Elephants in the Room: COVID-19 Pandemic Political Ecologies of Tourism in Tanzania

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ELEPHANTS IN THE ROOM:
COVID-19 PANDEMIC POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF TOURISM IN TANZANIA

THESIS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

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2022

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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The COVID-19 pandemic brought forth unprecedented and ever-changing crisis and disruption to societies and economies around the globe. As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to interrupt travel worldwide, the tourism industry, and the countries who rely on it as a major source of income, are in crisis. These processes have reconfigured economic capital flows and foreign investment in the global south. This is particularly the case in Tanzania, as tourism was Tanzania’s highest foreign exchange earner and accounted for 17% of Tanzania’s gross domestic product in 2019. This project draws upon a political ecology framework to examine the Tanzanian state response for tourism during the COVID-19 pandemic from February 2020-July 2021. I employ semi-structured interviews, discourse analysis and archival research of Tanzanian state economic and tourism policy documents, economic reports, views and decisions of hotel owners and operators, flows of tourists to and from Tanzania, and news media coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic from February 2020 to July 2021. I reveal how historical and contemporary power relations impact and influence Tanzanian state policy responses for tourism as well as the social and economic outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic policies on tourism on Mafia Island, Tanzania. Mafia Island is an important tourist destination with Africa’s largest marine park swimming with high biodiversity including whale sharks. My research reveals how the Tanzanian state responded to the pandemic in a variety of ways. This included initially closing borders, to denying the existence of COVID-19 and reopening borders without restrictions for tourists. I show


how the Tanzanian state centralized power and justified opening the country to tourism by creating narratives of fear, the divine, and misinformation about COVID-19. In addition, neo-colonial legacies and logic, economic dependence on foreign capital, and state structuring were found to be important factors in shaping how the tourist sector in Tanzania was affected by state responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Rather than an opportunity for transformation as some pandemic scholars have argued, I find a reinstallement of unevenness producing further entrenchment in economic dependency on international financial institutions and colonial relations within the tourist industry.³

KEYWORDS: tourism, COVID-19 pandemic, political ecology, coloniality, Tanzania

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For my grandmothers, who have always supported my creativity and education.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Three years into the COVID-19 pandemic, health, economic, environmental, and political crises continue to unfold and disrupt the lives of people around the world.\textsuperscript{4} The first global reports of COVID-19 suggested the virus was isolated to China, but by the end of January 2020, COVID-19 cases were officially reported in many countries. The world soon went quiet as travel bans and quarantine health measures were initiated.\textsuperscript{5} By mid-March 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, and lockdowns were imposed in many rich and middle-income countries along with even more stringent travel restrictions.\textsuperscript{6} Across the world, the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic demanded large scale changes in state structuring, economies, and healthcare systems.\textsuperscript{7}

In Sub-Saharan Africa, most countries took quick action to install mitigation measures and created continent-wide systems of health monitoring, surveillance, and organizing for medical supplies and vaccines.\textsuperscript{8} Throughout Africa, the COVID-19’s health and development crisis continues to unfold, and there is an urgent need to envision and analyze post-pandemic/mid-pandemic possibilities for transformation and to rethink


\textsuperscript{5} Sheervalilou et al., “COVID-19 under Spotlight.”; AJMC Staff, “A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020.”

\textsuperscript{6} Kantis et al., “Timeline of the Coronavirus.”

\textsuperscript{7} Kantis et al., “Timeline of the Coronavirus.”)

Already existing fragilities in many global systems – including healthcare, food production and distribution, livelihoods, ecological systems, resource access, employment, economies, global financial markets, governance, human rights, migrant rights, and more – have been revealed and deepened by this pandemic. COVID-19 responses proved challenging for many countries throughout Africa given global structural inequalities of neoliberal development and coloniality. As Leach et al. suggests, “the impacts of the disease and of measures to control it have raised questions about epidemic preparedness and more generally about development, past, present, and future”.

This thesis explores these important questions about economic development and inequality in Africa amid widespread international travel restrictions, biological characteristics of COVID-19 facilitating the disease’s rapid spread, and a global economic recession. I explore how COVID-19 wreaked havoc on the international tourism industry and why the complexity of responses to the COVID-19 pandemic related to tourism is an important area of analysis, particularly in countries of the developing world that rely on international tourism for their economic security. This is particularly the case in Tanzania, where this study takes place.

10 Ibid.
Prior to the pandemic, tourism was Tanzania’s highest foreign exchange earner and accounted for 17% of Tanzania’s gross domestic product. Over 38 percent of Tanzania’s land area is set aside in protected areas for conservation, with 17 national parks, 29 game reserves, and 40 controlled conservation areas and marine parks. Travel and tourism employed 10.77 percent of the country’s labor force (1,550,100 jobs) in 2019. In 2019, Tanzania’s tourism sector generated US $2.6 billion after years of growth, but in 2020, the earnings dropped to $1.06 billion. This thesis explores the history of economic dependence and reliance on tourism as a main source of economic development through a political ecology lens. Dependence on this sector is entangled with ongoing neoliberal economic development and the matrices of coloniality in global capital and in localities produced as tourist locations. The country remains beholden to international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, and the United States through aid and debt. Many of these actors influence economic planning and decision making through economic goals such as prioritizing private investment and removing trade restrictions.

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13 Masare, “Why Credit to Private Sector Growth Slowed to 3-Year Low.”; Kombe, “Tanzania Opening Up Tourism Despite Pandemic.”
18 IMF Communications. “IMF Executive Board Approves $14.3 Million Debt Relief to the United Republic of Tanzania Under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust.” IMF, June 10, 2020.; World
As such, my research is about tourism, but it is also about the global narratives and material effects of neoliberal economic development during one of the largest ongoing global economic upheavals during the lifetime of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. I focus on the impact of Tanzanian state responses to the COVID-pandemic on tourism and how international media and discourses related to the pandemic also impact state responses. I track refusals, reinstallations, and contestations of the economies neoliberal economic development forces support and build in Tanzania.

Pandemics animate different conflicts, powers, and responses in different places, as the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated across the world. This creates a multiplicity of pandemics. Tanzania’s pandemic is both particular in the specific methods of COVID-19 denialism by the state and similar to other countries’ pandemics in responses articulating authoritarian governance and fealty to neoliberalism and capital. In Tanzania, as the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded, multiple eras with different forms of state governance and nongovernmental actor responses appear. This thesis interrogates the connected crises of the COVID-19 pandemic, coloniality, economic instability in the tourism industry, and the Tanzanian state.

As Maldonado-Torres has theorized, “coloniality refers to the diversity of practices that derive from the matrix of power created by colonialism and are still at work within contemporary, post-colonial societies”. I argue the Tanzania tourism industry is constructed through coloniality, and the state response of Tanzania during the pandemic is invested in that industry and reproduces colonial relationships during the pandemic’s first year and a half. Coloniality in decision-making was contested by domestic actors who called for different economic structuring and different jobs, and by contestations between colonial forces and forces tied historically to colonial power. Each institution invested in coloniality has its own goals, and in the case of Tanzania during the COVID-19 pandemic, sometimes these goals oppose each other, causing a reckoning and power struggle between and against the state and colonial forces themselves.

This thesis also reveals how the Tanzanian state centralized power and justified opening the country to tourism by creating narratives of fear, the divine, and misinformation about COVID-19. The Tanzanian state censored the media to construct the COVID-19 pandemic as a crisis of fear, thereby minimizing the harms of the COVID-19 virus on Tanzanian citizens. The state weaponized narratives of “fear” of the virus as the main cause for economic hardships faced by the country during the pandemic and that the “power of prayer” and religious faith could “heal” the country along with opening it up to the tourism sector by lifting international travel bans.

This research also reveals how Tanzanian state policy responses for tourism in the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the tourism industry on Mafia Island, Tanzania. Mafia

Island is of significant tourism value for Tanzania as it contains Africa’s first and largest marine park, where tourists swim with whale sharks and experience one of the best diving sites in the world. As a result of these natural wonders, Mafia’s archipelago contains one of the world’s most expensive hotels. Mafia Island’s tourist industry has a long history, and tourism began on Mafia Island during the German colonial period when a lodge was built on the island for visiting colonial officials and other colonial subjects. After Tanzanian independence, the government built a hotel on the island. In the 1990s, the Mafia Island Marine Park was created for the purpose of attracting tourism development, and many privately-run hotels have been established on the island. Hotels in the archipelago include a luxury private island, ecotourism hotels, Tanzanian run inexpensive hotels and camping areas, and luxury resorts. Island economies are particularly sensitive to tourism industry changes because of the limits on environmental, social, and economic activities due to geography.

My research offers an analysis of critical moments at the beginning of the Tanzanian COVID-19 pandemic. However, the time analyzed for this study is not the end of critical moments in the pandemic. Certainly, some futures are foreclosed due to

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the decisions and events of the first two years of the pandemic, but futures of coloniality are not inevitable. Global crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, present opportunities to analyze these shifts and movements of power and gives a chance for peoples made marginal to enact new forms of worldmaking.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{27} Getachew, \textit{Worldmaking after Empire}
2.1 Research Questions

1. What is the Tanzanian state response for tourism during the COVID-19 pandemic from February 2020 – July 2021 and what narratives, discourses, and power relationships influenced state responses?
2. How do historical and contemporary power relations impact and influence Tanzanian state policy responses for tourism in the COVID-19 pandemic?
3. How does the Tanzanian state policy response for tourism in the COVID-19 pandemic impact the tourism industry on Mafia Island?

2.2 Political Ecology

Political ecology is a multidisciplinary field that examines how relationships of power are entangled in politics, society, and the environment. Anthropologists and geographers laid the theoretical foundations for the field in the late twentieth century, merging interests and practices of political economy and cultural ecology. The shared political project of Marxism in geography and anthropology led to focus on the role of the state on the environment and environmental conflicts. Many political ecologists were interested in Third World communities and their relationship with global capitalism. Political ecologists were raising important questions about the limitations of cultural ecology, a field formed in opposition to environmental determinism, concerned with human adaptation to and impacts on natural landscapes. Most notably, Michael Watts critiqued cultural ecology for its nature-society dualisms and portrayal of human behavior.
as rational adaptations to environmental hazards. Instead, Watts suggested that nature and society are a dialectical process and pointed to the social, political, and economic structures that dictate and constrain human interaction with the environment.  

Political ecologists began to recognize that degradation is largely determined by political power in terms of who has control and access to environmental knowledge and resources, and the circumstances under which this control is wielded. An emerging political ecology recognized that environmental crisis and degradation should be explained through the lens of social theory, specifically Marxist political economy related to the power relations that shape structures of inequality and political processes. It was the first analytical approach to reveal how “politics is inevitably ecological and … ecology is inherently political.”

Political ecology research set out to examine issues at multiple scales, through quantitative and qualitative methods, to produce new understandings of power and its ecological and social consequences. Political ecology has now evolved to address differing conceptions of environmental problems and to counter dominant and authoritative knowledge by recognizing reality as produced discursively. It is a “community of practice” that produces “certain kinds of texts,” rather than specific methodologies and approaches. One of the main strengths of political ecology is

31 Neumann, Making Political Ecology
32 Ibid.
33 Robbins, Political Ecology. 3.
34 Robbins, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction
changing and adapting to the new knowledge and practices in the disciplinary fields surrounding it, while at the same time demanding more rigorous and critical research and undermining previously widely held theories within the same surrounding traditions. In the 1990s and early 2000s, as the field evolved due to linkages with social theory, the rise of feminist political ecologists, and incorporation of poststructuralist thought, researchers began to raise important questions that interrogated the politics of communities. Researchers questioned nature-society discourse and its relationship to power, in particular, Arturo Escobar led the field to investigate and critique discourses of development imposed upon the global South by global North organizations, showing how production of these narratives opened up possibilities for resistance by people and communities in the global South. As Schroeder demonstrated, changing development discourses led to changes in how communities organize and new contestations of social and environmental rights, ownership, labor, and profit. In these new strands of political ecology, researchers recognized communities are dynamic and not homogenous, meaning power struggles within communities required study to better understand relationships between humans and the environment.

One example of important advances in political ecology is the formation of the subfields drawing on different theories. Decolonial theories informed political ecologists and demonstrated how to confront hegemonic power.

37 Neumann, Making Political Ecology
40 Neumann, Making Political Ecology
structures and develop analyses of actions, power, and language in relationship to historical colonial relations. Essential to decolonial theory is praxis to end colonial practices and actualize indigenous sovereignty. Anticolonial theorists in political ecology demonstrate how colonial relations are continually remade today through a multitude of power relationships. Both postcolonial and decolonial theorists theorize how the roots and legacies of colonial rule are embedded within development projects in the Global South.

More recent analyses by political ecologists highlight a lack of recognition of knowledge production systems outside the white Eurocentric academy and called for political ecologists to decenter whiteness in the field. Kim et al. notes that the whiteness of political ecology obfuscates the contributions of scholars of color and scholars in the Global South and naturalizes assumptions of whiteness in research. Political ecology research often examines the subjects of research with a postcolonial lens, but often fails to challenge the position and gaze of the researcher. Loftus examines different political ecology attempts to decenter whiteness and contribute to struggles against colonialism

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45 Kim et al., “Other Political Ecologies: Introduction”
and extraction, concluding recognition of situated identities and attending to these inequalities in analysis and research practices is necessary. In response political ecologists draw upon decolonial theory mainly during the twenty-first century drawing inspiration from Paulo Friere, Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire, Jamaica Kincaid, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, and Eve Tuck in order to broaden understandings of colonization, its effects, the institutions and powers imposing it, its mechanisms and laws, and many forms it takes. These studies highlight the role of colonialism and the legacies of colonial power continuing to produce violence and unjust environmental degradation and pollution across the globe. Through a praxis of political ecology, these scholars argue that production and engagement in decolonial work is paramount, because critical analysis is incomplete if the settler state and other forms of colonization are not examined and contested.

46 Loftus, “Political Ecology I:”
48 Loftus “Political Ecology I”
Bonds uses Bhandar’s theory to theorize the possessive geographies of white supremacy saying, “the material spaces made through the logics of possession…reproduce white propertied power,” which is seen throughout development and tourism industries, even in postcolonial states with large black or indigenous majorities. The settler view of land as property and intrinsically connected to labor is not the only option, and indigenous relationships with land create healthier communities because of a commitment to wellbeing of land and community, rather than of fidelity to the state and government. Inwood and Bonds clarify that settler colonial discourses around property and white supremacy lead white people to assume ownership of land, even if they have no legal right to possess that land. White supremacy and settler colonial logics rationalize dispossession of native peoples for settler capital.

McKittrick demonstrates the injustices of the past and people unjustly taken from the earth haunt the present materially in the built environment and continuations of inequality, but also metaphorically in stories, lived experiences, and memory. These continuations of inequality are deeply present in environmental justice issues. Pulido

53 Inwood and Bonds, “Property and Whiteness: The”
challenges researchers to more clearly demarcate how the environmental injustices of pollution, dispossession, flooding, warming, and more are fundamentally entwined with racial capitalism and the politics of the settler state.\textsuperscript{55} Pulido calls us to look beyond the state to create solutions for environmental justice and to critically analyze the state’s role in producing injustice.\textsuperscript{56} This is the larger context in the discipline to which my project will contribute through an analysis of power, tourism, and the COVID-19 pandemic in Tanzania.

2.3 Pandemic Political Ecologies

Due to the far-reaching effects of the COVID-19 pandemic particularly in communities made vulnerable by capitalism and colonial power, political ecologists are analyzing gendered experiences of state policies, public health practices, and racialized oppression connected to the health crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.\textsuperscript{57} These studies explore forms of labor where women are the majority of workers, such as care work, microfinance, service industry jobs (including tourism labor), and informal work, showing the fragility of this labor due to the close contact required and the curtailing of this work by lockdowns and state-enforced pandemic measures.\textsuperscript{58} Brickell et

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
al. investigates augmentation of private debt among borrowers in Cambodia due to the
global economic downturn and calls for debt relief among all actors.\textsuperscript{59} Other scholars
draw attention to differentiated challenges and produced effects in countries with
governments unable to support residents sufficiently at the same time as stringent
lockdowns, punitive militarized forces upholding restrictions, and public health practices
drastically challenge the economic stability of residents.\textsuperscript{60} While much of the literature
focuses on far-reaching impacts of the state and international actors, political ecologists
also demonstrate the moment of pandemic presents opportunities for marginalized
communities already immersed in environmental conflicts to confront power and reassert
their rights. In Brazil, a large collection of indigenous groups across different regions
mobilized blockades and other protocols to stop incursions on their territories by settlers
and limit extraction of natural resources on their lands.\textsuperscript{61} In addition, analyses examine
Covid-19 as part of ecology, an effect of environmental destruction, and air pollution as a
comorbidity of COVID-19.\textsuperscript{62}

The COVID-19 pandemic presents a critical moment of potential change and
justice, or a potential reassertion of colonial and racist power. This pandemic is

\textsuperscript{59} Brickell et al., “Compounding Crises of Social Reproduction:”, 3
\textsuperscript{60} Ali, Tariq Omar, Mirza Hassan, and Naomi Hossain. “The Moral and Political Economy of the
Pandemic in Bangladesh: Weak States and Strong Societies during Covid-19.” \textit{World Development} 137
\textsuperscript{61} Menton, Mary, Felipe Milanez, Jurema Machado de Andrade Souza, and Felipe Sotto Maior Cruz. “The
(February 1, 2021): 1 – 9.
\textsuperscript{62} Friedman, Michael. “The Political Ecology of Pandemics: Emerging Diseases and Ecosystem Decline.”
Mohanto, Mohammad J. Hosen, and Khaled Hossain. “Exposure to Air Pollution and COVID-19 Severity:
A Review of Current Insights, Management, and Challenges.” \textit{Integrated Environmental Assessment and
Management} 17, no. 6 (April 29, 2021): 1114–22.
unprecedented in its reach and potential longstanding impact on human and nonhuman life. For this reason, many theorists understand the pandemic(s) and the crises it creates and works with as co-creating and producing new worlds. As the COVID-19 pandemic(s) continue to intervene in and shape the lives of people around the world, the field of political ecology has shifted as well. Political ecologists have theorized the pandemic as an opportunity for transformation of the global economy, a moment of deepening economic, environmental, and social inequality, and a collection of new and ongoing crises, tying together climate change, settler colonialism, health crises, political instability, and economic emergency. This COVID-19 pandemic presents a conjuncture, between all ongoing ecological and human crises and the new challenges of the pandemic.

Arundhati Roy, an Indian writer, political dissident, and environmental activist, calls this moment of pandemic a, “portal,” a moment of clarity illuminating injustice and inequality undergirding human society. The “portal” of the pandemic not only allows humans to see the current moment clearly, but also imagine the world differently, as “a gateway between one world and the next”.

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lockdown made visible the poverty and lack of social safety net for migrant workers, state and extrajudicial violence against Muslims, and the plight of urban poor and sick people.\textsuperscript{68} In a later piece, Roy maps the systemic inequality and governmental abandonment translating in COVID-19 cases and deaths through her personal friend networks. She directly ties oppressive movements of the Indian state in displacement of indigenous peoples and violence against poor people and Muslims to more serious sickness and death during the pandemic.\textsuperscript{69} While Arundhati Roy may not self-identify as a political ecologist, her analyses of power, class, inequality, and environment fit within the field. Meanwhile, a political ecologist and tourism scholar Mostafanezhad similarly argues that the COVID-19 pandemic provides a “revelatory” moment, allowing researchers to see inequality and injustice starkly.\textsuperscript{70} Crises, such as the current pandemic, unearth the structural conditions which create differentiated impact and responses on and of states and people. Drawing from David Harvey, Mostafanezhad defines uneven effects and inequality resulting from these structural conditions as the unnatural aspects of crises.\textsuperscript{71} In her theorization, disasters are inevitable, but crises are the unnatural consequences of disasters due to systemic social, political, and economic disparities. However, the pandemic also provides an opportunity to address systemic problems,

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Mostafanezhad, “Covid-19 Is an Unnatural Disaster:”, 640.
organize along new geographies and behind new ideas, and make material improvements in the lives of people made marginal.\footnote{Mostafanezhad, “Covid-19 Is an Unnatural Disaster:”, 640 -2; 643-644.}

Political ecology analyses of the COVID-19 pandemic reveal reinstallation of inequality and unevenness in the world. They show how states, particularly those with authoritarian leaders, utilized COVID-19 measures for public health and economic assistance to consolidate power at the expense of their citizens, especially racialized minorities, the poor, and environmental activists.\footnote{Dressler, “Quarantining Activism: COVID-19, Frontline Defenders”; Roy, “The Pandemic is a Portal”; Ali et al., “The Moral and Political Economy of the Pandemic in Bangladesh;”; Roy, “Arundhati Roy on India’s Covid Catastrophe:”} The Filipino authoritarian and populist President Rodrigo Duterte, state security actors in the form of police and the military, and other political elites utilized quarantine laws created to address COVID-19 to suppress environmental and human rights defenders and enrich extractive industries. Duterte’s use of violent rhetoric against constructed enemies of his administration and labeling of left-leaning activists and movements as “terrorism” increased the violent responses of political elites to dissent.\footnote{Dressler, “Quarantining Activism: COVID-19, Frontline Defenders”, 455.} Defenders and activists received many surprise visits from state security actors during lockdown, leading to arrests and assaults. State actors arrested and charged protesting and organizing defenders for breaking quarantine, and the legitimization of violence and harassment of defenders by the state led to several assassinations. These actions by the state and its allies allowed illegal and legal resource extraction to increase in forests and marine environments, threatening indigenous communities’ livelihoods.\footnote{Dressler, “Quarantining Activism: COVID-19, Frontline Defenders”, 455.}
In India, a period of refusal to act and then sudden imposition of a stringent lockdown instituted by Hindu Nationalist President Modi served to displace and criminalize millions of migrant and low-income workers in cities. Police assaulted many of the unhoused and migrating poor as part of lockdown enforcement. Modi and his BJP party continued to attack the Muslim Indian community, inciting vigilante violence against Muslims at the beginning of the pandemic and violent aggressions of the state continues through enforcement of an Anti-Muslim citizenship law. In 2021, Modi claimed India defeated COVID-19 and began to mobilize his followers through mass rallies and celebrations, which became super spreader events during the Delta wave in India. Protesters and activists organizing against indigenous dispossession and resource extraction, anti-Muslim state policies, and the corporatization of agriculture were censored online, arrested and detained while sick with COVID-19, became victims of government abandonment during the Delta wave, and were beaten and teargassed during protests. Imprisonment of minority groups in Northern India continued despite the health and economic crises facing the country, and the national government took the opportunity of COVID-19 to deport Rohingya refugees to a genocidal regime in Myanmar. The Bangladeshi authoritarian one party government also instituted a strict lockdown sans adequate social safety net resources for poor and middle-income citizens. Stimulus packages for corporations along with general distrust of the government spurred blatant collective action ignoring the lockdown measures and evading state actors. Due to a history of corruption surrounding elections in Bangladesh, the ruling elites needed to gain

76 Roy, “The Pandemic is a Portal”, 1-2.
77 Roy, “Arundhati Roy on India’s Covid Catastrophe:”
legitimacy through provision of some freedoms and benefits to the lower classes, and they decided to follow working class laborers’ leads and lift the lockdown early. In these examples, governments and leaders used COVID-19 measures as a tool to suppress dissent, retain authority and power, and enrich industries and corporations.

Economic crises as a result of the global pandemic are also examined in the political ecology literature. Fresnillo reveals the effect of global patterns of development and financial institutions, finding that debt burdens are increased by the pandemic. COVID-19 is creating a new debt crisis in the global South, causing many countries to eliminate or decrease social services, increasing economic inequality within countries and widening the wealth inequality at the scale of states. Before the pandemic, a significant portion of global South states’ budgets went to international financial institutions to pay off debts, and now much of COVID-19 financial support at the international level has been given in the form of loans, further indebting countries already in debt to the World Bank and the IMF. Indebtedness intersects with challenges of the climate emergency, making global South communities more vulnerable to extreme weather events caused by climate change and less able to fund climate resilience projects. In addition, Fresnillo notes that the effects of austerity specifically marginalize women, through states decreasing social services, which increases the amount of care work and domestic labor at the scale of the family, work traditionally done by women. Development programs and international institutions working in Africa rely upon the labor of women, particularly

80 Ibid, p 500.
poor women, calling them “shock absorbers” for austerity policies. Women’s rights to health, economic stability, and safety have been threatened through large economic shifts hurting service industries (including the tourism industry) and state and nonstate infrastructure used to provide social safety nets. As unevenness continues to unfold, scholars call for attention to this intensification of inequality, intersectional and anti-racist analysis, and the valuing of marginalized and dispossessed people’s opinions and ideas within policy solutions and research.

COVID-19 has exacerbated existing inequality. As such, Ho and Maddrell demand geographers change research agendas to attend to differentiated experiences among genders and age groups, effects on migration and mobility, and the collective movements and responses to state-created crises during the pandemic. The authors call for intersectional analyses within scholarship studying the pandemic, so the policy recommendations created in response to these studies are more robust and better informed.

There are possibilities for transformation in the production of development data and knowledge through political ecology frameworks analyzing the social, political, economic, and environmental processes shaping pandemics.

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87 Leach et al. “Post-pandemic transformations”, 5-6.
completely changing the field and praxis of development to support and nurture grassroots-led political and economic futures in opposition to capitalist development hierarchical practices which reinscribe inequality and unjust solutions to economic problems in developing communities and economies. Fuentes understands the pandemic as a “biosocial” event, meaning biological systems are deeply entangled with human cultural and social lives, which has the opportunity to transform the world into a more environmentally conscious and ethical place, noting that within the first few months of the pandemic, attention to wildlife trade and air pollution decreased.

The conjecture of environmental degradation and crises along with the COVID-19 pandemic is not only deepening the effects of capitalism, colonialism, financialization, and imperialism, but creating new problems, resistances, imaginations, and movements. The COVID-19 pandemic and the specific conditions of place and structures of society create multiple pandemics with different effects over time in specific countries and places. Gomez-Becerra and Muneri-Wangari note that the virus creates uncertainties which force change in practices of care and produces different social relations and worlds. In studies of new forms and changes to Indigenous resistance to extraction and settler states during the pandemic, this is seen through community responses and changes. In Kenyan Maasai communities, social and environmental relationships

90 Sultana, “Progress Report in Political Ecology II:”
changed as communal practices of care increased to protect community members from state failures to provide proper care and financial relief. Women and men (even though men are traditionally not involved in as much care labor) responded to community members made vulnerable by state policies during the pandemic through creating new practices of food distribution, working through social networks to receive and distribute aid, translation of COVID-19 measures, and making informal community schools.  

In Bangladesh, communities and individuals resisted the weak state and its measures and policies through reopening shops and workplaces once it became clear the government was unwilling or unable to provide sufficient assistance and aid. Even state power and regulators in the form of police and the government began to ignore broken COVID-19 measures and policies.  

In moments of crises created by the COVID-19 pandemic, power relationships at all different scales had the potential to change. Taylor and Orning analyze inequalities in their countries and interpersonal lives as they navigate the labor of childcare and disability in the first months of the pandemic. In their lives, the familial structure changes and the power dynamics shift when for example, Taylor’s immediate family separates to protect each other and Taylor travels to live with extended family. These changes at the scale of the family are put in context with largescale problems of care labor. 

During the pandemic, many governments used state agencies to discipline and enact COVID-19 measures. But weak states, burdened by debt and smaller economies, could not

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successfully implement the same health policies and interventions, because of the power and urgent needs of their citizens. Subversion of state power also occurred through faith communities and religious leaders. Faith leaders challenged the need for COVID-19 measures in South Asia and parts of the United States, while in Tanzania religious authorities spoke against the government to alert community members of the presence of COVID-19. Following the uprisings for Black life in Minneapolis and around the globe, Taylor and Orning document the change in political will and power as collective action demanded material change at municipal levels, the level of the state, and nationally.

Colonial power during the pandemic surfaced in a variety of forms, within settler colonial states, between postcolonial states and global institutions, and former colonizer states and postcolonial states. Indigenous communities continued to organize against dispossession and extraction in Brazil, with some communities finding success in imposing health measures on their lands that also prevented new settling of their land. Meanwhile other Brazilian indigenous communities continually confronted incursions from legal and illegal extraction on their land, putting their communal health at risk.

Native American communities tracked colonial power and violence through the lackluster supply of COVID-19 related healthcare products from the federal government. On an

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100 Menton et al., “The COVID-19 Pandemic Intensified Resource Conflicts”
international level, rich, former and current colonizers bought most of the available contracts with vaccine providers, forcing poorer countries to rely upon their foreign relations with rich countries and the WHO to provide vaccines months after rich countries began to vaccinate their citizens. In addition, the funding of health research by private foundations continues to allow funders such as Bill Gates a significant say in control of patents and vaccine deliverance, preventing people most at risk in the Global South from receiving vaccinations.\textsuperscript{102}

2.4 Pandemic Political Ecologies of Tourism in the Global South

While many commentators are quick to identify the challenges and opportunities the COVID-19 pandemic created for the tourism industry, it is necessary to begin with a recognition of the ways international tourism connected and perpetuated the outbreak. For some, the coronavirus pandemic represented an important opportunity to change the problems at the root of the tourism industry. The pandemic demonstrated how tourism is used as a quick solution for recovery but creates its own health and environmental crises outside of economic unevenness. Tourism, “exacerbates the ongoing uneven geographies of climate vulnerability” and reasserts colonial relationships through neocolonial economic restructuring creating dependency.\textsuperscript{103} This COVID-19 pandemic presents a host of challenges and potential damage to tourist locations, but also offers a critical


moment for change. As Sheller writes, the pandemic and economic chaos should be an opportunity to move towards a different future, different relationships, and justice. Communities can take this opportunity to determine, write, and fight for their desires, despite damage and pain. Mostafanezhad identifies this inflection moment as an opportunity for capitalist power to wane in the face of a more ecologically sustainable and economically just form of tourism, because of the crisis it faces. She also presents the possibility of reassertion of corporate power through utilization of the pandemic as an accumulation practice. Mostafanezhad suggests the pandemic also offers the opportunity to reshape and rebuild the tourism industry into more economically and socially just relationships through inviting tourists to question the effects of their trips, what tourism exploits, and what people and systems tourists support through travel services. Meanwhile, indigenous movements, scholars, and marginalized people utilized the COVID-19 pandemic to call for change and make more livable futures and worlds. Scholars reported entrenchment of inequality, particularly economic inequality through debt, which is one of the most important mechanisms of neoliberal development at work in the world, both in national debt and small microfinance loans.

Tourism demonstrates the multiple temporalities of crises intersecting at the particular moment of pandemic including long temporal processes exemplified in the

climate crisis and capitalist development, as well as shorter processes like the health
crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic. The messy uncertainties of the pandemic require
openness and attention to more than structural inequalities to properly examine what is
happening and for, “unseen possibilities,” to unfold.\textsuperscript{109} This was captured in Sheller’s
analysis of the relationship between coloniality, climate change, tourism, and
development agendas to the particular crises of the Covid-19 pandemic on tourism.
Sheller demonstrates how the inequality rooted within tourism and its effects on local
peoples is tied to the coloniality of climate change. She defines coloniality of climate
change as through demonstrating climate vulnerability in Caribbean islands is the result
of colonization and neoliberal restructuring, both historically and in the present, which
curtails all industries and livelihoods in the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{110} Moving forward, Sheller argues
a just recovery for the peoples in the Caribbean is one with alternatives to not just tourism
but, “working with Caribbean-based communities to reimagine regenerative economies
and resilient ecologies that are grounded in more just relations of mobility and
connection”.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109} Gibson, Chris. “Theorising Tourism in Crisis: Writing and Relating in Place.” \textit{Tourist Studies} 21, no. 1
(March 1, 2021): 84–95. Quote p 92
\textsuperscript{110} Sheller, “Reconstructing Tourism in the Caribbean”, 7; Sheller, Mimi. \textit{Island Futures: Caribbean
\textsuperscript{111} Sheller, “Reconstructing Tourism in the Caribbean”, 10
CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY

Tanzania, officially the United Republic of Tanzania, is the 13th largest country in Africa (Figure 1). Tanzania’s estimated 2020 population is 57.797 million. The population is composed of approximately 120 ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. Among Tanzania’s many African and non-African residents, two groups are considered to indigenous, the Hadza and Sandawe hunter-gatherers. Prior to the pandemic, tourism was Tanzania’s highest foreign exchange earner and accounted for 17% of Tanzania’s gross domestic product. Over 38 percent of Tanzania’s land area is set aside in protected areas for conservation, with 17 national parks, 29 game reserves, and 40 controlled conservation areas and marine parks. Travel and tourism employed 10.77 percent of the country’s labor force (1,550,100 jobs) in 2019. In 2019, Tanzania’s tourism sector generated US $2.6 billion after years of growth, but in 2020, the earnings dropped to $1.06 billion.

Mafia Island, Tanzania, where this study takes place, has a total area of 972 sq km² and is composed of a large island and several smaller islands.

113 Bryceson et al., “Tanzania”
114 Masare, “Why Credit to Private Sector Growth Slowed to 3-Year Low.”; Kombe, “Tanzania Opening Up Tourism Despite Pandemic.”
approximately 120 km southeast of Dar es Salaam in the western Indian Ocean (see Figure 2). There are five inhabitable islands and a number of smaller reefs. According to the 2012 Tanzanian Population Census, Mafia District has 46,438 inhabitants. Mafia Island is home to the first and largest marine protected area in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Mafia Island Marine Park was created for the purpose of attracting tourism development, and many privately-run hotels have been established on the island. Mafia’s archipelago contains one of the world’s most expensive hotels on a private island which the owners have renamed from Shugi-Mbili (a Swahili name) to the name of their business, Thanda (Figure 2).

Mafia Island’s tourist industry is comprised of a variety of actors, including Mafia Island Marine Park, white expatriate hotel owners and employees, and Tanzanian hotel owners and employees. The hotels in the Mafia Island archipelago offer tourism options for a range of socio-economic statuses. The most expensive hotel is owned by a Swedish couple and rents for $45,000 a night (five nights minimum). Other hotels on the island range in price from beach bungalows costing less than $60 per night and hotels that cost $100 – $350 per night. Many of the less expensive lodging options are owned by Tanzanians.

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118 Bryceson et al. 2006; Figure 2
Figure 1. Tanzania is found on the coast of East Africa, bordering Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Lake Nyanza (the colonial name is Lake Victoria) and the Indian Ocean.124


Figure 2. This map was produced for tourists by a Zanzibar Scuba company, and it shows many of the villages, beaches, activities, and the Mafia Island Marine Park boundaries. The different zones colored on the map have stringent rules for local people regarding fishing and sea ecosystem maintenance.125

CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

I conducted semi-structured interviews with Mafia Island hotel owners and employees and discourse analysis of international financial institution reports, news articles covering tourism and COVID-19 in Tanzania and Mafia Island, as well as historical documents and texts on colonialism in Tanzania. Broadly, I found the first year and a half of the pandemic upheld the colonial matrix of power tying together the economic futures of the Tanzanian state, international financial institutions to which Tanzania is indebted, foreign white tourists and their capital, and the tourism industry. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, my project went through multiple iterations and strategies to collect information on Tanzania’s experience of the pandemic and policy responses. Most of my data is collected from national and international news media sources, state-level reports, and archival articles, however I conducted some virtual interviews with Mafia Island tourism industry workers, an island with a burgeoning tourism industry and longstanding environmental conflicts and disputes between locals and the tourism industry.126

4.1.1 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis examines knowledge formation through actions, practices, and words which form discourses shaped by power and confronting power. This methodology analyzes both the content and work of written text

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alongside the larger social and political context of materials. Discourse analysis is used to examine how the state, the tourism industry, international organizations, and the news media discuss the tourism industry and its importance to wider economic recovery during the pandemic. I explore conventional knowledges on the Covid-19 pandemic, tourism, and who sets these norms, critiquing relations of power underlying these discourses.

Discourse analysis was popularized through Foucault’s texts, *The Order of Things* and *The Archeology of Knowledge*, where he theorizes discourse and how to analyze these beliefs underpinning societies and temporal frames. In the sphere of geography and political ecology, discourse analysis is used to analyze epistemologies and power, the role of institutions in creating discourse, and the plurality of discourses from different actors and places. Discourse analysis has been used to examine forms of environmentalism, environmental truths created by power and changing policy and actions of governments, narratives of ruin and decay damaging communities, and many more discourses constructing and underwriting relationships of people, nature, and power. Feminist political ecologists use discourse analysis to analyze coloniality in past and present through discourses of blame for problems of climate change and environment, control of climate change knowledge in colonial power dynamics, and the language of environmentalism and climate change itself. This practice enables me to investigate the

underlying beliefs of development, tourism, foreign control, race and racialization, and economy within Tanzania’s tourism industry during the COVID-19 pandemic. These commonly held narratives build policy and have material effects on the lives of local people in tourism hot spots. Through also examining colonial discourses and colonization, I can better understand the connections and relationship of tourism to coloniality.

This research project commenced with an investigation of news articles published during the first year and a half of the pandemic (February 2020 – July 2021). Following data collection of these articles, I created questions for interviews of hotel workers on Mafia Island, Tanzania and examined the reports regarding the Tanzanian tourist industry published by the World Bank and the International Monetary fund during the pandemic. Reports from these international financial institutions detail the plans these organizations made for Tanzania and the loans and grants provided for those purposes. The data collected in news articles and Bretton Woods institution reports gave context and inspired important questions for the interviews. During and after the coding of these reports, I began to conduct interviews with hotel owners and workers on Mafia Island, with the help of my research assistant on Mafia Island. Collection and analysis of selected colonial histories and documents on Tanzania followed these interviews.

The first portion of my study began through the collection of news articles published between February 1, 2020 and August 1, 2021. I collected 262 articles through Google Alerts and a variety of time period specific Google News Searches with an amalgamation of these search terms: “Tanzania” “Covid-19”, “tourism”, “coronavirus”, “tourists”, “covid”, and “Mafia Island”. The authors and publications of these articles varied, with some from international tourism magazines, blogs, and promotional media, many from Tanzanian newspapers and news networks, several from foreign government news reports or statements, several press releases from international financial institutions, and many articles from independent news organizations.

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outside of Tanzania (Figure 1.). Because of the tenuous political situation throughout President Magufuli’s term and during the beginning of President Hassan’s term, censorship regarding COVID-19 pervades articles from Tanzanian newspapers beginning in May of 2020. For this reason, articles from international news organizations, foreign governments, and global financial institutions fill in some of the informational gaps censored in Tanzanian news reports. In addition, international sources provide ample opportunity to analyze the discourse of Tanzania tourism, which I then used alongside colonial historical documents and the papers from international financial institutions to disentangle colonial beliefs and ideas within the COVID-19 pandemic response in the sector.

**Figure 3**: Chart of collected newspaper articles and publications used in this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Publication</th>
<th>Number of Articles Collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzanian News (A)</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist Magazines and Blogs (B)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Government Press Releases</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Financial Institutions (D)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign News Organizations (E)</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Neoliberal Policy and Archival Document Review

Over the course of my study period (February 2020 – July 2021), five reports and press releases were published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Though the IMF and the WB are certainly not the only international banks focused on development providing loans, debt relief, and grants to Tanzania during the COVID-19 pandemic, they were the only international financial institutions to publish reports on Tanzania’s economy, including several specific reports on Tanzania’s tourism
industry. In addition, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have longstanding relationships with the Tanzanian government and have directed neoliberal restructuring since the partial bailout of Tanzania in 1986. Most international development projects utilize neoliberal solutions and are influenced by the IMF and WB projects. International development as a sector has been connected to coloniality, enforcing and maintaining dependence from former colonies on former colonial powers’ capital.

Using The Times (London) archive, I collected and transcribed forty newspaper articles to identify the relationship between German and English colonization of Tanzania and tourism. My search terms included: “German East Africa,” “expedition,” “Mafia Island,” “tour,” “Tanganyika,” “reserve,” and “tourism”. These results were culled to the specific time periods of colonization by Germany (1885 -1919) and Britain (1919 – 1961). In conjunction with newspaper articles and interviews, discourse analysis allowed me to analyze narratives of coloniality within the industry of tourism and within the development agenda of international financial organizations. A collection of texts examining the history of colonization and tourism in Tanzania and Mafia Island were


analyzed in the course of this study. Most of these texts focused on Tanzania writ large, or particular sites of game reserves and tourism. The data collected from both types of historical documents were instrumental in tracing connections and similar discourse between colonization and modern international tourism.

4.3 Semi-Structured interviews

Twelve interviews of hotel workers took place in August and September 2021. These interviews were conducted in English, a national language of Tanzania and a lingua franca of the tourism industry. I conducted two interviews through WhatsApp and Zoom with an owner and manager, while 10 interviews with other workers were conducted by my research assistant in person and in a private area. All the participants, at some point in the pandemic, were employed by one of five hotels selected for variation in type of hotel as well as price of stay. Six respondents identified as women and six identified as men. I assign respondents and each hotel pseudonyms for the protection of the respondents. Participants worked in a variety of different areas in these five hotels, including as cooks, housekeepers, boatmen, gardeners, masseuses, and more. These workers responded to a series of background questions about their work in the hotel, as well as questions specifically about their experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact on the hotel and tourism industry.

CHAPTER 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 COVID-19 Pandemic Timeline in Tanzania

**Figure 4:** COVID-19 Pandemic Timeline in Tanzania (below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 3, 2020</td>
<td>An opposition party (ACT-Wazalendo) calls for government to assess the economic impact of COVID-19, naming economic impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on tourism, economic trade with China, and being prepared for an outbreak in Tanzania as the reasons this is needed.\(^\text{136}\)

| March 6, 2020 | Zanzibar’s government bans flights from Italy. Tourists cancel plans “due to fear of contracting the deadly virus on their way, compounded by foreign or travel bans imposed by their countries”,\(^\text{137}\) The Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resources Mr Costantine Kanyasu, a member of the ruling CCM party, admitted the coronavirus outbreak was bound to hit hard the tourism industry, one of Tanzania’s leading foreign currency earner sectors.\(^\text{138}\) |
| March 13, 2020 | Arusha city health workers briefed hotel workers on COVID-19 due to the importance of tourism in the Arusha area.\(^\text{139}\) |
| March 15, 2020 | Cases of COVID-19 were reported in Rwanda and Kenya, but Tanzania claims they cleared a visitor from Europe with a high temperature after testing the tourist.\(^\text{140}\) |
| March 16, 2020 | **First case of COVID-19 confirmed in Tanzania.** The person was a Tanzanian woman returning to Tanzania from visiting Belgium.\(^\text{141}\) Enhanced health screening checks are installed at Tanzanian airports, in response to the first positive test.\(^\text{142}\) |
| March 17, 2020 | Tanzania mainland closed all primary and secondary schools.\(^\text{143}\) The Mwanza Regional Medical Officer, Dr Thomas Rutanchuzibwa, announced the government purchased a special ambulance to be used for transporting people who test positive for the coronavirus.\(^\text{144}\) |


\(^{138}\) Citizen Reporter. “Zanzibar Now Bans Italy Flights as Coronavirus Fears Takes Toll.”


\(^{140}\) Citizen Reporter. “Arusha on High Alert as East African Community Registers COVID-19 Case.”


\(^{144}\) Citizen Reporter. “Lifestyle Change for Tanzanians as the Coronavirus Hits.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 18, 2020</td>
<td>Zanzibari government closes schools indefinitely and announces the first COVID-19 case on Zanzibar, the person infected was a foreign national.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 20, 2020</td>
<td>Zanzibari government closes all hotels and bans all international tourist flights. Tourists must quarantine for 14 days on arrival on their own expenses.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 22, 2020</td>
<td>The Citizen’s Editorial board published a critical editorial calling for the Tanzanian government to take economic actions to protect against COVID-19.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23, 2020</td>
<td>Tanzanian government issued a travel advisory for tourists and imposed mandatory isolation at government approved facilities for 14 days at their own cost for all travelers entering Tanzania.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25, 2020</td>
<td>Zanzibar confirmed a second COVID-19 case, the infected was another foreign national, and announced the closing of all entries and exits to the island on March 28, 2020.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 2020</td>
<td>President John Magufuli announced the national elections scheduled for October 2020 will still be held.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 28, 2020</td>
<td>Zanzibar confirmed third COVID-19 case, the first Zanzibari resident case, which was a Zanzibari woman returning from the UK.151 The Tanzania Association of Tour Operators (TATO) announced a 45 day shutdown of hotels beginning April 1.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1, 2020</td>
<td>Hotels are closed in Tanzania.153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

153 Magubira, “Tanzania Tourism’s 45 Days of No-Activity.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 3, 2020</td>
<td>20 total coronavirus cases announced and 1 death in Tanzania. 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 2020</td>
<td>OPEC Fund for International Development’s Governing Board announced $50 million USD in loans to Tanzania for “Tanzania Poverty Reduction Project IV”. 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17, 2020</td>
<td>Magufuli called for three days of prayer on Good Friday to fight the virus, claiming, “God will protect Tanzanians from the virus.” Tanzania had in total 147 cases and 5 official deaths. 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22, 2020</td>
<td>President Magufuli claimed putting Dar es Salaam on lockdown is impossible. He ended regular updates from the Ministry of Health claiming, “the ministry of health was “causing panic” with their announcements of cases and deaths”. 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 26, 2020</td>
<td>Reports from Uganda claimed Kenyan and Tanzanian truck drivers were crossing the border and testing positive for COVID-19. 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 27, 2020</td>
<td>277 COVID-19 total confirmed cases and 10 registered deaths. 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 28, 2020</td>
<td>Zanzibar’s confirmed case count rose to 105 total cases. 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29, 2020</td>
<td>480 total confirmed COVID-19 cases and 16 total confirmed deaths announced. 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 2020</td>
<td>The largest opposition party, Chadema, asked MPs to isolate after three MPs died of unknown causes in the past 11 days and called on Parliament to suspend business for 21 days. Mbowe claimed these</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAACdHKlWhdUCx2JXawbuA79gUnQ1lfoBPZVu6fDnQ1X3uuV3-T1PS7cQ84cg-
WY0qfn95aCkJGQGxZ7IlV43fMWSkQOLqTkpd6Pwtq1MSGgLpFYO7CRbwCT0ZIVUJo1rUHJk7l
CztaZJPGoynFReadsUszED1si_aDBET24gb.


161 AFP, “Tanzania Opposition MPs to ‘isolate’ after String of Deaths.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 4, 2020</td>
<td>Magufuli accused the national laboratory of sabotage and questioned the official case numbers released by them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7, 2020</td>
<td>Government suspended the director and a senior official of the national laboratory responsible for coronavirus testing after Magufuli denounced irregularities at the facility. The health ministry formed a committee of nine experts to probe the laboratory testing system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 12, 2020</td>
<td>Zanzibar’s government updated its COVID-19 numbers, which brings Tanzania’s national total to <strong>509 total confirmed COVID-19 cases</strong> and <strong>21 total confirmed deaths</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13, 2020</td>
<td>ACT-Wazalendo demanded daily statistics from President Magufuli’s government and the truth about the COVID-19 outbreak in Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17, 2020</td>
<td>US Embassy raised alarm over overwhelmed hospitals in Tanzania and claimed the risk of catching COVID-19 in Dar es Salaam was, “extremely high”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 18, 2020</td>
<td>President Magufuli announced at a Lutheran church in Tanzania the reopening of tourism, ending quarantine requirements for tourists. There were no testing requirements for tourists. Tourists were still required to follow COVID-19 measures such as to wear masks, wash hands, and socially distance in gatherings and public transportation. Magufuli announced the full recovery of all coronavirus patients in Tanzania.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


167 AFP, “Tanzania Opposition Anger over No Coronavirus Update in Two Weeks.”

168 Tairo, Apolinari. “Tanzania First Country to Welcome All Tourists Again with Open Arms.”


170 Tairo, “Tanzania First Country to Welcome All Tourists Again with Open Arms.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 20, 2020</td>
<td>Kenya deported 182 Tanzanian truck drivers from Kenya after they tested positive at the border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21, 2020</td>
<td>The first tourists arrive from Greece (4 people) on a chartered plane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1, 2020</td>
<td>Universities reopened, regular international flights resumed (Ethiopian Air flights resume), and sports resumed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 2020</td>
<td>Qatar Air flights resumed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9, 2020</td>
<td>President Magufuli declared Tanzania free of the coronavirus and attributed success to Tanzanian prayers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10, 2020</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund approved debt relief to free up money for public sector health needs in Tanzania. $14.3 million over the next 4 months, and potentially up to $25.7 million over the next 23 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 2020</td>
<td>The African CDC director, John Nkengasong, called on Tanzania to cooperate and share COVID-19 data publicly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29, 2020</td>
<td>Schools at all levels reopened by presidential decree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2020</td>
<td>Published discussions of COVID-19 in Tanzania are criminalized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31, 2020</td>
<td>Tanzania canceled the license of Kenya’s national airline carrier, KQ to fly into Tanzania in response to Kenya announcing imposition of quarantine restrictions on travelers arriving from Tanzania in Kenya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1, 2020</td>
<td>Kenya required passengers from Tanzania flying into its territory to quarantine on arrival due to lack of coronavirus measures in the country.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

172 Materu, “Tourists Land in Tanzania as Hotels, Firms and Schools Resume.”  
174 Citizen Reporter, “Hope as Two Airlines Resume Dar Es Salaam Flights.”  
176 IMF Communications, “IMF Executive Board Approves $14.3 Million Debt Relief to the United Republic of Tanzania Under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust.”  
177 AfricaNews. “Tanzania Coronavirus:”  
178 Ibid.  
181 Citizen Reporter, “Regional Analysts Worried Tanzania-Kenya Tiff to Hurt Tourism.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| August 26, 2020       | AirKenya Express, Fly540 and Safarilink Aviation, all Kenyan Airlines, have also been banned from Tanzania due to passengers arriving from Tanzania having to undergo a 14 day quarantine in Kenya.  
| October 28, 2020      | National elections were held in Tanzania.  
| October 30, 2020      | John Magufuli and the CCM party claimed landslide victories in national elections, but Tundu Lissu, leader of Chadema, refused to accept the election results due to violence and fraud. The East African observers claimed the election was legitimate, but the observers include long-ruling parties and heads of state from Burundi and Uganda, who also held elections claimed to be fraudulent during 2020 and 2021.  
| December 2020 – January 2021 | Doctors (anonymously) and opposition leaders report increased virus cases in Tanzania, and the Ministry of Health acknowledged the virus in new health guidelines.  
| January 19, 2021      | The International School of Moshi announced a student tested positive for COVID-19 and was isolating, while the class of the student would be taught online. Two days later the school issued an apology for issuing false information and stated that the operations of the school had not been halted.  
| January 24, 2021      | The Catholic Archdiocese of Arusha issued a letter warning congregants of the existence of COVID-19 in Tanzania, and urged members to follow all necessary public health measures to prevent the spread of the virus in churches.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 26, 2021</td>
<td>Archbishop Nyaisonga, the head of the Tanzanian Episcopal Conference (the Roman Catholic Conference of Bishops) in a letter warned against a “possible new wave of coronavirus infections”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 31, 2021</td>
<td>Leader of the ACT-Wazalendo Party, Seif Sharif Hamad along with his wife and many aides are hospitalized with COVID-19.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 15, 2021</td>
<td>The Minister of Health in Oman announced 18 percent of travelers arriving from Tanzania tested positive for COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 17, 2021</td>
<td>Seif Sharif Hamad died of acute pneumonia complications due to COVID-19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 20, 2021</td>
<td>WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom called on Tanzania to start reporting COVID-19 cases, share data, implement tried-and-tested public health measures, and prepare for vaccination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 21, 2021</td>
<td>President Magufuli urged Tanzanians to take precautions against the spread of coronavirus in the country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 3, 2021</td>
<td>The secretary of the Tanzanian Episcopal Conference (Roman Catholic bishops in Tanzania) announced more than 25 priests and 60 nuns have died of COVID-19 in the last two months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 17, 2021</td>
<td>Vice President Samia Suluhu Hassan announced President Magufuli died of heart complications. Opposition parties claim he died of COVID-19.</td>
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192 van Eyssen, “Is There a Hidden COVID Crisis in Zanzibar?”


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 19, 2021</td>
<td>Samia Suluhu Hassan sworn in as President of Tanzania.197</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 26, 2021</td>
<td>Most mutated form of the coronavirus found in travelers from Tanzania.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 2021</td>
<td>Health Minister Dorothy Gwajima states that Tanzania has no interest in taking part in the COVAX (or any) vaccination initiative for COVID-19.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12, 2021</td>
<td>Russia suspended flights to Tanzania from April 15, 2021 to June 1, 2021 due to the COVID-19 situation in Tanzania.200</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 4, 2021</td>
<td>Tanzanian government started to require a 72 hour PCR negative test for all passengers on international flights.201</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 4, 2021</td>
<td>Tanzania announced foreign embassies and international agencies can import COVID-19 vaccines.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14, 2021</td>
<td>Tanzania announced it will resume publicly publishing COVID-19 data due to pressure from the UN and international financial lending institutions.203</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 17, 2021</td>
<td>The World Health Organization announced Tanzania is formally working to join the COVAX initiative.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 2021</td>
<td>President Hassan announced there were, “more than 100 COVID-19 patients in Tanzania as of [June 26, 2021], with 70 of them being provided oxygen”.205</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 10, 2021</td>
<td>Tanzania announced <strong>408 new cases of Covid-19 patients, 284 patients hospitalized</strong> on oxygen therapy as of July 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 2021</td>
<td>Zanzibar’s government announced it began to vaccinate Zanzibari health workers with Sinovac vaccine doses (the first of a two part series).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21, 2021</td>
<td>The government announced <strong>682 patients sick with COVID-19 across Tanzania and 29 new deaths</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28, 2021</td>
<td>President Samia Suluhu Hassan received the Johnson and Johnson vaccine along with the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice, and other high-ranking governmental officials at the beginning of Tanzania’s vaccination campaign.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Historical Context of Colonial Rule in Tanzania State-Making

Colonization began along the coastal strip in Tanzania, when the Omani Sultan Said bin Sultan moved his capital to Zanzibar City in 1840. During this time, Zanzibar became the center for the East African slave trade. Following the Berlin Conference, Germany took control over the regions that are now Tanzania (aside from Zanzibar, which was British-controlled) and incorporated them into German East Africa. Germany maintained control over mainland Tanzania (including Mafia Island) until the British took power after World War I and the Treaty of Versailles (1919). British rule ended the

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practice of enslavement and the slave trade in Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania and Mafia Island).²¹⁰

The settlement and colonization of East Africa, beginning with the Pwani coastal region, began through exploration tours led by European colonizers and Omani explorers. These men acted as agents of the state and creators of businesses, surveying the people, resources, and land to identify and claim what they saw as opportunities for extraction of enslaved people and natural resources. Following these expeditions and tours, the leaders often gained power in the colonial administration of East Africa, meaning that colonial governance began with an early form of tourism.²¹¹ The British and Germans created wildlife reserves around landmarks and as part of their attempts to force residents to be as agriculturally productive as possible, as well as displace residents into social and economic systems to “civilize” colonial subjects. For European colonizers, control of nature and separation of humans and land were considered necessary to control colonial subjects.²¹²

Colonial officials, colonists, and academics reported from their surveys, expeditions, and trips on a wide variety of concerns related to development in German East Africa and later colonial Tanganyika. These powerful men continually examined the status of economic production and develop policy to address it, establish the military force and power deemed necessary for the colony to be productive and controlled, rally support and investment for the communications, research, and transportation deemed

²¹⁰ Bryceson et al., “Tanzania”
necessary for development, and throughout these accounts construct and implement racial formations into labor systems and governance. The plantation systems these white colonists created for the colonial state led to the “underdevelopment” of the economy and created dependencies on the metropole. This underdevelopment comprised not only economic policy but military control and racist hierarchy upon which economic systems were developed and maintained by the British and German colonizers.

“Dr Peters, writing from on board the German warship Nautilus on December 12 and 20 last, gives some interesting details concerning a journey he was then making to the Bay of Tanga, on the northern limit of the German protectorate. He describes the region around the Bay as a smiling tropical landscape of the greatest beauty and fertility, with extensive plantations of coco palms, and fields of maize, beans, millet, and other grains extending far into the blue distance. The country is everywhere green and rich, covered with plantations and villages, and in some places produces the finest tobacco… At one of the society’s plantations, Sewa, in Usambora, about 20 miles from the coast, 100 natives engaged by contract are at work, besides 200 of the people from the surrounding villages who are working of their own free will… On all these plantations the health of Europeans hitherto leaves nothing to be desired, we are informed.”

Colonial official travels in and around what is now modern-day Tanzania served to analyze possibilities for development including exploitation of natural resources such as oil, minerals, and plantation monoculture, migration of missionaries and religious leaders, and to “open up the continent to commerce and civilization”. Many officials toured German East Africa after being appointed to the colonial service, such as Baron von Schele, the imperial governor of German East Africa in 1894, who immediately proposed plans for plantations and immigration from the metropole once he toured the

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214 *The Times*. “German East Africa.” February 1, 1888. 4.
Southern region, calling the territory an “expensive luxury”. Later, Count Von Götsen is promoted within the colonial administration primarily because of his travel in the Kilimanjaro region and his contributions to geography in his published accounts of his explorations. Eventually, even the Prince of Prussia toured German East Africa to “visit and study settlement possibilities” in the territory. The gaze of touring German and British officials imbricated with racist, Christian, and colonial biases then created reports for the European public and the colonial bureaucracy. These reports had profound consequences through the production of colonial policies and projects, provided officials with career-making opportunities and economic mobility, and negatively defined and characterized African residents. Colonial officials’ and colonial travelers’ travel writings produced and maintained colonial hierarchy through othering colonial racialized subjects and normalizing possession and consumption of their lands. During the British control of Tanganyika, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Mr. Dugdale, toured the territory and certain economic sectors to create development goals and policy. Mr. Dugdale’s concern for the soil and ecology of Tanganyika centered around production of agricultural goods and maintenance of the health of the African laboring population so this production can take place. The proposed solutions of making landscapes into forests to prevent soil erosion and removal of people from areas with tsetse flies impose solutions rooted in Eurocentric and capitalist ecological ideas which fail, in part because

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217 Our Own Correspondent. “German East Africa.”, 5.
of the distance between the policy creator and the colony. German colonial officials saw German East Africa primarily as a place that would make their careers and capital – allowing them to return to Germany as socially and economically a higher class, and they viewed their relationship to the colony as employees, rather than settlers. Thus, these governance and decisions made by colonialists is compounded by considerable turnover in colonial administrations, meaning few officials remain in positions for longer than a couple of years.

German and British colonial power throughout this era was continually disrupted and opposed by freedom fighters, ethnic groups, other colonial powers, and rebellions. Tours and expeditions routinely called for increases in military power or demonstrated the lack of colonial control through attacks on travelers. Dr. Peters - the traveler whose account of military expedition and plantations of unfree labor as tropical luxury opened this section - was killed along with his German entourage on the German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition. The expedition on which he was killed intended to install military stations and annex more people and land into German East Africa through treaties with local leaders and the violence of German forces. In 1893-1894, Baron von Schele not only formulated economic plans during a four-month tour of the southern district, but asked for, “more frequent exhibitions of military power,” recognizing militarization and violence as an integral component of colonial development and control. The development desired by colonial officials depended on colonial state violence to maintain

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220 Neumann, “Africa’s ‘Last Wilderness’:”, 648; Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 64.
and expand boundaries of control as in Dr. Peters’ expedition and von Schele’s assessment, as well as the continual and proximate violence of enslavement and plantation systems. McKittrick and Delaney theorized that plantation systems, though they strive for complete control, always have gaps and holes of partial control, which could be used to develop communities and form resistance struggles and plans. This was documented in German East Africa articles where people resisted through revolts, refused to work efficiently (so much so that colonizers wanted to import labor), and refused plantations and enslavement through fugitivity.

During the German colonial period, considerable struggles over the financialization of the colony began soon after the land was apportioned to the Germans, specifically surrounding the building of railroads. As The Times correspondent on January 23, 1888 noted, “while the British company is evidently quite prepared to lay down a railway into the interior of its region, it would be difficult in Germany to raise funds for a similar enterprise, though the journal strongly urges that it should be done, on condition that the Imperial Government should guarantee a certain amount of interest.” The German East Africa company’s expedition across the interior of German East Africa in late 1888 for establishment of military stations, treaties, and colonial governance had to occur through different forms of travel, because this railroad remained unfunded. Loans and financial support often remained elusive for German East Africa officials who,

225 Ibid.
after tours of the territory, proposed schools for scientific study and training of colonial officials in 1892 and again proposed railroads to open the interior to trade and commerce in 1894 and 1900.\textsuperscript{229} Financial opportunities in German East Africa were considered unfulfilled until railroads connect the lakes region with the Indian Ocean, because German colonizers relied upon caravans of native porters to transport goods long distances, which decreased labor sources for plantations.\textsuperscript{230} The colony of German East Africa was continually assessed by traveling officials because the investments into the colony both were produced through debt and created more debt from the perspective of the German colonial state, as German East Africa did not receive many profits. Books and travel accounts from the colonial territory raised interest from the metropole in the funding of the infrastructure needed for development and the potential of the East African territory to become profitable for the German Empire.

News reports from German East Africa and British East Africa began with plantation labor systems premised on the exploitation of native labor through enslavement and contract labor. However, rebellions and other forms of resistance to colonial plantations inspired German and British administrators to import labor from other colonial possessions specifically along the lines of race. Governor von Schele’s voyage in 1894 ended with a call for, “the necessity of employing Chinese and kindred races temporarily,” until the natives could be “trained to work regularly”.\textsuperscript{231} This construction of race and labor reveals how the German racial hierarchy intertwined with

\textsuperscript{229} A Correspondent. “German East Africa.” \textit{The Times}. September 27, 1892. 3.; “The Future of German East Africa,” \textit{The Times}, May 5, 1894. 9; Our Own Correspondent, “German East Africa,” December 13, 1900. 5;

\textsuperscript{230} Our Own Correspondent. “German East Africa (from Our Own Correspondent).” \textit{The Times}. October 17, 1903. 7.

\textsuperscript{231} “The Future of German East Africa,” \textit{The Times}, May 5, 1894. 9.
labor systems determined who could work in specific roles, and racialization constructed uneven alliances between colonizers and non-Black colonial subjects who were considered more useful and valuable than the domestic African population, but only temporary solutions to native people’s refusal to be productive cogs in exploitative labor systems. Because non-Black colonial subjects used as laborers were not as cheap as enslavement even as racialized colonial subjects might have been coerced through their labor conditions, these subjects eventually would be too expensive to keep employed, ending that tenuous labor arrangement. Malini Ranganathan’s recent research on the creation of Indian coolie labor contract systems found lower-caste Indian workers entered exploitative contracts to labor in plantation systems around the world, including in East Africa, likely in Zanzibar. The British, in particular, used coolie labor in place of enslaved people after the abolition of slavery in the British Empire. During World War I, accounts of British soldiers in battalions that occupied and attacked German East Africa delighted the Secretary of State for the British Colonies, Mr. Harcourt, who summarized the deaths of colonial subjects and destruction of infrastructure instrumental to empire as romantic and thrilling, rendering non-white colonial subjects and their lands as disposable. Mr. Harcourt attributed the success of colonial operations to the intelligence of whiteness, “the genius of the British race for self-government and good government”. Later he claimed the British, “have given probably and freely the most complete autonomy to our dominions and we have reaped a rich harvest.” Implied by

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234 Ibid.
the proffering of Canada and South Africa as examples, autonomy is only an option to British settler colonies engaged in domination of racialized people. For East African revolutionaries and the Irish Home Rule movement operating during World War I, independence and autonomy would need to be taken and demanded by force.

Colonial governance and development strategies in colonial Tanzania relied upon tourism practices. Through expeditions, surveys, and tours of the colonial territory, colonial statesmen produced economic policy and projects, violently enforced and expanded colonial rule (though they encountered significant resistance), tried to increase support and funding from Europe and banks, and imposed racial hierarchies throughout the economic systems in the colonies. All these practices composed the project of underdevelopment in German East Africa and Tanganyika which created capital and “development” for colonial powers. Concepts of development promoted by colonizers were underwritten by racist ideas about civilization and religious superiority. Today, development is used as a broad umbrella term in international institutions to describe the process of growing economies, political structures, and societies in poorer places through entrenchment in global capital relations which, it is assumed, will raise the quality of life and access to resources for people in these places.

Tanzania and many former colonies who claimed independence from colonial rule in the twentieth century remain caught in webs of domination by current colonial powers and former colonial powers. Due to international development economics, foreign policy, violent military intervention, rising power of global corporations, and

international politics, former colonies and their peoples struggle to claim full self-determination over their politics, economies, livelihoods, and land. To describe these situations of nominal freedom and the reality of continued historical domination and new practices of oppression, I use the term coloniality.

5.3 The Role of Coloniality in Economic Dependence on Tourism in Tanzania

This project identifies tourism’s role in developing key practices and ideas, such as the opening of trade for exploitation, which are central features in modern-day international neoliberal development as part of colonial projects.\(^\text{238}\) The unfinished project of decolonization requires identifying and confronting these practices in new and old colonial forces operating today, which the larger project of this work will address.\(^\text{239}\)

Tanganyika’s revolutionary leader, Julius Nyerere, organized the Tanganyika National African Union in the 1950s, and won Tanganyika’s independence in 1961. Zanzibar won independence in 1963, and united with Tanganyika to form Tanzania in 1964.\(^\text{240}\) Nyerere and other early leaders developed the concept of African socialism, on which they modeled much of their domestic and foreign policy. Nyerere also confronted the international power structure through attempts to create the New International Economic Order to fund newly independent nations’ development projects outside structures created by colonizing nations. The NIEO failed, and the challenge of trade as a primarily agriculture producing nation along with reverberations from the OPEC crisis


\(^{239}\) Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 181.

presented new challenges. Eventually, the Tanzanian state decided to remove socialist policies in the 1980s and 1990s to comply with neoliberal economic requirements from the IMF, the World Bank, and other “Western” donors in exchange for bailouts and loans. Since the 1980s and implementation of varying neoliberal development goals and restructuring, tourism has become a central focus of international financial institutions, nongovernmental organizations concerned about the environment and climate change, and the Tanzanian government. Even as the main political party remains named the same as the revolutionary socialist party, the policies and actions of its leaders consistently align with neoliberalism and conservatism.

In 2018, the IMF estimated Tanzania's gross domestic product (GDP) to be $56.7 billion (nominal), with a GDP per capita (PPP) of $3,457. Since the economic recession of 2009, and prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Tanzanian economy expanded rapidly, due in large part to tourism. From the 2009 recession to 2013, Tanzania's per capita GDP (based on constant local currency) grew an average of 3.5% per year, which is a higher growth rate than any other member of the East African Community. In 2020, the World Bank declared the Tanzanian economy a lower middle-income country for the first time, after the gross national income (GNI) per capita

243 Bryceson et al., “Tanzania”
Travel and tourism contributed 17% of Tanzania’s GDP and employed 11.1 per cent of the country's labor force (1,550,100 jobs) in 2019. Overall, receipts rose from US$1.74 billion in 2004 to US$4.48 billion in 2013, and receipts from international tourists rose from US$1.255 billion in 2010 to US$2 billion in 2016.

As with most systems built on a capitalist economy, the tourist industry in Tanzania experiences periods of fracture and expansion dependent on government interest, global economics, and international investment. The effects of the OPEC crisis of the 1970s necessitated subsequent bailouts of many former colonies, including the country of Tanzania, by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Following implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs, designed to keep postcolonies in debt, neoliberal institutions producing these debt-ridden relationships and programs began to endorse the tourist industry as a “passport to development”. Within the context of international debt and austerity, the IMF and the World Bank encouraged states to adopt financial and economic practices favoring an industry requiring reliance on foreigners and European and North American wealth and businesses.

Tanzania’s growing economy – as defined by international development indices - remains heavily dependent on tourism. Prior to the pandemic, tourism was Tanzania’s

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highest foreign exchange earner and accounted for 17% of Tanzania’s gross domestic product.\footnote{Kombe, “Tanzania Opening Up Tourism Despite Pandemic.”; Masare, “Why Credit to Private Sector Growth Slowed to 3-Year Low.”;} Much of this tourism economy is related to wildlife conservation parks, and approximately 38 percent of Tanzania's land area is set aside in protected areas for conservation, with 17 national parks, 29 game reserves, and 40 controlled conservation areas and marine parks.\footnote{Tanzania High Comission. “Tourism Opportunities in Tanzania.”} Travel and tourism employed 10.77 percent of the country's labor force (1,550,100 jobs) in 2019.\footnote{World Travel and Tourism Council. “Tanzania: 2020 Annual Research: Key Highlights.”} Tanzania’s tourism sector generated US $2.6 billion after years of growth in 2019, but during the first year of the pandemic, the earnings dropped to $1.06 billion.\footnote{Masare, “Banks Chart Ways to Boost Profits Hit by Pandemic.”} The country remains beholden to international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, and the United States through aid and debt.\footnote{US Aid, “United States Government to Provide Tanzania an Additional $2.4 Million Dollars to Help Respond to COVID-19 Outbreak.”; Jacob “Tanzania Should Account for COVID Funds and Stop Hiding behind the Facade of Sovereignty.”}

Many of these actors influence economic planning and decision making through economic goals such as prioritizing private investment and removing trade restrictions.\footnote{IMF Communications. “IMF Executive Board Approves $14.3 Million Debt Relief to the United Republic of Tanzania Under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust.” \textit{IMF}, June 10, 2020.; World Bank. “Tanzania Has an Opportunity to Ignite Inclusive Economic Growth by Transforming Its Tourism Sector.” Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Washington, July 30, 2021.} As Fresnillo noted, turns to natural resource extraction during economic crises to service debt is a common response by countries in the Global South.\footnote{Fresnillo, “Debt and Climate: Entangled Emergencies Derailing”, 504.} During the pandemic, the Tanzanian economy and government began to rely on lucrative natural resource extraction, gold mining, to boost the
economy when the tourist industry was in crisis. International financial institutions and foreign governments to which Tanzania is indebted thus are implicated in this gold mining and the environmental harms it may cause, along with the actions Tanzania took to incentivize its tourism industry during the pandemic.

The main policy point besides economic interest in tourism which the opposition and the ruling parties agreed upon was the deep need for debt relief from international financial institutions, other countries, and development organizations. Seif Sharif Hamad identified the heavy load servicing debt subtracted from Tanzania’s GDP, “Tanzania has an external debt of $23 billion, 65% of which comes from international financial corporations and donor countries. If our debt servicing is suspended for one year, Tanzania may save up to [$1.3 billion USD] which can be used to immediately strengthen our overburdened health system and alleviate economic shocks”. President Magufuli agreed with the need for debt relief, and asked for the World Bank to waive loans or even percentages of loans, “[every] month we use almost Sh700 billion to service our debts with a huge chunk going to the World Bank, so by giving us such relief it will allow us to build our economy. He called upon other African countries to join hands in asking the international financial institutions to waive such debts”.

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International financial institutions responded to the pandemic’s economic and health crisis through reproducing the hierarchical and institutional production of wealth in predominantly colonial banking institutions or those that deal with development broadly as a form of foreign policy and capitalist power insurance through offering multiple forms of loans and sending money to banking institutions globally. The Africa Development Bank also reproduced these power relationships by creating financial assistance through the largest social bond to date, and the IMF and the World Bank offered $210 billion USD in loans to companies and countries. For Tanzania, loans and debt relief took months to materialize, with the IMF approving debt relief in June of 2020, and the EU approving a $70 billion grant in September of 2020. Economists at these Bretton Woods institutions projected countries with high reliance on tourism would be most vulnerable in the pandemic. Throughout 2020, international observers asked organizations providing loans and funds to Tanzania to have baseline requirements regarding governance and COVID-19 policy. Magufuli lost investor trust due to serious COVID-19 outbreaks and declines in political freedom and fair governance, and President Hassan had to rebuild international development bridges between Tanzania and

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263 Jacob, “Tanzania Should Account for COVID Funds and Stop Hiding behind the Facade of Sovereignty.”
other countries, as well as other financial institutions. The United Republic of Tanzania is not only indebted to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other Western-run development institutions, but is also indebted to the People’s Republic of China. In January 2021, President Magufuli asked for debt cancellation of $167.7 million for past development projects investing in police, railroads, and a textile mill.

5.4 The Formal Political Climate Influencing State Responses

Tanzania is a one-party dominant state with the Chama Cha Mapinduzi – Party of the Revolution - (CCM) party in power. The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has been in power since independence from the British in 1963. In the 1990s, political oppositions formally were established, and a collection of opposition parties grew. The primary opposition party in Zanzibar, the Civic United Front, has significant support and is a liberal, pro-independence party. The second source of opposition is the Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Party of Democracy and Progress) known as Chadema. Chadema is a centre-right party and has never won a majority of the vote in an election, though it has gained votes since formation in 1992. In 2014, a new left-wing party formed called Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT), and ACT saw a small increase in votes in the 2020 election.

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The Tanzanian state responses varied due to the political and economic environment over the course of the pandemic. The Tanzanian government with John Magafuli and the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party at the helm, began to suggest public health strategies in February 2020. After the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Tanzania, the government suspended all public gatherings, closed schools, and suspended all international flights. Soon after Magufuli announced in late March that the national election would still be held in October 2020, he began to act differently, claiming prayer would end COVID-19 in Tanzania, and in May, he prevented the government from publicly reporting on the pandemic. Opposition parties including Chadema and ACT opposed the silence from the government and the firing of public health officials by Magafuli.268 By June, President Magafuli claimed Tanzania was free of COVID-19, reopened all schools and events, and international flights resumed without required quarantine. The state took great lengths to censor citizens, the opposition parties, and the media from reporting on the pandemic in Tanzania, despite pleas from international organizations (some international financial institutions) and partners to release information about COVID-19 in the country.269 Magafuli claimed there was no coronavirus in Tanzania and refused vaccines when vaccines became available.270 He also refused to report numbers to the World Health Organization, which is interpreted as an effort to attract tourists back to Tanzania.271

268 AFP, “God, Not Masks.”
269 AfricaNews, “Tanzania Coronavirus.”
270 Mwai and Giles, “Covid.”
Tanzania held national elections in October 2020, and Magafuli and the CCM party won reelection, despite suggestions from Tanzania and abroad that the election was not fair.272 A rising number of public figures and ordinary citizens dying from pneumonia and virus-like symptoms in early 2021, caused many international observers, church leaders, and opposition party members to conclude the government covered up a huge COVID-19 outbreak in Tanzania.273 Religious leaders and other governmental officials called on the Tanzanian national government to recognize the COVID-19 pandemic and take action to protect citizens. Doctors were unable to write COVID-19 as the cause of death, but there was a vast increase in deaths of patients with respiratory issues and pneumonia. In March 2021, the government announced President Magufuli died whilst serving in office.274 His Vice President, Samia Suluhu Hassan, became the country's first female president. Meanwhile, rumors claimed President Magafuli died of COVID-19 when his death was reported.275 The new President of Tanzania, Samia Suluhu Hassan, made a statement that her administration will shift away from COVID-19 denialism and censorship, but beyond some new required quarantines and testing for travelers, her government did not make clear commitments to addressing the pandemic during the time period investigated by this study.276

From the beginning, the interest of the national government was minimally on the health problems COVID-19 was and is generating. The opposition party and the ruling party were interested in the economic cost of the pandemic, and ACT Wazalendo

272 Kombe “Tanzania’s Magufuli Wins Landslide Re-Election.”
273 Sabuni, “Church, WHO Speak out against Tanzania over Covid-19.”
274 Mwai and Giles, “Covid.”
275 Mwai and Giles, “Covid.”
politicians called for an economic report when COVID-19 became a threat to, “...the government’s revenue…” and asked for, “...strategies to safeguard the economy.”

Zanzibar’s government and the opposition party took more actions to protect Tanzanians from the health problems of COVID-19. Zanzibar installed a travel ban quicker than the national government in response to the pandemic and began to implement health measures more quickly. Regional governments in tourism areas, such as the Arusha Regional Government mobilized quickly to contact trace and provide information while the tourism industry still operated in March of 2020, “health experts [took] samples of people, who occupied the hotel for testing at the National Health Laboratory in Dar es Salaam…the government was working around the clock to trace everyone that came into contact with the woman in order to test and keep them in quarantine.”

The first cases of COVID-19 identified were in tourist locations, which caused alarm and focus on the tourism industry.

5.5 Fears, the Divine, Misinformation, and Centralizing Power

Repeated emphasis on the “fear” of COVID-19 began in newspaper articles as soon as March 7, 2020, when the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar banned flights from Italy. This discourse trivialized the actual impact the coronavirus could have on citizens, tourists, and residents of Tanzania. The Citizen, a national newspaper in Tanzania, identified the logic behind Zazibari leaders’ decision-making as, “fear of the

278 Citizen Reporter, “Zanzibar Now Bans Italy Flights as Coronavirus Fears Takes Toll.”
279 Citizen Reporter. “Lifestyle Change for Tanzanians as the Coronavirus Hits.”
coronavirus malady,” rather than clear understanding of potential harm and
catastrophe. Fears of the coronavirus were claimed to drive sales of medical equipment
in large cities in Tanzania, “where masks and sanitizers had sold out in a number of
pharmacies”. Government officials called mass tourism cancellations in March, “the
peak of Covid-19 fears.” The verbiage of fearing COVID-19 is replicated by
interviewed citizens in newspapers, as citizens explain their anxiety about conditions in
Tanzanian cities, “I really fear coronavirus disease and it is risky here but there is no way
I can avoid coming. My family needs something to eat and this is where I earn my daily
bread,’ said [Masoud, a motorcycle driver].”

President Magufuli used this language and demanded officials and public figures
“preach” the positive about the coronavirus and spread misinformation on deaths and
quarantine. To further cast doubt about the threat COVID-19 posed, Magufuli claimed
the only COVID-19 testing site in Tanzania found animals, vehicle oil, and fruit positive
for coronavirus, which then allowed his administration to fire the directors and officials
involved and install officials willing to follow Magufuli’s lead in COVID-19
misinformation. In May 2020, the United States Embassy tweeted about an unsafe
environment in Dar es Salaam, and the Tanzanian Foreign Office summoned the top US
official to object and claimed the embassy caused panic and distress.

280 Citizen Reporter, “Zanzibar Now Bans Italy Flights as Coronavirus Fears Takes Toll.”
281 Citizen Reporter. “Lifestyle Change for Tanzanians as the Coronavirus Hits.”
282 Citizen Reporter. “Hotels, Conference Centres in Tanzania Feel the Pinch of Virus Outbreak.” The
in-tanzania-feel-the-pinches-of-virus-outbreak-2706178.
283 AFP. “God, Not Masks: Magufuli’s Tanzania Is an Outlier on Virus Response.”
285 AFP, “Tanzania Opposition Angry over No Coronavirus Update in Two Weeks.”
1/1849050.
As the language of fear of Covid-19 increased, in March of 2020, President Magufuli weaponized the language of prayer and religion to protect his power and his party’s power given the lack of meaningful government action on the economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. In a country with deep religious divides, it is notable that Magufuli, a Catholic, specifically seemed to appeal to the Christian community in Tanzania, despite the sizable Muslim community and political power in places such as Zanzibar. The construction of “coronavirus measures and responses are based in fears” transitioned to demands that people rely on divine power and religious organizations. In a social environment where diseases such as HIV/AIDS carry stigmas of moral deficiency often causing social isolation, ideas of religious purity and faith impacting illness and wellbeing can easily grow and cause harm.287 President Magufuli regularly used the political and cultural platforms of churches to spread COVID-19 misinformation and constructed the virus as an enemy of the faithful. Churches and mosques remained open under President Magufuli’s rule, and he called for people to attend faith services to pray for the end of COVID-19.288 “He insisted God alone can deal with the pandemic and called for three days of national prayer. In front of a faithful congregation, the nation’s president said the satanic COVID-19 does not reside in the body of Jesus and called for people to flock to churches”.289 Ordinary citizens in Tanzania repeated these ideas of divine protection from COVID-19 and the necessity of working despite the crisis when

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288 Munishi, “President Magufuli, We Need Leadership, Not Prayers.”
289 Ibid.
interviewed in newspaper articles, “I don't pray for lockdown in Tanzania because we may escape coronavirus and die from hunger at home. Life has to go on and God will protect us,’ said … a food vendor in the city.” President Magafuli claimed, “the coronavirus cannot harm the bodies of the faithful.” Magufili told worshipers in Dodoma, “'You haven't seen me fearing to take communion, because corona[virus] is satanic and can't survive in Jesus' body.'

President Magufili used faith communities as platforms to spread COVID-19 treatment misinformation, including the covid recovery of his son who used, “self-isolation, taking a lemon and ginger mixture and steam inhalation.” At Catholic masses and other Protestant services, Magufili announced national policies prioritizing the economy over health responses to the pandemic, saying, “[our] economy must come first. It must not sleep,” and even the reopening of international flights and tourism was announced in a church pulpit. When President Magufili announced the pandemic in Tanzania was ending, government officials encouraged unsafe celebrations in the streets for answered prayers. “Make all kinds of noise as a sign of thanksgiving to show our God has won against disease and worries of death…,’ the regional commissioner of commercial hub Dar es Salaam, said.”

Some religious institutions had closed due to

290 AFP “God not masks: Magufili’s Tanzania is an outlier on virus response”
291 Mules, “Tanzania under Fire from WHO for Lackluster Response to COVID-19 Pandemic
292 Ibid
293 AfricaNews, “Prayers, Citrus Mixture.”
294 Ibid
295 Taiko, “Tanzania First Country to Welcome All Tourists Again with Open Arms.”
COVID-19, and Magafuli, “ordered [them] to reopen” following his reopening of tourism announcements.297

President Magufuli and CCM cultivated prior to the pandemic an environment of threats of censorship against newspapers and news organizations, and by May 2020 there was a shift from the President and multiple officials in the government regarding the coronavirus pandemic and basic COVID-19 information. Even before discussing coronavirus and COVID-19 became censored and illicit in Tanzania, The Citizen did not ascribe authorship to many reporters reporting on economic and pandemic conditions. While part of this is likely due to the gradual process of digitizing newspapers in Tanzania, when the website created a specific place for reporter names/agencies, often during Magufuli’s life the only information given would be “Citizen Reporter”.

Censorship and silencing of COVID-19 information began in earnest April 22, 2020, after President Magufuli claimed the Ministry of Health updates were spreading panic. The Prime Minister Majaliwa addressed reporters on April 29, 2020 and, “offered no explanation for the government’s silence on coronavirus numbers, though he cautioned against the ‘tendency of some people to issue false statistics which leads to unnecessary unrest in society.”298 In this statement, the Prime Minister suggested critiques and opposing reports from opposition parties in April and May could cause unrest, which authorized state leaders with the power to use violent repression of truth. The Tanzanian state cracked down on opposition politicians and discussion of COVID-19, “[critics] have been arrested, and opposition politicians and rights activists [said] their phones are being

298 Mules, “Tanzania under Fire from WHO for Lackluster Response to COVID-19 Pandemic”
tapped.” Freedom Mbowe, head of Chadema, assessed Magufuli was in a “state of denial.” When a high-ranking district commissioner died in late April, the government called the cause of death a, “respiratory challenge.” People within Magufuli’s administration were ousted if their position or information contradicted the positive image of Tanzania wanted by the CCM main leaders, “[efforts] to reopen the country go hand in hand with steps to further shrink the available civic space in the country… COVID-19 has not stopped the Magufuli administration from detaining a comedian who laughed at the president’s old photos, arresting journalists, local and foreign, who interviewed people on their experience with the pandemic, as well as restricting NGOs working in the country.” Newspapers drew parallels between Magufuli and other authoritarian leaders such as Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, particularly when he, “used the pandemic to further his own political ends, calling for self-isolating opposition MPs not to be paid.” After firing health officials, President Magufuli forced delays in receiving personal protective equipment supplies for health workers. In addition, Magufuli appropriated the language of decolonial struggle to cast suspicion on international critics, he, “accused international health officials of exaggerating the crisis and suggested some health workers ‘may have been put on the payroll of imperialists.”

299 Associated Press “Tanzania Says Virus Defeated Through Prayer, but Fears Grow”  
300 AFP, “Tanzania Opposition MPs to ‘isolate’ after String of Deaths.”  
301 Ibid  
302 Said, “A Problem of Denial.”  
304 Associated Press, “Tanzania Says Virus Defeated Through Prayer, but Fears Grow”  
The secrecy and whirlwind of imposing, then upending COVID-19 measures and reporting created suspicion internationally and, “[made] many Tanzanians suspicious of the state’s claims and intentions.” Reports suggested Tanzanians were, “[dismayed] with Mr Magufuli and his resistance to following the advice of international experts.” But the historical reign of CCM and recent censorship prevented resistance, with much of the population conforming to Magufuli and CCM’s guidance, “all in exchange for ‘peace and development’ as defined by the party’s own ideologues and propagandists.”

Ordinary citizens often repeated Magufuli’s claims of no coronavirus in Tanzania after his proclamation that the pandemic was over and masking in public spaces became rare. To increase the interest in Tanzania as a tourism destination during the pandemic, President Magufuli and his government immediately utilized discourses of safety. They stated, “every leader at his or her capacity should be an ambassador for the rest of the world to understand that the country is safe.” President Magufuli constructed people questioning the safety in Tanzania as, “[our] enemies,” preemptively delegitimizing dissent of the state. Even as the President deployed this discourse, international officials signaled this reframing was not convincing to potential tourists, as one U.S.

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308 Said, “A Problem of Denial.”
311 Citizen Reporter, “President Magufuli Declares Tanzania Free from Covid-19.”
diplomat noted, “I can't imagine any tourists flocking back there in such an uncertain environment.”

Though the Tanzanian state’s decisions revolved around improving the economic conditions of the country, particularly international tourism, the state isolated itself diplomatically by not following WHO guidance. Magufuli and Tanzanian officials skipped international COVID-19 meetings in East Africa - leading to critique from other African leaders. Within Tanzania, opposition leaders first attempted to work with the CCM party and President Magafuli to address the threat of the coronavirus with both health concerns and economic concerns. Public calls from opposition leaders in op-eds and news conferences to address COVID-19 included, “the closure of ports, airports while advising international lenders to halt debt repayments by developing countries. The veteran politician also touched on other issues including people to protect themselves against infections of Covid-19, the rise in living costs, defence and security organs not to abuse their roles, the health system and how the deadly disease has impacted on tourism… Mr Hamad insisted that there was the need of starting to go for public testing.”

In April 2020, when problems of transparency and honesty about COVID-19 in Tanzania arose, opposition leaders spoke out against the President and his denial of the effect of COVID-19 on people and the economy. Despite the censorship, violence, and imprisonment, opposition leaders and journalists continued to oppose the administration of President Magufuli even after he was re-elected in elections in October, which

312 Associated Press, “Tanzania Says Virus Defeated Through Prayer, but Fears Grow.”
313 Said, “A Problem of Denial.”
domestic and international organizations claimed were fraudulent. The government censored opposition leaders and regular citizens through internet and news media blackouts in the weeks surrounding the October election. Opposition parties refused to recognize the results of these elections for months and called for mass protests. Eventually, in December, ACT-Wazalendo decided to proceed and their few elected party members took the oath and joined the Tanzanian Parliament, giving up on their calls for a free and fair election.

The international community, besides dictatorial leaders in East Africa, viewed the Tanzanian elections and COVID-19 policies with suspicion. In the European Union’s Parliament the questions surrounding unfair elections and President Magufuli’s COVID-19 denial caused several Members to ask for more regulatory power over budget and grants to other countries. Long after President Magufuli’s announcement that Tanzania was free from COVID-19, the country continued applying for international development and aid supposedly to address healthcare infrastructure and “combat the virus” but this aid may have been diverted to political campaigns as, “[the] president was seen dishing out money during various rallies.” In addition to funds from the EU, Tanzania received $14.3 million in debt relief from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in June, “$3.79 million from the World Bank to support ‘laboratory diagnosis and

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318 Green, “Tanzania’s Magufuli Claims Victory in an Election Marred by Fraud and Violence.”; Kombe, “Tanzania’s Magufuli Wins Landslide Re-Election.”

319 Jacob, “Tanzania Should Account for COVID Funds and Stop Hiding behind the Facade of Sovereignty.”
management of COVID-19 cases” in September, and a African Development Bank loan for $50.7 million for, “Covid-19 crisis response budget support.” International development funders such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund supported the Tanzanian state and it's denialism through much of 2020, while other forces connected to colonial power such as the United States Embassy and former colonial powers installed stringent travel requirements and warned that all was not well in Tanzania. These contesting forces changed as international scrutiny and alarm was raised when President Magufuli, casted doubt on, “the safety and efficacy of imported vaccines,” and instead propagated the use of “local herbs” as a remedy to COVID-19. Magufuli used global inequality along the lines of race to cast doubt on COVID-19 vaccinations, “[if] the white man was able to come up with vaccinations, then vaccinations for AIDS would have been brought.” As observers noted, this vaccine skepticism and COVID-19 censorship could lead to more stringent travel advisories about Tanzania and less tourists willing to take chances to visit.

In January of 2021, amid increasing reports of travelers returning from Tanzania with COVID-19 and anonymous reports of increased hospitalizations, illnesses, and funerals from the medical sector, resistance to the Tanzanian state’s censorship emerged from even more institutions and people able to negotiate their power to protect themselves. President John Magufuli’s faith tradition, the Roman Catholic Church in Tanzania, issued a letter to congregants alerting them, “...of the existence of COVID-19

320 Ibid.
322 Anna, “Tanzania’s Leader Denies COVID-19, and Countrymen Push Back.”
323 Eyakuze, “Tanzania Plays Chicken with Covid-19; Who Will Blink First?”
in Tanzania, and urged members to follow all necessary public health measures to prevent the spread of the virus in churches.” A few weeks later, “the Catholic secretariat of the Tanzania Episcopal Conference…urged followers, which include the president, to pray but also to adopt measures long practiced in the rest of the world, including avoiding public gatherings and close personal contact. The church’s newspaper on Friday stressed in a large front-page headline: “There is corona”. The platforms President Magufuli used to build power through coronavirus skepticism and manipulated theologies, used their power from the state and outside of the state to change the discourse of safety and speak against the state for their members and clergy. Even as many medical experts and hospitals failed to follow COVID-19 health measures and provide information to the public due to fear of reprisal, anonymous medical sources suggested Tanzania was, “experiencing a second wave of the outbreak.”

Members of President Magufuli’s cabinet broke with official informational norms, including the Minister of Health, who, “acknowledged the presence of the virus when issuing new guidelines and prices for testing.” An international school in Moshi, populated by wealthy students and the children of white expatriates, publicly stated a pupil had tested positive for COVID-19, though eventually the school disavowed this statement. Opposition leaders opposed the Tanzanian state’s vaccine misinformation and said, “a government that doesn’t protect its citizens lacks legitimacy” as many

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325 Anna, “Tanzania’s Leader Denies COVID-19, and Countrymen Push Back.”
327 Eyakuze, “Tanzania Plays Chicken with Covid-19; Who Will Blink First?”
328 Ibid
became sick with COVID-19. A prominent opposition party leader, Seif Sharif Hamad died of COVID-19 in February, which his family shared with the public and this information caused ordinary Tanzanian beliefs about the pandemic to change. The World Health Organization spoke with President Magufuli regarding his claims, and the Tanzanian government gradually changed tactics by encouraging prevention measures and eventually admitted COVID-19 was circulating in Tanzania in February.

In March of 2021, rumors circulated following the president’s absence in public and Kenyan news reporting which suggested that Magufuli was sick with COVID-19 in a Nairobi hospital. On March 17, 2021, Vice President Samia Suluhu Hassan announced President Magufuli died in Dar es Salaam from heart complications. Opposition leaders claimed that Magufuli died of COVID-19, but nothing has ever been confirmed.

During the national mourning period, the most mutated variant of COVID-19 was found in travelers arriving to Angola from Tanzania. After Magufuli’s death and the national mourning period, newly instated President Hassan’s administration slowly made changes to encourage mask wearing, changed state websites to release science-based coronavirus information, asked for medical experts’ advice on policy, and began the process of procuring COVID-19 vaccines. Medical experts suggested multiple policy changes

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329 Anna, “Tanzania’s Leader Denies COVID-19, and Countrymen Push Back.”
330 Eyssen, “Is There a Hidden COVID Crisis in Zanzibar?”
331 Sabuni, “Church, WHO Speak out against Tanzania over Covid-19.”; AFP, “WHO Chief Calls on Tanzania to Combat Covid.”
332 AfricaNews and AFP, “Magufuli Died from Covid, Says Tanzania Opposition Leader Tundu Lissu.”
including restrictions to curb the third wave of COVID-19 in Tanzania, to start reporting COVID-19 data again, and joining COVAX, the WHO’s global vaccine sharing initiative. President Hassan accepted some of these policy ideas and allowed embassies, international organizations, Zanzibar, and eventually Tanzania to request vaccines and receive them and the government began to set up new testing centers for tourists and residents. When Tanzania received its the first batch of COVID-19 vaccines, President Hassan and high ranking officials publicly received the vaccine, which aided the government in decreasing vaccine suspicions it previously created. However restrictions never were imposed, and COVID-19 data was published sporadically, only after the International Monetary Fund required public COVID-19 testing data before the IMF would loan the Tanzanian state COVID-19 relief funding.

The contours of resistance to the state and the Tanzanian state and its allies during my data period are messy. Alliances shifted and changed throughout the pandemic. Initially tourism industry and tourism workers voluntarily closed hotels and imposed COVID-19 measures against the Tanzanian state’s anti-lockdown approach, but once President Magufuli reopened international flights, the tourism industry stakeholders eagerly worked with the Tanzanian state and international funders to gain capital again. In January 2021, the tides changed for Tanzania after forces connected to colonial power

335 Feleke, Madowo, and Princewill, “After Death of Covid-Denying President, Tanzania Sets Roadmap to Combat the Virus.”
337 Kombe, “Tanzania President Launches COVID-19 Vaccination Campaign”
became negatively affected by the state COVID-19 policies domestic and continental actors had opposed since May. Priests and nuns died, tourists returned home sick, opposition leaders died, Tanzanian officials started to spread vaccine misinformation, and the pandemic could not be hidden from prospective tourists. Foreign governments, the UN, international financial institutions, Christian leaders, the Tanzania opposition, and the Tanzanian tourist industry work with and against the Tanzanian state and each other when it behooves them. The Tanzanian state changed strategies when Tanzania’s COVID-19 outbreak effected multiple colonial forces and the international community only after sanctions are imposed by international financial institutions that hold Tanzania in debt and use the matrix of colonial power to discipline the Tanzanian state.339

5.6 Tanzanian State Economic Dependence on Tourism and COVID-19

Tourism economic figures were often cited by newspaper articles to undergird the serious economic problems COVID-19 could cause. “Tourism is the main source of hard currency in Tanzania...[revenues] from tourism fetched $2.43 billion for the year 2018, up from $2.19 billion in 2017.”340 For this reason, the government paid special attention to tourism stakeholders and formed committees to redesign policy to address the tourism industry’s economic depression, even as the government was not optimistic of its ability to provide financial assistance. “Land, Natural Resources and Tourism Committee chairperson Kemirembe Lwota said the relevant ministry has formed a special commission to assess the impact of Covid-19 on the tourism and hospitality industries.”341

339 Maldonado-Torres, Nelson. “Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and Decoloniality.”
Government inquiries in April and May of 2020 discovered, “at least 477,000 jobs will be lost and revenues drop by 77 per cent should the pandemic persist beyond October [2020].”342 The Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism advocated for more investment in his department due to the calamity faced by the tourism industry, and most of the funding was, “sourced from international sources.”343 Plans prepared by the University of Dar es Salaam suggested to the Tanzanian government that Tanzania could, “still win back the [tourism] market,” by, “[relying] on the private sector in the revival efforts.”344 Reports suggested only particular parts of the private tourism sector were economically wealthy enough to continue in business, since, “local tourism operators [were not] eligible for government assistance.”345 In addition, Tanzania’s tourism industry relied upon mobility and wealth of people in Europe and the United States, which tourism industry actors noted meant recessions in these source markets would delay tourism recovery.346

The Tanzania governmental response incorporated multiple neoliberal responses throughout the pandemic. The opening of Tanzanian airports to international flights in May 2020 and working through diplomatic circles to influence airlines to return resulted in some booked flights beginning in June 2020 and continuing through the Fall of

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343 Ibid.
Government officials announce booked flights at national news conferences as confirmation of economic resurgence, and therefore legitimacy for governance. Tanzania partnered with news media organizations, public relation firms, and the film industry to promote Tanzania tourism sites internationally. The television program Serengeti Show Live in 2020, was created by the government and a white ex-patriate wildlife guide, “Carel Verhoef, aimed at allowing tourists and local wildlife fans access to their favorite conservation places during COVID-19 lockdowns.” News sources within Tanzania claimed citizens must support the government because, “Tanzania has restored tourist trust…after President John Magafuli declared victory against the deadly global pandemic,” and that, “hordes of tourists [were] flocking to the country.” Standard operating procedures, basic health protocols, were implemented throughout the Tanzanian tourist industry to assuage guest concerns about “the virus” (only the President and two other members of his administration could speak about COVID-19 after July 2020). The government used public-private partnerships to provide medical supplies to national park areas. In July, the World Bank recategorized Tanzania as a lower middle-income country and claimed this change was because of peace in the country and

349 Daily News Editor, “Reviving Tourism Sector Collective Responsibility.”
economic restructuring reforms. Throughout the pandemic, source countries for tourists shifted, which the government surveyed through new data collection at hotels and was directly involved in creating through diplomatic means. In August 2020, most tourists visited Tanzania from the United States or Europe, with France leading.

After the resumption of international flights, the state released updated economic figures suggesting greater growth in the economy due to, “measures taken by President John Magufuli’s administration, especially its insistence that people should get back to work while taking health precautions.” The government continually refused to consider a lockdown. Due to the global economic crisis, uncertainty in the stock market raised the price of gold and the mineral became Tanzania’s highest foreign exchange earner as tourism earnings fell significantly. Despite the economic outlook improvements for the national economy, surveys and studies suggested only about 11% of businesses in East Africa were sustainable for one year during the pandemic. Only one Tanzanian bank recorded a loss in 2020 which was attributed to tourism losses and restructuring, but all banks greatly increased the loans given to customers. While the banking sector did not see dramatic changes, Tanzanian tourism industry receipts

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354 Dausen, “Tanzania Raises 2020 Growth Forecast to 5.5% from 4% - Finance Minister.”
355 Mwai and Giles, “Coronavirus in Tanzania.”
358 Masare, “Banks Chart Ways to Boost Profits Hit by Pandemic.”
decreased 39.1% in 2020 compared to 2019, and in the early months of 2021, the COVID-19 denialism along with vaccine misinformation caused more countries to impose more travel restrictions upon travelers returning from Tanzania and canceled flights to Tanzania, limiting incoming tourists to mainly Eastern Europeans.359 Even so, the IMF announced the Tanzanian economy grew by 1% in 2020, and the institution predicted the Tanzanian economy would grow 2.7% in 2021.360 The Tanzanian government’s COVID-19 denials inspired tourists who did not believe in the existence of COVID-19 and anti vaxxers to settle in Zanzibar and work remotely.361 Despite the Tanzanian tourism industry earnings from May 2020 to May 2021 falling to an eleven-year low, the Tanzanian state saw an increase in tax earnings from the tourism industry and levies on travel related purchases, which interviewees then discussed in interviews.362 The state conservation and tourism organization tried to raise revenues even more in the summer of 2021 by imposing new land rent tariffs in national parks, but the tourism industry convinced the government to suspend land taxes for 3 more months.363

After President Magufuli announced Tanzania was free of COVID-19, the Tanzanian government successfully received grant aid from the European Union to support infrastructure in government medical facilities, which the Tanzanian ambassador

361 Roussi, “Tanzania’s Invisible Enemy.”
claimed would, “help the country scale up tourism and other sectors.” Bretton Woods institutions held a lot of power, and the debts Tanzania had to the IMF and the WB both curtailed the investment Tanzania could make in its own health and economic systems, but also these funders actively supported the funding and reopening of the tourism sector, at the expense of Tanzanian residents and citizens.

Throughout the pandemic, the Tanzanian government treated foreign visitors differently than Tanzanian residents. In March of 2020, the government created enhanced screening to test visitors and protect them at airports. Hotels implemented hygiene protocols and regular temperature checks after tourism businesses reopened in May of 2020. Tanzania used international loan money from the United Nations Development Program to provide ambulances for four tourism areas in the Northern circuit, as well as provide tourists and nearby hotels with PPE to, “assure tourists that Tanzania is well prepared to act promptly in care of emergency.” Serengeti National Park constructed the second COVID-19 testing and collection center in the country to provide tourists with quick and convenient tests through a partnership with the Tanzanian state and tourism business owners. Following the death of President Magufuli, President Hassan announced new testing requirements for travelers, including a negative PCR test in the 72 hours prior to arrival, and additional rapid testing on May 4, 2021. In addition, the government announced mandatory 14-day quarantines for travelers arriving from

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365 Citizen Reporter “Lifestyle change for Tanzanians as the Coronavirus hits”
countries with the Delta variant. The government then created two more testing centers in Arusha primarily for the use of residents involved in the tourism industry and tourists. After tourists complained about wait times at airports, eight more testing stations were installed with electronic payment systems. These tests were also subsidized by the Tanzanian government. When President Hassan restarted talks with the IMF for pandemic loans, one of the main purposes of the funding was to support the, “vulnerable,” tourism industry.

All this investment came at moments when COVID-19 testing and information was not accessible to the general public in Tanzania. The citizens and government of Tanzania entered more debt relations because of this investment, so the state could produce the performance of safety for nonresidents visiting Tanzania. It remained unclear if this investment and special treatment would produce mass returns of tourists to Tanzania and a return of tourist capital. International funders were complicit in these decisions to fund limited COVID-19 healthcare for tourists at the expense of Tanzanian citizens who did not have the freedom to speak or know about COVID-19 in the country. Recalling Walter Rodney’s theorization of underdevelopment during colonial rule, during the pandemic international investment in Tanzania was designed to produce medical care proximate to predominantly white foreigners in tourist areas and in airports. These spatial choices limited accessibility by Tanzania’s citizens, and rural and urban

tourism spaces often were already produced separate from Tanzanian society (with particular racial politics) through the power and economic wealth of tourism businesses and capital. While the COVID-19 development aid reproduced capital in financial institutions run predominantly in Europe and the United States - as underdevelopment prioritized the capitalist economies of colonizer nations, the material consequences of this development were in uneven spatial production in Tanzania which upholds unequal racial politics and relations woven through coloniality. Yet, here lies another contestation of colonial forces, the performance of safety international financial institutions funded did not make the predominantly white and foreign travelers safer, and this investment emboldened Tanzania to continue lying about the true situation of COVID-19 in the country, which actively harmed tourists and residents. Responses of the Tanzanian state and international funders that attempted return to the old order and processes in the creation of capital, the actual power and dynamic nature of COVID-19 as a virus, a part of ecology and something that can mutate and change, was ignored or underestimated. The COVID-19 virus wielded its own power in developing mutations which continued to threaten the lives of Tanzanians and tourists alike. The virus mutations cost actors related to colonial power and domestic opposition many lives, so many that the state was forced to abandon much of its COVID-19 denialism.

374 Schroeder *Africa After Apartheid*, Bryceson, Tropical Marine Biodiversity and People’s Rights.
375 Fuentes “A (Bio)Anthropological View of the COVID-19 Era Midstream:”
5.7 Tanzanian Tourism’s Response to COVID-19 and State Policies

The United Republic of Tanzania’s tourism sector began recording economic losses due to the COVID-19 pandemic in March of 2020, as tourists canceled or postponed their trips due to global COVID-19 crisis and travel restrictions.\textsuperscript{376} Tourism industry actors rallied in support of COVID-19 mitigation efforts, as well as broad economic changes to help industry such as reducing the taxes imposed on tourism operators.\textsuperscript{377} The largest lobbying group for the tourism industry in Tanzania (TATO) called for the government to close the borders to protect the country from COVID-19.\textsuperscript{378} Many hotels, “temporarily sent home their workers because there are no visitors to serve,” and regions relying on tourism already felt economic impacts in March of 2020.\textsuperscript{379} TATO called on the government to invest in advertising the Tanzanian tourist industry internationally, and initially asked employers to ensure all workers had health coverage.\textsuperscript{380} Tourist businesses and hotels independently of the government decided to close hotel and businesses for April and half of May, but there was a sense that tourism could recover after the crisis, and many commentators offered ideas of changes that could be made to the industry.\textsuperscript{381} This reckoning in the tourism industry was and is global, and

the UN released estimates projecting huge losses and turnover threatening 1 in 10 jobs globally.\textsuperscript{382}

A repeated theme throughout these articles included contested ideas about what influenced tourists to visit and the tourism industry to grow. In April, a news article claimed tourism is “at a standstill because communities in destinations simply cannot host or allow visitors in their regions”.\textsuperscript{383} Once Tanzania reopened airports and international flights, the Tanzania Tourist Board negotiated with airline companies and China, Malaysia, the Czech Republic, Israel, and other European countries to bring tourists to Tanzania.\textsuperscript{384} But there was uncertainty in the industry surrounding whether this would attract international tourists, given the government’s censorship of COVID-19 information.\textsuperscript{385} At the same time, governmental officials claimed international flights meant businesses were recovering from COVID-19.\textsuperscript{386} Hotels organize their own safety measures and COVID-19 protections for tourists, and the government decided to create minimal COVID-19 protections through Standard Operating Procedures in late May.\textsuperscript{387} Hotel owners expressed interest in COVID-19 testing and immunity screenings, in part, because home countries of tourists began to have new outbreaks.\textsuperscript{388} A significant amount

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\textsuperscript{382} Juergen T. Steinmetz, “Impact and a Way Forward for Africa on How to Survive COVID-19”
\textsuperscript{383} Ateino, “Covid-19: Fear of Job Losses Could Make Tourism Indifferent to Wellbeing”
\textsuperscript{384} Citizen Reporter, “Tanzania Expects Tourism Boom after Lifting Flight Ban.”
\textsuperscript{385} Kombe, “Tanzania Opening Up Tourism Despite Pandemic.”
\textsuperscript{386} Citizen Reporter, “Tanzania Expects Tourism Boom after Lifting Flight Ban.”; Citizen Reporter, “Hope as Two Airlines Resume Dar Es Salaam Flights.”
\end{flushright}
of reporting detailed the ever-changing travel lists of source countries, because, “it is the quarantines on return that limit interest in overseas travel.” Even though the travel bans were lifted and hotels reopened, hotel owners reported lower than average numbers of visitors to Zanzibar and in the safari parks. Tourists in the fall and summer of 2020 mainly visited from Western Europe, Australia, and the United States, all countries with imperial or settler colonial histories and presents.

New year celebrations in Tanzania revealed certain types of tourists traveled to Tanzania, particularly tourists eager to live without health restrictions and party, many of whom were from Eastern Europe. European tourists interviewed by newspapers claimed they believed in COVID-19 restrictions, but they, “just [chose] not to follow any of them.” Professionals who worked for, “major international organizations like Amazon, Citigroup and even the United Nations,” settled in Zanzibar during the pandemic to work remotely and go to parties and clubs. These tourists claimed President Magufuli did the right thing to abolish restrictions, even though many supported COVID-19 measures in their home countries. These wazungu also forged COVID-19 negative test documentation and successfully bribed officials when caught.

390 Ibid
395 Ibid.
Tourists recognized, “[this trip] is way too permanent to be just a COVID escape,” and many tourists were Covid deniers or skeptics, who called themselves Covid refugees.\textsuperscript{396} Several tourists decided to officially rent properties and started businesses to stay, however the lifting of restrictions in Europe and the United States caused many tourists to return to their home countries, which worried tourism industry owners that Tanzania might become “a pariah state.”\textsuperscript{397}

Tourists interested in creating their own businesses and settling on Zanzibar raises questions of who these tourists displaced to buy property on a famous tourist island, what communities these businesses aimed to create, and what power local people had to assert their own rights and safety in the face of white tourists who viewed Zanzibar as a place to enjoy, from which to extract experiences, and to engage in dangerous behavior, rather than a place encompassing all parts of life and ancestral histories.\textsuperscript{398} These narratives demonstrate uneven and colonial relations not only exist at the local scale of the Tanzanian tourism industry, but that COVID-19 deepened these colonial relations. More health options existed for predominantly white tourists while local Tanzanians were not able to speak about COVID-19 without fear of retaliation by the government. Many tourists refused to believe COVID-19 was real or tourists believed COVID-19 measures were not needed specifically in Tanzania while they supported health responses in their homelands. Tourists, the Tanzanian government, and their actions made local people’s lives disposable through increasing their vulnerability and seeing their lives as less


\textsuperscript{397} Roussi, “How an African Island Became the World’s COVID Conspiracy Capital.”

\textsuperscript{398} Ibid.
valuable than the lives of people in Europe. These tourist beliefs match Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s definition of racism in that paired with state policies, tourist decisions materialized in, “premature death” of Tanzanians and political leaders.399 In addition, some tourists claimed the term “refugee” for themselves, when based on their nationalities, socioeconomic class, and mobility and Tanzanian history the better approximation for long term European settlement in Tanzania that displaces local people and threatens the health of Tanzanians is a temporary settler.400 I say temporary settlers, because these visitors acquired property and assumed claims to Zanzibar, as whiteness encourages,401 even if these long-term visitors return to their home countries after restrictions ease.

Tourism industry leaders called for closer cooperation between the government and the private sector. The sector’s leaders used colonial concepts of returning to the past as marketing, making “Africa” a preferred destination, ideas of romance and discovery, and finding “new pioneers” (referring to tourists) in articles and presentations. Hotels marketed working from holiday destinations and offering deals to “lockdown refugees.”402 This language echoes colonial newspaper articles and stories as well as has resonance with tropical island tourism marketing and blogging prior to the pandemic.403 TATO leaders asked the government repeatedly to reduce tax burdens and market the

401 Inwood and Bonds, “Property and Whiteness”
402 Steinmetz, “The Mafia Island Model for a Brand-New Approach to Tourism Explained.”
403 Smith, “Instagram Abroad: Performance,”
country internationally for tourism.\textsuperscript{404} TATO not only partnered with the Tanzanian government, but also the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to market Tanzania to potential international tourists.\textsuperscript{405}

COVID-19 policies of the Tanzanian state significantly disrupted the possibilities of tourism throughout the pandemic. First, airline patterns for August and September were disrupted due to Kenya imposing travel restrictions on travelers from Tanzania, and the Tanzanian state retaliated by banning Kenyan airlines, some of the primary flights tourists take to get to Tanzania.\textsuperscript{406} The United States put Tanzania on its “Do Not Travel” list because of Tanzania’s COVID-19 denials, and safari camps began targeting domestic tourists and locals because there were no other options.\textsuperscript{407} In October, the Bank of Tanzania announced tourism earnings in Tanzania plunged by over 50% compared to the year prior.\textsuperscript{408} The state began to feel the economic vulnerability at the end of the fiscal year, when tourism governmental revenues, “dropped by 75 percent in the fourth quarter of the 2019/2020 financial year.”\textsuperscript{409} Tanzania received a significant number of tourists in December of 2020 and January of 2021, however alleged COVID-19 spikes amid Tanzania’s denial of the virus inspired countries like Japan to impose more travel

\textsuperscript{406} Citizen Reporter, “Regional Analysts Worried Tanzania-Kenya Tiff to Hurt Tourism.”
\textsuperscript{408} Christopher, “Foreign Exchange Earnings from Tourism Drop to a 10-Year Low.”
restrictions.\textsuperscript{410} Despite this, the World Bank adjusted its forecast for Tanzanian growth to 5.5\%, a three percent increase than the previous year.\textsuperscript{411} When Magufuli died, primary tourism source countries at that time, such as Russia, suspended air travel with Tanzania due to COVID-19 circulating in the country.\textsuperscript{412} Shortly after President Hassan’s administration imposed new Covid-19 testing requirements for tourists, Israeli travel agencies and Tanzanian tourism leaders lobbied for easing these restrictions, because Israeli travel agencies demanded vaccinated tourists should be excluded from having to test for COVID-19. These agents leveraged the cancellation of all Israeli tourist bookings.\textsuperscript{413}

The lack of governmental assistance in Tanzania threatened tourism industry workers and smaller companies. Safari guides and other workers had to, “figure out other ways to sustain themselves,” through starting other businesses and growing agricultural products to sell at markets.\textsuperscript{414} By September, most safaris did not see significant increases in visitors, and workers struggled to find other work, because tourism qualifications did not translate well to other economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{415} While smaller tourism businesses struggled in 2020 and 2021, large internationally owned hotel chains

\textsuperscript{410} Tadokoro, Ryuko. “Japan Warns against Traveling to Tanzania as Country Denies Existence of Coronavirus.” \textit{Mainichi Daily News}. February 10, 2021, sec. Japan. \url{https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210210/p2a/00m/0na/002000c}.


\textsuperscript{412} TASS. “Russian Tourists Not to Be Evacuated from Turkey, Tanzania but Can Return Earlier.” \textit{Russian News Agency}. April 12, 2021, sec. Coronavirus Pandemic. \url{https://tass.com/society/1277041}.


used the pandemic for expansion, by buying out independent hotels, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, which these hotel chains labeled “underserved.”\textsuperscript{416} By the second year of the pandemic, worker salaries in large rich hotels were reduced enough that many left to start businesses or created side businesses to supplement their income.\textsuperscript{417}

In these newspaper articles, it is clear Tanzanian state policies of COVID-19 denial and misinformation disrupted the Tanzanian tourist industry, at the very time the government officials enforced censorship and denial to save the tourism sector from crashing and protect the ruling party’s future. Tanzania’s policy of open borders and decreased COVID-19 measures curtailed the industry through disciplining actions from foreign governments. Once the government changed its policies, the tourism industry and foreign tourism actors from settler states and former colonies refused the new conditions Tanzania set for travel, decreasing Tanzania’s tourism appeal yet again. While the government and big industry leaders worked together and against each other, Tanzanian workers felt the economic harm of neoliberalism and the lack of social safety nets. Workers left jobs or took on more jobs to sustain themselves in this economic crisis. At the same time, global and powerful hotel chains headquartered in the Global North used the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic crisis to accumulate property and gain power in African tourism.


5.8 Historical Context of Mafia Island Tourism

Much of the history of Mafia Island is told through oral histories, in particular, the experiences of islanders prior to European colonization and during European colonization. Again and again, Mafia Island underwent occupation and governance from foreigners intending to build empires and wealth. Slavery as an institution landed on Mafia Island before the creation of plantations by Omani sultans on the island. A group of Shirazi Persians controlled Mafia remotely from a mainland city-state, Kilwa, from the tenth century to the early nineteenth century. Enslaved people were forced to harvest rice, work as artisans, and run the houses built on their labor. Later in the nineteenth century, plantations established by Zanzibar-based Omanis grew coconuts to produce copra for European oils and soaps.418

Enslaved people brought from the current-day mainland of Tanzania worked these plantations, by many accounts in a harsher and more dehumanizing form of slavery than previously experienced in East Africa. The British took over most of the islands off the coast of Tanganyika but traded Mafia Island to the Germans for a road connecting the British holdings in Malawi to missions and industry near Lake Tanganyika. Tourism began on Mafia Island during the German colonial period and a lodge was built on the island for visiting colonial officials and other colonial subjects.419 Emancipation of enslaved people officially took place in 1922, though during World War I many Mafia Islanders claimed their freedom and successfully ran away from the plantations. When

419 Ibid
the British gained Mafia Island in the aftermath of World War I, newly freed Mafia Islanders refused to work on coconut plantations, requiring the British to encourage migrants from mainland Tanzania to sustain their new wage labor system built on taxes and debt. Delaney writes that, “the period of emancipation … was a time of extraordinary confusion and invention,” in the North American context, and in Tanzania, the British capitalized on this confusion to create large taxes, requiring Tanzanians to work for British money, i.e. cash. British colonial elites and government officials used these taxes and work contracts to “[rebind]” Tanzanians to land producing cash crops, managed by white elites. Wage laborers could not end their contracts at will, and forms of corporal punishment used in slavery by white elites continued to be practiced by individuals and the state.

After Mainland Tanzanian Independence in 1961, the government built a hotel on the island in the hopes of securing some profit from the burgeoning industry. Following independence from the British, the Tanzanian government under the Arusha Declaration’s policy of ujamaa required local people to comply with forced villagization, enforced by government officials from the mainland and Tanzanian soldiers. Forced migration concentrated villagers into clear neighborhoods, but the government failed to provide adequate social services as leaders such as President Julius Nyerere claimed. Today, many of the villages on Mafia remain in this ujamaa-mandated structure. Though ujamaa was a development policy implemented throughout Tanzania, state focus

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420 Ibid.
421 Delaney, David. “Geographies of Slavery and Emancipation.”, 47; Walley, Rough Waters: Nature and Development in an East African Marine Park
422 Delaney, David. “Geographies of Slavery and Emancipation.”, 48
423 Bryceson et al., “Tanzania”
remained on mainland Tanzania, meaning Mafia Islanders did not experience much change in quality of life and communal economic prosperity during this period. \textsuperscript{424} Neoliberal restructuring due to economic bailouts after the OPEC crisis began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the Tanzanian government decided to establish Africa’s largest marine park in and around Mafia Island. Expanding tourism to Mafia Island was a guiding motivation for this park from the beginning. \textsuperscript{425}

Today, Mafia Island is increasingly marketed as an exclusive tourist location based on luxury hotels, the need to buy extra flights to reach the island, and the expensive fees of the Mafia Island Marine Park. \textsuperscript{426} Ex-patriates and foreigners own and manage most of the hotels and recreation centers and treat these sites as capital investments. The most expensive hotel on Mafia Island, renting at $33,300 a night in 2022, initially began as a search for a winter home for the Scandinavian owners. Now part of a multi-property tourism company, the hotel has political power beyond the local politics within the property of the hotel. Because of its location on a private island, the hotel rules are dispensed through hierarchical power systems on the surrounding area, dictating access to the island as well as environmental relationships. \textsuperscript{427}

\textsuperscript{424} Walley, \textit{Rough Waters: Nature and Development in an East African Marine}
\textsuperscript{425} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{427} Abel, “Thanda Island: Tanzania’s $10,000-A-Night Private Retreat.”; Thanda Island Portfolio. “Rates.”
5.9 Mobilities and Tourism on Mafia Island during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Articles about Mafia Island during the collection period provided insight into the economic and mobility challenges on Mafia Island, which did not begin in the pandemic, but are ongoing in conjunction with the tourism industry and conservation practices on the island. Beginning in June 2020, the Tanzanian Parliament and government officials began to confront questions regarding mobility and safety issues on Mafia Island, when Islanders sought a rescue boat for the island, as well as a safer ferry and port for local people to commute, sell goods, or travel to Dar es Salaam. The series of articles covering the port opening and reduction in ferry costs reveal that the local people on Mafia Island faced significant challenges to accessing markets and goods, improving their livelihoods, and visiting the mainland, even as the tourism industry facilitated constant circulation of tourists on the island through expensive transportation not available to local people. When a resident was asked about the significance of the more accessible ferry and port, he noted the improvement to business activities and said, “I believe good infrastructure stimulate development.” On Mafia Island, tourism was the industry the government and international organizations claimed would bring development when the conservation park was established, but the resident’s comment

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430 Lasteck, “Tanzania. Optimism High After New Berth Constructed at Nyamisati Port.”
suggests the built infrastructure for tourism industry was not accessible for local people and did not meet the needs of local people – meaning this investment produced development for white tourists and the spaces they visit on the island. Uneven infrastructure in Mafia Island was funded by the state and international capital, as the World Wildlife Fund, foreign hotel owners, and the Tanzanian government allocated money to build resorts, the Mafia Island Marine Park, the airport, and other infrastructure seen as necessary for the tourism industry. Even though the new port and ferry system improved transportation to and from Mafia Island for Mafia Islanders, the schedule of the ferry remained unreliable for travelers, and people waited for hours to depart at the port.

Meanwhile, tourism industry and conservation stakeholders used global networks to sell the tourism and conservation experience on and around Mafia Island to potential tourists. In several articles, a white hotel owner is described as the “CEO of Mafia Island,” flattening the island into a business, and eliding the existence of local people and government on the island. Language depicting colonial relationships and times on Mafia Island abound in these articles, beginning with the use of military and war terms to discuss how the tourism industry should address the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, “take the battle to the enemy and deal with each obstacle as it arises.” Articles detailing the luxury private island resort off the coast of Mafia Island

432 Walley, Rough Waters: Nature and Development in an East African Marine; Bryceson, Tropical Marine Biodiversity and People’s Rights.; Interview 2
433 Citizen Reporter, “Mafia Ferry Signals Hope for Island’s Economy.”
emphasized the exclusive nature of the retreat, and the large service staff available to potential tourists. Tourists were told they will contribute to “ethical” sea experiences and conservation activities, as they stay in a resort designed after a Kennedy compound in the middle of a marine reserve where local people are not allowed to travel.\textsuperscript{436} This private island uses US dollars as currency (which is not the currency of Tanzania) and provides elaborate dinners and a private helicopter to assist guests’ arrivals and departures.\textsuperscript{437} This island was described as a, “magical place,” which could be owned by them, “a complete paradise to enjoy in total privacy with family and friends.”\textsuperscript{438} The history of this island and the workers on it is silenced, with articles suggesting the private island is, “a deserted blip” and completely isolated from society.\textsuperscript{439} Again, the selling of the entire island and a full support staff in this resort is entangled in whiteness as the need to possess property and reproduces plantation logics of dispossession and uneven racial encounters.\textsuperscript{440} Racist violence is seen through the way local people are banned from this island and prevented from historical ecological practices and labor surrounding Shungi-Mbili island as well as Mafia Island, while tourists are able to participate and venture everywhere.\textsuperscript{441}

\textsuperscript{440} McKittrick, “Plantation Futures”; Bonds and Inwood, “Beyond White Privilege.”;
\textsuperscript{441} Beymer-Farris et al. “The Human Rights Dimensions of Conservation and Climate Change Initiatives in Coastal Tanzania:”

In consort with the regional government, the Mafia Island tourism industry hosted a tourism festival in November 2020 to highlight the island destination.\footnote{Steinmetz, “The Mafia Island Model for a Brand-New Approach to Tourism Explained.”} The articles and effort of the Mafia Island Tourism Industry to connect with partners appeared to work to some extent, leading to a rise in tourists from Russia, Ukraine, and Poland.
visiting during the pandemic. The government viewed the rise in tourists as an opportunity for, “revenue collection,” which I will explore more in the sections following.

5.10 Impact of the pandemic on Mafia Island lower-level hotel workers

While Mafia Island hotel workers often did not know exactly how the government was involved in the tourism industry, the hotel workers were overwhelmingly vocal about the need for the government to help with the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular, that the government needed to provide the COVID-19 vaccine for Tanzanians. Several participants mentioned the government’s lack of information or comments on the COVID-19 pandemic. At the end of the interview, my final question asked participants if they would like to share anything else with my research assistant or me. Many participants took this opportunity to share COVID-19 safety information and the belief that everyone should get vaccinated. Several shared that the government needs to work to end the epidemic so the tourism industry can progress again. Hotel workers did not report effects on their families besides economic uncertainty and problems relating to the pandemic, but the workers knew the disease was a serious problem. Many hotel workers described economic changes they would like the government to pursue, including reducing taxes on tourism businesses, working to bring more tourists from international sources, and providing training for people who want to change their livelihoods. Hotel


Worker 9 noted how easily people can be fired in the hotels during COVID-19 and asked that the government intervene to provide income and protections for workers. These moments of demands and appeals for protection of communities are reclamations of life and truth for people made disposable by the state, international financial institutions, and often by the tourism industry. In these appeals, respondents center desire and claim their own power to influence the government and people in their communities.449

Many hotel workers described how difficult it is to pay school fees for their children and other family members that they support in education. Even though education is supposed to be free to a certain level in Tanzania, many hotel workers have sent their family members to boarding schools or private schools which cost more. These workers described not being able to afford sending their family members to school – at the time sending children to government schools or no school at all - or if they were still paying school fees, how little money they have left for their own lives and sustenance. School fees are important, because their purpose is to guarantee better futures for young people, as well as their relations. Investing in better futures for Mafia Island hotel workers and their family members meant some workers drastically reduced their eating to support their families.450 In economic ruins451 and ecological struggle,452 workers refused to give up better futures. They directly tied income differences and lack of pay to lack of tourists coming to Mafia Island, particularly international tourists. Several respondents noted the challenge of reducing meals in households and many hotel workers described mass

449 Tuck, “Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities.”
451 Tsing, *The Mushroom at the End of the World,* 19
unemployment from hotels and the businesses that typically serve tourists. The hotel owner and manager also mentioned steep income drops, 80% net income decrease for the hotel owner and the hotel manager was not hired at a salary they thought they deserved because of the pandemic.

Several hotel workers noted dynamic changes in tourists’ origins, as Worker 1 noted, “it depends on the example, last season, I think many from Russia”. Multiple workers explained tourists to Mafia were rarely coming from international locations, as in the past, and most arrived from Dar es Salaam or Arusha, with some guests visiting from Zanzibar within the Mafia Island Marine Park (Worker 2; Worker 4; Worker 5; Worker 6; Worker 7). Workers in white-owned hotels reported international arrivals from Europe, particularly former European colonial powers, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Switzerland, and Spain, but domestic tourists also used their hotels (Worker 3; Worker 9). Workers in luxury hotels reported tourists from several other locations, the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Sweden (Worker 8; Worker 10). An interviewed hotel owner explained their hotel survived as a business through the French and Swiss markets in 2020 to 2021. The interviewed hotel manager also noticed a large increase in domestic tourism and expatriates living in Tanzania visiting, and a reduced number of international tourists. A hotel manager (E) noted the source country regulations influenced whether the tourists would come. Upper-level hotel employees explained the tourists’ source country’s regulations were one of the primary influences on whether tourists planned to visit. The red-lists and black-lists, which required various quarantines and COVID-19 stringent measures on return, highly influenced whether tourists felt it was safe or worth the trip to Tanzania.
5.11 The Elephant in the Room – the Tourism Industry and the State on Mafia Island

All hotel workers connected the government, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the hotel industry in some way, but the hotel manager and the hotel owner shared particular insights and critiques gained partly through their status as ex-patriates with passports for foreign countries. The hotel owner (M) kept calling the government, “the elephant in the room” to describe how the government’s interest in the tourism industry is primarily for the capital it receives from taxes on hotels and tourism revenue, and not for the industry itself to grow and profit. The Tanzanian government and the new president, President Hassan, invested in marketing Tanzania as a tourist destination through wildlife documentaries, but Mafia Island tourism stakeholders had significant challenges when they tried to work with the Mafia Island Marine Park officials and other regional and national government workers to address challenges in the industry – which the hotel owner tied back to governmental corruption and eagerness to tax the tourism industry to create revenue for the government, “you've got an industry that's being plucked like a chicken the whole time”. When I asked if the hotel owner believed the tourism industry could survive the COVID-19 pandemic challenges and the taxation hikes of the national and local governments, he said no, and claimed local people were privileged by these taxation practices, “what we're getting because of the government policies and the way they’re, they’re favoring local people, by not taxing them or not making them pay the fees they supposed to pay, the licenses and all the rest of it, the government is eroding the quality of the industry, all the time, our, our tourism industry, I think, is, is falling in quality” (Interview 2). The hotel owner’s assumption that the government of Tanzania, a
country to which he did not claim citizenship, was supposed to prioritize his influence in
government decisions, is connected to whiteness’s understanding of property and
assumptions about ownership.\textsuperscript{453} In Tanzania, most land is owned by the government, to
protect against colonial rule. A citizen can own land, but foreigners cannot, and can only
rent land. Settler logics have convinced this hotel owner that he owns the land, and the
government should not tax him heavily for exploiting and making capital off of this land
that does not belong to him, in a country where he is a foreigner.\textsuperscript{454} Later, the hotel owner
acknowledged he informally lobbied the Tanzanian state, demonstrating his power could
interfere in the democratic processes available to Tanzanian citizens whether because of
his wealth, whiteness, or power in the tourism industry. This struggle over land rents and
taxes gives good insight into the localization of national policies the Tanzanian
Association of Tour Operators opposed at the end of my research study period. The
Tanzanian state, because of indebtedness and the economic crisis of the country, decided
to tax the tourism industry so heavily, that it threatened the industry’s immediate future.
In short, the state, indebted to a colonial force, obstructed the life of the tourism industry,
a force made of colonial relations.

The hotel manager acknowledged that the government had sent some guidance for
COVID-19 practices to hotels, but nothing meaningful. The hotel owner was particularly
upset that that government never sought to formally include consultations with the private
sector to create policies in the tourism industry during the pandemic, though M
acknowledged he and his co-owner took part in informally lobbying the government.
Both the hotel manager and hotel owner identified the COVID-19 denialism and mocking

\textsuperscript{453} Inwood and Bonds, “Property and Whiteness: The”
\textsuperscript{454} Inwood and Bonds, “Property and Whiteness: The”
as originating from the deceased president, President Magufuli, though both believed COVID-19 did not have a significant impact on Tanzania or Mafia Island. This denialism reduced the interest in tourists from different countries, and foreign national governments imposed strict quarantines because of the state denial of COVID-19, which made it challenging to convince tourists to come stay on Mafia Island. The hotel owner suggested COVID-19 vaccines for all tourism industry related workers would greatly improve Tanzania’s reputation in the eyes of tourists but claimed that vaccine misinformation was rampant on social media (he claimed “which Africans are addicted to”) and estimated only 50-60% of his hotel workers would consent to be vaccinated, with significant pushback from women who believed the vaccine would negatively influence their reproductive systems. M believed the government completely failed the tourism industry on the global stage, and the COVID-19 malpractices at airports and suspected false negatives in COVID-19 testing of travelers negatively influenced perceptions of Tanzania. In this response, the hotel owner reveals his racism, which flattens and imbues his understandings of the tourism industry, his workers, and the politics of Tanzania.

5.12 Coloniality and Racial Capitalism in Hotel Management on Mafia Island

The two upper-level hotel workers interviewed for this study were white expatriates who grew up in countries outside Tanzania. Both came to Tanzania as adults, and one retained citizenship from a former colonial power, and one retained citizenship from a settler colony. Both the hotel owner and manager recently had lived in their country of citizenship for familial reasons and returned to Tanzania during or before the pandemic. M became involved in the hotel industry after working for international development projects in Tanzania related to conservation, marrying a tourism industry
worker, and acquiring land on Mafia Island (Interview 2). E chose to work in the tourism industry, attained a master’s degree relating to work in the hotel, and received a job on Mafia Island through knowing people in the network of tourism professionals in Tanzania (Interview 1). M and E both maintain permanent residences outside of Mafia Island, with M living on the island 50% of the time and E’s permanent residence located on the Tanzanian mainland. Both own and run businesses in other parts of Tanzania where they live for a significant amount of the year. M and E claimed to not have political affiliations or ideas and identified themselves as agnostic, though they were both raised Catholic. As the managers and owners of hotels, the permanent residences off Mafia Island is significant, given similarities to colonial rule and colonial plantation labor systems. This hotel manager did not claim ongoing relationships with the people of Mafia Island or the government outside of E’s presence on the island connected to capital accumulation. The hotel owner viewed Mafia Island in a very paternalistic vision and told me M and partner occasionally secretly contributed to Mafia Island projects M understood to be needed by villagers. This comment unearths the locality of neoliberalism, and the power structures and colonial relations it aids to maintain and create. As Melinda Cooper has deftly argued, the imposition of neoliberalism was and is used as a tool to uphold neoconservative ideals of heteropatriarchy and racism in the United States and globally at the scale of families and interpersonal relationships. Governmental abandonment through neoliberal policy in Mafia Island and Tanzania meant that white ex-patriates could control the movement of capital investment for

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societal infrastructure and make moral judgement calls about what is deemed necessary or not. Due to these processes working outside of formal government processes, local people have limited power to influence these decisions about their lives, land, and needs.

The cultural and power distance from the people and culture of Mafia Island influenced the way workers and Mafia Island people were characterized by these upper-management workers. Both the interviewed hotel owner and hotel manager were frustrated with the workforce at their respective hotels and believed Mafia Island workers to be deficient in attitude towards work and the pandemic. The manager described the staff she managed as, “...not really well aware of what is going on…they didn’t really understand the luck they had to get their salary” (Interview 1). Both the hotel owner and the hotel manager minimized the concerns and needs of their staff during the pandemic claiming workers could not see the larger picture of the crisis and the industry and used racist language to suggest the workers were not capable workers, constructing workers as, “childish” (Interview 1) and workers with “low loyalty” to the hotel (Interview 2), which both insinuated was because of Tanzanian and Mafia Island culture and history. M, the hotel owner, attributed distractions at work and stress to multigenerational family models and communal problem solving:

“And it's, it's taken a lot out of us to …to incentivize the staff to get them to think and to concentrate to pay attention to the to their work and all the rest of it. And I think it's largely because they have jobs, and so the extended family is depending much more on them than it would normally do. Because, at one stage what we decided to do was to exercise the right we have under Tanzania’s labor laws, which is to remove their telephones, their mobile phones, during working hours
and I think it was a relief to them that we did that, because they were not getting these phone calls all the time “I want money, I need money” you know from a distant relative or a grandmother or aunt to what to what, and you know, under the, under the family situation, extended family situation you, you've got to do it, you have to send the money. It's one of the reasons why poverty is so pervasive is because they share everything, they share all the cash, so they keep one another poor. They keep one another poor, by, by this extended family situation, whereas many, many years ago we abandoned that, and we said, you know if I'm going to work my butt off six or seven days a week, I’m going to use that money for my family and my requirements, not spread it around so much to our extended families. Started petering out a long time ago, so, I think that was the main cause of it, but also, you know, we had to cut their salaries. We cut their working time and they got more per hour but work fewer hours. They worked five hours a day, and not eight. We had no choice because we were trying to make this, this little amount of money we had left over from the previous season.”

M demonstrated the power the owners of the hotel hold over the working Tanzanian staff, to the extent that they removed personal cell phones and contact with the outside world during work hours. This isolating technique, M believed, was in the workers’ best interest and even believes this choice exercised by management provided “relief” to workers. M followed on a smaller scale in the colonial tradition of claiming the decisions of colonial powers provided better livelihoods and lifestyles for racialized laborers and colonial subjects. Bonds and Inwood wrote, “whiteness is constituted in and through the bodies, property, land, and labor of people of color…” and the owner’s
decision affirmed his control over not only the property of his hotel, but also over the labor and Tanzanians workers laboring in his hotel. M claimed African family systems of support and communalism are mainly responsible for poverty among Tanzanians who rely on extended relations instead of relying on capitalist immediate family systems and boundaries, but later admitted the owners cut worker salaries across the board. M continued to discuss workers leaving the hotel for financial reasons, partly because there is no government support for citizens:

“But we, and then we started losing people. People started going off because they felt they could do better elsewhere either fishing illegally or fishing honestly, with whatever they did. You know, we built up with that really good teams in the water sports and then guiding and activities and excursions and we've lost them all, we’re really running at the moment, and a lot of pressure and and I think not very well because we, we don't have our good teams in place anymore, but I think it's part I think it's part of a cycle, the fourth the fourth phase of that cycle. That, I think, every country is going through with this pandemic, ours is different it's not a lockdown that's caused this but rather an impact on on incomes, because there's been no government support, whereas in the case of Europe and America and so on it's been because people will lock down, but they, they have plenty of money. Here it was financial. It was caused by finance.”

In this excerpt, M suggested first that workers leaving employment decided to labor illegally in fishing in the MIMP – a park constructed through colonial development

457 Bonds and Inwood. “Beyond White Privilege: Geographies of White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism.”
finance and colonial ideas of conservation458 – with the caveat that some may fish, “honestly” outside of the conservation park. M described these career changes as rash and distressing, but also demonstrated that the hotel industry’s creation of guides and workers for tours and excursions was not sustainable in the pandemic. Later, M admitted, “we've lost, I guess, five or six staff to Zanzibar” because of the steady stream of tourists and better job opportunities there, and then, “…most of our staff were, were Mafia people anyway. So they've gone off to do other things in Mafia, living off the land. Living off the land, so to speak, or go to Dar es Salaam, maybe some.” This admission of employment changes reveals that many Mafia Island hotel workers have invested in livelihood practices more likely to sustain them than the tourism industry. This is an example of quiet refusal and reclamation of land and labor into practices that give life and are under the control of Mafia Island workers.459 The hotel owner noticed a vast increase in agricultural activities by Mafia Islanders between 2020 and 2021, and because of the good rains, the Islanders had a good harvest alongside fishing to supplement and sustain families and communities.

There is an element of possession inherent in the way the hotel owner talked about workers leaving the hotel for different opportunities, so much so that I once had to clarify to make sure none of the staff had died.

“…you know I’m very upset about that because we, we had a very good team going. You know, hotel and that, that is one of the biggest challenges here in Tanzania, is this very low loyalty to jobs. I mean when people will leave like that

for slightly higher salary elsewhere or an easier job, for example, being a cook in a hotel that provides all the meals for the staff, which is a typical thing in Zanzibar they'll go, because you know it's it's better for them so they – the idea of building careers isn't there yet, so that this, that is as well, as well as the impact of, impact of covid depleting our ranks. We had, we were losing good people and that, that institutional memory and skill memory, the skill set.”

The agency exercised by workers to leave for employment at more productive tourist locations and other jobs deeply upset the hotel owner, and M repeatedly brought up loss in relation to these employees. Instead of recognizing what was needed for the employees, M characterized their decisions during the pandemic as short-sighted, backwards, and only slightly recognized the culpability of the hotel and financial hardship in these decisions. These reflections on the mobility and power of Tanzanian labor by the hotel owner and manager demonstrate that the whiteness and relations of hotel management not only are invested in possessiveness of their property as Inwood and Bonds theorized, but also possessive of the labor and time of the Tanzanian workers in the hotel.460 Goeman writes that the concept of property locks together, “…land, labor, and conquest…” for colonial Europeans.461 Given Mafia Island’s history of plantations, enslavement, and the unfreedom of coerced Black labor, the wishes of white upper-level hotel employees to render their workers immobile and to curtail their presents and futures is rooted in colonial plantation logic.462

460 Inwood and Bonds, “Property and Whiteness: The”
462 McKittrick, “Plantation Futures”
At first glance, the Tanzanian state is often made culpable for the complex and shifting responses of the government and Tanzanian people over the course of the pandemic. However, this research reveals how narratives of faith and fear, the continued power and role of international economic development institutions, the COVID-19 virus, and power rooted in coloniality influenced the Tanzanian state response to the COVID-19 pandemic on tourism.\textsuperscript{463} I theorize here that the Tanzanian state, the Tanzanian formal political opposition, everyday people, and colonial forces operated and moved in shifting coalitions of power throughout my data collection and study period. From the start of the pandemic, colonial power consistently created dire economic circumstances and influenced Tanzanian state’s COVID-19 policy responses.

In the form of church platforms, religious discourse, and international loans, colonial forces legitimized the Tanzanian state, particularly the ruling CCM party and President Magufuli, in their denials, their censorship, violence, and actions to reopen the tourism industry in 2020. The tourism industry followed suit, reopening the hotels and businesses the Tanzanian tourism industry voluntarily had closed in April of 2020 and developed marketing campaigns alongside the government to lure international tourists to Tanzania. Tanzania’s state invested more deeply in extraction to cover the losses of the tourism industry on their revenue.

\textsuperscript{463} Maldonado-Torres, “Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and Decoloniality.”
Through this pandemic, it is clear Tanzania remains caught in webs of domination by current colonial powers and former colonial powers.\textsuperscript{464} Foreign government travel bans and other policies in the Global North, international development institutions, and international governing organizations carried influential power, because, due to ongoing colonial power relations, these forces set the terms for tourist mobility and flows, as well as the Tanzanian government’s economic health and policy. Despite Tanzania’s installation of COVID-19 denials and its ensuing policies designed to rejuvenate the Tanzanian tourist sector, by 2021 these death-making practices imperiled the industry as well as Tanzania’s economy.

The Tanzania tourism sector was constructed through coloniality, and the state response of Tanzania reveals colonial forces of domination.\textsuperscript{465} Governmental responses reproduced colonial relationships during the pandemic’s first year and a half. I found historically colonial governance relied upon tourism practices to produce development strategies in colonial Tanzania, and these practices have resonance today in the story of the Tanzanian state pandemic response. Expeditions, surveys, and tours of the colonial territory by colonial officials produced economic policy and projects, violently enforced, and expanded colonial rule, demonstrated the fractures and incompleteness of colonialism by tracking African resistance to colonial rule, functioned as funding campaigns for European colonizer states and banks, and imposed racial hierarchies throughout the economic systems in the colonies. All these practices composed the project of underdevelopment in German East Africa and Tanganyika which created

\textsuperscript{464} Getachew, \textit{Worldmaking After Empire}

\textsuperscript{465} Maldonado-Torres, “Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and Decoloniality.”
capital and “development” for colonial powers.\textsuperscript{466} Concepts of development promoted by colonizers were constructed through racist ideas about civilization and religious superiority.

On Mafia Island I found the tourism industry during the pandemic was influenced by colonial and plantation logics through hotel management’s possessive understandings of worker agency and racist ideas of the cultural and historical context of Mafia Island and Tanzania. In response, Mafia Island hotel workers invested in livelihood practices more likely to sustain them than the tourism industry in quiet refusals of the labor conditions and practices of the hotel industry. Some reclaimed their labor and agency by leaving for new jobs or agricultural subsistence practices. Mafia Islanders used agricultural knowledge to vastly increase in agricultural production on the island in 2020 and 2021. Amidst ongoing environmental struggles over ecological management of Mafia Island, local people used agricultural strategies to produce life in economic and ecological crises. The hotel owner admitted these subsistence practices and familial connections likely saved local people from the deepest of harms due to the pandemic’s economic crisis.\textsuperscript{467}

My research project provides needed political ecological analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on tourism in Tanzania. COVID-19 disrupted and challenged the tourism industry internationally, and this project examined the political, ecological, and health consequences of the pandemic in a tourist location dependent economically on tourism.\textsuperscript{468} The uncertainty of health and economics caused by the pandemic presented

\textsuperscript{466} Rodney 1972 \\
\textsuperscript{467} Interview 2, 2021 \\
\textsuperscript{468} Gaffney and Eeckels 2020
opportunities for governments and people to choose between past development projects, such as tourism, and creating new economies.\textsuperscript{469} Opposition leaders and workers began to imagine and demand different possibilities for Tanzania and their lives. Tanzania’s domestic opposition leaders refused the strategies and censorship of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and President Magufuli from the beginning, and when the international community and other forces connected to colonial power decided to act against the Tanzanian state, this opposition’s dissent and reporting was essential to provide evidence and backup these actions. Opposition leaders paid dearly for this dissent, through their lives, lost to COVID-19 and violence, and safety, as several were exiled.\textsuperscript{470} Due to these efforts of domestic opposition leaders, the death of President Magufuli and shifting power relationships led to a shift in state response to the pandemic to include vaccines and more transparency in COVID-19 data.

However, rather than an opportunity for transformation as some pandemic scholars have argued, I found a reinstallation of unevenness producing further entrenchment in economic dependency on international financial institutions and colonial relations within the tourist industry in my data collection period.\textsuperscript{471} As such, more research is needed on critical moments and contestations in developing countries during each country’s COVID-19 pandemic, and particularly on the roles of foreign and colonial power within state responses. As I write this conclusion in April of 2022, over 90% of Tanzanians have not been vaccinated for COVID-19.\textsuperscript{472} The Tanzanian government,

\textsuperscript{469} Kadt 1981
\textsuperscript{470} Dahir, “John Magufuli, Tanzania Leader Who Played Down Covid, Dies at 61”
\textsuperscript{472} New York Times 2022
international funders, philanthropists funding privatization of COVID-19 patents, and foreign governments who have not actualized their promises of vaccine donations and equity are all at fault for their roles in creating this situation. Futures in Mafia Island and Tanzania remain uncertain. However, cracks in the current tourism industry and development writ large are evident, even as pandemic policies and actions reinstall inequality and colonial relations in the tourism industry. May people always demand and envision nothing less than abundant and more just futures, even if it means reordering the world.\textsuperscript{473}

\textsuperscript{473} Getachew, \textit{Worldmaking After Empire}. 
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