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Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update

Kathryn L. Moore  
*University of Kentucky College of Law, kmoore@uky.edu*

Debra L. Goetz  

Douglas E. Perry  

David S. Rabb

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SPECIAL PROJECT

ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: AN UPDATE

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In 1978 the Cornell Law Review published a Special Project devoted to Article Two commercial warranties.¹ Nine years have since elapsed, and we have decided to update and reassess this important area of the law. We have discovered that although judicial treatment of many aspects of Article Two warranty law has remained stable, in some instances the courts’ treatment has progressed and in other instances it has become unclear. This Special Project is our attempt to assemble these changes, interpret the progress, and suggest new lines of analysis to clarify areas of conflict.

I

THE SCOPE OF THE WARRANTY SECTIONS

Article Two’s commercial warranty provisions apply to a large, but nonetheless limited, class of transactions. Article Two applies only to “transactions in goods,”² and the language of the various

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¹ Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 30 (1978).
² U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977). (All Special Project citations to the Uniform Commercial Code refer to the 1978 official text unless otherwise noted.) That section, which defines the scope of Article Two, provides:

Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the
warranty sections further limits their application to contracts for the sale of goods.\textsuperscript{3}

A. Sale-Service Hybrids

The traditional distinction between services and tangible goods blurs in today's complex commercial world.\textsuperscript{4} For purposes of Code warranty law, characterization of the transaction depends on whether the sale of the good or the performance of the service predominates.\textsuperscript{5} "This determination turns on the nature of the transac-

\textsuperscript{3} Id. Section 2-314 explicitly states that "a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale." Id. § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability). Sections 2-313 and 2-315 use the terms "seller" and "buyer." Id. §§ 2-313 (express warranties), 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose).


\textsuperscript{4} Section 2-105 defines "goods" as follows:

(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to or in action as described in the section on goods to be severed from or in action (Section 2-107).

(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are "future" goods. A purported present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as a contract to sell.

(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified goods.

U.C.C. § 2-105.

tion, the intent of the parties as reflected in the agreement, and a common-sense judgment of whether the buyer paid for goods or for services."

To determine whether a transaction constitutes a sale of goods a court must examine the entire transaction to find the essence of the agreement. When the service component is only incidental to the transaction, Article Two applies. For example, courts often treat installation of a purchased good as incidental to the sale and consequently apply Article Two warranties to both the good and the installation. In Levin v. Hoffman Fuel Co. a New York court determined that a contract to supply heating oil was primarily a contract...
for the sale of oil. Although important, the promised delivery service was incidental to the sales contract, and thus the Code warranties applied.

Similarly, Article Two may apply to goods sold in connection with repair service if the sale aspect predominates the transaction.\(^\text{10}\) Thus, in *T-Birds, Inc. v. Thoroughbred Helicopter Service, Inc.*\(^\text{11}\) the court held that the Code did not apply to a helicopter repair contract because the service aspect, overhauling the helicopter engine, predominated.\(^\text{12}\)

In deciding whether to classify a transaction as a sale of goods subject to Article Two courts should focus on the Code’s underlying principles.\(^\text{13}\) The Code itself requires liberal construction to promote its underlying principles.\(^\text{14}\) Consequently, courts examining

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\(^\text{12}\) Id. at 551, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 14. The *T-Birds* court concluded that the case did not involve a transaction in goods, but "involved a rendition of services in which a sale of goods were [sic] incidental thereto." *Id.,* 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 14.

\(^\text{13}\) Section 1-102 expresses some of those principles; it provides in part:

1. This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
2. Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
   a. to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
   b. to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
   c. to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.

U.C.C. § 1-102(1)-(2). Professors White and Summers, after noting that this section "does not exhaustively specify all the Code's underlying purposes," mention the additional purpose "that the law of commercial transactions be, so far as reasonable, liberal and nontechnical" even to the extent of being "anti-technical." J. WHITEx AND R. SUMMERS, *supra* note 5, § 4, at 15-16.

\(^\text{14}\) U.C.C. § 1-102; *see supra* note 13. The official commentary to the section provides in part:

It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices. However, the proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its reason.

Courts have . . . recognized the policies embodied in an act as applicable in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly included in the language of the act. They have done the same where reason and policy so required, even where the subject-matter had been intentionally excluded from the act in general. They have implemented a statutory policy with liberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory text. They have disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy where the reason of the limitation did not apply. Nothing in this Act stands in the way of the continuance of such action by the courts.
hybrid situations should consider factors such as simplification, modernization, and clarification of commercial law.

B. Leases

As with goods and services, the distinction between sales and leases is unclear. Courts have followed several approaches in handling lease cases under the Code.

1. Judicial Deference to the Legislature

Several courts have strictly construed various Article Two provisions to preclude extension of Code warranties to leases absent express legislative authorization.\(^{15}\) For example, in *Baker v. Promark Products West, Inc.*\(^{16}\) the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed a lower-court finding that even in the absence of a good reason to restrict the implied warranty of merchantability to sales, section 2-314's reference to contracts for sale controlled, and only the legislature could expand its scope to include leases and bailments.\(^{17}\) The Supreme Court concluded that "the Tennessee legislature intended that there exist in a products liability action a cause of action for

\[\text{Id. comment 1 (citations omitted); see infra text accompanying note 35.}\]

One commentator has suggested that courts should apply the Code's warranty provision by analogy to utility service contracts:

The problems arising between sellers and buyers in utility supply contracts are similar to those encountered in other commercial relationships. Problems of ... warranty ... may even be magnified, both because utility products are necessary and potentially dangerous and because there is great disparity of bargaining power between seller and buyer. Applying the Code to the sale of utilities would serve the Code's policies of uniformity, expansion and modernization of commercial practices.


\(^{15}\) See Briscoe's Foodland, Inc. v. Capital Assocs., 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1284, 1287 (Miss. 1986) (noting limiting language of sections 2-102 and 2-106, court determined transaction did not fall under Article Two because title did not pass to lessee and transaction was lease rather than sale); R. & W. Leasing v. Mosher, 195 Mont. 285, 290, 636 P.2d 832, 835, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 150, 151 (1981) (implied warranties inapplicable to leasing agreement because limited to sales); Leake v. Meredith, 221 Va. 14, 17, 267 S.E.2d 93, 95, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 484, 487 (1980) ("If the General Assembly had intended the warranty provisions of the Code to be applicable to leases, it could have changed the terms of these provisions. Since the legislature chose not to do so, we conclude that [Virginia's § 2-315] is inapplicable to chattel leases."). *But cf. Briscoe's*, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1241 (Robertson, J., concurring) ("when determining whether Article 2 applies by analogy to a lease, one question which should not be asked is 'Where is the title?'").

\(^{16}\) 692 S.W.2d 844, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 725 (Tenn. 1985).

breach of warranty arising out of a lease transaction." Thus, deference to the legislature served to expand warranties rather than to restrict them.

Strict construction of the Code's statutory language may also contravene the intent of the Code's drafters. Given section 1-102's language that the Code "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies," courts should reject strict constructions whenever the result conflicts with such purposes and policies.

2. Transactions in Goods

Some courts rely on section 2-102's provision that Article Two "applies to transactions in goods" in order to bring leases within the scope of the warranty provisions. For example, in *Xerox Corp. v. Hawkes* the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied warranty provisions to an equipment lease, reasoning that section 2-102 does not refer to "sales," but rather to the broader concept of "transactions in goods." Under this approach, the phrase "transactions in goods" encompasses leases as well as sales.

3. Disguised Sales

Several courts look to the effect of the lease and deny warranty protection to "true leases," but grant protection to leases they deem "disguised sales." In determining whether the transaction constitutes a disguised sale, courts consider "the intention of the parties as determined by the [particular] facts of each case." Some courts

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18 692 S.W.2d at 849, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 732 (emphasis added).
19 *See* U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1; *supra* note 14.
20 U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
21 *Id.* § 2-102.
22 The phrase "transaction in goods" can have various meanings; in *Wood v. Wilkinson*, 425 So. 2d 1062, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 41 (Ala. 1982), the court considered the exchange of an airplane for real estate a transaction in goods.
24 *Id.* at 615, 475 A.2d at 9, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 162.
25 *See* Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 696, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1364, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 350 (1980) (Rizzi, J., dissenting) ("any transaction in goods meeting the requirements of § 2-315 should carry with it an implied warranty of fitness regardless of whether the transaction is a sale or lease").
26 For discussion of the "true lease" theory, see *Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp.*, 625 F.2d 1291, 1295, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 849, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1980).
rely on objective factors in making the characterization. According to a Maine court, "Whether a lease is 'intended as security' is not a matter of the parties' subjective intent, but rather of the objective effects of the transaction."28 The court added that "[t]he objective effect of the contract, taken as a whole, was that 'upon compliance with the terms of the lease, [lessee-buyer would] become . . . the owner of the property for no additional consideration.' "29

4. Reasoning by Analogy to the Code

Courts also apply Article Two's commercial warranty rules to leases by analogy.30 Under this approach, "The Code, as a general legislative statement of public policy regarding commercial transactions, becomes a premise for judicial reasoning."31 The policies that support applying warranties to sales of goods usually apply with

30 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 41. The official comments provide some support for this view:

The legal consequences are stated as following directly from the contract and action taken under it without resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and actions of a tangible character.

U.C.C. § 2-101 comment; see also id. § 2-313 comment 2; infra note 31.

According to the concurring opinion in Briscoe's Foodland, Inc. v. Capital Assocs., 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1234 (Miss. 1986), the courts should "incorporate into our law the 'by analogy' approach to use of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code in equipment leasing transactions . . . but only to the extent that the lease is the functional equivalent of a sale and the provisions of Article 2 otherwise fit." Id. at 1239 (Robertson, J., concurring).

31 Special Project, supra note 1, at 41-42. Comment 2 to section 2-313 states:

Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for hire, whether such bailment is itself the main contract or is merely a supplying of containers under a contract for the sale of their contents . . . [T]he policies of this Act may offer useful guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise.

U.C.C. § 2-213 comment 2; see also 3 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314:12, at 118-19 (1983) (use of reasoning by analogy to extend Code warranties to lease transactions that in past would have been conducted as sales). But see Leake v. Meredith, 221 Va. 14, 17, 267 S.E.2d 93, 95, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 484, 486 (1980) (comments "should not become devices for expanding the scope of Code sections where language within the sections themselves defies such an expansive interpretation").
equal force to leases. Moreover, commercial realities such as the increased use of leases and the resemblance of many leases to sales support an analogy approach. Courts use this approach to extend Code warranties to nonsale transactions in goods.

Of the approaches canvassed, the analogy method offers the greatest potential for expanding the application of Code warranty principles. The reasoning of the Code's drafters supports such application:

The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle


The reasons for imposing the warranty of fitness in sales cases are often present in lease transactions. Public policy demands that in this day of expanding rental and leasing enterprises the consumer who leases be given protection equivalent to the consumer who purchases. . . . [T]here may be as much or more reliance on the competence or expertise of the lessor than on the competence of the seller. The prospective lessee with an immediate need is more apt to spend less time "shopping around" for the most suitable chattel if he contemplates possession for a relatively short time rather than permanent ownership. Just as in the sale of goods, the lessee may have little opportunity or ability to detect a design or other characteristic inherent in the leased chattel that might render it unsuitable for a particular intended use. The lessor as well as the seller is able to sustain or distribute as a cost of doing business the expense of protecting himself against damages sustained by breach of this warranty.

See also Hertz Comm. Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 229, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 132, 135 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) ("it would be anomalous if this large body of commercial transactions involving leases were subject to different rules of law than other commercial transactions which tend to the identical economic result"), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. App. Term 1970).

33 Special Project, supra note 1, at 41-43.

34 See Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1297, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 849, 858 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting in dicta that economic effect of computer lease same as that of sale); Januse v. U-Haul Co., 399 So. 2d 402, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Code extended in Illinois by analogy so that warranties apply to equipment lease for trucks with defective steering mechanism); All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 879, 538 P.2d 1177, 1183, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 933, 948 (1975) (By analogy in a lease transaction, in order for such an implied warranty [of fitness for a particular purpose] to arise, it must be shown that: (1) the lessor was made aware of the lessee's need, (2) that the lessor recommended a product, and (3) that the lessee leased the product as recommended.); Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 747, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1358, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 341 (1980) (Code not applicable to facts of case, but "application of selected provisions of article 2 to leases by analogy is the most well-reasoned approach"); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 291, 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1121, 1126 (1980) (in warranty case, principles of Code apply by analogy even if franchise agreements not otherwise covered by Code); cf. Briscoe's, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1239 (Robertson, J., concurring) (Article Two warranties inapplicable "not because the instrument on its face is a lease agreement and not a contract of sale—a fact to my mind of little consequence, but because the transaction in question is not analogous to the concept of a sale as contemplated by UCC Article 2").
in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of
the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case
may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.\textsuperscript{35}

The Code stresses substance over form\textsuperscript{36} and liberal constructions
that "promote its underlying purposes and policies."\textsuperscript{37} Consequently, the philosophy of the Code all but demands use of the ana-
logy method to fully implement its purposes. Moreover, courts can
best accommodate the needs of modern commercial transactions by
applying warranty protection in situations where the Code's prin-
ciples apply, regardless of the transaction's form.

II
EXPRESS WARRANTIES—SECTION 2-313

A. The Quality Representation

Express warranties are representations made by a seller to a
buyer that relate to the quality or performance of the product sold.
The seller must deliver goods that conform to his representations
unless he proves that those representations did not create an en-
forceable express warranty:\textsuperscript{38}

(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirma-
tion or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.

(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty
that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or
"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's

\textsuperscript{35} U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1; see J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 4, at 18
("The comment to 1-102 [directs] that Code provisions be extended by analogy when
their rationale justifies this.").

\textsuperscript{36} See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 4, at 15.

\textsuperscript{37} U.C.C. § 1-102(1); see also Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial
Reasoning, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 880 (1965) (discussing use of reasoning by analogy in
context of Code).

\textsuperscript{38} See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 39

Section 2-313 enumerates two necessary components of an express warranty. First, the seller's representations must include either an affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods, a description of the goods, or a sample or model of the goods. 40 Second, the affirmation or promise, the description, or the sample or model must be part of the basis of the bargain.

The first component describes the various forms of an express warranty. An affirmation of fact or promise relating to the product represents the most common way to create an express warranty. Sellers make these warranties by advertisement, 41 brochure, 42 written sales contract, 43 owner's manual, 44 repairs logbook, 45 or oral representation. 46 Affirmations of fact or promises generally relate to the good's quality. 47

Descriptions also create express warranties. Like affirmations

39 U.C.C. § 2-313.
40 Special Project, supra note 1, at 45-50. The phrase "seller's representations" refers collectively to the three categories listed in the Code.
44 See, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 815, 821, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 71, 74-75 (Me. 1982) (statements in owner's manual affirming quality of good could be affirmation of fact but not found express warranty here because not relied on by buyer).
47 See supra notes 41-46.
of fact, descriptions may exist in brochures, advertisements, owner's manuals, and sales agreements. Additionally, they may exist in letters and invoices. Furthermore, unlike affirmations of fact, the buyer can create an express warranty by providing specifications to which the goods must conform. Descriptions generally tend to focus on the product's physical attributes.

Finally, section 2-313 allows samples or models presented to the buyer to form express warranties. The official commentary distinguishes a sample from a model: "This section includes both a 'sample' actually drawn from the bulk of goods which is the subject matter of the sale, and a 'model' which is offered for inspection when the subject matter is not at hand and which has not been drawn from the bulk of the goods." For example, in *Ametel, Inc. v. Arnold Industries, Inc.* the seller produced threaded steel cones as a component for the buyer's log-splitting machine. The buyer approved a test-run batch and ordered 1,500 cones. The court stated that the case "involve[d] a 'model,' rather than a 'sample,' for when the cones in the 'test run' were produced, the bulk of the goods ultimately sold had not yet even been created." However, a sam-

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55 For more detailed discussion of descriptions under section 2-313, see Special Project, supra note 1, at 46-49.

56 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 6.


58 Id. at 56; see also *AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc.*, 501 F. Supp. 224, 228, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 81, 85-88 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (lining materials for bottle caps supplied to buyer was sample); *Automated Controls, Inc. v. MIC Enters., Inc.*, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 661, 669 (D. Neb. 1978), aff'd, 559 F.2d 288, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 677 (8th Cir. 1979) (in-house test of
ple drawn from the bulk of the goods sold "must be regarded as
describing values of the goods contracted for unless it is accompa-
nied by an unmistakable denial of such responsibility," while "the
mercantile presumption that [a model] . . . has become a literal de-
scription of the subject matter is not so strong."59 Samples, there-
fore, create an express warranty more easily than models.60

B. The Basis of the Bargain

Section 2-313's second component prescribes when an effective
representation becomes an express warranty. It requires that a
seller's representations become "part of the basis of the bargain"61
to create an express warranty. Section 2-313 and the official com-
ments fail to define this requirement, leaving courts without a spec-
cific standard to apply in breach-of-express-warranty cases.62 Courts
have fashioned a number of tests to respond to this ambiguous re-
quirement.63 This section first discusses the various interpretations
of the basis-of-the-bargain requirement, devoting particular atten-
tion to those tests purporting to incorporate the commentary's "no
particular reliance" provision.64 Next, this section presents its own
interpretation of the basis-of-the-bargain requirement. Finally, it
proposes a standard for applying the requirement in express war-
ranty cases. The discussion incorporates the goals of section 2-313,
which are to ease the buyer's burden of proof in establishing an ex-
press warranty claim65 and to protect the buyer's expectations cre-
ated by the seller's statements.66

1. Reliance and the Basis-of-the-Bargain Test

Section 2-313 replaced the Uniform Sales Act's express require-
ment that the buyer prove actual reliance on the seller's representa-

59 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 6.
60 For more on samples and models, see Special Project, supra note 1, at 49-50.
61 U.C.C. § 2-313(1).
62 Although the official comments do not give a precise definition for the basis-of-
the-bargain requirement, they do provide courts with a loose framework to begin con-
structing a workable test for determining if a seller's representations create an express
warranty. See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
63 These tests generally turn on whether a buyer must rely on the seller's representa-
tions when purchasing a good for those representations to create an express warranty.
See infra notes 67-112 and accompanying text.
64 See U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
65 See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
tions with the basis-of-the-bargain test. Courts are divided on the nature of the reliance requirement under section 2-313. Some courts interpret the basis-of-the-bargain clause as shifting to the seller the burden of proving the buyer's reliance. Others reject a reliance requirement but substitute an awareness or inducement standard.

a. Shifting the Burden of Proving Reliance. Although the law remains unsettled in this area, most courts cite the official commentary when addressing the buyer reliance issue. The relevant provision states: "In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement." Some courts and commentators interpret the commentary to shift the burden of proof so that the seller must

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67 Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act provided:

Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty.

UNIF. SALES ACT § 12 (1906), reprinted in I. MARISH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES 758 (1930); see Special Project, supra note 1, at 50-51.

68 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 50.

69 Id. at 51-55.


71 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.


73 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 9-4, at 334-35; Boyd, Representing Consumers—The Uniform Commercial Code and Beyond, 9 ARIZ. L. REV. 372, 385 (1968). Professors White and Summers do not conclusively adopt a precise interpretation of comment 3's no reliance provision, but state that the burden shifting theory is arguably sound.
prove that the buyer did not rely on the seller's affirmations of fact. This construction rests primarily on comment 3's statement that "any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof."\textsuperscript{74}

In \textit{Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co.}\textsuperscript{75} the court adopted this interpretation by ruling that a seller, who introduced proof of the buyer's lack of reliance, was entitled to a jury instruction on reliance.\textsuperscript{76} After declaring that the U.C.C. does not require an affirmative reliance test,\textsuperscript{77} the court confronted the difficult problem of a buyer who knew that the seller's representations were false.\textsuperscript{78} The court reasoned that such a "representation cannot be a part of the basis of the bargain" and therefore, "in some instances a jury instruction on lack of reliance may be germane to the basis of the bargain issue."\textsuperscript{79} The court concluded that the instruction must place the burden of proving the buyer's lack of reliance on the seller.\textsuperscript{80}

The court's reasoning in \textit{Indust-Ri-Chem} contains several flaws. The most obvious is that, even though purporting to reject a reliance requirement,\textsuperscript{81} the court nonetheless retained it by allowing the seller to escape liability upon proof that the buyer failed to rely.\textsuperscript{82} The nonrelying buyer still risks losing his claim if the seller can adequately show a lack of reliance.\textsuperscript{83} Therefore, the buyer must have relied to succeed on his warranty claim.

One commentator has suggested that the \textit{Indust-Ri-Chem} court confused itself with its illustration of a buyer who knows that a seller's representation is untrue.\textsuperscript{84} The court assumed that the only rationale for taking the representation out of the basis of the bargain was a lack of reliance.\textsuperscript{85} A buyer who knows a seller's statements are either untrue or mistaken, however, does not expect the goods to conform to these statements.\textsuperscript{86} Such statements never enter into the agreement between the two parties, not because the buyer failed to rely, but "because the buyer's knowledge forecloses

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{74} U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
\item \textsuperscript{75} 602 S.W.2d 282, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
\item \textsuperscript{76} Id. at 293-94, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 810-11.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Id. at 293, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 809.
\item \textsuperscript{78} See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{79} 602 S.W.2d at 293, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 810 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{80} Id. at 294, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 811.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Id. at 293, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 809.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Id. at 294, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 811.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Id. at 293-94, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 810.
\item \textsuperscript{84} See Murray, "Basis of the Bargain": Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283, 294-95 (1982).
\item \textsuperscript{85} 602 S.W.2d at 293-94, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 810.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Murray, supra note 84, at 295.
\end{itemize}
any such expectation.” The *Indust-Ri-Chem* court’s reliance analysis needlessly creates the possibility that other classes of buyers may have their warranty protection curtailed.

Finally, the *Indust-Ri-Chem* court erroneously concluded that comment 3’s “clear affirmative proof” requirement for removing a seller’s representation from the agreement meant proof that the buyer failed to rely. Because the previous line in comment 3 states that “no particular reliance on such statements need be shown,” the court’s finding that lack of reliance will remove those statements from the agreement seems implausible. Rather, the “affirmative proof” clause requires the seller to show that the buyer could not have understood the representations to be within the context of the bargain. Proof that the buyer knew the seller’s representations were false or mistaken or that the seller had effectively withdrawn his statements from the bargain would satisfy this standard.

b. *The Consideration Test.* Other courts interpreting section 2-313’s comment 3 require that the buyer at least consider the seller’s representations prior to the purchase. Some courts apply the consideration standard objectively, requiring only that the buyer be aware of the seller’s representations prior to completing the sale. In *Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird,* for example, the seller acknowledged making an express warranty, but argued that it was not part of the basis of the bargain because the warranty was delivered after the sale. The court, however, noted that the buyer “knew about the express warranty prior to the delivery . . . as it was discussed in the sales agreement; furthermore, . . . [the buyer] was familiar with the type of warranty given on such machines.” The court distin-

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87 Id. A buyer who does not expect goods to conform to the seller’s statements cannot reasonably rely on them. However, looking at a buyer’s expectations is better than looking for a lack of reliance.
88 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
89 Id.
91 See McGhee v. GMC Truck & Coach Division, 98 Mich. App. 495, 500, 296 N.W.2d 286, 289, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 121, 125 (1980) (buyer, an experienced truck mechanic, understood that no warranties were given on tractor’s running parts).
92 R. Nordstrom, supra note 54, § 68, at 211-12.
95 Id. at 1261, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 440 (distinguishing Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurty, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 608 (1969)).
guished this case from one in which a warranty was found invalid because the buyer did not discuss it until after delivery.\textsuperscript{96} Although the court in \textit{Massey-Ferguson} did not explicitly require that the buyer know of the warranty's existence, it implied that the buyer must have such knowledge to bring a claim under section 2-313.

An awareness standard, however, conflicts with comment 3's elimination of reliance. Comment 3 states that a seller's affirmations of fact "are regarded as part of the description of those goods."\textsuperscript{97} The comment's language eliminates reliance by presuming that all affirmations of fact create express warranties. Because the buyer need not rely on the seller's representation, he should not need to know that such a representation exists. Comment 3 directs the inquiry of whether an express warranty was made away from the buyer's awareness of a representation and towards a factual examination of the seller's representations.\textsuperscript{98} A seller who creates an express warranty by an affirmation of fact, description, or sample or model, therefore, should not escape liability simply because the buyer fortuitously failed either to hear the representation or to see a brochure or advertisement describing the product.\textsuperscript{99} Once the seller injects the express warranty into the bargain, comment 3 creates a presumption that the buyer has relied on the warranty.\textsuperscript{100} Courts should allow sellers to rebut this presumption only by showing that the buyer could not have understood these representations to be an express warranty.\textsuperscript{101}

Some courts apply the consideration standard subjectively, requiring that the seller's representations at least partially induced the buyer's purchase. In \textit{Keith v. Buchanan}\textsuperscript{102} the court explained in detail its interpretation of section 2-313's basis-of-the-bargain test. After finding that the buyer need not show reliance on the seller's representations, the court stated:

The change of the language in Section 2-313 of the California Uniform Commercial Code modifies ... the degree of reliance ... in express warranties under the code. The representation need only be part of the basis of the bargain, or merely a factor or con-

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Id.}, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 440.
\textsuperscript{97} U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3; \textit{see supra} note 71 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{98} R. NORDSTROM, \textit{supra} note 54, § 68, at 208-10.
\textsuperscript{99} Professor Nordstrom supported this proposition by arguing that the term bargain, as used in section 2-313, encompasses a much broader range of activity and time than the traditional contract law notion of the term. R. NORDSTROM, \textit{supra} note 54, § 67, at 206.
\textsuperscript{100} Murray, \textit{supra} note 84, at 210.
\textsuperscript{101} R. NORDSTROM, \textit{supra} note 54, § 68, at 210 ("The words used by the seller must be read in the way in which the buyer should reasonably have understood them.").
sideration inducing the buyer to enter into the bargain.\textsuperscript{103}

Similarly, in \textit{Perfetti v. McGhan Medical}\textsuperscript{104} the court found that representations made by the seller appearing on the product itself did not become part of the basis of the bargain because the representations did not enter into the buyer's decision to use the good.\textsuperscript{105} The court held that the buyer's testimony "that he normally used [the seller's] implants and 'had no reason to use anyone else's'" established that the representation failed to induce the purchase in any way. Consequently, it did not become part of the basis of the bargain.\textsuperscript{106}

The requirement that the seller's representations induce, at least in part, the buyer's entrance into the bargain has two defects in light of section 2-313. First, an inducement standard cannot be reconciled with the language of comment 3. If a representation induced a buyer to purchase a product, he relied on that representation in making his decision. To reiterate, comment 3 specifically states that "no particular reliance on such statements need be shown."\textsuperscript{107} This provision eliminates both the need for buyer reliance and the need for the buyer to know that the representation existed.\textsuperscript{108} If the buyer need not even know that the representation exists, then he certainly does not have to be induced by the seller's representations.

The second problem with the inducement standard is its failure to accomplish section 2-313's goal of easing the buyer's burden of proof. Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act required buyers to prove "both that the affirmation or promise induced them to purchase the goods, and that they relied upon the statement in purchasing the goods."\textsuperscript{109} Section 2-313 relieved the buyer from the

\begin{comment}
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Id.} at 23, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 393.
\textsuperscript{105} The plaintiff in this case sued the manufacturer of a breast prosthesis after the product deflated inside her body. \textit{Id.} at 647, 662 P.2d at 648, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1473-74. The court first found that the plaintiff's surgeon acted as her agent in the use of the prosthesis and thus any express warranty made to the surgeon inured to the plaintiff's benefit. \textit{Id.} at 650-51, 662 P.2d at 651-52, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1475. The buyer, therefore, is the surgeon who decided to use the defendant's product.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Id.} at 652, 662 P.2d at 653, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1477.
\textsuperscript{107} U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
\textsuperscript{108} R. NORDSTROM, \textit{supra} note 54, § 68, at 208-09. Professor Nordstrom stated that courts that allow representations unknown to the buyer to create an express warranty reach a result consistent with the Code. He argued, "The court's task is to determine whether that injury was caused by a defect in the product, and any statements made by the seller designed to induce the public to buy his product are relevant in making this determination." \textit{Id.} at 209. Nordstrom would thus shift the inquiry of inducement by the seller's statements from the individual buyer at issue, to the public at large.
\textsuperscript{109} Murray, \textit{supra} note 84, at 285.
\end{comment}
burden of proving that he relied on the seller's statement by removing the term "reliance" and replacing it with a requirement that the seller's representation become part of the basis of the bargain.\textsuperscript{110} Comment 3 shifted the burden of proof to the seller: "any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof."\textsuperscript{111} "Under this clause, the buyer must prove that the seller made a statement of fact relating to the goods. It is presumed that such a statement became part of the 'agreement.'"\textsuperscript{112} Section 2-313, therefore, requires the buyer to show only that the seller made a representation concerning the product. A buyer should not have to show to what extent, if any, the representations entered into his decision to purchase.

Thus, a consideration standard defeats section 2-313's goal of easing the buyer's burden of proving that the seller's representation created an express warranty. By requiring the buyer to prove that he considered the seller's representations in purchasing, courts essentially require the buyer to prove that he relied on the representation. Section 2-313's elimination of reliance, however, should eliminate the need for the buyer to even be aware that the representation existed.

2. The No-Reliance Approach

Although the cases examined above interpreted comment 3, they failed to clarify adequately\textsuperscript{113} the basis-of-the-bargain provision and devise a proper test for applying it.\textsuperscript{114} To propose a standard, a definition of the phrase "part of the basis of the bargain"\textsuperscript{115} as used in section 2-313 is necessary. The drafters of the Code intended the phrase to mean an inclusion of the seller's representations in the

\textsuperscript{110} Id. at 286.
\textsuperscript{111} U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
\textsuperscript{112} Murray, \textit{supra} note 84, at 287.
\textsuperscript{113} See \textit{supra} notes 72-106 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{114} Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 386 (1985), demonstrates this failure to define the phrase:

The shift in language clearly changes the degree to which it must be shown that the seller's representation affected the buyer's decision to enter into the agreement . . . . A warranty statement is deemed to be part of the basis of the bargain and to have been relied upon as one of the inducements for the purchase of the product. In other words, the buyer's demonstration of reliance on an express warranty is "not a prerequisite for breach of warranty, as long as the express warranty involved became part of the bargain."


The \textit{Keith} court stated only that reliance is unnecessary if the warranty becomes part of the bargain. The court failed to explain how it would determine whether the buyer has met this requirement.

\textsuperscript{115} U.C.C. § 2-313.
commercial relationship" between the buyer and the seller. A seller's representations thus create an express warranty whenever they enter the buyer's and seller's commercial relationship.

This definition is based primarily on that of a "bargain" as used in section 2-313.

A "bargain" is not something that occurs at a particular moment in time, and is forever fixed as to its content; instead, it describes the commercial relationship between the parties in regard to this product . . . . The Code's word is "bargain"—a process which can extend beyond the moment in time that the offeree utters the magic words, "I accept." The Code's usage of "bargain," then, eschews its traditional contract law meaning as an event that comes "into existence at some specific point in time." Instead, it takes on a broader scope that covers the entire span of the parties' commercial relationship. This relationship can begin before the buyer contacts the seller or after the sale's completion.

Section 2-313's basis-of-the-bargain provision is an objective requirement under which a court should merely determine whether the seller provided a quality representation about the product. The buyer should not have to prove that he purchased with any knowledge of, or reliance on, the seller's representations. Comment 3 demonstrates the drafters' intent to eliminate completely the need for reliance on or consideration of the seller's representations by the buyer. An express warranty exists if the seller used words of affirmation or description or displayed a sample or model relating to the product purchased. Once the buyer shows this, the seller is liable should the product not conform to his representations.

Comment 7 further supports this expansive interpretation of section 2-313 by ratifying the existence of post-sale warranties. Because comment 7 provides that the "precise time" when the seller

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116 R. Nordstrom, supra note 54, § 67, at 206. The language used herein to describe "the basis of the bargain" comes primarily from Nordstrom's treatise on sales. See id. §§ 66-68. Nordstrom clearly rejected a reliance requirement under section 2-313, id. § 68, at 208, and broadly construed the section in order to ease the buyer's ability to establish an express warranty. Id. § 67, at 206-07. Nordstrom, however, did not expressly extend his analysis to provide that all quality representations made by the seller are presumptively express warranties until the seller proves otherwise. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.


118 Id. at 206.

119 J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 9-4, at 335-36.

120 R. Nordstrom, supra note 54, § 67, at 206-07.

121 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

122 Murray, supra note 84, at 287.
makes a product representation is irrelevant, post-sale representations may create warranties. Courts cannot possibly require a buyer to rely on those representations made after the sale's completion.

Comment 7 assumes that post-sale representations create express warranties: "If language is used after the closing of the deal ... the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order." Professor Nordstrom has argued that the modification requires no consideration because "it is reasonable to assume that a buyer would agree to an expansion of his warranty protection."

Some courts, however, do not allow post-sale representations to become express warranties because the buyer did not rely on the statements made. In Global Truck & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Palmer Machine Works, Inc. the buyer received a sales brochure describing the purchased product's features after he entered into the contract. The court found that the brochure could not create an express warranty, stating, "If the buyer is not aware of the affirmation of fact and there is no evidence of any reliance on such affirmation, then it would seem that the mutual assent requirement is not met such

123 "The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material. The sole question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract." U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7.
124 The following example illustrates the deliverance of a post-sale express warranty:
A man enters a hardware store and selects a can of paint remover from the shelf. Upon paying for his selection at the counter, the cashier states: "This paint remover is the best made. It is guaranteed to remove paint without damaging the object's surface." The man returns home and properly applies the product to his car only to find that the paint remover contains a highly corrosive agent that badly damages the metal surface.

The clerk's statements created an express warranty because under our expansive notion of a bargain, see supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text, they "are part of the entire bargain even though they did not induce the contract." R. Nordstrom, supra note 54, § 67, at 207.
125 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7 (emphasis added).
126 R. Nordstrom, supra note 54, § 67, at 207. Nordstrom's argument that the buyer would not object to an expansion of his warranty protection also applies to presale representations not known by the buyer until after the sale. (E.g., sales literature included within the product's package which was sealed at the time of the sale.)
129 The Global Truck court required mutual assent because it viewed a bargain under section 2-313 as a contractual relationship between the buyer and the seller. A prerequisite for a valid contract, mutual assent means that each party is aware of the contract's
that a binding modification does not exist.”

By finding that no warranty existed because the buyer failed to rely, the court completely disregarded both comments 3 and 7 in reaching its decision. Courts that continue to require reliance as a prerequisite for meeting the basis-of-the-bargain test unjustifiably refuse to allow a post-sale representation to create a warranty.

One commentator has argued that courts should enforce these post-sale representations to protect the buyer’s “reasonable expectations that a seller’s statements create, regardless of when those statements were made or when the buyer learned of them.”

This analysis also applies to those presale representations that the buyer does not learn of until after completing the purchase. If a seller includes an owner’s manual or other product description with the purchase, then “[t]he buyer will feel oppressed and unfairly surprised if the goods do not contain the features represented in the sales literature.”

Protecting the buyer’s reasonable expectations about the product’s quality and the truth of the seller’s statements, therefore, justifies upholding unrelied-upon express warranties.

The example of advertising illustrates further that reliance on representations should not be required for them to fall under section 2-313. A seller advertises in order to induce the public, rather than one specific buyer, to purchase his product. Because the seller is able to represent his product’s quality to all potential buyers, he should bear the cost of any product defect. The law should protect the public whenever the product does not properly perform, even if a particular buyer did not rely on the advertisement in his purchase. This protective function makes the relationship between the individual buyer and the mass-media seller more fair because it requires the seller to stand by any public statements he has made about his product. The law, therefore, would deter a seller from overrepresenting to the public the virtues of his product.

This approach imposes a limited form of strict liability on the seller. Imposing a strict liability standard on the seller’s representations would allow courts to avoid the difficult evidentiary task of determining whether the product’s malfunction corresponded to the buyer’s reason for purchase. A strict liability approach would

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131 Murray, supra note 84, at 318.
132 Id. at 321-23.
133 Id. at 322 (footnotes omitted).
134 R. NORDSTROM, supra note 54, § 67, at 209.
135 The seller can still escape liability if he can show “clear affirmative proof” that the statement was his opinion or that the buyer knew the representation was false.
effectively deter a seller from overrepresenting his product and raising false expectations in the buying public.

The seller should also bear the burden of a defect because, generally, he increases the price of the product to offset the risk he bears for providing an express warranty. This risk is the potential liability the seller may incur should the product not perform as promised by the express warranty. Knowing that some of the products sold will subsequently become defective, the seller recoups this cost by increasing the product's price to the entire buying public. Therefore, even if the buyer is unaware of the warranty he has paid for it by simply purchasing the product.\footnote{R. Nordstrom, supra note 54, § 68, at 212; see also Special Project, supra note 1, at 56.}

3. Proposal

Section 2-313, in light of comments 3 and 7, does not require the buyer to rely on, consider, or even know about a seller's representations. A court should therefore decide if an express warranty exists by examining only the seller's representations to see whether they constituted either an affirmation of fact or "merely [an affirmation] of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion."\footnote{U.C.C. § 2-313(2).} Under this test, the buyer need prove only that the seller made representations relating to the product. The seller then has the burden of proving that the buyer could not have understood his representations to be an express warranty.\footnote{The seller can meet this burden by showing either that his representations amounted only to his opinions on the product's value or that the buyer knew that his representations were false.}

Comments 4 and 8 to section 2-313 also support this test.\footnote{See supra notes 97-101 & 107-12 and accompanying text (discussion of comment 3); notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussion of comment 7).} Comment 4 states that "the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell."\footnote{U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4.} As one commentator has noted, "it is interesting that the comment emphasizes the search for what 'the seller has in essence agreed to sell,' and not what the buyer has agreed to buy."\footnote{Murray, supra note 84, at 290.} This statement suggests that a court's inquiry should focus on the seller's conduct, i.e., whether he made representations relating to the product's quality, and not on the physical product purchased by the buyer.

Comment 8 states that "all of the statements of the seller . . .
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[are a part of the basis of the bargain] unless good reason is shown to the contrary." 142 The court's inquiry, therefore, should objectively focus on the affirmations of fact, descriptions, or samples or models included by the seller in the scope of the bargain to determine if those representations expressly warranted the product sold.

C. Negating an Express Warranty

The previous section proposed an expansive definition for section 2-313's basis-of-the-bargain requirement. This section suggests how a seller, once he creates an express warranty by his representations, can avoid liability by rebutting the warranty's existence.

Court generally allow two groups of factors to rebut the existence of an express warranty. The first group looks at the seller's representations directly to see whether they are affirmations of fact or simply opinions as to the product's value. 143 The second group looks at the circumstances surrounding the bargain to determine whether the buyer knew that the seller's representations could not have warranted the product. 144

The 1978 Special Project called this the "reasonableness of reliance" 145 issue and stated that an express warranty will not exist "unless the buyer would be justified in relying upon it." 146 We prefer to ask whether the buyer could have reasonably understood the seller's representations to create an express warranty. Under this approach, a court does not run the risk of inadvertently incorporating a reliance requirement into its analysis. Instead, a court will only focus on the representations made and the context of their delivery.

1. Opinions or "Puffing"

Section 2-313(2) acknowledges that not every statement by a seller relating to a product will become part of the basis of the bargain. It states that "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty." 147 A seller, therefore, must show that a reasonable buyer would have construed

142 U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 8.
143 See infra notes 147-65 and accompanying text.
144 See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
145 Although the 1978 Special Project used the term "reliance," it rejected reliance as a factor for courts to consider under section 2-313. It used the word simply as a shorthand for the conclusion that the basis-of-the-bargain requirement "is one of reasonable, constructive expectation based on the context of the sale and assuming the buyer's awareness of the seller's affirmations." Special Project, supra note 1, at 56.
146 Special Project, supra note 1, at 59.
147 U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
his representations merely as the seller’s opinion concerning the product, not as an express warranty.

The official commentary supplements section 2-313(2):

Concerning affirmations of value or a seller’s opinion or commendation under subsection (2), the basic question remains the same: What statements of the seller have in the circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the basis of the bargain? As indicated above, all of the statements of the seller do so unless good reason is shown to the contrary.\(^\text{148}\)

In determining whether a seller’s representation is merely an opinion, courts should apply an objective standard. They should look only at the statements made and not at the knowledge of the parties when deciding whether the statements created an express warranty.\(^\text{149}\) Juries should distinguish between a warranty and an opinion solely on the nature of the seller’s statements. The 1978 Special Project addressed four elements that point toward construing a seller’s representations as an opinion rather than an affirmation of fact: specificity, hedging, experimental goods, and buyer knowledge.\(^\text{150}\)

Specificity addresses the clarity of the seller’s representations. Courts generally will not regard imprecise or vague seller representations that do not convey “a positive averment of fact describing a product’s capabilities”\(^\text{151}\) as creating an express warranty.\(^\text{152}\)

Hedging refers to a seller’s equivocal statements that demon-

\(^{148}\) U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 8.

\(^{149}\) For a discussion of buyer knowledge, see infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.

\(^{150}\) For a detailed explanation of these elements, see Special Project, supra note 1, at 61-67.

\(^{151}\) Royal Business Mach., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 635 F.2d 34, 42, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 462, 468 (7th Cir. 1980).

strate his unwillingness to commit fully to the product's quality. In \textit{Perfetti v. McGhan Medical}\textsuperscript{153} a mammary prosthesis manufacturer included a flyer in the product's packaging which read: "McGhan Medical Corporation is aware of the potential for leakage in inflatable implants over an undefined time period. Considering the chemical and physical properties of the material used in the manufacture of the inflatable implants, deflation is not expected. However, long term results cannot be guaranteed by the manufacturer."\textsuperscript{154} The buyer argued that the last line warranted the product's short-term lifespan by negative implication. The court stated, "Whatever the meaning of 'long term', the affirmation also negates less than a long-term result; it is affirmatively stated that leakage can occur over an undefined period of time."\textsuperscript{155} By not making a commitment as to the product's lifespan, the seller effectively limited its liability.

Representations relating to unproven or untested products do not create an express warranty.\textsuperscript{156} Consequently, the experimental goods factor allows a seller to escape liability for a product's defect. The 1978 Special Project correctly stressed that a product's novelty should not definitively determine whether a warranty attaches to the seller's representations.\textsuperscript{157}

The final element that helps distinguish between an affirmation of fact and a mere opinion is buyer knowledge. One court has stated:

\begin{quote}
The decisive test for whether a given representation is a warranty or merely an expression of the seller's opinion is whether the seller asserts a fact of which the buyer is ignorant or merely states an opinion or judgment on a matter of which the seller has no special knowledge and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment.\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

This test is not particularly helpful in making the distinction between fact and opinion, however, because it does not focus on the

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Id.} at 651, 662 P.2d at 652, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1476 (emphasis deleted).
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Id.} at 652, 662 P.2d at 653, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1477 (emphasis deleted).
\textsuperscript{156} Research uncovered no new cases involving experimental goods.
\textsuperscript{157} See Special Project, supra note 1, at 65 (novelty should be one element in a general reasonableness requirement).
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES

statements actually made. Instead, it looks to the knowledge of the parties. Under this test, any statement made to an ignorant buyer becomes an express warranty simply because the buyer is ignorant. Conversely, the test allows a seller with little knowledge to make specific statements about the product without creating an express warranty. The test fails because it does not consider whether a reasonable buyer could understand the statements to create an express warranty on their face. Concededly, buyer knowledge can preclude a warranty from attaching to a clear affirmation of fact.159 This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion, however, that all statements made to ignorant buyers are warranties and all statements made by ignorant sellers are not.

In Keith v. Buchanan160 a California appeals court attempted to ease the buyer's efforts to show that the seller made an affirmation of fact rather than an opinion:

Recent decisions have evidenced a trend toward narrowing the scope of representations which are considered opinion, . . . resulting in an expansion of the liability that flows from broad statements of manufacturers or retailers as to the quality of their products . . . . It has even been suggested 'that in an age of consumerism all seller's statements, except the most blatant sales pitch, may give rise to an express warranty.'161

The Keith court adopted comment 8 to section 2-313162 as the standard to distinguish between fact and opinion. Comment 8 provides that all seller's representations will presumptively become part of the basis of the bargain unless the seller can prove otherwise. The drafters of section 2-313 intended comment 8 to create this broad presumption to ease the buyer's burden in establishing an express warranty.163 Comments 3 and 7 each have the effect of broadening the scope of representations that create an express warranty and easing the buyer's burden of establishing a warranty's existence.164 The Keith court correctly applied comment 8, holding that “[s]tatements made by a seller during the course of negotiation over a contract are presumptively affirmations of fact unless it can be demonstrated that the buyer could only have reasonably considered the statement as a statement of the seller's opinion.”165

159 *See infra* notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
161 *Id.* at 21, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 396, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 390 (citing E. ALDERMAN & B. DOLE, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 89 (2d ed. 1983)).
162 *See supra* note 148 and accompanying text.
163 *See supra* notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
164 *See supra* notes 97-101, 107-12 & 123-26 and accompanying text.
165 Keith, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 396, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 391.
2. Buyer Knowledge

A seller can also rebut the presumption that his representations became part of the basis of the bargain by showing that the buyer knew that the representations were either untrue or probably untrue. This would naturally preclude him from understanding that an express warranty was created. The 1978 Special Project dealt with buyer knowledge in its discussion of a seller's opinion.\(^\text{166}\) An examination of the buyer's knowledge, however, requires a court to focus on the circumstances surrounding the bargain rather than the representations made. Because the court must examine the knowledge possessed by the individual buyer in question, this inquiry requires a subjective standard; the standard applicable to sellers' opinions, however, is objective.\(^\text{167}\)

A seller can show that the buyer knew the untruthfulness of the representations by proving that the buyer inspected the goods before purchasing them and discovering patent defects.\(^\text{168}\) The Keith court found that although the buyer had experts inspect a boat, the warranty of seaworthiness was not waived because no in-water testing took place.\(^\text{169}\) "[A]n examination or inspection by the buyer of the goods does not necessarily discharge the seller from an express warranty if the defect was not actually discovered and waived."\(^\text{170}\) Because the inspection was limited, the buyer could not have discovered the boat's unseaworthiness.

The seller can also establish that the buyer knew of the falsity of his representations by showing either that the buyer had knowledge about the product before entering the bargain\(^\text{171}\) or that the buyer acquired such knowledge during the course of the parties' commercial relationship.\(^\text{172}\) In Price Brothers Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.,\(^\text{173}\) for example, the seller erroneously represented that the compo-

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\(^\text{166}\) See Special Project, supra note 1, at 66-67.
\(^\text{167}\) See supra text accompanying note 149.
\(^\text{169}\) Keith, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 24, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 393-94.
\(^\text{170}\) Id., 220 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 393.
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Components ordered by the buyer would meet the specifications listed in the buyer's purchase order. The court held that the seller's erroneous assurances that the components would conform to the purchase order's specifications did not create an express warranty because "Price Brothers' experts should have recognized this error as either 'puffing' or falsehood."174

In both the inspection and prior knowledge cases, the good faith standard of section 1-203 prevents the buyer "from remaining silent in the face of known overstatements of performance by [the seller] and then asserting that those falsehoods were a basis of the bargain."175 A buyer who knows the seller's representations are untrue has an obligation under section 1-203 to inform the seller of his overstatement. Under these circumstances a buyer cannot plausibly claim that he understood the seller's representations to create an express warranty.

Representations do not become part of the basis of the bargain if the seller can show that he withdrew them before completing the bargain.176 In McGhee v. GMC Truck & Coach Division177 a Michigan appeals court found that the seller explicitly withdrew any representations made concerning the quality of the truck purchases in the sales contract. "They so structured the terms of the sale as to lay the risk of hidden mechanical defects on the plaintiff, who admittedly understood this to be the case."178 Thus, the buyer could not establish that the seller's statement regarding the truck's good condition became part of the basis of the bargain.

174 Id. at 423, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 474-75. The court's use of the phrase "should have recognized" should not be confused with an objective standard for measuring buyer knowledge. The court discussed the buyer's representative's personal familiarity with the product at issue: "The expertise of Price Brothers' representatives, and their familiarity with the requirements of Price Brothers' pipe wrapping machine enabled them to make an independent assessment of the adequacy of the proposed components for the tasks assigned to them." Id., 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 475. The court used the phrase "should have known" not to invoke a reasonable man standard, but to hold these buyers' to a standard commensurate with their established knowledge of the product. The court looked only at the knowledge of the buyer in question.

175 Id., 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 475.

176 A seller's withdrawal of a representation should not be confused with a disclaimer. For a discussion of express-warranty disclaimers, see infra notes 576-605 and accompanying text. A seller withdraws a representation by informing the buyer that a specific statement made about the product is no longer included in their bargain. This withdrawal occurs before the bargain's completion. Each party agrees to the representation's removal. The buyer, therefore, knows not to expect the product to conform to the representation withdrawn. See R. Nordstrom, supra note 54, § 68, at 211.


178 Id. at 504, 296 N.W.2d at 291, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 125. The sales contract stated in part: "[T]here are no express warranties and no representations, promises or statements have been made by said seller in respect of said property unless endorsed hereon or incorporated herein by reference hereon . . . ." Id. at 499-500, 296 N.W.2d at 289, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 124.
The basis-of-the-bargain requirement provides the buyer with a great deal of latitude in establishing the creation of an express warranty. The buyer need only prove that the seller made representations relating to the product. The seller can escape liability only by showing that he merely stated his opinion as to the product’s value or that the buyer’s knowledge concerning the product precluded the representation from becoming part of the basis of the bargain. Section 2-313’s policy goals of easing the buyer’s burden of proving an express warranty and protecting the buyer’s expectations in the product as represented justify this framework.

III
IMPLIES WARRANTIES

Implied warranties, now a common element of the commercial environment, are codified in Code sections 2-314 and 2-315. "An implied warranty ‘is a curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract—a contractual term promising quality but imposed by law rather than agreement.’” This section of the Special Project examines the current status of implied warranties and recommends a number of changes or clarifications in existing doctrine.

There are several justifications for imposing warranties on the sale of goods. In this section we focus on the rationale that buyers ought to be able reasonably to rely on knowledgeable sellers. Courts have paid less attention to this policy in section 2-314 cases than they have in section 2-315 cases; nevertheless, we propose to show that in both contexts the policy not only furthers desirable

179 See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
182 The focus of the Special Project is on warranties arising from transactions between businesses. However, because implied warranties arising from consumer transactions also illuminate code policies, we will examine both kinds of transactions.
183 U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
184 Special Project, supra note 1, at 68 (footnote omitted) (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 636 (4th ed. 1971)).
185 Justifications include: “(a) public policy which requires that the party which puts goods into the stream of commerce should bear the risk of harm caused by defective goods, rather than the person injured by it; (b) the fact that one party has induced the reliance of the consumer on his skill and knowledge; (c) the fact that the former is in a better position to control the antecedents which affect the quality of the product; and (d) the fact that he is better able to distribute the loss.” Note, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 127, 140-41 (1968).
goals, but also serves to reconcile otherwise seemingly divergent results.

A. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability—Section 2-314

Section 2-314 codifies the implied warranty of merchantability. It provides in part: "Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." 

We propose that the way to understand the merchantability warranty, and thereby to resolve the gray areas of the law, is to examine the policies and theories underlying the Code and to use them to interpret new or unclear situations. The implied warranty of merchantability was "designed to protect the buyer of goods from bearing the burden of loss where merchandise...does not conform to the normal commercial standards." Its underlying theory is that by marketing goods a merchant makes certain implicit representations about their merchantability. In making a purchase, the buyer relies upon those representations. This reliance is justified because, as Prosser explained, "The seller has asserted, whether expressly or by his conduct, that the goods are of a particular kind, quality or character, and the buyer has purchased in reliance upon that assertion." The implied warranty of merchantability is thus an expression of the "reliance" concept underlying much of warranty law and can be seen as protecting the expectations that reasonably arise when a merchant of a particular good sells that good.

186 In the words of Professors White and Summers, the implied warranty of merchantability is "by far the most important" of the Code warranties. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 9-6, at 343.
187 U.C.C. § 2-314. For a discussion of section 2-316, see infra notes 606-707 and accompanying text.
188 Vlasses v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 849, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 164, 167 (3rd Cir. 1967). "The entire purpose behind the implied warranty sections of the Code is to hold the seller responsible when inferior goods are passed along to the unsuspecting buyer." Id. at 850, 4 U.C.C. Rep. at 168.
189 This is an objective conception of reliance—the seller's conduct has opened the way for a buyer to rely on the product; the buyer need not explicitly have done so. "The maker, by placing the goods upon the market represents to the public that they are suitable and safe for use, and by packaging, advertising, or otherwise, he does everything he can to induce that belief. He intends and expects that the product will be purchased and used in reliance upon this assurance of safety, and it is in fact so purchased and used." W. Prosser, supra note 184, § 97, at 651.
190 Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117, 122 (1943).
191 Reliance is used in an objective sense. We are not proposing that subjective reliance by the buyer is a consideration in a general merchantability case. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 9-6 (reliance by buyer on seller's representation not neces-
In examining section 2-314, we first consider the condition that the seller be a “merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” Later, we will turn to the question of whether the merchant has sold “goods.”

1. The Merchant Requirement—Section 2-314(1)

a. Definition of Merchant. Section 2-104(1) defines “merchant” as

a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.\(^{192}\)

Although section 2-104(1) defines merchant as encompassing those with special knowledge or skill both of business practices and of the kind of goods involved, section 2-314(1) conditions liability on the seller being “a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”\(^ {193}\)

Merchants with respect to goods of a particular kind should possess special knowledge about the goods,\(^ {194}\) which they are likely to have

\(^{192}\) U.C.C. § 2-104(1).

\(^{193}\) Id. § 2-314(1).

\(^{194}\) The term “merchant” as defined here roots in the “law merchant” concept of a professional in business. The professional status under the definition may be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge as to business practices, or specialized knowledge as to both and which kind of specialized knowledge may be sufficient to establish merchant status is indicated by the nature of the provisions.

\ldots For purposes of these sections almost every person in business would, therefore, be deemed to be a “merchant” under the language “who \ldots by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices \ldots involved in the transaction. \ldots” since the practices involved in the transaction are non-specialized business practices such as answering mail. In this type of provision, banks or even universities, for example, well may be “merchants” \ldots.

On the other hand, in Section 2-314 on the warranty of merchantability, such warranty is implied only “if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”

\(^{194}\) Id. § 2-104 comment 2. One court recently provided the following description of “merchant”:

Plaintiffs George Alpert and Lee Wolfman are partners and owners of Georgian Hill Arabians, which trains, breeds and sells Arabian horses for profit. Prior to the transaction involved in this lawsuit, Georgian Hill Arabians had consigned seven or eight mares for sale at auctions and had sold shares in a breeding stallion. George Alpert, through Georgian Hill Arabians, holds himself out as having knowledge and skill peculiar to the purebred Arabian horse business. Georgian Hill Arabians also employs agents who hold themselves out as having such knowledge and skill.

due to their handling of them. Buyers may naturally expect such a merchant to have special knowledge and thus tend justifiably to rely on the seller.

Accordingly, the limitation of section 2-314 to "merchants with respect to goods of that kind" suggests that warranties be imposed based on the respective knowledge and reliance of the parties involved. The seller's expertise with respect to the goods provides justification for holding the seller liable for the quality and performance of the goods he sells. Thus, the more a seller knows, the more justifiable it is to consider him a merchant of the goods of that kind for section 2-314 purposes. We suggest that courts adopt the following test for a merchant: As a general rule, merchant status is a function of the frequency of sales and the knowledge of the seller with respect to the goods in question. Under this test, a highly knowledgeable seller could be deemed a merchant even with few sales; conversely, a seller with relatively frequent sales, but who obviously lacked all knowledge of the product, would less likely be deemed a merchant.

b. Isolated Sale of Goods. The official commentary to section 2-314 states, "A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a 'merchant' within the meaning of the full scope of this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply." Such a seller

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195 The buyer's knowledge may also be relevant to whether an implied warranty arises. See Wingo v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 389, 391 (W.D. Va. 1986) (Implied warranty of merchantability can be defeated if seller "can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the buyer's knowledge of the defective quality of the goods was extensive enough for the buyer to truly appreciate the hazards of the goods."); Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 567, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 450, 455 (W.D. Va. 1984) (employer's actual knowledge of dangerous nature of product defeats employee's claim against seller for breach of implied warranty), aff'd sub nom. Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985).

196 This is analogous to common law tort principles imposing liability on the person possessing knowledge of a hazard because he has a greater chance to protect against its dangers. The more knowledge a merchant has of a particular good, the more capable she is of foreseeing problems with it. For discussion of warnings and implied warranties, see infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 388-401 (1977); J. Henderson & R. Pearson, The Torts Process 508-09 (2d ed. 1981).

197 See infra notes 198-203 & 247-49 and accompanying text.

198 U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 3. The comment further explains that the seller's "knowledge of any defects not apparent on inspection would, however, without need for express agreement and in keeping with the underlying reason of the present section and the provisions of good faith, impose an obligation that known material but hidden defects be fully disclosed." Id. Indeed, lack of disclosure brings a nonmerchant into the merchant category, resulting in imposition of the implied warranty of merchantability. In the case of a fire board selling an old pumper truck, a New York court stated, section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code would seem inapplicable for the reason that it speaks of a 'merchant with respect to goods of that kind' which defendant clearly is not. However, should it be demonstrated
should not be deemed a merchant because he will not have special knowledge or skill with regard to the good, and because a buyer presumably is less likely to rely upon one who seldom deals in the good and who possesses less knowledge of it.\footnote{Although comment 3 to section 2-314 supports this rationale, it presumes that such a seller of an isolated good neither deals in, nor by the seller’s occupation represents that he has special knowledge or skill with respect to, the goods sold. This presumption is not always correct, yet courts often apply the “isolated sale” exemption regardless of whether such skill or knowledge exists.}

We suggest, however, that isolated sellers should not be conclusively excluded from the implied warranty of merchantability. Isolated sellers should be included in the warranty of merchantability if they are experts or hold themselves out as experts in the sale of the goods. As the 1978 Special Project pointed out, “Refusing to find a warranty in an isolated sale may create the anomalous result of placing greater liability on a retailer who knows nothing about the goods than on a seller with substantial expertise as to the goods and upon whose reputation a buyer could more reasonably rely.”\footnote{Special Project, supra note 1, at 72 n.177.}

\textit{McGregor v. Dimou}\footnote{101 Misc. 2d 756, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 66 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).} illustrates this anomaly. \textit{McGregor} involved the sale of a used car by a body and fender specialist. Despite the seller’s knowledge, acquired by virtue of his specialty, the court deemed the seller a nonmerchant because the sale was an isolated transaction.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 760, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 809, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 70.} The decision failed to follow the underlying policy of an implied warranty of merchantability because such a person holds himself out to the public as an expert in the type of goods that he subsequently sold—even if the actual sale is isolated. We contend that section 2-314 suggests that a seller with specialized knowledge should be liable as a merchant because it would be reasonable for a buyer to rely on such a seller regardless of the fact that the sale may have been isolated.

The 1978 Special Project argued that with an “isolated sale” there should be a rebuttable presumption that the seller is a nonmerchant;\footnote{Special Project, supra note 1, at 71.} a buyer could rebut the presumption by showing that the seller has held himself out as knowledgeable or skillful with respect to the goods sold. We endorse this proposition. Several courts, however, still appear to treat the nonmerchant status of isolated sellers as conclusive rather than as a rebuttable
Courts have applied the general concept of "merchant" to cases involving isolated sales and related concepts in a variety of ways. A merchant of one type of good generally will not be held to be a merchant of another type of good in which he does not usually trade. In such a situation, the issue will be whether the seller's involvement with the second good is sufficient to justify merchant status in the second good.

*Vince v. Broome* involved a seller whose primary business was construction and who occasionally sold farm products at auction. A Mississippi court concluded that he was also a merchant of the farm products. The court held that the seller's volume justified this

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204 See, e.g., All States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 880, 538 P.2d 1177, 1184, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 933, 942 (1975) ("It is true that prior to the execution of the lease in issue, appellant handled between forty to fifty transactions over a period of six to eight months, concerning the same Budg-O-Matic Car Wash System that is the subject of this dispute. However, this in our mind does not make All-States Leasing a 'merchant' for purposes of the Code."); *McGregor*, 101 Misc. 2d at 760, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 809, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 69 (sale of car by specialist in collision repair held to be an isolated sale by a nonmerchant); Foley v. Dayton Bank & Trust, 696 S.W.2d 356, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (bank not merchant of used truck). *But see* Donald v. City Nat'l Bank, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d 92, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 891 (1976) (bank sued on sale of repossessed boat); Bass, 96 Idaho at 881, 538 P.2d at 1185, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 943 (Shepard, J., dissenting) (in disagreeing with the majority's holding that the lessor was not a merchant, the dissenting judge argued: "I cannot agree that the appellant who purchased and thereafter leased large numbers of car wash systems was not 'a person who deals in goods of the kind.' Although the appellant here did not build or manufacture such equipment, neither do most retailers."); Bennett v. Jansma, 329 N.W.2d 134, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 432 (S.D. 1983) (court considered frequency of sale, employment of intermediary, skill and knowledge in determining whether farmer was a merchant); *see also* Foley, 696 S.W.2d at 357, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 94 (providing some basis for holding the bank a merchant of repossessed cars although not a merchant of the repossessed trucks involved in the case).


206 The court explained: "We are compelled to note that some farming operations are worth millions of dollars. These farmers are engaged in multicommmercial transactions and are generally considered to be agribusiness persons. It would stretch the imagination to conclude that all these operations were exempt from coverage under the Commercial Code." *Id.* at 25, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1501. *But see* Pierson v. Armst, 534 F. Supp. 360, 362, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 457, 460 (D. Mont. 1982) ("It is inconceivable that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to place the average farmer, who merely grows his yearly crop and sells it to the local elevator, etc., on equal footing with the professional commodities dealer whose sole business is the buying and selling of farm commodities.").

Livestock and farm products are big business. See Grossman, *Choice of Law in Interstate Livestock Sales: Nonuniform Warranty Provisions Under the UCC*, 30 S.D.L. REV. 214, 215 (1985). Although the implied warranties generally would apply in such cases, "at least twenty-five states have amended their laws to exclude implied warranties in the sale of livestock under certain conditions." *Id.* at 216. For example, twenty-five states have excluded implied warranties on the health of livestock. *Id.* at 229 n.100. For a general discussion of livestock as "goods," see Note, *Commercial Law—Implied Warranty of Merchantability—Sale of Goods by Farmers May Give Rise to Implied Warranty of Merchantability*, 54 Miss. L.J. 175 (1984).
conclusion, despite its relative insignificance to his overall business.207

Banks that routinely repossess and sell cars or other goods may be similar to the seller in Vince, yet courts have generally refused to apply the same analysis to them. Courts have commonly held that banks are not merchants of these repossessed cars.208 Although banks presumably function primarily as financial institutions, a given bank could conceivably repossess cars frequently enough for the buyer to refute the presumption of the bank's nonmerchant status.209 Certain types of "isolated sales," however, are clearly covered by the warranty of merchantability. For instance, the "isolated sale" exemption does not exonerate a seller in a new business who should have the relevant knowledge, despite the fact that only one item had been sold.210 Accordingly, an importer's first shipment of

207 Vince, 443 So. 2d at 28, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1504.
208 See, e.g., Joyce v. Combank/Longwood, 405 So. 2d 1358, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1118 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (bank that sold five repossessed automobiles in a year did not hold itself out as having any special knowledge or skill and was therefore not a merchant); Foley v. Daton Bank & Trust, 696 S.W.2d 356, 359, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 92, 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) ("It is clear that the defendants . . . are not merchants within the meaning of the statute.").
209 The central question, of course, is whether the bank has the requisite knowledge about automobiles. Precisely what knowledge suffices to require a particular seller to comply with the implied warranty of merchantability cannot be specified as a formula, but must be handled on a case-by-case basis. A Florida court, for example, held that merchant status requires, in addition to frequency of sale, a professional status as to the particular kinds of goods in question, which even those banks that frequently deal in used cars did not have. Joyce, 405 So. 2d 1358, 1359, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1118, 1119; see infra note 212.

Similarly, courts have typically held that financial lessors are not merchants. See, e.g., Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1102 (D. Kan. 1986) (lessor whose contact with good is solely for the purpose of providing it to lessee has limited knowledge of the good which generally would be acquired by the lessor according to the lessee's wishes); Miller Auto Leasing Co. v. Weinstein, 189 N.J. Super. 543, 461 A.2d 174, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 786 (1989) (financier lessor not liable under the implied warranty of merchantability), aff'd, 193 N.J. Super. 328, 473 A.2d 996, cert. denied, 97 N.J. 676, 483 A.2d 192 (1984).

Contrasted to the situation of the merchant of a specific good making an isolated sale of a different product is that of the retailer of many types of goods who adds additional items to his inventory. Such a seller is presumably a merchant with respect to all the various goods with which he deals. See, e.g., McQuiston v. K-Mart Corp., 796 F.2d 1346, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1115 (11th Cir. 1986) (cookie jar in K-Mart); Schuessler v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (soda bottle in retail store). Even in cases such as McQuiston, where the warranty did not apply for other reasons, there is no question as to the general retailer's merchant status. Thus, if a wholesaler of office supplies adds office furniture to its inventory, it will be presumed to be a merchant with respect to both desk chairs and paper clips.
210 See Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 1416, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 99, 113 (D. Vt. 1986) (regardless of number of previous sales, seller is a merchant because he "holds himself out as having knowledge and skills peculiar to the practices and goods involved in the Arabian horse business").
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES

We suggest that individualized treatment of these cases is appropriate. Courts should apply a rebuttable presumption of non-merchant status instead of a conclusive rule. Certainly a bank that professes to hold no knowledge whatsoever of the cars with which it deals, but which is simply converting repossessed collateral into capital, should not be deemed a merchant under our test. This does not mean, however, that banks can never be merchants. A court should deem a bank a merchant when it would be reasonable for a buyer of repossessed collateral to rely on the bank’s special knowledge of the collateral because of its advertising, its volume of sales, or some other relevant factor. In these situations, the seller’s knowledge is the crucial factor, for the extent of the seller’s knowledge determines whether the buyer would be reasonable in relying on that knowledge.

The criteria for merchant status should therefore turn on both the seller’s “professional” status (encompassing knowledge of the product) and the frequency of sales. Thus, the more often a person sells a particular product the greater the possibility that he would be deemed a merchant of that particular good. Buyers are more likely to assume that sellers who frequently deal in certain goods possess such knowledge; they are therefore more likely to rely upon such a seller. This fits our thesis well, as the more contact a person has with a product, the more knowledge and skill he should develop.

2. Scope of “Goods” Under Section 2-314

Once a court determines that the seller is a merchant, its focus shifts to whether there has been a sale of “goods.” What constitutes a “good” under the Code? The simple answer is that a good is a tangible item; difficulty arises when courts need to apply the basic principles developed for traditional goods to services and other nontraditional goods.

a. Services as Goods. Courts disagree as to whether the sale of a service will give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability.

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212 See Joyce, 405 So. 2d at 1359, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 1120 (Plaintiff-buyer “testified that he was better qualified to determine the condition of the car than was defendant’s employee who negotiated the sale. It appears without dispute that the bank had no ‘professional status as to the particular [kind] of goods.’”) (brackets in original).
213 The new business merchant is a logical exception, where knowledge should be imputed to the new dealer. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 2-37 and accompanying text.
215 The 1978 Project suggested a “nexus test” to determine whether a transaction should be covered by warranties. “Where a sale would not be made but for the accompa-
Generally, the more the transaction at issue resembles a traditional sale of a good, the more likely the court will hold that the transaction is covered by an implied warranty. Thus, hybrid transactions, in which a tangible item is delivered to the buyer along with a service, tend to fall more readily within the warranties than do sales of pure services.

For example, repair services often do not give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability, even when a major part is conveyed to the service buyer as part of the repair. Generally, the inquiry is whether the transaction more closely resembles a sale of a repair service or a pure sale of the part. Some courts call this inquiry the "predominant purpose test."

The installation of goods is another form of a hybrid sale. Like the repair of parts, installations involve both a service and a conveyance of a tangible product. Arguably, an installation resembles a pure sale more closely than does a repair because, with the installation, a good is clearly being "sold." Perhaps for this reason, courts are more willing to find an implied warranty arising from an installation than from a repair. Yet, distinguishing between a "repair"
contract and a "purchase with installation" contract is often difficult. Thus, the disparate treatment accorded these situations by the courts is unsettling. Consider the following two scenarios:

(1) Buyer, not knowing what is wrong with his car, goes to a service station to have the car repaired. Buyer says to the seller, "Fix my car." As it turns out, all that is wrong with the car is a flat tire. The service station replaces the tire. Because the buyer purchased repair service, the transaction does not involve a good, and the implied warranty would not apply.\(^2\)  

(2) Buyer, knowing that her tire is flat, goes to a service station to buy a new tire she says to the seller, "Sell me a tire." The seller removes the flat tire and mounts the new one. Because the buyer went to the service station to purchase the tire, the transaction involved a good, and the implied warranty would apply.\(^2\)  

Such results are surely preposterous: The buyer not knowing the nature of his car's problems is excluded from warranty protection while the more knowledgeable buyer receives the warranty. Clearly the less knowledgeable buyer is in as much (or, indeed, greater) need of the implied warranty. Because the transactions are virtually identical, we propose that courts should apply the same warranty standards in both scenarios.

Pure services, those transactions in which only a service is provided without any accompanying tangible good usually do not give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability under section 2-314 even if the seller holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the service involved in the transaction. Regardless of the skill or knowledge of the seller, a service is simply not a good.\(^2\)

The concept of services as goods may, however, be gaining ac-

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\(^2\) Deaconess, 219 Neb. at 309, 363 N.W.2d at 161, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 403 (installation of roof was "incidental" to its purchase). But see Gee, 172 Ga. App. at 353, 323 S.E.2d at 178, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 32 ("although a 'repairer' may include new parts in the repair of a vehicle engine, the primary purpose of the contract is to 'repair' the vehicle, and is not the 'sale' of any component part of the engine").


\(^2\) See, e.g., De Valerio v. Vic Tanny Int'l, 140 Mich. App. 176, 180, 363 N.W.2d 447, 449, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 836 (1984) (use of equipment spa not covered by implied warranty of merchantability because the contract is for service and not for sale of goods); Mennonite Deaconess, 219 Neb. at 307, 363 N.W.2d at 160, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 402 ("If the transaction was really a contract for services and not a sale of goods, the provisions of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code do not apply."); see also supra notes 4-14 and accompanying text (service-sales hybrids).
ceptance.\textsuperscript{223} The Alabama Supreme Court provided support for this position in \textit{Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Board}.\textsuperscript{224} The \textit{Skelton} court held that a hospital could be liable under section 2-315’s warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when a surgical needle broke inside of a patient.\textsuperscript{225} The court rejected the hospital’s contention that surgery constitutes solely a provision of services not covered under the U.C.C.\textsuperscript{226} Instead, the court viewed the surgical procedure as a hybrid transaction to which the Code applied,\textsuperscript{227} stating that “[the hospital] can make no serious contention that \textit{Skelton} did not pay for the \textit{use} of the suturing needle, or that patients generally do not buy supplies and pay charges for equipment used in the course of their treatment.”\textsuperscript{228} The Court explicitly noted that the plaintiff went to the hospital “seeking services and products necessary to those services.”\textsuperscript{229} Although the court acknowledged that the suturing needles were re-used, and thus not sold to the patient, it held that this did not preclude the U.C.C.’s application. The court noted that Article Two applies to transactions in goods, and not just to sales.\textsuperscript{230} Although the hospital did not sell the suturing needle to the patient, it did, in a sense, lease its use.\textsuperscript{231} This lease constituted a transaction in goods, covered under Article Two; the analysis applies equally well to section 2-314.\textsuperscript{232}

Although the \textit{Skelton} court’s reasoning applies to hybrid service transactions, in practical effect it arguably subjects virtually all service transactions to Article Two’s implied warranties, for these services may be characterized as \textit{Skelton}-type hybrid transactions. Although we agree with the result in \textit{Skelton}, we believe that the court’s reasoning could result “in hairsplitting over contracts in

\textsuperscript{223} See Mallor, \textit{supra} note 14, at 89-90 (noting that although courts have traditionally characterized supplying utilities to consumers as a service, “[i]n recent years, a growing number of courts have either characterized utility supply contracts as sales of goods, or have considered such contracts to be sufficiently analogous to sales of goods to justify the application of a the Uniform Commercial Code principles.”) (footnote omitted).


\textsuperscript{225} \textit{id.} at 823, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 378.

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{id.} at 821, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373.

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{id.} at 822, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 374. Prior courts had used the “essence of transaction” test to determine that a hospital’s provision of medical care is a service and therefore not a good under article 2. \textit{See, e.g.,} Potts v. W. Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558 S.W.2d 939, 946, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 360, 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (“Texas follows the majority rule that the essence of a hospital stay is the furnishing of the institution’s healing services which may include incidental sales of medicines and the like.”).

\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Skelton}, 459 So. 2d at 821, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373 (emphasis in original).

\textsuperscript{229} \textit{id.} at 822, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 375.

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{id.} at 821, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373-74.

\textsuperscript{231} \textit{id.}, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373.

\textsuperscript{232} \textit{id.}, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 373-74. For a discussion of whether leases are included within the U.C.C. under “transaction in goods” theory, see \textit{supra} notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
which the goods and services elements are not realistically separable."  As an alternative, we recommend applying the Code to services by analogy. "Under this 'analalogical approach,' Code principles are given broad application to problems analogous to those contemplated by the drafters of the Code."

We suggest that courts should analogize services to goods where the buyer's reliance on the service provider resembles a buyer's reliance on a merchant when purchasing a good. Persons competent to perform repairs or installations probably meet and perhaps exceed the knowledge criteria for status as a merchant; conceivably, exceptions analogous to those applicable for merchants of pure goods would apply in appropriate circumstances. As services become more pervasive in commercial dealings, the protections arising from transactions in classic goods should expand to include them.

b. Technological Products as Goods. The development of computer technology has also challenged the traditional concept of what constitutes a good under Article Two. Although courts have uniformly regarded computer hardware as within the classic definition of "goods," their treatment of computer software has been less consistent. One commentator has suggested that the inconsistency stems from the intangible nature of software: "Computer software . . . is an intangible collection of ideas, even though it must be kept and transferred on a tangible medium. Traditional sales law was developed to deal with tangible goods, not intangibles." The commentator suggested two reasons why the implied warranty of

233 Mallor, supra note 14, at 93.
234 As Professors White and Summers have stated:
[W]e suspect that the sale-service dichotomy is merely a verbal formula in which results are expressed, results which courts reach upon analysis of a wide variety of factors. We would urge courts to identify these factors more candidly. We would also remind courts who do wish to impose warranty liability in nonsale cases that they can do so by analogy without indulging the fiction that the transaction at hand is a true sale of goods.
235 Mallor, supra note 14, at 93.
236 "The explosive growth of the computer industry has outdistanced efforts to adapt legal theories to govern computer-related disputes." Comment, The Warranty of Merchantability and Computer Software Contracts: A Square Peg Won't Fit in a Round Hole, 59 Wash. L. Rev. 511, 511 (1984). For a description of various computer terms, see Holmes, Applications of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer System Acquisitions, 9 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 1, 4-6 (1982).
237 Comment, supra note 236, at 511 (footnotes omitted).
merchantability should not attach to computer software. First, the inherent diversity of such collections of ideas makes developing a minimum standard of merchantability almost impossible. Second, because a software purchaser generally obtains a mere license to use the software, and not full rights of ownership, there has not been a sale. We disagree. Instead, we recommend that courts apply traditional standards of merchantability. First, we believe that when a merchant is particularly concerned about the merchantability of the product, he should so inform the buyer who will be purchasing and relying upon it. Second, we believe that courts should look past the formality of the computer software license and equate the transaction to a sale.

The purchasers of computer goods, like buyers of services, are likely to rely on the seller's superior knowledge and are thus entitled to warranty protection. This protection should not be denied by strict construction of either "goods" or "sales."

c. Used Goods. The implied warranty of merchantability applies to used as well as to new goods. Whether implied warranties apply depends on the expectations appropriate to the type of good. The good's used condition therefore influences the standard of merchantability by which the good is judged. Although used

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238 Id. at 521-23.
239 Id. at 518-20.
240 Passage of full rights of ownership is not necessarily a requirement for imposition of warranties. See U.C.C. § 2-105(3). Passage of title is not necessary either. See infra note 258.
242 "A contract for the sale of second-hand goods . . . involves only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods . . . " U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 3.
243 Dickerson, 109 Idaho at 711, 710 P.2d at 625, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 120 ("[T]he new or used character [of a product] is a factor in determining its standard of merchantability.").

The Code is silent as to whether section 2-315 applies to used goods. One commentator has suggested that this omission, in light of the explicit coverage under comment 3 to section 2-315, could be intentional according to the statutory interpretation maxim incolatio unius est exclusio alterius. However, recent case law has chosen instead to interpret section 2-315 to apply to second hand goods. Comment, Uniform Commercial Code—Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose—Applicability to the Sale of Secondhand Goods, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 499 (1984). There appears to be no theoretical reason for the courts to draw a distinction between used goods and new goods for section 2-315 purposes.
goods are not generally expected to be in mint condition, they
nevertheless must meet a basic standard of merchantability. For ex-
ample, used cars are expected to be in reasonably safe condition and
substantially free from defects that would render them inoper-
able.244 Notably, used goods are less likely to give rise to an implied
warranty of merchantability because often the seller will not be con-
sidered a merchant.245 For example, the sale of a used good will
frequently fall within the isolated sale exception of section 2-314.246

Consistent with our notion that courts should base liability on
factors of reliance and knowledge, we believe that the likelihood
that a seller will be subject to Article Two implied warranties should
be a function of the knowledge he possesses and the buyer's reliance
upon him. When the seller is a merchant dealing in used goods,
such as a used car dealer, the implied warranties should clearly ap-
ply. Problems may arise when a seller of used goods is not clearly a
merchant because the sales are only incidental to his regular busi-
ness.247 We believe that where the seller has special knowledge of
the used goods, such as a metropolitan transit authority selling its
used trolleys for scrap, there should be an implied warranty of
merchantability arising out of the sale.248 However, when the seller
has no specialized knowledge there should be no implied

244 See Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, Inc., 43 Wash. App. 208, 716 P.2d 911, 1
245 See Joyce v. Combank/Longwood, 405 So. 2d 1358, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1118 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (bank selling repossessed cars not merchant); Bernstein v. Sherman,
(private seller of used car not a merchant); see also Guess v. Lorenz, 612 S.W.2d 831, 30
U.C.C. Rep. 1529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (same). For a discussion of the merchant re-
quirement, see supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
(selling equipment no longer needed does not make seller a merchant); Guess, 612
S.W. 2d 831, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1529 (used car sale); Allen v. Nicole, Inc., 172 N.J. Super.
442, 412 A.2d 824, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 982 (1980) (seller not merchant in isolated sale of
amusement ride); Bernstein, 130 Misc. 2d 741, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 375
(prior owners' sale of car); McGregor v. Dimou, 101 Misc. 2d 756, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806, 28
U.C.C. Rep. 66 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (seller not merchant in isolated sale of used car even
though seller was body and fender specialist and had sold other used cars); see also supra
notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
477, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 304 (1985). In Ferragamo the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA) argued that its primary business was provision of transportation and
that the sale of its old trolley cars was "incidental" as a matter of law. The court dis-
agreed and, reversing the lower court's decision, considered the MBTA a merchant of
used trolley cars. The court based the decision on the following facts: the MBTA sold
almost all of its old trolley cars for scrap; it solicited bids for the cars; the trolleys had
been operated and repaired by its employees for 25 years; and it had originally designed
the cars. Id. at 585-89, 481 N.E.2d at 480-82, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 308-11. The court
therefore concluded that the MBTA was highly experienced and knowledgeable with
respect to the goods.
warranty.\textsuperscript{249}

3. \textit{A “Contract for Sale” Under Section 2-314}

Under section 2-314(1), “a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale.” Courts have interpreted “contract for their sale” broadly, focusing not upon the formal transfer of title from buyer to seller, but rather on whether a commercial relationship exists between a merchant and another party.\textsuperscript{250} As a result, leases, loans, and other transactions not involving transfer of title may give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability.

a. \textit{Incomplete Sales}. Some courts have broadened “contract for sale” to create an implied warranty to a retail purchaser before he has actually bought the goods. A common factual pattern involves a customer picking up an item off a shelf in a self-service store and manifesting an intent to purchase the item—by putting food in a grocery basket to carry it to the checkout counter, for example. Some courts have reasoned that placing goods on a shelf in a self-service store for customer inspection and selection constitutes an offer to sell such goods at the stated price, and the customer’s act of taking possession of the goods with intent to pay for them constitutes a reasonable mode of acceptance, so as to form a “contract for sale.”\textsuperscript{251} Likewise, a restaurant that serves a glass of wine to a patron can be held liable under an implied warranty theory for injuries sustained when the glass breaks in the patron’s hand.\textsuperscript{252} Courts have based this rule squarely on section 2-314, which expressly provides that “the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.”\textsuperscript{253}

b. \textit{Loans}. Implied warranties do not apply when goods are loaned. For example, school officials were not responsible for injuries resulting from a defective athletic helmet because they did not

\textsuperscript{250} See generally J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 9-6, at 344.
\textsuperscript{251} See Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 597 (Okla. 1979) (taking possession of softdrink bottle with intent to purchase constituted contract for sale.); see also Note, Barker v. Allied Supermarket: \textit{An Expanded Interpretation of the UCC’s “Contract for Sale,”} 33 Sw. L.J. 1294, 1295 (1980) (suggesting that the trend is to find an implied warranty of merchantability in these circumstances).
\textsuperscript{253} Id. at 297, 588 P.2d at 234, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 428. Notably, one court has refused to find an implied warranty when a browsing customer picked up a jar that injured her hand because the customer had not formed an intent to purchase. McQuiston v. K-Mart Corp., 796 F.2d 1346, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1115 (11th Cir. 1986).
sell it, but loaned it to the subsequently injured student.\textsuperscript{254} Similarly, a car dealer was not liable for injuries sustained by a prospective buyer test-driving the vehicle.\textsuperscript{255}

We believe, however, that implied warranties should arise from loans in some circumstances. Courts should distinguish between gratuitous loans and loans integral to a sales transaction—a bailment for mutual benefit. In the former case, it is proper to exclude loaned goods from implied warranty coverage because such a transaction clearly falls outside of section 2-106's definition of a sale. In the latter case, however, the bailment may "be considered so closely allied to selling as to become a sale."\textsuperscript{256}

We propose a rebuttable presumption that loans are not covered by implied warranties. A party could rebut this presumption by showing that the bailment was part of an anticipated commercial transaction. For example, under this test, school officials loaning athletic gear in a noncommercial setting would not be liable.\textsuperscript{257} However, a car dealer who loans a car to a potential customer in anticipation of a sale to that customer should be held to the implied warranty of merchantability assuming that the other requirements for the implied warranty were met.

c. Lease Transactions. Arguably, a lease resembles a contract for sale even more than does a loan.\textsuperscript{258} Courts that find the Code applicable to leases do so in one of three ways.\textsuperscript{259} If the leases are "disguised sales," courts may hold that they are in fact a "sale" for

\textsuperscript{255} See Mason v. General Motors Corp., 397 Mass. 183, 189, 490 N.E.2d 437, 441, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1553, 1558 (1986) ("There is no statutory language, however, that reasonably may be construed as either creating or sanctioning the judicial creation of a warranty in connection with a bailment of the kind that occurred in this case.").
\textsuperscript{256} Id. at 196 n.3, 409 N.E.2d at 445 n.3, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1561 n.3 (Liacos, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{257} We do not address the question of whether the school officials would be liable for a breach of duty to the students on any theory other than implied warranty.
\textsuperscript{258} See All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 808 (1979). In discussing Oregon's version of section 2-314, the court stated:

The more difficult question is whether the implied warranty of merchantability, which by the express terms of ORS 72.3140 is applicable to the sale of goods, also applies to the lease of goods. We observe that the U.C.C. is more concerned with the rights and obligations which attach to a transaction which has certain characteristics and with respect to which the parties have certain intentions, than it is with the form in which the transaction is cast.

Id. at 334, 600 P.2d at 909, 27 U.C.C. Rep. at 820 (footnote omitted); \textit{see supra} notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{259} \textit{See supra} notes 16-37 and accompanying text. Additionally, there is a fourth method—legislative action. Maryland, for example, adds a fourth subsection to section 2-314 providing that "Subsections (1) and (2) of this section apply to a lease of goods and a bailment for hire of goods that pass through the physical possession of and are
purposes of the Code. Other courts use the "transaction in goods" language of section 2-102 to justify extending warranty protection to leases. Finally, some courts simply incorporate leases into the goods language by analogy.

We suggest that a more consistent application of the underlying policies of the Code would condition the existence of an implied warranty arising from a lease on the amount of reliance and knowledge involved, and the resemblance of the transaction to a sale of goods. Often those policies lead to the use of the analogy method to expand the Code's applications to such transactions as services, leases, loans, and infrequent and incomplete sales.

4. The Standards of Merchantability—Section 2-314(2)

Assuming that an implied warranty of merchantability applies under section 2-314(1), section 2-314(2) sets forth the standards of merchantability:

Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as to
da. pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
b. in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
c. are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
d. run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
e. are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
f. conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.

Violation of any one of these standards constitutes a breach of the


260 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.

261 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.

262 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.

Generally, the rights and obligations defined by the lease and the seller's knowledge determine whether the lease gives rise to implied warranties. See Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 703 n.6, 324 S.E.2d 462, 468 n.6, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 408, 414 n.6 (1985) (lease that provided that the lessee shall purchase the leased goods at the termination of the lease is a "contract for sale" and thus is covered by the U.C.C.); Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336 (1980) (repair provisions render lease a sale under section 2-315); Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 808 (doctor who leased a computer relied on his own knowledge and not the lessor's who had no expertise in the field). Generally, the more the lease resembles a sale, the more likely the lessor will be liable.

263 U.C.C. § 2-314(2).
implied warranty of merchantability. Although comment 6 to section 2-314 implies that this list is not exhaustive, courts tend not to impose additional standards. For the most part, courts use a reasonableness standard to determine whether section 2-314(2)'s requirements have been met.

a. Pass Without Objection in the Trade. Section 2-314(2)(a) requires that goods "pass without objection in the trade." This section simply requires that goods meet whatever standard or custom prevails in the trade for goods of the kind. A few examples illustrate the application of this section.

With consumer goods, the courts have interpreted the standard to encompass public expectations of the product. In *Thomas v. Ruddle Lease-Sales, Inc.*, the buyer purchased a used Corvette, which, unbeknownst to him, had been wrecked and repaired prior to the sale. According to the court, the public generally rejects wrecked, although subsequently repaired, Corvettes and therefore found that such a Corvette fails to pass without objection in the trade.

With commercial transactions, courts often link the ordinary purpose of the goods to the expectations in the trade. For instance, one court found that seeds that had a general reputation in the trade for being disease-free did not pass without objection if they were highly contaminated with bacteria. Likewise, a court held that wine containing "Fresno mold" does not pass without objection in the trade, and therefore the seller of the wine breached the implied

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264 Subsection (2) does not purport to exhaust the meaning of "merchantable" nor to negate any of its attributes not specifically mentioned in the text of the statute, but arising by usage of trade or through case law. The language used is "must be at least such as . . ." and the intention is to leave open other possible attributes of merchantability.

265 Instead of creating new standards, courts may expand those listed in section 2-314 to cover unforeseen situations. However, our research has not disclosed any such new standards.

266 See Special Project, *supra* note 1, at 75.

267 The question when the warranty is imposed turns basically on the meaning of the terms of the agreement as recognized in the trade. Goods delivered under an agreement made by a merchant in a given line of trade must be of a quality comparable to that generally acceptable in the line of trade under the description or other designation of the goods used in the agreement.


269 *Id.* at 209-10, 716 P.2d at 912-13, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 395-96.

270 *Id.* at 214, 716 P.2d at 915, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 390.

b. *Fair Average Quality (Fungible Goods).* Section 2-314(2)(b) provides that to be merchantable, fungible goods must be of "fair average quality" within the contract description. "Fungible" means goods "of which any unit is, by nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like unit."\(^2\) The commentary to section 2-314 states:

"Fair average"... means goods centering around the middle belt of quality, not the least or the worst that can be understood in the particular trade by the designation, but such as can pass "without objection." Of course a fair percentage of the least is permissible but the goods are not "fair average" if they are all of the least or worst quality possible under the description.\(^3\)

Subsection 2-314(2)(b) is often used in connection with subsection 2-314(2)(a)\(^2\) because "[b]oth refer... to the standards of that line of the trade which fits the transaction and the seller's business."\(^4\) As with subsection (2)(a), few cases specifically address this area. Those cases that do involve one subsection usually involve the other as well.\(^5\)

c. *Fit for Ordinary Purposes.* Subsection (2)(c) provides that goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." This subsection embodies a fundamental concept of section 2-314—that goods be reasonably fit for their usual, intended purpose.\(^6\) To meet this standard goods must be reasonably safe when put to their ordinary use\(^7\) and reasonably capable of per-

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\(^3\) U.C.C. § 1-201(17).

\(^4\) *Id.* § 2-314 comment 7. Fair average is a term directly appropriate to agricultural bulk products. *Id.*

\(^5\) Although an item failing to meet any one of the six standards is not merchantable, comment 7 to section 2-314 advises that subsections (2)(a) and (b) "are to be read together." *Id.*

\(^6\) *Id.*

\(^7\) *Id.*


\(^9\) Comment 8 to section 2-314 characterizes paragraph (c) as "a fundamental concept" of that section.

\(^10\) See, e.g., *Maybank*, 46 N.C. App. at 692, 266 S.E.2d at 412, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 73 ("A flashcube which does not work properly and which causes... unexpected harm... is not merchantable."); Taterka v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 140, 271 N.W.2d 653, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 680 (1978) (car is unmerchantable if it has single defect causing substantial safety hazard).

Food and drink are covered by this paragraph as well. See U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 5. For cases discussing the application of section 2-314, see Shaffer v. Victoria Station,
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forming their ordinary functions. A product's ordinary purpose is one which is reasonably foreseeable to the merchant. The merchant will not be held liable for harm caused by deliberate misuse of the goods totally unrelated to any normal or intended use. The fitness for ordinary purpose requirement applies to goods sold for resale as well as to those sold to the customer.

Plaintiffs have attempted to expand the application of subsection (2)(c) by injecting a notice of freedom from hazard into the concept of ordinary purpose. For example, in Rhodes v. R.G. Industries a buyer argued that a handgun which had caused the death of a child was not merchantable because the ordinary purpose

Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 295, 297, 588 P.2d 233, 235, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 427, 429 (1978) (Where customer in a restaurant was injured by a glass of wine that shattered, the court stated, "[p]laintiff alleges the drink sold—wine in a glass—was unfit and has, therefore, stated a cause of action."); Orlando v. Herco, Inc., 351 Pa. Super. 144, 505 A.2d 308, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1624 (1986) (food merchant may present evidence pertaining to purchase, storage, and inspection of ingredients used to prepare food to show that the food was merchantable and fit for human consumption).

A merchant also may be liable for breach of an implied warranty under section 2-314(2)(c) if a product causes some kind of allergic reaction in a substantial number of people. Compare Tiderman v. Fleetwood Homes, 102 Wash. 2d 334, 339, 684 P.2d 1302, 1305, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 442, 445 (1984) (buyer could recover for hypersensitive allergic reaction to formaldehyde in mobile home interior because "formaldehyde [is] harmful to some extent to a reasonably foreseeable and appreciable percentage of users") (emphasis in original) with Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790, 798, 59 U.C.C. Rep. 446, 449 (Ala. 1984) (Plaintiff could not recover for severe reaction to benzocaine because the plaintiff was "the only person who ha[d] suffered this kind of injury in the long history of use of the drug in question.").


See, e.g., Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641, 649-50, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1259, 1259 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (dumptruck that overturned when used to haul clay not used for ordinary purpose because manufacturer could not reasonably have foreseen that truck would be used for other than its intended purpose of hauling washed rock); Allen v. Chance Mfg., 398 Mass. 32, 34, 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1326, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1124, 1126 (1986) (in personal injury claim asserting a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability plaintiff "must prove that at the time of his injury he was using the product in a manner that the defendant . . . reasonably could have foreseen").

Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 487 (1st Cir. 1980) (deciding manufacturer did not need to design beer bottle to withstand deliberate misuse by throwing bottle against telephone pole); see also infra notes 295-302 and accompanying text (related discussion of necessary warnings and labels).

"[P]rotection, under this aspect of the warranty, of the person buying for resale to the ultimate consumer is equally necessary, and merchantable goods must therefore be 'honestly' resalable in the normal course of business because they are what they purport to be." U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 8.

of a handgun is self-protection as opposed to killing children.\textsuperscript{285} The court refused to accept this characterization of a gun’s ordinary purpose, however, reasoning that a gun’s purpose is to fire when the trigger is pulled.\textsuperscript{286} Because the gun in \textit{Rhodes} had so fired, the Court held that it was merchantable.\textsuperscript{287}

Plaintiffs have had some success in including in a product’s ordinary purpose the notion that the product must function without causing damage. For example, in \textit{Streich v. Hilton-Davis}\textsuperscript{288} a buyer purchased a potato-sprout suppressant designed to facilitate the winter storage of seed potatoes.\textsuperscript{289} Although the suppressant did facilitate the storage of the buyer’s seed potatoes by preventing them from sprouting, “the seed potatoes treated with [the suppressant] showed delayed and erratic emergence, multiple sprouting, a heavy tuber set resulting in small potatoes, and reduced yield.”\textsuperscript{290} The defendant argued that the potato sprout suppressant had fulfilled its ordinary purpose of preventing potato seeds from sprouting, and that the altered growth pattern of the plaintiff’s potatoes was merely an unfortunate side effect.\textsuperscript{291} The court held for the plaintiff, however, stating that “[s]urely goods are not merchantable, if in their ordinary use, the goods cause damage to the property to which they are applied or harm to the person using them.”\textsuperscript{292}

Arguably, the reasoning in \textit{Streich}, if taken to its logical extreme, would impose liability on the handgun merchant in \textit{Rhodes}. The handgun would be unfit for its ordinary purpose because its ordinary use had caused the death of a child. Although we support the result in \textit{Streich}, its reasoning should not extend to cases such as \textit{Rhodes} because there is a difference between harm resulting from improper use of a product and harm resulting from a malfunctioning product. Purchasers of guns and other goods intended to be

\textsuperscript{285} Id. at 51, 325 S.E.2d at 446, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 1669.
\textsuperscript{286} Id. at 52, 325 S.E.2d at 467, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 1669-70 (“[T]he evidence showed that the gun performed exactly as was expected: when the hammer was cocked and the trigger was pulled, it fired.”).
\textsuperscript{287} Id., 325 S.E.2d at 467, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 1669-70; see also First Nat’l Bank v. Regent Sports Corp., 619 F. Supp. 820, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 419 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (dart thrown by child at infant merchantable because it did not malfunction and warnings were given), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 803 F.2d 1431, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 458 (7th Cir. 1986); Love v. Zales Corp., 689 S.W.2d 282, 284, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming summary judgment for defendant in action to recover for breach of warranty on shotgun used as murder weapon because “[t]here was nothing wrong with the shotgun”).
\textsuperscript{289} Id. at 442, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 109-10 (“The [sprout suppressant] is expected to keep the treated seed potatoes from sprouting until after they are taken from storage, aerated, and planted.”).
\textsuperscript{290} Id., 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 110.
\textsuperscript{291} Id. at 448, 440 U.C.C. Rep. at 111.
\textsuperscript{292} Id., 440 U.C.C. Rep. at 111.
hazardous should be aware of the danger inherent in the improper use of the product, and should be responsible for any damage from such misuse. By contrast, where, as in Streich, damage results from a product's malfunction, the merchant should be held liable. In such a case the buyer should be able to rely on the proper functioning of the product.

d. **Run of Even Kind, Quality, and Quantity.** Subsection (2)(d) provides that goods must "run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved." This paragraph adds "precautionary language . . . as a reminder of the frequent usages of trade which permit substantial variations both with and without an allowance or an obligation to replace the varying units." The 1978 Special Project noted that no reported cases raised the issue of uniformity. We have found no noteworthy cases since 1978.

e. **Adequately Contained, Packaged, and Labeled.** Subsection (2)(e) requires that goods must be "adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require" to be merchantable. "Adequate packaging generally entails protection of the goods or persons using the goods from harm." Therefore, whether a particular label or package is adequate will depend upon the characteristics of the goods involved in the transaction. Inadequate warnings may render a good unmerchantable. For example, a truck may be unmerchantable because of a failure to warn of the danger resulting from underinflated tires when the truck is overloaded. Similarly, a failure to warn of the risks attending the use of prescription drugs can render the drugs unmerchantable.

Whether a buyer or seller knows of a product's potential dan-
gers helps determine the necessity of a warning. The seller who knows of a product's hazards can protect against harm by warning the buyer. Indeed, it is likely that the buyer will have relied upon the seller's superior knowledge and expertise for such warnings. According to this analysis, the seller's failure to warn renders the goods unsafe and therefore unmerchantable. Conversely, when a buyer knows of the hazard he need not rely on the seller's warnings; therefore, a warranty need not arise.

Because the adequacy of warnings is a question of fact, the cases in this area fail to produce clear criteria for determining how explicit a warning must be. Therefore, sellers often must choose between risking liability because they have provided inadequate warnings and discouraging customers by providing excessive warnings.

f. Conform to Representations on Container or Label. Subsection (2)(f), the last of section 2-314's specified standards for merchantability, requires that goods "conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any." This standard applies "wherever there is a label or container on which representations are made, even though the original contract, either by express terms or usage of trade, may not have required either the labelling or the representation." Courts tend to rely on this provision less frequently than on section 2-314's other standards due to

300 See Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 567, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 450, 455 (W.D. Va. 1984) ("When a skilled purchaser . . . knows or reasonably should be expected to know of the dangerous propensities or characteristics of a product, no implied warranty of merchantability arises.").

301 See Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 485, 253 S.E.2d 344, 350, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 20, 29 ("Whether the product in question, when viewed as a whole (including contents, packaging, labeling and warnings) was merchantable is a jury question not susceptible of summary adjudication."), cert. denied, 297 N.C. 612, 257 S.E.2d 219 (1979).

302 This dilemma is not solely the result of the U.C.C. provisions; general tort principles may produce the same effect. Yet, the duty to warn under an implied warranty does differ from the duty under tort law. See Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1045, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 1569, 1576 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he duty to warn under an implied warranty theory focuses upon whether the lack of warning renders the product unreasonably dangerous; in contrast, a manufacturer will be liable in negligence for a failure to warn if its conduct is unreasonable.") (footnote omitted). Additionally, the implied warranty duty to warn exists only at the time the good leaves the manufacturer, while under tort principles the duty is continuous. Id. at 1046, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 1577; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 301(2)(b) (1965).

303 U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 10. "This follows from the general obligation of good faith which requires that a buyer should not be placed in the position of reselling or using goods delivered under false representations appearing on the package or container." Id.
the overlap between it and section 2-313’s express warranty.\textsuperscript{304} When the product fails to meet the representations of its label, the presence of the express warranty will often render the existence of an implied warranty of merchantability irrelevant.\textsuperscript{305}

The 1978 Special Project speculated that, under certain circumstances, conformity with label standards might “possess greater independent significance” than express warranties alone:\textsuperscript{306} “Suppose a farmer buys an insecticide to spray on his wheat crop. He later notices a label on the package indicating fitness for corn as well as wheat. pleasantly surprised the farmer sprays his corn crop, which promptly dies.”\textsuperscript{307} Even though there may be no express warranty,\textsuperscript{308} the implied warranty of merchantability could apply. Although court decisions have not expressly adopted the 1978 Special Project’s contention that this standard of merchantability has potentially independent significance,\textsuperscript{309} the theory still holds. In the above example, the seller explicitly expressed his knowledge in the form of the label specifications of insecticide use. The label conveyed to the buyer the seller’s understanding of the unique qualities of the good. The buyer justifiably relied on such representations. Although such reliance does not justify finding an express warranty, it represents a good example of reliance on an implied warranty.

B. The Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose—Section 2-315

The Code provides for an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose:

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.\textsuperscript{310}

\textsuperscript{304} See U.C.C. § 2-313; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{305} See supra notes 38-142 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{306} Special Project, supra note 1, at 83.
\textsuperscript{307} Id.
\textsuperscript{308} See supra notes 61-136 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{309} Apparently courts have not had the opportunity to address the issue. See Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp. v. Crane Barge R-14, 476 F. Supp. 282, 287, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 961, 968 (D. Md. 1979) (“The record reflects no warranty between plaintiffs and General Electric relating to the weight of the transformers other than that which may have arisen as a result of the stencilling by General Electric of weight information on the side of the various units. Where an affirmation of fact is made on a product or its container, an implied warranty arises that the product will conform to the representations.”), aff’d, 632 F.2d 1123, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1165 (4th Cir. 1980).
\textsuperscript{310} U.C.C. § 2-315.
The commentary to this provision notes:

A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.\textsuperscript{311}

Courts have characterized this distinction in various ways.

In section 2-315, the relationship between the warranty and the presence of reliance and knowledge is particularly apparent. According to Professors White and Summers, there are three prerequisites to imposition of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Notably, all three relate directly either to the seller's knowledge of the buyer's purpose or to the buyer's reliance on the sellers knowledge:

1. Seller's Knowledge of Buyer's Purpose

Where the buyer has explicitly informed the seller of the particular purpose for which the buyer requires the goods, it is clear that the seller had "reason to know" of the buyer's particular purpose.\textsuperscript{312} When the seller reasonably should know about reliance or purpose, such knowledge will be imputed to him, regardless of whether he actually does have such knowledge.\textsuperscript{313}

The commentary to section 2-315 explains:

Under this section the buyer need not bring home to the seller actual knowledge of the particular purpose for which the goods are intended or of his reliance on the seller's skill and judgment, if the circumstances are such that the seller has reason to realize the


\textsuperscript{312} J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 9-9, at 358 (footnote omitted).

\textsuperscript{313} See, e.g., AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 224, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (manufacturer of bottle caps told liner supplier how bottle cap liners were to be used). We do not here consider the various proof problems which could arise from oral exchanges.

purpose intended or that the reliance exists.\textsuperscript{315}

The seller will only be presumed to have knowledge of the particular purpose when such a presumption is reasonable under the circumstances.\textsuperscript{316} For instance, a seller was not presumed to have knowledge of the buyer's need for a fireproof baseball jacket that would not ignite when doused with petroleum.\textsuperscript{317} Similarly, no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose attached when a buyer provided product specifications to the seller without informing the seller of the product's intended use.\textsuperscript{318} In the extreme case, where the buyer refuses to disclose his particular purpose to the seller, the argument for the imposition of implied warranties certainly fails.\textsuperscript{319} On the whole, using common sense in the application of the knowledge-of-purpose and reason-to-know requirements for the imposition of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose seems to be the rule, which we endorse wholeheartedly.

2. \textit{Reliance}

The buyer's reliance in fact and the seller's reason to know of this reliance are related elements of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.\textsuperscript{320} To determine whether the buyer relied on the seller to provide suitable goods, courts often examine the comparative expertise of the buyer and seller.\textsuperscript{321} Although the

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buyer must have actually relied on the seller, courts often exhibit a willingness to find the buyer’s reliance by inference.\textsuperscript{322}

\textit{Skelton v. Druid City Hospital Board}\textsuperscript{323} provides an example of a buyer’s inferred reliance on the seller. Patients, especially unconscious ones during surgery, must rely on the skill and expertise of the seller. Hospitals foster this reliance by holding themselves out to the public as having special knowledge regarding the provision of medical services, and therefore are necessarily cognizant of the buyer’s reliance.\textsuperscript{324} Accordingly, hospitals implicitly warrant that they will furnish patients with goods for use in the provision of medical services that are fit for the intended purpose of medical care, giving rise to an implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose.\textsuperscript{325}

Several factors may lead a factfinder to conclude that a buyer did not actually rely on the seller. For example, when a buyer provides product specifications to the seller, the factfinder may conclude that buyer reliance is lacking, thus preventing the creation of the implied warranty of fitness.\textsuperscript{326} A buyer’s examination of the goods\textsuperscript{327} and his knowledge and expertise in the area\textsuperscript{328} also serve from lessor who had no expertise in the field). Leased goods may be covered by section 2-315 as well as section 2-314. \textit{See Knox v. North Am. Car Corp.}, 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336 (1980) (lease with certain repair provisions). \textsuperscript{322} But see \textit{Khan v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.}, 711 S.W.2d 310, 319, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1114 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting reliance not necessary element of breach of warranty claim under section 2-315 because section 2-315 is alternative to strict liability in tort). \textsuperscript{323} 459 So. 2d 818, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 369 (Ala. 1984); \textit{see supra} notes 224-31 and accompanying text. \textsuperscript{324} 459 So. 2d at 823, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 376; \textit{see also} \textit{Knox v. North Am. Car Corp.}, 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1359, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 342 (1980) (Where lease arrangement placed duties of maintenance and repair upon the lessor, plaintiff-lessee, “even more so than in a sale situation[,] relied upon [lessor’s] undertaking to provide a boxcar which was safe and suitable for the purpose contemplated by the parties to the lease. Such an undertaking on the part of the defendant lessor gives rise to a contractual implied warranty of fitness analogous to that applicable under § 2-315.”). \textsuperscript{325} 459 So. 2d at 823, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 377. \textsuperscript{326} \textit{See, e.g.}, \textit{Shell v. Union Oil Co.}, 489 So. 2d 569, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 692 (Ala. 1986) (plaintiff’s employer set specifications for product containing a carcinogen); \textit{Keith v. Buchanan}, 173 Cal. App. 3d 13, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 386 (1985) (no reliance on seller where buyer of sailing yacht had extensive experience with sailboats, provided specifications to seller, examined many vessels, surveyed advertisements, and received much advice from experienced friends); \textit{Hiskey v. City of Seattle}, 44 Wash. App. 110, 720 P.2d 867, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1127, \textit{review denied}, 107 Wash. 2d 1001 (1986) (no reliance where buyer specified thickness of leased rigging cable without explaining intended purpose to seller).

to defeat a finding of reliance. Finally, misuse of the product may prevent application of the implied warranty of fitness.\textsuperscript{329}

3. \textit{Overlap with Other Warranties}

The implied warranties of the Code at times overlap with each other\textsuperscript{330} and with the other Article Two warranties.\textsuperscript{331} As we stated

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\textsuperscript{328} \textit{See supra} notes 195 & 321 and accompanying text; \textit{cf.} Dunkin v. Syntex Labs, 443 F. Supp. 121, 126, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 304, 308 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) ("A similar analysis [to that used in the implied warranty of merchantability discussion] leads to the same conclusion as to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Where a drug manufacturer sells a drug designed for a specific purpose \ldots and warns the medical profession of possible side effects in some users, the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is not breached where one of those side effects occurs.").

\textsuperscript{329} \textit{Global Truck \& Equip. Co.}, 628 F. Supp. at 651, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1260 ("[I]n designing the product, Palmer had a right to rely on Global's assertion that the trailers were to be used to haul washed rock. \ldots [As the trailers were not used for that purpose,] the court [held] that any breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was the result of the ultimate purchaser's use of the product for other than the stated particular purpose and that allowing recovery under section \( 2 \)-315 would be improper."); \textit{see also} Keirs v. Weber Nat'l Stores, 352 Pa. Super. 111, 507 A.2d 406, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 387 (1986) (dousing baseball jacket in petroleum deemed "abnormal" use).

\textsuperscript{330} \textit{See} Special Project, \textit{supra} note 1, at 95. Comment 2 to section 2-315 acknowledges that a contract may give rise to more than one warranty: "A contact may of course include both a warranty of merchantability and one of fitness for a particular purpose." \textit{But see} Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 1102 (D. Kan. 1986) (distinguishing between ordinary and particular purposes); \textit{supra} note 311 and accompanying text.


In addition to those fact patterns where multiple warranties theoretically apply, plaintiffs may simply claim that the various warranties all apply to the facts. A current case in point, as evidenced by the complaint:

Deborah Jean Surber, a Little Rock lass
(A devoted chocolate addict, alas)
Trotted down to her friendly Alco store
Her Hershey supply to restore.
Now Hershey's, a company in Pennsylvania
Sells candy worldwide (even in Transylvania)
And way down south in Ar-Kansas
(In the Alco Stores, headquartered in Kansas)
There wiggled on the shelves some Hershey's candy.
Deborah shrieked in horror and practically fainted
She had no idea that the candy was tainted
After all, there were the company guarantees
\textit{Of expressed and implied merchantabilities}
\textit{And of fitness for the particular purpose}
To-wit, to eat it, for which she'd purchased it.
But somehow Hershey in stirring this batch
(Or maybe it was Alco on its shelves, alas)
Thought ghosts and goblins were not sufficient
On this Halloween they would be negligent
in 1978, "several decisions implicitly condone the merging of the two warranties." The overlap occurs where courts find a breach of the implied warranty of a particular purpose and the intended purpose is one of ordinary use. As we proposed in 1978, this overlap often suits the policies of the Code.

The policies underlying the fitness warranty apply regardless of the buyer's purpose for the goods. Aware of the buyer's purpose and reliance, the seller selecting the goods tacitly represents their particular suitability. Such a tacit representation may exist even where the buyer's purpose happens to be ordinary. Moreover, the presence of the fitness elements often suggests a disparity of bargaining power. Section 2-315 seeks to relieve buyers from the oppression such disparity might engender. The presence of bargaining disparity does not depend upon the nature of the buyer's purpose for the goods. Hence to advance fully the policies underlying the implied warranty of fitness, courts should not require that the aggrieved buyer's purpose be other than ordinary.

This is not to say that the separate warranties do not have their individual uses. We believe, however, that when the seller is aware of the buyer's specific purpose for the good, whether it be ordinary or unusual, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose should apply, assuming that the reliance requirement has been satisfied. When the seller does not possess, nor has reason to possess, knowledge of the buyer's purpose, the standards of the implied warranty of merchantability should suffice. We believe it is no more difficult to apply more than one kind of warranty to a particular transaction than it is to apply more than one standard of merchantability to a single transaction. We continue to advocate such a move as consistent with the underlying policies of the Code and recommend that it be followed.

C. Supplemental Implied Warranties—Section 2-314(3)

Section 2-314(3) provides: "Unless excluded or modified . . .

By adding all those squirming worms and maggots
(Well—maybe not so many, just a few to gag us.)
332 Special Project, supra note 1, at 96.
333 See Streich v. Hilton-Davies, 692 P.2d 440, 448, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 109, 112 (Mont. 1984) (Sprout suppressant used for its ordinary purpose of suppressing sprouts breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; because the seller knew of the particular, though ordinary, purpose, the buyer had "brought himself within the statutory language with respect to implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose . . . for which the goods [were] required.").
334 Special Project, supra note 1, at 99-100 (footnotes omitted).
other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.” Comment 12 to section 2-314 explains that the purpose of “[s]ubsection (3) is to make explicit that usage of trade and course of dealing can create warranties and that they are implied rather than express warranties.”

The effect of the supplemental course-of-dealing or usage-of-trade warranty has been minimal at best. As before, buyers seldom attempt to use this warranty. In 1978, we suggested that at least four reasons why this is so:

1. “[T]here may be no relevant course of dealing or usage of trade to create a supplemental warranty.”
2. The buyer’s case falls easily within one of the other warranties, and therefore he “need not resort” to supplemental warranties.
3. “[T]he seller may have effectively disclaimed all implied warranties under section 2-316(3).”
4. The buyer may have “confuse[d] this genus of implied warranty with the implied warranty of merchantability because of their shared location in section 2-314.”

In spite of this neglect, a section 2-314(3) warranty could serve a plaintiff as a last resort when all else has failed.

D. Conclusions

Over the years, the implied warranties codified in sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the Code have become fixtures in our commercial environment. A developing conception of reliance on the part of the buyer, coupled with the knowledge of the seller, can reasonably determine whether application of the implied warranties in a particular situation serves the underlying policy of reasonable protection, and therefore determine when and where these warranties should apply.

335 U.C.C. § 2-314(3).
336 Id. § 2-314 comment 12.
337 See id. at 102.
338 “[E]ither because litigation have failed to raise independent warranties or because courts have failed to address them, very few cases are to be found which discuss implied warranties actually created by dealing or usage.” Lord, Some Thoughts About Warranty Law: Express and Implied Warranties, 56 N.D.L. Rev. 509-572-73 (1980).
339 Special Project, supra note 1, at 102.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Id.
After the buyer has satisfied sections 2-313 through 2-315, has met the requirements of privity and notice, and has avoided any exclusions and limitations erected by the seller, he must prove damages. The Code spells out four general principles for measuring damages:

(1) The court should attempt to place the aggrieved party in the same position as performance would have placed him.

(2) The court should require the parties to mitigate damages where possible.

(3) The court, where consistent with public and statutory policies, should respect the intentions of the parties.

(4) Common sense, commercial practicality and Code policies should guide the court.

The buyer’s damages fall into two categories: primary and resultant. A buyer suffers primary damages to the extent that the goods he receives are not as promised. Any other damages that the buyer suffers are resultant damages, including property damages,
personal injuries, lost profits, and the like. Section 2-714(3) allows recovery for resultant damages “in a proper case,” as determined under section 2-715.350

A. Primary Damages—Section 2-714(2)

Section 2-714(2) provides a formula for measuring primary damages in warranty cases where the buyer has accepted and retained nonconforming goods:

The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.351

Courts often use either the cost of repair or independent indicia of value to determine the difference between the value of the goods as warranted and as delivered.

1. Cost of Repair

An easy and often accurate shortcut to measuring the difference between the value of goods as warranted and as received is the cost of repair. Courts often use cost of repair as the measure of primary damages in cases in which the goods can be brought into conformity with their warranties at a reasonable cost.352 The use of the cost of repair measure is constrained by the requirements of section 2-714(2) which sets the proper recovery amount at the difference between the value of the defective goods as accepted and the value of

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350 See infra note 403 and accompanying text.
351 Id. § 2-714(2).
352 See, e.g., Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77, 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (difference in value between goods as accepted and as warranted equaled cost of repairs); Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 802 (D. Minn. 1980) (if repairs will restore CB radios to their warranted value, cost of repairs is a reliable measure of damages for breach of implied warranty of merchantability); Bendix Home Sys., Inc. v. Jessop, 644 P.2d 843, 847, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1686, 1692 (Alaska 1982) (absent evidence of actual value of defective mobile home, only basis for awarding damages is cost of repairing home so that it will conform to warranties of sale); Midland Supply Co. v. Ehret Plumbing & Heating Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1126, 440 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1982) (practical measure of damages in determining difference between actual and warranted value of boilers for heating system is cost of repairing goods to quality warranted); Crest Container Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co., 111 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1075, 445 N.E.2d 19, 25 (1982) (useful objective measurement of difference between value of goods accepted and value they would have had if they had been as warranted is cost of repair or replacement); Vista St. Clair, Inc. v. Landry’s Commercial Furnishings, Inc., 57 Or. App. 254, 258, 643 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1982) (useful objective measure of difference in value “as is” and value as warranted is cost of repair or replacement); Cundy v. International Trencher Serv., Inc., 358 N.W. 2d 233, 240 (S.D. 1984) (where repairable, proper measure of damages for breach of warranty for sale of trenching machine should be based on cost of repair).
the goods as warranted. Therefore, if the cost of repair exceeds the value of the goods as warranted, repair costs could not represent the proper recovery amount.

Nevertheless, in Continental Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. K & K Sand & Gravel, Inc. the court allowed the buyer of defective construction equipment to recover the cost of repairing the equipment even though it exceeded the purchase price. The court found this result logical because capping damages at the purchase price "would clearly deprive the purchaser of the benefit of its bargain in cases in which the value of the goods as warranted exceeds that price." Other courts adhere strictly to the theory that limits the buyer's recovery to the purchase price.

Continental Sand adopts the better approach. Assume the seller has promised the buyer functioning goods. Presumably, if the seller could acquire goods in "as warranted" condition for less than the cost of repairing the defective goods, he would do so. Because he does not, the court must presume that the market value of the goods as warranted is greater than both the cost of repair and the original purchase price. In other words, contract price and value as warranted are not always equivalent. A difference between the contract price and the value as warranted is often attributable to section 2-714(2)'s requirement that courts measure the value as warranted on the date of acceptance of the goods rather than on the contract date.

Normally, a buyer seeking repair costs does not need to produce additional evidence that the same figure would result from subtracting the value as received from the value as warranted. Such a requirement would defeat the purpose of using the cost of repair

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353 Section 2-714 "deals with the remedies available to the buyer after the goods have been accepted and the time for revocation of acceptance has gone by." U.C.C. § 2-714 comment 1.
354 Usually the purchase price. See infra notes 370-72 and accompanying text.
355 755 F.2d 87, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 387 (7th Cir. 1985).
358 See Hill v. BASF Wayandotte Corp., 280 S.C. 174, 177-78, 311 S.E.2d 734, 736 (1984) (appropriate damages in breach-of-warranty case involving defective herbicide was value crop would have had if herbicide had worked minus value of crop actually produced).
359 See infra notes 370-72 and accompanying text.
as a practical shortcut to calculating the difference in value under section 2-714(2). Courts should presume that the cost of repair accurately represents the buyer's primary damages unless the seller presents evidence to the contrary.\(^{360}\)

Repairs to bring the goods into conformity with the contract also might improve or extend the life of the goods beyond what was originally warranted. In such a situation, the buyer will receive a windfall. For example, in *Cundy v. International Trencher Service*\(^{361}\) the buyer of a trenching machine was able to use the trencher, despite its defects, for almost two years before the seller finally paid for repairs. The repairs included installation of a new front axle and a total cleaning of the machine costing over $15,000.\(^{362}\) The court did not subtract the value of the buyer's use before repair;\(^{363}\) thus, the buyer may have obtained the benefit of almost two years' free wear and tear at the seller's expense.

The more logical approach is to allocate the cost of improvement in value to the buyer.\(^{364}\) A Texas court, in *Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co.*,\(^{365}\) reversed a jury award of the estimated repair cost of a used truck scale where repairs included new parts and cost more than the purchase price of the used scales. The court reasoned that the buyer "purchased an old used scale . . . and his recovery is for the cost of a new scale."\(^{366}\) A court should make an aggrieved buyer whole, but should not give him a windfall in the form of greater efficiency or longer life at the seller's expense.\(^{367}\)

2. Independent Indicia of Value

Sometimes defective goods cannot be repaired or the cost of repair is an inappropriate measure of the buyer's primary damages.\(^{368}\) In these situations, the buyer must independently prove "the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted."\(^{369}\)

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360 Not all courts accept cost of repair as a practical measure of the difference between value as received and value as warranted. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simpson, 626 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (cost of repairing defective van not proper measure of damages in breach-of-warranty case).

361 358 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1984).

362 *ld.* at 236.

363 *See id.* at 240 (damages based solely upon repair cost without deduction).

364 The court should place the buyer in as good a position as if the seller had fully performed but no better.


366 *Id.* at 878, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 257.

367 For a more detailed look at the cases in this area, see Special Project, *supra* note 1, at 111-12. Our research has uncovered no new cases dealing with this particular issue since 1978.

368 *See supra* notes 352-367 and accompanying text.

369 U.C.C. § 2-714(2). Because the plaintiff has the burden of proving and pleading
a. Value as Warranted. Section 2-714(2) fails to define "value as warranted." Courts should attempt to ascertain the fair market value of the goods as warranted\textsuperscript{370} rather than use the purchase price as an estimate of value.\textsuperscript{371} The Code requires that courts measure the difference in value at the time of acceptance.\textsuperscript{372} The purchase price, if it represents value at all, measures value at the time of contract, not at the time of delivery. For example, assume a buyer agrees on January 1 to take delivery of 100 direct-drive turntables on June 1 for $200 each. On June 1, however, a direct-drive turntable is only worth $100 because compact disc players are making turntables obsolete. Additionally, the seller supplies turntables that are not direct drive, but are belt driven and therefore are worth only $75. Upon discovering this defect, the buyer sues the seller for breach of warranty. A court that accepts the purchase price as prima facie evidence of value will award the buyer $12,500, which includes the buyer's $10,000 loss due to the rapidly improving technology of compact disc players. Alternatively, a court using fair market value at the time of acceptance of the goods would award the buyer only the $2,500 difference in value between direct- and belt-driven turntables.

\textsuperscript{370} Courts have defined "fair market value" as "the price at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell." Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27, 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960); see also Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1379, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1310, 1311-12 (8th Cir. 1977) (value is highest price product would have sold for on open market if neither party is forced to deal).


\textsuperscript{372} U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
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The buyer, as well as the seller, keeps the benefit of a good bargain when the court uses fair market value. In our example, if protective trade legislation causes a shortage of turntables driving the price up to $300 each, the buyer's primary damages could well exceed the agreed upon purchase price of the goods.

b. Value as Accepted. Fair market value also provides the best measure of the value of defective goods as accepted. The fair market value of defective goods, however, is often more difficult to measure than the fair market value of the goods as warranted. Thus, some courts use the resale price of the defective goods as an approximation of the fair market value at the time of acceptance.\textsuperscript{373}

Three criteria determine the appropriateness of using the resale measure. First, the buyer must resell the goods in a reasonable market.\textsuperscript{374} Standardized goods freely traded in a commercial market will usually meet this test.\textsuperscript{375} Second, if the goods are perishable or for some other reason their value fluctuates over time, the sale must be timely. A buyer who waits one month before selling defective fresh vegetables cannot use the resale price of the vegetables as their value at the time of acceptance.\textsuperscript{376} Third, the resale purchaser must know of the defects because the price obtained on resale will accurately reflect the goods' actual value only if the resale purchaser knows of the defects.\textsuperscript{377}

3. Special Circumstances

Section 2-714(2) allows courts to dispense with the prescribed difference-in-value assessment of damages if "special circumstances" exist which "show proximate damages of a different amount."\textsuperscript{378} The Code fails to define the meaning or scope of "special circumstances"; therefore, courts must determine the term's meaning and scope.\textsuperscript{379} The 1978 Special Project addressed four ways that courts interpret the "special circumstances" clause: (1) to

\textsuperscript{373} See infra notes 374-77 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{374} See Special Project, supra note 1, at 115.
\textsuperscript{375} Id.
\textsuperscript{376} See Th. Van Huijstee, N.V. v. Fachndrich, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 598, 601, 603-04 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (buyer waiting over one month to resell defectively marked eggs cannot use the price received as value at time of acceptance). Nevertheless, when the resale price is the best evidence available, some courts will use it as evidence of value. See Lackawanna Leather Co. v. Martin & Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1984) (accepting resale price of defective cattle hides as value of defective goods when accepted even though goods were resold four months after acceptance when price of cattle hides may have been inflated).
\textsuperscript{377} See Special Project, supra note 1, at 116.
\textsuperscript{378} U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
\textsuperscript{379} See Special Project, supra note 1, at 117.
award resultant damages; (2) to enter into the broader language of section 2-714(1); (3) to allow a buyer's subjective valuation of damages; and (4) to shift the time frame used to measure damages.\textsuperscript{380} Building on the approach of the 1978 Special Project, we will define the scope of the "special circumstances" clause and discuss the events that allow courts to bypass the difference-in-value formula.

a. Resultant Damages. Most courts no longer use the "special circumstances" provision to award resultant damages to an injured buyer.\textsuperscript{381} Courts that still permit the buyer to recover resultant damages under section 2-714(2) are evidently confused by the section's general language.\textsuperscript{382} By awarding resultant damages under the "special circumstances" clause, these courts render sections 2-714(3) and 2-715 superfluous.\textsuperscript{383} For example, section 2-715's specific requirements for recovering resultant damages are moot if the buyer can recover these damages under "special circumstances."

b. Entry into Section 2-714(1). Some courts construe the "special circumstances" clause to allow the buyer to recover damages under the expansive language of section 2-714(1).\textsuperscript{384} That section provides that the buyer "may recover as damages . . . the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable."\textsuperscript{385} The 1978 Special Project found that courts generally apply section 2-714(1) to award "fair" damages when faced with complex fact patterns that make ascertaining actual damages difficult.\textsuperscript{386} The danger of applying section 2-714(1) to assess damages is that courts will confuse primary and resultant damages. If courts thoughtfully applied section 2-714(2)'s difference-in-value formula in conjunction with section 2-715, then they would avoid this danger and buyers would recover

\textsuperscript{380} Id. at 117-28.

\textsuperscript{381} For a complete discussion of resultant damages, see infra notes 401-571 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{383} See Special Project, supra note 1, at 117-18.

\textsuperscript{384} See, e.g., Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 311 S.E.2d 734, 736, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 1254, 1256 (S.C. 1984) (special circumstances exist when court cannot ascertain warranted or accepted value of goods).

\textsuperscript{385} U.C.C. § 2-714(1).

\textsuperscript{386} See Special Project, supra note 1, at 119.
adequate compensation for their losses.\footnote{387}

c. Subjective Valuation. Under a subjective standard, a buyer receives the goods' value as warranted less the goods' current value to him. This value can either be higher or lower than the defective goods' market value. In contrast, under an objective standard a buyer recovers the value of the good as warranted less the market value of the defective product.\footnote{388}

Professors White and Summers suggest that "special circumstances" exist when "the value of the goods to the particular buyer [are not] the same as their value to a class of buyers in general," and that courts should apply a subjective standard to determine damages in these cases.\footnote{389} Courts should award damages based on a subjective measure only if an objective measure would overcompensate the buyer.\footnote{390} "[C]ourts should recognize a presumption in favor of the objective standard."\footnote{391} This presumption would force the seller to prove a higher subjective value before a court would award damages based on the subjective measure.

As an illustration, suppose a buyer purchases a mobile home for $16,900 and discovers soon after delivery that the roof leaks.\footnote{392} After living in the home and attempting repairs, the buyer moves out and sues the seller for damages. The buyer estimates that the home has zero value. Suppose the seller objectively establishes that the mobile home has a salvage value of $5,000. If the court awards subjective damages, then the buyer will recover $16,900, because the value of the home to the buyer is zero and the value as warranted is the purchase price. The buyer, however, can still sell the home for its market value of $5,000 and receive a windfall. Thus, a court, in order to avoid overcompensating the buyer for his loss, should only award objective damages of $11,900. The buyer can then sell the home and recover its market value.

Suppose, however, that the buyer values the mobile home at more than the market price (assume $10,000). If the court awards objective damages, then the buyer will receive $11,900 (warranted value less market value) and a windfall in overall value received (his subjective value of $10,000 plus the award of $11,900). For this rea-

\footnote{387} Id. at 119 n.372.
\footnote{388} J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 10-2, at 382-83.
\footnote{389} The "special circumstances" clause allows courts to calculate market value of the defective goods at the time the buyer discovers the defect. This interpretation shifts the time frame of § 2-714(2), which ordinarily requires valuation at the time the buyer accepts the goods. See infra notes 394-400 and accompanying text.
\footnote{390} Professors White and Summers state that section 1-106 suggests this same result. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 10-2, at 382.
\footnote{391} Special Project, supra note 1, at 122.
son, when a buyer values a good above its market value, a court should apply a subjective measure to avoid overcompensating the buyer. Because the Code favors a “liberal administration” of its remedies, however, the seller should bear the burden of proving that the buyer has a higher subjective value.

d. Time-shifting. Courts have also used the “special circumstances” clause to shift the timeframe used in measuring the buyer’s damages from the time of acceptance (as stipulated in section 2-714(2)) to some time after acceptance. The 1978 Special Project argued that although the U.C.C. drafters intended this application of the clause, the courts expressly used the time shifting construction only in section 2-312 warranty-of-title cases. Since 1978, however, courts have applied the clause to cases involving defective products.

Courts apply the time-shifting interpretation primarily in cases involving latent product defects. Courts deem the latent defect’s manifestation a “special circumstance” and measure the buyer’s damages using the date of discovery of the defect. In Intervale Steel Corp. v. Borg & Beck Division, Borg-Warner Corp., for example, a buyer purchased sheets of steel to manufacture parts for an automobile clutch assembly. The buyer inspected and accepted the sheets, the latent defect was not discovered until some time after acceptance. The courts then assessed damages based on the date of discovery of the defect, rather than the date of acceptance.

393 U.C.C. § 1-106(1); see also Special Project, supra note 1, at 122.

394 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 124-25. Courts continue to use the time-shifting construction of “special circumstances” in warranty-of-title cases. See, e.g., Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); U-J Chevrolet Co. v. Marcus, 460 So. 2d 1341, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 485 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); City Car Sales, Inc. v. McAlpin, 380 So. 2d 865, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 993 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); De Weber v. Bob Rice Ford, Inc., 99 Idaho 847, 590 P.2d 103, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1057 (1979); Metalcraft, Inc. v. Pratt, 65 Md. App. 281, 500 A.2d 329, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 14 (1985). These cases involve goods that were accepted before defects in title were revealed. The buyers in these cases generally used the product for some period of time after acceptance and later were dispossessed of the goods. Courts have assessed damages in these cases by finding the defective title to be a “special circumstance.” This approach relieves the courts of section 2-714(2)’s difference-in-value formula and allows them to shift the calculation of the goods’ actual value to the date the buyer lost his use of the goods.


396 Latent defects are defects that the buyer cannot detect by a reasonable inspection of the goods upon acceptance. The defect manifests itself after acceptance through no fault of the buyer.

and then began to fabricate the steel by stamping out "blanks" that it stored until needed. One month later, the buyer discovered that the blanks failed various stress requirements; the steel was defective and unfit for its intended purpose. The buyer argued that the blanks had only scrap value. The seller contended that under section 2-714(2) the court must determine damages on the basis of the steel's value at the time of acceptance. This value was higher than the scrap value because the buyer could have sold the unprocessed steel for another use. The court found that the seller's calculation "of the 'value' of the steel would be unfair and contrary to the purpose of the Code" because the buyer "reasonably could not have discovered the defect in the steel until the steel was blanked out." The court adopted the time-shifting construction of the "special circumstances" provision and awarded damages by assessing the steel's value at the time that the buyer discovered the defect.

Such an approach is equitable because a buyer saddled with a latently defective good cannot minimize his damages at the time of acceptance (when the good has a higher value). Furthermore, because the seller's conduct is more culpable than the buyer's, the seller should absorb the loss. Thus, courts should shift the time of assessment of the defective good's value from the date of acceptance to the date of the defect's discovery.

B. Resultant Damages—Section 2-715

A commercial buyer who receives nonconforming goods often sustains losses beyond the diminution in their value. In addition to recovery of proximate damages for breach of the seller's contractual

398 Id. at 1090, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 817 (emphasis in original). The Intervale court also stated that although the steel was more valuable than scrap before the buyer stamped it out, the buyer "could not have benefitted from that value nor could [he] have reasonably known of the material's defective condition until the steel was processed." Id. at 1091, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 817-18.

399 Id. at 1091, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 818.

400 The 1978 Special Project attempted to justify the time-shifting construction of "special circumstance" by citing the last clause of comment 3: "If, however, the nonconformity is such as would justify revocation of acceptance, the time and place of acceptance under this section is determined as of the buyer's decision not to revoke." U.C.C. § 2-714 comment 3. In 1978, the Special Project found no cases that cited this clause, nor did we. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 124-25 & n.391.

Although the comment suggests a time-shifting assessment in "special circumstances" cases, courts can reach this conclusion without referring to the comment. The language of section 2-714(2) requires the use of the difference-in-value formula "unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount." Id. Courts have correctly read this clause to release them completely from the Code's narrow formula for calculating primary damages. Courts, therefore, can adopt the time-shifting method without the comment's support. As long as the courts award only primary, and not resultant, damages, the "special circumstances" clause of section 2-714(2) seems to allow any formula chosen.
obligations, section 2-714(3) allows the buyer to recover incidental and consequential damages as defined in Section 2-715. Section 2-715 provides:

1. Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.

2. Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
   (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
   (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.

Courts must clearly distinguish between incidental and consequential damages in order to honor the parties' contractual allocations of risk and to avoid overcompensating the buyer for his loss. Some courts have upset the parties' contractual allocations.

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401 "Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance," section 2-711 allows the buyer to seek incidental and consequential damages pursuant to sections 2-712 and 2-713. U.C.C. § 2-711.

402 "In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages [for breach of warranty of an accepted good] under the next section may also be recovered." U.C.C. § 2-714(3). The Code also provides for incidental and consequential damages for nondelivered or repudiated goods. U.C.C. § 2-713. Not all of the cases discussed in the following sections are warranty cases, but the same principals of recovery apply.


404 The court in Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A. Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), made the following distinction between incidental and consequential damages:

While the distinction between the two is not an obvious one, the Code makes plain that incidental damages are normally incurred when a buyer (or seller) repudiates the contract or wrongfully rejects the goods, causing the other to incur such expenses as transporting, storing, or reselling the goods. On the other hand, consequential damages do not arise within the scope of the immediate buyer-seller transaction, but rather stem from losses incurred by the non-breaching party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were a proximate result of the breach, and which were reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party at the time of contracting.

Id. at 508, 14 U.C.C. Rep. at 667.

It often makes no difference whether a court labels damages "incidental" or "consequential." See Special Project, supra note 1, at 190-91. Nevertheless, an accurate classification of resultant damages is important because the Code's different categories base recovery on separate legal requirements. A buyer may recover any reasonable incidental damages. To recover consequential damages, however, a buyer must establish that, at
of risk by labeling consequential damages as incidental.\textsuperscript{405} For example, in Council Bros., Inc., v. Ray Burner Co.\textsuperscript{406} the buyer purchased a pressure vessel under an agreement excluding the seller’s liability for consequential damages.\textsuperscript{407} The buyer incorporated the pressure vessel into a unit and sold this combined unit. When the pressure vessel failed, the original buyer sought indemnification from the seller.\textsuperscript{408} In addition to a refund of the contract price,\textsuperscript{409} the court awarded the reselling buyer incidental expenses incurred in adding to, shipping, and starting up the boiler.\textsuperscript{410} The court also granted, as incidental damages, the labor and repair expenses incurred by the buyer’s customer.\textsuperscript{411} This last item, however, is more properly classified as consequential damages, and the court should have denied recovery under the limitation clause of the contract. Allowing recovery overcompensated the buyer.\textsuperscript{412}

Classifying damages as consequential or incidental provides a framework for accurately assessing damages and thereby facilitates planning by allowing parties to allocate risks pursuant to established categories of damages. Courts should first take care to distinguish consequential losses from incidental losses. Then, before awarding consequential damages, a court should examine the contractual intentions of the parties and the type of transaction involved.\textsuperscript{413}

the time of contracting, the losses were foreseeable and could not have been prevented by “cover or otherwise.” U.C.C. § 2-715 (2)(a). Thus, a court that classifies consequential damages as incidental may overcompensate the buyer to the extent the buyer did not meet the restrictive standards of § 2-715(2). Cf. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assoc. v. S.S. Sovereign Faylene, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 74, 80-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (labeling buyer’s mitigation expenses “incidental”). Conversely, a court labeling incidental damages “consequential” may deny the buyer recovery if it finds the losses were not foreseeable under § 2-715(2).

Fortunately, mislabeling damages is often harmless. See Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 507, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 636-37 (8th Cir. 1971) (applying Arkansas Law) (labeling cost of equipment repairs necessitated by seller’s breach “incidental” damages although buyer would have recovered same damages under the correct label). See generally Special Project, supra note 1, at 134-36.

\textsuperscript{405} See Special Project, supra note 1, at 136.
\textsuperscript{406} 473 F.2d 400, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1126 (5th Cir. 1973).
\textsuperscript{407} Specifically, the warranty provided that “[n]o claim for cost of removing, returning, or replacing defective parts or for other consequential damages will be allowed.” Id. at 406, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1134 (emphasis added). In view of this clause the court stated: “[C]onsequential damages having been excluded by the terms of the warranty, Ray Burner would be entitled to recover only those items of damage which might properly be classified as incidental.” Id. at 407, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1136.
\textsuperscript{408} Id. at 402, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1129.
\textsuperscript{409} Id. at 408 n.9, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1136 n.9.
\textsuperscript{410} Id. at 408, 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1137.
\textsuperscript{411} The court awarded $3505.72 for repairs made by the third party, and $1519.76 for labor associated with those repairs. Id., 11 U.C.C. Rep. at 1197.
\textsuperscript{412} See Special Project, supra note 1, at 135-36.
\textsuperscript{413} See A.E.S. Technology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 861, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1978) (Before court awards consequential damages, it
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Courts that mislabel damages not only upset commercial planning, but also violate the express provisions of the Code.

1. Incidental Damages—Section 2-715(1)

The Code expressly allows recovery of incidental damages where the buyer rightfully rejects nonconforming goods, revokes acceptance, or incurs expenses associated with cover. A buyer who justifiably rejects nonconforming goods may recover, as incidental damages, the costs of inspecting the goods in addition to storage and transportation expenses. Similarly, although the Code’s language is not explicit on this point, a buyer who accepts and subse-

should “carefully examine the individual factual situation including the type of goods involved, the parties and the precise nature and purpose of the contract. The purpose of the courts in contractual disputes is not to rewrite contracts by ignoring parties’ intent; rather, it is to interpret the existing contract as fairly as possible when all events did not occur as planned.”.

Section 2-715(1) refers expressly to expenses connected with “goods rightfully rejected” and with “effecting cover.” U.C.C. § 2-715(1). A comment to that section provides:

Subsection (1) is intended to provide reimbursement for the buyer who incurs reasonable expenses in connection with the handling of rightfully rejected goods or goods whose acceptance may be justifiably revoked, or in connection with effecting cover where the breach of the contract lies in non-conformity or non-delivery of the goods. The incidental damages listed are not intended to be exhaustive but are merely illustrative of the typical kinds of incidental damage.

Id. § 2-715 comment 1. The Code encourages the buyer to mitigate damages by covering his losses in the marketplace. Accordingly, a buyer may recover expenses associated with effecting cover. These typically involve transaction costs associated with the buyer’s efforts to locate alternative goods or buyers in the marketplace. Section 2-711(1) provides that “[w]here the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance... [the buyer] may ‘cover’ and have damages under the next section as to all the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract.” Id.

Section 2-712(2) states that “[i]f the buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller’s breach.” Id.

Consequential damages under § 2-715(2)(a) may only be recovered if they “could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.” Id. Accordingly, a buyer who wishes to recover consequential damages is obligated to attempt to cover his losses. The concept of “cover” is absent from consequential damages under section 2-715(2) concerning “injury to persons or property.” See, e.g., Larry Goad & Co. v. Lordstown Rubber Co., 560 F. Supp. 583, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 167 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (buyer entitled to recover reasonable expenses for materials and labor in its attempt to complete contract with customers).

quently revokes acceptance of nonconforming goods may recover
these items as incidental expenses.\footnote{Comment 1 states that the objective of section 2-715 is to reimburse the buyer for reasonable expenses in connection with "goods whose acceptance may be justifiably revoked." U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 1. See Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 393 Mass. 666, 473 N.E.2d 1066, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 93 (1985).}

For example, suppose that a wine bottler contracts to buy wine from a California wholesaler.\footnote{See Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 393 Mass. 666, 473 N.E.2d 1066, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 93 (1985).} After accepting the wine, the bottler learns from indignant customers that the wine contains fresno mold. The bottler justifiably revokes acceptance. Upon notice of the seller's breach, the bottler may recover as an incidental expense the shipping charges incurred when the customers returned the spoiled wine.\footnote{Id. at 678-79 & n.6, 473 N.E.2d at 1074 & n.6, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 103-04 & n.6.} Additionally, the buyer may recover the cost of inspecting the remaining cases of wine and the cost of storing the wine until the bottler could return it to California.\footnote{The buyer in Delano actually inspected and reprocessed the wine at the seller's request. Thus, the wine was not returned. The court properly allowed recovery for this reprocessing expense. 393 Mass. at 678-79 & n.6, 473 N.E.2d at 1074 & n.6, 40 U.C.C. at 103-4 & n.6.}

Although courts may find it more difficult to conceptualize items of incidental damages in a case in which the buyer retains the good, this difficulty should not automatically bar a meritorious claim.\footnote{The 1978 Special Project argued that a retaining buyer should not recover damages labeled incidental. This assertion was not based upon the Code's language, but upon the view that by excluding the retaining buyer from recovery of such expenses, courts would avoid the risk of awarding double compensation to the buyer. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 132-40; see also Jackson v. Glasgow, 622 P.2d 1088, 1091, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 482, 486 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980) (incidental damages under section 2-715(1) "would not be recoverable in this action because the owner accepted the goods rather than taking other actions afforded him under the code upon seller's breach") (dictum). But section 2-714(3) and comment 1 to section 2-715 indicate that the retaining buyer may recover incidental damages in appropriate circumstances. Section 2-714(3) provides that where the buyer has accepted defective goods, "[i]n a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under [section 2-715] may also be recovered." Id. § 2-714(3). Moreover, the language of § 2-715 may be read as consisting of three separate clauses under which incidental damages are recoverable for expenses related to rejection, for expenses related to cover, and for expenses related to delay or any other breach. A seller who provides nonconforming goods is in breach whether the buyer rejects the goods on receipt or accepts and subsequently revokes acceptances. Thus, under section 2-715 courts should grant either type of aggrieved buyer recovery of incidental expenses.}

In Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp.,\footnote{551 F. Supp. 771, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 102 (D.S.D. 1982), rev'd. in part on other grounds,} for example, the buyer
purchased a remanufactured airplane engine from the seller. Following acceptance, the buyer incurred, among other expenses, the cost of shipping the defective engine to and from the seller's factory for repairs, employee travel expenses to the factory, and additional inspection costs. The court found that these costs were recoverable as incidental damages.

Section 2-715 imposes two principal requirements for recovery of incidental damages: (1) they must be incident to the breach, and (2) they must be reasonable. Incidental expenses are limited to those expenses solely attributable to the nonconformity of the goods. One of the purposes behind section 2-715(1) is to carry forward the Code's policy that damages put the aggrieved party "in as good a position as if the other had fully performed." Limiting incidental damages to expenses directly arising out of the breach furthers this policy and also avoids overcompensating the buyer.

Courts risk overcompensating a buyer when they fail to identify whether the claimed expenses reflect losses actually suffered as a result of the breach. In Productora E Importadora de Papel, S.A. de C.V. v. Fleming the buyer of newsprint agreed to pay the required import fees and freight charges from Boston to Mexico. The seller breached by providing substantially less newsprint than agreed upon in the contract. The trial judge awarded the buyer shipping expenses as well as import fees for the entire quantity of

714 F.2d 862, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 1207 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming holding below as to cover expenses, reversing the holding as to amount of consequential damages). The following discussion draws principally from the district court's memorandum opinion as the Eighth Circuit focused primarily on the question of the buyer's right to consequential damages, did not discuss the question of incidental damages, and cursorily affirmed the lower court's decision on the issue of cover.

The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.

U.C.C. § 1-106(1).

Courts also risk overcompensating the buyer when they confuse the Code's incidental and consequential damages categories. See supra notes 404-13 and accompanying text.


Id. at 839, 383 N.E.2d at 1137, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 736.

Id. at 828-29, 383 N.E.2d at 1132-33, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 731-33.
newsprint specified in the contract, including the unshipped newsprint. In reversing the award for these damages, the reviewing court correctly observed that if the seller had shipped the agreed upon tonnage of newsprint, the buyer would have had to pay the import fees and the shipping costs for the entire order. Thus, the costs associated with the undelivered amount represented expenses saved because of the breach. Upon recovery of these damages, the buyer could effectively fill its order through other suppliers without having to pay any shipping or import fees. In short, these expenses were not "incident" to the breach because they represented expenses that the buyer would have had to pay absent the seller's breach.

Section 2-715(1) also requires that the incidental damages be reasonable. This requirement often directly relates to whether the incidental expenses arose as a result of the seller's breach. In *Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp.* a federal district court held that the buyer of defective citizens band radios could not claim incidental damages for additional overhead and interest expenses incurred in the buyer's unsuccessful attempt to cover its losses by reselling the radios. The court decided that these expenses were unreasonable because the buyer maintained high prices in a declining market.

Where the buyer establishes that the breach caused the claimed expenses and that he acted reasonably under the circumstances, courts generally grant incidental expenses. In *District Concrete Co. v. Bernstein Concrete Corp.*, for example, the court awarded the buyer incidental damages for the costs of field overhead necessitated by defective concrete supplied by the seller. Although the buyer could have chosen a less costly method of repairing the damage resulting from the defective concrete, the court found the buyer's chosen remedy reasonable under the circumstances and therefore held the seller liable for the field overhead expenses.

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430 Id. at 837, 383 N.E.2d at 1136, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 734.
431 Id. at 839, 383 N.E.2d at 1137, 25 U.C.C. Rep. at 736.
432 Although *Productura* does not involve a warranty situation, the damages analysis is the same.
434 *Id.* at 808-09, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 669.
435 *Id.*, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 669 ("The unreasonable adherence to high pricing decisions throughout the time the 23 channel market was disintegrating was in large part the cause of the delay which in turn contributed to the increased overhead and interest expense.").
437 "The choice of the composite slab was reasonable at the time it was made. Clearly Bernstein [the buyer] was most concerned with minimizing costs and delays. Bernstein need not bear the burden of unanticipated costs that were actually incurred.
District Concrete suggests that courts may presume the reasonableness of an incidental expense provided the buyer can establish that the cause of the expense was the seller's breach. Courts are unlikely to challenge the amount of the claimed incidental expenses provided the buyer establishes the reasonableness of the claim. Although a buyer should provide more than a rough guess, the Code recognizes that buyers may suffer loss and still not have precise records of the amount of loss. Thus, courts have properly interpreted the Code to prevent breaching sellers from escaping liability merely because the other party was unable to establish losses with mathematical precision.

2. Consequential Damages—Section 2-715(2)

A buyer who receives nonconforming goods often sustains losses peculiar to his situation that are not solely attributable to the nonconformity. The Code recognizes this commercial reality and authorizes consequential damages when appropriate. Recoverable consequential damages include physical injuries, property damage, and economic losses including loss of use or down-

See Buckeye Trophy, Inc. v. Southern Bowling & Billiard Supply Co., 3 Ohio App. 3d 32, 443 N.E.2d 1043, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 140 (1982) (where buyer did not sit down and calculate damages, but instead made a "guesstimate" that damages were between $1,000 and $1,500, buyer only entitled to nominal damages of $5).

U.C.C. § 1-106(1) provides that the Code's remedies are to be administered liberally. See supra note 425. Commentary to section 2-715 states: "the section on liberal administration of remedies rejects any doctrine of certainty which requires almost mathematical precision in the proof of loss. Loss may be determined in any manner which is reasonable under the circumstances." U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 4.

"The damage award need not be absolutely exact; a reasonable estimate based on relevant data is sufficient to support an award." District Concrete, 418 A.2d at 1038, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 211.


time, investments made in reliance upon the seller's assurances of conformity, increased production costs, and attorney's fees where the buyer incurs liability to third parties. In addition, a buyer in the resale business may recover lost profits where the breach frustrates plans to resell the warranted goods. Courts also award consequential damages where the buyer suffers loss of

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445 See, e.g., Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. v. Continental Info. Sys. Corp., 621 F.2d 353, 358, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 112, 118 (9th Cir. 1980) (where seller knew buyer ordered peripheral equipment in reliance on timely delivery of computer system, buyer awarded consequential damages for cost of renting equipment upon seller's failure to deliver computer by specified date).


448 "In the case of sale of wares to one in the business of reselling them, resale is one of the requirements of which the seller has reason to know within the meaning of subsection (2)(a)." U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 6; see, e.g., Mann v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 709 F.2d 272, 276, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1147, 1153 (8th Cir. 1983) (buyer entitled to recover from box manufacturer revenues lost when it reduced price to dissatisfied customers); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 563, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1371, 1375 (3rd Cir. 1980) (seller who knew that buyer was in the business of resale liable for costs incurred by buyer in extending credit to customers for seller's defective belting); Wullschleger & Co. v. Jenny Fashions, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 373, 378, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (dressmaker entitled to recover profits lost from cancelled order for dresses to be made from seller's flawed fabric); Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co., 146 Cal. App. 3d 787, 792, 194 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 148, 152 (1983) (seller who knew buyer was in business of resale required to reimburse buyer for profits lost due to seller's failure to deliver raisins); R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holman, 470 So. 2d 60, 70, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (buyer entitled to recover consequential damages from lost sales; buyer's customers purchased sprinkler systems from another supplier due to their bad experience with manufacturer's systems), review dismissed, 482 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1986).
To recover consequential damages an aggrieved buyer must establish: first, that he suffered loss; second, that such loss resulted from the seller's breach; and third, that the seller could have foreseen the consequences flowing from the breach. The buyer must also establish the claimed losses with reasonable certainty and attempt to mitigate those losses.450

a. Loss. The Code's damages provisions seek to make the aggrieved buyer whole without allowing him to profit from the seller's breach. A court, therefore, should not award consequential damages when the seller's breach does not cause the buyer any loss whatsoever.451 For example, in Wilson v. Marquette Electronics, Inc.452 the lower court awarded the corporate buyer damages for the time an employee doctor was required to spend away from his private practice to work on a computer system which failed to function as warranted.453 The Eighth Circuit denied these damages because no evidence showed that the corporate buyer suffered loss. Rather, the evidence showed a loss to the doctor's private practice.454 Other courts have recognized that only variable expenses are proper items of loss and have barred buyer claims for the recovery of fixed expenses.455

Courts must also distinguish between profits lost from inability

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450 Consequential damages include "any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).

451 A buyer who has not suffered a loss would probably not sue. For practical purposes, the loss requirement only comes in where problems of proof arise.

452 630 F.2d 575, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 399 (8th Cir. 1980).

453 Id. at 585, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 415.

454 Id. at 586, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 415-16.

455 Courts have avoided including the buyer's fixed expenses when calculating lost profits. See, e.g., Barnard v. Compugraphic Corp., 35 Wash. App. 2d 414, 418, 667 P.2d 117, 120, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 141, 145 (1983) ("employee costs were a fixed expense, unaffected by defendant's breach and need not have been deducted in calculating profits"); see also Special Project, supra note 1, at 145 ("[s]eller's breach does not reduce buyer's fixed expenses, so a court should deduct only variable expenses from buyer's recovery"); cf. Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 909, 587 P.2d 1071, 1079, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1047, 1054 (1978) ("overhead expenses or plant 'burden' should not have been deducted in computing [seller's] lost profit" where the buyer was in breach).
to produce and those lost as a result of diminished business reputation. In *Hydraform Products Corp. v. American Steel & Aluminum Corp.*\(^{456}\) the buyer contracted with the seller for enough steel to manufacture 400 woodstoves during the peak manufacturing season.\(^{457}\) The seller failed to supply the steel in time for the peak season and the buyer was unable to locate alternative suppliers. The resultant delays led to cancelled orders. Two years later, the buyer sold the woodstove business.\(^{458}\) The court held that the buyer could recover profits "lost on the sale of 150 stoves, the difference between the 400 mentioned in the contract and the 250 actually sold."\(^{459}\) The court, however, denied the buyer's claim for lost profits on sales projected for the two subsequent years in addition to loss of goodwill.\(^{460}\) In denying the buyer recovery for these items, the court stated: "even if such profits could have been calculated in this case, allowing the jury to consider both a claim for diminished value resting on lost profits and a claim for lost profits themselves would have allowed a double recovery."\(^{461}\) In the two years following the breach, the buyer could have procured substitute steel from other sources and could have continued to manufacture woodstoves. Whatever lost profits the buyer suffered in the two years subsequent to the breach arose from loss of business reputation, not from the buyer's inability to produce.

Courts also risk overcompensating the buyer where the claimed damages include interest expenses on money borrowed to finance the purchase. The Third Circuit observed:

> In the absence of special circumstances, interest is not a proper factor to be considered. Interest represents the cost of the money borrowed to buy the goods because capital was not available to make a cash purchase. If, however, the buyer is awarded lump sum damages, he would be able to make a replacement purchase without borrowing and incurring interest expenses. To the extent, therefore, that the recovery included interest on the original purchase, it would constitute a windfall.\(^{462}\)

Thus, a buyer should not ordinarily recover financing expenses as


\(^{457}\) *Id.* at 191, 498 A.2d at 341-42, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1203 (seller agreed to provide steel beyond the 400-stove level on demand).

\(^{458}\) *Id.*, 498 A.2d at 341-42, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1203.

\(^{459}\) *Id.* at 198, 498 A.2d at 345-46, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1211.

\(^{460}\) *Id.* at 199, 498 A.2d at 346, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1210.

\(^{461}\) *Id.* at 199-200, 498 A.2d at 346-47, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1211.

consequential damages. If, however, the seller had reason to know that the buyer would borrow money to purchase the goods, a court might award expenses as consequential damages. Additionally, courts might allow recovery of losses caused by rapidly changing interest rates incurred as a result of a seller’s breach.

Courts thus risk overcompensating buyers when they fail to differentiate the elements of the claimed losses. For this reason, courts should avoid awarding lump sum damages. For example, suppose an insecticide that a farmer applies to his crop fails to perform as warranted, resulting in crop loss. To place the farmer in the position he would have been in had the insecticide performed as warranted, the court should award the difference between the crop’s probable value at harvest had the insecticide performed as warranted and its actual value at harvest, less any savings in labor and expenses attributable to the reduced yield. At least one court, however, has granted buyers in similar circumstances double recovery by also awarding the price of the worthless goods. Nevertheless, most courts in recent years have apparently avoided the mistake of granting buyers lump sum damages representing both the integrated whole and its parts.

b. Causation. In addition to proving loss, the buyer must prove that damages resulted from the seller’s breach. The causation re-

463 See, e.g., Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 925, 934, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 1070, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (because seller had reason to know at time of contracting that buyer would borrow money to purchase computer, interest charge was a proper item of damages under section 2-715), aff'd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
464 See, e.g., Chatlos, 635 F.2d at 1088, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 425. (“With today’s rapidly changing interest structures, however, it may be that the buyer can demonstrate some actual loss.”).
467 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 144-45. We have uncovered no other cases since 1978 in which the court made such a mistake.
ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES

requirement poses two immediate practical problems. First, the buyer must establish an independent link of causation between the seller's breach and each item of claimed damages. Second, the buyer must establish that the seller's breach was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the loss. Courts generally do not differentiate between these two elements of causation, but an alert seller should be careful to make the distinction. Suppose that a buyer purchases watered-down gasoline that causes her truck to break down. Another vehicle strikes the disabled truck, causing damage to the truck and injuring the buyer. If the court fails to differentiate between the two elements of causation it might award the buyer lump sum damages for personal injuries and damage to the truck, even though the personal injuries probably were not proximately caused by the seller's breach of warranty.

Situations in which either the goods or the buyer are unique create the greatest conceptual difficulty with the causation requirement. The Sixth Circuit addressed such a situation in Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc. The buyer, a veterinarian, desired to prevent mares from contracting a particular virus which caused them to abort their foals. The seller represented that its vaccine would inoculate horses against the virus. Although the buyer administered the vaccine, six inoculated mares contracted the virus and

(buyer's damages could have proximately resulted from nonconforming combine where rains and birds destroyed crops while buyer awaited delivery of parts).

This is an obvious proposition, but in cases involving complicated items of proof seller's counsel must examine whether the claimed damages in fact resulted from the breach and not from some other intervening or independent cause.

Cause in fact asks the question: Did the defendant's conduct in fact cause the plaintiff's harm? Often, the cause-in-fact issue involves circumstantial proof, and plaintiffs may try to introduce statistical evidence to establish causation. See, e.g., Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 470, 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (1945) (evidence that mathematical chances suggest that defendant bus company caused plaintiff's accident was insufficient to establish causation).


See, e.g., Southern Ill. Stone Co. v. Universal Eng'g Corp., 592 F.2d 446, 454, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1979) (buyer entitled to "incidental and consequential damages proximately flowing from" breach); El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 704-05, 261 N.W.2d 358, 363 (1978) (buyer may recover, as consequential damages, lost profits proximately resulting from seller's breach).


Id. at 1288, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 176.
Id., 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 177.
The court held that the buyer failed to establish causation as a matter of law because no alternative treatment existed to prevent the horses from contracting the virus and the vaccine did not cause the mares to abort. In the words of a concurrence, "There was simply a failure to prevent an occurrence that nothing would have prevented, and [the buyer] may not recover the value of the foals." The dissent vigorously argued that the majority had established an "alternative product" rule allowing "manufacturers of new products to make unsupportable claims concerning product effectiveness; yet insulate the manufacturers from liability for consequential damages."

The dispute centers on whether the court should focus on the buyer's resulting injury, or the seller's breach of warranty. When determining causation, courts should focus on the warranty rather than the resulting injury. Although the seller's vaccine did not cause the mares to abort, the abortions would not have occurred had the product performed as warranted. The implied warranty extended not only to preventing the mares from contracting the virus, but ultimately to preventing the abortions caused by the virus. The Code's language permits recovery for damages "resulting from the breach." Although the manufacturer's drug did not cause the mares to abort, the abortions resulted directly from the breach of warranty.

The advantage of focusing on the warranty rather than on the particular buyer's situation is especially clear when the buyer's situ-
tion is unique. Assume that several available drugs will prevent horses from contracting the virus, but one horse is allergic to all except one of the drugs. Under the Overstreet majority's reasoning, the buyer could not recover consequential damages if the product fails to prevent the allergic horse from aborting, but could recover if the other horses aborted because the alternative drugs, presumably, would have prevented the abortions. To avoid this anomalous conclusion courts must focus on the breach of warranty. Courts should consider the difference between the product's actual performance and the warranted performance, disregarding what would have happened without the product.

The causation issue also arises when the buyer's intervening conduct contributes to the damages or to the nonconformity of the goods. In Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, for example, the seller furnished and installed a reactor charge heater in the buyer's factory. The buyer sued to recover for property damage and economic loss after the heater and the refinery caught fire. The Texas Supreme Court, upon evidence that the explosion resulted from both the defective design of the heater and the buyer's failure to follow warnings, held:

The buyer may recover only those consequential damages proximately caused by the breach of warranty; he may not recover for those consequential damages proximately caused by the buyer's own negligence or fault... [T]he buyer's negligence or fault does not automatically bar recovery, but only diminishes or mitigates the damages the buyer may recover.

When the buyer's negligence is a concurring proximate cause of the damages, the trier of fact should determine the percentages by which the concurring causes contributed to the damages. If the buyer is ninety-five percent negligent, the seller should be liable for the remaining five percent. This result is sensible if the

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481 The court in Overstreet presented this hypothetical. 669 F.2d at 1293-94, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 185-86 (Keith, J.).
482 Subsection (2)(b) states the usual rule as to breach of warranty, allowing recovery for injuries "proximately" resulting from the breach. Where the injury involved follows the use of goods without discovery of the defect causing the damage, the question of "proximate" cause turns on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods without such inspection as would have revealed the defects. If it was not reasonable for him to do so, or if he did in fact discover the defect prior to his use, the injury would not proximately result from the breach of warranty.
484 Id. at 322-23, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 557-58.
485 Id. at 328, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 567.
486 Id., 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 567.
seller's breach of warranty did in fact cause some of the damages. Thus, the seller's attorney should distinguish cause in fact from proximate cause to avoid compensating the buyer for expenses not caused by the seller's breach.

c. Foreseeability, Certainty, and Duty to Cover. In addition to loss and causation, an aggrieved buyer must establish three other elements to recover damages: (1) that the loss resulted from needs the seller knew or had reason to know about, at the time of contracting;\(^{488}\) (2) that the damages are ascertainable with reasonable certainty;\(^{489}\) (3) that the damages could not have been prevented by cover or otherwise.\(^{490}\)

(1) Foreseeability. The Code's foreseeability requirement finds its origin in *Hadley v. Baxendale*,\(^ {491}\) where the court declared that the aggrieved parties could only recover damages "arising naturally" from the breach, or damages that both parties could reasonably contemplate, at the time of contracting, would result from a breach.\(^ {492}\) Following the *Hadley* rule, the Code rejects the tacit agreement test\(^ {493}\) and requires only that the parties know the facts that make the loss a foreseeable result of the breach.\(^ {494}\)

\(^{488}\) U.C.C. § 2-715(2) ("Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know.").

\(^{489}\) Id. § 2-715 comment 4 ("Loss may be determined in any manner which is reasonable under the circumstances.").

\(^{490}\) Id. § 2-715(2)(a) ("Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any loss ... which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.").

\(^{491}\) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).

\(^{492}\) Id. at 151. The court stated that the buyer could recover only such damages as "may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it." Id.

\(^{493}\) For the tacit agreement test see, e.g., Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903) ("The consequences [of the breach] must be contemplated at the time of the making of the contract."). Thus, the tacit agreement test would require the parties to have contemplated the extent of potential liability, not just the facts that give rise to the liability.

\(^{494}\) See U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 2. Subsection (2) operates to allow the buyer, in an appropriate case, any consequential damages which are the result of the seller's breach. The "tacit agreement" test for the recovery of consequential damages is rejected. Although the older rule at common law which made the seller liable for all consequential damages of which he had "reason to know" in
Under the Code, a buyer rarely has difficulty recovering consequential losses because the commercial contexts in which parties contract suggest to the seller how a breach will affect the buyer's general needs. For example, if the seller is aware that resale is part of the ordinary course of the buyer's business, the buyer need not expressly state plans to resell the goods. Moreover, the "reason to know" requirement is an objective standard. The Code presumes the seller is a reasonable, sophisticated party and therefore imposes liability for all foreseeable consequences of a breach, even if the seller did not in fact foresee the actual consequence.

The Code's foreseeability requirement balances the buyer's interest in recovering for all losses resulting from the breach against the seller's need to identify potential liabilities when structuring prices. If a court finds that the risks associated with the breach were foreseeable, the Code requires the seller to assume the full consequences of the buyer's loss. If the seller does not wish to assume liability for consequential damages, the seller may exclude them in the sales contract as an item of recovery.

A buyer with particular needs that the seller could not reasonably foresee must make these needs known to the seller to recover

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495 See U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 3 ("[G]eneral needs [of the buyer] must rarely be made known to charge the seller with knowledge."); Special Project, supra note 1, at 147-48.

496 U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 6 states: "[I]n the case of sale of wares to one in the business of reselling them, resale is one of the requirements of which the seller has reason to know." Id.; see supra note 448 (cases interpreting this provision).

497 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).


499 U.C.C. section 2-719 expressly allows the parties to exclude consequential damages unless the exclusion is unconscionable. In Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985), the court upheld a seller's exclusion of liability for consequential damages, but refused to enforce the contractual exclusion of incidental damages.
consequential damages. This requirement allows the parties to allocate risks in the contract. In *Seaman v. United States Steel Corp.*, the seller constructed a heel plate to link the boom of a floating crane to the crane base. The seller breached its warranty by providing steel of inappropriate quality. Although the seller knew at the time of contracting that the buyer needed the steel to fashion a heel plate for the floating crane, the seller had no reason to know, and the buyer failed to inform it, that the buyer planned to use the crane in a bid on an Army Corps of Engineers contract. The buyer spent $410.45 for the steel and claimed damages of $85,000. In rejecting the buyer’s claim, the court commented that if the seller had known that it could be liable for lost profits it “might have refused to sell the plate without some assurance that [it] would not be responsible beyond a stipulated sum.” The Code is generous in the amount of consequential damages a buyer may recover for breach of warranty, but if the buyer fails to advise the seller of special needs, and the seller neither knows nor has reason to know of such needs, the buyer must bear the consequential losses.

(2) *Certainty.* An aggrieved buyer must show consequential losses with a reasonable degree of certainty in order to recover. A buyer need not show mathematical precision, however. Com-

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501 Id. at 470, 400 A.2d at 92, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 82.
502 Id. at 472, 400 A.2d at 93, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 84.
503 Id. at 468-70, 400 A.2d at 91-92, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 81-82.
504 Id. at 472, 400 A.2d at 93, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 84.
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ment 4 to section 2-715 indicates that courts should apply the cer-
tainty standard flexibly and liberally:

The burden of proving the extent of loss incurred by way of con-
sequential damage is on the buyer, but the section on liberal ad-
ministration of remedies [section 1-106] rejects any doctrine of
certainty which requires almost mathematical precision in the
proof of loss. Loss may be determined in any manner which is
reasonable under the circumstances.507

The buyer need only establish the probability of some loss. By
identifying an available market for the goods, a buyer in the busi-
ness of resale can establish lost profits.508 Where a buyer purchases
goods to incorporate into the production process, however, the
amount of loss is not as easy to quantify because the lost profits
become more remote from the breach of warranty.

In some cases, the buyer's claim for lost profits is based upon
sheer speculation. Suppose a buyer in the home repair business
purchases defective aluminum siding.509 The buyer testifies that the
business depends on word-of-mouth advertising and since the
seller's breach she has been unable to locate other work in the
neighborhood. If the buyer's testimony is the only evidence linking
the loss to the breach, a court should not award damages for lost
profits.510 As one court stated under similar facts: "This may or may
not be true, and if true may be either an unfortunate coincidence or
a conspiracy by the homeowners of that neighborhood."511 Sup-
pose, however, that the buyer establishes that she did, in fact, lose
business because of the defective siding, but cannot specify the
amount lost. In response to this practical problem, courts have
adopted the "fact-amount" doctrine: "The reasonable level of cer-
tainty required to establish the amount of a loss is generally lower
than that required to establish the fact or cause of a loss."512 The
fact-amount doctrine most frequently applies where the breach in-
terrupts the buyer's production process, the buyer is involved in a
new business, or the buyer suffers a loss of goodwill.

(a) Interruption to the Buyer's Production Process. Hawthorne

507 U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 4.
508 See supra note 448 and accompanying text (cases discussing section 2-715).
510 Id. at 740, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 1276.
511 Id. at 744, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 1276.
512 Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1219
(Utah 1983) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the doctrine, see Special Project,
supra note 1, at 155-56. But see 5 A. Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1022, at 135-47
(1964) (negating the fact-amount doctrine).
Industries, Inc. v. Balfour Maclaine International, Ltd.\textsuperscript{513} illustrates the practical difficulties that make the fact-amount doctrine necessary. In Hawthorne a carpet manufacturer bought jute to use as carpet backing.\textsuperscript{514} Substantial deviations in the quality of the jute forced the buyer to slow down its machinery to make adjustments by hand and to add extra adhesive to the carpet surface. The buyer sought to recover consequential damages for increased production costs caused by the nonconforming jute. The buyer testified that the normal speed of the jute processing machines had to be slowed by approximately three feet per minute to process the seller's jute.\textsuperscript{515} The buyer used this estimate, together with weekly production reports and estimates of plant down-time while processing the seller's jute, to prepare an estimate of the total costs to the buyer. A witness previously involved with other carpet plants in the buyer's locale substantially confirmed the buyer's estimate of lost efficiency.\textsuperscript{516} Unquestionably, the buyer suffered loss due to seller's breach. The court decided that having established some loss, the buyer's recovery "should not be denied merely because the amount of damages cannot be precisely and exactly determined."

Courts are loath to deny recovery if the buyer can establish some loss. Even if documented proof is lacking, the testimony of the buyer, corroborated by an independent expert, should provide a sufficient basis for assessing damages.\textsuperscript{518} Ultimately, the fact-amount doctrine helps to deter breaches. The Code's provisions discourage breaches and favor contractual performance.\textsuperscript{519} A seller should stand behind all representations made and should not escape liability merely because the buyer cannot quantify loss with exacting particularity.

(b) New Businesses. The rationale for the fact-amount doctrine is perhaps most evident in situations involving new busi-

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{513}{676 F.2d 1385, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1339 (11th Cir. 1982).}
\footnote{514}{Id. at 1386, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1340.}
\footnote{515}{Id. at 1386-87, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1340-41.}
\footnote{516}{Id. at 1386, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1341.}
\footnote{517}{Id. at 1388, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1343. Because the district court held that the plaintiff's claimed damages were not certain enough, id. at 1387, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1343, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for determination of whether the buyer established his losses with reasonable certainty. Id. at 1388, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1344.}
\footnote{518}{Cf. infra text accompanying note 525.}
\footnote{519}{See Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together after Material Breach—Common Law Mitigation Rules, the U.C.C., and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 553, 579-93 (1976) (arguing that the Code's provisions on cover, good faith, notice, seller's right to cure, and parties' rights to demand adequate assurance of performance encourage parties to avoid breaching); see also 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 512, § 1002, at 84 ("The fact that damages must be paid tends directly to the prevention of breaches of contract."). This applies equally to breaches of warranty.}
\end{footnotes}
When a seller's breach causes interruption of a buyer's ongoing business, courts prefer records of past profits as evidence of the business's lost prospective profits. The buyer may strengthen this proof by showing profits earned after the operation returned to normal.

Where the seller's breach interrupts the buyer's new business, but does not cause it to fail, the buyer likewise should be able to establish his losses with reasonable certainty. In *Cook Assoc., Inc. v. Warnick* the buyer contracted to buy parts for the silo storage complex of an explosives plant it was constructing. The seller delayed delivery of some of the parts for almost a year, causing delay in plant completion. The court awarded the buyer lost profits based on two elements of proof: (1) evidence of the buyer's profits once the plant opened; (2) profit and sales statistics from a similar plant. Taken together, these elements of proof supplied a reasonably certain basis for awarding the buyer lost profits.

Proof of lost profits is more difficult, however, if the buyer's new business fails as a result of the seller's breach. The buyer cannot introduce evidence of past or subsequent profitability. The buyer must therefore rely solely on evidence of sales from comparable businesses. Although this is not the preferred method of proof, courts have begun to accept this comparative approach for new businesses.

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520 See *Vickers v. Wichita State Univ.*, 213 Kan. 614, 518 P.2d 512 (1974). Strict application of the certainty doctrine would place a new business at a substantial disadvantage. To hold recovery is precluded as a matter of law merely because a business is newly established would encourage those contracting with such a business to breach their contracts. The law is not so deficient. *Id.* at 620, 518 P.2d at 517. See generally Comment, *Remedies—Lost Profits as Contract Damages for an Unestablished Business: The New Business Rule Becomes Outdated*, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 693 (1978) (arguing that the new-business rules, predicated on the belief that lost profits of new businesses cannot be established with reasonable certainty and therefore are not recoverable, should be abandoned).


522 See infra text accompanying note 525.


524 *Id.* at 1163-64, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 1215.

525 *Id.* at 1165-66, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 1217-19.

526 *Id.* at 1166 n.4, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 1218 n.4.

527 See Comment, *supra* note 520, at 713 (the "yardstick measure" which compares "the performance of businesses as similar to the plaintiff's as possible in size, location and nature during the time period in question" is the most recognized method of proving lost profits other than using past profits); see also *supra* note 521 (demonstrating the
Allowing new businesses to rely on comparative sales evidence places them under a looser evidentiary standard than a buyer with an established business. Situations could arise in which a court denies recovery to a buyer in an established business but, under similar evidence, grants recovery to a counterpart in a new business. The fact-amount doctrine is the fairest way to allocate liability because it requires any buyer, new or old, to establish actual loss. Once loss is established, the factfinder must assess damages. Although damages awarded under this doctrine may not always reflect the exact value of the loss, the doctrine roughly apportions liability according to the risks bargained for, and provides consistent application of the Code’s damages provisions.

(c) Goodwill. Loss of goodwill presents the final situation in which proving loss with reasonable certainty becomes difficult. Goodwill is an intangible property interest “which attaches to a business on account of name, location, reputation for competency and the imponderables which cause buyers to return.”\(^5\) When a breach injures goodwill, a plaintiff should recover if he proves damages with sufficient certainty. Nevertheless, some courts deny recovery for goodwill damages because of the inherently speculative nature of such claims\(^5\) or because the seller could not have known of the buyer’s needs under section 2-715(2)(b).\(^5\) However, some courts have allowed recovery for loss of goodwill.\(^5\)

In contrast to profits lost from a specific transaction, goodwill relates closely to future profits. In calculating the “good will” value

\(^{528}\) Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); see also Wallach, supra note 521, at 269 (loss of future business occurs when present customers take their business elsewhere or when potential customers learn of dissatisfaction.).


\(^{530}\) See Chrysler Corp. v. E. Shavitz & Sons, 536 F.2d 743, 744-45, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that seller could not have known of buyer’s lost job opportunities).

\(^{531}\) See supra note 449 (cases allowing recovery of goodwill losses).
of a business, courts consider such matters as the profit the business has made "over and above an amount fairly attributable to the return on the capital investment and to the labor of the owner...; (2) ... [and] the reasonable prospect that this additional profit will continue into the future, considering all circumstances existing and known as of the date of the valuation." The method by which a buyer proves loss of goodwill varies with the nature of the business. A reselling buyer might establish loss of goodwill by showing that certain customers began trading with a competitor as a result of the seller's breach. Alternatively, the buyer might introduce evidence of decreasing profits following the breach, or the buyer might provide testimony of the value of the goodwill. Finally, a buyer might sell the business and claim the difference between the pre-breach value and the sale price as the value of the goodwill loss.

The above examples illustrate that no comprehensive method exists for establishing the value of goodwill loss. A buyer may successfully establish that a loss in goodwill occurred as a result of the seller's breach, but precisely quantifying that loss may be impossible. Nevertheless, goodwill is often one of a business's primary assets. Thus, courts should not, per se, bar recovery for loss of goodwill. In many commercial contexts, a seller can anticipate that a breach will injure the buyer's goodwill, causing substantial damage. A California wine wholesaler, for example, should anticipate that the bottler it supplied will suffer loss of goodwill when customers discover that the bottler has sold them bad wine. The customers will likely blame the bottler, not the wholesaler; the bottler may permanently lose customers. The fact-amount doctrine allows the bottler to recover for some of its lost goodwill. This doctrine should not, however, override the requirements of causation, loss, and cer-

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534 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 166.
535 Id.; see also Wallach, supra note 521, at 270 ("The courts have not required certainty in the evidence showing the value of the lost goodwill. In a development paralleling that involving proof of lost profits for new businesses, the courts have been willing to accept expert testimony to establish the amount of loss.") (citations omitted). For judicial discussion on the use of expert testimony, see Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 604 F.2d 990, 995, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 1010, 1018 (6th Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs lost goodwill claim because they failed to provide expert testimony valuing goodwill); Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (expert testimony permitted to show loss of goodwill).
536 See Special Report, supra note 1, at 166.
537 See supra note 533.
tainty. The Code protects the seller from unwarranted claims by requiring the buyer to prove that the seller did foresee or should have foreseen the loss of goodwill and that the loss proximately resulted from the seller's breach. Only after the buyer has met these threshold requirements does the fact-amount doctrine lower the evidentiary standard required to meet the Code's reasonable certainty provision.

(3) Duty to Cover. A buyer may only recover those consequential losses "which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." The Code's mitigation requirement reduces the seller's overall liability to the difference between the cost of reasonable cover and the actual damages under the contract. Thus, the Code attempts to place the buyer in the same economic position that he would have occupied had the seller performed as warranted. The duty to cover also reduces difficulties associated with calculating damages and allows the buyer to achieve the primary objective of securing conforming goods.

The greatest practical difficulty with the cover requirement lies in determining what activities qualify as reasonable attempts to cover. If the buyer is unable to cover because of either lack of present resources or unavailability of alternative conforming goods, courts may still award consequential damages. If circumstances

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538 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).

Subsection (2)(b), seemingly designed principally for consumer situations, does not impose a mitigation requirement. The reason for the distinction between the two subsections is that commercial parties can control risks through contractual planning more easily than the consumer, who frequently is in no position to negotiate the terms of sale. Moreover, the consumer is frequently unable to effect cover because of either a lack of resources or because the harm resulting from the defective goods is not readily remediable. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 252 n.958. The Code defines "cover" as follows: "making in good faith and without reasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller." U.C.C. § 2-712(1).

539 Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Indus., 675 F.2d 745, 753, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1201, 1212 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 865 (1982); see supra text accompanying note 525. The cover requirement also helps prevent the buyer from profiting as a result of the seller's breach.


make cover impossible the buyer should cooperate with the seller’s efforts to make the goods conforming. Failure to cooperate in good faith or to effect cover may reduce consequential damages in proportion to the losses that the buyer could have avoided through reasonable attempts to mitigate.\textsuperscript{542}

One court has held that the buyer may cover by manufacturing the goods internally. In \textit{Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Industries}\textsuperscript{543} the seller breached by not supplying cross-ties at the contract price.\textsuperscript{544} After soliciting price quotations from other manufacturers, the buyer determined that producing the ties internally was cheaper than buying substitutes.\textsuperscript{545} The court found this method of cover reasonable because it provided goods that were the object of the contract and reduced the buyer’s overall damages.\textsuperscript{546} Moreover, by covering in this manner, the buyer did “not have to prove damages through more onerous means.”\textsuperscript{547} The \textit{Dura-Wood} opinion, however, suggests that courts should not compel buyers to cover by producing goods internally. Frequently, a buyer with the capacity to produce the goods internally will suffer lost volume profits. In \textit{Dura-Wood} the buyer could have sold the cross-ties used for cover to new or different customers at the higher market price.\textsuperscript{548} The court, however, denied the buyer recovery for profits lost by using the goods to cover rather than to fill other orders because “Century Forest should not be obligated to pay for Dura-Wood’s poor choice.”\textsuperscript{549} Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, Dura-Wood should have bought cross-ties at the higher market price and recovered the price differential from the breaching seller. The buyer then could have sold internally manufactured ties at the market price. The court might have awarded lost profits had the buyer demonstrated that it actually had to forego some orders.\textsuperscript{550} The lesson of \textit{Dura-Woods} is that a buyer may cover by manufactur-

\textsuperscript{542} See, e.g., Larry Goad & Co. v. Lordstown Rubber Co., 560 F. Supp. 583, 588, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 167 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (reducing buyer’s damages by the amount third party offered to pay and buyer unreasonably refused to accept); \textit{Chatlos Sys.}, 479 F. Supp. at 746, 27 U.C.C. Rep. at 657 (denying buyer recovery of consequential damages when it refused to cooperate with seller’s attempts to cure).


\textsuperscript{544} \textit{Id.} at 748, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1204.

\textsuperscript{545} \textit{Id.}, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1204.

\textsuperscript{546} \textit{Id.} at 753-54, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1212-13.

\textsuperscript{547} \textit{Id.} at 753, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1213.

\textsuperscript{548} \textit{Id.} at 755, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1215.

\textsuperscript{549} \textit{Id.}, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1216. One concern in internal cover cases is that damages may be too speculative. See, e.g., Cives Corp. v. Callier Steel Pipe & Tube, Inc., 482 A.2d 852, 858-60, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1705, 1713-16 (Me. 1984) (buyer could not recover claims for overhead expenses associated with internal cover because of inadequate proof of loss).

\textsuperscript{550} 675 F.2d at 755, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 1216.
ing substitute goods internally, but in so doing risks losing profits that could have been made by selling the goods used for cover on the open market.

To recover consequential damages, a buyer need not choose what, in hindsight, appears the best method of mitigation. In *S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co.*, the seller failed to deliver adequate supplies of ready-mixed concrete at the scheduled times, but reassured the buyer that it would make the deliveries. The buyer, had one alternative source for ready-mixed concrete, but that supplier had limited production facilities, charged more for the concrete, and did not have certification to do state work. Commenting that “[t]here are situations in which continuing with the performance of an unsatisfactory contractor will avoid losses which might be experienced by engaging others to complete the project,” the Third Circuit held that the buyer met its obligation to mitigate by cooperating with the seller.

In an alternative holding, the *Groves* court adopted the “equal opportunity doctrine”: “Where both the plaintiff and the defendant have had equal opportunity to reduce the damages by the same act and it is equally reasonable to expect the defendant to minimize damages, the defendant is in no position to contend that the plaintiff failed to mitigate.” Thus, the court held that the seller had an obligation to cover the buyer’s losses because the seller could have engaged the alternative supplier to meet the delivery schedule.

The Seventh Circuit in *Cates v. Morgan Portable Building Corp.* rejected the “equal opportunity doctrine” because it conflicts with the policy behind the duty to cover: “to preserve the buyer’s incentive to consider a wide range of possible methods of mitigation of damages.” Less incentive would exist if a buyer could rely on the seller’s ability to find substitute goods or make the present goods conforming.

Courts should reject the “equal opportunity doctrine” because the economic inefficiency it creates outweighs any fairness arguments that support it. The buyer is often in a better position to assess the potential damages flowing from the breach of warranty and is therefore in a better position to determine appropriate steps

552 *Id.* at 526, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 4.
554 *Id.* at 530, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 10.
558 780 F.2d 683, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 451 (7th Cir. 1985).
559 *Id.* at 689, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 457.
to reduce losses.\textsuperscript{560} This is particularly true with consequential damages, which flow from the buyer's particular situation.\textsuperscript{561} The Code imposes liability on the seller to the full extent of the buyer's consequential losses, even if the amount of the damages was not foreseeable;\textsuperscript{562} thus the party in the best position to reduce losses should have an affirmative duty to do so. Moreover, because the seller often has the burden of establishing the buyer's failure to cover,\textsuperscript{563} the buyer's claim that the seller passed up an equal opportunity to cover would unduly burden the seller. The seller would have to show not only that the buyer failed to cover, but that the seller lacked the opportunity. These considerations outweigh the fairness argument that would place responsibility to mitigate on the breaching seller as well as the innocent buyer.\textsuperscript{564} Finally, efforts to cover may allow the buyer to recover for loss incurred after discovery of the defect. Normally, a buyer may not recover consequential damages for losses which occur after the buyer discovers the defect in the goods.\textsuperscript{565} Nevertheless, in \textit{Prutch v. Ford Motor Co.}\textsuperscript{566} the court allowed farmers to recover such losses from the seller of defective farm equipment. The court reasoned that the farmers had a duty to mitigate by producing a partial crop, and this necessitated the use of the defective equipment.\textsuperscript{567}

Courts permit a wide range of activities to constitute mitigation

\textsuperscript{560} See id. at 688, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 455-56.
\textsuperscript{561} See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{562} See supra notes 512-27 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{564} See supra text accompanying note 556.
\textsuperscript{565} Consequential damages created by a buyer's use of a product after discovery of a defect may not be recovered in a breach-of-warranty action. \textit{General Instrument Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pressed Metals, Inc.}, 366 F. Supp. 139, 149-50, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 829, 835-37 (M.D. Pa. 1973), \textit{aff'd}, 506 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1974); \textit{Michigan Sugar Co. v. Jebavy-Sorenson Orchard Co.}, 66 Mich. App. 642, 646, 239 N.W.2d 693, 695, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 100, 103 (1976); \textit{cf. U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 5} ("Where the injury involved follows the use of goods without discovery of the defect causing the damage, the question of 'proximate' cause turns on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods without such inspection as would have revealed the defects. If it was not reasonable for him to do so, or if he did in fact discover the defect prior to his use, the injury would not proximately result from the breach of warranty.")
\textsuperscript{567} Id. at 662, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 1514.
so long as they do not find bad faith. A buyer who incurs reasonably avoidable losses acts in bad faith and the Code reduces damages accordingly. The decision of whether a buyer should have covered losses depends upon the Code's policy concerns and the court's judgment concerning the buyer's good faith actions.

C. Conclusions

The Code's damages provisions present two principal policy issues: the extent to which the seller should be held liable for breach of warranty and the amount of proof the buyer must produce to recover claimed losses. These policy issues do not generally arise with the Code's incidental damages provisions because the claims result directly from the goods involved in the transaction; they are more capable of proof. Consequential damages, however, present greater difficulties. The Code allows courts to award damages for breach of warranty in many situations. The seller is liable for breach of warranty when the goods fail to meet their implied warranty of merchantability or implied warranty for a particular purpose. Additionally, a wide range of actions may create express warranties that trigger liability against the seller.

Although the frequent creation of warranties suggests that the buyer should easily recover both primary and incidental damages, recovery of consequential losses is not so easy. The Code presumes that commercial parties can more efficiently allocate risk by contract than through litigation and it therefore limits the seller's liability by requiring cover and foreseeability. The foreseeability requirement

568 U.C.C. § 2-712 comment 2 states, "The test of proper cover is whether at the time and place the buyer acted in good faith and in a reasonable manner, and it is immaterial that hindsight may prove that the method of cover used was not the cheapest or most effective." Id.; see also Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 590 n.2, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1553, 1557 n.2 (4th Cir. 1985) (buyer's hiring of neighboring farmers to plant after tractor failed was reasonable cover); Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. v. Continental Information Sys., 621 F.2d 353, 357, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 112, 116-17 (9th Cir. 1980) (purchase of substitute computer system following seller's failure to deliver not made in bad faith); Wullschleger & Co. v. Jenny Fashions, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 373, 378, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (buyer's unsuccessful but good faith effort to purchase substitute fabrics satisfied cover requirement); Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1018, 1022-23, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1587, 1593 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (buyer's good faith effort to locate substitute army boots satisfied section 2-715(2)(a)); aff'd, 722 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983); Leininger v. Sola, 314 N.W.2d 39, 49, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 191, 205 (N.D. 1981) (purchase of one bull to impregnate cows reasonable cover for seller's failure to provide pregnant cows). But see Larry Goad & Co. v. Lordstown Rubber Co., 560 F. Supp. 583, 588, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 167 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (buyer's refusal to accept money offered by its customer for the value of its work upon cancellation of contract resulted in reduction of buyer's consequential damages).

569 See supra note 424 and accompanying text.

570 See supra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.

571 See supra notes 38-142 and accompanying text.
assures that, at the time of contracting, the parties at least implicitly allocated the risks of loss associated with the transaction. Likewise, the duty to cover reflects the view that reasonable parties expect each other to minimize losses. The Code permits efficient breach to the extent that a breaching party can calculate potential losses associated with the breach and consider the buyer's ability to mitigate losses. If the risks of entering a transaction outweigh the potential profits, the Code authorizes the parties to exclude liability for consequential losses.

Once a court determines that the parties implicitly agreed to allocate the risk of consequential loss, a reduced evidentiary standard applies. Under the fact-amount doctrine, once the buyer establishes that a loss occurred, the buyer need not establish the exact amount of loss to recover. The buyer must, however, establish the creation—and subsequent breach—of a warranty. Once the buyer makes this showing, the Code's damages provisions establish a framework for the accurate assessment of loss and reasonable standards for recovery of such losses.

V
LIMITATIONS ON WARRANTY LIABILITY

We have examined thus far the creation of both express and implied warranties in commercial sales and considered a buyer's potential remedies against a seller who has breached his warranty obligations. For the most part, we have assumed a passive seller who leaves the resolution of warranty conflicts to the Code rather than to contract. Such an assumption is unrealistic in an actual commercial context, for sellers often carefully draft agreements to limit significantly their exposure to warranty liability. Sellers may employ section 2-316 to negate virtually all implied warranties in commercial transactions. Section 2-719 allows sellers to restrict buyer recovery for breach of warranty, thus limiting the reach of undisclaimable express warranties.

Applying sections 2-316 and 2-719 to both commercial and consumer transactions creates tension. The drafters found commercial utility in allowing parties to allocate contractually the risks inherent in any sale. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 170. The drafters tempered this power, however, by imposing procedural and substantive requirements to protect unsophisticated buyers. Note that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982), imposes federal limitations on disclaimers to consumers. Section 2-316 might have differed had it been drafted after the Magnuson-Moss Act.
tection, courts are less likely to demand strict compliance with the requirements in cases involving sophisticated buyers.

A. Basic Purpose of Section 2-316

Sellers often include phrases like "there are no warranties express or implied" in their sales contracts to limit liability. Section 2-316 establishes the requirements that these phrases must meet to serve as effective disclaimers of warranties. The section is designed principally to deal with those frequent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude "all warranties, express or implied." It seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbartered language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express warranty and permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.574

In seeking to protect buyers from unbargained disclaimers, section 2-316 establishes procedures to ensure that the buyer knows the risks he undertakes regarding product quality pursuant to the agreement.575

B. Disclaimers and Express Warranties—Section 2-316(1)

The Code's position regarding conflicts between express warranties and disclaimers appears in section 2-316(1):

Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.576

In accordance with the Code's mandate that warranties and disclaimers be reconciled "wherever reasonable," courts may interpret a disclaimer narrowly rather than simply declare it invalid.577 When

574 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
576 U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
courts cannot construe away apparent inconsistencies, however, the Code declares inoperative disclaimers that conflict with express warranties. Most courts routinely refuse to give effect to disclaimers that negate express warranties.

1. Warranty Language in the Written Agreement—Consistency


In applying the Uniform Commercial Code to leases in three recent cases, federal district courts ignored the express mandate of section 2-316(1) and found disclaimers of express warranties effective. See Agristor Credit Corp. v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307, 1315-16, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1653, 1659 (D. Or. 1985) (“Whether the U.C.C. applies or not, [the lessor] disclaimed all warranties, either express or implied. The disclaimers are conspicuous and are valid under Oregon law.”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); Agristor Leasing v. Hansen, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1660, 1666 n.7 (D. Minn. 1985) (“The lease provision in [question] . . . effectively disclaims any express warranties which might exist.”); Agristor Leasing v. Kjergaard, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1667, 1671 n.5 (D. Minn. 1985) (same). These cases seem to be based on St. Paul Leasing Co. v. Winkel’s Inc., 309 Minn. 583, 244 N.W.2d 661 (1976) (granting summary judgment in favor of lessor enforcing disclaimer terms in lease despite finding that salesman for lessor “made certain representations . . . concerning the performance of the equipment”). These cases should not be followed.


For a detailed discussion of express warranties and the basis of the bargain, see supra notes 61-142 and accompanying text. Note also, however, that a disclaimer may not be given effect if it simply is not part of the bargain between the parties. See McNa-
(1) emphasizes that courts should attempt to construe words of disclaimer and warranty consistently wherever reasonable. This reminds courts that the underlying goal of buyer protection does not override section 2-313's express warranty requirements. According to section 2-313 comment 4, parties may consciously make any bargain they wish. Thus, the parties may, by carefully disclaiming warranties, create an agreement without warranties.

Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co.582 illustrates how a disclaimer may operate to prevent the creation of an express warranty. In Universal Drilling the Tenth Circuit applied section 2-316(1) to find that the description of the used goods accompanying the contract did not create an express warranty. The court reasoned that "[t]he exhibits to the contract that described the goods must be read in conjunction with the contract itself."583 In an agreement between "experienced, sophisticated, intelligent business[persons] with vast education and experience"584 the court gave effect to the contractual statement that "the goods are used and there is no guarantee that they are fit or even operable."585 The court stated that it could not "think of alternative language which would memorialize the intent of the parties—to purchase and sell used 'as is' equipment which has value but which may need repairs or additional parts to be fit and operable."586 This specific disclaiming language, in conjunction with sections 2-313 and 2-316, prevented the formation of any warranties.587

Most courts, however, do not enforce such disclaimers.588 Courts often find the disclaimer inoperative because it conflicts with the product's description. While such findings may protect buyers from unexpected disclaimers, courts should avoid a reflexive pro-buyer, antidisclaimer stance. Courts should carefully consider the entire contract to determine whether the description forms a guarantee that the parties consider integral to the bargain, or whether they consider the disclaimer integral to the bargain and the descrip-


582 737 F.2d 869, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 1576 (10th Cir. 1984).
583 Id. at 874, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 1581.
584 Id. at 870, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 1577.
585 Id. at 874, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 1581 (emphasis in original).
586 Id. at 871, 38 U.C.C. Rep. at 1581.
587 See also Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287, 291, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 91, 96 (4th Cir. 1982) (disclaimer on label limited warranties to those expressly stated; disclaimer instrumental in preventing creation of any parol warranties).
588 See supra note 580.
tion merely secondary. Although section 2-316(1) subordinates disclaimers to warranties in the event of conflict, both section 2-313 and section 2-316 mandate enforcement of the bargain between the parties. Rather than declare any inconsistent disclaimer inoperative, courts must evaluate carefully all descriptions and only enforce those that clearly constitute warranties basic to the bargain.

b. "Time Warranties"—A Special Problem of Consistency. Sellers often limit the duration of warranties. Time qualifications may directly limit the duration of the warranty or simply limit the period after delivery in which a buyer must notify the seller of a breach to recover under the warranty. Such limitations effectively exclude warranties covering nonconformities that a buyer could not reasonably discover within the prescribed time period. So long as such exclusions do not conflict with express warranties, courts should enforce these limitations. Conflicts may arise when a seller provides an unqualified warranty in one clause while a subsequent clause attempts to qualify it by establishing a time limit. Sellers can avoid these conflicts by extending limited warranties only, or by placing clauses describing the time limit immediately after the warranty. For example, rather than make an unqualified promise that items are of good, merchantable quality, a seller might simply warrant goods against any defects discovered within a certain time period.

Professors White and Summers have noted that "[s]ince the Code does not oblige the seller to make any express warranties, limitations on such warranties should stand in the absence of inconsistency under [section] 2-316(1)." Since 1978, few reported cases have addressed the problem of "time warranties." Courts that have addressed the issue appear more willing to enforce time limitations than they were in 1978.

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589 Pictures in advertisements and brochures may also create undisclaimable warranties. See Grady, Inadvertent Creation of Express Warranties: Caveats for Pictorial Product Representations, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 268 (1983).
590 Special Project, supra note 1, at 173.
591 Id.
593 See, e.g., Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 404-05, 244 N.E. 2d 685, 689, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 112-13, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1217-18 (1968) (clause excluding liability for defects discovered more than 10 days after delivery does not limit unqualified express warranty that yarn was of good, merchantable quality).
In *Hart Engineering Co. v. FMC Corp.*,\(^{596}\) for example, the court accepted the White and Summers position and validated a one-year time warranty. The court found the warranty disclaimers governed by section 2-316 but also found no explicit authorization anywhere in the Code for invalidating [time warranties]. In fact, such an approach would appear to run at cross purposes with the spirit, if not with any specific provision, of the Code . . . . [Assuming arguendo] that the interdiction of a time warranty might be appropriate in an exceptional case, no such departure is merited . . . [where] no . . . unfairness polluted the process by which the contract was negotiated, drafted, and ultimately executed.\(^{597}\)

2. *Parol Warranties*

Section 2-316(1), by explicitly referring to section 2-202,\(^{598}\) protects sellers’ disclaimers from buyers’ allegations of oral warranties that the parties did not include in their complete and final agreement.\(^{599}\) Most courts apply section 2-202 literally and require that evidence of parol warranties meet the same standards of admissibility as the agreement’s other terms.\(^{600}\) Of course, the parol evi-

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\(^{597}\) *Id.* at 1479-80, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 1323-25 (footnotes omitted). The court also considered the length of the warranty—a year rather than days—and the fact that the seller’s attempts to repair went far above and beyond the call of duty in validating the warranty.

\(^{598}\) U.C.C. § 2-202 provides:

> Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented

(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of performance (Section 2-208); and

(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.

\(^{599}\) See also U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 2 (“The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence . . . .”)

\(^{600}\) Parol evidence is admissible when the written agreement is not the complete and final expression of the parties’ agreement. See, e.g., *Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes*, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 763, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1076, 1082-83 (10th Cir. 1983) (where invoice not intended to express final agreement of the parties, district court properly submitted express warranty question and properly excluded written disclaimer language); *Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp.*, 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1505, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 49,
Occasionally a court may fail to consider the parol evidence rule in determining the effectiveness of a disclaimer. For example, in *Art Hill, Inc. v. Heckler* the court did not mention section 2-202 in finding a written disclaimer ineffective to disclaim an express warranty created by the seller's conduct. The court noted that "[b]ecause these affirmations were made orally and were not contained in a writing intended as a final expression of the agreement, whether they amount to an express warranty is a question of fact." The court found that the seller's conduct created an express warranty, however, the court never specifically stated that the purchase agreement was not a complete and final expression of the parties' agreement. The court should have decided this fact before finding the disclaimer inoperative.


603 Id. at 244, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 700.

604 Id. at 245, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 700.

605 Had the court considered the issue, however, it would likely have reached the same result. The court's reference to the fact that the oral affirmations were not in a "writing intended as a final expression of the agreement," *id.* at 244, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 700 (emphasis added), leads one to believe that the court would not have found the writing the final expression of the agreement, rendering the parol evidence admissible. If the court had found the purchase agreement the final expression of the parties' agreement, the court might still have considered the sellers' promises under the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule. The seller's repeated assurances that created the
C. Express Disclaimers of Implied Warranties Under Section 2-316(2)

Section 2-316(2) establishes the general procedure by which a seller can effectively disclaim the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Subsection(2) provides:

Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." Uniformly requiring the parties to

1. Language Requirements
   a. Language to Disclaim the Implied Warranty of Merchantability.

Section 2-316(2) mandates that the seller use the word "merchantability" effectively to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability. Uniformly requiring the parties to

express warranty induced the buyer to enter into the agreement. If the seller had no intention of fulfilling the promises, then his conduct might be considered fraud under state law. Parol evidence is admissible to prove fraud. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 2-11, at 88; see also Society Nat'l Bank v. Pemberton, 63 Ohio Misc. 26, 409 N.E.2d 1073, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 76 (Mun. Ct. 1979) (court failed to consider parol evidence rule in finding oral express warranty created and not effectively disclaimed by conspicuous written disclaimers since such disclaimers inconsistent with oral express warranty), aff'd mem., Case No. 9502 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 25, 1980). Had this court considered the parol evidence rule, it probably would have found the written agreement was not the complete and final expression of the parties' agreement. See generally J. Wurte & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 2-1 to -12, at 50-95 (detailed analysis of parol evidence rule and its exceptions).

For discussion of effective disclaimers of implied warranties under section 2-316(3)(a), see infra notes 682-707 and accompanying text.

While the express language requirements of section 2-316(2) are clear, section 2-316(3)(a) appears to undermine completely these requirements. For a discussion of the relationship between the two subsections, see infra notes 682-707 and accompanying text. Nevertheless most courts enforce disclaimers under section 2-316(2) without reference to section 2-316(3)(a). See, e.g., Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1252, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1169, 1179 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying only section 2-316(2) to find effective disclaimer of merchantability); Hi Neighbor Enters., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823, 826, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1256, 1260 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that "[t]he warranty exclusions of the contracts in this case meet the requirements for modification or exclusion" after citing section 2-316(2)); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter Co., 491 F. Supp. 611, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 127 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (enforcing a waiver that refers specifically to merchantability, without reference to the requirements of section 2-316(3)(a)).

Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 73 (1st Cir. 1962), appeared to ignore this requirement by finding a waiver of the warranty of
b. Language to Disclaim the Implied Warranty of Fitness. Section 2-316(2) does not require specific language to disclaim the implied warranty of fitness. Rather, written and conspicuous general language that clearly demonstrates the seller’s intent suffices to disclaim such warranties. The case law does not include many examples of effective or ineffective uses of general language to disclaim the implied warranty of fitness. Successful disclaimers of merchantability even though the specific language was not used. Roto-Lith was expressly rejected in Potler v. MCP Facilities Corp., 471 F. Supp. 1344, 1350, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 651, 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("We believe we must follow the example set by [Zicari v. Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969),] rather than Roto-Lith and hold that the language printed on MCP’s brochure and labels does not exclude or modify the warranty of merchantability.") (footnote omitted).


Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose may be excluded by general language, but only if it is in writing and conspicuous. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 4 (emphasis added).


See, e.g., Imperial Stamp & Engraving Co. v. Bailey, 82 Ill. App. 3d 835, 838, 403 N.E.2d 294, 297, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1307, 1310 (1980) (language “overall production is not guaranteed” is unclear and ambiguous thus failing to waive the implied warranty of fitness).
this sort use language very similar to that recommended in section 2-316(2): for example, "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."\textsuperscript{614} Although the Code does not require mention of the word fitness, cautious sellers often preclude the creation of any implied warranty of fitness by explicitly mentioning "fitness" in the disclaimer.\textsuperscript{615} Sellers risk an ineffective disclaimer if they stray too far from the recommended language.\textsuperscript{616}

2. Conspicuousness

Section 2-316(2) instructs courts to give effect only to conspicuous disclaimers of implied warranties. Courts\textsuperscript{617} must choose between an objective and a subjective test for conspicuousness. "The drafters apparently felt that the goals of certainty, long-run buyer protection, and avoidance of difficult fact questions counseled against looking beyond the 'four corners' of the written instrument."\textsuperscript{618} Some courts believe that this suggests that an objective test is the appropriate test to determine conspicuousness.\textsuperscript{619} Other courts, however, reject the objective test and consider the buyer's actual awareness of the disclaimer in evaluating its conspicuousness.\textsuperscript{620} Still other courts have adopted the "modified objective test,"\textsuperscript{621} suggested in the 1978 Special Project, which we continue to advocate.

\textsuperscript{614} See supra note 612.


\textsuperscript{616} See Imperial Stamp \& Engraving Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 403 N.E.2d at 297, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 1310 (merely stating "OVERALL PRODUCTION IS NOT GUARANTEED" is insufficient to disclaim warranty of fitness).

\textsuperscript{617} Note that conspicuousness is a question of law, not fact. See U.C.C. § 1-201(10) ("Whether a term or clause is 'conspicuous' or not is for decision by the court."); see also Bert Smith Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Franklin, 400 So. 2d 1235, 1237, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 1273, 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (conspicuousness is a question of law, but seller waived objection to jury instruction on this question when it failed to object at trial); Todd Equip. Leasing Co. v. Milligan, 395 A.2d 818, 820, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 704, 707 (Me. 1978) (trial court erred in submitting question of conspicuousness to jury).

\textsuperscript{618} Special Project, supra note 1, at 182.

\textsuperscript{619} For a complete discussion of the objective test, see infra notes 622-46 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{620} For a complete discussion of the buyer awareness test, see infra notes 647-54 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{621} Special Project, supra note 1, at 185; see supra notes 597-99 and accompanying text (discussing a different instance when the Code suggests going beyond the four corners of the document). For a complete discussion of the "modified objective test," see infra notes 655-62 and accompanying text.
The Objective Test. Section 1-201(10) defines "conspicuous." It suggests an objective test focusing on whether a disclaimer is "so written" that a "reasonable" buyer ought to have noticed it. Section 1-201(10) provides:

A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous".

Many courts base their decisions on the conspicuousness of the written words alone. In evaluating the conspicuousness of a written disclaimer, these courts frequently consider the location of and reference to the disclaimer in the contract, the type face, type size, and variation in printing, the heading referring to the dis-
claimer,\textsuperscript{627} or some combination of these factors.\textsuperscript{628} Courts generally apply the same objective standards of conspicuousness to disclaimers on labels as they do to disclaimers in written contracts.\textsuperscript{629}

Courts have not adopted a universal definition of a minimally conspicuous disclaimer. In \textit{Collins Radio Co. v. Bell}	extsuperscript{630} the Oklahoma Court of Appeals considered a disclaimer in “minimal compliance”

\textsuperscript{627} Courts that focus solely on the heading referring to the disclaimer tend to find the disclaimer ineffective due to ambiguity rather than inconspicuousness. \textit{See, e.g.}, Hartman v. Jensen’s, Inc., 227 S.C. 501, 504, 289 S.E.2d 648, 649, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 889, 990-91 (1982). In the typical, objective conspicuousness test the heading may be one of several factors considered. \textit{See infra} note 628.

\textsuperscript{628} \textit{See, e.g.}, Transurface Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 738 F.2d 42, 46, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1984) (effective disclaimer where print not large but “disclaimer appears on the front of the document and the lead clause, ‘DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES’... printed in larger type with all capital letters’); Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 669 F.2d 1049, 1061, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 490, 506-07 (5th Cir. 1982) (conspicuous waiver when written in boldface, uppercase type, located on same side of contract as signatures, and contract contains prominent warning to read the contract before signing); Union Exploration Co. v. Dowell Div., Dow Chem. Co., 41 U.C.C. Rep. 759, 762 (D. Kan. 1985) (considering the language, contrasting type, ink color, and size, as well as references on front to disclaimer on reverse page, in finding disclaimer conspicuous); Rudy’s Glass Constr. Co. v. E.F. Johnson Co., 404 So. 2d 1087, 1090, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1373, 1374-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“The reference on the front of the document to terms and conditions stated on the back, when coupled with the separate paragraph titled, ‘Disclaimers of Warranties’, and the contrasting type, clearly causes disclaimer’ to be conspicuous.”); J & W Equip., Inc. v. Weingartner, 5 Kan. App. 2d 466, 471, 618 P.2d 862, 866, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 866, 871 (1980) (adopting a broader objective approach to evaluating the conspicuousness of a disclaimer by referring to the whole document rather than simply to the elements of type size, color, and contrast); Commercial Credit Corp. v. CYC Realty, Inc., 102 A.D.2d 970, 972, 477 N.Y.S.2d 842, 844, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 108, 111 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (disclaimer which was “the only boldface print in the only four paragraphs on the first page of the agreement... [which] was under the broad heading of ‘TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF LEASE’ and [which] appeared before the authorizing signatures on the front side of the agreement and not on the back with the boilerplate paragraphs,” was conspicuous); Henderson v. Benson-Hartman Motors, Inc., 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 6, 13-14, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 782, 787 (Ct. C. P. 1983) (disclaimer inconspicuous “because it appears on the second page of the lease in small print and would not come to the attention of the lessee unless he or she read the entire contents of this form lease agreement”).

\textsuperscript{629} \textit{See, e.g.}, Monsanto Agricultural Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574, 577, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 781, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (disclaimer was conspicuous when appearing in bold face capitals on labels of each can and in directions for product use, and thus effective despite buyer’s claim he did not read it); Victor v. Mammana, 101 Misc. 2d 954, 955, 422 N.Y.S.2d 850, 351, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 1295, 1296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (“Courts interpreting ‘conspicuousness’ on labels have used standards similar to those that have been used for forms.”); Basic Adhesives, Inc. v. Robert Matzkin Co., 101 Misc. 2d 283, 290, 420 N.Y.S.2d 983, 987, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 993, 999 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (“[C]onsidering all factors—the size, prominence, and contrast of the capitalized words—the disclaimer on the label was sufficiently conspicuous.”).

with the conspicuouslyness requirement of section 2-316(2) when the disclaimer appeared on the reverse side of a single sheet contract, was in all capital letters set off in a separate paragraph, and was virtually the only language in capital letters on the page. In addition, an easily read, small-type reference to terms on the back and a large-type general reference to warranties appeared on the front of the document. We agree with the Collins Radio court and maintain that this disclaimer meets the minimal requirements of an objective test of conspicuouslyness. Given the easily read reference to terms on the back and the large type and placement of the disclaimer in a separate paragraph, we believe any reasonable buyer, commercial or consumer, ought to have noticed it when reading the contract. Because the disclaimer certainly could have been more conspicuous, we agree that it simply meets minimal compliance.

We would counsel sellers when drafting disclaimers to observe the following guidelines: Disclaimers should be written in large, noticeable print, set off from the rest of the page, and placed below a heading that clearly indicates that a disclaimer follows; sellers should ensure that the disclaimer or a noticeable reference to it appears near the buyer's signature.

A Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, apparently relying on a federal district court decision in Pennsylvania, tentatively accepted "understandable" as an element of conspicuouslyness in Wagaman v. Don Warner Chevrolet-Buick, Inc. This extension of the definition led to rather bizarre results in which the court found a twenty-three-line paragraph, although "somewhat long

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631 Id. at 1051, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 72.
632 The section headings and limitation-of-remedies clause also appeared in capital letters. Id. at 1051, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 71.
633 Id. at 1049-50, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 71-72.
634 The Collins Radio court's test was not completely objective. Id. at 1051, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 71-72; see infra note 636.
635 The Collins Radio court considered the sophistication of both parties before finding the disclaimer conspicuous. Id. at 1050, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 72.
636 Note that the Collins Radio court specifically relied in part on the fact that the buyer was a "sophisticated business concern" in finding the disclaimer conspicuous "in this case, upon these facts." Id. at 1051, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 72 (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, we maintain that the minimum standard adopted is suitable for objective application even if one ignores the individual characteristics of the parties.
637 For example, the reference to the back of the contract could have appeared in large type or the disclaimer itself could have appeared on the front.
638 See Thermo King Corp. v. Strick Corp., 467 F. Supp. 75, 78, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 50, 53 (W.D. Pa.) ("We conclude, therefore, that such language is 'conspicuous,' since a reasonable person should have noticed and understood it."), aff'd mem., 609 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1979).
640 It is mutually understood and agreed that:
(a)(1) if said property is principally used for business or agricultural purposes, or (2) if buyer is clearly informed in writing prior to the sale that
and somewhat complicated,” understandible because “a little time and patience unravels its meaning.” We believe, however, that most readers would need more than a little time and patience to unravel and understand the morass of words constituting this disclaimer. Viewing conspicuousness without the “understandable” gloss, a reader might accept the twenty-three-line paragraph printed in bold type as conspicuous, although “burying [an exclusion or modification] in a profusion of words may operate to hide and to make it inconspicuous.” Because section 1-102(10) simply defines “conspicuous” as noticeable without reference to ease of comprehension, no other court has or should infuse an element of understandability into the objective test of conspicuousness.

b. The “Evidence of Buyer Awareness” Test. In 1978 a majority of courts considered evidence of buyer awareness to support or compel the finding of an effective disclaimer in commercial transactions. Since 1978, however, only a few courts have found effective disclaimers compelled by evidence of buyer awareness. These courts either completely ignored the conspicuousness requirement, or they enforced a disclaimer despite its inconspicu-

the property is sold on an ‘as is’ basis and that the entire risk as to the quality of performance of the property is with the buyer, there is no implied warranty of merchantability, no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and no implied warranty which extends beyond the description of said property on the face hereof; (b) except where the seller is also the manufacturer of said property and, as such manufacturer, issued to buyer or to a prior buyer of said property said manufacturer’s separate written new product warranty in respect thereof and said warranty is in effect at the date hereof, there are no express warranties and no representations, promises or statements have been made by seller in respect of said property unless endorsed hereon or incorporated herein by reference hereon; but seller’s obligations under any express warranty made and evidenced as aforesaid shall continue in accordance with the terms thereof and regardless of whether seller shall have transferred and assigned to another seller’s rights hereunder; and (c) except where the seller is also the manufacturer of said property, buyer will not assert against any subsequent holder as assignee of this contract any claim or defense which the buyer may have against the manufacturer or a seller other than the seller of said property obtained pursuant hereto.

Id. at 576, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1606.
641 Id. at 577, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1606.
643 See supra note 640.
645 See U.C.C. § 1-201(10) comment 10 (“[T]he test is whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to it.”).
646 Note, however, that a Kansas federal district court alluded to the understandability gloss when stating that disclaiming “language [was] clear and concise” in its determination that a disclaimer was conspicuous. Union Exploration Co. v. Dowell Div., Dow Chem. Co., 41 U.C.C. Rep. 759, 762 (D. Kan. 1985).
647 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 184.
648 See Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 772 F.2d 1329, 1335 n.3, 41 U.C.C.
ousness. The drafters intended section 2-316 to protect buyers from surprise and unbargained language. Although the courts did not violate this intent, they did ignore the express conspicuousness requirement of section 2-316. Courts should abide by the section's language and only enforce disclaimers that are objectively conspicuous. Because the Code rejects the parties' subjective knowledge as a test for determining the effectiveness of disclaimers, courts should ignore evidence of such knowledge.

As a prerequisite to the enforcement of a conspicuous disclaimer, however, we believe that the buyer must have had an opportunity to read the disclaimer. In Willoughby v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. the court justifiably refused to enforce a conspicuous disclaimer that the buyers never had the opportunity to see. The buyers purchased herbicide from the sellers and hired their agent to apply the product. Although the container bore a conspicuous disclaimer, the sellers never showed the buyers the container or told the buyers about it. The conspicuous disclaimer did not protect the buyers from surprise or unbargained language because the buyers never had an opportunity to read the disclaimer. Thus, the court considered the conspicuous disclaimer ineffective.

c. The Modified Objective Test. We continue to advocate a modified objective test to determine the conspicuousness of a dis-

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649 See Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 784, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 857, 868 (E.D. Wis. 1982) ("Discussion of the effectiveness of the disclaimer provisions in the contract does not end with the finding of lack of conspicuousness"); evidence that buyer was aware of disclaimers and disclaimers neither unexpected nor unbargained for was sufficient to make them enforceable.).
650 See also J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 12-5, at 444 (also criticizing enforcement of inconspicuous disclaimers even when buyers knew of their existence).
651 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1 ("[section 2-316] seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language . . . ").
653 Id. at 388, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 1518.
654 Id., 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 1518.
655 We first proposed the modified objective test in the 1978 Special Project. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 185-87.
claimer. This test focuses on the phrase "reasonable person against whom it is to operate" found in section 1-201(10). It allows courts to concentrate not only on the writing, but on the commercial buyer's experience and size as well. Where parties of relatively equal bargaining power negotiated the contract terms, a court could appropriately find that the buyer "ought to have noticed" a disclaimer despite its inconspicuous print. The modified objective test courts to distinguish between commercial and consumer buyers without compromising the drafters' goal of avoiding inquiry into the parties' negotiations. Since courts would probably expect the reasonable consumer to notice only objectively conspicuous language, this approach would continue to promote disclaimer visibility.

Several courts have adopted this test. For example, in AMF Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc. the court expressly adopted the modified objective test to determine the conspicuousness of a limitation-of-remedies clause. The court noted that "[t]he modern trend... is to determine if the bargaining strength and commercial sophistication of the parties made it reasonable [to assume] that the limiting language was brought to the attention of the parties." The court found the clause conspicuous even though it did not differ from the surrounding text in size, color, or typeface. Because both parties were commercially sophisticated, had dealt extensively with one another, and had actively negotiated the terms of the contract, the court concluded that the buyer ought reasonably to have noticed the clause. Thus, it was conspicuous.

3. Disclaimer or Limitation of Remedy Subsequent to Contracting

Conspicuous disclaimers must constitute an element of the par-
ties' bargain to have effect. Thus, the disclaimers must appear in the original contract or in a subsequent modification. Section 2-209 controls contract modifications that seek to modify or limit warranties, while section 2-207 governs modifications that accompany or follow delivery of goods.

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663 See U.C.C. § 2-209 (permitting subsequent modifications of the agreement which would include disclaimers); infra notes 674-75 and accompanying text.

664 (1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.

(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or recission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party.

(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions.

(4) Although an attempt at modification or recission does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.

(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.

U.C.C. § 2-209.

665 (1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.

(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:

(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.

(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.

Id. § 2-207.

666 The time at which a disclaimer becomes a part of the agreement does not affect its conspicuousness. In Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 29 U.C.C. Rep. 832 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980), the court erroneously combined conspicuousness with the requirement that a disclaimer be part of the bargain between the parties. The court stated:

The printed Silvercrest warranty containing a purported disclaimer of any warranty of merchantability or fitness was not received until several months after the sales transaction and in fact after delivery of the mobile home. As such it could not have been "conspicuous" at the time the Florys entered into the contract but was merely a unilateral attempt to limit liability and therefore ineffective under the statute.

Id. at 834.
a. Frequently Encountered Fact Patterns. In a simple retail sale, a seller can effectively disclaim an implied warranty by a writing on the outside of a package. The buyer accepts such a disclaimer as a term of the seller's offer when he purchases the goods. A seller cannot effectively disclaim an implied warranty by hiding a disclaimer inside a sealed package because the buyer does not accept such a hidden disclaimer as a part of the parties' agreement when he purchases the goods.

In more complex sales, a seller should disclaim implied warranties at the time he enters into an oral or written contract with the buyer. A seller who fails to do this may be unable to escape implied warranties. In Gold Kist, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, for example, the court found a disclaimer printed on seed bags ineffective as a "post-contract, unbargained-for unilateral attempt by [the seller] to limit its obligations under the contract." Because the parties had already reached an agreement prior to the delivery of the seed bags and the seller failed to direct the buyer's attention to the disclaimer at the time of the agreement, the disclaimer did not become an effective term of the agreement. "According to the prevailing interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code," the

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668 The disclaimer will be effective if that buyer should have been aware of the disclaimer through course of dealing or trade usage. See infra notes 723-31 and accompanying text.


671 Id. at 277, 333 S.E.2d at 70, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 330.

court stated, “a disclaimer printed on a label or other document and given to the buyer at the time of delivery of the goods is ineffective if a bargain has already arisen.”

If the parties agree to the modification, section 2-209 provides that a subsequent disclaimer may become a binding part of the agreement. To create an effective modification, the buyer must know of the modification and have the opportunity to object to it. In Gold Kist the court found no modification because the seller presented no evidence that the buyers ever learned of or accepted the terms of the disclaimer.

The Code does not require negotiation for an effective disclaimer. The drafters apparently felt that requiring conspicuousness sufficiently protected buyers against surprise and unbargained language.

b. Security Agreement Disclaimers. Article Two governs disclaimers of warranties in purchase money-security agreements. Section 9-206 comment 3 notes:

[Subsection 2] prevents a buyer from inadvertently abandoning his warranties by a “no warranties” term in the security agreement when warranties have already been created under the sales arrangement. Where the sales arrangement and the purchase money security transaction are evidenced by only one writing, that writing may disclaim, limit or modify warranties to the extent permitted by Article 2.

When parties execute a security agreement and a sales agreement contemporaneously, the instruments should be construed together in the absence of conflicting terms. A conflict between ambiguous

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673 Id., 333 S.E.2d at 70, 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 330.
674 See U.C.C. § 2-209 (reprinted supra note 664). Sometimes the seller’s first communication with the buyer is upon delivery pursuant to the buyer’s order. This should not, however, affect the result. Under section 2-207, disclaimers constitute proposed additional terms that materially alter the contract. See U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 4. Thus, the disclaimers are effective only if the buyer is expressly aware of them.
677 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
678 “When a seller retains a purchase money security interest in goods the Article on Sales (Article 2) governs the sale and any disclaimer, limitation or modification of the seller’s warranties.” U.C.C. § 9-206.
679 Id. comment 3.
waiver provisions in a purchase order may compel a court to disregard clear disclaimer language in a contemporaneously executed security agreement.681

D. Express Disclaimers of Implied Warranties Under Section 2-316(3)(a)

By its terms, section 2-316(3)(a) seems to undermine entirely 2-316(2)'s disclaimer requirements. The subsection provides: "Notwithstanding subsection (2) . . . unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty . . . ."682 Most courts resist the temptation to read 2-316(3)(a) so broadly as to undermine 2-316(2). Two courts have found "as is" language inapplicable in the sale of new goods.683 Other language, however, may effectively disclaim implied warranties accompanying the sale of new goods if "in common understanding [it] calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty."684

1. Language Requirements

Courts routinely validate "as is" disclaimers685 but remain reluctant to enforce other disclaiming language under 2-316(3)(a) that does not meet the language requirements of 2-316(2).686 For exam-

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681 See id. at 1365, 36 U.C.C. Rep. at 796; see also Bone Int'l Inc. v. Johnson, 74 N.C. App. 705, 706, 329 S.E.2d 714, 716, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 29, 31 (1985) (purchase-money security agreement effectively disclaimed all warranties by meeting requirements of section 2-316(2) but disclaimer waived by subsequent modification of contract).

682 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).

683 Gaylord v. Lawler Mobile Homes, Inc., 477 So. 2d 382, 383, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 131, 133 (Ala. 1985) ("Because the product involved was new, the statutory disclaimer and its language 'as is,' 'with all faults,' . . . has no application.").

684 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).


686 See, e.g., Lee v. Peterson, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 85, 89 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (statement "that the 30-day warranty was 'in lieu of all other warranties and/or representa-
ple, in Insurance Co. of North America v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America\textsuperscript{687} the court found the phrase "in lieu of" ineffective under section 2-316(3)(a).\textsuperscript{688} Similarly, in Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co.\textsuperscript{689} the court found the language "[seller] gives no warranty, express or implied, as to description, variety, quality, or productiveness, and will not in any way be responsible for the crop"\textsuperscript{690} insufficient to constitute a valid disclaimer under 2-316(3)(a).\textsuperscript{691}

2. Conspicuousness

Whether disclaimers under 2-316(3)(a) must be conspicuous remains an open question.\textsuperscript{692} Most courts apply the section 2-316(2) conspicuousness requirement to 2-316(3)(a) disclaimers\textsuperscript{693} because to do otherwise "would allow the implied warranties . . . to be annulled by implication by language less conspicuous than if they were


\textsuperscript{688} Id. at 94, 423 N.E.2d at 154, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 1599.


\textsuperscript{690} Id. at 541 n.2, 625 P.2d at 173 n.2, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 1555 n.2.

\textsuperscript{691} Id. at 545, 625 P.2d at 175, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 1557 ("disclaimer does not make it clear the buyer is assuming the risk as to the quality of the goods purchased.").

\textsuperscript{692} See Leake v. Meredith, 221 Va. 14, 17 n.4, 267 S.E.2d 93, 95 n.4, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 484, 487 n.4 (1980) ("It is not settled that disclaimers pursuant to [section 2-316(3)(a)] must be conspicuous.").

directly eliminated."

3. A Narrow Reading of Section 2-316(3)(a)

We continue to urge courts to read section 2-316(3)(a) narrowly. The drafters of section 2-316(3)(a) intended to give effect to certain "magic words" like "as is" and "with all faults" that are recognized in commerce as disclaiming all implied warranties. Courts should limit the applicability of the subsection solely to those phrases that, through trade usage, buyers clearly expect to disclaim implied warranties. Any broader application of section 2-316(3)(a) could surprise buyers and thus subvert the primary goal of section 2-316.

Unlike the authors of the 1978 Special Project, however, we do not believe that application of the subsection should be limited to commercial transactions. Sellers commonly use "as is" disclaimers when selling used goods to consumers, and courts have properly enforced such disclaimers in those instances. Noncommercial buyers know the meaning of "as is," and they are not surprised that it effectively disclaims implied warranties. The drafters expressly endorsed disclaimers using "as is" language without limiting their use to commercial settings. We believe that courts should continue to give effect to these disclaimers in noncommercial as well as commercial sales.

We believe that courts are generally justified in requiring that disclaimers under section 2-316(3)(a) be conspicuous. In instances where clear disclaiming language would be ineffective as inconspicuous under section 2-316(2), courts should not allow sellers to effectively disclaim warranties by using hidden "as is" language. Giving effect to hidden, unexpected "as is" disclaimers would subvert the drafters' specific intent to protect buyers from unbargained language.

However, because the drafters intended section 2-316(3)(a) to particularize the trade usage method of disclaiming warranties,

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695 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-316:03, at 384 (discussing how to reconcile section 2-316(2) with section 2-316(3)(a)).

696 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 7.

697 In addition to "as is" and "with all faults," these phrases include "no adjustments." See Trimpey Tire Sales & Serv., Inc. v Stine, 266 Pa. Super. 91, 92, 403 A.2d 108, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 92 (1979) ("no adjustments" as used in tire industry sufficient to exclude warranties under section 2-316(3)(a)).

698 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.

699 See supra note 685.

700 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.

701 See U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 7 (phrases like "as is," etc. are "merely a particulari-
we believe that conspicuous language is not always necessary to disclaim warranties effectively. In particular, where trade usage in commercial sales dictates the disclaimer of warranties, buyers expect disclaimers and do not need the protection of conspicuous language. In such contexts, courts should give effect to inconspicuous "as is" disclaimers.

Courts should consider such objective factors as trade usage in fixing the scope of section 2-316(3)(a). They should not, however, regard this as an invitation to delve into the negotiation process in evaluating the effectiveness of disclaiming language under this section. The drafters intended to limit the application of section 2-316(3)(a) to discrete phrases that are commonly accepted in trade as warranty disclaimers. The subsection was not meant to invite a subjective inquiry into whether the buyer expected a disclaimer. In South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. the court reviewed the following disclaimer: "There are no other warranties, whether expressed or implied, other than title." The court upheld the disclaimer under section 2-316(3)(a) after expressly rejecting it under section 2-316(2). The court scrutinized correspondence between the parties and found that the disclaimer was expected as a part of the bargain between the parties. We strongly disapprove of this approach. This language does not constitute a "magic words" expression commonly found in trade usage to disclaim warranties. The drafters did not intend section 2-316(3)(a) to create a subjective test which would enable courts to enforce any disclaiming language other than those discrete phrases commonly accepted in trade usage. Because the South Carolina Electric court's approach rejects the drafters' intent, it should not be followed.

4. "As Is" and Express Warranties

"As is" disclaimers apply only to implied warranties. Because section 2-316(1) mandates that language creating and disclaiming...
warranties be construed as consistent wherever reasonable,\textsuperscript{708} courts should attempt to construe "as is" disclaimers consistently with express warranties. Like merchantability and fitness disclaimers, "as is" disclaimers may or may not effectively prevent the formation of express warranties. Thus, courts should consider the disclaiming language to determine whether the parties meant other language to create warranties.\textsuperscript{709}

E. Disclaimers Implied from Circumstances

Subsections 2-316(b) and (c) provide additional circumstances which create an effective disclaimer.

1. By Examination—Section 2-316(3)(b)

According to section 2-316(3)(b) an effective examination by the buyer may serve to disclaim implied warranties:

Notwithstanding subsection (2) 

. . . .

(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him . . . .\textsuperscript{710}

The subsection\textsuperscript{711} provides that implied warranties arise unless, before entering the contract, (1) the buyer examines the goods, sample, or model\textsuperscript{712} "as fully" as he desires,\textsuperscript{713} or (2) the buyer ignores the seller's demand that the buyer examine the goods.\textsuperscript{714} A
refusal to inspect service records does not operate as a waiver of implied warranties.\textsuperscript{715}

An examination must occur prior to the formation of the contract to exclude implied warranties.\textsuperscript{716} Acceptance after post-contractual inspection may preclude rejection or revocation of acceptance,\textsuperscript{717} but the inspection itself should not affect the existence of implied warranties.\textsuperscript{718}

The seller may negate an implied warranty by showing that, prior to the sale, either the buyer actually discovered the defect or the buyer failed to perform a reasonably adequate inspection that would have revealed the defect.\textsuperscript{719} Questions of fact often arise in the determination of whether the buyer ought to have discovered the defect;\textsuperscript{720} the buyer’s skill is one factor relevant to such a determination.\textsuperscript{721} Subsection (3)(b) does not cover problems associated


\textsuperscript{716} See, e.g., W.M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Georgia, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 432, 433, 339 S.E.2d 646, 647, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1296, 1298 (1986) (no implied warranties where buyer insisted its original order of a copier be made contingent on a trial approval basis and copier left with buyer for a week before buyer purchased it); Perry v. Lawson Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458, 463 n.9, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 75, 80 n.9 (Okl. 1980) (“There are no reported cases dealing with exactly when an examination by the buyer must occur to exclude the implied warranties and interpreting ‘before entering the contract.’ But in our case, it seems clear that this use and examination by the buyer before payment was early enough in the sale to warn him of obvious defects . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{717} See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 8-2, at 296-97.

\textsuperscript{718} “‘Examination’ as used in this paragraph is not synonymous with inspection before acceptance or at any other time after the contract has been made.” U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 8.

\textsuperscript{719} Section 2-316(3)(b) reads in part “which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him” (emphasis added). See, e.g., Hall Truck Sales, Inc. v. Wilder Mobile Homes, Inc., 402 So. 2d 1299, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (buyer who had grader examined by expert and failed to inspect and test for grader’s only function negated implied warranty of merchantability), review denied, 412 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1982). But see Lafayette Stabilizer Repair, Inc. v. Machinery Wholesalers Corp., 750 F.2d 1290, 1295, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 122, 128 (5th Cir. 1985) (“While a more complete inspection of the lathe might have uncovered its hidden defect — of being unable to cut [the type of] connections [for which it was being purchased] — the overall problem with the machine was even more severe . . . . [Therefore] [t]he district court’s finding that the condition of the lathe ‘was not apparent upon ordinary inspection’ [was] not clearly erroneous.”).

\textsuperscript{720} See, e.g., Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105, 111, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 419, 427 (3d Cir. 1985) (“there is a disputed question of fact as to whether Heide ought to have noticed a defect in the trays through its testing procedure”); Davis v. Dils Motor Co., 566 F. Supp. 1360, 1365, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 792, 796 (S.D.W. Va. 1983) (“[F]urther inquiry into the facts is needed in order to clarify . . . whether the Plaintiff’s inspection of the tractor ‘ought in the circumstances to have revealed [the alleged defects] . . . .’”).

\textsuperscript{721} “The particular buyer’s skill and the normal method of examining goods in the
with "latent" defects.\footnote{22}{See, e.g., Wullschleger & Co. v. Jenny Fashions, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 373, 376, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1213, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("the skew was a latent defect not discoverable through reasonable physical inspection"); implied warranties not waived); Controltek, Inc. v. Kwikee Enters., Inc., 284 Or. 123, 130, 585 P.2d 670, 675, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 421, 426 (1978) ("[T]he trier of fact could properly find that ... any defects were 'latent' defects and would not have been revealed by the inspection and tests made by defendant upon receiving them from plaintiff."); Twin Lakes Mfg. v. Coffey, 222 Va. 467, 473, 281 S.E.2d 864, 867, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 770, 773 (1981) ("[The] defects in manufacture [of mobile home] did not become apparent, even to experienced workmen, until pressure was applied to join the two sections [of the house] .... Such latent defects are not those contemplated by [section 2-316(3)(b)]."; buyer's inspection did not waive implied warranties as to those defects.).}

2. *By Course of Dealing, Trade Usage, or Course of Performance—Section 2-316(3)(c)*

An express contract disclaimer is not always necessary to disclaim warranties:\footnote{23}{See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 3-3, at 100-01 (discussing how course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage may supersede or vary the effect of contractually variable Code provisions).}

Notwithstanding subsection (2)

\ldots

(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.\footnote{24}{U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c).}

Course of dealing, trade usage, or course of performance\footnote{25}{Section 1-205 defines course of dealing and trade usage:

(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.

(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.

*Id.* § 1-205.

Section 2-208(1) defines course of performance:

(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.

*Id.* § 2-208(1); *see also J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 3-3, at 98-104 (detailed discussion of course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage).} may add disclaimers to oral and written contracts or enforce express disclaimers in contracts. For example, in *Standard Structural Steel Co. v.*
Bethlehem Steel Corp. the court found a long course of dealing between parties in which the seller always disclaimed warranties to an extent sufficient to negate implied warranties in an oral contract. In Kincheloe v. Geldmeier the court found minimally sufficient evidence to show buyers at a cattle auction bought livestock “as is” and accepted the risk that the animal was not in good health. Trade usage effectively excluded or modified the implied warranty of merchantability. Course of performance may also operate to waive disclaimers.

In applying section 2-316(3)(c) courts should remember that knowledge or reasonable expectation of knowledge is a mandatory element in the application of disclaimers stemming from course of dealing, trade usage, and course of performance. Disclaimers produced through carefully defined course of dealing, trade usage, and course of performance should give effect to the parties’ reasonable expectations. Failure to limit application of this subsection to instances in which the parties had the requisite knowledge could result in unexpected, unbargained disclaimers and buyer surprise, thus subverting a primary goal of section 2-316.

F. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties—Section 317

Express warranties often conflict with implied warranties.

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727 Id. at 185, 40 U.C.C. Rep. at 1252.
731 A “common basis of understanding” is an essential element of course of dealing. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1). A usage of trade is a practice so regular to “justify an expectation” it will be observed in the particular transaction. See id. § 1-205(2). Knowledge of the performance is an integral element of course of performance. See id. § 2-208(1).
When such a conflict occurs, the question arises whether the express warranty should displace the implied warranty or whether the two warranties should apply cumulatively. Section 2-317 provides:

Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the following rules apply:

(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or model or general language of description.

(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general language of description.

(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.7

Thus, a court may consider the parties’ intent7 only after finding it unreasonable to construe the warranties as consistent.

1. Consistency Among Warranties

Although section 2-317 does not enumerate explicitly when warranties are consistent, one comment implies that warranties are consistent if the seller can comply with all of them.7 This test gives the buyer the benefit of all express and implied warranties and puts the burden on the seller, who typically has drafted the sales agreement, to resolve any possible inconsistency.7

In addition to forcing the seller to resolve ambiguities in warranty language, this test effectively places the burden on the seller to disclaim any implied warranties he wishes to avoid. The typical case involves a seller who drafts a sales agreement in which he promises to make free repairs for ninety days. Although the seller may intend to limit his liability to repair only defects that arise within the first ninety days of operation, a court may conclude that the seller delivered the product in an unmerchantable condition if the seller also


734 "The rules of this section are designed to aid in determining the intention of the parties as to which of inconsistent warranties which have arisen from the circumstances of their transaction shall prevail." Id. comment 2.

735 "To the extent that the seller has led the buyer to believe that all of the warranties can be performed, he is estopped from setting up any essential inconsistency as a defense." Id. § 2-317 comment 2; see Special Project, supra note 1, at 207-08.

736 J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 12-7, at 462 (because the seller usually drafts the sales agreement and has the opportunity to resolve any possible inconsistencies, it seems reasonable to place the burden of multiple warranties on him).
failed to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability. Such a finding may require the seller to make repairs long after the ninety-day express warranty period has expired.\(^7\) If the seller does not intend such a result, he must disclaim the implied warranty in the sales agreement.\(^8\)

2. Consistency Between Express and Implied Warranties

The consistency problem between express and implied warranties commonly arises in two contexts. The first situation involves a buyer who gives detailed specifications to the seller. One comment states how the Code resolves conflicts between express and implied warranties in contracts involving specifications: "[W]here the buyer gives detailed specifications as to the goods, neither of the implied warranties as to quality will normally apply to the transaction unless consistent with the specifications."\(^9\) Courts consistently hold that express warranties by specification negate the implied warranty of merchantability because holding otherwise would place the seller in a hopeless dilemma.\(^10\) If compliance with the buyer's specifications exposed the seller to the risk of delivering unmerchantable goods (i.e., the express specifications warranty conflicted with the implied warranty of merchantability), then the seller would have to breach one warranty in order to honor the other.

A seller making an express specifications warranty does not necessarily escape all implied warranty liability, however. If the seller provides the specifications, he still may breach an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, even if he adhered to the specifications. In *Singer Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*,\(^11\) for example, the seller recommended and supplied paint specifications to a manufacturer of air conditioners and furnaces for use in a new electrodeposition paint system. Although the paint met contract specifications, metal parts emerged from the paint tanks with blotches and streaks.\(^12\) The court upheld a jury finding that

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\(^7\) See, e.g., *Dickerson v. Mountain View Equip. Co.*, 109 Idaho 711, 710 P.2d 621, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 114 (Ct. App. 1985); see also infra notes 744-51 and accompanying text (suggesting that an express 90-day warranty is consistent with implied warranty of merchantability).

\(^8\) See infra notes 763-78 and accompanying text.

\(^9\) U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 9.


\(^12\) Id. at 436, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 278.
buyer relied on the seller's expertise, creating an implied warranty of fitness. To avoid such an unintended result, a careful seller should comply with section 2-316 and disclaim the implied warranty of fitness.

The second situation in which the consistency issue arises involves an implied warranty that reaches a defect that an express warranty does not. This is by far the more difficult of the two situations; courts and commentators disagree whether an express warranty should displace an implied warranty in the absence of a disclaimer.

The typical case involves the sale of goods with a repair warranty of limited duration, typically ninety days. The goods are plagued with defects and require many repairs, which the seller makes at his own expense for ninety days. After the express warranty expires, the seller begins charging the buyer for repair work. The buyer, frustrated with the products' poor performance and furious with the seller for failing make adequate repairs, brings a suit for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The seller argues that the parties intended the express warranty to displace all implied warranties. The buyer argues that the two warranties are consistent and that the court should construe them as cumulative. Judicial decisions support both positions.

In Dickerson v. Mountain View Equipment Co. the court distinguished between the implied warranty of merchantability, which pertains to the goods' condition at the time of delivery, and the express ninety-day warranty, which extends to the future performance of the goods. The court in finding for the buyer held that the two warranties were consistent with each other and noted that the seller could have disclaimed the implied warranty. However, the court in Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Engineering & Equipment Co. took the opposite approach. In this case, the parties contracted for the sale of a used gas compressor, including an express ninety-day

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743 Id. at 444, 24 U.C.C. Rep. at 284-85; see also Ingram River Equip., 573 F.Supp. 896, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 88 (boat builder liable for breach of implied warranty of fitness, even though contract specifications adhered to, because buyer relied on seller's expertise to provide desired results); cf. Mohasco Indus., 90 Nev. 114, 520 P.2d 234, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 605 (where buyer supplied seller with exact specifications for carpet, seller not liable for excessive shading because the contract specifications adhered to, and buyer did not rely on seller's skill or judgment).


parts and labor repair warranty. The seller made two repairs during the ninety-day warranty and a third repair after its expiration. The buyer sued to recover the cost of the third repair. The court found for the seller, concluding that extending the warranty coverage beyond ninety days was unreasonable because the parties did not intend such a result.

Professors White and Summers favor sellers in these cases on the ground that the parties probably intended the express warranty to displace any implied warranty. We think courts finding for the buyer have developed the better view. The White and Summers view frustrates the policy of the Code's disclaimer section by allowing the seller to displace an implied warranty through insertion of a seemingly innocuous express warranty. Moreover, in finding for the seller under these circumstances, courts displace section 2-317's carefully designed presumption of cumulativeness. Absent clear evidence of the parties' contrary intent, courts should construe an implied warranty reaching defects not covered by an express warranty as consistent with any express warranty. A seller who wishes to avoid liability under the implied warranty of merchantability should be forced to disclaim clearly and unambiguously the implied warranty.

3. Conflicts Among Express Warranties

Subsections 2-317(a) and (b) govern conflicts among express warranties. The Code attempts to emulate the parties' probable intent by establishing a hierarchy based on the specificity of the express warranties. Exact specifications have priority over inconsistent samples, models, or general descriptions, and in turn, a sample drawn from an existing bulk prevails over inconsistent general descriptions. However, section 2-317 does not aid in resolving conflicting warranties having the same specificity. In Heat Exchanges, Inc. v. Aaron Friedman, Inc., for example, the court confronted two conflicting express warranties in an agreement for the purchase of thirty-eight heat pumps. One warranty obliged

747 Id. at 865-66, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 819-22.
748 Id. at 872, 29 U.C.C. Rep. at 830-31; see also, Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 873 (Utah 1976) (mobile home retailer could not recover from manufacturer after expiration of one-year express warranty).
749 J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 12-7, at 459.
750 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1 explains that the disclaimer section's primary purpose is to "protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by ... permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise."
751 Special Project, supra note 1, at 209-10.
752 U.C.C. § 2-317(a)-(b).
seller to make repairs at its own expense for one year. The other warranty limited the seller’s liability to furnishing replacement parts for one year. Because neither warranty was more specific than the other, the court found section 2-317 inapplicable. The court therefore turned to section 2-316(1) to determine which warranty controlled. Section 2-316(1) states that if an agreement contains both an expanded obligation and a similar but more limited obligation, the more expansive warranty controls. Thus, the court held that the seller was obliged to make repairs at its own expense.

The Code attempts to emulate the parties’ intent. The parties’ conduct often makes clear that the strict application of sections 2-317(a) and (b) would contravene their true intent. In Stewart-Decatur Security Systems, Inc. v. von Weise Gear Co. the buyer extensively tested a model gear motor manufactured by the seller. The buyer approved the model but specified a different input speed on the purchase order. The seller made motors conforming to the model, not to the specifications. The court held that the buyer improperly rejected the motors because it found that the parties intended the model rather than the specifications to govern the seller’s obligation. Although the court held section 2-317 inapplicable because the buyer did not accept the goods, it noted that section 2-317’s hierarchy only approximates intent and would have been inappropriate because the parties’ intentions were clear.

Although the law in this area is still somewhat in flux, several principles regarding cumulation and conflict of warranties emerge from the above discussion. First, the Code makes clear that evidence of parties’ intent supersedes application of section 2-317. Therefore, parties should take care to spell out clearly their intent. Second, a seller who makes an express warranty, intending it to displace an implied warranty, should formally disclaim the implied warranty in accordance with section 2-316. Because courts are split over whether an express warranty displaces an inconsistent implied

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754 Id. at 377-79, 421 N.E.2d at 337-38, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 1389-91.
755 Id. at 387, 421 N.E.2d at 344, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 1399.
756 Id. at 388-89, 421 N.E.2d at 344-45, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 1400-01.
757 U.C.C. § 2-317 comment 2 states in relevant part: “The rules of this section are designed to aid in determining the intention of the parties . . . .” Comment 3 states: “These rules are not absolute but may be changed by evidence [of contrary party intent].”
758 517 F.2d 1136, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 24 (8th Cir. 1975).
759 Id. at 1139, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 29 (“The circumstances . . . leave little doubt that the parties intended [the model] to serve as the basis for any future dealings between them. [Seller] knew that [buyer] was relying on the test results [of the model] to . . . uncover any defects that would have to be remedied.”).
760 Id. at 1140 n.12, 17 U.C.C. Rep. at 30-31 n.12.
warranty, cautious sellers should avoid the issue entirely by formally disclaiming the implied warranty.

G. Remedy Limitations

1. *Distinguished from Disclaimers*

The Code provides a seller three ways to limit a buyer's potential remedies. As previously discussed, section 2-317 allows certain warranties to override other inconsistent warranties, thereby reducing the buyer's available remedies. In addition, a seller may limit his liability through disclaimers and limitations.

Section 2-316 authorizes sellers to use disclaimers to prevent warranties from arising. An effective warranty disclaimer completely insulates the seller from all liability under that warranty. To be effective against implied warranties, the seller must provide a conspicuous, written disclaimer.

Warranty limitations, on the other hand, do not prevent warranties from arising; rather, they allow sellers to narrow the scope of their potential liability under existing warranties. The procedures for disclaiming warranties and for limiting remedies are entirely distinct. Section 2-316(4) directs sellers to sections 2-718 and 2-719 if they wish to limit remedies for breach of an express or implied warranty. Section 2-719(1)(a) specifies, without requiring conspicuousness, that "the agreement . . . may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article." Thus, although Section 2-316(2) requires that a disclaimer of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness must be conspicuous, the conspicuousness requirement does not extend to remedy limitations under section 2-719.

Some courts, however, recognize that a remedy limitation can limit a buyer's recovery as effectively as a disclaimer and therefore impose section 2-316's conspicuousness requirements on remedy-
limitation clauses. Other courts similarly ignore the distinction by reasoning that if the seller has not alerted the buyer to an inconspicuous remedy limitation, the term is not "bargained for" and consequently is not part of the agreement. Because section 2-718 requires a written agreement between the parties to effect any limitation of remedies, these courts refuse to enforce the remedy limitation unless the seller alerts the buyer that the contract includes the limitation. A few courts have found that an inconspicuous remedy limitation may be unconscionable and thus invalid under section 2-719(3). Nevertheless, the majority of courts recognize the Code's distinction between the requirements for effectuating a warranty disclaimer and for limiting remedies. In *Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc.*, the buyers of a steel mine shaft sued for lost income due to an interruption of their mining business. A clause in the sales agreement declared that "[i]n no event shall any claim for consequential or special damages be made by either party." The buyer asserted that the language should not protect the seller be-

766 See, e.g., Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (holding that remedy limitation was "modification" of implied warranty of merchantability within meaning of section 2-316(2) and was therefore ineffective because it did not mention "merchantability").


768 "Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement. . . ." U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (emphasis added).

769 (9) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.

Id. § 2-719(3); see, e.g., Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g, 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 163; Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 226 (1971). For a further discussion on unconscionability as it relates to liability limitations, see infra notes 779-844 and accompanying text.


772 Id. at 288, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 61 (emphasis omitted).
cause it did not meet section 2-316(2) requirements for an effective implied warranty disclaimer. The court rejected the buyer's argument because "the damage limitation clause was exactly that: a limitation on the damages available to either party and not a limitation/disclaimer on the duties created under the implied warranties."  

One commentator has suggested that courts should impose identical controls on disclaimers and remedy limitations because both devices can have the same effect on a seller's liability. We disagree. The Code recognizes some distinction between disclaimers and remedy limitations. In the majority of cases, the buyer requires different protection depending upon which form of limitation the seller uses. In the typical remedy limitation case, the seller promises to make repairs and limits the buyer's recovery to the purchase price plus consequential damages. Section 2-718 allows the buyer to resort to the Code's usual remedies if the limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, i.e., if the seller cannot or will not make repairs. The buyer requires this protection because he presumably agreed to the remedy limitation in reliance on the seller's promise to make repairs. On the other hand, the seller may choose to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability and explicitly offer in its place to repair the goods for ninety days. The "failure of essential purpose" analysis no longer applies because the buyer does not specifically rely on the seller's ability to repair when he accepts the disclaimer. Section 2-316's requirements that the disclaimer mention "merchantability" and be conspicuous adequately protect the buyer by alerting him to potential problems with the goods and allowing him to negotiate the price with the disclaimer in mind.

Undoubtedly some sellers will attempt to use remedy limitations as disclaimers solely to avoid the conspicuousness requirements of section 2-316. However, if a court determines that the remedy limitation "unfairly surprised" the buyer, the court may re-

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773 Id. at 290, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 65.
774 Note, Legal Control on Warranty Liability Limitation Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Va. L. Rev. 791, 791-92 & 805-06 (1977). The author observes that the seller can achieve the same allocation of risk by using either a disclaimer ("the warranty of merchantability expires after ten days") or a remedy limitation ("the buyer must assert any breach of the warranty of merchantability within ten days"). Id. at 791. Because the two clauses achieve the same effect, the author argues that the Code should apply the same controls to each.
775 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 2 states that "under subsection (4) the question of limitation of remedy is governed by §§ 2-718 and 2-719 rather than by this section." (emphasis added).
776 See infra notes 857-99 and accompanying text (discussing failure-of-purpose doctrine more fully).
fuse to enforce the limitation under the unconscionability doctrine. Courts also may apply a "substance over form" analysis to recharacterize a limitation as a disclaimer. These two doctrines suffice to prevent an unscrupulous seller from "sneaking" a disclaimer past an unwary buyer by disguising it as a remedy limitation.

2. Unconscionability and Liability Limitations

The Code offers no clear definition of unconscionability, leaving the development of the doctrine to the courts. Section 2-302 provides:

(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.

(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.

In this section, we examine the unconscionability doctrine and its application to three types of liability limitations: disclaimers of implied warranties, exclusions of consequential damages, and exclusions or limitations of primary damages.

a. Warranty Disclaimers. For a plaintiff's unconscionable disclaimer claim to succeed, the court must affirmatively answer two

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777 U.C.C. § 2-302; see, e.g., Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 92 (N.D. 1974) (buyer of new car was handed booklet containing Basic Warranty and Limitation but signed no papers agreeing to limitation); see also infra text accompanying note 779.


779 Although commentators express varying degrees of dissatisfaction with this approach, they all agree that the Code offers no workable definition. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4-3, at 151 ("It is not possible to define unconscionability.") (emphasis in original); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 761 (1969) (arguing that section 2-302 defers to courts to define unconscionability); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) ("[R]ead this section alone makes nothing clear about the meaning of 'unconscionable.'"); Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 215 (1985) ("Neither the Code nor its comments give a specific definition of the word 'unconscionable.'").

780 U.C.C. § 2-302.
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questions: (1) whether section 2-302 ever applies to implied warranty disclaimers that satisfy section 2-316 tests, and (2) if so, whether the disclaimer is unconscionable under section 2-302.

Commentators disagree whether courts should ever find unconscionable warranty disclaimers that comply with section 2-316. Section 2-316 requirements “protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer.” Professors White and Summers have noted that this purpose coincides with section 2-302’s desire to prevent “oppression and unfair surprise,” thereby making application of section 2-302 unnecessary. Similarly, Professor Leff has argued that the detailed specificity of section 2-316’s disclaimer provisions evidences the drafters’ intent to make section 2-316 the sole provision governing implied warranty disclaimers. According to Leff, section 2-316’s comments evidence the drafters’ “full awareness of the problem at hand.”

Nevertheless, neither section 2-316 nor its comments specifically prohibits section 2-302’s application to warranty disclaimers. Other Code provisions that also lack cross-references to section 2-302 have applied it to contract terms. By its express terms, section 2-302 applies to “any clause of the contract.” Moreover, comment 1 to section 2-302 describes ten cases, seven of which deny full

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781 See Leff, supra note 779, at 520-24 (Section 2-316 compliance eliminates “unfair surprise” of section 2-301, making application of the unconscionability doctrine unnecessary). Professors White and Summers split on this issue. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 12-11, at 481 (“One of us believes that such courts misread the intention of the draftsmen and that the draftsmen never intended 2-302 to be an overlay on the disclaimer provision of 2-316.”); cf. Phillips, supra note 779, at 200 (“[S]ection 2-302 should be aggressively applied to invalidate disclaimers of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.”). 
782 U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
783 J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 12-11, at 475; see also Leff, supra note 779, at 516-28.
784 U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1.
785 Leff, supra note 779, at 523. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1 states the drafters’ intent to protect buyers from “unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by . . . permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.”
786 Leff, supra note 779, at 523. The nine provisions containing cross-references to section 2-302 are sections 2-202, 2-204, 2-205, 2-207, 2-303, 2-508, 2-615, 2-718, and 2-719. Professor Phillips has argued that section 2-719(3)’s specific textual reference to the possibility of unconscionability, which is conspicuously absent from section 2-316, may support Leff’s position. See Phillips, supra note 779, at 221-22.
787 See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, § 12-11, at 476 (waiver-of-defense clause, U.C.C. § 9-206(1), and cross-security clauses, U.C.C. § 9-206, lack cross-references to section 2-302); see also Phillips, supra note 779, at 221.
effect to disclaimers. White and Summers have pointed out that "[i]t is difficult to reconcile an intent on the part of the draftsmen to immunize disclaimers from the effect of 2-302 with the fact that they used cases in which courts struck down disclaimers to illustrate the concept of unconscionability." 788 Even if a disclaimer is both conspicuous and actually understood by the buyer, 789 it may "oppress" the buyer within the meaning of comment 1 to section 2-302 because of unequal bargaining power. Thus, a seller in a strong bargaining position could force a buyer to accept an unconscionable warranty disclaimer that fully complies with section 2-316's requirements. Furthermore, because buyers rarely read and understand implied warranty disclaimers, section 2-316(a)'s conspicuousness requirement probably will not protect buyers from "unexpected" disclaimer language.

A court applying section 2-302 to a disclaimer 790 must decide whether the disclaimer is in fact unconscionable. This determination is difficult to make because, as White and Summers have pointed out, "[i]t is not possible to define unconscionability. It is not a concept but a determination to be made in light of a variety of factors not unifiable into a formula." 791 The most common factors that courts consider in implied warranty disclaimer/unconscionability cases include relative bargaining power, extensiveness of negotiations, sophistication of the parties, the parties' prior dealings, and trade customs. 792 Each case invariably turns on its own set of facts, making generalizations difficult.

788 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 12-11, at 476.
789 See supra note 764 and accompanying text.
791 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4-3, at 151 (emphasis in original).
792 See infra notes 802-07 and accompanying text.
In *U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.*, for example, the court concluded that superior bargaining power is irrelevant in deciding whether the contract was unconscionable if both parties realize that the contract's purpose is to allocate risk. In comparison, the court in *FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree*, a case also involving commercial parties, considered the absence of grossly disproportionate bargaining power a significant factor in determining that a valid warranty disclaimer was not unconscionable. Although both courts found no unconscionability, they differed on the significance of the parties' bargaining power in reaching their conclusions.

Courts may find disclaimer clauses unconscionable if one party is an unsophisticated businessman. In *A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.*, the plaintiff, a farmer, was the sole shareholder of his farming company. The plaintiff had no experience farming tomatoes when he entered into a contract to buy weight-sizing equipment. The sales contract contained an implied warranty disclaimer satisfying the requirements of section 2-316(2). After concluding that section 2-302 applies to an implied warranty disclaimer satisfying section 2-316, the court noted that unconscionability claims by businessmen generally do not find favor with the courts. Nevertheless, in finding the disclaimer unconscionable, the court stated that "courts have begun to recognize that experienced but legally unsophisticated businessmen may be unfairly surprised by unconscionable contract terms . . . and that even large business entities may have relatively little bargaining power, depending on . . . the commercial circumstances surrounding the agreement."

In sum, there is no easy way to capsulize these cases.

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794 Id. at 460, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 268. The buyer of machinery used to make cotton pads sued the manufacturer. The contract required very precise specifications for the machine and disclaimed all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of merchantability. Id., 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 268.
795 632 F.2d 413, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 496 (5th Cir. 1980).
796 Id. at 420, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 503.
797 Both courts considered the nature of the parties important in finding that the disclaimer was not unconscionable. See *U.S. Fibres, Inc.*, 358 F. Supp. at 460, 13 U.C.C. Rep. at 268 ("In the light of the facts and commercial background of this transaction, the contract is neither oppressive nor unfair."); *FMC Fin. Corp.*, 632 F.2d at 420, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 504 ("While Illinois courts will readily apply the unconscionability doctrine to contracts between consumers and skilled corporate sellers, they are reluctant to re-write the terms of a negotiated contract between businessmen.").
799 Id. at 478, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1132.
800 Id. at 483-85, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 120-21, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1137-38.
801 Id. at 489-90, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1144 (emphasis in original).
"[G]eneralizations are always subject to exceptions and categorization is rarely an adequate substitute for analysis." While some courts emphasize bargaining power in determining whether a warranty disclaimer is unconscionable, others focus on the buyer's ability to seek better terms elsewhere, and still others look to the sophistication of the aggrieved party. Although the declaration of White and Summers that "courts have not been solicitous of businessmen in the name of unconscionability" remains essentially accurate, A&M Produce illustrates an emerging willingness by courts to engage in a more sophisticated inquiry, rendering the results of unconscionability cases between commercial entities even less predictable.

Typically, consumers lack the sophistication, expertise, and bargaining power possessed by business actors. Courts, however, do not invariably find disclaimers unconscionable in consumer cases. Although courts usually find disclaimers in personal injury situations unconscionable, in other consumer cases courts generally uphold disclaimers except in extremely one-sided deals.

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802 Id., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1144.
804 See, e.g., Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241 (S.D. 1984) (plaintiff could obtain yellow-pages advertising from only one source and to limit recovery to amount of charges for advertising is unconscionable).
805 See supra text accompanying notes 798-801.
806 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4-9, at 170.
808 See Phillips, supra note 779, at 232 (of 12 cases examined by Professor Phillips about half found disclaimer unconscionable).
b. Consequential Damage Exclusions. Section 2-718(3) permits sellers to exclude consequential damages.\footnote{811} Unlike section 2-316, section 2-719(3) expressly states that the limitation is valid \textit{unless it is unconscionable}. Thus, consequential damage exclusions may be unconscionable, although the Code remains neutral as to their unconscionability in the commercial context.\footnote{812}

Most claims alleging unconscionability in commercial cases fail. For example, in \textit{Kaplan v. RCA Corp.}\footnote{813} a television station brought an action against the seller of a defective antenna. The buyer argued that a clause in the sales agreement excluding the seller's liability for consequential damages was unconscionable.\footnote{814} The court held that the limitation-of-remedy clause was not unconscionable for several reasons: the loss was commercial, the buyers were experienced businesspeople, the buyers did not have to deal with this particular seller, and the clause was reasonable considering both the sales price ($12,000) and the risk of consequential damages (possibly millions of dollars).\footnote{815}

Although unconscionability claims involving two business entities almost invariably fail, some courts have struck down consequential damage exclusions in the commercial setting. In \textit{A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.}\footnote{816} the court found a consequential damages exclusion unconscionable even though both parties were commercial entities. The court found both "unfair surprise"\footnote{817} and "une-

\footnote{811} Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).

\footnote{812} Limitations of consequential damages in consumer cases are prima facie unconscionable. \textit{See supra} note 811.

\footnote{813} 783 F.2d 463, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1312 (4th Cir. 1986).

\footnote{814} \textit{Id.} at 464, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1314.

\footnote{815} 763 F.2d 463, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 1318; \textit{see also} Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1076 (10th Cir. 1983) (limitation-of-damages clause in agreement for sale of oil well injection packer sealant not unconscionable because loss was commercial, both parties were business entities, and limitation language was conspicuous); \textit{M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr.}, 708 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1983) (limitation-of-remedy clause in agreement to repair ship was not adhesion contract but rather commercial transaction between two business entities); \textit{Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co.}, 389 F. Supp. 476, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 415 (W.D. Pa.) (limitation on liability for lost profits in contract to repair an electrical motor was not unconscionable because the loss was commercial and involved large business entities), \textit{aff'd}, 523 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1975).

\footnote{816} 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1129 (1982); \textit{see also supra} text accompanying notes 798-802.

\footnote{817} The disclaimer and consequential damages exclusion were located in the middle of the back page of a long, preprinted form contract and were not pointed out to the buyer. \textit{A&M Produce Co.}, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490-91, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1144-45.
qual bargaining power" and therefore refused to enforce the limitation clause.

In Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., the court found unconscionable a consequential damages exclusion in a sales contract between a farmer and an herbicide manufacturer. The herbicide sold to the buyer failed to control the growth of foxtail. The court reasoned that (1) enforcing the limitation would leave the buyer without any substantial recourse for his loss, (2) farmers do not have equal bargaining power when dealing with herbicide manufacturers, (3) farmers cannot test pesticides before purchasing them, and (4) allowing sellers to avoid responsibility for the ineffectiveness of a product that has only one purpose contravenes public policy.

Although most commercial cases of unconscionable consequential damage limitations involve parties with unequal bargaining power, courts usually do not rely solely upon unequal bargaining power to find such limitations unconscionable. While more courts have found unconscionability in the bargaining process since 1978, most claims of unconscionability between commercial parties of equal bargaining power continue to fail.

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818 The buyer was unfamiliar with the product, and the buyer's company was smaller than the seller's company. In addition, the seller's salesman was not authorized to negotiate terms of the contract. Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1145.
819 Id. at 489-91, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25, 34 U.C.C. Rep. at 1143-46.
821 Id. at 700, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 593.
823 In many cases involving defective farm products, courts have struck down consequential damage exclusions on the ground that the buyer could not discover the defect until after the loss occurred. See, e.g., Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 592 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (sale of defective soybean inoculant); Durham, 315 N.W.2d 696, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 588 (sale of defective herbicide). These cases involved small farmers and large manufacturers of farm products, where the parties had unequal bargaining power. A court finding unconscionability based solely on the undiscoverable nature of the defect would be incorrect because the Code does not distinguish between discoverable and latent defects, expressly approving the contractual allocation of unknown risks. See U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (valid clauses which limit or exclude consequential damages are merely allocations of unknown risk).
824 Special Project, supra note 1, at 220.
c. Primary Damage Limitations. In commercial transactions, sellers cannot deprive the buyer of all remedies for breach of a warranty.

[I]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.\textsuperscript{826}

The "fair quantum of remedy" question most often arises where the express warranty expires after an allotted time but before the buyer could have discovered the defect. For example, in \textit{Trinkle v. Schumacher Co.}\textsuperscript{827} two commercially experienced companies contracted for fabric, which the buyer intended to use to manufacture Roman shades. The agreement contained a clause stating that the buyer could not initiate a claim after cutting the fabric. While processing the fabric the buyer discovered that the seller improperly applied the fabric's vinyl backing. The buyer could not have discovered the defective condition until processing. The court acknowledged that unconscionability rarely exists in a commercial setting involving parties of equal bargaining power but nevertheless found the damage limitation unconscionable because it "provide[d] neither a minimum nor adequate remedy to [buyer]."\textsuperscript{828} \textit{Trinkle} represents the paradigm case for unconscionability because the terms of the contract did not allow the buyer any meaningful recovery for the seller's breach.\textsuperscript{829}

In \textit{McCullough v. General Motors Corp.}\textsuperscript{830} the buyer recovered on a similar, but less favorable, set of facts. The buyer became injured

\textsuperscript{826} U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1.
\textsuperscript{827} 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 39 (1980).
\textsuperscript{828} \textit{Id.} at 20, 301 N.W.2d at 259, 31 U.C.C. Rep. at 44.
\textsuperscript{829} \textit{See also} Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 81 (3d Cir.), \textit{cert. denied}, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (holding that 15-day notice requirement was manifestly unreasonable and ineffective to relieve seller of its warranty obligations with respect to oil, sold for manufacture into resins, which contained chemical contaminant that could not be detected until complex chemical process took place after 15-day notice had elapsed); Vandenberg v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 383 (1964) (seller of tulip bulbs could not bar claims for defective bulbs by requiring notice before bulbs would normally bloom).
when the collapsible steering wheel on his car failed to collapse in an accident. The vehicle came with an exclusive twelve-month or 12,000-mile warranty, which expired before the accident. The court refused to grant the seller's motion for summary judgment, stating that the defect was not discoverable until an accident occurred. The court reasoned that enforcing the limitation would leave the buyer without the minimum adequate remedy required by comment 1 to section 2-719. The argument for unconscionability was weaker in this case than in Trinkle because the defect was not necessarily undiscernible until after the expiration of the warranty period.

The fact that both parties are commercial entities may influence a court to find a lack of unconscionability even though a defect probably could not be found within the warranty period. In Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., a sales agreement for the purchase of a DC-8 commercial aircraft included an exclusive express warranty to repair or replace any defective equipment that became apparent within one year or 2,500 flying hours, whichever came first. The seller disclaimed all other warranties and excluded liability for consequential damages. The seller delivered the aircraft with defective spoilers that the buyer did not discover until the airplane crashed after expiration of the warranty. The court upheld the contract's validity because the seller would have corrected the defect had the buyer discovered it prior to the warranty expiration date. The court found that the buyer had a "fair quantum of remedy" for the seller's breach of its contractual obligations. Although the defect in the spoilers was as undiscoverable as the steering wheel defect in McCullough, the Tokio court was unsympathetic to the commercial buyer's plight.

When the issue of undiscoverability of a defect within the warranty period does not exist, courts likely will find that the buyer had a "fair quantum of remedy." In Stan D. Bowles Distributing Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., for example, a national brewer entered into a distribution contract with a wholesale distributor. The distributor sued the brewer over a disagreement as to whether the contract included the right to distribute malt liquor as well as beer. The court upheld the validity of a clause excluding liability for the distributor's

831 Id. at 44, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1532.
832 Id. at 46, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1536.
833 Id. at 45, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 1536.
834 617 F.2d 936, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 402 (2d Cir. 1980).
835 Id. at 938-39, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 403-04.
836 Id. at 940-41, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 406-07.
838 Id. at 343-44, 317 S.E.2d at 685-86, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 501-02.
lost profits despite his claim that the clause left him without "minimum adequate remedies." The agreement did not exclude all damages but rather listed the items for which the brewer would not be liable. Thus, the court found that the contract provided a "fair quantum of remedy."

The term "fair quantum of remedy," like unconscionability, escapes precise definition. Contracts leaving the aggrieved party with no possible means to recover for the other party's breach are clearly unconscionable. On the other hand, commercial contracts that merely exclude consequential damages are not unconscionable. Contracts in between these extremes may be unconscionable depending upon their individual facts. In deciding whether a contract provision is unconscionable, courts should consider the presence or absence of the traditional factors of unconscionability, such as unequal bargaining power or extreme one-sidedness.

3. Exclusiveness of Remedy—The Language Requirement of Section 2-719(1)(b)

Although the Code provides sellers with ways to limit their liability through disclaimers and remedy limitations, it also allows sellers to provide more remedies than the Code itself extends. Often, however, the seller intends his express warranty to serve in lieu of the Code remedies, not in addition to them. To achieve exclusivity, section 2-719(1)(b) requires the parties to agree expressly that the stated remedy will act as the buyer's sole remedy.

In consumer cases, courts usually give the buyer the benefit of even the slightest doubt as to whether the parties intended the express remedies to be exclusive. In Williams v. Hyatt Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., for example, the purchaser of a defective automobile brought an action to recover damages for breach of warranty. The sales agreement stated that Chrysler would repair without charge any defects occurring within the first twelve months or 12,000 miles. The contract further stated that this limited warranty represented

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839 Id. at 851, 317 S.E.2d at 690, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 504.
840 For instance, the brewer was liable to the distributor for the diminution in the value of the franchise. Id., 317 S.E.2d at 690, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 504.
841 See supra note 779.
842 See supra note 829 and accompanying text.
843 See supra note 839 and accompanying text.
844 U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) provides in relevant part that "the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article."
845 Id. § 2-719(1)(b) states that "resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy."
the sole warranty made by Chrysler, and went on to exclude liability for consequential damages.\textsuperscript{848} The court made available to the buyer all remedies under the Code other than consequential damages, finding that "[t]here is . . . no language in the warranty expressly stating that such a remedy is exclusive."\textsuperscript{849}

In commercial cases, a court more likely will look to the parties' true intent,\textsuperscript{850} but even in these cases the contract must express an intent to make the remedy exclusive. Polcon Industries, Inc. \textit{v. Hercules, Inc.},\textsuperscript{851} for example, involved a contract for the sale of plastic blowmolding machines. The parties agreed that the buyer could return the machines within ninety days and receive a full refund if they did not meet performance requirements.\textsuperscript{852} The court held that despite this agreement, the buyer's failure to return the machines within ninety days did not bar it from other remedies under the Code.\textsuperscript{853} Thus, whether the contract is a consumer or a commercial agreement, the seller should make clear the parties' intent that express warranty be exclusive to avoid a contrary result.

4. \textit{Scope of Remedy Limitations}

Sellers must carefully draft remedy limitations to cover all warranty breaches. Use of the term "this warranty," for instance, could backfire because express warranties may lurk elsewhere in the agreement despite disclaimer language. The seller must disclaim each and every warranty he wishes to disable, and sloppy draftsmanship can easily expose the seller to unexpectedly broad liability.

\textsuperscript{848} \textit{Id.} at 315, 269 S.E.2d at 188-89, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 96.
\textsuperscript{849} \textit{Id.} at 316, 269 S.E.2d at 189, 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 96; \textit{see also} Ford Motor Co. \textit{v. Reid}, 250 Ark. 176, 184, 465 S.W.2d 80, 85, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 985, 990 (1971) (seller's promise to repair defects in lieu of other warranties or obligations did not make automobile purchaser's remedy of repair exclusive, permitting him to recover consequential property damages resulting from fire in his car because "[t]here [was] no language . . . 'expressly' stating that the remedy of repair or replacement of defective parts [was] to be the exclusive remedy").
\textsuperscript{850} In J.D. Pavlack, Ltd. \textit{v. William Davies Co.}, 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 245, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 394 (1976), the contract for the sale of meat provided that "seller will allow for excess fat content at invoice price and buyer will accept such as full settlement." \textit{Id.} at 3, 351 N.E.2d at 245, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 396. The court found that the parties' intent was to treat the allowance as the buyer's exclusive remedy despite their failure to employ the word "exclusive." \textit{Id.} at 4, 351 N.E.2d at 246, 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 398.
\textsuperscript{852} \textit{Id.} at 1319, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 922.
\textsuperscript{853} \textit{Id.} at 1325, 26 U.C.C. Rep. at 928; \textit{see also}, District Concrete Co. \textit{v. Bernstein Concrete Corp.}, 418 A.2d 1030, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 201 (D.C. 1980) (fact that specifications for project provided for use of tear-out remedy to repair in-place defective concrete roof did not mean that supplier was entitled to rely on tear-out remedy as only remedy contemplated by parties because nowhere in contract did there appear designation of tear-out as exclusive remedy).
In *Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Industries* the seller made four express warranties in “Item 16” of the contract. Immediately following the warranty, the agreement stated that the “[seller’s] liability for any breach of this warranty shall be limited solely to job site replacement or repair.” The seller’s price quote, however, contained detailed technical specifications, which the court found to have created a separate express warranty. Because the lead sentence in the limiting clause spoke only of a breach of “this” warranty, the court held that the clause applied only to the “Item 16” warranties. The limiting clause did not shield the seller from liability for breach of the technical specification warranty. Careful sellers should therefore use broad, all-encompassing language when drafting remedy limitations.

5. Failure of Purpose—Section 2-719(2)

a. When Applicable. Section 2-719(2) provides: “Where circumstances cause an exclusive remedy or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.” Remedies ensure that the buyer receives what the seller promised. If a limited remedy fails to achieve that end, it has failed its essential purpose. Thus, section 2-719(2) applies whenever an exclusive remedy, which may have appeared fair and reasonable at the inception of the contract, operates as a result of later circumstances to deprive a party of a substantial benefit of the bargain. The test for determining whether a limited warranty fails its essential purpose is whether the buyer receives, within a reasonable period of time, goods conforming to the contract. The most common example of a remedy that can fail its essential purpose is

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854 777 F.2d 405, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1 (8th Cir. 1985).
855 Id. at 410 n.6, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 9 n.6 (emphasis added).
856 Cf. Community Television Servs., Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 586 F.2d 637, 640, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 851, 856-57 (8th Cir. 1978) (advertising enlarged warranty created by technical specifications contained in contract; clauses in contract limiting liability of seller applied only to limited warranty of materials and workmanship set forth in contract and not to broader warranty created by advertising), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 285, 290, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 59, 64 (W.D. Va. 1986) (seller adequately protected himself by providing that “in no event” would either party claim consequential or special damages; court rejected buyer’s claim that consequential damages exclusion applied only to incidence involving delivery).
857 U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
858 See, e.g., Hartzell v. Justus Co., 693 F.2d 770, 774, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1594, 1597 (8th Cir. 1982) (where repairs did not bring house to the promised condition, the limited repair remedy failed its essential purpose).
the exclusive remedy of repair or replacement of defective goods. Other exclusive remedies can fail their essential purpose as well. For example, an exclusive refund-of-the-purchase-price remedy could fail its purpose if the seller refuses to refund the price.

Some limitations, by definition, cannot fail their essential purpose, and thus section 2-719(2) cannot apply. For example, clauses that limit damages to the purchase price, or clauses excluding consequential damages, should never fail their essential purpose. These "allocation of risk" clauses accomplish precisely what the parties intend.

Nevertheless, where a limitation-of-remedy clause operates to deny the buyer an adequate remedy, courts sometimes improperly use section 2-719(2) to invalidate an exclusionary clause. For example, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. the court faced a seller's limitation of remedies that provided unconscionably low damages. The court concluded that "[t]he essential purpose of any damage award is to make the injured party whole." Because the limitation of remedies prevented this, it failed its essential purpose. The court applied section 2-719(2) and held that a "'remedy may be had as provided in [the Code].'" Although the court correctly held for the buyer, it unnecessarily applied section 2-719(2) because unconscionability alone would have sufficed to render the limitation invalid. Only a "fair and reasonable clause" can fail of its pur-

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861 Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287, 292, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 91, 98 (4th Cir. 1982) ("failure of essential purchase exception applies most obviously to situations where the limitation of remedy involves repair or replacement that cannot return the goods to their warranted condition"). Professor Eddy has argued that the exclusive remedy of repair or replacement was the only remedy limitation the drafters considered when they wrote section 2-719(2). See Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REV. 28, 39 (1977).

862 See, e.g., Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832, 31 U.C.C. Rep. 984 (Utah 1981) (automobile seller failed for two months to return purchase price to buyer even though there was no real dispute as to defects in automobile, limited remedy of return of amount paid failed its essential purpose, allowing resort to additional remedies); cf. Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427, 431-32, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 170, 175 (6th Cir. 1983) (seller's refusal to rescind sale of freezer to buyer did not cause contractual rescission remedy to fail its essential purpose because court could have enforced rescission provision, and thus essence of remedy could have been carried out).

863 Nevertheless, refund remedies and damage ceilings occasionally have been held to fail under section 2-719(2) when defects are undiscoverable before the buyer sustains large losses. See infra notes 895-95 and accompanying text.

864 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 667 (1986).

865 Id. at 39, 388 N.W.2d at 599, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 676 (citation omitted).

866 Id. at 40, 388 N.W.2d at 592, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 677 (citation omitted).

867 See Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1510, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 49, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (very essence of a sales contract requires that at least minimum adequate remedies be available so limited remedy fails its essential purpose when enforcement of remedy limitation essentially would leave plaintiff with no
pose. The court should have found this clause unconscionable pursuant to section 2-719 because it denied the buyer a fair quantum of remedy.868

b. Failure of an Exclusive Remedy of Repair or Replacement. The limited remedy of repair or replacement may serve several purposes, but it primarily gives the seller an opportunity to make the goods conform to the sales contract while limiting exposure by excluding liability for other possible damages.869 From the buyer's standpoint, the repair remedy ensures that the seller will provide goods that conform to the contract at an appropriate time.870 A limited remedy breaks down when it "fails in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain."871 Because the exclusive repair or replacement remedy seeks to give the buyer conforming goods, the remedy fails its essential purpose whenever the seller does not perform his obligation.

Fiorito Brothers, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp.872 exemplifies a clear case of failure of essential purpose. In Fiorito Brothers the manufacturer of dump truck bodies arbitrarily declined to make necessary repairs to bodies sold, causing the limited repair remedy to fail.873 The court of appeals did not hesitate to affirm the district court's summary judgment that the repair or replacement remedy failed its essential purpose. The court reasoned that "[d]enial of responsibility to repair is a failure of a limited remedy in the most basic sense."874

Such examples of willful breach are relatively uncommon, however. In most cases, the seller tries to repair the goods but cannot. Although some courts have held otherwise,875 in most recent decisions regarding whether a repair warranty failed its essential purpose courts have correctly ignored whether the seller made a good remedy at all), rev'd in part, 786 F.2d 72, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1656 (2d Cir. 1986); Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (1968) (refusing to enforce remedy limitation by invoking section 2-719(2) when doing so would leave plaintiff with essentially no remedy).
868 "If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach . . . ." U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1.
870 Id., 30 U.C.C. Rep. at 420.
871 U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1.
872 747 F.2d 1309, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1298 (9th Cir. 1984).
873 Id. at 1313, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 1302-03.
875 See Special Project, supra note 1, at 255-36 (discussing cases holding that a seller's good faith shields him when a buyer pleads failure of purpose).
faith effort to perform. In Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. the court recognized that a limited remedy to repair "reveals an unequivocal assumption that [the seller] will be able to correct any mechanical problem . . . but nowhere suggests—much less provides for—the possibility that repair may be impossible." Thus, the court correctly found for the buyer even though the seller "was able to arrange for prompt service attention within his own shop, but the company-trained service personnel were not able to solve the . . . problem."

Courts must apply this bright-line approach to assure the buyer of a fair quantum of remedy. A "best efforts" rule easily could deprive buyers of any recovery for breach of remedy. As one court has recognized, "The detriment to the buyer is the same whether the seller diligently but unsuccessfully attempts to honor his promise or acts negligently or in bad faith."

A limited repair warranty also fails if the seller takes too much time to repair the goods. In Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, for example, the court awarded damages to the buyer of a combine for breach of warranty to repair or replace when the seller made numerous repairs over an extended time period but failed to repair the machine to the buyer's reasonable satisfaction. Although the seller was willing to continue making repairs, the court correctly held:

[T]he seller does not have an unlimited period of time to repair and/or replace parts under a warranty. Given the numerous attempts at repair over the extended time period, the jury could properly conclude . . . that the combine was not repaired within a reasonable time and that the limited warranty had failed of its essential purpose.
Such a rule is critical to ensure that the buyer is made whole. A
counter rule would allow an obstinate seller to make patch-work
repairs over an extended time period, leaving the aggrieved buyer
without the benefit of his bargain.

c. Effect of Separate Consequential Damage Exclusions After Failure of
Purpose. Most contracts containing an exclusive remedy of repair
and replacement also contain a clause excluding consequential dam-
gages. Section 2-719(1) allows the seller to limit the buyer's reme-
dies, and section 2-719(3) explicitly authorizes limitations of
consequential damages. However, section 2-719(2) gives the buyer
remedies "as provided in this Act" when a limited remedy fails its
essential purpose. Thus, the question arises whether section 2-719(2)
voids the consequential damages exclusion clause when an
exclusive remedy fails.

A majority of cases have answered correctly that the failure of
an exclusive remedy voids the consequential damages exclusion
clause, although the ways in which courts have reached this conclu-
sion vary tremendously. In most situations, the consequential dam-
gages exclusion is inexorably linked to the exclusive remedy
provision. The two provisions are interdependent in that the parties
use the contract to allocate risk based on the assumption that the
seller can and will repair or replace the goods within a reasonable
time. If this assumption later proves unfounded, courts should no
longer bar the buyer, who has bargained away his right to conse-
quential damages in reliance on the seller's promise to repair or re-
place, from recovering resultant damages. Several cases explicitly
recognize this, while others seem to do so implicitly.

ships, was given four opportunities to repair or replace defective parts but failed to fix
defects in vehicle during a four month period); Givan v. Mack Truck Inc., 569 S.W.2d
243, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (buyer is not bound to permit warrantor
to tinker with article indefinitely in hope that it may ultimately be made to comply;
rather, limited remedy fails of its purpose whenever warrantor fails to correct the defect
within reasonable period of time).

See infra notes 885-92. An exclusive remedy of repair and replacement suffices in
itself to exclude consequential damages. When the remedy fails, however, courts readily
award such damages in the absence of a separate exclusion. See, e.g., Beal v. General
gages awarded in breach of contract for sale of tractor).

See, e.g., Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1553
(4th Cir. 1985) (under sales contract for tractor, which limited seller's obligation to re-
pair and replacement of parts and excluded seller's liability for consequential damages,
exclusion of consequential damages did not extend to situation where seller failed to
repair tractor as required by warranty because contract indicated that parties contem-
plated certain repair of tractor and thus did not anticipate any need to limit damages
from failure of certain repair); Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 39
U.C.C. Rep. 1298 (9th Cir. 1984) (purpose of parties in agreeing to exclusive-remedy
 provision was to insure that buyer would not suffer consequential damages from down
Nevertheless, not all courts have held that the consequential damage exclusion necessarily fails when an exclusive remedy fails. Some courts sensibly reduce the inquiry to whether recognizing the consequential damages exclusion is unconscionable. In the rare instance where the buyer does not rely on the seller’s promise to repair in bargaining away his right to recover consequential damages, the exclusionary clause should stand. If, on the other hand, the buyer relies on the repair warranty, courts should consider it unconscionable to allow the seller to avoid all consequential liability by sheltering himself behind one portion of the warranty while ignoring its obligations under another portion.

Most courts that adopt the unconscionability analysis do not, however, follow this reasoning. Instead, these courts look for the traditional aspects of unconscionability, such as unequal bargaining power. For example, in *In re Feder Litho-Graphic Services* the court upheld the validity of a consequential damages exclusion in a sales contract for an offset press even though the limited repair remedy failed, because the court could find none of the traditional indicia of unconscionability. A few courts have held that the failure of a repair remedy does not invalidate a consequential damages exclusion but have given no reasons for their finding. Finally, some
time of trucks; therefore seller's failure to repair trucks voided consequential damages exclusion); *see also infra* note 892 and accompanying text.


887 *See infra* note 889.


889 *Id.* at 489, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 499; *see also* Frantz Lithographic Servs., Inc. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (consequential damages exclusion not unconscionable because buyer could still recover the amount paid under the contract, and therefore was not deprived of all remedies); AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924, 930, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 1583, 1589-90 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (consequential damages exclusion not unconscionable even if exclusive repair remedy failed because both parties were sophisticated merchants); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 34 U.C.C. Rep. 857 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (consequential damages exclusion not unconscionable regardless of failure of repair remedy because both parties were of equal sophistication and bargaining power and there was no evidence of haste or undue pressure exerted on buyer to compel it to enter into the contract).

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courts treat the limited remedy of repair and a consequential damages exclusion as separate, independent attempts by the parties to allocate risk. 891

We find highly implausible the notion that parties consciously allocate the risk that an exclusive repair remedy will fail completely. A rational buyer would not accept the seller’s promise to repair the goods as his sole remedy, agree not to seek consequential damages or a refund of the purchase price, and then agree that in the event seller cannot (or will not) repair the goods the buyer cannot recover damages resulting from the seller’s breach. We find it far more likely that the parties never contemplate the possibility of a failure of the repair remedy, and that the buyer agrees to waive his right to consequential damages in reliance on certain repair. Although each case must stand on its own facts, under such an analysis courts will usually void the consequential damages exclusion in cases involving the failure of a repair warranty. 892

d. Failure of Price Repayment Remedies. An exclusive refund remedy typically requires the seller to return the substantial value of warranted goods while excluding resultant damages. A price repayment remedy would therefore fail its purpose when the seller wrongfully refuses to refund the price. 893 Moreover, if the purpose of the price repayment is to enable the buyer to acquire substitute goods promptly, even an immediate refund may cause the remedy to fail; for example, substitute goods might not be readily available, 894 or the market price may have risen sharply since the time of contracting. Absent an explicit understanding to the contrary, however, courts should not hold that a repayment remedy fails merely because the buyer cannot obtain a substitute within a reasonable


892 See RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 547, 41 U.C.C. Rep. 1561, 1565 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Neither bad faith nor procedural unconscionability is necessary under [section 2-719(2)]. It provides an independent limit when circumstances render a damages limitation clause oppressive and invalid.”).


time. The buyer should foresee the problems of substitution, and unlike the limited repair remedy, the buyer relies on market condition, not on the seller’s performance, in agreeing to an exclusive remedy. Thus, although the prompt acquisition of substitute goods may serve as an important secondary purpose of a repayment remedy, the essential purpose is most likely the return of consideration.

No remedy limitation is foolproof, but a seller can increase greatly the chances that courts will enforce his limitation through careful drafting. Sellers should take particular care that the limitation covers all warranty breaches and that the contract leaves the buyer with a fair quantum of remedy in the event of the seller’s breach. The agreement also should state explicitly that the parties intend the express warranties as exclusive. The seller should use consequential damage exclusions, but with the knowledge that courts may not enforce them if the seller fails to honor his express warranties.

VI
DEFENSES TO WARRANTY ACTIONS

A. Privity—Section 2-318

Privity describes the relationship between the parties to a contract: Those who have entered into a contract with one another are "in privity." Those who have not contracted directly with one another are not in privity. Traditionally, manufacturers owed no duty of care to people not in privity. Consequently, only buyers in privity with the manufacturer could recover for harm caused by the manufacturer’s defective or unsafe products. This traditional doctrine reflected fears that remote buyers would subject sellers to unexpected and unrestrained suits. Recently, however, the doctrine has fallen into decline.

There are two basic kinds of privity relationships. "Vertical

895 See supra text accompanying notes 884-92.
896 See supra notes 854-56 and accompanying text.
897 See supra notes 827-45 and accompanying text.
898 See supra notes 845-53 and accompanying text.
899 See supra notes 884-92 and accompanying text.
900 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-2, at 399 (discussing privity and warranty claims).
902 See id. at 405 ("Unless we confine the operation of [contracts indirectly affecting third parties] to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences . . . would ensue.").
903 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-2, at 399 ("[T]he subject itself is crumbling away.").
904 A third form of privity relationship, "diagonal privity," is sometimes discussed. See infra notes 905-06.
privity” describes the relationship between parties in the marketing chain, usually the manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, and ultimate buyer. In this chain, only parties who have contracted directly with one another are in privity. Typically, the manufacturer is only in privity with the wholesaler and the ultimate buyer only with the retailer. The wholesaler and retailer are in privity with each other as well as with the manufacturer and buyer, respectively. “Horizontal privity” describes the relationship between the retailer and persons other than the ultimate buyer, who use or consume the goods. For example, horizontal privity describes the relationship between the retailer and a child who uses a lawnmower his grandfather purchased.

Initially, privity protected parties from both tort and warranty liability. After a period of decline, however, the New York Court of Appeals effectively ended its application to tort claims in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. In MacPherson the court held that lack of privity between a manufacturer and a consumer does not shield the manufacturer from liability for personal injury and property damage resulting from faulty manufacture of a product where one reasonably could expect the defect to cause the damage that in fact ensued. The demise of privity in contract law has been slower and less uniform.

Four major social policy grounds support the attacks on privity in the products liability field. First, manufacturers and suppliers can best distribute losses caused by unsafe products because they can include the cost of damages or insurance in the price of the product. Second, strict liability both compensates injured parties and deters the production of unsafe products. Third, suppliers impliedly represent that their goods are safe by placing them in the

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905 Hawkland also mentioned “diagonal privity,” a combination of horizontal and vertical privity. 2 W. Hawkland, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 421.


908 See 2 W. Hawkland, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 419-20.

909 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see 2 W. Hawkland, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 420 (“After MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. the application of the privity doctrine to torts ended in most states . . . .”).

910 217 N.Y. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.

911 See 2 W. Hawkland, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 423; Special Project, supra note 1, at 256.

912 2 W. Hawkland, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 423.
market, and courts should protect the public’s reliance on such representations.913 Finally, the purchaser of an unsafe product normally can recover from the retailer who can then recover from the supplier or manufacturer. Abolition of privity avoids the waste involved in this circuitous recovery route.914

When section 2-318 was first drafted there was no national consensus on the proper scope of warranty protection.915 Professor Llewellyn initially drafted the section to restrict severely the effect of both horizontal and vertical privity rules.916 The proposed section, which appeared as section 43 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act, provided:

A warranty extends to any natural person whose relationship to the buyer is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person or property by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.917

The first official Uniform Commercial Code, however, contained a substantially narrower version of section 2-318. It provided:

A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.918

The official commentary to the section noted that beyond the expressly included beneficiaries, “the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.”919

Although the drafters expected some variation in the common law development of the privity doctrine, they did not expect the number of amendments to section 2-318 that were enacted.920 Cali-
fornia, for example, criticized the section as "a step backward" and went so far as to omit the section from its version of the Code. To "prevent further proliferation of separate variations in state after state," the drafters provided two alternatives, Alternative B and Alternative C, to the initial version of section 2-318, which is now Alternative A. Alternative B provides:

A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.

Alternative C provides:

A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.

According to one commentator, the drafters intended the initial version of section 2-318 to codify contemporary case law on horizontal privity while remaining neutral regarding further limitations on the privity doctrines. Similarly, the drafters intended the subsequent alternatives to check the trend towards nonuniform statutory rules, not to impede further common law limitations on privity. According to this view, courts may develop their own horizontal and vertical privity doctrines without regard to the legislative choice of alternatives.
Under the better view, adopted by the majority of courts, the legislative choice of Alternative A limits further common law erosion of the horizontal privity doctrine while allowing courts to develop their own rules on vertical privity. The official commentary supports this position: Alternative A "is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain." Courts that exceed "Alternative choice of alternatives may be important in deciding the social policy of the state on the privity question." Id.

See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 5, at 403 n.17 (endorsing this view); Special Project, supra note 1, at 257-60 (same).


U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3 (emphasis added). Hawkland argues that comment 2 to section 2-313 also admonishes that the section's drafters did not intend to inhibit case law development that further relaxes privity requirements. 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 575, § 2-318:01, at 426. Comment 2 states that the Code warranty rules are
A's horizontal limits overstep the judicial role by amending existing legislation, and frustrate the Code’s underlying policy of uniformity.\textsuperscript{934}

Two commonly litigated issues involving privity in commercial settings are (1) whether a buyer's employee may recover from the manufacturer or supplier for personal injuries sustained by use of the defective product and (2) whether a buyer may recover for economic loss from a remote manufacturer.

1. \textit{Recovery for Personal Injury by Buyers' Employees}

In jurisdictions embracing Alternatives B and C, buyers' employees should be entitled to recover from the manufacturer or supplier for personal injuries sustained by the use of defective products. Alternatives B and C extend sellers' warranties for personal injuries to buyers' employees because they easily qualify as persons “who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by” goods purchased by their employers.\textsuperscript{935}

Coverage under Alternative A is more limited. Most courts read section 2-318 strictly: Because employees are not included in the express language of section 2-318, they cannot recover for breach of warranty.\textsuperscript{936} This strict approach is consistent with the view that the choice of Alternative A represents a legislative prefer-

\textsuperscript{934} Special Project, \textit{supra} note 1, at 259 (footnotes omitted).


ence about the applicable extent of horizontal privity. In applying Alternative A, however, Pennsylvania courts extend warranty coverage to buyers' employees harmed by defective products.937

2. **Buyer Recovery for Economic Loss from Remote Sellers**

Buyer recovery for economic loss from remote sellers involves both vertical privity considerations and public policy choices regarding the breadth of warranty coverage. Courts should develop their own positions on these two issues without regard to legislative choice of alternatives of section 2-318. The official commentary notes that the choice of Alternative A should not affect the development of vertical privity case law.938 Courts adhere to this comment and determine vertical privity policy without regard to legislative choice of section 2-318.939

Although Alternatives A and B provide warranty coverage only to those who suffer personal injury while Alternative C extends coverage to any injury caused by a breach of warranty, courts should not and do not consider legislative choice of section 2-318 to be a

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938 U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3; see supra note 933 and accompanying text.

legislative statement on the proper breadth of warranty coverage. Courts should consider the relevant public policy concerns and select a rule regarding the proper breadth of warranty coverage based on their evaluations of these concerns.

In abolishing the vertical privity requirement for recovery for solely economic loss, the court in *Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp.* advanced the primary public policy considerations for extending warranty coverage to economic loss. First, to permit recovery for personal injury but not economic loss is unfair and inconsistent. Second, economic loss can be as devastating as personal injury. Third, and most important, fears about unforeseen and unlimited liability—the primary reason given for limitation of liability—are illusory given the Code's protections.

Not all courts reach the same result as the *Industrial Graphics* court. For example, in *Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp.* the court found personal injury and property damage different interests deserving different treatment. The court declined to extend warranty coverage to economic loss.

**B. Notice**

Section 2-607(3)(a) provides that "[w]here a tender has been accepted . . . the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy." Thus, notice of breach is a condition precedent to recovery for breach of warranty, even absent prejudice to the seller.

The notification requirement promotes good faith in commer-
cial transactions.\textsuperscript{947} Section 2-607(3)(a) affords the seller an opportunity to inspect and to repair or supply conforming goods.\textsuperscript{948} It also provides the parties an opportunity to negotiate a settlement or to prepare for litigation.\textsuperscript{949} Finally, the notice requirement protects the seller from stale claims and permits the seller to close its books on past accounts.\textsuperscript{950}

Notification to the immediate seller generally satisfies section 2-607(3)(a).\textsuperscript{951} In consumer transactions, the buyer is not likely to know who the manufacturer is or which party is legally responsible for the breach.\textsuperscript{952} Jurisdictions that permit consumers to satisfy

\textsuperscript{947} See Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 409, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1, 8 (8th Cir. 1985) ("the notice requirement [is] 'designed to defeat commercial bad faith'") (quoting U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 (1965)).
\textsuperscript{948} See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 409, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1, 7 (8th Cir. 1985) (one policy of notice requirement is "to enable the seller to make adjustments or replacements or to suggest opportunities for cure"); Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1101, 1103, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1171, 1173 (Ala. 1983) (one policy objective of notification requirement is "to enable the seller to make adjustments or replacements, or to suggest opportunities for cure, to the end of minimizing the buyer's loss and reducing the seller's own liability to the buyer"); General Matters, Inc. v. Paramount Canning Co., 382 So. 2d 1262, 1264, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1031, 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (notice requirement "protects the seller's right to inspect the goods").
\textsuperscript{950} See, e.g., Courtesy Enters. v. Richards Laboratories, 457 N.E.2d 572, 577, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 765, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("The final policy consideration involved is that notice is required to discourage the assertion of stale claims in the same way as, and for the same reasons as, do statutes of limitation."); Petro-Chem, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 686 P.2d 589, 591, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 139, 141 (Wyo. 1984) (one policy consideration "is to enable the seller to make adjustments, to afford the seller an opportunity to arm himself for litigation, and to allow the seller to close the book on goods which have been sold in the past").
\textsuperscript{952} Professors Prosser and Keeton addressed this concern:
Both the Sales Act and the Commercial Code contain provisions which prevent the buyer from recovering on a warranty unless he gives notice to the seller within a reasonable time after he knows or should know of the breach. As between the immediate parties to the sale, this is a sound
section 2-607(3)(a) by notifying the immediate seller.[953] Some courts, however, construe the section as requiring direct notice to the ultimate manufacturer,[954] in part out of concern that the immediate seller will not adequately apprise the manufacturer of the alleged defect in time for it to inspect and cure the defect.[955] Rather than follow either of these approaches, courts should resolve the question of whom the buyer must notify on a case-by-case basis by examining whether the buyer reasonably believed that the notice provided would reach the responsible parties and whether the manufacturer justifiably believed that the immediate seller would relay any notice of breach. Moreover, a buyer who works closely with the other parties to the manufacture, distribution, and sale of a product should provide notice directly to the manufac-

commercial rule, designed to protect the seller against unduly delayed claims for damages. As applied to personal injuries, and notice to a remote seller, it becomes a booby-trap for the unwary. The injured consumer is seldom “steeped in the business practice which justifies the rule,” and at least until he has legal advice it will not occur to him to give notice to one with whom he has had no dealings.”


[Whether one or more of those upstream of the consumer in the distributive chain is ultimately sued for breach of implied warranty by the consumer, the Code envisions that when the consumer’s notice of breach is given to his immediate seller, such person to preserve any right of action he may have for breach of implied warranty will give notice to his immediate seller, and so on upstream until the seminal point of the distributive chain is reached.

Id. at 348, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1087, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 888, 892-93; see also Palmer v. A.H. Robbins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 206, 38 U.C.C. Rep. 1150, 1158 (Colo. 1984) (“This sequential notice requirement is thus calculated to provide the remote manufacturer with notice and an opportunity to correct the defect, where possible, and to investigate claims that might eventuate in litigation.”).

Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park, 696 S.W.2d 423, 424, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 169, 171 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (section 2-607(3)(a) requires buyer to “notify any seller, including a remote seller such as the manufacturing, of the product’s alleged defect”), writ ref’d n.r.e., 701 S.W.2d 842, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1303 (Tex. 1986); see also Spring Motors Dists. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660, 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1184 (1985) (holding that buyer cannot sue remote seller in common law negligence or strict liability—reserving determination of whether buyer must notify remote seller).

Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park, 696 S.W.2d at 424, 42 U.C.C. Rep. at 171 (“It would be untenable to allow a buyer . . . to recover damages for breach of warranty from a remote seller or manufacturer who was never even made aware that the product in question was defective and who, consequently, never had an opportunity to remedy the defect to the buyer’s satisfaction before litigation was commenced or even to inspect the product to ascertain if indeed a defect existed.”)
In such a situation, the dealer can reasonably assume that the buyer will also inform the manufacturer of the defect. Thus, the reasons for limiting the notification requirement to the immediate seller do not apply.957

A buyer who notifies the proper party must also establish that the content of the notice was sufficient and that notice was provided within a reasonable time.

1. Content

Section 2-607(3)(a) does not require a particular form of notice: written notice, oral notice, or in some situations, action may suffice.958 The parties can set general notice requirements by contract.959 Where the contract is silent, however, courts split as to whether the buyer must merely inform the seller that "the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched,"960 or whether the

956 See Carson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 776, 785, 635 P.2d 1248, 1256, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 834, 844 (1981) ("where the buyer and the other parties to the manufacture, distribution and sale of the product are closely related, or where the other parties actively participate in the consummation of the actual sale of the product, the reasons for the exclusion of such other parties from the . . . notice provision cease to exist").

957 See id., 635 P.2d at 1256, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 844.


959 See U.C.C. § 1-204(1) ("Whenever this Act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable time, any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.").

960 The analysis on the loose/strict content standard relies heavily on Note, Notification of Breach Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-607(3)(a): A Conflict, a Resolution, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 525 (1985). Courts adopting the looser standard rely on the language of comment 4, which states that "[t]he content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched." U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co., 719 F.2d at 1102, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 441-42 (complaint sufficient if reasonable jury could infer that it was both sufficient and timely enough to notify seller transaction was troublesome); Continental Forest Prods. v. V.S. & Bros., 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1578, 1579 (9th Cir. 1982) (request that seller "fulfill[] . . . all orders" sufficient notification that transaction was troublesome);
buyer must expressly notify the seller that the buyer intends to hold the seller liable for damages for breach.\textsuperscript{961}

Some courts that apply the lenient "troublesome nature" standard have held that the buyer need not notify the seller of the late delivery of goods because a reasonable seller should realize that failure timely to deliver goods will be "troublesome" to the buyer.\textsuperscript{962} Similarly, in continuing-use cases, a buyer who initially notifies the seller of the troublesome nature of the transaction, but subsequently continues to deal with the seller without further mention of the breach, may nevertheless satisfy this notice standard.\textsuperscript{963}

On the other hand, courts applying the stricter standard have held that the buyer must notify the seller of the late delivery of goods.\textsuperscript{964} In Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp.\textsuperscript{965} the Sixth Circuit noted that the seller may believe that the buyer will accept a tender that does not strictly comply with the contract. Moreover,


\textsuperscript{962} See Chemeron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 254, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 832, 841-42 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (notification not required where seller did not deliver adequate quantities of liquid oxygen in timely manner), aff'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975); Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 680 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (notification not necessary where seller makes late delivery of goods under contract specifying that time was of essence); see also Note, supra note 960, at 533.

\textsuperscript{963} See Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 509, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 625, 638-39 (5th Cir. 1971) (buyer's complaints to seller that oil was improper for use in machine constituted sufficient notice despite buyer's continued purchase of oil following seller's assurances that it was fit). See Roth Steel Prods., 705 F.2d at 152, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1461; Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 971-73, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 373.

\textsuperscript{964} See Roth Steel Prods., 705 F.2d at 152, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1461; Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 971-73, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 373.

\textsuperscript{965} 705 F.2d 134, 35 U.C.C. Rep. 1435.
The statute, by its terms, requires notice with regards to "any breach" and the same policies which support a rule requiring notice of breach when a latent defect is discovered also support a rule requiring notice of breach when performance does not conform to time or price terms of the contract.\footnote{Id. at 152, 35 U.C.C. Rep. at 1462; see also Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 973, 19 U.C.C. Rep. at 365 (purposes of section 2-607 compel application of notice requirement to late delivery cases).}

A seller who delivers goods late may realize, without the benefit of separate notice, that the transaction is "troublesome." Nevertheless, the seller may not know whether its tardiness caused the buyer any reliance damages or whether the buyer considers the late delivery sufficiently serious to seek damages for breach.

Similarly, courts applying the stricter approach in continuing-use cases emphasize the seller's reliance interests. In \textit{K & M Joint Venture v. Smith International, Inc.}\footnote{669 F.2d 1106, 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1 (6th Cir. 1982).} the buyer continued to use a tunnel-boring machine after informing the seller of the machine's problems.\footnote{Id. at 1114-16, 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 11-14.} The court held that the buyer failed to meet the notification requirement because it had continued to order repair and replacement parts for the machinery without protest.\footnote{Id., 33 U.C.C. Rep. at 11-14.}

Several factors favor application of the strict standard. First, section 2-607(3)(a) requires the buyer to notify the seller of "breach."\footnote{U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).} Second, under the strict standard, the buyer must threaten legal action, which may encourage the seller to make greater efforts to conform or to enter into settlement negotiations.\footnote{A credible threat may increase the chances of settlement. On the other hand, it may cause the other party to take an inflexible position. The evidence is inconclusive on this point. The strict standard may be superior, however, at providing the seller an incentive to cure the breach because it makes a lawsuit more imminent. See Note, supra note 960, at 547.} Finally, the strict standard reduces the potential for misleading behavior because the buyer must allege breach in unambiguous terms.\footnote{See id. at 545.} These observations, however, have yet to be confirmed by empirical evidence, and it is equally possible that the strict standard discourages settlement because it may lead parties to take inflexible bargaining positions.

Rather than adopt a lenient or strict approach for all transactions, courts should tailor the standard to different classes of cases. In late delivery cases, for example, courts should hold buyers to a strict notification standard because a lenient standard that excuses a buyer's failure to notify the seller of breach is inconsistent with sec-
tion 2-607(3)(a)'s policies. The seller may not know that the goods arrived late, that "time is of the essence," or that the buyer suffered harm. In continuing-use cases, on the other hand, initial notice that the transaction is troublesome should suffice. Such notice would provide the seller with the opportunity to inspect the goods, to enter into settlement negotiations, or to supply con-
forming goods.

2. Reasonable Time

The timeliness of notice depends upon the commercial context of the transaction, the past conduct of the parties, and the discover-
ability of the defect. Although the reasonable time requirement turns upon the facts of each case, the policies behind the Code's notification requirement provide some indication of the require-
ment's boundaries.

Comment 4 takes the position that consumers should have more time than commercial buyers because "the rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to de-
prive a good faith consumer of his remedy." Thus, the Code's "reasonable time" requirement turns initially not upon the conduct and circumstances of the case, but upon the status of the parties.

Beyond this initial distinction, the Code provides few guidelines other than those derived from the policies behind the notice re-
quirement. For example, where the goods are perishable, the buyer must often provide notice in time to allow the seller an opportunity to inspect. Additionally, good faith and the policy of encouraging the parties to cure defective goods suggest that the buyer should have more time to notify the seller of breach where the parties have attempted to remedy the defect. Furthermore, although some courts have allowed consumers to satisfy the notice requirement by filing a complaint, the majority apparently reject such a view.

See supra notes 947-50 and accompanying text for discussion of the policies underly-
ing the notification requirement.

See U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4.

Id.

Cf. Willmar Cookie Co. v. Pippin Pecan Co., 357 N.W.2d 111, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1249 (Minn. 1984) (notice within four or eight days of discovery of moldy pecans sufficient).


We . . . are of the opinion that a complaint filed by a retail consumer within a reasonable period after goods are accepted satisfies the statutory notice requirement. The filing of a complaint is certainly not a bar to the negotiation and settlement of claims. To the contrary, the prospect of
Allowing a party to satisfy the notice requirement by filing a complaint removes the seller's incentive to inspect the allegedly damaged goods and discourages negotiated settlement.

Beyond these general observations, the timeliness of notification will turn upon the facts of the case. The Code's notice provision is in general enough terms to adapt to a variety of circumstances. Given the open-endedness of section 2-607(3)(a), the parties may wish to specify in the sales contract whom the buyer must notify, what the notice must contain, and when the notice must be provided.\textsuperscript{980}

C. The Statute of Limitations—Section 2-725

Section 2-725 of the Code governs the period of limitations for commercial warranties.\textsuperscript{981} Application of this section typically going to trial is often a powerful incentive to a defendant to investigate the claims against it and to arrive at a reasonable agreement. A defendant may more easily and effectively prepare for either settlement or trial when it may compel discovery and so determine for itself the basis for a plaintiff's claims of liability. Allowing a consumer's complaint to serve as notice will not prevent a defendant manufacturer from raising the issue of timeliness if it has been prejudiced by an unreasonable delay.\textsuperscript{979}

\textit{Id.} at 462, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 59-60. Whatever the merits of this argument, the court failed to address the policy of providing the seller an opportunity for cure prior to litigation. \textit{See also} Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 560 P.2d 789, 792, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 490, 493-94 (Ariz. 1977) (filing of complaint can but does not always satisfy notice requirement).\textsuperscript{980}

\textit{Cf.} Shooshonian, 672 P.2d at 462, 37 U.C.C. Rep. at 59 (view that pleadings satisfy notice requirement is minority view).\textsuperscript{981} C. The Statute of Limitations—Section 2-725

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poses few problems: it simply bars a buyer from bringing an action for breach of warranty more than four years after tender of delivery. This straightforward rule forces buyers to sue when evidence is most readily available and allows sellers to continue with their businesses without fear of suit after a reasonable definite period. Nevertheless, two complications to the rule's application sometimes develop: determination of the timing of accrual and modification of the limitations period.

1. Timing of Accrual

Subsection 2-725(2) provides that the "cause of action accrues when the breach occurs." Breach usually occurs upon tender of delivery, "presumably because the condition of the goods at the time of delivery is central." Where products obviously breach a warranty at the time of delivery, section 2-725 applies in a straightforward manner.

Unfortunately, not all breaches are apparent, or even discoverable, at the time of delivery. In such cases, buyers have argued for application of the "discovery rule," under which the limitations period does not begin to run until a buyer could discover the

of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes effective.

U.C.C. § 2-725.

The drafters' comment states that section 2-725 provides needed uniformity and declares the four-year period "the most appropriate to modern business practice" because it "is within the normal commercial record keeping period." U.C.C. § 2-725 comment. But see Kleiderfabrik v. Peters Sportswear Co., 483 F. Supp. 1228, 1235, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 534, 543-44 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (does not permit destruction of records after four years in all cases, and particularly not in case of ongoing dispute involving goods owned by third parties).


breach. Although section 2-725(2) expressly rejects this interpretation, some courts have nevertheless circumvented the section’s language by delaying accrual under subsection (4)’s tolling provision.\(^8\)

Subsection (2) excludes from the general rule any warranty that “explicitly extends to future performance of the goods [where] discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance.”\(^7\) In such a case, the limitations period begins to run not at tender of delivery, but rather “when the breach is or should have been discovered.”\(^6\) This exception applies only to an explicit future performance extension,\(^9\) and the “basic tension between the words ‘implied’ and ‘explicit’”\(^9\) usually leads courts to bar causes of action for “future” implied warranties.\(^8\) “An implied warranty, by rule inapplicable because it ‘speaks only of discovery of the injury’ by IUD not of plaintiff’s discovery that IUD was a defectively designed Dalkon Shield).

The discovery rule commonly refers to the point at which the breach was reasonably discoverable, not necessarily the time at which the plaintiff actually discovered it. Id., 41 U.C.C. Rep. at 1735. \(^8\)

\(^6\)See Richardson v. Car Lot Co., 10 Ohio Misc. 2d 32, 462 N.E.2d 459 (Mun. Ct. 1983) (limitations period tolled while seller kept automobile for repair for unreasonable period of time; warranty only runs while buyer had use of vehicle). Some states have changed subsection (2). \(^7\)See U.C.C. § 2-725(2), 14 U.L.A. 525-26 (1976) (in Alabama and Maine, cause of action accrues at time of injury; in South Carolina, cause of action accrues when breach is or should have been discovered); see also Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Ill. App. 3d 683, 692-93, 399 N.E.2d 1355, 1362, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 336, 347 (1980) (Simon, J., concurring) (“In determining whether to apply the discovery doctrine to a statute of limitation, competing interests must be balanced: the increased difficulties of proof which accompany the passage of time against the hardship to the injured plaintiff who neither knows nor should have known of the right to sue. Because we are dealing with the Uniform Commercial Code, we should also consider the important interests of uniformity of result and commercial certainty.”) (citations omitted).

\(^7\)U.C.C. § 2-725(2).

\(^9\)Id. Cf Knox, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 399 N.E.2d at 1361, 28 U.C.C. Rep. at 346 (Simon, J., concurring) (in implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose case, statute of limitations not tolled to time of discovery or repair because “[t]he covenant to repair was not an explicit guarantee of future performance”).

\(^9\)See, e.g., O’Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 1502 (3rd Cir. 1981) (DES-induced cancer claim barred by four year statute of limitations because no showing of warranty explicitly extending to future performance); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 821, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 65, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1978) (seller’s express warranty of machine explicitly extended to future performance so limitations period did not begin to run until defect was or should have been discovered; nevertheless, suit barred because brought after limitations period ended), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (contract for computer sale subject to buyer’s final approval of programming extended to future performance to the extent that the contract was not performed until plaintiff approved programming).

\(^8\)City of Carlisle v. Fetzer, 381 N.W.2d 627, 629, 42 U.C.C. Rep. 1676, 1678 (Iowa 1986).

ARTICLE TWO WARRANTIES

its very nature, cannot explicitly extend to future performance."

Because the timing of accrual turns on tender of delivery, the determination of when tender occurs is critical. For example, when the seller agrees to install a good, tender of delivery usually occurs when the seller completes installation. Similarly, when the seller agrees to replace goods or parts, the cause may accrue upon tender of delivery of the replacement. Additionally, complete tender of delivery goods when the seller delivers in multiple shipments must often await the final delivery.

2. Period of Limitation

A buyer normally has four years from the time the cause of action accrues to commence litigation. Section 2-725(1) permits the parties to shorten the statutory period in their original agreement, but not to extend the period.
In addition to enforcing express agreements, several courts apply a "repair estoppel" doctrine to alter the statutory period.\textsuperscript{999} The doctrine tolls the period when the defendant offers to repair the breach. For example, a court would apply the doctrine if the buyer of an item could prove that the seller had represented that repairs would cure its defect.\textsuperscript{1000} However, "mere attempts to repair are not sufficient. There must be representations made by defendant as to the curing effect of the repairs."\textsuperscript{1001}

Other courts reject the repair estoppel doctrine.\textsuperscript{1002} For example, in \textit{Kemp v. Bell-View, Inc.}\textsuperscript{1003} a Georgia court rejected the argument that the seller's repeated promises to repair or replace certain windows tolled the statute of limitations for the buyer's claim for property damage allegedly caused by the defective windows. The court reasoned that, regardless of the promises of the seller to remedy the situation, "[t]he windows were part of the initial construction of the home. Therefore, the cause of action would have accrued at the time of the allegedly defective construction."\textsuperscript{1004}

Section 2-725 and its exceptions may dramatically affect individual warranty lawsuits. Nevertheless, they do not affect the war-
ranties themselves because a statute of limitations affects only the timing of suits and not their substance. Consequently, in the majority of situations, applying section 2-725 to commercial warranty actions remains a relatively straightforward matter.

Debra L. Goetz
Kathryn L. Moore
Douglas E. Perry
David S. Raab
Jeffrey S. Ross