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Kelly Grenier, Student

Dr. Emily Beaulieu Bacchus, Major Professor

Dr. Michael Zilis, Director of Graduate Studies

Citizen Demand for Cultural Censorship: A Mixed Methods Study

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Arts and Science
at the University of Kentucky

By
Kelly Nicole Grenier
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Emily Beaulieu Bacchus, Professor of Political Science
Lexington, Kentucky
2023

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Citizen Demand for Cultural Censorship: A Mixed Methods Study

This dissertation investigates the political causes and consequences of cultural censorship. One of the central arguments of this project is that cultural censorship is often a response to citizen demand. Using a mixed methods approach, this dissertation explores the demand for censorship and benefits a regime receives from censoring citizens in an effort to understand the calculus of cultural censorship. This project focuses on the Americas and looks at censorship in both democracies and autocracies across time. Leveraging high quality archival data, a survey experiment, and regional datasets, this project aims to understand the rationale behind cultural censorship and finds that both democracies and autocracies benefit from imposing limits to the freedom of expression. Additionally, preliminary findings suggest that citizens do not consume the media they are demanding be censored and are instead seeking censorship to protect third persons in an imperfect information environment. The experimental portion of this project tests this relationship of who wants censorship of what and why further and suggests that those with conservative ideologies are more likely to demand censorship to protect minors while liberals are more concerned about censoring hateful themes. The research I have completed for this project also finds that citizens in censored settings display lower levels of interpersonal trust and higher levels of institutional trust. Not only do these findings tell us something about how cultural censorship affects citizens and artists politically, but indicates that regimes, both democratic and authoritarian, are incentivized to fulfill citizen-demanded censorship in the interest of political survival.

KEYWORDS: Cultural Censorship, Regime Survival, Repression, Strategic Interactions, The Americas, Mixed-Methods

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06/19/2023
Date

Citizen Demand for Cultural Censorship: A Mixed Methods Study

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06/19/2023

Date

DEDICATION

To the artists who left behind a legacy of creativity and imagination.

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INTRODUCTION

“I believe they’re being poisoned by what they hear and what they read.”- Chair Kevin Adams calling for the censorship of books in school libraries in an Escambia County, FL school board meeting, May 2023, qtd. in Goldberg 2023

In 2022, complaints were raised against 2,571 unique book titles by concerned citizens. These complaints resulted in the removal of literature from many school and public libraries within the United States. This amount nearly doubled the number of suspect books reported by citizens from the previous year suggesting the growing significance of this issue within the American political climate (Alter and Harris 2022). While the intensity of this issue has been escalating in recent years, the inclination of governments to restrict aspects of culture is not a novel occurrence. Instances of both authoritarian and democratic governments censoring elements of culture can be found throughout the Americas as well as abroad. Nonetheless, there remains limited understanding of the underlying motivations driving governments to engage in this costly behavior. This manuscript contributes to our understanding by addressing the question: Why do governments censor culture?

To address this inquiry, I employ a mixed methods approach throughout the Americas. Beginning with a qualitative study conducted in Chapter 1, I focus on the Pinochet Regime and extend the two prevailing theories that explain media censorship to apply them to the context of cultural censorship. Throughout this dissertation, cultural censorship may be understood as government limitations placed and/or enforced upon the cultural artifacts of society. This can range from movie rating systems to fines and imprisonments for artists. Building upon this foundation, an emerging theory of citizen

demanding censorship is further developed to explicate the motivations behind cultural censorship in Chapter 2. This theory is subsequently examined in greater depth through multiple avenues: analysis of a unique dataset comprising citizen letters in a comprehensive examination of a case study of mid-century Brazil in Chapter 3, exploration of observational data from a regional dataset encompassing Latin American countries experiencing censorship in Chapter 4, and a survey experiment conducted in the United States aimed at identifying instances where citizens may demand censorship from their government in Chapter 5.

Cultural censorship encompasses the control or suppression of various forms of cultural expression, such as literature, art, music, and films, by governmental authorities. Despite its significance, cultural censorship remains a relatively understudied field within Political Science. To contextualize the research and familiarize the reader, Chapter 1 of this dissertation provides an illustrative case study. This case study of the Pinochet regime in Chile examines the process of cultural censorship within an authoritarian context demonstrating how a particular art form captures the regime's attention, undergoes suppression, and modifies to endure. The theory of dissertation is based upon these lessons and expands the study to democratic contexts as well.

This dissertation moves the conversation on censorship past the two central theories on media censorship (State Critique Theory and Collective Action Potential Theory) to Citizen Demand Theory. In Chapter 2, this theory, based on the work of Jane Esberg who found that regimes may censor to reward supporters, is further explored in relation to the work on Third-Person Effect. I argue that individuals in both democratic and autocratic contexts will demand censorship of suspect art when it stands to harm vulnerable groups

such as minors. Thus, the work from Esberg on censorship as a reward and that on the Third-Person Effect come together to illuminate Citizen Demand Theory.

Exploring the theory that censorship may be in response to citizen demand, Chapter 3 presents a novel dataset created from letters written by citizens in both autocratic and democratic settings asking their government to censor aspects of culture. This case study is of Brazil from 1968 to 1988 and finds that many citizens write to their government to ask for censorship of suspect themes within television shows and other readily available media to protect societal values and women and children from harmful influences.

In Chapter 4, I operate with the assumption from the findings of Chapter 3 that articulate that citizens demand censorship in both democratic and autocratic regimes and deduce that if there is demand for censorship, and censorship is being carried out by the government, then there should be evidence of this in citizen attitudes. Using data from an 11-year period (2008 to 2019) from the Latin American Public Opinion Project and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), I find from this observational data that there is a trend consistent with the theory presented for interpersonal trust to diminish and institutional trust to augment when cultural censorship is conducted by the government. This suggests that governments may choose to censor not only because their citizens demand it, but because there is some benefit to the regime.

Chapter 5 of this dissertation attempts to disentangle some of the factors that lead to citizens demanding censorship. Through conducting a survey experiment, this chapter aims to establish a causal pathway for citizen demanded censorship. There is evidence that within the United States context, partisanship predicts attitudes towards censorship. While the results were limited due to the context of the survey, the results present

promising future directions for research on cultural censorship both in the United States and the world.

From the aforementioned chapters, several key findings emerge that may inform future research. The first key finding is that theories of media censorship may not only be extended to cultural censorship, but may be better understood in the process because of the presence of cultural censorship in democratic settings. The second key finding is that citizens may desire this form of repression and that there is a propensity for conservative individuals to desire censorship more than their liberal counterparts to protect minors. The last key finding is that citizen demand influences the strategic calculation behind why governments may choose to engage in the costly act of censoring suggesting that governments may be inclined to censor to build and maintain institutional trust. Thus, government may censor because their citizens demand it and responding to citizen demand is often a strategic choice for regimes reliant on citizen support to stay in power.

CHAPTER 1. CULTURAL CENSORSHIP IN AUTHORITARIAN CHILE

To understand who seeks censorship and how it affects the interactions among individuals and institutions, it is essential to grasp the messaging that art can convey and the various forms censorship can take. To gain this understanding and contextualize the research presented, this dissertation begins with a robust case study on the development of political messaging within the Nueva Canción movement and its subsequent censorship in Chile, utilizing the qualitative research method of phenomenology (Crewell and Plano Clark 2007). This method allows me to examine the phenomena of censorship through analyzing the lived experiences of artists through their art and archived interviews.

To summarize, the Nueva Canción emerged as a Chilean music movement that faced extreme censorship during the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Characterized by its use of folk instruments, traditional rhythms, and lyrics advocating social justice, this music became closely associated with the leftist political movement in Chile that ultimately led to the election of socialist president Salvador Allende in 1970. Allende was later overthrown by Pinochet in a 1973 military coup. The Nueva Canción's lyrics, which were critical of the status quo and called for collective action against social inequalities, particularly in marginalized communities, drew the attention of the Pinochet regime, resulting in severe consequences for numerous artists in line with existing theories on censorship. While some artists remained in Chile to face censorship, imprisonment, or death, others went into exile, where they could continue creating music. The story of the Nueva Canción is one of government repression of the arts, raising questions about the nature and reasons for censorship that this dissertation engages with.

Censorship theories suggest that political regimes may censor when they feel threatened by critiques of the regime, fear calls for collective action against it, or may be attempting to reward their supporters. The Nueva Canción exemplifies how art forms like music can simultaneously present both threats through their critical messages and their ability to mobilize collective action. Thus, this manuscript utilizes the case study to examine the political messaging of arts and the manifestations of censorship, aiming to form the framework to understand why certain actors demand state censorship to avoid disruptions or unfavorable outcomes.

This chapter investigates the political messaging in the Nueva Canción by addressing three questions: Why and how does a musical genre develop an explicitly political message? When would a regime seek to censor such messages? What becomes of the messengers under censorship? Drawing from primary sources, this chapter first analyzes lyrics from the Nueva Canción movement and then examines archived interviews with Nueva Canción artists to understand the factors that led to censorship and its impact on the music's subsequent political messages. These primary sources offer insights into the evolution of the Nueva Canción movement, revealing the development of messages critical of social conditions and calls for change. As these messages emerged, the Nueva Canción's music became a potent and adaptable political instrument, posing a threat to the ruling powers. The regime responded by censoring artists, which either drove them away from politicized music or further into it.

This chapter concludes that the Nueva Canción, while not initially overtly political, gave voice to traditional stories of rural and indigenous people, fostering a collective identity and highlighting the injustices faced by these marginalized groups, thereby

politicizing the movement. Once these injustices were recognized, the music provided an ideal medium and platform for more explicitly activist musicians to politicize the issues. The music both encouraged action against the government and criticized the regime's policies and practices. Consequently, the music was censored, and the artists who survived faced altered roles. Some remained in Chile as cultural curators, refocusing on traditional elements of the music and sometimes conveying more subtle political messages, while others fled and continued their political activism through song abroad. The lessons learned from this case study are not limited to authoritarian regimes. Consequently, this chapter lays the groundwork for subsequent chapters examining the demand for and consequences of censorship in both autocratic and democratic regimes by exploring a brutal and well-documented case of governmental censorship of the arts.

1.1 The Politization of the Nueva Canción

Music is a versatile feature of human social organization. Through song, individuals may disclose and share collective memories, personal feelings, and other emotions as well as communicate an identity to both members and outsiders. (Eyerman and Jamison 1998). Through its rhythm, melody, and instruments, music communicates with its audience in multiple ways, linking to past experiences and assumptions. From lullabies and fables to anthems and epics, music allows humans to decide who they are and how to communicate their expression. These songs then may become artifacts that individuals are later able to place in social context as well as in their own cogitation. This is what makes listeners nostalgic, sad, happy, or even angry when hearing certain tunes (Turino 2008). The Nueva Canción was a movement that articulated an identity for marginalized groups in Chile and carried that message across the world. It grew and

changed over several decades, transforming into a movement that had personal and political consequences.

In 1950s Chile, a poet and visual artist named Violeta Parra gave birth to the “new song” simply by collecting the voices of her country. Violeta Parra was a poet and songwriter, and also a painter and fiber artist, who sought to capture her country’s beauty through her talents in those media (Verba 2013), but she is also rightly considered an oral historian. In early 1952, Parra journeyed around the Chilean countryside on foot equipped with her tape recorder and guitar (Blau 2020; Vetter 2017). Travelling to small villages in the interior of the country, she spoke to the elders about their community’s folklore (Cabezas 1977). In the process of her rural and indigenous cultural preservation efforts, Parra also communicated with rural musicians known as *cantores*. These musicians helped Parra piece together stories and songs largely forgotten by modern Chilean society (Fairley 1984). By finding and recording these pieces, Parra preserved these artistic artifacts for future generations and brought awareness of these traditions to Chile’s urban centers. As such, Parra is largely credited as the mother of Nueva Canción for her preservation efforts and her own musical compositions informed by the social conditions she observed.

At this point in Chile’s history, the world was subjected to the Cold War which encouraged western imperialism to extend into new spheres of influence. This expansion diminished pride in, and production of, local identities (Becerra 1978; Jara 1984). Radio, television, and cinema all featured American music, soap operas, and movies, respectively (Jara 1984). Through their soft power, American arts were beginning to form the hegemonic culture for Chileans. This type of commercialism may be perceived as a

form of inauthenticity and even destructive to the traditional music in the Chilean culture (Trilling 2009). The music that began with Parra revived traditional instruments and rhythms, which allowed for the pieces to portray a Chilean identity that was deeply personal to the people of Chile. Violeta Parra’s reinterpretation of folk melodies, songs, themes, and sounds was invaluable to the preservation and resurgence of a Chilean identity communicated through recording traditional melodies, instruments, and themes of Chile.

Andean woodwind instruments such as the zampoñas and quena, and the stringed charango, were used by the artists associated with the Nueva Canción movement. Instruments were chosen with a focus on enriching the work and experimenting (Becerra 1978). However, the lyrics themselves in these songs were equally powerful in challenging imperialism. In her song, “Arauco Tiene Una Pena (*Arauco has a Sorrow*),” Parra sang about the indigenous people of Chile. In the lyrics of her song, she describes the marginalization that occurred first from Spanish colonizers and then from the privileged classes within Chile.

*One day comes from afar
 Conqueror Huescufo
 Looking for mountains of gold
 That the Indian never sought
 Gold is enough for the Indian
 That it shines from the sun
 Get up Curimon
 So the blood runs
 The Indian does not know what to do
 They will take away his land
 ...
 They are no longer the Spanish
 The ones that make them cry
 Today they are the Chileans themselves
 Those who take away their bread*

Un día llega de lejos
 Huescufo conquistador
 Buscando montañas de oro
 Que el indio nunca buscó
 Al indio le basta el oro
 Que le relumbra del Sol
 Levántate, curimón
 Entonces corre la sangre
 No sabe el indio qué hacer
 Le van a quitar su tierra
 ...
 Ya no son los españoles
 Los que les hacen llorar
 Hoy son los propios chilenos

...

Los que les quitan su pan¹

...

While traditional instruments and musical elements were a part of the folklore that Parra was recording and helping to reinterpret, the artists who joined the movement used all available instruments as tools to create the sound, and evoke the feelings, they desired. While the Andean instruments such as the quena were employed, so too were non-native instruments such as the guitar. “Cultured” music, as it was called by the artists, was another major artistic influence on the development of the Nueva Canción (Becerra 1978). Cultured music is a term that references the music from European heritage that was considered the ideal in society and thus, more accessible to the audiences because they too were familiar with it. Considered essential to a proper musical education, this music was a remnant of Spanish imperialism deeply embedded into the culture. Because of the deep connection, some of the artists in the movement incorporated their classical training into their new works, combining with indigenous music in a manner that complemented each other. Because a large part of the Nueva Canción was about exposing the injustices of imperialism, it appears to be an anomaly to see imperialistic forms of music as a part of the genre. But the new imperialism coming from the west was different from the older Spanish imperialism that was by this time embedded in Chile’s broader culture. As such, it could not be completely disentangled from the movement. Thus, while the Nueva Canción was critiquing historical and contemporary imperial structures, some of those same imperial structures were also embedded in the movement itself, because of the training and tastes of the musicians who came to be involved with the

¹ Thank you to Rossana Diaz for your insights regarding the translations provided in this chapter.

music. The messaging of the Nueva Canción allowed for two potentially contradictory artistic spaces to merge into one.

As the following quote demonstrates, for artists like Sergio Ortega, such a merge was unavoidable, as instruments did not belong to any culture, but to humanity as a whole:

The instruments are universal heritage. We could use the guitar without problems, an Arabic-Spanish instrument; the harp, a European instrument; the piano, another European instrument. Why not all of the others then? Now, in music there are no indigenous techniques. Music is the effort of millions of men and women of all times and from all latitudes. The delay of our music for a whole century is due to this particular eagerness to believe that its content and its form would be contaminated by using other "foreign" instruments than those that already occupied a place in the tradition. But not even the cultrún is Chilean, because percussion is not a discovery of Arauco, but of man.

Los instrumentos son patrimonio universal. Nosotros podíamos usar sin problema la guitarra, un instrumento árabe-español; el arpa, un instrumento europeo; el piano, otro instrumento europeo. ¿Por qué no entonces todos los demás? Ahora bien: en la música no hay técnicas autóctonas. La música es el esfuerzo de millones de hombres de todos los tiempos y de todas las latitudes. El retraso de nuestra música durante todo un siglo se debe a este afán particular de creer que su contenido y su forma se contaminaban utilizando otros instrumentos «extranjeros» que los que ya ocupaban una plaza en la tradición. Pero ni siquiera el cultrún es chileno, porque la percusión no es un descubrimiento de Arauco, sino del hombre.

Sergio Ortega (Becerra 1978)

The Nueva Canción maintained a delicate tension between preserving culture and expressing modern grievances with music that was both traditional and new. In the beginning with the work of Parra, we see an artist who was creating an identity for marginalized groups by documenting hardships endured and elevating traditional cultural forms (Costa 2017). This was an important foundation for the Nueva Canción movement—such an identity can serve as the basis for communicating ideas and ideals and encourage those who connect to that identity to address their hardships. Thus, while folklore was an important part of the development of the musical movement, the Nueva

Canción was not explicitly defined by its connections to and expressions of folklore. The Nueva Canción is sometimes viewed as a type of neo-folklore or nationalistic music; indeed, if looking at the work of Parra, this conclusion seems valid. However, the music produced was highly experimental and did not align with these genres alone, which is why the music formed its own distinct genre (Becerra 1978). The musical movement instead would go on to feature a wider range of political and cultural implications.

In 1957, Violeta Parra met Victor Jara. Jara was a musician, an artist, activist and, later, a professor of the State University of Technology in Santiago. Together Parra and Jara encouraged other artists to join the movement to preserve Chilean culture and, thanks to Jara's influence, to fight for the rights of the people. In her song, "La Carta (1971)," officially released posthumously, Violeta Parra sang about such themes when she described a person watching and lamenting her brother being arrested and dragged through for having supported a strike. In this same song, Parra sings of the hunger and injustice found in the country. The themes in Parra's "La Carta" are a common through line for the songs of the Nueva Canción. In his song "Plegaria a un Labrador (1969—released posthumously)," for example, Victor Jara sings about being freed from the rulers who let the farmers live in poverty. His lyrics call for the workers to unite against those in power.

"La Carta (1971)" begins with the following stanzas:

*They sent me a letter
by the post, this morning.
In this letter they tell me that my brother
is in jail and that, merciless, they dragged
him in chains by the street, yes.*

*The letter tells the reason.
What Roberto has done.*

Me mandaron una carta
por el correo temprano
y en esa carta me dicen
que cayó preso mi hermano
y sin lástima con grillos
por la calle lo arrastraron, si.

La carta dice el motivo

*He had supported the strike that is now resolved.
Well, if that is the reason please take me to jail too, sergeant, yes.*

que ha cometido Roberto haber apoyado el paro que ya se había resuelto si acaso esto es un motivo presa también voy sargento, si.

Plegaria a un Labrador (1969), by contrast, ends with the following:

<i>Deliver us from the one who dominates us in misery.</i>	Líbranos de aquel que nos domina en la miseria.
<i>Bring us your kingdom of justice and equality.</i>	Tráenos tu reino de justicia e igualdad.
<i>The flower blows like the wind of the ravine.</i>	Sopla como el viento la flor de la quebrada.
<i>Clean like fire the barrel of my rifle.</i>	Limpia como el fuego el cañón de mi fusil.
<i>Your will be done at last here in the earth.</i>	Hágase por fin tu voluntad aquí en la tierra.
<i>Give us your strength and your courage when fighting.</i>	Danos tu fuerza y tu valor al combatir.
<i>Get up and look at your hands to grow, shake it to your brother.</i>	Levántate y mírate las manos para crecer estréchala a tu hermano.
<i>Together we will go united in blood now and at the hour of our death.</i>	Juntos iremos unidos en la sangre ahora y en la hora de nuestra muerte.
<i>Amen.</i>	Amén.

Though the songs of Parra and Jara express a similar dissatisfaction and even a disgust with the current reality for the poor in the country, the difference in their messaging is stark. Parra is describing a person being punished for joining socialist movements but is lamenting, offering themselves up as a kind of passive martyr “...please take me to jail too, sergeant...”. By contrast, Jara is encouraging the workers to rise up. Through the lyrics of these two pieces, we see how political messages are communicated through songs. Music is able to communicate values and ideals of both the individual and the larger society. It is able to communicate the realities lived by people to others who may not have the same experiences or confirm those realities to those who have.

We also see how those political messages can feature critique but can also serve as a call to collective action. Parra is illustrating an injustice and articulating the grief that is felt in her country during her life. The lyrics of the song further point to the fact that there is little to be done to solve the issues providing a critique that is almost fatalist. In contrast, Jara is describing a similar injustice, but is encouraging collective action to resolve it. When a singer is advocating for collective action, not only are they communicating to their audiences about a resonant issue, but they are also encouraging a pathway forward. This may enable disaffected individuals to overcome coordination problems, as the song not only communicates that others feel the same way but also suggests undertaking action that individuals can be assured others who hear the song are also being encouraged to undertake.

When a singer is only documenting injustice, even injustice at the hands of the regime in power, but not encouraging action, individuals may not engage because they do not know if others will follow attempts to change the situation. A popular song advocating collective action, by contrast, when heard on the radio or sung along to at a concert, can communicate that others not only feel the same, but are also willing to take action (McNeill 1997). Music is particularly good at this kind of communication, because the message is repeated, which is an element of ritualistic behavior that facilitates further coordination (Chwe 2013). Music is also an effective communication tool because messages are able to be concealed within the lyrics of a song. Violeta Parra used such lyrical devices in her song, “Mazúrquica Modérnica ” (1966). This political song was able to communicate its message effectively through the use of jargon (Los Grandes Precursores De La Nueva Canción Chilena). Thus, music is able to communicate

meaning to its audience in a variety of ways and express political thought without being overtly political.

Ultimately, Jara would have to continue spreading the messages of the Nueva Canción alone, as Violeta Parra, the internationally celebrated and beloved Mother of Folklore for the Chilean people, succumbed to the depression she had dealt with for most of her life and died by suicide in 1967. Like Parra, Victor Jara also saw that one the main problems that Chile faced was confronting imperialistic influences. He described these influences to his wife, Joan as the following:

“The cultural invasion is like a leafy tree which prevents us from seeing our own sun, sky and stars. Therefore in order to be able to see the sky above our heads, our task is to cut this tree off at the roots. US imperialism understands very well the magic of communication through music and persists in filling out young people with all sorts of commercial tripe. With professional expertise they have taken certain measures: first, the commercialization of so-called ‘protest music’; second, the creation of ‘idols’ of protest music who obey the same rules and suffer from the same constraints as the other idols of the consumer music industry – they last a little while and then disappear. Meanwhile they are useful in neutralizing the innate spirit of rebellion of young people. The term ‘pretest song’ is no longer valid because it is ambiguous and has been misused. I prefer the term ‘revolutionary song.’ (Jara 1984, 121)”

In this quote we see Jara recognizing that art has the ability to both narrate and block other narratives from becoming hegemonic (Said 1993). Jara would not allow the music of the movement to be neutralized through commercialization. Instead, he advanced the Nueva Canción beyond protest music and produced songs fit for a

revolution. By the late sixties, Jara was writing revolutionary songs that were “no longer autobiographical but dealt much more with the general problems, task and objectives facing the peoples of Latin America – even though they were very often about individual human beings” (Jara 1984, 174).

In order for the political messaging of the Nueva Canción to take hold, there needed to be an audience for Jara’s revolutionary songs, and that audience needed to be receptive to his messaging. During this time period, these revolutionary themes were finding popularity with the socially aware. This included students, unionists, rural workers, and the urban poor. The music was an integral part of these individuals’ gatherings and the creation of their social networks (McSherry 2017). The movement gained widespread recognition after the *First Festival of the New Chilean Song* organized by the Catholic University of Santiago in 1968. The concert’s organizer, Ricardo García, chose to invite ‘protest’ singers such as Victor Jara, Particio Manns, and Violeta’s child Angel Parra. It is from this concert that the work that started with Parra and Jara came to be a recognized genre. The Nueva Canción would be the term used to describe the reinterpretation of traditional music (Mattern 1996).

The political messaging in the music was not simply of Chilean nationalism or patriotism, the music of the movement told of class divisions and struggles and highlighted marginalized identities. Such themes connected the music of the Nueva Canción to the labor movement quite naturally. As time went on, the artists of the musical movement began to support political reform and the platforms of specific parties and individuals. Victor Jara, for example, brought the issues he presented in his songs to the political sphere, working to advocate for political change through supporting the early

presidential bids of Salvador Allende and becoming involved with the socialist and communist parties of Chile (Anderson 2007). This action cemented Nueva Canción's political messaging, linking the music with leftist political ideology and eventually gaining the attention of the subsequent right-wing military regime.

By the presidential campaign of 1970, several prominent musicians in the movement, including Victor Jara, were also involved in the Popular Unity party. Popular Unity was a leftist party that sought to transition the country to socialism. The main tenants of the party were the end of the domination of foreign capital in natural resource development, agrarian reform, and income redistribution to benefit the poorer classes (Caviedes et al. 2020). Nueva Canción artists supported the movement by composing songs to spread the messages to voters. The following is the song "Venceremos" written by Claudio Iturra and Sergio Ortega and served as presidential candidate Salvador Allende's campaign song (Morris 1986):

*From the deep crucible of the homeland
The popular clamor rises,
The new dawn is announced,
All of Chile begins to sing.
...
We will overcome, we will overcome,
A thousand chains will have to be broken,
We will overcome, we will overcome,
We will know how to win misery
(fascism).
Peasants, soldiers, miners,
The woman of the homeland too,
Students, employees and workers,
We will do our duty.
We will sow the lands of glory
The future will be Socialist
Together we will make history
To fulfill, to fulfill, to fulfill.*

Venceremos
Desde el hondo crisol de la patria
Se levanta el clamor popular,
Ya se anuncia la nueva alborada,
Todo Chile comienza a cantar.
...
Venceremos, venceremos,
Mil cadenas habra que romper,
Venceremos, venceremos,
La miseria (al fascismo) sabremos vencer.
Campesinos, soldados, mineros,
La mujer de la patria tambien,
Estudiantes, empleados why obreros,
Cumpliremos con nuestro deber.
Sembraremos las tierras de gloria,
Socialista sera el porvenir,
Todos juntos haremos la historia,
A cumplir, a cumplir, a cumplir.

This song is a prime example of the themes present in the music of the Nueva Canción. In it, we see that the singer is suggesting that the “peasants, soldiers, miners...students, employees, and workers” will work together for a better Chile after breaking their chains that are holding back the society.

In 1970, Popular Unity candidate Salvador Allende won the election and served as Chile’s first socialist president. Inti-Illimani an Andean band of university students who formed in 1967 and became one of the best know groups to emerge from the Nueva Canción, performed their politically charged songs for community and political gatherings. They supplemented the messaging of the Allende government through songs. In 1970, they even recorded an album called “Canto al Programa (*Sing of the Program*)” to detail the party’s agenda after the election in accessible language and style (Morris 1984). For example, the song, “Vals de la Educacion Para Todos (Worth of Education for All)” outlined the new education policy. The following is an excerpt:

<i>For them to be educated</i>	Para que los eduquen
<i>Workers and peasants</i>	Obreros y campesinos
<i>They will have better wages</i>	Tendrán mejores salarios
<i>With this beautiful process.</i>	Con este proceso lindo.
<i>But you don't have to settle</i>	Pero no hay que conformarse
<i>with education young children only</i>	Sólo con los niños chicos
<i>Because now we will educate</i>	Porque ahora educaremos
<i>those who are older</i>	A los que son mayorcitos.

From this song, the lyrics show Allende’s plan for education as well as continued Nueva Canción themes. The song suggests that education will be available for all citizens and through education the people will be able to improve the conditions that they face.

Tracing the evolution of the Nueva Canción, we can see its origins in Violeta Parra’s cultural recordings of the indigenous and rural people of Chile’s history. The songs she sang told the stories of their folklore and of class struggles and deprivation.

These themes were picked up by other artists such as Victor Jara, Iturra, and Ortega, and augmented with more explicit calls to political action. Writing lyrics around the themes of poverty and injustice, and composing the accompaniment using traditional instruments and musical motifs familiar to the people, the artists of the Nueva Canción began a new genre that eventually communicated political identity and ideals through music. With songs lyrics communicating a marginalized identity and calling Chilean people to act, and popularizing events like music festivals, such communications took forms that also demonstrated the clear coordinating power of the musical movement. When the singers began to align themselves with the Popular Unity party, and that party won the 1970 general elections, the entire genre became associated with leftist political ideology. It is from these associations that we may begin to understand our next question: when would a regime seek to stop such messages?

1.2 Why the Pinochet Regime Censored the Nueva Canción

Music is fundamental to people's freedom of expression and has flourished in a multitude of cultures and contexts. At the same time "throughout history it has been a source of fear and object of repression" for governments threatened by what their citizens might have to say (Street 2012, 9). The questions then become when and why are regimes motivated to censor music? To answer this question, this chapter borrows from the work on news and social media censorship and finds that in the case of the censorship of the Nueva Canción, it appears as though Augusto Pinochet's military regime was threatened by both the implicit critique and collective organizing power contained in the music of the movement. As such, the regime used its military might to engage in a brutal censorship campaign, as soon as its military coup was underway.

During Allende's time as president, he endeavored to restructure the country to redistribute incomes and improve the conditions faced by the urban poor and peasants. These reforms, while supported by Allende's base and Nueva Canción musicians, were unpopular with key domestic and foreign political actors, specifically the Chilean middle class and the United States. Furthermore, during Allende's presidency, the country had multiple political factions that were difficult to control, including even some with similar leftist ideologies (Gorlinski 2019).

As a result, on September 11, 1973, a military junta overthrew the Allende Regime and began to terrorize the citizens of Chile. During the coup, executed by army commander in chief, Augusto Pinochet, the national police jammed the telephone lines and closed the airports (O'Shaughnessy 2013). The national police also blocked the streets and fired upon the presidential palace. An eye-witness account describes farmers headed into the city center to defend President Allende from the coup, but those farmers ultimately died at the hands of the national police (Sheehy 2018) and Allende later died by suicide (Associated Press 2011). The national police also herded students and professors, who were protesting and attempting to protect the State University of Technology, into the Stadium of Chile. There, the protesters were detained without being arrested. Even as these events were unfolding, those under Pinochet's control also began a campaign of artistic censorship.

During the coup, perpetrators burned large piles of books and media associated with leftist ideology in the street. Upon seeing this, some onlookers hid LPs of Nueva Canción musicians such as Andean bands Quilapayún and Inti-Illimani to prevent them from being destroyed (Sheehy 2018). The Pinochet Regime deployed the military to ban

the music of the Nueva Canción from the radio and to confiscate and destroy recordings from stores and homes during the house-to-house searches that followed the coup (Morris 1986). They also made efforts to further extinguish the memory of the singers by destroying their master recordings (Rohter 2002).

The Pinochet regime targeted musicians because of the viability of and the musicians' relationship with the now-opposition. As exiled singer Eduardo Carrasco explains:

In the Chilean situation, the defense of national music reached such a degree of identification with the revolutionary struggle that in the first weeks of the black period initiated by the fascist government, a meeting was called to all the most prominent folklorists to inform them that certain folk instruments like the quena and the charango were forbidden. This means that for this 'astute' military men, even the sound of the music of the people was in itself a manifestation of revolutionary resistance.

En la situación de Chile, la defensa de la música nacional llegó a tal grado de identificación con la lucha revolucionaria que en las primeras Semanas del negro penodo iniciado por el Gobierno fascista se llamó a una reunión a todos los folkloristas más destacados para informarles que ciertos instrumentos folklóricos como la quena y el charango quedaban prohibidos. Es decir, que para estos astutos militares el solo timbre de la música del Pueblo era Ya una manifestación de rebeldía revolucionaria.

This observation that traditional music was so closely associated with political opposition is borne out by a broader view of Pinochet's policies. Though the regime banned traditional instruments, there is no evidence that the Pinochet regime was opposed specifically to indigenous cultures or objected to the fostering of a distinctive Chilean cultural identity. In fact, some Nueva Canción artists survived by shifting their focus to work on indigenous music, which the Pinochet regime continued to allow. The prohibition of certain instruments shows how successfully Nueva Canción had been able to connect political messaging and contemporary leftist ideology to traditional Chilean artistic expression through the Nueva Canción. By the time the Pinochet regime engaged

in its censorship, the mere sound of these instruments would orient individuals toward the messages that the music of Nueva Canción normally projected.

After the coup, censorship was further enforced through limitations placed on the press, radio, and television. Any new music had to have the expressed approval from the government (USIP 2002). The only songs from the Nueva Canción movement that were allowed to play in public could not feature any overtly political themes. The only concerts that were permitted required song lyrics and a list of all performers be given to local police stations in advance. There were also lists of performers who were not allowed to appear on television or radio (Morris 1986). The cultural censorship experienced during this period was so severe that it is referred to as a time of “*agagón cultural*” or cultural blackout (Morris 1986).

In researching political censorship, scholars have identified three theories as to why the state may censor their citizens, the first two are top-down in nature and aimed at preserving a political regime’s survival. According to previous research and theorizing, states censor either to prevent critique or to prevent collective action. Both of the theories outlined in the literature may be applied to help further our understanding of music censorship. As a political art form, music offers the potential for an integration of the two perspectives. The first theory—the state critique theory—holds that the regime wishes to promote a hegemonic culture and diminish a plurality of voices that may critique the state particularly on social media. By not allowing one group to communicate its traditions and values, the state automatically narrows the range of expression and limits opportunities for critique. (Korpe, Reitov, and Cloonan 2006; Guriev and Treisman 2015). A state may also choose to censor to promote or create a hegemonic culture. To

achieve this, regimes may decide to censor one group while openly promoting the culture of another (King, Pan, Roberts 2013).

The state critique theory of political censorship can be extended beyond news and social media censorship to understand music censorship. Music can provide a powerful channel to communicate political ideals. Through lyrics, individuals are able to voice their critiques of the state (Côté 2011). These critiques are all the more powerful as they are memorized and internalized by the listener. An individual singing or playing a song critiquing the state is not likely to cause alarm. However, what begins as a soloist and a guitar can become a rallying cry of the disenfranchised and undermine the perceived legitimacy of the regime. For example, in Nazi Germany, international music as well as the music of minorities was prohibited in order to prevent a plurality of voices from being heard. These efforts were further augmented by the existence of an office producing German folksongs (Music in The Third Reich).

The second theory regarding state censorship is that regimes censor media to prevent collective action against the state (King, Pan, Roberts 2013; Stoychef, Burgess, and Martucci 2018). Individuals face several challenges turning their own objections to a political regime into action that might actually challenge the state. In making the decision to act, individuals may want to know that others feel the same grievances that they feel, they might also want to know that if they choose to act on those feelings, they will not be alone in doing so. When individuals know that others feel the same way that they do, and when individuals have information about others' willingness and plans to act, they are more likely to be able to overcome coordination problems and act on their concerns (De Mesquita 2010). For example, when a newspaper or radio program reports

on dissatisfaction, others are able to know that they are not alone with their dissatisfaction. Media further helps coordination through allowing individuals to communicate how and when to act. Thus, a state wanting to prevent collective action will find censorship an effective means of doing so.

This theory explaining a state's rationale to censor information can also be applied to music censorship. Through music's lyrics, individuals can communicate their dissatisfaction with the regime and the popularity of a given song or genre allows individuals to know that they are not alone in their critiques of the state. By virtue of its popularity, music may also allow individuals to understand that others are willing to take action and, as a result, individuals may feel more empowered to assemble against the state. There is no clear scholarly understanding of which songs ultimately become protest songs. What constitutes a protest song changes through time. Groups select and rally behind message and motifs that they find compelling (Moore 2013), and the messages in the music need do not to be overtly political to inspire political action. Instead, over time, the message may become a symbol to the people and to the regime. Once this process has occurred, however, the regime may be motivated to censor such music.

Another explanation to consider is that regimes may censor content to satisfy citizens, strategically rewarding factions or acting in accordance with public demand. As suggested by Jane Esberg's work (2020), states might censor the arts to appease specific factions. While her research mainly focused on the censorship of sexual themes in films to accommodate the Catholic faction in Chile, the broader implications of her theory are relevant to this manuscript as they propose that citizens may desire censorship and regimes could respond accordingly. Applying this strategic use of censorship to the

current case study in this chapter is limited by data constraints; the data collected for this chapter is focused on the lived experiences of those who endured censorship. As a result, this theory of citizen demanded censorship will be further explored in subsequent chapters, while this chapter maintains its focus on the arts as a political tool, the ways in which regimes censor art, and the fate of artists in censored environments to inform the research presented in the following chapters.

The music of the Nueva Canción was extremely important to the development of the left as it attracted “masses of people to political causes, popularizing radical-democratic and socialist political visions through their song, and inspiring broad sectors of society to fight for progressive social change (McSherry 2016).” Indeed, the political themes in Nueva Canción were developing in a moment where the working class within Chile was becoming well organized with peasants and students which underscores the movement’s collective action potential. When a song is calling for action and that message is reaching a primed audience, the regime may have good reason to fear the kind of action that could result (Jara 1984). However, according to other scholars this music was not popular in a broad sense, that could be captured by something like record sales. Instead, it was played widely at leftist political rallies and for small groups of leftist audiences (Party 2010). Regardless of how popularity is measured, the music of the Nueva Canción contained leftist themes and while the collective action potential of this music may have been constrained to a narrow segment of the population, those who were listening were well-organized. It is these features of the Nueva Canción that captured the attention of Pinochet.

In order for censorship of music to be effective, it requires a great deal of enforcement. The regime must deal with the musicians who compose and perform, radio stations that play, record stores that sell, and people who listen to, and can themselves reproduce, the music. Because of the censorship implementation and enforcement costs, we should understand that the regime would only choose to take such action when it seems necessary for its survival. Thus, when musicians are promoting an ideology of the opposition or are suggesting that the citizens rise against the very forces that a regime represents, and that music is popular—resonating in particular with citizens with organizational capacity—a regime might decide censorship is worth the cost. The Nueva Canción featured lyrics that could be construed as critical of the Pinochet regime (openly criticizing fascism, for example) and called for collective action against injustices observed. For example, in this verse of “El Pueblo Unido Jamás Será Vencido,” we are seeing the themes that the Pinochet Regime worked to censor.

<i>Stand up to sing [fight], the people will conquer</i>	De pie cantar [luchar], el pueblo va a triunfar
<i>Millions already impose the truth;</i>	Millones ya imponen la verdad;
<i>They are made of steel, fiery battalion</i>	De acero son, ardiente batallón
<i>Their hands carry justice and reason</i>	Sus manos van llevando la justicia y la razón
<i>Woman, with fire and with courage</i>	Mujer, con fuego y con valor
<i>You are already here with the worker</i>	Ya estás aquí junto al trabajador
<i>And now the people who rise up in the fight</i>	Y ahora el pueblo que se alza en la lucha
<i>With a giant's voice screaming: go ahead!</i>	Con voz de gigante gritando; adelante!
<i>The people united will never be defeated!</i>	El pueblo unido jamás será vencido!
	(Quilapayún, El Pueblo Unido Jamás Será Vencido)

This song is an example of lyrics encouraging the workers to rise up and fight against the state. Here we see that the music was not about who was in the audience or its

size, but the fear of the music was that it promoted individuals to take action. These features of the movement support both the state critique and collective action theories of censorship. It is difficult to say which theory better applies to the Pinochet Regime's censorship of Nueva Canción. Because music may both describe injustices and call for collective action simultaneously, it highlights how art may not fit the theoretical dichotomy that has been thus far used to understand political motivations for censorship. Instead, it suggests that certain media such as music may pose both threats of critique and collective action at once, which can help us understand why, beginning with the actions during the military coup itself, the Pinochet regime undertook the costly decision to censor and implemented that choice with brutality and callousness. However, the censorship was also unevenly applied, as some musicians suffered extreme repression while others were largely untouched. By studying which musicians were forced into exile or killed and which were allowed to stay and perform in the next section of this chapter, we gain additional insights into the regime's implementation of censorship.

The fate of Victor Jara is an example of the most extreme form of censorship: murder of the artist. As a professor of the State University of Technology, Jara was among those protesting Pinochet's coup who were detained. Because he was an open advocate for the kind of change to the country's economic and political systems that Pinochet opposed, Jara knew that he would be a target of the military regime. However, he chose to stand at the university in solidarity with the students and other faculty (Naddaff and Meedzan n.d.). As the time that Jara and other protesters were kept inside a stadium stretched into several days, one of the guards recognized him. Once recognized, Jara was singled out among the protestors, and tortured by the guards. Witnesses described the

guards breaking Jara's hands and then taunting him to play his guitar. Jara, a man of peace and non-violence, died by multiple gunshot wounds and his body was dumped outside the stadium.

While the story of Jara's death was infamous due to his popularity, he was not the only Nueva Canción musician murdered by the regime during Pinochet's rule. However, Jara's high-profile death sent a specific message to the musicians of the movement: This regime did not welcome the messages expressed through the Nueva Canción. In his final days held captive, Jara composed his final song perhaps anticipating his death and knowing what it would mean to the artistic community. Those who escaped the stadium wrote down the lyrics he sang which expressed how "hard it is to sing when I must sing of horror (Tapscott 1996)." The death of Victor Jara left an imprint on the cultural memory of Chile. While his death served as a warning from the regime to other artists, it also showed the people of Chile the brutality, callousness, and inhumanity of the regime. As stated in her biography of Victor Jara's life, his wife writes that his only crime was "awakening the consciousness of the Chilean people with his message of hope and social change (Jara 1984, 1)." But, for a regime wishing to silence critiques and prevent collective action, this was indeed a crime.

The Pinochet regime left few options available for artists. Artist could stay, enduring censorship and risking being jailed or killed, or live free in exile from their home country. Some of the artists from the Nueva Canción who stayed in Chile and accepted censorship restrictions include Eduardo Carrasco, Hans Stein, Luis Advis, Margot Loyola, the members of Santiago del Nuevo Extremo, Silvia Urbina, Kiko Alvarez, Tito Fernandez, and Carlos Isamitt Alarcón. These individuals vary in their

contributions to the movement and popularity; however, each of the artists was associated with the movement in some fashion. Generally, those artists who remained in Chile were part of musical groups and created music that emphasized the indigenous roots of the movement instead of the political ties of the Nueva Canción. In order to prevent persecution, some such artists such as Margot Loyola chose to shift their work back to the movement's origins with Violeta Parra and returned to documenting folklore heritage.

Artists who stayed and did not observe the regime's strict censorship rules were arrested and jailed. Over the course of the Pinochet Regime, censorship was enforced by arresting and torturing around 130,000 members of the opposition. Musicians were among those whose lifestyles, as well as lives, were threatened the most. Mauricio Redolés was a singer, songwriter, and poet and was one of the musicians who was jailed even though his work was only tangentially related to the Nueva Canción movement. He served two years as a political prisoner in the Valparaiso prison (Chornik 2014). Some artists still attempted to write from prison and smuggled their work to the public. The resulting songs are known as the Cantos Cautivos and have recently been collected by scholars to piece together the experience of being jailed during that time (Vulliamy 2016). Because of the enforced censorship, a climate of insecurity and fear arose and those working in fields subject to censorship developed an attitude of self-censorship, a far more efficient means of control by the regime (USIP 2002).

The artists who decided to leave their beloved homeland appear to be primarily solo artists in the movement, but also included groups whose music had overtly political themes. Some appear to have left due to direct relations to someone who was central to the leftist movement in the country. These individuals included Violeta Parra's children,

Isabel and Ángel Parra, who composed and performed in exile. Additionally, Charo Cofre, Daniel Salinas, Eulogio Davalos, Hugo Arevalo, Inti-Illimani, Miguel Angel Cherubito, Patricio Castillo, Patricio Manns, Sergio Ortega, Osvaldo Rodriguez, Gabriela Pizarro, Héctor Pavez, Illapu, Julio Numhauser, Los Jaivas, Quilapayún, Rodolfo Parada, Max Berru, and Payo Grondona also fled Chile. These are arguably the most influential artists for the movement because their ideas were uncensored; although they lived abroad, they were free to compose without fear of retribution. Their music was influential to audiences abroad and well received. The people of Europe, the United States, and other countries within Latin America were able to learn about the struggles faced by the people of Chile. Furthermore, when receiving broadcasts from abroad, the Pinochet regime did not have the capabilities to censor the radio channels. Thus, producing works abroad became a strategy used by the artists to continue to perform and spread their message. It is from their archived interviews and songs that we may address our final question: What became of the messengers?

1.3 How the Nueva Canción Endured Censorship

Even if there are some debates about the overall popularity of Nueva Canción music, not only was it undoubtedly popular among well-organized people who were politically active, it exerted a further influence by extending into and inspiring other artistic disciplines. The music was used to underscore films and dance performances, inspired visual artists to create work such as murals in cities, and its themes as well as songs were used in theatre performance. These collaborations are credited as occurring both because of the music's popularity as well as the connections among those in the artistic community in Chile. While these connections and influences undoubtedly further

increased the perception that the Nueva Canción was a threat, they also allowed the movement to endure even the strictest of censorship rules. Using archived interviews from the artists performing during the cultural blackout, this final section looks at how some of the music was adjusted to make the political messages more subtle and acceptable to evade the attention of political elites in Chile, and how some artists continue their art more explicitly in exile.

Nueva Canción music after the Pinochet coup is often referred to as the Canto Nuevo movement. While the former music was about fighting imperialism and spreading ideas of social justice, the Canto Nuevo movement provided a space for groups and artists to grieve Pinochet's brutal repression and censorship, and the systematic restriction on their expression. For the music produced in Chile that followed the coup's censorship and repression, the political messaging was deeply embedded in metaphor to protect the musicians, as the brutality of the regime's censorship had made clear the consequences for open political messaging. Obviously, the musicians who lived through this time of censorship were deeply affected by it, but had to take care with how they expressed those feelings, for fear of more reprisal.

Despite all efforts to stamp out the political messaging of the music, it was still able to endure the censorship of the Pinochet regime, due to the symbolism of both the music's structure and the lyrics themselves. There remained a role for the artist both inside and outside of Chile. As Inti-Illimani, put it:

*Numerous groups have been born,
with their own ways of channeling the
song, outside and inside Chile. We
see new paths in poetry, a clear
phenomenon in the case of songs that*

Han nacido numerosos grupos, con
formas propias de encauzar el canto,
fuera y dentro de Chile. Vemos
caminos nuevos en la poesía,
fenómeno claro en el caso de las

are made in Chile. The situation in our country, the weight of fascism, life under fascism, are undoubtedly giving a dimension to the song that it did not have before. Today, singing to the right to live, the most elemental, it is a desperate battle, and the song summarizes all of this.

Inti-Illimani

canciones que se hacen en Chile. La situación de nuestro país, el peso del fascismo, la vida bajo el fascismo, sin duda que están dando una dimensión al canto que antes no tenía. Hoy, cantar al derecho a vivir, a lo más elemental, es una batalla desesperada, y la canción recoge todo esto.

Inti-Illimani

From this quote, we can see that the art produced by the artists during this period

were altered by the political climate after the coup, but still had a very clear role. The composers of the Nueva Canción who remained and those who fled still continued to produce music that expressed the emotions of the oppressed and calling for social justice, even as they were responding to censorship.

Political messages and ideals were still held by each artist, but how each artist chose to express those ideas differed. After enduring censorship and threats, it is rational to expect that artists and their art would be impacted. The coup left a lasting memory on the people of Chile both at home and abroad. As Angel Parra, son of Violeta Parra, describes, no one was left unscathed by the coup.

The military coup has influenced all Chileans, from the right to the left. Even more so in a painter, a writer, a musician. It shows in the songs. In mine and in those of other comrades; It is evident in the violence of the language, in the decision, the lyrics are deeply defined by the events. The reason was already known ten years ago: our Song is not for fancy venues, it is a song made from daily life, from what is happening. How then not to feel the influence of the coup?

Angel Parra

El golpe militar ha influido en todos los chilenos, desde la derecha hasta la izquierda. Con mayor razón en un pintor, en un escritor, en un músico. Se nota en las canciones. En las mías y en las de otros compañeros; se nota en la violencia del lenguaje, en la decisión, los textos están profundamente marcados por los acontecimientos. La razón ya estaba dicha hace diez años atrás: nuestra Canción no es de salón, es una canción hecha de la vida diaria, de lo que está pasando. ¿Cómo entonces no sentir la influencia del golpe?

Angel Parra

From this quote, we see further evidence that the political messaging in music was changed from the coup, but still very much present in the work that was being produced. As the musicians of the Nueva Canción had always done before, the songwriter expresses the stories of those who are being oppressed and silenced through music and amplifies those voices. Through lyrics, the influence of coup and the subsequent dictatorship were processed by both the performer and audience.

Those who had the most freedom to express political themes in their music were the individuals living in exile, though that choice came with its own costs. Those Nueva Canción artists who could not stay in Chile under Pinochet fled to neighboring countries and Europe to live in exile. This decision was pragmatic for both the safety of the artists and the preservation of the art. From exile, Nueva Canción artists continued to compose and record their songs. They continued to play for universities, unions, towns, and in smaller venues. To each eager audience, the musicians explained the social, historical, and economic significance of the pieces, effectively transporting the audience to a different space and time. In exile, the artists were free to spread their message and perform anywhere except their home in Chile. While some would return to Chile after the fall of the Pinochet regime in 1990, that day came after many years separated from the culture that they were trying desperately to protect and preserve. This section explores what became of the messengers in terms of how the artists viewed their heavily censored artistic spaces and political messaging.

Charo Cofre and her husband Hugo Arevalo were among the artists that lived in exile. Both Cofre and Arevalo were independent singers and musicians who contributed to the Nueva Canción movement through continuing to play overtly political music.

Before escaping the violence of the Pinochet regime, Hugo Arevalo worked as the director of programs for Teletrece, a popular national broadcasting station in Chile. At the time of the coup, he was working on a project about the poet, Pablo Neruda, who was also communist party senator. After Arevalo was fired for this work, the couple decided to flee the country, to Italy via Argentina, for safety. In exile, they continued to compose and record. As Arevalo said:

The influences come, for now, only from Chile. In the first place, the people themselves and their songs, that is, the peasant singers and mainly the popular poets, guitar players and singers from the Puente Alto area, from whom I have learned almost everything I know and do about music.

Las influencias vienen, por ahora, sólo de Chile. En primer lugar, el pueblo mismo y su canto, o sea, las cantoras campesinas y principalmente los poetas populares, tocadores de guitarrón y cantores de la zona de Puente Alto, de quienes he aprendido casi todo lo que sé y hago de música.

Although they were living abroad, these artists remained connected to Chile through their music. For the artists in exile, music not only provided a way of life and a way to process their own emotions, but also allowed the political messaging of the movement to continue. The artists took their role fighting the regime through song seriously. For some, the song was a sword to wield by the culture and destroy the forces that were trying to prevent expression and memory. In this way, the music changed. It was no longer advocating for social justice and anti-imperialism. In the post-coup context, the same music took on a new meaning. Instead of the original political movement, supporting the emergence of a new Chilean version of socialism, in new compositions, there were more explicit themes of anti-fascism. Hugo Arevalo made this his life's purpose as he said:

From the simple interpretation of compilation folk songs and the

De la simple interpretación de cantos folklóricos de recopilación y de la

creation of personal songs, I have gone on to a stage of contribution with my humble work and my song to the fight against fascism. My creation is now, therefore, geared almost exclusively to criticize the Junta.

creación de canciones personales he pasado a una etapa de contribución con mi pequeña obra y mi canto a la lucha contra el fascismo. Mi creación está ahora, por lo tanto, orientada casi exclusivamente a golpear a la Junta.

From interviews with the artists of the Nueva Canción living in exile, it is clear

that the artists understood that the music they produced was inherently political.

However, there was a general consensus among the artists that Nueva Canción was not unique in its political potential; that all cultural media could be used as a weapon to fight fascism. On one hand, Patricio Manns suggested that songs were arguably the strongest of the arts due to their ability to transmit a message and evoke emotion simultaneously, but others argued that all of the arts can be anti-fascist. This potential to fight fascism was part of the motivation to live in exile. Exile allowed artists to survive to continue creating expressions too powerful for words alone.

My opinion is formal: There must be two types of songs. Those that are broadcast for Chile and those that are destined to be broadcast in the rest of the world. Domestic Radio programs must constitute a true spiritual and ideological support for the resistance and must be built not only with songs by Chilean authors and interpreters, but also make a selection of other songs that serve; [the purpose of the ideological resistance] request the collaboration of friendly foreign authors and interpreters

Patricio Manns

Mi opinión es formal: Debe haber dos tipos de canciones. Las que son difundidas para Chile y las que están destinadas a ser difundidas en el resto del mundo. Los programas de radio destinados al interior deben constituir un verdadero soporte espiritual e ideológico de la resistencia, y deben construirse no sólo con canciones de autores e intérpretes chilenos, sino hacer una selección de otras canciones que sirvan; solicitar la colaboración de autores e intérpretes extranjeros amigos.

Patricio Manns

From this quote, we see something interesting identified by the artist and that is

the role of the audience. The world outside of Chile is not merely a safe haven for the artists to avoid the repressive regime. Instead, it is able to be a source of support and

assistance for the artists fighting political oppression. Without the repression of the regime, the music produced abroad was often able to be more expressive and sorrowful, enumerating the grief the artists felt for the country they left behind. Those who composed abroad mostly kept their overall style the same and did not conform to their new local culture. While some of the songs from the initial movement would age and disappear, others would continue to be played as the artist continued to compose, waiting for the day they could safely return home.

However, like the artists who remained in the country performing, some exiled artists also modified their music to offer more subtle political messaging. Quilapayún, one of the most popular bands during the Nueva Canción, continues to play and produce Canto Nuevo music. One of the original members, Eduardo Carrasco was interviewed on behalf of the band for a magazine in 1978. In it, he spoke about how their music continued, even in exile.

In our concrete experience today there are various examples that show that in spite of being subjected to tremendous repression in history, national and folkloric music has never ceased to be political. In our current Chilean situation, our people have invented another language, a way of saying things without saying them, in which the smallest allusion speaks louder than a hundred speeches. Additionally, the broad political character that art has adopted throughout all these years, is clearly visible in the struggle for the reassessing of folklore, the defense of the New Chilean Song and the rediscovery of indigenous music. This does not mean that we underestimate the song explicitly

En nuestra experiencia concreta de hoy día hay diversos ejemplos que muestran que no por el hecho de estar sometida a la más feroz represión de nuestra historia, la canción ha dejado de ser política. Es que en la situación actual de Chile nuestro pueblo ha inventado otro lenguaje, una manera de decir las cosas sin decirlas, en la cual una mínima alusión habla más que cien discursos. Pero además este carácter político amplio que puede adoptar el arte lo hemos visto a lo largo de todos estos años en la lucha por la revalorización del folklore, en la defensa de la Nueva Canción Chilena y en el redescubrimiento de la música indígena.

political that takes on the political relevant messages and attempts to respond to these in concrete circumstances, utilizing the necessary language that the situation demands. But it is necessary to recognize its limits and realize that the political function of popular music is not limited to the action of marches and contingent songs, however important and necessary they may be.
Eduardo Carrasco

Lo que venimos diciendo no significa que subestimemos la canción que toma la consigna política e intenta responder a la circunstancia concreta y hablar el lenguaje que la situación exige. Pero es necesario reconocer sus límites y darse cuenta de que la función política de la música popular no se reduce a la acción de las marchas y de las canciones contingentes, por más importantes y necesarias que éstas sean
Eduardo Carrasco

This quote demonstrates how music can be political even in very subtle ways.

Through the choice of rhythms and melodies, music can link itself to another period or movement. Through lyrical symbolism, music can covertly express messages. It is because of the elements of music that Carrasco identifies, we understand why the Pinochet Regime censored the music of this period. It is not necessarily that the music was calling for collective action or that it was critiquing the regime, but that it had a latent potential to do both.

In his interview, Carrasco goes on to explain the challenges of producing art away from the inspiration of the song. For Carrasco, the music was always political and always addressed an anti-imperialist struggle by re-discovering peasant songs and remembering indigenous music. Due to censorship, the band played music abroad, but the music had to change so that the message was able to be consumed by the foreign audience. Thus, the band tried to make the music universal and thereby more accessible to foreign audiences, but remarked that it further distanced them from their homeland because the themes were no longer clearly identifying with the Chilean people. Thus, we see that Nueva Canción artists in exile lived and produced their art amidst a series of tensions—free to express

regime opposition more openly, but constrained in their ability to return home; able to access a broader audience that might offer political support to the people of Chile, but always risking a loss of connection to those very people as they sought more universal appeal and support for the movement.

Overall the Canto Nuevo or revised Nueva Canción music still expressed a love of the Chilean people, but now it expressed a hatred for fascism (Becerra 1978). In Europe, the music played on radio and television; the artists toured and performed in Europe. The receptive audiences were both political and apolitical. In some ways, the music itself was similar to what had always been played, but for most, the violence witnessed and endured by Chilean society influenced their work. The lyrics now reflected the pain felt by both the artist and community.

The Pinochet Regime ended in 1990 with the election of a new president. Some of the artists were able to return home before that time while others could not. Thanks to more subtle political messaging and the continued production of artists in exile, the Nueva Canción music continued through censorship and is a still active genre of music today. The music continues to be deeply cultural, carrying meanings from the initial movement and progressing through time with the needs of the people, responding to the brutal repression of the military regime. While Chile was the birthplace of such a movement and the people who were a part of its creation experienced severe censorship, Chile was not the only country whose country expressed political discourse through music. Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, France, Nicaragua, Spain, and Uruguay all had a variation of people seeking to protect their cultural identity and critique their government through song (Gorlinski 2019).

The artists of this movement continued to the best of their abilities. Acting as curators of culture, the musicians who remained were able to preserve the parts of the movement that they could and decide on the new directions of the movement within the confines of the regime. Abroad, some played their same songs while others adjusted for the comfort and understanding of the audience. Some artists hid their themes through metaphor while others loudly declared their lyrics. Regardless, the music continued despite the regime's attempts at repressive censorship, showing a triumph of the art and the human spirit in the face of political oppression.

1.4 Cultural Censorship is an Ongoing Issue

The Nueva Canción began from a single woman's efforts to record the songs found in the rural interior of Chile. Capturing these songs brought forth a marginalized identity, revealed frustrations of the working classes of Chile, and, over time, started to promote social justice. Social justice themes turned into political themes with the aid of more action-oriented artists, which then aligned with the growing leftist political movement and organizations in Chile. In this way, a musical genre developed a political message. When the Pinochet Regime seized power, it found the music threatening, and censored these songs that both critiqued the regime and suggested an intense potential to continue the collective action it had already inspired in the leftist political movement and Allende presidency. Despite the censorship that Nueva Canción artists were subject to, the music endured. Either individual artists hid the overt political messages in their compositions and highlighted the folkloric roots of the movement, or individuals produced music abroad and continued more open political critiques and calls to action through international audiences and less monitored airways. Though the musicians of the Nueva

Canción endured a long period of severe censorship, the songs they produced still continued to reach the people that desperately needed the messages they told, to let marginalized Chileans know that they were not alone in their struggles.

The aforementioned case of the Nueva Canción shows an example of a political artistic movement. In the intersection of arts and politics, it is understandable that a regime seeking to maintain its power would censor such a movement as it would any other type of political dissonance. However, not all censored art is inherently political. The idea that not all cultural expression needs to be political to be in danger of being censored is critical to this manuscript and will be explored in the forthcoming chapters. Art is a powerful communication tool available for members of all classes and ethnicities to use to express emotions, share stories, reveal power structures, and establish morals. Because the arts are so closely linked to identity, individuals are able to form assumptions and stereotypes related to the art form. In this way, art may still be political while not overtly stating an ideology as clearly as seen in the Nueva Canción.

Recommendations for regimes to censor art are found in the works of some of the earliest political philosophers and yet, in the modern political science literature, little is known about the calculus of government censorship of the arts and the effects that censorship has on society. However, the absence of this work should not suggest that censorship of the arts is not a salient issue for modern societies. In 2020 alone, Freemuse reported that globally “322 artists were arbitrarily detained, prosecuted or sentenced to prison terms, primarily on political grounds (Freemuse, 2021).” To provide prospective, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported that 280 journalists were jailed that same year. While it would be incongruous to suggest that a higher number of arrests gives

substantive power to an issue, it does illustrate the point that cultural censorship is a tool used in addition to news and social media censorship by regimes and is thus worthy of our attention.

Censorship is a type of repression. While there is a tendency to imagine repression as a phenomenon that occurs solely in autocratic regimes such as the Pinochet regime, democracies also repress the rights of citizens when the institutions are enabled to do so (Conrad, Hill, and Moore 2018). Because governmental policies that limit expression are prevalent in both democratic and autocratic regimes, it is therefore important to understand why censorship occurs and the consequences of that censorship. Both of these pieces are missing in our understanding of the Nueva Canción, but can be explored throughout the Americas.

To answer the first question, why would any regime choose to censor culture, this case of the Nueva Canción suggests that states may censor strategically. Three theories prevail within the literature on censorship suggesting why regimes may choose to censor culture – State Critique, Collective Action Potential, and Citizen Demand. However, most of the research in this area tests and applies these theories to news and social media censorship and not cultural censorship. This dissertation does not seek to disprove the posed theories nor suggest that one theory is more prevalent than another. This dissertation seeks to add to the conversation on censorship through expanding the referent object of censorship to include aspects of culture instead of news and social media. In doing so, this dissertation adds to our collective understanding of the citizen demanded censorship through exploring the Third-Person Effect and the interaction between citizens and institutions. Through moving the referent object to cultural censorship, this type of

repression may be found in both autocratic and democratic regimes. Through being able to study censorship across regime types, this manuscript adds to our collective understanding of repression.

The example of the Nueva Cancion suggests that culture can survive continued repression. However, the fact that repression persisted for so long presents an interesting puzzle because it suggests that there may have been support for continued repression of certain groups by the selectorate. Such a demand may occur in democratic settings as well. Because the origin and effects of censorship are largely unknown, this dissertation specifically contributes to this area by asking, why do citizens demand cultural repression and what are the effects on citizens and institutions?

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Why do citizens demand the regime censors culture?

To establish the theoretical framework of this dissertation, cultural censorship must first be defined. When narrowly defined, cultural censorship is a term used to describe the “persecution of a segment of society for expressing its cultural identity through the use of a particular language or musical genre associated with that identity (Bastian and Laing 2003, 58).” As it is measured and coded by Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), cultural censorship is “the extent to which the freedom of academic and cultural expression, as related to political issues, is respected by authorities.”² However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the term, cultural censorship, is referring to the government limitations placed and/or enforced upon the cultural artifacts of society.³ Thus, a broader understanding of culture is employed which may therefore include political, moral, religious, sexual, and aesthetic censorship, but is not including censorship that is enforced by private corporations or social pressure alone. The key aspect to cultural censorship in this argument is that it is the government that is limiting the cultural or artistic expression

² Studying cultural censorship has two notable challenges both revolving around the issue of conceptualization. The first issue is measuring censorship. It is not always apparent that citizens are having their culture censored by the government. With a few notable exceptions, censorship is not always a violent and intrusive practice. Instead, censorship may be a process that is so ingrained in the norms of society that it may escape the attention of the majority of citizens. This may particularly be the case if it is consistent with the norms and values of that person. The second issue is that citizens may be aware that the production of certain ideas or materials may go against societal norms or against laws and not produce the artifact at all because they may anticipate the response of government. Self-censorship poses an issue to conceptualization because as a non-event it cannot easily be captured. Thus, in our measures of censorship, we are likely underestimating its presence in society.

³ In this manuscript, media is used in the artistic media/medium sense. To prevent confusion, news and social media will never be referred to as simply media.

of individuals.⁴ In this way, cultural censorship may be considered theoretically distinct from news and social media censorship.

In the field of political science there has been a rich study of news and social media censorship, however, cultural censorship is a relatively understudied phenomenon despite its prevalence. Cultural censorship does not always entail a pile of books going up in flames; censorship by the government can include bans, governmental led violent attacks on art and artists, court room trials, and/or governmental standards (Cather 2012). When it comes to censorship, bureaucracies may be more inclined to create difficulties to slow artistic production rather than to efficiently oversee the artistic artifacts in a country (Masliah 1993). Thus, censorship may be common, but difficult to observe.

Measuring censorship has its challenges because any measure is likely to underestimate the amount of censorship occurring in a given society. For example, if an artist sees the work of another artist taken to court and successfully sued, it will provide a disincentive for an artist to continue that artistic tradition (Shen and Truex 2019). Furthermore, if artists know that speaking about politics will be punished by the market, artists will be less likely to engage with political themes (Friesinger 2021). However, with the difficulties of underestimation aside, we may observe that though costly, regimes do censor. Thus, the question then becomes why regimes limit this type of expression. The rational answer to this question is that there must be some benefit to the regime.

⁴ The literature on censorship suggests that there are three types of censorship that may occur by institutions. The first is prior restraint which occurs when the audience available to an artist is restricted by institutional forces. The second, is restriction which is institutional constraints on the availability of product (Collins and Murrone 1996). The third is suppression which is when governmental institutions enforce a moral and/or a political code (Cloonan 2003). This manuscript is concerned with the latter. While regimes may encourage or create an environment to support censorship by private institutions, focusing on the direct enforcement of censorship by the regime to the artist provides a clearer understanding of the motivation of the regime to censor and the causal process.

To understand why regimes carry out such actions, the factors that go into the calculus need to be considered.

I begin with the assumption that censorship imposes costs to the regime.⁵ In order to censor, the regime has to have the resources to identify and deal with the perceived threat and ensure that it is not an issue again in the future. When the object of censorship is a type of expression, it can be difficult to monitor and understand how it may be perceived and received by the masses. For example, what constitutes a protest song changes through time and over the lifespan of the song itself. Groups may select and rally behind messages and motifs that they find compelling (Moore 2013), and the messages in the music need do not to be overtly political to inspire political action. Furthermore, if perceiving that censorship is a likely option, artists⁶ will often hide the true meaning in allegory which leads to more time invested in the censorship process. Additionally, when a regime censors its citizens, the regime loses a source of information about the state of

⁵ One of the notable variations in censorship that occurs among regimes is the way in which censorship is conducted. Beginning with the censoring organ itself, some regimes censor through the judicial system while others leave censorship to the military or intelligence agencies. For example, in the United States, censorship of the arts for moral reasons often comes through the court system. In contrast, during the dictatorship in Argentina, while there was central governmental office overseeing censorship, the police carried out the censoring process through intimidation and economic punishment to censor. In both cases, though the governmental institution differed, the moral content of art was in question.

⁶ There is a theoretical difference between artist and entertainer. The role of the artist is to present interpretations of society through their own lens as they wish to express it. In contrast, the entertainer is producing art for the comfort of society and may be basing their production on economic and social trends rather than true preferences or opinions. Of course, it is worth specifying that true preferences may never be expressed by either artist nor entertainer for a variety of reasons. But the artist as a performer has a larger capacity to express their authentic selves. According to Moore, there are three types of authenticity a performer may have. First-person authenticity 'arises when an originator (composer, performer) succeeds in conveying the impression that his/her utterance is one of integrity, that it represents an attempt to communicate in an unmediated form with an audience (2002, 214).' In other words, the artistic expression from facial expressions and movement to instrument choice and vocal style can convey meaning to the audience. Second-person authenticity 'occurs when a performance succeeds in conveying the impression to a listener that that listener's experience of life is being validated, that the music is "telling it like it is" for them.' (2002, 220). The last type, third-person authenticity 'arises when a performer succeeds in conveying the impression of accurately representing the ideas of another, embedded with a tradition of performance.' (2002, 218).

the regime and citizen perceptions which could have unfavorable consequences to the regime (Gehlbach, Shirikov, Luo, and Vorobyev 2022). Thus, we may understand that to carry out cultural censorship, costs are involved, and tradeoffs are considered by the regime. From a utilitarian perspective, if there is a cost incurred by the institutions, there is likely a benefit that makes the costs worthwhile. This utilitarian nature of censorship is critical to unpack in order to understand why regimes would choose to censor. However, it is worth noting that research suggests that censorship may be a less costly option to other forms of repression for the regime to carry out (Gehlbach, Shirikov, Luo, and Vorobyev 2022).

The following is a more robust summary of the three dominant theories in the literature on censorship than what was discussed in Chapter 1. Because cultural censorship is an undertheorized phenomenon, this manuscript makes use of the contributions from those who study news and social media censorship when necessary. As a result, it is argued that regimes censor to promote a political position/prevent critiques against the regime (State-Critique Theory), thwart collective action against the regime from its citizens (Collective Action Potential Theory), and appease the winning coalition or significant population of the citizenry (Citizen Demand).

2.1.1 State-Critique Theory

States may choose to censor the content available to citizens in order to preserve a political position. Censorship, by its nature, establishes a hierarchy and is an act of repression. Ranging from rating systems and fines to governments destroying the work and lives of artists, censorship restricts the freedom of expression of artists and the content available to citizens. The act of censoring at the governmental level allows for a

society to choose which narratives they are willing to tell and what practices, stories, and norms they would like to hide. The stories that are able to be expressed are the stories that can become the dominant narratives as they are more accessible to all individuals within the society. Deciding whose story to tell and what to forbid is likely not done arbitrarily given the costs involved to censor the culture of citizens. Censorship is often less about the actual content that is being produced by the artist and more about the ability of a regime to alter communication and establish control (Nuzum 2001).

In general, during times of crisis, citizens are more likely to allow governments to seize power and limit the rights and liberties of people in order to be protected. If the government sees a certain type of expression as a threat, they are more likely to be able to use governmental resources to placate it. This attack may be on a specific group such as an ethnic minority or it may be an attack on the larger societal or political values. For example, during Franco's dictatorship, censorship was used to support conservatism and catholic values. The censorship of cinema, radio, and television provided the regime with a "safety valve" to ensure that political tensions were kept to a minimum (Carr and Fusi 1979). During the Second World War, the government of Argentina censored films in an attempt to influence citizens' opinions of the Axis powers and maintain neutrality (Mizala 2021). Thus, states may censor comments critical of the state in the media as well as in the culture.

In summary, though State Critique Theory of political censorship was developed to understand social media censorship, it can be extended to understand cultural censorship more broadly. Indeed, art can provide a powerful channel to communicate political ideals as seen in Chapter 1. State-Critique Theory in the context of cultural

censorship would look like the government banning aspects of the culture that are critical of the state or the values of the state. In the calculus of censorship, it stands to reason that states may engage in this top-down censoring behavior due to this theory. The actions of the Pinochet Regime presented in Chapter 1 is a key example of this theory in action in relation to culture.

2.1.2 Collective Action Potential Theory

Studying news and social media censorship in China, King, Pan, and Roberts argue that states censor comments, not critical of the state, but those that call for collective action against it (2013). The logic here is that regimes are going to invest resources to diminish threats to their survival. This finding is particularly interesting and relevant to this manuscript because it is contrary to the existing commentary and research performed on censorship, such as previous works using the framework of the State Critique Theory. This theory suggests that regimes censor by suppressing opposing viewpoints. The nuance of the Collective Action Theory is that the opposing viewpoints are not a threat to the regime until they are calling for others to join them in changing the status quo. Thus, censorship is about ensuring the survival of the regime by not allowing citizens to coordinate against the government.

Through thwarting the collective action potential, limiting the expression of alternative ideologies, and protecting the supporters of the regime's culture, regimes diminish the strength of the opposition while appealing to their base. By understanding what governments are censoring, we are better able to deduce why it occurs. The content of the materials being censored allows us to deduce the interests, goals, and intentions of the regime (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). Though Collective Action Potential Theory

was initially tested through news and social media censorship, the argument may be extended to expressions of culture. Like news media, art can also carry political messages and assist individuals in overcoming coordination problems by letting other citizens know that there is discontent. Music is particularly good at this kind of communication (Chwe 2013) but is not the only artistic form that can carry a message.

In making the decision to act, individuals may want to know that others feel the same grievances they feel. They might also want to know or gauge that if they choose to act on those feelings, they will not be alone in doing so. When individuals know that others feel the same way they do, and when individuals have information about others' willingness and plans to act, they are more likely to be able to overcome coordination problems and act on their concerns (De Mesquita, 2010). For example, when a newspaper or radio program reports on dissatisfaction, others can learn that they are not alone with their dissatisfaction. Media further helps coordination through allowing individuals to communicate how and when to act. Thus, a state wanting to prevent collective action will find censorship an effective means of doing so.

Based on the work performed by other scholars, Collective Action Potential Theory is already well developed and as such, easily able to be extended to the censorship of culture. As discussed in Chapter 1, music may be a type of cultural expression that has the potential to be both critical and rally citizens to action. Thus, this dissertation is not seeking to dispel these theories, but work with them to better understand why a state may choose to engage in the costly behavior of censorship.

2.1.3 Citizen Demand

From the historical case study of the Nueva Canción presented in Chapter 1, we can see that when studying cultural censorship, it is difficult to disentangle the two classic explanations to the question of why regimes censor. An additional issue is that the two aforementioned theories are more likely to persist in autocratic regimes. This is because censoring comments critical of the state and attempts to protest against it is antidemocratic regime behavior. Thus, by definition, it should not be observable in democracies. However, there is still another theory that warrants discussion. The third theory of censorship further developed by this dissertation, Citizen Demand Theory, may explain the choice to censor in both autocratic and democracy regimes.

This theory first arose in a recent publication on the Chilean film industry in which the author suggests that censors were not actively thwarting films with political content, but content that was sexual in nature. Reviewing the content of 8,000 films in Chile, Esberg argues that content that would be considered immoral by the Catholic faction was censored in exchange for support of the regime. The logic of this is that individuals want censorship, so repressive measures by the regime can be used as a tactic to gain support (2020). While this example continues the story of the censorship that took place under the Pinochet regime in Chile, it illustrates the larger point that regimes may be censoring citizens for a strategic reason: the citizens want censorship. While the data available on the censorship of the Nueva Canción did not allow me to explore this theory, there is reason to suspect that it was part of the strategic decision for the regimes to censor. Thus, determining who wants cultural censorship may be critical in understanding why regimes censor and is the focus of this dissertation.

The idea that governments censor because citizens demand it is critical to the argument of this manuscript and leads to questions of who wants what to be censored and why. Citizens may demand censorship in order to protect cultural values. The power of art and specifically, films to influence the public has long been recognized as a threat to social conservatism and traditional values (Nurik 2018). Because they are readily available to mass audiences, movies and, by extension, TV programs, theater performances, and music can replace traditional agencies of socialization such as the church, the school, the family (Vaughn 1990). Thus, individuals seeking to protect those values will be in favor of the government censoring arts and entertainment.

Citizens seeking to protect cultural values may be conflated with protecting other citizens from harmful ideas, which is exemplary of the Third-Person Effect. This theory holds that citizens and institutions will call for the censorship of material that is deemed to harm others but has no effect on those calling for the censorship. For example, lyrics that are seen as encouraging risky behavior may be banned not because the listener is asking for themselves, but because they are concerned about the lyrics impact on others (Nuzum 2001). The canonical work on the Third-Person Effect holds that individuals exposed to a message will expect that message to have a stronger impact on others than themselves. The message will not affect a theoretical “you” or “me,” but it will affect a theoretical “them” (Davison 1983). The magnitude of the Third-Person Effect increases as the social distance between demander of censorship and the other widens (Eveland and McLeod 1999; Gunther et al 1995). Though the Third-Person Effect is rooted in the idea that others in society need protection from the influence of harmful ideas, individuals often overestimate the gullibility of the other (Rojas, Shah, and Faber 1996; Hoffner and

Rehkoff, 2011) and underestimate the effect on themselves (Gunther 1991). Furthermore, there may be an age limit on the effect. Conducting a study of students, Hevener found that students were less likely to believe that adults should have content restricted but were in favor of censorship that would protect children from explicit content (1989).

However, conclusions from the empirical work performed on suggesting that the Third-Person Effect is driving behavior is mixed. Rojas, Shah, and Faber find support of the Third-Person Effect looking at media, violence on television, and pornography (1996). Shah, Faber, and Youn found that the perceived harmful effects on another group was a justification used by groups calling for restricted media content. In this study, the researchers studied commercials (1999). Feng and Guo performed a meta-analysis of 35 empirical studies to test the effect of the theory that violent behavior on television will lead to violent behavior in individual, which is also a societally held belief (Friedrich-Cofer and Huston 1986). They concluded that the Third-Person Effect size is weak. Additionally, they suggest that the country of study impacts the effect further (2012). Thus, from the literature, the scope and nature of this effect is still an open question that this manuscript intends to explore, but the area this dissertation seeks to contribute is further developing Citizen Demand Theory as a product of Third-Person Effect and a contributing factor in the calculation to reward supporters as set forth by Esberg.

To summarize, the question of why regimes may censor has three answers in the literature: 1) Regimes may censor culture that is critical of the state, 2) regimes censor calls for collective action against it, and 3) regimes censor culture that the citizens demand to be censored.

The research presented in this dissertation is not suggesting that one theory of state censorship is more explanatory than another or that one occurs at the expense of the others. Instead, this dissertation seeks to explore the undertheorized demand for censorship by citizens. In the case of cultural censorship in Chile, we see an authoritarian regime targeting music. Music is fundamental to people's freedom of expression and has flourished in a multitude of cultures and contexts. At the same time, "throughout history it has been a source of fear and object of repression" for governments threatened by what their citizens might have to say (Street 2012, p. 9). In the case of the censorship of the Nueva Canción, it appears as though Augusto Pinochet's military regime was threatened by both the implicit critique and collective organizing power contained in the music of the movement. As such, the regime used its military might to engage in a brutal censorship campaign as soon as its military coup was underway.

The aim of this project is to explore the undertheorized Third-Person rationale in relation to citizen demand and regime compliance in censoring culture. The third rationale is interesting to consider in both democratic and autocratic settings because the freedom of expression is a liberty that is a benchmark of democracy, and yet democracies have a responsibility to also be responsive to their citizens. Thus, it is necessary to understand who wants cultural censorship of what and why in exploring this theory further in both democratic and autocratic regimes.

2.2 Who Wants Cultural Censorship?

Though some studies have set out to determine the factors differentiating between those who oppose or favor censorship, much is contested (Rojas, Shah, and Faber 1996). Despite the debate, there have been several studies conducted to understand who wants

censorship that should be explored because they suggest that there is a demographic dimension to censorship including an individual's gender, age, parenthood, ideology, and religion. However, the theory of this manuscript suggests that such relationships may depend on the referent object of censorship and the relationship of the individual calling for censorship and the intended audience. The following is a summary of the literature surmising who wants censorship and the expectations that this dissertation will explore.

2.1.4 Ideology and Censorship

Within the literature on censorship, there is a prevalent idea that some personalities may demand censorship more than others. One of the first studies on this topic conducted by Byrne, Cherry, Lamberth, and Mitchell attempted to understand demand for censorship by measuring married couples' attitudes towards censoring pornographic materials. The researchers found that couples who had authoritarian values were more in favor of censorship (1973). In another study among college and high school students, the researchers found that positive attitudes towards censorship were significantly correlated with authoritarianism, conservatism, traditional family ideology, and religiosity (Hense and Wright 1992). This idea of an authoritarian mindset leading to support of censorship even in democracies is still present in the literature (See Pietiläinen 2010 on Russia). However, there is research that disputes this relationship (see Schell and Bonin 1989; Thompson, Chaffee, and Oshagan 1990; and Ryan and Martinson 1986).

Censorship may be seen as an authoritarian tactic favored by those with an authoritarian mindset because it is an act of repression, but others may view censorship as a mean to protect others from harm when justifying the action. Research capturing that nuance finds that those who prioritize the responsibility and the welfare of others over

freedom and individual rights are more likely to favor censorship of porn (Cowan 1992). However, the research on censorship is fairly limited in the sense that it primarily focuses on censorship of pornographic materials. Though arguably a large part of culture, by focusing on these dimensions alone, the research may be missing a key relationship which is both what is being censored and for what reason.

The referent object of censorship will impact who wants what censored. For example, censoring explicit lyrics on the radio or themes from television is different from billboards, posters, and magazines, or theatre productions and books. This is because there is a difference in both accessibility of the message and the limitations of the audience. Demand for censorship of a blasphemous film screening on a college campus is different from a desire to ban hateful speech from shows being on television during children's after school hours. Suedfeld, Steel, and Schmidt began to move the study of demand for censorship forward through suggesting that support for censorship is a function of both the media in question and the political ideologies of the respondents. For example, the censorship of media such as books, art, and music, is different from the censorship of obscene and pornographic materials. Their theory argues that censorship is supported by both liberals and conservatives. However, the type of censorship varies. They hold that liberals will support censoring political incorrectness and violence. In contrast, conservative will support censoring obscene media and those that are offensive to their religious values (1994). This nuance is interesting to consider, because it suggests that censorship is something that all citizens could demand regardless of their mindset.

In a recent study by the Pew Research Center, 78% of liberals said that cancel culture helps to hold people accountable for their actions (Vogel 2021). Cancel culture is

about silencing alternative perspectives across the political spectrum (Norris 2021) which is a type of censorship. Thus, considering these studies from the American context, we may expect that across the political spectrum citizens may demand censorship, but what they demand censorship of may differ. At this point, the research available has only asked these questions of American citizens which questions the generalizability of the findings.

2.1.5 Gender and Censorship

In the literature on censorship, there are several studies that suggest that there are other demographic predictors of citizen demanded censorship. Ritts and Engbretson's research suggests that there is a gendered difference in demand for censorship. Focusing on the availability of pornography, the researchers found that males significantly favor the availability of the materials in contrast to their female counterparts (1991). More recent research from the Cato Institute finds that women are more likely to favor government censorship of hate speech. In their study, 57% of women supported a law being passed to make it illegal to say insulting things to African Americans while only 36% of men supported it. This gendered difference for support of laws making it illegal to say insulting things to minorities continued for immigrants, gays, lesbians, and transgender people, the police, Hispanics, Muslims, Jewish people, and Christians. Additionally, American women are more likely to than men to support banning sexually explicit public statements and actions such as flag burning (Ekins 2017). Thus, following this line of logic, we should expect to see a higher proportion of women desiring cultural censorship from the government when these themes are present.

However, the research performed on censorship and gender has not accounted for cultural censorship more broadly. Instead, it has highlighted sexual, violent, and hateful

content. Additionally, there is little known about which citizens will outrightly demand that the government does something about cultural censorship. Turning to the literature on political participation, we may expect men to be more active in communicating their demands to the government (Bernhard, Shames, and Teele 2021, Welch 1977, and Wolak 2020). Thus, while women may be more likely to favor censorship, we may anticipate that of those who demand censorship that those who identify as male are more likely to articulate that stance to the government.

2.1.6 Religion and Censorship

Studies looking at that the relationship between censorship and religion have regularly found a positive correlation. Often the more religious one considers themselves, the more willing they are to censor. Church attendance and high religiosity predicts support for banning sexually explicit public statements (Ekins 2017; Droubay, Butters, and Shafer 2018). Additionally, several studies show that religiosity predicts demand for censorship of sexually explicit media content (Herrman and Bordner 1983, Rojas et al 1996), general attitudes about freedom of expression (Anderson and Reinhardt 1987, Paulson 1999, Rojas et al. 1996), and the removal controversial books from public libraries (White 1986). However, there are studies that show that religion does not help to predict desire to censor television violence (Rojas et al 1996) nor legislative control over pornography (Cowan 1992). Based on this research, religion will be a key demographic to focus upon.

2.1.7 Other Key Demographics and Censorship

There has also been research conducted to understand how other demographic factors such as education may influence the desire for censorship. The Purdue Opinion

Panel added to our understanding of censorship by suggesting that high school students whose parents received less education were more in favor of censorship than their counterparts whose parents received more education (1974). However, this result was later contested (Suedfeld, Steel, and Schmidt 1994). Another study of censorship in the United States that looks particularly at rap music censorship found that age and parenthood mattered. In this study, those over 40 years of age were likely to support censorship of rap music as were those with children (Fried 1996). Thus, this manuscript will pay particular attention to these attributes to determine further who wants and demands censorship of culture from their government. Again, I would like to emphasize that the studies pulled upon to create these expectations are focused in the American context. Thus, part of the contribution of this dissertation is to expand beyond this sampling.

In addition to understanding more about the individuals in this puzzle, more must also be understood about the media type being censored, the content of the media, and who the intended audience is. These factors all matter in understanding who wants censorship.

2.3 What is being censored?

While all art has the potential to be political, not all art carries the same threat to regimes. Music, as a political art, is particularly potent because it is able to be shared widely and allows messaging to be spread quickly. With the development of radio, music poses a unique issue for regimes, because it is not always within the regime's ability to limit foreign radio. Music is also a multimodal discourse able to effectively communicate values and community through the choice of instruments, rhythms, and lyrics as well as

album art and music videos. Because of music's versatility, as an object of censorship, musicians can hide meaning from censors in allegory and wordplay. Like music, concerts, film, and theater are other artforms that draw a crowd to observe it. These artforms are inherently more visual and able to communicate a story. The aforementioned artforms pose a unique threat because crowds are able to view these pieces together and receive a message in a fairly succinct timeframe. Literature, while often the object of censorship in modern debates, varies in this regard because it takes time for the reader to receive the message and is far more limited in terms of audience. Thus, while literature may pose a significant threat to the regime, it is inherently different. Television also differs as a political art form. Like radio, television is able to enter the homes of individuals with the capabilities to receive the airwaves. While concerts, cinemas, and theaters may all have paid admissions or age restrictions, television and radio do not have these limitations. This is perhaps why censorship surrounding these art forms tends to focus on sexual material that may be harmful to children across regime types. Thus, in this manuscript, the referent object of censorship will also be examined.

The terms culture and art encompass a wide range of expression. From the quiet nooks of a library to echoes of a concert hall, art can present itself in many different forms. However, there is a key distinction to make in terms of how the audience encounters that art. For each art form, we can think of it in terms of its capturability. In other words, how the expression of art is limited in terms of audience when the art is enjoyed by someone. One person listening to a song on a radio does not prevent another from listening to that song. Thus, it has a lower amount of capturability. In contrast, if an individual is reading a book, then it is difficult for another person to enjoy that same book

in that moment. Thus, a book has a higher amount of capturability. Additionally, art consumption that has a higher cost to consume is more capturable. For instance, a song playing on the radio in a public space or a mural that citizens walk past regularly is interacted with less work from the individual than a song that has not been released on an album or a work of art that is in a ticketed museum.

Lower Capturability	High Capturability
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amphitheatre • Radio • Television/YouTube • Library • Murals/Statues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theatre • Album • Cinema • Book • Museums

1. Figure 2.1: Culture and its Capturability

Figure notes: This figure shows that even within the same medium art can be more accessible in different forms. This availability may impact an individual's desire to restrict the availability of the artform.

If the regime is mostly concerned with preventing collective action against the regime, to allow the regime to be openly critiqued, or for harmful ideas to circulate to third persons we should anticipate that the regime would focus on censoring the less capturable forms of art and that citizens would demand censorship of these artforms. However, history demonstrates that regimes will also censor theatre productions, ban films, and burn books. Thus, this categorization is not meant to dichotomize art into a censored/not censored dichotomy, but rather provide a framework to think about the abstract term "art" and argue that art with lower capturability does pose more of a threat to the regime. This threat arises from the ability of the art to distribute messaging and ideas.

This type of understanding of the arts may have very little impact if we instead focus on citizen demand for censorship. For a citizen to demand censorship of an aspect

of culture, it is reasonable to assume that they would also desire censorship of art that is less capturable. However, if they are solely concerned with the effect on third-persons, any representation of the themes they are wishing to censor may be enough to call for censorship. Additionally, another driving factor may be the presence of a multimodal discourse such as the audio-visual messaging of television.

However, for an individual to be concerned enough to contact their government, there has to be both awareness of the media and a relationship to the possible group at risk. Thus, it is worth considering how the citizen is related to the audience of the media in question in addition to content being censored.


2.1.8 Audience

Another dimension of art to consider is the relation of the individual demanding censorship and the audience. The first step of this relationship is the artist or entertainer who creates a piece of culture to share with an intended audience. Within the society there are those who are a part of the intended audience and those who are not a part of the intended audience even if the release of the art is public. The intended audience is a matter of the artist/entertainer's preference, that of the producers, or the self-selection from the audience itself. The individual in the intended audience may or may not actually consume the media. For example, you may be a part of a demographic who is generally associated with a certain genre of music, but that does not mean you enjoy that music even if you are the intended audience.

Those who demand censorship are likely not the consumers of the media whether or not they are in the intended audience. Citizen demand of censorship is unlikely to arise

from individuals looking to self-regulate and are instead trying to regulate the material that is available to society.

Exposure to the media does matter. One has to know that the media exists in order to have an opinion on the art. However, how the art is framed will matter for how it is understood. One study found that individuals were more willing to censor violent content when exposed to more news stories about intimidation (Hoffner et al 1999). This suggests that demographic factors may matter less in determining who wants censorship and instead how salient the threat in is in someone's mind and which individuals are more likely to be responsive to that threat matters. Therefore, the public debate around the art will also matter in determining who wants censorship.



2. Figure 2.2: The Intended Audience and Media Consumption

Figure notes: This figure provides a visual representation of the difference in exposure to the media and the intended audience. I argue that individuals who do not consume the media will be more inclined to demand censorship of it.

2.1.9 Content

Returning to the literature on ideology and censorship, we should anticipate that both liberals and conservatives would want censorship, just of different things. From the work of Haidt et al., we know that across the moral matrix, most citizens value

minimizing harm and promoting fairness. Thus, when thinking about the content people want censored, we should expect to see that most individuals will value the censorship of violence and cultural content that is promoting violent rhetoric. In their theory, openness to new experiences is a trait that tends to track with a liberal ideology. This would suggest that those who wish to censor content that is different than what they enjoy would tend to be politically conservative (2013). However, this relationship deserves more consideration because this manuscript is concerned with citizens demanding government censorship of materials and not private enterprise nor the household regulating and/or banning aspects of culture.

Another important consideration of the art is who created it and whether or not it is a part of the dominant culture or a subculture. In other words, whether or not the artist is a part of the ingroup. In terms of content, some research has shown that the actual lyrics account for very little when it comes to demand for censorship and instead, the genre matters. Aspects of culture such as music, art, and film, are ways for many groups to express identity. Thus, some demand for censorship may arise out of a desire to suppress a certain narrative or the subcultural identifiers of the group. The work of Carrie Fried explores the dynamics of rap censorship. In her survey experiment, she found that “the same lyrical passage that is acceptable as a country song is dangerous and offensive when identified as a rap song (1996).” In terms of finding the lyrics offensive, a threat to society, in need of regulation, in need a warning label, in need of a complete ban, or in need of censorship from children listening, the difference in labelling the music as rap or country was consistently statistically significant. Individuals, particularly those 40 years and older, deemed that the lyrics were harmful and in need of intervention when they

were seen as rap music lyrics. Thus, content may not matter as much as other theories hold but is instead an interaction between ingroup loyalty.

2.4 Theoretical Expectations

From the literature and theoretical framework presented thus far come three expectations. The first is that those who desire cultural censorship are not the consumers of the media. This is because if the individual consumes the media and enjoys it, they are unlikely to want the media to be censored and if they consume the media and do not enjoy it, it is unlikely that they would undergo the costly endeavor of demanding governmental censorship to assist them in regulating their own content availability. Therefore, those demanding cultural censorship from the government are likely not active consumers of that media, though they are aware it exists.

The second expectation is that the demander of censorship is likely acting out of a desire and/or is persuaded to protect a vulnerable group or the general status quo. In order to partake in the censorship process, there should be a benefit to outweigh the cost. Thus, it stands to reason that censorship is demanded for a certain desirable outcome. In this case, individuals may demand censorship to protect vulnerable groups such as the youth or to protect a larger existential goal such as society more broadly. Such goals would need a larger organization such as government in order to be realized

The final expectation is that members of the dominant group and/or in a privileged position are able to demand censorship from their government. Active engagement in politics is costly for individuals. Thus, we should expect that those who are able to have the time, resources, and status will be willing to engage in political discourse to ensure that they do not lose what they have.

2.4 What are the Political Consequences of Cultural Censorship?

By definition, news media censorship is not found in democracies. However, it is not that democratic leaders are opposed to news and social media censorship. Instead, the censoring of news media is inherently anti-democratic and thus, by definition, a regime that restrict its news media is no longer considered a democracy. In contrast, cultural censorship is generally not a metric used in regime measurements. When cultural censorship occurs, the spaces where individuals can network and express themselves is altered. Like news and social media censorship, cultural censorship disrupts the flow of information. However, cultural censorship also disrupts communication and self-expression of individuals and groups which will have political consequences for regimes.

When censoring citizens because there is a demand for censorship, regimes, both autocratic and democratic, will receive an electoral boost from honoring the wishes of their selectorate. Furthermore, we should expect to see this type of censorship readily available in both democracies and autocracies because the citizens are demanding it. However, due to the differences in autocratic and democratic cultures we should not expect the political consequences for citizens, the regime, and the artists to look the same.

2.1.10 For Citizens

The civic culture is the collection of associations that allow individuals to develop and strengthen trust and build their social networks (Putnam 2001). It includes organizations such as charities, sport clubs, and volunteer associations such as community choirs. In this space, individuals can exchange ideas and make connections with each other. Though not explicitly included in the original work on civic culture, art spaces may be considered a part of this construct as they also create a space for social

networking in communities (Grodach 2010). The arts themselves as a tool of engagement is necessary to discuss because art has an homogenizing effect on social behavior through sharing messages as well as emotions (Eyerman and Jamison 1998).

When the government limits the freedom of expression through censoring aspects of the culture, regardless of the theory driving this action by the government, we should expect to see a decrease in interpersonal trust due to the lack of space for connection. As established, artistic space is one component needed for individuals to come together and build trust relationships. Thus, without this space, we should expect to see a decrease in interpersonal trust because there are fewer opportunities to connect and engage in creative pursuits that further human connection. This leads to the expectation that the bonds between people will diminish when cultural censorship is present leading to lower levels of interpersonal trust in autocracies. In democratic settings, citizens will have additional opportunities to form these relationships, thus the effect should not be as prevalent in these regimes. However, in autocratic societies, repressing the culture of certain groups, affects the ability of citizens to interact with each other and form trust bonds.

2.1.11 For Artists

For the artist, who it is within the role of to critique the regime through their medium, the consequences of such actions can be devastating. While lyric labelling laws are a form of censorship that is not the extent to which artists are restricted and punished for their expression. Particularly in authoritarian regimes, artists have endured tremendous pain for their art. For example, during the censorship that took place in the Pinochet Regime, artists under the scrutiny of the regime had few options. They could

stay in the country, enduring censorship and risking being jailed or killed, or flee and live in exile. Many saw their life's work and their livelihoods destroyed by the choices of the regime. Similarly, in Brazil, artists against the regime faced exile until 1985 when the government declared amnesty for the exiled artists (Vieira 2018). Some of the artists who did remain did so through hiding the meaning of their songs through allegory and metaphor (Nicodemo 2018). Thus, the consequences for the artist of censorship can be dire and severely limit the freedom of expression those individuals have.

Censorship will change the art that the artist produces even when the consequences are not as severe as the aforementioned punishments. For example, lyric labeling laws have restricted markets for artists. Thus, artists who want their message or music to sell in those markets must abide by the parameters. Furthermore, even in democratic regimes such as the United States, music that is seen as anti-establishment is more likely to undergo scrutiny by the regulatory powers. Generally, in democracies, censorship is often less about restricting an artist than it is about restricting that which is available to white suburban youth (Nuzum 2001). The artist may be merely a pawn in a larger debate about ideas within society and the dominant narratives that deserve the protection of free expression. However, this still has consequences for the artist and their art.

2.1.12 For the Regime

Political trust is essential for regime survival. Democracies need public support to survive (Claassen 2020) as do authoritarian regimes (Chen, Pan, and Xu 2016). Thus, there is going to be an incentive to perform in a manner that will generate such feelings. One way to do this is through generating feelings of political trust. Political trust creates

the atmosphere leaders need to be successful (Hetherington 1998) and is an indicator of regime support (Chen 2017). Trust connects citizens with representative institutions (Bianco 1994). Trust is imperative for leaders to be able to obtain compliance without coercion, make enduring changes, or commit resources (Barber 1983; Levi 1997, 1998; Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Scholz and Pinney 1995). With low levels of trust, we understand that individuals may turn to protest parties, if they do not abstain from voting altogether (Bélanger and Nadeau 2005; Gabriel 2015; Hetherington 1999; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018).

When citizens observe that their inputs into the political system such as protests, voting, and other civic pressures are received and responded to, trust is strengthened in the institutions (Easton 1965). For supporters of the regime, those who see that the government is acting on their demand to censor are more likely to support the regime. In other words, institutional trust is a result from the institutions performing well. When cultural censorship is present, we should observe an increase in institutional trust due to the citizens who demand censorship having their demands met.

2.5 Theoretical Expectations

With the understanding of institutional interactions illuminated by the literature, there are several expectations for the political consequences of censorship. The first is that the relationship between citizens will change. Cultural spaces are a place to interact with fellow group members as well as share aspects of culture with others. Cultural products help to share the lived experiences of others. When governments censor those products and spaces, governments are altering spaces for citizens to share, educate, and learn. This reshaping will particularly effect artists, but also lower levels of interpersonal

trust among citizens. Thus, in regimes that censor and do not offer alternative pathways for individuals to form trust bonds, we should expect to see a negative relationship.

However, there is an argument to be made that the causal arrow for this negative relationship is pointing the other way. That is that lower levels of interpersonal trust lead to the government being able to censor culture. This concern can be mitigated through considering the logic in play. Saying that the government will sponsor censorship when interpersonal trust is low violates two key assumptions of this manuscript which is that censorship is costly and regimes act strategically. Thus, if the causal arrow was indeed the inverse, we should expect to see censorship of materials that would be beneficial for the state to censor. If we only saw censorship of materials critical of the regime or calling for collective action against it, that would indicate that the regime is committing to the costly endeavor of censorship for its own reward. However, we see censorship of the arts occur across a moral spectrum which indicates that the state is seeking to reward supporters or is in some way compelled to respond to citizen demand.

Now, it stands to reason that the state, or the elites within it, may on its own chose to censor for morality for no other reason than the benefit of seeing their version of a good society play out. If this were the case, then we should not expect to see individuals trust in the institutions increase. This is because institutional trust is formed by institutions performing well and good performance is thought to be a result of citizen demands going into the system and coming out as policy. Thus, the second expectation that stems from this literature is that regimes will be rewarded for censoring culture. Because institutions are rewarded by supporters when the regime performs well, we

should expect that imposing citizen demanded censorship will result in higher levels of trust being given to the government by supporting citizens.

2.6 Research Design

To explore the complex relationship between cultural censorship and citizen demand, this manuscript uses a mixed-methods approach. Leveraging high quality archival data, a regional dataset, and survey experiment, I aim to explore the theoretical expectations laid out in this chapter. The mixed methods design uses qualitative strategies such as phenomenology and Critical Discourse Analysis to uncover the context and power dynamics of censorship and qualitative techniques such as cross-national research and a survey experiment to determine larger trends. Working in concert with each other, the qualitative cases studies work with the quantitative methods to suggest causal relationships and provide insights into an untheorized area of citizen and institutional interactions. In order to create this study, original data collection efforts are featured in Chapter 1, 3, and 5. The following is a summary of the research design found in each chapter.

Beginning in Chapter 1, this dissertation began with an exploration of the causes and consequences of cultural censorship. Focusing on the historic case study of the Nueva Canción in Chile, I articulated how a musical movement could become political, how that political movement could threaten a regime, and what the consequences of censorship was for the artists and creatives involved. In many ways, this case study presents an idealized version of censorship which allowed for me to conduct a phenomenology of it; the case study demonstrates an authoritarian government repressing the rights of their citizens with the assumed intention of staying in power. Though

answers surrounding the questions posed at the start were largely answered by this study, the theory driving the choice of the regime to carry out that action points to many factors at play. One understudied factor is that some citizens may demand censorship. This finding is explored further in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 begins with an historical case study of Brazil. Because censorship is both a historic and modern phenomenon, I am able to leverage archival data to study what censorship looks like in circumstances that I may otherwise would not have been able to openly study. Thus, in Chapter 3, I use critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyze a series of citizen letters written to the Division of Public Censorship. These letters were made available by the Brazilian government and are kept in an online database of the National Archives of Brazil. Written from 1964 to 1988, these letters provide an invaluable insight into why citizens may demand repression from their government. The letters are written from citizens varying in location, socioeconomic status, age, gender, and parentage. The authors of the letters are expressing concerns about the lack of censorship in certain areas and will often articulate a reason as to why they are demanding censorship. This is because during this time period, Brazil was governed by an autocratic and democratic regime. Thus, under both regimes, individuals were writing in protest of the government failing to act on aspects of culture citizens wanted censored. Through coding these letters and creating an original dataset analyzing the text of these letters, the question of why citizens demand censorship can be explored. CDA is a particularly useful qualitative method in this circumstance because it focuses on the power relationships among citizens and between citizens and institutions.

There are a few limitations to the two qualitative studies that I have presented thus far. The first is the concern that within the interviews and letters the artists and citizens are addressing a very specific audience and may not be revealing their true preferences. They may instead be writing in order to persuade a specific audience. For example, citizens may instead be choosing to argue for censorship with a rationale that would likely get a response from the government. Thus, while these letters may express a clear reason as to why the citizen desires censorship, it may not be a genuine reason. Additionally, there is no metadata which allows me to validate the author of the letter. Using the letterhead and the signature of the individual, I was able to glean valuable information about the author, but there is no way to further validate this information.

Cultural censorship is not a phenomenon limited to a specific time period or region. In this dissertation, the focus is placed on the trends and patterns presented in the Americas. Following the qualitative case studies of Brazil and Chile, there is a regional study conducted to determine general trends in the outcomes of censorship. Regional studies allow researchers to study the specific dynamics and processes that would be over-generalized in large-*n* studies. Through studying the Americas as a region, I am able to pay attention to regional effects and dynamics (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2007). Latin America is a region with a rich history marked by early transitions in and out of democracy.⁷ The role of informal politics, manner of political participation, and history of democratization are aspects unique to Latin America and relevant to the theoretical

⁷ Latin America, as a region, is primarily democratic, but there has been a plethora of transitions. Latin America has a history of early democratization that makes the region unique. Latin America has also faced waves of populism (Roberts 1995). See appendix for the breakdown of electoral democracies in the region during the survey data years.

framework of this chapter. Thus, when trying to understand the specific outcomes of censorship, I use the high-quality observational data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). One of the challenges of the aforementioned data is that the observational data shows general patterns and trends but does not show causality. However, through the presented theoretical framework, I present an argument to suggest a causal direction and consider why reverse causality is unlikely.

To suggest the causal mechanisms driving the individual's choice to support efforts to censor, this dissertation employs a survey experiment. This survey experiment is conducted within the United States. While still a part of the Americas, the United States is in Northern America and differs from Southern and Central America in its history and relationship with democracy. There are notable differences among these regions including the longevity of democracy and the strength of the political institutions, the colonizing forces and legacy, and the practices of political participation. While these are significant differences, these differences allow the theory of this paper to be tested thoroughly. Furthermore, because the United States is largely considered a stable democracy and democratic since its inception, it provides a well-suited case study to demonstrate that even within countries with a robust democratic tradition, there is a desire for cultural suppression.

There are several weaknesses with this survey instrument that will be address in future iterations. The first weakness is that the survey presents a small non-representative sample of the US population. In order to obtain pilot data, a snowball sample was employed. The second weakness is the questions asked in the survey, while designed to

create an overall censorship index, may have influenced the responses by making the respondents deal in absolutes and not randomizing the module order.

This dissertation employs a mixed-methods approach to elucidate the intricate relationship between cultural censorship and citizen demand. By analyzing cases throughout the Americas, it emphasizes the diversity in censorship practices and the underlying factors that drive citizens to endorse these measures. The findings offer valuable insights into the dynamics of cultural censorship, enhancing our comprehension of its implications for society and politics within the region.

CHAPTER 3. CITIZEN DEMAND FOR CENSORSHIP - AN HISTORIC CASE STUDY OF AUTOCRATIC & DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL

I beg you to continue your work, with fearlessness and in favor of good manners, and in favor of national culture. Rest assured that, like me, millions of well-educated Brazilians applaud your courageous management in federal censorship, asking you, however, for even more rigorous action against the attacks carried out in the name of freedom of thought, expression and authorship, but disastrously against Brazil.

Rogo-lhe continuar o seu trabalho, com destemor e em favor dos bons costumes, e em favor da cultura nacional. Tenha V.S^a a certeza de que, como eu, milhões de brasileiros bem formados, aplaudem a corajosa gestão de V.S^a na Censura federal, rogando-lhe, entretanto, ação ainda mais rigorosa contra os atentados que se perpetram em nome da liberdade de pensamento, de expressão e de autoria, mas desastrosamente contra o Brasil.⁸
(Manifestações da Sociedade Civil Fonds)

This excerpt, written in 1985 by a Curitiba city council member to the director of the Divisão de Censura de Diversões Públicas or the Public Entertainment Censorship Division (DCDP), stands as an example of the citizen supported censorship in Brazil. In the letter written during Brazil's transition to democracy, the author describes the DCDP as a desperately needed force to defend the culture of the country. The DCDP was an institution within Brazil that operated during the dictatorship to censor the content of art. Through listening to, watching, or reading every song, film, television show, radio program, and theater production that reached the Brazilian markets, the DCDP effectively directed the cultural development of the country during its period of dictatorship. While many found this period to be oppressive in terms of artistic development and consumption, as the sentiments found in the aforementioned excerpt demonstrates, there was citizen support for the actions taken by the government as well. This demand for censorship motivates this chapter.

⁸ Thank you to Ana Gonçalves Sampaio and Helen Rabello Kras for your insights for the translations used in this chapter.

While the DCDP took time to establish its structure, purpose, and authority, the organization eventually became a powerful institution within the country able to oversee the development of the arts and enforce its stance. As such, this organization stands as a testament to the idea that censorship is costly for the government to conduct but is supported by citizens. Bureaucrats could censor any song that they deemed to go against national interest. This led to artists hiding the meaning of their songs through allegory and metaphor and added to the costs to determine whether a song was in need of revisions (Nicodeo 2018). As written by one bureaucrat in an archived document, the purpose of the DCDP was to protect the national security of Brazil and the morality and good customs of the society. For the purposes of this chapter it is important to note that citizens were aware of this bureau's existence and the bureau played a large role in the artistic community and any space where people gathered. Thus, analysis of this organization and its interaction with citizens assists reaching the objective of this dissertation which is to understand citizen demand of censorship.

In this chapter, I analyze the expectations discussed in Chapter 2, beginning with the disconnect between cultural censorship proponents and media consumers. Additionally, I explore the motivations behind censorship demands, which often stem from a desire to safeguard vulnerable groups or external influence. I also examine how individuals in dominant or privileged positions can exert their influence on the government to request censorship.

To conduct this analysis, I employ Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) on a collection of 352 letters submitted to the DCDP by citizens. CDA is an interdisciplinary and qualitative method that allows for researchers to analyze multimodal media for the

power structures and ideological underpinnings within it. Thus, with this analysis, I am able to preliminarily conclude that those who desire censorship enough to let their grievances be known to the government are individuals who are interested in protecting vulnerable third persons from less capturable artforms such as television that they themselves do not enjoy.

3.1 Historical Context

To examine the question of who supports censorship, this chapter centers on a historic case study of mid-century Brazil. As single-country case study, Brazil offers a compelling example to undertake a comprehensive exploration of citizen demand for censorship due to a few significant factors. The first is that during the majority of the years studied, Brazil was under an authoritarian regime. The regime's repressive policies created an environment where censorship was pervasive and systematically enforced. This allows for an examination of censorship in an explicit autocratic setting. However, this period also witnessed Brazil's transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. Studying censorship during this transitional phase provides insights into how censorship dynamics change as a society moves from autocracy to democracy.

The study of censorship in this context provides valuable insights into the broader historical and political developments of Brazil during this transformative period and contributes to a broader understanding of the factors that influence censorship practices and their impacts on society. By focusing on Brazil from 1964 to 1988, we can gain a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay among authoritarian rule, citizen support, political transition, and the evolution of censorship practices. Thus, this case

offers a rich historical and political context for analyzing the various dimensions of censorship and its implications for democratic processes and civil liberties.

Historically, within Brazil the artists and intellectuals in the country aligned themselves with the leftist ideologies. Using art, these creatives were attempting to encourage the masses to adopt reforms based on the principle of developmentalism (Napolitano 2007). While censorship was permitted since the 1930s by the Constitution of Brazil, it was not until the Coup of 1964 that this movement was silenced by the military regime. This regime would rule from 1964 until 1985 and systematically remove any threat to its existence.

To gain context, in 1961, President Quadros resigned and his vice-president João Goulart served in his place until 1964. During this time the intellectual and artistic communities in Brazil were thriving. With the influences of the Cuban Revolution and the Vietnam War, artists used their media to form organizations that were supported by the National Students Association and the Popular Culture Center. The goal was to gain support for a social revolution (Hollanda 2004). Because the leadership was friendly to the ideas of social equality and political liberty, this posed a threat to the conservatives in the country. The conservatives had allies in the civil society, Catholic Church, multinational companies, and the American government. These would be the same actors that were behind the Coup of 1964 (Alves 1985).

Once in power, the military regime crushed its opposition through censorship of public spaces. The government centralized this service through the creation of the National Information Service which had the authority to oversee activities that were deemed disruptive to the public order (Magalhães 1997). At first, music escaped scrutiny

arguably because it was too powerful. Music programs were extremely popular both in festivals and on television. Within Brazil, popular music had a history of being political (Schwarz 1978). During the 1960s and 1970s, the musical movement became known as the Tropicalismo, or the Tropicalia and it overtly spread political messaging. However, when the Fifth Decree was enacted, the regime gained more power. This permitted censorship to be enforced by imprisonment and torture (Fausto 1999). For some of the artists, this censorship resulted in exile. These artists include Casetano Veloso, Gilberto Gil, Geraldo Vandré, and Chico Buarque. One policy outcome of the Coup that is important to the context for this manuscript was the bureaucratization of censorship.

To give an example of the bureaucratization involved, starting in the late 1960s, songs were reviewed by three bureaucrats to see if the song needed to be changed before it was released or banned. Using a catalog system, the bureaucrats would mark the time period, genre, language, topic, message, plot, and write their conclusion. Songs were categorized under the following labels: protest songs, romantic songs, lyrical songs, songs with double-meanings, political songs, or obscene songs (Fiuza 2006). While the aforementioned practice was suggested by the DCDP, the online archives reveal a much more convoluted process to censorship that evolved throughout the tenure of the DCDP.

The repression faced in the country subsided when General Ernesto Geisel came into power in 1974. However, the General had a difficult time fighting the bureaucracy that was well developed. Thus, while media censorship decreased in terms of free press beginning to return, cultural censorship remained in place. It was not until the end of the dictatorship in 1985 that the censorship began to wane and even then, some measures were still in place until 1988 (Nicodeo 2017).

Reflecting on the censorship that took place, there are multiple waves of censorship and at different points, different sources of media were the object of repression for the regime. The first period was from 1964 to 1968. During that time cultural protests took place. From 1968 to 1978, the period is referred to as the Sufoco or the suffocation. At this point works were severely censored by the government. The last period from 1978 to 1985 was when censorship began to stop, and the government declared amnesty for the exiled artists (Vieira 2018).

While the government appears to have cared about censoring art that was critical of the regime or called for collective action against it, the purpose of this chapter is not to dispel either of those theories. Instead, I would like to suggest that there is another driving force behind the censorship occurring in the country and offer support for Citizen Demand Theory. This theory may explain why the archives show that the bureaucrats were working to omit media that were against the country's dominant moral framework.


3.2 Data and Methodology

To determine who wants censorship in this historic case study of Brazil, this chapter leverages 352 citizen letters written to the DCDP from 1968 to 1988. These letters are the surviving correspondence kept in the Brazilian National Archives. Out of the 352 letters in the archive, 261 were used in the following analysis. Letters were not included if they were duplicates, procedural messages, or responses from the DCDP to a citizen without the original citizen letter. The dataset begins in 1968 with the first letter that was saved and ends in 1988 when the DCDP officially ended in its censorship capacity and no further letters were collected and filed. The years of this data are particularly insightful to this manuscript because it spans both a period of dictatorship

(1968 to 1984) and a transition to a democracy (1985 to 1988). As a result, the themes of citizen demand can be examined in both a democratic and autocratic context within the same country. Due to the variation in regime, I can compare and contrast the demands of the citizenry.

When answering, “who wants censorship,” these letters provide critical insight about citizens who feel compelled to demand censorship from the government. The information that is available for each individual is limited to the letter itself; the Brazilian National Archives did not contain any metadata on the authors of the letters. Thus, if the information was not readily available through the letterhead, signature, nor offered in the content of the letter, there was no additional way to garner the information. However, Figure 3.1 shows an example of letterhead commonly found within the corpus. From letterhead such as this, the name and occupation of the individual as well as the region the individual was writing from could be determined. The letterhead added legitimacy to the data by providing evidence that the individuals writing the DCDP were in fact citizens.

When answering, “what is being censored,” the content of the letters provides many insights into why the individuals were writing in protest to their governments. Many individuals would specify that they wanted censorship of a particular television program or a movie poster because in many cases they were concerned about the wrong audience viewing the materials. Thus, this corpus of letters is particularly helpful in informing the theory presented throughout this dissertation and more generally, analyzing these letters qualitatively provides important contributions to the study of censorship as well as political participation.



3. Figure 3.1: Sample Letterhead


Figure Notes: This is an example of a letterhead from one of the letters in the archive. A typical letterhead would include the name, occupation, region, and date of the individual writing the letter. I would use such information in my coding process.

Writing letters to government officials is a form of voluntary political participation present in both authoritarian and democratic regimes (Cooper, Knotts, and Haspel 2009, Distelhorst and Fu 2019). Studying such letters reveals how citizens view their role in the government and how they view the role of the government itself. This type of research provides a different perspective than the insights provided by surveys or interviews because it is an authentic political interaction. This is not to imply that citizens are necessarily revealing their authentic selves in the letters, but that it is a natural discourse and not an artificial research environment. However, this type of public transcript may be “shaped to appeal to the expectations of the powerful (Scott 1990, 2)” and should be interpreted with caution. Though these are aspects that merit careful consideration, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is able to help mitigate them due to the emphasis placed on power relationships. The discourse written from citizens to the DCDP provides invaluable insight into the study of censorship.

To understand the content of these letters, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is used. As defined by Wodak, CDA is “fundamentally concerned with analyzing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and

control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequalities as it is expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)” (2001, 2). Thus, this method of interpreting qualitative data is well suited for this chapter because it focuses on the power relationship within the society as it is expressed through language.

Turning to the corpus of letters, from 1968 to 1984, the period during which Brazil may be considered a dictatorship, there were 171 letters written by citizens, citizen groups, and public officials to the Public Entertainment Censorship Division in Brazil. Figure 3.2 shows that during the transition to democracy 90 letters were written between 1985 and 1988 with an immediate surge in letter writers during 1986 and 1987. While this suggests that the surge in letters was a result of the sudden relaxation of censorship, it is also possible that letters from this period were better archived due to the government attempting to increase its transparency. Regardless of the reason as to why these particular letters were saved and the possibility that there are others, because these letters are primarily written in support of censorship, they provide a useful window into understanding the demand for cultural censorship. The letters written during both periods favor the work of the DCDP and are calling for further censorship with 90% of citizens writing in favor during the dictatorship and 93% of citizens writing in favor of censorship after the dictatorship. These are the letters this manuscript focuses on and are the results that are reported. Though these letters may constitute the majority of the corpus, I do not assume that they reflect the majority opinion on censorship in the country.



4. Figure 3.2: Count of Letters by Year

Figure notes: This figure presents a count of the letters for each year of the dataset. There are two different spikes worth noting. The first occurs when The Sufoco ends in 1979 and 24 letters were archived. The second occurs when Brazil transitioned to a democracy and 37 letters were archived. In both instances a period of opening took place and citizens wrote to request continued censorship.

3.3 Analysis: Who wants censorship?


When asking “who wants censorship,” one of the most consistent findings within the literature is that women overwhelmingly are more supportive of censorship (see Armstrong, Friesdorf, and Conway 2019, Lambe 2004, Ritts and Engbretson 1991). The

research on this dynamic shows that there is a gendered difference in who would support the censorship of sexual, violent, hateful, and/or offensive content. This should lead to the expectation that most of the letters written to the DCDP will be written by women.

To determine if this relationship was present in my sample, I evaluated whether the name signed to the letter was a traditionally male or female name and further confirmed this if the response to the letter from the DCDP addressed the author as “senhor” or “senhora.” I would like to recognize that there may be instances of misgendering using this approach because this was usually the only signifier of gender in the letter. However, using this coding system, I found that during the dictatorship (1968-1984), 76% of the letters written to the government calling for further censorship by the government were written by men, 19% were written by women, and the remaining 5% were coauthored by both traditionally male and female names. This trend largely continues during the transition to democracy with 73% of the letters written by men, 20% written by women, and 7% coauthored by individuals with both traditionally male and female names. The Figure 3.3 presents the results for the entire sample.

This result is contrary to what the literature would suggest. However, turning to the literature on political participation, the gendered difference in the authorship of the letters

may be due to the fact that men are more likely to directly to write to the government in protest than their female counterparts.



5. Figure 3.3: Gender of the Authors 1968-1988

Figure notes: This figure highlights that the vast majority (75%) of the authors were men. This finding is interesting because it is contrary to what the literature would suggest.

Alternatively, the result may be due to the content of the art being censored and/or the relationship to the consumer of the media. In terms of content, from the literature we should expect that women will be more upset with art that is obscene or pornographic in nature. Of all the letters that women wrote, 25% of them did reference the obscenity/pornographic nature of the art in question. For reference, 36% of the letters written by men referenced this. Perhaps more strikingly, of the letters written by referencing porn only 15% of them were written by women. While the rate of exposure to obscene/pornographic art cannot be determined, the lack of women writing on that is still interesting to consider given the literature which predicts that women are less likely to favor free expression when it is pornographic. However, a point to consider here is the relationship of the author of the letter to those they are demanding censorship for. In the corpus, there was not a single letter that demanded censorship of materials that the individual freely consumed. Instead, there was concern over someone else consuming the media. The referent of this concern will be discussed in the next section.

Of the letters archived, 10% of the letters written during the dictatorship directly reference a religious affiliation. This percentage jumps to 32% during the democratic period. The research on censorship predicts that religiosity is positively correlated with pro-censorship attitudes. Most of the authors of the archived letters did not state a clear affiliation with a given church. However, during the dictatorship 15 letters did reference a church with 11 of those referencing the Catholic Church while during the democratic transition, the proportion of religious affiliations climbed 22 letters referencing a specific church.

Though religion was referenced as a part of the author's identity, that did not always mean that the author was using a religious rationale for censorship. A larger proportion of the letters provided a religiously based argument for the censorship imposed even though no denomination was mentioned. During the dictatorship, around 15% of the letters use a religious argument for the basis of censorship. After the dictatorship, this number jumps to nearly 30% of the letters. For some of the authors, Brazil and Catholicism are ubiquitous. This is why alternative interpretations of biblical stories and presentations of biblical icons are seen to be within the realm of the state to thwart. Citizens writing to the DCDP occasionally remark on the Christian behavior of the director and state the importance of having Christians in positions of leadership.

Research suggests that those who contact officials are often of a higher socioeconomic status, are more educated, and from urban areas (Balla 2012, Brooks 2014, and Zuckerman and West 1985). Within the literature on Brazilian political participation, there is an established difference between the socialization of urban and rural citizens. In general, those living in rural Brazil experience a strong patriarchal

tradition, have fewer educational opportunities, and are used to having their electoral systems manipulated through fraud and violence (Love 1970). Thus, we should expect to see more letters come from urban areas than their rural counterparts. From the following figure, we see that the majority of the letters came from southern urban centers following this prediction. However, further analysis of the country's population distribution demonstrates that the cities are not represented proportionally. For example, 20% of the letters come from São Paulo, but only around 10% of the population lives here at the time of the sample. The letters in this corpus confirm the trend identified in previous research that found individuals in urban areas tend to be more politically engaged.

From the analysis of the corpus, there is a general trend that those who demand censorship are urban males. The generalizability of this claim is unknown at best considering that it is in direct conflict with the existing literature. However, these findings from a single-country historic case study offer an interesting point of comparison for future research.



6. Figure 3.4: Location of the Authors

Figure notes: This figure shows the geographical location of the authors. The urban south of the country is primarily represented and based on demographic information at the time, is overrepresented in the sample.

3.4 Analysis: Why do citizens demand censorship?

Moving beyond the descriptive elements of the letters that aid in the understanding the demographics of who is writing the government, I can now present the themes of the content that helps to determine what the citizens are demanding censorship of and why citizens are demanding that censorship.

When analyzing the content of the letters, the first component to unpack is the tone of the letters. While my analysis of the tone is limited due to the language barrier, it is informed by the research of Distelhorst and Fu who study the scripts of citizens interacting through written communication with authoritarian regimes. Though there is a stronger association with average citizen engagement and democracies, citizens in autocratic settings may also write to their government with their demands. Research in

this area by Distelhorst and Fu has determined that citizens in these regime types tend to write with three distinct types of scripts (2019). I found that these scripts were also found in the corpus suggesting that the citizens were contacting officials in line with social norms.

In the first script, individuals emphasize the benevolence of the government and the subjecthood of themselves. Though not used exclusively, this script is used by many throughout the corpus. For example, many citizens refer to the censors as “Vossa Excelência” or “Your Excellence” which is not the official title of the director of the Public Entertainment Censorship Division, but is a respectful title used to address someone high ranking within the state. This presented a formal if not flattering tone to the director. However, within the corpus, citizens also forwent any title or would use less flattering, but still formal titles such Senhor Director or Prezado Senhor.

The second script outlined by the researchers occurs when citizens highlight the legal commitments of the state. This was also seen in the letters when citizens would write that it was not only within the role of DCDP to censor, but that it should do so. Utilizing this script, citizens sometimes would congratulate the DCDP for their work thus far and suggest that it was the duty of the state to continue to censor for the morals or education of the Brazilian people.

The final script outlined is closely related to the second script and is used when citizens appeal to the moral duties of officials to protect the collective welfare (2019). This script was also commonly used in the letters by citizens who were concerned about the moral welfare of the citizens and are reminding the state of its duty to protect citizens

against harmful influences. Therefore, within this corpus the three scripts articulated by Distelhorst and Fu are present.

The presence of these scripts is important to note because it suggests that even in autocratic settings, citizens are communicating their preferences to the government, even if they may be articulating those preferences in a style that is permitted by the regime's norms. The tone of the letters may follow social norms more broadly and may not represent the true feelings of the citizens. Thus, when analyzing the letters, I am taking this power relationship into account and discerning what themes arise in the letters beyond the script that may be used to articulate their stance to an official within an autocratic regime.

3.1.1 Object of Censorship


As established in Chapter 2, art is a type of communication that can transmit both information and values to its audience. As a result, art is largely seen as a type of communication that can be restricted in the same manner that free speech may be restricted. One aspect of art that differs from speech is that aspects of culture vary greatly in their discourse. For example, television is a prime example of a multimodal communication that is also less capturable than other forms of art. While a song listened to on the radio does not have as many points of entry because the listener is only having the auditory experience, a music album is a multimodal communication because the lyrics, images used on the album, and music all influence its interpretation and meaning (McKerrell and Lyndon 2017). Thus, when thinking about objects of censorship, it is important to notice the subtleties about the art that citizens write about. According to the corpus, it appears that multimodal art that is less capturable is often the target.

One of the key themes presented in the letters was a deep concern with the intrusion of explicit materials into both the home and public spaces. In the corpus of letters, citizens were very concerned about the availability of these degenerative ideas and did not believe that such ideas deserved protection in either democratic or autocratic settings. Many concerned citizens wrote about perverse material making its way into accessible public places and the home and were concerned that the art was not limited to places with economic barriers such as tickets or other barriers to prevent the wrong audience from encountering the art. While cinema, literature, and theater were all the targets of censorship during the dictatorship (1968-1984), citizens were primarily writing about their concern regarding the presence of perverse material coming into their homes via television and radio. The media citizens were writing to the government about can be seen in more detail in Figure 3.5.

This idea of less capturable media being in need of censorship continued to any type of media that could be passively consumed particularly during the dictatorship. For example, there was concern about the materials being seen on news racks which is another type of media that is freely available to any passersby. One concerned citizen wrote to the DCDP and called for the government to demand that cinemas take down the posters of their nightly showings of sexually explicit films during times when children and families were likely to walk past. In the same vein, other citizens requested that explicit television shows only be aired in the middle of night and that lude magazines be wrapped in plastic and placed away from children and teens. The primary concern of this less capturable media was the sexual content being shown freely and the ultimate result of corruption of youth and society.

In Figure 3.5, the total share of each media type in the letters is presented in percentages by regime type. From this figure, we see that television is consistently mentioned as the referent object of censorship. This would align with the idea that media that is less capturable causes more concern as does media that is multimodal communication. Another aspect of this figure that is important to discuss is the overwhelming presence of visual media. Print media is referring to posters and magazines; print media does not include books. In all of the letters, calls to explicitly ban books was notably absent. While it was implied in some letters that called for censorship of all media, no letters were written specifically about banning books.

One surprising shift shown in Figure 3.5 is the shift in focus to the radio during the democratic period. This may be due to the fact that the DCDP censored music more diligently than it did television. Thus, the themes that were upsetting may have not been present in the music during the dictatorship. But, when that censorship stopped, citizens began to write about the themes they were hearing. The other shift worth mentioning is that during the democratic transition, citizens were less likely to write about a specific media type than in the dictatorship. Instead, we can observe that citizens were writing to encourage censorship of all media during a time that the DCDP was scaling back censorship efforts.




7. Figure 3.5: Referent Object of Censorship 1968-1988

Figure notes: This figure shows that television was the main referent object in the letters. Looking at the data, it appears that media that was of a concern to citizens was media that was either low in capturability (ex. posters) or was multimodal (ex. cinema).

3.1.2 Protecting Third-Persons

Thus far, I have shown who is likely writing to demand censor and the media that the individual is wanting to be censored. However, it is still an open question why the individual may be demanding censorship in the first place. Within the pages of each letter, citizens would express their opinions related to censorship often calling for the government to enforce harsher standards in the arts. Four categories presented themselves with such frequencies in the letters that they merit theoretical exploration. They are concern for the health of society, harmful influences on the youth, corruption of women, and the duration of the family unit. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Many citizens would write out of concern for both women and children for example. The

category that was consistently mentioned the most in both regime settings was concern for the corruption of the youth who were likely to be the most influenced by the media.




8. Figure 3.6: Overview of Rationales

Figure notes: This figure shows the rationales commonly cited in the letters demanding censorship. If citizens would reference that they were concerned for society or the youth in the country in their letter, then I would code that individual as being concerned for both. Thus, this figure presents a count of each rationale.

Figure 3.6 provides the count of each rationale used. However, because the majority of the sample was written during the dictatorship, it does not offer a comprehensive understanding of the concerns outlined in the letters. Thus, Figure 3.7 offers a side by side comparison of the different rationales employed in the letters broken out by regime type.

During the dictatorship, 50% of the letter specifically mentioned concern for the youth. However, this percentage dropped to 35% during the democratic transition with the percentage over concern of women growing the largest by doubling to 13% of the letters. While this shift is interesting in terms of gender dynamics, it is worth noting the similarities between women and the youth and that is that from the author’s point of view, they were generally third-persons.



9. Figure 3.7: Breakdown of Rationales in Percentages

Figure notes: This figure presents a side by side comparison of the rationales used to justify the request to censor in both autocratic and democratic regimes. From this comparison the proportion of individuals writing to justify censorship of the youth decreased while the number seeking to protect women increased.

Returning to the literature, these descriptive results show support for the Third-Person Effect which holds that others in society need protection from the influence of harmful ideas (Rojas, Shah, and Faber 1996; Hoffner and Rehkoff, 2011). Support for this theory is found because citizens are suggesting that they do not want censorship because they are disturbed by the media, but they are concerned about the effects on another person. Interestingly, most individuals writing out of concern for others were writing about concern about their immediate family. For example, some were concerned about their wives watching soap operas or their children seeing commercials containing explicit materials. While the canonical research suggests that the magnitude of the Third-Person Effect increases as the social distance between demander of censorship and the other widens (Eveland and McLeod, 1999; Gunther, 1995), the findings from these letters would go against this trend. This is because the individual is often a member of the household or an active member of the group they are writing to protect. However, these

letters do support the notion that individuals are more willing to censor media that they themselves do not consume.

To look at the actual content of the letters, the following excerpt was written by a member of the military police in 1985, in which he is upset that women are watching shows that he believes are immoral and bad for society. This is a prime example of an individual is calling for censorship of culture from the government. The author is referring to a soap opera he believes is obscene and wants his family to stop watching it. Thus, his relationship with the other of the Third-Person Effect is very close to him.

Our mentally gifted women, like children, absorb all this filth, which is transmitted to husbands and children, causing them psychological disorders. Parents cannot stop these home invasions. When the woman wants it, it's no use. To insist is to create rivalry.

Nossas mulheres dotadas, mentalmente, igual à criança, absorvem todas essas imundícies, que são transmitidas aos maridos e aos filhos, causando-os distúrbios psicológicos. Os pais não conseguem impedir essas invasões aos lares. Quando a mulher quer, não adianta. Insistir, é criar rivalidade.
(Manifestações da Sociedade Civil funds)

Within this letter, the author argues that the soap opera is a disgraceful and devastating to the people of Brazil and to the family unit. Using profanity, the author draws the government to the issue. The man writing the letter views the government as the only authority that is able to stop the spread of these ideas. He explicitly states that it is not within the power of the head of the household to prevent these ideas from making their way into the lives of those unable, in his view, to self-censor. Thus, while he has the power to determine what women and children should not encounter, he sees himself as powerless in this fight. This idea of censorship being a power that only the government can wield effectively is present in a lot of the letters.

Exploring the text of the letters, passionate language, expletives, and an abundance of explanation marks and capitalization were commonplace in the letters

written to the government officials. The following is an example of the latter written by a woman enraged at the depiction of women in her profession. This letter provides an interesting juxtaposition against the other letter written about censoring context about and for women as this author is angry that women are not being taken seriously in the workplace.

The nurse does not study for years on end, does not face the "ghost" of the entrance exam, does not attend 3, 4 or even 5 years of college to see herself constantly humiliated, depreciated, diminished (which, by the way, should not be done with the lowliest of men); the nurse does not sacrifice herself every minute, for every patient, enduring (and how...) the contempt of most doctors to see herself, afterwards, ridiculed in the most diverse television programs...

I am a NURSE !!!

As a NURSE (which I'm proud to be), I don't ask for respect: I DEMAND that respect! This is the most basic of human rights and one that, out of my self-love, I have an obligation to claim!

A enfermeira não estuda anos a fio, não enfrenta o "fantasma" do vestibular, não frequenta 3, 4 ou mesmo 5 anos de faculdade para se ver constantemente humilhada, depreciada, diminuída (o que, diga-se de passagem, não deveria ser feito com o mais humil de dos homens); a enfermeira não se sacrifica a cada minuto, por cada paciente, aguentando (e como ...) o menosprezo da maioria dos médicos para se ver, depois, ridicularizada nos mais diversos programas de televisão ...

Eu sou ENFERMEIRA !!!

Como ENFERMEIRA (que me orgulho de ser), não peço respeito: EXIJO esse respeito! Esse é o mais básico dos direitos humanos e que, por meu amor-próprio, tenho a obrigação de reivindicar !

(Manifestações da Sociedade Civil funds)

This letter focused on censoring the portrayal of women in the workplace raises a common theme in the letters written by women. When women did write in favor of censorship, the subject matter was not about limiting violence against women as the research suggests compels women to censor. Instead, the tone often did reflect a dissatisfaction with the way women were being portrayed sex objects which is adjacent to the findings in the literature. Like in the letter above, within the corpus of letters, the professional women writing would express their exasperation with the way that their profession was being portrayed and women not working out of the home would also

express dissatisfaction. The following is an excerpt written by a group of Methodist women in 1986.

The Methodist women, gathered in their Congress, decided, by unanimous vote of the delegates present, to file their protest with the federal authorities of our country, against the abuses in which the female figure has been used in the media, especially in television stations. Television, in advertisements that use the woman's body as an aggressive and disrespectful way to the dignity of human creature.

There's no use in the dishonest excuse that every viewer is free to turn off their device if the scene doesn't suit their taste. Many of these situations are beyond the control of families, who are often surprised by advertisements that explore the body in a truly clumsy way.

Children and adolescents are growing up with a distorted image of the dignity of women, used only as an object of eroticism, in a purely commercial way.

As mulheres metodistas, reunidas em seu Congresso, decidiram, por unanimidade das delegadas presentes, lavrar o seu protesto junto às autoridades federais do nosso País, contra os abusos nos quais tem sido usada a figura feminina nos meios de comunicação, especialmente nas emissoras de televisão, em divulgações publicitárias que usam, o corpo da mulher como forma agressiva e desrespeitosa à dignidade da criatura humana.

Não vale a desonesta desculpa de que cada telespectador é livre para desligar seu aparelho, se a cena não for do seu agrado. Muitas dessas situações fogem do controle das famílias, que muitas vezes se vêem surpreendidas com anúncios que exploram o corpo de forma verdadeiramente torpe.

Crianças e adolescentes estão crescendo com uma imagem distorcida da dignidade da mulher, usada apenas como objeto de ertismo, de maneira puramente comercial (Manifestações da Sociedade Civil fonds)

This letter expresses a religious group's dissatisfaction with the portrayals of women on television and how they are concerned about such images impacting the youth of the country. It also presents the interesting idea that while television can be monitored by the individual or guardians, it is difficult to do so because advertisements on TV were not fitting the programming's intended audience. In this letter, the authors are suggesting yet again that the government is better able to regulate this form of expression and has a duty to its people to set such limits. Thus, the power to censor ultimately is suited for the government.

Democracy gives the power of governance to the people (Fiss 1999). Citizens may demand what they want their society to look like. The letters found in the Brazilian

National Archives raise an interesting consideration that is at the heart of this dissertation: how do governments respond to demands of repression by citizens? In the letters mentioned in this chapter, the authors were primarily concerned with regulation of sexual themes. The rationale being that those who were consuming the media may be too young or impressionable to see these ideas which were considered contrary to the goals of society. But, while most people agree that sex and violence should be regulated, this still has an impact on the free expression of artists and sets a precedent for the society that the government has the power to exercise censorship to protect vulnerable populations. Such a precedent could have harsh consequences for those not in the government's protection.

3.5 Summary

This case study of citizen letters written to the DCPD has several takeaways. First, the research on gender and demand for censorship is inconsistent with the letters maintained in the archive, which suggest that men were more likely to engage in this form of voluntary political activism. Second, citizens were calling for censorship of multimodal media that was primarily less capturable. Lastly, to protect third persons, namely women, children, and society as a whole, citizens were willing to relinquish the power to censor to the government.

These findings are interesting because while it is consistent with some of the work on the Third-Person Effect, the social distance between the other is not as far as the theory would suggest. Instead, individuals were concerned with the media impacting their own household. Such a finding presents an interesting dynamic between citizens and institutions as it suggests that some citizens may indeed demand censorship.

While this historic single-country case study presents many interesting findings to support the theory of this dissertation and build our collective understanding of institutional and citizen interactions, it is worth noting the limitations of the study. The first is the narrow sample that was available. Though the letters presented a rich summary of citizen demands for censorship, the understanding was limited by the citizens who chose to participate in this way and the letters that survived through the years. However, these findings suggest that some citizens may demand repression from their government which is of interest to those studying the strategic interactions between people and institutions. Governments may act on citizen demand for a variety of reasons; the goal of this dissertation is not to understand the causal relationship of why governments may censor citizens, but rather to understand the demand for censorship and the outcomes of censorship. Thus, the next chapter of this manuscript explores the outcomes of governmental censorship in terms of relationships among people and between people and institutions.

CHAPTER 4. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CENSORSHIP ACROSS LATIN AMERICA

A modern regional study allows for the identification of regional patterns and trends in cultural censorship. Building upon the lessons learned from Brazil in the previous chapter, this chapter expands to encompass Latin America more broadly, enabling the examination of regional effects and dynamics (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, 2007). Cultural censorship often emerges from a complex interplay of historical, political, and socio-cultural factors. Understanding regional dynamics provides valuable insights into the interconnectedness of cultural censorship practices and the influences that shape them, thereby enhancing the policy relevance of this subject area.

This chapter utilizes data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) over an 11-year period (2008 to 2019), including analysis of up to 23 countries in the region to look at the interaction of cultural censorship, citizens, and their levels of trust towards each other and the regime. As a region, Latin America has endured more censorship than can be captured with survey data only spanning 11 years. Thus, the limitation of the quantitative analysis will be considered when suggesting the generalizability of the results.

The previous chapter examines a historic case study that provides evidence supporting the idea that citizens may have a desire for, and even demand, censorship from their government. The underlying assumption in this chapter is that if cultural censorship is indeed a policy demand of citizens then there should be observable evidence of their behavior reflecting this preference when censorship is occurring. By employing a regional perspective and utilizing high-quality observational data, this chapter explores the political consequences of censorship finding that higher levels of

censorship is associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust and higher levels of institutional trust across regime types. It is important to note that while this study does not assert a causal relationship, it does identify general trends that are consistent with the theoretical framework presented throughout the dissertation. This chapter demonstrates that cultural censorship is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has significant implications for society, politics, and individual freedoms.

4.1 Cultural Censorship in Latin America

Censorship occurs when the government limits or prohibits the production of ideas from actors such as academics, artists, or journalists. Governments may censor expression through legal means and enforce the laws and regulations in place through a variety of methods ranging from fines to imprisonment (Crabtree, Fariss, and Kern 2015). Censorship comes in many varieties but the literature on the subject tends to focus on censorship of media (both traditional and social) when considering its political and behavioral implications.

Through shifting the focus from news and social media to cultural censorship, we observe that both autocratic and democratic regimes censor. Democracies by their definition may not freely engage in news and social media censorship.⁹ However, by using apolitical rationales such as upholding norms or community standards, or political ones such as a response to citizen demand, even democracies may engage in cultural censorship. Although the occurrence of censorship across regime types may be an unexpected finding, as it should strike most as antithetical to democratic norms, it makes

⁹Free press is often seen as a central measure of democracy. For example, the Freedom House Index uses press freedom as a criterion.

sense if we understand that regimes of all types will act in their best interests (de Mesquita et al. 2005). Expanding the lens beyond news and social media censorship to consider cultural censorship thus moves censorship beyond a simple “authoritarian tactic” and offers an opportunity for a more robust understanding of the political causes and consequences of censorship. Given the influence of political identity and the importance of group formation, individuals may be affected unequally by cultural censorship; thus, in this chapter, cultural censorship’s effects on both regime supporters and non-supporters will be examined.


Latin America, as a region, is primarily democratic, but there has been a plethora of transitions. For the analysis in this chapter, the shifts in and out of a democratic state are monitored. For the complete details of electoral democracies in the region during the survey data years, see the appendix. While the data in this chapter only highlights the recent trends, Latin America has a history of early democratization that makes the region unique (Roberts 1995). It is well documented in many Latin American authoritarian regimes that culture was suppressed.

As discussed in the opening chapter, in Chile, during the coup of 1973, art and leftist materials were seized and burned in the streets (Sheehy 2018). Throughout the following military regime of Augusto Pinochet, the government censored musicians producing perceived leftist musical themes by jailing, executing, or exiling artists. The Pinochet Regime went so far as to deploy the military to ban the music of the certain artists tied to the leftist Nueva Canción movement from the radio and to confiscate and destroy recordings from stores and homes during the house-to-house searches that followed the coup (Morris 1986). The regime also made efforts to further extinguish the

memory of the singers by not only banning their songs from the radio but by also destroying the master recordings archived by record companies (Rohter 2002). The cultural censorship experienced during this period was so severe that it is referred to as a time of *agagón cultural*, or cultural blackout (Morris 1986).

Chile was not the only place in Latin America to endure cultural censorship. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, during the dictatorship in Brazil, media, art, and academia were severely censored by the state. Through a centralized agency Serviço de Censura de Diversões Publicas bureaucrats could censor any aspect of culture that they deemed to go against national interest. The censorship experienced from 1968 to 1978 is referred to as *el Sufoco*, or the suffocation (Hall 2018).

Beyond the case studies highlighted in this manuscript, this tradition of regimes censoring culture is found throughout Latin America during the mid to late 20th Century. In the Dominican Republic, the merengue was the target of censorship in the for both political and moral reasons during the Trujillo regime; in Jamaica, Reggae music was banned throughout the 1960s; and in Mexico, rock music was severely censored throughout the midcentury. Moreover, during Castro's regime Cuban artists could only perform songs in favor of the revolution. However, it is important to note that while some of the most prominent examples cultural censorship in Latin America did occur under dictatorships, censorship in this region is not limited to a regime type or time period. For example, in Colombia, lawmakers continue to censor Reggaeton music. Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, the Comisión de Espectáculos Públicos (Commission of Public Performances) continues to be tasked with controlling media production within the framework of what is considered suitable for "public morality."




10. Figure 4.1: Cultural Censorship from 1940 to 2020

Figure notes: This figure presents the measure of cultural censorship as defined by V-Dem which whether there is academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues. If cultural and academic expression is fully respected by public authorities, the variable is coded as a 4, if it is not respected by public authorities, meaning that there are no restrictions placed on academic freedom or cultural expression, it is coded as a 0. Thus, in this figure which covers years 1940 to 2020, we see that a lower curve is a more censored society and a higher curve is a less censored or more free society.

At this point it is necessary to note that, while I have drawn attention to examples of music censorship, cultural censorship is not limited to that art form. Cultural censorship includes limitations of scholarship and films, books, and other artforms. These forms of expression were also censored throughout Latin America. Figure 4.1 demonstrates visually the varying levels of academic and cultural expression endured by citizens from 1940 to 2020. The data for these charts are from V-Dem’s measure of Cultural Censorship. The strengths and weaknesses of this measure are discussed further in the methods section of this chapter.

Figure 4.1 highlights that over a span of 80 years, citizens of Latin America have endured varying levels of censorship. While there have been shifts in the democratic nature of the regimes, these shifts do not clearly follow the overall level of cultural censorship within the country. Instead, the level of censorship may follow, lead, or be immune to these changes.



11. Figure 4.2: Cultural and News and Social Media Censorship
 Figure notes: This figure presents the same measure of Cultural and Academic Censorship presented in Figure 4.1 with an additional measure from V-Dem which measure the respect media receives from the government. This figure is meant to illustrate that media and cultural censorship are not the same and that at times each receives harsher treatment depending on the context. Lower levels of freedom correspondent with a lower level on the chart.

Cultural censorship is not merely a proxy for authoritarianism nor is it the same as media censorship. In Figure 4.2, the differences between cultural and news and social media censorship are shown. While the trends are generally similar, there are not identical. In Argentina for example, the 1970s was a time during which the people

experienced more severe cultural censorship than media censorship. Moreover, throughout much of the history of Guatemala and Colombia, cultural censorship has been harsher than media censorship. However, the inverse is true in Mexico. With this difference between news and social media and cultural censorship, understanding how the suppression of culture impacts people and institutions is an area and open question that warrants further study.

4.2 Cultural Censorship and Interpersonal Trust in Latin America

The first hypothesis of this chapter adds to the prior work in political science through examining the effects of cultural censorship on interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust is defined as the degree to which individuals feel comfortable in dealings with other persons. When individuals are active in civic organizations or, more generally, associative groups, the assumption is that there is a high level of interpersonal trust among participants. The reasoning here is that bonds emerge from shared experiences and repeat encounters. These connections lead to higher levels of interpersonal trust, which increases levels of cooperation and stability in democratic institutions (Almond and Verba 1963, Inglehart 2006). Cultural theories of trust hold that interpersonal trust is created outside of the political sphere by cultural norms. This exogenous space where interpersonal trust is formed is called the civic culture.

The civic culture is the collection of associations that allow individuals to develop and strengthen trust and build their social networks (Putnam 2001). It includes organizations such as charities, sport clubs, and volunteer associations. Within the civic culture, individuals can exchange ideas and make connections with each other. Though

the causal arrow is debated, research has shown that when individuals are civically engaged, they are able to generate feelings of interpersonal trust (Shah 1998).

Though not explicitly included in the original work on civic culture, artistic spaces are a vital part of this network. Artistic spaces may be considered a part of the civic culture because they too create a space for social networking in communities (Grodach 2010). The arts have a homogenizing effect on social behavior through the sharing of messages and emotions (Eyerman and Jamison 1998). By extending the definition of civic culture to include artistic spaces, we are able to have a more robust understanding of the term and are able to conduct robust analysis of it.



12. Figure 4.3: Interpersonal Censorship Relationship

Figure notes: This figure is intended to illustrate that when cultural spaces are censored, there are fewer spaces for individuals to form trust bonds. This is due to the relationship between building social capital to generate interpersonal trust in shared spaces.

When cultural censorship occurs, the spaces where individuals can network, express themselves, and challenge the status quo are altered. When the government limits the freedom of expression by censoring aspects of the culture or academia, we should expect to see a decrease in interpersonal trust due to the lack of space for connection. Artistic and academic space is one component needed for individuals to come together and build trust relationships. Thus, when this space is compromised by censorship

restricting ideas, instruments, themes, and other components of art, there are fewer opportunities to connect and engage in creative pursuits that further human connection.

The extent to which this space will be diminished will depend on the regime. If the regime censors to the extent of the Pinochet regime as seen in Chapter 1, there will be little to no cultural spaces to exchange ideas and arts. During the Pinochet regime, the ability of the left to lament and/or express hope for the future was highly censored by the regime. However, as seen in the case study presented in Chapter 3, censorship may also look like citizens demanding that television shows with sexual themes be kept off of the air. While this type of censorship is different in terms of its severity, it is still altering the space for individuals to connect. For example, there may be fewer conversations about shows or even watch parties. These two examples are varied in many areas, but the result of both is the same: cultural spaces have been modified by the government.

The first hypothesis of this chapter is based on the following logic: when the government makes alterations to cultural spaces, it impacts the opportunities for individuals to connect and establish trust bonds. Consequently, a decrease in available spaces for connection would result in lower levels of interpersonal trust. This logical framework is visually represented in Figure 4.3, and it serves as the basis for the first hypothesis put forward in this chapter.

Interpersonal Trust Hypothesis: *Higher levels of cultural censorship should be associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust for non-supporters of the regime.*

4.3 Cultural Censorship and Institutional Trust in Latin America

Censorship is a costly endeavor for governments to undertake. In order to censor, governments must have the bureaucratic capabilities in place to codify what materials and ideas it is seeking to limit, the executive power to enforce those choices, and the legal

structure to uphold those decisions. Thus, we should understand that governments will not pursue this action unless there is a demand for it and a benefit the regime receives from censoring.

According to the literature and the results from Chapter 3, citizens will support and demand censorship. Censorship is usually demanded by citizens under the guise of protecting another group unable to protect themselves. This third-person effect is the idea that others are affected by the idea in a way that those making the claim are not similarly influenced. For example, rock music may be seen as causing deviant behavior among the youth and should thus be banned but does not cause this behavior in those suggesting its ban (Nuzum 2001). Individuals may believe that censorship of certain cultural expressions is necessary to prevent the spread of ideas or content that they perceive as harmful or threatening to their preferred way of life. In this case, they might trust the government to make decisions in the best interest of their society, even if it involves limiting cultural freedoms.

Understanding that citizens may want censorship, censorship may then be used as a strategic tool to reward for supporters. The government may use censorship to strategically censor some voices within the society or to garner favor among supporters. For example, in Argentina, films showing the Axis powers' position were strategically censored in order to encourage public opinion to support Argentina's neutrality during the second world war (Mizala 2022). Moreover, during the dictatorship in Chile, films were censored to preferences of the conservative Catholic faction who in turn supported the regime (Esberg 2020). Both of these examples demonstrate that the regime will censor the cultural products made by and available to citizens in a strategic fashion.

Institutional theories of trust hold that trust is endogenous, meaning that political trust is a consequence of institutions performing well (Mishler and Rose 2001). Institutions enable political involvement (Norris 1999). When citizens observe that their inputs go into the political system, are received, and are responded to, trust is strengthened in the institutions (Easton 1975). Inputs include protests, voting, and other civic pressures. We may also deduce that citizen demand for censorship is a similar input. From this we may understand that people trust institutions more when they see aggregated demands go into the political system and come out as policy. The underlying assumption is that the average citizen is able to have their preferences become demands in the system. With this logic, I pose the second hypothesis of this chapter.

Elected Institutional Trust Hypothesis: *Cultural censorship will increase Institutional Trust for supporters of the regime.*

While not necessarily the numerical majority in the population, supporters of the regime are likely to be a part of the dominant culture at the time because a member of their ideological group is in power. This political identity allows reinforcing cleavages to be shared, protected, and even preferred by the political elites. It is unlikely that cultural censorship will be targeted at this group because the ruling party came to power by the support of these individuals and thus would not have an incentive to censor the group but may be incentivized to censor on the group's behalf.

In contrast, those who are not members of the winning party are likely to have other experiences. Through not being a part of the dominant group, members of the outgroup are more likely to experience discrimination (Tajfel 1981). Censorship may be thought of as a type of discrimination because it can be a symbolic threat to group identity. Symbolic threats threaten what one group stands for and the values and beliefs

of the group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Censorship may be understood as a symbolic threat because through not being able to express all aspects of an identity, the identity may not be able to fully form. Furthermore, censorship may erode aspects of identity that have been previously able to form through individuals not being able to communicate and refine that identity. However, the group may not be aware that this threat is occurring due to the clandestine nature of censorship.

Knowing that there are differences between the two groups, it is interesting to consider the effects of cultural censorship on group membership and its relationship to institutional structures. Cultural censorship may prevent the outgroup from being able to form a strong group identity. Group behavior is dependent on the strength of the identity (Huddy 2003). When cultural censorship is occurring, it is less likely that the political opposition groups will be able to form a strong sense of political identity. In contrast, through allowing the politically dominant culture to persist, cultural censorship of some aspects of identity may help the dominant group's political identities to homogenize and solidify through group identity being regularly communicated by leadership.

For both supporters and non-supporters of the regime, cultural censorship may prevent groups from engaging in discourse and identity formation; however, with a lack of opposition discourse, the ruling party should appear to be performing well, and these perceptions may even extend beyond regime supporters to affect those who don't support the regimes as well. We should expect to see higher levels of trust in the ruling political party for the group in political power because they will have an awakened consciousness that aligns with political power and because opposition or counterculture will be censored to some extent. This should encourage feelings of trust towards the ruling political party

that will be stronger for supporters in particular though non-supporters may also witness that the ruling party is acting effectively.

Partisan Institutional Trust Hypothesis: *Across regime types, cultural censorship will increase trust in the ruling party for supporters of the regime.*

4.4 Methods

To test the theoretical predictions outlined in this chapter, survey data from Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), years 2008 to 2019, are used for the dependent variables in this study. Depending on the wave, there are 19 to 23 Latin American countries covered in dataset during this time period. The number of countries is limited due to the availability of data for the years being studied as well as the controls employed. The three dependent variables found in the models constructed for this chapter are *Interpersonal Trust*, *Elected Institutions Trust*, and *Political Party Trust*. To measure the latter two concepts, I followed Mishler and Rose's precedent for measuring institutional trust (2001). To capture this concept, respondents were asked "To what extent do you trust (the national congress or political parties)?" Respondents could choose between 1 meaning not at all to 7 meaning a lot. Those who did not know or did not answer had their observation dropped.

To measure interpersonal trust, Almond and Verba set the precedent in their General Social Survey by asking, "Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?" The exact wording posed by this canonical work is not available from LAPOP. Instead, respondents were asked "And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?" Respondents could choose 1 meaning very

trustworthy to 4 meaning untrustworthy. This measure may be understood as a generalized measure of interpersonal trust. This is because the survey question refers to people in general rather than trust directed toward specific individuals or types of people (Sullivan and Transue 1999). Thus, I believe that it is a suitable proxy measure for interpersonal trust.

The main independent variable of interest, *Cultural Censorship*, comes from the database produced by Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). Recognizing that democracy requires robust measurements, V-Dem collects information from a plethora of country experts to create their latent variables. The *Cultural Censorship* variable measuring the freedom of academic and cultural expression measures whether there is academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues. After recoding, if cultural expression is fully respected by public authorities, the variable is coded as a 0. The ordinal scale progresses up to 4 if academic and cultural expression is not respected by public authorities, meaning that there are no restrictions placed on academic freedom or cultural expression. Because this measure focuses on the relation to political issues, it is underrepresenting the amount of censorship taking place in the country by not accounting for aesthetic reasons for censorship.

As discussed, censorship is a difficult construct to measure. We may assume that any measure is going to underreport censorship that takes place in a society because self-censorship often occurs as a result of suppression from the government. However, it is also worth noting that measures of censorship are not measures of repression. Censorship is “the process whereby restrictions are imposed upon the collection, dissemination, and exchange of information, opinion, and ideas” (O’Higgins 1972). Thus, this is different

than “disappearances” or other acts of silencing the opposition through repression. While V-Dems’ measure of cultural censorship is not a perfect measure, it is adequate for the purposes of this study because it seeks to capture general levels of cultural and academic censorship within the country. Through including both academic and cultural censorship, the measure is capturing two spaces where individuals may aggregate to challenge the status quo and form identity, activities that are important to the theory of this chapter.

The individual level control variables are provided by LAPOP and include measures of *Age*, *Education*, *Gender*, and *Race*. The country level controls include *Logged GDP* (The World Bank), *Clean Election Index* (V-Dem), and *Electoral Democracy* (see appendix for coding). These country-level variables were measured annually and were coded to correspond to the same year that each survey was conducted for a given country. See the appendix for the descriptive statistics on all of the variables used in the models.

To capture the interaction variable, *Ruling Party Supporter*, individuals were asked who they voted for in the last presidential or parliamentary election. This information was turned into a variable by matching the party they voted for with the current executive of the country. If they supported the president or prime minister, they were coded as a 1, or a regime supporter. If they voted for any other party or casted a null vote, they were coded as a 0, or a regime non-supporter. This variable was coded for each wave of the survey.

In order to test the three hypotheses posed, this chapter utilizes an ordered logit model due to the ordinal nature of the dependent variables. The inclusion of country-level fixed effects aims to minimize the impact of time-invariant differences across countries,

while fixed effects for survey waves are incorporated to account for any time-specific factors. By employing an ordered logit model with country fixed effects, this study effectively analyzes ordered categorical data while considering country-level heterogeneity and controlling for unobserved factors that may influence the outcome variable. This modeling approach offers a powerful tool for examining the relationships between the explanatory variables and the ordered outcome variable, enhancing the reliability and robustness of the findings.

4.5 Results - Substantive Interpretation

1. Table 4.1: Ologit Model

	Interpersonal Trust	National Congress Trust	Political Party Trust
Cultural Censorship X Regime Supporter	-0.0565** (0.0283)	0.453*** (0.135)	0.457*** (0.147)
Cultural Censorship	0.0902 (0.0715)	0.383 (0.275)	0.348 (0.215)
Ruling Party Supporter	-0.365*** (0.0851)	2.023*** (0.423)	2.174*** (0.472)
Gender	0.185*** (0.0234)	0.0881*** (0.0158)	0.0126 (0.0147)
Race	-5.77e-05 (4.07e-05)	0.000192*** (7.35e-05)	0.000162*** (5.95e-05)
Electoral Democracy			0.322** (0.142)
Clean Election Index	0.577 (0.469)	0.181 (0.842)	0.104 (0.987)
Logged GDP	-0.278 (0.247)	0.769** (0.346)	0.915** (0.390)
Gender	0.185*** (0.0234)	0.0881*** (0.0158)	0.0126 (0.0147)
Observations	115,005	112,743	114,635


Table notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ologit Model for Two-Tailed Test. See appendix for full table. The table presented here is the subset of the table based on the full model. Model 1 tests the Interpersonal Trust Hypothesis,

Model 2 tests the Elected Institutions Trust Hypothesis, Model 3 tests the Political Party Trust Hypothesis. All models were tested across regime type.

Table 4.1 presents the results of a series of Ologit regression models. Models 1, 2, and 3 focus on the effects of *Cultural Censorship* as the main independent variable. For model 1, we see that estimated coefficients are negative and statistically significant for *Interpersonal Trust*, indicating that increased *Cultural Censorship* is associated with decreased trust in interpersonal trust across regime types thus supporting the Interpersonal Trust hypothesis.

This finding is interesting because cultural censorship is shown as decreasing interpersonal trust in regimes. Given that interpersonal trust is needed for collective action to occur, this implies that cultural censorship may prevent collective action against the regime. This would motivate the regime to censor the cultural of its citizens because the outcome benefits the regime by ensuring survival. As such, this finding contributes to the literature on regime survival and authoritarian tactics. Future studies of both autocratic and democratic regimes should not overlook the influence that cultural censorship may have on political behavior. See the following figure for a visualization of this effect. In all of the graphics representing the models, supporters of the regime are represented by a dashed grey line and non-supporters are represented by a solid black line. Furthermore, for all figures, 84% confidence intervals are used when there are two lines, which gives each line 95% confidence (For more, see: Payton, Greenstone and Schenker 2003).¹⁰

¹⁰ You should only use 84% CIs for figures where there are two predicted lines and you are trying to see if they are significantly different from one another with 95% confidence. For figures with a single line, to see if predicted probabilities change significantly over whatever is along the x-axis you should use a 95% CI.




13. Figure 4.4: Interpersonal Trust

Figure notes: For party supporters there is not a lot of movement, but not supporters begin to have their trust eroded. This has implications for democracies.

In Model 2, it is observed that the estimated coefficient for *National Congress Trust* is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that increased *Cultural Censorship* is associated with increased trust in elected institutions. This result holds across regime type. This result suggests that democracies may be inclined to censor culture to boost citizen trust of the institutions.

Further examination of these findings is provided by the following figure, which shows that cultural censorship results in an increase in the probability of an individual trusting the national legislature a lot. This result indicates that democracies may be willing to censor certain cultural expressions of citizens because it boosts citizens' trust of the institutions. Thinking of institutions as strategic actors, we understand that this finding adds to the literature by suggesting that even regimes that are founded on

principle of the freedom of expression may censor the citizens for electoral gains. This finding deserves more consideration in future studies.




14. Figure 4.5: National Congressional Trust

Figure notes: This figure shows that when the rate of cultural censorship is higher, the probability of trusting elected institutions a lot increases for ruling-party supporters.

From Model 3, we see that the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant for the interaction term. This indicates that increased Cultural Censorship is associated with increased trust in these institutions for both supporter and non-supporters across regime type. From this analysis, support is found for all three hypotheses posed in this study.

However, the interpretation of the results in Model 3 is limited to the question that is being asked: "To what extent do you trust political parties?" This question is broadly capturing trust of political parties. It is not asking about opposition trust nor ruling party

trust. What we can deduce from this question is how individuals feel towards political parties more generally, and we observe that cultural censorship boosts feelings of trust.



15. Figure 4.6: Political Party Trust

Figure notes: This figure shows that when the rate of cultural censorship is higher, the probability of trusting political parties a lot increases for ruling-party supporters.

4.5 Conclusion and Future Directions

This chapter sought to explore the behavioral consequences of cultural censorship. There are three main conclusions worth reiteration from this study. The first is that cultural censorship decreases interpersonal trust among citizens. For regimes hoping to dismantle collective action against it, censorship of the culture may prove to be a fruitful tactic. The second finding is cultural censorship is associated with an increase in trust in elected institutions. The final conclusion is that for supporters of the regime, censorship increases feeling of trust towards the political parties. These findings would suggest that within even democratic institutions, there may be incentives to censor citizens.

Through studying cultural censorship, this chapter contributes to two areas that are understudied in the literature. The first area that it contributes to is the study of censorship. Most studies in the literature on censorship study media or press censorship. While this is an important measure, it limits the analysis to autocracies. Limiting our studies in this way prevents our understanding of behavioral outcomes that may take place in all regime types. Because democracies can censor culture without arousing too much attention, it is important to understand the possible consequences. This points to the second area this chapter contributes to: strategic institutions.

This study demonstrates that not only do democracies censor, but they may receive electoral benefits from censorship. Such a finding poses an interesting consideration for future studies on strategic institutions. If cultural censorship boosts trust in both political parties and the elected institutions, it incentivizes strategic actors to censor the citizenry. Future studies should consider this finding, which suggests that cultural censorship is a tool for both democracies and autocracies to use for electoral advantages.

While the research presented stands to contribute to our collective understanding of censorship and its consequences, the limitations of this study need to be mentioned. One shortcoming of this study is the range of the survey data available. This chapter's dataset begins in 2008. In contrast, the measure of censorship extends back until 1940, and there is interesting variation to observe over this time period. Seeing how this variation affects behavior would be interesting to note and likely show a more robust picture of censorship.

In summary, this chapter stands to contribute to the literature on censorship through examining cultural censorship, which occurs in both democracies and autocracies. By

using cultural censorship as an independent variable, this study is able to determine the consequences of such an action and finds behavioral consequences that would incentivize both democracies and autocracies to censor the culture expression of citizens. However, because this chapter uses observational data, it is not able to suggest causality. Instead, this chapter shows general trends that align with the theoretical framework posed.

CHAPTER 5. UNDERSTANDING WHO WANTS CENSORSHIP – A SURVEY EXPERIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

5.1 Introduction

This chapter leverages the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 which dove into the unresolved inquiries surrounding the proponents of censorship and the targeted subjects. The framework posits that individuals are inclined to advocate for censorship when they perceive the media as potentially detrimental to others. This inclination is commonly associated with conservative ideologies and is often exhibited by individuals who refrain from personal consumption of the media. Moreover, these individuals possess the ability to effectively convey their censorship preferences to the governing authorities. By elucidating these interconnected aspects, the chapter lays the foundation for a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics underlying individual demands for censorship.

The previous chapters brought several insights into the conversation on cultural censorship that supplement the aforementioned theoretical framework. The case study on citizen support for censorship in both democratic and autocratic Brazil presented in Chapter 3 revealed that men were more likely than women to call for censorship and that those close to a perceived vulnerable population will demand that the government protects that population from content perceived as harmful. This chapter aims to build upon these findings by creating a deeper understanding of the relationship of who wants censorship through a survey experiment set in the United States. By manipulating the political identity of the individual suggesting censorship, the context and media being censored, and asking a host of demographic questions in the survey, this chapter sets out to empirically examine who wants censorship and of what.

5.2 Case Study

Thus far, this manuscript has focused primarily on censorship in states within the Americas that have experienced prolonged periods of autocratic rule. However, a central tenant of the theory is that not only does cultural censorship occur in democracies, but democratic citizens may demand censorship from their government. To test the idea that democratic citizens want their government to censor, and to obtain a more refined understanding of the type of censorship desired, this chapter conducts a survey experiment in the United States.

The United States is an appropriate choice to conduct the survey experiment because of its long history of democratic rule. Often held as a model of democratic governance, the United States provides a valuable case study for the idea that citizens socialized in a democratic setting may still demand censorship. Due to the limitations of the data collected in the previous chapters, I have not been able to study citizens who have experienced prolonged democratic rule demanding a seemingly authoritarian behavior from their government. As such, this study will contribute to our understanding of tensions that are a part of democratic governance.

The United States further proves to be an appropriate selection because there have been many enduring and evolving debates over free expression and speech. While censorship of some materials has decreased over time, there have been debates over free speech in recent years that suggest this decrease may not continue and may in fact be reversed. Newspaper headlines in the United States suggest a resurgence in demand for cultural censorship. Examples of libraries and classrooms banning an increasing number of books and movies are found throughout the United States and suggest that culture wars

and cancel culture are impacting the availability of culture to citizens, particularly minors (See Alter and Harris 2022 and Blow 2023).

Cultural censorship has a variety of forms in the United States that still leads to the same result of artistic expression being limited. Censorship of art in order to protect minors is not a recent phenomenon. For example, in 1985, Tipper Gore and Susan Baker both campaigned to have explicit lyric labelling laws put in place to protect minors from potentially harmful themes (Chastagner 1999). This is the same rationale used to justify the movie rating system used in the United States. However, censorship to protect minors is just one rationale for censorship within the United States.

While the term is still evolving, cancel culture is generally used to describe the process of an individual or artifact having public support withdrawn from it due to it being in opposition of a societally held values (Vogels et al. 2021). This means that artifacts and people are being censored by the public. Though not led by the government, this is a type of censorship because when the public withdraws support from a person or artifact it can limit the ability of that individual to express themselves and for others to express themselves in a similar fashion.¹¹ Though cancel culture is currently conducted by society, there is no reason that the rationales could not be applied to citizen demand for the government to censor.

It is not yet clear if the censorship is taking place out of a desire to protect vulnerable populations such as third-persons or to protect the status quo more broadly. This desire to protect the status quo is further influenced by the concept of culture wars first coined by sociologist James Davison Hunter to describe the competing and often

¹¹ An example of this occurred when the (formerly Dixie) Chicks effectively lost the radio play market after Natalie Maines criticized George W Bush (Snapes 2020).

conflicting views held between groups (Stanton 2021). When groups have conflicting views on cultural issues, this can lead to calls for censorship. Within the United States, this desire to support group led censorship that is then enforced by the government is a consideration that this chapter will consider. As a mass exporter of cultural products and policy, the trends and treatment of culture within the United States may assist in our understanding of cultural production and censorship around the world.

5.3 Theoretical Context and Hypotheses

This chapter relies on the theoretical framework established in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, there was a discussion about the individual characteristics of those who demand censorship, what they demand be censored, and who they are trying to protect. This chapter is further informed by the empirical findings presented in Chapter 3 and 4 and uses that to inform the following theoretical context and hypotheses.

As discussed, this manuscript operates with the assumption that political participation is costly to the individual (Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, and Rose 2011). For an individual to undertake these costs and take an issue to their government, there needs to be some kind of incentive. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that individuals will not ask the government to censor culture for purely aesthetic reasons. If the artifact of culture is simply disagreeable to the individual, they may simply choose to not consume the media. However, if the artifact of culture is threatening to that individual's way of life by its influence on another, the individual may be more compelled to do something about it including engaging in political participation targeted at cultural censorship.

Following the observations from the corpus of citizen letters, we see that Brazilian citizens were not writing to the government to request the censorship of media that they

regularly enjoyed. While the awareness of the media mentioned in the letters ranged from those who were a horrified audience member themselves to hearing about the media from another, the individuals were not writing because they wanted the government to assist them in regulating their own behavior. When citizens demanded censorship, it was not over material that they wanted the government to prevent them from enjoying because they were unable to regulate themselves, but rather they were alarmed of the material being available to others.

Within the literature on the Third Person Effect, the research suggests that the individual at risk to be negatively influenced is largely unknown to the individual who is concerned about the safety of the at-risk individual. However, the letters from citizens explored in Chapter 3 suggests that those who have at-risk individuals in their homes will be more willing to write to their government demanding censorship in order to protect them. While this desire to protect third persons in close proximity goes against the traditional understanding of the Third Person Effect, it is rational because the individual is looking to preserve the status quo with someone who matters more to them. Thus, it is logical to predict that the effect may be more noticeable with caretakers who are concerned about the media their dependents come into contact with. It is this logic from which the first hypothesis is formed.

Third-Persons Hypothesis: *Citizens are more likely to demand censorship of art perceived as harmful to third persons.*

While the logic presented here suggests that most individuals will want censorship to protect third persons from harmful materials, the nuances of the content they may demand censorship for have not yet been explored. Theoretically, there should be a distinction because not all themes are threatening to the values of ideological groups.

Returning to the literature on ideology and censorship, it is crucial to anticipate that both liberals and conservatives may express preferences for censorship, albeit targeting different aspects. Drawing from the comprehensive work of Haidt et al., it becomes evident that citizens, irrespective of their ideological leanings, commonly uphold the values of minimizing harm and promoting fairness across the moral matrix (2013). Consequently, when contemplating the specific content individuals seek to censor, it is reasonable to expect a shared inclination towards censoring violence and cultural material that propagates violent rhetoric.

In the context of ideological tendencies, Haidt et al.'s theory suggests that openness to new experiences typically aligns with a liberal ideology (2013). Consequently, it follows that those advocating for the censorship of content that deviates from their personal preferences would tend to exhibit a conservative political orientation. This relationship has been supported by past research (Byrne, Cherry, Lamberth, and Mitchell 1973; Hense and Wright 1992). However, it is important to note that this relationship warrants further investigation, as the primary focus of this manuscript revolves around citizens demanding government intervention in the form of censorship, rather than exploring the realms of private enterprise or household regulations pertaining to the control or prohibition of cultural elements.

Ideology Hypothesis: *Those who identify as conservative will be more in favor of censoring materials to protect minors than those who identify as liberal.*

To gain a better understanding of censorship, it is important to not only look at general trends of those demanding censorship but also of what is specifically being

censored. In the United States context, Cary Federman argues that Republicans are “mild defenders” of the censorship of pornography versus “radicals” are in favor of censoring hate speech (2021). Federman notes that censorship of pornographic materials has a long history in the United States that is a part of both the American culture and institutions. Indeed, philosopher Foucault writes extensively about censorship relating to sexuality spanning centuries in the West (Foucault 1978). In contrast, hate speech censorship is a relatively modern phenomenon with no clear boundaries nor tradition (Federman 2021).

From the argument set forth from Federman, it is reasonable to assume that there are some themes that society as a whole may deem as being in need of censorship to protect the values of that society. For example, aggressively violent art may go against societal standards of what is appropriate to expose children to and thus be accepted by most people in need of governmental regulation. However, values differ among ideological groups which may result in certain themes being more suspect than others to members of the group. It is this logic from which the third hypothesis is formed.

Hate Speech Hypothesis: *Those who identify as liberal will be more in favor of censoring material that is considered hate speech than conservatives.*

Art that is more pervasive poses a larger threat than art that more obscure. The art form itself changes how individuals engage with it. For example, television is an aspect of culture that streams from a station and into the home. The viewer then both listens and watches the medium and their viewership does not detract from another’s ability to watch the show. In contrast, a book purchased from a shop for an individual to consume is limited to that individual and the individual receives the message of the book through reading and analysis. Thus, artifacts of culture that are able to be spread and enjoyed by

more individuals at a time pose a larger threat to individuals seeking to censor that message.

This may be due to the fact that films are seen as able to influence the public and threaten social conservatism and traditional values (Nurik 2018). Thus, governments may be compelled by concerned citizens to censor films through a rating system which will signal to both citizens and filmmakers the preferences of the government and society and ensure that the standards and norms are abided by. Beyond films, other art that is readily available to mass audiences such as TV programs can replace traditional agencies of socialization such as churches, schools, and the family (Vaughn 1990).

Uncapturable Hypothesis: *Conservatives are more likely to demand censorship of art that is seen as uncapturable.*

In addition to the aforementioned hypotheses, there are generalization about the demographics of those demanding censorship that were largely untrue in the Brazilian case study. For example, from the literature, it is expected that women will desire censorship more than their male counterparts and yet, in the Brazil case study, we observed a higher percentage of men demanding censorship from the government. This reveals a curious departure from the literature and is worthy of further attention. Furthermore, little was known about other key demographics of interest including age, income, parenthood status, education obtainment, location, and religion and political affiliations. Thus, this chapter endeavors to create a more complete understanding of who demands censorship.

5.4 Methods and Data

In Chapter 3, the citizen letters written to the Division of Public Censorship revealed patterns in the types of media that different groups sought to censor. However,

because the analysis was based only on the preserved letters, the study was limited in scope. The analysis of the individual writers was also limited to the context in which they were writing. In order to expand upon these findings and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the issues at hand, this chapter seeks to build upon the previous research and conduct a survey experiment.

Survey experiments generally enjoy a higher level of external validity than case studies. Because I am able to randomize the treatments to minimize any order effects or biases, this method also has a high level of internal validity. In the survey, I am able to manipulate who is consuming the media, what content is in the media, and the party identity of the individual proposing the bill that would restrict the media. These manipulations allow me to test all four of my hypotheses and obtain general information about the demographics of the individuals in favor of censorship. Within the survey, I conducted six different modules to test various relationships seen the previous chapters. The following are a summary of the four modules used in this chapter. See Appendix 5 for more details.

In the Minors Module presented in the survey, the theme altered at random from sexual themes to hate speech to violence in addition to the audience of the artform. Through varying the content of the art, I am able to capture the nuances of censorship and test the Hate Speech Hypothesis. Furthermore, by varying the content and the audience of the art to include minors, this module also allowed me to see the effects of this treatment. Additionally, if able to interact the demographic variable *Parenthood*, I would also be able to see the effects of distance from the third person to the respondent of the survey.

2: Table 5.1: Full Text of Minors Module

Condition	Treatment Text
Sexual Themes	Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should restrict art (music, films, etc) if it contains sexual themes.
Hate Speech	Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should restrict art (music, films, etc) if it contains hate speech.
Violence	Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should restrict art (music, films, etc) if it contains violence.
Minor/Sexual Themes	Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should protect minors and restrict art (music, films, etc) if it contains sexual themes.
Minor/Violence	Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should protect minors and restrict art (music, films, etc) if it contains violence.
Minor/Hate Speech	Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should protect minors and restrict art (music, films, etc) if it contains hate speech.

Table notes: Each respondent received at random one of the treatments in the table. This module was intended to test the influence of theme being censorship and the audience on attitudes towards censorship. Individuals were able to respond on a scale from 1 meaning strongly agree to 5 meaning strongly disagree.

The full text of the treatment exploring individuals' attitudes towards censorship is presented in Table 5.2. The treatment examines the responses of individuals when they are informed that an American, American woman, or American child is the viewer of a television show. This treatment builds upon the findings from Chapter 3, which revealed that adult males were the primary group advocating for the banning of television shows perceived as harmful to women and children.

The experiment presents at random an American, woman, and child to the respondent. In order to suggest that the individual does indeed consume the media, the respondent is primed with the sentence “suppose a recent study found that the average

American/American woman/American child watches around 3 hours of television a day.”

As such, the Third Person Module aims to assess the Third Persons, Ideology, and Uncapturable Hypotheses. By randomizing the viewer in the treatment, I can observe how individuals perceive third persons and minors. By including a measure of ideology, I can see how individuals on a 5-point scale react to the treatments. Furthermore, by focusing on television as the medium, I emphasize a less capturable form of media.

3. Table 5.2: Full Text of Third Persons Module

Condition	Treatment Text
Control	Suppose a recent study found that the average American watches around 3 hours of television a day. Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should ensure that television shows do not have harmful themes in them.
Women Treatment	Suppose a recent study found that the average American woman watches around 3 hours of television a day. Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should ensure that television shows do not have harmful themes in them.
Child Treatment	Suppose a recent study found that the average American child watches around 3 hours of television a day. Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should ensure that television shows do not have harmful themes in them.

Table notes: Each respondent received at random one of the treatments in the table. This module was intended to test whether or not individuals felt more inclined to censor materials when they knew it was consumed by third persons. Individuals were able to respond on a scale from 1 meaning strongly agree to 5 meaning strongly disagree.

The Capturability Module is designed to look deeper into the effects of capturability of the artform and test the Uncapturable Hypothesis. Through asking about books being removed from libraries or bookstores, I can compare the element of art being readily available to anyone or having a barrier such as economics limiting the audience.

4. Table 5.3: Full Text of Capturability Module

Condition	Treatment Text
Libraries	Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: Books containing harmful themes should be removed from libraries.
Bookstores	Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: Books containing harmful themes should be removed from bookstores.

Table notes: Each respondent received at random one of the treatments in the table. This module was intended to test the influence of media capturability on attitudes towards censorship. Individuals were able to respond on a scale from 1 meaning strongly agree to 5 meaning strongly disagree.

In the Distance to Media Module, both the partisanship of the representative and the genre of music is alternated at random. This experiment provides a different perspective on censorship because it names the artform specifically and the artform was a less capturable form of art. Through leveraging the artform of music, I was able to see how the capturability of art mattered to the individuals. However, the music genre in question alternated between country and rap music. As discussed previously, rap music is generally the object of censorship even when the same lyrics are presented as a country song. Because there is an established strong connection between ideology and music preference, I am able to predict that conservatives would be more likely to listen to country music and liberals would more likely listen to rap (Friedersdorf 2013; Johnson 2015; McCoy 2017). Thus, with this module, I am able to see whether individuals who consume the media are calling for censorship of it.

5. Table 5.4: Full Text of Distance to Media Module

Condition	Treatment Text
Republican/Country	A Republican representative proposed a bill that would restrict the broadcasting of offensive country music lyrics in public. Do you support this bill?

Republican/Rap	A Republican representative proposed a bill that would restrict the broadcasting of offensive rap lyrics in public. Do you support this bill?
Democratic/Rap	A Democratic representative proposed a bill that would restrict the broadcasting of offensive rap lyrics in public. Do you support this bill?
Democratic/Country	A Democratic representative proposed a bill that would restrict the broadcasting of offensive country music lyrics in public. Do you support this bill?

Table notes: Each respondent received at random one of the treatments in the table. This module was intended to test the influence of the partisan of the representative and the theme of censorship. Individuals could respond that they either supported or did not support the bill.

The survey is designed to collect key demographic variables that are necessary for understanding how different segments of the population demand censorship. Through including questions regarding age, gender, income, parenthood status, education, location, religion, ideology, and music preferences, this survey is able to gather information that was often missing from the Brazilian corpus of letters. Additionally, the survey includes variables to allow me to create indexes for social and institutional trust and tolerance. These variables are of particular interest because though the survey research presented in the previous chapter had these measures, I was not able to make a causal claim empirically.

Ideology is coded from 1 indicating that the individual is very conservative to 5 meaning that the individual identifies as very liberal. Within the vignettes of this survey, it is assumed that those who are conservative will more likely identify with the Republican treatment and those who are more liberal will identify with the Democrat treatment. This assumption is based on the ideological distribution and the polarized two-party system in the United States (Pew Research Center 2014). *Gender* is coded as 1 for

male, 2 for female, and 3 for non-binary or third-gender. *Income*, *Education*, and *Age*, are all coded in intervals from smallest to largest.

5.5 Descriptive Statistics

The data for this dissertation was collected using a snowball sampling method. The online survey was open to individuals who were 18 years of age or older from May 4th until May 18th, 2023. This survey was shared through social media (Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook) as well as the political science department newsletter at a large research university in the south. On social media, individuals were invited to take the survey with the following message, “If you are 18 years or older, please consider participating in this survey to support my research on citizen support and cultural censorship. Full details regarding the survey are provided on the consent page.” Several individuals retweeted and shared this survey on their personal pages.


Through this snowball sampling approach, a total of 168 individuals completed the survey. It is important to note that due to the limited number of participants, the generalizability of the findings is restricted. Furthermore, due to the small sample size, I was unable to interact and control for all of the variables which does not allow me to fully test my hypotheses posed at the start of the chapter. Although the results should be interpreted cautiously due to the limited sample size and lack of national representativeness, they contribute valuable insights to the discourse on censorship that shall be discussed in this section. In this section, I will provide a detailed description of the sample, highlight any disparities between the sample and the overall population of the United States, and discuss how these differences may impact the results based on the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

The majority of respondents in this survey identified as female, comprising 64% of the total sample. This indicates an overrepresentation of women in the sample. While previous studies have indicated that women tend to be more supportive of censorship efforts, the letters addressed to the DCDP in Chapter 3 imply that men may also express a desire for censorship. Additionally, 68% of the respondents reported not having children, which exceeds the national average. However, it is worth noting that this difference in parental status may impact the ability to examine the third-person effect, as Chapter 3 suggests that individuals with children in their households were often the most concerned.

In addition, it is important to note that 29% of the respondents in the survey hold a bachelor's degree, while a significant majority (60%) possess a master's degree or higher. Furthermore, the majority of respondents reported an income level exceeding \$50,000, and they predominantly reside in urban areas.

Visually represented in Figure 5.1, when participants were asked about their political leanings, the majority of respondents identified themselves as either slightly


liberal (20%) or very liberal (54%). Consequently, the sample appears to be skewed towards liberal ideologies, indicating an underrepresentation of conservatives.



16: Figure 5.1: How would you describe your political leanings?


Figure notes: This figure represents the self-described political leaning of the 168 respondents who took this survey May of 2023. This figure shows that those with a liberal political leaning were overrepresented in the sample.

To gain a general sense of the overall attitudes towards censorship from the respondents, questions were posed that asked what types of scenes and themes the individual would be likely to restrict. When respondents were given specific examples of scenes, 33% of respondents marked one or more of the examples as being in need of regulation and not permitted by law on a primetime television program. After being provided with an example, the respondents were then asked about the general themes they would like to see regulated and not permitted by law. These themes matched the scenes. This time, 59% of respondents answered that they would like censorship of at least one of the themes.



17. Figure 5.2: Censorship of Television Themes

Figure notes: This figure presents the results from the question “which of the following scenarios do you think should be regulated and not permitted by law on a primetime television program? Select all that apply.” While many of the respondents stated that they did not support the idea of cultural censorship, many selected a scenario that they believed should not appear on primetime television.




18. Figure 5.3: Government Enforcement

Figure notes: This figure presents the main themes that respondents believed the government should regulate in artistic production. The question asked following a question about primetime television was “which of the following themes do you believe the government should enforce censorship of? (Select all that apply).” These themes directly reflected the scenarios presented in the question prior.

At this point in the survey, the respondents were not presented with a definition of cultural censorship. Instead, they were asked about scenes and themes being “regulated” and “not permitted by law.” While these words may have cued individuals that censorship was occurring, it was not overt. When respondents were given the text “cultural censorship refers to the restriction or suppression of cultural materials, including literature, art, music, films, and other forms of expression, by governments” and were then asked to report whether or not they supported the idea of cultural censorship, only 5% of the respondents answered yes.


One explanation of why there is such a difference among the responses is that there may be a desire to not support censorship. Thus, future research should consider wording very carefully.



19. Figure 5.4: Support for Cultural Censorship

Figure notes: This figure presents the results of the question, “do you support the idea of cultural censorship?” Though respondents previously answered questions that asked about censorship affirmatively, the vast majority of respondents answered negatively to this question. This suggests that there may be a social desirability to oppose censorship.


After being provided with a definition of cultural censorship, respondents were asked when they believed cultural censorship was appropriate and 72% of respondents answered that some scenarios should be censored by the government. Most of those in favor of censorship marked that cultural censorship was appropriate when it promotes violence or hate speech. This is seen in Figure 5.5.



20. Figure 5.5: Censoring Themes

Figure notes: This figure presents the results of the question “Under what circumstances do you believe cultural censorship is appropriate? (Select all that apply).” Even though 95% responded that they do not support cultural censorship, 72% marked that there are some circumstances under which cultural censorship is appropriate.

When determining which cultural artifacts should be the object of censorship, most did not mark an artform, but among those who did respond to the question, television was the main object of censorship. Surprisingly, very few individuals marked that music should be the object of censorship.



21. Figure 5.6: Referent Object of Censorship

Figure notes: This figure presents the results of the question “which of the following do you believe should be subject to censorship? (Select all that apply).” Though most respondents did not select an artform, of those who did, the majority chose artforms that are multimodal.

5.6 Results and Limitations

In this section, a comprehensive analysis of four modules conducted in the survey experiment are presented. Due to the small sample size, a limitation of this analysis is that I could not perform interactions on the models that would have been of theoretical interest. These limitations will be discussed later in the chapter.

Table 5.5 displays the findings from Minors Module of the survey. Noteworthy results are observed for the *Third Persons* variable in both the Sex and Hate Speech Treatment. This means that those who identify as more conservative are more likely to agree that governments need to act to protect minors and that liberals are more likely to support censorship of sexual themes and hate speech. Thus, I find support for the Third Persons, Minors, and Hate Speech hypotheses.

Within the survey, *Third Persons* served as a treatment and was coded as either 0 or 1, depending on whether the question addressed the restriction of art in general (coded

as 0) or the restriction of art to protect minors (coded as 1). The analysis reveals that individuals were more likely to agree with censorship efforts aimed at protecting minors from sexual themes and hate speech.

6. Table 5.5: Minors Module Results

	Citizens Treatment	Minors Treatment	Violence Treatment	Sex Treatment	Hate Speech Treatment	Full Model
Theme Treatment	-0.153 (0.279)	0.321 (0.299)				-.00433 (0.193)
Third Persons			0.359 (0.593)	2.113*** (0.717)	1.375** (0.616)	0.994*** (0.320)
Ideology	-0.0362 (0.189)	-0.814*** (0.225)	-0.487* (0.282)	-0.786*** (0.255)	-0.0678 (0.260)	-0.341** (0.136)
Gender	-0.272 (0.540)	0.291 (0.453)	0.108 (0.598)	-0.866 (0.670)	1.113* (0.630)	0.0730 (0.334)
Education	0.122 (0.202)	-0.157 (0.221)	0.311 (0.317)	-0.194 (0.251)	-0.169 (0.271)	0.0363 (0.139)
Age	0.156 (0.136)	-0.0659 (0.163)	-0.0520 (0.190)	0.0745 (0.176)	-0.0342 (0.214)	0.0578 (0.0995)
Income	0.00879 (0.196)	-0.106 (0.217)	0.453 (0.294)	-0.265 (0.285)	-0.405 (0.247)	-0.0448 (0.140)
Cut 1	0.646 (1.719)	-4.962*** (1.830)	0.383 (2.132)	-4.887** (2.383)	-0.961 (2.154)	-0.921 (1.141)
Cut 2	1.337 (1.725)	-4.088** (1.805)	1.083 (2.148)	-4.048* (2.343)	0.217 (2.162)	-0.169 (1.141)
Cut 3	1.708 (1.731)	-3.962** (1.802)	1.376 (2.153)	-3.733 (2.326)	0.430 (2.167)	0.0595 (1.142)
Cut 4	2.780 (1.758)	-0.980 (1.734)	2.833 (2.164)	-1.202 (2.246)	3.764 (2.298)	2.042* (1.157)
Observations	71	73	47	48	49	144

Table note: Results presented for an Ologit model with standard errors in parentheses. The question asked was “Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should protect minors and restrict art/restrict art (music, films, etc) if it contains hate speech/violence/sexual themes.” Strong Agree = 5 Strongly Disagree =1. Ideology is coded 1 = very conservative to 5 = very liberal. Theme Treatment Violence = 0, Sex= 1, Hate Speech = 2. Third-Persons citizens = 0 and minors =1.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Furthermore, *Ideology* is significant in the Minors Treatment. This finding suggests that conservatives are more inclined to support censorship efforts compared to their liberal counterparts when it comes to protecting minors. By identifying the

significance of *Ideology* in the context of the Minors Treatment, this study provides valuable insights into the differing perspectives of conservatives and liberals on censorship, particularly concerning the safeguarding of minors. Future research can further explore the nuances of these ideological differences and investigate the underlying factors that contribute to varying attitudes towards censorship efforts.

Table 5.6 presents the results of the Third Persons Module. In this module, *Ideology* is significant for both the *American Treatment* and *Child Treatment*. This means that the more conservative an individual identifies as the more likely they agree with the idea that the government should monitor television shows. These treatments were designed to test the extent to which the results from Brazil were transferrable. In Chapter 3, the letters from Brazil suggested that individuals would likely demand censorship of television that was harmful to children, women, or society. Because these letters were written by men, concern for women and children was akin to concern for third persons. The significance of the *Child Treatment* suggests support the Third Persons Hypothesis.

Interestingly, the *Woman Treatment* is not significant. This may be due to the fact that women were overly represented in the survey and thus they were not a third person. Due to the small sample size, I was unable to interact these terms. However, this suggests an interesting and possibly fruitful line of further inquiry.

7. Table 5.6: Third Persons Module Results

	American Treatment	Woman Treatment	Child Treatment	Full Model
Treatment				-0.342* (0.200)
Ideology	0.763*** (0.281)	0.475* (0.249)	0.595** (0.280)	0.453*** (0.136)
Gender	-1.248 (0.767)	-1.174* (0.665)	0.0851 (0.521)	-0.465 (0.342)
Education	-0.406	0.253	0.368	0.0975

	(0.317)	(0.245)	(0.229)	(0.139)
Age	-0.106	0.140	0.0873	0.0675
	(0.200)	(0.192)	(0.180)	(0.103)
Income	0.754**	-0.152	0.175	1.160
	(0.334)	(0.241)	(0.274)	(1.142)
Cut 1	-0.845	-1.913	2.698	-1.180
	(2.345)	(1.858)	(2.230)	(0.200)
Cut 2	-0.541	-1.318	4.217*	0.390
	(2.331)	(1.823)	(2.245)	(1.128)
Cut 3	0.967	-0.458	4.849**	0.922
	(2.335)	(1.789)	(2.268)	(1.131)
Cut 4		0.828	5.526**	1.941*
		(1.784)	(2.304)	(1.131)
Observations	49	49	47	145

Table note: Results presented for an Ologit model with standard errors in parentheses. The question asked was “Suppose a recent study found that the average American/woman/child watches around 3 hours of television a day. Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should ensure that television shows do not have harmful themes in them.” Strongly Agree = 1 Strongly Disagree =5. Ideology is coded 1 = very conservative to 5 = very liberal. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5.7 presents the findings from the Capturability Module of the survey which examined respondents' perspectives on whether books with harmful themes should be removed from either bookstores which are less accessible to the average person or libraries which are more accessible to the average person.

In this module, which randomized the two treatments, the significance of *Ideology* was observed specifically in the Library Treatment. The results indicate that individuals who identify as more conservative are more inclined to agree with the notion of removing books with harmful themes from libraries compared to their liberal counterparts. The significance of the Library Treatment also supports the Uncapturable Hypothesis.

Notably, this outcome aligns with the findings from Module 1 (see Appendix 5), which also explored attitudes towards books in libraries. This suggests a consistent

pattern where conservative individuals express a greater inclination towards the removal of books, particularly in the context of libraries.

The parallel results across these modules add depth to our understanding of how ideological beliefs shape attitudes towards book censorship, specifically within the library setting. These findings prompt further exploration into the underlying factors that contribute to these ideological differences and highlight the importance of considering contextual factors when examining censorship attitudes related to books.

8. Table 5.7: Capturability Module Results

	Bookstores Treatment	Libraries Treatment	Full Model
Treatment			-0.607 (0.375)
Ideology	0.253 (0.245)	0.537** (0.230)	0.416*** (0.159)
Gender	-0.889 (0.696)	-0.507 (0.562)	-0.538 (0.411)
Education	0.0136 (0.260)	0.179 (0.207)	0.0975 (0.159)
Age	0.405** (0.199)	-0.0427 (0.169)	0.175 (0.125)
Income	0.0663 (0.270)	-0.137 (0.225)	-0.0899 (0.165)
Cut 1	-2.167 (2.101)	-1.557 (1.784)	-2.339* (1.365)
Cut 2	-1.193 (2.030)	-1.053 (1.765)	-1.579 (1.323)
Cut 3	0.382 (2.006)	-0.382 (1.760)	-0.861 (1.307)
Cut 4		0.924 (1.764)	0.503 (1.299)
Observations	73	71	144

Table note: Results presented for an Ologit model with standard errors in parentheses. The question asked was “Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: Books containing harmful themes should be removed from libraries/bookstore.” Strong Agree = 1 Strongly Disagree =5. Ideology is coded 1 = very conservative to 5 = very liberal.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5.8 displays the findings from the Distance to Media Module of the survey,

which examined the effects of randomly varying the party affiliation of the representative proposing a bill to restrict either rap or country music.

Within this module, the significance of *Ideology* is observed primarily in the Republican and rap treatments. The results indicate that individuals with liberal inclinations are less inclined to support a bill proposed by a Republican or a bill aiming to restrict rap music. Due to the assumption posed earlier in this chapter, it also suggests that individuals are more inclined to censor music that they themselves do not enjoy. However, because rap and country music may carry their own stereotypes, future studies should consider a pop music control. Regardless, the results suggest that ideology plays a crucial role in shaping attitudes towards these specific policy measures.

The outcomes of this module provide valuable insights into the relationship between ideology, political affiliation, and support for music-related legislative restrictions. These findings contribute to our understanding of the nuanced factors that influence public opinion in this context.

9. Table 5.8: Distance to Media Module Results

	Democratic Treatment	Republican Treatment	Rap Treatment	Country Treatment
Theme Treatment	1.083 (0.993)	-0.545 (1.209)		
Party Treatment			0.714 (1.005)	-0.103 (1.083)
Ideology	0.541 (0.379)	0.838** (0.353)	0.998*** (0.336)	-0.0305 (0.476)
Gender	-1.388 (1.064)	-0.119 (1.315)	-0.782 (1.032)	-0.192 (1.136)
Education	0.147 (0.369)	-1.084 (0.924)	-0.644 (0.529)	0.520 (0.448)
Age	-0.117 (0.268)	-0.171 (0.373)	-0.154 (0.269)	0.198 (0.296)
Income	-0.189 (0.402)	0.884 (0.782)	0.104 (0.454)	0.386 (0.500)
Cut 1	-2.736	-3.383	-3.189	1.333

	(3.278)	(4.247)	(3.731)	(3.759)
Observations	66	62	69	59

Table note: Results presented for an Ologit model with standard errors in parentheses. The question asked was “A Republican/Democratic representative proposed a bill that would restrict the broadcasting of offensive rap/country music lyrics in public. Do you support this bill?” Yes = 1 No =2. Theme Treatment refers to whether the individual received the Rap Treatment (0) or the Country Treatment (1) and Party Treatment refers to whether the individual received the Democratic treatment (0) or the Republican treatment (1). Ideology is coded 1 = very conservative to 5 = very liberal. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

While it can be argued that individuals are merely responding to the partisan cues, the results are likely not entirely due to elite cues. This is because Module 3 (see Appendix 5) showed null results when the artform was vague, but the party of the representative was controlled. The question did not specify the object or theme of censorship but focused on a bill proposed by a Republican representative, Democratic representative, or representative aiming to restrict the production of art. In that particular case, the analysis reveals that *Ideology* was not found to be a significant factor. This indicates that individuals' ideological beliefs did not have a notable influence on their responses to this vague censorship scenario.

There are several limitations to this study worth mentioning. The first is the small sample size. Having a small sample size that was over representative of females and highly educated individuals did not allow for a complete picture of who wants censorship. Additionally, due to the small sample, I was unable to interact key variables of theoretical interest. For example, *Parenthood* and *Music* were two variables that were unable to be both added to the models and interacted with the treatments. Interacting the *Parenthood* and with the Third Person Treatments would have allowed me to test the distance between the third person and the individual requesting censorship. Additionally,

interacting *Music* with the Rap and Country Treatments would have allowed me to test the consumers of the art versus those with concern for the theme. Moreover, I was unable to interact *Ideology* which was a significant variable with some of the treatments to further see the extent of its effects. In future studies, these relationships would be something to consider.

Even in this experimental research design, it is difficult to determine how much state propaganda is influencing the choice of the individual to support or not support censorship. While there is an experimental question randomizing the party identity of the representative proposing a bill, the environment is not controlled. This means that the individual could have just been exposed to something or someone who made their own feelings of identity and group membership more or less salient. Additionally, the modules themselves were not randomized. This means that individuals may have learned as they were taking the survey.

5.7 Conclusion

Drawing from the insights gained in Chapter 3, this chapter aimed to delve deeper into the causal pathways that lead to censorship. Despite the limitations imposed by the sample size, the survey experiment yielded valuable findings and highlights a promising direction for future research.

A significant takeaway from this study is the influence of ideology on attitudes towards censorship. It was observed that individuals with a more liberal orientation tend to oppose censorship initiatives more than their conservative counterparts. This finding underscores the role of ideological beliefs in shaping perspectives on censorship.

By uncovering this relationship, the study contributes to our understanding of the factors that contribute to differing viewpoints on censorship. However, given the scope and constraints of this research, there is ample room for further investigation in this area. Future studies could explore additional variables and employ larger sample sizes to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics surrounding censorship attitudes.

In conclusion, this chapter's findings shed light on the impact of ideology on attitudes towards censorship, emphasizing the need for continued exploration in this field. This research sets the stage for future investigations that can build upon these insights and further enhance our understanding of the multifaceted nature of censorship and its underlying determinants.

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

Throughout this dissertation, the question of why regimes may censor underscored the research. Analyzing cultural censorship, a type of suppression that is theoretically distinct from news and social media censorship, allowed for a robust study in both democratic and autocratic regimes. While the theories of State Critique and Collection Action Potential were extended from the work on news and social media censorship to answer why regimes may censor aspects of culture, the true contribution of this dissertation is the expansion and development of Citizen Demand Theory informed by Esberg's work on censorship as a reward and the Third-Person Effect. The work of this dissertation suggests that regimes may censor culture as a strategic choice in both democratic and autocratic settings because their citizens demand it. Thus, the question of why regimes may censor was best answered by carefully examining why citizens demand censorship and analyzing the attitudes of citizens towards institutions and each other in censored societies. These were key pieces in the puzzle of cultural censorship.

Each chapter of this dissertation sought to provide insight into the complex relationship between citizens and institutions. Employing both qualitative and quantitative methods, the topic of citizen demanded censorship critically examined. Chapter 1 presented an historic case study of an authoritarian regimes censoring a politicized music movement using archived interviews and song lyrics. Through demonstrating how the existing theories on news and social media censorship could be extended to culture, this chapter written on Chile's Nueva Cancion contextualized the research and familiarize the reader with a qualitative case study of censorship as a repression tactic.

Central to the theory of this dissertation is that cultural censorship is a fruitful area of study because it is present in both autocratic and democratic regimes. Thus, Chapter 3 again presents a qualitative study, but through analyzing citizen letters written in protest to the Brazilian government from 1968 to 1988, shows both autocratic and democratic citizens may demand censorship of their government to protect values and persons dear to the authors. This expanded the research presented on Chile by further developing the theory that governments censor because citizens want institutions to exercise that power.

With the assumption that citizens may demand censorship, Chapter 4 engages in a modern quantitative regional study to see the effects of censorship in citizen attitudes towards institutions and each other. While the data was observational, the results are consistent with the theory; when levels of cultural censorship are higher, trust in institutions increases. This relationship may be due to institutions carrying out the demands of citizens which may include censorship or from rewarding their supporters.

Informed by the work on Brazil, the final study of this dissertation leverages a survey experiment conducted in the United States. The choice to conduct this experiment is based on two rationales. The first is that because the United States is largely considered a stable democracy and democratic since its inception, it provides a well-suited case study to demonstrate that even within countries with a robust democratic tradition, there is a desire for cultural suppression. The second reason for this case study is that there is growing attention to the issue of cultural censorship in the United States and little remains known about who desires such actions from the government. However, from the quantitative study in Chapter 5, it appears that those with a conservative ideology are more likely to support efforts to censor than their liberal counterparts. There is some

evidence that calls for censorship are driven by a desire to protect values and minors from alternative influences that the parents alone are unable to control. Additionally, liberals are more likely to demand censorship when the content features hateful language.

The research conducted in this dissertation opens up several promising avenues for future investigation. One significant direction pertains to examining whether governments respond to citizen pressures for cultural censorship. As discussed in Chapter 2, three theories shed light on the motivations behind state censorship. Further exploration is needed to understand how these theories operate in both democratic and autocratic contexts. The question of whether states are primarily driven by citizen demands for censorship, fear of citizen revolt, or the anticipation of critical citizen reactions to state actions remains an open inquiry. While this dissertation provides insights into the censorship preferences of citizens and the groups demanding it, the focus now shifts to understanding when governments act upon those demands. This is the part of the research question this dissertation did not answer.

Overall, this research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of censorship dynamics and sets the stage for future investigations that delve deeper into the complexities of citizen-state interactions in the context of cultural censorship. The findings of this dissertation indicate that every regime has an incentive to engage in censorship, which raises concerns for artists and their creative work. While culture has proven its resilience and ability to endure even in such circumstances, citizens should consider the society they are building when asking governments to censor or protect the works, and sometimes even the lives, of artists.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Obs.	Means	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Interpersonal Trust	129,557	2.21	0.92	1	4
Political Party Trust	125,244	3.02	1.76	1	7
Parliamentary Trust	126,731	3.62	1.75	1	7
Cultural Censorship	122,228	3.08	0.60	0.4	3.9
Age	131,876	39	15	16	101
Gender	132,270	1.5	0.49	1	2
Race	127,516	168	613	1	2713
Clean Elections	122,228	0.71	0.20	0.2	0.98
Logged GDP	122,228	11.09	1.66	8.01	16.88
Electoral Democracy	122,228	0.85	0.36	0	1
Regime Supporter	132,329	0.14	0.35	0	1

APPENDIX 2. Electoral Democracy

Electoral Democracy = 0	Electoral Democracy = 1
Bolivia (2019)	Argentina (2008-2019)
Haiti (2008-2017)	Bolivia (2008-2017)
Honduras (2008-2019)	Brazil (2008-2019)
Nicaragua (2008-2010, 2014-2019)	Chile (2008-2019)
Venezuela (2008-2016)	Colombia (2008-2018)
	Dominican Republic (2008-2019)
	Ecuador (2008-2019)
	El Salvador (2008-2018)
	Guatemala (2008-2019)
	Guyana (2008-2016)
	Jamaica (2008-2019)
	Nicaragua (2012)
	Panama (2008-2018)
	Paraguay (2008-2019)
	Peru (2008-2019)
	Trinidad and Tobago (2010-2019)
	Uruguay (2008-2019)

APPENDIX 3. Table

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Interpersonal Trust	Trust Parliament	Trust Political Party
Cultural Censorship	0.0943 (0.0770)	0.429 (0.271)	0.348 (0.215)
Ruling Party Supporter	-0.366*** (0.0856)	2.017*** (0.424)	2.174*** (0.472)
Cultural Censorship X Ruling Party Supporter	-0.0567** (0.0285)	0.452*** (0.136)	0.457*** (0.147)
Age	-0.00689*** (0.00168)	-0.000823 (0.00165)	-0.00139 (0.00197)
Gender	0.185*** (0.0234)	0.0879*** (0.0157)	0.0126 (0.0147)
Race	-5.76e-05 (4.07e-05)	0.000192*** (7.38e-05)	0.000162*** (5.95e-05)
Electoral Democracy	0.0400 (0.0681)	0.463*** (0.149)	0.322** (0.142)
Clean Election Index	0.587 (0.472)	0.292 (0.782)	0.104 (0.987)
Logged GDP	-0.270 (0.251)	0.853*** (0.322)	0.915** (0.390)
2016	-0.240*** (0.0713)	0.443** (0.182)	0.180 (0.142)
2014	-0.289*** (0.0743)	0.180 (0.169)	0.208 (0.134)
2012	-0.396*** (0.0924)	0.546*** (0.178)	0.609*** (0.165)
2010	-0.344*** (0.104)	0.868*** (0.209)	0.865*** (0.223)
2008	-0.289** (0.142)	0.663*** (0.244)	0.848*** (0.282)
Guatemala	-0.881 (0.782)	1.884* (0.993)	2.511** (1.229)
El Salvador	-1.353 (1.016)	2.953** (1.295)	3.544** (1.598)
Honduras	-1.151 (1.113)	3.159** (1.405)	3.764** (1.804)
Nicaragua	-1.278 (1.220)	3.393** (1.526)	3.851** (1.930)
Costa Rica	-1.567* (0.827)	2.659** (1.082)	3.275*** (1.266)
Panama	-1.224 (0.862)	2.488** (1.119)	3.451*** (1.331)
Colombia	-0.702** (0.329)	0.676 (0.417)	1.007* (0.521)
Ecuador	-0.715 (0.664)	1.284 (0.843)	1.888* (1.010)
Bolivia	-0.931 (0.992)	3.353*** (1.285)	3.421** (1.519)
Peru	-0.0710 (0.475)	0.492 (0.603)	1.433** (0.726)

Paraguay	-1.445 (0.922)	2.145* (1.186)	2.915** (1.471)
Chile	-0.588 (0.400)	1.534*** (0.527)	1.985*** (0.574)
Uruguay	-1.341* (0.807)	3.272*** (1.064)	3.624*** (1.227)
Brazil	0.236 (0.198)	-1.289*** (0.251)	-0.893*** (0.333)
Venezuela	-0.417 (0.314)	0.515 (0.381)	0.954* (0.493)
Argentina	-0.216 (0.230)	0.219 (0.317)	0.779** (0.336)
Guyana	-1.858 (1.426)	4.639** (1.818)	5.641** (2.200)
Cut 1	-5.221 (3.589)	9.879** (4.530)	11.63** (5.647)
Cut 2	-3.460 (3.585)	10.55** (4.532)	12.28** (5.646)
Cut 3	-1.731 (3.586)	11.29** (4.534)	13.03** (5.644)
Cut 4		12.16*** (4.533)	13.94** (5.641)
Cut 5		13.15*** (4.538)	14.97*** (5.646)
Cut 6		14.12*** (4.555)	15.90*** (5.655)
Observations	115,005	112,743	114,635

Ologit Model

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Ologit Model for Two-Tailed Test.

APPENDIX 4. Censorship Survey Questionnaire Text

Demographic Information

Age: How old are you?

- a. Under 18
 - b. 18-22
 - c. 23-30
 - d. 31-40
 - e. 41-50
 - f. 51-60
 - g. 61-70
 - h. 70 and older
2. Gender: What best describes your gender?
 - a. Male
 - b. Female
 - c. Non-binary/third gender
 - d. I prefer not to say
 3. Location: What best describes where you live?
 - a. a city
 - b. on the outskirts or surroundings of a city
 - c. In a town near a rural area
 - d. rural area
 - e. I prefer not to say
 4. Parenthood status: At the moment do you have dependents in the following age groups?
 - a. 0-5 years old
 - b. 6-10
 - c. 11-13
 - d. 14-18
 - e. 18 and older
 - f. No dependents
 5. Ethnicity: What is your ethnic identity?
 - a. White
 - b. Hispanic/Latino
 - c. Black/African American
 - d. Native American/American Indian
 - e. Asian/Pacific Islander
 - f. Other (with entry field)
 - g. I prefer not to say
 6. Education: What is your highest level of education?
 - a. Some high school
 - b. High school degree or equivalent
 - c. Trade School
 - d. Bachelor's degree
 - e. Master's degree
 - f. Doctorate
 - g. Other

7. Income: What best describes your current household income level?
 - a. Less than \$25,000
 - b. \$25,000 - \$50,000
 - c. \$50,000 - \$100,000
 - d. \$100,000 - \$200,000
 - e. More than \$200,000
 - f. I prefer not to say
8. Religion Affiliation: What is your current religious affiliation?
 - a. Protestant (ex. Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian)
 - b. Roman Catholic
 - c. Mormon
 - d. Orthodox
 - e. Jewish
 - f. Muslim
 - g. Buddhist
 - h. Hindu
 - i. Atheist
 - j. Agnostic
 - k. Other (with a blank entry field for the participant to self-identify)
 - l. I prefer not to say
9. What type of music do you enjoy listening to? (Rank the following genres from your most enjoyed genre to your least)
 - a. Country
 - b. Christian/Gospel
 - c. Classical
 - d. Folk
 - e. Indie
 - f. Jazz
 - g. Pop
 - h. Showtunes/Soundtrack
 - i. R&B
 - j. Rap
 - k. Rock
 - l. Other Please Specify

Dependent Variables

10. Social Trust Index: Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?
 - a. Most are trustworthy
 - b. Can't be too careful
 - c. Don't know
11. Social Trust Index: Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?
 - a. Try to be fair
 - b. Would take advantage
 - c. Don't know

12. Social Trust Index: Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?
 - a. Try to be helpful
 - b. Look out for themselves
13. Institutional Trust: To what extent do you trust Congress?
 - a. 1=Not at all to 7=A lot
14. Institutional Trust: To what extent do you trust the President?
 - a. 1=Not at all to 7=A lot
15. Institutional Trust: To what extent do you trust the Democrats?
 - a. 1=Not at all to 7=A lot
16. Institutional Trust: To what extent do you trust the Republican?
 - a. 1=Not at all to 7=A lot
17. Institutional Trust: To what extent do you trust mass media?
 - a. 1=Not at all to 7=A lot
18. Tolerance: There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion . . .
 - a. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your city/town/community) against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not?
Yes, allowed to speak
Not allowed
 - b. If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?
Remove
Not remove
19. Tolerance: Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior.
 - a. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior, should he be allowed to speak, or not?
Yes, allowed to speak
Not allowed
 - b. If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote which said Blacks are inferior should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?
Remove
Not remove
20. Tolerance: Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist.
 - a. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?
Yes, allowed to speak
Not allowed
 - b. Suppose he wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?
Remove

Not remove

21. Tolerance: Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country.
- a. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak, or not?
Yes, allowed to speak
Not allowed
 - b. Suppose he wrote a book advocating doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. Somebody in your community suggests that the book be removed from the public library. Would you favor removing it, or not?
Remove
Not remove
22. Tolerance: And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual?
- a. Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?
Yes, allowed to speak
Not allowed
 - b. If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?
Remove
Not remove
23. Tolerance: Now consider a Muslim clergyman who preaches hatred of the United States.
- a. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community preaching hatred of the United States, should he be allowed to speak, or not?
Yes, allowed to speak
Not allowed
 - b. If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote which preaches hatred of the United States should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?
Remove
Not remove

Censorship Index

24. Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statements:
- The government should restrict or ban books if they have harmful themes in it.
 - The government should restrict or ban art if it has harmful themes in it.
 - The government should restrict or ban music if it has harmful themes in it.
 - The government should restrict or ban movies if they have harmful themes in it.
- a. Strongly agree
 - b. Somewhat agree
 - c. Neither agree nor disagree
 - d. Somewhat disagree
 - e. Strongly disagree

25. Which of the following scenarios do you think should be regulated and not permitted by law on a primetime television program? Select all that apply.
- A character making a joke about God.
 - A character mocking an accent of another character.
 - A character choking a woman.
 - Unmarried characters having sex with each other.
 - Same-sex characters holding hands in a romantic way.
 - An episode that glorifies a political agenda.
 - None of these themes should be censored.
26. Which of the following themes do you believe the government should enforce censorship of? (Select all that apply)
- Blasphemous
 - Racist
 - Violent
 - Sexual
 - Homosexual
 - Liberal Propaganda
 - Conservative Propaganda
 - None of these themes should be censored
27. Which of the following do you believe should be subject to censorship? (Select all that apply)
- Books
 - Movies
 - Television shows
 - Music
 - Art
 - None of the above
28. Under what circumstances do you believe cultural censorship is appropriate? (Select all that apply)
- When it promotes violence or hate speech
 - When it goes against religious or moral beliefs
 - When it contains explicit sexual content
 - When it portrays drug or alcohol use
 - When it contains political content
 - Other (with an entry field for participants to provide additional reasons)
 - There are no circumstances.
29. Are you aware of any instances of cultural censorship in your community or country?
- Yes
 - No
30. Who do you think is most at risk when inappropriate themes are present on primetime television programs? (Select all that apply)
- Women
 - Children
 - Minorities
 - Society

- e. Other (Please specify)
- 31. Do you support the idea of cultural censorship?
 - a. Yes
 - b. Somewhat
 - c. No
- 32. Which of the following would you consider doing to support your views on cultural censorship? (select all that apply)
 - a. Writing a letter to a representative
 - b. Supporting a candidate who would introduce legislation on this issue
 - c. Attending a school board meeting
 - d. Voting out a representative who did not support such efforts
 - e. Protest the government
- 33. Do you believe that cultural censorship can be detrimental to artistic expression and creativity?
 - a. Definitely not
 - b. Probably not
 - c. Might or might not
 - d. Probably yes
 - e. Definitely yes

Conditioning Variable

- 34. Party Support: In the last election, which party did you vote for?
 - a. Republican
 - b. Democratic
 - c. Other
 - d. Did not vote
- r. Election: Which party are you most likely to vote for in the next election?
 - a. Republican
 - b. Democratic
 - c. Other
 - d. Don't plan to vote
- 35. Political Preferences: How would you describe your political leanings?
 - a. Very conservative
 - b. Slightly conservative
 - c. Neutral/ Neither conservative nor liberal
 - d. Slightly liberal
 - e. Very liberal
 - f. I prefer not to say

Censorship Modules

- 36. According to a recent study, the average (American child/American woman/American) watches around 3 hours of television a day. Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should ensure that television shows do not have harmful themes in them.
 - a. Strongly agree
 - b. Somewhat agree

- c. Neither agree nor disagree
 - d. Somewhat disagree
 - e. Strongly disagree
37. Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: The government should (protect minors and) restrict art (music, films, etc) if it contains (sexual themes/violence/contains hate speech).
- a. Strongly agree
 - b. Somewhat agree
 - c. Neither agree nor disagree
 - d. Somewhat disagree
 - e. Strongly disagree
38. Please tell me to what extent do you agree with the following statement: Books containing harmful themes should be removed from (libraries/bookstores).
- a. Strongly agree
 - b. Somewhat agree
 - c. Neither agree nor disagree
 - d. Somewhat disagree
 - e. Strongly disagree
39. A [Democratic/Republican/representative] proposed a bill that would restrict the production of art that is harmful to society. Do you support this bill?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
40. A [Democratic/Republican] representative proposed a bill that would restrict the broadcasting of offensive [rap/country music] lyrics in public. Do you support this bill?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
41. A [Democratic/Republican] representative proposed a bill that would restrict the books in school libraries that contain [LGBTQ+ characters/racist language]. Do you support this bill?
- a. Yes
 - b. No

Attention/AI Check

42. Age: How old are you? This is to validate that you are a person and not a bot.
- a. Under 18
 - b. 18-22
 - c. 23-30
 - d. 31-40
 - e. 41-50
 - f. 51-60
 - g. 61-70
 - h. 70 and older

APPENDIX 5. Additional Module Results

The full text of the first module is found in Table 5.1. This module is set to test all four hypotheses. This is because the module varies treatments on two dimensions and presents a scenario of a school library. The first dimension varied is the political party of the representative. The respondent received at random either a Democratic or Republican representative seeking to restrict a book from a school library. The second dimension is whether this book is banned because racist language is used or because it features LGBTQ+ characters. A school library is a location that indicates that minors are the group of interest and that the media is less capturable because there is not an economic barrier. With these treatments, I intend to capture the influence of both partisan politics and the difference in themes using what has been salient in the news.

Full Text of Module 1

Condition	Treatment Text
Democratic/Racist	A Democratic representative proposed a bill that would restrict books containing racist language from school libraries. Do you support this bill?
Democratic/LBGTQ+	A Democratic representative proposed a bill that would restrict books containing LGBTQ+ characters from school libraries. Do you support this bill?
Republican/Racist	A Republican representative proposed a bill that would restrict books containing racist language from school libraries. Do you support this bill?
Republican/LBGTQ+	A Republican representative proposed a bill that would restrict books containing LGBTQ+ characters from school libraries. Do you support this bill?

Table notes: Each respondent received at random one of the treatments in the table. This module was intended to test the influence of the partisan of the representative and the theme of censorship. Individuals could respond that they either supported or did not support the bill.

	Module 1 Results			
	Democratic Treatment	Republican Treatment	Racist Treatment	LGBTQ+ Treatment
Theme Treatment	-0.236	0.955		

	(0.881)	(0.852)		
Party Treatment			-0.544 (0.708)	104.8 (0)
Ideology	0.694** (0.338)	1.349*** (0.382)	0.524* (0.294)	
Gender	0.642 (1.047)	-1.640* (0.950)	-1.141 (0.818)	155.5 (0)
Education	0.428 (0.387)	-1.049** (0.516)	-0.473 (0.391)	104.7 (0)
Age	0.305 (0.314)	0.0825 (0.233)	0.116 (0.223)	49.66 (0)
Income	0.118 (0.371)	0.0801 (0.371)	0.414 (0.334)	-306.3 (0)
Constant	-4.882* (2.878)	3.935 (3.111)	2.385 (2.243)	-190.5 (0)
Observations	72	73	73	9

Table note: Results presented for a logit model with standard errors in parentheses. The question asked was “A Democratic/Republican representative proposed a bill that would restrict books containing racist/LGBTQ+ language from school libraries. Do you support this bill? Yes = 1 No =2. Theme treatment refers to whether the individual received the *Racist Treatment* (0) or the *LGBTQ+ Treatment* (1). Party treatment refers to whether the individual received the *Democratic Treatment* (0) or the *Republican Treatment* (1). Ideology is coded 1 = very conservative to 5 = very liberal.

Table 5.8 displays the results for Module 2. Theme Treatment and Party Treatment do not demonstrate significance. However, within the Democratic Treatment and Republican Treatment, Ideology emerges as a significant factor. These findings suggest that individuals who identify as more liberal are less inclined to support censorship initiatives proposed by both Democrats and Republicans regardless of the theme of censorship. This module asked about censorship of racist or LGBTQ+ themes in books in school libraries. Thus, the respondents were not considering censorship broadly, but in the context of what themes are available to minors in an area that government has some authority.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the third experiment, I seek to isolate the effect of partisanship on censorship and test the Ideology Hypothesis. At random, respondents would receive the control of a representative or the treatment of a Republican or Democratic representative. This experiment asked about support for a bill that would restrict art that was harmful to society. I have intentionally not specified the art that is being censored and left it up for interpretation. This ambiguity allows me to see the influence of elite cues on censorship.

Full Text of Module 3

Condition	Treatment Text
Control	A representative proposed a bill that would restrict the production of art that is harmful to society. Do you support this bill?
Republican Treatment	A Republican representative proposed a bill that would restrict the production of art that is harmful to society. Do you support this bill?
Democratic Treatment	A Democratic representative proposed a bill that would restrict the production of art that is harmful to society. Do you support this bill?

Table notes: Each respondent received at random one of the treatments in the table. This module was intended to test the influence of the partisan of the representative on opinions regarding censorship. Individuals could respond that they either supported or did not support the bill.

	Module 3 Results		
	Representative Treatment	Democratic Treatment	Republican Treatment
Ideology	-0.330 (0.311)	1.074 (0.697)	1.437 (2.085)
Gender	1.912** (0.802)	-3.750 (3.769)	-15.64 (3,102)
Education	-0.00870 (0.328)	-1.630 (2.067)	-1.872 (3.004)
Age	-0.625** (0.281)	-0.184 (0.543)	-1.389 (1.880)
Income	-0.147 (0.300)	0.992 (1.873)	0.723 (1.479)
Cut 1	-6.052** (2.833)	-12.57 (15.65)	-44.26 (6,204)
Cut 2	-0.366 (2.488)		
Observations	47	37	40

Table note: Results presented for an Ologit model with standard errors in parentheses. The question asked was “A Republican/Democratic/Representative proposed a bill that would restrict the production of art that is harmful to society. Do you support this bill?” Yes = 1 No =2. Gender is coded Male = 1, Female = 2, and Third Gender/Non-Binary = 3.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Professional Publications

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