not been richer in putting forward alternative ways for society to develop and people to flourish in it. It’s interesting that so many books on it have titles like, “Sources or Resources of Opposition,” because we do draw on theories articulated in the past, lodged in the archive, and to some extent we all climb on the shoulders of giants, in this case giant ideas, to try and bring forth something new by adapting them to the circumstances of our times. Unless we know what we’re doing, have some idea of what we’re doing, then again we can’t explain because we won’t account for the concept dependence that the agents involved are actually using.
DC: What would you say to those graduate students who shudder at the thought of theory?

MA: The same I’d say to those students who shudder at the sight of a table, a diagram, a calculation, when they turn the page. Doing stats is not doing maths. Doing stats is just understanding logical relationships. You can give a course teaching first years how to do a correlation coefficient without introducing any maths at all. Why bother, they all have computers? Understand the logic. But, they mustn’t shudder about theory because they really have to take on board. If you’re not putting in a theory that you think is useful, then you’re putting in some rubbish that is still theory. You may think you’ve dodged the issue, but you haven’t. I mean, I do think this flight into ethnography, and there’s nothing wrong with ethnography at all, unless you’re doing it because you’re running scared. But, if you think you can hide behind that Nebraskan farmer, or wherever we put him, and get away from theorizing, you can’t. You’ll be picking out some features of his context, some features about him, some features about his culture, and you’ll be giving them importance that you, the grad student, haven’t theoretically justified. So, you use your own SAC if you don’t construct a SAC out of what’s on offer in the university shop.

DC: Now we would like to turn to the topic of the talk you will give tomorrow night, “‘We Believe’—but Who Are ‘We’?: The Relational Subject Versus the Plural Subject.” We found this to be a fascinating topic. For someone who has never really gotten into it before, but hopefully will feel compelled to explore, is there anything that you might be able to say to ease a person into this topic?

MA: Let’s put it this way. There’s a decision that’s reached, and let’s say it’s a decision that’s reached in the House of Representatives or Parliament. When we’re talking about decisions of that kind we really do mean aggregate decisions, because specific individual people have voted for or against. So, whether a bill passes and a decision gets made—I’m taking this down to bare bones—is really simply a matter of how many yeses you’ve got against how many noes you’ve got. Those people who say yes may have very little in common besides the fact that they say yes, and the same for the noes. So, it’s just a matter of aggregate individualism, and it’s absolutely no different from doing a market survey on how many people prefer white bread versus brown bread. That’s just aggregate individualism, and you can do a whole marketing campaign on the basis of aggregate individualism.

Now, I would hope that the kinds of ways we make decisions in the family, in the university department, in whatever voluntary associations we work for, and ultimately in politics and economics themselves, mean that we’re not just
adding up what individuals feel, because that aggregative individualism is part of individualistic philosophy. It’s just me and my preference schedule, and how many other folks living in the same department, family, town, whatever it is, think the same way that I do and have the same preference schedule. It’s what mainstream economics is based on. That’s one of the main reasons why we’re in the mess that we are in. So, can we have a genuine collective decision making, feeling that we have solidarity as people, whether it’s academic solidarity, familial solidarity etcetera? There can be all sorts of different bases for “we-ness,” and some of them can be solidarity for and solidarity against. Sometimes with church membership, there can be very strong solidarity within a church and quite hostile feelings to the next-door church members.

So, the real question is: Can we have solidarity? This is the question that bothered Émile Durkheim, bothered Karl Marx, and bothered Max Weber. This is why I said they all asked the best questions, even if their answers were quite different. To me, one of the worst things of our time is the decline in social solidarity. There are so many signs of it. In Britain, 50% of people have kids, or have a kid, without being married. Marriage is a great thing, but wanting to marry is one sign of solidarity, felt solidarity at that moment. There’s that. There’s the fact that on the last British census, the most common form of household was people living alone. Again, over half. Well, there’s also the intergenerational loss of solidarity, people don’t look after their own old folks the way they used to, often for good reasons. So, can we find an authentic way in which we can talk about the “we” and the “ours,” and ultimately the common good? That’s the supreme relational good, the common good. It’s quite different from the general good or the greatest good of the greatest number, the utilitarian definition of it.

You can put it this way: Those are just addition sums, the greatest good of the greatest number. Of course, the good becomes higher if you exclude some people, if you say, “Let’s not count the people who can’t work because, obviously, they can’t earn.” Or, “Those who have mental problems or conditions that mean they probably can’t live alone or do an ordinary day’s work for an ordinary day’s pay? Let’s leave them out because they’re just dragging down the greatest number.” Well, the more you do that, “Why don’t we leave the illiterates out? Why don’t we leave people with diabetes out?” You know, you can end up excluding more of the population than you included! Of course, your measure, in dollar terms of the greatest good, gets higher and higher and higher the more you leave out. So, that’s your addition sum. Now, imagine multiplication sums, the simplest. Suppose we’re multiplying three terms, and one of those three terms is a naught. What’s your multiplication sum? There’s a naught in it. If you do times zero, the answer to your sum is zero. So, that’s the common good. It’s when you never insert a naught. When every living individual in the town, the state, or our single global society today, where not one single one of them is left out because
the well being of the rest of us depends on the well being of each and every other one. It’s an old classical philosophical thought; it’s not original thinking. But, it is what leads me to get to be involved in human trafficking, because I think that’s one of the most horrendous forms of degrading other human beings—it treats the trafficked as a naught. It’s one that we can do something about, hopefully.

DC: For our final question, where do you think micro-level sociology is headed, especially in light of this kind of tendency to sharply divide between the micro and the macro?

MA: I don’t see mine as a micro-level theory at all. I see myself as theorizing from the micro up to the macro and then working the other way round. So, there’s upward causation, then downward causation from the macro to the micro. The reason why it sounds kind of utopian is because it takes an awfully long time to do. You’re looking at the almost completed career of a person who started young! There’s been time for this. So, we start with this 800-page book, which is a macro book, on how do educational systems got to be different, centralized rather than decentralized. Then, you could say structure and agency represented the macro, the structure, with the micro, as the agent. This isn’t always the case. You could be talking about a very small structural feature and a very large social movement, of class or revolution or whatever. Then, you get to my reflexivity trilogy, which is certainly micro in the empirical work, but it didn’t end up remaining micro. That was just doing, well, a very American thing, using your own students. It led on a Springer series of books on, can we talk at the most macro-level about where modernity is going and link it back, both upwards and downwards, to the changing modes of reflexivity of people’s subjectivity? So, it keeps going, up and down, down and up again – always over time. The reason is, usually, you can only handle so much in one head at one time. I don’t think I’ve ever been very good at using lots of big data very profitably. So, I would always prefer a kind of rich canvas of petit point tapestry, and kind of disentangle strands from it. There has to come that point where people, grads or perhaps post-docs, are thinking about their first book that isn’t under somebody’s supervision. It really is theirs; they have to take ownership of it and authorial authority for it. That’s when the key thing really is get to know yourself. You get most out of it when you put most into it, something productive and enjoyable. The two do tend to go together.

DC: That is all. Thank you for speaking with us.