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The UN-Intended Effects of Risky Mandates

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The UN-Intended Effects of Risky Mandates

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

The UN-Intended Effects of Risky Mandates

In May 1948, the United Nations launched its first peacekeeping mission named the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Since this first mission, the United Nations has launched over 70 peacekeeping missions in regions such as Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa (Bellamy and Williams, 2015). The overarching goal of the United Nations, and the Security Council as the organ responsible for authorizing peacekeeping missions, is to protect international peace (United Nations, 1945a). However, the means of achieving international peace differs across missions. One source of variation concerning the means of achieving peace is found in peacekeeping mission mandates. While these mandates are determined on a case-by-case basis (United Nations Secretariat, 2008), scholars and policymakers find that mandates are becoming increasingly risky regarding peacekeeper physical security due to the surge in mandates that authorize the use of force (Howard and Dayal, 2018). Furthermore, the conflict environment has made mandate implementation increasingly dangerous, as seen by the overall increase in peacekeeper fatalities (Henke, 2019). The rise in the number of peacekeeping missions, increased peacekeeper fatalities, and the frequent authorization of risky mandates risk leads to the question, how does mandate risk affect peacekeeping mission outcomes? I argue that missions with high-risk mandates and dangerous conflict environments generate sub-optimal mission outcomes, specifically, fewer troop contributions from troop-contributing states, smaller troop deployments in the host state, and shorter force commander tenures.

The dissertation is organized in the following way. In Chapter 1, I motivate the dissertation using qualitative and quantitative evidence to create the empirical puzzle. In Chapter 2, I explain the literature on the foundational and modern questions of peacekeeping research. With this information, I then introduce the three literatures I intend to address in the dissertation, which are troop contributions, local troop deployments, and force commander tenure, that concludes with the gaps my work fills. Chapter 3 contains a brief discussion on the mission creation process that ranges from initial authorization to putting "boots on the ground" in the mission host state.

Following the background knowledge, I develop three chapters with unique theoretical arguments and empirical models to determine the effect of mission mandates on various outcomes. Chapter 4 introduces the concept and measure of mandate risk employed through the remainder of the dissertation. From this explanation, I argue that higher levels of mandate risk and conflict environment danger increase the perceived costs of troop contributions, leading to reduced troop contribution levels. In Chapter 5, I generate the force commander's dilemma to demonstrate that mandate risk and conflict danger are associated with small troop deployments in the host state and the conclusion that the reducing effect of mandates deteriorates after a significant amount of time. I argue in Chapter 6 that risky mandates and dangerous conflict conditions should reduce force commander tenures, but empirical models do not provide evidence in support of the argument. Last, I summarize each chapter's conclusions, ramifications for the peacekeeping literature, policy implications, and directions for future work in Chapter 7.

KEYWORDS: United Nations, Peacekeeping, Mandates, Civil Conflict

Robert L. Wood III

May 3, 2023

The UN-Intended Effects of Risky Mandates

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Date

I want to dedicate my dissertation to the brave men and women who served as peacekeepers, especially those who died in the line of duty. Peacekeepers deploy to the most dangerous conflicts on the globe, and they must endure the observational results of conflict that remain in their minds after returning home. According to the United Nations, over 4,280 peacekeepers have given their lives while on mission. I hope the findings presented in this dissertation can can provide information to keep peacekeepers safe as they attempt to create peace and protect those caught in the crossfire of conflict.

In addition, I dedicate this dissertation to the force commanders that must juggle the pressures of the job. These individuals make difficult decisions that either place peacekeepers or civilians at risk. Even the best force commanders feel the weight of lost troops and civilians after returning home. I hope the conclusions found in this dissertation can be used for effective decision-making for force commanders to keep peacekeepers and civilians safe.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping operations have become a popular tool for international peace and conflict management, especially after the Cold War (Fortna and Howard, 2008). Since its first mission, dubbed the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was deployed in 1948, the United Nations has authorized more than 70 operations with 20 new missions between 1989 - 1994 (United Nations, 2022b). As of January 2022, the United Nations has 12 active missions (United Nations, 2022e) and holds one Nobel Peace Prize for "preventing armed clashes and creating conditions for negotiations" (Outreach, 1988). Numerous scholars have lauded the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions as they create lasting peace (Fortna, 2004c,a, 2008), protect civilians (Hultman et al., 2013; Phayal, 2019; Phayal and Prins, 2020), and promote state development (Blair, 2021; Blair et al., 2022; Joshi, 2013). In addition, political leaders such as former President Barack Obama praise efforts of peacekeeping missions to generate peace and maintain international security (Obama, 2015).

However, the positive impact on peace from missions also comes with negative side effects. While on mission, peacekeepers tend to engage in sexual exploitation and abuse (Nordås and Rustad, 2013; Karim and Beardsley, 2016; Beber et al., 2017), general crimes against the host state population (Horne et al., 2020; Horne and Barney, 2019; Bell et al., 2018), as well as economic disruption (Beber et al., 2019). In addition to the hazards imposed against the host state population, contributed peacekeepers are increasingly in danger on mission. Peacekeepers create a forceful separation between government and non-state actors (Hultman et al., 2014), and troops are placed in multiple dangerous contexts. Over the last 20-30 years, the number of deaths related to civil conflict, the number of conflict recurrences, and

the recurrence rate has steadily increased (Von Einsiedel et al., 2017) in addition to the vast authorization of peacekeeping missions. As a result, causes of peacekeeper fatality have shifted from being the byproducts of conflict to being strategically killed by warring parties (Salverda, 2013; Fjelde et al., 2016). In a 2017 report spearheaded by Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, the former force commander finds that "the blue helmet and the United Nations flag no longer offer 'natural' protection,"(dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017).

In response to the increased level of violence, the United Nations developed altered the design of mission mandates to enforce peace. In 2000, a high-level United Nations panel, led by Lakhdar Brahimi Algeria, submitted a report that outlined current mission projects as well as policy recommendations to overcome peacekeeping deficiencies. The Brahimi Report noted that the United Nations must develop clear, achievable mandates that authorize the use of force in defense of the mandate and civilians (Brahimi Report, 2000). After this report, the Untied Nations increasingly used Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to authorize new peacekeeping missions, as seen by 1.1. Chapter VII authorization frees peacekeepers to use force to implement their mandate, such as through protecting civilians caught in conflict (Howard and Dayal, 2018), and creates a substantial reduction in the likelihood of conflict (Hegre et al., 2019).

While the effects of mandates that allow force have the potential to limit conflict, the increase in this type of authorization was met with high-level concern. In an interview, former mission evaluator for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Conor Foley, explains that peacekeepers are increasingly in danger on mission since "the line between peacekeeping and war-fighting is getting very blurred" due to increasingly dangerous mission mandates (Martin, 2018). Due to the rise of dangerous mission mandates, the number of peacekeeper fatalities increased beginning in 2000 (Henke, 2019). Peacekeepers are asked to intervene in dangerous locations to imple-



Figure 1.1: Proportion of Missions with Ch.7 Authorization (Lloyd, 2021a).

ment risky mandates that demand forceful action. For example, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) experienced over 118 fatalities from 2013 - 2017 due to the mission's emphasis on counter-terrorism tactics (Sieff, 2017). Mounting peacekeeper fatalities inspired some states, such as China, to draft resolutions that emphasize peacekeeper protection since many troop contributors fear the high-danger situations generated by dangerous mandates (Fung, 2022)

The generation of increasingly robust, or risky, mandates sets the motivation for this dissertation. The United Nations mandates peacekeepers to implement increasingly risky mandates in dangerous, life-threatening conflict environments. Since risky mandates are burdensome to implement in treacherous conflict environments (Blair et al., 2021), I investigate how mission mandates and conflict conditions generate sub-optimal mission outcomes through three empirical chapters. After reviewing the literature surrounding peacekeeping operations on troop contributions, local peacekeeper deployments, and force commander tenure, in addition to the process of mission formation, I present three theoretical frameworks. First, I argue that risky mission mandates and dangerous conflict environments incentivize states to reduce their deployments to risky missions. Second, I theorize how force commanders

that operate under risky mandates and dangerous conditions succumb to pressures from contributing states and junior military officers. This negative pressure leads to reduced local troop deployment sizes. Finally, I explain how risky mandates and difficult conflict conditions increase the likelihood of force commander termination since risky mandates that undermine commander performance are arduous to implement.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

The literature on United Nations peacekeeping missions has rapidly grown since the 1990s, leading scholars to examine multiple mission outcomes. Early work focused on fundamental questions such as where missions go in addition to the duration of peace after a mission withdraws. From these basic questions, scholars diversified their outcomes of interest to investigate other effects of peacekeeping missions. Specifically, scholars investigate peacekeeping troop contributions, troop deployments within the host state, and the duration of mission force commanders. Below, I provide an overview of the early and modern questions asked by peacekeeping scholars. Then, I discuss the current literature on troop contributions and the nascent literature on the predictors of local troop deployments and force commander tenure duration. Last, I review the gaps my dissertation fills by exploring the effects of mission mandates.

2.1 The Early Questions of United Nations Peacekeeping

The first early question concerning peacekeeping asks "where do missions go?" Some scholars found that mission supply is related to Permanent Five interest due to their veto power[1] (O'Neill, 1996) to direct where missions go. When national interests, such as strategic, economic, or ideology, are at stake, the Security Council is more willing to deploy a mission and accept potential human costs of fighting (Jakobsen, 1996; Gibbs, 1997). Furthermore, when conflict threatens humanitarian and security issues, the Permanent Five are more likely to intervene when their strategic interest in the state is high (Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012). The Security Council also tends to allow major powers to intervene in a conflict as United Nations intervention could

undermine the major powers' strategic interest in the host state (Mullenbach, 2005).

Moving beyond the interests of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, security-related factors also drive the supply of peacekeeping missions. Some scholars have argued that the United Nations selects towards easier conflicts where the chances of mission success are high, inflating peacekeeping effectiveness (Carter, 2007; Gilligan and Stedman, 2003). However, work by Fortna (2004b,c, 2008) finds the United Nations selects the most violent conflicts, such as those settled in a tie, civil conflicts, and conflicts with high death tolls, including those with desperate humanitarian need (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012). This evidence suggests that since missions go to the most violent conflicts, the effect of peacekeeping missions may be underestimated (Howard, 2008). The literature review surrounding peacekeeping written by Fortna and Howard (2008) leaves the debate on whether or not peacekeeping missions deploy to easy or challenging cases unsettled, but modern studies by Fjelde et al. (2019); Phayal and Prins (2020) and others demonstrate that peacekeeping missions do, in fact, go to difficult cases.

The second early question concerns "can peacekeeping create durable peace?" Early peacekeeping scholars found peacekeeping operations to be ineffective (Dubey, 2002) due to the creation of hurting stalemates (Greig and Diehl, 2005) or an inability to intervene in active conflict (Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008). However, scholars have since overwhelmingly found evidence of the opposite. A peacekeeping mission signals international interest in conflict termination through the commitment of resources for resolution (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell et al., 2001). Peacekeepers as third-party guarantors foster reciprocity between the warring parties by increasing the costs associated with an attack, decreasing the uncertainty of actions, and preventing accidental violations (Fortna, 2004c).

[1]In Chapter 3, I will provide a more detailed explanation of the dynamics surrounding Permanent Five member-state veto power concerning the creation of peacekeeping mandates.

2.2 New Questions and Answers

After this initial wave of research, scholars moved beyond previous questions and explanations concerning peacekeeping. Scholars found new evidence that the distance of a potential mission host (Duque et al., 2015) and trade ties between the host and Permanent Five member-state affect the likelihood of receiving a mission (Stojek and Tir, 2015a). Conflict dynamics alter mission likelihood as having a previous civil war (White et al., 2018) and high levels of sexual violence in the conflict (Benson and Gizelis, 2020) increase the chances of a mission. However, when more missions are active, the Security Council is less likely to approve of a new mission (Cordell et al., 2021). Interestingly, scholars have investigated how the United Nations may deploy different peacemaking tools, such as a diplomatic or political-development mission instead of a peacekeeping mission when the host state has a longer duration of peace after their last civil war (Dorussen et al., 2021).

Another line of literature evaluates the effects of mission composition on conflict outcomes. In a series of papers concerning the size of deployments, authors find that increasing military troop and police contingent sizes decrease one-sided violence (Hultman et al., 2013; Haass and Ansorg, 2018) and battlefield deaths (Hultman et al., 2014) while also increasing peace duration after civil war (Hultman et al., 2016). Missions with a larger female-to-male ratio reduce sexual exploitation and abuse while on mission (Karim and Beardsley, 2016), but this effect may be too optimistic since females are less likely to be deployed to increasingly dangerous missions (Karim and Beardsley, 2013).[2] Culturally diverse peacekeepers are able to better protect civilians (Bove and Ruggeri, 2019) and foster non-violent government protest (Belgioioso et al., 2021a). Interestingly, diversity among troop units, such as combinations of medical, mechanized, and troop units, support mission effectiveness, unless these units are from different troop-contributing states (Dworschak and Cil, 2022).

[2]In a survey of peacekeepers from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), female

Furthermore, many scholars are interested in the ability of peacekeepers to limit one-sided violence. Looking at monthly, state-wide civilian deaths, peacekeepers can reduce government and rebel one-sided violence during (Hultman et al., 2013) and after the conflict has terminated (Kathman and Wood, 2016). When these military troops come from ethnically diverse backgrounds (Bove and Ruggeri, 2019) or are of higher quality in terms of military spending (Haass and Ansorg, 2018), increasing the number of troops reduces one-sided violence. However, upon disaggregating the instigator of one-sided violence with a smaller spatial unit, it seems that peacekeeper effectiveness cannot deter government and rebel action. Using localized data, Fjelde et al. (2019) and Phayal and Prins (2020) find that the presence of peacekeeping troops effectively averts rebel organizations from engaging in one-sided violence, but troops cannot deter government forces since government forces do not have to fully demobilize after conflict (Walter, 2009), and is responsible for providing consent for the movement of peacekeepers in the host country (Fjelde et al., 2019).

Peacekeeping can successfully limit the adverse side effects of conflict, but it brings additional problems to the host state. Missions with larger force sizes increase reports of peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse[3] (Nordås and Rustad, 2013), especially when military command breaks down (Moncrief, 2017). The presence of peacekeepers is also associated with increased counts of transactional sex by younger women (Beber et al., 2017), increased demand for sex work (Bell et al., 2018; Horne and Barney, 2019), and increased Category 1 and 2 allegations of peacekeeper misconduct[4] (Horne et al., 2020). Finally, peacekeepers create artificial demand for host state goods, which promotes severe economic contractions and selection towards low-skill labor that hinders future economic development (Beber et al., 2019).

peacekeepers report disrupted effectiveness since their chances to leave the base are limited, but locals find female peacekeepers as more "effective" than their male counterparts (Karim, 2017).

[3]Interestingly, in Nordås and Rustad (2013), the authors find that mission mandates that mention women are more likely to have a mission that has reported peacekeeper SEA, but this finding is not robust to various model specifications.

[4]Horne et al. (2020) define Category 1 allegations as peacekeeper misconduct that is felonious,

2.3 Peacekeeper Contributions

The first section of the literature I address is the mission contribution literature. Similar to other studies regarding the provision of a public good, peacekeeping missions suffer from collective action problems. However, various mission-related benefits entice states to contribute to missions.

2.3.1 Mission Collective Action

After mandate creation, the mission begins to gather the necessary resources to function. United Nations member-states have two roles in burden sharing for United Nations peacekeeping operations: financial and troop contributions. Each fiscal year, portions of the United Nations' budget are allocated to member-states based on relative economic wealth and permanent membership status on the Security Council, among other criteria. These financial contributions are shared between various United Nations budgets, including the peacekeeping budget (Coleman, 2020). Due to the compulsory nature of this aspect of burden sharing, missions are more likely to have the necessary financial resources to build and support peacekeeping operations.[5]

In contrast to financial contributions, the voluntary nature of troop contributions often leads to under-supplied missions. Peacekeeping operations suffer from collective action problems as the goal of conflict resolution and peace is non-rivalrous and non-excludable (Olson, 1965; Boncheck and Shepsle, 1997). The United Nations does not keep a standing army for conflict intervention, creating a reliance on member-states' contributions. To gather the necessary resources, the Department

which includes organized crime, risking life to staff or others, life threat/murder, and abuse or torture of detainees. Category 2 allegations are misdemeanor acts of misconduct that include discrimination, simple fraud, administrative incompetence, and breaking curfew.

[5]Some member-states have records of making late payments, even though they are legally obligated to fulfill their financial responsibility. Some member-states make full payments within the 30-day pay period as determined by the United Nations' Financial Regulation 3.5, but many member-states make late payments. The United Nations will operate with a tight budget, but it can rely on cash and other reserves to fund missions until additional payments are received (General Assembly, 2021).

of Peacekeeping Operations negotiates with member-states to gather troops and resources for the mission (Allen and Yuen, 2014); however, member-states have no obligation to contribute troops. Knowing this, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations offers a monthly reimbursement to the contributing country in exchange for their troops (United Nations, 2021e), but repayments cannot entice all member-states to contribute due to the cost of a soldier or contributions from other states (Bove, 2011). This lack of benefits incentivizes member-states to free-ride off the contributions of other member-states.

Should a member-state decide to contribute to the mission, states will determine how many peacekeepers to send and to which missions they want to supply with the understanding that their troops can be recalled at any time (United Nations, 2021e). The contributed troops do not give their loyalty to the force commander but rather acquiesce to the commander's operational control. The lack of formalized allegiance means that peacekeepers can be directed by the force commander while on mission, but the troops are still under command of their native government at all times, even to the point of withdrawal from the mission (Leck, 2009). This implies that troop-contributing countries have flexibility regarding contribution and withdrawal decisions.

2.3.2 Drivers of Contributions

Even though member-states are not required to contribute to a mission, contribution benefits can entice mission burden-sharing. The benefits of monthly troop reimbursements and coup-proofing are heavy incentives for troop contribution, often drawing autocratic states to lead troop contributions (Ex. Gaibulloev et al., 2015; Kathman and Melin, 2017; Levin et al., 2021; Duursma and Gledhill, 2019). As of July 2017, contributing states receive about $1,410 per troop each month (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021). Many member-states engage in "peacekeeping for profit"

as state leaders use reimbursements to provide goods to potentially troublesome military officers[6] (Gaibulloev et al., 2015; Kathman and Melin, 2017; Lundgren, 2018; Albrecht, 2020). If reimbursements do not quell the disgruntled officers, states can deploy them to disrupt the coup network (Hesse, 2015; Kathman and Melin, 2017; Albrecht, 2020; Levin et al., 2021). Democratic states are less motivated to contribute for the sake of coup-proofing due to their participatory institutions (Levin et al., 2021). After the 1990s, the threat of violence deterred democratic troop contributions, but the prospect of troop reimbursements and a comparative advantage in the "mercenarization" of their respective military allowed autocratic states to fill this contribution gap (Duursma and Gledhill, 2019; Levin et al., 2016; Bove, 2011).

In addition to domestic effects, states are also motivated to contribute by international factors. States that have high costs per troop that also want a peacekeeping operation[7] can pressure other member-states to contribute by supplementing troop reimbursements with foreign aid (Boutton and D'Orazio, 2020), "whitewashing" poor human rights records (Levin, 2020; Hesse, 2015), or by leveraging their foreign policy similarity (Joshi, 2020; Ward and Dorussen, 2016). Even with these enticements, states have incentives to free-ride when missions have multiple contributors (Bove, 2011), creating mission shortfalls that hinder mandate implementation (Passmore et al., 2018). By participating in the mission, contributed troops utilize the arms and artillery training provided to peacekeepers to train or stay in military shape (Kathman and Melin, 2017). Mission participation makes a state more likely to have one of their own selected as a Force Commander or a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Oksamytna et al., 2021) as well as a reduced risk of replacement given poor leadership performance (Lundgren et al., 2021).

[6]Other authors have pushed against the "peacekeeping for profit" narrative suggesting that only when contributors acquire and maintain stocks of old equipment and pay modest deployment allowance does this narrative hold (Coleman and Nyblade, 2018).

[7]These states are called pivotal states. They are unwilling to deploy their troops but have the political and financial power to secure foreign aid for developing states that contribute (Boutton and D'Orazio, 2020).

2.4 Movement of Peacekeepers

Compared to the peacekeeping literature on contributions, there is little research regarding where peacekeepers go while on mission. In an initial study on the local movements of peacekeepers, Townsen and Reeder (2014) leveraged spatial data on the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and found that peacekeepers tend to cluster in locations of conflict, one-sided violence, borders, transportation networks, and densely populated cities. Peacekeepers move to positions of rampant one-sided violence (Fjelde et al., 2019), especially when the government and rebels are involved in high-profile clashes (Phayal and Prins, 2020). However, even though peacekeepers tend to move to locations experiencing violence, they do so slowly and when the site is relatively convenient (Ruggeri et al., 2018). Even with slow deployments, the movement of peacekeepers can effectively limit one-sided violence (Fjelde et al., 2019; Phayal and Prins, 2020) while also containing conflict to specific regions (Beardsley and Gleditsch, 2015).

2.5 Force Commander Tenure

In addition, even though scholars have considered the effects of leadership tenure, little attention has been given to peacekeeping force commanders. Long-tenured leaders with more experience before conflict enjoy shorter conflicts at the interstate (De Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Smith and Spaniel, 2019) and sub-state levels (Uzonyi and Wells, 2016; Thyne, 2012). However, responsible leaders increase the duration of conflict (Krcmaric, 2018; Prorok, 2018) since culpable leaders attempt to gamble for favorable outcomes in the face of punishment (Croco, 2011; Prorok, 2016). Many leaders are evaluated based on their performance on the battlefield as worsening trends signal poor performance (Weisiger, 2016b) leading to replacement in the hopes of turning the tide (Reiter and Wagstaff, 2018). United Nations' force

commanders are evaluated based on their ability to perform, but their tenure is also influenced by politics rather than performance. Force commanders must effectively implement their mandate to remain at their post, but commanders who are from permanent members of the Security Council and who have a history of troop contributions maintain a lesser performance standard (Lundgren et al., 2021).

2.6 What's Missing in the Literature?

After reviewing the literature surrounding troop contributions, local peacekeeper deployments, and force commander tenure, I find that while scholars have contributed to our knowledge of United Nations peacekeeping, the literature has overlooked the effects of mission mandates. Contributing states maintain authority regarding where their troops are deployed, but they are discouraged by potential participation costs leading to avoidance of missions with risky mandates and arduous implementation conditions. Once on mission, force commanders must weigh pressures from the United Nations, contributing states, and junior officers, which vary based on the level of mandate risk and the conflict environment. Even with these pressures, force commanders with risky mandates find it strenuous to implement risky mandates leading to their removal much earlier when compared to missions with less risky mandates. After explaining the process of mission formation, I provide three theoretical chapters with associated statistical models to test observable implications to fill the gaps found in the literature.

Chapter 3 Peacekeeping Mission Formation

In this section, I provide an overview of the bureaucratic process that mandates and deploys a peacekeeping operation. I explain the role of the United Nations Security Council as the driving force behind mission mandates creation. After noting the Security Council's duty, I discuss the dynamics surrounding the Security Council's voting process for mission authorization and the consultation process between the Security Council and the Secretary-General. I note how mandates have developed due to the Brahimi report and a need for Security Council member-state unification. Last, I provide a discussion concerning mandate implementation in the conflict environment.

3.1 The Role of the Security Council

The United Nations Security Council carries the responsibility of authorizing peacekeeping operations and their mandates. Chapter I of the United Nations Charter presents the central goal of the United Nations: "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace," (United Nations, 1945a). This goal provides the legal basis for peacekeeping; however, peacekeeping missions are not a conflict management tool specified in the Charter (United Nations, 2021d; Bellamy et al., 2010). Chapter V of the United Nations Charter charges the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. Member-states must agree to accept and carry out any decisions the Security Council makes per the Charter (United Nations, 1945b).

Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter provide the legal basis for the Security Council to act on behalf of the international community when considering

conflict management practices (United Nations, 1945b). Chapter VI allows the Security Council to call upon the parties to settle their dispute. In addition, Chapter VI provides the power for the Coucnil to investigate potential threats posed by the conflict and make dispute resolution recommendations (United Nations, 1945c). Chapter VII expands on the Council's right to recommend actions towards peace that include "operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations." All member-states must make armed forces, assistance, and facilities available to aid the Security Council's responsibility to enforce peace. This aid is usually in the form of voluntary member states provision of the use of their armed forces (United Nations, 1945d). Should the Security Council vote against conflict intervention, regional security institutions, such as the Economic Comunity of West African States (ECOWAS) or the African Union (AU), must gain approval of the Council to operate within a host state under the Untied Nations' name (United Nations, 1945e).

3.2 How Are Mandates Formed?

Peacekeeping mandate formation functions on a case-by-case basis, but the process for creating a mandate is similar across missions. The Security Council observes if a dispute has made progress towards a cease-fire or a settlement, whether regional or sub-regional organizations can assist, and whether the safety and security of United Nations personnel are likely, to name a few. As the conflict continues, the Security Council will consult member states, the Secretariat, parties on the ground, the potential host state, and potential troop-contributing countries to see if a mission would be effective. The Secretary-General then deploys a Technical Assessment mission to observe the potential host state so that the Secretary-General may present a Strategic Assessment for the Security Council. With this information, the Security Council will vote on a resolution that, if it passes, details the size and mandate of the mission (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Secretariat, 2008).

After being presented with details on the conflict, the Security Council votes to pass a resolution to form the mission. The Security Council contains fifteen member-states where five states are designated the Permanent Five,[9] which hold a veto. In addition to these five, the Council includes ten non-permanent members. Every two years, five new members are elected to join the Security Council for a two-year term. To ensure regional representation, the ten non-permanent members must consist of five African and Asian states, one from Eastern European States, two from Latin American States, and two from Western European and other States. The mission must receive at least nine affirmations from all fifteen states while avoiding a veto from a Permanent Five member (O'Neill, 1996). The mandate must demonstrate unified support by all members of the Security Council as divided preferences undermine mission legitimacy and authority that may embolden conflict spoilers. (Wallensteen and Johansson, 2016). This unification of preferences allows the Security Council to create leverage on any issue regarding implementation.

Even though mandate creation involves a bargaining process, scholars know little about this intra-institutional dynamic. Allen and Yuen (2014) attempt to explain the dynamics between the Permanent Five members of the Security Council and how that relates to the mission mandates. When the Permanent Five members are interested in a civil war state, the mandate will be broad to give the mission the necessary resources to create peace. In a more in-depth approach, Allen and Yuen (2020) provide a new dataset that details which issues the Security Council decides to debate in addition to the frequency of debate over the issue. Interestingly, when the agenda item concerns peacekeeping, this item is more likely to receive Security Council attention. This suggests that peacekeeping is a high priority of the Security Council.

Not only does a clear mandate increase prospects of success, but it can also

[9]The Permanent Five members of the Security Council include the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France.

help ensure contributions to mission efforts. The United Nations has no standing army but based on Chapter VII, the Security Council can request contributions from member-states. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations negotiates with contributors to create a memorandum of understanding. This agreement establishes expectations surrounding the administrative, logistical, and financial conditions for troops, equipment, and service contributions. In addition, the memorandum specifies the standard of conduct for the contributed troops. The agreement also defines the expected reimbursement to the contributors based on the number of troops provided to the mission at a current rate of $1,410 per troop (United Nations, 2021b).

Upon passing the resolution, the Secretariat will review the mandate to ensure it is clear and achievable (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Secretariat, 2008) in light of the recommendations found in the Brahimi Report. In response to failed peacekeeping efforts, increased demand for peacekeeping operations, and mission instability in Sierra Leon (UNAMSIL), the United Nations Secretary-General created a panel led by Lakhdar Brahimi to investigate weaknesses inherent to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi report emphasized the importance of decision-making at the United Nations headquarters, the rapid deployment of peacekeepers, and other recommendations to increase force effectiveness. Most importantly, the report stressed the need for clear mandates with enough resources to fulfill the mandated tasks. The report recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations provide realistic advice on missions as well as documents with precise word choice to create attainable mandates (Bellamy et al., 2010).

3.3 How Is the Mission Fielded?

After mission authorization, the United Nations negotiates two legal documents to begin mission deployment. The first document is the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the potential troop-contributing country. This

bilateral agreement outlines the administrative, logistical, and financial terms and conditions of deployment for the troops contributed to a mission, as well as troop responsibilities while on mission (United Nations, 2021b). The troop-contributing country will then gather its committed equipment and troops to transport them to the host state. The speed of the process is affected by the troop-contributing country's incentives to pledge and deploy quickly, the capabilities of the contributor, and procedural constraints to approve deployment (Lundgren et al., 2021). The second legal document needed for mission implementation is the Status of Forces Agreement. This bilateral agreement between the United Nations and the host state defines the legality of the peacekeeper's presence in the host country. The United Nations implements a template Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) allowing for rapid deployment, with a tailored version usually formed later (Charara, 2018). Each SOFA outlines the immunities granted to United Nations peacekeepers, dependent on the status and function of the peacekeeping personnel. SOFAs demand that peacekeepers follow local laws, but SOFAs also reserve the punishment of military contingents for breaking the law to the jurisdiction of the contributing country (Burke, 2011).

With the agreements in place and troops prepared for deployment, the mission will begin the process of mission start-up. The pre-deployment stage includes the negotiation of the Memoranda of Understanding and the SOFA to gather the necessary troops and outline troop responsibility and expected conduct. Next, the mission begins a phase of rapid deployment by sending a small advance team to establish mission infrastructure and the administration network. This team paves the way for the incoming troops and mission staff. Third, mission leadership arrives and creates command and control systems for the contributed troops. Finallys, mission leadership establishes mission headquarters to coordinate local military command to begin mandate implementation (United Nations Secretariat, 2008).

Chapter 4 Mandate Risk and Troop Contributions

> "When [Troop Contributing Countries] send recce missions, they are all staring at us like a kid in a toy shop, seeing how different this environment is. 'Oops, you can die in this country, not by heart attack or accident but by enemy attack.' This is not what they're expecting in peacekeeping, and that is what they are unprepared for."
>
> - Unattributed quote from "Improving Security of Untied Nations Peacekeepers" (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017)

In 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with plans for a south Sudanese referendum. In 2011, the referendum demonstrated that many individuals in southern Sudan supported self-determination leading to the creation of South Sudan. In response, the United Nations Security Council mandated the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) to develop government institutions, promote socio-economic development, and protect civilians. Instead of focusing on external issues such as the new state's relationship with Sudan, UNMISS emphasized internal problems in South Sudan (de Coning and Costa, 2015). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement formally ended the Sudanese civil war, but the agreement failed to finalize the division of disputed territories. Specifically, contestation erupted over the Abyei territory between Sudan and South Sudan, obstructing peace accord implementation, thereby creating renewed conflict in 2008, which displaced over 100,000 civilians in Abyei in 2011. Later in 2011, the United Nations deployed the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to promote the demilitarization of the region, develop security forces, and repatriate refugees (Osterrieder et al., 2015).

Both United Nations peacekeeping missions were rooted in the same conflict

and peace agreement concerning Sudan, but their average contributions deviated drastically. Using contribution counts provided by Perry and Smith (2013), in 2011, UNMISS averaged 29 troops per contributor month while UNISFA averaged 13 troops per contributor month. In substantive terms, Egypt in 2011 maintained an average of 604 troops in UNMISS and 7 troops in UNISFA. Furthermore, India in 2011 deployed an average content of about 2250 troops in UNMISS, in contrast to an average of 8 troops in UNISFA. In summary, UNISFA stemmed from the same conflict and operated concurrently with UNMISS; however, UNISFA maintained about half the average contributions and had a noticeable difference in contributor deployments. The disparity in mission contributions motivates the research question of this study: *Why do troop-contributing countries differ in their contribution levels across missions?*

I argue that contribution levels are a function of mission mandate tasks and the conflict environment associated with each mission. UNMISS was tasked to monitor and enforce the peace agreement, but the mission had less risky tasks such as election assistance, government capacity development, and free press promotion. In contrast, UNISFA had a riskier mandate with tasks that included buffer zone monitoring, peace agreement enforcement, and human rights protection (Lloyd, 2021a). The risky tasks and dangerous conflict environment of UNISFA deterred states from contributing to the hazardous peacekeeping operation, but UNMISS' relatively less risky tasks did not avert troop contributions. When mandates are less risky and the conflict environment is peaceful, states will contribute troops to receive domestic and international benefits. However, increasingly risky mandates with dangerous conflict environments increase the perceived costs that outweigh the contribution benefits. The increase in perceived costs leads to reduced troop contributions. Leveraging a dataset with peacekeeper troop contribution counts, mandate tasks, and a measure of conflict danger, I find that contributing states avoid sending troops to missions with risky mandates and dangerous conflict environments. I conclude that risky missions

reduce states troop contributions and this reducing effect intensifies when the conflict environment becomes increasingly dangerous.

This first chapter sets the stage to evaluate how risky mission mandates create unintended, adverse outcomes in contexts where the most support is needed. Securing troop contributions is one of the central considerations that fosters mission success since troops are required to enforce peace. In addition, continuous mandate updating throughout each mission leads to dynamic changes among the states that contribute and their respective troop allocations. Furthermore, scholars find that large troop contingents effectively implement their mandates, including reducing one-sided violence (Hultman et al., 2013; Fjelde et al., 2019). As a result, evaluating the effect of risky mandates on troop contributions provides an opportunity to investigate a critical aspect of peacekeeping missions that directly affects overall mission effectiveness.

4.1 Defining Mandate Risk

Peacekeeping mandate tasks subject peacekeepers to increased risk in terms of their physical security. Peacekeepers on mission confront forms of risk such as the risk of war recurrence (Fortna, 2008), terrorist attacks (Hansen et al., 2020), and post-mission mental conditions including post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol dependence (Forbes et al., 2016). However, the risk of death or injury is the most critical form in this investigation. Conor Foley, a former evaluator in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, finds that the United Nations' emphasis on protecting civilians through the authorization of offensive operations and robust mandates[4] coincide with peacekeepers moving to conflict locations such as villages and buffer zones where risk is much higher (Martin, 2018). Troop-contributing countries realize the risk associated with specific mandate tasks and mission locations, leading to concern for their troops (Karlsrud, 2015a; Henke, 2019). With this in mind, I define "risk" as the likelihood of peacekeeper death or injury while implementing the mission man-

date. Table 1 presents the division of peacekeeping mandate tasks classified as "risky" and "less risky."

When classifying tasks as "risky" or "less risky," I identify tasks where peacekeepers are likely to be targets of conflict, expected to use force in protection of the mandate, or engage in naturally risky tasks as these situations are most likely to lead to peacekeeper death or injury. Peacekeepers who monitor buffer zones or patrol villages are likely to be targets of warring parties should the parties engage in some level of conflict (Fjelde et al., 2019; Townsen and Reeder, 2014). In addition, peacekeepers tasked to monitor state borders and natural resource deposits are likely to be targeted due to rebel group border hopping and conflict over financial opportunity, respectively (Beardsley, 2011; Townsen and Reeder, 2014). Some mandate tasks demand that peacekeepers protect civilians, human rights, and United Nations and humanitarian mission personnel through the use of force (Hultman et al., 2013). Last, some tasks similar to warring party demobilization and demining assistance are inherently dangerous due to occupational hazards associated with the task (United Nations, 2021c,f). Appendix 1 includes a fuller explanation of the tasks divisions. In summary, risky tasks make peacekeepers potential targets of conflict, demand the use of force, or are naturally dangerous.

4.2 Mandate Tasks and Contributions

Compared to the number of wars observed in the international system, peacekeeping missions are relatively rare and deploy to the most dangerous conflicts. Fortna (2008) finds that only 38% of post-Cold War civil wars experienced a United Nations deployment.[5] The United Nations Security Council prioritizes deployments to "hard cases," meaning civil conflicts that lack a decisive victory and that experienced high

[4]The United Nations characterizes a robust mandate as one that allows "the use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with authorization of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process," (Hiller, 2020).

Table 4.1: Table of Task Risk

Risky	Less Risky
Monitor Peace Agreements Subtasks: Buffer Monitor and Liaise War Parties	Promote Good Offices (Monitor Peace Agreements Subtask)
Monitor Human Rights Subtask: Monitor the Refugee Situation	Monitor Weapons Trade, Monitor Weapons Embargo, Inspect Cargo (Monitor Borders Subtask)
Protect Human Rights Subtasks: Protect Children, Protect Women, Protect Civilians	Monitor Use of Natural Resources
Protect UN Personnel (Ensure Security)	Monitor Elections
Assist in Demining	Provide Security During the Electoral Period
Monitor Borders	Assist with Election Implementation (Technical or Logistical Assistance)
Chapter VII Authorization	Build Government Capacity Subtask: Implement Government Policies
Assist with Security Sector Reform Subtasks: Assist Police Reform, Monitor the Police, Conduct Joint Patrols with Police	Preserve Cultural and Historical Sites
Monitor Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	Assist Quick Impact Projects (QIP) Implementation
Help Implement Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	Assist with Justice Sector Reform
	Promote National Reconciliation Subtask: Pursue Justice for War Criminals
	Disseminate Info About the Mission to the Public
	Promote Freedom of the Press

Table adapted from tasks coded in Lloyd (2021).

battle deaths counts and previous mediation attempts (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004a; Mullenbach, 2005). These conflicts suffer from information asymmetries and commitment problems that prevent conflict termination or hinder long-term post-conflict peace (Walter, 2009).

Once peacekeepers arrive in the most treacherous host states, troops deploy to dangerous locations within the host state. When on mission, peacekeepers deploy to hotspots of conflict, such as host state borders and surface-based natural resource deposits that host rebel transnational movements and combat over loot, respectively. Peacekeepers also move to zones of rampant one-sided violence (Fjelde et al., 2019) and arenas of government and rebel troop head-to-head combat (Phayal and Prins, 2020) to protect civilians from physical harm. If peacekeepers are not near these locations, they reside near transportation networks for rapid response (Townsen and Reeder, 2014). The trend of missions going to dangerous host states and conflict zones demonstrates that United Nations military leadership is risk-acceptant in conflict.

[5]Mission types range from observer missions without the authorization to use force, Chapter VI missions with an emphasis on peacebuilding, and Chapter VII missions that intend to force peace during conflict (White, 2015).

4.2.1 States Sometimes Rise to the Occasion

State participation in international institutions, such as through peacekeeping troop contributions, shows that the perceived benefits of contribution are higher than its perceived costs. When international institution participation demands little to no behavior change or has few costs associated with participation, states participate in international institutions to receive cooperation benefits (Downs et al., 1996). When the provision of benefits is not credible or too small to outweigh the costs in the bargain enforcement stage, states will not expend resources in the bargaining phase (Fearon, 1998). In the pre-contribution stage, the United Nations bargains with potential contributor countries to create a memorandum of understanding. This agreement establishes expectations regarding troop contributions, mission responsibilities, and the expected reimbursements for the member-state (United Nations, 2021b) in the enforcement stage. Should a member-state find the benefits outweighed by the costs, the state will not bargain with the United Nations over contributions.

When member-states decide to send troops to a mission, states receive both international and domestic benefits associated with contributions. Domestically, states receive the benefits of troop training, coup-proofing, and monthly reimbursements (Kathman and Melin, 2017; Lundgren, 2018). Internationally, states receive foreign aid considerations, international prestige, and peacekeeping leadership opportunities as participation benefits (Boutton and D'Orazio, 2020; Levin, 2020; Lundgren et al., 2021; Oksamytna et al., 2021). When potential costs are minimal, states prefer to contribute and provide larger contributions to peacekeeping operations to receive domestic and international benefits (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997). However, as the costs, or prospective costs, of contribution increase, states will decrease or even withdraw their respective troop contributions.

4.2.2 Risk-Averse Contributors

When deciding to contribute troops, states weigh the prospective costs in light of the benefits of participation. While battle death tolls in civil conflict have decreased over time (Gleditsch et al., 2016), the increase in peacekeeper deaths since 2000 (Henke, 2019) has contributed to the risk-aversion of states that fear losing troops to conflict violence.[6] Deploying troops into a conflict environment exposes troops to the risk of being injured or killed as a product of the conflict. States place a high value on the life of a soldier due to state investments in training and the costs associated with troop replacement. As a result, states are risk-averse when sending troops into conflict (Bove, 2011) as losing troops in one conflict restricts the contributor's force supply (Von Clausewitz, 2008). When peacekeepers are killed on mission, states incur not only human and material costs (Oestman, 2021), but also domestic reputational costs as states must justify the loss of life to their audience (Page and Stevis, 2016).[7] Peacekeeper deaths also embolden rebel groups to continue to kill peacekeepers as troop deaths signal weakness to rebel groups (Levin, 2021). States as mediators avoid cases that are difficult or are likely to be unsuccessful (Iwanami, 2014), such as when the conflict situation becomes increasingly violent. As a result, high levels of risk incentivize states to withdraw or reduce their respective contributions to avoid the costs of troop fatalities.

In 2014, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to reward risk premiums to troop units that "are operating without restrictions and caveats imposed by troop- and police-contributing countries and that have acquitted themselves well

[6]Former force commander Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz admits that peacekeepers face threats from hostile acts from armed groups, terrorists, organized crime, and other threats are constant, causing troop-contributing states to reduce their contributions as "some T/PCCs remain risk-averse and unwilling to use force, leaving attacks unpunished and undeterred," (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017, 11).

[7]In 2016, two Chinese peacekeepers were killed in a refugee camp. China's Defense Ministry "strongly condemned" this use of violence, but Chinese online users asked, "What use is condemnation? ... Fight those who have injured us, don't just condemn!" (Page and Stevis, 2016).

despite exceptional levels of risk." Units must be free of contributor caveats, experience "exceptional levels of risk," perform beyond the call of duty, and execute their tasks with a high level of skill and professionalism to receive risk premiums. The premium is no greater than 10% of the standard monthly reimbursement rate. If the unit under consideration has misconduct allegations, it cannot receive risk premiums (Di Razza, 2020a). The United Nations does not publicly record risk payment rewards, but the extensive process of recommending units and the arduous review process make risk premium awards rare. Furthermore, a 10% bonus of about $141 given at the end of service is likely to be non-motivating.

With the risk-aversion of states in mind, mandates that imply risky peacekeeper action cause states to decrease their contributions. When the United Nations Security Council passes a resolution, the mission is given assorted mandate tasks[8] with varying risk prospects. Mission mandates include tasks that communicate how troops should engage with the warring parties and the domestic population while on mission (Di Salvatore et al., 2022). While each task signals some level of risk, states observe mission mandates as an aggregation of all tasks. This aggregation signals to states the risk level associated with implementing the given mandate and the likelihood of losing troops during mandate implementation. As a result, mandates with tasks that communicate high levels of risk receive smaller contributions than those with low levels of risk.

To further explain how tasks communicate risk, I draw on the monitor buffer zone task found in Table 1. The buffer zone monitoring task requires peacekeepers to patrol areas of high risk. Buffer zones mark territory that warring parties cannot cross to deter aggressive action, but the peacekeepers who monitor the buffer zone risk being wedged between combatants. While patrolling the buffer zone in Cyprus, peacekeepers experience approximately 1,000 incidents each year with issues

[8]A task is a mission action that relates to some actor, institution, or process (Lloyd, 2021a).

that include name-calling, the unauthorized use of firearms (Peacekeeping, 2021a), and patrol vehicle attacks (United Nations, 2022d). The desolate territory also attracts illegal hunting and stray bullets that peacekeepers fear will reignite conflict (Peacekeeping, 2021b). The Israel-Syria buffer zone also experienced peacekeeper kidnappings in 2013 and 2014 (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015) in addition to interstate skirmishes leading to United Nations condemnation regarding the use of force in the buffer zone. The buffer zone monitoring task signals to contributors increased levels of risk in the mandate, which is compounded by a dangerous implementation environment.

In contrast to risky tasks, less risky mandate tasks such as election monitoring are comparatively low-risk duties (UN-DPPA, 2021). Election monitoring requires the mission to protect elections from tampering to support the host state's political process. Tasked with election monitoring in 2006, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) delivered election materials to 9,200 polling stations to safeguard local leadership elections despite limited, isolated incidents of violence (UN News, 2006). This relatively easy task does not require troops to move to conflict zones since elections occur once conflict has subsided (Fjelde and Smidt, 2021). This easy task matched with safe implementation conditions makes this a low-risk task for contributors searching for peacekeeping benefits.

Mission mandates provide information regarding the expected actions of their troops while on mission. Knowing that contributing states base their contributions on the risk signaled by the mission mandate, missions with risky mandates deter states from sending military peacekeepers into a host state. High-risk mandates increase the potential contribution costs leading to reduced contribution benefits and troop contributions. These considerations lead to Hypothesis 4.1:

Hypothesis 4.1. *As the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate increases, the number of contributed troops will decrease.*

Mission mandates signal information to contributors about the risky actions expected of their peacekeepers, while conflict environments communicate the difficulty associated with mandate implementation. Drawing on the argument of Downs et al. (1996), states are more likely to participate in institutions for benefits when costs are low. During peacekeeping operations, the potential contribution costs increase as mandate risk increases. Furthermore, when situations arise that demand risky mandate implementation, such as warring party clashes (Phayal and Prins, 2020), peacekeepers will move to those locations to enforce their risky mandate. This suggests that increased conflict danger will make risky mandate implementation increasingly difficult. Since peacekeeping units are smaller than the forces of the warring parties, peacekeepers must rely on comparatively unsuccessful coercive strategies (Sullivan, 2007) against highly resolved warring parties (Lloyd, 2017). As a result, contributor states will send smaller contributions when mandate risk is high and the conflict environment is increasingly dangerous to avoid losing peacekeepers attempting to implement the mission's risky mandate since states avoid intervention in dangerous cases (Iwanami, 2014). This combination of factors leads to Hypothesis 4.2:

Hypothesis 4.2. *As the level of conflict danger in the conflict environment increases, the negative effect of the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate on the number of contributed troops will strengthen.*

States must make a difficult decision when considering the costs and benefits associated with contributions. Potential contributing states observe mission mandates that signal the potential contribution costs as risky mandates increase the likelihood of losing troops. Increased mandate risk deters states from contributing to arduous missions. In addition to the information gleaned from mission mandates regarding troop activities that communicate risk, dangerous conflict environments signal to potential contributors that the risky mandate must be implemented in a treacherous

conflict environment further compounding the deterring effects of risky mandates on troop contributions.

4.3 Research Design

To test the implications of the theory, I use the potential-contributor-mission-month unit of analysis to capture the change in contributions each mission-month. I count a potential contributor as any state listed in the Correlates of War (COW) State System Membership List (Correlates of War Project, 2016). Next, I capture each state's respective troop contribution for each possible mission the state did or did not contribute to in a given month. For example, the United States of America in November 1995 contributed 365 troops to United Nations Confidence Mission in Croatia (UNCRO) and sent 0 troops to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I). The United States sent troops to UNCRO, but it also had the potential to send troops to UNVAEM I in the same month.

To capture potential contributing states, I employ endogenous stratified sampling (King and Zeng, 2001) from the conflict mediation literature (Ex. Savun, 2008). This strategy limits excess zeros by collecting all cases where states contributed to a mission in a given month and a random set of states who did not contribute. I chose 15 randomly selected non-contribution cases since this is the sample's average count of mission-contributing states. While two-stage count models can explain excess zeros, these models are likely to estimate biased probabilities and standard errors due to rare event issues (King and Zeng, 2001) from having more than ten times the number of non-contributors to contributors. Random selection of non-contributors alleviates rare event issues while creating a representative sample of non-contributors for proper comparison.

The sample consists of all mission-months from 1990-2014. I exclude observer missions from the sample, such as the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

(BINUB), as these missions are authorized for either zero or few troops leading to meager contribution levels regardless of mandate risk. Appendix 1 contains a list of all missions included in the sample. Furthermore, I limit the sample to potential-contributor-mission-months with two-hundred or fewer battle deaths as these are extreme observations within the sample and exhibit high leverage on model estimates.[9] Removing these observations produces relatively conservative estimates.

4.3.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the number of troops contributed in a potential-contributor-mission-month, which comes from the International Peace Institute's Peacekeeping Database (Perry and Smith, 2013). This database provides information regarding which states contribute, the year and month of contribution, to which mission the state contributes, and how many troops the state contributes. I exclude counts of mission observers and civilian police as military troops are the actors most subject to mission risk. For example, mission observers are not the peacekeepers patrolling a buffer zone, nor are the civilian police responsible for enforcing a peace agreement. Figure 4.1 provides a histogram of the dependent variable. Due to the over-dispersion of the dependent variable, I employ the negative binomial estimator.

While some scholars are interested in explaining mission shortfalls (Ex. Passmore et al., 2018), the theory of this project does not benefit from explaining shortfalls for two reasons. First, this chapter argues how mandate risk and conflict conditions signal information to individual contributors when making contributions, which demands a state-level unit of analysis. All states use the information on mandated tasks and the associated risks during negotiations over the Memoranda of Under-

[9] Appendix 1 provides estimates that include observations with large battle death counts. Many of these observations with large battle death counts come from the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). The models are robust to these influential observations, but I exclude these cases to avoid inflating statistical and substantive significance.



(a) Histogram of Troops (b) Histogram of Troops, No 0's

Figure 4.1: Histograms of the troop contributions.

standing as mandate tasks influence state contribution promises (United Nations, 2021b). Collapsing to the mission-level unit of analysis hides state-based decisions that the theory explains while overlooking the bilateral nature of securing troop contributions. Second, the United Nations strategically sets troop authorizations to levels that minimize potential shortfalls. After the criticisms raised in the Brahimi Report (Brahimi Report, 2000), the United Nations has prioritized reducing mission shortfalls, as seen in Figure 4.2. The United Nations utilizes information from tactical assessments (United Nations, 2023), state interactions within the organization (Joshi, 2020), and Memoranda of Understanding negotiations to set troop authorizations and strategically limit shortfalls. This strategic behavior creates a bias towards minimal shortfalls regardless of mandate risk.

4.3.2 Independent Variables

I use the Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) dataset[10] to capture the tasks within peacekeeping mandates. Table 1 provides an initial task organization, but detailed classification explanations are in Appendix 1. This dataset developed by Lloyd (2021a) covers all United Nations mission mandates from 1948-



Figure 4.2: LOESS graph of mean shortfall proportion.

2015. Mandate tasks are time-variant and are coded at the mission-month level since mission mandates are often updated mid-mission. A task is any directive assigned to a mission in the mandate, such as monitoring a ceasefire. Mandate tasks are binary indicators where "1" indicates that the task is present in the mandate.

To measure mandate risk, I develop a risk ratio index. Upon creation, mission mandates contain several tasks that include risky and less risky tasks. When states contribute, they observe risk as the aggregate of all risky tasks within the mission mandate. To capture this process, I create a risk ratio measure based on the tasks found in Table 1. Per Equation 4.1, I count the total number of risky tasks and divide

[10]While groups of scholars such as Di Salvatore et al. (2022) and Hellmüller et al. (2023) developed datasets on peacekeeping mandates, they are not the ideal choice for this analysis. The Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset compiled by (Di Salvatore et al., 2022) provides modalities of engagement for each task, but it is regionally limited to African missions. In comparison, the Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) dataset codes mandates for missions in and outside Africa. Next, the UN Peace Mission Mandates (UNPMM) dataset by Hellmüller et al. (2023) expands beyond Africa and includes data on peacekeeping missions, special political missions, and Special Envoys/Advisers; however, it lacks distinctions between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding tasks that are necessary to classify risky and less risky tasks. As a result, TAMM is a better choice for this analysis.

it by the total number of mandate tasks where the variable ranges from [0, 1].[11]

$$\text{Risk Ratio}_{t-1} = \frac{\sum \text{Risky Tasks}_{t-1}}{\sum \text{Total Tasks}_{t-1}} \tag{4.1}$$

Due to the properties of the mandate task dataset, measuring mandate risk as a proportion is the best alternative to a continuous measure of risk. A continuous variable requires data with an inherent ordering and meaningful distance between the values (Thyne, 2019). The mandate task dataset lacks an inherent ordering and distance between each task in terms of risk, making the creation of a risk continuum difficult. For example, I can distinguish that Chapter VII enforcement is riskier than the promotion of press freedom; however, it is challenging to identify the difference in risk between Chapter VII enforcement and buffer zone monitoring. Using a proportional measure assumes that each additional task increases the level of risk equally, meaning adding a peace agreement enforcement task has the same effect as including a border monitoring task. While a continuous measure of risk would provide more variation, a proportional measurement strategy is the next best alternative.

Battle deaths[12] captures the conflict environment difficulty that states consider when contributing troops. The battle death data comes from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). I use the monthly summation of the total number of deaths due to conflict, which includes battle deaths and civilian killings. I incorporate the interaction of risk ratio and total battle deaths to test Hypothesis 4.2.

[11]Some may argue that states receive risk signals based on the number of task in the mandate instead of the number of risky tasks out of all mandated tasks. To test this argument, I re-estimate the main models with the count of total tasks in the mandate and the count of risky tasks in the mandate. Both potential operationalizations are positive and statistically significant. These results, found in Appendix 1, signify that missions with more tasks require more resources. Since the Security Council must authorize achievable mandates in terms of tasks and resources (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2012), mandates with many tasks require more troops. This evidence demonstrates that task counts capture resource requirements instead of mandate risk.

[12]Scholars find that contributors reduce their contributions in response to peacekeeper fatalities (Ex. Oestman, 2021). I include total and malicious peacekeeper fatalities that a contributor and the mission experiences from Henke (2019) and find no statistical significance nor increased model fit for a one, three, or six-month lag. As a result, I do not include fatalities in the models.

Some argue that mandate risk is endogenous to conflict conditions as dangerous conflict environments could foster risky mandates. If this is true, the effect of mandate risk on contributions would be spurious to the conflict environment. To ensure that mandate risk is not spurious to a dangerous conflict environment, I follow the approach of Mattes and Savun (2009, 2010) and employ a fractional logistic model where battle deaths and mission-level variables predict risk ratio. I find that battle deaths do not affect mandate risk meaning mandate risk has an independent effect on troop contributions. Appendix 1 contains these results.

As a secondary analysis, I disaggregate the risk ratio index into individual risky tasks. I evaluate each risky task by interacting the task with battle deaths and plotting each task individually at various levels of battle deaths to investigate the task's marginal effect on troop contributions. This disaggregation further probes how mandate tasks deter troop contributions while providing corroborating evidence to the main analysis.

4.3.3 Controls

While the independent variables are measured at the mission-month level, collapsing to the mission-level not only obscures the state-level processes of making contributions, as explained above, but an increasingly coarse unit of analysis limits the model's ability to capture a state's propensity to contribute. While all states consider the risk associated with mission mandates and the conflict environment (Bullion, 1997), states are unequal in their likelihood to participate in peacekeeping missions. For example, democratic and wealthy states deploy smaller contingents to missions (Duursma and Gledhill, 2019; Bove and Elia, 2011) while neighboring states are inclined to participate in local peacekeeping efforts (Uzonyi, 2015). Aggregating to the mission-level removes contributor-level factors necessary to make the conditional independence assumption tenable (Cunningham, 2021) as state characteristics

alter a state's propensity to contribute, in addition to how a state interacts with the risky signals of mission mandates and the conflict environment. As a result, the contributor-level of analysis is necessary to protect against biased estimates.

The model includes control variable groups drawn from the literature to remove potentially confounding effects. The controls are divided into mission, contributor, and dyad controls. Mission level controls[13] account for other mission-specific characteristics. I include the number of contributors in each mission month from the International Peace Institute's Peacekeeping Database Perry and Smith (2013) to capture the collective action problem regarding troop provisions. From Koops et al. (2015), I code whether the mission was "re-hatted" or was a previous United Nations mission. To ensure that mandate risk is not spurious to mission shortfalls, I include the difference between the count of authorized troops and the total number of contributed troops in a mission month (Passmore et al., 2018). Due to data limitations, the main models will be those without the shortfall variable making shortfalls function as a robustness check.

The second group of controls accounts for a state's propensity to contribute troops. I include the contributor's gross domestic product per capita from the United Nations Department of Statistics (United Nations Statistics Division, 2021) and the contributor's level of democracy from the Varieties of Democracy dataset's polyarchy variable (Coppedge et al., 2021) to capture the effects of wealth and regime type on a state's propensity to contribute. The model also contains the total number of troops a contributor deployed to all peacekeeping operations (Perry and Smith, 2013). Finally, I include the proportion of a state's military personnel deployed to a specific mission each month using the count of military personnel from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset (v6.0) (Singer et al., 1972).

[13]Some argue that host state characteristics of the number of discriminated groups (Vogt et al., 2015) and rugged terrain (Shaver et al., 2019) affect contributions; however, I do not include these variables due to a lack of statistical significance nor improved model fit.

The last group of controls incorporates the relationship between the potential contributor and the host state. I create an indicator of whether the host and contributor are on the same continent, since neighboring[14] states are likely to contribute troops to stop conflict contagion. The model also includes the level of bilateral trade (Barbieri et al., 2009) and the number of joint international organization memberships (Pevehouse et al., 2020) to account for the international connections between the two states.

4.3.4 Method

I use the negative binomial estimator due to dependent variable over-dispersion. To combat heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation, I cluster the error term on the contributing country and include a lagged dependent variable as a regressor. I lag each independent variable by one month to ensure the ordering of the treatment and outcome. To demonstrate the robustness of the results, I provide multiple alternative specifications. First, I include observations of more than 200 battle deaths. Second, I include observer missions. Third, I expand the potential contributor sample to include 30 randomly selected non-contribution states. Fourth, I employ a sample of major powers and contributors on the same continent as the mission host state (Crescenzi et al., 2011). Fifth, I include a sample of only states who ever contributed to a mission. Sixth, I employ a zero-inflated negative binomial estimator. Each alternative specification presents results consistent with the main analysis and is in Appendix 1. In Appendix 1, I replicate the 15 and 30 potential contributor sampling procedures to generate ten samples for both counts. I employ meta-analysis to estimate an overall average of the effects across the ten samples for the 15 and 30 potential contributor samples to demonstrate that the results are not an artifact of the sampling procedure.

[14]I employ the Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al., 2002) to investigate if contiguous states send more peacekeepers. A Wald test demonstrates that contiguity is not distinguishable from zero nor adds to model fit.

4.4 Results

Hypothesis 4.1 states that higher mandate risk reduces the number of contributed troops. Table 2 provides strong support for the first hypothesis. In a naïve approach, Model 1 demonstrates that risk ratio is negatively associated with troop contributions at $p < 0.01$. In Model 2 with the entire list of controls, mandate risk remains negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. As a tougher test, in Model 4, which includes troop shortfalls, mandate risk is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. For substantive significance, Figure 4.3 presents predicted troop contributions across values of mandate risk with all other variables held at their central tendencies. For Model 2, a min to max shift of mandate risk from 0.40 to 1 reduces the predicted contribution from 53 to 15 troops, which is a 72% reduction. In more substantive terms, the average number of contributors in the sample is 15 per mission month. Missions with a risk ratio of 0.4 are estimated to have 795 troops in a month, but a mission with a risk ratio is estimated 1 to have 225 troops in a month. As a more strenuous test, a min to max shift of mandate risk for Model 4 represents a 53% reduction from 40 to 19 troops.

As further evidence, I draw on two missions: the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was authorized for about 6,000 troops, and the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) was authorized for about 5,000 troops. In 1997, UNIFIL had a risk ratio of 0.5, meaning an equal amount of risky and less risky tasks, and maintained an average troop contribution of 478 troops when a state decided to contribute. In contrast, UNTAES in 1997 had a risk ratio of 1 and an average troop contribution of 298 when a state contributed. This evidence means that UNTAES had a 37% less average contributed troops than UNIFIL when it maintained a twice as risky mandate. This evidence supports the hypothesis that risky missions receive decreased troop contributions supporting Hypothesis 4.1.

Table 4.2: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Contributions

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-1.601**	-2.103**	-1.875**	-1.250**	-1.179**
	(0.498)	(0.459)	(0.477)	(0.444)	(0.457)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$ (100s)	0.012	0.072	2.359**	0.087	0.929
	(0.085)	(0.099)	(0.636)	(0.104)	(0.668)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ X Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$			-3.086**		-1.150
			(0.858)		(0.940)
Troop Shortfall$_{t-1}$ (100s)				0.015**	0.015**
				(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of Contributors$_{t-1}$ (10s)		-0.069†	-0.073†	-0.099**	-0.100**
		(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Re-hatted$_{t-1}$		-0.045	-0.043	-0.131	-0.130
		(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.169)	(0.169)
Previous UN Mission$_{t-1}$		0.555**	0.539**	0.486**	0.479**
		(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.156)	(0.156)
Contributor GDP per Capita$_{t-1}$ (10,000s)		-0.114*	-0.114*	-0.110*	-0.110*
		(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Contributor Democracy$_{t-1}$		2.324**	2.290**	2.315**	2.304**
		(0.501)	(0.500)	(0.512)	(0.513)
Total Contributed Troops$_{t-1}$ (100s)		0.027**	0.026**	0.020**	0.020**
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Proportion of Contributor Troops$_{t-1}$		1.109†	1.108†	1.462†	1.459†
		(0.576)	(0.575)	(0.773)	(0.771)
Same Continent$_{t-1}$		-0.004	0.005	-0.160	-0.155
		(0.170)	(0.166)	(0.176)	(0.174)
Trade$_{t-1}$ (1,000,000,000s)		0.168*	0.162*	0.314**	0.310**
		(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.118)	(0.117)
Joint IOs$_{t-1}$		0.020**	0.019**	0.020**	0.020**
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Troops$_{t-1}$	0.632**	0.519**	0.519**	0.551**	0.550**
	(0.093)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Constant	3.529**	1.833**	1.707**	0.987	0.953
	(0.430)	(0.604)	(0.602)	(0.627)	(0.623)
lnalpha	2.056**	1.884**	1.882**	1.753**	1.752**
	(0.099)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Observations	78659	72553	72553	61665	61665

State clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample.
† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.



Figure 4.3: Predicted troop contributions based on 20,000 simulations for Models 2 (left) and 4 (right). Gray bands represent the inner 95% of predicted values.

After finding support for Hypothesis 4.1, I evaluate Hypothesis 4.2. This hypothesis states that the negative effect of mandate risk on troop contributions will strengthen as the number of battle deaths increases. In Models 3 and 5, the constituent term of risk ratio is negative and significant at $p < 0.01$, signifying that when monthly battle deaths are at zero, mandate risk reduces troop contributions. For Model 3, the constituent term of battle deaths is positive and significant at $p < 0.01$, meaning when the risk ratio is zero, battle deaths increase troop contributions; however, a risk ratio of zero does not exist in this sample. Furthermore, in Model 3, the interaction of risk ratio and battle deaths is negative and significant at $p < 0.01$, but Model 5's interaction term is not statistically significant; however, interaction term significance requires graphical interpretation. Based on Figure 4.4, the interaction terms in Models 3 and 5 are negatively significant at $p < 0.05$ across all levels of battle deaths, except for Model 5 when battle deaths near 200. For Model 3, a min to max shift of battle deaths from zero to 200 represents a marginal effect increase from -39 troops to about -154 troops. For the more difficult test of Model 5, a min to max shift of battle deaths is an increase from -28 troops to -91 troops. These substantive effects provide strong evidence for Hypothesis 4.2 that the effect



Figure 4.4: Marginal effect of risk ratio on contributions conditional on battle deaths based on 20,000 simulations for Models 3 (left) and 5 (right). Gray bands represent the inner 95% of predicted values.

of risky mandates becomes increasingly strong as the conflict becomes increasingly dangerous.

A few control variables present intriguing relationships. Increased shortfalls and missions that are a continuation, such as UNOSOM moving to UNOSOM II, are associated with higher contributions. Due to collective action problems, more contributors reduce the number of troops states deploy. While wealthier states contribute fewer troops to missions, democratic states deploy more peacekeepers, which is a finding counter to the literature (Ex. Duursma and Gledhill, 2019). States who send a significant proportion of their armed forces and are large contributors send sizable deployments. States that trade more and maintain more international organization relationships with the host state contribute more troops.

4.5 Disaggregation of Risk Ratio

After finding support for both theoretical implications, I now investigate the effect of individual risky tasks on troop contributions. For this analysis, I estimate separate models for the interaction of each risky task with battle deaths to capture state decisions in light of the task and conflict environment. This analysis aims



Figure 4.5: Marginal effect of risky tasks on troops contributions based on 20,000 simulations. Black lines represent the inner 95% of predicted values.

to probe each task's direction concerning contributions. Figure 4.5 visualizes the marginal effect of each task on contributions conditional on battle deaths. The graphs provide marginal effects of mandate risk with battle deaths set at zero, its mean, and one standard deviation above the mean. The original control variables are set to their central tendencies, similar to previous graphics. The analysis provides rough evidence of each task's respective influence on contributions.

Figure 4.5 presents a few interesting patterns. First, some tasks demonstrate diminishing positive effects, such as the agreement implementation, humanitarian protection, and United Nations personnel protection tasks. Second, other tasks signal contributor willingness to accept risky actions, as seen by security and police reform assistance and refugee assistance. Overall, the group of risky tasks demonstrates both deterrent or compellent effects on contributions conditional on battle deaths. While states make contribution decisions based on mandates in the aggregate, these estimates provide an initial investigation of which tasks may be driving the results found in the main analysis.

4.6 Note on Endogeneity

It is common for peacekeeping statistical models to suffer from endogeneity (Ex. Fortna, 2004a; Beardsley, 2011; Fjelde et al., 2019), but like past studies, I argue that endogeneity biases against my findings. Peacekeeping missions are not randomly assigned since mission authorization is contingent on an unobserved factor, the United Nations decision-making process. Fears related to building a poor reputation incentivize the United Nations to provide the mission with sufficient resources for successful mandate implementation. This fear motivates the United Nations to campaign for larger contributions.

In addition, the United Nations will authorize the mission with more risky tasks to support the mission's goal of peace generation, such as when the United Nations authorized the use of force to protect civilians in Libya (United Nations, 2011). Due to the dual positive correlations between the unobserved factor, mandate risk, and troop contributions, the overall bias is positive that under-estimates the results.

Another source of bias concerns the optimal level of troops required to fulfill each task. The United Nations does not provide guidelines concerning the number of troops necessary for each task. However, the United Nations instructs mission force commanders to deploy larger troop contingents as a costly signal of resolve to deter future violence (Fearon, 1997; Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). To effectively discourage future conflict, the mission needs more risky tasks that authorize the use of force. The dual positive correlation between optimal troop levels, mandate risk, and troop contributions creates a positive bias that under-reports the results.

An important underlying assumption of the analysis is that the optimal number of troops required to implement risky tasks is higher than less risky tasks. While the United Nations does not publicly provide guidelines concerning the number of peacekeepers the force commander should deploy, United Nations' policy dictates that larger contingents are required to enforce risky tasks since large deployments

to violent locations function as costly signals of resolve. Robust shows of force allow missions to display their willingness to enforce their tasks by limiting conflict violence (Fearon, 1997; Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). For example, the Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence notes that the military component is "required to carry out coordinated, robust... operations... to prevent a [conflict-related sexual violence] threat from manifesting itself, to protect civilians, and to neutralize threats," (United Nations, 2020, 95). Furthermore, an infantry battalion manual stresses the importance of force protection through robust deployments to avoid injuries and implement mandated tasks (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). As a result, the assumption that risky tasks require more troops on average than less risky tasks is not a strong assumption.

4.7 Strategic Mission Mandates

Some scholars may argue that the United Nations strategically sets mission mandates in anticipation of contributor reluctance to support risky missions, introducing potential bias to the estimates. Institutions such as the United Nations engage in organizational learning by analyzing the outcomes generated by various policies over time (Hirschmann, 2012). Knowing that contributors are wary of risky mandates (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017), the United Nations may strategically reduce the level of mandate risk to avoid deterring potential contributors. Furthermore, to create successful mission outcomes, the United Nations will attempt to increase state contributions since larger missions are associated with various indicators of mission success (Ex. Hultman et al., 2013). This strategic behavior creates a potential negative bias that over-reports the effect of mandate risk. Below, I argue that strategic mandate creation due to anticipation is unlikely.

After the 2000 Brahimi report, the United Nations has not only increased the

level of risk in mission mandates, but it has also increased the overall size of mission troop contingents. The Brahimi Report recommended developing "sufficiently robust" peacekeeping mandates in terms of when missions may use force matched with "bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent," (Brahimi Report, 2000, x). Since the Report, the United Nations Security Council has increased the use of Chapter VII authorization (Howard and Dayal, 2018), especially for protecting civilians (Phayal and Prins, 2020). Furthermore, the overall total of deployed peacekeepers has expanded from 12,000 troops in 1999 to over 108,000 in 2015 (Gao, 2016). This evidence suggests that since 2000, the United Nations has increased the risk associated with mandates and the number of troops required from contributors, making strategic mandate setting to foster contributions unlikely.

As further evidence, the effect of mandate risk on contributions is consistent before and after the Brahimi Report. If the United Nations engages in strategic mandate creation concerning contributions, the most likely case to observe this difference would be after the Brahimi Report in 2000. To test this, I re-estimated Models 2 and 4 by splitting the samples into observations before 2000 and those after 2000. To visually inspect if the effect of mandate risk differs across the sub-samples, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 provide simulated mandate risk coefficients from Models 2 and 4. Figure 4.6 demonstrates that the coefficient of risk ratio is relatively equal before and after the Brahimi Report. Figure 4.7 visualizes that the coefficients of the risk ratio, battle deaths, and the interaction are equal before and after the Brahimi Report. Table 4.3 provides further evidence of coefficient equality. Using seemingly unrelated estimations, I re-estimated Models 2 and 4 to compare the coefficients across the samples.[15] Since $p > 0.05$ for all coefficients for Models 2 and 4, I fail to reject the null of coefficient equality across the sub-samples. Due to the lack of statistical significance in a most likely case, the estimates from the main analysis are unlikely to experience



Figure 4.6: Risk Ratio Pre-Post Brahimi

Note: Vertical lines present 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5% quantiles. 20,000 Simulations

Table 4.3: Test of Coefficient Equality

	Model 2	Model 4		
	Risk Ratio	Risk Ratio	Battle Deaths	Interaction
χ^2	1.77	1.53	0.01	0.24
Degrees of Freedom	1	1	1	1
Probability	0.18	0.22	0.95	0.62

The null hypothesis is coeffficient equality.

negative bias due to strategic mandate design.

4.8 Conclusion

This study explains how mission mandates and the conflict environment affect troop contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. The peacekeeping contribution literature has overlooked critical mission-specific characteristics that affect contribution decisions, specifically mission mandates and the conflict environment. Using regression analysis, I find that risky mandates reduce troop contributions to

[15]The process is similar to a Chow test. The STATA command "suest" simultaneously estimates the pre- and post-2000 models to compare the coefficients across the two sub-samples. After estimation, I rely on the χ^2 test statistic to evaluate the null hypothesis of coefficient equality across the sub-samples.



Figure 4.7: Risk Ratio, Battle Deaths, Interaction Pre-Post Brahimi

Note: Vertical lines present 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5% quantiles. 20,000 Simulations

peacekeeping missions, especially when the conflict environment becomes increasingly dangerous. The disaggregation of mandate risk demonstrates that some risky tasks deter contributions while others entice deployments. Overall, I conclude that states reduce their troop contributions when mandates are increasingly risky and when the conflict environment is dangerous. While the United Nations prefers to intervene in the hardest conflicts, states prefer the relatively easy ones.

This study provides significant implications for those investigating peacekeeping effectiveness and the effects of mission size (Ex. Hultman et al., 2013; Fjelde et al., 2019; Phayal and Prins, 2020). This study suggests that larger peacekeeping missions are most likely a product of less risky mandates and safe conflict environments. Missions with risky mandates and dangerous conflict environments limit the generation of large mission sizes, hindering conflict-related outcomes. Furthermore, the United Nations' reliance on Chapter VII authorization and civilian protection mandates (United Nations, 2022c) is inadvertently reducing troop contributions to the most dangerous missions limiting mission effectiveness. Policymakers must note

the unintended consequences of the Responsibility to Protect and the foundation of civilian protection mandates while expanding risk premium rewards to attract contributors (Di Razza, 2020a). Increasing the employment of risk premiums in risky missions should increase contributor benefits and entice contributions.

Chapter 5 Mandate Risk and Local Peacekeeper Deployments

> "If the Untied Nations and T/PCCs [troop and police contributing countries] do not change their mindset, take risks and show a willingness to face these new challenges, they will be consciously sending troops into harm's way... To deter and repel attacks and to defeat attackers, the United Nations needs to be strong and not fear to use force when necessary. Some T/PCCs and leadership remain risk-averse when it comes to using force, but they have failed to understand projecting strength is more secure for uniformed and civilian personnel."
>
> - Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017)

In 2017, Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz published his report, *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers*, in response to heightened peacekeeping fatalities. In his report, Santos Cruz indicted troop-contributing countries and United Nations peacekeeping leadership for being unwilling to project force against combatants. For example, from 2010 - 2014, United Nations peacekeepers failed to respond to roughly 400 of 500 attacks, contributing to at least 2,282 civilian deaths. The United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services noted that these cases of inaction were likely due to troop caveats, limitations placed on contributed troops by their home state (The Economist, 2021), thereby limiting the ability of force commanders to deploy troops.

In contrast to some missions suffering from inaction, other missions experience non-commanded peacekeeper action. In 2014, al-Qaeda militants captured 45 Fijian soldiers from the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the rebel group's conflict against Syrian government forces in the Golan Heights. In response, the mission's force commander ordered a Filipino troop contingent near the capture point to hold their fire and avoid violence that could endanger the captured

peacekeepers. Instead of following orders, the Filipino forces called their commanding officer in Manila, who ordered the troops to hold their ground and not surrender. After three days of violent engagement, the Filipino troops successfully deterred the rebel militants and escaped. The 45 Fijians were released two weeks later (Charbonneau and Mogato, 2014).

While some force commanders are unable or unwilling to use force against combatants, others are more willing to maintain deployments in the face of danger. In 2009, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) stationed 196 peacekeepers in rebel group occupied Muhjiriya, Sudan. The Government of Sudan requested the mission to redeploy to another location before government forces began a major offensive to retake the city. The force commander rejected the request and remained in Muhjiriya to protect the 30,000 residents. Even amid government-rebel conflict, peacekeepers protected the 3,000 civilians that camped near the mission's base from further suffering from the costs of conflict (Holt et al., 2009).

These examples demonstrate that peacekeeping force commanders, the actor of interest in this chapter, consider when and how to use force to defend their mandates. While force commanders may be reluctant to use force in some contexts, they are still motivated to deploy troops in other situations. This puzzle regarding force commanders' decisions to deploy troops motivates the following question: *Why do force commanders send robust troop deployments to some mission locations and not others?*

I argue that force commanders face a dilemma regarding deploying troops to locations within the host state. Force commanders maintain their appointments with the United Nations by performing well during mandate implementation. To successfully defend the mandate, force commanders should deploy large troop contingents to deter violence; however, caveats placed by troop-contributing countries and threats of non-compliance by lower-ranking officers reduce the size of troop deployments due

to the level of risk associated with the mission. To test the implications of the theory, I leverage the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) dataset and the Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) dataset (Lloyd, 2021a). The results from the quantitative analysis support past work that peacekeepers move to locations of violence, such as sites of battle deaths and one-sided violence; however, risky mandates reduce local deployments. This negative effect intensifies when interacted with acts of conflict violence until the data becomes sparse at extreme counts of conflict violence. Importantly, the negative effects of mandates are strongest in the presence of recent conflict, meaning troops deploy to violence locations after a significant amount of time after the event. Last, counter to expectations, long tenured force commanders are able to deploy more troops and they are resilient to the effects of risky mandates.

The results of this chapter provide further insight into the difficulties associated with risky mandates. The previous chapter discussed how increasingly risky mandates disincentivize potential troop contributors from participating in dangerous missions. The results demonstrated that missions in the direst situations suffer from low contributions leading to resource deficits. This chapter takes the next step to discuss how resources are deployed throughout the host state as I move from the contributor unit of analysis to the host state grid unit of analysis. Instead of analyzing troop contributions, this chapter investigates how factors, such as mandate risk and the conflict environment, affect where peacekeepers go within the host state after they arrive. The results of this chapter demonstrate that missions with risky mandates and dangerous conflict conditions experience reduced troop deployments to locations within the host state.

Figure 5.1: Peacekeeping Operation Authority Structure



Figure Adopted from Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2019)

5.1 The Role of the Force Commander

The United Nations maintains a chain of command to create a hierarchy and describe the general responsibilities of mission decision-makers. Figure 5.1 visualizes an average chain of command for peacekeeping missions. After the Security Council formally establishes a peacekeeping operation by passing a resolution, the responsibility of the mission is delegated from the Security Council to the head of the United Nations Secretariat, the Secretary-General (on Foreign Relations, 2021). The Secretary-General then appoints a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who oversees all military, police, and civilian components of the mission (Oksamytna et al., 2021). The Special Representative functions as the Head of Mission to ensure that the mission follows the political and strategic guidelines set by the Secretary-General. The Mission Leadership Team contains the Chief of Staff, the Head of the Police Component, the Director of Missions Support, and other smaller component heads to advise the Head of Mission. In addition to these officers, the Mission Leadership Team includes the Head of the Military Component called the Force Commander (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019).

The United Nations does not explicitly describe the selection process and role of the force commander, but other United Nations documents can fill this gap. After the Security Council authorizes a new mission, United Nations member-states recommend candidates for the force commander posting. Officers from the Secretariat then interview these candidates and pass the top candidate to the Secretary-General for final selection (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2021). While many of these potential force commanders maintain advanced military rank and experience, political reasons shape commander selection. Many force commanders come from member-states active in the international community, have previously supplied a force commander for the mission, are geographically close to the mission host state, and contribute large quantities of troops (Oksamytna et al., 2021). Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, admitted that mission military officers are often decided by major troop-contributing countries, which sometimes led to the selection of lesser quality commanders (Guéhenno, 2015, 226).

Once on mission, force commanders exert command over troop movements and the use of force while on mission. Force commanders are responsible for gathering information on the level of training for the contributed units and filling in training gaps to develop an effective fighting force (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1999). This training includes information on the rules of engagement that detail scenarios when peacekeepers can use force (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). This information is also provided in writing to lower-ranking officers to detail when their troops may use force in violent situations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2017). In addition to authorizing the use of force, force commanders have the authority to assign tasks to units and deploy the troops throughout the mission host. Should the units defy their orders, force commanders are authorized to discipline and punish their troops. This authorization also extends to cases of units following the order of their national officers since this

leads to the undermining of force commander authority. In these cases, the United Nations will take action against the member-state to support the authority of the force commander (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019).

5.2 Force Commander Benefits

The office of force commander supplies the benefits of political opportunity, prestige, and the ability to shape United Nations military policy to those selected for the job. According to Villa and Passos (2022), force commanders develop political skills necessary for political advancement. First, force commanders become adept in political articulation and negotiations due to consistent communication with the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, local authorities, and rebel groups. For example, three force commanders from African missions[1] met with the United Nations Security Council to discuss the need to rapidly establish a secure environment for peacebuilding and peacekeeper protection (S/PV.8251, 2018). Second, force commanders gain hands-on experience in conflict management, mediation, and nonviolent political action containment through the allowance and protection of nonviolent protests (Belgioioso et al., 2021b). Third, force commanders build international reputations that create opportunities to exert political influence in domestic arenas. For example, twenty high-ranking Brazilian peacekeepers, many of who acted as force commanders, obtained political positions such as Defense Minister, Army Commander, and Vice President of Brazil (Villa and Passos, 2022).[2] As a result of their skills and experience, force commanders develop successful political careers after leaving their posts.

[1]These force commanders included Major General Jean-Paul Deconinck from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Lieutenant General Frank Mushyo Kamanzi from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and Lieutenant General Leonard Ngondi from the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (S/PV.8251, 2018).

[2]General Hamilton Mourão was a military observer in the United Nations Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM III) from 1995 - 1997 and serves as the Vice President of Brazil as of 2019

In addition to domestic opportunities, force commanders' skills and experiences make them assets to the United Nations' bureaucratic arm of military operations. International organizations effectively gather information and enforce policy when assisted by experienced local or grass-roots actors (Murdie and Davis, 2012; Tallberg et al., 2014). As a result, the United Nations is increasingly interested in hiring former force commanders as they provide valuable first-hand experience of successful and unsuccessful modes of mandate implementation (See S/PV.8251, 2018; dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017). For example, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye of Senegal served as the force commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) from 2005 - 2010.[3] After serving as force commander, Lieutenant General Gaye served as the Assistant Secretary-General and the Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations from 2010 - 2013, which allowed him to advise the Secretary-General, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, and all peacekeeping operations with military components (United Nations, 2022a). After this appointment, the United Nations selected Lieutenant General Gaye as the Special Representative to the Secretary-General and Head of Mission over the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office for the Central African Republic (BINUCA) (SG/A/1415, 2013).[4] This example demonstrates how force commanders can leverage this experience for a successful career after their military service.

Military officers who become force commanders resign from high-ranking domestic and international military positions to lead a peacekeeping operation's military component. Major General Nirmal Kumar Thapa of Nepal was selected as the Head

(Villa and Passos, 2022).

[3]Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye began as the force commander of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and remained force commander after the mission transitioned to MONUSCO.

[4]Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye was later forced out of this role in 2015 by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in response to sexual abuse allegations against the United Nations peacekeepers operating in the Central African Republic.

of Mission and Force Commander for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in 2022. Previously, Major General Thapa served as the General Officer and Joint Coordinator at the Secretariat of the National Security Council of Nepal and as the Director-General of Military Operations of the Nepali Army (SG/A/2132, 2022). As another example, Lieutenant General Cornelis Johannes Matthijssen of the Netherlands resigned as the Deputy Chief of Staff Plans for The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Joint Force Command to accept the post of force commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2021 (SG/A/2077, 2021). Both officers resigned from high-ranking military offices, domestically and internationally, for the opportunity to advance their careers through the office of force commander.

During their deployment, force commanders may act as informal policymakers through the development of procedural precedence. Force commanders are responsible for ensuring that all subordinate officers and peacekeepers are familiar with the rules regarding the use of force (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2017); however, these rules often create contradictory statements when compared to mission mandates. For example, the United Nations Secretariat defines civilian protection as human security promotion, while the Department of Peacekeeping Operations defines it as saving human lives from physical violence. These differences create confusion among peacekeepers regarding civilian protection (Phayal and Prins, 2020), and present opportunities for force commanders to selectively use force to match their ideals or those of their home state (Harig and Jenne, 2022). For example, Chinese delegations to the United Nations have criticized the use of force on mission leading to policy development for peacekeeper safety and the promotion of troop caveats (Fung, 2022). These policy preferences coincide with China's deployment of over 2,000 troops, where thirteen occupy posts such as force commander and deputy force commander (The State Council Informa-

tion Office, 2020), granting the state control over procedural precedence for the use of force. With this in mind, the office of force commander provides individuals with opportunities for career advancement and informal policy development.

5.3 Pressure of the Position

Force commanders have the opportunity to build successful political careers, but poor mission performance undermines opportunities for advancement. As previously noted, the Secretary-General maintains the authority to appoint individuals as force commanders. As a result, force commanders must uphold "the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity," as governed by the United Nations charter concerning Secretary-General appointments (United Nations, 1945f). In other words, force commanders are hired and fired based on merit. The United Nations maintains the responsibility to protect, meaning the international community expects the United Nations to intervene when a sovereign government lacks the capacity or is unwilling to establish peace and defend its citizens (Thakur, 2016). Force commanders unable to maintain high-quality performance records by protecting civilians or limiting battle deaths fail to meet performance standards, leading to their resignation or replacement (Lundgren et al., 2021). These pressures become magnified since force commanders must direct missions sent into the harshest conflicts characterized by high death tolls and precarious moments of peace (Fortna, 2004a, 2008). The pressure to achieve, matched with intervention in the most challenging conflicts, puts high stress on force commanders who desire to remain in office and receive later benefits.

Many force commanders have met untimely ends to their tenure due to the pressure associated with the position.[5] In October 2008, Lieutenant General Vincente Diaz de Villegas of Spain resigned as force commander after less than two months for "personal reasons." During his tenure as force commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(MONUC), the mission oversaw the collapse of a newly minted peace deal, rebel destruction of two United Nations armored vehicles from rockets, escalated violence by the warring parties, and riots near the mission base that led to one civilian death (Balakrishnan, 2008). In January 2006, General Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar of Brazil committed suicide while acting as force commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as Haiti experienced the forced removal of the Haitian president from office, delayed elections, an average kidnapping rate of 12 people a day in December 2005, and the death of 10 United Nations soldiers and police officers (Thompson, 2006). In addition, Lieutenant General (Retired) Roméo Dallaire was the force commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the genocide of Tutsis in 1994.[6] The former commander made multiple failed attempts at suicide and continues to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of his never-ending mental images of the tragedy he was powerless to stop (Bethune, 2016). These serve as examples of the pressures that force commanders endure when the costs of poor mission performance become increasingly high.

5.4 The Force Commander's Dilemma

While on mission, force commanders face pressure regarding troop deployments from at least three different groups: the United Nations, contributing states, and lower-ranking officers. Figure 5.2 presents a visual of the dilemma that force commanders face when making decisions regarding the size of troop deployments through three paths. In Path 2, the United Nations pressures force commanders to deploy robust troop contingents and deter conflict violence. In Path 1, troop caveats limit the number of troops force commanders may deploy in the host state. Finally, Path 3

[5]Lundgren et al. (2021) find that the median tenure of a force commander is a little under two years.

[6]Lieutenant General (Retired) Roméo Dallaire attempted to alert the United Nations of the impending genocide with the "Genocide Fax" where he detailed the conditions of the mass unrest. The United Nations was forewarned but failed to act, leading to partial responsibility for the genocide. See Gourevitch (1998) for more information on the "Genocide Fax."

Figure 5.2: Limitations on the Force Commander



Note: Thicker lines represent "more" while thinner line represent "less."

visualizes how force commanders are also restricted by lower-ranking officers' threats to defy orders, reducing the number of troops a commander will deploy. Below, I explain how the three actors apply contrasting pressure through their respective paths on force commanders' decisions regarding troop deployments.

5.4.1 United Nations Pressure

The United Nations maintains the responsibility to protect, generating its desire to limit the adverse effects of conflict. The responsibility to protect refers to a sovereign state's duty to protect its population and provide for citizens' general welfare; however, should a state be unable or unwilling to ensure the safety and welfare of its citizens, the international community is called to enforce this responsibility. After the tragedy in Rwanda, the United Nations adopted Resolution A/RES/60/1 in 2005 that outlined the international community's empowerment of the United Nations to enforce the responsibility to protect through Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter (Thakur, 2016). Since 2005, the United Nations Security Council has cited the responsibility to protect in more than 80 resolutions concerning

the limitation of armed conflict and human rights abuses (The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2022). For example, the mandate for the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) includes provisions concerning civilian protection. The additions were rooted in the responsibility to protect due to the public outcry for intervention on behalf of civilians. Due to its reliance on the legitimacy conferred upon it by member-states (Binder and Heupel, 2015), the United Nations desires to limit the effects of conflict through peacekeeping operations.

From its responsibility to protect, the United Nations, through Path 2, instructs force commanders to deploy troops to project the mission's power and reduce the negative externalities of conflict. The United Nations standard for mission success is measured by force commanders' ability to accomplish their mandated tasks, especially those related to conflict management and civilian protection. To implement these tasks, force commanders and their subordinate officers are instructed to deploy robust troop contingents to violent locations as shows of force. Robust troop deployments are deterrent signals of mission resolve to demonstrate the United Nations' desire to generate and protect peace within the host state (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). The costs associated with peacekeeper mobilization, from local patrol states or mission and sector headquarters, function as a sunk cost signal (Fearon, 1997; Quek, 2021). Large peacekeeping deployments successfully limit battle deaths, civilian targeting, and the duration of conflict (Hultman et al., 2014, 2013, 2016), demonstrating how large deployments are conducive to mission success. With this in mind, force commanders are motivated to deploy large troop contingents due to United Nations pressure and incentives from holding office.

Force commanders risk being removed from their commands by not adequately protecting their mandate. The United Nations evaluates commanders on their abilities to implement their mandates by deterring further violence (Lundgren et al., 2021), making poor mission performance grounds for removal. For example, Lieutenant

General Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki was appointed as the force commander for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in May 2016 after spending three years as the Deputy Army Chief of Staff-Command and Control for Kenya Army forces (SG/A/1658, 2016). In November 2016, the United Nations disgracefully removed the UNMISS force commander after a report demonstrated the mission's inability to protect civilians, which Secretary-General Ki-Moon called a "chaotic and ineffective response." During attacks in the capital city, peacekeepers abandoned their posts, ignored humanitarian and civilian requests for protection, and allowed the looting of the mission compound. In addition, peacekeepers permitted acts of gross sexual assault near the mission compound while other peacekeepers watched from their base's windows. The force commander was blamed for improper troop preparation and command, which led to removal from his post (Quinn, 2016). With this in mind, force commanders are incentivized by the United Nations to send troops to enforce their mandate and maintain the United Nations' image as a protector due to the credible United Nations threat of removal for poor performance.

5.4.2 Contributing State Pressure

Second, contributing states pressure force commanders through Path 1 by maintaining control over their troops on mission. In contrast to the United Nations, which favors larger troop deployments, contributing states apply pressure to limit force commanders' opportunities to deploy a large contingent. States contribute troops to missions in exchange for troop reimbursements, coup proofing, and United Nations leadership considerations (Gaibulloev et al., 2015; Hesse, 2015; Oksamytna et al., 2021). However, states incur heavy costs associated with losing contributed troops, such as material costs from soldier investments and audience costs from fatalities in a war of choice (Bove, 2011; Oestman, 2021). Contributing states impose troop caveats to avoid the costs of peacekeeper fatalities and receive contribution-related benefits.

Troop caveats are restrictions that states place on their troops that limit deployment locations and the use of force by their peacekeepers while on mission (Novosseloff, 2016). During the Memoranda of Understanding development, states specify informal caveats with the United Nations. Troop caveats are not written or recorded into a database[7] for force commanders, creating issues when the commander intends to deploy troops. Since many of these caveats are secret, force commanders become aware of these limits when ordered troops overtly refuse to follow their orders.

Former force commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz wrote in a report that troop-contributing states are risk-averse and unwilling to allow their troops to use force on mission. He wrote that troop-contributing countries do not initially realize that troops "can die in this country... by enemy attack" and that fatalities are "not what they're expecting in peacekeeping" when countries make contributions (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017, 10). The United Nations flag and the blue helmet have changed from a sign of peace to a blue target, as warring parties recognize that troops are unable or unwilling to engage in combat to deter violent advances. Troop caveats limit information and skill exchanges between units as some of the most trained and equipped troops cannot use force. As a result, only the worst troops can be sent on deployments, leading to poor combat performance (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017). Due to caveats, force commanders are left with only a few poorly trained troops to engage warring parties, demotivating force commanders to deploy troops to conflict locations.

Over time, force commanders and the United Nations have become increasingly aware of the frequent use of troop caveats. In 2015, the United Nations Security Council held a meeting regarding how troop caveats limit a mission's ability to pro-

[7]Richard Gowan of the International Crisis Group believes that a caveat database does not exist since these records would "add humiliating precision to the accusations of dereliction of duty traded between different national contingents in the same operation" (Economist, 2021).

tect civilians. The Head of Mission and Force Commander for the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) detailed the mission's inability to create a mission presence on the Syrian-controlled side of the ceasefire line due to caveats in response to the dangerous conditions stemming from the Syrian Civil War. As a result, the mission could not send officers to major mission cities, such as Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo. Representatives from Angola and the United States emphasized that caveats undermined the mission chain of command as contributed troops inhibited the actions of higher-ranked force commanders. Other representatives noted that caveats are due to increasing peacekeeper fatalities. The representatives warned that increased caveats limit the mission's ability to protect civilians, leading to more civilian and peacekeeper fatalities (S/PV.7464, 2015). As a result of troop caveats, force commanders are increasingly hamstrung in their abilities to send large deployments to violent locations, applying counteracting pressure to the United Nations' desire to send robust deployments.

5.4.3 Lower-Ranking Officer Pressure

The last actor that applies negative pressure to commanders leading to smaller deployments through Path 3 is junior officers who threaten non-compliance. Military structures have strict chains of command to facilitate the flow of orders and enforcement (Mattila et al., 2017), which, as seen in Figure 5.1, also applies to peacekeeping missions. Drawing from the military relations literature, the force commander acts as the principal while lower-ranking officers act as agents since the officers must carry out force commander orders. These orders range from orders to patrol mission sectors to engaging with warring parties to protect civilians (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). However, lower-ranking officers may defy their orders due to national commander orders and caveats when confronted with dangerous conditions, creating agency drift (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012; Charbonneau and Mogato, 2014).

Officers are trained to minimize unit fatalities (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b), meaning officers are unlikely to intervene in dangerous conditions that threaten the lives of their troops (French, 2009). Peacekeeping contingents have high social group heterogeneity and low unit cohesion. The unit dynamics foster desertion and responsibility shirking (McLauchlin, 2015) that undermines mission performance. These dynamics suggest peacekeeping operations may observe order defiance when conditions become increasingly dangerous. These dynamics are prevalent in missions, such as in the case of Juba in South Sudan, when peacekeepers deserted during a conflict at a United Nations base. The United Nations ordered the peacekeepers at the base to intervene and protect civilians and humanitarian workers, but the peacekeepers would not leave the safety of the base (Burke, 2016). As a result, force commanders were unlikely to send units to dangerous situations and avoid undermining their authority due to non-compliance (Nassif, 2015), demonstrating the pressure on force commanders to avoid sending robust deployments to dangerous situations.

Force commanders must balance officer preferences on mission to avoid peacekeeper mutinies. In September 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) experienced a military mutiny by about 150 Chadian troops. After fighting against the Tuareg militants in Northern Mali in April 2013, Chadian troops remained stationed in Tessalit to enforce a peace deal signed in June 2013. Once the ceasefire broke and conflict resumed, the soldiers deserted in protest of their pay and long service time in Tessalit. The Chadian troops experienced 10 Chadian peacekeeper deaths through two attacks in September 2013. In November of the same year, 38 Chadian peacekeepers once again abandoned their posts in protest of poor conditions, rooted in the slow transportation of food and water as these soldiers monitored the dangerous and dry conditions of Northern Mali, which also hosted continued violence between rebel and government forces (Reuters Staff, 2013; Knodell, 2014). With this in mind, force commanders must consider the

preferences of lower officers and their troops to avoid non-compliance and peacekeeper mutinies, pushing the commanders to send smaller deployments.

5.4.4 Protecting Civilians or Troops

Military officers are trained to accomplish directives, such as engaging the enemy or protecting civilians, with the expectation of troops (Wong et al., 2003). Rooted in a lack of intervention in response to civilian deaths in Rwanda, the United Nations has encouraged member-states to develop military training that includes the protection of civilians (Gordon, 2013). For example, the United States Military Academy (West Point) and the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps train their officers on the importance of civilian protection (Bell, 2022), which is observed by the United States' preference to protect civilians at the risk of losing troops during its conflict against the Taliban (Flaherty and Burns, 2010). As further reinforcement, handbooks developed by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations explain that troops must prioritize the protection of civilians at the risk of losing troops (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b,a). Due to their training, force commanders are willing to risk the lives of their troops to protect civilians.

Even though force commanders and their officers are expected to protect civilians, they must also weigh these considerations in light of force protection principles. Military officers are responsible for the safety of their troops, meaning they must consider the potential outcomes of violent engagement in light of the potential costs of troop fatalities (Geiss, 2012). Force commanders that lose troops on mission signal trends towards defeat and incompetence (Weisiger, 2016a; Sudduth, 2021) and reduce their available resources, especially considering that contributors withdraw troops due to fatalities (Oestman, 2021). Troop fatalities are unavoidable products of conflict, but officers prefer to protect their troops instead of civilians. In a survey of the Australian Army, senior officers expressed that they would defend a civilian in exchange

for losing a soldier; however, officers are more inclined to avoid risks to their units and not intervene on behalf of civilians (Bell and Terry, 2021). The need for force protection is increasingly salient in peacekeeping operations as missions experience troop shortfalls and contributors that withdraw troops in reaction to peacekeeper fatalities (Passmore et al., 2018; Levin, 2021). As a result, force commanders are willing to accept low levels of risk and deploy peacekeepers, but force commanders are less inclined to send large contingents to protect civilians when risk is high.

In an interview with PassBlue, Lieutenant General Dennis Gyllensporre, former force commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), explained that troop deployments depend on his ability to protect peacekeepers. Lieutenant General Gyllensporre formerly led MINUMSA, the "world's deadliest peacekeeping mission," from 2018 - 2021, where he presided over forty peacekeeper fatalities, with many occurring due to combat. The former force commander explained that the United Nations prioritized the protection of civilians through the authorization of the use of force; however, the former commander admitted that he did not intervene to protect civilians on multiple occasions due to dangerous conditions. He highlighted that he is not only responsible to the United Nations, but also to the soldiers, troop-contributing countries, and the soldiers' families (Hoije, 2022). This interview by the former force commander exemplifies the trade-off between mandate implementation and force protection that drives the force commander's dilemma.

5.5 Effect of Mandate Risk and Observable Implications

The force commander's dilemma models the pressure that force commanders face from the United Nations, troop-contributing countries, and lower-ranking officers when making decisions regarding the size of troop deployments. Two factors that drive the trade-off force commanders must make are conflict conditions and the

level of mandate risk. Referring again to Figure 5.2, the level of conflict danger dictates whether factors like battle deaths or the presence of one-sided violence function through Path 2 while the level of mandate risk operates through Paths 1 and 3. The intensity of conflict danger captures the effect of Path 2 on the decision calculus of force commanders. The United Nations prefers force commanders to engage in dangerous events to enforce the institution's responsibility to protect civilians through the presence of peacekeepers (Thakur, 2016). As the level of conflict danger increases, force commanders will deploy increasingly robust troop deployments as a sunk cost mechanism to deter violence (Fearon, 1997; Quek, 2021). Commander decisions concerning conflict danger lead to Hypothesis 5.1 to test for Path 2:

Hypothesis 5.1. *As the conflict violence in a cell increases, the number of troops sent to the location will increase.*

Even though this was previously investigated (See Phayal, 2019; Phayal and Prins, 2020; Fjelde et al., 2019), the current literature is limited in its ability to explain the roughly 400 failed peacekeeper responses to warring party violence. The level of mission mandate risk captures the pressure exerted on force commanders by troop contributors and lower-ranking officers as mandates dictate how peacekeepers must operate in dangerous situations. Mandate risk signals the likelihood of peacekeeper death or injury when peacekeepers attempt to implement tasks. For example, mission mandates with tasks that require buffer zone monitoring carry more risk compared to monitoring free and fair elections. While each task communicates the danger associated with an action, task risk is viewed in the aggregate of the entire mandate. Mandates that contain more tasks requiring the use of force are riskier than those with less risky tasks, such as government policy assistance and quick impact project deployment. When the level of mandate risk increases, peacekeepers engage in increasingly risky actions to implement the mandate, putting peacekeepers in danger.

Even though the United Nations pressures force commanders of high-risk missions to send more troops to violent locations, pressure from contributing states and lower-ranked officers to send fewer troops becomes more acute as mandate risk increases. While conflict conditions manipulate the strength of Path 2, Paths 1 and 3 are dictated by the level of mission mandate risk. Path 1 notes that troop caveats limit the ability of contributed troops to move to violent locations and use force as caveats to protect contributed troops from violence (Novosseloff, 2016). Increasingly risky mandates create conditions that activate troop caveats; thereby reducing the number of available troops for force commanders to deploy. In addition, risky mandates signal the likelihood of troop fatalities pushing the force commander to follow principles of force protection instead of civilian protection. Furthermore, high mandate risk signals to lower-ranking officers the potential danger that troops must face upon deployment, leading to possible non-compliance (French, 2009; McLauchlin, 2015), creating increased pressure on the force commander through Path 3. As a result of the negative pressures stemming from mandate risk, increased levels of mandate risk decrease the number of troops deployed in the host state. The effects of risky mandates lead to Hypothesis 5.2 to test for the combined effects of Paths 1 and 3:

Hypothesis 5.2. *As the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate increases, the number of troops sent to a location will decrease.*

While mission mandates and battle deaths exert unique effects, the force commander's dilemma notes the interaction between United Nations pressure and pressure from contributing states and lower-ranking officers. Pressure from the United Nations through Path 2, captured by conflict conditions, motivates force commanders to deploy robust contingents. However, the pressure from contributing countries and officers tempers this effect as the level of mandate risk increases, activating Paths 1 and 3. Force commanders realize that troop fatalities decrease contributions (Bove,

2011; Oestman, 2021), driving their decision to avoid situations that increase the likelihood of peacekeeper fatalities. As a result, missions with high levels of mandate risk avoid robust deployments to locations with high conflict danger. Even though force commanders prefer to deploy troops to create a record of high performance (Lundgren et al., 2021), increasingly dangerous locations and high mandate risk increase the priority for force protection (Bell and Terry, 2021). Instead of increasing deployments, Path 2 reduces deployments when coupled with the effects of Paths 1 and 3. The interaction of the paths leads to Hypothesis 5.3:

Hypothesis 5.3. *The negative effect of the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate on the number of troops sent to a location will intensify as the level of conflict violence increases.*

Furthermore, force commanders are more willing and able to send larger deployments to violent locations once the conflict subsides. To prevent conflict violence, peacekeepers must be able to quickly deploy to a site, as seen by peacekeeper clustering around transportation networks (Townsen and Reeder, 2014). Force commanders must quickly deploy troops to coerce warring parties and stop the fighting. As the fighting dwindles, force commanders are unlikely to deploy large contingents as there is no conflict to prevent. However, the level of mandate risk limits rapid troop deployments. Troop caveats are active in situations requiring the use of force, and lower-ranking officers may defy orders to intervene in difficult situations (Novosseloff, 2016; Nassif, 2015). To balance the preferences of the United Nations, contributing states, and lower-ranking officers, force commanders with risky mandates deploy larger contingents as the violence subsides (Ruggeri et al., 2018). By deploying after the violence dwindles, force commanders appear interested in implementing the mandate, avoiding caveats and non-compliance. Furthermore, increasing time since the last violent action allows the effects of Paths 1 and 3 to wane, allowing for Path 2 to increase troop deployments. This strategic choice leads to Hypothesis 5.4:

Hypothesis 5.4. *The negative effect of the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate on the number of troops sent to a location will intensify as the level of conflict violence increases.*

Force commanders are also more attentive to United Nations pressure early in their placement since they are unaware of the caveats and feelings of non-compliance upon arrival. Force commanders are hand-picked by the Secretariat, based on merit and political considerations (United Nations, 1945f; Oksamytna et al., 2021), to maximize mission success. Organizations replace poorly performing military leaders to generate performance increases (Reiter and Wagstaff, 2018; Lundgren et al., 2021). Force commanders recently selected to lead a mission are more likely to cooperate with the United Nations and send larger deployments to violent locations since new agents are more attentive upon their initial placement. However, new force commanders learn mission limitations over time (Powell, 2004), decreasing the United Nations' influence in favor of contributing states and lower-ranking officers (Lo et al., 2008). In addition, mandate risk moderates this relationship. With increased mandate risk, force commanders experience more situations of activated caveats, increasing the speed of the learning process. In addition, higher mandate risk creates more instances of potential non-compliance, turning the force commander's attention from the United Nations to the pressure of the mission. These commander experiences lead to the last set of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5.5. *As the tenure of a force commander increases, the number of troops sent to a location will decrease.*

Hypothesis 5.6. *The negative effect of force commander tenure on the number of troops sent to a location will intensify as the proportion of risky tasks in mandate increases.*

United Nations force commanders are stuck between the United Nations, troop-contributing states, and their junior officers. Counter-acting pressures by these actors create a trade-off between mandate implementation and force protection due to mandate risk and conflict conditions. Force commanders are motivated by the United Nations to deploy troops to locations of violence to support peace. In contrast, high-risk mandates generate pressure on commanders from contributing states and junior officers that reduce deployment sizes. The negative pressure on force commanders from risky mandates becomes especially acute when conflict conditions make implementation increasingly difficult, leading to reduced troop deployments. To manage the pressures associated with risky mandates, force commanders will deploy to conflict locations once the violence dies down to satisfy United Nations pressure while utilizing troops when state-applied caveats no longer apply. Over time, force commanders become familiar with this trade-off that limits their ability to deploy, leading to reduced deployment sizes, which become increasingly strong with risky mandates.

5.6 Research Design

5.6.1 The Sample

This chapter utilizes geo-spatial data to capture fine-grained dynamics of troop movements within the mission host state. The sample is drawn from the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) Dataset v.2.1 compiled by Cil et al. (2020), making the unit of analysis the grid-cell-month. This unit of analysis creates a population of all grid-cells in the host state to capture the number of deployed troops in a given cell and how they respond to various factors. The dataset utilizes United Nations mission deployment maps, United Nations Secretary-General mission progress reports, and the Dag Hammarskjold Library Cartographic Section's peacekeeping mission deployment maps to locate peacekeeping units from all peacekeeping operations from 1994 - 2020. However, due to data limitations, the temporal span only



Figure 5.3: Example Map

includes all peacekeeping operations from 1994 - 2014. Figure 5.3 visualizes average troop deployments and battle deaths in Sudan Sudan. I exclude observer missions from the sample to avoid capturing different troop movement dynamics and missions without the potential to deploy militarized troops.[7] Furthermore, I limit the sample to observations with two-hundred or fewer battle deaths as grid-cell-months with more than two-hundred battle deaths are extreme observations and have the potential to exhibit high leverage on model estimates. This exclusion produces relatively conservative estimates.[8]

Due to excess zeros in the dataset, I limit the sample to all grid-cell-months that receive troops and twenty-five percent of mission grid-cell-months that did not receive troops in the cell, adjusting the unit of analysis to the potential-grid-cell-month.

[7]The results are robust to observer mission inclusion. Appendix 1 contains these results.

[8]The results are generally robust to removing death restrictions. For Hypothesis 5.1, battle deaths and total one-sided violence become negative but substantively insignificant after removing death restrictions. Appendix 1 contains these results.

Including every grid-cell in the sample would inflate the number of zeros since some grid-cells will never receive troops. I employ endogenous stratified sampling (King and Zeng, 2001) to mitigate this issue. Due to the lack of literature to guide the selection, I chose a twenty-five percent sampling of grid-cell months that did not receive troop deployments.[9]

5.6.2 Dependent Variable

To capture the allocation of peacekeepers within the host state, I utilize the number of peacekeepers present in each grid-cell-month from the Geocoded Peacekeeping Operations (Geo-PKO) dataset v.2.1 compiled by Cil et al. (2020). A count outcome is preferable to a binary outcome as my argument concerns counts of troops deployed to a location. The theory demonstrates that force commanders are incentivized to deploy to locations due to the United Nations' responsibility to protect, but commanders may prefer smaller deployments due to risky mandates. As a result, a count dependent variable better captures the dynamics of the theory. I exclude observer missions and observations with more than two-hundred battle deaths. The dataset includes the movements of militarized troops since these actors are the forces deployed in defense of the mandate. A histogram of the dependent variable, with and without zeros, can be found in Figure 5.4.[10] Due to the over-dispersion of the dependent variable, I employ the negative binomial estimator.

5.6.3 Independent Variables

Similar to the previous chapter, I capture the level of risk associated with peacekeeping mandates by utilizing the Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) dataset.[11] I calculate a risk ratio index of the number of risky tasks in a

[9]The results are robust to using a 50% of non-deployment cells. Appendix 1 contains the results. In addition, Appendix 1 provides a Meta-Analysis of the 25% and 50% non-zero cells with ten randomization samples.

[10]The dependent variable distribution is based on Model 1.



(a) Histogram of Troops (b) Histogram of Troops, No 0's

Figure 5.4: Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics

mandate divided by the total number of tasks given in the mandate,[12] making the variable constrained from [0,1].[13] This reflects the inherent risk to troop death or injury of the mission that force commanders must account for when making decisions regarding troop deployments.

To capture the level of danger in the conflict zone, I include counts of battle deaths, one-sided violence, rebel one-sided violence, and government one-sided violence from the UCDP Geo-Referenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013).[43] I aggregate the death events in the database into a monthly summation

[11] As previously noted, the datasets developed by Di Salvatore et al. (2022) and Hellmüller et al. (2023) on peacekeeping mandates provide insightful information on task implementation modalities and the use of political missions in tandem with peacekeeping missions, the Tasks Assigned to Missions in the Mandates (Lloyd, 2021a) allows for a global sample of missions in addition to the division of tasks between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding.

[12] Some may argue that force commanders receive risk signals based on the number of tasks in the mandate. Similar to Chapter 4, I re-estimate the main models with the count of total tasks in the mandate and the count of risky tasks in the mandate. Both measures are positive and statistically significant. These results are found in Appendix 1. Once again, these results imply that missions with more tasks to implement require larger deployments within the host state, suggesting that these measures do not adequately capture mandate risk.

[13] The risk ratio measure does not place tasks on a continuum of risk as it is difficult to imply an inherent ordering and distance between each task in terms of risk. For example, I can distinguish that Chapter VII enforcement is riskier than the promotion of press freedom, but it is difficult to measure the difference in risk level between buffer zone monitoring and Chapter VII enforcement. As a result, a proportion of risky tasks that constitute the mandate is the best alternative to capturing mandate risk.

of the total number of deaths for each grid-cell. Battle deaths include the death of combatants as well as one-sided violence. Deaths are also disaggregated into counts of one-sided violence from either the rebels or the government since these deaths are a motivating factor of peacekeeper action (Ex. Hultman et al., 2013; Fjelde et al., 2019). Each measure of conflict zone danger is subject to the exclusion of observations with counts above two hundred.

The models also include a variable to capture a cell's time since the most recent act of conflict danger. Noting how peacekeeping operations are slow to deploy to locations that have experienced an act of conflict danger (Ruggeri et al., 2018), I create a variable that counts the months since the most recent death from conflict in the cell. I include a time variable for each death type when I disaggregate conflict-related deaths in various models. For example, in government one-sided violence models, I incorporate a time variable for months since the last government one-sided violence death.

Finally, the models include the duration of a force commander's tenure on mission. Jenne (2022) captures the appointment of all peacekeeping mission leaders. While the dataset contains information on all mission senior officials, I limit the individuals to only those listed as the mission's force commander. The force commander duration variable is the number of months the individual served as a force commander.

5.6.4 Controls

I include various control variables to remove potential confounding effects. The controls are divided into host, distance, and mission-specific variable groups. The host control variable group captures factors specific to the mission host state. To

[14]In the previous chapter, I addressed the potential argument that mandate risk may be endogenous to the conflict environment. After following the procedure of Mattes and Savun (2009, 2010), I found that the conflict environment does not explain the variation in the level of mandate risk. Appendix 1 contains the estimates based on the models from the previous chapter. Due to these previously found results, the effect of mandate risk provides an effect that is independent of the conflict environment.

capture population centers, I include data on average night light emissions to proxy for population levels in a given grid-cell (Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, 2021). I also incorporate a measure of the longest streak of consecutive months in the given year that the cell experienced a drought (Guttman, 1999; McKee et al., 1993) as another proxy for population and as local grievances since droughts undermine food security. In addition, to capture treacherous terrain in the grid-cell, I include a measure that captures the proportion of the grid-cell covered by mountains (Blyth, 2002).

The second group of control variables captures multiple distances to various informative features in the host state. First, I measure the distance of the grid-cell to the closest deployment of peacekeepers in hundreds of kilometers since cells with units nearby may require fewer troops since other troops are geographically close. The variable captures the distance to the nearest peacekeeping unit within the last three months. This window means a grid-cell in October 2000 could be matched with a unit from October 2000, September 2000, or August 2000, depending on which unit was the closest to the grid-cell. Second, I include a distance measure of the grid-cell to the border of the host state in hundreds of kilometers since units deploy locations near the border (Townsen and Reeder, 2014). The third distance is the distance in hundreds of kilometers of the grid-cell to the capital since cells close to the capital are likely to have fewer troops due to government exclusion of peacekeeping presence (Fjelde et al., 2019). Weidmann et al. (2010) supply the data on the distance to the border and capital city. The last distance is the travel time in days from the grid-cell to the nearest major city.[15] Since many peacekeepers aggregate near major population centers (Townsen and Reeder, 2014), cells that are farther from urban centers are less likely to receive a deployment. Data on the distance to the nearest urban center is from Uchida and Nelson (2009).

[15]A major city is required to have more than 50,000 inhabitants (Uchida and Nelson, 2009).

The last group of control variables is related to mission-specific geographic factors found in the Geo-PKO dataset. The models include a binary variable to capture if there is a troop-contributing country headquarters, a mission sector headquarters, or a mission headquarters in a cell. The excluded group is no headquarters.[65] This variable is included since any headquarters type hosts multiple peacekeeping units. The model includes a binary indicator of whether the cell is in a zone of confidence, also known as a buffer zone. Due to the need for peacekeepers to enforce warring party separation, cells in the zone will naturally have larger deployments. The excluded category is a cell not in the zone. Next, I include a count of the number of troops in a neighboring cell since cells with nearby troops need fewer troops to deter violence. This variable is in thousands of troops and transformed using the natural log since the variable is highly correlated with a lagged dependent variable. Last, I include a measure of average troop quality. I use Singer et al. (1972) to calculate a state's military spending per troop and then estimate the average troop quality in thousands of dollars within each deployed unit.

5.6.5 Method

The over-dispersion of the dependent variable demands the negative binomial estimator for proper inference. To combat heteroskedasticity and temporal auto-correlation, I cluster the error term on the mission and include a lagged dependent variable as a regressor. In addition, I lag each independent variable by one month, except for the variables that count the time since the last act of conflict danger. In addition, I combat spatial auto-correlation through the queen's contiguity to capture the total number of troops in contiguous cells.[17]

[16]While the variable indicates whether the cell contains a troop-contributing country, mission sector, or mission headquarters in the cell, a Wald test indicates that the coefficients of each category are equal. As a result, I collapse the categories into a binary indicator of whether or not the cell contains any headquarters type.

[17]The queen's contiguity, in this project, is a misnomer. In chess, a queen can move in any direction without distance restrictions. In this study, a better term would be "the king's contiguity"

5.7 Results

5.7.1 Hypothesis 1 and 2

After explaining the methodological design, I now discuss the results of the estimated models. Hypothesis 5.1 retests the current literature by evaluating if increases in conflict violence in a cell will increase the number of peacekeepers sent to a cell. Models 1-4 in Table 5.1 present evidence of this hypothesis. The measures of conflict danger as battle deaths, total one-sided violence, and rebel one-sided violence are each positive and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$, providing evidence supporting Hypothesis 5.1 that peacekeeping operations respond to violence during the mission. However, the coefficient of government one-sided violence is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. This finding is unique since Fjelde et al. (2019) find no relationship between government one-sided violence and peacekeeping deployments. In addition, Phayal and Prins (2020) observe that peacekeepers only respond to government one-sided violence when conditioned on government-rebel clashes. The results in Model 4 build on these findings by demonstrating that commanders reduce deployments when the government engages in one-sided violence, regardless of a clash.

To assess practical significance, Figure 5.5 provides various graphs of predicted troop accounts given counts of conflict danger. All other variables are held at their central tendencies to capture an average case. The small multiples representing battle deaths, all one-sided violence, and rebel one-sided violence, display a positive trend across the counts of conflict danger. For battle deaths, a shift from the minimum to the maximum value is associated with an increase from about 0.08 troops to about 1.29 troops making this a 150% increase. For all one-sided violence, a min-to-max shift is associated with an increase from 0.08 troops to about 3.1 troops or a 377% increase. In the case of rebel one-sided violence, a min-to-max shift is associated

since the spatial lag captures all first-order, or next-door, cells in any direction along the grid space.

Table 5.1: Risk Ratio on Troops in Cell

	(1) Battle Deaths	(2) Total OSV	(3) Rebels OSV	(4) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.651**	-8.457**	-9.218**	-9.115**
	(1.837)	(1.744)	(1.754)	(1.871)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.014**			
	(0.004)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.023**			
	(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.018**		
		(0.002)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.024**		
		(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.020**	
			(0.003)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.024**	
			(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.011†
				(0.007)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.022**
				(0.006)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.027**	0.025**	0.025**	0.025**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.144†	0.159*	0.263**	0.139*
	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.069)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.074	-0.041	-0.145	-0.416
	(0.608)	(0.634)	(0.698)	(0.602)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	0.306	0.298	0.375	0.045
	(0.746)	(0.710)	(0.799)	(0.733)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.094**	-0.095**	-0.093**	-0.101**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.605**	-0.631**	-0.654**	-0.664**
	(0.131)	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.133)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.146**	-0.144**	-0.138**	-0.111*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-12.310**	-12.538**	-12.787**	-13.397**
	(1.400)	(1.447)	(1.443)	(1.522)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.029	-0.022	0.828	0.101
	(0.420)	(0.420)	(1.071)	(0.442)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.053*	-1.316**	-1.583**	-1.389**
	(0.424)	(0.413)	(0.499)	(0.428)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.852**	1.908**	1.946**	1.774**
	(0.545)	(0.512)	(0.532)	(0.493)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.030**	0.036**	0.027**	0.033**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.661**	12.762**	13.360**	13.349**
	(1.736)	(1.700)	(1.725)	(1.923)
lnalpha	5.074**	5.073**	5.088**	5.099**
	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.393)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.



Figure 5.5: Predicted Troop Contributions for H1

Inner 95% of predicted values based on 20,000 simulations. Models 1 - 4. Average troop count is 14 troops.

with an increase from 0.08 troops to about 4.9 troops or a 602% increase. Last, a min-to-max shift for government one-sided violence is associated with a decrease from about 0.08 troops to 0.008 troops making this a 90% decrease. The combination of statistical significance and visual evidence provides support for Hypothesis 5.1.

Hypothesis 5.2 states that as the proportion of risky tasks in a mandate increases, the count of troops in a cell will decrease. I find general support for the hypothesis based on Models 1-4 in Table 5.1. For all measures of conflict violence, the risk ratio is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. To assess practical significance, Figure 5.6 provides predicted counts given values of the risk ratio. These graphs report predicted values for Models 1-4 with all other variables held at their central tendencies. For each measure of conflict violence, a min-to-max shift from a



Figure 5.6: Predicted Troop Contributions for H2

Inner 95% of predicted values based on 20,000 simulations. Models 1 - 4. Average troop count is 14 troops.

risk ratio of 0.4 to 1 represents a decrease from about 2 troops to 0.008 troops, which is about a 250% decrease. Once again, the combination of statistical significance and predicted values lends support to Hypothesis 5.2.

5.7.2 Hypothesis 3 and 4

Hypothesis 5.3 states that as the level of conflict violence increases, the negative effect of the risk ratio on troop counts in a cell will become stronger. Models 5-8 in Table 5.2 provide unclear evidence for this hypothesis. First, the constituent term of risk ratio has a negative and statistically significant effect at $p < 0.01$ for each model, meaning that risk ratio is associated with a reduction in the count of troops in a cell when each measure of conflict danger is equal to zero. Second, for Models 5-7,

Table 5.2: Risk Ratio and Death Interactions

	(5) Battle Deaths	(6) Total OSV	(7) Rebels OSV	(8) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.660**	-8.455**	-9.217**	-9.117**
	(1.843)	(1.747)	(1.756)	(1.871)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	-0.037			
	(0.060)			
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.061			
	(0.076)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.023**			
	(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.062		
		(0.076)		
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Total$_{t-1}$		-0.051		
		(0.090)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.024**		
		(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.067	
			(0.085)	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Rebs$_{t-1}$			-0.055	
			(0.100)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.024**	
			(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				0.762
				(0.567)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Gov$_{t-1}$				-1.180
				(0.828)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.022**
				(0.006)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.027**	0.025**	0.025**	0.025**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.144†	0.159*	0.263**	0.139*
	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.069)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.068	-0.043	-0.147	-0.416
	(0.609)	(0.636)	(0.699)	(0.602)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	0.310	0.297	0.374	0.043
	(0.746)	(0.710)	(0.800)	(0.734)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.094**	-0.095**	-0.093**	-0.101**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.606**	-0.631**	-0.653**	-0.664**
	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.133)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.145**	-0.144**	-0.138**	-0.111*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-12.314**	-12.536**	-12.786**	-13.398**
	(1.399)	(1.446)	(1.442)	(1.522)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.030	-0.022	0.828	0.106
	(0.422)	(0.420)	(1.071)	(0.441)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.053*	-1.316**	-1.583**	-1.394**
	(0.424)	(0.413)	(0.499)	(0.429)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.852**	1.908**	1.946**	1.776**
	(0.545)	(0.512)	(0.532)	(0.493)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.030**	0.036**	0.027**	0.033**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.667**	12.760**	13.359**	13.353**
	(1.740)	(1.702)	(1.726)	(1.923)
lnalpha	5.074**	5.073**	5.088**	5.098**
	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.393)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

the constituent terms for conflict danger are positive and statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This evidence suggests that battle deaths, total one-sided violence, and rebel one-sided violence have an indiscernible effect on troop counts in a cell when the risk ratio is equal to zero; however, mandates with zero risk are not present in the dataset.[18] In contrast, Model 8's constituent term of government one-sided violence is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.10$ meaning the effect of government one-sided violence is negative and statistically significant when the risk ratio is equal to zero.

To fully assess the significance of an interaction term, Figure 5.7 provides graphs of the marginal effect of risk ratio on the count of troops in a cell conditional upon the level of conflict danger. The graph represents Models 5-8 with all other variables set at their central tendencies. Each small multiple demonstrates tentative support for Hypothesis 5.3. For battle deaths, the effect of risk ratio on troop counts is about a 0.7 troop reduction until it becomes indistinguishable from zero at 50 battle deaths. All one-sided violence begins with the marginal effect of risk ratio at about 0.5 fewer troops, which increases to about 5.8 fewer troops until statistical insignificance at 90 one-sided deaths. For rebel-caused one-sided violence, the marginal effect of risk ratio on troop counts begins at 0.7 fewer troops at zero deaths but it increases to about 5.9 fewer troops at a value of 70 deaths when it reaches statistical insignificance. Last, government one-sided violence begins with a negative effect of 0.7 fewer troops at zero deaths, but this effect approaches zero as deaths increase, suggesting that force commanders prefer to leave the government alone in one-sided events. Due to the lack of data in categories greater than 80 deaths, the confidence intervals in each plot become large, leading to statistical insignificance. When considering the data at lower levels of conflict danger, the effect of risk ratio on troop counts is negative and statistically significant leading to marginal support in favor of Hypothesis 5.3.

[18]The measure of mandate risk is bound between [0, 1], but observations of the measure are to between [0.4, 1], making a value of zero impossible.

Table 5.3: Risk Ratio and Time Since Violent Aciton Interactions

	(9) Battle Deaths	(10) Total OSV	(11) Rebels OSV	(12) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-14.265**	-15.148**	-16.189**	-14.583**
	(1.811)	(1.954)	(1.928)	(2.305)
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.070**			
	(0.018)			
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since Death	0.057*			
	(0.022)			
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.016**			
	(0.004)			
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.078**		
		(0.018)		
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Total		0.067**		
		(0.023)		
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.017**		
		(0.002)		
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.078**	
			(0.016)	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Rebs			0.068**	
			(0.021)	
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.020**	
			(0.003)	
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.065**
				(0.019)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Gov				0.054*
				(0.025)
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.017**
				(0.007)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.023**	0.022**	0.022**	0.022*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.106†	0.120†	0.194*	0.112†
	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.084)	(0.066)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.415	-0.396	-0.519	-0.636
	(0.781)	(0.801)	(0.832)	(0.640)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	-0.104	-0.156	-0.133	-0.326
	(0.662)	(0.655)	(0.698)	(0.669)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.087**	-0.087**	-0.085**	-0.095**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.595**	-0.614**	-0.650**	-0.658**
	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.138)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.148**	-0.145**	-0.136**	-0.104†
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.053)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-13.353**	-13.750**	-14.173**	-14.477**
	(1.257)	(1.280)	(1.254)	(1.397)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.282	0.245	0.517	0.340
	(0.639)	(0.682)	(0.974)	(0.665)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.545**	-1.909**	-2.017**	-1.846**
	(0.472)	(0.493)	(0.545)	(0.509)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.843**	1.877**	1.939**	1.747**
	(0.569)	(0.531)	(0.540)	(0.501)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.020*	0.028**	0.025*	0.027**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	17.371**	18.311**	19.133**	17.845**
	(1.459)	(1.539)	(1.601)	(1.817)
lnalpha	5.061**	5.056**	5.074**	5.089**
	(0.392)	(0.388)	(0.393)	(0.391)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.



Figure 5.7: Predicted Troop Contributions for H3

Inner 95% of predicted marginal effect values based on 20,000 simulations. Models 5 - 8.

Looking at Hypothesis 5.4, I expect the negative effect of risk ratio on troop counts in a cell will decrease as the time since the last violent action increases. Models 9-12 in Table 5.3 provide initial evidence for the hypothesis. First, the constituent term of risk ratio is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ across all models. This signifies that the risk ratio reduces the number of troops sent to a cell when months since the last violent action is zero. Second, the constituent term of time since the last conflict action is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$, meaning that time since the last violent action in a cell reduces the number of troops in a cell when the risk ratio is 0, which is an unobserved value in this sample. Last, each interaction between risk ratio and time since the last violent action is positive and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$, meaning that a mission with a high-risk mandate

will send more troops to a conflict location when the violence has sufficiently subsided. This finding provides initial support for Hypothesis 5.4.

Figure 5.8 provides the small multiples required to assess the significance of the interactive relationships in Models 9-12. Each figure exhibits the marginal effect of risk ratio on troop counts in a cell conditional on the number of months since the last act of conflict danger. For both battle deaths and government one-sided violence, when time is equal to zero, the marginal effect of risk ratio on troop counts is about 10 fewer troops. When time reaches 160 months for battle deaths and government one-sided violence, the effect of risk ratio on troop counts becomes indistinguishable from zero. For total one-sided violence and rebel one-sided violence, the marginal effect of risk ratio on troops counts is about 12.5 fewer troops when time is equal to zero. As total one-sided violence approaches 150 months and rebel one-sided violence approaches 170 months, the effect of risk ratio on troop counts is indistinguishable from zero. These results demonstrate that risky peacekeeping mandates deter troop deployments by force commanders during recent violence. To demonstrate their commitment to United Nations' values, force commanders deploy troops to these locations after the conflict has subsided, which, according to the model, is in about 12 and a half years. This evidence provides strong support for Hypothesis 5.4 that the negative effect of mandate risk becomes weak as the time since the last violent action increases.

5.7.3 Hypothesis 5 and 6

Hypothesis 5.5 explains that as the tenure of a force commander increases, the number of troops sent to a cell will decrease. Looking again at Models 1-4 in Table 5.1, the models do not support Hypothesis 5.5. In Models 1-4, the coefficient of force commander duration is associated with a statistically significant increase in the number of troops in a cell at $p < 0.05$, but the coefficient in Model 4 is



Figure 5.8: Predicted Troop Contributions for H4

Inner 95% of predicted marginal effect values based on 20,000 simulations. Models 9 - 12. Average troop count is about 15 troops.

statistically significant at $p < 0.10$. To further assess this relationship, Figure 5.9 provides predicted counts of troops within a cell across the values of force commander duration. Figure 5.9 presents the estimates for Models 1-4 with all other variables held at their central tendencies. For each small multiple, as a force commander increases their tenure, the number of troops within a cell also increases. For each plot, a min-to-max shift from a new force commander to a force commander with about 45 months of experience is associated with an increase from 0.05 to about 0.18 troops in a cell, which is a 260% increase in the number of troops. Given this evidence, Hypothesis 5.5 is rejected since an increase in force commander tenure is associated with more troops in a cell.

Hypothesis 5.6 states that as the mandate becomes increasingly riskier, the

Table 5.4: Risk Ratio and Force Commander Duration Interactions

	(13) Battle Deaths	(14) Total OSV	(15) Rebels OSV	(16) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.910**	-8.571**	-9.230**	-9.243**
	(1.507)	(1.360)	(1.311)	(1.434)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.013	0.019	0.024	0.018
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.062)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.017	0.008	0.001	0.009
	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.014**			
	(0.004)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.023**			
	(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.018**		
		(0.002)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.024**		
		(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.020**	
			(0.003)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.024**	
			(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.011†
				(0.006)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.022**
				(0.006)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.144†	0.158*	0.263**	0.139*
	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.068)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.070	-0.038	-0.145	-0.415
	(0.612)	(0.634)	(0.697)	(0.602)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	0.304	0.296	0.375	0.044
	(0.745)	(0.710)	(0.802)	(0.733)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.094**	-0.095**	-0.093**	-0.101**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.608**	-0.632**	-0.654**	-0.665**
	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.127)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.146**	-0.144**	-0.138**	-0.111*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-12.346**	-12.555**	-12.789**	-13.414**
	(1.424)	(1.469)	(1.462)	(1.534)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.030	-0.021	0.829	0.104
	(0.426)	(0.420)	(1.052)	(0.439)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.080*	-1.328**	-1.584**	-1.402**
	(0.450)	(0.436)	(0.509)	(0.451)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.867**	1.913**	1.947**	1.780**
	(0.565)	(0.524)	(0.541)	(0.507)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.030**	0.036**	0.027**	0.033**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.869**	12.854**	13.370**	13.452**
	(1.429)	(1.347)	(1.319)	(1.508)
lnalpha	5.074**	5.073**	5.088**	5.099**
	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.393)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.



Figure 5.9: Predicted Troop Contributions for H5

Inner 95% of predicted marginal effect values based on 20,000 simulations. Models 1 - 4. Average troop count is about 14 troops.

negative effect of force commander tenure on troops in a cell will increase. Models 13-16 in Table 5.4 assess this hypothesis, but the results do not provide initial support for this theoretical implication. First, the constituent terms for risk ratio are negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$, suggesting that when force commanders are brand new, the effect of the risk ratio significantly reduces the count of troops deployed to a cell within the host state. Second, the constituent term for force commander duration is positive and statistically insignificant at conventional levels, meaning that the effect of force commander tenure is indiscernible from zero when mandate risk is equal to zero, which is unobservable in this sample. Last, the interactions between mandate risk and force commander duration provide no initial support for Hypothesis 5.6. For Model 13, the interaction of risk ratio and force commander duration is positive and



Figure 5.10: Predicted Troop Contributions for H6

Inner 95% of predicted marginal effect values based on 20,000 simulations. Models 13 - 16.

statistically insignificant, but the interaction is negative and statistically insignificant in Models 14-16. This evidence, taken collectively, does not provide support in favor of Hypothesis 5.6.

To assess the statistical significance of Hypothesis 5.6, Figure 5.10 provides small multiples of Models 13-16 that visualize the marginal effect of force commander duration on troop counts in a cell conditional upon mandate risk. For each model, the marginal effect of the risk ratio begins with a statistically significant and negative effect when the level of mandate risk is low. However, as the level of mandate risk increases, the mandate's negative effect becomes indistinguishable from zero, signifying that high-risk mandates create a sense of urgency for commanders to learn on the job quickly. In addition, this unexpected effect may be a product of riskier man-

dates providing force commanders with the authorized use of force required to send troops that can protect themselves in a violent encounter. By allowing the ability to use force, commanders may deploy units to locations knowing the troops can defend themselves.

In addition, the control variables provide continued insight into the deployment of troops within a host state. The discussion of the control variables relies on the estimates from Model 1. Urban locations and those with larger population centers maintain larger troop contingents, similar to the findings of (Fjelde et al., 2019). While cells close to peacekeeper deployments receive more troops, cells with more neighboring units receive fewer troops, likely due to the deterrent ability of neighboring troops on warring parties. United Nations troops congregate near state borders to limit the ability of warring parties to engage in border jumping (Townsen and Reeder, 2014; Beardsley, 2011). In line with expectations regarding the risk associated with specific tasks, force commanders prefer to send smaller deployments of troops to monitor zones of confidence that separate warring parties. Last, when available, force commanders tend to deploy larger contingents of increasingly professionalized troops to provide a strong signal of deterrence.

5.8 Addressing Endogeneity

Similar to the previous chapter, the underlying assumption of the main analysis is that risky mandate implementation requires more troops compared to less risky mandates, but this assumption is tenable in the context of local troop deployments. Even though the United Nations does not publish recommendations on local troop deployment sizes, several mission manuals stress the need for force commanders to send larger deployments in the face of violence. For example, the second volume of the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual explains that missions must send large troop deployments to buffer zones for the sake of "robust force projection to preserve

the sanctity of the buffer zone by preventing any violation of ceasefire/peace agreements" (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2012, 147). In addition, the Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations recommends the deployment of large contingents to provide a visible deterrent to promote secure environments as well as to implement tasks such as refugee protection, humanitarian protection, and disarmament and demobilization (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2012). Due to the instructions provided in peacekeeping materials, the optimal level of troop deployments for risky tasks is likely higher than less risky tasks, making the underlying assumption of the main analysis tenable.

5.9 Conclusion

United Nations force commanders balance competing pressures when making sub-national deployment decisions. The United Nations, through their responsibility to protect, pressures force commanders to deploy robust troop deployments to protect civilians from the negative effects of conflict. In contrast, troop contributing-state use of caveats and threats of non-compliance from junior officers incentivize force commanders to reduce their deployments. Geo-spatial data analysis confirms expectations produced by the force commander's dilemma while presenting interesting counter-expectations. Similar to the literature, increased levels of conflict danger increase the size of troop deployments. Increasingly risky mandates reduce the size of troop deployments while also increasing the time it takes for deployments to travel to locations of past violence. Counter to expectations, long-tenured force commanders deploy larger continents as they can better navigate the pitfalls of counter-veiling pressures. Finally, increasingly risky mandates remove any negative effects related to force commander tenure. The combined evidence between the last two chapters suggests that risky missions experience smaller contributions and smaller sub-national

deployments, undermining mission effectiveness.

The conclusions of this chapter integrate findings from previous scholarly work while also challenging the results of other research. The results from Fjelde et al. (2019) and Phayal and Prins (2020) confirm the results regarding Hypothesis 1. The force commander's dilemma integrates these findings as Path 2 expects the level of conflict violence, such as battle deaths and one-sided violence, to be associated with an increase in the number of troops deployed in a cell. In addition, Ruggeri et al. (2018) find that troops deploy to violent locations after a considerable amount of time has passed since the last violent act. Hypothesis 5.4 supports these findings, but this study suggests the effect is greater than previous results showcased. However, the findings of Hultman et al. (2013, 2014) and the main results of Fjelde et al. (2019) are called into question. These studies find that larger peacekeeping deployments can limit one-sided violence and battle deaths, but the results of this chapter demonstrate that large deployments to violent locations arrive once the level of violence has dwindled over time. The findings in this chapter suggest that large peacekeeping deployments that reduce conflict violence are due to a dwindling level of conflict over time.

These results present numerous implications regarding how the United Nations should approach incentivizing force commanders. While battle deaths increase the size of peacekeeping deployments, the level of mandate risk deters force commanders from deploying robust contingents to enforce risky mandates. In addition, these risky mandates create incentives for force commanders to engage in "grandstanding" by deploying troops once the violence has subsided. To avoid these undesired outcomes, the United Nations needs to increase the monitoring of force commander actions while also developing credible threats for force commander punishments to reduce the roughly 400 attacks that led to civilian deaths where peacekeepers did not intervene (Economist, 2021). Monitoring the behavior of force commanders, whether through

United Nations staff or outside actions, including non-governmental organizations, should incentivize commanders to deploy large troop contingents to avoid punishment (Kelley and Simmons, 2015). In addition, the United Nations must develop a credible threat to remove poor-performing force commanders. Normally, poor-performing force commanders are quietly asked to step down or find their contracts ton not be renewed at the end of their term (Lundgren et al., 2021). By maintaining a credible threat (Fearon, 1997), the United Nations can motivate commanders to deploy troops to violent locations.

Chapter 6 Mandate Risk and Force Commander Duration

> "I am confident that with your full support, we will be able to achieve the mandate that has been assigned to us. I know the difficulties of the mandate but I don't think anything is so difficult that you cannot achieve it with effort, patience, and perseverance."
>
> - Lieutenant General Shailesh Sadashiv Tinaikar, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (PTI, 2019)

> "[Major General E.L.M. Burns] states that this report is quite false. There is a thorough understanding between him and the Secretary General concerning policies governing the operation of UNEF and the reasons therefore and there is not, and has never been, any disagreement. Gen. Burns has no intention of resigning and expects to continue in command of UNEF for an indefinite period."
>
> - Statement from the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) headquarters in response to rumors of Major General Burns considering his intended resignation (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 2015)

Former force commander Major General Mountaga Diallo served the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) for nearly four years. His enduring service to the United Nations made him the longest-tenured force commander in United Nations peacekeeping history, among commanders in the post-Cold War era (Jenne, 2022). Under his command, the Major General oversaw MONUC's expansion from several hundred observers to 10,800 troops deployed throughout the host state. The commander enforced high respect for the ceasefire between the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and various rebel groups. Furthermore, his commitment to peacebuilding supported the repatriation of over 4,000 former combatants. In July 2003, the United Nations Security Council authorized MONUC to use force to disarm rebel groups, particularly those on the eastern side of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; however, the force comman-

der ended his mission tenure six months later, which also capped off his illustrious forty-year service in the armed force (New Humanitarian, 2003).

In November 2016, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon dismissed Lieutenant General Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki as force commander of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) after only five months into his post. During an attack on the capital city, peacekeepers exhibited risk-averse behavior and failed to intervene on behalf of civilians experiencing human rights violations within the peacekeepers' view. Instead of demanding actions, mission leadership allowed peacekeepers to abandon their posts, leading to failed responses to the aid workers' cries for help. A United Nations special investigation into the event found that mission leadership engaged in a "chaotic and ineffective response" regarding civilian victimization that led to the termination of Lieutenant General Ondieki (Quinn, 2016).

These examples demonstrate the considerable variation found in United Nations force commander tenures. While some force commanders provide many years of service and can retire after a note-worthy career, others were quickly removed from their posts after a short and harmful tenure. These examples draw attention to the variation in force commander tenure, which motivates the following question: *Why do some force commanders have longer tenure than others?*

I argue that force commander tenure is a function of the level of risk associated with mission mandates in addition to mission-specific and institutional factors. Force commanders are hired and fired by the Secretary-General based on mission performance. As a result, the theory centers on the considerations of another actor, the United Nations Secretary-General. Risky mandates present a high bar regarding performance that force commanders must reach to signal quality high mission performance to the Secretary-General. However, risky mandates are difficult to implement, leading to the shortened tenure of force commanders serving in difficult missions, especially when the conflict environment is particularly violent. Poor mis-

sion performance forces the hand of the Secretary-General to remove unsuccessful force commanders, as seen in the case of Lieutenant General Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki. However, institutional factors, such as Permanent Five status and Security Council preferences, limit the ability of the Secretary-General to remove poor-performing force commanders.

Using the Leadership Positions in UN Peace Operations dataset (Jenne, 2022), I estimate an event-history model to capture the time-variant factors that affect force commander tenures. The results of this study demonstrate that risky mandates and the interaction between mandates and cumulative deaths have no effect on commander termination. In addition, the interaction between mandate risk and the proportion of troops deployed to the mission have no effect on termination. The interaction between mandate risk and commander Permanent Five nationality has no effect. While the marginal effect of mandate risk on termination is negative at high policy distance between the Permanent Five and the host state, mandate risk is insignificance at all levels of Permanent Five policy heterogeneity with respect to the host state.

While these results could not provide further evidence of the negative effects of mission mandates, the null results present a potentially alarming implication. The models estimated below find that mission mandates do not affect force commander tenure, even though force commanders are evaluated based on their ability to implement mission mandates. Furthermore, a force commander's inability to stop deaths associated with conflict does not affect force commander termination. These unexpected findings present the bleak perspective that force commanders who cannot implement their mandates nor stop the violence are replaced only after contract expiration.

6.1 The Secretary-General and Peacekeeping

The Secretary-General acts as the top diplomat, advocate, civil servant, and administrator of the United Nations, which Trygve Lie called the "most impossible job in the world," (on Foreign Relations, 2022). During active conflict or in the face of rising tensions, the Secretary-General can act on their own accord or by order of the Security Council to engage in a diplomatic mission to promote good offices or mediate the conflicting parties (Skjelsbaek, 1991). These opportunities allow the Secretary-General to advocate for peace on behalf of the civilians affected by the negative externalities of conflict, such as when Secretary-General António Guterres visited Ukraine in April of 2022 and called for peace talks between Ukrainian and Russian leaders on behalf of the civilians "who were paying the highest price for a war for which they had not contributed" (Westfall and Timsit, 2022). While the Security Council and leading states in the General Assembly hold sizeable importance in the election process, the Charter demands an impartial Secretary-General willing to work on behalf of all states. The United Nations Charter entrusts the Secretary-General to carry out all functions given to them by the Security Council, the General Assembly, and other principal organs (Newman, 2018). The Secretary-General's vast job description coincides with high international responsibility making the selection process increasingly important.

The Secretary-General is the elected representative of all United Nations member-states, but the Security Council maintains chief influence over the selection process. Article 97 of the Charter explains that Secretary-General selection requires a recommendation from the Security Council and an election in the General Assembly. Similar to other resolutions, the Security Council recommendation requires at least nine votes and zero permanent member vetoes. The President of the General Assembly may present potential candidates to the Council for deliberation, but Secretary-General selection closely follows the joint preferences of the Permanent Five states.

Upon recommendation, the General Assembly then votes on the candidate. Both the deliberation of the Security Council and the General Assembly are held in private, allowing for private bargaining between states. In addition to formal rules, much of the selection process is governed by convention. While these states have the most important votes, Permanent Five states traditionally avoid nominating their nationals for consideration. Also, previous selections follow the norm of regional rotations to provide fair representation. Once elected, the Secretary-General serves a five-year term and is unofficially limited to two five-year terms (Flemming, 2007). Within their terms, Secretary-Generals have many opportunities to guide policy action, especially policies related to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

The Secretary-General is responsible for supporting and resourcing formed peacekeeping operations through their cooperation with the Security Council. After conflict onset, the Security Council is made aware of the conflict by member-state action or by the power of the Secretary-General to bring the Council's attention to anything that may threaten international peace and security; however, the Council requires sufficient information to make an informed decision. To support the Council, the Secretary-General may organize a Strategic Assessment of the conflict by deploying a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to provide potential action plans and resource recommendations for the Council. With this information, the Council may pass a resolution that provides the mission's mandate, troop authorizations, and expected mission duration (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Secretariat, 2008). The Council then delegates the mission to the Secretary-General to resource and staff under the watchful eye of the Security Council.

According to Article 100 of the United Nations Charter, the Secretary-General is responsible for staff mission leadership and military troops who fall under the authority of the Secretary-General (United Nations, 1945f). As explained in Chapter 3, the Secretary-General commands the Secretariat, the United Nations' principal

organ that the Secretary-General leads, to engage in bilateral negotiations with contributing states to create Memorandums of Understanding. These documents express the contributors' contributions to the mission while setting the rules of conduct for peacekeepers (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). Reminiscent of Chapter 5, the Secretary-General is responsible for selecting the force commander. After initial mission authorization or before position vacancies, the office of the Secretary-General gathers and reviews potential candidates for the post the applicants based on criteria such as merit, gender, geographic balance, and mission contributions. These potential candidates are then interviewed by a panel of peacekeeping experts who generate a shortlist of candidates [1] for the Secretary-General to review. The Secretary-General then chooses and announces the selection of the force commander (Wynes and Zahran, 2011). While the process attempts to select and keep commanders based on merit (Oksamytna et al., 2021; Lundgren et al., 2021), many of these considerations are based on the strategic choices of the Secretary-General.

6.2 Managing Above and Below

For Secretary-Generals to achieve their goals of successful mandate implementation, they must provide a record of success to maintain institutional support. The United Nations Charter describes the Secretary-General as the "chief administrative officer," but the delegation of roles to the office by other principal organs, such as with peacekeeping missions, has increased the powers of the office (Ravndal, 2020). While these delegated powers can facilitate increased cooperation (Tallberg, 2010), Secretary-Generals rely on Security Council support to implement their preferred peacekeeping policy (Rushton, 2008). In peacekeeping, Secretary-Generals are motivated by altruism to limit human suffering and their need to produce positive outcomes to maintain Council support (Allen and Yuen, 2014). Since poor policy per-

[1] For all senior management positions in the United Nations, at least one potential candidate must be a woman.

formance impedes the ability of leaders to pursue their other policy goals (Gelpi and Grieco, 2015), the Secretary-General is incentivized to produce successful mission outcomes.

The Secretary-General relies on observing progress in favor of mandate implementation when evaluating force commander performance. United Nations peacekeeping documents explain success as the ability of the force commander to implement and complete the tasks described in the mission's mandate (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). Most missions require force commanders to reduce violence, as seen by reductions in armed combat (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017) and the limitation of violence against civilians (Oksamytna and Wilén, 2022). Not only are force commanders evaluated on their ability to limit the effects of conflict, but they are also liable for the troops lost on mission (Willmot et al., 2015) since losing troops leads to contributor troop reductions (Oestman, 2021). While it is uncommon for force commanders to be publicly removed for poor performance (Ex. Quinn, 2016), many force commanders are given silent punishments in the form of non-renewed contracts and suggestions to leave their posts early (Lundgren et al., 2021). In addition to attempting to manage force commanders after poor performance on missions, the Secretary-General must also handle the Security Council.

The Security Council is responsible for setting and renewing peacekeeping mandates based on the information provided by the Secretary-General. During the mission formation stage, the Secretary-General presents mandate task recommendations to the Security Council. While both principal organs prefer successful missions, the Security Council prefers the mission to be quick and cost-effective in its design (Oksamytna and Lundgren, 2021). These mandates are also updated mid-mission based on conflict dynamics and preferences of the Permanent Five states of the security council (Allen and Yuen, 2014). The Secretary-General facilitates the information-gathering process in mandate updating through mission progress reports. These

reports display the success of the mission, note where the mission fails, and deliver recommendations by the Secretary-General in favor of mandate adaptations, such as when Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked for increased military personnel for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in February 2005 (Annan, 2005b), which the Council granted the following July (S/RES/1608, 2005). For the Secretary-General to find success, they must effectively steward the Security Council, especially the states most involved with mandate writing.

The United Kingdom, the United States, and France are three of the five permanent members of the Security Council and are responsible for drafting the majority of mission mandates. These three states must negotiate with each other, then with the other two Permanent Five states, and then with the rest of the Security Council. Even with these negotiations, authorized mandates and their updated versions tend to follow the preferences of these three states (Oksamytna and Lundgren, 2021), but their preferences cannot stray too far from the other permanent members due to the threat of a veto. Not only do these states effectively wield the pen, but they also wield the purse. These states are assessed a higher proportion of the peacekeeping budget and consistently near full payment (Passmore et al., 2023). The financial hold on the budget affords these states high influence over mandate provisions. Due to the power these states wield toward the Security Council, the Secretary-General must manage the preferences of these states while attempting to monitor the performance of force commanders.

6.3 Force Commander Performance

Successful mandate implementation is measured by the ability of force commanders to implement their tasks, making risky mandates a difficult bar to reach. As explained in Chapter 4, risky mandates and their associated tasks communicate the likelihood of peacekeeper death or injury while implementing their mandate. These

mandates provide mission authorization to use force against combatants in cases of peace disruption or civilian targeting (Hiller, 2020), which endanger peacekeepers. Furthermore, many of these risky mandates function as "Christmas-tree mandates" that reflect the vast number and diversity of tasks in the mandate. These risky mandates are inherently dangerous to implement, especially in hazardous conflict environments (Williams, 2020). As a result, force commanders with risky mandates have the most arduous to-do lists, making mission success increasingly unlikely.

For example, the force commanders for the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei operated with contrasting levels of mandate risk and tenure duration. UNISFA was authorized to monitor the ceasefire in the contested lands of the Abyei region, protect civilians and humanitarian personnel, and provide border security. Their mandate included demilitarized zone creation and monitoring between Sudan and South Sudan, which took about two years to create upon mission deployment (Osterrieder et al., 2015). While UNOCI was charged with monitoring a ceasefire and engaging in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, the mission was responsible to promote public understanding of the peace process, restore the rule of law, and support the presidential election (Novosseloff, 2015). The risk ratio measure used in this dissertation estimates that UNISFA maintained a higher average level of mandate risk compared to UNOCI. In addition, UNISFA's average force commander term is 7.6 months compared to UNOCI's average of 12 months, which is a 58% longer term.

The United Nations Secretary-General, as head of the Secretariat, plays an important role in peacekeeping efforts. Force commanders are selected by the Secretary-General after being reviewed by Secretariat officials. Once on mission, commanders are evaluated on their ability to implement the tasks recorded in their mandates. The Secretary-General is incentivized to ensure high mission performance to be elected again and to ensure their policies are enacted. Since risky mandates are difficult to

implement, force commanders with high-risk mandates are held to a high bar regarding performance that is arduous to reach. As a result, force commanders with risky mandates are more likely to be terminated than those with less risky mandates. This argument leads to Hypothesis 6.1:

Hypothesis 6.1. *As the proportion of risky tasks in the mandate increases, the probability of force commander termination will increase.*

Furthermore, mission mandate implementation becomes increasingly difficult when the conflict environment becomes increasingly dangerous. Peacekeeping missions are continuously deployed to mission hosts in active conflict (Karlsrud, 2015b). Peacekeepers with peace-enforcement mandates become targets of rebel groups and other warring parties as the conflict intensifies (Fjelde et al., 2016), increasing the danger associated with implementing risky mandates. As implementation conditions become increasingly dangerous, force commanders are even less likely to implement their mandated tasks leading to an increased likelihood of contract termination. For example, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), commanded by Major General Vijay Jetley of India, was mandated to enforce the Lomé Peace Agreement, assist with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of military forces, facilitate humanitarian intervention, and was also authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Olonisakin, 2015). A progress report from Secretary-General Kofi Annan in July 2000 noted that the mission was consistently under attack from rebel forces, including an ambush of UNAMSIL forces during troop transport, among many other peacekeeper-targeting events and acts of one-sided violence from May to July 2000 (Annan, 2000). As a result, the United Nations terminated Major General Jetley's contract at the end of September 2000 after nine months of service.[2] This leads to Hypothesis 6.2:

Hypothesis 6.2. *The positive effect of the proportion of risky tasks on the likelihood of force commander termination will intensify as the level of conflict violence increases.*

Force commanders are fired based on their performance and inability to implement mandates, however, politics can also weaken the effect of risky mandates. The United Nations relies on the military contributions from member-states to supply missions with necessary resources, creating a disproportionate amount of influence in favor of major contributing states. As a result, the United Nations operates by the informal practice of selecting force commanders from major troop contributors as a reward (Oksamytna et al., 2021). As a result, force commanders from major contributing states enjoy increased tenure as the commander's state can threaten troop withdrawal upon commander removal (Lundgren et al., 2021). In November 2016, Kenya responded to the firing of UNMISS' force commander, Lieutenant General Johnson Mogoa Kimani Ondieki, by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon after the commander allowed gross acts of violence against civilians. Kenya threatened to withdraw its troops from the mission as the security situation in South Sudan was "no longer tenable and is inimical to their safety and well-being" (Biryabarema, 2016). As a result, force commanders are protected from termination due to poor performance when their home state provides a large share of troops to the commander's mission, leading to Hypothesis 6.3:

Hypothesis 6.3. *The positive effect of the proportion of risky tasks on the likelihood of force commander termination will intensify as the level of conflict violence increases.*

[2]Major General Jetley was also involved in an internal scandal during his tenure. In an internal report, the force commander accused Nigerian troops of being paid off by rebel groups to ignore illegal diamond mining. Due to this internal division, the United Nations was able to leverage the force commander's recent poor performance to terminate his contract (Olonisakin, 2015).

6.4 Security Council Preferences

During a mission, Secretary-Generals must assess the performance and politics regarding force commanders, but Secretary-Generals must also consider the preferences of the Permanent Five states of the Security Council.[3] Secretary-General selection begins with the recommendation of a candidate from the Security Council to the General Assembly, which also applies to Secretary-Generals seeking a second term. Due to the recommendation process hinging on all permanent states expressing support for the candidate, these states maintain high influence in the selection process (Flemming, 2007). Secretary-Generals must steward the preferences of the permanent members or risk losing their post, such as when the United States blocked former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's second term after the diplomat defied the United States' preference for United Nations financial and administrative reform in addition to presiding over the events of "Black Hawk Down" (Goshko, 2016). Furthermore, these states are responsible for drafting large portions of initial mission mandates and future mandate alterations, including changes in tasks and resource allocations (Oksamytna and Lundgren, 2021). As a result, Secretary-Generals must also steward the preferences of these permanent states when considering force commander replacement.

Due to the threat of Secretary-General non-renewal and control over mandates, force commanders from permanent members of the Security Council experience longer tenures. High-level appointments within international organizations provide international prestige to the individual's home state (Oksamytna et al., 2021). However, being removed from these posts due to poor performance can bring shame to the leader's home state (Ausderan, 2014). Removing a force commander for poor performance by the Secretary-General can create a hostile relationship between the Secretary-General and the permanent states. As a result, Secretary-Generals are willing to overlook poor

[3]These states include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China.

force commander performance when the commander comes from a permanent member state. For example, Major General Alain Pellegrini of France led the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon beginning in February 2004. In January 2005, a Hezbollah roadside explosive killed one Israeli soldier and injured three others. In addition, three UNIFIL troops came under tank and machine gun fire from responding Israeli soldiers. These events escalated to artillery shelling of Hezbollah positions and increased use of roadside explosives (Annan, 2005a). After this incident, Major General Pellegrini remained force commander until February 2007. This evidence leads to Hypothesis 6.4:

Hypothesis 6.4. *The positive effect of the proportion of risky tasks on the likelihood of force commander termination will weaken when the force commander comes from a Security-Council Permanent Five member-state.*

Secretary-Generals not only manage the preferences of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, but they also must consider the relationship between the permanent members and the host state. The Security Council prefers the creation of peace in a cost-effective manner (Williams, 2020). However, the permanent members of the Security Council are sympathetic to states that maintain special relationships with the permanent members, such as high-volume trading relationships (Stojek and Tir, 2015b). While close ties between the permanent members of the Security Council and the host state increase the resources given to the mission (Allen and Yuen, 2014), these ties also increase the scrutiny of mission performance. When the host state has close connections with the Permanent Five, the Council is increasingly interested in monitoring mission progress (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Due to increased monitoring, poor mission behavior is more likely to be punished, increasing the likelihood of force commander removal from their post (Gohdes, 2020). As a result, when the Security Council has increased interest in the mission host

state, force commanders with difficult-to-implement mandates are more likely to be replaced. This argument leads to Hypothesis 6.5:

Hypothesis 6.5. *The positive effect of the proportion of risky tasks on the likelihood of force commander termination will strengthen as the Permanent Five members of the Security Council maintain increased interest in the mission host state.*

While Permanent Five state interest in the host state increases the scrutiny of mission performance, preference heterogeneity creates confusion for the Secretary-General regarding performance standards. When the permanent members of the Security Council lack unified preferences regarding the mission host state, mandates lack clear goals required for mission effectiveness (Allen and Yuen, 2014). The Brahimi Report in 2000 criticized the lack of clarity in mission mandates that led to ineffective missions as a result of unclear directives (Brahimi Report, 2000), which, for example, can lead to missions being unable to protect civilians from the negative effects of conflict (Benson and Tucker, 2022). Heterogeneity of preferences between permanent members of the Security Council leads to a lack of clear benchmarks undermining a mission's ability to comply with the Council's preference to create durable peace (Staton and Romero, 2019). Due to a lack of specificity in mission mandates because of permanent member heterogeneity, difficult-to-implement risky mandates become increasingly arduous leading to force commander removal. This leads to Hypothesis 6.6:

Hypothesis 6.6. *The positive effect of the proportion of risky tasks on the likelihood of force commander termination will strengthen as the heterogeneity of Permanent Five members of the Security Council preferences towards the mission host state increases.*

The office of the Secretary-General demands the occupant manage multiple factors when considering force commander performance. Mission success is measured

by the commander's ability to implement the tasks assigned in the mandate. Due to the difficulty of implementing risky mandates, the Secretary-General is more likely to remove force commanders attempting to implement risky mandates. In addition, the effect of mandate risk is increasingly acute when the commander cannot limit violence on mission. However, the effect of risky mandates on the likelihood of termination weakens when the force commander's home state contributes a large share of troops, since removing the commander jeopardizes mission resources. Secretary-Generals must monitor commander performance while accounting for the preferences of the Permanent Five member-states on the Security Council. The Secretary-General holds force commanders to a high standard when commanders have a risky mandate, but Permanent Five member-states have a lesser standard due to Secretary-General's electoral incentives. Furthermore, when the Permanent Five member-states express similar foreign policy preferences to the host state, the effect of mandate risk strengthens due to the Council holding the mission and the Secretary-General to a higher standard. Last, high preference variance between the permanent member-states reduces the level of resources allocated to the mission, strengthening the effect of mandate risk on termination.

6.5 Research Design

6.5.1 The Sample

This chapter leverages force commander tenure data to capture the likelihood of force commander termination as a function of mission and Security Council factors. The sample is from the Leadership Positions in UN Peace Operations dataset developed by Jenne (2022) that records all individuals who served in some capacity in a peacekeeping mission. While the dataset includes individuals serving as the Head of Mission and Special Representative to the Secretary-General, I limit the sample to force commanders. I exclude deputy force commanders since these individuals are not

the head of the military component and do not interact with the Secretary-General as frequently as the force commander. Furthermore, I exclude interim force commanders as these officers function as placeholders since they are replaced regardless of performance. The unit of analysis for the sample is the force commander-mission-month. Due to data limitations that are explained below, the sample includes all observations from 1990 - 2015.

6.5.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates if a force commander was terminated in the given month. This variable is coded a "1" when the mission month reaches the force commander's contract end month found in Jenne (2022). Figure 6.1 visualizes the distribution of force commander termination and the observed duration of the force commanders in the sample. Force commanders enter the sample at their appointment date and are removed once their tenure is terminated. The measurement of the dependent variable includes force commanders terminated at end of their contract, those who were silently not renewed, and those who were removed for poor performance. The Secretary-General does not publicly announce the reason for contract termination or non-renewal (Lundgren et al., 2021), except in rare cases of gross performance (Ex. Quinn, 2016). Due to the inability to readily distinguish the motivation for force commander termination, the dependent variable aggregates all termination causes.

In addition, measuring force commander termination as a discrete outcome instead of a continuous outcome allows for time-variant characteristics and ease of hazard function interpretation. First, the relationships of interest in this study require time-variant measures to estimate the likelihood of commander termination. For example, it is common for the Security Council to update the tasks contained in mission mandates leading to a change in the associated level of risk. The United Na-



(a) Bar Graph of Force Commander Termination

(b) LOESS of Force Commander Duration

Figure 6.1: Histograms of the troop contributions.

tions Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) experienced five mandate changes that led to a minimum mandate risk level of 0.44 to a maximum level of 1. Second, employing discrete-time models with cubic time polynomials increases the ease of interpretation and hazard function flexibility. While some models require assumptions regarding the functional form of the hazard rate or proportional hazards, cubic time polynomials make no strict form assumptions due to their flexibility. In addition, discrete-time models with cubic time polynomials readily interpretable hazard functions (Carter and Signorino, 2010). As a result, the dependent variable is a discrete measure of force commander termination.

6.5.3 Independent Variables

To capture force commander performance, the models include a measure of mandate risk and the cumulative number of deaths during a commander's tenure. I utilize the risk ratio index developed in earlier chapters to capture mandate risk. Using the Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) dataset, I count the number of risky tasks in the mandate and divide it by the total number of

mandated tasks.[4] The risk ratio measures theoretically range from [0, 1], but the values observed in the sample range from [0.4, 1]. The measure captures the challenge associated with implementing a mission mandate as risky tasks in mission mandates are increasingly difficult to implement (Williams, 2020). The models also include the cumulative number of deaths from conflict to measure force commander performance regarding the generation of peace. Similar to the approach used in Lundgren et al. (2021), I include the cumulative number of deaths related to the conflict over the force commander's tenure from the UCDP Geo-Referenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). The cumulative sum includes battle deaths and civilian deaths and is summed over the force commander's entire tenure.

Next, the models include variables that capture the politics associated with the status of the home state of the force commander. I leverage the International Peace Institute's Peacekeeping Database (Perry and Smith, 2013) to calculate the proportion of troops on mission from the force commander's home state. Since missions vary in terms of the total number of troops on mission, a proportion is more favorable compared to a count. As the proportion of contributed troops on the mission increase, force commanders should be less likely to be terminated since the Secretary-General fears large troop withdrawals from the commander's home state after termination (Lundgren et al., 2021). I also include a binary indicator of whether the force commander's home state is a permanent member of the Security Council. This variable captures the Secretary-General's trepidation when considering how they should treat force commanders from permanent member-states.

[4]Some may argue that a Secretary-General observes the count of mandate tasks rather than the proportion of risky tasks when evaluating force commander performance. I test this argument by re-estimating the main models with the count of total mandate tasks and the count of risky tasks, which is found in Appendix 1. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant, suggesting more tasks reduce the likelihood of termination. Organizations that replace top leaders experience reduced performance, especially in times organizational turmoil (Wang and Sun, 2022). Due to the difficulty of implementing mandates with many tasks, the United Nations will avoid replacing leaders that would reduce future performance. As a result, the count of total and risky tasks captures force commander responsibilities rather than mandate risk.

Last, I include two independent variables to capture the preferences and heterogeneity of preferences between the Security Council and the mission host state, similar to the approach developed by Allen and Yuen (2014). For both measures, I employ the state ideal point data from Bailey et al. (2017) that uses United Nations voting data to estimate a state's foreign policy preferences. To capture permanent member-state preferences regarding the mission host state, I estimate the average distance in the ideal points between each permanent member-state and the host state. This distance represents the average policy difference between the permanent members of the Security Council and the host state. Larger values indicate higher levels of policy dissimilarity. To capture the heterogeneity of permanent member preferences, I calculate the coefficient of variation in ideal point distances. This measure divides the standard deviation of the ideal point differences by the mean of the differences. This indicates that larger values represent increased heterogeneity in permanent member preferences.

6.5.4 Control Variables

To account for alternative explanations, the models include groups of controls related to force commander factors and mission factors. For force commanders, I first include the gross domestic product of the force commander's home state from Fariss et al. (2022) to capture the economic power the force commander state can utilize to influence staffing decisions. Second, I create a binary indicator from Jenne (2022) to include whether the current force commander has previously occupied a United Nations force commander post. Last, to control for the ability of a force commander to protect their troops on mission, I include the cumulative number of peacekeeping troop deaths over the commander's tenure from Henke (2019).

The last group of controls captures mission-level factors. First, the models incorporate the number of mandates included in the mission to capture the Security

Council's change in the mandate's tasks and resource allocations. This information comes from the TAMM dataset on United Nations mandates. Second, I include the duration of the mission, in months, from the United Nations Leadership Positions in UN Peace Operations dataset to account for the level of United Nations involvement in a particular conflict and host state. Finally, the model captures the total number of troops on mission from the International Peace Institute's Peacekeeping Database to account for the number of troops a force commander can employ to implement the mission's mandate.

6.5.5 Model

I utilize a logistic regression model due to the binary nature of the dependent variable in a discrete-time framework. To capture the baseline hazard of force commander termination, I include the first through third order polynomial of force commander tenure duration (Carter and Signorino, 2010). The models also include clustered standard errors to combat observation clustering. All independent variables, except for the time polynomials, are lagged by one month.

6.6 Results

6.6.1 Hypotheses 1 and 2

Table 6.1 provides the results of the specified model to test each of the hypotheses generated from the theory. Hypothesis 6.1 explains that the likelihood of force commander termination will increase as the level of mandate risk increases. Model 1 presents no support for the given hypothesis. The coefficient for the level of mandate risk is negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Figure 6.2 presents the predicted probabilities associated with Model 1. For both plots, the gray bands indicate 95% confidence intervals. All other variables are at their central tendencies. As seen by Figure 6.2a, the slope of the risk ratio is negative, which is counter to

Table 6.1: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Force Commander Termination

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-0.554	-0.538	0.751	-0.554	4.386†	-4.649
	(0.871)	(0.901)	(1.279)	(0.945)	(2.647)	(2.905)
Cumulative Deaths$_{t-1}$ (Thousands)	-0.020	0.095	-0.023	-0.020	-0.017	-0.020
	(0.018)	(0.217)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Proportion of Troops from FC State$_{t-1}$	1.151*	1.174*	6.414	1.151*	1.244*	1.201*
	(0.555)	(0.557)	(4.424)	(0.580)	(0.599)	(0.573)
FC from P5$_{t-1}$	-0.450	-0.452	-0.418	-0.444	-0.406	-0.438
	(0.588)	(0.587)	(0.627)	(2.294)	(0.596)	(0.601)
P5-Host Policy Distance$_{t-1}$	-0.842**	-0.843**	-0.774*	-0.843**	1.223	-0.992**
	(0.308)	(0.309)	(0.324)	(0.313)	(1.044)	(0.340)
P5-Host Policy Heterogeneity$_{t-1}$	-2.491*	-2.436*	-2.375*	-2.491*	-2.406*	-7.765†
	(1.139)	(1.183)	(1.132)	(1.166)	(1.038)	(4.643)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ X Cumulative Deaths$_{t-1}$		-0.131				
		(0.266)				
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ X Troop Prop. from FC State$_{t-1}$			-6.213			
			(5.071)			
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ X FC from P5$_{t-1}$				-0.009		
				(3.161)		
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ X P5-Host Policy Distance$_{t-1}$					-2.670*	
					(1.222)	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ X P5-Host Policy Heterogeneity$_{t-1}$						6.058
						(4.477)
FC Home GDP$_{t-1}$ (Billions)	-0.019	-0.019	-0.041	-0.019	-0.022	-0.029
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.107)	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Previous Experience$_{t-1}$	-0.057	-0.096	-0.085	-0.057	-0.022	-0.102
	(0.441)	(0.471)	(0.459)	(0.441)	(0.460)	(0.455)
Cumulative Military Deaths$_{t-1}$ (Tens)	-0.060	-0.061	-0.094	-0.060	-0.086	-0.068
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.130)	(0.121)	(0.127)	(0.120)
Number of Mission Resolutions$_{t-1}$	0.168	0.169	0.189	0.168	0.218	0.180
	(0.180)	(0.177)	(0.186)	(0.182)	(0.188)	(0.178)
Mission Duration$_{t-1}$	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.004**	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands)	-0.008	-0.010	-0.003	-0.008	-0.006	-0.003
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)
FC Duration	0.254**	0.254**	0.273**	0.254**	0.251**	0.263**
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.093)
FC Duration (Sq)	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
FC Duration (Cb)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.684	-1.715	-2.471	-1.685	-5.482	2.312
	(3.144)	(3.164)	(3.014)	(3.177)	(3.602)	(3.878)
Log Likelihood	-301.783	-301.731	-300.740	-301.783	-301.055	-301.204
AIC	635.566	637.462	635.480	637.566	636.110	636.409
Observations	2524	2524	2524	2524	2524	2524

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is force commander termination
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

expectations and relatively flat. As a result, Model 1 does not provide any support in favor of Hypothesis 6.1.

Moving to the next theoretical implication, Hypothesis 6.2 states that the positive effect of mandate risk on the likelihood of force commander termination will strengthen as the number of cumulative battle deaths increases. Model 2 in Table 6.1 provides little initial support for the hypothesis. The coefficient of risk ratio is negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero, meaning mandate risk does not affect force commander termination when cumulative battle deaths are equal to zero. The coefficient of battle deaths is positive and indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that cumulative battle deaths, in thousands, have no effect on force commander termination when the risk ratio is equal to zero, but this value does not appear in the sample. The interaction between risk ratio and cumulative deaths is negative and indistinguishable from zero. To properly assess the statistical significance of an interaction term, Figure 6.2b displays the marginal effect of risk ratio on the likelihood of force commander termination conditional on the number of cumulative battle deaths. Since the confidence interval continuously overlaps with zero, the relationship between mandate risk and force commander conditional on cumulative battle deaths is indistinguishable from zero. As a result, Hypothesis 6.2 is not supported due to a lack of evidence.

6.6.2 Hypotheses 3 and 4

Hypothesis 6.3 states that the positive effect of risk ratio on the likelihood of force commander termination will weaken as the proportion of the troops on a mission from the force commander's home state increases. Model 3 from Table 6.1 presents an initial lack of support for Hypothesis 6.3. The coefficient of risk ratio is, while positive, statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This means that the effect of mandate risk on force commander termination is indistinguishable from



(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2

Figure 6.2: Inner 95% of predicted values based on 20,000 simulations.

Note: 95% Confidence Intervals.

zero when the force commander's home state does not contribute troops to a mission. In addition, the coefficient of the proportion of troops on a mission from a force commander's home state is positive and indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that deploying a larger share of the mission's total troops does not affect termination when risk ratio is equal to zero. The interaction term coefficient between mandate risk and the proportion of troops deployed on mission by the commander's home state is negative, but indistinguishable from zero. Figure 6.3a provides a marginal effect plot to assess the statistical significance of the interaction term. Since the 95% confidence interval continuously overlaps with zero, the interactive relationship is not statistically significant. As a result, Hypothesis 6.3 is not supported.

Hypothesis 6.4 states that the positive effect of risk ratio on the likelihood of force commander termination will weaken when the force commander comes from a Permanent Five member-state. Model 4 from Table 6.1 provides little evidence for this hypothesis. The coefficient for risk ratio is negative and statistically insignificant, meaning mandate risk does not affect force commander termination when



(a) Model 3

(b) Model 4

Inner 95% of predicted marginal effect values based on 20,000 simulations.

Vertical gray lines present 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5% quantiles from 20,000 simulations.

Figure 6.3: Margins plots for Model 3 and 4.

the commander does not come from a Permanent Five state. The coefficient for a force commander coming from a Permanent Five state is negative and insignificant, meaning force commander Permanent Five member-state status does not affect the likelihood of termination when mandate risk is zero. Figure 6.3b provides a further lack of evidence for Hypothesis 6.4. This graph presents the marginal effect of risk ratio on commander termination when a commander does not come from a Permanent Five member-state, when the commander is from a Permanent Five member-state, and the first difference. The solid, vertical lines represent the 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5% quantiles, respectively. Since the simulated probabilities for all three density plots include zero, the interaction term is not statistically significant. As a result, Hypothesis 6.4 is not supported.

6.6.3 Hypothesis 5 and 6

Moving to the last set of hypotheses, Hypothesis 6.5 sets the expectation that the positive effect of risk ratio on the likelihood of force commander termination will strengthen as the policy distance between the Permanent Five states and the

host state increases. Model 5 in Table 6.1 provides interesting results counter to expectations. The coefficient of risk ratio is positive and statistically significant at $p < 0.1$, suggesting that mandate risk increases the likelihood of force commander termination when foreign policy distance is equal to zero. The coefficient of policy distance is positive, but statistically insignificant, meaning policy distance does affect force commander termination when risk ratio is zero. Counter to expectations, the coefficient of the interaction between mandate risk and policy distance is negative and significant at $p < 0.05$. Figure 6.4a presents the marginal effect of risk ratio on commander termination conditional on policy distance. The figure displays that when policy distance is equal to 2.2, mandate risk decreases the likelihood of commander termination. Hypothesis 6.5 posited that high similarity/low distance would make the effect of risk ratio on termination increasingly positive, but Figure 6.4a demonstrates the corollary since high low similarity/high distance makes the effect of risk ratio on termination increasingly negative. With this evidence, Model 5 provides partial support for Hypothesis 6.5.

The last hypothesis, Hypothesis 6.6, describes that the positive effect of mandate risk on force commander termination will strengthen as the heterogeneity in terms of policy preferences between the Permanent Five and the host state increases. Model 6 in Table 6.1 fails to provide support in favor of Hypothesis 6.6. The effect of risk ratio on force commander termination when policy heterogeneity is equal to zero is indistinguishable from zero, signifying that risk ratio does not affect the outcome when there is no policy heterogeneity between the Permanent Five members and the host state. The coefficient of policy heterogeneity is negative and statistically significant at $p < 0.10$, suggesting that when mandate risk is equal to zero, increases in policy heterogeneity reduce the likelihood of force commander termination. The interaction between risk ratio and policy heterogeneity is positive, but statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Figure 6.4b provides a marginal effect plot to assess



(a) Model 5 (b) Model 6

Figure 6.4: Margins plots for Model 5 and 6.

Inner 95% of predicted marginal effect values based on 20,000 simulations.

the interactive relationship's significance. The graph displays that zero continuously falls within the 95% confidence interval across all levels of policy heterogeneity. With this evidence, Model 6 does not provide support for Hypothesis 6.6.

6.6.4 Hazard Function and Control Variables

After evaluating the implications of this body of theory, I now discuss the baseline hazard and the effects of the control variables. Figure 6.5 visualizes the baseline hazard taken from Model 1. The figure demonstrates a relatively increasing and monotonic relationship between force commander duration and the likelihood of force commander duration. Model 1 in Table 6.1 provides evidence of this monotonic relationship as the first-order polynomial of force commander duration is positive and statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. The second and third-order polynomials of force commander duration are negative and positive, respectively, and statistically indistinguishable from zero. As a result, the likelihood of force commander termination is strictly increasing over time.

In addition, the control variables and other independent variables provide further insight into the likelihood of force commander termination. In contrast to Lundgren et al. (2021), as the proportion of contributed troops from the force commander's home state increases, the likelihood of force commander termination increases across all models where the proportion is not a constituent term. When the Permanent Five states' policy preferences are increasingly dissimilar from the host state, the likelihood of force commander termination will decrease. This suggests that force commanders remain on mission when the host state and Permanent Five have different preferences, which is likely due to low Permanent Five state interest in the mission. In addition, when Permanent Five state preferences regarding the host state are increasingly heterogeneous, the likelihood of commander termination decreases. This may be a result of a Secretary-General lacking sufficient resources to find a new force commander since a heterogeneous set of Permanent Five state preferences reduces the resources allocated to a mission (Allen and Yuen, 2014). Last, long-running peacekeeping missions are less likely to experience force commander termination. This is likely due to a host state being increasingly stable due to long-term mission presence, making these missions a relatively easy post for a commander.

6.7 Issues to Address for the Future

The lack of results in favor of the theoretical implications suggests the presence of issues that are difficult to overcome. The first issue is the difficulty of addressing potential selection effects surrounding force commander selection. The United Nations Charter instructs Secretary-General to hire force commanders based on merit. Even though the selection of force commanders is partially political (Oksamytna et al., 2021), the Secretary-General is also motivated to appoint a commander with the best skills in order to not undermine the Secretary's reputation (Allen and Yuen, 2014). As a result, Secretary-Generals are likely to choose the most capable force



Figure 6.5: Hazard Function of FC Termination based on Model 1.
Inner 95% of predicted values based on 20,000 simulations.

commanders for the riskiest mandates. As a result, this selection of more competent commanders in cases of risky mandates creates negative bias pushing the results toward a null finding.

While the issues related to the selection process are relatively easy to identify, a remedy is not as straightforward. Resolution A/64/640 (2010) provides a report by the Secretary-General regarding the selection process of senior leaders by the Secretariat. Once a post requires new leadership, the Secretariat creates criteria that are provided to all member-states. All member-states may nominate a candidate for the force commander vacancy. A senior panel of United Nations officials reviews the candidates based on the provided criteria to create a shortlist for the Secretary-General, where at least one candidate is a woman. After interviewing the candidates, the Secretary-General makes the final selection to fill the force commander posting. Neither the shortlists nor the complete list of candidates for a force commander posting is publicly available, making a justifiable sample of potential candidates and their home states nearly impossible.[5] As a result, identification of "potential force

commanders" to solve the selection problems described above would require access to classified materials or high-ranking individuals, making the solution to the selection problem difficult to obtain.

As a second issue, many key peacekeeping variables are temporally limited, creating an inability to capture United Nations institutional learning. International organizations engage in learning based on previous experiences and mistakes. Successful and unsuccessful outcomes provide knowledge to organizations like the United Nations regarding actions that work and do not work, leading to increased efficiency and ability over time (Haas, 1991). As noted in Chapter 4, the United Nations learned how to minimize troop shortfalls after 2000 due to the Brahimi report. However, the United Nations has had learning opportunities since peacekeeping missions began in 1945. While the data regarding United Nations leadership and mandate tasks includes missions since 1945, the data on troop contributions are temporally bound by the start year of 1990. Information on historical contributions is readily available, but it must be accessed at the United Nations archives in New York, NY. Due to this limitation, the data for this chapter is left truncated, hindering the model's ability to capture institutional learning regarding force commander tenure.

Last, this analysis would benefit from a disaggregation regarding the reason for contract termination. The literature on alliances recognizes that military agreements terminate for multiple reasons, such as loss of state independence, renegotiation, and violation of the terms of the agreement (Leeds and Savun, 2007). Unlike the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP) (Leeds et al., 2002), the Leadership Positions in UN Peace Operations dataset (Jenne, 2022) does not disaggregate based on the reason for termination. The United Nations strategically frames issues to maintain states' support of their actions (Joachim, 2003; McEntire et al., 2015),

[5]Black and Owens (2016) have a similar problem in selecting the sample of "contender" justices that alter their behavior to increase their chances of being nominated for the United States Supreme Court. However, the authors have access to the nominating president's shortlist of potential nominees, making sample identification comparatively easy.

thereby incentivizing the institution to silently remove poor performing force commanders when they reach the contract renewal stage, except in rare cases of gross under-performance (Lundgren et al., 2021). One way to potentially disaggregate terminated force commanders with a quality performance record from those removed for a poor record would be to collect performance evaluations on force commanders written by the United Nations Office of Military Affairs. Force commanders are systematically reviewed on their ability to implement mission mandates by their superiors (Di Razza, 2020b); however, these evaluations are kept classified. As a result, the outcome of force commander termination cannot be disaggregated due to the lack of available resources to parse force commander termination causes.

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter presented a theory related to the effects of risky mandates on force commander tenure. The Secretary-General is the officer in charge of hiring force commanders at mission onset or due to an impending vacancy. The Secretary-General must manage force commanders based on their ability to implement the mission's mandate. However, political factors surrounding the mission lead to alterations regarding the likelihood of force commander termination. Factors such as force commander home state mission contributions, force commander nationality, and Permanent Five Security Council member-state preferences were expected to moderate the effect of risky mandates on force commander termination. However, the estimated models provide no evidence in favor of the generated hypotheses. These null results may be due to selection effects, dataset temporal limitations, and an inability to distinguish termination due to poor or quality performance.

While the results are unexpected when considering the body of theory presented above, they present interesting implications for the duration of a force commander's tenure. While force commanders are intended to be evaluated based on their ability

to implement the mandate, the level of mandate risk does not affect commander tenure, potentially signifying that force commander tenure is not associated with the tasks assigned to the mission. Furthermore, the effect of mission mandate risk is not altered by the ability of commanders to limit violence during their tenure. The provided results question whether commanders are evaluated based on mandate implementation (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). Furthermore, these results conflict with the findings of Lundgren et al. (2021) as the effect of cumulative battle deaths does not affect force commander tenure. With this information, unless in an instance of gross misconduct, missions may potentially maintain a poor-performing force commander until their contract has expired.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

> "For all the civilians saved thanks to the presence of peacekeepers, there have been those who were lost - the Untied Nations personnel who sacrificed their lives for a noble cause. Even as we mourn our fallen colleagues, we are all uplifted by their unflinching commitment and are inspired to strive even harder for the collective cause so eloquently envisaged in the United Nations Charter: a world free from the scourge of war."
>
> - Jan Eliasson, Former President of the United Nations General Assembly (Eliasson, 2006)

> "When we ask them to do more than ever, that is the peacekeepers, in even more difficult and more dangerous situations, we owe them more."
>
> - Joe Biden, Former Vice President of the United States at the United Nations Summit on Peacekeeping Operations (Biden, 2015)

This dissertation began with the observation that United Nations peacekeepers attempt to enforce peace in increasingly dangerous situations. I argued that the level of mission danger, or risk, is a function of peacekeeping mission mandates and the conflict environment. The risk associated with a mandate signals the likelihood of peacekeeper injury or death while on mission based on the tasks provided in the mandate. The conflict environment signals the danger of implementing the mandate within the host state. The interaction between mandate risk and conflict conditions plays a major role in risk signaling. As the level of danger associated with the conflict environment increases, missions will have an increasingly difficult time implementing their mandate, making already risky missions much riskier. To demonstrate how the combination of mandate risk and the danger associated with the conflict environment affects peacekeeping generally, I developed three empirical chapters to test how this interaction affects various mission outcomes. Below, I summarize the general arguments and implications of each chapter.

7.1 Mandate Risk and Troop Contributions

In the first empirical chapter, I investigated how peacekeeping mandates and the conflict environment affect the number of troops a state will provide to a mission. While the United Nations prefers to enter into the most difficult host states (Fortna, 2004c) and local conflict zones (Phayal and Prins, 2020), I explained that contributing states avoid costly participation in international intervention (Downs et al., 1996; Iwanami, 2014). Potential mission contributors observe mission mandates and the conflict environment and use them as signals of the likelihood of peacekeeper injury or death. Mandates provide information regarding the actions that their contributed troops will likely execute while on mission, such as border monitoring and peace agreement enforcement (Lloyd, 2021a). These mandates include risky tasks, such as Chapter VII enforcement, and less risky, such as promoting a free press. Since risky tasks signal a higher likelihood of peacekeeper injury or death on mission, as the proportion of risky tasks in a mandate increases, the number of troops a state will contribute to the mission will decrease. Furthermore, as the conflict environment becomes increasingly dangerous, risky mandates become increasingly difficult to implement, leading to rising perceived costs of contributions, thereby compounding the troop-reducing effects of risky mandates.

After specifying a set of empirical models, I find results consistent with my theoretical expectations. First, mandates with a high proportion of risky tasks drastically reduce the number of troops states provide to peacekeeping operations. A shift from the minimum observed value of mandate risk to the maximum observed value is associated with a 72% reduction in the number of contributed troops. In addition, as the number of battle deaths increases from zero to 200, the negative effect of mandate risk on troop contributions becomes three times as strong. In addition, in an ad hoc analysis, risky tasks have different marginal effects on the number of contributed troops when considering the conflict environment. For example, tasks such as peace

agreement implementation and United Nations personnel protection experience reductions in contributions as battle deaths increase, while the liaising war parties and assisting refugee tasks experience increased contributions as the conflict environment becomes increasingly dangerous. This evidence demonstrates that contributing states are deterred from contributing due to the information gleaned from mission mandates and the conflict environment.

7.2 Mandate Risk and Local Peacekeeper Deployments

After establishing the deterrent effect of mandate risk and the conflict environment on troop contributions, the second empirical chapter shifts focus from troop contributors' choices to those of mission force commanders. In terms of mission divisions of labor, force commanders serve as the head of the military component and are responsible for deploying troop contingents within the mission host state (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019). Force commanders are evaluated on their ability to successfully implement mandated tasks (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b), and force commanders with records of success enjoy career advancement opportunities within their home state or internationally (Villa and Passos, 2022; S/PV.8251, 2018). While on mission, force commanders operate under tremendous pressure that pressed some commanders to abrupt terminations or suicides (Balakrishnan, 2008; Thompson, 2006).

While on mission, force commanders are subject to the preferences of the United Nations, contributing states, and junior officers, creating pressure that forms the force commander's dilemma. Force commanders receive pressure from the United Nations due to their responsibility to protect (Thakur, 2016). This responsibility drives the United Nations to pressure force commanders to deploy to violent locations to restrict the negative effects of conflict. However, contributing states and junior officers apply countervailing, negative pressure on the force commander to not deploy

to violent locations. To protect their troops, contributing states place caveats that restrict where their troops can go within the host state and when they may use force (Novosseloff, 2016). These caveats limit the number of troops available for local deployments, reducing the size of deployments within the host state. Last, junior officers can threaten non-compliance in the face of violence to apply negative pressure on force commanders (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012). With this in mind, when mission mandates become increasingly risky, and the conflict environment becomes increasingly dangerous, the negative pressures from contributing states and junior officers begin to outweigh United Nations' pressures leading to small, local troop deployments within the host state.

After developing statistical models that leverage the grid-cell-month unit of analysis, I undercover evidence of the deterring effects of risky mandates and conflict environment danger. While I confirm that higher numbers of battle deaths increase the number of troops in a cell, increasingly risky mandates reduce the number of deployed troops in a cell by 2.5 times when shifting from the observed minimum level of risk to the observed maximum. In addition, the marginal effect of mandate risk on local deployments becomes increasingly negative as the number of deaths increases, except in the case of government acts of one-sided violence. Due to the need for force commanders to deploy for the sake of the United Nations' responsibility to protect, as the level of violence in a cell subsides over time, the effect of risky mandates wanes. While much of this evidence presents a bleak picture, an encouraging discovery is that longer-tenured force commanders can deploy more troops and are resilient against highly risky mandates, allowing for larger local deployments. This chapter finds further evidence that the combination of risky mandates and dangerous conflict environments creates adverse outcomes in the form of smaller local deployments.

7.3 Mandate Risk and Force Commander Duration

In the final empirical chapter, I further investigate the effects of mandate risk and the conflict environment, but I once again alternate the actor of interest and focus on the Secretary-General to explain the variation in force commander tenure. Among the Secretary-General's multiple roles within the United Nations, they function as the head of the Secretariat and the international "hiring manager" for peacekeeping force commanders (United Nations, 1945f). The Secretary-General is bound by the United Nations Charter to hire and fire force commanders based on their mission performance regarding successful mandate task implementation (Department of Peace Operations, 2020b). Under-performing force commanders with risky mandates are held to a high-performance evaluation bar, which is arduous since risky mandates are grueling to implement, especially in dangerous conflict environments (Williams, 2020). Due to the high bar produced by mandates with difficult tasks and dangerous conflict environments, the likelihood of force commander termination will increase.

Even though force commanders are evaluated based on their ability to implement their mandate, politics play a role in force commander termination. Force commanders who supply a large share of the mission's troops are evaluated less harshly since removing force commanders may result in troop withdrawals by the commander's home state (Lundgren et al., 2021). As a result, the effects of mandate risk on force commander termination will dampen as the proportion of the troops on mission from the commander's home state increases. Furthermore, the preferences of the Security Council Permanent Five also affect force commander tenure. Since the Secretary-General relies on the Permanent Five members to remain in office and win reelection (Flemming, 2007), the Secretary-General will consider the preferences of these states regarding force commander decisions. Due to these considerations, the effect of risky mandates will weaken when the force commander is from a permanent five member-state. In addition, when the permanent five member-states have a high

interest in the mission host state, the Secretary-General will increase the scrutiny over force commander performance, making the effect of risky mandates on termination stronger. Last, when these permanent states have high preference heterogeneity over the host state, risky mandates will increase the likelihood of commander termination due to a lack of monitoring from the permanent states.

After another set of analysis, the results of this chapter offer no support for the theoretical implications, but the lack of results present an equally unsettling conclusion. The level of mandate risk does not affect the likelihood of commander termination, nor does it have a multiplicative effect when it interacts with the total number of conflict deaths during the commander's tenure. In addition, the mandated risk does not affect force commander termination when interacted with the proportion of troops on mission from the commander's home state or the commander's status as a national from a permanent member of the Security Council. Finally, while a large preference distance between the permanent five states reduces the marginal effect of mandate risk on force commander termination, there is no discernible effect for the interaction of mandate risk and permanent five preference heterogeneity. The lack of results presents a concerning picture that commander performance does not affect their likelihood of termination, suggesting that force commanders, regardless of performance, remain at their post until their contract has expired. While commanders enjoy job security, the United Nations may also allow under-performing leaders to remain at their posts, spelling potentially disastrous results.

7.4 Informing the Peacekeeping Literature

The conclusions of this dissertation provide interesting nuance to established peacekeeping literatures. First, these findings highlight the potential effects of the United Nations' strategy to intervene in the most difficult cases (Ex. Fortna, 2004c). The United Nations tends to deploy peacekeepers to challenging locations, such as

those plagued by civil conflict with high casualties (Fortna, 2004c,b). While this dissertation cannot directly speak to which conflicts missions are deployed, it raises the issue that the United Nations' intervention preference for direst conflicts is driving away contributions. Chapter 4 notes that missions with risky mandates and dangerous conflict environments, situations the United Nations would deem as "dire," experience reduced troop contributions. As a result, this chapter finds that the United Nations and its contributors possess divergent preferences regarding intervention opportunity selection.

Another area that this dissertation can directly speak to is the literature on where local deployments go. Scholars have found that large contingents of troops are deployed to locations of violence and clashes between warring parties to reduce the effects of conflict violence (Ex. Fjelde et al., 2019; Phayal and Prins, 2020; Townsen and Reeder, 2014). Referring to Chapter 5, the force commander's dilemma finds this as an unsurprising result since the United Nations pressures force commanders to deploy to these locations. However, the results in Chapter 5 conclude that commanders deploy smaller contingents when mandate risk is high, especially when a large number of battle deaths strengthen the mandate's deterrent effect. While Ruggeri et al. (2018) find that deployments to violent locations become larger after sufficient time, Chapter 5 finds that this effect is stronger than previous expectations. These results call into question findings that larger deployments reduce conflict violence since the reducing effects may apply to cases of low mandate risk, safe implementation conditions, and sufficient time after the violence subsides.

7.5 Policy Prescriptions

In addition to the academic world, this dissertation presents implications for policy-makers. Overall, policymakers must recognize that risky mission mandates created for the direst missions contribute to sub-optimal outcomes. The information

from risky mandates and the conflict environment relayed to contributors and force commanders demotivate participants from supporting international peace. In light of Chapter 4, I first recommend that the United Nations explore a sliding scale of troop reimbursements. The United Nations currently relies on a flat reimbursement rate for contributing states. In Chapter 4, I explained that contributors analyze participation decisions through a cost-benefit framework. Since high-risk mandates signal increased potential costs, the United Nations should increase the potential benefits of contribution by altering the reimbursement rate for each mission based on the mandate and the implementation conditions. Setting a higher reimbursement rate should overcome the issues associated with risky mandates that deter contributions.

Based on the results of Chapter 5, the United Nations should consider ways to support force commander decisions to deploy troops. Force commanders understand the effects of troop caveats on performance as caveats limit troop socialization and the number of troops that could be deployed in the host state (S/PV.7464, 2015). To avoid these hindrances, the United Nations must limit the use of troop caveats. While limiting the use of caveats may decrease the overall quality of contributed troops, consistent cooperation among contributed units, regardless of quality, makes peacekeepers increasingly effective (Morey and Morgan, 2022). The United Nations should also remove informational barriers regarding caveats to overcome caveat issues. The United Nations does not communicate the presence of caveats to commanders, which surprises commanders when they observe defiant units (Novosseloff, 2016). The United Nations should directly disclose present troop caveats to reduce the time required for commanders to learn the informal limits of their forces.

7.6 Future Work

After noting the importance of the tasks assigned to missions in their mandates, future work should continue to explain the effects of mandates on other mission-

related outcomes. The first avenue of inquiry should investigate how mission mandates affect one-sided violence. While Lloyd (2017) considered how responsibility to protect mandates, which include human rights monitoring, civilian protection, and security sector reform tasks, increased one-sided violence by warring parties, the literature lacks an investigation regarding how mandates affect one-sided violence in a broader sense. For example, mandates that emphasize civilian protection and Chapter VII enforcement, or have many other risky tasks, may exacerbate the level of one-sided violence by warring parties, which would explain the failure of peacekeepers to stop civilian victimization even after the inclusion of civilian protection tasks (Nichols, 2014).

Another interesting avenue would be to consider when states with professionalized militaries decide to deploy troops. Recently, states with high-quality militaries have increased their participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions. For example, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have deployed large quantities of troops, special forces units, and high-end support assets to various missions (Boutellis and Beary, 2020). This is surprising since the United Nations has increased its use of Chapter VII enforcement since the 1990s (Howard and Dayal, 2018). The theory from Chapter 4 would expect these states with professionalized militaries to have more to lose when they deploy their troops. However, high-risk mandates may draw in these states since the more dire missions may require the best troops to terminate conflict and maintain peace.

Appendices

Appendix A: Mandate Risk and Troop Contributions

Table 1: Model Robustness Checks

	All Battle Deaths		Observer Missions		30 Contributors		Same Continent, MP		Ever Sent		Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial			
	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Inflate	Model 17	Inflate
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-2.174**	-2.145**	-1.832**	-1.667**	-2.240**	-1.982**	-3.813**	-3.603**	-2.879**	-2.555**	-2.648**		-2.271**	
	(0.431)	(0.431)	(0.450)	(0.477)	(0.499)	(0.521)	(0.760)	(0.839)	(0.498)	(0.529)	(0.516)		(0.546)	
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$ (100s)	0.000	0.040*	0.118	1.535**	0.099	2.734**	0.637**	2.283†	0.279†	3.302**	0.288*		3.652**	
	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.110)	(0.503)	(0.109)	(0.640)	(0.207)	(1.255)	(0.145)	(0.777)	(0.142)		(0.738)	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ X Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$		-0.040*		-1.885**		-3.516**		-2.202		-3.982**			-4.437**	
		(0.017)		(0.661)		(0.845)		(1.666)		(0.962)			(0.924)	
Number of Contributors$_{t-1}$ (10s)	-0.091**	-0.088**	0.007	0.007	-0.083*	-0.088*	-0.011	-0.005	-0.037	-0.036	-0.149*	-0.294**	-0.155*	-0.301
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.063)	(0.079)
Re-hatted$_{t-1}$	-0.131	-0.122	0.098	0.100	-0.094	-0.093	0.946**	0.950**	0.099	0.104	0.088		0.101	
	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.195)		(0.194)	
Previous UN Mission$_{t-1}$	0.553**	0.539**	0.545**	0.546**	0.701**	0.694**	0.889**	0.862**	0.780**	0.766**	0.862**		0.862**	
	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.197)	(0.206)	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.140)		(0.143)	
Contributor GDP per Capita$_{t-1}$ (10,000s)	-0.125*	-0.124*	-0.150**	-0.149**	-0.063	-0.061	0.062	0.058	-0.088	-0.085	0.028	0.181	0.030	0.180
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.110)	(0.267)	0.105)	(0.253)
Contributor Democracy$_{t-1}$	2.181**	2.188**	2.572**	2.553**	1.567**	1.533**	2.564**	2.537**	2.293**	2.264**	0.837	-5.007†	0.785	-4.999*
	(0.496)	(0.496)	(0.512)	(0.512)	(0.454)	(0.452)	(0.524)	(0.520)	(0.469)	(0.467)	(0.556)	(2.613)	(0.530)	(2.437)
Total Contributed Troops$_{t-1}$ (100s)	0.025**	0.025**	0.030**	0.030**	0.038**	0.037**	0.056**	0.055**	0.059**	0.058**	0.053**		0.052**	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)		(0.016)	
Proportion of Contributor Troops$_{t-1}$	1.288*	1.286*	0.981	0.979	1.200	1.200	0.533	0.511	1.954	1.895	2.800		2.709	
	(0.560)	(0.561)	(0.610)	(0.610)	(0.906)	(0.905)	(0.575)	(0.570)	(2.972)	(2.861)	(3.695)		(3.500)	
Same Continent$_{t-1}$	0.002	-0.004	-0.030	-0.028	0.193	0.195			0.472*	0.467*	0.245	-0.813	0.229	-0.821
	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.172)	(0.169)	(0.173)	(0.169)			(0.228)	(0.225)	(0.262)	(0.718)	(0.256)	(0.701)
Trade$_{t-1}$ (1,000,000,000s)	0.178*	0.177*	0.168†	0.163†	0.089	0.084	-0.007	-0.009	-0.012	-0.015	-0.035	-21.523*	-0.039	-21.387*
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(9.140)	(0.038)	(8.929)
Joint IOs$_{t-1}$	0.020**	0.020**	0.033**	0.032**	0.028**	0.027**	0.010	0.009	0.020*	0.019*	0.012	-0.055**	0.011	-0.056**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Troops$_{t-1}$	0.504**	0.506**	0.587**	0.587**	0.752**	0.751**	1.351**	1.360**	1.690**	1.692**	1.459**		1.454**	
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.273)	(0.274)	(0.253)		(0.251)	
Constant	2.087**	2.045**	0.676	0.573	1.154†	1.010†	0.493	0.356	-0.534	-0.738	0.830	4.287**	0.628	4.326**
	(0.565)	(0.573)	(0.616)	(0.616)	(0.595)	(0.600)	(0.665)	(0.673)	(0.629)	(0.637)	(0.846)	(0.716)	(0.844)	(0.717)
lnalpha	1.865**	1.864**	2.038**	2.037**	2.425**	2.422**	3.334**	3.332**	3.533**	3.529**	3.355**		3.346**	
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.186)		(0.181)	
Observations	79097	79097	86253	86253	112492	112492	133629	133629	363427	363427	442899		442899	

State clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable is troop counts.
$^{\dagger}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.



Figure 1: Marginal effect of risky tasks on troops contributions from Model 13 based on 20,000 simulations. Gray bands represent the inner 95% of predicted values.

Table 2: Missions Included in Sample

MINURCA	MINURCAT	UNISFA	UNMEE
MINURSO	MINUSCA	UNMIH	UNMIL
MINUSMA	MINUSTAH	UNMIS	UNMISET
MONUC	MONUSCO	UNMISS	UNOCI
ONUB	ONUCA	UNOSOM	UNOSOM II
ONUMOZ	UNAMIC	UNPREDEP	UNPROFOR
UNAMID	UNAMIR	UNSMIH	UNTAC
UNAMSIL	UNCRO	UNTAES	UNTAET
UNDOF	UNFICYP	UNTMIH	UNTSO
UNIFIL	UNIKOM		

Table 3: Meta Analysis of 10 Random Samples

	15 Non-Contributors	30 Non-Contributors	15 w/ Interaction	30 w/ Interaction
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-1.989	-2.414	-1.736	-2.166
	[-2.283, -1.695]	[-2.709, -2.119]	[-2.041, -1.431]	[-2.475, -1.858]
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$ (Hundreds)			2.567	2.642
			[2.188, 2.946]	[2.234, 3.051]
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ X Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$			-3.431	-3.361
			[-3.939, -2.924]	[-3.903, -2.819]

95% Confidence intervals presented in brackets.
Dependent variable is troop counts. Common effect model with inverse-variance.
Read as overall effect size across all 10 samples.

To demonstrate that battle deaths does not predict mandate risk, I estimate a fractional logistic regression since the dependent variable is bound between 0 and 1. The unit of analysis for this model is the mission-month as it best captures the variation in the level of mandate risk. I include controls related to conflict conditions and the host state to limit potential confounders and cluster the standard errors on the mission. The results can be found in Table 4. A few control variables are statistically significant such as conflict termination, conflict duration, host GDP per capita, and host democracy, but battle deaths does not approach statistical significance in neither the naive model or the full model. This suggests that the two independent variables of interest are not mutually reinforcing allowing for valid inference between mandate risk and battle deaths on troop contributions.

Table 4: Predicting Mandate Risk with Conflict Dynamics

	Model 18	Model 19
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$ (Hundreds)	-0.143	-0.066
	(0.275)	(0.204)
Number of Contributors$_{t-1}$		-0.137
		(0.093)
Previous UN Mission$_{t-1}$		0.389
		(0.370)
Re-hatted$_{t-1}$		-0.064
		(0.345)
Host GDP per Capita (Thousands)		0.250**
		(0.062)
Host Democracy		-2.566*
		(1.167)
Host Size (Million Sq. Km)		-0.070
		(0.198)
Conflict Termination		0.848†
		(0.436)
Constant	1.416**	1.335**
	(0.306)	(0.502)
Observations	2870	2870

Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable is risk ratio.
† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: The Effect of Task Counts on Contributions

	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29
Total Task Count	0.027**		0.047**		0.047**		0.026**		0.025*	
	(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.011)	
Risky Task Count		0.032*		0.055**		0.058**		0.026†		0.026†
		(0.013)		(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.014)		(0.015)
Total Task Count X Battle Deaths					-0.006				0.006	
					(0.012)				(0.012)	
Risky Task Count X Battle Deaths						-0.021				0.006
						(0.019)				(0.016)
Battle Deaths (Hundreds)	-0.139	-0.085	-0.183†	-0.148	-0.055	0.170	-0.095	-0.061	-0.231	-0.158
	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.300)	(0.347)	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.309)	(0.286)
Troop Shortfall (Hundreds)							0.015**	0.015**	0.015**	0.015**
							(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of Contributors (Tens)			-0.096*	-0.072†	-0.097*	-0.075†	-0.111**	-0.095*	-0.111**	-0.095*
			(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Re-hatted			-0.319†	-0.272	-0.321†	-0.277	-0.255	-0.210	-0.254	-0.210
			(0.177)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.178)	(0.175)	(0.178)
Previous UN Mission			0.398**	0.468**	0.395**	0.457**	0.379*	0.434**	0.386*	0.439**
			(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Contributor GDP per Capita (Ten Thousands)			-0.125*	-0.125*	-0.125*	-0.126*	-0.115*	-0.117*	-0.115*	-0.117*
			(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Contributor Democracy			2.489**	2.428**	2.492**	2.433**	2.406**	2.342**	2.401**	2.340**
			(0.506)	(0.503)	(0.505)	(0.500)	(0.508)	(0.510)	(0.509)	(0.510)
Total Contributed Troops (Hundreds)			0.023**	0.023**	0.023**	0.023**	0.019**	0.019**	0.019**	0.019**
			(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Proportion of Contributor Troops			1.299*	1.312*	1.301*	1.319*	1.562*	1.575*	1.561*	1.574*
			(0.587)	(0.600)	(0.585)	(0.596)	(0.768)	(0.782)	(0.769)	(0.783)
Same Continent			0.073	0.065	0.071	0.061	-0.080	-0.096	-0.079	-0.096
			(0.162)	(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)
Trade (Billions)			0.192*	0.189*	0.192*	0.190*	0.344**	0.339**	0.342**	0.338**
			(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Joint IOs			0.014†	0.016*	0.014†	0.016*	0.016*	0.018**	0.016*	0.018**
			(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Troops	0.637**	0.636**	0.521**	0.523**	0.522**	0.523**	0.549**	0.551**	0.550**	0.551**
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Constant	1.980**	2.032**	-0.058	-0.095	-0.071	-0.121	-0.108	-0.113	-0.100	-0.110
	(0.248)	(0.251)	(0.552)	(0.555)	(0.551)	(0.553)	(0.577)	(0.584)	(0.579)	(0.583)
lnalpha	2.059**	2.062**	1.886**	1.891**	1.886**	1.890**	1.754**	1.757**	1.754**	1.757**
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Observations	78659	78659	72553	72553	72553	72553	61665	61665	61665	61665

State clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable is troop counts. 15 potential contributor random sample.
† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Below, I explain the classification of tasks between "risky" and "less risky" tasks found in Lloyd (2021a). In general, risky tasks are those that make peacekeepers potential targets of conflict, demand the use of force, or are naturally dangerous.

Monitoring Peace Agreements

The main task of monitoring a peace agreement and its subtasks of monitoring the buffer zone and liaising war parties are classified as risky tasks while promoting good offices is classified as less risky. Conflicts that end in a peace agreement are more likely to reoccur (Fortna, 2004a; Walter, 2009) increasing the likelihood of peacekeeper use of force.

Monitoring a buffer agreement was explained in the main body of the paper, but I will provide a brief summary. This tasks is considered risky since peacekeepers monitor and patrol a combat zone that splits the warring sides that is likely to be the sight of any further conflict.

Liaising war parties requires the peacekeepers to create effective lines of communication between the warring parties by visiting their respective field headquarters. Peacekeepers vulnerable when entering warring party field headquarters, but this risk is greater when visiting rebel headquarters as rebel groups likely see peacekeeper-government relations as an act of conspiracy against the group. This puts peacekeepers at risk of being a target of conflict (Fjelde et al., 2016).

The promotion of good offices, while a subtask of monitoring a peace agreement, is considered less risky. An interview with a former Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General explains that promoting good offices is another mode to create warring party communication. The mission acts as a mediator to carry messages or create peaceful contact between warring parties without directly taking part in the negotiations (Della-Giacoma, 2015). As a result, I categorize the promotion of good offices as less risky.

Peace Agreement Implementation

The task to implement the peace agreement takes monitoring the peace agreement task on step further making this a risky task. To implement the peace agreement, the mission takes an increasingly active role by enforcing the peace agreement crafted by the warring parties with the use of force. Since peace agreements are less durable compared to decisive military victory (Fortna, 2004a; Walter, 2009) and emphasize peacekeeper use of force, I classify this task as risky.

Monitor Human Rights

The main task of monitoring human rights and its subtask of monitoring the refugee situation are classified as risky tasks. Missions tasked to monitor human rights require peacekeepers to investigate reports of human rights abuses. Many of these abuses are by-products of conflict such as the killing of civilians (Hultman et al., 2013) or sexual exploitation and abuse (Johansson and Hultman, 2019; Kirschner and Miller, 2019). As a result, missions are likely to move to these dangerous locations to monitor human rights abuses making it a risky task.

I classify monitoring the refugee situation as a risky task. Refugee movements contain rebels hiding in human camouflage, weapons, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies (Beardsley, 2011), which puts peacekeepers at risk of being targeted or using force.

Protect Human Rights

I classify the main task of protecting human rights and the subtasks of protecting children, protecting women, and protecting civilians as risky tasks. The human rights abuses are by-products of conflict (Hultman et al., 2013; Johansson and Hultman, 2019; Kirschner and Miller, 2019). Furthermore, warring parties kill civilians or commit sexual violence improve its relative bargaining position by undermining the

opposing side's support base (Fjelde and Hultman, 2014; Fjelde et al., 2019; Cohen, 2013). To deter these human rights violations, especially when protecting children, women, and civilians, peacekeepers move to conflict locations to enforce the protection of human rights. As a result, I consider this main task and its subtasks as risky.

Protect UN Personnel

I classify the main task of protecting United Nations personnel as a risky task. Military troops can be called protect United Nations personnel, such as other troop units, United Nations police, and civilian units (Department of Peace Operations, 2012). Troops are expected to use force to protect United Nations personnel making peacekeepers likely targets. As a result, I classify the protection of UN personnel as a risky task.

Assist in Demining

I classify the task of assistance with demining as a risky task. This task requires peacekeepers to remove landmines from the combat zones to protect civilians or other potential victims from danger. These mines may be hidden and remain active long after the conflict subsides. Peacekeepers called to remove mines must exercise high caution to avoid injury or death natural to removing these explosives (United Nations, 2021f). Due to the danger associated with removing mines, I classify this task as risky.

Refugees Assist

The main task of assisting the refugee situation is classified as a risky task. Assisting refugees exposes peacekeepers to potentially hazardous situations as refugee groups are host to rebels in human camouflage and arms trafficking (Beardsley, 2011). Furthermore, assisting refugees forces peacekeepers to facilitate refugee movement across borders, which is a common battle ground for warring parties and border

hoping rebels (Townsen and Reeder, 2014). As a result, I classify assisting refugees as a risky task.

Facilitate the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance

I classify the main task to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and its subtask of protecting humanitarian personnel as risky tasks. Humanitarian aid workers are an increasingly vulnerable target, especially in the presence of conflict. Humanitarian aid workers are drawn to protect and help those who may be or are caught in civil conflict or those who do not have necessary resources. Due to the dynamics of conflict, humanitarian aid workers are increasingly killed as a direct or indirect product of conflict (Hoelscher et al., 2017). Since peacekeepers are likely to use force to protect humanitarian deliveries and workers, I classify these tasks as risky.

Monitor Borders

I classify the main task of monitoring the host state's borders as a risky task, but I classify the subtasks of monitoring the weapons embargo, monitoring the trade of weapons, and the inspection of cargo as less risky tasks. Host state borders are home to the facilitation of refugees and are the site of warring party confrontations that create conflict risk (Beardsley, 2011; Townsen and Reeder, 2014). As a result, I classify the task of border monitoring as a risky task.

In contrast, I classify the subtasks of monitoring the weapons embargo and cargo inspections as less risky tasks. Monitoring an arms embargo and the weapons trade requires peacekeepers to deliver information on the flow of arms into the country. In the case of cargo inspections, peacekeepers inspect cargo in safe locations such as ports, airports, and the occasional military base and host state border (Lloyd, 2021b). The lack of specificity in mission mandates on how to carry out these tasks lead to

principal-agent problems as peacekeepers shirk their responsibility leading to a lack of engagement with risky environments (Bellamy et al., 2010). Second, the majority of shipping locations are less conflict prone since private businesses are risk averse (Morrow et al., 1998). As a result of these considerations, I classify these subtasks as less risky.

Monitor Use of Natural Resources

I classify the task to monitor the use of natural resources as a less risky task. It is understandable that scholars may think that the monitoring of natural resources should be considered a risky task since many civil conflicts feature conflict over natural resources (Lujala, 2009). However, peacekeepers are not charged to protect and monitor the resources, but rather to provide advice to governments on how to manage their natural resources (S/RES/2556, 2020) making this an advisory action. As a result, I classify this task as a less risky task.

Chapter VII Authorization

I classify the task of Chapter VII authorization as a risky task. The United Nations Security Council provides Chapter VII authorization to use force in the development and duration of peace. This task allows the mission to take overt military action to combat threats to peace with more force compared to Chapter VI authorized missions (White, 2015). Due to the authorization of the use of overt military action, I classify Chapter VII authorization as risky.

Elections

I classify that main tasks of monitoring elections, providing security for the elections, and assisting with election implementation as less risky tasks. Monitoring elections requires peacekeepers to provide technological, logistical, and administra-

tive support to ensure that the election process is smooth. During election assistance, peacekeepers have a more active role by assisting the acting government to organize, monitor, and carry out elections (Lloyd, 2021b). This actions do not demand peacekeepers to use force or engage in conflict making it a less risky task.

Similar to the previous election related tasks, I classify the provision of election security as a less risky task. Peacekeepers charged with electoral security raise the costs of election violence creating a strong deterrent effect on election violence. In addition, elections are normally implemented once the conflict has subsided (Fjelde and Smidt, 2021). This allows peacekeepers to avoid the negative externalities of conflict making election security a less risky task.

Build Government Capacity

I classify the main task of building government capacity and the subtask of government policy implementation as less risky tasks. Peacekeepers are given the responsibility to re-establish government authority, especially through the use of political and administrative reform. Furthermore, when missions have the responsibility to implement these reforms, the mission will act in an administrative role (Lloyd, 2021b). Due to the peacekeepers acting in an administrative role, I classify these tasks as less risky.

Preserve Cultural and Historical Sites

I classify the protection of cultural heritage sites to be a less risky task. This task requests that peacekeepers assist, when necessary and feasible, to protect cultural and historical sites alongside government authorities and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Lloyd, 2021b). The task to protect cultural sites has two important qualities that make this task less risky. First, peacekeepers assist the host government and UNESCO instead of being

the main enforcers of protection. Second, the task should only be carried out when necessary and feasible suggesting that this is not a high priority task limiting potential danger. As a result, I classify the protection of cultural and historical sites as a less risky task.

Assist in the Implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIP)

I classify the task to assist with Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) as a less risky task. QIPs are initiatives funded by the mission to assist local communities by renovating schools, providing safe access to fresh water, creating solar-powered water systems, and weapons-free zones (United Nations, 2021g). QIPs develop local communities after the decaying effects of civil conflict allowing the mission to reach out to impacted communities instead of engaging with warring parties. As a result, I classify the tasks of QIP implementation as less risky.

Assist with Justice Sector Reform

I classify the task to assist with justice sector reform as a less risky task. The Untied Nations pushes missions with this tasks to develop the justice system, strength criminal justice prosecution, and facilitate rule of law reforms. Many of these factors deal with educating state actors to understand the law, increasing accountability and monitoring to find those who break the law, and ensuring the cost of punishment for breaking the law offset the benefits of breaking the law (Blair, 2021). Due to the educator and reformer role of the mission, I classify this task as less risky.

Assist with Security Sector Reform

I classify the main task of assisting with security sector reform and its subtasks of assisting police reform, monitoring the police, and conducting joint patrols with the police as risky tasks. Government security forces are former actors used

attack warring parties and civilians. Peacekeepers must reform former combatants while also investigating and tracking culpable rebels groups (Lloyd, 2017) making this a risky task. The subtasks of assisting police reform, monitoring the police, and conducting joint patrols with the police follow follow a similar logic. Assisting the police requires peacekeepers to not only impart principles and best practices, but it also requires peacekeepers work with police to create and protect a peaceful environment. Monitoring the police requires peacekeepers to carryout police reform among the police units, but also to ensure the police support human rights further putting peacekeepers at risk. Last, conducting joint patrols with the police requires troops to work alongside the police in the monitoring and patrolling of dangerous locations with high levels of crime, suggesting continued risk to troop physical integrity (Lloyd, 2021b). As a result of potential peacekeeper harm, I classify these subtasks as risky.

Promote National Reconciliation

I classify the main task of promoting national reconciliation and its subtask of pursuing justice for war criminals as less risky tasks. The process of national reconciliation is a political action by peacekeepers as mediators to promote trust and reduce social tensions between the warring parties (United Nations, 2021a). Due to its political and social nature, I classify this task as less risky. I also classify the subtask of pursuing justice for war criminals as a less risky task. With this task, peacekeepers take an investigative role to search for human rights violators. Instead of looking to combat these individuals, peacekeepers investigate crimes and assist police units in bringing in criminals (Lloyd, 2021b). With this in mind, I classify this subtask as a less risky task.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

I classify the main tasks of monitoring and assisting with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) as risky tasks. DDR takes weapons that are surrendered by former armed groups and aids their reintegration into society. Peacekeepers must deal directly with armed groups in order to carry out this task putting the troops in a precarious situation (United Nations, 2021c). Peacekeeping troops are not responsible for the placement of former combatants into job skill programs, but they are more responsible to gather information on the DDR program, guard weapon and ammunition stockpiles from would-be spoilers, providing safe transportation of weapons, and proactively engage with warring parties (Department of Peace Operations, 2012). As a result of the high potential to engage with frustrated armed combatants and would-be spoilers, I classify the monitoring and assisting with DDR tasks as risky.

Disseminate Info About the Mission to the Public

I classify the main task of disseminating info about the mission the public as a less risky task. Peacekeepers act as information sharing agents by sharing with local communities and the warring parties about the role of the mission through radio broadcasts and community outreach (Lloyd, 2021b). Due to the community outreach nature of this task, I classify this task as less risky.

Promote Freedom of the Press

I classify the main task to promote press freedom as a less risky task. Peacekeepers have the responsibility to strengthen the legal and regulation frameworks to protect the media and other forms of societal communication while also promoting media professionalization (Lloyd, 2021b). Due to the legal reformation approach of peacekeepers, I classify this task as less risky.

Appendix B: Mandate Risk and the Movement of Peacekeepers

Table 6: All Models Including Observer Missions, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(17) Battle Deaths	(18) Total OSV	(19) Rebel OSV	(20) Gov OSV	(21) Battle Deaths	(22) Total OSV	(23) Rebel OSV	(24) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.547**	-8.338**	-9.102**	-8.950**	-8.561**	-8.335**	-9.100**	-8.951**
	(1.772)	(1.676)	(1.703)	(1.782)	(1.777)	(1.680)	(1.706)	(1.783)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.012**				-0.049			
	(0.004)				(0.053)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.021**				-0.021**			
	(0.005)				(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.019**				0.066		
		(0.003)				(0.092)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.022**				-0.022**		
		(0.006)				(0.006)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.021**				0.062	
			(0.004)				(0.108)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.022**				-0.021**	
			(0.007)				(0.007)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.008				0.898
				(0.007)				(0.721)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.020**				-0.020**
				(0.006)				(0.006)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.029**	0.027*	0.026*	0.026*	0.029**	0.027*	0.026*	0.026*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$					0.075			
					(0.067)			
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Total$_{t-1}$						-0.056		
						(0.107)		
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Rebs$_{t-1}$							-0.048	
							(0.126)	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Gov$_{t-1}$								-1.368
								(1.036)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.145*	0.162*	0.270**	0.148*	0.145*	0.162*	0.270**	0.148*
	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.091)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.091)	(0.068)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.803	-0.664	-0.772	-1.002	-0.795	-0.666	-0.773	-1.002
	(0.794)	(0.771)	(0.812)	(0.760)	(0.794)	(0.773)	(0.814)	(0.760)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	-0.071	-0.082	-0.078	-0.296	-0.065	-0.084	-0.079	-0.298
	(0.745)	(0.729)	(0.831)	(0.726)	(0.744)	(0.729)	(0.832)	(0.727)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.096**	-0.096**	-0.095**	-0.101**	-0.096**	-0.096**	-0.095**	-0.101**

Continued on next page

Table 6: All Models Including Observer Missions, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(17) Battle Deaths	(18) Total OSV	(19) Rebel OSV	(20) Gov OSV	(21) Battle Deaths	(22) Total OSV	(23) Rebel OSV	(24) Gov OSV
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.597**	-0.615**	-0.632**	-0.642**	-0.598**	-0.614**	-0.632**	-0.643**
	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.124)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.138**	-0.137*	-0.130*	-0.106†	-0.138**	-0.137*	-0.130*	-0.106†
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-10.600**	-10.707**	-10.880**	-11.508**	-10.603**	-10.705**	-10.879**	-11.509**
	(1.308)	(1.349)	(1.367)	(1.466)	(1.308)	(1.348)	(1.367)	(1.466)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.648	0.615	1.178	0.727	0.650	0.615	1.178	0.731
	(0.458)	(0.452)	(0.815)	(0.455)	(0.459)	(0.452)	(0.815)	(0.456)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.783*	-1.956*	-1.940*	-1.991*	-1.781*	-1.956*	-1.940*	-1.994*
	(0.815)	(0.844)	(0.902)	(0.892)	(0.815)	(0.844)	(0.902)	(0.894)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.407**	1.506**	1.557**	1.418**	1.407**	1.506**	1.557**	1.420**
	(0.515)	(0.483)	(0.494)	(0.461)	(0.515)	(0.483)	(0.494)	(0.462)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.046**	0.049**	0.040**	0.046**	0.046**	0.049**	0.040**	0.046**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.343**	12.368**	12.930**	12.898**	12.352**	12.365**	12.929**	12.900**
	(1.708)	(1.670)	(1.730)	(1.887)	(1.712)	(1.673)	(1.732)	(1.888)
lnalpha	5.178**	5.180**	5.195**	5.200**	5.178**	5.180**	5.195**	5.200**
	(0.371)	(0.369)	(0.372)	(0.371)	(0.371)	(0.369)	(0.372)	(0.371)
Observations	212228	212264	212275	212275	212228	212264	212275	212275

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 7: All Models Including Observer Missions, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(25) Battle Deaths	(26) Total OSV	(27) Rebel OSV	(28) Gov OSV	(29) Battle Deaths	(30) Total OSV	(31) Rebel OSV	(32) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio	-13.198**	-13.886**	-14.671**	-13.363**	-7.811**	-7.480**	-8.163**	-8.040**
	(2.188)	(2.399)	(2.416)	(2.629)	(1.813)	(1.694)	(1.707)	(1.835)
Battle Deaths	0.014**				0.012**			
	(0.004)				(0.004)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.061**				-0.021**			
	(0.022)				(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence		0.018**				0.019**		
		(0.003)				(0.004)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.068**				-0.022**		
		(0.023)				(0.006)		
Rebel One Sided Violence			0.020**				0.022**	
			(0.003)				(0.004)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.065**				-0.021**	
			(0.022)				(0.007)	
Government One Sided Violence				-0.014†				-0.008
				(0.007)				(0.008)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.055*				-0.019**
				(0.023)				(0.006)
FC Duration	0.025*	0.023*	0.023*	0.023*	0.069	0.074	0.078	0.076
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.099)
Risk Ratio x Time Since Death	0.048†							
	(0.026)							
Risk Ratio x Time Since OSV Total		0.056*						
		(0.028)						
Risk Ratio x Time Since OSV Rebs			0.054*					
			(0.026)					
Risk Ratio x Time Since OSV Gov				0.044				
				(0.029)				
Risk Ratio x FC Duration					-0.051	-0.060	-0.065	-0.063
					(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.115)
Night Lights	0.122†	0.139*	0.224**	0.133†	0.146*	0.163*	0.271**	0.149*
	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.086)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.091)	(0.068)
Proportion of Year in Drought	-1.065	-0.928	-1.049	-1.170	-0.825	-0.694	-0.807	-1.027
	(0.917)	(0.887)	(0.911)	(0.797)	(0.775)	(0.748)	(0.791)	(0.736)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain	-0.393	-0.442	-0.469	-0.584	-0.065	-0.072	-0.063	-0.290

Continued on next page

Table 7: All Models Including Observer Missions, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(25) Battle Deaths	(26) Total OSV	(27) Rebel OSV	(28) Gov OSV	(29) Battle Deaths	(30) Total OSV	(31) Rebel OSV	(32) Gov OSV
	(0.649)	(0.656)	(0.713)	(0.652)	(0.745)	(0.729)	(0.832)	(0.728)
Distance to Nearest Unit (Hundred km)	-0.089**	-0.089**	-0.087**	-0.096**	-0.097**	-0.097**	-0.096**	-0.103**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Distance to Own Border (Hundred km)	-0.589**	-0.600**	-0.630**	-0.636**	-0.591**	-0.606**	-0.623**	-0.635**
	(0.126)	(0.123)	(0.117)	(0.126)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.116)
Distance to Capital (Hundred km)	-0.141**	-0.138**	-0.129*	-0.100†	-0.138**	-0.136*	-0.130*	-0.105†
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Days to Urban Center	-11.208**	-11.387**	-11.652**	-12.145**	-10.519**	-10.610**	-10.775**	-11.407**
	(1.433)	(1.503)	(1.537)	(1.621)	(1.366)	(1.409)	(1.426)	(1.528)
Headquarters	0.829	0.800	1.022	0.893†	0.640	0.594	1.092	0.701†
	(0.528)	(0.539)	(0.731)	(0.522)	(0.439)	(0.421)	(0.727)	(0.420)
Zone of Confidence	-2.105*	-2.302*	-2.287*	-2.235*	-1.735*	-1.906*	-1.911*	-1.943*
	(0.921)	(0.962)	(0.984)	(0.986)	(0.818)	(0.838)	(0.896)	(0.883)
Neighboring Troops (Thousands, Logged)	1.367**	1.455**	1.517**	1.381**	1.391**	1.493**	1.542**	1.405**
	(0.513)	(0.473)	(0.486)	(0.450)	(0.515)	(0.476)	(0.485)	(0.456)
Troop Quality (Millions of Dollars)	0.042**	0.047**	0.043**	0.044**	0.046**	0.050**	0.041**	0.047**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Number of Troops in Cell (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	16.233**	16.955**	17.544**	16.508**	11.752**	11.676**	12.176**	12.166**
	(1.920)	(2.089)	(2.167)	(2.238)	(1.648)	(1.596)	(1.642)	(1.802)
lnalpha	5.170**	5.169**	5.187**	5.194**	5.178**	5.179**	5.195**	5.199**
	(0.369)	(0.367)	(0.371)	(0.370)	(0.372)	(0.369)	(0.372)	(0.371)
Observations	212228	212264	212275	212275	212228	212264	212275	212275

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 8: All Models without Death Restrictions, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(33) Battle Deaths	(34) Total OSV	(35) Rebel OSV	(36) Gov OSV	(37) Battle Deaths	(38) Total OSV	(39) Rebel OSV	(40) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio	-8.634**	-8.451**	-9.218**	-9.114**	-8.636**	-8.452**	-9.217**	-9.114**
	(1.837)	(1.744)	(1.754)	(1.871)	(1.836)	(1.743)	(1.756)	(1.871)
Battle Deaths	-0.000				0.009			
	(0.000)				(0.026)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.023**				-0.023**			
	(0.005)				(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence		-0.000				0.010		
		(0.000)				(0.039)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.025**				-0.025**		
		(0.005)				(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence			0.016**				0.044	
			(0.003)				(0.087)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.024**				-0.024**	
			(0.006)				(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence				-0.005**				-0.013
				(0.002)				(0.033)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.022**				-0.022**
				(0.006)				(0.006)
FC Duration	0.027**	0.026**	0.025**	0.025**	0.027**	0.026**	0.025**	0.025**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Risk Ratio x Battle Deaths					-0.009			
					(0.026)			
Risk Ratio x OSV Total						-0.010		
						(0.039)		
Risk Ratio x OSV Rebs							-0.033	
							(0.102)	
Risk Ratio x OSV Gov								0.010
								(0.040)
Night Lights	0.144†	0.159*	0.263**	0.139*	0.144†	0.159*	0.263**	0.139*
	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.069)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.069)
Proportion of Year in Drought	-0.091	-0.052	-0.145	-0.416	-0.089	-0.050	-0.146	-0.416
	(0.603)	(0.630)	(0.698)	(0.602)	(0.604)	(0.630)	(0.699)	(0.602)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain	0.314	0.304	0.375	0.044	0.311	0.302	0.375	0.044
	(0.745)	(0.709)	(0.799)	(0.733)	(0.746)	(0.710)	(0.800)	(0.733)
Distance to Nearest Unit (Hundred km)	-0.095**	-0.095**	-0.093**	-0.101**	-0.095**	-0.095**	-0.093**	-0.101**

Continued on next page

Table 8: All Models without Death Restrictions, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(33) Battle Deaths	(34) Total OSV	(35) Rebel OSV	(36) Gov OSV	(37) Battle Deaths	(38) Total OSV	(39) Rebel OSV	(40) Gov OSV
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border (Hundred km)	-0.605**	-0.630**	-0.654**	-0.664**	-0.605**	-0.630**	-0.654**	-0.664**
	(0.131)	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.133)
Distance to Capital (Hundred km)	-0.145**	-0.144**	-0.138**	-0.111*	-0.145**	-0.144**	-0.138**	-0.111*
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Days to Urban Center	-12.333**	-12.555**	-12.788**	-13.396**	-12.328**	-12.551**	-12.787**	-13.396**
	(1.402)	(1.449)	(1.443)	(1.522)	(1.401)	(1.447)	(1.442)	(1.522)
Headquarters	0.022	-0.026	0.828	0.100	0.024	-0.025	0.828	0.100
	(0.418)	(0.422)	(1.072)	(0.442)	(0.417)	(0.421)	(1.072)	(0.442)
Zone of Confidence	-1.047*	-1.313**	-1.583**	-1.391**	-1.048*	-1.314**	-1.583**	-1.391**
	(0.427)	(0.413)	(0.499)	(0.428)	(0.427)	(0.413)	(0.499)	(0.429)
Neighboring Troops (Thousands, Logged)	1.846**	1.902**	1.946**	1.779**	1.848**	1.903**	1.946**	1.778**
	(0.544)	(0.512)	(0.532)	(0.493)	(0.545)	(0.513)	(0.532)	(0.494)
Troop Quality (Millions of Dollars)	0.030**	0.036**	0.027**	0.033**	0.030**	0.036**	0.027**	0.033**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Number of Troops in Cell (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.660**	12.762**	13.361**	13.348**	12.660**	12.762**	13.360**	13.349**
	(1.735)	(1.700)	(1.724)	(1.923)	(1.736)	(1.700)	(1.727)	(1.923)
lnalpha	5.075**	5.073**	5.088**	5.098**	5.075**	5.073**	5.088**	5.098**
	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.393)	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.393)
Observations	197354	197354	197354	197354	197354	197354	197354	197354

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 9: All Models without Death Restrictions, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(25) Battle Deaths	(26) Total OSV	(27) Rebel OSV	(28) Gov OSV	(29) Battle Deaths	(30) Total OSV	(31) Rebel OSV	(32) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-14.211**	-15.124**	-16.190**	-14.576**	-8.905**	-8.583**	-9.230**	-9.241**
	(1.826)	(1.961)	(1.928)	(2.304)	(1.513)	(1.362)	(1.311)	(1.434)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	-0.000				-0.000			
	(0.000)				(0.000)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.070**				-0.023**			
	(0.018)				(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		-0.000				-0.000		
		(0.000)				(0.000)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.078**				-0.025**		
		(0.018)				(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.016**				0.016**	
			(0.003)				(0.003)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.078**				-0.024**	
			(0.016)				(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.005**				-0.005**
				(0.002)				(0.002)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.065**				-0.022**
				(0.019)				(0.006)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.024**	0.022**	0.022**	0.022*	0.013	0.019	0.024	0.018
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.062)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since Death	0.057*							
	(0.023)							
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Total		0.067**						
		(0.023)						
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Rebs			0.068**					
			(0.021)					
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Gov				0.054*				
				(0.025)				
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x FC Duration$_{t-1}$					0.018	0.009	0.001	0.009
					(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.107†	0.120†	0.194*	0.112†	0.144†	0.158*	0.263**	0.139*
	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.084)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.068)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.436	-0.412	-0.520	-0.636	-0.087	-0.049	-0.145	-0.415
	(0.778)	(0.798)	(0.832)	(0.640)	(0.607)	(0.630)	(0.696)	(0.602)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	-0.094	-0.150	-0.133	-0.327	0.312	0.302	0.375	0.043

Continued on next page

Table 9: All Models without Death Restrictions, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(41) Battle Deaths	(42) Total OSV	(43) Rebel OSV	(44) Gov OSV	(45) Battle Deaths	(46) Total OSV	(47) Rebel OSV	(48) Gov OSV
	(0.662)	(0.654)	(0.698)	(0.669)	(0.744)	(0.709)	(0.801)	(0.733)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.087**	-0.087**	-0.085**	-0.095**	-0.094**	-0.095**	-0.093**	-0.101**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.595**	-0.612**	-0.650**	-0.658**	-0.608**	-0.632**	-0.654**	-0.665**
	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.138)	(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.127)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.147**	-0.145**	-0.136**	-0.104†	-0.145**	-0.144**	-0.138**	-0.111*
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-13.377**	-13.768**	-14.174**	-14.476**	-12.370**	-12.574**	-12.790**	-13.414**
	(1.261)	(1.283)	(1.254)	(1.397)	(1.427)	(1.472)	(1.463)	(1.534)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.266	0.243	0.517	0.339	0.023	-0.024	0.829	0.103
	(0.634)	(0.683)	(0.974)	(0.666)	(0.423)	(0.422)	(1.052)	(0.440)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.528**	-1.905**	-2.017**	-1.849**	-1.075*	-1.327**	-1.584**	-1.404**
	(0.470)	(0.492)	(0.545)	(0.509)	(0.452)	(0.437)	(0.509)	(0.451)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	1.836**	1.870**	1.939**	1.754**	1.862**	1.908**	1.947**	1.785**
	(0.567)	(0.530)	(0.540)	(0.501)	(0.564)	(0.524)	(0.541)	(0.507)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.021*	0.028**	0.025*	0.026**	0.030**	0.036**	0.027**	0.033**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	17.342**	18.298**	19.134**	17.840**	12.878**	12.869**	13.370**	13.451**
	(1.466)	(1.546)	(1.601)	(1.817)	(1.431)	(1.349)	(1.319)	(1.508)
lnalpha	5.061**	5.057**	5.074**	5.089**	5.075**	5.073**	5.088**	5.098**
	(0.392)	(0.388)	(0.393)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.394)	(0.393)
Observations	197354	197354	197354	197354	197354	197354	197354	197354

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 10: All Models with 50% of Cells, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(49) Battle Deaths	(50) Total OSV	(51) Rebel OSV	(52) Gov OSV	(53) Battle Deaths	(54) Total OSV	(55) Rebel OSV	(56) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.849**	-8.680**	-9.411**	-9.349**	-8.856**	-8.676**	-9.411**	-9.348**
	(1.893)	(1.813)	(1.833)	(1.929)	(1.899)	(1.816)	(1.834)	(1.930)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.016**				-0.032			
	(0.006)				(0.072)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.023**				-0.023**			
	(0.005)				(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.020**				0.103		
		(0.003)				(0.092)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.025**				-0.025**		
		(0.005)				(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.022**				0.041	
			(0.004)				(0.079)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.025**				-0.025**	
			(0.006)				(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.010				2.135**
				(0.008)				(0.485)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.022**				-0.022**
				(0.006)				(0.006)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.027**	0.026**	0.025**	0.026**	0.027**	0.026**	0.025**	0.026**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$					0.058			
					(0.092)			
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Total$_{t-1}$						-0.098		
						(0.108)		
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Rebs$_{t-1}$							-0.022	
							(0.094)	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Gov$_{t-1}$								-3.136**
								(0.679)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.178†	0.194*	0.308**	0.172*	0.178†	0.194*	0.308**	0.173*
	(0.095)	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.079)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	0.024	0.066	-0.014	-0.330	0.029	0.063	-0.015	-0.329
	(0.656)	(0.683)	(0.744)	(0.651)	(0.657)	(0.686)	(0.745)	(0.651)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	0.133	0.109	0.129	-0.147	0.136	0.107	0.129	-0.149
	(0.836)	(0.810)	(0.895)	(0.821)	(0.836)	(0.811)	(0.896)	(0.822)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.094**	-0.094**	-0.093**	-0.100**	-0.094**	-0.094**	-0.093**	-0.100**

Continued on next page

Table 10: All Models with 50% of Cells, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(49) Battle Deaths	(50) Total OSV	(51) Rebel OSV	(52) Gov OSV	(53) Battle Deaths	(54) Total OSV	(55) Rebel OSV	(56) Gov OSV
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.655**	-0.683**	-0.709**	-0.715**	-0.655**	-0.683**	-0.709**	-0.715**
	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.148)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.135**	-0.134**	-0.127*	-0.102†	-0.135**	-0.134**	-0.127*	-0.102†
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-12.512**	-12.760**	-13.017**	-13.623**	-12.515**	-12.756**	-13.016**	-13.623**
	(1.362)	(1.408)	(1.405)	(1.466)	(1.361)	(1.408)	(1.404)	(1.467)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.371	0.289	1.040	0.394	0.372	0.289	1.040	0.411
	(0.466)	(0.458)	(1.093)	(0.470)	(0.467)	(0.458)	(1.093)	(0.466)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-1.737**	-1.983**	-2.194**	-2.049**	-1.737**	-1.984**	-2.194**	-2.060**
	(0.390)	(0.423)	(0.585)	(0.464)	(0.390)	(0.423)	(0.585)	(0.467)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	2.237**	2.272**	2.339**	2.127**	2.237**	2.273**	2.339**	2.135**
	(0.588)	(0.552)	(0.570)	(0.537)	(0.588)	(0.552)	(0.570)	(0.538)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.027**	0.034**	0.025**	0.031**	0.027**	0.034**	0.025**	0.031**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	12.165**	12.300**	12.885**	12.927**	12.169**	12.296**	12.884**	12.927**
	(1.804)	(1.781)	(1.816)	(2.000)	(1.808)	(1.783)	(1.817)	(2.001)
lnalpha	5.756**	5.753**	5.766**	5.777**	5.756**	5.752**	5.766**	5.777**
	(0.401)	(0.397)	(0.400)	(0.399)	(0.401)	(0.397)	(0.400)	(0.399)
Observations	390151	390203	390217	390216	390151	390203	390217	390216

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 50% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 11: All Models with 50% of Cells, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(57) Battle Deaths	(58) Total OSV	(59) Rebel OSV	(60) Gov OSV	(61) Battle Deaths	(62) Total OSV	(63) Rebel OSV	(64) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-14.754**	-15.725**	-16.435**	-15.318**	-9.339**	-9.026**	-9.691**	-9.710**
	(1.729)	(1.882)	(1.931)	(2.239)	(1.622)	(1.477)	(1.424)	(1.524)
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.018**				0.016**			
	(0.006)				(0.006)			
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.072**				-0.023**			
	(0.017)				(0.005)			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.018**				0.020**		
		(0.003)				(0.003)		
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.081**				-0.025**		
		(0.017)				(0.005)		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.021**				0.022**	
			(0.004)				(0.004)	
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.079**				-0.025**	
			(0.016)				(0.006)	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.017*				-0.011
				(0.008)				(0.008)
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.068**				-0.022**
				(0.018)				(0.006)
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.024**	0.022**	0.023**	0.023*	0.001	0.007	0.010	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.061)
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since Death	0.060**							
	(0.022)							
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Total		0.069**						
		(0.023)						
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Rebs			0.067**					
			(0.021)					
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Time Since OSV Gov				0.058*				
				(0.025)				
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x FC Duration$_{t-1}$					0.033	0.024	0.019	0.025
					(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.070)
Night Lights$_{t-1}$	0.134†	0.152*	0.238**	0.144†	0.177†	0.194*	0.307**	0.172*
	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.091)	(0.075)	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.100)	(0.078)
Proportion of Year in Drought$_{t-1}$	-0.336	-0.312	-0.392	-0.586	0.033	0.074	-0.006	-0.324
	(0.837)	(0.862)	(0.887)	(0.697)	(0.665)	(0.689)	(0.749)	(0.658)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain$_{t-1}$	-0.321	-0.398	-0.394	-0.575	0.129	0.105	0.125	-0.149

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Table 11: All Models with 50% of Cells, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(57) Battle Deaths	(58) Total OSV	(59) Rebel OSV	(60) Gov OSV	(61) Battle Deaths	(62) Total OSV	(63) Rebel OSV	(64) Gov OSV
	(0.740)	(0.737)	(0.782)	(0.740)	(0.833)	(0.809)	(0.895)	(0.819)
Distance to Nearest Unit$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.086**	-0.086**	-0.084**	-0.094**	-0.093**	-0.094**	-0.092**	-0.100**
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.647**	-0.669**	-0.708**	-0.711**	-0.659**	-0.687**	-0.712**	-0.719**
	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.147)	(0.153)	(0.143)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.142)
Distance to Capital$_{t-1}$ (Hundred km)	-0.137**	-0.135**	-0.125*	-0.095†	-0.135**	-0.134**	-0.127*	-0.102†
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Days to Urban Center$_{t-1}$	-13.633**	-14.067**	-14.430**	-14.816**	-12.582**	-12.812**	-13.057**	-13.675**
	(1.177)	(1.195)	(1.179)	(1.283)	(1.379)	(1.422)	(1.415)	(1.463)
Headquarters$_{t-1}$	0.559	0.499	0.753	0.594	0.369	0.291	1.071	0.400
	(0.654)	(0.699)	(1.008)	(0.684)	(0.474)	(0.465)	(1.098)	(0.476)
Zone of Confidence$_{t-1}$	-2.204**	-2.544**	-2.627**	-2.504**	-1.783**	-2.016**	-2.214**	-2.083**
	(0.461)	(0.535)	(0.611)	(0.562)	(0.406)	(0.430)	(0.585)	(0.467)
Neighboring Troops$_{t-1}$ (Thousands, Logged)	2.251**	2.264**	2.335**	2.118**	2.270**	2.293**	2.357**	2.148**
	(0.612)	(0.577)	(0.584)	(0.550)	(0.603)	(0.560)	(0.575)	(0.549)
Troop Quality$_{t-1}$ (Millions of Dollars)	0.017†	0.026**	0.023**	0.025**	0.026**	0.033**	0.025**	0.031**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Number of Troops in Cell$_{t-1}$ (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	17.130**	18.165**	18.726**	17.862**	12.559**	12.580**	13.110**	13.217**
	(1.351)	(1.450)	(1.584)	(1.726)	(1.527)	(1.443)	(1.424)	(1.583)
lnalpha	5.741**	5.735**	5.752**	5.766**	5.756**	5.753**	5.766**	5.777**
	(0.399)	(0.395)	(0.399)	(0.398)	(0.401)	(0.397)	(0.400)	(0.399)
Observations	390151	390203	390217	390216	390151	390203	390217	390216

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 50% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 12: Meta Analysis with Randomly Selected 25%, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(1) Battle Deaths	(2) Total OSV	(3) Rebel OSV	(4) Gov OSV	(5) Battle Deaths	(6) Total OSV	(7) Rebel OSV	(8) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.831 [-9.998, -7.664]	-8.656 [-9.769, -7.543]	-9.397 [-10.518, -8.277]	-9.325 [-10.508, -8.142]	-8.690 [-9.848, -7.532]	-8.507 [-9.608, -7.406]	-9.247 [-10.359, -8.136]	-9.159 [-10.332, -7.986]
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.016 [0.012, 0.019]				-0.029 [-0.069, 0.012]			
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$					0.052 [0.002, 0.103]			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.021 [0.019, 0.023]				0.058 [0.009, 0.108]		
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Total$_{t-1}$						-0.045 [-0.104, 0.014]		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.023 [0.021, 0.026]				0.058 [0.008, 0.107]	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Rebs$_{t-1}$							-0.042 [-0.100, 0.016]	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.010 [-0.15, -0.005]				0.935 [0.585, 1.285]
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Gov$_{t-1}$								-1.448 [-1.956, -0.940]
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.027 [0.022, 0.032]	0.026 [0.020, 0.031]	0.025 [0.020, 0.030]	0.025 [0.019, 0.032]				

95% Confidence intervals presented in brackets.
Dependent variable is troop counts. Common effect model with inverse-variance.
Read as overall effect size across all 10 samples.

Table 13: Meta Analysis with Randomly Selected 25%, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(9) Battle Deaths	(10) Total OSV	(11) Rebel OSV	(12) Gov OSV	(13) Battle Deaths	(14) Total OSV	(15) Rebel OSV	(16) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio	-14.339	-15.343	-16.281	-14.891	-9.046	-8.736	-9.389	-9.392
	[-15.432, -13.246]	[-16.519, -14.168]	[-17.467, -15.095]	[-16.285, -13.497]	[-10.012, -8.080]	[-9.611, -7.860]	[-10.236, -8.542]	[-10.305, -8.479]
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.070							
	[-0.081, -0.059]							
Risk Ratio x Time Since Death	0.058							
	[0.044, 0.072]							
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.079						
		[-0.090, -0.068]						
Risk Ratio x Time Since OSV Total		0.068						
		[0.054, 0.082]						
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.079					
			[-0.088, -0.069]					
Risk Ratio x Time Since OSV Rebs			0.068					
			[0.055, 0.081]					
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.067				
				[-0.078, -0.055]				
Risk Ratio x Time Since OSV Gov				0.056				
				[0.041, 0.072]				
FC Duration					0.007	0.013	0.017	0.012
					[-0.027, 0.041]	[-0.022, 0.047]	[-0.020, 0.053]	[-0.026, 0.050]
Risk Ratio x FC Duration					0.025	0.016	0.010	0.016
					[-0.014, 0.064]	[-0.024, 0.055]	[-0.032, 0.052]	[-0.027, 0.060]

95% Confidence intervals presented in brackets.
Dependent variable is troop counts. Common effect model with inverse-variance.
Read as overall effect size across all 10 samples.

Table 14: Meta Analysis with Randomly Selected 50%, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(1) Battle Deaths	(2) Total OSV	(3) Rebel OSV	(4) Gov OSV	(5) Battle Deaths	(6) Total OSV	(7) Rebel OSV	(8) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$	-8.831	-8.656	-9.397	-9.325	-8.836	-8.651	-9.396	-9.324
	[-9.998, -7.664]	[-9.769, -7.543]	[-10.518, -8.277]	[-10.508, -8.142]	[-10.006, -7.666]	[-9.766, -7.537]	[-10.517, -8.274]	[-10.507, -8.141]
Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$	0.016				-0.020			
	[0.012, 0.019]				[-0.066, 0.026]			
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x Battle Deaths$_{t-1}$					0.042			
					[-0.016, 0.100]			
Total One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$		0.021				0.117		
		[0.019, 0.023]				[0.055, 0.179]		
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Total$_{t-1}$						-0.114		
						[-0.186, -0.041]		
Rebel One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$			0.023				0.062	
			[0.021, 0.026]				[0.011, 0.114]	
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Rebs$_{t-1}$							-0.047	
							[-0.108, 0.015]	
Government One Sided Violence$_{t-1}$				-0.010				1.988
				[-0.15, -0.005]				[1.551, 2.425]
Risk Ratio$_{t-1}$ x OSV Gov$_{t-1}$								-2.930
								[-3.546, -2.313]
FC Duration$_{t-1}$	0.027	0.026	0.025	0.025				
	[0.022, 0.032]	[0.020, 0.031]	[0.020, 0.030]	[0.019, 0.032]				

95% Confidence intervals presented in brackets.
Dependent variable is troop counts. Common effect model with inverse-variance.
Read as overall effect size across all 10 samples.

Table 15: Meta Analysis with Randomly Selected 50%, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(9) Battle Deaths	(10) Total OSV	(11) Rebel OSV	(12) Gov OSV	(13) Battle Deaths	(14) Total OSV	(15) Rebel OSV	(16) Gov OSV
Risk Ratio	-14.686	-15.690	-16.552	-15.274	-9.338	-9.013	-9.679	-9.698
	[-15.765, -13.607]	[-16.863, -14.516]	[-17.741, -15.362]	[-16.658, -13.890]	[-10.330, -8.346]	[-9.912, -8.113]	[-10.545, -8.812]	[-10.622, -8.774]
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.072							
	[-0.083, -0.061]							
Risk Ratio x Time Since Death	0.060							
	[0.046, 0.074]							
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.081						
		[-0.092, -0.070]						
Risk Ratio x Time Since OSV Total		0.070						
		[0.055, 0.084]						
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.080					
			[-0.089, -0.070]					
Risk Ratio x Time Since OSV Rebs			0.069					
			[0.056, 0.082]					
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.068				
				[-0.080, -0.057]				
Risk Ratio x Time Since OSV Gov				0.058				
				[0.042, 0.074]				
FC Duration					-0.000	0.006	0.010	0.005
					[-0.034, 0.034]	[-0.029, 0.041]	[-0.027, 0.047]	[-0.033, 0.044]
Risk Ratio x FC Duration					0.034	0.024	0.019	0.025
					[-0.005, 0.073]	[-0.016, 0.064]	[-0.023, 0.062]	[-0.019, 0.069]

95% Confidence intervals presented in brackets.
Dependent variable is troop counts. Common effect model with inverse-variance.
Read as overall effect size across all 10 samples.

Table 16: Effect of Total Counts on Troops in Cell, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(65) Battle Deaths	(66) Total OSV	(67) Rebel OSV	(68) Gov OSV	(69) Battle Deaths	(70) Total OSV	(71) Rebel OSV	(72) Gov OSV
Total Task Count	0.180*	0.180*	0.192**	0.194**	0.180*	0.180*	0.192**	0.194**
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.074)
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.022**				-0.022**			
	(0.004)				(0.004)			
Battle Deaths	0.018†				0.038			
	(0.010)				(0.035)			
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.023**				-0.023**		
		(0.004)				(0.004)		
Total One Sided Violence		0.019**				0.040		
		(0.003)				(0.035)		
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.023**				-0.023**	
			(0.005)				(0.005)	
Rebel One Sided Violence			0.022**				0.055	
			(0.004)				(0.051)	
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.021**				-0.021**
				(0.005)				(0.005)
Government One Sided Violence				-0.030*				-0.215**
				(0.013)				(0.053)
FC Duration	0.023†	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.023†	0.022	0.022	0.022
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Total Count x Battle Deaths					-0.001			
					(0.002)			
Total Count x OSV Total						-0.001		
						(0.002)		
Total Count x OSV Rebs							-0.002	
							(0.003)	
Total Count x OSV Gov								0.006**
								(0.001)
Night Lights	0.247**	0.264**	0.351**	0.254**	0.247**	0.264**	0.351**	0.254**
	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.078)
Proportion of Year in Drought	-1.236*	-1.099*	-1.252*	-1.579**	-1.231*	-1.097*	-1.248*	-1.580**
	(0.548)	(0.534)	(0.551)	(0.527)	(0.547)	(0.532)	(0.549)	(0.527)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain	1.110†	1.139†	1.272*	1.024	1.113†	1.141†	1.274*	1.023
	(0.620)	(0.612)	(0.646)	(0.675)	(0.618)	(0.612)	(0.645)	(0.675)
Distance to Nearest Unit (Hundred km)	-0.090**	-0.091**	-0.089**	-0.097**	-0.090**	-0.091**	-0.089**	-0.097**

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Table 16: Effect of Total Counts on Troops in Cell, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(65) Battle Deaths	(66) Total OSV	(67) Rebel OSV	(68) Gov OSV	(69) Battle Deaths	(70) Total OSV	(71) Rebel OSV	(72) Gov OSV
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border (Hundred km)	-0.631**	-0.637**	-0.657**	-0.668**	-0.632**	-0.637**	-0.658**	-0.668**
	(0.153)	(0.148)	(0.145)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.148)	(0.145)	(0.150)
Distance to Capital (Hundred km)	-0.156**	-0.159**	-0.155**	-0.129**	-0.156**	-0.159**	-0.155**	-0.129**
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.042)
Days to Urban Center	-7.333**	-7.450**	-7.351**	-8.012**	-7.331**	-7.450**	-7.351**	-8.014**
	(2.089)	(2.154)	(2.172)	(2.145)	(2.091)	(2.154)	(2.172)	(2.146)
Headquarters	0.608	0.508	1.011	0.618	0.612	0.509	1.012	0.618
	(0.676)	(0.644)	(0.959)	(0.587)	(0.682)	(0.645)	(0.959)	(0.587)
Zone of Confidence	-1.396**	-1.575**	-1.727**	-1.661**	-1.395**	-1.575**	-1.727**	-1.663**
	(0.457)	(0.453)	(0.528)	(0.479)	(0.457)	(0.453)	(0.528)	(0.478)
Neighboring Troops (Thousands, Logged)	1.640**	1.711**	1.720**	1.587**	1.639**	1.711**	1.720**	1.588**
	(0.623)	(0.574)	(0.578)	(0.546)	(0.625)	(0.575)	(0.579)	(0.546)
Troop Quality (Millions of Dollars)	0.038**	0.043**	0.038**	0.041**	0.038**	0.043**	0.038**	0.041**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Number of Troops in Cell (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	2.380†	2.574*	2.379†	2.457*	2.372†	2.572*	2.376†	2.459*
	(1.242)	(1.247)	(1.228)	(1.187)	(1.246)	(1.250)	(1.231)	(1.187)
lnalpha	5.001**	4.999**	5.009**	5.016**	5.001**	4.999**	5.009**	5.016**
	(0.374)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.374)	(0.374)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.374)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 17: Effect of Total Counts on Troops in Cell, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(73) Battle Deaths	(74) Total OSV	(75) Rebel OSV	(76) Gov OSV	(77) Battle Deaths	(78) Total OSV	(79) Rebel OSV	(80) Gov OSV
Total Task Count	0.256**	0.255**	0.264*	0.219†	0.170*	0.171*	0.182**	0.182*
	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.076)
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.014*				-0.022**			
	(0.006)				(0.004)			
Battle Deaths	0.018†				0.018†			
	(0.010)				(0.010)			
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.016**				-0.023**		
		(0.006)				(0.004)		
Total One Sided Violence		0.018**				0.019**		
		(0.003)				(0.003)		
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.016*				-0.023**	
			(0.006)				(0.005)	
Rebel One Sided Violence			0.021**				0.022**	
			(0.003)				(0.004)	
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.019**				-0.021**
				(0.007)				(0.005)
Government One Sided Violence				-0.033†				-0.029*
				(0.019)				(0.013)
FC Duration	0.021	0.020	0.020	0.022	0.015	0.014	0.013	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Total Count x Time Since Death	-0.001							
	(0.000)							
Total Count x Time Since OSV Total		-0.001						
		(0.000)						
Total Count x Time Since OSV Rebs			-0.001					
			(0.001)					
Total Count x Time Since OSV Gov				-0.000				
				(0.001)				
Total Count x FC Duration					0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
					(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Night Lights	0.230**	0.250**	0.330**	0.250**	0.246**	0.264**	0.350**	0.253**
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.078)
Proportion of Year in Drought	-1.755*	-1.539*	-1.689*	-1.722*	-1.177*	-1.049*	-1.203*	-1.508**
	(0.727)	(0.736)	(0.816)	(0.694)	(0.525)	(0.519)	(0.539)	(0.519)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain	1.002†	1.024†	1.153†	0.988	1.091†	1.122†	1.254†	1.001

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Table 17: Effect of Total Counts on Troops in Cell, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(73) Battle Deaths	(74) Total OSV	(75) Rebel OSV	(76) Gov OSV	(77) Battle Deaths	(78) Total OSV	(79) Rebel OSV	(80) Gov OSV
	(0.600)	(0.597)	(0.622)	(0.661)	(0.617)	(0.609)	(0.643)	(0.673)
Distance to Nearest Unit (Hundred km)	-0.086**	-0.087**	-0.085**	-0.096**	-0.091**	-0.091**	-0.090**	-0.097**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border (Hundred km)	-0.655**	-0.661**	-0.695**	-0.679**	-0.633**	-0.638**	-0.658**	-0.670**
	(0.186)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.165)	(0.155)	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.153)
Distance to Capital (Hundred km)	-0.164**	-0.166**	-0.158**	-0.127**	-0.155**	-0.157**	-0.153**	-0.127**
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.041)
Days to Urban Center	-7.074**	-7.218**	-7.193**	-7.988**	-7.352**	-7.467**	-7.368**	-8.030**
	(1.936)	(2.018)	(2.058)	(2.107)	(2.072)	(2.138)	(2.156)	(2.129)
Headquarters	0.666	0.568	0.944	0.647	0.596	0.495	0.958	0.600
	(0.640)	(0.613)	(0.866)	(0.604)	(0.688)	(0.653)	(0.957)	(0.604)
Zone of Confidence	-1.871**	-2.038**	-2.152**	-1.807**	-1.344**	-1.528**	-1.689**	-1.602**
	(0.611)	(0.625)	(0.715)	(0.671)	(0.449)	(0.448)	(0.524)	(0.477)
Neighboring Troops (Thousands, Logged)	1.548*	1.641**	1.663**	1.559**	1.646**	1.719**	1.729**	1.597**
	(0.629)	(0.570)	(0.588)	(0.558)	(0.630)	(0.578)	(0.581)	(0.552)
Troop Quality (Millions of Dollars)	0.039**	0.044**	0.041**	0.041**	0.038**	0.043**	0.038**	0.041**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Number of Troops in Cell (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.532	1.749	1.589	2.177	2.508*	2.690*	2.497*	2.600*
	(1.341)	(1.352)	(1.406)	(1.518)	(1.256)	(1.264)	(1.252)	(1.234)
lnalpha	4.990**	4.990**	5.002**	5.015**	5.000**	4.998**	5.008**	5.015**
	(0.372)	(0.371)	(0.372)	(0.374)	(0.375)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.375)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 18: Effect of Risky Counts on Troops in Cell, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(81) Battle Deaths	(82) Total OSV	(83) Rebel OSV	(84) Gov OSV	(85) Battle Deaths	(86) Total OSV	(87) Rebel OSV	(88) Gov OSV
Risky Task Count	0.272*	0.272*	0.290*	0.293*	0.272*	0.272*	0.290*	0.293*
	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.128)
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.020**				-0.020**			
	(0.004)				(0.004)			
Battle Deaths	0.015*				0.009			
	(0.006)				(0.045)			
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.021**				-0.021**		
		(0.004)				(0.004)		
Total One Sided Violence		0.019**				-0.013		
		(0.003)				(0.099)		
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.021**				-0.021**	
			(0.004)				(0.004)	
Rebel One Sided Violence			0.022**				0.022	
			(0.004)				(0.100)	
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.019**				-0.019**
				(0.004)				(0.004)
Government One Sided Violence				-0.027*				-0.214**
				(0.014)				(0.055)
FC Duration	0.018	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.018	0.017	0.016	0.016
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Risky Count x Battle Deaths					0.001			
					(0.003)			
Risky Count x OSV Total						0.002		
						(0.008)		
Risky Count x OSV Rebs							0.000	
							(0.007)	
Risky Count x OSV Gov								0.010**
								(0.002)
Night Lights	0.250**	0.265**	0.346**	0.257**	0.250**	0.265**	0.346**	0.257**
	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Proportion of Year in Drought	-1.836*	-1.707*	-1.945**	-2.100**	-1.837*	-1.709*	-1.945**	-2.100**
	(0.729)	(0.707)	(0.728)	(0.685)	(0.727)	(0.704)	(0.725)	(0.684)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain	1.479*	1.511*	1.656*	1.436*	1.479*	1.509*	1.656*	1.435*
	(0.604)	(0.613)	(0.646)	(0.681)	(0.603)	(0.614)	(0.646)	(0.681)
Distance to Nearest Unit (Hundred km)	-0.085**	-0.086**	-0.084**	-0.091**	-0.085**	-0.086**	-0.084**	-0.091**

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Table 18: Effect of Risky Counts on Troops in Cell, Part 1

	No Interactions				Risk Ratio and Death Interactions			
	(81) Battle Deaths	(82) Total OSV	(83) Rebel OSV	(84) Gov OSV	(85) Battle Deaths	(86) Total OSV	(87) Rebel OSV	(88) Gov OSV
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border (Hundred km)	-0.646**	-0.642**	-0.665**	-0.679**	-0.646**	-0.642**	-0.665**	-0.679**
	(0.157)	(0.151)	(0.148)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.152)	(0.149)	(0.155)
Distance to Capital (Hundred km)	-0.147**	-0.151**	-0.147**	-0.118*	-0.147**	-0.151**	-0.147**	-0.118*
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.048)
Days to Urban Center	-6.422*	-6.473*	-6.291*	-6.906**	-6.423*	-6.474*	-6.291*	-6.908**
	(2.566)	(2.643)	(2.638)	(2.586)	(2.567)	(2.643)	(2.638)	(2.587)
Headquarters	0.479	0.414	0.860	0.533	0.478	0.414	0.860	0.536
	(0.638)	(0.619)	(0.915)	(0.563)	(0.641)	(0.620)	(0.915)	(0.565)
Zone of Confidence	-1.474**	-1.606**	-1.712**	-1.696**	-1.475**	-1.606**	-1.712**	-1.699**
	(0.505)	(0.501)	(0.591)	(0.553)	(0.504)	(0.500)	(0.591)	(0.553)
Neighboring Troops (Thousands, Logged)	1.690**	1.744**	1.749**	1.660**	1.690**	1.744**	1.749**	1.662**
	(0.602)	(0.561)	(0.569)	(0.530)	(0.603)	(0.561)	(0.569)	(0.529)
Troop Quality (Millions of Dollars)	0.045**	0.048**	0.044**	0.047**	0.045**	0.048**	0.044**	0.047**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Number of Troops in Cell (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.909	2.072	1.843	1.855	1.912	2.074	1.843	1.857
	(1.447)	(1.464)	(1.421)	(1.410)	(1.447)	(1.466)	(1.424)	(1.410)
lnalpha	5.028**	5.026**	5.039**	5.044**	5.028**	5.026**	5.039**	5.044**
	(0.375)	(0.373)	(0.374)	(0.375)	(0.375)	(0.373)	(0.374)	(0.375)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 19: Effect of Risky Counts on Troops in Cell, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(89) Battle Deaths	(90) Total OSV	(91) Rebel OSV	(92) Gov OSV	(93) Battle Deaths	(94) Total OSV	(95) Rebel OSV	(96) Gov OSV
Risky Task Count	0.294*	0.285*	0.283†	0.229	0.253†	0.254†	0.270*	0.270†
	(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.146)	(0.158)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.144)
Months Since Last Battle Death	-0.018**				-0.020**			
	(0.006)				(0.004)			
Battle Deaths	0.015*				0.015*			
	(0.006)				(0.006)			
Months Since Last OSV Death		-0.020**				-0.021**		
		(0.006)				(0.004)		
Total One Sided Violence		0.018**				0.019**		
		(0.004)				(0.003)		
Months Since Last Rebel OSV			-0.021**				-0.020**	
			(0.007)				(0.004)	
Rebel One Sided Violence			0.023**				0.022**	
			(0.006)				(0.004)	
Months Since Last Government OSV				-0.024**				-0.019**
				(0.007)				(0.005)
Government One Sided Violence				-0.021				-0.026†
				(0.016)				(0.014)
FC Duration	0.017	0.017	0.016	0.018	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Risky Count x Time Since Death	-0.000							
	(0.001)							
Risky Count x Time Since OSV Total		-0.000						
		(0.001)						
Risky Count x Time Since OSV Rebs			0.000					
			(0.001)					
Risky Count x Time Since OSV Gov				0.001				
				(0.001)				
Risky Count x FC Duration					0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
					(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Night Lights	0.243**	0.262**	0.348**	0.273**	0.250**	0.265**	0.347**	0.257**
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Proportion of Year in Drought	-1.963*	-1.766*	-1.907*	-1.795*	-1.747*	-1.625*	-1.856*	-1.992**
	(0.780)	(0.762)	(0.834)	(0.783)	(0.740)	(0.724)	(0.760)	(0.716)
Proportion of Mountainous Terrain	1.458*	1.498*	1.664*	1.488*	1.454*	1.485*	1.628*	1.402*

Continued on next page

Table 19: Effect of Risky Counts on Troops in Cell, Part 2

	Risk Ratio and Time Interactions				Risk Ratio and FC Duration Interactions			
	(89) Battle Deaths	(90) Total OSV	(91) Rebel OSV	(92) Gov OSV	(93) Battle Deaths	(94) Total OSV	(95) Rebel OSV	(96) Gov OSV
	(0.605)	(0.616)	(0.649)	(0.677)	(0.603)	(0.613)	(0.650)	(0.684)
Distance to Nearest Unit (Hundred km)	-0.084**	-0.085**	-0.084**	-0.092**	-0.086**	-0.086**	-0.084**	-0.091**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Distance to Own Border (Hundred km)	-0.646**	-0.643**	-0.663**	-0.667**	-0.651**	-0.647**	-0.670**	-0.685**
	(0.161)	(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.159)	(0.152)	(0.149)	(0.155)
Distance to Capital (Hundred km)	-0.150**	-0.152**	-0.146**	-0.120*	-0.145**	-0.149**	-0.144**	-0.116*
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Days to Urban Center	-6.315*	-6.418*	-6.320*	-7.091*	-6.473*	-6.523*	-6.344*	-6.963**
	(2.492)	(2.592)	(2.648)	(2.762)	(2.552)	(2.630)	(2.632)	(2.577)
Headquarters	0.476	0.414	0.869	0.513	0.462	0.393	0.782	0.503
	(0.623)	(0.611)	(0.913)	(0.609)	(0.667)	(0.647)	(0.950)	(0.607)
Zone of Confidence	-1.575**	-1.659**	-1.682*	-1.426*	-1.417**	-1.550**	-1.668**	-1.629**
	(0.610)	(0.620)	(0.719)	(0.660)	(0.497)	(0.497)	(0.583)	(0.555)
Neighboring Troops (Thousands, Logged)	1.671**	1.737**	1.753**	1.704**	1.711**	1.766**	1.775**	1.685**
	(0.596)	(0.555)	(0.570)	(0.546)	(0.624)	(0.578)	(0.590)	(0.556)
Troop Quality (Millions of Dollars)	0.045**	0.049**	0.044**	0.046**	0.044**	0.048**	0.045**	0.047**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Number of Troops in Cell (Lagged)	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.725	1.970	1.903	2.416	2.093	2.251	2.034	2.075
	(1.473)	(1.511)	(1.565)	(1.731)	(1.574)	(1.592)	(1.583)	(1.598)
lnalpha	5.026**	5.026**	5.039**	5.042**	5.026**	5.025**	5.038**	5.042**
	(0.374)	(0.373)	(0.374)	(0.376)	(0.375)	(0.374)	(0.374)	(0.376)
Observations	197321	197337	197348	197344	197321	197337	197348	197344

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is troop counts
Randomly selected 25% of grid-mission-month cells
Restricted to 200 deaths and non-observer missions
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Appendix C: Mandate Risk and Force Commander Duration

Table 20: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Force Commander Termination

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Total Task Count	-0.053**	-0.068**	-0.048*	-0.051**	-0.064	-0.035
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.046)	(0.059)
Cumulative Deaths (Thousands)	-0.014	-0.171	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.016
	(0.012)	(0.141)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Proportion of Troops from FC State	1.217*	1.234*	1.582	1.185*	1.190*	1.193*
	(0.497)	(0.527)	(1.017)	(0.508)	(0.518)	(0.499)
FC from P5	-0.681	-0.735	-0.662	-1.078	-0.687	-0.688
	(0.510)	(0.506)	(0.511)	(0.734)	(0.500)	(0.504)
P5-Host Policy Distance	-0.983**	-1.043**	-0.966**	-0.968**	-1.050**	-1.007**
	(0.253)	(0.259)	(0.266)	(0.249)	(0.300)	(0.234)
P5-Host Policy Heterogeneity	-2.426*	-2.244*	-2.481**	-2.405*	-2.414*	-2.277†
	(0.983)	(0.940)	(0.949)	(0.980)	(0.985)	(1.165)
Total Count X Cumulative Deaths		0.012				
		(0.009)				
Total Count X Troop Prop. from FC State			-0.030			
			(0.078)			
Total Count X FC from P5				0.056		
				(0.067)		
Total Count X P5-Host Policy Distance					0.006	
					(0.024)	
Total Count X P5-Host Policy Heterogeneity						-0.025
						(0.077)
FC Home GDP (Billions)	-0.025	-0.012	-0.023	-0.019	-0.025	-0.026
	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Previous Experience	-0.004	-0.214	-0.058	0.003	0.003	-0.013
	(0.431)	(0.554)	(0.416)	(0.433)	(0.443)	(0.436)
Cumulative Military Deaths (Tens)	-0.114	-0.132	-0.113	-0.104	-0.118	-0.116
	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.125)
Number of Mission Resolutions	0.255	0.322†	0.254	0.246	0.264	0.259
	(0.171)	(0.196)	(0.169)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.173)
Mission Duration	-0.004**	-0.005**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of Troops (Thousands)	0.043†	0.039	0.041	0.036	0.043	0.043†
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
FC Duration	0.270**	0.270**	0.271**	0.271**	0.270**	0.270**
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.088)
FC Duration (Sq)	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
FC Duration (Cb)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.293	-1.510	-1.404	-1.501	-1.178	-1.341
	(2.489)	(2.556)	(2.633)	(2.429)	(2.460)	(2.543)
Log Likelihood	-298.792	-297.936	-298.730	-298.709	-298.777	-298.767
AIC	629.585	629.872	631.461	631.418	631.553	631.534
Observations	2524	2524	2524	2524	2524	2524

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is force commander termination
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

Table 21: The Effect of Risk Ratio on Force Commander Termination

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
Risky Task Count	-0.082**	-0.108**	-0.079*	-0.076**	-0.118†	-0.043
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.066)	(0.085)
Cumulative Deaths (Thousands)	-0.012	-0.228	-0.012	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.011)	(0.194)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Proportion of Troops from FC State	1.489**	1.492*	1.625†	1.431*	1.420*	1.440*
	(0.578)	(0.605)	(0.971)	(0.586)	(0.604)	(0.592)
FC from P5	-0.626	-0.708	-0.615	-1.156	-0.646	-0.643
	(0.526)	(0.531)	(0.530)	(0.811)	(0.512)	(0.516)
P5-Host Policy Distance	-0.993**	-1.075**	-0.984**	-0.967**	-1.150**	-1.033**
	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.281)	(0.253)	(0.323)	(0.235)
P5-Host Policy Heterogeneity	-2.551*	-2.385*	-2.571*	-2.511*	-2.529*	-2.296†
	(1.033)	(0.969)	(1.003)	(1.024)	(1.013)	(1.210)
Risky Count X Cumulative Deaths		0.021				
		(0.015)				
Risky Count X Troop Prop. from FC State			-0.014			
			(0.079)			
Risky Count X FC from P5				0.101		
				(0.107)		
Risky Count X P5-Host Policy Distance					0.019	
					(0.032)	
Risky Count X P5-Host Policy Heterogeneity						-0.057
						(0.112)
FC Home GDP (Billions)	-0.048	-0.028	-0.048	-0.039	-0.048	-0.049
	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Previous Experience	-0.055	-0.227	-0.072	-0.038	-0.037	-0.064
	(0.422)	(0.498)	(0.426)	(0.423)	(0.440)	(0.425)
Cumulative Military Deaths (Tens)	-0.102	-0.116	-0.102	-0.089	-0.110	-0.106
	(0.126)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Number of Mission Resolutions	0.255	0.337†	0.255	0.242	0.273†	0.262
	(0.162)	(0.193)	(0.161)	(0.165)	(0.160)	(0.163)
Mission Duration	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.004**	-0.005**	-0.005**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of Troops (Thousands)	0.043†	0.041	0.042	0.034	0.044†	0.044†
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.025)
FC Duration	0.271**	0.273**	0.272**	0.273**	0.270**	0.272**
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.088)
FC Duration (Sq)	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
FC Duration (Cb)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-0.562	-0.907	-0.598	-0.905	-0.282	-0.661
	(2.588)	(2.647)	(2.650)	(2.528)	(2.536)	(2.648)
Log Likelihood	-298.348	-297.241	-298.338	-298.212	-298.267	-298.281
AIC	628.696	628.482	630.675	630.423	630.535	630.563
Observations	2524	2524	2524	2524	2524	2524

Mission clustered standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable is force commander termination
$\dagger p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01$. Two-tailed test.

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