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Debt and Discipline: Neoliberal Political Economy and the Working Classes

Tayyab Mahmud

ABSTRACT

Over the last three decades, neoliberal restructuring of the economy created a symbiosis of debt and discipline. New legal regimes and strategic use of monetary policy displaced Keynesian welfare, facilitated financialization of the economy, broke the power of organized labor, and expanded debt to sustain aggregate demand. Public laws and policies created a field of possibility within which financial markets extended their reach and brought ever-increasing sections of the working classes and the marginalized within the ambit of the credit economy. Reordered public policies and new norms of personal responsibility demarcated the horizon within which the economically vulnerable pursued strategies of economic survival and security. Neoliberalism deployed refashioned concepts of individual responsibility and human capital to facilitate the assembling of subjects who would engage the financialized economy as risk-taking entrepreneurs. Faced with restructured labor markets, wage pressures, and shrinking welfare, working classes found themselves with little choice but to pay for their basic needs through debt. Engulfment in debt, in turn, induced self-discipline and conformity with the logic of the financialized economy and precarious labor markets. This ensemble sutured debt with discipline.

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1 Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Justice, Seattle University. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Law and Public Affairs (LAPA) Seminar at Princeton University, Law & Society Association's Annual Meeting at San Francisco, ClassCrit VI Workshop at Washington, D.C., LatCrit XVI Conference at San Diego, Chapman University School of Law, DePaul University School of Law, and Hofstra University School of Law. I want to thank Jaswinder Brara, Paula Chakravarthy, Angelin Chang, Sumi Cho, Tim Canova, Andrea Freeman, Carmen Gonzalez, Marc-Tizoc Gonzalez, Gil Gott, Carol Greenhouse, Hamid Khan, Victoria Kill, Martha McCluskey, Charles Pouncy, Steven Ramirez, and Denise Da Silva for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Research librarians at Princeton University and Seattle University School of Law provided invaluable assistance with this project. Any remaining errors are, of course, mine alone.
Get them to invest their savings in their homes and own them. Then they won’t leave and they won’t strike. It ties them down so they have a stake in our prosperity.

—Charles Harris Whitaker

If history shows anything, it is that there’s no better way to justify relations founded on violence, to make such relations seem moral, than by reframing them in the language of debt—above all, because it immediately makes it seem that it’s the victim who’s doing something wrong.

—David Graeber

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.

—Michel Foucault

INTRODUCTION

Before there was money, there was debt. Before there was an American republic, there was America’s national debt. Over the last three decades, the neoliberal reordering of political economy produced a “debtor nation,” a “republic of debtors,” and an “American way of debt” resting on a hypertrophied financial system. Pushed beyond the frontiers of sustainability, this “empire of debt” induced a global financial meltdown. The subsequent cost of the public rescue of the financial industry in the

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2 Charles Harris Whitaker, The Joke About Housing 9 (1920) (quoting the “Welfare Director of a large company”).

3 David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years 5 (2011).


5 For over 5000 years, elaborate credit systems have been used to buy and sell goods—long before the invention of coins or currency. The language of many ancient works of law and religion—words like “guilt,” “sin,” and “redemption”—often derives from ancient debates about debt, and shaped most basic ideas of right and wrong. Graeber, supra note 3, at 8.


United States alone stands at 7.77 trillion dollars,9 and the credit worthiness of the United States has been put into question.10 The meltdown–induced Great Recession sharply increased income and wealth inequality11 and has hit the working classes and racial minorities particularly hard.12 The number of those living in poverty in America stands at 46.2 million,13 and many cannot even afford a burial and are choosing cremation instead.14 The financial crisis metastasized into pervasive fiscal crises, prompting declarations of “financial martial law” and renewed assaults on the working


14 Cremation is chosen over burial in 41% of American deaths, up from 15% in 1985. For one-third of those who chose cremation in 2010, cost was the primary factor. Kevin Sack, In Tough Times, a Boom in Cremations as a Way to Save Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at A1.
classes.\textsuperscript{15} Lower incomes and increased poverty have rendered the 2000s a “lost decade.”\textsuperscript{16} A sluggish economy with high unemployment is the “new normal,”\textsuperscript{17} with prospects of a steep and lasting drop in wages.\textsuperscript{18} The search for culprits has turned into a rush to round up the usual suspects.\textsuperscript{19} Personal greed, corrupt financiers, imprudent investors, and unworthy homeowners are the favored targets.\textsuperscript{20} There is scant recognition that the current financial crisis is a symptom of the structural crisis of capitalism\textsuperscript{21} and that we stand at “a transformative moment in global economic history


\textsuperscript{17} See Magoff, supra note 12, at 26, 36; Jason DeParle et al., \textit{Older, Suburban and Struggling: ‘Near Poor’ Startle the Census,} N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at A1; Sabrina Tavernise, \textit{Middle-Class Areas Shrink as Income Gap Grows, New Report Finds,} N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, at A16; see also David McNally, \textit{Slump, Austerity and Resistance,} 48 SOCIALIST REG. 36, 39 Fig. 1 (2012) (comparing employment recoveries following recessions between 1974 and 2011).


\textsuperscript{19} Timothy J. Sinclair, \textit{Round Up the Usual Suspects: Blame and the Subprime Crisis,} 15 NEW POL. ECON. 91, 92, 104 (2010).


\textsuperscript{21} “The economic and financial crisis of the late 2000s was not an accident nor the mere result of a banking system that had escaped control. It was a moment of revelation, one that exposed the systemic contradictions with which global capitalism has been struggling for decades.” ALEX CALLINICOS, \textit{Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crises of the Liberal World} 94 (2010).
whose ultimate resolution will likely reshape politics and economics for at least a generation.22 Pressing systemic and structural questions confront us: Why, when, and how did a debt–driven financialized economy come about? What changes in the labor markets induced the working classes to turn to debt? How were the working and marginalized classes incorporated into the circuits of credit? What was the impact of this incorporation? This article explores these questions by bringing into relief the production of a debt–fueled financialized economy and the laws and public policies that made this possible.

This article argues that neoliberalism, a reorganization of capitalism to secure hegemony of finance capital,23 is a project of the wealth–owning classes to reverse the setbacks they had suffered during the era of Keynesian welfare. This transformation entailed a rollback of the welfare state, an attack on the power of organized labor, precarization of labor markets,24 financialization of the economy, and exponential expansion of debt.25 In this ensemble, debt sustained aggregate demand, fueled liquidity to lubricate financialization, and facilitated assemblage of entrepreneurial subjects responsible for their own economic security. Public welfare was replaced by self–care and working classes were constrained to fund their private welfare through private debt, while calibrating their conduct with the demands of precarious labor markets. Debt, no longer a private choice but a structural imperative, became an instrument of control and discipline. Subprime mortgages that engulfed dispossessed communities are emblematic of the symbiosis of debt and discipline forged by public policies and the market working in concert. This neoliberal concord between debt and discipline underscores that economics is always entwined with politics, with the law as a primary suture between the two.26

In order to substantiate these arguments, this article first outlines a conceptual framework suitable to explore the relationship between debt and discipline. It then focuses on the transition from Keynesian to neoliberal response to the chronic demand–deficit problem of capitalism: while Keynesianism prescribed full–employment and raising wages, neoliberalism relies on consumer debt induced by wage–compression and contraction of public welfare. The article then recounts the genesis of

22 Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 208 (2009).
23 See discussion infra Part II.
24 See discussion infra Part III.
25 See discussion infra Part II, III, IV.
neoliberalism by focusing on the radical use of monetary policy to trigger the transition from Keynesian welfare to the hegemony of finance, break the power of organized labor, and put downward pressure on wages. It then focuses on the role of law and public policy in forging a link between financialization of the economy and entrapment of the working classes in relationships of debt including subprime mortgages. Next, it brings into relief the increasingly precarious labor markets that add to the pressure on the working classes to turn to debt. Finally, it explores the role of debt in the assemblage of compliant subjects disciplined to conform to the logic of precarious labor markets.

I. Theoretical Framework

This article combines insights of critical political economy with the conceptual toolkit of Michel Foucault to analyze the connection between debt and discipline. While critical political economy helps uncover macro-level neoliberal economic transformations, Foucault’s constructs focus on the attendant micro-level processes of market-mediated subject formation. Of particular utility are Foucault’s constructs of governmentality, bio-power, and assemblage of self-caring subjects through “modes of subjectivation . . . in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations.”

Governmentality refers to “techniques and procedures for directing human behavior” and concerns the proper arrangement of the dynamic field of exchange of “individuals, goods, and wealth.” The construct trains on the practice of “economic government,” where the economy designates “a field of intervention for government.” While at a general level it refers to “any manner in which people think about, and put into practice, calculated plans for governing themselves and others,” more specifically it refers to the ensemble of technologies of governance that aim at “the care and maximization of the potential of the population.” Biopower emerges from the shift of focus in modern societies from “an exhaustive and unitary project of police . . . to the economy as a domain of naturalness.” Taken together, biopower and governmentality “refer to a manner of exercising power over a population that is directed towards maximizing its potential.

27 See discussion infra Part V.
29 Id. at 81.
31 Id. at 95.
32 BEN GOLDER & PETER FITZPATRICK, FOUCAULT’S LAW 31 (2009).
33 FOUCAULT, supra note 30, at 354.
and optimizing its capacities.”

This frame where the economy displaces sovereignty as the primary field of governance is particularly useful to examine neoliberal political economy. It posits that *homo economicus* reappears under neoliberalism not only as a “partner of exchange” but as “an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself.” Subjected to the incentive structure of the market this entrepreneur is “eminently governable.”

This article deploys this Foucauldian conceptual toolkit to explore the connection between the aggregate demand problem of capitalism and the disciplinary impact of private debt upon working classes caught between shrinking wages and neoliberal demands of individual responsibility and self-sufficiency.

An obstacle to any fruitful use of Foucault to analyze the debt-discipline combine is his underestimation of the role of law and the state in the exercise of power. Foucault holds that “[d]isciplines will define not a code

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34 Golder & Fitzpatrick, supra note 32, at 32.


36 Id. at 270.

37 For detailed articulation of this argument, see Alan Hunt & Gary Wickman, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (1994); Alan Hunt, Foucault’s Expulsion of Law: Towards a Retrieval, 17 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1, 1 (1992). For a detailed examination of what they term the “expulsion thesis,” see Golder & Fitzpatrick, supra note 32, at 11–52. Some read Foucault as implying a “radical discontinuity” or “mutual incompatibility” between law and disciplinary power. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Sex Dressing Etc. 117–18 (1993); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation 5 (2d ed. 2002). In sum, the critique is that Foucault “led to underestimate at the very least the role of law in the exercise of power within modern societies;... he also underestimates the role of the State itself.” Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism 77 (Patrick Camiller trans., 2000).

of law, but a code of normalization.”38 He insists that modern techniques of normalization “develop from and below a system of law, in its margins and maybe even against it.”39 He sees liberal political economics driving “a formidable wedge” between the powers of the state and the sphere of daily human life.40 Contrary to Foucault’s designation of a capitalist economy as a “neutral area,” my position is that capitalism is not a de-politicized and de-subjectified market governed solely by “economic laws” but a set of politically contested social relations under the hegemony of capital. Mainstream discourses conflate capitalism and markets and see markets as entities with force and agency of their own.41 I argue instead that capitalism is a relation of power where the state and the market remain intertwined. Rather than directly determining subjectivities,42 governmentality forms a “habitat of subjectification” within fields of operation demarcated by law.43 Foucault comes closer to this position when he acknowledges that operations of power constitute “a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has population as its main target.”44 Indeed, he posits that these modalities of power are “deployed coterminously, and in complex contextual amalgams.”45

In this schema, the state and the law do not evaporate, but are rather “welded to substantive, normalizing, disciplinary and bio–political objectives having to do with the re–shaping of individual and collective conduct in relation to particular substantive conceptions of desirable

39 FOUCAULT, supra note 30, at 56.
41 LOWELL BRYAN & DIANA FARRELL, MARKET UNBOUND: UNLEASHING GLOBAL CAPITALISM 21 (1996). Capital and capitalism are often presented as “large, powerful, persistent, active, expansive, progressive, dynamic, transformative; embracing, penetrating, disciplining, colonizing, constraining; systemic, self-reproducing, rational, lawful, self-rectifying; organized and organizing, centered and centering; originating, creative, procreative; victorious and ascendant; self-identical, self-expressive, full, definite, real, positive, and capable of conferring identity and meaning.” J. K. GIBSON-GRAHAM, THE END OF CAPITALISM (AS WE KNEW IT): A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (1996). In the neoliberal era, there is an increasing tendency to treat economic policy as a technical rather than a political matter. See DIMITRIS MILONAKIS & BEN FINE, FROM POLITICAL ECONOMY TO ECONOMICS: METHOD, THE SOCIAL AND THE HISTORICAL IN THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY (2009). Polanyi, in his critique of the “free market,” reminded us that “[t]here was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course.... [L]aissez-faire itself was enforced by the state.... Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not.” KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 145–47 (Beacon 2d ed. 2001).
42 See infra Part V.
44 FOUCAULT, supra note 30, at 107–08.
45 GEORGE PAVLICH, GOVERNING PARADOXES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 9 (2005).
Public policies promote an incentive structure conducive to "the shaping and reshaping of conduct" by configuring the range of choices within which individuals choose to conduct themselves. Neoliberalism, "a political project that endeavors to create a social reality that it suggests already exists," aims to produce subjects who, under conditions of apparent autonomy, make choices to perform in ways that are in tune with market imperatives. Neoliberal disciplinary regimes aim to constitute rationally calculating individuals who bear full responsibility for the consequences of their actions; subjects who voluntarily embrace particular choices and behaviors conducive to sustaining the socio-economic order. Promotion of self-disciplined entrepreneurial behavior becomes a primary task of governance. The confluence of debt and discipline demonstrates that neoliberalism has transformed the state rather than diminishing it: "the outcome [is] not implosion but reconstitution." This article argues that in the neoliberal era the hidden hand of the market and the iron fist of the law work in concert to forge governmentalities that suture debt with discipline.

II. FROM KEYNESIAN COMPROMISE TO NEOLIBERAL COUNTERREVOLUTION

It is often claimed that neoliberalism is "more an ethos or an ethical ideal[] than a set of completed or established institutions." Ostensibly, the central political tenet of neoliberalism is "the negative unity of the disempowerment of government: it disables the state from interfering with the established order of society." I discern, instead, a "programmatic coherence" in the neoliberal socio-economic transition in the U.S. that can be seen, following Karl Polanyi, as historical alternation of stages of de-socialization, re-socialization and a new de-socialization. In these

50 Mitchell Dean, Sociology After Society, in SOCIOLOGY AFTER POSTMODERNISM 205, 212 (David Owen ed., 1997). It is claimed that only when "reified," neoliberalism "takes on the denotation of a concrete abstraction, an accomplished object, a totalizing ideological formation; even, in its temporal dimension, an epoch." John Comaroff, The End of Neoliberalism? What is Left of the Left, 637 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 141, 142 (2011).
52 Barry Hindess, A Society Governed by Contract?, in The New Contractualism 14, 22 (Glyn Davis et al. eds., 1997).
53 Polanyi termed systemic changes under capitalism "double movement." First, there is the historical movement of the market, a movement that has no inherent limits and therefore threatens society's very existence. In response, the society defends itself by creating institutions for its protection. Rise of laissez-faire capitalism and the subsequent rise of the
transitions, the state and the law play a formative role. The ideology of the "free" market notwithstanding, "the market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of government which imposed the market organization on society for noneconomic ends." In order to appreciate the neoliberal transformation of the economy, it is critical to take account of the preceding Keynesian welfare order.

Born amidst the carnage of the Great Depression, Keynesianism rests on the premise that "[c]apitalism is a flawed system [whose] development[,] [i]f not constrained, [...] will lead to periodic deep depressions and the perpetuation of poverty." The linchpin of Keynesian economic theory is the underemployment equilibrium thesis and systemic failure of aggregate demand in capitalist economies. Consequently, capitalism can be stuck periodically, even permanently, in a condition of slow growth, high unemployment, and excess capacity. The recognition that "the normal state of the monopoly capitalist economy is stagnation" produced

welfare state follow this model. Polanyi, supra note 41, at 136. In this progression, neoliberalism can be seen as ascendency of the market at the expense of the society. In a similar vein, democratic capitalism as a political economy is seen as ruled by two conflicting principles or regimes of resource allocation: "one operating according to marginal productivity, or what is revealed as merit by a 'free play of market forces', and the other based on social need or entitlement, as certified by the collective choices of democratic politics." Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 New Left Rev. 5, 7 (2011). Neoliberalism, in this frame, is ascendency of the first principle at the expense of the latter.

54 Polanyi, supra note 41, at 258.
56 Costas Lapavitsas, Mainstream Economics in the Neoliberal Era, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER 32 (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston eds., 2005). Keynes argued that the traditional "microeconomic" vision, based on the interaction between prices and wages, be replaced by a "macroeconomic" vision based on relations between aggregates, or overall quantities, with influence from economic policy, such as the money supply, national revenue, total consumption, and the volume of savings and investment. In sum,

Keynes's basic conclusion can be... previously it had been held that the economic system, any capitalist system, found its equilibrium at full employment. Left to itself, it was thus that it came to rest. ... Keynes showed that the modern economy could as well find its equilibrium with continuing, serious underemployment. Its perfectly normal tendency was to what economists have since come to call an underemployment equilibrium.


the so-called Keynesian compromise between capital and labor, which animated national fiscal and counter-cyclical monetary policies calibrated to promote full employment. With this turn the welfare state was born.\textsuperscript{59} The chronic aggregate demand problem of capitalism was to be resolved through full employment, increasing wages with increases in productivity, and the resulting enhanced purchasing power of the working classes.\textsuperscript{60} The Keynesian compromise produced an activist state as a countervailing power to the market, with the state using regulations and protections to temper the creative destruction of capitalism.\textsuperscript{61} Welfare safety nets related to unemployment, nutrition, health, and retirement provided partial but significant reprieve from the ever-expanding commodification of life by capitalism.

Containment of finance capital was a critical component of this compromise. While Keynes’s desire for “euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor”\textsuperscript{62} and the policy goal to “drive[e] the usurious money lenders out of the temple of international finance”\textsuperscript{63} remained elusive, elaborate national and international regulatory regimes that were set in place to make finance capital subservient to production and national priorities.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{59} A good definition of a welfare state is offered by Asa Briggs:

A welfare state is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions – first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second by narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain “social contingencies” (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services.


\textsuperscript{61} For details, see, e.g., John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power 141–57 (1952); Polanyi, supra note 41.

\textsuperscript{62} General Theory, supra note 56, at 376. Keynes took the position that “comprehensive socialisation [sic] of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment.” Id. at 378.

\textsuperscript{63} Henry Morgenthau, Sec’y of the Treasury, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Closing Address at the Bretton Woods Conference (July 22, 1944), quoted in Leo Panitch & Sam Gindin, Finance and American Empire, in Empire Reloaded 50 (Leo Panitch & Colin Leys eds., 2004) (alteration in original).

\textsuperscript{64} Architects of the new regulatory regimes were mindful of the inter-war havoc in global finance. Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System 43–90 (2d ed. 2008); John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace 226 (1920). For details of the post–World War II international financial order, see, for example, Howard Davies & David Green, Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide (2008); Armand Van Dormael, Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System
The result of this macroeconomic policy framework was a prolonged era of growth, rising wages, and a linkage between Fordist mass-production and mass-consumption that is often termed "the golden age" of capitalism.  

By the early 1970s, the Keynesian welfare system appeared exhausted. The costs of accelerating demands from below for expanded economic and social rights, imperial wars, and an escalating balance of payment deficits created a crisis for wealth-owning classes. Rates of profit were falling, and the share of income of wealth-owning classes shrunk. Predictions of "the death of equities" accompanied "the worst bond bear market not just in memory but in history" and the Bank of International Settlements raised alarms of "a genuine dollar crisis." The "golden age" of prosperity turned first into a "limping golden age" then into a "leaden age." Faced with declining rates of profit and shrinking shares of wealth, wealth-owning classes desired a fundamental break with the Keynesian compromise. Breaking the power of the working classes in order to depress wages was an essential step towards this objective. This is when the neoliberal counterrevolution was launched.

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2 (1978); ANTHONY M. ENDRES, GREAT ARCHITECTS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: THE BRETON WOODS ERA (2005); Jonathan Kirshner, Keynes, Capital Mobility and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism, 6 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 313 (1999); Tayyab Mahmud, Is It Greek or Đêđ đа All Over Again?: Neoliberalism and Winners and Losers of International Debt Crises, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 654-661 (2011).


66 For a detailed analysis, see GÉRARD DUMÉNIL & DOMINIQUE LÉVY, THE CRISIS OF NEOLIBERALISM 7-10 (2011).


68 The Death of Equities: How Inflation is Destroying the Stock Market, BUSINESS WEEK, August 13, 1979, at 54.


70 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1979) [hereinafter BIS].

71 JOAN ROBINSON, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 52-54 (1962).


Neoliberalism is a strategy of wealth-owning classes to reverse the setbacks to their wealth and privilege and to expand their reach globally under the hegemony of the United States. Neoliberalism did not displace the state as much as it reformulated it, turning the “nation-state” into a “market-state.” Neoliberalism was first road-tested in Chile following Pinochet’s coup d’état, then in New York City’s 1975 “coup d’état by financial institutions against the democratically elected government,” and finally in the United Kingdom by the International Monetary Fund to reverse the course of Keynesian fiscal policies. These trial runs established an enduring principle of neoliberalism: “in the event of a conflict between the integrity of financial institutions and bondholders on the one hand and the well-being of the citizens on the other, the former [should be] given preference.” Finally, a decisive financial “coup”, indeed a “putsch”, was launched in 1979 by way of the so-called “Volcker shock,” which Paul Volcker, then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, characterized as a “triumph of central banking.” In a radical tightening of monetary policy, interest rates were raised exponentially ostensibly to break the back of inflation, the enemy of finance capital. Note that “monetary policy


This is in tune with Max Weber’s observation that “naked class situation” tends to predominate during periods of economic transformation, whereas status-group claims predominate during periods of economic stability. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 938 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. Calif. Press 1978) (1922).

Anthony Carty, Marxism and International Law: Perspectives for the American (Twenty-First) Century?, in International Law On The Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies 170 (Susan Mark ed. 2008). In an evocative portrayal, under neoliberalism government has “become business. And nation-states have become holding companies in and for themselves.” Comaroff, supra note 50, at 145 (emphasis in original).

See Jean Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (1995), for a detailed account.


Gérard Duménil & Dominique Lévy, Capital Resurgent: Roots of Neoliberal Revolution 69, 165 (Derek Jeffers trans., 2004).

Streeck, supra note 53, at 12.

involves trade-offs between inflation and unemployment. Bond-holders worry about inflation; workers, about jobs.\textsuperscript{83} High interest rates induced an inflow of capital as U.S. government securities became a secure investment and the dollar became the global currency of choice. Highly liquid U.S. Treasury bills expanded secondary markets in bonds and allowed the U.S. to rely on global savings to run up deficits.\textsuperscript{84} Henceforth, bondholders were the disciplinarians of U.S. policy makers.\textsuperscript{85} The “Volcker” shock thus represented a convergence of imperial and domestic responsibilities.\textsuperscript{86}

To be able to institute a new global capitalist discipline, the U.S. economic policy-makers had to first, in Volcker’s words, “discipline ourselves.”\textsuperscript{87} The “induced recession”\textsuperscript{88} triggered by the Volcker shock was intended to repress wages and emasculate organized labor by raising unemployment to unbearable levels.\textsuperscript{89} While the specter of inflation was invoked, what guided the Federal Reserve was “a baseless fear of full employment.”\textsuperscript{90} The timing of each of the Fed’s interest rate hikes substantiates that it “wanted wages to fall, the faster the better. In crude terms, the Fed was

\textsuperscript{83} JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 142 (2010); see also STEPHEN H. AXILROD, INSIDE THE FED: MONETARY POLICY AND ITS MANAGEMENT, MARTIN THROUGH GREENSPAN TO BERNANKE 14 (2011) (explaining that the monetary policy objectives as stated in the Federal Reserve Act require the Federal Reserve to “maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates ... so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”). For key economic objectives and monetary policy indicators between 1960 and 2010, see id. at 209–10 figs.B.1 & B.2.

\textsuperscript{84} GRAEBER, supra note 3, at 364–369. “To the extent that these Treasury IOUs are being built into the world’s monetary base they will not have to be repaid, but are to be rolled over indefinitely. This feature is the essence of America’s free financial ride, a tax imposed at the entire globe’s expense.” MICHAEL HUDSON, SUPER IMPERIALISM: THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 12 (2d ed. 2003)


\textsuperscript{86} Panitch & Gindin, supra note 63, at 65.


\textsuperscript{88} Panitch & Gindin, supra note 63, at 63.

\textsuperscript{89} See Monetary Medicine: Fed’s ‘Cure’ Is Likely to Hurt in Short Run, Most Analysts Believe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1979, at A1. Alan Greenspan questioned, “Whether, if unemployment begins to climb significantly, monetary authorities will have the fortitude to ‘stick to the new policy?’” Id.

determined to break labor.”91 Repeatedly, the Fed raised interest rates just before major union contract re-negotiations, forcing employers to squeeze wages.92 In order to establish its credibility with finance capital, "the Federal Reserve had to demonstrate its willingness to spill blood, lots of blood, other people's blood."93 Volcker knew that there would be “blood all over the floor,” and “[t]here was blood indeed.”94

The “shock therapy” of tight monetary policy, a canonical opening salvo of neoliberal structural adjustment,95 paved the road to jettison welfare safety nets96 and severed the Keynesian linkage between increasing productivity and increasing worker's wages.97 Sustained assault on wages and workers ensured that the distribution of gain and pain under neoliberalism would comply with the objectives of the wealth-owning classes. The downward trajectory of the rate of profit was reversed and incomes and wealth of the wealthy increased while those of the rest stagnated and declined.98

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95 See Ben Fine & Dimitris Milonakis, 'Useless But True': Economic Crisis and the Peculiarities of Economic Science, HIST. MATERIALISM, June 1, 2011, at 6 (arguing that neoliberal reordering falls "roughly into two phases - the first as the shock-therapy associated with Reagan and Thatcher, Latin America, and the Soviet bloc, and the second with the social market, Third-Wayism and the post-Washington consensus."). For uses of shocks, both natural and man-made, to promote neoliberal restructuring, see Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism 7 (2007).
97 See Graeber, supra note 3, at 375, for the relationship between productivity and wages between 1947 and 2004.
98 See Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 58–59 fig.4.1 (explaining that the rate of profit, which was 7.8% in 1952–1971, and fell to 6.4% during the 1970s, rose to 8.3% between 1995–2005); id. at 46 fig.3.1 (explaining that the share of total income received by the top 1% of the income bracket rose from 9% in 1980 to 23% in 2007); id. at 51–52 fig.3.5 (explaining that the share of the top 5% of the total of wages and capital income rose from 15.5% during 1952–1971 to 25.8% during 1990–2009); Lawrence Mishel et al., The State of Working America, 2008/2009 125 tbl.3.1 (2009) (explaining that the median overall compensation, wages plus benefits, rose at a rate of 0.2% during 1983–9, 0.1% per year between 1992–2000, and did not grow at all during 2002–07). For share of total income of the top 1%, 1913–2007, see Robert B. Reich, Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future 20 fig.1 (2010); Robert B. Reich, The Limping Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SRI6; see also Duménil & Lévy, su-
Concurrently, neoliberalism scored “a critical victory” by “[c]hanging public expectations about citizenship entitlements, the collective provision of social needs, and the efficacy of the welfare state.”

Along with the assault on wages and workers through tight monetary policy, the power of organized labor was crushed by direct coercion. This was inaugurated by the smashing of the Air Traffic Controllers’ strike in 1981 by President Reagan. Paul Volcker characterized this as “the most important single action of the administration in helping the anti-inflation fight,” and Alan Greenspan designated it “a paradigm shift” and a “political turning point.” In its demonstration effect on corporate behavior, this state action “recast the crimes of union busting as acts of patriotism.” It triggered “a

pra note 66, at 49–50 fig.3.3 (explaining that between 1980 and 2009, the share in total income of the bottom 95% wage earners fell from 62.2% to 51.5%); Edward N. Wolff, Top Heavy 7 (1996); David McNally, From Financial Crisis to World–Slump: Accumulation, Financialisation, and the Global Crisis, Hist. Materialism, June 1, 2009, at 35, 60 (explaining that incomes of the bottom 90% fell by 9%, while incomes for the top 1% increased by 101%, and those of the top 0.1% rose 227%); Sabrina Tavernise, Poverty Rate Soars to Highest Level Since 1993, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2011, at A1, A21 (stating that in 2010, 15.1% Americans, 46.2 million, were living below the poverty line; the highest level since 1993. The rate for Blacks is 27%, Hispanics 26%, Asians 12.1%, and Whites 9.9%). For a study of global rise of top incomes during the neoliberal era, see Anthony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes in the Long Run of History 1–68 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15408, 2009), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/atkinson-piketty-saezNBERtopincomes.pdf.


capitalist offensive that involved both political mobilization and relentless hostility to unions."  

Henceforth, investment and relocation decisions were guided by an informal rule that "no plant which is unionized will be expanded onsite." As neoliberal ideology of market fundamentalism took hold, unions weakened. Even labor leaders acknowledged that unions were "sliding towards irrelevance and oblivion," and were on the road to a complete collapse.

Another prong of the neoliberal attack on wages and workers was to mobilize global labor surpluses through offshoring. As neoliberal globalization, a "disciplinary force over the powers of labor," unfolded, union power weakened further. Liberalization of international trade and capital movements induced investments to flow to regions where prevailing political and social conditions allowed higher returns on investments.

106 See id.; see also William B. Gould IV, Op.-Ed., Crippling the Right to Organise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A25 (explaining that the primary federal labor relations oversight body, the National Labor Relations Board, was increasingly rendered dysfunctional after the neoliberal turn).
109 David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis This Time, in Business As Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown 89, 98 (Craig Calhoun & Georgi Derluguian eds., 2011).
110 Id. at 96.
112 Flows of corporate profits from the rest of the world generated by U.S. direct foreign investments as a percentage of GDP, rose from 1.4% to 2.0% during the 1990s, and reached 3.8% in 2008. Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 116. Until 1980, flows of annual direct foreign investment fluctuated around 0.5% of Gross World Product (GWP); by 2007, it accounted for 3.9%. Id. at 114-15. By 2007, the outstanding stock of worldwide direct foreign investment reached 29% of GWP and accounted for 25% of global stock market capitalization. Id. at 115. A defining feature of neoliberal globalization is dramatic expansion of international trade. Prior to the first oil shock of the early 1970s, foreign trade amounted to about 10% of GWP; by 2008, it accounted for 26.5%. Id. at 113-14.
Wage pressure from countries with low labor costs was transmitted to the United States. Fragmentation and global dispersal of labor markets necessitated that workers compete against one another across national boundaries. Labor movements weakened in areas of capital emigration and strengthened in areas of capital in-migration. Capital's unbridled mobility impeded states' ability to manage national economies, and with workers in different parts of the world in direct competition, labor's efforts at international solidarity fragmented.

The global labor market erased territorial boundaries for the highly skilled while reinforcing borders for the unskilled. All this combined to add downward wage pressure on vulnerable jobs and, indirectly, throughout the economy.

The combined effect of these developments on organized labor was devastating. Both union membership and union efficacy sank to historic lows. Given the nature and size of union wage premium, wages were

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116 By 2007, 6.5% of U.S. jobs were deemed highly offshorable and another 15.1% offshorable, translating into about 31.6 million jobs. Mishel et al., supra note 98, at 194-95 tbl.3.29. Note that occupations vulnerable to offshoring require more education and pay more than other occupations. The offshorable wage premium is 16.8%, and among jobs requiring at least a college degree the offshorable premium is 13.9%. Id. The United Nations has observed, “The global labour market is increasingly integrated for the highly skilled — corporate executives, scientists, entertainers, and the many others who form the global professional elite — with high mobility and wages. But the market for unskilled labour is highly restricted by national barriers.” United Nations Dev. Program, Human Development Report 1999 3 (1999). Immigration added to the complexity of the labor markets. In the U.S., in 1970, the share of immigrants in the workforce stood at 5.2%, steadily increasing to 15.8% in 2007. Mishel et al., supra note 98, at 197, tbl.3.30. The increase in the available labor supply coupled with the fact that 29.1% of immigrants as opposed to 6.1% of native-born workers have less than a high school education, and 11.1% as opposed to 9.1% are with advanced degrees, puts downwards pressure on wages particularly in both unskilled and unskilled sectors. Id. at 168, tbl.3.18.

directly impacted by the decline of unions. Those in lower-paid jobs and racial minorities were hit particularly hard. Decline in the value of the legally mandated minimum wage added to the burdens of the most vulnerable sections of the working classes. Anemic growth, high systemic unemployment, and a decrease in the rate of investment despite a rise in profits—all enduring features of the neoliberal era—exerted added pressure on the working classes. The Keynesian era linkage of productivity growth with wage growth went by the wayside, resulting in


In 2007, the union wage premium was 14.1%; 17.1% for men, and 10.7% for women. Mishel et al., supra note 98, at 201, tbl.3.32. Unionized workers are 28.2% more likely to be covered by employer-provided health insurance, and 24.4% more likely to receive health insurance coverage in their retirement. Id. at 202, tbl.3.33. Between 1979 and 2006, the employers’ contribution to retirement benefits declined, and workers are less likely to have an employer-sponsored pension in 2006 compared with 1979. Id. at 150, tbl.3.13. In 1979, the number of those without any health coverage was 27 million, or about 15% of the nonelderly population; in 2006, the corresponding numbers were over 46 million and almost 18%. Katherine Swartz, Uninsured in America: New Realities, New Risks, in Health at Risk: America’s Ailing Health System—And How to Heal It 32, 59 (Jacob S. Hacker, ed., 2008). For the relationship between income inequality and the decline of unions, see Zaid Jilani, How Income Inequality Skyrocketed and the 1 Percent Profited From the Decline of Unions, Think Progress (Oct. 21, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/special/2011/10/21/350012/income-inequality-decline-of-unions/

The union wage premium along racial groups is 17.4% for Asians, 18.3% for Blacks, 21.9% for Hispanics, and 12.4% for Whites. Mishel et al., supra note 98, at 201, tbl.3.32. The union wage premium is even larger for those with low wages, in lower-paid occupations, and with less education. Id. at 207, tbl.3.36.

There was a 29.9% decline in minimum wage’s value between 1979 and 1989. Even after subsequent legislated raises, in 2009, it was 6.8% less than its peak value in the late 1960s. Id. at 208–211, figs.3AA & fig.3AB, tbl.3.38. The ratio of minimum wage to what an average worker earned per hour has also consistently declined since the late 1960s. This ratio was 50% in the late 1960s, 45% in mid–1970s, 40% in early 1990s, and 34% in 2007. Id. at 209. Entry-level wages for male high school graduates, adjusted for inflation, have fallen 23% since 1973. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Money and Morals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2012, at A27.

Real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5.9% in the 1940s, 4.2% in the 1950s and 1960s, 3.4% in the 1970s, 3.2% in the 1980s and 1990s, and 1.9% in the 2000s. Magdoff, supra note 12, at 30. During the 1950s and 1960s, for about 40% of the time, the unemployment rate was below 4%; from the 1970s through 2010, unemployment was less than 4% for less than 1% of the time, and higher than 6% over half the time. Id. Since the early 1980s, the trend has been a generalized decrease in wages and a decrease of the rate of accumulation despite a rise in profit rates. Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Financial Capitalism, in Crisis in the Global Economy: Financial Markets, Social Struggles, and New Political Scenarios 17 (Andrea Fumagalli & Sandro Mezzadra eds., Jason Francis Mc Gimsey trans., 2010). The stock of fixed capital in the U.S. economy is 32 percent lower than it would have been if investment rates of the pre–1980 era were maintained. Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 61–63.
further wage-compression and inequality. Workers, in particular married women with children, were constrained to work longer hours. In the end, the average household worked more hours for lesser wages and retiring at age 65 became an increasingly elusive goal.

Structural changes in the organization of capital added to the woes of the working classes. The paradigm of shareholder value maximization became the “zeitgeist” of corporate governance. The emphasis on shareholder
value necessitated squeezing out other stakeholders; job cuts, lower wages, and fewer benefits were a natural corollary. Capital accumulation was sacrificed in favor of income distribution benefiting the upper classes. As dividends and stock buybacks increased, reinvestment decreased, with a negative impact on productive capacity and employment. Furthermore, increased debt levels of corporations unavoidably tended to “discipline the employment relationship” as firms with higher debt reduced their employment more often, used more part-time and seasonal employees, paid lower wages, and funded pension plans less generously.


128 Chang, supra note 123, at 19.


Financialization, another defining feature of the neoliberal era, engendered "a prolonged split between the divergent real and financial economies."

Whereas up until the 1970s "the old structure of the economy[] consist[ed] of a production system served by modest financial adjuncts," with the neoliberal turn this gave way to "a new structure in which a greatly expanded financial sector had achieved a high degree of independence and sat on top of the underlying production system."

Far beyond its classic role of credit provision, finance was now positioned "directly at the heart of the accumulation process, essentially introducing a new sector that straddled credit and production." The result was "exhaustion of the progressive force of capital" and reinforcement of its "increasingly parasitical character." The pursuit of neoliberal class objectives resulted in a "divorce" between the upper classes and the United States domestic economy.

In sum, the radical use of monetary policy to attack wages and smash the power of organized labor inaugurated the neoliberal era. This was complemented by coercion of unions, globalization, focus on shareholder value, and a divorce between finance and the productive economy. These systemic changes decisively transformed the grounds of aggregate demand from full employment to consumer debt. Two mechanisms combined to create the requisite domestic demand: (1) increased consumption by wealth owning classes whose incomes now saw a steady rise, and (2) increased indebtedness of the working classes.

Financialization of the economy, facilitated by public laws and policies, operationalized this historic shift.

III. FINANCIALIZATION, REVERSE RED-LINING, AND PRIVATE DEFICIT SPENDING


134 Panitch & Gindin, supra note 63, at 68.

135 Carlo Vercellone, The Crisis of the Law of Value and the Becoming-Rent of Profit in Crisis in the Global Economy: Financial Markets, Social Struggles, and New Political Scenarios 86, 90 (Andrea Fumagalli & Sandro Mezzadra eds., Jason Francis Mc Gimsey trans., 2010). The progressive force of capital refers to its active role in the organization of labor and development of productive forces as a means of struggle against scarcity and enabling the passage from necessity to liberty. Id. at 92. Parasitical character comes forth in intensification of accumulation by dispossession and increased appropriations of the commons. Id. at 94-95.

136 Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 27.

137 Id. at 37-38. Critical political economists recognized "the increase in the reliance on debt by U.S. households as a means of maintaining their living standard as their wages started to stagnate or fall." Robert Pollin, The Man Who Explained the Empire: Remembering Harry Magdoff, COUNTERPUNCH, Jan. 6, 2006, http://www.counterpunch.org/pollino1062006.html.
Financialization refers to a marked increase in the volume, velocity, complexity and connectedness of financial flows and an increasing shift of finance capital from production and trade toward speculation and intermediation.\footnote{138} In the U.S., financialization entailed both the exponential expansion of financial institutions and instruments to accommodate corresponding masses of assets and debt and the hegemony of the corporate managerial criteria of the primacy of value for the shareholders.\footnote{139} These developments furnished the prerequisites for the dramatic growth of household debt and the connection between debt and discipline. Public law and state policy played a foundational role in this transformation.\footnote{140}

Neoliberalism's turn to financialization as a systemic response to the crisis of profitability is in tune with historical cycles of capitalism.\footnote{141} However, in a departure from historical precedence, financialization of the U.S. economy served added objectives through innovative means. It increased both the reach and the depth of the credit economy whereby debt became the primary catalyst for aggregate demand. Securitization of debt was a considered public policy aimed to help boost demand and liquidity for financial markets. As early as the 1980s, Alan Greenspan, the

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\footnotesize{138 Beverly J. Silver & Giovanni Arrighi, The End of the Long Twentieth Century, in Business As Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown 53, 66 (Craig Calhoun & Georgi Derluguian eds. 2011); Immanuel Wallerstein, Dynamics of (Unresolved) Global Crisis, in Business As Usual, 69, 78 (Craig Calhoun & Georgi Derluguian eds. 2011). Financialization also entails a "set of transformations through which relations between capitals and between capital and wage-labour have been increasingly financialised — that is, increasingly embedded in interest-paying financial transactions." McNally, supra note 98, at 56.}

\footnotesize{139 R. Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981) (1910), quoted in Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 35; see Craig Calhoun & Georgi Derluguian, Introduction to Business As Usual, supra note 109, at 47. See Krippner, supra note 72, for a detailed study of the political context of the turn to financialization.}

\footnotesize{140 The state is "necessarily present in the financial markets." Massimo Amato & Luca Fantacci, The End of Finance 46 (English ed. 2012). There are two essentially public functions without which financial markets cannot function: setting up a legal framework within which contracts are performed and to define what will serve as a unit of account and as an instrument of payment. Furthermore, the state is the lender of last resort for financial institutions, Id.}

\footnotesize{141 The pattern of capital shifting into finance and away from trade and production unfolded in Genoa in the early seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic in the late eighteenth century, and in Britain in the early twentieth century. Silver & Arrighi, supra note 138, at 55. For a detailed explanation of this phenomenon, see Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century 85–86 (2007). Perceptive economists argued as early as the mid-1970s that "the over extension of debt and the overreach of the banks was exactly what was needed to protect the capitalist system and its profits; to overcome, at least temporarily, its contradictions." Harry Magdoff & Paul M. Sweezy, The End of Prosperity: The American Economy in the 1970s 35 (1977); see also Harry Magdoff & Paul M. Sweezy, Stagnation and the Financial Explosion 149 (1987); Harry Magdoff & Paul M. Sweezy, Production and Finance, 35 Monthly Rev. 11 (May 1983).}
“maestro” of neoliberal financialization,142 articulated a primary objective of American foreign economic policy: “diversifying international securities portfolios . . . disproportionately in dollars.”143 Securitizing debt and channeling it into global financial markets enabled syphoning of global savings to sustain fiscal and trade deficits of the U.S.

The interconnected shift towards financialization and globalization linked the dramatic growth of household debt with access to global liquidity.144 It facilitated Americanization of global finance, helped to entrench the imperial role of the U.S. into global finance, and made it possible for global savings to flow to the U.S. at an unprecedented scale.145 The global capital flows now resembled a game of marbles in which, after each round, “the winners return their marbles to the losers.”146 These capital flows secured by a deficit-ridden military power functioned as “an imperial tithe,”147 and enabled the U.S. to become “the superpower

144 Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 24. This interconnection is evidenced by exponential rise is the amount of foreign assets held by banks around the world. These assets amounted to 9% of GWP at the end of 1977 and rose to 59% in 2008. Id. at 118. Another evidence of this interconnection is the nearly five-fold rise in the daily global turnover of foreign exchange markets for USD 590 billion in 1989 to USD 3.2 trillion in 2007. Id. at 124 tbl.8.3. For the whole U.S. economy, profits from investments abroad represented about 6% of total business profits in the 1960s, 11% in the 1970s, 15 to 16% in the 1980s and 1990s, and averaged 18% for the five year period 2000-04. Foster & Magdoff, supra note 129, at 41.
145 Martin Wolf, Fixing Global Finance 78 fig.4.14 (2008). For the current account balance between the industrialized North and the rest of the world, see Silver & Arrighi, supra note 138, at 64 fig.1.2.
147 Panitch & Gindin, Finance and American Empire, supra note 63, at 69 (emphasis added). In the 1990s, the Clinton administration put direct pressure on governments around the world to open their markets for goods, capital and services, and instructed the IMF to pursue this strategy in the strictest possible terms. Nicholas Kristoff & David E. Sanger, How US Wood Asia to let Cash Flow in, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1999, at A1. The United States removed its capital controls in 1974, the United Kingdom in 1979, Australia and New Zealand in 1984-85, and Japan during the 1980s. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of International Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s 8-9 (1994). In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty established free mobility of capital within the European Union with the rest of the world. Under Article 73c of the treaty, unanimity is required to restrict mobility towards countries outside the Union. Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 132, 359 n.2. Seeking “global cooperation,” Ben Bernanke sought Japan’s help to hold down U.S. interest rates. Bonner and Wiggins, supra note 8, at 224. In response, Japanese monetary authorities in 2003-04, injected 35 trillion yen to support the dollar that kept the U.S. long bond yields down to historical low levels. “By creating and lending the equivalent of $320 billion to the United States, the bank of Japan and the Japanese Ministry of Finance contracted a private sector run on the dollar and, at the same time, financed the U.S. tax cuts that reflated the global economy . . . .” Richard Duncan, How Japan Financed Global Reflation, Fin. Asia, Feb. 2005, at 35. For details, see Richard Duncan,
of borrowing,”148 making the current account a “meaningless concept” for U.S. policy makers.149 The escalating U.S. current account deficit and debt-driven consumer spending allowed the U.S. economy to function as “the ‘Keynesian engine’ of the global economy.”150 Financialization, then, is a kind of “paradoxical financial Keynesianism” whereby demand was stimulated by asset-bubbles, and these bubbles together with the reserve currency status of the USD made the U.S. “catalyst of world effective demand.”151

Again, the financialized economy turned debt, rather than full employment, into the propellant of aggregate demand. Here was “privatized Keynesianism” in action; instead of governments taking on debt to stimulate the economy, individuals and families, including the poor, did so.152 Stagnating and declining wages triggered a marked decline in savings.153 However, even in the face of stagnating wages and declining savings, the boom of consumption during the neoliberal era was “without precedent,”154 making the U.S. consumer “by far the most important consumer in the world.”155 As shrinking wages were insufficient to generate


148 Wolf, supra note 145, at 4.

149 The O’Neill Doctrine, Economist, Apr. 27, 2002, at 12 (quoting Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill). This refers to the unique exemption the U.S. enjoys on account of its global hegemony from the general requirement for states to balance their external trade and current accounts. Duménil and Lévy, supra note 66, at 24. Outstanding U.S. Treasury securities held by the rest of the world increased from 17% of the total GDP in 1980 to 51% in 2008. U.S. corporate bonds outstanding held by the rest of the world increased from 4% in 1980 to 29% in 2008. Id. at 116 fig. 8.4; see also Godfrey Hodgson, More Equal than Others: America from Nixon to the New Century (2004) (discussing the economic history of the United States from the era of President Nixon until 2003).

150 McNally, supra note 98, at 63.


153 While between 1965 and 1980 savings amounted to 9.3% of disposable income, by 2005, savings declined to 1.2% (~3.7% if residential investment is treated as consumption). Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 147 fig. 10.3.

154 Id. at 146. Consumption in the period 1952–1980, as a percentage of GDP remained about constant at around 62%, then rose steadily to a plateau of about 70% since 2001. Id. at 147 fig. 10.3.

155 Stephen Roach, US Not Certain of Avoiding Japan-Style ‘Lost Decade,’ Fin. Times, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b2e558f4-e1db-11dd-a5f0-0000779df2ac.html#axzz3252fYjL9o. Consumption, which in the period from 1952–1980, as a percentage of GDP, was around 62%, rose steadily to a plateau of about 70%. Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 147 fig. 10.3. For the impact of consumer rights movements on the transformation of retail-
effective demand, consumers turned to debt by partaking of "overextended credit."\textsuperscript{156} This turn to debt-driven consumption was facilitated by public policy and the market acting in concert, a combination appropriately characterized the "state-finance nexus."\textsuperscript{157} The intellectual justification for new regulatory regimes was furnished by the overarching neoliberal ideology augmented by the "efficient market hypothesis" that saw all markets as efficient and self-adjusting entities which, left to their own, would produce efficiency, innovation, supply and demand equilibrium, and stability.\textsuperscript{158} Mythologies of neoliberal deregulation notwithstanding,

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\bibitem{156} Caglar Keyder, \textit{Crisis, Underconsumption, and Social Policy, in Business as Usual}, supra note 109, at 159, 165. Outstanding consumer debt as a percentage of disposable income grew from 62% in 1975 to 127.2% in 2005. Foster & Magdoff, supra note 129, at 29 tbl.1.1. Gross debt of households rose from 50% of GDP in 1980 to 98% of GDP in 2007. \textit{Id.} at 150 fig.10.6. Between 1980 and 2008, the size of debt of all U.S. sectors as a percentage of GDP rose from 155% to 353% by 2008. Dumenil & Levy, supra note 66, at 104 tbl.7.2. The flow of interest paid by households that was 4.4% of GDP in 1979, rose to in 5.7% in 2007. \textit{Id.} at 65-66. The size of debt of all U.S. sectors as percentage of GDP was 126% in 1952, 155% in 1980 and rose dramatically to 353% by 2008. \textit{Id.} at 104. From 1996 to 2000, all debt increased by an average of USD 1.6 trillion per year, with household debt alone averaging over USD 400 billion per year, at a time when the GDP grew at an average rate of about USD 500 billion per year. Magdoff, supra note 12, at 30-31. From 2001 through 2007, all debt increased by USD 3 trillion per year, with household debt increasing by USD 900 billion per year, while the GDP increased by less than USD 600 billion per year. \textit{Id.} at 31. At the end of 2008, 70% of U.S. families held credit cards, with the total credit card debt reaching USD 972.73 trillion. \textit{Credit card statistics, industry facts, and debt statistics, Credit Cards}, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-industry-facts-personal-debt-statistics-1276.php (last visited August 25, 2012). In 2007, interest paid by household and governments amounted to a total of 8.1% of GDP; this is larger than the profits of nonfinancial enterprises that were 7.6% of GDP for that year. Dumenil & Levy, supra note 66, at 65-66. Instructive literature on consumer credit in the U.S. includes, David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, \textit{Playing with Plastic: The Digital Revolution in Buying and Borrowing} (1999) (discussing the role of technology in the evolution of credit card use); Lloyd Klein, It's in the Cards: Consumer Credit and the American Experience (1999); Joseph Nocera, \textit{A Piece of the Action: How the Middle Class Joined the Money Class} (1994); Juliet Schor, \textit{The Overspent American} 19-20 (1998) (discussing credit card debt as it relates to the intensification of competitive consumption); Brett Williams, \textit{Debt for Sale} (2004). For the variety of lending and repayment practices of consumer credit, see Rose-Maria Gelpi, \textit{The History of Consumer Credit: Doctrines and Practices} (2000).

elaborate new regulations were fashioned to pave the way for the ascendency of finance capital. After over three decades of the neoliberal era's ostensible deregulation, the financial sector remains "among the most heavily regulated sectors of the American economy." During the heyday of neoliberal "deregulation," the U.S. had a regulatory regime with over 100 authorities overseeing different segments of the financial market.

Critical legislations that enabled neoliberal financialization included: the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which eliminated interest rate caps; the addition of the 401(k) provision


to the tax code in 1980, which channeled savings into private pension plans; the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which allowed Savings and Loan Associations to engage in commercial lending and corporate bonds; the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, which permitted investment banks to buy, pool, and resell mortgages; the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which created the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit, making mortgage–backed securities more attractive; the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enhancement Act of 1989, which rearranged the government–sponsored mortgage–facilitating entities; the Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994, which allowed banks to operate across state lines; the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which made it difficult for securities fraud plaintiffs to plead fraud; the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, which directed financial institutions to expand their market base; the Gramm–Leach Billey Act of 1999 that permitted comingling of commercial and investment banking; the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which left derivatives out of regulatory oversight; and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which made it more difficult for consumers to seek bankruptcy


protection. The courts and regulatory agencies played a supportive role in the interpretation and enforcement of these provisions. This new legal terrain was indispensable for the financialization of the U.S. economy and consolidation of debt as a primary source of aggregate demand.

Law and public policy also played a critical role in enhancing liquidity, the lifeblood of financialization. This blood was first drawn from workers' savings and expanded debt-creation through extraordinarily loose monetary policy. The 401(k) provision of the tax code inaugurated siphoning of workers' savings through privatization of pension funds. Tapping this colossal reservoir of liquidity served three related functions: it fed the ever growing indebtedness of firms and households, gave workers a stake in the health of the financial markets, and augmented the ideological ensemble of ownership society, workers-as-shareholders, and "shareholder nation." The other crucial step in liquidity generation was expansion and securitization of debt. In this context, "the purpose of making loans, mortgages and offering credit cards [was], increasingly, the generation of tradable financial assets based on the cycle of monthly repayments." Neoliberalism, which was inaugurated by a radically tight

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174 Indeed, the combination of subprime mortgages and securitization rested "programmatically on the assumption that the important thing about debt is not its 'payability' but its 'liquidity.'" AMATO & FANTACCI, supra note 140, at 63.


monetary policy, now turned to a radically loose monetary policy to fuel liquidity by keeping interest rates at historical lows. Financial markets relied on the Fed to keep the system awash with liquidity to sustain the wealth–effect produced by credit–driven financialization. Particularly in response to the dot–com crash of the early 2000s, the Fed lowered interest rates and kept them low, incessantly creating liquidity and a credit–fueled boom. This propelled “artificial liquidity,” “liquidity black holes,” and “Ponzi finance,” the ubiquitous characterizations of the financial boom that rested substantially on derivatives based on bundled and securitized debt, particularly mortgages. An accompanying recalibration of securities laws facilitated the change from lend–and–hold to lend–and–distribute banking and triggered “in–house debt collection” to increasingly give way to a “debt sale market in personal finance.” The exponential rise in subprime mortgages was made possible by these general policies that “stoked mortgage bonfire.”

177 Before the neoliberal era, the ability of credit originators to grant new loans was highly dependent on the support of public agency securitization and the levels of Federal Fund rate. With neoliberalism, private–label securitization allowed credit originators to refinance their activity as much as needed. Lenders became less vulnerable to shortage of liquidity induced by tighter monetary policy, and securities pooled in vehicles were sold at long–term rates in the rest of the world independent of Federal Reserve policies. Dumênil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 199–200. One effect of financial globalization was the convergence of long–term interest rates around the world, depriving the ability of national monetary authorities to adjust rates for domestic purposes. Id., at 137. For convergence of rates worldwide, see id., at 138 fig.9.1. After the 2001 recession, long–term interest rates stopped responding to increases in Federal Fund rates. For the relationship between the Federal Funds rate and long–term rates between 1980 and 2009, see id., at 198 fig.14.1. Alan Greenspan reported to Congress that “[t]he drop in long–term rates is especially surprising given the increase in the federal funds rate over the same period. Such a pattern is clearly without precedent in our experience.” Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress (July 20, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2005/july/testimony.htm.


industry grew at an annual rate of 25 percent between 1994 and 2003, and was "the key to extending the asset-based welfare vision."  

Far from being a "democratization of finance," subprime mortgages testify to the enduring grammar of modern power's engagement with alterity as one of engulfment/subordination and not of exclusion. The subprime-lending boom was "reverse redlining"—marginalized groups traditionally denied credit became targeted with high-risk credit. It demonstrated that, to grow and increase profits without engaging the sphere of production, finance needed to spread its reach beyond the middle class to the poor. Home ownership had long been advocated as an effective tool of social control, indeed, a "prophylactic against mob mind." The liberalized financial markets were well-positioned to deploy this tool on an ever-widening scale. With the neoliberal turn, equity markets propelled by inflow of funds from newly created private pension schemes began to rise and 

"[b]ig companies . . . increasingly relied on equity markets for finance . . . ." In response, banks pushed lending into more marginal markets, developed new financial instruments, and invented new ways


184 For an insightful refutation of the exclusion thesis in the context of race relations, see Denise Ferreira Da Silva, Towards a Global Idea of Race (2007).


186 Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 165, 176-79 (2010). For racial wealth inequality partly resulting from lack of access to credit, see Melvin Oliver, Black Wealth / White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality 136-41 (1995). For a comparison of assets and debt use between black and white households, see Hyman, supra note 165, at 139-40, Figs.5.2 & 5.3. Racial minorities traditionally paid higher interest rates on mortgage loans. Id., at 143-44, Figs.5.4 & 5.5. Indeed, "FHA policies led to a systematic disinvestment in black-owned housing." Id. at 341, n.1. For a detailed exposition of the impact of public policies on minority housing, see "Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 7 (1996). For how class impacted credit availability, see Consumer Credit and the Poor Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 3-5 (1968) (statement of Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission).


188 Barbara Ehrenreich & Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women 133-34 (1978) (quoting Sociologist Ross).

to make mortgage loans to lower-income workers whom lenders had previously avoided. Alan Greenspan expressly acknowledged this move: “innovation and deregulation have vastly expanded credit availability to virtually all income classes.”

190 Ferreting out economically marginal groups for mortgage and consumer credit expanded the scope of the financial market. “Bottom-feeding” on the “unbanked” and “uncarded ethnics” became a lucrative growth field. In this process “[e]conomically marginal people constituted, in effect, a ‘developing country’ within the United States.”

191 African Americans, who historically had limited access to credit markets on account of racial prejudice and discrimination, now became “the most profitable group to lend to.” Gender also intersected with race and class in this schema. As women constituted an ever-increasing proportion of recipients of subprime loans, “single, female, with two children, in her first home” became the profile of a typical subprime borrower seeking foreclosure counseling.

For the borrowers, the subprime mortgages boom was “asset-based welfare”; a “welfare trade-off” emerged between housing as a social right secured by public resources and homeownership as a mode to accumulate and store wealth. Neoliberal contraction of the redistributive
function of the welfare state was complemented by “privatization of deficit spending” — creation of aggregate demand through private debt. Demand for credit and complex financial products did not naturally flow from their supply; it had “to be created, and liquidity relied critically on demand being whipped up.” Financial markets cultivated expectations of infinite increases in asset prices and the resulting wealth—effect—an inflationary increase without which it would be impossible to co-opt the have—nots.

Legal regimes played a pivotal role in the expansion and securitization of sub—prime loans and in their channeling into global financial markets. It was “the securitization rules themselves made all this possible, and indeed desirable.” State intervention in the home mortgage business had started with the creation of the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation in response to the collapse of the property market and the real estate bond market following the Great Depression. New Deal legislation designed to support the housing market created FHA to provide lenders with protection against losses and established Fannie May to buy mortgage loans of banks, thus providing them liquidity to expand mortgage lending. For over four decades, such public backing facilitated expansion of home—ownership by high—wage


198 Christian Marazzi, supra note 121, at 31.

199 Nesvetailova & Palan, supra note 179, at 166. As Stiglitz reports: “The economy grew, but mainly because American families were persuaded to take on more debt, refinancing their mortgages and spending some of the proceeds. And, as long as housing prices rose as a result of lower interest rates, Americans could ignore their growing indebtedness.” Joseph Stiglitz, America’s Day of Reckoning, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz9o/English.

200 A comprehensive study of concludes:

The government made the resale of debt possible, not just through the enforcement of contracts, but in many instances by actually creating the basic institutions for buying and selling loans — making markets — like the government—made quasi—corporation Fannie Mae. . . . [I]t was not by the invisible hands of the market but by the visible minds of policymakers that new financial instruments and institutions were invented.

Hyman, supra note 7, at 2–3.

201 Amato & Fantacci, supra note 140, at 73.


203 Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 185–87. In 1934 the National Housing Act created the Federal Housing Administration, and in 1938 the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was set up. For details, see Leonard Seabrooke, The Social Sources of Financial Power: Domestic Legitimacy and International Financial Orders 125 (2006). Fannie Mae bought and sold mortgages, thus creating a secondary market for mortgages that linked lender, insurers and investors. Hyman, supra note 7, at 53–70.
earners—the so-called “middle class.” As wages started to stagnate in the 1970s and the existing mortgage market was saturated, public policy promoted a broadening of this market by inducing the financial sector to reach new borrowers and develop new financial instruments. Often discourses of civil rights and equal access and opportunity were deployed to effectuate the changes. Salutary as the stated objectives were, bringing the marginalized into circuits of credit at a time when financialization and debt-driven demand generation was taking root, the consequences for the purported beneficiaries were disastrous. Ginnie Mae, created to cater particularly to low-income and minority borrowers, invented mortgage-backed securities. Freddie Mac was created with the specific purpose of securitizing mortgage loans and selling those in secondary markets. The first-ever mortgage-based security sale by Ginnie Mae in 1970 was hailed by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development as “a revolutionary step.” Subsequent legislations explicitly forbade redlining practices and required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to concentrate more on the lower income and minority groups. Soon, next to the Treasury Department, Freddie Mac was the largest debt-issuing institution in U.S. capital markets. Wall Street became “addicted to mortgage-backed


205 Johnson & Kwak, 13 Bankers, supra note 7, at 123. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Title VIII), the Fair Housing Act that created Ginnie Mae to cater particularly to low-income and minority borrowers, also created mortgage-back securities paving the way for resale of debt as a financial investment. Hyman, supra note 7, at 221, 225–30.


208 The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 explicitly forbade redlining practices. Stuart, supra note 206, at 110. For a detailed exposition of the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the mortgage finance crisis, see Acharya et al., supra note 204, at 31–79.

securities” and the demand for subprime loans by banks and investors outstripped their supply. By modifying Keynesian-era legal regimes and fashioning new ones, neoliberal policies had ignited the subprime mortgage frenzy. With foreigners holding one-third of the debt of the two agencies, compared with 13 percent of the U.S. mortgage-backed securities market in general, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, together “the single largest player in the game,” served as the key link between global finance and the U.S. mortgage market. Hailed at the time as instruments of progressive expansion of home-ownership, the expanded borrower-base and mortgage-backed securitization had three inter-linked effects: ever-larger sections of the working classes were brought within the fold of housing debt, the secondary markets for these securities helped syphon global savings to the U.S., and the size and profits of finance exploded.

The entrapment of the working classes and the marginalized into circuits of credit, then, resulted from the financial sector’s search for depth and liquidity as debt became the primary instrument to sustain aggregate demand. Redesigned legal regimes and public agencies were critical to this transformation.

IV. THE NEW ECONOMY AND PRECARIOUS LABOR MARKETS

The turn to debt by the working classes was also propelled by the rise of precarious labor markets. Besides the demise of unions and

210 JOHNSON & KWAK, 13 BANKERS, supra note 9, at 124–25. For the share of the mortgage market backed by public entities, see ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 204, at 21 fig.1.1 (2011). In 1994, 32% of subprime loans were securitized for a value of USD 11 billion; in 2003, the figures rose to 61% and USD 203 billion. DAWN BURTON, supra note 180, at 81 tbl.4.4 (2008).

211 By the end of the 1990s, the value of outstanding mortgage-backed securities was USD 1 trillion, with the share of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at 90%. SEABROOKE, supra note 203, at 126–27. By 2008, this had grown to USD 5.3 trillion. By 2003, the total liabilities, both standard securities and mortgage-backed securities of these institutions reached 53% of GDP. This amount compares to 136% of all assets of banks and insurance, or, equivalently, 132% for all financial assets of mutual and pension funds. DUMÉNIL & LÉVY, supra note 66, at 185–87. Between 2001 and 2006, while conforming mortgages declined from USD 1280 billion to USD 990 billion, subprime rose from USD 120 billion to USD 600 billion, and nonprime climbed from 14% of the market to 48% of the market. ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 204, at 46 tbl.3.1. For the increasingly risky lending activity by government-sponsored entities between 2003 and 2007, see id. at 59 tbl.3.4. Use of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) as an insurance hedge against the expanding securitized investment instruments induced riskier speculation. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 104–08, 201–12 (2010).

212 Daniel Chirot, A Turning Point or Business as Usual?, in BUSINESS AS USUAL, supra note 109, at 121.


214 Between 1982 and 2007, profits of financial corporations as a percentage of total corporate profits rose from 5% to 41%. Wade, supra note 158, at 33.

215 For precarization of labor, see GERALD RAUNING, A THOUSAND MACHINES: A CONCISE
compression of wages, compelling corollary changes in the employment landscape have included the reduction of socially necessary labor, the rise of flexible contingent labor, and the growth of ever-vaster pools of free labor. In a new "age of the superfluous worker,"216 a growing segment of the working class forms part of the "precariat,"217 signified by jobs that are temporary, low-wage, and without benefits or protections. The contingent workforce includes independent contractors, contracted workers, leased employees, part-time employees, and temporary employees.218 Estimates of the numbers of contingent workers range between twenty to thirty percent of the work force.219 This "crisis of work"220 and "contingency explosion"221 issued from firms' drive to maximize labor market flexibility, changes in information technologies, the rise in forms of work that avoid employee status and its accompanying legal structures, and firms' desire to avoid unions.222 Fordist era forms of work, based on full-time employment,
clear-cut occupational assignments, and a career pattern over the life cycle eroded. Racial discrimination and the widespread availability of flexible peripheral labor markets combined to increase social inequality and marginalization. The rise of contingent work also directly contributed to the decline of unions and wages. As a result, an increasing portion of the workforce received less wages and benefits.

Revolutionary changes in information and communication technologies combined with changes in the organization of production increasingly changed the very nature of work and attendant social rights. Reduction of labor costs in both private and public sectors was achieved through lean production and outsourcing. While just-in-time production organized labor in the most flexible way possible to avoid accumulation of inventory, outsourcing helped avoid social costs of labor. With the demise of Fordist

the contingent economy and the forces that have driven its development; Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Workforce: The Key Challenges and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863 (1995) (analyzing key questions raised by the growth of the contingent work force in the economic and political climate). See also Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557, 571 (1996) (“One of the primary motivations for employers to move to contingent work arrangements is to avoid employment regulations.”). The judiciary has treated contingent workers as having weaker entitlements to protections under unjust dismissal laws. Mark Berger, Unjust Dismissal and the Contingent Worker: Restructuring Doctrine for the Restructured Employee, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 7-8 (1997).

223 For a detailed study, see Martin Carnoy, Faded Dreams: The Politics and Economics of Race in America (1994).

224 Many contingent workers are technically not employees of any entity and therefore not covered by NLRA. Others, though legally classified as employees, are often excluded from bargaining units on account of insufficient community of interest with permanent employees. Leased employees cannot be included in bargaining units of user firm’s employees without consent of both joint employers. See Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 503, 505 (1997); Katherine M. Forster, Note, Strategic Reform of Contingent Work, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 558 (2001); Bita Rahebi, Comment, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Board’s Treatment of Temporary Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2000). Part-time employees earned 58 percent of the hourly wage of median full-time employees in 1989, and the average hourly wage for temporary employees in 1994 was 35 percent lower than it was for full-time employees. Middleton, supra note 222, at 565; Karst, supra note 220, at 525 n.11. Only 22 percent of part-time workers received health care benefits through their employers in 1988 as compared to 78 percent of full-time employees. Middleton, supra. For the link between contingent employment and growing income inequality, see Bennett Harrison & Barry Bluestone, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America 74-75 (1988).


226 For details, see Christian Marazzi, Capital and Affects: The Politics of the Language Economy 19-35 (Giuseppina Mecchia trans., Semiotext(e) 2011).
and Taylorist production systems, direct command and control over the production process was increasingly substituted with marketplace command. Taylorist modes of direct allocation of tasks were increasingly replaced by indirect mechanisms based on imperatives to deliver and unavoidable pressures of precarization of the wage relation. The labor force had to adapt to the increasingly volatile process of value creation; indeed, the pressure was to constantly "reinvent oneself." The just-in-time inventory management and optimal scheduling led to just-in-time labor. The working classes faced new market imperatives to be adaptable and "multivalent." Flexible production produced flexible individuals who changed jobs frequently and whose social relations were increasingly transitory. As a result, a growing number of workers lived "neither inside nor outside the world of work, but along its margins. . . . [inhabiting] a new netherworld, the vocational purgatory of the 'unjob.'"

In a financialized economy, "profit, like rent, increasingly depend on mechanisms of value expropriation that proceed from a position of exteriory in respect of the organization of production." The new speculative profit-making rested on the value-making capabilities of "common work." Labor practices made possible by new information

227 Fordism refers to the system of industrial mass production symbolized by the assembly line of auto production introduced by Henry Ford. Under Fordism, industrial workers are paid relatively high wages to generate demand for products of industrial mass production. For details, see ANTONIO GRAMSCI, Americanism and Fordism, in SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., trans., 1971). Named after industrial engineer Frederick Taylor, Taylorism is an industrial efficiency methodology that breaks down each task to small and simple segments that can be easily taught and replicated. Taylorism introduced time and motion study to promote optimum job performance, cost accounting, and tool and work–station design. For details, see ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE BEST WAY: FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY (1997).

228 The wage form itself has changed with fixed salary increasingly replaced by adjustable performance–based remuneration. MARAZZI, supra note 226, at 47–48. This facilitates a servile labor force constrained to demonstrate devotion and obedience, under the penalty of losing work. Id. at 44–47.

229 Giuseppina Meccia, Introduction to MARAZZI, supra note 226, at 10.

230 MARAZZI, supra note 226, at 17–25.

231 MARAZZI, supra note 226, at 23.


233 GOSSELIN, supra note 183, at 142.

234 Vercellone, supra note 135, at 91.

235 MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, COMMONWEALTH 155 (Paperback ed., Harvard University Press 2011) (2009). This phenomenon is yet another appropriation of the commons for private gain, an enduring feature of capitalism. For example, the widespread knowledge base of the working classes tapped into by cognitive capitalism in conditions of precarization of work, is the fruit of socialized education supplied by the welfare state.

[T]he truly driving sectors of an economy founded on knowledge are not found in the private R&D laboratories. Such a driving role is instead played by the collect-
technologies expanded the scope of immaterial labor, helping to blur the line between work and non-work. As a result, increasingly processes of production of value traditionally confined to the place of work spread "throughout the whole society." Here we see deployment of bio-labor: "life put to work, outside the times officially certified by private law." The new order becomes one of externalization of the production process, of "crowdsourcing" and "unpaid labor" of the crowd. The consumer-as-producer phenomenon is part of this complex. Bagging one's own groceries and self-service at IKEA are emblematic examples of externalizing fixed and variable costs. Similarly, open-source information systems shift costs of labor to consumers through mechanisms like externalization of program evaluation, beta-testing, user technical assistance, and open-source program development. The information/communication revolution resulted in the centrality of cognitive/non-material labor, the loss of the strategic importance of fixed capital, and the transfer of a series of productive-instrumental functions to the living body of labor-power. This rapidly unfolding phenomenon

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tive man for man productions, traditionally assured by the common institutions of the welfare state according to a non-commercial logic. This element explains the extraordinary pressure exercised by capital to privatize collective welfare services, and this is both for its strategic role in the growth of the social demand and in biopolitical and bioeconomic control of the population.

Vercellone, supra note 135, at 111.

236 For a detailed analysis, see Marazzi, supra note 121, at 37–42.

237 Fumagalli, supra note 187, at 81–82.


"These crowdsourcing technologies represent the new organic composition of capital, i.e., the relation between constant capital diffused in society and variable capital that is de-localized, de-spatialized and dispersed in the sphere of reproduction, consumption, forms of life, and individual and collective imaginaries." Marazzi, supra note 121, at 41.

239 Marazzi, supra note 121, at 38–39.

240 For detailed analyses, see Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (2006); Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (2d ed. 2010); John Banks & Sal Humphreys, The Labour of User Co-Creators: Emergent Social Network Markets?, 14 CONVERGENCE: THE INT'L J. OF RES. INTO NEW MEDIA TECH. 401 (2008). The key phrases of the post-crass New Economy were "social web" or "web 2.0." These models were based on their ability to attract masses of users who create a world of social relations on the bases of cost-free web platforms, to harness user browsing, and applications that allow extraction of value from common actions like linking a site, flagging a blog post, modifying software, etc. Web 2.0 proved a winning model for investors since it harnesses, incorporates and valorizes users' social and technological labor, through marginalization of waged labor and the valorization of free user labor: unpaid and undirected labor, which is nonetheless controlled by its insertion into a value appropriation circuit. For detailed analyses, see Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization (2004); Tiziana Terranova, Network Culture: Politics for the Information Age (2004).
Knowledge-based innovation and value-production by highly skilled precarious labor are distinct features of cognitive capitalism. Armed with new technologies, immaterial organizational systems "pursued workers in every moment of their lives ... and the work day, the time of living labor, is extended and intensified." Modalities of value production moved "from factory to the social factory." The information revolution procreated a new labor culture that had absorbed the need for liberty and informality born of the preceding cycle of social struggles, imported the dissolution of the borders between work-time and life-time from academic labor, and possessed the ideology of entrepreneurship. It produced a new economic model capable of generating value by mass use of the internet. In this realm, ubiquitous activities such as using a search engine, visiting a website, even carrying a cell phone that transmits the carrier's location, generate opportunities for enterprises to harvest value without costs.

"Skill-biased technological change" is a dominant explanation for inequality trends in the United States, with the computer/internet revolution and the failure of education to keep pace with the growing skill demands of the knowledge economy cited as the main reasons. Analysts discerned a "new digital divide" that runs along class and racial

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242 Marazzi, supra note 121, at 41.


244 For a detailed analysis, see Andrew Ross, No-Collar: The Humane Workplace and Its Hidden Costs (2003).

245 Tim O'Reilly, What is Web 2.0, O'REILLY (Sept. 30, 2005), http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-2-0.html.

246 This phenomenon is captured well by the following: "You may not know it, but if you carry a smartphone in your pocket, you are probably doing unpaid work for Apple or Google—and helping them eventually aim more advertising directly at you." Miguel Helft, Phone Data Used to Fill Digital Map, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2011, at B1; see also Stephen Baker, The Next: Companies May Soon Know Where Customers are Likely to be Every Minute of the Day, BUS. Wk., Mar. 9, 2009, at 42, 44-45.

divides\textsuperscript{248} and is marked by deep socio-economic distinctions between "the networkers ... the networked ... the switched-off" and between "the deciders ... the participants ... the executants."\textsuperscript{249} In this context, higher education and incessant skills-development play an increasingly critical role in establishing an individual's ranking in the hierarchy of employability.\textsuperscript{250} At the same time, public education faced disinvestment, and the cost of education spiraled.\textsuperscript{251} As a result, reliance on debt for education and retraining soared. Surging above one trillion dollars, student-loans now exceed credit-card and auto-loan debt.\textsuperscript{252}

In the context of a financialized economy, with precarization of labor, demands for enhanced skills, and contraction of public support for education and re-training, increasing reliance on debt to re-train, indeed to live, becomes the only available option for the working classes.

V. DISCIPLINE OF DEBT

Throughout history, debt both lubricated circuits of value extraction and acted as a disciplinary device. From Athenian debt-bondage to contemporary labor trafficking, debt-peonage has been part of labor management regimes across a variety of modes of production. The historical role of debt in moral discipline is evidenced by the fact that in all Indo-European languages, words for debt are synonymous with those for sin or guilt.\textsuperscript{253} Debt has also played a foundational role in modern imperial

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{249} Castells, supra note 240, at 260.
  \item \textsuperscript{250} For a detailed analysis of the nexus between education and economic growth, see Alison Wolf, \textit{Does Education Matter?: Myths About Education and Economic Growth} (2002).
  \item \textsuperscript{251} The average tuition at a four-year non-profit college in 2009–10 was $21,324, while at public colleges it was $10,747. Tamar Lewin, \textit{What's the Most Expensive College? The Least? Education Dept. Put It All Online}, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A8. Between 1999 to 2009, tuition at public two-year colleges increased 71\%, while the median family income, adjusted for inflation, declined 4.9\%. Id. Between 1989 and 2009, law school tuition shot up 317\%. David Segal, \textit{Law School Economics: Ka-Ching?}, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at B1. For the political economy of education under neoliberalism, see John Bellamy Foster, \textit{Education and the Structural Crisis of Capital: The U.S. Case}, 63 MONTHLY REV., 2011, at 6, 7–10, 14, 30. These developments have helped trigger student protests. See \textit{Springtime: The New Student Revolutions} 1–2 (Clare Solomon & Tania Palmieri eds., 2011).
  \item \textsuperscript{253} Geoffrey Ingham, \textit{The Nature of Money} 90 (2004).
\end{itemize}
domination. During the colonial era, colonial powers often intervened militarily to enforce debt contracts. After decolonization, conditions accompanying international credits were deployed to control public policies of post-colonial formations. The recurrent international debt crises of the last three decades were used to enforce neoliberal restructuring of economies of debtor states. Debt levels of corporations unavoidably tend to discipline the employment relationship as firms with higher debt reduce their payroll, use more part-time employees, pay lower wages, and have anemic pension plans. The disciplinary impact of debt in all these instances issued from direct coercion and/or express provisions of debt contracts. What is distinctive about the neoliberal era is the self-discipline of debtors procreated by governmentality that are unencumbered by direct coercion or express undertakings.

In the perennial search for effective modes to contain and control the dispossessed, debt surfaced on the agenda of American ruling classes at least as early as the early 1900s. In particular, home mortgage was advocated as an effective tool of social control, indeed, a “prophylactic against mob mind.” As organized labor took roots, captains of industry recommended that workers should be induced to “invest their savings in their homes and own them. Then they won’t leave and they won’t strike. It ties them down so they have a stake in our prosperity.” While a beginning was made along this agenda during the Keynesian era, neoliberal financialization dramatically expanded the scope and reach of credit in general and mortgage-driven home-ownership in particular. Neoliberalism opened up new frontiers for the disciplinary operations of debt: self-discipline by indebted masses engulfed by the financialized economy and refashioned governmentality.

Neoliberal economic policies and an attending discourse of personal responsibility furnished the grounds for the symbiosis of debt and discipline. Neoliberal rationality aims at congruence between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational actor: a prudent subject whose moral quality rests on rational assessment of economic costs and benefits of their actions. The prescription of subjectivity to obtain interiorization of the market’s goal in the context of precarization of labor is accomplished

256 For details, see Tayyab Mahmud, Is it Greek or Déjà Vu All Over Again: Neoliberalism and Winners and Losers of International Debt Crises, 42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 629, 661–68 (2011).
258 Edward Alssworth Ross, Social Psychology 89 (1908).
259 Charles Harris Whitaker, The Joke About Housing 9 (1920) (emphasis added) (quoting a business manager).
through generalization of debt. The result is an assemblage that “accepts” itself as a *homo economicus*, a dependent subjectivity, a subjectivity conforming to capital, and in which the rationality of *homo economicus*, of *human capital*, replaces the idea of social rights and common goods. This ensures self-discipline whereby time and life both within and outside the bounds of any specific site of production remain subjected to value production.

Neoliberalism fashioned “workfare regimes” intended to “throw a long shadow, shaping the norms, values, and behavior of the wider population, and *maintaining a form of order*.” Evocatively styled, the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act* of 1996, ended “welfare as we know it” and instituted “workfare”: forced deskilled wage labor as the sole means of support on the pretext of setting the indigent on the road to “independence.” Similarly, the *Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act* of 1998 radically reduced public housing and turned the indigent towards private rental markets. Workfare underscored the imperative of wage labor by issuing “a warning to all Americans who are working more and earning less, if they are working at all. There is a fate worse, and a status lower, than hard and unrewarding work.” The new behavior-related rules of workfare aim “to build habits of responsible behavior.” “Stripped

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260 FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, supra note 39 at 269.
261 Vercellone, supra note 235, at 107.
263 R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT I (2000).
264 See Sharon Dietrich et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y. REV. 57 (1998). Women were disproportionately impacted by the changes in the welfare systems. For details, see SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN: WOMEN IN THE AGE OF WELFARE REFORM 7–8 (2004).
down to its labor-regulatory essence," workfare seeks "to make 'docile bodies' for the new economy: flexible, self-reliant, and self-disciplining."\textsuperscript{268}

Under neoliberalism, responsibilization emerged as the dominant register of subject-formation. Responsibilization turns on the ubiquitous neoliberal construct of "human capital."\textsuperscript{269} Through the lens of human capital, wage is not the selling of labor power but an income from a special type of capital. This capital is integral to the person who possesses it and consists of both physical predispositions and the skills acquired as a result of "investments" in education, training, and physical capacity.\textsuperscript{270} This focus on predispositions and acquired capacities raises troubling questions of race, genetics, family, and class.\textsuperscript{271} In the "human capital" discourse, a human being is deemed a "machine-stream ensemble," a "capital-ability," indeed "a machine that produces."\textsuperscript{272} This actively responsible agent is a subject of the market and is obliged to enhance her quality of life through her own decisions. In this schema, everyone is an expert on herself, responsible for managing her own human capital to maximal effect. A politics of the self emerges wherein we are all induced to "work on ourselves" outside the purview of the social.\textsuperscript{273} This biopolitical governmentality produces a subject to represent herself as enough for herself, complete and self-

\textsuperscript{268} Peck, Workfare States, supra note 262, at 6.


\textsuperscript{270} For a detailed exposition of the argument that central to contemporary strategies for governing is to produce subjects that are required to conduct themselves responsibly and to be free at maximize one's life as a kind of enterprise, see Nikolas Rose, \textit{Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self} (1989). This broad strategy is tied to neoliberalism, which created another rationality for government in the name of freedom, and invented or utilized a range of techniques that would enable the state to divest itself of many of its obligations, devolving those to quasi-autonomous entities that would be governed at a distance by means of budgets, audits, standards, benchmarks, and other technologies that were both autonomizing and responsibilizing.


\textsuperscript{271} Foucault, \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics}, supra note 39, at 227–30.

\textsuperscript{272} Id. at 224–25.

sufficient: a "narcissistic separation of living labor from the public sphere ... [where] labor becomes individual business and/or human capital." 274

As welfare safety nets are removed, workers are induced to think of themselves as free-standing businesses that shield themselves, much as corporations do, by measuring and apportioning risks and by diversifying operations and investments. 275 Indeed, cheerleaders of neoliberal globalization are rather explicit: "We're all entrepreneurs now, or should be." 276 Risk, which was deemed harmful and needed careful calculation and management by actuarial experts, 277 is now represented as an opportunity to be negotiated, cultivated, and exploited by the entrepreneurial financial subject. 278 Ideologues of neoliberalism warn against "diffusing, equalizing, concealing, shuffling, smoothing, evading, relegating, and collectivizing the real risks" and argue "with more of the risks borne by the individual citizens ... the overall system may be more stable." 279 This assemblage of the risk-taking entrepreneur is facilitated by attendant discourses of rational economic actors, efficient and self-correcting markets, and the ostensibly tamed business cycle. 280 This calls forth a particular subjectivity by demanding that individuals increasingly act as entrepreneurial investor subjects as part of a wider individualization of risk. 281 In this schema, "a personal loan was taking responsibility for life's uncertainties." 282

274 Chicchi, supra note 243, at 149 (parentheses omitted).
275 For a detailed analysis, see Colin Gordon, The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and Government, in MAX WEBER, RATIONALITY AND MODERNITY 293 (Scott Lash & Sam Whimster eds., 1987).

The old paradigm of climb up a stable career ladder is dead and gone. ... No career is a sure thing anymore. The uncertain, rapidly changing conditions in which entrepreneurs start companies is what it's now like for all of us fashioning a career. Therefore you should approach career strategy the same way an entrepreneur approaches starting a business.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reid Garrett Hoffman, founder of LinkedIn).
282 Hyman, supra note 165, at 75.
With the neoliberal call for individuals to secure their freedom, autonomy and security through financial markets and not the state, practices of investment, calculation and speculation became signs of initiative, self-management, and enterprise. Neoliberal economic theory rests on the notion of the “rational individual,” a fantastic creature that aims exclusively at private gain, has no altruism and strictly calculates the necessary means to achieve desired ends. Eliding the fact that much of human behavior is irrational, neoliberalism expects individuals to rationally evaluate risk. Indeed, in the neoliberal ensemble, “risk itself is being more positively evaluated,” with the result that “investment appears as the most rational form of saving.” In the assemblage of investor/entrepreneur subjectivity, “[w]ithout significant capital, people are being asked to think like capitalists.” The consolidation of finance as a way of life introduces “a new set of signals . . . as to how life is to be lived and what it is for.” Everyday life is increasingly framed as a space of investment, and the individual is positioned as an investor in a life project to continuously pursue opportunities and negotiate risks in the expectation of rewards. One is engulfed by information about finance in the news media, particularly the ubiquitous stock market ticker-tape on television, that “breathe[s] life into finance, turning it into a living organism.” Tying everyday practices to global financial networks—retirement plans, pensions, purchase of goods on credit, repayment of credit bills, credit cards, student loans, and mortgages—induces the self-fashioning of financial subject.


284 For studies on irrationality of human behavior, see George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism (2009) (arguing that “animal spirits”–like confidence and fear, corruption and fairness–influence human decisions and drive worldwide financial events); Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (1996) (arguing that rational choice theory has not offered empirically useful results and demonstrating its inconsistencies in the context of voter turnout and social dilemmas); Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph 132 (1st ed. 1977) (arguing that “capitalism was supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be denounced as its worst feature”); Peter A. Ubel, Free Market Madness: Why Human Nature Is at Odds with Economics—And Why It Matters (2009) (arguing that irrational human behavior undermines the premise of free-choice economics, particularly in the context of decisions involving health and well-being).


positions and identities. In this context, finance becomes "a way of working money over, and ultimately, a way of working over oneself." Finance, then, by constituting a primary frame of interpellation of subjectivity, became a primary "technology of the self," and financialization becomes "a practice of social control . . . compatible with democratic societies where order is based on the formalized participation of great masses." The "command devices" of this practice exist in "the hybrid zone where the political economy meets social psychology." In the wake of the displacement of the welfare state by neoliberal reordering of the economy, personal well-being and financial security becomes increasingly bound up with the fortunes of the international financial markets through pensions, mortgages, and stocks. The result is inescapability of finance as everyday life becomes increasingly financialized. It leads individuals to believe that their well-being depends more on financial markets than on demands for higher wages and claims on public resources. In this context, to be a leveraged mortgage debtor is to be a responsible and self-disciplined entrepreneur.

The Keynesian productivity-wage and production-mass consumption connections are substituted with a debt-consumption connection driven by the so-called wealth-effect, an evocative instrument of this mode of control and discipline. The wealth-effect is tied to the emergence of "an asset economy," which, in turn, results in a "patrimonialization' of behaviors." The wealth-effect, "a sort of illusory social insurance for the crumbling of Fordist social security" induced by increases in asset value, particular stocks, and housing, "affects consumption behaviors more than the expected wealth due to an increase in wages." Indeed, debtors often harvested the wealth-effect, further fueling aggregate demand: cash-out volumes for all prime conventional loans amounted to $26 billion in 2000

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290 Martin, supra note 287, at 17; see also Alyssa Katz, Our Lot: How Real Estate Came to Own Us 38 (2009).
291 Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self, in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault 16, 17 (Luther H. Martin et al. eds., 1988).
293 Id. at 119-20.
296 Paulré, supra note 241, at 193.
297 Chicchi, supra note 243, at 147.
298 Lucarelli, supra note 292, at 125.
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and reached $318 billion in 2006. In effect, the working classes "used asset-growth to substitute for wage-growth."

In this context, for the risk-taking entrepreneurial subject, borrowing and living with debt appear both essential and rational. Living with debt, however, is living in a "credit panopticon," with disciplining effects both at the inception of debt and through its career. The disciplinary controls of standardization and synchronization exercised through the "credit panopticon" displace trust as a grounds for lending. Critical to note here is that credit scoring did not aim at exclusion of deviants but provided the grounds for inclusion and differentiation in mortgage lending, a development critical for reverse redlining. Credit scoring knowledge produced debtors sorted, targeted and governed through the prism of risk-based pricing. It also produced new forms of responsible and entrepreneurial self-discipline and mortgagors as leveraged investor subjects. In this context, charging higher interest rates to racial minorities became seemingly rational and above political questioning. Finally, the subprime mortgage market partook of the benefits of the neoliberal phenomenon of responsibilization of entrepreneurial self, whereby individuals were induced to provide for

299 Duménil & Lévy, supra note 66, at 151 (citing Freddie Mac, Cash-Out Refinance Report (2008)). While predatory lending has received scholarly attention, perceptive scholars have identified "predatory borrowing," where speculative borrowers took advantage of easy credit and a rising property market. See Cummings, supra note 20, at 181–83.

300 Hyman, supra note 165, at 4.

301 Dawn Burton, Credit and Consumer Society 53 (2008). A panopticon is a type of institutional building designed by philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century that allows a watchman to observe all inmates of the institution without the inmates being able to tell whether or not they are being watched. Bentham's idea of a panopticon was very influential in the designs of modern prisons. For details, see Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon Letters, in The Panopticon Writings 29 (Miran Božović ed., 1995); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 195–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).


their own freedom and security through opportunities offered by the market.\textsuperscript{304}

The marketing of credit is built around the time-and-space-specific constructs of the “normal” consumer held within financial institutions.\textsuperscript{305} These normative expectations inform profiles of consumers including embedded understandings of normalcy and deviance.\textsuperscript{306} Therefore, in order to qualify for debt, a borrower has to demonstrate subscription to such standards of normalcy. Internalizing such constructions of normalcy, debtors who use credit disproportionately “feel affluent” and think of themselves as “ordinary.”\textsuperscript{307} Once indebted, debtors become subjected to normalization by debt and are less likely to claim nonconformist views or indulge in nonconformist conduct.\textsuperscript{308} It was noted as early as the 1920s that debt-encumbered homeowners are less likely to go on strike.\textsuperscript{309} Later, during the neoliberal era, Greenspan echoed that the more debts workers have, the less free they are to strike.\textsuperscript{310} Conformity with rules of the new financial and labor markets renders the debtor a responsible subject called forth by neoliberalism.\textsuperscript{311} Thus disciplined, the atomized and self-sufficient


\textsuperscript{305} Traditionally, class, race and gender underscore construction of credit worthiness, as credit standards are “geared towards affluent, white men.” Louis Hyman, \textit{supra} note 165, at 173. For details of how credit rating systems have historically marginalized the poor, women and racial minorities, see \textit{id.} at 173–219.

\textsuperscript{306} See Burton, \textit{supra} note 180, at 53; see also David Knights et al., \textit{The Consumer Rules?: An Examination of the Rhetoric and “Reality” of Marketing in Financial Services}, 28 \textit{EUR. J. OF MARKETING} 42 (1994); Leyshon & Thrift, \textit{supra} note 302, at 455–61 (1999).

\textsuperscript{307} Hyman, \textit{supra} note 165, at 155–56.


\textsuperscript{309} Ross, \textit{supra} note 188, at 85; see also David Harvey, \textit{The Urban Roots of Financial Crises: Reclaiming the City for Anti-Capitalist Struggle}, in \textit{The Crisis and the Left}, \textit{supra} note 217, at 15.

\textsuperscript{310} Amato \& Fantacci, \textit{supra} note 140, at 227.

\textsuperscript{311} Parents and teachers are encouraged to inculcate even in children “the problems that can result from a poor credit rating,” \textit{HOUSEHOLD FIN. CORP., MONEY MANAGEMENT: CHILDREN'S SPENDING} 28 (1968). Empirical studies find that serious debtors are less likely to claim nonconformist views. Lea et al., \textit{supra} note 308, at 85. Household heads who have outstanding credit, and who have higher amounts of such debt, are significantly less likely to report complete psychological wellbeing. The average increase in the psychological distress is greater when outstanding credit is measured at the individual, as opposed to household, level. Sarah Brown et al., \textit{Debt and Distress: Evaluating the Psychological Cost of Credit}, 26 \textit{J. OF ECON. PSYCHOL.} 642, 645 (2005). Rising tuition has led to increased student indebtedness and a decline in student satisfaction with the education they receive. Hilary Metcalf, \textit{Paying for University: The Impact of Increasing Costs on Student Employment, Debt and Satisfaction}, 191 \textit{NAT'L INST. ECON. REV.} 106 (2005). Those from lower income groups are more debt averse than those from other social classes, and are far more likely to be deterred from going to university because of their fear of debt. Claire Callender \& Jonathan Jackson, \textit{Does the Fear of Debt Deter Students from Higher Education?}, 34 \textit{J. OF SOC. POL'Y} 509, 520 (2005). Debt affects students’ academic decisions during college, and causes graduates to choose substantially higher-salary jobs and
subject of the market becomes incompatible with projects of solidarity, collective rights, and anti-subordination. 312

VI. JUST IN CASE: HYPER-EXTENDED PENAL APPARATUS

To be on the safe side, the neoliberal order did not leave the project of disciplining the working classes entirely to debt. It complemented the "invisible hand" of the precarious labor market and burdens of debt with the "iron fist" of the penal state. 313 Indeed, mass incarceration and a "plague of prisons" have become a defining feature of the neoliberal age. 314

Betraying "an eerie similarity" between criminal justice and welfare reform, 315 the neoliberal era is marked by a "culture of control." 316

reduces the probability that students choose low-paid "public interest" jobs. Jesse Rothstein & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Constrained After College: Student Loans and Early-Career Occupational Choices, 95 J. OF PUB. ECON. 149, 150 (2011). Financial issues constrain lower income group students' choice of university far more than those from other social classes. Claire Callender & Jonathan Jackson, Does the Fear of Debt Constrain Choice of University and Subject of Study?, 33 STUD. IN HIGHER EDUC. 405, 409 (2008). Housing payment problems have independent psychological costs over and above those associated with general financial hardship, and the magnitude of the effect is similar to that shown for marital breakdown and job loss. Mark P. Taylor et al., The Psychological Costs of Unsustainable Housing Commitments, 37 PSYCHOL. MED. 1027, 1034 (2007). Note that the connection between debt-driven home-ownership and self-discipline had been argued at least since the early twentieth century. For example, a leading campaigner against liberalization of divorce laws argued that "[t]he industrial world should see that its fundamental needs of industry, efficiency, fidelity to tasks, and loyalty to all demands of the situation require qualifications of mind and character that depend very largely on the home behind the workman . . . ." 3 ARTHUR W. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 197–98 (1919) (quoting Rev. Samuel Dike).

312 The overarching political impact has been captured well by the following:

The bases of prosperity shifted from the social democratic formula of working classes supported by government intervention to the neoliberal conservative one of banks, stock exchanges and financial markets. Ordinary people played their part, not as workers seeking to improve their situation through trade unions, legislation protecting employment rights and publically funded social insurance schemes, but as debt-holders, participants in credit markets. The fundamental political shift was more profound than anything that could be produced by alternations between nominally social democratic and neoliberal conservative parties in government as the result of elections. In has imparted a fundamental rightward shift to the whole political spectrum, as the collective and individual interests of everyone are tied to the financial markets, which in their own operations act highly unequally, producing extreme concentrations of wealth.


313 Pierre Bourdieu makes a parallel analogy by way of "the left hand" of the state, which protects and expands life chances through Keynesian welfare, and is supplanted by the "right hand," that of coercion. PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET 1–10 (1998).


“penalisation of poverty,” and an “enlargement and exaltation of the penal sector” of the state. A renewed deployment of the penal apparatus “increase[s] the cost of strategies of exit into the informal economy of the street” and “neutralizes and warehouses” its most disruptive factions or those “rendered wholly superfluous” by the new economy. While between 1950 and 1970 the imprisonment rate declined, it saw an exponential boom after 1975. Between 1975 and 2000, the total incarcerated population increased by 500 percent. In the United States today, over seven million adults are subjected to the correctional system, including 2,266,800 incarcerated and 4,887,900 under criminal justice supervision outside prisons. Racial minorities and the economically marginalized constitute disproportionate parts of this population. Since 1975, “corrections” posted the fastest expansion in public expenditures and has become the third largest employer in the U.S. As public housing has been dismantled in large part as part of welfare reform, prisons have “effectively [become] the country’s main public housing program.” In tune with the neoliberal agenda of turning the state into a market-state, the penal system has been increasingly privatized. For-profit private prisons,
reinstated in 1983 after having been outlawed in 1925, saw an exponential growth, yielding handsome profits for the burgeoning industry.\(^3\) In line with replacing taxes with user-fees, federal and state governments increasingly adopted “carceral taxation” to have inmates pay for the cost of their own incarceration.\(^3\) Coercive discipline, of course, begins in the streets. The “militarization” of the American police that started with the “war on drugs” and accelerated with the “war on terror” was on display as the Occupy Movement erupted in late 2011.\(^3\)

For the working classes, the expanded deployment of the penal arm of the state increases the cost of not participating in the increasingly precarious labor markets. The prospect of falling off the treadmill of the financialized debt-driven becomes more frightening than ever. This further substantiates the position that law and the state remain critical enablers of subject-forming governmentalities.

CONCLUSION

This article has combined insights of critical political economy with Michel Foucault’s constructs of governmentality, bio-power, and assemblage of self-caring subjects to explore the symbiosis of debt and discipline in the neoliberal era. Laws and public policy were indispensable for choreographing the displacement of Keynesian welfare by the hegemony of finance capital, the hallmark of neoliberalism. Strategic use of monetary policy and radical rearrangement of legal regimes facilitated financialization of the economy, broke the power of organized labor, and expanded debt to sustain aggregate demand. Financial markets extended their reach and expanded liquidity by bringing ever-increasing sections of the working classes within the ambit of the credit economy. Faced with shrinking welfare, wage pressures, and precarious labor markets, working classes had little choice but to fund their basic needs through debt. The subprime mortgage boom testifies to this structural transformation. Neoliberal rationalities procreated constructs of individual responsibility and human capital that facilitated assemblage of subjects who were coaxed to engage the financialized economy as risk-taking entrepreneurs. Engulfment in relationships of debt induced self-discipline and conformity with the logic of the financialized economy and precarious labor markets. Neoliberal

\(^3\) For growth of private imprisonment, see id. at 170 fig.5; see also Alexis M. Durham III, Origins and Interest in the Privatization of Punishment: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century American Experience, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 107 (1989); Charles H. Logan & Sharla P. Rausch, Punish and Profit: The Emergence of Private Enterprise Prisons, 2 JUST. Q. 303 (1985).


financialization of the economy, thus, has transformed capitalism and recruited within its modes of governance the transformation of subjectivity. Neoliberalism emerges as a regime of immanent social control through the market. Public policies drew the frame for conventions and norms of social practice and shaped the horizon within which individuals pursued strategies of economic survival and security. State power created a field of possibility within which market governmentality instilled in the subject an understanding of herself as capital. To live and survive in the debt-fueled financialized economy, this understanding had to be reproduced in practices of daily life. This ensemble sutured debt with discipline.

For three decades, neoliberal financialization combined with globalization contained the crisis of profitability and produced debt-encumbered self-disciplined working classes. In the process, however, it sowed the seeds of a larger crisis. Syphoning of savings from the periphery to sustain demand in the core and securitization of subprime mortgages to generate liquidity had its limits. Pushed beyond the frontiers of sustainability, this empire of debt collapsed. Securitization of debt, designed to spread risk, now spread contagion. The result was the 2008 global financial meltdown and the resulting Great Recession. This trajectory underscores the history of capitalism; it never solves its foundational contradictions and tendencies to crisis, it only transforms them.

The magnitude of the ongoing crisis created by neoliberal financialization is alarming. The global losses of the financial sector exceed 3.4 trillion dollars, and the bill for public rescue of financial institution exceeds 20 trillion dollars. Worldwide, over 50 million jobs were lost. 200 million working people slipped below the poverty line, and high unemployment has become the “new normal.” Value of derivatives at 596 trillion dollars dwarfs the entire world output of 48.6 trillion dollars.

By 2014, government debt of G20 countries is projected to be 120 percent of GDP. The credit worthiness of the U.S. stands questioned and the

333 FERGUSON, supra note 6, at 5, 229.
status of the dollar as the dominant global currency is in jeopardy. The policy responses to the crisis thus far are consistent with the track record of the last three decades: using crises to reinforce the priority of financial institutions and bondholders over the well-being of working classes.\textsuperscript{335} The myriad policy responses have stubbornly refused to ease the debt burdens of consumers and sovereigns, lest the disciplinary role of debt falter. There have been five typical policy responses to the crisis thus far: (1) massive injections of liquidity into the financial system and bailouts of major financial institutions; (2) imposition of fiscal discipline through austerity measures, turning governments into collection agencies for the bond markets; (3) accelerated hollowing out of welfare systems and further pressure on wages; (4) activation of racist xenophobia to recalibrate the boundaries of legitimate membership in society; and (5) acceleration of militarization and use of direct violence both locally and globally.

The crisis and the policy responses have triggered resistance from below. From the Arab Spring to Greek general strikes and from the Occupy Wall Street Movement in the U.S. to mass demonstrations in London, new spaces and modes of resistance are being forged. However, finding a way to respond to the disciplinary function of debt is yet to achieve priority on the agendas of these movements. It is imperative that theory and praxis aimed at emancipatory transformation and global justice take account of the nature and magnitude of the contemporary crisis and the implications of policy responses on the offer. In particular, we must focus on how to deal with the new and refurbished disciplinary regimes that are reinforcing the discipline of debt through national policies to transfer all costs of the crisis to the working classes and the marginalized. Popular democratization of finance through management of finance as a public utility must be high on the agenda of popular movements. An urgent challenge is to explore agendas, coalitions, and organizational forms of resistive social movements suitable to pursue popular democratization of finance. Also needed are designs of political and economic governance conducive to organizing banking and finance as public utilities. The current crisis has opened up the possibility of alternative social orders and modes of life. What shape the future will take depends in no small measure on how contending social forces will confront the perennial question of finance and the relationship between debt and discipline.

\textsuperscript{335} For details, see Paul Krugman, \textit{End This Depression Now!} (2012).