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Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining

Wesley MacNeil Oliver¹

PLEA bargaining has been quite accurately described as "an informal, administrative, inquisitorial process of adjudication."² Those who brag of the superiority of the American criminal justice system often praise its adversarial, as opposed to inquisitorial, nature.³ Yet for approximately ninety-five percent of all defendants, the prosecutor is, for all practical purposes, the only judge they will encounter.⁴ The prosecutor-judges who resolve these cases do so without necessarily referring to how any other case was resolved and do not follow any particular procedure, formal or informal, in deciding how to make offers.⁵ Their decisions are not subject to review and largely avoid public scrutiny.⁶ Defense lawyers, in part for reasons of their own making, are ill equipped for whatever idiosyncratic process a particular prosecutor's office

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³ While championing the unique superiority of America's criminal justice system has long provided an applause line in political speeches, opinions of the United States Supreme Court have now similarly taken to touting its virtue. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (observing, with no small degree of contempt for European practice, that contrary to the "continental civil law," the "common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing"); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 51, 55 (1964) (boasting this country's "preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice").


⁵ See Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369, 373 (2010) (observing that prosecutorial discretion is exercised in a way that "is very often ad hoc, hidden, and insulated from public scrutiny and criticism").

⁶ Id.
has developed for considering the defendant's perspective.\textsuperscript{7} As one critic of the American inquisitorial system has noted, our plea driven practice lacks the attributes of the rule of law.\textsuperscript{8}

There has been considerable disagreement in the legal community about the impact the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in \textit{Missouri v. Frye}\textsuperscript{9} and \textit{Lafler v. Cooper}\textsuperscript{10} will have on this currently unregulated system of adjudicating criminal cases.\textsuperscript{11} In this Article, I argue that the long-term impact of these decisions could cause judges and defense lawyers to reconsider their roles. These decisions have the potential to address one of the most troublesome problems in the criminal justice system—sentencing. From a macro-perspective, the problem is inconsistent sentencing, but the problem from the individual’s perspective is that some defendants are receiving excessive sentences. \textit{Lafler} and \textit{Frye} have the potential to address two of the causes of this phenomenon: underperforming defense counsel and overzealous prosecutors. These decisions create the potential for improving the performance of defense lawyers in negotiations and may help inject criteria and transparency into the previously unregulated world of prosecutorial discretion.

The opinions themselves broke new ground because they were the Supreme Court’s first recognition of the right to an effective plea bargainer and may assume a place among the most important right-to-counsel decisions. There has never been any doubt that the Constitution ensured the right of a defendant to hire a lawyer for trial. With \textit{Gideon v. Wainwright},\textsuperscript{12} the Court recognized that a defendant had a right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one,\

\textsuperscript{7} To remedy this problem, Ron Wright and Ralph Peeples have suggested that defense lawyers should now be evaluated by comparing the deals they cut compared to other lawyers in that jurisdiction and that this information should be used to train defense lawyers. See Ronald F. Wright & Ralph A. Peeples, \textit{Criminal Defense Lawyer Moneyball: A Demonstration Project}, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1221 (2013).


\textsuperscript{9} Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).

\textsuperscript{10} Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).

\textsuperscript{11} Luminaries in the area of criminal procedure have concluded that the decisions will have little impact. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 Yale L.J. Online 39 (June 12, 2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1097.pdf; Craig M. Bradley, Effective Counsel for Plea Bargains, Trial, June 2012, at 56, 58 (specifically challenging commentators quoted in the Times). Others conclude that these are groundbreaking decisions. See Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 Yale L.J. Online 35, 35 (June 20, 2012) (“Finally, the Supreme Court has brought law to the shadowy plea-bargaining bazaar.”), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1096.pdf; Cara H. Drinan, Lafler and Frye: Good News for Public Defense Litigation, 25 Fed. Sent’g C. Rep. 138, 138 (2012) (suggesting that Lafler and Frye signal a retreat from formalistic reliance on separation of powers that has thwarted the success of litigation seeking better compensation for indigent defense).

and with *Strickland v. Washington*, the Court held that the Constitution entitled a defendant to effective representation. Until *Lafler* and *Frye*, however, the Court had not recognized that a defendant could suffer prejudice from his attorney's poor performance in the course of a negotiation. The absence of any constitutional requirement that defense counsel effectively negotiate was substantial, since the overwhelming percentage of convictions in this country are obtained through a plea bargain—ninety-seven percent in federal court and ninety-four percent in state court. Statistically, the right to counsel is the most critical in the negotiation phase. Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to indigents, who comprise the bulk of criminal defendants. In *Lafler* and *Frye*, the Court extended the right to counsel to the plea bargaining process, the phase of the trial that determines the outcome for the bulk of criminal defendants.

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14 In *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985), the Court found that a defendant who received a thirty-five year sentence under a plea agreement could not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's incorrect description of his parole eligibility. Because the defendant had a prior felony, of which neither the prosecution nor defense was aware, he was eligible for release after serving half of his sentence, not one third as both the prosecution and defense assumed. *Id.* The Court concluded that there had been no ineffective representation because the defendant would have been required to serve half of whatever sentence he received at trial, not the third that lawyers for each side assumed during their negotiations, and the defendant's sentence was discounted by the percentage he believed when he entered into the plea. *Id.* He got the benefit he bargained for; his exposure was simply higher than his attorney or the prosecutor assumed. *Id.* Of course, this lack of knowledge by defense counsel could well have prejudiced the defendant. If the prosecutor was willing to accept a sentence of thirty-five years with release eligibility after a third of that time, he may have been willing to accept a shorter sentence if he had known the defendant was not eligible for release until half the sentence was served.

The prejudice standard in *Hill* effectively precluded the claims the Court accepted in *Lafler* and *Frye*. In *Hill*, the Court concluded that defense counsel's failure to be aware of his client's actual release date for the crime to which he pled would be relevant only if this information would have caused his client to reject the plea and go to trial. *Hill*, 474 U.S. at 60. The Court's standard said nothing about the possibility of this new information providing a basis for an argument in the negotiation.

In *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010), the Court recognized that a defense lawyer's knowledge of a proposed plea bargain's immigration consequences is important because it informs the negotiation strategy, something the Court did not consider as a possibility in *Hill*. As Justice Stevens observed, a prosecutor may be amenable to a package that avoids deportation, something defense counsel's failure to understand the deportation consequences prevented him from exploring with the prosecuting attorney. *Id.*


17 *Lafler*, 132 S. Ct. at 1384; *Frye*, 132 S. Ct. at 1405.
The facts of Lafler and Frye were not complicated. In Frye, defense counsel failed to communicate an offer to his client before it expired. In Lafler, defense counsel incorrectly believed that a shot below the waist was insufficient to demonstrate intent to kill and advised his client to reject a plea offer to the crime of assault with the intent to kill. These cases were not about whether the lawyers performed adequately during the negotiation phase. The state authorities defending the convictions in Lafler and Frye did not claim that either lawyer had behaved reasonably. Instead, the lawyers for the states of Michigan and Missouri argued that there was no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process. The Court rejected their arguments, recognizing the central role plea bargaining plays in the modern world.

Prior to Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court regarded plea offers to be a matter of prosecutorial largesse, severely limiting defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment obligations in negotiations. Before these decisions, defense counsel were found to be ineffective during plea negotiations only when they recommended that their clients accept a plea even though there was a reasonable probability that their client would have been acquitted on some or all of the charges. While some lower courts had recognized that defense counsel had a broader constitutional obligation to their clients during plea bargaining, the Supreme Court’s doctrines had placed no obligation on defense counsel during the negotiation phase aside from evaluating the possibility of prevailing at trial.

Surely few convictions will be overturned because defense counsel was so deficient that it failed to function as counsel during the negotiation process. But recognizing that counsel’s role in the negotiation phase is as important as it is in the trial phase may well change the ethos of defense lawyers and

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18 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404–05.
19 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
21 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
25 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) permits a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel only if counsel was “not performing as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. A number of commentators have observed that few cases will be overturned because of the Lafler and Frye decisions. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 150, 152 (2012); Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 Yale L.J. Online 39, 42 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1097.pdf.
those who train them. Trial lawyers have long served as the role models for
great defense lawyers. Lawyers honing their skills to be like their idols have
sought to improve the skills that made their mentors famous—their persuasive
opening and closing arguments, their tight cross-examinations.26 Continuing
legal education courses for criminal lawyers have focused on trial and appellate
skills.27 Law schools have similarly reinforced the view that the most important
skills a criminal lawyer can possess are those used in the courtroom. Negotiation
courses have been taught at law schools for decades, but plea bargaining classes
are all but unknown.28

Lafler and Frye will be important in changing the internal and external
perceptions of criminal defense lawyers. It is significant that the Supreme Court,
rather than just a lower court, announced the right to an effective negotiator.
Law professors are reluctant to teach anything unless the Court has addressed
the issue, regardless of how important the issue may be to actual clients.29 Lafler
and Frye will make it difficult to continue to ignore plea bargaining in the law
school curriculum. Defense lawyers and those who train them will come to see
the need for studying plea bargaining techniques as equally important to the
need for practicing litigation skills for trials and appeals.

The visibility of these Supreme Court decisions puts them on defendants'
radar in a way that lower court's decisions could not. The decision of an
intermediate appellate court does not get the publicity of a Supreme Court
opinion. Lawyers will thus be more aware of these decisions, but so will their
former clients. This means that defendants in post-conviction proceedings,
who typically lack access to counsel, are thus much more likely to raise claims
for ineffective assistance of counsel in the negotiation phase in pro se filings.

Lafler and Frye may, however, have an even more profound effect, not because
of what the Court did in these cases, but because of what it did not do. While the
Court recognized there was a right to effective assistance in the plea bargaining
process, it did not identify the appropriate remedy for the violation.30 The Court
rejected as too rigid the two remedies used by lower courts finding ineffective
assistance in the plea bargaining process.31 These courts had either ordered new
trials or ordered prosecutors to re-offer the offers that were rejected on the

26 See discussion infra Part I.A.
27 See discussion infra Part I.B.
28 Bobbi McAdoo et al., It's Time to Get It Right: Problem-Solving in the First-Year Curricu-
ulum, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y, 2012, at 39, 49 (noting dramatic increase in the number of negotia-
tion classes). Recently, the law schools at the University of Virginia and American University have
started teaching courses on negotiation. By contrast, most law schools in this country teach courses
on negotiation and/or alternative dispute resolution.
29 See discussion infra Part I.E.
30 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388–91 (2012) (remanding to determine appropriate rem-
edy); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1411 (2012) (remanding to determine whether defendant
would have accepted plea and whether prosecutor would not have withdrawn it).
31 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388–90.
basis of bad advice.\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Lafler} and \textit{Frye} established that lower courts were not limited to these two options. The Court held that if constitutionally ineffective counsel causes a plea to be rejected, the remedy, in the judge's discretion, lies somewhere between the penalty offered in the rejected plea and the punishment the defendant actually received.\textsuperscript{33} The Court specifically observed that in the exercise of their equitable discretion, lower courts could find that defendants rejected plea bargains on the basis of advice rising to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, and yet provide no remedy at all.\textsuperscript{34} To understand how to exercise this vast discretion, lower courts seemingly must look to guidance the Supreme Court has previously provided in ineffective assistance of counsel cases. If their remedial powers are consistent with the limits on their ability to sustain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally, then these courts must now fashion remedies that ensure defendants receive the "fair" portion of the plea offer they would have received were it not for their lawyers' errors.

In crafting this remedy, courts should look to the reasons prosecutors offer plea bargains. Some pleas are driven by the prosecutor's sense that the outcome achieves a just result, others are driven by the prosecutor's risk-aversion, efforts to preserve judicial resources, or receipt of cooperation from the defendant. Most are driven by some combination of those factors.\textsuperscript{35} In fashioning equitably appropriate remedies for counsel's errors at the plea stage, courts seemingly would have to consider the factors that would drive a reasonable prosecutor to offer the deal that was lost to determine which portion of the plea represented a "fair" outcome. As courts reason their way to providing remedies, they will be speculating on the amount of consideration a reasonable prosecutor, in crafting his offer, would give to various factors in the case. The reasoning of courts can then provide a starting point for negotiations between prosecutors and defense lawyers.

In the language of negotiation scholars, these decisions granting remedies provide a standard of legitimacy—a respected source weighing in on how prosecutorial discretion ought to be exercised.\textsuperscript{36} Until \textit{Lafler} and \textit{Frye}, the Supreme Court had recognized few constitutional duties of defense counsel during plea negotiations.\textsuperscript{37} More significantly, prior to these opinions, separation of powers considerations kept the judiciary from exercising any oversight over prosecutorial charging or plea bargaining decisions.\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Lafler} and \textit{Frye} provide a
vehicle for courts to offer standards for the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion without intruding on the province of the executive branch.

The impact of these decisions is therefore potentially enormous. Scholars have long called for judicial oversight of the prosecutorial discretion but their calls for reform have been thwarted by courts' hard-wired respect for separation of powers. By expanding the scope of defense counsel's Sixth Amendment duty, and recognizing that courts have broad equitable powers to fashion remedies, the Supreme Court has invited lower courts to indirectly develop a set of best practices in plea bargaining negotiations.

This article considers the changes Lafler and Frye will mean for defense lawyers, judges, and as a result, for prosecutors. While the greatest effects of these decisions are likely to be indirect, the Supreme Court has potentially caused a revolution in criminal procedure. Criminal defense lawyers will be forced to think about negotiation in a systematic way, as civil lawyers have done for decades. The decisions also provide judges fashioning remedies an opportunity to define the appropriate uses of prosecutorial discretion.

I. Defense Lawyers

It may seem illogical to think that granting a remedy to defendants for ineffective plea bargaining will cause defense lawyers to change. Defense lawyers have, after all, been engaging in some form of plea bargaining for centuries. It

opment, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 2–3 (2009) (arguing that while extraordinary power of prosecutors is often explained in separation of powers terms, this is an historically inaccurate explanation).


is certainly true that only since 1970 has the Supreme Court expressly regarded guilty pleas as voluntary when they were entered into in exchange for leniency. As George Fisher has demonstrated, however, an underground system of plea bargaining existed long before the Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of trading trial rights for leniency in sentencing or a reduction of the charges.

Recent history is, of course, more instructive on this point. Ninety-four percent of all state criminal cases and ninety-seven percent of all federal criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas. Defense lawyers are thus quite accustomed to plea bargaining.

Requiring defense lawyers to meet the less-than-demanding Strickland standard, which requires only a minimal level of competence, while engaging in the task they most often perform may not be expected to change practice. Yet the uncomfortable role negotiation plays in a criminal defense lawyer's self-description—and the lack of academic appreciation for the skill of plea bargaining—made an opinion announcing a remedy for ineffective negotiation necessary to improve the quality of representation during the negotiation phase.

A. Defense Lawyers View Themselves as Courtroom Advocates, Not Problem-Solving Negotiators

Lafler and Frye, unlike Strickland, will change the way defense lawyers view themselves. Despite its prominence, defense lawyers rarely see their primary job as a settlement negotiation, nor do they frequently boast of their negotiation skills. White-collar criminal defense lawyers often lament that they have no opportunity to boast their greatest accomplishment—convincing responding gave more lenient sentences to defendants who entered guilty pleas. Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 Yale L.J. 204, 206–206 (1956).


42 FISHER, supra note 40.


44 See Thomas F. Liotti, Avoiding Prosecutions, 67 N.Y. St. B.J., Feb. 1995, at 49, 50 (observing that while there is a "paucity of literature" on prosecutorial negotiations, it "may be explained by the secretive nature of these matters, more to the point is the fact that since these backstage machinations do not have the sexy glitz of trials, they are obscured.").

45 See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 563, 596 (1999) ("Many prosecutors, as well as defense lawyers, see themselves as 'trial lawyers.' Their role satisfaction, standing among peers and effectiveness as negotiators can all turn on their ability to believe and project their belief that they will win any case they try."). As one scholar on negotiation has observed, "it may seem strange to apply general negotiation theory to plea bargains." Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 309, 313 (2013). Another scholar has observed that "[i]t may seem counterintuitive to link negotiation theory and criminal procedure." Rebecca Holland-Blumoff, Getting to "Guilty": Plea Bargaining at Negotiation, 2 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 115, 118 (1997).
prosecutors not to seek indictments against their clients. There are few vehicles for criminal lawyers to study the negotiating talents of great lawyers. Civil lawyers obtaining large judgments are celebrated, regardless of whether those judgments are negotiated or the result of a trial. Those identified as great criminal defense lawyers are recognized for their performance in trial, or in the rare case, on appeal. Those great trial lawyers often are good negotiators but their negotiation ability is rarely what brings them notoriety and certainly is not the role the public envisions when it thinks of a preeminent criminal lawyer. The public pictures Clarence Darrow examining a witness or addressing a jury, not negotiating with a prosecutor.

Regardless of their affinity for the task, negotiation is certainly not the work law school trained criminal defense lawyers to do. For many, there is something that seems illegitimate about discussing possible settlement with prosecutors, particularly when those settlements involve some type of cooperation agreement. Some high profile defense lawyers refuse to plea bargain at all, at least when deals are contingent on cooperation. People questioned O.J. Simpson's choice of Robert Shapiro, noting that Shapiro's primary experience was as a negotiator.

46 See Liotti, supra note 44, at 49 (observing that "prosecution avoiders . . . are not necessarily famous" and "function quietly behind the scenes").
47 For instance, the Million Dollar Advocates Forum and Multi–Million Dollar Advocates Forum limit membership to lawyers who have obtained million (or multi–million) dollar judgments for their clients, but they do not differentiate between settlements and verdict. The Top Trial Lawyers in America, Million Dollar Advocates Forum, http://www.milliondollaradvocates.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
48 Alan Dershowitz seems to be one of the few lawyers who gained a popular reputation as a criminal lawyer from his appellate work. This was largely a result of his work on the Claus Von Bülow case, which became the subject of one of Dershowitz's books and was made into a popular movie. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Reversal of Fortune: Inside the von Bülow Case (1986).
49 A number of biographies have been written about Darrow. See, e.g., John A. Farrell, Clarence Darrow: Attorney for the Damned (2011); Andrew E. Kersten, Clarence Darrow: American Iconoclast (2011); Irving Stone, Clarence Darrow For the Defense: A Biography (1941); Kevin Tierney, Darrow: A Biography (1979); Arthur & Lila Weinberg, Clarence Darrow: A Sentimental Rebel (1980). None of these biographies describe Darrow's plea bargaining practice.
50 See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 Clinical L. Rev. 73, 74 (1995) (asking why criminal defense lawyers do not bargain effectively despite the frequency with which defense lawyers bargain). In research interviews, defense lawyers nevertheless report that they approve of the process of plea bargaining. See Milton Heumann, Adapting To Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys 157–62 (1978). The public at large has a very different view of the legitimacy of the practice. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 211, 237–39 & nn.114–15 (2012) (citing survey research). While actors in the system may regard plea bargaining as legitimate, it is clear that defense lawyers regard it is as a less legitimate, or prestigious, way to practice law, as the defense bar has engaged in a less concerted effort to study and improve its skills in this area than it has with other skills defense lawyers employ.
not as a trial lawyer.\textsuperscript{52} The obvious inference was that one's skills at negotiating high-profile cases were not as impressive as trying cases, or that negotiating such cases did not demonstrate competence at presenting these issues in court. Given the strong case the State of California had against O.J. Simpson, a lawyer with a reputation as a good negotiator should have seemed like an excellent choice.\textsuperscript{53}

There is also an economic explanation for the reluctance of criminal lawyers to see themselves primarily as negotiators. Transactional costs play a more substantial role in evaluating the effectiveness of a civil lawyer than a criminal lawyer. In a civil case, a rational litigant is indifferent to paying $100,000 in litigation costs as opposed to $100,000 in a settlement.\textsuperscript{54} In a criminal case, there is no such equivalence. Typically the only victory to be achieved in negotiation is the avoidance of more jail time. Clients rarely consider the cost of litigating a trial in deciding whether to accept a plea offer. Clients with money to pay counsel would pay virtually any legal fee imaginable to avoid jail time. But, of course, many defendants are indigent, and those that aren't generally pay flat fees.

A criminal defense lawyer who recommends his client accept a plea is thus typically making a recommendation that advances the lawyer's financial interests. The retained attorney is most often receiving a flat fee\textsuperscript{55} for less work and the public defender whose client accepts a plea is able to move to other cases, or perhaps get a weekend off. This potential conflict between the lawyer's interest in a plea and the value to the client of a plea is often referred to as an agency cost—the lawyer's role leads him or her to have interests opposed to those of his client.\textsuperscript{56}

Maximizing a client's wealth—or minimizing his losses—is the goal of a civil lawyer, and the value of his work is judged in monetary terms. Negotiating is thus more central to the civil lawyer's role of maximizing his client's wealth,

\textsuperscript{52} See Mick Brown, Tearing Down the Wall of Sound: The Rise and Fall of Phil Spector 406 (2007) ("Shapiro enjoyed a formidable reputation for smoothness and charm; he was a man who, according to [a] Los Angeles lawyer 'couldn't find his way out of a box' in trial but was widely regarded as a peerless negotiator and fixer.").


\textsuperscript{54} Of course, economists and psychologists describe bounded rationality, which leads litigants to reject settlement offers that are in their economic interests. See Michael J. Kaufman, Summary Pre-Judgment: The Supreme Court's Profound, Pervasive, and Problematic Presumption about Human Behavior, 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 593, 615 (2012) (observing that litigants will reject offers that they believe to be unfair even when they should—rationally—accept the offers).

\textsuperscript{55} Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 595, 600 (1993) (observing that "virtually everyone advises criminal defense lawyers to get their whole fee up front, either as a flat fee for the entire representation or in the form of a retainer against which their hourly rate will be offset.").

as a negotiated settlement consumes less of the client's wealth than a trial. The financial costs of trial are very much a part of the calculation for civil litigants, while the odds of beating the prosecution's offer alone typically determine a criminal defendant's decision to go to trial or accept the offer. A public defender, or retained counsel receiving a flat fee, may shy away from embracing negotiation as her essential function because settling cases in this manner highlight one of the tensions in her representation. A settlement is typically more economically efficient for the criminal defense lawyer than trying the case. The tension is less often obvious for civil lawyers, as most criminal defense lawyers do not bill hours. Lawyers billing hours—and to a lesser extent civil lawyers on contingency fees—have a stake in taking a case to trial if a better result is possible. When a civil lawyer, who bills by the hour, advises a client to settle, such advice is contrary to her pecuniary interests so it does not raise the same sort of conflict of interest that could result from a typical criminal lawyer's advice to take a plea. Despite popular culture's depiction of criminal defense lawyers, most regard their duties to their clients as sacred obligations and not just a means of making a comfortable living (in fact, a good percentage of criminal defense lawyers do not live that comfortably). It may be difficult for well-intentioned defense lawyers to see their primary job description as one that highlights a tension between the lawyer's economic interest and the client's liberty interest.

B. Training Reinforces the Courtroom Advocate Model of Defense Lawyers

Law schools train students for litigation. The majority of courses use the case method, teaching students to view the world through the lens of litigation—appellate litigation to be precise. While law schools typically boast that they are training students to think like lawyers, they are primarily training students for

57 It is frequently assumed that there is a tension between a lawyer receiving a contingency fee and his client as the amount of work that would produce the optimal outcome for the client would not necessarily produce the optimal outcome per hour worked for the lawyer. See e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Contingency Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1996).
58 See Schulhofer, supra note 36, at 1988 (observing the financial incentives of public defenders and court-appointed counsel to plead cases).
59 Contingency fees in criminal cases obviously do not raise the same sorts of concerns as contingency fees in civil cases. In a civil case, a lawyer working on a contingency fee who only collects if there is a judgment in the plaintiff's favor may have a financial motive in settling too early, and may not fight hard enough for the client. In a criminal case, a contingency fee paid to a lawyer only when he obtained an acquittal would lead a lawyer to be hesitant to settle. Given the infrequency of acquittals, few lawyers would be willing to accept such a contingency fee in a criminal case. Most state ethics rules forbid contingency fees in criminal cases. For an excellent argument challenging this rule, see Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498 (1991).
60 David Abrams has suggested that defense counsel's institutional interest in maintaining a working relationship with a prosecutor may create pressure for settlement. David Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 200, 220 (2011).
only one aspect of lawyering: courtroom advocacy. Quite naturally, graduating law students going into litigation view their most important skill sets to be those used in a courtroom. The criminal bar organizations, which generally do an excellent job in both skills training and updating their members in statutory and case law developments, have not remedied this inaccurate self-perception. In fact, they have reinforced the adversarial model of the legal profession.

Plea bargaining is not a part of the training for defense lawyers, neither in law schools nor as part of continuing legal education courses conducted by defense lawyer organizations. National, state, and local organizations provide seminars covering every aspect of strategy in conducting trials and pre-trial hearings. Members of these organizations publish manuals and treatises such as Cross Examination: Science and Techniques and Pretrial Motions in Criminal Prosecutions. Last year’s annual meeting of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers illustrates the point. Courses were offered, for instance, on voir dire, opening and closing statements, suppressing illegally obtained evidence, and appellate advocacy. Not one course was offered on negotiating with prosecutors. By contrast, civil lawyers frequently study the art of negotiation.

Law schools are part of this problem as well. Take a look at any major law school’s curriculum. All have courses on the definition of crimes and the admissibility of the fruits of police searches and interrogations. Many have courses on the rules and procedures governing the pre-trial, trial, and post-conviction process. Classes dealing with how either prosecutors or defense lawyers should approach plea bargaining are remarkably absent from virtually

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61 See Uphoff, supra note 50, at 75 ("[L]ittle attention has been paid to the application of general negotiation principles to the plea bargaining of criminal cases.").


64 JAMES A. ADAMS & DANIEL D. BLINKA, PRETRIAL MOTIONS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (2d ed. 1998).

65 NAT’L ASSN OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 62. Similar course offerings are, in my experience, quite standard at all levels of defense organizations.

all law school curricula. This absence is glaring given the prevalence of plea-bargaining and the very different types of arguments made in those settings. Traditional criminal law courses do not cover the considerations about the appropriateness of bringing a charge, the possibility of cooperation and how it should be valued, or how to consider equities not contemplated by statutes. All of these considerations play more prominently in most plea negotiations than the principles of statutory interpretation, or the admissibility of evidence, taught in traditional criminal law and procedure classes.

The standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington was not necessary to motivate lawyers to dedicate themselves to their clients at trial. This is the role they've trained for and the task they view themselves as performing. Law school trained them to view themselves as courtroom advocates and professional societies reinforced this self-image. Strickland's requirement that defense lawyers be minimally competent at presenting cases in a courtroom naturally did little to change the quality of representation for defendants.\(^67\)

C. The Effect of Sanctions

The threatened sanction for, or shame of, being identified as an ineffective lawyer in Lafler and Frye may be necessary to reorient the perspective of defense counsel and those who train them.\(^68\) Very few lawyers will be found to be ineffective for applying the level of care they currently employ in negotiating criminal cases.\(^69\) But the Supreme Court's recognition that the same type of scrutiny that applies to a lawyer's negotiation also applies to his work in trial

\(^{67}\) In fact, in Strickland, the Court observed that the Sixth Amendment's purpose was "not to improve the quality of legal representation...." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).

\(^{68}\) See Batra, supra note 45, at 310 (contending that the Supreme Court "has effectively created a negotiation competency bar for criminal defense attorneys"). Contrary to what some ill-informed critics of criminal defense lawyers may say, these attorneys do not with any frequency intentionally render ineffective assistance to their clients and do want to avoid the stigma of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Robert J. Levy, The Dynamics of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution: Two Florida Case Studies, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 71 n.50 (2005) (observing that lawyers in a post-conviction proceeding were clearly attempting to avoid the stigma of having rendered ineffective assistance). State ethical rules recognize defense counsel's interest in avoiding such stigma and permit defense counsel to divulge information otherwise protected by attorney-client privilege, even though the defendant is not seeking damages but merely relief from a bad plea-bargain. For an excellent criticism of these rules, see Jenna C. Newmark, The Lawyer's "Prisoner's Dilemma": Duty and Self-Defense in Postconviction Ineffectiveness Claims, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 699 (2010).

\(^{69}\) See Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, supra note 25, at 161–3. There will, however, be a fair number of these cases; decisions on the merits of the attorney's performance will be necessary. Unlike a claim of ineffective assistance at trial or on appeal, a claim of ineffectiveness at the plea bargaining stage necessarily involves prejudice. See discussion supra Part I. B. The most likely mechanism for screening these cases seems to be the requirement that a court finds that a defendant would have accepted the plea offer. The Court granted cert in Burt v. Titlow, a case raising the question of whether a defendant's assertion that he would have accepted the plea is sufficient. Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1457 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013) (No. 12–414).
may go a long way in changing the defense bars' view of plea bargaining. The Court announced that the work a defense lawyer does in negotiating is every bit as important—every bit as much a part of his Sixth Amendment obligation to his client—as vigorously challenging the prosecution's case in open court. As the ethos of criminal defense lawyers changes and they openly recognize that a form of alternative dispute resolution is a legitimate use of their skills, they will seek to improve their ability to perform this task. Programs on negotiating with prosecutors may become as common as programs on trial advocacy. The Court's recent decision in *Padilla v. Kentucky* held that a defense lawyer is not acting competently if he fails to learn of his client's potential for deportation before entering a guilty plea, and this awakened the defense bar to the need to understand immigration law. Just as continuing legal education (CLE) programs began to change after *Padilla, Lafler* and *Frye* may lead to CLE events on negotiation tactics and certainly on the basic duties of lawyers in negotiations.

**D. The Defense Bar and the Effects of Information Sharing**

Clients represented by all criminal defense lawyers, whether highly compensated private lawyers or public defenders, will benefit from this change in self-perception. The criminal defense bar in most places is a very tight-knit group that frequently convenes to discuss new cases, legislation, rules, and even skills and strategies. As criminal defense practices tend to be small, there is often less of a hierarchical structure in the criminal defense bar than among lawyers who primarily engage in other practices. Senior criminal lawyers routinely mentor and share information and experience with junior
lawyers. By formal and informal methods, information, tactics, and even war stories (perhaps especially war stories) travel very quickly through this relatively egalitarian group with a strong sense of shared interest.

If the members of the defense bar begin to view negotiation skills as important, as worthy of study and honing as trial skills, then defense lawyers will learn from each other how to better present their cases to the prosecutor-judges who most often determine their clients' fates. The capital defense bar provides a solid analogy. Many believe that a concerted effort by the defense bar to understand how best to defend capital cases has contributed to the decline in death sentences. As Jeffrey Toobin described in a recent New Yorker article, capital defense lawyers, with the help of anthropologists and ex-journalists, began in the mid-1980s to learn how to tell mitigation stories about defendants in a way that did not offend juries. The sentencing phase of a capital case provided lawyers an opportunity to “tell the life story of the defendant in a way that explained the conduct that brought him into court.” Today, those techniques are an essential part of building an effective capital defense case. Many believe these efforts were prompted by a string of Supreme Court decisions holding that a defense lawyer rendered ineffective assistance if he put on an inadequate mitigation.

Some may argue that such an effort by the defense bar would not similarly assist attorneys in plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is certainly idiosyncratic because each prosecutor is unique and may employ any tactic he chooses in the discussion. But juries are similarly unique, and the defense bar has found it enormously helpful to train members of its profession in trial methods that have proven successful, and not just in capital cases. Many criminal defense lawyers swear by the training they receive from organizations like the National Criminal Defense College, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and various local organizations to improve their abilities.

In the context of plea bargaining, it is not just skills that defense lawyers could acquire from sharing information and institutional training by various bar organizations. Once these groups begin to publicly acknowledge the value of being an effective negotiator, they will likely begin to share information about

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73 See Quintin Chatman, Death Penalty Roundtable, CHAMPION, July 2008, at 14, 15 (describing improved results from better training).
74 Jeffrey Toobin, The Mitigator, NEW YORKER, May 9, 2011, at 32, 32-34.
75 Id. at 34.
78 See Quintin Chatman, The War Against Capital Punishment, CHAMPION, June 2010, at 18 (”[P]articipants in [NACDL] seminar[s] regularly report of successful outcomes in their capital trials and credit the success to the training they received.”).
79 Id.
One might suspect that defense lawyers would be competitive and not disclose the tactics that lead to the special deals they believe themselves uniquely able to acquire. This may be true in some cases, but the culture of criminal defense lawyers is typically quite collaborative. Defense lawyers generally have no qualms about teaching others the trial tactics that have made them successful.

As Lafler and Frye encourage defense lawyers to embrace their skills as negotiators, metrics can be developed to study the effectiveness of various lawyers so that their tactics can be replicated. Ronald Wright and Ralph Peeples have suggested that the value a particular lawyer brings to a case can be considered by looking at how the results she obtains compare to results other lawyers obtain in similar cases. Wright and Peeples suggest that this sort of data would be valuable to organizations like public defender offices in evaluating and training lawyers. As Lafler and Frye make lawyers more comfortable with their value being measured by the results they obtain in negotiations, such data collection for training purposes is likely to become more prevalent. Data sets would provide not only insight on training skills, but the data itself will also provide a baseline for typical offers, thus constraining prosecutors who want to deviate from the norm.

E. The Effect on Law Schools

It is not only the defense bar that is to blame for ignoring the importance of plea bargaining. Law schools have done virtually nothing to teach students how to engage in this vital role. My own story reflects the type of practice for which law school equips students. In my first month as a criminal defense lawyer in a small firm, I had a preliminary hearing in a drug case (which led to a suppression motion), three arguments in an intermediate state appellate court, an argument in a federal appeals court, and countless negotiations with prosecutors. Law school had prepared me quite well to develop the Fourth Amendment issues

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80 See Batra, supra note 45, at 332–33.
82 See Mary S. Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031, 1095 (2006) (describing training provided by the National Criminal Defense College but noting that few public defenders have funding to attend).
83 See Wright & Peeples, supra note 7, at 1236.
84 Id. at 1223.
85 Susan Klein has suggested that prosecutorial discretion could be constrained by requiring prosecutors to disclose the sort of deals that are standard for the crime charged. Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 2023, 2028 (2006) ("To ensure accuracy and equality, federal criminal defendants and jurists need the information necessary to determine whether a prosecutor could prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, and the data regarding charges imposed and sentences levied against suspects alleged to have engaged in similar conduct.").
in a suppression motion and had trained me extraordinarily well to handle the appeals. Virtually every class approximated responding to an appellate judge’s questions, and my first year writing class and second year moot court simulated appellate panels. Nothing, however, prepared me for the prosecutor's offer that my client plead to a misdemeanor drug offense and serve eleven months and twenty-nine days, day for day, at thirty percent for an offense charged as a B felony. Tennessee’s sentencing structure is confusing and law school (certainly one in a different state) could not have prepared me to understand it. It would have been a waste of the limited time in law school to learn the sentencing structure of all the neighboring states. But I was unsure of what I should have learned going into this meeting, whether this was a good offer, or what sort of information I should offer to try to improve it. I had no idea how to go about this very informal discussion that had enormous consequences for my client.

By contrast, law schools have long been educating students and practicing lawyers on how to approach civil negotiations, though these classes have surely been under-appreciated. Most law students graduate without taking a class in negotiation. Nevertheless, a vast amount of research in psychology, economics, and game theory has informed academic research on negotiations, which has greatly enhanced training in negotiation. Thus far, however, no one has attempted to adapt the extraordinary amount of work done to understand and teach the skill of negotiation to the unique circumstances of criminal negotiations.

86 Josh Bowers described a very similar disconnect between his legal training and experience in a white-collar boutique firm and his subsequent experience in dealing with cases as a public defender in the Bronx. See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1133, 1134 (2013).

87 Certainly the intricacies of Tennessee sentencing law are all but impenetrable, even to those involved in the system daily. See Mark Bell, No Standard Jail Sentence Calculations at County Level in Tennessee, Nat’l Sheriffs’ Ass’n Inst. for Jail Operations (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.jailtraining.org/node/715.

88 See McAdoo, supra note 28, at 49.


90 One excellent example of a program of instruction on negotiation for law students and practicing lawyers alike is the Harvard Program on Negotiation. Program on Negotiation, Harv. L. Sch., http://www.pon.harvard.edu/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). This program features practical instruction that uses the lessons learned from all of these disciplines. Their instruction focuses on Robert Mnookin’s groundbreaking work on a collaborative approach to negotiation whereby
Lafler and Frye should send a signal to law schools that if they are going to teach their students to function as competent counsel, they should at least provide them an introduction to plea bargaining. The Supreme Court has had more influence in developing criminal procedure curricula than it has any other topic. A look at virtually any criminal procedure casebook will illustrate this point. With one exception, these books almost exclusively contain cases from the Court. And the exception proves the rule. The early editions of Ron Wright and Marc Miller's excellent casebook on criminal procedure primarily contained state cases, though those cases incorporated federal cases in their analyses. The later editions responded to concerns from law teachers who wanted landmark Supreme Court cases on criminal procedure in the book. Once Lafler and Frye are included in casebooks, these important Supreme Court cases will at least prompt law professors to introduce students to the fact that they are responsible for being effective at the plea bargaining stage of the process, just as they are at the trial and appellate phases.

Unfortunately, teaching the Court's criminal procedure doctrines has not yet led to an increase in the skills associated with those doctrines. A number of Supreme Court cases have found lawyers ineffective for failure to investigate, yet with few exceptions law schools do not teach students how to investigate. The law schools that teach Strickland typically do so in a second semester criminal procedure course, but only the legal standard is taught—not how to go about, or supervise, an investigation. This omission is particularly glaring given that Northwestern journalism students, not law students, discovered the facts revealing the cases of innocence on Illinois' death row. Law schools, however,
are coming under increasing pressure to teach the skills lawyers will actually use in practice. The Court's recognition of a criminal defendant's right to an effective plea bargainer coincides with a new call for skills instruction. Instruction in appellate and trial advocacy is commonplace at virtually every law school. A growing number of law schools have centers on negotiation and virtually all have classes on negotiation. Often advocacy and negotiation courses are taught by adjuncts and therefore may seem not to get the attention they deserve, but these courses certainly exist at most every American law school. Although negotiation courses are available, there is no doubt that an insufficient number of students take them, even though every single lawyer will need this skill in her career. Criminal negotiation—plea bargaining—is taught by virtually no one and involves very different considerations than civil negotiation because of the power differential between prosecutor and defense lawyer and the prosecutor's dual advocate-judge role. The well-developed models for understanding and teaching civil negotiation have not yet been adapted for criminal negotiation. Law schools can ignore skills training in plea bargaining for only so long given these pressures.

By focusing the attention of defense lawyers and those who train them on the constitutional significance of the plea bargaining process, the Supreme Court may have improved criminal representation in ways that will not be obvious from just looking at the results of post-conviction cases alleging constitutionally ineffective negotiation.

II. Judges

Lafler and Frye impose new burdens on courts hearing ineffective assistance claims. Courts will first have to determine whether a defendant has suffered ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining phase. Many lower courts had recognized, prior to these decisions, that a defendant had a right to effective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining phase, but the high profile of a Supreme Court decision will certainly increase the number of claims. Indigent defendants are far more likely to have heard of a ruling from the high court granting the right to effective assistance during the negotiation phase than a similar decision from an intermediate appellate court.

96 See McAdoo, supra note 28, at 49.
98 See McAdoo, supra note 28, at 49.
99 See discussion infra Part III.
100 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (observing that the Court has not yet defined the duties of defense counsel in criminal negotiations).
101 See Perez, supra note 24, at 1539–40.
If the numbers since Lafler are any indication, these decisions could open up the floodgates of litigation on this issue requiring courts to develop standards defining effective assistance at this phase. More significantly, the Court in Lafler instructed lower courts to use their equitable discretion to determine what remedy to grant a defendant whose attorney unreasonably instructed him to go to trial. The Court provided little guidance on how to go about fashioning such a remedy and thus gave lower courts an interesting burden and opportunity for creativity.

Courts will no doubt struggle with determining what constitutes ineffective assistance in proceedings that do not follow any formal process and leave little in the way of a paper trail to document defense counsel's performance. Courts considering habeas corpus petitions have, however, long dealt with similar, if slightly less thorny, issues. The adequacy of a defense lawyer's investigation is frequently challenged in post-conviction proceedings. A defense lawyer's decision not to use limited resources to pursue a particular lead is as much art as science. No legal standards explain how to conduct an investigation. Yet, frequently courts find that attorneys have failed in their Sixth Amendment duty to investigate their client's cases. It is at least clear what the result of a perfect investigation would look like—all the relevant information would be discovered. There is, however, no model for a perfect negotiation. In determining whether a violation of a defendant's right to effective counsel occurred at the plea stage, courts will very much be writing on a blank slate.

With recent decisions in Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court has left lower courts with a more difficult and far more interesting question to resolve: What remedy applies when a court finds ineffective assistance of counsel? Prior to Lafler and Frye, when lower courts found a violation at this stage, they granted one of two remedies: they either ordered a new trial or they ordered the district attorney to re-offer the plea that had been rejected because of defense counsel's lapse of duty. The Supreme Court rejected these options as too rigid and

102 As of October 31, 2013, a year and a half after these decisions were issued, a Westlaw search reveals that 1,072 cases cited Lafler. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
103 Id. at 1381.
104 See id. at 1389 ("[T]he court may exercise discretion in determining whether the defendant should receive the term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence he received at trial, or something in between.").
105 See Wright & Peeples, supra note 7 (observing that effectiveness of lawyers in negotiations could be evaluated by comparing results between lawyers).
107 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 400–03 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing how limited resources force strategic decisions about which investigations to conduct).
108 This occurs most often in the sentencing phase of capital cases. See Smith, supra note 106.
109 See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) ("The art of negotiation is at least as nuanced as the art of trial") (quoting Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 741 (2011)).
110 See Perez, supra note 24, at 1535.
instructed lower courts to use their equitable discretion to fashion a remedy for a violation. In considering ineffective assistance of counsel cases with habeas corpus petitioners, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that those petitioners should only obtain relief when their convictions were somehow unfair. It would seem to follow that lower courts fashioning remedies for defendants receiving ineffective assistance at the plea bargaining phase would have to determine what portion of the plea offer constituted a fair sentence.

A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must, of course, under Strickland v. Washington demonstrate that his lawyer “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” He must also demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result, which requires him to show “that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

After Strickland, the Court emphasized in Lockhart v. Fretwell that an analysis of prejudice that focuses only on “mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.” In Fretwell, the defendant’s counsel failed to object to an aggravating factor supporting his death sentence. The defendant was convicted of felony murder for a death that occurred during a robbery. His death sentence was imposed on the basis of the jury’s finding of one aggravating factor: that the crime was committed for pecuniary gain. After the defendant was sentenced but before the case was appealed, the Eighth Circuit held that an aggravating factor that duplicates an element of the offense—as it did in Fretwell—could not be the basis of a death sentence as the factor did not narrow the class of persons who were death eligible. The defendant therefore asserted that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise this claim, which would have successfully barred any subsequent effort to obtain the death penalty. By the time the defendant filed his habeas claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court held that aggravating factors duplicating elements of the offense did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s

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111 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410–11.

112 See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 91, 145 (1995) (observing that “the prejudice prong of Strickland... effectively deincorporates the most fundamental right and deprives defendants of the effective assistance of counsel unless the trial in retrospect can be seen as ‘fundamentally unfair.’”)


114 Id.


116 Id. at 366–67.

117 Id.

118 Id. at 367.

119 Id.

120 Id.
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.\textsuperscript{121} Even though the results of the sentencing hearing would have been different had Fretwell's lawyer objected to the aggravating factor on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that his death sentence "was neither unfair nor unreliable."\textsuperscript{122}

\textit{Strickland} and its progeny therefore seem to require a court reviewing a lost opportunity to obtain a favorable plea to inquire whether the foregone plea would have yielded an unfair result. A number of courts prior to \textit{Lafler} and \textit{Frye} concluded that a sentence within the parameters prescribed by the statute for which a defendant was convicted could not be said to be unfair.\textsuperscript{123} These courts effectively rejected any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the negotiation phase. The Supreme Court in \textit{Lafler} concluded that \textit{Fretwell} did not preclude a defendant from demonstrating prejudice as a result of defective performance in the plea bargaining phase.\textsuperscript{124} The Court certainly did not conclude, however, that the principles of \textit{Fretwell} had nothing to say about the remedy a defendant should receive. In fact, the Court strongly suggested that the principles of \textit{Fretwell} have much to say about the remedy.\textsuperscript{125} The Court concluded only that \textit{Fretwell} did not preclude the possibility of a remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining phase.\textsuperscript{126} Unlike the defendant in \textit{Fretwell}, Justice Kennedy observed that the habeas petitioner in \textit{Lafler} was not seeking to benefit from the application of an incorrect legal principle that he missed because of his lawyer's error—he was seeking to obtain the benefit he would have obtained through the plea process. The Court stated:

\begin{quote}
\[\text{The Petitioner\]} maintains that, absent ineffective counsel, he would have accepted a plea offer for a sentence the prosecution evidently deemed consistent with the sound administration of criminal justice. The favorable sentence that eluded the defendant in the criminal proceeding appears to be the sentence he or others in his position would have received in the ordinary course, absent the failings of counsel.\textsuperscript{127}
\end{quote}

This part of the opinion makes the remedy seem deceptively simple. Courts must simply determine what defendants are typically offered for crimes with similar characteristics, which would actually be a fairly complicated task, but not nearly as complicated as the task Justice Kennedy ultimately assigns to lower courts.\textsuperscript{128}

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121 \textit{Id.}\ add 368 (citing Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988)).
122 \textit{Id.}\ at 371.
123 See Perez, supra note 24, at 1535.
125 See \textit{id.}\ at 1387.
126 See \textit{id.}\ at 1386.
127 \textit{Id.}\ at 1387.
128 Susan Klein has similarly proposed that defendants in negotiations ought to be informed about the standard offer defendants receive in similar cases. See Klein, supra note 82, at 2028. Professor Stuntz further suggested that the Court in \textit{Bordenkircher v. Hayes} should have required a similar empirical inquiry. See Stuntz, \textit{Bordenkircher v. Hayes}, supra note 8, at 27. He suggested that the Court should have forbidden prosecutors to threaten penalties that were not at least occasionally
\end{flushright}
Remedies, Kennedy wrote, "must 'neutralize the taint' of a constitutional violation, while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution." The Court did not explain how to identify plea offers, or portions of plea offers, that constituted windfalls, but did give courts great discretion to craft remedies to avoid windfalls. Once a trial court has found ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea phase, the Court instructed that the nature of the plea offer must be considered. If the plea deal offered a lesser sentence than the defendant received, the trial court is to "exercise discretion in determining whether the defendant should receive the term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence he received at trial, or something in between." If the plea offer involved a reduction in the charge, then "the proper exercise of discretion . . . may be to require the prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal." As if that weren't vague enough, the Court immediately added that once the plea was reoffered, "the judge can then exercise discretion in deciding whether to vacate the conviction from trial and accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed." The Court's given as a tactic to extract pleas. Id. Stuntz’s limitation would have looked to actual results as a way of cabining the practice of plea bargaining. The remedy the Court initially seemed to recommend in Lafler had a similar look-to-practice feel, but would instead look to bargains typically struck for such offenses under similar circumstances. Much like the scheme of remedies the Court actually created, this method of determining the remedy would have had the effect of creating a starting point in plea negotiations and may have even more quickly pushed the development of a common law of plea bargaining. For the reasons described below, it is clear that the Court did not fashion such an easily discernible approach.

130 Id. at 1389.
131 Id.
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 Id. The Court required lower courts to engage in a very similar analysis in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971). In Santobello, a defendant reached an agreement with the prosecutor's office that he would plead guilty to the lesser of two of the charges against him and the prosecution would agree not to make a recommendation at sentencing. Id. at 257. By the time of sentencing, a new prosecutor was assigned to the case who was unaware of the agreement to remain silent at sentencing and recommended substantial jail time. Id. The Court agreed that the defendant had been denied the benefit of his bargain but, much as the Court in Lafler, returned the case to the state courts to determine an equitable remedy. Id. at 263. The Court concluded that

[ the ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave to the discretion of the state court, which is in a better position to decide whether the circumstances of this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by petitioner, i.e., the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.

Id. Jenia Turner argues that remedies for Sixth Amendment violations prior to Lafler and Frye have restored defendants to the positions they would have occupied prior to the violation. She therefore criticizes the Court for allowing a less complete remedy in Lafler. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Effective Remedies for Ineffective Assistance, 48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 101 (2013). She is certainly correct that the Court has not previously recognized this range of remedies in an ineffective assistance
moment of greatest clarity in describing the remedy came in the following paragraph when it recognized that it was telling lower courts virtually nothing about determining remedies for defendants who had suffered from ineffective assistance at this phase. “Principles elaborated over time in decisions of state and federal courts, and in statutes and rules, will serve to give more complete guidance as to the factors that should bear upon the exercise of the judge’s discretion.”134

With little guidance, judges considering remedies must ask what portion of the plea offer that the defendant lost, because of ineffective assistance of counsel, would constitute a windfall to a defendant if he received it through a post-conviction proceeding. Judge Frank Easterbrook has suggested that the entire amount of leniency the defendant was offered in a plea deal would amount to a windfall if the defendant received it after the trial.135 For Easterbrook, plea deals are about trading risks—the prosecution exchanges the risk of an acquittal for the defendant’s risk of a sentence longer than the one in the plea deal. After a trial, as Easterbrook correctly observes, the prosecution has no risk of an acquittal and thus any remedy provides a windfall.136 Prosecutors, however, make plea offers for reasons other than minimizing the risk of acquittal.137

Justice Kennedy’s opinion obviously rejected Judge Easterbrook’s view that a remedy granting any kind of plea offer leniency would constitute a windfall. His opinion recognizes, though, that post-trial remedies for some portions of a plea could constitute a windfall. Unpacking which plea offers, or portions of plea offers, amount to windfalls seems to require a court to analyze why prosecutors made the offers. Prosecutors make offers for several reasons, only some of which involve attempts to achieve fair results. Judge Easterbrook’s analysis only accounted for one of these reasons—risk-aversion.138 Prosecutors agree to pursue lesser charges or shorter jail sentences than those that would result from trial for a variety of reasons, including: (1) weaknesses in the case; (2) cooperation by the defendant; (3) administrative costs to the prosecution in conducting the trial; (4) emotional toll and economic costs to the witnesses; and (5) equitable considerations not adequately accounted for by the statutory elements or sentencing guidelines.139 Many of these considerations involve

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134 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
136 Id.
137 Elsewhere, Judge Easterbrook has recognized a variety of reasons that might drive guilty pleas and specifically suggested that a plea offer will diverge from estimates of conviction probability for notorious crimes. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 299–302 (1983).
138 See Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 135, at 552.
139 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 35, at 53.
quid pro quo exchanges that are not possible once there has been a conviction and, more importantly, have nothing to do with the appropriateness of the defendant's sentence.

Post-trial, it would certainly amount to a windfall to grant the defendant the benefit of a trade that is no longer possible and has nothing to do with how the defendant ought to be punished. Once a case has been litigated, the prosecution has no reason to fear weaknesses in the case that will result in an acquittal; the prosecution has already spent its resources and burdened its witnesses trying the case. By the time a case reaches post-conviction proceedings, it is unlikely that a defendant could offer the prosecution anything worthwhile by providing information or testimony. Courts attempting to give defendants the "fair" outcome they were denied by rejecting the plea may well attempt to approximate the portion of the plea driven by the prosecutor's sense of the equitably proper outcome of the case. Giving the defendant the benefit of a now-unavailable quid pro quo seems like a windfall inconsistent with Strickland's requirement that remedies be limited to errors denying fundamental fairness.

At least one court has recognized that a defendant should not receive the benefits of a plea that were predicated on cooperation that is no longer possible. In Burt v. Titlow, the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant's lawyer inappropriately advised his client to go to trial rather than accept a plea offer. The appeals court ordered the case remanded to the trial court to fashion a remedy, observing that the trial court should take into consideration the fact that the plea offer was at least partially motivated by the defendant's agreement to testify against a co-defendant. Because the co-defendant had been tried and acquitted that cooperation was no longer possible.

Prosecutors do, however, often make decisions that are driven, at least in part, by fairness considerations. Consider the case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes. The defendant was charged with uttering a forged instrument—a check made out for $88.30 that he had stolen from a Pic Pac in Lexington, Kentucky. Under Kentucky law, this offense could have been charged as felony or a misdemeanor. The prosecutor chose to charge it as a felony, which carried a penalty between two and ten years at hard labor, but judges during this period had wide discretion.

140 Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577, 586–92 (6th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, finding that the lower court had not been adequately deferential to a state court finding that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. Burt v. Titlow, 133 S. Ct. 1457 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013) (No. 12-414).

141 Id. at 592.

142 Id. at 592.


144 See Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 2.
as to how sentences were to be served, so even a conviction for the felony may not have involved any jail time.\[145\] The defendant, Paul Hayes, however, had a relatively serious record. He had previously been convicted of detaining a female, which was a lesser included offense for rape, and a conviction for armed robbery.\[146\] Hayes was on probation for the armed robbery charge when he tried to cash the forged check.\[147\] The prosecutor therefore made Hayes an offer he couldn't (to be precise, should not have) refuse: if Hayes pled guilty to the felony offense, with an agreed sentence of five years hard labor, the prosecution would not seek to have Hayes declared a habitual criminal, which meant a mandatory life sentence.\[148\]

The prosecution could not have thought life was appropriate for this crime—even given Hayes' past—or it would have never offered five years as the alternative.\[149\] The trial in this case would have been a short one with Hayes' guilt easy to establish—his accomplice had given a statement against him, and Hayes was caught at the scene.\[150\] This was not a crime of violence, so there would have been no emotional toll on the witnesses. Hayes' accomplice had already confessed and implicated Hayes.\[151\] The prosecution did not need him to convict other defendants or solve other crimes. None of the utilitarian reasons for a plea offer—risk aversion, resource preservation, minimizing witness inconvenience or discomfort, or incentivizing cooperation—could have played a prominent role in the prosecutor's decision. The prosecutor's decision seems to have been driven by his sense that five years was an appropriate sentence for a previously violent offender who returned to crime while still on probation.\[152\] The plea offer in this case appears to have been motivated entirely by the quasi-judicial equitable task implicitly assigned to the prosecutor to determine not only what crimes had been committed, but which punishments ought to be sought. The Kentucky Legislature had empowered the prosecutor in Hayes' case to obtain a life sentence and doing so was not a difficult task. The decision to offer a considerably lighter sentence was apparently driven by the prosecutor's sense

\[145\] \textit{Id.}
\[146\] \textit{Id.}
\[147\] \textit{Id.}
\[148\] \textit{Id. at 3.}
\[149\] \textit{Id. at 24.}
\[150\] \textit{Id. at 5 & n.14.}
\[152\] The prosecutor in \textit{Bordenkircher v. Hayes} described his decision to seek a third-strike enhancement if the defendant refused the five-year offer to be based on efficiency not equity. During his cross-examination of Paul Hayes, he asked "isn't it a fact that I told you at that time if you did not intend to save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial and taking up this time that I intended to return to the grand jury and ask them to indict you based upon these prior felony convictions?" \textit{Id. at 2-3.} The discount for pleading, from life to five years, would have been an extraordinary discount to save the prosecution a very brief trial if the prosecutor found life to be an appropriate sentence.
of fairness.

As courts start to fashion remedies, they should analyze how prosecutors determined what plea bargain to offer defendants. This should reveal how much of an offer is based on a prosecutor’s unspoken, equitable considerations of how a particular defendant ought to be punished. Courts could either consider how a reasonable prosecutor would have gone about arriving at the rejected offer or it could attempt to determine what motivated this individual prosecutor. If courts attempt to reconstruct the thought processes of individual prosecutors, they will create incentives for prosecutors to document their reasoning in making offers, thus preventing defendants from attempting to recast all offers as driven by fairness concerns. In recording the basis for their offers, prosecutors would look (and perhaps act) much more like the judicial actors they are in the American inquisitorial justice system.

For a variety of reasons, however, lower courts should not attempt to get inside the heads of individual prosecutors. Inconsistent remedies would certainly follow from looking at the subjective thought processes of individual prosecutors, but this is the weakest objection. Every prosecutor will have idiosyncratic reasons for making a particular plea offer. Inconsistency is unavoidable in the plea bargaining process. A stronger objection is that making the subjective motivations of prosecutors relevant to the remedy for ineffective performance by defense counsel would encourage prosecutors to document the basis of their offers and discourage offers on the basis of “fairness” grounds that produce remedies. Prosecutors would have an incentive to report being motivated only by an interest in minimizing any possible remedy. Prosecutors would also view themselves as promulgating guidelines. Therefore, another objection is that guidelines promulgated by legislators or prosecutors tend to

153 Often such efforts are referred to as attempts to examine the subjective motivations of individuals and such efforts are typically rejected because of the impossibility of the task. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006) (stating that if basis to believe emergency entry is permitted, the officer’s motivations are irrelevant); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (permitting traffic stop on the basis of probable cause regardless of officer’s subjective motivations); People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986) (explaining that the necessity of deadly force to save one’s life is viewed from standard of reasonable person). In this context of evaluating a prosecutor’s motivations for offering a plea, it may actually be possible to evaluate his motivations because he may state them in making the offer. In fact, in reviewing Batson challenges, trial courts consider alone the subjective motivations of prosecutors. Judges observe the actors as they engage in the allegedly discriminatory selection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). But see Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2011) (observing that the method of assessing the subjective bias of lawyers in Batson permits lawyers to discriminate with impunity).

There are, however, problems with relying on prosecutors to self-report the motivations for their plea offers when the consequences of those reports change the remedies defendant may be able to seek. In the Batson context, the trial judge has witnessed the entire encounter and is therefore in a good position to evaluate the advocate’s veracity in offering his race-neutral justification for the peremptory strike. In the plea bargaining context, just as in the Batson context, prosecutors would have an incentive to mis-report, but judges would have a lesser ability to evaluate credibility because the decision-making would have occurred outside the judge’s presence.
minimize the role of mitigating factors. Sentencing guidelines at the federal and state level as well as in the United States Attorney's Manual illustrate this reality. Those promulgating rules are, for obvious reasons, institutionally disinclined to recognize large spheres of discretion. If prosecutors begin to explain the basis for their pleas, they will be disinclined to acknowledge that they regard the legislatively prescribed penalties as too harsh in certain cases.

Trial judges, however, occupy a very different institutional role than code-drafting politicians or law-enforcing prosecutors. A number of federal judges resigned because the federal sentencing guidelines limited their ability to consider the individual circumstances of an offender and his crimes. The trial judge's perspective gives him little reason to hide the fact that a plea is driven, at least in part, by a concern that the facts of this crime do not really "fit" the crime, even though all the elements of the crime are satisfied. It is the essence of a trial judge's job to consider all of the circumstances of a defendant's crime and background and determine an appropriate sentence and do so in a methodical way on the record—or at least it was in a world before sentencing guidelines. Trial judges ought to be adept at considering how reasonable prosecutors would view the equitable considerations in a defendant's case. It may be objected that in this case the judge would only be substituting his subjective view of the equities for the prosecutor's, but judges have in a number of contexts been asked to consider what reasonable and actual prosecutors considered. In reviewing denials of motions for pretrial diversions, judges are asked to consider what reasonable prosecutors would do. In Batson challenges, judges are asked to consider


See Joanna Shepherd, Blakely's Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 533, 551-52 (2007) (discussing theories of how state guidelines have produced longer sentences). The United States Attorney's Manual forbids dismissing any readily provable offense as part of a negotiation, thus creating pushing punishments toward standard, and higher, penalties. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.400 (2002) ("The basic policy is that charges are not to be bargained away or dropped, unless the prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government's ability readily to prove a charge for legal or evidentiary reasons."). For a defense of sentences under the federal guidelines, see Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (2004).


156 Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), of course made the sentencing guidelines advisory, but the judges who had been handing down sentences under them for years did not radically change their sentences after Booker. See Jeffery Ulmer & Michael T. Light, Beyond Disparity: Changes in Federal Sentencing After Booker and Gall?, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 333, 340 (2011).

determine the actual motivations of prosecutors. It therefore does not seem to be a stretch to ask a judge to consider how much leniency a reasonable prosecutor would have attributed to any particular factor when making the plea offer.

Courts specifically have experience in determining whether a decision was motivated by equitable considerations and giving that distinction a legal consequence. Courts look at the reason a conviction was overturned on post–conviction to determine whether the conviction will have immigration consequences. When convictions are vacated because of “procedural or substantive defects in the underlying proceeding,” those convictions may not serve as the basis for deportation. Where, however, a sentence is “vacated because of postconviction events, such as rehabilitation or immigration hardships,” the immigration consequences of the conviction remain despite the fact that the conviction was vacated. As one court stated it, where the vacation of the conviction is of a “purely equitable” basis or to avoid deportation, the conviction remains valid for the purposes of immigration law.

More significantly, judges are permitted to reject guilty pleas as too lenient only when the judge determines that the prosecutor has given too much weight to equitable considerations calling for leniency. In the leading case on this issue, United States v. Ammidown, the D.C. Circuit reversed a trial judge’s refusal to accept a guilty plea, holding that in only in extreme cases could a judge make such a refusal. Under no condition, however, could the trial judge second–guess a plea offer motivated by concerns about how prosecutorial resources should be spent, or one based on a prosecutor’s view of the strength of the case. Ammidown thus requires courts to determine the basis of a prosecutor’s decision to offer leniency in a plea. Courts therefore have the institutional competence to make these evaluations.

While commentators have reasonably suggested that few defendants will obtain relief under Lafler and Frye, the number of cases reversed will not be negligible. The most commonly used basis for rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim—lack of prejudice to the defendant—will not be available when a defendant claims his lawyer was ineffective in the negotiation process.

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158 See Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 32–33 (1997) (observing that Batson calls for a judge to make a subjective determination but that the Court could have been concluding that a discriminatory impact was sufficient); Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 284 (2007). See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).


160 Id. at 135 (quoting In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624, 2003 WL 21358480 (B.I.A. 2003)).

161 Id. at 135 (citing Renteria-Gonzales v. I.N.S., 322 F.3d 804, 812–13 (5th Cir. 2003)).


163 Id. at 621–23.

164 See Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, supra note 25, at 152.
The Supreme Court in *Strickland* observed that most claims could be quickly rejected by concluding that a lawyer's alleged deficiency did not prejudice the defendant; that is, the result of the trial or sentencing hearing would have been the same if the lawyer had performed as he should have. When a defendant claims that his lawyer ineffectively represented him in the negotiation process, he is claiming that he either took a worse deal than was offered or that his lawyer could have obtained, or that he went to trial and received a greater sentence than he was offered or should have been offered had his lawyer performed effectively. Unlike in a trial where a reviewing court is left to speculate about the result that counsel's failure had on the verdict, no speculation will be necessary to demonstrate that the defendant was prejudiced from his counsel's unreasonable conduct during negotiations. The sentence the defendant would have received from the plea offer that was not communicated to him, or the defendant would have received had he not gone to trial, will be evident from the case records. And a defendant would only bring a post-conviction claim if those plea offers provided for a lesser sentence than he actually received.

No doubt courts will defer to many of the defense counsel decisions during the negotiation process as strategic choices, but this is true for the decisions of counsel during the trial and appeal as well. In fact, there may be fewer purely strategic choices in trials and appeals than in negotiations. The most frequent source of successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims is attorneys' failure to investigate, and these claims are most successful in the sentencing phase of capital cases where the jury can consider any mitigating factor in choosing life over death. Plea bargaining is much like the sentencing phase of a capital case in that a prosecutor can consider anything in deciding whether to extend mercy. Failure to investigate and present equitable arguments to prosecutors seems as problematic as a defense lawyer's failure to investigate mitigating circumstances, though sentencing consequences are regarded by most as less severe in any non-capital case. Courts will thus have a non-trivial number

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166 In *Missouri v. Frye*, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404–05 (2012), defense counsel had actually obtained a deal better than the one the defendant ultimately accepted, but had failed to communicate the offer to the defendant.
168 David Abrams' empirical research of sentencing in Chicago suggests that there will not be that many cases in which defendants go to trial and receive jail terms longer than they were offered in plea bargains. David S. Abrams, *Is Pleading Really a Bargain?*, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 200 (2011). His results are counter-intuitive to virtually everyone who has worked in the criminal justice system but definitely worthy of further exploration. At least one academic has been strongly critical of his Abrams' conclusion. See Albert W. Alschuler, *Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band Aids for a Festering Wound*, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 687–91 (2013).
of cases in which they are required to develop a remedy for petitioners whose attorneys were ineffective negotiators.

A remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel that permits a judge to grant a defendant only part of the leniency he would have received under the plea will certainly appeal to trial judges. It is politically difficult to reverse convictions or sentences when there is little or no doubt about the defendant's guilt and the court has spent the time trying the defendant. It certainly requires a measure of creativity to look behind the plea offer and ask what part of the plea offer was driven by quid pro quo exchanges and what part was driven by a prosecutor's sense that the offer represented a fair outcome. Trial judges tend to avoid creativity for fear of appellate reversal. But some principled basis will be necessary to exercise the discretion afforded lower courts to grant remedies less lenient than those contained in lost plea offers. Such creativity is consistent with Strickland's insistence on fairness in remedy and Lafler's concern that defendants not receive windfalls in post-conviction proceedings. And the development of a record at the trial court level would be helpful, if not essential, to appellate courts' fashioning a remedy based on the prosecutor's subjective determination of what punishment fits the crime. The incentives trial level courts have to minimize the impact of post-conviction remedies may well cause them to take up the opportunity to define the appropriate use of the prosecutorial function to charge and bargain.

III. Prosecutors

The unchecked power of prosecutors to decide which charges to bring and what plea to offer the defendant is problematic for all the reasons that led to sentencing guidelines. There is no reason to believe that prosecutors will be more consistent in their exercise of discretion than judges. In fact, there are several reasons to believe the contrary. A prosecutor has never had to explain his decision to seek certain charges and not others, or to offer or accept a plea bargain. Even in the bygone era of extraordinary judicial discretion, the sentencing hearing required an explanation of the judge's decision. There are no transparency requirements for prosecutors and thus, unlike judges, there is no system for routinely evaluating their reasoning. Prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining decisions—which can have a greater effect on a defendant's punishment than any decision made by a judge—knows virtually no limits.

eath, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.”

The late Professor William Stuntz has argued that the extraordinary range of conduct criminalized by legislatures, combined with the absence of any limitation on prosecutorial charging decisions, has permitted prosecutors an unchecked power to determine who shall be punished and how much.173

Prosecutors can determine what charges to bring, what bargains to offer, and what processes to use to determine both the appropriate charge and the appropriate plea. As described above, Lafler and Frye should encourage defense lawyers to systematically develop their skills as negotiators and provide judges an incentive to provide guidance on what the results of these negotiations should look like.

These soft-limits on prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining are long overdue. One after another, the Supreme Court’s opinions have rejected any limit on the prosecutorial prerogative, despite a host of criticism for vesting extraordinary, unchecked authority in the hands of a government official. Separation of powers concerns have prevented judicial oversight over initial charging decisions.174 A healthy respect for the practice of plea bargaining has impeded any work to set limits on the gap between the initial charge and the plea offer.175 Finally, liberty of contract principles have been used to justify permitting prosecutors, with defendants’ consent, to circumvent procedural protections that would otherwise be available during pre-trial proceedings.176

Lafler and Frye may empower defense counsel to impose limitations on prosecutors through the negotiation process itself, taking advantage of the very principles that have previously thwarted regulation. Should these decisions achieve this goal, they will be regarded as some of the Court’s finest work, legally and politically.177 Without reversing long–existing doctrines or ordering changes to established practices, circumstances in the trenches may change. A conversation about the appropriate uses of plea bargaining may well follow from the work judges are now asked to do. Outlier prosecutors, both the excessively harsh and the excessively lenient, may feel pressured to moderate their positions. A discussion about the justifications for common charging and bargaining

174 Rachel Barkow has argued persuasively that while historical practice and constitutional text support deference to prosecutors in criminal matters, such deference is unwise. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, supra note 40, at 1024–28.
175 Numerous legal scholars have found substantial gaps between the initial charge (or the threatened charge) and the plea offer to be problematic. See, e.g., Richard L. Lippke, The Ethics of Plea Bargaining 31 (2011); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 851, 868–70 (1995).
176 See Meares, supra note 174, at 869–70.
177 See Donald A. Dripps, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court: The End of the Beginning?, 25 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 141, 141–42 (2012) ("If, indeed, we ever reach a system of transparent, regulated, and accountable plea incentives, we will look back at Padilla, Frye, and Lafler as the cases that initiated the metamorphosis.").
practices may ensue. To understand how significant such developments would be, it is important to look at how thoroughly the Court has previously deferred to the discretion of prosecutors to charge and set the terms of negotiation.

A. Charging Decisions

Courts have repeatedly and categorically rejected the idea that they have the authority to exercise any oversight over prosecutor's charging and plea bargaining. In *Oyler v. Boles*, the Supreme Court in 1962 considered an equal protection challenge to a life sentence under West Virginia's habitual criminal act, which provided for a mandatory life sentence for the third felony, but only if the prosecutor filed an information seeking the enhanced penalty prior to sentencing.\(^\text{177}\) Two defendants sentenced under this law objected that the enhancement was not sought against all defendants who were eligible for the mandatory life punishment.\(^\text{179}\) One of the two defendants contended that during a fifteen-year period, there were five others in his county eligible for this enhancement—but the prosecutor sought it only in his case.\(^\text{180}\) He further asserted that West Virginia prosecutors chose not to seek the enhancement against 904 other defendants.\(^\text{181}\)

The Court concluded that "[t]he statistics merely show that according to penitentiary records a high percentage of those subject to the law have not been proceeded against."\(^\text{182}\) Nothing, the Court concluded, showed that prosecutors were aware that the other defendants were eligible for the enhancements.\(^\text{183}\) The Court's reasoning went much further. Even if the prosecutors had known about the prior offenses of these other defendants, respect for separation of powers prevented the Court from doing anything about it so long as the decisions to seek, or not seek, the enhancement were not based on a constitutionally protected criteria:

> [T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics in this case might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.\(^\text{184}\)

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\(^{177}\) *Oyler v. Boles*, 368 U.S. 448, 449 (1962). In *Ewing v. California*, 538 U.S. 11, 28-29 (2003), the Court considered California's three-strikes law and found it constitutional. The California law, in contrast to the West Virginia law, gave a trial judge considerable discretion to determine that sentencing under the provision was inappropriate and, once the judge found the third-strike provision appropriate, required only a twenty-five year minimum. *Id.* West Virginia's law knew no such discretion and had a mandatory life penalty. *Oyler*, 368 U.S. at 449.

\(^{179}\) *Oyler*, 368 U.S. at 454-56.

\(^{180}\) *Id.* at 454-55.

\(^{181}\) *Id.*

\(^{182}\) *Id.* at 456.

\(^{183}\) *Id.*

\(^{184}\) *Id.* at 456.
Almost two decades later, the Supreme Court would again be asked to consider whether a prosecutor’s charging decision violated the Constitution. In United States v. Batchelder, two federal statutes prohibited the receipt of a firearm by an individual with a felony conviction. One of the statutory provisions provided for a maximum two-year penalty; the other provided for a maximum five-year penalty. The provisions were otherwise substantively indistinguishable. The defendant, who was sentenced under the five-year statute, therefore argued that either Congress intended the more lenient statute, which was the later-enacted statute, to be the sole punishment for possession of a firearm by a felon, or if Congress had no such intent, that giving prosecutors the option to choose between the statutes ran afoul of the Constitution.

The Court in Batchelder held that neither contention was true: Congress did not intend to effectively repeal the first statute with the subsequent more lenient one, nor did the Constitution forbid vesting this sort of discretion in the hands of prosecutors. The Court found that the principle of lenity that would limit the prosecution to the less severe statute would have only applied if there were an ambiguity about whether the defendant had violated the more severe statute. The Court held that it was clear the defendant had violated both statutes.

The Seventh Circuit, when it considered Batchelder, concluded that the “due process and equal protection interest[s] in avoiding excessive prosecutorial discretion” limited the prosecutor to charging the defendant with the less severely punished crime. The Supreme Court did not share the lower court’s willingness to intrude on the prosecutorial prerogative. The Court observed that

there is no appreciable difference between the discretion a prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge under one of two statutes with different elements and the discretion he exercises when choosing one of two statutes with identical elements. In the former situation, once he determines that the proof will support conviction under either statute, his decision is indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter context.

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186 Id. at 116-17.
187 The jurisdictional elements of the two offenses were different. The offense carrying the five year maximum required the government to demonstrate that the gun possessed had traveled in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1970). The offense carrying the maximum two-year penalty required the government to demonstrate that the firearm was received, possessed, or transported in interstate commerce or that the defendant's possession, receipt or transportation of the gun affected interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (1970).
188 Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 118.
189 Id. at 122–23.
190 Id. at 121–22.
191 Id. at 121.
192 Id. at 124.
193 Id. at 125.
The obvious, but unstated, premise is that the Constitution imposes no limitation on a prosecutor to make a charging decision among a range of options provided by the legislature, unless, as the Court observed, that decision was based on "race, religion, or other arbitrary classification" as previously recognized in *Oyler v. Boles.*\(^{194}\) Likely anticipating the Court's strong respect for separation of powers, especially when dealing with prosecutors, Batchelder argued that allowing prosecutors to select among identical offenses created a problem of executive encroachment into the legislative function.\(^{195}\) The legislature had, according to the Seventh Circuit, "impermissibly delegate[d] to the Executive Branch the Legislature's responsibility to fix criminal penalties."\(^{196}\) The Court disagreed, noting that the degree of discretion the legislature conferred on prosecutors to choose among the two statutes was "no broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing the criminal laws."\(^{197}\) Doubtlessly the Court was on solid ground with this observation. The extraordinary discretion of prosecutors to charge defendants was frequently noted.\(^{198}\) The Court's observation does not, however, defend the constitutionality of conferring extraordinary discretion on prosecutors; it merely illustrates that the phenomenon is widespread.

There is little impact even to the limitations on prosecutorial discretion that the Court has recognized. While other courts have recognized that charging decisions may not be made on the basis of race, religion, or other improper motives, the Supreme Court has made it very difficult to go about demonstrating that a prosecution was commenced on the basis of such an improper motive. In *United States v. Armstrong,* defendants claimed that African Americans were selected for crack cocaine prosecutions on the basis of their race.\(^{199}\) In support of this claim, the defendant offered evidence that only African Americans in the particular district had been the subject of crack cocaine indictments despite the fact that state courts were prosecuting white defendants for this crime and treatment centers were admitting white patients for crack cocaine use.\(^{200}\) The defendants sought, on this basis, to have the United States Attorney's Office provide the reasons why it chose to prosecute.\(^{201}\) The Court found that the defendants had made an insufficient threshold showing of race-based prosecutions to justify obtaining this information.\(^{202}\) The problem of crafting a remedy, if discriminatory prosecution had ultimately been found, undoubtedly contributed to the Court's reluctance to permit the discovery of evidence that

\(^{194}\) *Id.* at 124–25; *Oyler v. Boles,* 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).

\(^{195}\) *Batchelder,* 422 U.S. at 114.

\(^{196}\) *Id.* at 125.

\(^{197}\) *Id.* at 126.

\(^{198}\) See *id.* at 115, 123–26.


\(^{200}\) *Id.* at 459.

\(^{201}\) *Id.*

\(^{202}\) *Id.* at 458.
would have proven the claim.\textsuperscript{203} The upshot of \textit{Armstrong} is nevertheless that the extraordinary discretion given to prosecutors practically extends to decisions potentially based on constitutionally impermissible grounds.

Courts have demonstrated the same reluctance to intervene in prosecutors' decisions to decline charges as they have prosecutors' decisions to pursue charges. In \textit{Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller}, guards retaking a maximum security prison following a riot allegedly used unnecessary force on captured inmates and committed unjustified killings.\textsuperscript{204} Surviving inmates and the families of those killed in the retaking of Attica sought to compel state and federal officials to conduct more thorough investigations than those conducted and prosecute those who had violated federal and state laws.\textsuperscript{205} The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court denying the requested writ of mandamus, noting that respect for the discretion of prosecutors prevented such an order.\textsuperscript{206} The court recognized that "[t]he primary ground upon which this traditional judicial aversion to compelling prosecutions has been based is the separation of powers doctrine."\textsuperscript{207} The inmates and families observed that the federal law "authorized and required" United States Attorneys "to institute prosecutions against all persons" violating the civil rights laws they alleged the Attica guards violated.\textsuperscript{208} The Second Circuit observed that the "required" language in the statute was not sufficiently clear to abrogate the widely recognized broad discretion of prosecutors.\textsuperscript{209}

The Second Circuit in \textit{Inmates of Attica} suggested that courts lacked certain institutional competence to determine which charges were appropriate.

In the absence of statutorily defined standards governing reviewability, or regulatory or statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in the task of supervising prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves to resolution by the judiciary. The reviewing courts would be placed in the undesirable and injudicious posture of becoming "superprosecutors."\textsuperscript{210}

Institutional competence does not, however, seem to be driving the reluctance of courts to review the charging decisions of prosecutors. Statutes authorizing courts to exercise some oversight over prosecutorial discretion rarely provide anything close to clarity and require the same sort of decision-making believed

\textsuperscript{203} By contrast, \textit{Batson v. Kentucky} requires an advocate to offer a race-neutral explanation of a pre-emptory strike, but the remedy for such a violation is quite simple. \textit{See} \textit{Batson v. Kentucky}, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).


\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Id.} at 379–80.

\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Id.} at 379.

\textsuperscript{208} \textit{Id.} at 381. (quoting 12 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (2012))

\textsuperscript{209} \textit{Id.} (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1987 (2012)) ("The mandatory nature of the word 'required' as it appears in § 1987 is insufficient to evince a broad Congressional purpose to bar the exercise of executive discretion in the prosecution of federal civil rights crimes."

\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Id.} at 380.
to be in the exclusive domain of prosecutors. Courts conducting proportionality review of death sentences are not looking at whether the legal criteria for the punishment are satisfied. They are asking whether the case, notwithstanding the fact the legal criteria have been satisfied, is as aggravated as cases typically yielding the penalty.\footnote{See David S. Baime, Comparative Proportionality Review: The New Jersey Experience, Crim. L. Bull., Spring 2005, available at WestlawNext 41 No. 2 Crim. Law Bulletin ART 6 (observing that no criteria guide proportionality review); see also Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (with Lessons from New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2001) (contending that "comparative proportionality review is unwarranted, methodically unsound, and theoretically incoherent").}

Some states have adopted the Model Penal Code’s provision permitting judges to dismiss de minimis infractions of statutes.\footnote{As well as states that have directly adopted the MPC provisions, several more have enacted similar (but not identical) provisions. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (2012); Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the "De Minimis" Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51, 82 (1997); Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 833–39 (1999).}

Under this provision, a prosecution may be dismissed if the defendant’s conduct is customarily tolerated, did not threaten or cause the harm contemplated by the statute, or could not reasonably be regarded as within the legislature’s contemplation in passing the statute.\footnote{See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 209 n.31 (1982) (describing statute).} Finally, statutes in a number of states require prosecutors to explain their decision not to allow a defendant pre-trial diversion and permit courts to review the reasoning of prosecutors for abuse of discretion.\footnote{See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Pretrial Diversion: Statute or Court Rule Authorizing Suspension or Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on Defendant’s Consent to Noncriminal Alternative, 4 A.L.R.4th 147 (1981).}

B. Lack of Substantive Limits on Plea Bargaining

The Supreme Court’s first foray into plea bargaining in 1970 did no more than recognize that convictions were legitimate even though they were part of an agreement between the prosecutor and defendant to lessen the defendant’s exposure to criminal penalties. The further the Court delved into cases involving plea bargaining, the more it became apparent that this process, whose very legitimacy was questioned prior to 1970, was not only permissible but knew no constitutional limits whatsoever.

It is generally assumed that plea bargaining was underground until well into the second half of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court expressly found a plea made as part of a deal to be voluntary.\footnote{Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747–48 (1970). See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, supra note 40, at 1044 (“plea bargaining existed as an underground and unapproved practice for most of the nation’s history”); see also discussion supra note 40.} Given the prevalence of such bargains, however, it is hard to imagine that trial courts were unaware of
the practice. A survey of federal judges in 1956 found that entry of a guilty plea was a basis for a more lenient sentence.\footnote{216\textsuperscript{216} Al Alschuler observed in 1968 that plea bargaining had received remarkably good press.\footnote{217} Plea bargaining was nevertheless inconsistent with the oft-recognized rule that a plea could not be induced by a threat or promise of any kind.\footnote{218} A plea bargain, of course, is induced by just these sorts of pressures.\footnote{219} One can view the bargain as either a promise by the government not to seek the most serious conviction or severe sentence if he takes the deal—or a threat to attempt the most serious consequences for the defendant if he does not accept the offer.

Until 1970, the Supreme Court had not resolved the conflict between the requirements for a plea bargain and the reality that a number of defendants were entering pleas in exchange for the hope, if not the express promise, of leniency. With \textit{Brady v. United States}, the Court for the first time formally recognized that a guilty plea could be voluntary even if induced by a promise of less punishment.\footnote{220} Brady claimed that he pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty.\footnote{221} The facts of Brady's case are unusual because the possibility of execution was not removed through a promise from the prosecution. The federal kidnapping statute under which Brady was charged was drafted in such a way that a death sentence could only follow from a jury verdict.\footnote{222} By pleading guilty, Brady escaped execution regardless of the prosecution's willingness to trade Brady's trial right for his life.\footnote{223} As a peculiar side note to the Brady decision, the Court held in \textit{United States v. Jackson}—decided two years before Brady's case—that the burden the federal kidnapping statute placed on trials was unconstitutional.\footnote{224} Brady therefore alleged, to no avail, that he had pleaded guilty to avoid an unconstitutional sentence.\footnote{225} The Court reasoned that while

\footnote{216}{See Comment, supra note 40, at 207.}
\footnote{217}{See Alschuler, \textit{The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining}, supra note 35, at 51.}
\footnote{219}{The difficulty of strictly adhering to principles of general applicability still exists today. Leniency in exchange for testimony seems to be a purchase of that testimony, yet practically prosecutors must have a way to encourage co-conspirators to testify against one another, so the law assumes there is no problem. See \textit{United States v. Singleton}, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344–52 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that because § 201(c)(2) states that "whoever" gives a witness anything of value for or because of his testimony has violated the statute, a plain-meaning reading of the statute must include a federal prosecutor's giving a witness a reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony), \textit{revisited en banc}, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).}
\footnote{220}{\textit{Brady}, 397 U.S. at 751.}
\footnote{221}{\textit{Id.} at 745–44.}
\footnote{223}{\textit{See id.} at 2313–22.}
\footnote{224}{\textit{United States v. Jackson}, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).}
\footnote{225}{\textit{Brady}, 397 U.S. at 744–51.}
avoidance of the death penalty may have been one of Brady’s motivations, other factors may have also led to the plea, including his factual guilt.\footnote{226} The Court further emphasized that the defendant was advised by an attorney who was, presumably, able to weigh the strength of the evidence that would be presented at trial and determine whether accepting the plea was in Brady’s interest.\footnote{227} Promises or threats were different, the Court reasoned, in the interrogation context, as suspects unaided by counsel were unable to decide whether providing information was worth the exchange offered.\footnote{228}

Reading Jackson and Brady side by side, one is struck by the disparate treatment the two men received. Jackson successfully filed a pre–trial motion to have the death penalty provision of the federal kidnapping statute declared unconstitutional, and tried his case with no risk of execution.\footnote{229} Brady’s lawyer did not file a similar pre–trial motion and Brady pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty.\footnote{230} When the death penalty provision that prompted Brady’s plea was declared unconstitutional, Brady was not afforded an opportunity to go to trial or restart plea negotiations without the threat of execution.\footnote{231}

Brady and Jackson also reveal something about the Court’s unique deference to prosecutors. In Jackson, the Court concluded that the legislature is forbidden to burden a defendant’s right to trial by attaching a greater penalty to a conviction resulting from a trial than one resulting from a guilty plea.\footnote{232} However, Brady established that the Constitution is not offended if the prosecution chooses to exchange a lesser penalty for procedural protections.\footnote{233} Deference to prosecutorial discretion is usually defended on separation of powers principles.\footnote{234} But Jackson denied the legislature the power to trade leniency for constitutional rights.\footnote{235} Brady gave only prosecutors this power.\footnote{236} The legislative provision at issue in Jackson guaranteed leniency to any defendant who waived his right to trial. Prosecutors are not required to comply with this or any neutral principle of application. They may decide for virtually any reason to exchange a lesser sentence for a waiver of trial.\footnote{237}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[226]{Id. at 749–50, 758.}
\footnotetext[227]{Id. at 749, 754.}
\footnotetext[228]{Id. at 754–55.}
\footnotetext[229]{Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572, 591.}
\footnotetext[230]{See Hoffman, Kahn & Fisher, supra note 221, at 2314–15.}
\footnotetext[231]{Id. at 2314–16, 2321.}
\footnotetext[232]{Jackson at 390 U.S. at 581–85.}
\footnotetext[233]{Brady, 397 U.S. at 751–53.}
\footnotetext[234]{See Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, supra note 40; see also supra text accompanying note 40.}
\footnotetext[235]{See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570–72, 581–85.}
\footnotetext[236]{Cf. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, supra note 40, at 1048 (observing that courts defer to prosecutors more completely than they do many other actors in the law).}
\footnotetext[237]{See Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 172.}
\end{footnotes}
The case of *North Carolina v. Alford* forced the Court to resolve the question of whether a threatened penalty was alone a sufficient basis for a voluntary plea.\(^{238}\) The defendant, facing a possible death sentence, agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a thirty-year maximum sentence.\(^{239}\) Unlike the defendant in *Brady*, however, Alford refused to admit his guilt.\(^{240}\) Nothing other than the prosecution's threat of a death sentence explained Alford's willingness to enter this plea. The Court concluded that so long as there was a "factual basis" for the charge the prosecution brought, the plea was constitutional.\(^{241}\) *Alford* thus trusted prosecutors with extraordinary discretion. Again in *Alford*, the Court observed that the defendant acted on the advice of counsel.\(^{242}\) *Alford* not only demonstrated limited oversight of charging decisions, but also revealed that the Court required little supervision over negotiations between prosecutors and defense lawyers.

*Brady* and *Alford* were not without their problematic parts, but the offers themselves did not look unreasonable. *Brady*, of course, involved the threat of an unconstitutional death sentence.\(^{243}\) *Alford* involved a plea that, according to the terms of the defendant's plea, was motivated alone by the prosecution's threat of a death sentence. Yet, the fifty-year offer given to Brady was effectively a life sentence, and the thirty-year sentence Alford received was also a substantial period of time.\(^{244}\) If the prosecution offered a defendant facing a capital charge a plea, a very long prison sentence was the least amount of consideration that could be offered. These offers do not call into question the legitimacy of the prosecutorial decision to seek the death penalty, nor do these offers themselves raise questions about defendants' reasons for accepting them. It is somewhat hard to imagine an innocent defendant agreeing to a life sentence merely to avoid execution.

If *Brady* and *Alford* were representative of the type of plea offers prosecutors were offering in the early 1970s, then prosecutors had not, at that point, assumed the adjudicative role they have in the modern criminal justice system. Perhaps uncertainty about the constitutionality of plea bargaining kept the gap between threatened punishment and plea offers to a minimum. After the Supreme Court's recognition of the legitimacy of plea bargaining, however, it was clear that prosecutors were using their vast charging discretion to avoid trials without reducing the amount of time served.

*Bordenkircher v. Hayes*, discussed above, was the first case in which the Supreme Court took a look at the full brunt of the power it was authorizing with *Brady* and *Alford*. Paul Hayes forged and uttered a check he stole from a


\(^{239}\) Id. at 25.

\(^{240}\) Id. at 28.

\(^{241}\) Id. at 38.

\(^{242}\) Id. at 31.


\(^{244}\) See id. at 744; *Alford*, 400 U.S. at 28–29 (describing Alford's sentence).
Pic Pac in Lexington, Kentucky, his third felony, which meant the prosecutor could seek a mandatory life sentence. For a defendant who has no good defense to a crime, a term of any years is a good deal compared to a life sentence. By authorizing a life sentence for any third felony, the Kentucky Legislature transferred power from judges to prosecutors to determine fair sentences. Prosecutors were given the ability to make offers defendants couldn't refuse.

_Bordenkircher_ thus expressly recognized that extraordinary power would rest in the hands of prosecutors. Criminal codes defining most prohibited acts in a variety of ways, mandatory minimums, three strikes laws, and later sentencing guidelines, gave prosecutors the power to put enormous pressure on defendants to accept pleas. At least some judges after _Bordenkircher_ have demonstrated discomfort with the vast powers given to prosecutors. For example, in _Newton v. Rumery_, the majority of the Supreme Court approved of a criminal defendant's waiver of liability for illegal arrest. The majority concluded, quite reasonably, that if a defendant could voluntarily waive his constitutionally guaranteed procedural protections in exchange for leniency, then he could certainly waive his right to a civil action in exchange for leniency in a criminal matter.

Justice O'Connor's concurrence in _Rumery_, however, raised potential concerns about the coercive nature of an agreement like this one. She concluded that a court considering whether the waiver of liability was valid should look at a number of factors, including the criminal charge that was dismissed. As she noted, "the greater the charge, the greater the coercive effect." While this point is undeniably true, its logical extension calls into question the threat of severe criminal penalties to obtain a plea involving considerably less severe sanctions—the very sort of threat brought against Paul Hayes.

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246 As Albert Alschuler has nicely described the power of prosecutors to create "good deals" for defendants, when a gunman makes you an offer of "your money or your life," surrendering your money is certainly the better option, but says nothing about the legitimacy of the choice to which the victim was put. See Alschuler, _Lafler and Frye_, supra note 167, at 698.
248 _Id._ at 397–98.
249 See _id._ at 399.
250 _Id._
251 _Id._ at 401.
252 It is interesting that Justice O'Connor raises this concern as she joined the portion of the Court's opinion comparing these agreements to plea bargaining. See _id._ at 400, 402.
Just as the Supreme Court has permitted prosecutors extraordinary discretion with the substantive decisions in plea bargaining—i.e., what charges and pleas to offer—it has similarly deferred to prosecutors to define the procedures leading up to a plea. Pre-trial proceedings are heavily regulated both by statutory and constitutional limitations. As for conditions of accepting pleas, however, prosecutors appear to have all but unlimited power to require defendants to waive those pre-trial protections. In this context, there are times when the prosecution and defense interests overlap, which gives them the power to bargain around the conditions. Even if the prosecution’s offer is a contract of adhesion, it may well benefit defendants. The cases nevertheless illustrate the lack of any judicial oversight of this process.

In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Court permitted a defendant to waive the immunity the Federal Rules of Evidence provide for plea negotiations. Justice Thomas noted that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 permits a defendant and his lawyer to speak candidly with the prosecutor in an effort to reach a settlement offer without fear that admissions made in this context could be used in the prosecution’s case. But, as in Mezzanatto, a defendant can waive that protection if, in exchange for a meeting with the prosecutor, the defendant agrees to allow any statements made in that meeting to be used for impeachment purposes at trial. The reason a prosecutor would seek a waiver is obvious. Through such a mechanism, the prosecutor has not committed himself to any amount of leniency if the suspect’s information is of limited use—or if his culpability turns out to be much greater than initially realized. If a deal is not struck, information learned during the negotiation process provides the prosecution valuable evidence to be used at trial. More importantly, the prosecutor’s ability to use the defendant’s statements from the negotiation—which will make the prosecution’s case much more solid—provides an assurance that the defendant will cooperate fully and honestly. Prosecutors often have to decide quickly which suspects to cooperate with. A mechanism that ensures the reliability of the information they are obtaining from suspects allows prosecutors to make these decisions better.

The opportunity to make such a proffer also presents potential upsides for the defendant. The prosecution may well be willing to offer a better deal to defendants making blind—and admissible—waivers than they are to defendants who condition information on specific assurances. Specific deals must be

254 Id. at 197, 207.
255 Id. at 198.
256 The best known example of a deal driven purely driven by a quid pro quo exchange would be the five-year sentence given to Sammy “the Bull” Gravano, who admitted to killing nineteen people. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 903, 916 (2011).
257 See Richman, supra note 51, at 94, 98; Eric Rasmussen, Mezzanato and the Economics of
disclosed to co-defendants and almost surely will be used to undermine the credibility of cooperating witnesses. The earlier the prosecution is aware that it has a reliable cooperating conspirator, the greater the opportunity for the defendant to provide helpful information and accordingly receive a reduction in his sentence.258

This argument is, however, somewhat reminiscent of the liberty of contract argument made against minimum wage and maximum hour laws in the early twentieth century. Laws forbidding workers to work for less than a specified amount were said to interfere with the liberty of the worker to agree to work for a less money, longer hours, or in unsafe conditions.259 Defendants in the modern criminal justice system are permitted to waive their evidentiary privilege to inadmissible plea negotiations just as workers in the early twentieth century were permitted to work for any amount of money, regardless of what the legislature regarded the minimum wage to be. The practical reality was, of course, that in a labor-flooded market the absence of regulation permitted employers to determine salaries. Similarly, prosecutors are now able to deal only with those suspects who are willing to waive their right to discuss cooperation agreements without risk of incrimination. Permitting this waiver does not increase the options for defendants but instead shifts power to prosecutors so they may interrogate risk-averse suspects.

Surely there are checks on the amount of leniency a prosecutor will offer, but the individual defendant has no idea what sort of deal he is receiving. The prosecutor's concern that a subsequent defendant will learn of a less-than-sufficiently lenient deal and refuse to cooperate with her provides the defendant's only protection in this situation. There is a market check on a prosecutor's determination of the appropriate amount of leniency post-cooperation, but substantial pressure is placed on a defendant who has no way of knowing if market pressure will constrain this particular prosecutor.

In 2002, the Supreme Court recognized that prosecutors could effectively remove the defense counsel's involvement in their client's case. In United States v. Ruiz, the Court held that acceptance of a plea offer could be premised on a defendant's waiver of "the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses."260 In Ruiz, the prosecution did agree to disclose "any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant."261 Ruiz obviously raises a question about why the prosecution would

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258 See Benjamin A. Naftalis, "Queen for a Day" Agreements and the Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 13 (2003) (noting that the ability of a defendant to secure leniency from the government results is a "race . . . to the swift").


261 Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
bring a case in which the defendant's factual innocence was "established." For those cases in which the prosecution was not in possession of such evidence (hopefully this is true for all the cases on a prosecutor's docket) Ruiz permits prosecutors to essentially eliminate the role of defense counsel that Brady and Alford regarded as crucial to a legitimate plea process. Without information about the weaknesses in the prosecution's case, defense counsel is not able to meaningfully assist his client in evaluating the likelihood of conviction because he has no way of knowing whether the deal is a good one or not. The Court has deferred to prosecutors to determine how much they will allow defense lawyers to be part of the process the state set in motion.

D. Potential for Soft Regulation of the Plea Bargaining Process

At present, prosecutors hold all of the cards in criminal negotiations, which Professor Stuntz describes as contrary to American constitutional norms and inconsistent with the rule of law.\textsuperscript{262} Lafter and Frye offer the potential for soft-regulation of the plea bargaining process, or stated another way, create the potential for defense lawyers to hold a card or two as well. By encouraging courts to generate norms of prosecutorial discretion, they put pressure on prosecutors to comply with advisory guidelines. In invigorating the defense bar to concern itself with negotiation, the Court has created conditions that may allow defense counsel to better arm themselves for settlement conferences with prosecutors.

Negotiation scholars instruct parties to seek agreement on standards of legitimacy and sources that provide fair standards for valuation.\textsuperscript{263} In criminal law, the only such sources are statutes identifying maximum penalties and sentencing guidelines instructing judges once a defendant has been convicted of the offense. As Stephanos Bibas has observed, however, these values are the sticker prices for criminal conduct, not the deal that most defendants receive when they enter into agreements to plead guilty.\textsuperscript{264} Lafter and Frye, however, invite courts finding ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining phase to fashion sentences on the basis of fairness, which, as illustrated above, is to ask which part of the plea offer, which led to the sentence, was motivated by equitable concerns as opposed to quid pro quo exchanges. Such decisions by courts would provide non-binding guidelines for prosecutors as to how they factor fairness and leniency into their negotiations with defendants.

As described above, courts would not be required to delve into considerations of the appropriate amount of leniency attributable to every possible prosecutorial motive to determine what remedy a defendant should receive. A variety of

\textsuperscript{262} See Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 21.
\textsuperscript{263} See Patton, supra note 36, at 281.
considerations animate a prosecutor’s decision to enter into a plea agreement. Equity is only one of those considerations. As described in more detail above, risk of acquittal, preservation of limited resources, emotional toll on victims and witnesses, and cooperation may all explain a prosecutor’s willingness to make a deal. Courts accepting the Lafler and Frye invitation to craft remedies that reflect fair outcomes will only be required to identify the portion of the plea motivated by equitable considerations, as opposed to the portion solely motivated by quid pro quo exchanges that are no longer possible and would represent a windfall to the defendant, rather than a punishment calibrated to his degree of culpability. Consequently, courts will, at most, be identifying how reasonable prosecutors ought to consider equitable factors when making plea offers.

In assessing how a reasonable prosecutor would view the equities in a particular case, however, courts will be providing guidance to prosecutors where guidance is the most necessary. Prosecutors are the least well equipped to consider equitable factors—the circumstances of the particular offense and the defendant’s unique background. As advocates, they are well equipped to understand the weaknesses in their cases. As law enforcement officers, they understand the value of information, testimony, or other assistance a cooperating defendant may be willing to offer. As administrators, they are certainly able to appreciate the resources required to conduct a jury trial. The values prosecutors place on these quid pro quo exchanges, though unregulated like all prosecutorial offers of leniency, do not raise the same concern of under-valuation that the consideration of equities raises.

This is not to say that plea offers on the basis of these quid pro quo considerations are currently without problems. Critics of plea bargaining frequently object to the weakness in the evidence as a basis for leniency.265 They rightly note that such offers place great pressure on defendants to forego an opportunity to demonstrate their innocence and leave the public unsure of the guilt of the person punished and the innocence of persons, known and unknown, who have gone unpunished.266 A trial of James Earl Ray, for instance, may have dispensed with a number of conspiracy theories that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., as well as assured the public of Ray’s guilt despite his later protests that he pleaded guilty to avoid the electric chair.267 Sometimes leniency offered in the face of weak evidence raises very substantial concerns about the innocence of a suspect who was made “an offer too good to refuse” in light of the threat of very serious punishment. Chinese scientist Wen Ho Lee, who was being held on espionage charges that would have led to incarceration for his natural life, accepted a plea to a felony charge that allowed

266 Id. at 1996.
267 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DePaul L. Rev. 671, 675 n.16 (2009) (observing that Martin Luther King’s son visited James Earl Ray and expressed his belief in Ray’s innocence).
him to be released on time served. Lee's case, in particular, raises this concern because the conditions of his pre-trial confinement were so onerous as to have prompted a civil rights action—with the blessing of the trial judge who oversaw his criminal case—after his release.

The problem with these results is that they were the product of offers of leniency, not the result of a judicial determination of guilt. The problem is not that the prosecution has assigned a low value to the possibility of innocence when making that plea offer. Ultimately, prosecutors are analyzing their own cases as litigators when they decide whether a plea offer should be made to avoid an acquittal. There are certainly advocates for eliminating plea bargaining who forcefully object to the burden it places on potentially innocent defendants to concede guilt and accept punishment. There is also a tension between the judicial and advocate aspects of the prosecutor's role when considering the possibility of innocence. It is, however, very much the task of an advocate to consider the weakness in his case and determine the point at which his adversary will settle. If reduced penalties are an acceptable way for the criminal justice system to deal with weaknesses in evidence, prosecutors are probably as able as any actor in the system to determine what offer should be made to the defendant so that defendant will abandon his right to trial.

Prosecutors, however, can likely be trusted to deal fairly—perhaps even too mercifully from the public's perspective—when cooperation serves as the basis for a lenient plea offer. This may well seem ironic given the current practice of prosecutors not to make express offers to defendants before the defendants agree to provide information, act as undercover agents, or testify against co-conspirators. However, juries are likely suspicious of essentially purchased testimony. Prosecutors therefore frequently agree only to consider immunity for the cooperating witness in a deal that is offered as a result of the cooperator's

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270 See generally Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73 (2009).
273 See Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2573-74 (2008) (observing that the view jurors tend to have about the reliability of cooperators' testimony is completely unknown, but so is the rate at which cooperators lie).
assistance or testimony against some third party. Although the prosecutor is in the best position to know how much the cooperator has assisted the case, he is making that determination after the cooperator has nothing more to offer and has handed the prosecution all the evidence needed to convict. Allowing the prosecution to determine the amount of the reduction appropriate for cooperation seems like allowing the foxes to guard the hen house.

It turns out, however, that prosecutors offer more leniency in plea offers for cooperation than they do for virtually any other basis. A prosecutor's institutional role makes him most interested in solving crimes and obtaining convictions. While prosecutors have a quasi-judicial role, at the end of the day, prosecutors are law enforcement officers. This would explain why a prosecutor would make a relatively generous offer to obtain information but would not explain why he would be so generous once he obtained the information. It must be remembered that prosecutors are repeat players and so are the defense lawyers who represent clients with helpful information. Prosecutors who get reputations for making stingy offers after receiving substantial assistance are likely to encounter defendants willing to take their chances at trial. There is no active market for a snitch's information in the sense that competing prosecutors are offering different amounts of leniency, but there is a sort of market check on the prosecutor's pricing of information.

However, a prosecutor's exercise of equitable discretion involves an inherent conflict of interest. The advocacy half of the advocate-jurist role naturally leads a prosecutor to minimize the circumstances unique to the defendant's case that would suggest he should be treated leniently. Prosecutors consider the evidence presented to them by beat officers and detectives. They meet with victims or, in very serious cases, the families of victims. They come to understand how crime in general, and certainly the crime they are currently prosecuting, caused injury to real human beings. They do not meet with the defendant except with his attorney for the purpose of discussing a deal. For obvious reasons, the sympathetic factors about the defendant only appear on the prosecutor's radar in the bargaining process. As prosecutors prepare their cases for a potential trial, they consider how to introduce those facts that will make jurors dislike the defendant and how to minimize the impact of evidence that might make the defendant seem sympathetic. As courts crafting remedies consider how much leniency should have been attributed to concepts of fairness in particular cases, they add balance to the conversation. From a more objective viewpoint, judges are less likely to minimize equitable considerations.

If defense lawyers are able to approach negotiations with information about deals other lawyers have received and guidance from courts about the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the negotiation process will


fundamentally change. Soft-regulation by the judiciary would impose legal norms into the discussion and the process of negotiation would be much more of a give-and-take. By creating the possibility of greater substantive and procedural protections for defendants, these decisions have the potential to begin plea bargaining's journey, from an essentially lawless regime toward a common law of plea bargaining.

Conclusion

The Court’s long-standing respect for separation of powers—or more precisely, the prosecutorial prerogative—prevented direct judicial limits on America’s unregulated inquisitorial system of criminal justice: plea bargaining. Laftner and Frye have created the circumstances that may allow courts and defense lawyers to have influence over a world previously dominated by unchecked agents of the executive branch.