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STAYING COMPLIANT OR STAYING IN OFFICE? INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, POST-COUP SIGNALS, AND COUP-BORN REGIMES

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DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

STAYING COMPLIANT OR STAYING IN OFFICE? INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, POST-COUP SIGNALS, AND COUP-BORN REGIMES

Although there has been a great deal of scholarly work that explores the various determinants of coups, their effects have received considerably less attention, especially in the realm of international cooperation. Even less attention has been paid to the consequences of post-coup signals sent to the new regimes that staged these coups from the international community. This dissertation investigates how both the presence of leaders who seized power via coup and how the international community reacts to such a power grab affects their behavior, specifically in areas where there is either an obligation to comply with pre-existing international legal agreements or an opportunity to voluntarily engage in behavior that is in line with international norms and priorities. In this dissertation, a theoretical framework that suggests that political survival is the coup-born leader's highest priority and so we should only expect to see cooperation and compliance from coup-born regimes if they perceive an increased chance of survival through cooperation.

Using a series of regression models, the effects of coup-born regimes and the international community's post-coup signals on three policy areas that range from legally binding to fully voluntary are investigated. First, the implications of coup-born regimes on the likelihood of the termination of military alliances via violations of their treaty provisions are considered; the empirical results show that the presence of a coup-born regime in at least one member of a bilateral treaty make it more vulnerable to violations. Next, the effects of coup-born regimes and the international signals they receive in the post-coup period on their use of repression is explored; the analysis in this chapter finds that while coup-born regimes are generally more repressive than other regimes, negative signals from the international community lead coup-born regimes to better respect personal integrity rights than their counterparts which received positive international

signals. Finally, the effects of coup-born regimes and the international community's response on states' willingness to contribute troops to UN-led peacekeeping missions is explored. Consistent with findings that suggest vulnerable regimes may utilize peacekeeping operations to coup-proof, the empirical findings show that coup-born regimes tend to contribute more troops to peacekeeping operations and that receiving negative signals from the international community following coups lead to larger contributions, compared to other coup-born regimes.

KEYWORDS: Coup-Born Regimes, International Cooperation, Alliance Termination, Physical Integrity Rights Abuse, Peacekeeping Troop Contributions

Jennifer A. Flinchum

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1.1 Introduction and Background

Over several decades, coup activity had become increasingly rare and when attempts were made, increasingly unsuccessful. From the peak of the 1960s, in which 123 coup attempts were made and 67 succeeded, to the 2010s, in which 22 coup attempts were made and 11 succeeded (Powell and Thyne 2011), the consequences of coups and the leaders that they empower seemed to be of little concern to the international community, a fading relic of the Cold War era. A resurgence of coup activity seems to be happening in the 2020s; with 10 coup attempts occurring between the start of 2020 and the midpoint of 2022 (ibid.), the decade is on track to have the most coup activity since the 1990s. With seven of the ten most recent coup attempts succeeding in overthrowing the incumbent regime of a state and replacing it with leadership selected by the coup-plotters, the characteristics of the coup-born regime are becoming increasingly relevant to scholars and policymakers.

While much progress has been made on the path to understanding what conditions encourage coup attempts and coup success and what policies can be enacted to discourage potential coup plotters, there is still much work to be done on understanding the consequences of coups. While some scholars have considered the effects of coup-born leadership on regime change, with some suggesting that coups will frequently result in authoritarian regimes (Derpanopolous et al. 2016), others have found that the context of the coup will determine its consequences for regime type. Some have found that the relationship between coups and the establishment of authoritarian regimes only existed during the Cold War era and that since its end, there has been more variation in post-coup

institutions (Marinov and Goemans 2014; Miller 2016) and that international pressures for democratization may lead to incomplete democratization and the establishment of an electoral authoritarian regime in the post-Cold War era (Tansey 2016).

On the question of coups and their economic consequences, studies have found that coups are generally not beneficial to the economies of the states in which they occur, as they generally lead to lowered GDP (Meyersson 2016) and lower international trade (Childers 2015) when they displace democratic regimes and low economic growth when they displace authoritarians (Meyersson 2016). Domestic spending priorities often shift after coups; successful coups that result in authoritarian leaders tend to result in increased military spending, while those that are followed by a transition to democracy tend to result in lowered military spending. Regimes that experience coup attempts also tend to ramp up military spending as they attempt to coup-proof their regimes (Bove and Nistico 2014). Coup-born regimes often cut non-military domestic spending, which leads to increased chances of economic crises, increased indebtedness, lower educational attainment, and higher infant mortality rates (Meyersson 2016).

A small number of studies have considered the effects of coups on political violence, most notably on civil war duration and the use of repression. One study found that successful coups should shorten civil conflict because they remove a potential spoiler from the negotiations to end the conflict by combining the government and military (Thyne 2017). Two other studies focused on the use of repression in the immediate post-coup period and found that both successful and failed coup attempts lead to increased personal integrity rights violations as the regime uses repression to settle scores against

regime opponents and deter threats to the regime's survival (Curtice and Arnon 2020; Lachapelle 2020).

Another consequence of coups that has received a small degree of scholarly attention is the responses that elicited by the international community after a successful coup occurs. Reactions from states and international organizations (IOs) seem inconsistent, although there are some patterns that have been recognized. States tend to react with greater frequency if the deposed regime was a democracy, compared to pre-coup autocracies, and IOs have become more likely to issue official responses to coups in the post-Cold War period, whereas states were more frequent responders during the Cold War (Shannon et al. 2015). Another study found that the nature of the international signals that are sent post-coup can alter the coup-born regime's tenure in office, with consistently negative signals from the international community or anti-regime domestic protests leading to a shorter tenure. The effects of such signals are most influential when they come from powerful international actors with which the state had ties before the coup occurred, and least effective when they are inconsistent with either other international signals or domestic signals (Thyne et al. 2017). A final study found that supportive international signals, especially those from democratic external actors can help push a post-coup regime toward democracy, while positive signals from authoritarian governments do not influence the trajectory of a coup-born regime (Thyne and Hatch 2020).

While these studies have provided scholars with a new understanding of how coups and the governments that they create affect a number of policy areas, there are still a number of areas that have not yet been fully explored. There has been little attempt to

explain how coup-born regimes will determine whether they should abide by international standards of conduct, upholding both binding international agreements and informal international norms, and whether they will take an active role in the international community when they are able to voluntarily do so. In order to examine the ways in which coup-born regimes' decision-making processes may vary from other regimes, this dissertation will examine the relationships between the presence of coup-born regimes and the international responses they receive and three policy areas: the maintenance or violation of bilateral military alliances, the use or avoidance of repression, and the contribution of troops to UN-led peacekeeping operations.

While these policy areas vary in a number of ways, their selection was based on the variation between the three when it comes to the type of obligation each policy area represents. On one end of the spectrum, military alliances are formed by the signing and ratification of alliance treaties; these treaties create obligations for member states to act (or not act) in specific ways under specified conditions. In some cases, the obligations created by alliance treaties require states to engage in military combat when their partner is attacked or chooses to attack third state; in other cases, alliances require partners' neutrality or nonaggression, or consultation when an alliance member is engaged in international conflict. When states violate these obligations, they risk terminating the alliance and losing any benefits they gain from it, as well as the sunk costs of forming and, up to that point, maintaining the alliance.

On the other end of the spectrum, troop contributions to peacekeeping operations are voluntary. While states may be encouraged to contribute by the international organizations that lead missions or by powerful states that help recruit contributors to

specific missions, there is no international legal obligation to participate. Furthermore, once contributions are made, there is no required length of time for a contribution; troop-contributing countries are able to pull their troops out at any point, without needing to seek approval from the organizers of the mission. While there is no obligation to participate, there are incentives for states who choose to do so, making the dynamics that underpin this form of cooperation quite different from the legal obligations that form the foundation of military alliances.

Somewhere between the concrete legal obligations of military alliances and voluntary cooperation of peacekeeping troop contribution lies the international human rights regime. There are a number of human rights treaties that many states have signed and ratified, but most of these treaties lack the formal enforcement mechanisms that are present in alliance treaties. States sign these treaties for a number of reasons that may be unrelated to their actual dedication to the improvement of human rights conditions in their territories. In addition to the human rights treaties that have been signed and ratified by many, but not all, states, a series of human rights norms have spread throughout the international community. These norms, while not binding, are applied universally and states that fail to uphold them may face consequences, although this enforcement of human rights norms is highly inconsistent and often tied to other facets of interstate relations.

International legal agreements and international institutions are designed by international actors both to solve specific problems and to further their own goals (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). While hard law, such as the treaties that military alliances are based on, creates precise, legally binding obligations

for which the authority for interpretation and implementation of the agreements are delegated; it reduces the transaction costs of agreements, makes signatories' commitments more credible, and resolves the problems associated with incomplete contracting, but also restricts the behavior and, in some cases, the sovereignty of participants (Abbott and Snidal 2000). It has been suggested that states use soft law when its offers solutions to the problems that are preferable to the potential solutions created by hard law agreements while allowing states to maintain national sovereignty (ibid.). Divergent preferences among participants may lead actors to prefer soft law agreements over hard law but can also lead to bargaining problems in the process of creating an international institution (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001).

By utilizing three forms of international cooperation that range from hard law to flexible agreements, this dissertation allows for a more nuanced understanding of the benefits and drawbacks of these various levels of commitments. Variation in the level of compliance may help international actors understand more fully what types of agreements are more likely to hold when parties to the agreement have dramatic domestic political shifts and could lead to the creation of agreements that are more likely to be upheld when such shifts occur. Given the important nature of these policy areas, the formation of more effective agreements could have major implications for the lived experience of many.

1.2 Outline of Dissertation

Chapter 2 of this dissertation will serve two main purposes; the first is to give more in-depth background about coup-born regimes and the signals that they receive from the international community in the immediate post-coup period. By exploring the

operational definitions of these two concepts and how they are measured, the reader will be able to more clearly understand why these issues are important in determining foreign policy and tactics for minimizing dissent among domestic audiences. The second part of chapter 2 will lay out the assumptions that underpin my theoretical expectations and why these assumptions are valid. The third section will lay out my broad theoretical expectations that will be explored in more detail in the following chapters.

The first empirical chapter will investigate the ways in which coup-born regimes affect the durability of the military alliances in which they are a member. While military alliances are rarely terminated due to a member violating the terms of the alliance's treaty, it does happen in a small set of cases, and I argue that both coup-born regimes and their alliance partners are more likely to take such actions compared to other alliance partners. I argue that coup-born regimes will be more likely to violation due to the reputational costs of violation being less important to coup-born regimes than the increased foreign policy flexibility and decreased costs that come with breaking an alliance; I further argue that the partners of coup-born regimes are more likely to terminate because they doubt the new regime's resolve or oppose it on the grounds of its illegal seizure of power. I further argue that negative reactions from the international community should decrease this willingness to violate for the coup-born regimes, as it indicates poor prospects to forming new alliances, while positive responses should suggest that old alliances can be replaced, increasing the likelihood of violation even further.

In the second empirical chapter, I turn to the relationship between repression and coup-born regimes. While others have found an immediate increase in personal integrity

rights following coups, this chapter will consider the entire tenure of the regime as well as the influence of outside support or condemnation. In this chapter, I argue that coup-born regimes are more willing to repress than other regimes, as they seek to strike down domestic opposition groups which may pose a threat to their survival, both as a regime and as individuals. While regime survival may be a bigger concern to these regimes than international reputation, I argue that negative responses in the post-coup period should lead states to rethink the use of repression, as it may reinforce their already negative international reputation and increase the likelihood of lost cooperation. I further argue that positive international signals will encourage repression as coup-born regimes will use this external source of legitimacy to whitewash their record of repression.

The third empirical chapter will focus on the factors that coup-born regimes take into account when determining whether to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations. I argue that because coup-born regimes are at heightened risk for coups following their seizure of power and peacekeeping operations give them both increased military budgets and a mission to keep the military occupied, they will contribute more to peacekeeping operations than their counterparts who came to power through other means. I further argue that negative international signals will lead to even greater contributions as they try to whitewash their international reputation and leverage their peacekeeping contributions to improve their international standing. I argue further that coup-born regimes that receive positive signals will feel less pressure to undertake these missions, although they will still contribute at a higher rate than states without coup-born regimes.

The final chapter will summarize the findings from this dissertation and the implications that they suggest. It will outline lessons for both policymakers and scholars.

It will also consider the potential extensions to this project that may be carried out in the future.

Chapter 2: Overview of Theoretical Expectations

2.1 Operational Definitions

Before outlining the assumptions on which I build my theoretical expectations, and the expectations themselves, I will briefly outline some of the major concepts that will be referred to throughout the dissertation. Before the concept of a coup-born regime can be outlined, however, there must be clarity about what comprises a coup. Coup attempts have been defined as an "illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive" (Powell and Thyne 2011, pg. 252). A coup attempt is considered successful if the coup-plotters "seize and hold power for at least seven days" (ibid.). It is important to note that in order to be classified as a coup, all criteria in the definition must be met; actions taken by individuals or groups outside of the state apparatus, actions that target other institutions or leaders, and activities that are not illegal or overt may have serious consequences, but they fall outside of the realm of coup activity. Furthermore, although failed coup attempts may have serious consequences that mirror the consequences of successful coups, these too fall outside the scope of this dissertation.

A coup-born regime is the regime that is formed in the aftermath of a successful coup; there are no specific institutional characteristics that classify a coup-born regime, only the method of its formation. Coup-born regimes can be led by executive who initially took power after the coup, but this is not always the case. Coup-born regimes can also be led by a successor that was selected by the initial post-coup leader; this is often another coup-plotter or a member of the leader's family (Thyne et al. 2017). A coup-born regime is coded as ending when the state is no longer led by an executive with ties to the

coup; removal of coup-born leaders often occur via elections, rebellions, or counter-coups, although there are a small number of cases where the transitions were more complex (ibid.).

International signals can come in many forms and from a number of sources. They often are comprised of "actions or statements that potentially allow an actor to infer something about unobservable, but salient, properties of another actor" (Gartzke 2003, pg. 1). International signals can refer to verbal or written statements made by officials or policy changes that target a state. Signals can be positive or negative and vary in intensity. The signals examined in this dissertation are from officials from states and IOs that are able to speak on behalf of the entire body it represents; for states, this includes sitting chief executives, cabinet members, ambassadors, and representatives authorized to speak on their behalf. Other government officials, such as legislators, are not authorized to speak on behalf of the state as a whole and therefore their statements are not included. For IOs, individuals who are authorized to speak for the organization, such as the Secretary General of the UN, and resolutions passed by assemblies, committees, or councils according to the rules of the IO are included. These signals, once collected, were scored using the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) scale. The WEIS scale scores interactions as either conflictual or cooperative, with verbal or written statements scoring closer to neutral and concrete policy steps scoring as closer to the extreme on either side. The most conflictual policy ranked on the scale is a military attack, which would be scored -10, while the most cooperative policy is the extension of military assistance, which would be scored an 8.3(Goldstein 1992).

In the sample of international signals used in this dissertation, which began with Thyne et al.'s (2017) data and extends through 2019, there are 1,563 country-year level observations. These values illustrate the average of the signals that are sent in the six-month period following a coup; while there is not a trend toward strong shifts over multiple signals responding to the same coup, they do often move from a more neutral signal, such as one promising to monitor the developing situation, toward a more extreme signal in either direction. These signals are those that respond directly to the coup itself; subsequent signals that are sent regarding a coup-born regime's policies are not included in this variable.

The mean value for the sample is 0.113, which is slightly positive and is about the value of a policy of asking for information. The standard deviation is 1.917; one standard deviation above the mean would be a 2.03, which would indicate that a state admits wrongdoing in a signal to another state. One standard deviation below the mean, -1.803, is a score that aa signaling state made an informal complaint about the regime it was targeting. The modal score is 0, is the score for a state sending a signal that explained its policy without making positive or negative comment. The lowest score that appears in the data used in this dissertation is a -6.3, which falls between the scores for a threat with a specific negative non-military action and a threat with a negative sanction and a time limit, while the highest score in the data, a 7.4, is the score for the extension of economic aid from the signaling state.

2.2 Underlying Assumptions

The first assumption that underpins my theoretical expectations is that leaders wish to retain their offices and will make policy choices that will enable them to do so.

This is far from a new assumption; Mayhew's (1974) study of the US Congress showed that members of Congress prioritize their reelection chances when determining which policies to support, to the potential detriment of their constituents' interests and preferences. Subsequent studies suggested that executives in democratic and authoritarian leaders will choose policies that benefit the individuals and groups whose support is necessary for them to remain in office, even if they are a minority of their state's citizenry (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001).

A second assumption is that incumbents are more vulnerable to internal threats, compared to external threats. In the period from 1950 to 2015, only 20 regimes were removed from power by foreign-imposed regime changes (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). In the same period, 233 successful coups removed incumbents from office (Powell and Thyne 2011). Given these numbers, and the other ways in which domestic opposition can remove executives in office, I assume that the potential removal by domestic audiences will be more important to coup-born leaders when they are making policy-making decisions.

A final assumption is that coup-born regimes are less concerned with international reputation than other regimes. This, in part, flows from the previous expectations; if regimes must decide between a policy that will enhance their chances of surviving a domestic challenge or a second policy that will enhance their international reputation, they will choose the former. International signals that are sent in response to coups are highly inconsistent (Shannon et al. 2015) and coup-born regimes cannot accurately predict states' reactions based on pre-coup relations (Thyne and Hitch 2020), I assume that coup-plotters will view the international signals that follow coups to be at least

somewhat exogenous to their actions, suggesting that international reputation is something beyond their control. I therefore assume that coup-born regimes will act without considering it until they receive international signals following their seizure of power. Because coup-born regimes are especially vulnerable to removal from office via countercoups (Londregan and Poole 1990), I assume that they will show an even stronger sensitivity to domestic threats to their survival and make policy decisions that show little concern for international reputation, especially if reputational concerns will undermine their attempts to insulate themselves from domestic threats.

2.3 Theoretical Expectations

Based on the assumptions above, I have developed a series of theoretical expectations that will explored throughout this dissertation. My first expectation is that coup-born regimes will avoid cooperation or compliance with international law and norms if they believe it will not increase their chances of survival. If they are prioritizing surviving domestic threats to their tenure over maintaining their international reputation, I expect that their policies should reflect an attempt to either appease domestic audiences or protect themselves from irregular removal from office. There may be divergent consequences of noncompliance for different constituencies (Dai 2005). Given this potential divergence and the unequal influence of domestic constituencies based on their role in maintaining the incumbent's position, I expect that domestic audiences to which the regime is accountable will be unlikely to prioritize foreign policy and thus the maintenance of a good international reputation will be unimportant to the regime staying in office in most circumstances.

However, I expect that there may be cases in which international cooperation will matter to regime survival, and in these circumstances, coup-born regimes will be more likely to cooperate than they otherwise would be. If powerful constituencies to which the regime is accountable benefit from international cooperation and the coup-born regime risks losing their support if they fail to cooperate, I expect that this would increase their likelihood of cooperation, compared to coup-born regimes whose supporters' interests are either not tied to or are hurt by international cooperation. Similarly, I expect that international cooperation that benefits a domestic constituency that is opposed to the regime and is able to threaten the incumbents' hold on power will continue even if it does not mirror the regime's interests. Another circumstance in which I expect coup-born regimes to be more cooperative than they would otherwise be is when the consequence of their cooperation decreases the ability of domestic opposition groups to remove the regime from office, by either reducing the group's ability to interfere in governing or strengthening the regime's ability to resist a threat.

My final theoretical expectation is that international signals of support or condemnation can alter citizens' evaluations of the coup-born regime (Tomz 2002). I expect that negative signals would decrease domestic approval of the regime, while positive signals would increase domestic support. These changes in domestic support for the regime may alter the regime's calculation of their risk of removal from office, leading them to reconsider their policymaking decisions. Specifically, I expect that negative international signals will increase the regime's belief that their time in office is threatened while positive signals will lead to the regime believing they are more secure in their positions. I expect that these changes in the regime's beliefs about their security in office

will lead to policy changes and lead them to more compliant policies as they attempt to alter perceptions of their degree of cooperation among domestic audiences and improve the international signals they receive. I expect that coup-born regimes that receive positive international signals will continue being noncooperative, as the positive international relationships may serve as an alternate source of legitimacy or as an escape plan if they need one.

Chapter 3: Alliance Termination by Violation and Coup-Born Regimes

3.1 Introduction

When new leadership takes power after successfully staging a coup, they often implement policies that differ from the previous regime. While some research has considered changes to domestic policies following coups, there has been little attention paid to foreign policy. There has been some scholarly work focusing on the consequences of coups for international trade (Childers 2015), the effect of coups on the maintenance of military alliances that pre-date the coup has not been considered; neither have the effects of domestic and international responses to coups. Military alliances allow states to reveal their intentions to potential adversaries. Alliances alter the incentives for states that enter into them, increasing the likelihood that they will come to the aid of their allies; alliances also have a deterrent effect, reducing the likelihood of military challenges from states outside the alliance (Morrow 1994; Smith 1995). Alliances can also allow states to redirect government expenditures that would otherwise be used for defense spending, due to joint weapons programs and the ability to maintain a smaller military (Leeds 2003), allowing for such funds to be spent in other ways. Given the nature of the benefits of alliances, the effect of coups on their reliability is an important relationship to explore. Another aspect of alliances that make them an interesting test case for the theory outlined previously in this dissertation is the fact that, when states form alliances by signing and ratifying alliance treaties, they become binding international law. When alliance members fail to uphold their obligations under the alliance treaty, negative sanctions, up to and including a termination of the alliance and the benefits it provides, are likely to follow. While some may expect that the binding nature of military alliances will lead to a higher

level of compliance by coup-born regimes, I argue below why I do not expect this to be the case.

In 1976, Egypt and Sudan signed a 25-year joint defense agreement. Following the overthrow of Sudanese president Ja'far Muhammad al-Numayri in 1985, the new regime terminated the alliance with Egypt 16 years before it was due to end. Although later governments would attempt to rebuild the relationship with Egypt, Sudan's relations with Egypt were never as close as they were under al-Numayri (Ronen 2003; Shinn 2015). This termination of the alliance before it was set to expire signaled a major shift in Sudanese foreign policy and represented a violation of both the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international law. However, new leadership in states that have experienced recent coups may not be the sole driver of the relationship between coup-born regimes and alliance termination. Following the 1978 coup in Mauritania, Morocco terminated their alliance, allegedly even helping to foment an unsuccessful coup attempt that occurred in Mauritania in 1981 (Handloff 1990; New York Times 1981).

The relationship between coup-born regimes and violation of alliance treaties has not yet received scholarly attention. This study seeks to serve as a first attempt to specify the relationship between coups and their resultant regimes' decisions to maintain their alliances or terminate them by violating their provisions. By the nature of their ascension to power, coup-born regimes have demonstrated their willingness to violate both domestic law and international norms, so it may follow that they are willing to terminate their alliances in violation of the treaties that created said alliances. Previous work has found that changes in both domestic decision-making processes (Leeds 2003, Leeds and

Savun 2007) can make alliance violation more likely; however, I argue that coup-born regimes and their alliance partners are more likely than other states to violate their alliances, even when other forms of regime change are accounted for.

This does not mean that alliances that include a coup-born regime are equally vulnerable to termination; instead, I expect that the signals they receive from the international community in the immediate post-coup period will alter their decisions on violating preexisting alliance treaties. Because of the deterrent effect of alliances, I expect that coup-born regimes will be less likely to terminate regimes when they receive negative signals from the international community, whereas regimes that receive positive signals will be more likely to terminate due to their perceptions of a greater availability of potential allies due to these supportive signals. In order to test these theories, I conducted a series of logistic regression models using data on bilateral alliances from 1950 to 2018 and found empirical support for the expectations outlined above.

3.2 Determinants of Alliance Termination by Violation

Much of the research on alliance reliability focuses on factors that may lead states to determine that the costs of maintaining an alliance are (or are not) outweighed by the benefits they receive from the alliance. The degree of military coordination and institutionalization required by an alliance treaty has been shown to have a positive effect on alliance reliability, as the benefits of a more effective joint fighting force outweigh the costs of greater military institutionalization (Lake 1999; Leeds and Savun 2007; Morrow 1994). Joint democracy has also been found to decrease the likelihood that an alliance will be terminated in violation of its treaty, as the higher level of accountability and lower level of policy flexibility in democracies will increase the member states' domestic

political incentives to fulfill alliance treaty agreements and enhance member states' ability to credibly commit to an alliance (Leeds 1999). A final factor that, in some cases, makes states less likely to violate their alliances is the presence of a major power and a minor power in the alliance. Early work on the relationship between power distribution and alliance reliability suggested that although major powers may not depend on their minor power partners for security, they are likely to receive other benefits from the alliance and therefore will choose to maintain it, and minor powers are less likely to violate the alliance because their major-power ally would likely be able to change the outcome of a potential war should the minor power find themselves in one (Morrow 1994). However, more recent studies have suggested that this may not always be the case; Chung (2020) has suggested that this is true in more geographically remote alliances, as minor powers with major-power allies close by may fear their ally's influence may become overbearing. He further argues that allies with more equal capabilities will benefit from geographic proximity, as distance impedes the coordination needed to maintain an efficient alliance, which may lead to a shorter duration.

Changes in the environment in which the alliance exists may also lead its member states to reconsider the costs and benefits of maintaining it. When the conditions that underpin an alliance change, the likelihood of opportunistic abrogation increases (Leeds and Savun 2007). If a state finds itself in an environment where the external threat level is lower than it was when the alliance was formed, it may determine that the alliance is no longer as valuable and therefore choose to abrogate the agreement (ibid).

Another change that is likely to lead alliance members to rethink the value of their agreements is change to the military capabilities of one or both members of the alliance.

Alliance members are more likely to violate an alliance treaty when they have increased their military capability or when their partners have decreased military capabilities (Leeds 2003; Leeds and Savun 2007). In the first case, states that have recently become stronger are likely to believe they can now win a military conflict without the support of their ally, while in the second case, states whose partners have lost capacity are likely to believe their ally will no longer factor into their ability to succeed militarily. In both cases, these shifts have been found to lead to the recalculation of the value of an alliance. Other scholars have found that changes in allies' capabilities may lead them to be viewed as less credible by potential challengers, reducing their ability to deter attacks and thus further reducing the value of the alliance (Johnson and Joiner 2021).

A final change that will likely lead states to rethink their alliances is the formation of a new outside alliance (Leeds and Savun 2007). This new outside alliance provides the state with a substitute for the old alliance which may lead the old alliance to become less valuable. In some cases, the new alliance's mandate for foreign policy coordination may make continued foreign policy with the old ally more difficult and thus raising the cost of maintaining the old alliance and increasing the likelihood of termination.

Perhaps most relevant to this study is the relationship between changes in leadership and alliance termination that has been identified in several previous studies. Like other changes to the environment in which alliances exist, new leaders who take office after a regime change may find preexisting alliances to be worth less than their predecessor and therefore be more likely to terminate the alliance in violation of its provisions (Leeds 2003). Furthermore, changes to alliance portfolios often accompany regime change (Siverson and Starr 1994) and changes to decision-making structures can

lead to changes in the foreign policies that are most likely to allow leaders to remain in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Regime change may also lead the state's allies to rethink the value of the alliance. Domestic leadership changes may lead other regimes to question the state's capabilities and resolve; this questioning increases the chances that the allies of a state that has undergone such a change will be attacked from a third-party state, assuming the potential challenger does not share an alliance with the state having undergone the regime change (DiLorenzo and Rooney 2018).

Changes in leadership that reflect changes in foreign policy preferences may increase the likelihood of alliance termination by violation even if the institutions in which such leaders operate do not change. If the domestic support base of a new leader is different than the support of their predecessor, there will likely be a shift in foreign policy preferences of the leader's source of support. Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel (2009) have found that when the source of leadership support changes in a democracy, new leaders tend to maintain their state's previously existing alliance commitments, but in authoritarian regimes, source of leadership support changes increase the chances of alliance termination by violation. Although some may expect that this will overlap with coups to such a degree that it will be impossible to disentangle the two, I argue that this should not be an issue. One major reason is that I am investigating the regime for its entirety, while the SOLS change only indicates the year in which the shift occurs. A second reason to believe that there are two distinct results of coups – a reshuffling of the leadership within the regime that leaves its structure intact or a full change to the regime institutions as well as the removal from power of the incumbent regime elites (Aksoy, Carter and Wright 2015). In fact, the Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transition does

not code a new regime starting after most successful coups (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014), further emphasizing that coups and SOLS changes can, but do not always, coincide.

Missing in the research on the causes of alliance termination by violation is the effect of coups on its likelihood. While there are studies that consider regime change generally, I expect that an extraconstitutional overthrow of the existing regime by one or more elite members of the military or regime would have different consequences for the alliances the new regime inherits than would be the case when a regime change was carried out via a negotiated agreement between the outgoing regime and the opposition.

3.3 Theory and Hypotheses

Coup-born leaders who inherit previously existing alliances or who form alliances after taking power must determine whether the benefits of terminating these alliances by violating the provisions of the treaty alliance outweigh the costs of doing so. While violation brings with it domestic and international consequences that may lead such regimes to lose power, it allows them to avoid the costs of maintaining an alliance they may not find to be strategically advantageous. Additionally, states whose alliance partners have recently experienced coups may find that the new leadership and its actions diminish the benefits of maintaining the alliance, leading them to determine that the alliance's benefits no longer outweigh its costs. In both cases, leaders must consider the domestic and international reactions to these foreign policy decisions in an attempt to both advance their state's national interest and minimize the probability they will be removed from office by domestic constituencies that oppose these foreign policy decisions (Putnam 1988).

One benefit of terminating an alliance is the increased flexibility in foreign policy decision making that follows. Alliances limit the foreign policy choices that states can make (Crescenzi et al 2012; Johnson 2015) and their termination allows leaders who did not choose to form these alliances to determine foreign policy without being hampered by their predecessor's alliance. This is especially important when the alliances in question include either offensive or defensive provisions. States that are part of offensive alliances are more likely to intervene on behalf of an ally that initiates a conflict with a third state, while states that are part of defensive alliances are more likely to intervene on behalf of an ally that is targeted by a third state (Johnson 2016) meaning that alliances may lead states into conflicts they do not truly wish to be involved in or do not believe to be in their core national interest.

Another benefit of terminating an alliance is the termination of the costs of maintaining the alliance. Governance costs are a form of transaction costs and can be subdivided into two categories. One is the cost of negotiating an alliance treaty that all partners will agree upon, and the other is the cost of monitoring allies and enforcing the agreement once the alliance treaty has been agreed upon and taken effect (Lake 1999). In some cases, states' military spending will increase when they form an alliance. This is most likely to be the case when non-major powers join alliances that are relatively shallow. In these situations, major-power partners are likely to use their leverage in negotiations to demand greater military spending from the non-major power in order to limit their exposure to entrapment (Alley 2021). This increased military spending that is required by such alliances would no longer be necessary if such an alliance was terminated.

There are also costs to breaking an alliance. States who enter into alliances often benefit in terms of security, its desire to protect the status quo it wishes to maintain, or autonomy, its ability to challenge the status quo it wishes to change. Alliances often represent a trade-off between security and autonomy and states often negotiate alliance treaties with this trade-off in mind (Morrow 1991). Perhaps the most important security benefit that termination of an alliance would end is the deterrent effect that defensive alliances provide (Smith 1995).

A second cost of terminating alliances in violation of their provisions is the cost of the damage done to the violating state's reputation. States seeking a new alliance will use information about potential allies' previous behavior, assigning them a reputation based on whether they upheld or violated their previous alliances. A reputation for unreliability as an ally can make it more difficult for states to form new alliances, as potential partners generally prefer states that have reputations for upholding their alliances (Crescenzi et al 2012; Gibler 2008). States in alliances often reduce their military spending and rely on their allies' capabilities, which can leave them more vulnerable if their partners prove to be unreliable, which can lead states to avoid alliances with states that have reputations for unreliability (Narang and LeVeck 2019). In addition to the international consequences of a reputation for unreliability, leaders who violate their alliances may also face domestic audience costs for breaking international agreements or failing to keep their word in foreign policy (Fearon 1994; Smith 1998), which may decrease the level of domestic support they enjoy and make their tenure in office less secure.

Studies focusing on the effects of leadership turnover on foreign policy has found that successive leaders who rule the same country may have different foreign policy preferences and that when new leaders take office, other states will not know how the new leader's preferences and resolve differ from their predecessor (Wolford 2007). This potential change in resolve may lead to commitment problems if a negotiated agreement that predates the leader does not fall within their range of acceptable settlements and the new leader wishes to revise the agreement to reflect their individual resolve (Wolford 2012). I extend this argument by applying it to alliance treaties, which were negotiated by the coup-born regime's predecessor and which they may wish to revise.

When considering how the presence of a coup-born regime would alter the likelihood that an alliance would be terminated in violation of its treaty provisions, both the coup-born regime and the partner of the coup-born regime must be considered potential violators. While regime changes in general have been found to have a powerful effect on alliance survival, due to changes in foreign policy preferences and leaders' perceptions of the value of specific alliances, I expect that a coup will further destabilize an alliance due to its extraconstitutional nature. Given that a coup is a violation of both domestic law and international norms, I expect that coup-born regimes are generally less concerned with their international reputations, lowering a coup-born regime's estimation of the costs of alliance violation.

A second reason I expect coup-born regimes to be more willing to violate an alliance is that coups tend to result in authoritarian regimes (Derpanopolous et al 2016), providing them a measure of protection from domestic audience costs that may otherwise threaten their tenure in office. Domestic audiences that are opposed to an authoritarian

regime's foreign policy decisions are less likely to successfully remove their leaders from office than their democratic counterparts (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002; McGillivray and Smith 2000). This isolation from the domestic audience's potential opposition to alliance violations should further reduce a coup-born regime's estimation of the costs of alliance violation.

Allies of coup-born regimes may also find reasons to recalculate the costs and benefits of terminating their alliances. States with allies who are ruled by coup-born regimes may determine that terminating their alliance would be preferable to renegotiating the existing treaty with the new regime. Even if they are uncertain of the new leader's level of resolve, allies may decide that they wish to punish their ally's new leadership by implementing a strategy of agent-specific grim trigger. Agent-specific grim trigger was originally conceptualized as a way that states punish others for failing to live up to their interstate agreements; when states implement it, they cease cooperation with the target state only as long as the leader in place when the agreement was violated is in power. Once a new leader takes office in the targeted state, the state implementing agent-specific grim trigger will restart cooperation with the target state (McGillivray and Smith 2000, 2005). I extend this argument, predicting that a violation of the international anti-coup norm will lead the allies of coup-born regimes to terminate their alliances as a form of agent-specific grim trigger. I also extend the argument from Johnson and Joiner (2021) that, as with changes in military capabilities, coups (and other forms of regime change) are visible changes that lower potential challengers' view of the alliances' reliability, lowering the value of the alliance for coup-born regimes' partners.

In 1983, for example, former prime minister and army captain Thomas Sankara overthrew the government of South Volta, which was later renamed Burkina Faso (United Press International 1983). Burkina Faso and Mali signed a nonaggression pact in 1975, following a clash over a disputed border. On December 25, 1985, Mali launched a new offensive against Burkina Faso (Associated Press 1985), violating the terms of the pact and thus terminating it. Although the leaders denied it, some reports suggested that Sankara and Malian president Moussa Traore had emerged prior to this border clash, driving a wedge between their countries (Xinhua News Service 1985). Based on the discussion above, I posit:

Hypothesis 3.1: Alliances in which at least one member is governed by a coup-born regime should be more likely to be terminated by a violation of treaty provisions.

I also expect that certain factors will affect the likelihood that a coup-born regime outside of its mere existence. One factor I expect to make a difference is the overall response to the coup from the international community. As outlined above, two of the factors that may lead a state to reevaluate the value of their alliances are the state's military capabilities and the presence or absence of alternative potential allies that the state can turn to if they decide to abandon their current allies. If the state's military capabilities weaken or they believe they have fewer potential allies, leaders should value their current alliances more highly, making the costs of termination higher and thus, making their alliances more secure. For example, a regime that faces military aid cuts in the immediate post-coup period may fear they would not be able to mount an effective defense in the case of an international confrontation, making them more likely to maintain the alliances formed before the coup. Similarly, the withdrawal of cooperation and other sanctions that may follow a coup would likely be understood as a sign that the

signaling state would be unwilling to form an alliance with the coup-born regime. I argue that negative reactions to coups from the international community will lead coup-born regimes to make such changes in their valuation of their alliances and make them less likely to terminate their alliances. Furthermore, while new leaders tend to enact foreign policies that reflect their interests, the international context in which the new leaders are operating can increase the degree of foreign policy stability observed after a leadership change, even in authoritarian states (DiLorenzo and Rooney 2021). Conversely, positive signals in response to a coup often happen when the pre-coup leader was opposed by the international community. In such cases, the new regime may interpret these signals to mean that non-allied states may be more open to forming alliances thanks to the ouster of a leader who may have been the target of agent-specific grim trigger. This perceived increase in potential new allies may lead the coup-born regime in question to devalue its existing alliances, making it more likely to violate these alliances.

In February 1958, for example, Iraq and Jordan signed an agreement creating the Arab Federation, which linked their foreign and defense policies and created a close partnership between the two countries which, at the time, were both ruled by monarchs from the Hashemite family (Maddy-Weitzman 1990). On July 14th of that year, a group of military officers overthrew the government and assassinated King Faysal and his prime minister (Curtis 2000). The coup received mixed responses from the West, but was supported by other states in the region, most notably Syria and Egypt (Caruthers 1958; New York Times 1958), the latter promising military action if Iraq was attacked. Shortly after the coup-plotters took power, the Arab Federation was dissolved by Iraq (Curtis 2000). Based on the discussion above, I posit:

Hypothesis 3.2: As post-coup signals from the international community become more negative, the likelihood of alliance termination by a violation of an alliance that includes at least one coup-born regime will decrease.

While I have outlined my theoretical expectations for the relationships between coup-born regimes, international post-coup signals, and the likelihood that alliances were be terminated via treaty provision violations, there are alternative expectations that could be made about the connections between these variables. One potential alternative expectation is that coup-born regimes are more likely to uphold the alliances they inherit when taking office. Others may expect this because they expect that coup-born regimes, which are likely to either have military officers in top leadership positions or as important regime supporters may feel this is in the best interest of the military as an institution. While it may seem logical to expect military leaders to prefer higher levels of military expenditures sometimes associated with military alliance membership, this may not be the case. Alliances may not always lead to higher military expenditures (Alley 2021). Additionally, obligations stemming from the specific provisions in military alliance treaties may lead to defense policies that are not preferred by military leadership, in which case terminating such an alliance would allow greater flexibility in policymaking.

Another alternative expectation is that negative post-coup signals from the international community would make alliances more vulnerable to opportunistic abrogation rather than less. Such an argument may rely on the assumption that, if the partner of a coup-born regime sees that their ally is receiving signal of international condemnation, they may decide to terminate their alliance rather than suffer the consequences of an alliance with regime that has been condemned by the international community. Following this logic, we should see international support leading to more

secure alliances, as the partners of coup-born regimes are willing to maintain their partnerships with regimes that have experienced a supportive international community. However, I expect that these states would be more likely to maintain their alliances in an attempt to avoid the costs associated with violating an alliance treaty.

Another alternative argument regarding the relationship between alliance termination and international post-coup signals is alliances in which one member has received positive post-coup signals from the international community will be less vulnerable to termination by violation because the risk of negative post-coup consequences that could decrease the alliance's military capabilities is reduced. However, I do not expect this to be the case as this decreased risk of punishment may have an effect similar to a decreased threat environment as measured by the occurrence of MIDs and encourage the violation of alliances. Positive post-coup signals may also lead coup-born regimes to believe that more valuable alliances are possible and that the benefits of these potential new alliances will outweigh the costs of violating their existing ones.

3.4 Data and Estimator

In order to test the hypotheses outlined above, logistic regression models were used to determine the effects of the independent variables on the likelihood of termination by violation. The unit of analysis was alliance-year for all bilateral alliances in the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds et al 2002) that were in place between 1950 and 2008. In order to correct for potential autocorrelation, I included in all models the number of years since the alliance treaty had entered into force as well as squared and cubed values for this variable; in order to correct for potential heteroskedasticity, I used robust standard errors clustered by alliance.

3.4.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable used in this analysis is a dichotomous variable that indicates an alliance in question was terminated via "violation of provisions by one or more members, including willful abrogation before the scheduled termination date" (Leeds 2020, pg. 20) and is coded 1 in observations when the alliance in question was terminated by violation in the year of the observation and 0 otherwise. This variable was derived from the TERM variable in the ATOP version 5.0 dataset. Although other data sources are available that indicate which member of an alliance was responsible for violating an alliance, it was determined that attempting to disentangle the influence of a coup-born regime from the influence of its partner would be empirically unfeasible.

3.4.2 Independent Variables of Interest

In order to test the first hypothesis, I used a binary variable that indicated if at least one member of an alliance was under the control of a coup-born regime in the year of the observation. A regime is considered to be the result of a coup if it is led by a chief executive who was directly involved in the coup or the designated successor of such a leader. The tenure of such leaders begins with a successful coup, as coded by Powell and Thyne (2011) and ends with a new regime taking power, due to another successful coup, uprising, or election (Thyne, et al. 2017). This variable is coded 1 if the state in question was ruled by a coup-born regime on January 1 of the year of the observation and zero otherwise. This coding was utilized to ensure that alliance termination by violation observed before a successful coup were not incorrectly attributed to a regime that had not yet taken power.

In order to test the second hypothesis, I constructed a series of binary indicator variables that represented the type of post-coup signals the members of the alliance had received. To code these variables, I utilized Shannon, Thyne, Dugan and Hayden's (2015) coding of post-coup reactions and updated the data using the Historical New York Times and Lexis-Nexis to include coups that occurred after 2012. One variable was coded one to indicate if one or both states had coup-born regimes which received positive post-coup signals from the international community and zero otherwise; a second was coded one to indicate if one or both states had coup-born regimes which received neutral post-coup signals from the international community and zero otherwise; a third variable was coded one to indicate if one or both states had coup-born regimes which received negative post-coup signals from the international community and zero otherwise; and a final variable was coded 1 to indicate if the states had received different post-coup signals (e.g., one received positive post-coup signals and the other received neutral or negative signals).

3.4.3 Control Variables

In addition to the independent variables outlined above, I included a number of control variables in the analysis in order to account for other factors that have been found in previous research to influence the likelihood that an alliance would in due to violation of its provisions. In order to measure the effects of military institutionalization on alliance member behavior, Leeds and Anac (2005) create a three-level ordinal measure utilizing variables from the ATOP data which is utilized in the analyses below. Alliances are coded as being in the highest level of military institutionalization if they include at least one of the following provisions: "…(1) alliances that require an integrated military

command during both peacetime and wartime; (2) alliances that require the members to conduct a common defense policy, including integrated military plans, training, procurement, etc.; and (3) alliances that provide for joint troop placements, mutual exchanges of bases, or for one state to establish bases on the territory of another state" (Leeds and Anac 2005, pgs. 188-189). Alliances are coded as being in the moderate level of military institutionalization if they do not include any of the provisions listed above but do include at least one of the following provisions "…(1) alliances that require official contact among the military officials of the member states for planning and coordination during peacetime; (2) alliances that create any formal military organization to coordinate plans and behavior; (3) alliances that require one party to provide training and/or technology for the military of other parties; (4) alliances that include specific plans for subordination of one military to another during conflict or that specify military contribution levels (troops, supplies and/or funds) from the parties in the event of conflict" (ibid., pg. 189). All other alliances are coded as having a low level of institutionalization.

In order to measure the effects of joint democracy on the likelihood that an alliance will be terminated due to violation of its provisions, I included a binary indicator variable that is coded 1 if both states in the alliance had a democratic regime in the year in question and 0 otherwise. In order to determine if both regimes within an alliance were democratic, I used the Polity IV scores, which are coded from -10 to 10, with scores of six or higher indicating a democratic regime. Polity IV uses three main factors when assigning scores to states: the openness of executive recruitment, the constraints on executive power; and the level of political competition (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

In order to measure the effects of power asymmetries between allies, I created a binary indictor variable based on the Correlates of War's list of major power states. There is no precise operational definition of major powers; however, in the post-World War II period, permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council was enough to be granted major power status, while in the post-Cold War period, states that have considerable material capabilities and international policy influence were added to the major powers list (Correlates of War 2017). The binary indicator variable is coded 1 in observations in which only one alliance partner are members of the Correlates of War Major Powers list in the year in question and coded 0 otherwise.

In order to measure the effect of a change in threat environment, I used a measure similar to that of Gibler (2008), who used total number of MIDs involving one or more of the allies to measure alliances' threat environment. In order to measure decreases in threats faced by alliance members and the effects of such changes on the likelihood of alliance termination by violation, I created a binary indicator variable that measured when alliance members faced decrease threat. The variable is coded 1 for every observation in which one or both members of the alliance experienced a decrease of MIDs of at least 10 percent, compared to the previous year; it is coded 0 otherwise.

In order to measure the effect of changes in military capabilities, I created a binary indicator variable based on the Correlates of War's National Military Capabilities dataset. The Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores are used to measure state military capacity, using measures of iron and steel production, military expenditures, military personnel, primary energy consumption, total. population and urban population (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). The indicator variable was coded 1

in observations in which one or both alliance members' CINC scores are ten percent higher or lower than the previous year and coded 0 otherwise.

In order to measure the effect of new alliances, I created a binary indicator based on the ATOP (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell and Long 2002) that is coded 1 in any observation in which one of the members of the dyad entered into an alliance with another state or group of states and coded 0 otherwise.

In order to measure the effects of regime changes that do not fit the definition of a coup on alliance termination by violation, I created a binary indicator variable based on the Geddes Wright and Frantz Autocratic Regimes dataset that is coded 1 if one or both members of the alliance experienced a regime change that is not listed as a coup in the Powell and Thyne (2011) dataset in the year in question and coded 0 otherwise.

In order to measure the effects of the change in source of leadership support (SOLS), I created a binary variable that is coded 1 if the state in question or its alliance partner experienced a SOLS change in the year in question and coded 0 otherwise. This is based on the CHISOLS dataset (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura 2016).

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Alliance Termination by Violation Covariates

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum Value
Alliance Termination by Violation	0.007	0.082	0	1
Coup-Born Regime	0.121	0.326	0	1
Positive Response	0.021	0.144	0	1
Neutral Response	0.075	0.263	0	1
Negative Response	0.025	0.157	0	1
Mixed Responses	0.005	0.069	0	1
Military Institutionalization	0.274	0.609	0	2
Joint Democracy	0.239	0.427	0	1

Table 3.1, Continued

Major Power / Minor Power Dyad	0.858	0.349	0	1
Decrease in MIDs	0.397	0.489	0	1
Capabilities Change	0.195	0.396	0	1
New Alliance	0.119	0.324	0	1
Regime Change	0.035	0.185	0	1
SOLS Change	0.171	0.376	0	1
Years Since Alliance Formation	12.75	11.28	1	58

3.5 Results

In order to test my first hypothesis, which predicted a positive relationship between the presence of a coup-born regime and likelihood of alliance termination by violation, I estimated a logistic regression model; the results of the model are outlined in Table 3.2, below. Consistent with my expectations, I found a positive and statistically significant relationship between the two variables of interest. One example that illustrates these findings are a series of events that began when Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, then the president of Libya, announced plans to annex neighboring Chad in January 1981. In the process, he encouraged members of the Taureg ethnic group to rise up against the governments of Niger and Sudan (Koven 1981). Libya was later accused of both training Nigerien dissidents in guerilla warfare tactics (United Press International 1982) and plotting the assassination of Nigerien leader Colonel Seyni Kountche, who ousted President Hamani Diori, Niger's leader since gaining independence from France (Associated Press 1981). Due to these actions, Niger terminated their alliance with Libya, violating their alliance treaty.

Using the Margins command in Stata to calculate predicted probabilities of violation, I found that an alliance with at least one coup-born regime has a 1.2 percent higher probability of termination due to violation than an alliance in which both regimes did not seize power in a coup. Given that the predicted probability of violation in an alliance in which neither state has a coup-born regime is 0.0012, this represents a risk of violation that is 11 times higher when a coup-born regime is present. This change is illustrated in Figure 3.1, below.

In order to test my second hypothesis, which predicts higher risk of violation for alliances in which one or both members have a coup-born regime which received positive post-coup signals from the international community and lower risk for alliances in which one or both members received negative post-coup signals, I estimated a second logistic regression model using the series of binary indicator variables described above to determine if international post-coup signals influence the likelihood of alliance termination by violation. Although the initial results outlined above seem promising, I ultimately did not find support for my second hypothesis. While the coefficients for positive, neutral, and mixed post-coup signals were positive and statistically significant, suggesting that they do increase the likelihood of alliance violations, tests to determine if these coefficients were statistically significant from one another failed to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that the type of signals received did not influence the probability of alliance termination by violation. There was also no statistically significant difference between these coefficients and the coefficient for negative post-coup signals. Given this, it suggests that the presence of a post-coup signal, not its orientation, is influencing the dependent variable; because these signals are only present if the alliance has at least one

coup-born regime, I assume that the presence of this regime is driving the influence on the dependent variable, not the signals. Results from this model are outlined in Table 3.2, below.

Table 3.2: Logistic Regression on Alliance Termination by Violation

Coup-Born Regime in Alliance	2.418***	
	(.301)	
Positive Response to Coup		2.152***
		(.573)
Neutral Response to Coup		2.637***
		(.313)
Negative Response to Coup		0.579
		(1.074)
Mixed Response to Coups		2.289**
		(.703)
Military Institutionalization	0.899***	0.889***
	(.183)	(.179)
Joint Democracy	-1.423	-1.505
	(.762)	(.769)
Mixed-Power Dyad	0.169	0.219
	(.568)	(.580)
Decrease in MIDs	0.457	0.466
	(.305)	(.305)
Capabilities Change	0.594*	0.507
	(.296)	(.307)
New Alliance	1.142***	1.053**
	(.315)	(.321)
Regime Change	0.469	0.524
	(.471)	(.469)
SOLS Change	1.156**	1.207***
	(.340)	(.345)
Years	-0.072	-0.074
	(.133)	(.136)
Years^2	0.007	0.007
	(.009)	(.009)
Years^3	-1.86×10^{-4}	-1.93×10^{-4}
	(.0002)	(.0002)
Constant	-6.789***	-6.808***
	(.774)	(.785)
Observations	7,241	7,241
Wald Chi^2	147.32***	167.52***
Pseudo R^2	0.2148	0.2218

Note * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Robust standard errors clustered by alliance reported in parentheses

Figure 3.1: Predicted Probability of Alliance Termination by Violation



In addition to the mixed support for my hypotheses, there was also mixed support for previous findings on the influences of alliance termination by violation. In both models outlined above, the degree of military institutionalization, the presence of a new alliance, and the experience of a SOLS change in one or both alliance members significantly increased the likelihood that an alliance would be terminated due to violation of its treaty provisions. Change in military capabilities was shown to be positively and significantly associated with higher probability of alliance termination in the first model, meeting expectations based on previous studies, although it did not reach statistical significance in the second model. The presence a major power-minor power dyad, decreased MIDs, and regime changes were all insignificant in both models. In both models, the presence of two democratic regimes approached, but did not meet the

conventional standard for statistical significance. While this is quite surprising, this may be due in part to the use of a sample that begins in 1950, whereas many of the other studies that found these variables to be significant covered a broader timeframe.

3.6 Conclusions

The study outlined above considers the relationships between coup-born regimes, post-coup signals from the international community, and the likelihood of alliance termination by violation. The empirical analysis, based on a series of logistic regression models, found support for my first hypothesis which predicts that bilateral military alliances in which one or both members are under the control of a coup-born regime will be more fragile, compared to alliances in which both members are controlled by regimes that followed other pathways to power. The analysis failed to support my second hypothesis, that as international post-coup signals became more negative, alliance termination by violation became less likely.

There are a number of implications of these results and pathways for future projects that stem from the results of this study. The findings provide a new direction for the research agenda on alliance violations, as they suggest that not all regime changes are created equally in terms of their effect on the likelihood of alliance violations. The finding that international responses to coups do not affect the likelihood that the coup-born regime will violate a response suggests that changes in the international context that register at a level below a change to the threat environment measured by the occurrence of MIDs do not affect alliances' vulnerability to violation. For the research agenda on coups, this could spur a new direction for research on the consequences of coups and how they are received by international audiences, especially the consequences related to

foreign policy and international legal commitments, as these have been mostly overlooked by scholars to this point.

This study also presents potential implications for policy makers, especially those who are interested in maintaining alliance commitments. While the international community's responses can be described as somewhat ambivalent about coups, there are numerous actors who have interest in maintaining their military alliances and the security benefits they offer. These findings suggest that alliance members who believe their allies are vulnerable to coups have an incentive to encourage them to engage in coup-proofing strategies in order to avoid losing power. International organizations which seek to preserve international peace and stability may also find it a worthwhile to give higher priority to decreasing the likelihood of coups in the states most vulnerable to them in an effort to shore up alliances and the security benefits they provide.

Chapter 4: Repression and Coup-Born Regimes

4.1 Introduction

The use of repressive policies, including physical integrity rights violations, by regimes that came to power through the use of a coup is unlikely to come as a surprise to many. Many regimes that followed coups, including the Chilean regime under Augusto Pinochet and the Sudanese regime under Omar al-Bashir, have been accused of exceptionally high levels of repression (Evans 2006; BBC News 2020). While not every coup-born regime will repress their citizens to the point of accusations of crimes against humanity, as Pinochet and al Bashir were, they are set apart from their fellow coup-born leaders by the intensity of their repressive policies, not by the mere existence of such policies.

While such anecdotal evidence may be easily found, the relationship between regimes established as a result of a coup and the use of physical integrity violations has gone mostly unexamined. Two recent studies have examined this relationship and found that coups generally lead to greater levels of human rights abuses (Curtice and Arnon 2020; Lachapelle 2020). While these studies have made important contributions to our understanding of whether coup-born regimes will repress more than others, there are a number of factors that could modify this relationship that they did not consider, including the influence of international signals of support or opposition to the regime based on its decision to take power through a coup.

One aspect of physical integrity rights abuses, as they compare to the other policy areas examined in this dissertation, is the legal status they enjoy under international law. There are a number of international treaties that ban various forms of human rights

abuses. Many, including the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1987 Convention Against Torture, do not include enforcement mechanisms that are overseen by international bodies or other states (Hathaway 2007). While naming and shaming within the halls of the UN can occur, enforcement is left up to domestic institutions that are expected to ensure that states live up to their commitments on the avoidance of the use of repression. Others have argued that socialization and norm diffusion has led to a shift in the expectations that states will protect human rights, even if they are not obligated to do so. The spiral model of socialization, in which states begin adopting human rights protections due to pressures from domestic and transnational actors, eventually leads to the internalization of international standards and preferences toward the protection of human rights (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). However, the spread of human rights standards does not come with a legal obligation, meaning that states which are not party to the international and regional treaties on human rights may be affected without being obligated. It should be noted that, while this chapter investigates states' human rights practices rather than their level of compliance with human rights treaties, the widespread ratification of major human rights treaties and acceptance of human rights standards among the international community suggests that we should see a correlation between human rights practices and compliance with human rights treaties.

This study seeks to build upon this new research and further specify the relationship between coups and their resultant regimes' decisions to pursue or forego policies of repression. Instead of considering only the presence or absence of a coup-born regime, I will utilize data on international signals sent in response to coups to these

regimes to examine if these reactions make coup-born regimes more or less likely to pursue repressive policies in order to maintain control of the state.

While I do not dispute the previous findings that coups have a negative influence on human rights conditions, I argue that states that receive negative international attention will have better human rights conditions, as these states seek to cooperate with the international community and abide by the norms set out by the international human rights regime, and that states that receive positive international attention will use this as a cover for higher levels of repression. These theoretical expectations are tested using data on coups and the regimes that follow them, international signals, and physical integrity rights conditions. A series of ordinary least squares regressions was conducted and finds support for the above expectations.

4.2 Determinants of Repression

The relationship between coups and human rights abuses failed to receive scholarly attention until very recently. While scholars have investigated a number of other factors that they expected to influence the use of repression, coups have only recently been linked to repression in political science research. Two recent studies represent the scholarly effort to understand these connections. In one study, the authors argued that repression should increase in the year after a coup was either successfully staged or attempted. (Curtice and Arnon 2020). They argue that this occurs through two primary mechanisms – the regime attempting to deter potential challengers and punish those who are known to oppose the regime. They argue that we should see both of these mechanisms happen in cases where the coup-plotters succeed as well as in cases where the incumbent regime is able to prevent their removal from power; they do suggest that

the cycle of post-coup punishment will be longer following a failed coup because the incumbent government will have more difficulty identifying the failed coup-plotters and their supporters, who have an incentive to hide their preferences, while successful coup-plotters should be able to identify members and supporters of the ousted regime (ibid.).

The second study also considers the level of repression that occurs after both successful and failed coups and, like Curtice and Arnon (2020), find that repression is generally higher following any coup activity. The author finds that this increase in repression is observed regardless of the pre-coup regime type, and that even when the pre-coup regime was committing major personal integrity rights abuses (Lachapelle 2020). He finds that successful coups will result in larger increases in repression, and that the increased repression will not last long; he finds that by post-coup year five, the coup will no longer affect the level of repression seen in the state (ibid.).

While these studies provide a promising start to the investigation between coups and human rights abuses, there are multiple ways in which they can be expanded. First, they only consider the initial post-coup period, not the entire tenure of the coup-born regime. Given that the average coup-born regime is in office for around nine years and the longest surviving coup-born regime held power for 42 years, there is a large portion of time that coup-born regimes are in office that are not taken into account by these studies. This chapter takes into consideration the entire tenure of a coup-born regime in order to determine whether coup-born regimes are more repressive for their entire reign.

Another factor that is not taken into account by these studies is the ability of actors outside the regime to influence the regime's use of repression. Coups, particularly those following the end of the Cold War, often receive a great deal of attention from the

international community and these reactions may alter the new regime's decision-making calculus in its attempt to consolidate power without risking their removal from office. By taking these responses into account, this study will help develop a more nuanced understanding of how coups effect repression.

A number of other factors that influence the level of repression seen in a state have been identified by scholars. One such factor is regime type, as democracies generally repress less than authoritarian regimes, due to the accountability and policy compromise seen in democratic regimes (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Hill and Jones 2014).

The ability of the state to adequately distribute resources and benefits to its citizens. States that are unable to adequately meet the demands of their citizens are more likely to repress in an attempt to avoid challenges from opposition groups formed by citizens dissatisfied due to the unequal or inadequate distribution of goods. Higher levels of economic development provide the revenue to distribute adequate benefits, which should decrease repression. As population increases, the revenue required to distribute adequate benefits to all citizens increase and the probability of unequal or inadequate distribution of benefits rises, as does the expected level of repression (ibid.).

A final factor that can increase repression is participation in war. States that fear they may lose power are more likely to repress, and armed conflict involving other states or rebel groups increases this perceived risk (ibid.). Hill and Jones (2014) completed a completed a cross-validation analysis on the determinants of human rights abuses and found that, although there are concerns about the measures and their overlap with the concept of repression, civil war participation and democracy were the most important

factors in determining the level of repression utilized by a regime and that, more generally, domestic factors played a much more important role than international factors in the use of repression.

4.3 Theory and Hypotheses

States' decisions to use repression are not made randomly and they are rarely made by an individual or small group of low-level state agents. Instead, they are generally top-down decisions driven by leaders who have weighed the positive and negative consequences associated with human rights abuses and determined that the benefits of repressive policies outweigh the costs (Wantchekon and Healy 1999; Davenport 2007b). Each state's decision-making calculus will differ, and the actions of the opposition play an important role in a state's choice between policies of repression and accommodation (Moore 2000; Carey 2006). Franklin (2009) outlines four ways a government can react to a contentious challenge from domestic opposition: repression, accommodation, a combination of repression and accommodation, and toleration. While moral or ethical questions may lead some states to choose a set of policies, there are other costs and benefits to each of the four options that states consider when choosing their policies.

Ethics aside, there are a number of reasons states may choose to pursue a repressive policy response. Perhaps the most important reason that states choose to repress is that repression is often effective in ending the challenge they are facing (Franklin 2009). Repression can weaken internal opposition and disrupt challengers' planning, increasing the likelihood that the regime will survive (Krain 1998; Pierskalla 2010; Ritter 2014). Repression also provides several secondary benefits, such as the

opportunity to gather information about opposition groups (Bell and Murdie 2018) and extract resources that can be used to build state capacity (Krain 1998). Finally, repression has relatively low start-up costs, especially when compared to concessionary policies meant to coopt opposition groups (Ryckman 2016).

There are, however, a number of costs that states face when they choose to repress. Repression undercuts any domestic legitimacy the regime has (Ritter 2014) and internal backlash against the repressive regime may lead to greater protests (Moore 2000; Carey 2006; Franklin 2009; Ryckman 2016). International condemnation may follow repression (Carey 2006; Franklin 2009) and the international human rights regime, consisting of the UN Human Rights Commission, universal and regional human rights treaties, regional institutions, and non-governmental organizations has been developed to punish human rights violators (Buergenthal 2006). It should be noted, however, that violations of human rights treaties, like other areas of international law, are rarely punished (Guzman 2008) and there is debate about the efficacy of the naming and shaming campaigns undertaken by NGOs and other organizations (Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012).

Policies meant to accommodate opposition, which range from symbolic gestures like economic support and promises to reform to major changes such as firing of government officials and drafting of new constitutions (Ryckman 2016) also come with their own costs and benefits. Concessionary policies may offer another pathway to end the contentious challenge the state faces, with the additional benefit of allowing the state to avoid both the internal backlash and international condemnation that often follows repression (Franklin 2009). However, this does not mean that there are no costs

associated with accommodation. Accommodating the opposition may serve to legitimize it and its demands (Ryckman 2016). The bandwagon effect, in which the opposition gains members because they see that its protests are leading to concessions, may lead to more protests (Carey 2006), and other groups may be emboldened by the state's newfound reputation for concessions (Fujikawa 2017). Finally, the policies may themselves be more costly than repression (Franklin 2009; Ryckman 2016) and the regime's future policy options may be more limited than they would have been had they not made concessions (Franklin 2009).

Combining repression and accommodations is another policy option that states may choose to pursue, and it is highly effective at ending the contentious challenge faced by the state (Franklin 2009). However, it combines the costs of the two policies, which include both the costs of the concessionary policies and the international condemnation associated with repression. Perhaps most importantly, the internal backlash to the repression and the perceived likelihood of opposition success due to the accommodations combine to make this policy combination more likely to increase protests than repression or accommodation alone (Franklin 2009).

Toleration, in which the state neither represses the opposition nor offers them concessions, is unlikely to successfully reduce opposition, but it is the least costly of the policy options outlined here (Franklin 2009; Ryckman 2016). It also avoids the potential costs of other policies, such as increased protests due to internal backlash, the bandwagon effect or the state's reputation of accommodation, as well as international condemnation that follows repression. However, this policy choice, like accommodation policies, runs

the risk of legitimizing the opposition, making it at least somewhat risky (Franklin 2009; Ryckman 2016).

While each state's decision-making calculus will differ, there are reasons to believe that coup-born regimes will be more likely to determine that the benefits of repression outweigh its costs. Repression may be used to punish the old regime and its supporters, and preemptively warn challengers to the regime (Herreros 2011). In the three years following the 1973 coup that resulted in a military regime led by Augusto Pinochet, for example, over 130,000 Chileans were arrested and many of them were tortured in an attempt to eliminate the remaining liberal opposition that still existed within Chile. (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2021). Following a coup in 2014, the Thai government led by General Prayut Chan-ocha arrested activists for crimes including *lese majeste* and sedition, banned public gatherings of more than five people, and banned all pro-democracy activities in order to eliminate pro-democracy opposition movements (Phasuk 2018).

Perhaps more importantly, states are vulnerable to countercoups for several years after a successful coup (Londregan and Poole 1990) and outgoing leaders are more likely to face imprisonment, exile, or death after an irregular regime change (Goemans 2008), meaning that leaders may repress to not only ensure the regime's survival, but their own as well. In August 2020, for example, Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was overthrown by a group of military officers led by Colonel Assima Goita. A transitional government led by president Bah N'Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane was inaugurated in September of that year, only to be overthrown by a group of military officers led by Col. Goita in May of the following year. Both N'Daw and Ouane were

placed under house arrest after their forced resignations and remained there until August 2021 (Reuters 2021; Wing 2021).

When these factors are taken together, the benefits of repression for coup-based regimes are likely to exceed the benefits for other regimes as well as outweighing the potential costs. Based on the discussion above, I posit:

Hypothesis 4.1: In states with coup-born regimes, the use of repression should be higher compared to other states.

While Lachapelle (2020) found that the effects of repression would diminish over time, I expect that this may not be the case when looking at the entire tenure of a coup-born regime. Previous studies have emphasized the relationship between the current use of repression in a state and its previous use of repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Regimes may unintentionally fall into a consistent level of repression due to policy inertia (Carey 2006), and the decentralization of repression may make it difficult for high-level regime leaders forcing agents of the state, such as police officers, soldiers, and prison guards, to stop committing acts of repression once they have begun (Hafner-Burton 2008). Continued repression may also be the result of a purposeful policy choice, as accommodation can, at any time, lead to new protest movements (Fujikawa 2017) and consistent government policy, whether repressive or accommodative, has been found to decrease protests more than alternating policies (Carey 2006). Considering these factors, I do not expect to find a relationship between the length of time a coup-born regime has been in office and the level of repression in that state.

One factor I do expect to affect the level of repression used by a coup-born regime is the nature of the post-coup signals they receive from other states and international organizations. Because of the vulnerable nature of coup-born regimes and

the officials who lead them, I expect that these regimes will be sensitive to these signals. This is not because their international critics pose an existential threat to the regime, but because these signals may alter their citizens' evaluations of the regime and may increase their vulnerability to irregular removal from office by a domestic actor or group. The potential for increased domestic dissatisfaction based on such negative international signals should lead to the recalculation of domestic policies that may compound this disapproval. Should states that send negative post-coup signals decide to engage in agent-specific grim trigger, wherein they cut off cooperation with the state as long as the current regime is in power with the intention of reinitiating cooperation when a new leader takes office (McGillivray and Smith 2000, 2005; Smith 2009), domestic constituents that benefit from international cooperation may become more dissatisfied with the regime and, should those constituents be important in the regime maintaining its hold on power, this dissatisfaction could increase the vulnerability of the regime. While it may seem that this should lead to increased repression, I expect the opposite. Instead, I expect that coup-born regimes will use less repression in the wake of negative international signals in an attempt to improve their international standing and avoid losing international cooperation that benefits their domestic constituencies. However, I do not expect that coup-born regimes will fully stop the use of repression in the wake of negative international post-coup signals; instead, I expect that they will choose to repress a smaller, more targeted group of individuals that it has reasons to believe may oppose the new regime, such as the officials and supporters of the recently ousted regime, instead of repressing a more widespread group that may include civilians who do not pose a threat to the regime. This more targeted repression should help the regime maintain its

hold on power by retaliating against potential opponents without raising the suspicions of the international community due to widespread, indiscriminate repression.

Following the 2014 coup in Thailand, for example, the US cancelled planned joint military exercises and a visit to Thailand by the US Pacific Fleet Commander, withdrew an invitation to the Commander General of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, and cancelled multiple training programs planned for the Royal Thai Police. A statement made by the US Defense Department's press secretary, Rear Admiral John Kirby, tied the cancellations to the coup that had recently taken place (Associated Press 2014).

Positive international signals, however, should make the regime less concerned about their chances of being removed from office and, even if removal occurs, their post-removal fate. Positive international signals should lead some domestic audiences to evaluate the regime more positively, reducing potential challenges to the regime; these signals should also lead to the continuation of international cooperation, as states not expressing opposition to the coup would be unlikely to initiate agent-specific grim trigger. This continued cooperation should help the regime gain support from the constituencies that benefit from this cooperation, further decreasing potential opposition. Assuming that these two factors are enough to decrease the regime's vulnerability to removal, it may seem intuitive to expect decreased repression. However, I expect that these positive signals will be used to compensate for the loss of legitimacy that results from repression, allowing the regime to repress the remaining potential threats and the supporters of the previous regime. In addition to shoring up regime legitimacy in a way that allows for greater repression, the positive international responses may also suggest to

the coup-born regime that other states will intervene on their behalf and either reinstate them or give them safe passage to leave the state without being punished (Cottiero 2019).

It is important to note that these expectations are based on the idea that there is not a correlation between international post-coup signals and domestic dissent. If there was a connection between international responses and domestic protests, it would suggest that the presence of domestic protests is actually driving the level of repression (see Moore 1998, 2000 for discussion of the connections between repression and dissent). However, if there is not an identifiable connection between these two phenomena, it suggests that the international post-coup signals that are received do, in fact, have an independent effect on repression. As seen in the figure below, there is not a consistent relationship between the orientation of post-coup international signals and the number of domestic anti-regime protests that occur in the same six-month post-coup period.

Figure 4.1: Scatterplot of Domestic Protests and International Post-Coup Signals



The correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.0536, which by conventional standards would be considered to be quite weak. Based on the discussion above, I posit:

Hypothesis 4.2: In states with coup-born regimes, as international responses to coups become more negative, the regime's use of repression should decrease.

Unlike the effects of the coup-born regime's presence, I do expect the relationship between international post-coup signals and repression to diminish over time. One reason I expect this to happen is that other states will observe the level of repression in the coup-born regime following their initial post-coup signals and update their evaluations of the coup-born regime. While punishment of human rights violations is not consistent, states that had previously approved of the regime may determine that the increased repression warrants the application of agent-specific grim trigger or naming and shaming campaigns. Likewise, states that had previously condemned the coup-born regime for its seizure of power may determine that the relatively low level of repression, compared to other coup-born regimes, may warrant a more cooperative relationship with the regime. I also expect that citizens' evaluations of the regime will change over time, relying less on the signals from the international community and more on what they are able to observe on the ground. This shift should lead to poor evaluations of repressive regimes that received international support and positive evaluations of less repressive regimes that were condemned. Based on the discussion above, I posit:

Hypothesis 4.3: In states with coup-born regimes, the effects of international post-coup signals on repression should decrease over time.

While I have outlined the expectations for the relationships between the use of repression, the presence of a coup-born regime, and the post-coup signals regimes receive from the international community, there are other potential relationships that others may

expect to find. Some have suggested that coups, especially those which replace deeply authoritarian regimes, should provide an opening for democratization and greater respect for human rights (Thyne and Powell 2016). However, as shown by others, post-coup governments are unlikely to be more democratic than their predecessors and may actually reverse previous democratization efforts (Derpanopolous et al. 2016).

Others may expect that increased repression will happen following a coup but that these trends will quickly reverse as coup-born regimes consolidate power. However, I do not expect this to be the case for two important reasons; one reason I expect repression to remain high is the high level of correlation between current and past levels of repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Furthermore, regimes may unintentionally fall into a consistent level of repression due to policy inertia (Carey 2006), and the decentralization of repression may make it difficult for high-level regime leaders forcing agents of the state, such as police officers, soldiers, and prison guards, to stop committing acts of repression once they have begun (Hafner-Burton 2008). Continued repression may also be the result of a purposeful policy choice, as accommodation can, at any time, lead to new protest movements (Fujikawa 2017) and consistent government policy, whether repressive or accommodative, has been found to decrease protests more than alternating policies (Carey 2006).

Finally, some may suggest that negative post-coup signals from the international community may lead to higher levels of repression as coup-born regimes determine that they are likely to suffer from the consequences of declining international relations already and the increased use of repression will not matter in determining its standing in the international community. However, I do not expect that this is the case because rather

than surrendering all benefits of international cooperation that the regime and its supporters may otherwise receive, I expect that coup-born regimes will attempt to maintain whatever international goodwill that survived their seizure of power in order to continue to benefit and allow their supporters and other important constituents to continue benefiting from the remaining cooperation.

4.4 Data and Estimator

For the statistical tests of the hypotheses above, a country-year unit of analysis is utilized. In the model that tests the first hypothesis, the dataset includes observations of 144 states in the years 1950 to 2005, which represent the cases for which all covariates are available. In the models that test the second and third hypotheses, the dataset includes 59 states that were ruled by coup-born regimes in the years 1950 to 2005. Because the dependent variable is a continuous measure, least ordinary squares regression models were used to test all hypotheses. In all models presented below, Newey-West standard errors are calculated, as this model specification controls for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation without using a lagged dependent variable (Newey and West 1987). Unlike other forms of standard errors, Newey-West does not assume that there is only first-order autocorrelation and requires a specification of how many lags should be considered in the calculation. In order to determine the number of lags needed for the calculations, I followed the guidelines set forth by Greene (2018) and determined that 3 lags would be appropriate given the range of years covered by the data observations.

4.4.1 Dependent Variable

In order to measure the severity of repression in each observation, I utilized the latent human rights protection scores first introduced by Fariss (2014). To create a

dynamic standard model, Fariss relaxed the assumption that the human rights reports used to construct standards-based repression data are written with the same information, access and classifications each year the data was compiled, creating what he claims to be "unbiased country-year estimates of repression" (ibid., pg. 299). In order to construct this latent variable, Fariss used four standards-based repression datasets (CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, Hathaway Torture Data, Ill-Treatment and Torture Data, and the Physical Terror Scale) that measure up to four forms of physical integrity rights violations utilizing human rights reports from the US State Department and/or Amnesty International, as well as five event-based repression datasets (Harff and Gurr, the Political Instability Task Force, the Rummel Dataset, the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset and the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators) that measure specific repressive events, including mass repression, genocide, politicide, democide, and government killings by using primary and secondary historical sources. These datasets are then combined through the dynamic standards model to create a latent score that ranges from -3.459 to 5.029 in the sample used.

4.4.2 Independent Variables of Interest

In order to test the first hypothesis, the key independent variable of interest is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether a state's regime was in place due to a coup. A regime is considered to be the result of a coup if it is led by a chief executive who was directly involved in the coup or the designated successor of such a leader. The tenure of such leaders begins with a successful coup, as coded by Powell and Thyne (2011) and ends with a new regime taking power, due to another successful coup, uprising, or election (Thyne et al. 2017). In order for an observation to be coded as a 1 for this

variable, there must have been a coup-born regime in place in the state in question on January 1 of the year in question. This coding was utilized to ensure that human rights conditions observed before a successful coup were not incorrectly attributed to a regime that had not yet taken power.

In order to test the second hypothesis, I constructed a series of binary indicator variables that represented the type of post-coup signals the members of the alliance had received. To code these variables, I utilized Shannon, Thyne, Dugan and Hayden's (2015) coding of post-coup reactions. One variable was coded one to indicate if a coup-born regime received positive post-coup signals from the international community and zero otherwise, a second variable was coded one if a coup-born regime received neutral post-coup signals from the international community and zero otherwise, and a final variable was coded to equal one if a coup-born regime received negative post-coup signals from the international community and zero otherwise.

In order to test the third hypothesis, I coded a variable that measured the number of years the coup-born regime has been in power. This variable was coded 0 in the year in which a coup-born regime took power, 1 in the first year following the coup, and so on. This variable was coded as missing if the coup-born regime was not in place on January 1 of the year of the observation or did not seize power via coup in the year of the observation. I then created a multiplicative interaction term using this variable and the international signals variable described above.

4.4.3 Control Variables

In addition to the key independent variables listed above, I included a number of control variables, described below. All of the control variables have been identified in

previous literature as being significantly associated with human rights conditions. In addition to the descriptions, tables outlining the descriptive statistics of the control variables is included below. Although Polity IV scores are commonly used to indicate the level of democracy or autocracy in a country in a given year, this may be problematic when the dependent variable in a study is a measure of human rights conditions. Hill and Jones (2014) argue that, because some conceptual measures of democracy and human rights overlap, Polity scores should not be used in human rights-focused research. In order to avoid this methodological issue, I have used the elected officials index from the Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2021), which measures on a 0 to 1 scale the degree to which both the chief executive and the legislature is elected, either directly or indirectly, the country and year of the observation. In order to control for the effects of economic development on human rights conditions within a state, I have included the natural log of per-capita gross domestic product (GDP). The values have been standardized to the 2010 US Dollar to remove the influence of currency valuations from the measure and was obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. The natural log of the variable to correct for the skewed nature of the variable.

In order to control for population, I have included the natural log of the population. The natural log was used instead of the raw numbers in order to reduce the influence of outliers. Population data came from the Correlates of War's National Military Capabilities database (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972).

In order to control for states' participation in both international and civil wars, I have included dichotomous variables that indicate if, in a particular year, a state was

involved in an international war or a civil war. These variables were coded using data from the Correlates of War data (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).

In order to control for the presence of domestic dissent that does not rise to the level of civil war, I included a variable that indicates the number of protests in the state. I coded a variable that indicates the number of anti-regime protests carried out by domestic non-state actors using the Social, Political and Economic Event Database (SPEED) Project data, which uses a computer-human hybrid model to record "human-initiated destabilizing events" (Nardulli, Hayes and Bajjalieh 2013, 1).

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Repression Covariates

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum Value
Latent Human Rights Protection Score	-0.083	1.384	-3.459	5.029
Coup-Born Regime	0.161	0.368	0	1
Years Since Coup	8.283	8.389	0	36
Positive International Signals	0.029	0.169	0	1
Neutral International Signals	0.113	0.317	0	1
Negative International Signals	0.033	0.179	0	1
Elected Official Index	0.717	0.437	0	1
GDP per capita (logged)	8.426	1.104	4.898	12.31
Population (logged)	9.070	1.567	4.111	14.09
International War Participation	0.014	0.117	0	1
Civil War Participation	0.054	0.227	0	1
Protests	2.043	10.46	0	288

4.5 Results

In order to test my first hypothesis, which predicted a negative relationship between the presence of a coup-born regime and latent human rights protection scores, I estimated an ordinary least squares regression; the results of the model are outlined in Table 4.2, below. Consistent with my expectations, I found a negative and statistically significant relationship between the two variables of interest. The difference between the

predicted latent human rights protection score for coup-born regimes is 0.263 poin ts lower than the predicted value for other regimes, as shown in Figure 4.2. An example that illustrates the findings is the repression seen in the aftermath of the 2021 coup in Myanmar. After high-ranking military officers overthrew the civilian government led by Daw Aung Sung Suu Kyi, the security apparatus began repressing opposition groups, killing dozens of civilians suspected of protesting against the junta. In about two and a half months, the death toll reached 700 (Paddock 2021).

In order to test my second hypothesis, which predicts higher levels of repression when coup-born regimes received positive post-coup signals from the international community and lower repression when coup-born regimes received negative post-coup signals, I estimated a second ordinary least squares regression model using the series of binary indicator variables described above to determine if international post-coup signals influence the level of repression used by a coup-born regime. The coefficients for each binary indicator variable are negative and statistically significant when compared to the excluded category, regimes that had not received any post-coup signals from the international community. In most cases, this is because there was not a coup-born regime in the state during the year of the observation. However, when testing these coefficients among themselves, only the coefficient for positive post-coup signals was significantly different from the other coefficients. The p-value for the difference between the coefficients for positive signals and neutral signals was 0.0003, while the p-value for the difference in coefficients for positive signals and negative signals was 0.0018. There was no significant difference between the coefficients for the regimes that received neutral and negative signals, suggesting that while positive signals enabled coup-born regimes to

violate their citizens' personal integrity rights, there was no effect from the neutral or negative signals. The predicted latent human rights protection score for coup-born regimes that received positive signals was 0.7 points lower than the predicted score for all other regimes. An example that illustrates these results come from the aftermath of the 1953 coup in Iran, in which Prime Minister Mossadegh seized absolute power and suspended Parliament. The international community signaled cautious optimism after the coup (Whitney 1953), but this did not prevent a sharp increase in repression that followed it (Love 1953).

In order to test my third hypothesis, which predicts a negative relationship between the interaction of post-coup international signals and the time the coup-born regime held office, I estimated a third ordinary least squares regression model. The relationship between the interaction and the dependent variable was found to be insignificant, suggesting that any effect on repression caused by international post-coup signals does not vary over time. The results of all models are reported in Table 4.2, below.

Table 4.2: OLS Regression on Latent Human Rights Protection Scores

Coup-Born Regime	-0.262***		
	(.057)		
Positive International Signals		-0.568***	
		(.085)	
Neutral International Signals		-0.180*	
		(.071)	
Negative International Signals		-0.202*	
		(.088)	
International Signals			-0.036
			(.032)
International Signals x Years Since Coup			0.003
			(.003)

Table 4.2, continued

Years Since Coup			0.005
			(.005)
Elected Officials Index	0.493***	0.491***	0.106
	(.049)	(.049)	(.079)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.539***	0.543***	0.079
	(.026)	(.026)	(.059)
Population (logged)	-0.306***	-0.303***	-0.367***
	(.017)	(.017)	(.027)
International War Participation	-0.593***	-0.608***	-0.568**
	(.148)	(.151)	(.181)
Civil War Participation	-1.011***	-1.007***	-1.003***
	(.073)	(.072)	(.095)
Domestic Protests	-0.005**	-0.005*	-0.013
	(.002)	(.002)	(.007)
Constant	-2.092***	-2.142***	1.935***
	(.264)	(.267)	(.501)
Observations	6,609	6,609	1,152
F	231.18***	183.42***	61.03***

Newey-West standard errors reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 4.2: Effect of Coup-Born Regime on Human Rights Protection



Figure 4.3: Effect of Positive Post-Coup Signals on Human Rights Protection



Generally, the control variables included in the models performed as expected based on previous literature. In the first two models, all control variables were statistically significant with coefficients of the sign predicted by previous literature on the determinants of repression. In the third model, logged population and participation in both international and civil war were all negatively and significantly associated with human rights protections, but the other control variables failed to meet conventional standards of statistical significance. Because only observations in which a coup-born regime was present are included in the third model, this may be due to the smaller sample size or because of other shared characteristics of coup-born regimes not captured in the model.

4.6 Conclusions

The study outlined above considers the relationships between coup-born regimes, international post-coup signals, and levels of repression. Based on a series of ordinary least squares regressions, I found that the presence of a coup-born regime will increase the likelihood that the regimes will choose to use repression, as will supportive post-coup signals from the international community.

There are a number of implications that come from these results, as well as potential for further exploration of the relationship between coup-born regimes, international responses to said regimes, and the regimes' decision-making calculus used to determine policy. For the research agenda on coups, a new direction for research could follow this study, as numerous other policy decisions could be examined for influence from international and domestic opposition to coup-born regimes. In the human rights literature, this study could be extended to consider the impact of other types of regime changes, both regular and irregular, on states' use of repression. Although coups are the most common form of irregular regime change, it seems possible that non-elites who overthrow regimes may decide against the use of repression if they had previously been the targets of it. Regular regime changes, likewise, may be unlikely to follow the same pattern as a coup as these transitions are more likely to result in a democratic successor regime.

This study also presents potential implications for policy makers, both at the national level and within international organizations. While the international community is somewhat ambivalent to coups, the international human rights regime is supported by many states and international organizations. Given the effects of coup-born regimes and

international signals following coups on repression, the international community may determine it should strengthen its anti-coup norms in order to bolster the promotion of respect for human rights, or that it should proceed with caution when considering extending support to newly established coup-born regimes.

There are several ways in which this study could be extended. One potential direction is to investigate the relationship between coups, international post-coup signals, and civil and political rights. It may be the case that these rights are affected by coups in ways that mirror the effects on personal integrity rights, although it could also be the case that the relationships are different.

Chapter 5: Peacekeeping Troop Contributions and Coup-Born Regimes

5.1 Introduction

Peacekeeping missions sponsored by the United Nations began in 1948, with a force sent to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its neighbors, since then over 100,000 troops from 120 countries have participated in the UN's 70 peacekeeping operations (peacekeeping.un.org). Missions have become both increasingly complex and numerous and in the post-Cold War period are concentrated in developing states experiencing civil conflict (Kathman and Melin 2017). Researchers have recently begun examining the motivations for states that contribute troops to peacekeeping operations, attempting to identify the reasons states choose to voluntarily send their military personnel into increasingly dangerous conditions that may not directly affect the troop-contributing country.

Today, the states that contribute troops often experience conditions that make them considerably more vulnerable to coups and other forms of irregular civil-military relations, but there has not been any investigation into the ways in which the presence of a coup-born regime could change a state's willingness to participate in peacekeeping missions. It is reasonable to believe that troop-contributing countries participate in order to receive private goods, as otherwise the collective action problem would likely be seen (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020). I argue that these benefits will be particularly valuable. to coup-born regimes, especially those which have received negative post-coup responses from the international community. A diplomatic cable leaked in 2004 suggested that the leaders of the Bangladeshi military were concerned that any act of subordination would risk its future participation in UN peacekeeping missions and the UN funding associated

with such missions (Lundgren 2018) but what about leaders who have already taken power through a coup?

A factor that makes troop contributions to peacekeeping operations distinct from other policy areas examined earlier in this dissertation is the fact that these are voluntary. Unlike alliance commitments and human rights standards, there are no obligations in international law for any state to participate in peacekeeping missions located in the territories of other states. This suggests that troop-contributing countries must have a reasonable expectation that they will receive a private benefit in exchange for their voluntary cooperation with the UN and major power states that act as recruiters for UN peacekeeping missions (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020), as there is no reasonable expectation for punishment if potential troop-contributing countries do not participate.

In this chapter, I develop a theory that links the presence of a coup-born regime and negative international responses to such a regime to higher peacekeeping troop contributions as these regimes seek both to minimize the risk of countercoups and rehabilitate their international image. Empirical tests that measure this relationship in the context of UN peacekeeping missions in the period from 1990 to 2012 show that these factors do indeed encourage states to contribute larger numbers of peacekeepers than their non-coup-born counterparts.

5.2 Determinants of Peacekeeping Troop Contributions

A recent debate has emerged in the literature on peacekeeping operations that considers the potential for participation in peacekeeping operations to help or hurt civil-military relations in troop-contributing countries. Some have argued that militaries are socialized to support norms of civilian control over the military (Kathman and Melin

2017) and that participation in peacekeeping operations can direct the attention of the military away from politics, allowing civilian leadership to consolidate power and ensure that it remains in control (Sotomayor 2013; Worboys 2007). Others have focused on the stabilizing effects of removing the military from its home state, which renders it unable to interfere in domestic politics (Findlay 1996). Because the biggest threat faced by many unstable regimes comes from its security apparatus, the removal of troops through peacekeeping operation can help prolong the incumbent regime (Kathman and Melin 2017). Troops that participate in peacekeeping operations receive advanced training that their regimes would be unable to provide otherwise, allowing troop-contributing countries to maintain military readiness they would otherwise not have (ibid.)

Another argument that suggests that peacekeeping operations can help normalize civil-military relations in troop-contributing countries focuses on the economic benefits that troop contributions bring. Most troop-contributing countries in the post-Cold War period are low- or middle-income countries and they receive billions of dollars of reimbursement funds from the UN (Lundgren 2018), as well as economic incentives to participate in the form of foreign aid from wealthier states (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020). By providing revenues the state would otherwise not have, the income from peacekeeping operations allows the government to increase domestic government spending without cutting military expenditures (Kathman and Melin 2017). Governments are responsible for distributing soldier pay that is funded by peacekeeping revenues; this responsibility combined with the increased pay associated with peacekeeping operations enables states to buy military loyalty (Caverley and Savage 2018). Militaries from poor troop-contributing countries are more likely to fear losing UN peacekeeping

reimbursement and are thus incentivized to avoid visible instances of military insubordination, as the UN prefers to use peacekeepers from states with stable civil-military relations (Lundgren 2018).

Others have argued that participation in peacekeeping operations will make civil-military relations deteriorate. Some suggest that the additional military funds associated with peacekeeping operations will make the military more independent from the civilian regime as they now have a source of external funding, which will increase the likelihood that military leadership will attempt a coup (Levin et al. 2016) while others suggest that the additional training troops receive will increase the likelihood of successfully deposing the civilian regime (Kathman and Melin 2017).

Another reason some suspect that peacekeeping operations may lead to declining civil-military relations is the potential for grievances that may inspire mutinies. Peacekeepers are exposed to troops from other countries and can compare their training, pay, and equipment. Given the fact that troops are aware that the UN pays troop-contributing countries a flat rate per troop-month, differences between this rate and what the individual soldiers receive may lead to a sense of injustice and suspicions of corruption in their regime, while their overseas location may lead to higher levels of group cohesion and open planning of disloyalty (Dwyer 2015). However, some have suggested that these grievances are likely to lead to mutiny rather than coups as soldiers who are deployed to peacekeeping operations have less political leverage than officers and are therefore less likely to target the civilian regime (Caverley and Savage 2018).

Finally, there have been arguments that, depending on the conditions in which they exist, peacekeeping operations can lead to improvement or deterioration in civil-

military relations. The constraining effects of peacekeeping operations may be less effective if the UN has few alternative troop-contributing countries, as there is a lower chance of peacekeepers being sent back due to poor civil-military relations (Lundgren 2018). Large militaries may be less constrained than smaller militaries, as relatively fewer troops receive the individual economic benefits (Lundgren 2018). In authoritarian regimes that allow for the distribution of peacekeeping reimbursement funds as private goods among military leadership, a potential loss of peacekeeping funds may lead military leadership to depose the incumbent regime in order to continue receiving these benefits (Levin et al. 2020). Others have suggested that the socialization effects of peacekeeping operations are unlikely to be universal and that instead, peacekeeping participation will reinforce pre-existing norms rather than dramatically change civil-military relations in states where they are dysfunctional before the deployment (Caverley and Savage 2018; Kenkel 2021).

Another line of research that has emerged recently is the potential for states to use participation in peacekeeping operations to alter their international reputations. Although some have suggested that troop-contributing countries participate in peacekeeping operations because their political cultures are closely aligned with the mission, values, and norms of the UN (Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Andersson 2002), more recent research has suggested that this is not the case. Instead, troop-contributing countries likely receive private benefits other than the economic benefits outlined above. Returning peacekeepers and the funds they brought to their regime may be used by authoritarians to repress domestic opposition groups and stabilize the regime (Caverley and Savage 2018; Levin et al. 2016). The average level of repression in troop-contributing countries has

increased over time and participation in peacekeeping operations give these regimes two mechanisms to mitigate the reputational damage this repression may otherwise bring. Repressive states are able to whitewash their domestic human rights records by emphasizing their participation in peacekeeping, while also extorting the international community by threatening to withhold or withdraw peacekeepers if the international community interferes in their domestic affairs (Levin 2020). Leaders who face high probability of prosecution upon removal from office are more likely to deploy peacekeepers in an attempt to build international goodwill and ensure either foreign intervention to reinstate them or guaranteed safe passage to asylum in the event they are removed from office via coup (Cottiero 2020).

There are several other domestic factors that are known to influence a state's cost-benefit analysis when deciding if they will contribute troops to peacekeeping operations. The relationship between economic conditions and peacekeeping contributions is somewhat ambiguous, as states must have a sufficient military budget to send peacekeepers (Cottiero 2019; Lundrgren 2018), but states which send peacekeepers are often motivated by the promise of UN reimbursement and foreign aid from wealthy states who wish to see a peacekeeping force created, even if they do not wish to send their own troops (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020). Domestic political institutions also play an ambiguous role. While the UN may prefer to use peacekeeping troops from democratic states when possible (Lundgren 2018), this is not always possible. Others have suggested that democratizing states will contribute peacekeepers in order to consolidate power while the military is occupied abroad and therefore cannot interfere, although this strategy is not guaranteed to succeed. (Caverley and Savage 2018). Population has also

been introduced as a determinant of the number of peacekeeping troops sent by states as the size of the population directly influences the number of people in the state who could serve as peacekeepers (Levin 2020).

The status of mission host or a party to a war are both associated with lower likelihood of peacekeeping contributions, as the security apparatus of the state is already engaged in a mission that is almost certainly of greater interest to the regime than a peacekeeping mission abroad (Cottiero 2019; Levin 2020). Contiguity with a mission host is often a factor that encourages peacekeeping contributions, as states wish to stabilize proximate states and avoid large groups of refugees or combatants entering their territory (Perkins and Neumayer 2008). Finally, the number of active UN peacekeeping missions changes the number of opportunities that exist for states to contribute and has a close relationship with the contributions from individual countries (Levin 2020).
One potential determinant of participation in peacekeeping operations as a troop-contributing country is the presence of a coup-born regime. This is somewhat surprising, given the sizable debate on the efficacy of peacekeeping operations as a form of coup-proofing and the potential changes to civil-military relations that are observed in troop-contributing countries.

5.3 Theory and Hypotheses

While all states that may choose to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations must weigh the costs and benefits of doing so as listed above, I expect that coup-born regimes will have different considerations when they determine whether they wish to participate. Because coup-born regimes are more vulnerable to countercoups following their seizure of power (Londregan and Poole 1990) and leaders who are removed from

office through irregular means, including coups, are more likely to face exile, imprisonment, or execution compared to leaders who leave office due to electoral results or through a negotiated exit (Goemans 2008). Based on this, I expect that leaders who take power through coup are especially sensitive to policy choices that may change their coup risk and that this extra scrutiny will lead coup-born leaders to contribute more to peacekeeping operations than their counterparts that achieved power through other means.

While all troop-contributing countries receive reimbursement from the UN for participating in its peacekeeping operations, I expect that this funding may matter more to coup-born regimes. Powell (2012) has found that military expenditures reduce military disposition and ability to coup; the additional funding associated with peacekeeping participation should allow the incumbent to avoid being ousted. This effect is magnified by the government's control over distribution of such pay, allowing the regime to distribute the pay in a way that is most advantageous for their survival, buying the loyalty of potential countercoup plotters (Caverley and Savage 2018). Another reason that this funding may be more important to coup-born regimes is their tendency to repress domestic opposition at higher rates than their counterparts (Curtice and Arnon 2020; Lachapelle 2020). This funding may allow regime to maintain a large security apparatus used to repress (Levin et al. 2016).

In addition to the monetary benefits of peacekeeping, coup-born regimes are also likely to value the training that their troops deployed to peacekeeping operations will receive. Professionalization and the value of military subordination to civilian leadership is an important cornerstone of the training received (Kathman and Melin 2017), and this

should help stabilize civil-military relations in the post-coup environment. Given that a coup is a sign of highly unprofessional civil-military relations, coup-born regimes may find this training of the current military to be of especially high value in their effort to prevent a countercoup that removes them from office. Furthermore, any training that results in improved military capabilities may be harnessed for domestic repression, which should stabilize the existing regime (Caverley and Savage 2018). Although this training may increase the chances of the military successfully staging a coup if they choose to do so (Kathman and Melin 2017), the decreased propensity to coup should help neutralize this risk.

Another benefit that should be highly valued by coup-born regimes concerned about maintaining their hold on power is their ability to select specific military personnel to send on peacekeeping missions. Regimes that have recently seized power are generally able to identify which individuals or groups are most likely to threaten their hold on power; generally, they are most at risk from the members and supporters of the previous regime (Curtice and Arnon 2019). This ability to identify the sources of the biggest coup risk, plus the voluntary nature of peacekeeping contributions, allows for strategic deployment of units that may pose the most risk to the regime's tenure (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020; Hesse 2015).

There are potential risks to peacekeeping deployments, mainly in the form of grievances that are associated with peacekeeping deployments and the consequences of these grievances for civil-military relations. Peacekeepers often develop new grievances against the regime and/or military leadership during deployments, and their remote location allows greater freedom in planning insubordinate behavior compared to troops

located at domestic military installations. However, these soldiers are unlikely to have enough political leverage to target civilian leadership and are therefore more likely to stage a mutiny in response to their peacekeeping deployment-related grievances (Caverley and Savage 2018; Dwyer 2015).

For example, Pakistan increased its peacekeeping troop contributions by 293 percent in 2000 (Perry and Smith 2013), one year after a coup installed General Pervez Musharraf in office. By the end of Musharraf's tenure in office, the number had grown almost ten-fold from the 2000 level. Although there were no statements from Musharraf or his government directly linking this uptick in troop contributions to peacekeeping missions and fears of countercoups, it is quite likely that this was part of his attempt to stay in power, which also included suspending the constitution, firing the Supreme Court justices, and declaring martial law (Rohde 2007). Based on the discussion above, I posit:

Hypothesis 5.1: Coup-born regimes should contribute more troops to peacekeeping operations than other regimes.

I do not, however, expect that all coup-born regimes will use the same decision-making process when deciding if they will contribute troops to peacekeeping missions. Because of the anti-coup norms that have become more generally accepted since the end of the Cold War, leaders who seize power by carrying out a coup risk losing pre-existing cooperation from other states through a process known as agent-specific grim trigger. Agent-specific grim trigger occurs when a state decides to suspend cooperation with another state for the tenure of their current executive with the intent of reinstating such cooperation when a new regime takes place and is often used when states oppose the actions of their partners' leaders (McGillivray and Smith 2000, 2005; Smith 2009). In

addition to the lost benefits of the cooperation itself, this can lead to the loss of domestic support from constituencies that benefited from the cooperation.

However, peacekeeping mission participation may give coup-born regimes an opportunity to whitewash their domestic records and give them leverage to extort states that may withdraw cooperation, as is the case for human rights violating states. Because the demand for peacekeepers is often higher than the supply (Kathman and Melin 2017) and wealthy democracies have become less willing to provide adequate troops in the post-Cold War period, the UN may be forced to accept troop contributions from states that fall short of their ideal, and states that wish to repair their international standing may choose to pursue peacekeeping opportunities to do so.

For example, the United States cut $29 million in foreign aid to Thailand following a coup in 2006 that removed democratically elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and led to the declaration of martial law (Mydens and Fuller 2006). A spokesperson from the US Department of Defense stated that the suspension of aid was a response to the coup and that the program would be reinstated after a democratically elected leader took office (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2006). In 2007, the US was working to arrange troop contributions for the joint United Nations-African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Thai junta saw an opportunity to act. Although there was no security interest for Thailand, they sent peacekeeping troops to Darfur and in 2008, military aid from the US was resumed (Henke 2016). Based on the discussion above, I posit:

Hypothesis 5.2: In states with coup-born regimes, negative post-coup signals from other states and the international community should be associated with more troop contributions to peacekeeping operations.

While I have outlined my theoretical expectations above, it should be noted that others may have alternative expectations about the relationships between coup-born regimes, post-coup signals, and troop contributions to peacekeeping operations. Some may argue that regimes which fear their loss of power may wish to ensure that their military personnel is in the country and able to repress should there be an uptick in domestic dissent. While this concern about the short-term loss of coercive capacity in the regime's territory may be a factor that determines troop contribution, I do not expect that this will deter troop contributions. One reason I doubt that there will be a sizable impact of this shift of capacity is that because coup-born regimes are at an especially high risk of countercoups, we should see them focusing on the source of that countercoup threat, which is military elites that supported the former regime. Only if civilian opposition poses a larger threat to regime survival than does coup activity should this concern prevent the deployment of peacekeepers. I also expect that should not be a determining factor because the deployment of peacekeepers will increase the long-term coercive capacity of the state through both the training of troops sent to participate in peacekeeping operations and the reimbursement from the UN that can be used to fund additional military expenditures.

Others may also expect that coup-born regimes which received signals of condemnation will choose not to participate in peacekeeping operations due to their rejection of support for the pro-democracy and pro-human rights norms that are the foundation of peacekeeping missions. While this argument would be sound if states were only motivated to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions by normative concerns, there is mounting evidence that this is not the case. I argue that the benefits for regime

survival will outweigh the lack of ideological and normative incongruence between the regime and the mission.

5.4 Data and Estimator

In order to test the hypothesis outlined above, I created a dataset of all states, regardless of their status as a troop-contributing country. The data range from 1990 to 2012, the years for which all covariates were available. Because the dependent variable is a count variable that measures the size of contributions to peacekeeping operations, ordinary least squares and logistic regression analysis are not appropriate statistical methods. As shown below, the data is characterized by over-dispersal, which violates the assumptions that underpin the Poisson model, and there is a disproportionately high number of observations in which the state did not contribute to a peacekeeping operation in the specified year. Given these characteristics of the data, and following previous works on peacekeeping contributions (Kathman and Melin 2017; Levin 2020), I used a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. In order to correct for heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors clustered by country are calculated, while a lagged dependent variable is included in the model in order to correct for autocorrelation.

5.4.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, peacekeeping contributions, is derived from the International Peace Institute's dataset on UN peacekeeping operations (Perry and Smith 2013). Because the IPI's data are in a monthly format and the covariates are in an annual format, I calculated the average monthly contribution to a mission by taking the total annual contribution and dividing it by the number of months during the year in question in which the operation was active. Because many troop-contributing countries were

involved in multiple UN peacekeeping missions in the same year, I then added these average monthly contributions in order to create a variable that measures the total peacekeeping contributions of a state in a particular year.

5.4.2 Independent Variables of Interest

The first independent variable is a binary measure that indicates if there is a coup-born regime in place in the country-year observation in question. A regime is coded as coup-born if, on January 1 of the year of the observation, it is ruled by a chief executive that took power by staging a coup or was appointed as the successor to an executive who did so. This measure comes from Shannon et al. (2015).

To test of the second hypothesis, I constructed a series of binary indicator variables based on the international response variable from Shannon et al. (2015). Their original variable measures the average of the responses from other states and international organizations in the initial six-month post-coup period based on the Goldstein (1992) scale. I created three binary variables that were coded as 1 if the state in question had a coup-born regime that had received positive, neutral, and negative reactions and 0 otherwise. While this does lead to the loss of some of the specificity of using the original continuous measure, this transformation ensures a sufficient number of observations.

5.4.3 Control Variables

In order to control for the economic factors that may encourage states to contribute peacekeeping troops, I included the natural log of the per-capita gross domestic product and the net development assistance and official aid for each state. The GDP per capita was logged in order to correct for an uneven distribution. Both variables

come from the World Bank's online World Development Indicators database (data.worldbank.org). I also included the natural log of military expenditures and the natural log of population in order to control for factors that may affect a states' ability to assemble a peacekeeping force. These were both logged because of irregular distributions. These variables come from the Correlates of War Project's National Military Capabilities dataset (Singer, Bremmer, and Stuckey 1972). To control for the effects of regime type, I included Polity IV scores (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).

To determine which states were at war, I used the Correlates of War Project's Intrastate and Interstate War datasets (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) to create a binary variable that was coded as 1 if a state was involved in either type of war and coded 0 otherwise. The data on UN peacekeeping operations from Perry and Smith (2013) was used to create a binary variable that was coded 1 if a state was the host of a UN peacekeeping mission in the year of the observation and 0 otherwise, as well as a variable that indicated the total number of UN peacekeeping operations that were active in each year in the data. Finally, the Perry and Smith (2013) data was combined with the Correlates of War Project's Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett et al. 2002) to create a binary variable that was coded 1 if a state was contiguous to a state hosting a UN peacekeeping mission and 0 otherwise.

Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Peacekeeping Troop Contribution Covariates

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum Value
Peacekeeping Contribution	417.720	1234.014	0	14348.58
Coup-Born Regime	0.128	0.334	0	1
Negative Signals	0.048	0.214	0	1
Neutral Signals	0.050	0.219	0	1
Positive Signals	0.034	0.182	0	1

Table 5.1, continued

Military Expenditures (logged)	13.258	2.271	5.879	20.357
Polity IV Scores	3.422	6.626	-10	10
GDP (logged)	8.799	1.234	4.898	11.955
Net Aid	3.59×10^8	6.27×10^8	-9.39×10^8	1.14×10^{10}
Population (logged)	9.284	1.484	5.855	14.135
Mission Host	0.098	0.298	0	1
At War	0.045	0.207	0	1
Contiguous to Mission Host	0.395	0.489	0	11
Number of Missions	19.315	2.59	12	23

5.5 Results

In order to test my first hypothesis, which predicts higher troop contributions from coup-born regimes, I estimated a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model that tested the relationship between troop contributions to UN-led peacekeeping missions and the presence of a coup-born regime. Consistent with my expectations, there is a positive and significant relationship between the size of peacekeeping troop contributions and the presence of a coup-born regime, among those regimes inclined to contribute to peacekeeping operations. However, the inflate stage of the model, which estimates the likelihood of contributing no peacekeepers did not find a statistically significant effect of coup-born regimes. These findings suggest that while the presence of a coup-born regime will not move a state out of the "certain zero" group that is unwilling to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations, it does increase the size of the deployment once the decision to participate has been made. Using the Margins command in Stata, I found that the presence of a coup-born regime will, on average, lead to a 56.36 percent increase in the size of troop contribution, all else equal. An example that illustrates this finding is the change in troop contributions from Guinea, which transitioned from having a coup-born

regime in 2008. Guinea's troop contributions fell by about 10 percent from 2008 to 2009, demonstrating the contribution-boosting effects of the presence of a coup-born regime (Perry and Smith 2013).

In order to test my second hypothesis, which predicts a positive effect on peacekeeping troop contributions from negative post-coup signals from the international community. Consistent with my expectations, there is a positive and significant relationship between the size of peacekeeping troop contributions and negative post-coup signals from the international communities, among those regimes inclined to contribute to peacekeeping operations. There was no significant effect from neutral or positive international post-coup signals. However, the inflate stage of the model, which estimates the likelihood of contributing no peacekeepers did not find a statistically significant effect of post-coup signals. Using the Margins command in Stata, I found that on average, a coup-born regime that has received negative post-coup signals will contribute 66.37 percent more troops to peacekeeping missions than other regimes. An example that illustrates this finding is the change in Guinea-Bissau's contributions to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, which fell by a third from 2014, when there was a coup-born regime that had been condemned by the international community, to 2015, when there was a new regime in place (Perry and Smith 2013). All models are outlined in Table 4.2, below.

Table 5.2: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression on Peacekeeping Troop Contributions

	Model 1 Total	Model 1 Inflate	Model 2 Total	Model 2 Inflate
Coup-Born Regime	0.4947**			
	(.159)			

Table 5.2, continued

Negative Response			0.5395***	
			(.152)	
Neutral Response			0.4939	
			(.378)	
Positive Response			0.3487	
			(.214)	
Military Expenditure (logged)	0.1256***		0.1255***	
	(.027)		(.028)	
Polity IV	0.0183***		0.0182***	
	(.004)		(.004)	
Peacekeeping Contributions$_{(t-1)}$	0.0012***		0.0012***	
	(.0002)		(.0002)	
Constant	3.1263***		3.129***	
	(.417)		(.421)	
Coup-Born Regime		0.7002		
		(.416)		
Negative International Signals				0.4638
				(.730)
Neutral International Signals				1.0812
				(.700)
Positive International Signals				0.4159
				(.619)
GDP per capita (logged)		-0.4557**		-0.4564**
		(.143)		(.145)
Aid		-1.43 x 10^{-9*}		-1.38 x 10-9
		(6.90 x 10^{-10})		(7.14 x 10^{-10})
Population (logged)		-0.6947***		-0.6951***
		(.151)		(.155)
Mission Host		1.7806***		1.7564***
		(.410)		(.407)
At War		1.6327***		1.6781***
		(.461)		(.476)
Contiguous to Mission Host		0.5378		0.5095
		(.282)		(.284)
Number of Missions		-0.1092***		-0.1077***
		(.428)		(.021)
Constant		11.4679***		11.4502***
		(1.671)		(1.654)
Lnalpha	0.7726***		0.7715***	
	(.119)		(.119)	
Observations	3,132			3,132
Wald Chi2	130.68***			137.36***

Note * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Robust standard error clustered by country reported in parentheses

5.6 Conclusions

In this chapter, I investigated the relationship between coup-born regimes and troop contributions to peacekeeping missions, as well as the effect on contributions caused by the international responses that coups elicit. I found empirical support for my hypotheses that coup-born regimes will send more peacekeepers than other regimes, and that coup-born regimes which received negative post-coup signals from the international community will contribute more than others. These findings expanded the current scholarly discussion on the utility of peacekeeping troop contributions as a coup-proofing strategy by linking the higher level of contributions to regimes that experience heightened coup risk.

The findings presented in this chapter add to the body of scholarly work on both the foreign policy-related consequences of coups and the signals from the international community as well as the factors that encourage states to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions. While the debate over the efficacy of peacekeeping operations as a coup-proofing strategy will likely continue, this study suggests that leaders believe it will be effective in prolonging their time in office. This may also help policymakers who recruit troop-contributing countries understand what makes states more willing to send large numbers of troops and how regimes may use contributions to peacekeeping operations to their advantage.

There are a number of ways this project could be extended. One way would be to consider peacekeeping operations that are organized by organizations other than the UN, especially those which operate in coup-prone regions such as ECOWAS. Another potential avenue to expand this would consider whether the presence of troops from

coup-born regimes (or any regimes which are using peacekeeping contributions to coup-proof) changes the efficacy of the mission as a whole.

Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks

6.1 Summary of Findings

In the studies outlined in the previous chapters, I tested a series of hypotheses based on my overarching theoretical expectations that coup-born regimes will cooperate if they feel it will decrease the chances of removal from office by a domestic audience but will not cooperate otherwise, and that international signals will lead to changes in domestic support and these changes will lead coup-born regimes to pursue policies based on these changes.

In the first empirical chapter, I conducted a series of tests of the relationships between coup-born regimes, international post-coup signals, and the likelihood of alliance termination by violation of the alliance treaty's terms. The first hypothesis, that predicts that a bilateral military alliance that includes at least one coup-born regime will be more vulnerable to termination by violation than an alliance that does not include such a regime. The second hypothesis, which predicts that positive international signals will lead to a higher probability of violation by coup-born regimes and negative international signals will lead to a lower probability of violation by coup-born regimes received partial support, as positive and neutral signals were associated with an increased probability of violation, but negative signals were not associated with a change in the likelihood of violation.

In the second empirical chapter, I conducted a series of tests of the relationships between coup-born regimes, international post-coup signals, and the use of repression. The first hypothesis, that coup-born regimes will repress at higher levels than other regimes, received statistical support. The second hypothesis, which predicts that negative

international post-coup signals will lead to lower levels of repression and positive international post-coup signals will lead to higher levels of repression, received partial support, as positive post-coup signals were associated with higher levels of repression. The third hypothesis, which predicts that the influence of international post-coup signals will decrease as the coup-born regime's time in office increases, did not receive statistical support.

In the third empirical chapter, I conducted a series of tests of the relationships between coup-born regimes, international post-coup signals, and troop contributions to peacekeeping operations. The first hypothesis, that coup-born regimes will contribute more troops to peacekeeping operations than their non-coup-born counterparts, received statistical support. The second hypothesis, that negative international post-coup signals will increase coup-born regimes' peacekeeping contributions and positive signals will decrease their contributions received partial statistical support. While negative reactions did lead to increased peacekeeping contributions, positive signals were not associated with the size of peacekeeping contributions.

6.2 Implications for Researchers

There are a number of implications for research on coups that can be taken from this dissertation. The most apparent implications are those that relate directly to the policy areas that were studied. Changes in the reliability of alliances, the use of repression, and contributions to peacekeeping operations are all topics of import and the findings on the ways in which they are affected by coup-born regimes and the international community's response to them should not be ignored. However, there are further implications that may help us understand the foreign policy of coup-born regimes

more broadly. The findings in this dissertation support the theory that coup-born regimes will cooperate internationally if they have a reason to believe that it has the potential to extend their tenure in office but are unlikely to do with without this benefit. There are a number of other policy areas that could be used as dependent variables to test this relationship, such as compliance with requirements for IO membership, sanctions and embargoes against other states, and intervention in conflicts outside of the realm of peacekeeping missions.

For the research agendas on alliances, human rights abuses, and peacekeeping contributions, there are a number of implications that can be drawn from the results of this dissertation. The first implication is that foreign policy is not immune to decision-making processes that prioritize regime survival over the interests of the state or its citizens. While such effects on domestic policies have been investigated for many years, the findings that these influences carry over to coup-born regimes' policies on alliance performance and peacekeeping contributions adds a new facet to the research agendas that seek to explain their determinants. For human rights and alliance research, the moderating effect of international signals implies that even if regimes are not constrained by pre-existing international legal commitments or international norms can be influenced by the international community's support for or condemnation of a regime, even when this support or condemnation is not tied directly to the use of repression or the violation of alliances.

6.3 Implications for Policymakers

This dissertation also presents implications for policymakers who are attempting to predict and/or alter the policies of coup-born regimes. Perhaps the most interesting

implication from this research is that international agreements that obligate states to act in certain ways, such as military alliances, are more at risk for violation from coup-born regimes, while forms of cooperation that are voluntary, such as contribution of peacekeeping troops, are enhanced by the presence of coup-born regimes. While these findings are in line with my general expectation that coup-born regimes will be more cooperative if they believe it will extend their time in office, it seems counterintuitive when considering the variation between the three policy areas in terms of potential for negative consequences, as violating a military alliance carries considerably higher costs than failing to participate in a peacekeeping mission.

The findings that illustrate the differences between coup-born regimes and other regimes provide instruction for what other states should expect when a successful coup is carried out in a state with which they have relations. It should also help policymakers predict how international signals will affect the coup-born regime's policies in these areas, helping them prepare for the outcomes as the signals are sent. Perhaps most importantly, the findings in this dissertation suggest a way for the international community to influence the policy-making processes within coup-born regimes by altering the signals sent in the aftermath of a successful coup. For policymakers attempting to assemble a peacekeeping force, this may also give them a new tool to determine which states are more likely to contribute large numbers of troops to peacekeeping operations, even if it seems to be unrelated to their national interests. This may help them choose better recruiting targets if they face difficulty finding participants. It may also help policymakers distinguish potential contributors who are willing to send troops to peacekeeping missions for self-interested purposes, which can lead to lower

professionalization and poor peacekeeping performance in the mission. Concerns about alliance violations and repression may be minimized if the leaders of other states or IOs are able to push for statements of condemnation. This could be done by the leaders of powerful states in bilateral settings with the states over which they have influence, or it could be carried out by diplomats or organization bureaucrats through IOs or regional organizations.

6.4 Unanswered Questions and Potential Extensions

One of the ways in which the research presented in this dissertation could be extended is to consider the sources of specific signals and how these sources may change the effects of the signals. Utilizing the individual signals rather than the averages could help illuminate a number of variations of these signals' efficacy, such as the differences between regional and global international organizations, states with shared past colonial ties or geographic proximity, as well as the influence of individual states such as the United States or, during the Cold War era, the Soviet Union. While disentangling these signals is outside of the scope of this dissertation, it may prove to be an interesting direction for continued research.

In addition to the implications outlined above, the findings from this dissertation also suggest implications for research on regime change more broadly. While this dissertation focuses specifically on regimes that take power through coups, there are other irregular methods for gaining power, including victory in civil conflict, revolution, and democratic backsliding in an unconsolidated democracy. While these forms of regime change have varied proximate causes, the regimes that utilize these methods to enter office are likely to have similar concerns for the security of their hold on power and

how international signals may alter the length of their tenure. This could also potentially be expanded to include the effects of domestic audiences or of particular parts of the international community, such as the signals from allies or trading partners compared to the signals from states with which the regime in question has no pre-existing relations with.

In the three policy areas investigated, there are also opportunities for extension. In alliances, there could also be studies on the formation of new alliances following coups or coup-born regimes' record of upholding their alliance commitments when an ally is attacked or starts an armed conflict. The findings on repression could be expanded in several ways, to consider the violation of civil and political rights, the occurrence of large-scale atrocities, or the targets of repression; further studies could also explore the connection between coup-born regimes and their willingness to sign or ratify human rights treaties. The findings on peacekeeping contributions could be expanded to consider peacekeeping operations organized by regional organizations and how the coup-proneness of the region affects the source of the contributions, as well as the success or failure of peacekeeping operations when larger or smaller percentages of their troops are contributed by coup-born regimes.

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