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Coups d'état and Democracy

Implications for Development Aid

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Executive Summary

Coups d'état are a type of political instability that involves a sitting ruler being overthrown by his or her own military or other elite within the state apparatus. Coups are commonly viewed as a threat to democracy. Policy makers in donor countries have taken action in line with this belief by implementing foreign aid suspension policies in regard to states that recently experienced a coup. More recent research, however, shows that coups may actually promote democracy; particularly in long-standing autocratic states. In these circumstances, the new democracies may benefit more from an increase in aid, as opposed to suspension of aid. In the present study, I investigate whether successful coups and the level of democracy affect development aid receipts.

Based on relevant literature, I developed a model to predict development aid receipt. The model includes successful coups, democracy level, as well as various economic and social indicators as explanatory variables. I evaluated coups and development aid during the time period 1960 to 2007. Panel data was constructed using data from the World Bank, the Correlates of War project, as well as Powell and Thyne's (2011) comprehensive coup dataset.

I find no evidence that donor countries change their behavior in response to recent coups. A post-hoc analysis of failed coup attempts was also conducted. This analysis revealed that donors do in fact change their behavior in response to failed coup, such that donors tend to increase their aid to the failed coup states. This effect was observed despite the fact that the vast majority of coups occur in autocratic states. I suggest that this effect is observed because donor countries are attempting to form relationships with the unshakeable autocratic leader before non-ally countries are able to form relationships.

Introduction

A coup d'état is a form of political instability. Specifically, a coup attempt can be defined as an “illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (Powell & Thyne, 2011). A successful coup is one in which the ruling power transfers to a different executive for at least a notable period of time. Following these definitions, there were 457 coup attempts world-wide from 1950 to 2010, with 227 being successful coups. Coup attempts occur most commonly in the Americas and Africa (145 and 169, respectively).

Overall, coups have decreased in frequency over time (for a review see Powell & Thyne, 2011). Despite this decrease, coups are important to study because they remain a complex situation in which the full impact on society is unclear, but can involve significant events (e.g. bloodshed, civil war, economic decline or improvement, strained or improved international relations). For example, a bloody 1975 coup in Bangladesh resulted in a decades-long civil war. Events such as Bangladesh's civil war render the study of coups both important and necessary so that we can better understand immediate and long-term outcomes of coups.

In the current study I propose to investigate the interaction between coups and democracy on the change in amount of development aid received by all states that experienced a successful coup. Before presenting results of the analysis I will review relevant literature on coups d'état and the relationship with democracy, as well as previous research on determinants of development aid allocation.

Literature Review

Coups d'état and Democracy

In order to evaluate coups, it is important to first understand that certain state characteristics are associated with coups and coup attempts. Some of the strongest predictors of coups are structural causes including strength of civil society, legitimacy of the ruling regime, and recent coups (occurred within last decade; Belkin & Schoffer, 2003). Rulers who face a high-risk of coups often sabotage, by means of weakening or dismantling, their own governance, political, and social structures in an attempt to remain in power and quell potential coups. Some of the actions taken by rulers who face a high risk of coups include bribing their military in order to earn favor in the military's eyes, or conversely weakening the military to prevent a powerful takeover (Migdal, 1988). Rulers may even execute strong military officials viewed as a threat to the rulers' power. For example, Saddam Hussein executed his most successful military leaders for fear they would gain public approval and overtake Hussein himself (for a review, see Powell & Thyne, 2011). Severe suppression of citizens by the regime (e.g. restricting public press, imprisonment) is another form of coup prevention in states at high-risk of coups.

If a regime's coup-proofing strategies fail, the consequences of successful and attempted coups can be of further detriment to the surrounding society. For example, one-fifth to one-third of all successful and attempted coups are violent and include significant bloodshed. Moreover, the presence of a coup has been linked to future civil war, which is one of the most costly and destructive activities for a state to experience (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In addition, coups have also been linked to inhibiting democratic consolidation (for a review, see Thyne & Powell, 2013).

The actions of policy makers in both international organizations and individual states are in line with the view that coups are a threat to democracy and have potentially volatile outcomes. In an attempt to avoid reinforcing coups, some states have implemented policies requiring suspension of aid, while some international organizations require suspension of membership in response to a coup (for a review, see Thyne & Powell, 2013). The U.S. currently has aid suspension policies in place, while the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU) have membership suspension policies. These policies have become commonplace for other states as well. After the March 2012 coup in Mali, the U.S. quickly condemned the overthrow and called for an immediate restoration of constitutional rule. The World Bank and African Development Bank reported that they were suspending all aid (Mali coup: World condemns mutineers; BBC March 22, 2012). The former colonial power, France, condemned the coup and stated it was suspending all aid except for food aid and “joint efforts to combat terrorism” (Soldiers Overthrow Mali Government in Setback for Democracy in Africa; New York Times March 22, 2012). Furthermore, organizations including ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and the AU imposed heavy sanctions on Mali including economic sanctions (African Union adds to sanctions in Mali; CNN April 3, 2012).

Although research shows that coups can be a threat to democratic consolidation, and policy makers have reacted in line with this theory, recent research provides evidence that coups may actually promote democracy. Thyne and Powell (2013) found that a coup in an authoritarian regime is likely to bring about democratic transition, especially in those states that are least likely to democratize otherwise. More specifically, coups attempts were most likely to lead to democratization when they occurred in strongly authoritarian states

or states with leaders who remained in power for a long time. Therefore, although coups may be a threat to democratic *consolidation* (definition: process by which a new democracy matures) they lead to a greater probability of democratic *transition* (definition: initial transition from autocracy to democracy).¹ Other researchers have found that coups may be a last resort effort to rid a state of an authoritarian ruler who has maintained power for a long time (Collier, 2008; 2009), and that coups are an efficient way of taking out a dictator (Snyder, 1992).

The different findings of various researchers concerning the intricacies of coups and the impact on democracy brings into question the intent of aid suspension policies held by states and international organizations. The countries and organizations seem to be well-intentioned; however, looking at Thyne and Powell's findings that coups can lead to democracy, the suspended aid policy may actually be harming potential new democracies. A nascent democracy may benefit from increased aid in order to help build infrastructure, increase overall government capacity and legitimacy, as well as stimulate the economy.²

Development Aid

Before conducting the analysis, it is important to further explain and understand the relevance of development aid. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the purpose of development aid is to “help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone.”

Particularly germane to my study are three out of seven pillars that UNDP reports as the

¹ Although coups lead to a greater probability of democratic transition (particularly for staunch autocracies), there is debate whether democratic transition is likely to lead to a true democracy. Some researchers argue that democratic transition frequently results in a semi-democratic/autocratic state which leaves the country in a “grey zone” (for a review, see Sorensen, 2010).

² There is ongoing debate concerning the impact and effectiveness of aid. The primary arguments are discussed in Sachs (2005) and Easterly (2006).

focus of development aid. These three pillars are (1) building democratic societies, (2) preventing crisis, enabling recovery, and (3) growing national capacity (for a full description see www.undp.org). It is clear that a state which has recently experienced a coup is in strong need of strengthening these three pillars, particularly the first pillar. Thus, as previously mentioned, one may predict a post-coup state should receive increased development assistance in order to better address the three pillars. However, we find that policy makers have reacted in an opposite manner by implementing aid suspension requirements. Nevertheless, previous research shows that donors are more likely to provide aid to states that are democratizing (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Therefore, one may expect that coups which lead to a greater likelihood of future democracy will result in increased aid flows after the initial aid suspension has been revoked. This prediction lends further support to the value of investigating the interaction between coups and degree of democratization on development aid.

Another important reason for understanding the impact of coups on development aid is because of the substantial amount of aid that donors provide to countries around the world. In 2011, the estimated development aid from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD's DAC) countries alone was over US\$133.5 billion (OECD Aid Statistics). OECD's DAC consists primarily of Western countries and does not include all of the nontraditional donors who are not required to report aid donations to the OECD. In other words, the US\$133.5 billion is a conservative estimate. With the extremely large amount of aid provided each year, it is important to understand donor behavior patterns. Recognizing donor behavior will allow

us to better understand how aid may be at risk of contributing to political instability or, conversely, how aid could improve political stability.

Previous research on development aid reveals several consistent predictors of aid allocation. Donor countries tend to provide more aid to poor countries (for a review, see Neumayer, 2003a); higher infant mortality rate in some instances leads to greater aid (Trumbull and Wall, 1994); in general more respect for political and civil rights is associated with higher levels of aid (for a review see, Neumayer, 2003b); population has also been tied to aid allocation, as well as the Physical Quality of Life Index which includes infant mortality rate, literacy, and life expectancy; finally donor strategy plays a large role in allocation (for a review, see Neumayer, 2003b). The impact of political instability on aid is less clear. Since coups are related to subsequent political structure (a predictor of aid), it is relevant to evaluate the type of impact coups have on development aid allocation. The current development aid literature lends itself to investigation of coups, which will add to the current academic work and provide further explanation of the rationale behind development aid allocation.

Research Design

I constructed a panel dataset in order to evaluate the impact of coups d'état and democracy on development aid. This allows me to observe development aid across time for all countries. The dataset includes countries during the time period 1960 to 2007. The number of countries varies depending on year due to newly formed or dissolved states. For example, in 1960, 107 countries were included while 193 countries were present in 2007.

This led to 7,657 total observations (year × country) in the dataset. There were 171 successful coups and 163 failed coup attempts.

I analyze the change in the amount of development aid received by each country that has experienced a successful coup. I examine lagged values of aid at one, two, three, four, and five years after a successful coup. Development aid statistics were retrieved from the World Bank’s net official development assistance (ODA) dataset which is part of the World Development Indicators dataset. ODA in this dataset includes “disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries... It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent)...Data are in current U.S. dollars.” (World Development Indicators, 2012). (See Table 1 for a list of included donor countries and institutions.)

Table 1. Donor countries and institutions included in development aid dataset

Development Assistance Committee Countries		Non- Development Assistance Committee Countries		Multilateral Institutions
Australia	Japan	Bulgaria	Lithuania	EU Institutions
Austria	Korea	Taiwan (2004)	Malta	
Belgium	Luxembourg	Cyprus	Poland	
Canada	New Zealand	Czech Republic	Romania	
Denmark	Norway	Estonia	Russia (2010)	
European Union	Portugal	Hungary	Saudi Arabia (1970)	
Finland	Spain	Iceland	Slovak Republic	
France	Sweden	Israel	Slovenia	
Germany	Switzerland	Kuwait	Thailand	
Greece	The Netherlands	Latvia	Turkey (1991)	
Ireland	United Kingdom	Liechtenstein	United Arab Emirates (1970)	
Italy	United States			

***Years in parentheses indicate the first year development aid was recorded for the country

Data on coups stem from Powell & Thyne's (2011) dataset. Powell and Thyne define a coup as an "illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive." This dataset categorizes coups into three groups: plots, attempts, successful. My primary analysis covers only successful coups. A successful coup is one in which the ruling power transfers to a different executive for at least seven days (Powell & Thyne, 2011).

In order to measure the level of democracy, I used the Polity IV index (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000), which provides a yearly measure of authority characteristics of states worldwide. The Polity IV index evaluates states on a scale of -10 to +10 (with -10 indicating fully institutionalized autocracy and +10 representing fully institutionalized democracy). Polity IV researchers use a three-category interpretation of regimes with -10 to -6 indicating "autocracies," -5 to +5 signifying "anocracies," and +6 to +10 representing "democracies." While I include the Polity score as a continuous variable in my analysis, I also choose to interpret it in the same three-category format.

Finally, GDP per capita, population, infant mortality rate, and life expectancy are included as control variables. The first two variables are gathered from the Correlates of War Project trade dataset (Barbieri & Keshk 2012; Barbieri, Keshk, & Pollins, 2009) and the last two are from the World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2012). These variables have been previously shown to predict development aid receipt (for a review see Neumayer, 2003b). Region of the world is also included as a loose proxy variable for donor political strategy (only included in the between effects model). This was included because Western countries may have strategic ties to specific areas of the world. This variable was retrieved from the Correlates of War dataset.

The model is specified as:

$$Y_{(\ln)\text{Development Aid}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{L1.\text{coup}} + \beta_2 X_{L2.\text{coup}} + \beta_3 X_{L3.\text{coup}} + \beta_4 X_{L4.\text{coup}} + \beta_5 X_{L5.\text{coup}} + \beta_6 X_{\text{Polity}} + \beta_7 X_{(\ln)\text{population}} + \beta_8 X_{(\ln)\text{GDPpc}} + \beta_9 X_{\text{Infant Mortality Rate}} + \beta_{10} X_{\text{Life Expectancy}} + \alpha + \varepsilon$$

Where Y denotes the aid given to a particular country, X_{1-5} represents lagged effects of coup, X_6 is Polity level, the remaining Xs are predictor variables and controls (population, GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, life expectancy), α is the fixed effect of the state, and ε denotes the random error in the model.

****I also estimate an expanded version of this model, which includes interaction terms of the lagged coup observations with their corresponding Polity levels.*

Hypothesis (1) Coups d'état and Aid

I predict that aid will decrease after a coup. However, I expect this effect to weaken over time due to requirements in suspension of aid that are held by many donor countries (i.e. strongest at one year after the coup, weakest at five years after).

Hypothesis (2) Democracy and Aid

I predict that states which increase their Polity level will receive a greater amount of aid due to an attempt to help strengthen the newly democratic state.

Hypothesis (3) Coups d'état by Democracy Interaction

I expect a significant interaction in that coups will result in a lower amount of aid given to the state, except when the ruling power transitions the state into a higher level of democracy.

Results

A fixed-effects regression was initially conducted on the data in order to control for variability within each country. A between effects, pooled analysis was subsequently run on predictors of development aid. The outcome variable (development aid) as well as two explanatory variables (GDP per capita and population) were skewed right and therefore transformed into their respective natural log in order to standardize their values.

Successful Coups d'état – Fixed Effects

The initial fixed effects regression analysis yielded only one statistically significant relationship. Population was significantly associated with development aid. For every 1% increase in population, development aid increased by almost 2%. Change in the remaining explanatory variables was not significantly related to development aid (see Table 2 for regression coefficients). Overall, 89% of the variability in the model could be explained by fixed factors.

Table 2. Fixed effects regression results

Development aid received (ln)			
Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	Percentage change in aid
Successful Coup			
1-year lag	-0.08	0.08	-8%
2-year lag	-0.02	0.08	-2%
3-year lag	0.02	0.06	2%
4-year lag	-0.002	0.06	-.2%
5-year lag	0.005	0.07	.5%
Polity	0.005	0.01	.5%
(ln)GDP per capita	0.19	0.15	.19%
(ln)Total Population	1.87***	0.34	1.9%***
Infant Mortality Rate	-0.006	0.005	-.6%
Life Expectancy	-0.002	0.02	-.2%
Constant	0.98	3.37	--

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

A separate analysis using the same model as above was run for two different time periods: 1960 – 1989 and 1990 – 2007. My primary focus for this analysis was to investigate whether the impact of Polity level on development aid differs between the two time periods (during the Cold War compared to after the Cold War). Results indicate that change in Polity level had no impact on development aid for the time period 1960 – 1989, but it did have an impact on the time period 1989 – 2007.³ After 1989, for every one unit increase in Polity level, development aid increased by 1.5% ($\beta = .015$, $SE = .007$, $p < .05$). This analysis shows that in more recent years, democracy has played an increasing role in development allocation. An evaluation of the distribution of Polity scores for both time periods indicates that the average Polity score for 1960 – 1989 is negative six, while the average score for 1990 – 2007 is five. Perhaps the difference in average Polity score between the two time periods plays a role in development aid. In other words, an increase in Polity level from 1990 – 2007 is more likely to indicate a step into true democracy according to the three-category interpretation of Polity level (recall a democracy score is 6 to 10); while a same size increase in Polity level during the time period 1960 – 1989 is less likely to remove a state from an autocratic or anocratic score (combined autocracy and anocracy range is -10 to 5).

Successful Coups d'état – Between Effects

A between effects, pooled analysis was conducted to evaluate the average impact of the explanatory variables on development aid. The analysis yielded several statistically significant relationships (see Table 3 for regression coefficients). First, successful coups was marginally significant ($p = .17$) in that the more successful coups experienced by

³ There was no statistically significant relationship between any of the lagged successful coups variables and development aid.

countries on average, the less aid received by the country on average. In addition, higher levels of Polity (more democratic) were found to be associated with higher levels of development aid received. Specifically, every one unit increase in Polity score was associated with a 7% increase in development aid. Population was also positively and significantly associated with aid in that a 1% increase in population was associated with approximately .5% increase in development aid. GDP per capita had a negative association such that a 1% increase in GDP per capita was associated with a .4% decrease in aid. In this analysis, region of the world was included (it was not included in the fixed-effects model since it does not change over time). The omitted, and therefore comparison, group was Europe. Region five (the Americas) was marginally ($p < .1$), negatively associated with aid. In other words, the Americas tend to receive less aid than European countries.

Table 3. Between effects regression results

Development aid received (ln)			
Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	Percent Change
Successful Coup	-2.71*	1.95	--
Polity	.07****	.02	7%****
(ln)GDP per capita	-.42***	.15	-.4%***
(ln)Total Population	.45****	.06	.5%****
Infant Mortality Rate	.01	.01	1%
Life Expectancy	.03	.03	3%
Region 2 (N. Africa and Middle East)	.28	.35	--
Region 3 (Sub-Saharan Africa)	.35	.40	--
Region 4 (Asia)	-.08	.33	--
Region 5 (Americas)	-.55**	.33	--
Constant	15.18****	2.28	--

* $p < .2$, ** $p < .1$ *** $p < .05$, **** $p < .001$

A fixed-effects model was run once again to evaluate whether there was an interaction between coup and Polity level. There was no significant relationship between

the change in interaction term and development aid. Upon further evaluation it was identified that most coups occur in countries with a Polity level of zero or below (only 14 of 162 observed successful coups occurred in Polity levels of 1 or higher). The lack of balance between coups occurring in low levels of Polity compared to higher levels of Polity would make it very difficult to find a significant interaction because coups in general are especially rare in democracies (see Table 4 for a breakdown of coup by Polity level observations).

Table 4. Coup by Polity Level Observations

Polity Level	Successful Coup	Failed Coup Attempt
-10*	3	1
-9*	8	13
-8*	4	8
-7*	68	46
-6*	8	7
-5**	9	11
-4**	6	4
-3**	9	5
-2**	4	2
-1**	14	7
0**	15	9
1**	1	2
2**	2	4
3**	2	4
4**	2	4
5**	2	3
6***	1	8
7***	2	6
8***	1	9
9***	0	4
10***	1	1
Total	162	158

** Autocracy, ** Anocracy, *** Democracy*

Successful Coups d'état – Summary

Overall, the first set of analyses shows that donor countries continue to provide recipient countries with development aid even after the recipient country experiences a coup. These findings are not consistent with my hypotheses that (1) successful coups will lead to less development aid received, (2) an increase in Polity level will lead to more development aid received, and (3) coups will lead to less development aid received except for when the country changes from an autocratic state to a more democratic state. I did, however, find that on average more democratic states tend to receive higher levels of development aid. Furthermore, for the time period 1989 – 2007, an increase in democracy level was associated with an increase in development aid received.

Failed Coups d'état Attempts – Fixed Effects

Next, I decided *post-hoc* to evaluate the impact of failed coups attempts on development aid. Since successful coups and failed coups are conceptually and qualitatively different political events, it is important to determine how international donors react to the two different types of political uprising. Donor countries may be called on differently to react to unstable, but still intact, political systems. I used a similar model as for successful coups, except that I replaced lagged values of successful coups with lagged values of failed coups (one, two, three, four, and five years back).

The fixed-effects regression yielded five statistically significant relationships (see Table 5 for regression coefficients). One, two, and five years after a failed coup the recipient countries received increased levels of aid (11%, 20%, and 24% increase, respectively). Population was strongly and positively associated with development aid. For every 1%

increase population, development aid increased by almost 2%. Similar to the previous fixed-effects model, 90% of the variance was explained by the fixed characteristics.

Table 5. Fixed effects regression results

Development aid received (ln)			
Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	Percent change in aid
Failed Coup			
1-year lag	0.11*	0.06	11%*
2-year lag	0.20***	0.07	20***
3-year lag	0.09	0.07	9%
4-year lag	0.10	0.06	10%
5-year lag	0.24***	0.08	24%***
Polity	0.004	0.01	.4%
(ln)GDP per capita	.20	0.15	.2%
(ln)Total Population	1.86****	0.34	1.9%****
Infant Mortality Rate	-.01	0.01	-1%
Life Expectancy	-0.003	0.02	-.3%
Constant	0.99	3.34	--

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, **** $p < .001$

Failed Coups d'état Attempts – Between Effects

A subsequent between-effects, pooled analysis was conducted this time including failed coups as an explanatory variable. Failed coups were not significantly related to development aid. Coefficients for the rest of the explanatory variables remained the same as the previous between-effects regression, including statistically significant, positive findings for Polity and population, and statistically significant, negative findings for GDP per capita and region 5 (the Americas). (See Table 6 for regression coefficients.)

Table 6. Between effects regression results

Development aid received (ln)			
Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	Percent Change
Failed Coup	-2.02	1.77	--
Polity	.07***	.02	7%***
(ln)GDP per capita	-.40**	.15	-.4%**
(ln)Total Population	.45***	.06	.5%***
Infant Mortality Rate	.01	.01	1%
Life Expectancy	.03	.03	3%
Region 2 (N. Africa and Middle East)	.25	.35	--
Region 3 (Sub-Saharan Africa)	.31	.40	--
Region 4 (Asia)	-.11	.34	--
Region 5 (Americas)	-.62*	.32	--
Constant	15.16***	2.29	--

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Failed Coups d'état Attempts – Summary

Overall, the second set of analyses reveals that failed coup attempts do in fact change the pattern of aid received by countries. One, two, and five years after a failed coup attempt, the country experiences statistically significant increased levels of development aid. This effect can be observed without conditioning on the Polity score.

Discussion

The primary purpose of this paper was to investigate the impact of coups d'état on development aid receipt. Specifically, I wanted to determine whether change in level of democracy would have an impact on state development receipt after a successful coup. The analysis reveals that donor countries do not change their donor behavior in response to a successful coup. I expected development aid to decrease after a coup, which was not present. I also predicted that an increase in Polity level (increase in democracy) would be associated with an increase in aid; however, this relationship was not significant when

evaluating all time periods at once. The interaction between successful coup and Polity level was also not significant. These findings did not lend support to my hypotheses. Although initially the Polity hypothesis was not supported, further evaluation of time periods revealed that Polity does relate to aid allocation but only after the Cold War (1990-2007). During this time period, an increase in Polity level was associated with an increase in aid. In other words, democracy played a role in donor behavior but only in more recent years.

These results paint an interesting picture. Overall, there is no evidence that donor countries react financially to successful coups d'état. Since the vast majority of coups occur in states that have low Polity scores (zero or lower), a coup may be viewed by donor countries as a likely event for a politically unstable country. In other words a coup is not unexpected and, therefore, the donor countries simply continue their donor behavior without change. Furthermore, we may not see a significant decrease in aid because coups that occur in states with low Polity scores (more autocratic) may not be viewed as a threat to democracy (which is contrary to common views of coups). As previously stated, the majority of coups do not occur in democracies, further supporting the theory that coups are not always viewed as a threat to democracy.

I found it puzzling that coups d'état do not elicit any type of significant financial response from donor countries especially since, overall, they are a rather unique event. Therefore, I decided to conduct a further analysis evaluating a similar model for failed coups attempts. The failed coup variable was chosen because preceding factors and motivations to stage a coup would be similar, yet the standing authority's power to quell the putsch makes it qualitatively different from a successful coup. Interestingly, I found that

failed coups do in fact have an impact on the amount of development aid received. Specifically, one, two, and five years after a failed coup attempt, countries received significantly higher levels of development aid. Similar to the pattern of successful coups, the majority of failed coups occur in countries with low Polity scores. In other words, donors are greatly increasing their aid to autocratic states; specifically, autocratic states whose leaders are remaining in power.

These findings might be interpreted as donor countries coming to the realization that the autocratic leader is remaining in power for the long haul and thus relationships and alliances must be formed. Furthermore, the development aid data analyzed in this study is from primarily Western countries which may show the desire of the West to form relationships with the autocratic countries before Russia or other non-ally countries form relationships.

Limitations and Further Research

Although research exists on determinants of development aid allocation as well as determinants and implications of coups d'état, research is lacking on the relationship between development aid and coups. This study serves to provide a foundation to understanding the pattern of development aid allocation after a coup.

One of the limitations to this study is the fact that development aid was evaluated as a whole rather than by the amount of aid donated by specific countries. Although analyzing development aid as a whole served to paint an overall picture of donor behavior pattern, future research would benefit from investigating specific donor country behavior after a coup. It would also be interesting to include additional nontraditional donor countries that are not part of the OECD's DAC. Future studies should measure individual country's aid

donations to determine whether one, or several, countries in particular are responsible for the increase in aid after a failed coup.

A second limitation, which is also related to the first one, is not being able to fully control for donor strategy. Future studies that evaluate specific country donor patterns should also look at national security, trade, and related strategies such as former colonial relationships. In the current study I attempted to tap into strategy by using world region as a proxy variable since Western countries tend to have greater interests in certain areas of the world. Using a fixed effects model served to reduce the unmeasured impact of former colonial relationships, but did not account for change in strategies due to newly found natural resources or other such factors. Nevertheless, investigating strategy in combination with coups is an important area for future research.

Finally, future studies may also benefit from looking in-depth at development aid over certain blocks of time. Although I included pre- and post- Cold War time periods for a single analysis it is important to further explore this categorization of time as well as others. For example, aid suspension policies were implemented within the last few decades; therefore, donor patterns may differ on average in more recent years compared to the earliest measured years of the study (i.e. 1960).

Recommendations and Conclusion

Despite these limitations the study contributes to the current literature by providing a picture of donor response to both successful coups and failed attempts. In response to the results of this study I would recommend that countries and organizations re-visit their policies concerning suspension of aid to countries after they experience a coup. The policies currently exist as a response to threatened democracies; however, coups very

infrequently occur in a democracy. Therefore, the current policies are somewhat irrelevant because they are typically suspending aid to countries whose only threat is to an autocracy. Furthermore, their suspension of aid is not necessarily even felt by the post-coup state (as it was not even identified by the statistical analysis in this study). Therefore the suspension of aid may act more as a political statement rather than a political move intended to be felt by the recipient state.

The results of this study may also be of interest to international organizations which provide humanitarian and development aid to countries. This information may help them to better prepare a response to countries which have recently experienced a successful or failed coup. Predicting the amount of aid each country will receive is important in planning which programs, areas, and countries will be in greatest need.

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