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EXPERIENCING DISPLACEMENT AND STATELESSNESS: FORCED MIGRANTS IN ANSE-À-PITRES, HAITI

Daniel Joseph

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EXPERIENCING DISPLACEMENT AND STATELESSNESS: FORCED MIGRANTS IN ANSE-À-PITRES, HAITI

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Dissertation

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By

Daniel Joseph

Lexington, Kentucky

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

EXPERIENCING DISPLACEMENT AND STATELESSNESS:
FORCED MIGRANTS IN ANSE-À-PITRES, HAITI

In 2013, the Dominican state ruled to uphold a 2010 constitutional amendment that stripped thousands of Dominicans of Haitian origin of their citizenship and forced them to leave the country during summer 2015. About 2,200 of these people became displaced in Anse-à-Pitres, where most took up residence in temporary camps. I use the term forced migrants or displaced persons interchangeably to refer to these people. Many endure challenges in meeting their daily survival needs in Haiti, a country with extreme poverty, considerable political instability, and still in the process of rebuilding itself from the devastating earthquake of 2010. Drawing on fourteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Anse-à-Pitres, I examine how these displaced people, in the face of statelessness and amid their precarious social and economic conditions, create survival strategies by drawing upon everyday labor mobility and informal economic activities within and across their communities. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the involvement of these displaced people in community life through socio-economic practices attests to a sense of belonging and produces a form of substantive citizenship in their absence of legal citizenship. This kind of substantive citizenship is also shaped by the ability of the displaced people to redefine life goals, participate in local meetings with the local state and organizations on the ground, and challenge systems of power that seek to impose their choices upon them. In this dissertation, I argue against construing the displaced people as hopeless by focusing on the forms of power and agency that they exercise in and over their lives, which make them agents of their self-development.
KEYWORDS: forced migrants, border, informal economy, mobility, substantive citizenship

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June 19, 2019
EXPERIENCING DISPLACEMENT AND STATELESSNESS:
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To the memory of my deceased mother, Evane Elysée
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ iii

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. vii

CHAPTER 1: Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Contextualization and theoretical contribution ....................................................... 7
  1.2 The research and the fieldsite .................................................................................. 12
    1.2.1 The camps: structure and navigation of the place .......................................... 17
    1.2.2 Methodological approach ............................................................................... 21
    1.2.3 Participant Observation, Interviews, and Focus Groups ............................... 26
  1.3 Livelihood, agency .................................................................................................... 29
  1.4 Labor mobility or the unsettled experience of life .................................................... 32
  1.5 Building citizenship ................................................................................................. 35
  1.6 The structure of the dissertation ........................................................................... 38

CHAPTER 2: The border as a site of social meaning and agency ........................................ 43
  2.1 Historiography of the border .................................................................................. 46
  2.2 Border power .......................................................................................................... 52
  2.3 The border as the site that unites and divides ......................................................... 55
  2.4 Crossing the border: the risks of mobility .............................................................. 60
  2.5 The Communicational, Temporal, and Spatial Dimension (CTS) in border crossings as resources for agency and power ......................................................... 64
    Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 70

CHAPTER 3: Documentation and ID paper: the materiality of displaced people’s lives 72
  3.1 Becoming stateless and displaced .......................................................................... 76
  3.2 The Haitian civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres ............................................................. 78
    3.2.1 Towards supporting the civil status: SJM’s documentation project of PwoKontram ................................................................. 85
  3.3 Statelessness and its social corollary in the lives of the displaced people ............ 90
    Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 94

CHAPTER 4: The informal economic practices of the forced migrants and emancipation ................................................................................................................. 97
  4.1 Present economic behavior and colonial history .................................................... 100
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 205

VITA ..................................................................................................................................... 226
LIST OF FIGURES

[Figure 1, Anse-à-Pitres: a small Haitian city located on the Haitian-Dominican border and close to the Dominican city, Pedernales].................................................................2
[Figure 2, Anse-à-Pitres and surrounded areas].................................................................16
[Figure 3, A typical configuration of the camps with no infrastructure.]........................18
[Figure 4, Focus group in Parc Cadeau #2].................................................................28
[Figure 5, People from Anse-à-Pitres crossing a small bridge on the Pedernales River that serves as the border between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales]........................................45
[Figure 6, Packages of Flanbo assembled to be sold].........................................................113
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In 2015, thousands of undocumented Haitian migrants and Dominicans born of undocumented Haitian descent were forced to leave the Dominican Republic. They arrived in Haiti where most still currently live in makeshift camps in the border region between the two countries. This displaced population is diverse in age because members of this population are from several different generations. The oldest members of this population were born in the 1940s-50s, with the youngest ones born in the 1990s. However, regardless of age, all members of this population are equally affected by the decision of the Dominican state to uphold a 2010 constitutional amendment that revoked birthright citizenship to children of undocumented Haitians. Drawing on fourteen months of ethnographic fieldwork with this group of people in the Dominican-Haitian border town of Anse-à-Pitres (Figure 1), my dissertation ethnographically examines how members of this displaced population, in the face of statelessness and amid their precarious social and economic conditions, create substantive citizenship by mobilizing resources within and across their communities.

While doing preliminary research fieldwork with members of the Haitian community in Chicago in the summer of 2015, news about a series of events that involved Haitians in the Dominican Republic started to spread through local and international news media. Haitian and Dominican newspapers reported the killing and disappearance of Haitians, and the displacement\(^1\) of thousands of Dominican-Haitians and undocumented Haitian

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\(^1\) In 1994, the World Bank estimated that 10 million people per year were displaced in developing countries by development programs, producing 100 million people displaced per decade (Cernea 1994; Cernea and Maldonado 2018). This raises important issues of human rights, and causes the impoverishment of populations that are often already marginal or poor. Cernea contends that, if not mitigated by policies and approaches that restore oustees to their previous living standards, displacements tend to lead to
migrants. Those events garnered my attention while I was in the United States and motivated me to conduct research with Dominicans of Haitian origin and undocumented Haitian migrants displaced in Anse-à-Pitres in order to investigate their everyday experiences.

[Figure 1 Anse-à-Pitres: a small Haitian city located on the Haitian-Dominican border and close to the Dominican city, Pedernales].

impoverishment by processes that include marginalization, food insecurity, and social disintegration. Completely abandoned by the Haitian state and the Dominican state who displaced them and considering the fundamental challenges they are facing in their daily lives, forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres have experienced all these issues.
Among the events reported in the local and international media was the lynching and hanging in February 2015 of a Haitian known by the nickname “Tulie,” described as a young man who worked shining shoes around the area of a park. His body was found hanged in a park in Santiago (the second largest city of the Dominican Republic) with his hands and feet bound. (Huffington Post 2015).

According to most news reports, the Tulie’s lynching was committed by a crowd of Dominicans—portrayed as a nationalist group—which sought the deportation of Haitians (Danto 2015) and which saw mob justice as necessary in light of the perceived incompetency of local authorities in judicial matters (Liberato 2015). Following the lynching, an attorney with the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights declared: “frankly it is all too reminiscent of shameful denials of southern officials during the decades of terror lynchings perpetrated against African Americans here at home (HuffPost Latino Voices 2015).” Even though lynching Haitians in the Dominican Republic may not be considered a routine (Perloff 2000) as it was in the case of African Americans in the late 19th century, Tulie was not the first Haitian lynching victim in the Dominican Republic. Back in 2009, the lynching of another Haitian named Carlos Nerilus led the Haitian government to call its ambassador from the Dominican Republic amid tensions between the two countries (Rosario 2009).

This public and outrageous crime committed against these Haitians was the precursor of a violent storm to come: Dominican civilians and soldiers made constant verbal and physical threats to people of Haitian descent including intimidation and breaking into the homes of Haitians in an attempt to force them to leave the Dominican Republic. These actions are part of a form of structural violence, which Galtung (1969
cited by Simmons 2010) refers to as those social structures—economic, political, religious, and cultural—that prevent individuals and groups from realizing their full potential. This structural violence is based on a historically political divide between Haiti and the Dominican Republic that led to an anti-Haitian sentiment called anti-Haitianismo, conceived of as a manifestation of the long-term evolution of racial prejudices, the selective interpretation of historical facts, and the creation of a nationalist Dominican “false consciousness” (Simmons 2010; Sagas 2000). Anti-haitianismo was created and perpetuated by the Trujillo regime, which appropriated it as a state ideology in the creation of Dominican nationhood in the 1930s (Sagas 2000).

Such blatant and long established patterns of anti-Haitian discrimination transpired in 2010, when the Dominican state adopted a new migration law called la sentencia that revoked birthright citizenship to children of Haitian origin. This law changed a constitutional provision that had been in force since 1929 and that recognized the jus soli according to which all children who were born on Dominican soil, except children of people in transit, automatically acquired Dominican nationality. This change left thousands of Dominican-Haitians stateless. Indeed, in 2015, thousands of these stateless people, along with other undocumented Haitian migrants were forced to leave the country, where many became displaced in the Haitian-Dominican border region. During the months of June and July, 2015, an estimated 2,203 forced migrants arrived in the border town of Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. In this region, they took up residence in six camps: Parc Cadeau 1 and 2, Tête-à-l’Eau, Fond-Jeanette, Maletchipe, and Savanne Galata (GARR et al. 2016). Haiti is a country with extreme poverty and considerable
political instability; thus, this population of forced migrants has had to try to find ways to make a living and many endure challenges in meeting their daily survival needs.

Indeed, Haiti’s constant economic and political instability is rooted in historical and structural factors that are both external and internal. For more than two centuries, the country’s children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren continued to be largely dominated and terrorized by tyrants and military juntas from within the country and by occupying superpowers from outside (Leiderman 2002). In 1915, after Haiti’s failure in redeeming its debts to US business, the U.S. invaded the country (Middleton 2010: 34). The U.S. controlled the country’s finances, putting the Haitian unique national bank under the control of the national bank of New York (Pamphile 2001). At the same time as the U.S. invasion of Haiti, Americans were also settling in the Dominican Republic and Cuba. However, investments were eight times less valuable in Haiti than in the Dominican Republic and a hundred times less valuable than in Cuba (Audébert 2004), which pushed many Haitians to migrate. Between 1925 and 1926, about 23,000 Haitians were working in Cuba and by the 1930s this number had increased to around 80,000 (Souffrant 1974).

Haiti has also been affected by structural problems, including dictatorship and a series of coup d’états; from 1957 to 1986 the country was submitted to twenty-nine years of dictatorship by François Duvalier and his son Jean Claude Duvalier. During these twenty-nine years of governance of the Duvalier regime, at least 200 million dollars were transferred to the Duvalier private accounts in Switzerland while the population was living in extreme poverty (Stepick 1982). In addition, the country has experienced many coup d’états including those against Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 and 2004, keeping
the country in almost perpetual violence and instability. In 2010, an earthquake added the chaos of a natural disaster to this sustained period of political instability, creating a window of exciting opportunities for NGOs.

In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, which claimed the lives of more than 230,000 and left more than one million homeless (Theodore and Dupont 2012), Haiti simply became the “republic of NGOs” (Johnson 2011). This produced what is conceived of as disaster capitalism: using people’s suffering as an instrument to accumulate financial and political capital. Donors favored NGOs over the Haitian government, giving many NGOs the power to coordinate and distribute humanitarian aid to the victims of the 2010 earthquake. This collaboration is reminiscent of Haitian professor Jean-Anile Louis-Juste’s definition of NGOs as government bodies: i.e., another category of government, which is mingled directly with the “international community,” but acts locally (Louis-Juste quoted by Schuller 2010). The Haitian government received only 1% of the emergency aid sent to Haiti (Schuller and Morales 2012: 57), which seems to corroborate Buss’s argument that donors will fund everything in Haiti except democratization, governance, and public sector reform (Buss 2008:5). As Moore stated, “The sovereignty of life within Haiti became de-politicized, internationalized, and negotiable” (Moore 2012: 113). In 2015, therefore, impoverished forced migrants entered a country where many millions of people were already living in similar precarious conditions. However, the precariousness of these forced migrants is not only created by the conditions of the country to which they migrate, but also by their condition of “statelessness” and a feeling of being foreign in a country that many have never seen before.
I aim to accomplish several things in this introduction. First, I describe the research site and the methodological approach to the study. Second, I address the challenges faced by the forced migrants in their experience of displacement and statelessness, their livelihood strategy, and their capacity of agency. Finally, I examine how they build an alternative form of citizenship conceived of as substantive citizenship.

1.1 Contextualization and theoretical contribution

There is an ample literature documenting discrimination against Haitians living and working in the Dominican Republic (Simmons 2010: 10-11). Simmons (2010) describes the terrible experience of and discriminatory practices against Haitian agricultural workers on Dominican bateys. Simmons (2009) and Derby (1994) evoke the racial practices rooted in anti-Haitianism created by Trujillo. Sagas (2000) also shows that Dominican elites—in particular historians—contribute to maintaining an anti-Haitian ideology through a process of “national engineering” that consists of legitimizing traditions and shaping national culture (Sagas 2000: 5). The facts that wrap identity-formation and nation-building run high in the process of exclusion in the Dominican Republic and the extension of violence against Haitians. While this literature helps us understand the root causes of the displacement and statelessness of people of Haitian backgrounds in the Dominican Republic, I argue that, by crossing an international border, the interpretation of these displaced people’s lives and their constant shifting between the boundaries of two nation-states needs to be contextualized within a larger theoretical

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2 Bateys are shantytown communities that have developed around sugar plantations, and they are known to have some of the worst living and working conditions in the country: no potable water, no electricity, no means of waste disposal, constant surveillance and policing by Dominican authorities, endemic diseases such as dengue, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and malaria to name a few (Simmons 2010:11)
frame. To develop this argument, I engage several lines of theory such as border and labor mobility, informal economy, and substantive citizenship in order to craft a socio-cultural analysis that leads not only to an understanding of people’s experience of displacement and statelessness, but also of their self-determination to cope, fight back, and survive (Cornell 1997). This dissertation contributes to anthropological studies of border, mobility, informal economy, and citizenship in several important ways.

First, borders are generally defined as instruments that empower the state, which can employ “coercive efforts to build a nation-state by excluding outsiders and to distinguish between members and unacceptable residents of the territory” (Fassin 2011: 214 citing Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). In the context of Haitian migrants, both borders and boundaries played a significant role in forcing and keeping them out of the Dominican Republic. I refer to the border as the physical delimitation that resulted from agreements between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and that is secured by the Dominican state’s legal measures, such as the establishment of checkpoints and soldiers to control the flux of undocumented Haitian migrants. By boundaries, I mean forms of social constructs establishing racial differences and producing distinct cultural identities (Fassin 2011) that lead to the marginalization and exclusion of people. In the Dominican Republic, these boundaries take the form of prejudice and discrimination against Haitians, and spatial and social segregation of Haitian agricultural workers (Simmons 2010) that finally led to their exclusion. Border crossers such as the forced migrants going to Pedernales are not only threatened by the enforcement of legal procedures in the Dominican Republic, but also by the multiplication of illegal practices of border guards, who are deployed by the central Dominican state. These officials replace migration
officers in the regulation of people and transform the border into a window of opportunities that allow them to generate income illegally. I call this misuse of power conferred to these officials “border power” to describe how state power has been turned into an instrument used by official to accomplish personal goals. The border power between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales has two components: soldiers acting as migration officers and the implementation of corrupt practices. By examining the border as a space of daily actions and the exercise of power relations, my dissertation contributes to understanding the border as both a bridge and a barrier, but also as a site for the exercise of agency and power. This agency and power is expressed in the capacity of the forced migrants to use communication networks and to articulate notions of time and space as strategies that enable border crossings.

The second theoretical line is mobility, which has been imposed upon the forced migrants struggling to maintain stability in their lives since their displacement in Anse-à-Pitres (Mason et al 2011). The forced migrants are part of a large-scale movement of people, flow of goods, capital, and objects across the world—what Sheller & Urry (2006) consider to be the ‘new mobilities’ paradigm. All categories of people—including tourists, workers, and migrants—are involved in these mobilities (Sheller, Urry, and Hannam 2006). Their movements are enabled by infrastructural and institutional moorings (Sheller, Urry, and Hannam 2006) which provide these people with strategic advantages (Alan Smart 1999) for the creation of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships (Levitt, Schiller 2000). When it comes to forced migrants caught in transit between states (Gill, Caletrio, Mason 2011), these migrants do not all possess the necessary infrastructural and institutional resources to facilitate their movements. Under
the myriad of constraints and uncertainty surrounding them, these displaced people are forced into everyday labor mobility in the hope of remaking their lives. In this sense, mobility has a double meaning for them. It involves both forms of agency, but also reflects a lack of choice or autonomy. My dissertation contributes to theoretical conversations that see mobility as an expression of “power to” and agency. It describes the capacity of the displaced people to act with the purpose to change their lives.

The third theoretical foundation is the informal economy. The informal sector remains the ultimate resource for these forced migrants to create opportunities and livelihoods. Their informal economic practices include selling goods (sometimes these include second-hand clothes retrieved from the garbage) at the local market, selling their labor, collecting pieces of tree branches to sell or with which to make charcoal, and performing domestic labor. In addition, the Service Jesuite aux Migrants (SJM) has provided some forced migrants, particularly women, with a microcredit loan in order for them to create their own small business. My perspective on microcredit loans is based on their impact on social economic processes beyond the immediate project environments, instead of on quantitative indicators (Fernando 2006). This allows an examination of how microcredit helps people improve themselves, but also of the role these loans play in people’s social transformative capacities (Fernando 2006). Informal activities undertaken by forced migrants, I suggest, allow them to build their self-reliance and reduce their dependency on NGOs—whose aims often deviate from those of local communities’ interests due to their need for accountability to their donors (Schuller 2010). Indeed, Schuller points out accountability as one of the problems of NGOs operating in Haiti. He contends that these NGOs show a strong commitment towards their donors while
ignoring local communities, a process he terms “trickle-down imperialism.” I perceive the forced migrants reliance on informal economic practices in order to create survival strategies as modes of resilience that express agency and a sense of individual responsibility (Freeman 2014) in a country with limited resources, high unemployment, and political instability. My dissertation broadens our understanding of the informal economy not simply as a means of income generation, but also as a source of motivation that endows the displaced people with courage and endurance, expressed in a mentality animated by local expressions such as m’ap degaje m, or ti degaje (literally, “I am doing a little something”) that help them survive and keep going. This way of perceiving the informal economy as something more than just income contributes to the conception developed by economic anthropologists of economics as not simply about market or non-market institutions as in the debate opposing formalists and substantivists, but as something that also includes the dimension of human culture and the behavior of individuals (Cliggett and Wilk 2007). The engagement of these people in practices to improve their lives describes their desires and aspirations to be better, but also illustrates the gestation of a form of citizenship, which, in the absence of their legal citizenship, I conceptualize as substantive.

Finally, the forced migrants created an organization to help them acquire visibility and make their voices heard. This organization, the Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres (ODRA), plays a significant role in substantive citizenship making by allowing the forced migrants to assert their human rights. Without legal citizenship, this substantive citizenship takes shape through their social dynamics in organizing themselves, the sense of belonging that they earn from their residency in
Anse-à-Pitres, and the recognition they receive from organizations that have negotiated with them. In this way, following Miller (2000), the stateless people contribute to shaping the direction of their communities in Anse-à-Pitres, which then displaces the role of the state as the sole guarantor of citizenship. From an anthropological perspective, they build substantive citizenship, which takes into account not only their collective actions, but also their personal experience in their communities, which the legal conception of citizenship does not account for (Greenhouse 2011: 262). My dissertation suggests an understanding of substantive citizenship as part of the forced migrants’ initiatives to enact changes in their lives in a community where they are marginalized, and as something that is differentiated due to the inequalities created by the organizations on the ground and the local state in their assistance to and relationship with the forced migrants.

1.2 The research and the fieldsite

I learned about Anse-à-Pitres, a small city located in the south-east of Haiti, during my years in primary school. At that time, I could hardly locate it on the map and did not know its significance as a southeastern border town conceived of as a potential site for tourist development. I later came to be aware of this place more profoundly through the social and political events that aggravated the relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 2015, and that led to the displacement of hundreds of Dominican-Haitians and undocumented Haitian migrants to the area. Anse-à-Pitres is located on the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It has a surface area of 185.19 km$^2$ and a population of about 23,500, as of the 2005 census (Mairie de Anse-à-Pitres 2008)$^3$. The downtown area is only 3 km$^2$ and is inhabited by people who have travelled there

$^3$ This was the demographic data available at the City Hall during my research in 2016
from different parts of Haiti. Anse-à-Pitres attracts the interest of people from other regions of the country due to the access to the Dominican Republic that it affords them, and because of the opportunity for the development of commercial activities along the border, particularly the commerce of second-hand clothes. Generally, after being bought in the Dominican Republic, the merchandise crosses the border in Anse-à-Pitres to be stored, sorted, and packed on trucks to be carried to other Haitian cities such as Jacmel and Port-au-Prince. Like Ouanaminthe, Belladère, and Fonds-Parisien, Anse-à-Pitres is one of the official crossing points, on land, to the Dominican Republic. It is separated from its Dominican sister city Pedernales by the Pedernales River, over which a small footbridge facilitates access to the binational market located on the Dominican side of the border. Because of the poor infrastructures that connect Anse-à-Pitres with other main Haitian cities such as Port-au-Prince—the capital of the country—Anse-à-Pitres remains isolated and rarely benefits from state investment.

Anse-à-Pitres (Figure 2) is characteristic of remote Haitian areas where the state has only a marginal presence and provides few public services (Schwartz 2009). The city is about seven hours by bus from Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti. The bus (a Toyota Land Cruiser with its seats rearranged as a mini-bus) from Port-au-Prince takes passengers to Thiottes, the final destination, an area about two hours by motorcycle from Anse-à-Pitres. This means that, for my trip, after getting off the bus in Thiottes, I had to take a motorcycle to complete my trip to Anse-à-Pitres, where I arrived in the middle of the night in early September 2016. My travel to Anse-à-Pitres was endangered by the poor state of infrastructure in the area. The road is rocky, with cliffs on both sides all along the route. The bus was swinging and shaking passengers; in the absence of a
seatbelt I directed my head towards the roof to prevent the shaking movement from happening. Despite the turbulence, the other passengers were very quiet and were joking as though it was a normal routine for travel in the area. I tried to be relaxed and to keep my feet still on the floor, but deep down I was scared and remained attentive to each jolt of the bus. Travelling in these conditions is extremely risky and perilous. People from the area complain about the passivity of the state in building or even maintaining infrastructure; the safety of passengers is not a state priority. I lived in Anse-à-Pitres for about a year and a half; I had to take the risk of travelling on that road every time I had to run errands in Port-au-Prince. However, I was a bird of passage. For hundreds of people who live in the area, this risk is a part of their everyday life as they have to travel frequently for their basic needs. The damaged state of the infrastructure explains the marginalization of many regions of the country, including Anse-à-Pitres, which, all the same, remains a dynamic city.
Despite its isolation from the rest of the country, the city of Anse-à-Pitres enjoys a vibrant nightlife animated by disc jockeys playing music at nightclubs, hotels, and in open-air bars. The public includes mostly local residents but a few Dominicans also cross the border to join with the leisure activities, which are an occasion for people to meet and socialize while enjoying Haitian and Dominican songs of various rhythms such as konpa, meringue, bachata, and Creole rap songs. The musical diversity reflects the border culture and aims to attract an equally diverse audience; for example, younger people tend to be interested in rap songs and are open to foreign music such as the Dominican meringue and bachata. More importantly, though, this musical atmosphere is essential to the city’s economic life, as many people go out at night to sell their products such as alcoholic and natural drinks, sodas, and *fritay*[^4]. This nightlife usually finishes around 1:00 or 2:00 AM, but it sometimes end with verbal and physical violence. Very often, while I was sleeping in the middle of the night, I heard people yelling, insulting each other copiously, and throwing stones.

Anse-à-Pitres, as with other border towns, experiences a two-way flow of both goods and people; i.e., goods and people going to the Dominican Republic and goods and people coming back from the Dominican Republic. Cockfighting provides one example of this flow. The economic and social dynamics of the city of Anse-à-Pitres are reflected in the practice of cockfighting; Dominican gamblers cross the border every week to participate. This activity usually takes place twice a week and displays moments of

[^4]: *Fritay* is a special Haitian dish made of fried plantains, meat, and salad
passion for the participants. Engagement in this event can be understood through the lens of Geertz’s cultural and economic interpretation of cockfighting. Geertz (1973) showed that cockfighting is a social and cultural process, but also he showed that it was a source of public revenue in precolonial Balinese states. In fact, the participation of the two peoples—Haitian and Dominican—in this event is part of a cultural construction between them, but also symbolizes the conflicts that exist between them. For instance, Wucker (1999) described cockfighting as an important aspect of Dominicans and Haitians’ daily life on the island, Hispaniola. At the same time, he explained that this does not prevent the two peoples from sharing a history of violence and, like two roosters, they fight, disputing over border issues. Overall, cockfighting remains an economic activity for both the organizers and the Dominican and Haitian participants. Generally, the forced migrants do not participate in the city’s cultural activities; among other things they lack the economic resources needed to participate and are isolated from the downtown area of Anse-à-Pitres.

1.2.1 The camps: structure and navigation of the place

The majority of forced migrants arrived in Anse-à-Pitres in June 2015. They include old and young families with children, and singles (both men and women)—basically, everyone, because no-one was spared when they were forced out of the Dominican Republic. Based on my conversations with the forced migrants, very few had existing contacts with people in Anse-à-Pitres. This made it difficult for many to find a place to stay after they were forced to cross the border to Haiti or were deported by Dominican authorities at the official gate, a journey that was far from pleasant in its own right. The camps (Figure 3) remained the only viable option for them upon their arrival
in Anse-à-Pitres, and the forced migrants have spread through different camps on the border: Tête-à-l’Eau, Fonds-Jeannette, Parc Cadeau #1, Parc Cadeau 32, Maletchipe, and Tête Source.

[Figure 3 A typical configuration of the camps with no infrastructure.]
The camps are linked to downtown Anse-à-Pitres by a dusty and stony road frequented mostly by motorcycles. Some residents were able to access the border market, but they were still isolated from the larger Anse-à-Pitres community. Like the whole city, the residents of the camps have no electricity. A Puerto-Rican group called AMAR gave those forced migrants living in Parc Cadeau #1 a generator after an activity in the camp. However, only a very few people had a light bulb in their small houses, which were made only of straw and cardboard. This same camp also held an open-air school for children, although the school operated poorly because of the lack of both funding and material support. Water is the only resource to which people have access because they can get it from a relatively nearby source in the Pedernales River. As one woman explained, “The water source is not far. This is where people get drinkable water. The river is close and it is where they go to do laundry.” It only remains for them to filter the water by adding water purification tablets called aquatabs; however, some people do not always purify the water because they do not have aquatabs. Aid organizations used to give the forced migrants the ingredients to purify the water upon their arrival, but now the forced migrants must get the aquatabs themselves. Apart from water, the camps are completely destitute. Even though some organizations have placed prefabricated toilets in the camps, these toilets are insufficient. Josemar, a man in his thirties from the camp of Parc Cadeau #1, said: “The toilets are almost full. So we need new ones in the camp.” While touring the camp with Josemar for the first time, I observed into a large, open-air hole in the middle of the camp that constitutes a danger for children playing nearby. Josemar told me that the hole was dug by an organization in order to build a toilet for residents, but the members of the organization never came back to finish it.
This case exemplifies how organizations progressively withdrew from helping the forced migrants, who were ultimately left on their own. The forced migrants would mention the names of some of the organizations that used to assist them, such as Groupe d’Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Rapatriés (GARR), Heart to Heart, or even the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). However, during my research, all these organizations almost disappeared. This withdrawal may be because NGOs and agencies do not often have defined goals beyond their immediate projects. The absence of any good infrastructure at the camps is a reflection of a group of displaced people who are marginalized and the withdrawal of the state from ensuring the well-being of its people.

The consequences of this state abandonment are noteworthy, as forced migrants are vulnerable to exploitation and there are attempts to profit from their precarity. That is why many forced migrants seem to be reluctant to give their names to outsiders. For instance, during a visit to Parc Cadeau #2, I was surrounded by a small group of people who were curious about what I was doing at the camp. Having an outsider such as myself among them creates both hope and disappointment; because of the lack of support from the state and their marginalization, the forced migrants hope that my presence means that someone (or even an organization) may be interested in them, but they also experience disappointment because they are mistrustful towards those who pretend to help them. This was evidenced in one man’s words: “It was only GARR that helped us. Some people came, took our names, and made money out of migrants. For example, a director is being paid for the schooling of our children but our children are not even accepted at his school. Even though people are taking our names, we are hesitant because we were too often a victim. There are always things coming for us but we don’t get them. People are being
paid in our name but we don’t get anything.” This discomfort towards outsiders is not unique to forced migrants. Trust is often, if not always, a concern for displaced people in all parts of the world, as they are subject to manipulation and exploitation from others. As Knudsen and Valentine (1995) argue, “In the life of a refugee, trust is overwhelmed by mistrust, besieged by suspicion, and relentlessly undermined by caprice.” This may help explain forced migrants’ paranoiac attitude towards outsiders.

1.2.2 Methodological approach

My ethnography of these displaced persons involved fourteen months of participant observation, one-on-one interviews, informal conversations, and focus groups. These displaced people include undocumented Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent. They are a diverse population of both genders and all ages since no one was spared from being forced from the Dominican Republic. These people have one thing in common: they were materially dispossessed after having been forcibly removed from their homes in the Dominican Republic, leaving behind all their belongings behind. Between January and March 2016, about one year after the displaced persons occupied the camps, the intervention of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) led to the relocation of more than 200 migrants in the town of Anse-à-Pitres only, but far from stabilizing their lives, this relocation only seems to create more precarity and uncertainty about their future. In an environment where the migrants lack almost all basic resources and do not have control over their own destiny, forced migrants are simply “existing not living” (Koch 2015).

Everyone in the displaced population is subject to this uncertain and insecure situation. They all have to go through this painful experience. For instance, Fredo, a
young Haitian-Dominican man, was forced out of his own country of birth to enter Haiti—a new country where he did not know anybody—after his father died and he was forced to separate from his mother, who stayed in the Dominican Republic. He is having a nightmarish life in Anse-à-Pitres where he is suffering hunger, an ever-present situation that cannot be easily escaped from in his mind. His trembling voice expressed his reality, “We are eating the dust. There is no work. I bought a cup of salt and I suck a grain every morning. That is life here. You don’t have any help here.” As Fredo’s words suggest, he is not alone in this experience; most were experiencing tremendous challenges in meeting their basic survival needs and finding ways to make a living in the camps. The population of Anse-à-Pitres suffers from poverty, a lack of opportunities for young people, who do not have any institution of higher education to pursue their studies after secondary schools, a documentation crisis that sees many people effectively stateless, and women who are subject to domestic violence. For the most part, the forced migrants are unable to acquire wage work in the formal economy because of the lack of documentation and formal jobs in Anse-à-Pitres. As a result, the forced migrants had to develop informal economic activities and continued to go back to the Dominican Republic to do odd jobs.

I conceive of my ethnographic fieldwork with these displaced persons as a descent into the ordinary (Fassin 2013), one that embraces the precarious reality of these people’s everyday lives in Anse-à-Pitres. I was both an insider and an outsider, a positionality which is not fixed, but processual as every anthropologist exhibits a "multiplex subjectivity" with many shifting identifications (Rosaldo 1989; Narayan 1993). On the one hand, I am a native Haitian; I grew up in a poor family, and have faced considerable obstacles in getting an education, securing livelihoods, and seeking out a
better life for myself. In this sense, I was able to relate my family experience to the kinds of everyday challenges the group of displaced people were facing, as well as the daunting experience of settling into and adapting to new environments. On the other hand, as someone who has attended foreign universities and lived abroad in both France and the U.S., my cartography of the daily reality of Anse-à-Pitres was distinct from the one that might be drawn by the forced migrants, who are experiencing various kinds of social and economic challenges such as critical poverty, statelessness, and displacement (Monroe 2016). Establishing myself in the city of Anse-à-Pitres was a challenge as people were already disappointed by outsiders, who sometimes sought to exploit their suffering. I relied on the connections I had developed with the SJM (Service Jésuite aux Migrants) before going to Anse-à-Pitres.

SJM is a lay organization that works to protect the rights of undocumented migrants. The SJM staff in Anse-à-Pitres is composed of Haitians, including two promoters and many monitors, depending on the project in progress. They are all from the Anse-à-Pitres region except Inès, who was from another city also located in the south-east department of Haiti. I collaborated with the organization with which I had volunteered during the whole period of my research fieldwork. This relationship allowed me to engage with the forced migrants through participation in community-based and outreach activities, where I led discussion and spoke on behalf of the forced migrants. Knowing that I was seeking to make their voices heard led people to accept me and view me as a member of their community. People were very happy to talk about their experiences and hoped that their conversations would be brought to the attention of the international community. For example, when I went to participate in the meetings of
ODRA (Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres—a migrants’ organization), the president would invite me to talk so that I could inform them of SJM projects. People would applaud me and come to talk to me after the meeting, asking me to visit their homes. When I visited them at their homes people opened their doors to me, gave my assistant and me a chair to sit and talk to them, and offered me their food. I felt people’s appreciation, but they also tried to remind me of my indebtedness to them such as when a woman told me: “you forgot us. Longtime ago, you said you were coming but you never came. We are hungry.” The legitimacy that I gained from them was reinforced by the talks I gave about documentation and women’s and children’s rights at a series of events organized by the SJM in Anse-à-Pitres.

During my fieldwork, I participated in different activities and gave talks where I informed people about the importance of documentation and some of the fundamental rights to which women and children are entitled. I argued for the integration of women into society and gave them advice about how they could be engaged in both the development of their community and their own personal development. These activities, organized by the SJM, brought together people from the entire population in Anse-à-Pitres: long-term residents, local state authorities, and the forced migrants. I found this collaboration with the SJM productive, as it gave me a profound insight into people’s lives. Many people have reacted and made comments about the reality of life in the community.

In addition to my involvement with the SJM, I developed individual strategies to make myself accepted by people and gain access to them. In the field, I adopted a simple way of life that reduced visible differences in status between myself and the displaced
people. I developed a close relationship with people by visiting them, comforting them when they were sick, sharing with them, and having informal conversations with them on various topics including the news and common life stories. This provided me with some legitimacy in their community and also, as Malkki (1995) suggests, led me both to understand and experience what displacement and statelessness mean in their lives, instead of simply making them the object of my study. This was fundamental in conveying to me the meaning of doing ethnography in that it encouraged me to build relationships with my research population, interacting positively with their lives by placing myself in their conversations (Kingsolver 2011), listening to them, and opening space for them instead of imposing my own categorization upon them (Rosaldo 1993).

The establishment of these kinds of connections between ethnographers and the research population is always beneficial in providing valuable insights. For example, in her fieldwork with Palestinian refugees in the Shatila camp, Allan (2014) lived among her research population for a long time in order to develop close relationships and build trust with them. This cohabitation with the people helped her understand the living experience, values, and daily predicaments of the community. Similarly, in Anse-à-Pitres, I lived near the camps and with the guide of a local assistant that I hired upon my arrival, I performed daily visits to forced migrant’s homes, which enabled me to observe and participate in their activities.

In addition, as a native anthropologist, I was able to develop a unique perspective that allowed me to develop cultural intuition that I conceive of as the automaticity and instincts I have acquired about the displaced people’s cultural values and knowledge through immersion and constant interaction with them. This intuition helped me grasp the
meaning of their cultural expressions, saying, and riddles, and also find the truth behind common stereotypes by sharing and experiencing the stories of their lives that were being told in the news.

My ability to speak their languages, Creole and Spanish, was also helpful in order to connect with people more easily and quickly. Creole was the most common tool of communication for my interviews and other interactions with the forced migrants. Their mastery of Creole surprised me because many were born in the Dominican Republic. For instance, I met with Chana at the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. She was born in Aguas Negras, Dominican Republic and had spent her whole life there. However, she said: “I don’t speak Spanish, but sometimes when the Panyol (Dominicans) speak, I understand. Sometimes I can answer. Sometimes I can’t.” As this reveals, Chana speaks only basic—or what I would consider to be functional—Spanish. Their inability to speak Spanish resides in the fact that the displaced people were living far away from Dominican urban centers and proximous to Haitian fellows where Creole could still remain the primary language. While some do speak Spanish fluently, they also still speak Creole.

Finally, while sharing their values has provided me with a kind of cultural facility and proficiency into their community, I consider my interpretation of their lives and their narratives two aspects of the same history (Lyon 2011; Wolf 1982).

1.2.3 Participant Observation, Interviews, and Focus Groups

I undertook participation observation at several sites. I participated in activities organized by the SJM in which I was an important actor and in ODRA meetings (the Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres) where I often
intervened, giving advice to members in their fight to make their voices heard. Also, I performed daily and weekly visits to migrants’ homes in downtown Anse-à-Pitres and at the camps. In addition, I went frequently to the border market on Fridays where I learned about the transactions, interactions, exchanges, and practices that enfold their daily lives in the area and above all connect them with the Dominican Republic. I observed and felt the feverish atmosphere of the market through the movement of people—loading and unloading goods for merchants, arguing, bargaining and purchasing a variety of local goods such as rice, plantains, vegetables, meat, and seafood. I witnessed motorcycle riders transporting people and goods, making weird noises by sounding their horns. During my observations, I was also able to have informal conversations with people and schedule appointments for semi-structured interviews with them.

My interviewees were from different categories of adult people ages eighteen and above and included long-term residents in Anse-à-Pitres, representatives of the city hall, and forced migrants from distinct places: Anse-à-Pitres downtown, Parc Cadeau #1, Parc Cadeau #2, Fond-Jeannette, Tête Source, and Tête-à-l’Eau. In total, I conducted one hundred two (102) semi-structured interviews of which forty eight (48) were with females and fifty four (54) were with males, all between the ages of eighteen and seventy. I had the help of my local assistant, who is from Anse-à-Pitres and who already had experience working with the forced migrants. People generally volunteered to be interviewed and were not happy if they were not included. This made it both easy and difficult for me. On the one hand, in a context where people hardly trust outsiders, I was lucky they were available to me. On the other hand, some people may have felt excluded because I did not interview them.
I encountered a similar situation with the focus groups. I organized six focus groups (Figure 4), one in each of the places I mentioned above, but also with another group of people of forced migrants who received financial microcredit from the SJM. I tried to limit the number in each focus group to fifteen people. However, more people came and the final number often increased to as many as twenty-five. The focus groups took place in the open air, in schools, churches, and at the SJM office (for people living in downtown). The questions were general and included asking about their experiences and how they see themselves in Anse-à-Pitres. The focus groups provided the participants with the opportunity to talk freely about their experiences, from learning about the Dominican state’s decision to remove them from the country to their current way of life in Anse-à-Pitres. I avoided asking them specific questions related to their feelings about their forced displacement so that I did not traumatize or offend them.
1.3 Livelihood, agency

Despite the multiple stresses and forms of hardship—vulnerability, limited financial opportunities (Koch 2015), and visible and invisible post-traumatic stress (Vincanne et al. 2009)—that members of displaced populations endure, my own conceptual standpoint in my research is one that argues against construing these forced migrants as hopeless. Forced migrants work hard to make a living in Anse-à-Pitres. They undertake informal economic activities in order to develop coping and survival strategies. These activities include gathering and selling wood, selling second-hand clothes, and starting small businesses. Through such activities, members of this displaced population generate sources of income, however meager they are, to help them sustain their lives in Anse-à-Pitres. For instance, Lidor went to the Dominican Republic in 1980 and was displaced in Anse-à-Pitres in 2015. Even though he was experiencing hardship, Lidor did not want to be dependent on humanitarian aid. He said: “I don’t get any job from organizations or the state. I use my ten fingers to work. If I find wood, I make charcoal. I see people in line fighting for food. I wouldn’t do that. If they give me, I say thank you.” Like many people Lidor, tries to be self-reliant. The informal economy appears to be the best alternative for forced migrants to develop this self-reliance and resilience. Their personal practices and modes of participation in the informal economy are prevalent throughout the poorer countries in the Caribbean. Browne (2004) refers to these informal practices as ‘Creole economics’; they offer possibilities for the building of autonomy in the face of people’s inability to work in the formal economy.
Even though forced migrants are largely fighting alone to create livelihoods, some of them obtained a small loan from the SJM to run a small business through a micro-credit program. Their small businesses were sometimes worth less than $20 USD. For instance, when I visited the camps, I saw some people hang a bag in front of their tent; the bag contained some products such as candies, detergent, and soaps, and this was their business. The strategies used by the forced migrants in order to create livelihoods demonstrate that they are fighters and believe in change and improvement. Their attitude is similar to that of other refugees and displaced people in the world. For example, Indra (2000), in her study of forced migrants in rural Bangladesh, explains how the poor develop innovative strategies such as selling goods from their houses and growing vegetables on patches of land in order to survive in a context of severe economic, social and political disenfranchisement. Similarly, Stepick (1990) demonstrates how Haitian refugees who arrived in South Florida during the 1970s and 1980s developed a richly varied range of adaptations in the informal sector in order to survive. Through economic activities such as dressmaking and tailoring, petty commerce, food preparation, childcare, transportation, and the like, these refugees managed to make ends meet. Even though the income generated from these activities was meager and, in fact placed them very close to the US poverty line, Stepick (1990) describes how they constituted a mode of livelihood and a mechanism by which these new migrants avoided seeking welfare assistance. This is a way for these people to prove that they are not just displaced, but people with ideals working hard to make do in order to maintain themselves (Senior 1991). The strategies employed by the displaced people in order not to succumb to the poverty that plagues their environment are supported by the sense they make of their lives and their culture.
Their courage to survive and fight is embedded in local cultural values, which describe the agentive mentality of these people. They are animated by a philosophy of life that pushes them to act with tactics that exceed the boundaries of the legal and the formal. Going to the Dominican Republic illegally is seriously discouraged by Dominicans, who are taking drastic measures to stop the illegal crossing of migrants. Forced migrants know the risks, but they consider that their actions are motivated by a good cause. This mentality is expressed by a common expression in Haitian larger society degaje pa peche, which basically means: “working off the books is not a sin,” and which approximately implies a Machiavellian method of “the end justifies the means.” Thus, we need to question the aim of these people’s projects before calling into question their strategies. In this sense, degaje pa peche aims to show that using the informal sector to make a living or illegally crossing the border—the unique strategies available to them—to create livelihoods is a good cause that eclipses the forbidden, the formal, and the legal. Although the informal economy is generally understood as the result of practices that take place outside formal institutions and that escape state control, they consider this infringement of legality and formalities a way to take back from the Dominican Republic what they have built through their labor. The meaning of the expression degaje pa peche approaches the concept of debrouillardism as described by Browne (2004) to show how the informal practices of these people to create ways of life are tinged with savvy and smartness. Their strategies resonate with the practices of the slave underground economies that included working their own gardens and trading articles sometimes taken from the plantations in order to meet families’ needs. The historian Forret (2004) has demonstrated that slaves were involved in the underground economy by developing
unlawful trades with poor whites in the antebellum Carolinas. According to Forret, the slaves traded products that included poultry, corn, and pigs while they sought commodities such as liquor, shoes, blankets, and rugs from poor whites. In a colonial system that oppressed people from every aspect of their human lives, slaves were required to develop such survival strategies in order to reduce their dependency on miserly food rationing provided by colonizers. For instance, slaves were able to survive by taking advantage of the small amount of time they were given to garden and undertake food collecting activities and marketing (Handler and Wallman 2014: 448). For the forced migrants, most of their informal economic practices take place beyond the border.

1.4 Labor mobility or the unsettled experience of life

The daily labor mobility of the forced migrants is reflected in Manolo’s unsettled life. Manolo had already lived at the camp of Tête Source for two years when I met him in 2016. His life means closing his eyes in Haiti with the sunset and opening them in the Dominican Republic before sunrise. He said, “It is in the Dominican Republic I am living. I almost know nothing about Haiti. Every morning I get up at 6 a.m. and sometimes as early as 3 a.m. to go to put in a day of work in the Dominican Republic.” Tête Source, a peripheral area of the city of Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, is so close to Pedernales, Dominican Republic that it is difficult to separate the two cities. During my first visit to Tête Source, people were pointing to a small tree that was supposed to serve as the Dominican-Haitian border, which means that Pedernales is visible through Manolo’s window. Pedernales is a region with a green landscape, in contrast with a great part of Anse-à-Pitres that seems to be a desert because the biggest trees have been cut down for charcoal and commercial logging. Pedernales serves as the breadbasket for
many forced migrants who return to the Dominican Republic to sell their labor. In Pedernales, most work as sharecroppers or daily laborers on the agricultural fields located in the mountainous regions.

As suggested by Manolo, the Dominican Republic is fundamental in the creation of livelihoods for the forced migrants, who contend that for every basic thing, they have to go to the Dominican Republic. For many of them, it is the only place they can go in order to scavenge for their daily bread. Even with the reinforcement of border security by the Dominican state, they continue to increase their trips between the two countries. Their dynamics, as expressed through their everyday labor mobility, demonstrate that they exercise agency and forms of power. This form of power resides in the capacity of the displaced persons to pursue purposeful goals in their lives. I refer to this power as “power to” (Miller and Tilley 1984), which emphasizes the ability of these people to control their destiny through the actions they are taking to improve their lives. My dissertation favors this side of power, which conditions people’s agency, over a conceptualization of power, as something associated with domination or control (power over) and conceived of as a form of power geometry that defines mobility as set up differently for diverse citizens (Gogia 2006 citing Massey 1994). In this sense, in my work, I am unconcerned with the kind of unequal relationship people have with power, but I am concerned with what makes people agentive and able to take actions. My approach to mobility is defined within this perspective of “power to” showing that labor mobility is fundamental to forced migrants’ creation of livelihoods, but at the same time imposed upon them because everyday border crossings are undertaken under the constant threats imposed by border securitization. In this sense, I argue that labor mobility is both an exercise of agency and
constraint. Among the displaced population, both men and women attest to this ability through drawing upon mobility to challenge marginalization, precarity, and insecurity in their lives.

Among other things, the engagement of women in labor mobility challenges cultural constructions of them as dependent on their husbands. Indeed, women are generally construed as followers of their migrant husbands or as people who stay behind to take care of children. This cultural construction of gender roles in labor mobility tends not to hold, as women are increasingly as equal agents of mobility as men. For instance, in Latin America, Collins (1995) showed how Mexican women migrated to other parts of Latin America, such as Brazil and Chile in order to do agricultural work. In order to respond to the constraints of home responsibility, those women were engaged in labor mobility in the same way as men. Similarly Sanchez (2013) highlighted how a few “single” women, considered heads of households, became sharecroppers in a male-dominated system in order to supply the needed labor in Californian strawberry farms. This active participation of women in labor migration changes the construction of a patriarchal society that considers women dependent on men. To be sure, in the case of forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres, there exists a kind of male dominance in labor mobility because men tend to move more than women to go to work in the agricultural fields in the Dominican Republic. However, some women brave the risks and go out on their own. They cross the border on a daily basis to go to work in the Dominican Republic. Even though a very few women may accompany their husbands to the agricultural field in the Dominican Republic to prepare food for them, the majority go to sell their labor. The majority of those migrant women go to carry out domestic work at Dominicans’ homes
and to sell as mobile merchants in the streets and at the binational market. The significance of these women as agents of labor mobility in their own rights changes gender perspectives in a labor mobility generally considered men’s prevalence. The involvement of these women in labor mobility increases their agency and empowers them. For those left behind, their lives are equally shaped by everyday labor mobility because many are dependent on the bread coming from the men’s border crossings. They experience the same fear and stress as their husbands who have to face soldiers to go to work.

1.5 Building citizenship

The removal of citizenship of Dominican-Haitians was fundamental to the displacement of thousands of people to Haiti. The decision of the Dominican state to adopt a constitutional amendment that stripped thousands of people of Haitian backgrounds of their citizenship has gravely affected these people, who were forced to leave the Dominican Republic. In addition to their state of precarity, many displaced persons who are Dominicans of Haitian origin have also found themselves stateless in Anse-à-Pitres. Their statelessness or the lack of a nationality seems to have also been confirmed by Prime Minister Evans Paul of Haiti when he proclaimed on June 25, 2015, “it is about migrants [these people are migrants], mostly Dominicans. They are, for the most part, children born in the Dominican Republic and have no identification (Louis 2015).” Legally, he meant, they are not citizens of Haiti. The inattention of the local state toward the displaced is a reflection of the central Haitian state, which rejects these people. However, this rejection seems to be more an effect of the incapacity of the state to support these people based on the political economic factors I have described above,
rather than to be a deliberate choice. In the absence of legal citizenship, I argue that these people build a limited form of citizenship through everyday social, cultural, and economic activities (Danahay and Brettell 2008). I conceive of the kind of citizenship that they create as substantive citizenship and it goes beyond the legal scope of citizenship. It is both an individual and collective making process, which is determined by the forced migrants’ personal engagement in improving their lives and organizing themselves to make their voices heard. These sorts of engagement help the displaced people who lost their citizenship to participate in society and construct some form of social life in the face of marginalization and exclusion. All displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres demonstrated this dynamic as someone valuable, capable of contributing to society like all legal citizens.

In anthropological literature, citizenship is understood as not simply a set of rights and duties but as a set of practices or experiences. Anthropologists seek to displace the state as the sole reference in the definition of citizenship (Caglar 2004: 284) emphasizing the significance of individuals’ personal experience, something that the legal conception of citizenship does not account for (Greenhouse 2011: 262). These practices and experiences include how people live in their community, how they are engaged in personal and collective enterprises, overall, what they actually do in their daily lives (Lazar 2013). Therefore, marginalized people create substantive citizenship as an outcome of their exclusion from political and legal citizenship by claiming belonging to their place of residence (Vora 2013), acquiring social and civil rights (Lazar 2013). Forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres create substantive citizenship in ways that are different from many other people in the world. For example, they are different from the wealthy
members of the Chinese diaspora that Ong (1999) describes in her book, *Flexible Citizenship*, who can instrumentalize citizenship through flexibility and transnational mobility due to their economic capital and who seem to constitute a kind of stateless economic power (Tölölyan 1996). Forced migrants also differ from members of the Indian diaspora in Dubai who can work in the formal economy even if it is in the form of “modern-day slavery” (Vora 2013). Forced migrants, who are caught within the boundaries of a very poor country where they are both unrecognised and unauthorized (Sassen 2002) and also excluded from the formal economy, create substantive citizenship that can be defined in several ways.

First, their substantive citizenship is expressed in the ways forced migrants trigger a set of collective actions that highlight their presence in Anse-à-Pitres. They created their own organization called the Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres (ODRA). Not only does the organization define and re-define their goals as people who know what they want, but it also gives them visibility in the community of Anse-à-Pitres.

Second, their substantive citizenship is asserted by local and international organizations from which they enjoy some recognition and which sit and negotiate with them. For instance, the IOM supported these dispossessed people during a short period after their displacement, providing some with the financial assistance needed to relocate from the camps and promising to give them money for their survival (even though the IOM completely withdrew from helping them while I was on the ground). The SJM also provided support to the displaced people, advocating for their rights. The organization implemented a documentation program called *PwoKontram* to provide stateless people
with a birth certificate. This effort constitutes an important step toward building legal citizenship for some of these people.

Finally, substantive citizenship is also an individual making process for the displaced people and refers to the daily actions they undertake in the course of their lives. For instance, while living in Anse-à-Pitres, forced migrants continued to move to the Dominican Republic for multiple purposes. Some people considered themselves as still belonging to Dominican society even after having been in Haiti for more than one year. Therefore, this dual belonging, reflected in the economic opportunities that the Dominican Republic represents to them and the residence that Haiti grants to them, expresses a way that these people forge citizenship that encompasses the two different countries, which I conceive of as transnational substantive citizenship. This transnational substantive citizenship can be illustrated through Manolo’s involvement in everyday labor mobility. While his practices are considered a survival strategy, they show that his life is a construction of the in-between and that both countries play a role in defining his citizenship.

1.6 The structure of the dissertation

The second chapter provides a historical background of the border, particularly its role in connecting and disconnecting Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This controversial role can be explained by the relationships between the two countries that attest to strong economic bonds, but at the same time are fraught with violence. I also show how the border is both secured and porous. On one hand, the Dominican Republic has established its military presence and checkpoints on the border. The constellation of
soldiers deployed strategically to control the official crossing points places the border under constant surveillance. These soldiers often manipulate the border to their advantage, making it a site of illegality and illicit transactions, and the imposition of illegal taxes. I conceive this misuse of power as “border power” to describe how power is made into an instrument that serves illegal causes. On the other hand, the forced migrants find ways to circumvent soldiers and cross the border on a daily basis, making the Dominican Republic their backyard. This porosity is attested to by the dozens of long-term residents and forced migrants who claim that they go to shop and work in the Dominican Republic every day, without legal documents. Forced migrants rely on the communication networks they develop with their neighbors and a nuanced understanding of time and space that allows them to find the right moment to cross the border and locate resources in the Dominican Republic. These strategies are the product of creativity and smartness and have increased their agency.

The third chapter examines how the displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres continue to live in continuous marginalization, as many contended that they did not have legal documents. They are the victims of the incapacity of the state to integrate its members into society. During an informational session on documentation organized by the SJM, the registrar in Anse-à-Pitres deplored the bad working conditions at the civil registry. He maintained that the state did not provide the required documents so that the clerks could fulfill their duties. As a result, they could not respond to people’s needs for multiple birth certificates. It should be noted that all the social categories of the population in Anse-à-Pitres are victims of the malfunction of the registry. The civil status—which is the state institution in charge of delivering identity documents to people—is deficient and operates
just like the state, which is inefficient and absent. The inefficiency of the state is illustrated, for example, by the delivery of invalid birth certificates to people. This creates an exciting window for racketeers, who extort people who want to have legal documents. The absence of the state appears in its incapacity to document people, leaving a vacuum to be filled by organizations. For instance, the Service Jésuite aux Migrants (SJM) leaped to the rescue of the civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres by implementing a program of documentation called *PwoKontram* that aimed to provide a limited number of forced migrants and their children with a birth certificate. The program helps some stateless people re-establish their identity and assign them Haitian nationality. However, SJM cannot replace the state, which excludes and marginalizes its own people, handicapping them so far as their full participation in society is concerned in comparison to other legal citizens.

The fourth chapter focuses on the role of forced migrants as agents of their own survival and self-development in the absence of state support and the limited help provided by organizations working on the ground. The displaced people exercise important forms of agency by undertaking informal economic practices such as selling their labor, gathering wood to sell, doing domestic work, and turning themselves into mobile merchants that allow them to generate a little income. These informal economic activities are intertwined with colonial history and are embedded in larger Haitian cultural context in the way it shapes their economic behavior. In particular, when comparing the motivation of the forced migrants in undertaking their informal economic activities, there are some similarities between their practices and the slave-based economies. The displaced people and enslaved people’s informal economic practices
show how these groups of people exercise forms of agency in and over their lives, but this economic enterprise does not free them from a world of economic and social inequalities. Furthermore, the combativeness of the forced migrants is stimulated by Haitian culture through a mentality of *debrOUillARDIsm* and moral values such as *degaje pa peche* anchored in a philosophy of life that motivates them to take actions when it comes to creating livelihoods.

The fifth chapter argues that despite statelessness, illegality, and infrastructural and institutional constraints, forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres exercise power over their lives by relying on everyday labor mobility as a resource. Despite the risks of imprisonment and death that border crossings entail, forced migrants go to Pedernales on a daily basis to sell their labor in the Dominican Republic. These labor mobilities undertaken by both men and women are an attempt to create livelihoods. They are constitutive of power in that they show the capacity of the forced migrants to act in the world with the aim of building and rebuilding their lives. Drawing on Miller and Tilley (1984), I refer to this form of power as “power to” to distinguish forced migrants’ exercise of power drawn upon everyday mobility from power associated with domination and coercion.

Finally, in the last chapter, I argue that the stateless people create a kind of substantive citizenship that fills in the gap left by the absence of legal citizenship and that allows them to participate in community activities and exercise forms of agency in a context where they are highly constrained to act legally, politically and economically. There are several ways they try to build this form of substantive citizenship that emphasize belonging and community involvement, and that go beyond the legal category
and bureaucratic considerations. These are: 1) creating their own local organization (ODRA), 2) participating in local meetings with the city hall 3) participating in organizations on the ground, and 4) resisting systems of power such as when they opposed a program of relocation by the SJM. Because their practices take place in both Haiti, where they seek to re-settle, and the Dominican Republic where they go on a daily basis for labor purpose, their lives remain a continuum between these two countries, so they are transnational substantive citizens.
CHAPTER 2: THE BORDER AS A SITE OF SOCIAL MEANING AND AGENCY

I was in Tête-Source to meet with some forced migrants. Tête-Source is one of the most remote localities of Anse-à-Pitres and sits 10 to 20 meters from the Dominican-Haitian border. During his interview with me, François, a resident of the area, explained,

I am from Tête Source. I came here three years ago. I have my sister in Saint Domingue. I go to the Dominican Republic. It is not far. I cross the line around Altagracia. I always enter those areas to look for casual work. I go to put in a day of work in the Dominican Republic regularly even though they (Dominican soldiers) are mistreating and humiliating us.

François’ involvement in border crossings is typical for many labor migrants around the world who take advantage of the porosity of borders to look for job opportunities. What is specific about François and almost all forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres who go to the Dominican Republic, and which is not obvious to everyone in François’ statement, is that border crossing is not only about fearing Dominican soldiers (who have the monopoly of the legitimate means of violence, and who also are the incarnation of a kind of “border power” that works to perpetuate the Dominican state ideology) but also about fearing Dominican civilians, who participate in policing the movement of Haitian migrants across the border. The ability of these forced migrants to persist in crossing the border—despite all the forces that threaten, frighten, and kill—to make border crossing into a way of life is an expression of agency and power. Following Dobres and Robb (2000), I understand agency as the carrying out of actions by the forced migrants to accomplish intentional goals in their lives. This agency attests to their credible power to make decisions on their own.
In this chapter, I examine how the Dominican-Haitian border (Figure 5) serves as both a bridge and a barrier (Ortiz-Gonzalez 2004) for displaced people in Anse-à- Pitres, Haiti, who engage in everyday border crossing practices as a survival strategy. The border holds multiple functions in the relationships between the two peoples, especially socially and economically. The border area is host to a vibrant formal and informal economy upon which residents of border cities rely. From 1993 to 2002, for example, border trade accounted for a reduction in poverty on a scale of 12 to 18 percent in border cities where free open markets take place (Coupeau, 2008). While the border plays a central role in the maintenance of socio-economic relations between Haitian and Dominican people, at the same it constitutes a barrier between them. The Dominican state, in particular, has taken steps towards securing the border in order to control the flux of Haitian migrants. I argue that the enforcement of border security by the Dominican state to control waves of migrants transgressing the territory produces “illegal migrants” (Fassim 2011), but, at the same time and paradoxically, this makes the border a space in which agency and power are exercised by these “illegal people.” This agency and power are expressed by forced migrants’ development of various strategies, including relying on communication networks, time, and space, that allow them to circumvent border officials, reduce the risks of crossing, and succeed in their daily border jumping practices.
In the first section of the chapter, I examine how Haitians and Dominicans have been connected through the border that represents a dynamic place of social and economic exchange between the two peoples. At the same time, I demonstrate how the border embodies violence and enmity between the two countries, which are rooted in the building of Dominican nationhood and identity.

Second, I demonstrate how border officials deployed by the Dominican state are sometimes involved in illegal practices and negotiations with crossers that are part of what I consider a form of border power.
Third, I show the risks that crossing the border entails for the forced migrants. In addition to border guards, forced migrants must also face Dominican civilians who scare and threaten them, making the border a barrier and their crossing into Pedernales a highly dangerous adventure.

Finally, I examine how forced migrants exercise forms of power and agency by adopting strategies that allow them to minimize risks in crossing the border. Their capacity in using resources that include communication networks, space, and time to carry out their intentional goals increases their visibility, power, and agency.

2.1 Historiography of the border

The current border experiences of Dominican and Haitian people need to be contextualized within a historical framework that explains their historically evolving relationships. The border is best understood as one that has had different economic, cultural, social, and political meanings in different historical eras.

Haiti and the Dominican Republic share the same island, Hispaniola, but have two distinct colonial experiences. Hispaniola used to be a Spanish island during the colonial period, with the arrival of Christopher Columbus, but in a 1697 treaty, Spain conceded the western part to France, forming the colony that is now Haiti, and retained the eastern part, which is now the Dominican Republic. The two countries are separated by a land border with four juxtaposed Haitian-Dominican towns that are official entry points for migration and traffic. The four Haitian border towns are coupled with four Dominican sister cities: Malpasse (western Haiti)/Jimani (Dominican Republic), Anse-à-Pitres (southeast Haiti) /Pedernales (Dominican Republic), Belladères (central Haiti) /Elias
Pinas (Dominican Republic), and Ouanaminthe (northeast Haiti)/Dajabon (Dominican Republic).

Historically, the border has been porous in another way: the movement of Haitians across the border was entirely undocumented before 1915 (Martinez 1999: 66). During the U.S. occupation of 1916-1924, an effective national police was created, but clandestine entrance at the frontier was still common. According to Martinez (1999: 69), “law enforcers were spread thinly across the countryside and held tenuous control at most over the rural populace. The central authorities were hard pressed even to collect duties on the Haitian frontier, let alone keep tabs on immigrants entering Dominican territory” (Martinez citing Baud 1993: 49-56). Border control became a priority when a national guard was created and more importantly with the accession of the Dominican dictator Trujillo to power after the US occupation, where the “establishment of the national guard made policing the movements of Afro Caribbean immigrants a practical possibility” (Martinez 1999:69). Since the early 20th century, Haitians have been migrating to the Dominican Republic to work in agriculture, tourism, the sugar industry, and the construction sector (Wooding and Mosley-Williams 2004; Mariner 2002). The migration of Haitian workers to the Dominican Republic was a prosperous enterprise that profited the two countries. For instance, in the 1950-60s, there existed a series of annual contracts between the Dominican and Haitian governments to recruit Haitians to go to work as seasonal laborers in Dominican sugar cane fields. This migration “by contract” has ranged from 10,000 to 14,000 per year (Grasmuck 1982: 369). In 2015, of the 8,000 to 10,000 sugar cane workers in the Dominican Republic, the majority were Haitian immigrants (Kanaar 2015).
Following Derby (1994), before the Dominican Republic developed infrastructure, Dominican provinces were not integrated into Dominican towns but maintained networks of commerce with Haitian urban centers inherited from the colonial period. Therefore, border markets have been an economic mainstay for the region’s residents since the colonial era and were closely tied to large commercial hubs in Haiti as a result of the relatively sparse settlement—and thus infrastructure—of the western part of the Spanish colony (Mallon 2018:339).

Therefore, for a long time, Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been connected through the border that was sometimes unregulated (such as before 1915), and sometimes regulated by the Dominican state. This relationship between the two countries, however, is also fraught with violence and discord. For instance, from 1822 to 1844, the Haitian president Jean Pierre Boyer governed the entire island, until the Dominican Republic obtained its independence from Haiti in 1884. This twenty-two-year occupation by the Haitian army has been long remembered in Dominican history as “the Haitian Domination” (Vergne 2005) and used to promote anti-Haitianismo sentiment (i.e., anti-Haitianism), which reinforces both borders and boundaries (Fassin 2011). This sentiment is also provoked by the wave of Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic, a kind of ideology that appears in the discourse of the Dominican president Mejia, who once spoke about a “peaceful invasion of Haitians” (Martin et al. 2006). In addition, anti-Haitianism consists of making Haitians the scapegoats of an economically weakened Dominican society and also politically, a situation evoked by Sagas (2000) by maintaining that “it is a political strategy that has worked before, to distract the people from other issues and rally the troops”. This anti-Haitianism is apparent in the refusal of legal citizenship to
Haitian children born in the Dominican Republic (Simmons 2010), which aims to keep Haitians away from the country, and in the expression of racial prejudices such as seeing blackness as incompatible to Dominicanness (Simmons 2009). These kinds of racial discrimination are at work in housing, where sex workers are forced to cluster together and rent their own houses in Haitian neighborhoods, and in the sex industry where Dominican women distance themselves from their poor, dark-skinned Haitian neighbors (Brennan 20004: 36). Tracing the historiography of the Dominican-Haitian border, by referring to Moya Pons (2010), the historian Paulino (2016) summarizes the history of the border in terms of three significant cycles or periods that describe how the border has been established from its creation to the role it plays today.

The first cycle includes the history of the border during the colonial period, where it served to set the limit between France and Spain, who shared the island, Hispaniola (1700s-1800s). The second is the history of the political border, which is the period where the two countries—Haiti and the Dominican Republic—implemented treaties to settle an official demarcation and territorial boundaries (1874-1936). This is the period where the Dominican dictator, Rafael Trujillo, declared war on Haitians who lived around the border. An estimated 15,000 to 35,000 Haitians were tracked down and executed by the Dominican regime (Clammer et al 2012) in 1937. The border was turned into a wall of blood (Paulino 2016: 9), as “the blood of innocent Haitians flowed freely into the water and transformed the border from a place that had once been a refuge from persecution and slavery into a memory to forget, to flee” (Wucker 1999).

The third cycle, according to Moya Pons, is the social border, which began in the aftermath of the massacre, and particularly after Trujillo’s assassination, where
“Dominican scholars move beyond issues of territorial boundaries, directing themselves to new themes such as racial prejudice, economic domination, political class relations and Haitian presence” (Paulino 2016: 7). The social boundaries that Moya Pons refers to are the embodiment of Haitian immigrants’ racialization within Dominican territory. This process is manifest in the process that excludes Haitians from the nation-state, through both the definition of Dominican identity in opposition to Haitians (Howard 2001) and their removal from the country in 2015. This cycle appears to be a continuation of the anti-Haitianism that Trujillo forged in the front line of his politics of governance. Paulino (2016: 7) extends his reflection of the post-massacre period to what he calls la dominicanizacion de la frontera (dominicanization of the border), highlighting the aim of the Dominican Republic to institutionally and ideologically distance Dominican border residents and the nation from their Haitian neighbors, who are unwelcome to the country (Orenstein 1995).

After the cholera outbreak that hit Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, the Dominican Republic has reinforced its border security against Haitians who sought to cross the border, considering them impure and dangerous (Mallon 2018). As reports of cholera in Haiti surfaced in October 2010, the Dominican Republic deployed 1,500 soldiers alongside hundreds of public health professionals to the border between the two countries (Mallon 2018: 339). Health surveillance has been enacted in a way that restricted immigration, conflating the spread of disease with the movement of people across the border, and pathologizing Haitian bodies (Mallon: 340). Simmons (2010), in previous contexts, demonstrated that health was always used by the Dominican state as an instrument with which to establish boundaries in Dominican society; Haitian workers
were geographically marginalized, did not have access to hospitals and clinics, and were forced to work without protection, which increased their vulnerability. In this way, the body of Haitian people is not only considered a threat to the border, but it is also expandable (Agamben cited by Zigon 2011), as it is instrumentalized by the Dominican state to enact its power and sovereignty (Foucault 1977). The “danger” mapped onto Haitian bodies by Dominican identity politics conflates race with epidemiological pollution, identifying the border spaces of economic exchange as a threat to Dominican nation building (Mallon 2018: 342).

The Dominican state’s effort to control or simply “own the border” (Ortiz-Gonzalez 2004) and make it a barrier to undocumented Haitian migrants seems to find its support from Dominican civilians—who take part in a campaign of exclusion of Haitian migrants—and border guards—who are in charge of regulating the flow of migrants. First, border residents, particularly Dominican civilians, have usurped state power and threatened Haitian border residents. Similar scenarios, where civilians illegally intimidate and persecute border crossers, were underlined by Oscar (2006: 4), who contends that “in many cases, zealous citizens have, on their own, undertaken unlawful incursions intended to detach possessions of neighboring countries.” This is what happened in the Dominican Republic in 2018. After a seeming calm between the two peoples following the migration crisis of 2015, a resurgence of hatred resurfaced when a group of Dominican extremists from the region of Pedernales took to the street to ask Haitian residents to leave the city.
The state was forced to intervene by reinforcing military presence and police in that province.5

Second, I conceive of the power exercised by border officials as border power. This border power is the exercise of power by border officials to control border crossers, but they also work to legalize the illegal or render the legal illegal. Specifically, isolation, weak institutions, and lax administration can lead to a deviation from the norms of interior zones and a development of institutional patterns and interests quite separate from those of the centers of power (Oscar 2006). I do not consider the illegal practices on the Dominican-Haitian border a separate institutional pattern as suggested by Oscar (2006), but these practices do illustrate the definition of power as a multishifting strategy (Foucault 1981) which actors can exercise according to their desire to accomplish specific goals.

2.2 Border power

I define border power as a discrete kind of power exercised by border officials to regulate both crossers’ lives and the flow of goods. Border power is an instrumentalization of power by officials. This border power can take different forms. On the Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales border, border power includes soldiers acting as agents of migration, and enacting corrupt practices, during which they channel state power for independent interests. While officials deployed at the border are generally expected to take legal enforcement action according to state and international policy, border power deviates from legality in order to produce illegality. The zone of illegality and opacity

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produced by border power is characterized by the intervention of soldiers in the role of migration officers and by corruption that includes bribing, trafficking, smuggling, and the like. The role of soldiers as migration officers is linked with the structure at the border. For example, when someone is crossing the border from Anse-à-Pitres to Pedernales, they must go directly through the soldiers at a checkpoint, instead of migration officers. This means that soldiers are conferred all the power with which to fulfill all related tasks. Their total power erases the authority of any migration agents. The other way that border power is exercised is through the il-legalization of the legal and the legalization of the illegal.

The il-legalization of the legal consists of border officials taking advantage of the power conferred upon them and using that power to serve illegal causes. In order to facilitate the border officials in the exercise of border power and obtain people’s consent, officials often put a legal face on the illegal and the illegitimate, a process that seems to be at work at the Dominican customs point on the border between Pedernales and Anse-à-Pitres. During a conversation at the SJM office with Berard, who has monitored the movement of people on the border, Berard explained to me how Haitians in Anse-à-Pitres have an illegal tax imposed upon them by Dominican border officials when they make their passports in the Dominican Republic. He said:

Dominican authorities at the gate seize their passport and ask them (Haitians) to pay 25,000 pesos at the customs contending that the passport made in the Dominican Republic is not good. They claim that this money will be used to legalize the passport. Usually, Haitians pay $100 USD for the passport. From the $100, $20 will go to racketeers. In reality, the passport costs only $20.
I am not familiar with the procedure of making passports in the Dominican Republic, but this knowledge has educated me. While it is generally said that borders are corridors of opportunities for border residents who can maintain some freedom of movement across and around them (Flynn 1997) or benefit from economic activities, the borders may also become corridors of opportunity for state delegated officials. By focusing too much on border crossers, we often forget about the agency of the border officials (Chalfin 2001) and how they exercise their power to make the border impermeable.

Chalfin (133-134) argues that “the agency of border officials is often portrayed as vulnerable to two sorts of compromise, where on the one hand, state agents’ public responsibilities are shown to be subverted by personal interests and assimilation into border communities (Chalfin 2001 citing MacGaffey et al. 1991; Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990) or, on the other hand, the autonomy of border agents is compromised by the imperatives of ruling individuals and groups (Chalfin 2001 citing Reno 1998). Similarly, border agents on the Dominican-Haitian border are motivated by personal interests. However, I did not notice any significant interactions between Dominican agents and Haitians crossing the border that could be interpreted as compromising border power. The imposition of soldiers’ power does not favor any kind of amiability between these state representatives and migrants. In this way, the exercise of border power works to reinforce the border as a barrier.
2.3 The border as the site that unites and divides

During my research, I traveled frequently to the border market in order to shop, but also to observe the back and forth movement of people between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales and their interactions. People cross from Anse-à-Pitres and as far as Jacmel, a distant city in the southeast department of Haiti, in order to join the market place. According to Horst and Taylor (2014: 158), Anse-à-Pitres was a popular place to cross into the Dominican Republic after the earthquake of January 2010, as hundreds of Haitians entered the region to seek refuge with their relatives in Pedernales and other parts of the Dominican Republic. Even though people do not need documents to access the border market located on the Dominican side, Dominican soldiers are present and sometimes check people at the gate. For example, one day while Makdo—a friend who worked at the SJM—and I were moving towards the entry gate of the market, a Dominican soldier asked him for his ID. According to both local people and the city hall, this contradicts the existing agreement between Dominican and Haitian authorities according to which Haitians can go as far as the Dominican city of Pedernales without a Dominican visa or even a passport during market days. The market is fundamental to the connection of the two cities and attracts both Haitian and Dominican merchants and buyers. While a diversity of goods is displayed on the trestles and the bare floor, these products are mostly Dominican, because Dominican authorities forbid Haitians to enter with their products in order to prevent competition with Dominican sellers. Haitian merchants or retailers are then only able to buy and resell Dominican products. During market days, many people are turning around, buying, bargaining, selling, and talking to each other. The market smells of good, cooked food. It is a warm atmosphere, with people unloading trucks full of plantains, yams, tubers, vegetables, and fruits. All around
are merchants of second-hand clothes, staple products, and seafood. On both sides of the border, there are currency traders and motorbike taxi drivers sound their horns while waiting outside for their client-passengers. In this way, the border is a key site through which both people and goods flow, connecting Pedernales and Anse-à-Pitres. From this one perspective, the border is permeable.

The role of the border in bridging the economic life of the two peoples can be seen, for example, in Mirta’s frequent border crossings to the city of Pedernales. Mirta is a woman in her late twenties who gave birth to a child at a hospital in the Dominican Republic, like many women who cross the border in order to give birth in the Dominican Republic because of the poor access to healthcare in Anse-à-Pitres. The same agreement that authorizes Haitians to go to Pedernales without a visa, allows pregnant women to go to the hospital for regular checkups until they give birth. However, these women cannot register their children in the Dominican Republic because, like children of diplomats or tourists, they fall into the category of people *in transit*. Even though, according to earlier versions of the Constitution, legal interpretation has long restricted the category of "foreigners in transit" to persons in the country for less than 10 days, since the 1990s, many Dominican civil registrars have refused to register the children of Haitian parents born in the Dominican Republic (Amnesty International 2015: 6). In 2010, a constitutional amendment officially put an end to the birthright citizenship of children of Haitian descent. Therefore, Mirta could not register her daughter, born in Pedernales, at a Dominican registry.

After delivery, Mirta wanted to eat a particular type of hot soup to energize her body. For such a soup, she needed the head of a goat, which she had to buy at a
Dominican slaughterhouse. She called her father, a well-known man in his late sixties who owns a cockfight in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, and sent him to get the goat head. In less than one hour, her father was back with the goat meat. Usually, in a week, Mirta would make up to three to four trips to the Dominican Republic. She would go for this special luxurious head of goat, for her baby milk, and for bags to wrap the ice to sell in Anse-à-Pitres. Mirta’s frequent crossings attest to how the border connects Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales, but also reflect the greater need of people in Anse-à-Pitres to travel than Dominicans, due to their isolation from other Haitian town centers and a range of other social and economic factors (Heather et al. 2014: 158).

For the most part, Haitians cross the border to go to Pedernales for a variety of reasons that range from going to work, to buy, and to access services that are not offered in Haiti. In fact, with the Dominican state becoming the facilitator of global flows of capital during the last decades which has opened the country to foreign investments (Gregory 2014), the Dominican Republic has reached a higher standard of living, enjoys a better developed and more robust economy, and has access to better services in comparison to Haiti. This explains why Haitians cross the border, which is in stark contrast to Dominicans, who cross into Haiti for entertainment; Dominicans cross to Anse-à-Pitres in order to go to clubs and cockfights in which they are significant stakeholders. Generally, these Dominicans enter the Haitian side of the border at the official gate without having to show any legal document. According to the inspector of migration—a Haitian whose office is on the border—Dominicans are allowed through the entry gate even without an identity document because they are simply considered as gwògman (drinkers) (Joseph 2018). In Anse-à-Pitres, although those Dominican crossers
are not too many, their presence in the city was visible at the bars that constantly play Dominican music in order to please them. Also, at least twice a week, Dominicans cross the border to participate in cockfights with Haitians. The socio-economic and cultural relationships that develop between the two peoples show that the border can sometimes be less a boundary dividing them into two nations than a bridge linking them in mutual interdependence (Flynn 1997). Flynn has demonstrated how the border can become a deeply placed stable identity, a way in which locals define themselves and their relationships to others. On the Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales border, this border culture has developed through cockfighting. However, as Alvarez (1995) argues, the notion of a border culture either glosses over or essentializes traits and behaviors and obliterates the actual border problems. Indeed, there exist multiple internal boundaries among the two peoples including experiences of racism, anti-Haitianism, and exclusion from the global economy; these are at the root of many conflicts that loom large in their history and that continue to occur in recent years. In this way, the Pedernales River that the two peoples share both joins and divides at the same time, explaining the complexity of border social relationships (Grimon 2002). Therefore, the border is also a place that has born witness to the violent history that has divided the two countries and its peoples.

Today, the border is secured by Dominican soldiers, who are present on the four official crossing points, including the border of Pedernales-Anse-à-Pitres, where Dominican border guards known as CESFRONT watch official checkpoints and patrol unofficial points to look for illegal migrants, who live off everyday border crossings. These measures of security aim to scare forced migrants who are very much dependent on crossing the border for creating livelihoods. Sanika has lived all her life in the
Dominican Republic, having been brought to the Dominican Republic by her mother when she was a child. Now, displaced in Anse-à-Pitres, a new country to her, Sanika is having a difficult life with four children to feed. Her border crossings to gather wood in the Dominican Republic are stressful, as she has to deal with border security and soldiers. Sanika said: “I don’t feel good at all. I have four children I am in charge of. I don’t have any support. Sometimes I go to the Dominican Republic to look for small charcoal wood. They (Dominican soldiers) ran after me. I used to run and hide up to three days in the forest.” Crossing the border is crucial to Sanika’s survival since her displacement from the Dominican Republic. Precarity, insecurity, and uncertainty in Anse-à-Pitres force her to face the danger of crossing the border illegally to go to work in the Dominican Republic. Forced migrants’ daily back and forth movements to Pedernales for their basic needs only increase their stressful experiences and dangerous relationship to the border.

Generally, crossing borders has always been a risky enterprise, where violence has become naturalized and embodied. As Dorsey and Barriga (2010) argue, “Borders everywhere attract violence, violence prompts fences, and eventually fences can mutate into walls’ (citing Charles N. Bowden’s 2007). The idea of the border as a barrier is inevitable, as states feel threatened by the waves of people entering their territory. The modern state has engaged a plethora of technologies and employed special officials to monitor the border in order to reduce transgression and control the flux of illegal migrants. With the rapid increase in migration, where thousands of people are continuously fleeing their countries and braving the sea in search of security, Europe, for example, has adopted drastic measures ranging from sea patrols and advanced
surveillance machinery to fencing in order to keep migrants out (Andersson 2014). Similarly, since the mid-1990s, the United States has reinforced its border with Mexico by militarizing the border, more than doubling the U.S. Border Patrol budget and personnel, building a security wall, and introducing other technologies to deter migration (Cornelius, 2001; Whitaker, 2009 cited by Kyoko and David 2012: 167). This border militarization has led to grave consequences for crossers such as deaths, torture, imprisonment, family separations, and the like. Yoko and David (2012) have underlined a sad revelation about the regime of violence on the US-Mexico border that has led to the loss of many lives. According to them, “U.S. government agencies, academic researchers, and nongovernmental organizations concur that the death count is in the thousands and that estimates based on recovered bodies consistently undercount the actual number of deaths (167).” This account is frightening, when considering the millions of people who are forced to cross borders. Moving across border is risky. The forced migrants are not exempt from the danger and risks created by crossing the Haitian-Dominican border.

2.4 Crossing the border: the risks of mobility

Many forced migrants have chosen to stay in Anse-à-Pitres, in part so that they can take advantage of the border proximity, as it gives easy access to the region of Pedernales, Dominican Republic. Among other things, the border deserves attention because of its role in both preventing mobilities and affording new potentials (Richardson 2013). While the Dominican-Haitian border has generally been considered porous due to the lack of documentation of people moving across it (Martinez 1999), since the 1990s, with the creation of the National Guard, the Dominican state has taken steps towards securing the border and has made it a space of constant surveillance and regulation.
(Gogia 2006 citing Verstraete 2001). Furthermore, for forced migrants, crossing the border is not simply about fearing the state, but also fearing violence from Dominicans more generally. Despite the militarization of the border by the Dominican state at official crossing points and the threat of Dominican civilians to make the border inaccessible to illegal migrants, forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres develop strategies to cross into Pedernales, Dominican Republic.

Generally, forced migrants living in the different camps in Anse-à-Pitres are close to the Haitian-Dominican border. For example, for those who live in the city center of Anse-à-Pitres, the border is a ten-to-fifteen minute walk. The camps of Maletchipe, Parc Cadeau 1, and Parc Cadeau 2 are in the peripheral areas of the town of Anse-à-Pitres and are also located close to the border, which is demarcated by the Pedernales River. This is where the forced migrants get fresh water. The other camps of Tête-à-l’Eau, Tête Source, and Fonds Jeannette, are in the remotest areas of the town of Anse-à-Pitres, but close to the Dominican-Haitian border. These peripheral areas are closer to the region of Pedernales than to the city of Anse-à-Pitres. Living close to the border means a lot to forced migrants because they continue to see the Dominican Republic as the land that can offer them the opportunities that Haiti does not. However, the deployment of Dominican soldiers along the border and the establishment of checkpoints at entry gates aim to limit, regulate, and anticipate the movement of the forced migrants (Richardson 2013; Hannan, Sheller, and Urry 2006). Crossing the border entails severe risks for them that can include death, imprisonment, or deportation. For instance, when Emile, a young man in his mid-twenties, decided to go to the Dominican Republic, he felt sick with fear. Yet, Emile was born in the Dominican Republic. Like many other young Dominican-Haitians, he never
got a Dominican identity card. In the camp of Parc Cadeau #1, where he lives in a small tent made of wood, cardboard, straw, and pieces of clothes, a return to the Dominican Republic to look for small, odd jobs seemed inevitable to him; his future in the camp in Anse-à-Pitres is unclear and uncertain because the land does not belong to him, and he may face eviction anytime. However, crossing the border is no easy task for him because of the soldiers patrolling the border. He had already been apprehended by these soldiers, an incident that he described to me during an interview at the camp:

“I went to make a small charcoal in the bush where everybody seeks to make a life, making small charcoal to get food to eat, and me, bad luck for me, the soldiers took me; they attacked me. They went to Pedernales with me. I spent eight days in prison. After the eight days of jail, they made me pay 2,000 pesos. I didn’t have the 2000 pesos. It was friends who contributed to giving the money so that they released me.”

Emile not only served time in jail, but he was also fined. These are the kinds of punishment that people are incurring, which can also be aggravated by Dominican “extremists,” who sometimes clash with them.

Dominican civilians also contribute to perpetuating this fear. According to the forced migrants, in 2015, many members of the Dominican population threatened them and forced them to leave the country in massive numbers. Even after their departure from the Dominican Republic, forced migrants continue to be the target of Dominicans who may insult the forced migrants and violently attack them when they try to cross the border. When Emile returned to the Dominican Republic just a few months after he was forced to leave, he was surprised. The place that he used to call home was no longer
ready to welcome him back. He has simply become a black sheep. Not only did he face soldiers who arrested him, he also experienced fear of and violence from Dominican citizens, as he explained,

They (Dominicans) always threaten me. I went to work there. I was passing by, a Dominican called me while I didn’t do anything wrong. He said: people from Anse-à-Pitres must not go up there because those people are used to stealing our things. I say: you can’t tell me something like this. How many things have you already put somewhere and they told you I was the one who took them? At the same moment, he threw me a machete. I had a machete in my hand. I spared his machete. He threw me another one, I spared it. Then I went to him and I threw him a machete too. By seeing that I could injure him, he moved away.

Like many other undocumented migrants, Emile was able to cross the border by avoiding the soldiers who were watching the entry and the exit points. This strategy is commonly used by clandestine migrants, who often follow several devious paths that avoid official checkpoints in the border zone (Musoni 2016). However, Emile not only has to escape state officials, but also civilians, who are unofficially also a part of the surveillance apparatus of the Dominican-Haitian border.

The multifaceted nature of the border as both a bridge and a barrier that characterizes fear embodied by Dominican soldiers and civilians, and the symbolic violent history that continues to haunt people’s minds, makes the border both a terrain of danger and agency. The danger for the forced migrants is based on the fact that corporeal mobility remains the greatest means available to them to cross the border. Such physical mobility puts them at risk crossing the border because of Dominican soldiers’
surveillance and civilians’ potential threat. The agency is reflected in their ability to concoct strategies that include drawing on communication networks, time, and space to challenge both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized border forces.

2.5 The Communicational, Temporal, and Spatial Dimension (CTS) in border crossings as resources for agency and power

Thanks to an array of resources available to them, migrants residing in the global north are able to undertake activities that connect them with people and places across borders without necessarily having to move (Louie 2000). Despite their lack of technology, the forced migrants develop strategies that include sharing information among members of their groups and using space and time to facilitate their border crossings. This section is a description of the strategies that shape and enable the forced migrants’ transnational mobility, that is, their movements across the Dominican-Haitian border.

First, being informed plays a significant role in guiding and enabling the forced migrants’ transnational mobility. As Louie (2000) argues, the creation of social networks across borders is essential to migrant’s practices. The networks that allow migrants to connect with people and their homeland can be part of both local and global circuits (Smart 1999). Forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres lack a constituted global network. Information about the danger that crossing the border may entail is locally constituted and generally spread by word of mouth between group members. Through verbal networks, friends may advise each other against crossing the border at a specific time. When I met Willy, a man in his forties who arrived in Tête-à-l’Eau in 2015, he was worried about the risks of crossing the border everyday to go to work. During my visit, he
stayed in Anse-à-Pitres and he explained to me why he did not go to the Dominican Republic: “I don’t go to St Domingue because of information I got from people; sometimes they (fellows) tell us to sit down here, to not go out. Therefore, we stay here.”

Willy was informed by friends about the potential threat of crossing the border. When spreading information to alert someone about the threat of crossing the border, people also tell each other stories about people who were caught in the Dominican Republic and their horrific experiences. Therefore fellows constitute a great resource despite the lack of access to technologies. While I was in Anse-à-Pitres, many forced migrants said that they did not even have a phone.

Like communication networks, knowledge of time and location help coordinate movement. For instance, Cresswell (2006) suggests that movement is made up of time and space and that any consideration of movement that does not take time into account is missing an important facet. Therefore, people’s everyday mobility is imbued with a relationship to time (Munn 1992). In the context of my work, time is shaped by Malinoskian functionalism that views time as a means to coordinate activities (Munn 1992). Malinowski’s view of culture is rooted in utilitarianism, a theory according to which every feature of any people past and present must be explained in relation to the biological needs of individual human beings (Radcliffe-Brown 1949). I refer to this utilitarian aspect to show how forced migrants rely on time to coordinate their border activities. In this context, time is not simply a system in which events come in succession, but functions as a system that directs and shapes forced migrants’ daily practices. For instance, Evans Pritchard relied on time to explain "social activities" or the "relation between activities" (Munn 1992), in particular the daily movements of cattle and seasonal
passages between villages and camps. In the same way, forced migrants use time as a safety net to coordinate their movements across borders.

Forced migrants know when soldiers are not in service and when it is the right time for them to cross to the Dominican Republic to undertake their activities. Although soldiers do not have a constant presence on the unofficial points of the border, there are times they patrol the mountainous regions where most forced migrants go to work. If someone is unlucky enough to find themselves in the wrong place and time, they risk being apprehended by Dominican soldiers. Therefore, forced migrants get up early at dawn to cross the border, predicting that the soldiers will not be around so early in the day. Knowing the right time to cross the border is a concern for Melinord, who has been displaced in Tête-à-l’Eau since 2015 and whose precarious family life obliged him to turn towards the Dominican Republic. He explained: “sometimes, it is in the Dominican Republic we go to make small charcoal to improve our lives. Soldiers are watching us. We can’t go all the time.” As a result of the soldiers’ surveillance of the border, Mélinord often stays in Anse-à-Pitres in order to avoid crossing the border at an inappropriate time.

Sometimes, forced migrants must wait days for the best time to cross, especially after rumors had spread or they had been informed from fellows of people who have been apprehended in the forests by soldiers. Therefore, time shapes and guides the forced migrants’ border crossings, and together with space, it constitutes two fundamental axes around which their everyday mobility revolves (Cresswell 2006).

Third, in addition to communication and time, forced migrants use space to enable them in their mobility through their conception of Pedernales, a Dominican Region, as a continuous space of the Haitian border town of Anse-à-Pitres. This way of
conceptualizing place allows them to mentally insert and project themselves in spaces that are geographically imagined even before traversing them. Through this kind of geographical imagination, the forced migrants have become less place-based and place-bound (Daniels 1992), making Pedernales simply their next door. Taking advantage of this proximity, people from Anse-à-Pitres go to Pedernales for healthcare services and even school. This continuity is expressed in how people talk about the border and how in particular, they perceive the region of Pedernales as a continuous space of Anse-à-Pitres.

As a matter of fact, in their narratives, forced migrants reframed Pedernales as a continuous space of Anse-à-Pitres than a discontinuous one, which appeared in the way they interchanged the names of places. In the Dominican Republic, the majority of forced migrants were living in poor, mountainous, and peripheral areas of Pedernales such as Avila, Mencía, Aguas Negras, Los Arroyos and others. A number of forced migrants I had conversations with perceived these areas as distinct from St Domingue. In fact, St Domingue, is the Spanish equivalent of Santo Domingo. Informally, Haitians refer to the Dominican Republic as Saint Domingue and use the name of Santo Domingo to officially refer to the capital of the Dominican Republic. Many forced migrants use Saint Domingue and the Dominican Republic as two distinct places, where Saint Domingue is seen as just the other side of the border or simply as in juxtaposition with Anse-à-Pitres. For example, Alina, a young woman who was born in the Dominican Republic, maintained that she was not in Saint Domingue during an interview: “I wasn’t in Saint Domingue. I was in a mountain on the other side of the border.” Another woman, Tisia, when talking about her migration history from Haiti to the Dominican Republic, maintained that: “I come from Croix-des-Bouquets, Haiti. I crossed to the Dominican
Republic. From the Dominican Republic, I went to St Domingue.” In the first story, Alina’s statement expresses a form of geographical continuity when she vaguely situated where she was living as the other side of the border without referring to the Dominican Republic. It means to her that the place was so close. The place she refers to is one of the peripheral areas of the region of Pedernales where the majority of migrants were working. Tisia’s statement expresses a form of discontinuity between the Dominican Republic and Saint Domingue as if they were two different countries. Yet, the two places refer to the same country. These border narratives are sometimes confusing and require geographical and historical knowledge from audiences in order to understand where people stand when they talk about space. However, these narratives broaden our understanding of place as something that is not so much fixed (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006), but something that is a center of meaning (Cresswell, 2006) and that can be culturally constructed by people (Coe 2011). The conception of continuous space rooted in people’s stories expresses an appropriation of space. Also the forced migrants rely on their visual knowledge of Pedernales in order to avoid soldiers and cross the border strategically.

Indeed, the sense of geographical knowledge of Pedernales is an asset in strategically crossing the border in that it helped forced migrants locate resources and reconfigure the visual space. Mobility is fraught with risks, so sometimes, the forced migrants need to run away when soldiers are around and watching the border. Not knowing the space can be dangerous as they can be forced to surrender and be trapped. Forced migrants know how to navigate the mountains in order to be at the right place during their transnational endeavors. The way they define and redefine space illustrates
how we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how people represent the world to themselves (Levitt, Schiller 2004). This re-configuration of space according to people’s desire reflects in Kännel’s strategies to cross the border. As an undocumented migrant, going to the Dominican Republic cannot be more perilous for him, but his knowledge of the space plays an important role in helping him succeed in his move and circumvent Dominican soldiers. Kännel explained his strategies crossing the border:

“I have a sister who lives in the Dominican Republic. I always go to see her, but you know, I don’t have papers. When I am going, when I get in front of the barracks, sometimes they let me pass. Other times, when they don’t want to let people cross, I pass behind under the bush. There is a speed bump; once you pass under it, you appear on a street. They won’t make me return because I appear on the other street.”

The technique used by Kännel, juggling different reference points to cross to Pedernales and recreate space for himself, corroborates Cresswell (2006)’s idea according to which moving people are agents in the production of time and space. The new space of crossing created by Kännel is a transnational space that goes beyond the borders connecting the two countries. The previous experiences of the displaced people living in Pedernales helped them develop a good sense of the place and time, which allows them to speculate about when soldiers are patrolling the border and where they are in the mountains. Those previous experiences are stored in their memory, recalled, and reused at any given moment. As Boyarin (1994) suggests, memory becomes the principal medium through which the forced migrants manipulate time-space.
Other migrants use the Pedernales River as a reference point to cross to the city of Pedernales. I was in the office of SJM with Makdo, Josie, Inès, and Zamy. The latter, Zamy, has sisters in Pedernales. He does not have legal documents to go to the Dominican Republic, but by exploring the notion of space, he found a way to go to his sisters’ house almost every afternoon in Pedernales, which is within a twenty minute walk from Anse-à-Pitres. He went sometimes to spend time with his sisters and took the opportunity to charge his phone. Like Kannèl, he was capable of juggling with space. Zamy usually went to take a bath in the river—which serves as the border between the two countries—with Dominicans and merged with them. As a “light-skinned man,” he was invisible to Dominican soldiers. This allowed him to cross to Pedernales once he finished his bath in the Pedernales River. Each time forced migrants create a small space within a larger space beyond the border, they challenge imposed fixity by inventing and reinventing transnational space, which takes shape with the movement of these people across the border and their agency to produce and reproduce transnational structures.

**Conclusion**

Finally, an understanding of the event of 2015 that resulted in the displacement of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent needs to be contextualized within the history of the Haitian-Dominican border that informs of the connection and disconnection between the two peoples and their practices. In fact, the border has played a significant role in building social and economic relationships between the two peoples. However, the connecting role of the border is limited, as the Dominican state seeks to own the border, keeping Haitians out. In complicity with Dominican civilians, the state has secured the border, making it a barrier to Haitian migrants. Galemba (2013:276) argues that “at
borders, states may be both present and absent—in terms of providing services and responding to citizens (Donnan and Wilson 1999).” In the exercise of border policing on the Anse-à-Pitres border, the Haitian state is totally absent, which gives the Dominican state the power to impose its domination at the border. Despite the risks that crossing the border involved, the forced migrants employed many tactics that enabled their mobility and challenged Dominican surveillance and border power. Their ability in shifting strategies to brave the danger of crossing is constitutive of power and agency, but this does not erase the need for documentation to cross the border, something that many people in Anse-à-Pitres lack.
CHAPTER 3: DOCUMENTATION AND ID PAPER: THE MATERIALITY OF DISPLACED PEOPLE’S LIVES

“I was born in Abila (Dominican Republic). I don’t have a cédula. When I was a child, I think they (my parents) could do it for me but because of their lack of intelligence, they didn’t. Now it is harder, people can’t register their children. In the past, it was possible to do it but they didn’t do it for me. My mother and my father are Haitian. The fact that I don’t have an ID paper; I can’t live on Dominican land.”

In this statement, Manchina expresses her regret for not having a Dominican identity. As she was born in the Dominican Republic, according to the law of jus soli, which was in force in the country at the time she was born or until 2010, she had the right to have a birth certificate. She blames her parents for her stateless situation. Even though parents have to be held responsible for providing their children with legal documents, Haitian parents faced many challenges when registering their children at a Dominican registry. The absence of a legal document has cost her the right to reside in the Dominican Republic. Manchina is simply an example of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian origin who became excluded on the basis of documentation.

This chapter examines how the displaced people have continued to experience forms of statelessness in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, as most are living without legal documents, which contributes to marginalizing them. These newly displaced people to Anse-à-Pitres are living in a state of civil death. By civil death, I refer to the incapacity of these people to enjoy civil and political rights in society in the same way as legal citizens. As a result, they are marginalized and isolated from the larger Anse-à-Pitres community. I argue that
the absence of legal documentation contributes to marginalizing the displaced people, excluding them from society, leaving them in a state of civil death that constitutes a barrier to the enjoyment of civil and political rights. The lack of a legal document that confers them Haitian nationality attests to the absence and laxity of the Haitian state in guaranteeing and protecting the rights of its subjects.

Generally, the invention of a documentating system forms a well constituted bureaucracy that guarantees administrative control and the construction of subjects, objects, and socialities (Hull 2012: 253). Documenting individual identity allows modern governments to control their populations by rendering them legible (Caplan and Torpey 2001). According to Torpey (2000), documenting people gives the state the monopoly of the legitimate means of movement, endowing the state with the capacity to embrace its own citizens in order to extract from them the resources they need to reproduce themselves over time (Torpey 2000). On the other hand, people who are documented are not only controlled by the state, but they are also endowed with some kind of empowerment that allows them to exercise political and civil rights in society i.e., engage in society as full members. In this chapter, I am focusing on specific forms of documentation that includes birth certificates, passports, and ID cards, which can be conceived of as technologies of identification that enable states to make their subjects “legible”— an operation that is essential to modern, democratic state-making (Reddy 2005: 255-256 citing Scott et al.). These kinds of identity document are fundamental to modern society in most of its aspects and institutions, including government, employment, education, health, transportation, recreation, social life, property ownership and legal defense.
Documentation allows the state to accomplish multiple goals that include labeling individuals both on its territory and abroad, distinguishing them from outsiders, and regulating their movements inside and across the boundary of the nation-state. On the one hand, identity papers force the state objectively to recognize and comprehend people’s existence (Kaufmann 2004). As such, people who hold identity documents can benefit from access and communication with the state and institutions that are extensions of the state (Abrams 2006). On the other hand, documented identity is central to the process of subjectification, where identity itself becomes akin to paper or material, constantly shifting into and out of reach—but also capable of being possessed, moved, disregarded, stored away, and dissolved (Bolker 2018: 319). Through this process of subjectification, man’s existence is directed and controlled by central agencies (319), hereby, the state. These ideologies based on processes of subjectification that are central to documentation can help us to understand the relations between stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres and the Haitian state. First, by not giving these people ID papers, the state frees itself from all kinds of responsibilities towards these people. Second, as a result of this gap, the displaced people become more subjects of themselves than of the state. This lack of documentation prevents these people from making their identity corporeal (Bolker 2018: 324) i.e., physically visible to the state. In Anse-à-Pitres, many displaced people remain stateless, as they did not possess any document that granted them Haitian citizenship. I suggest that their lack of legal identity is attributable to the absence and laxity of the Haitian state that fails in its state-ness, leaving a gap that fill by designing programs to document people in Anse-à-Pitres.
In this chapter, first, I discuss the legal context that led to the statelessness of Dominicans of Haitian descent and their displacement to Haiti. Through documentation, the Dominican state concocted a mode of governance that helped it identify and de-identify people on its territory including people of Haitian backgrounds that were stripped of their citizenship.

Second, I show that the civil registry, which is the institution responsible for the delivery of birth certificates, is confronted with a series of structural problems because the state neglects the institution and does not fund it. This lack of attention to the civil status in local areas is also the consequence of the politics of former Haitian leaders that aimed to favor urban development over rural.

Third, with the support of CRS (Catholic Relief Service) and USDOL (US Department of Labor), the SJM has implemented a program of documentation called PwoKontram (literally Protecting People’s Work Conditions), which helped some vulnerable people, such as undocumented forced migrant families, to secure birth certificates. This step towards re-establishing identity papers for these people confers them citizenship or quasi-citizenship, but also fills in the gap left by the state.

Fourth, I examine how the absence of legal documentation contributes to the marginalization of the forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres. Their condition of statelessness constitutes an impediment to their social, economic, and political participation in society in the same way as legal citizens.
3.1 Becoming stateless and displaced

In 2010, the Dominican state officially upheld a constitutional amendment that revoked birthright citizenship to children of undocumented Haitians (Hazel 2014). This new migration law was followed by a decision of the Dominican Constitutional Court in 2013 after Juliana Deguis Pierre—a Dominican born of undocumented Haitian parents, who was denied a Dominican ID in 2008—filed a complaint to the court for discrimination. In 2013, the Dominican Constitutional Court decided against her and made the sentence, called “la sentencia,” retroactive to 1929 (Mahoney and Nolan 2015). This retroactivity means that not only did this decision (known as decision 168-13) remove the citizenship of Haitian children born at the moment it was adopted, but the Dominican state also decided to apply this law against those who were born of undocumented parents who had entered the country since 1929 (Andreopoulos and Arat 2014). This decision made thousands of Dominicans born of Haitian parents stateless. Dominican-Haitians, even those who were part of families that had resided in the country for many generations, were no longer considered Dominican by the state. Being stateless means that they were not legally authorized to participate in Dominican society such as to vote, attend schools at a certain level, or work. There was a delay in the application of the law due to protests by the Haitian government and human rights organizations, but it was finally implemented in 2015. According to Amnesty International (2015: 6), “a large number of these people consider the Dominican Republic as their country, since they were born there and lived there all their life. Often, they have no connection with Haiti, have never been there, and can barely speak the language. Many of them are the children or grandchildren of people who are also born on Dominican soil. For these families, the Dominican Republic has been their homeland for generations.”
The Dominican state made documentation a mode of governance, whereby documenting serves as a strategy to exclude Dominican-Haitians from Dominican citizenship. It is by referring to the Dominican constitution that one may understand how documentation has been used not simply as an instrument of bureaucratic organizations, rules, ideologies, knowledge, practices, and subjectivities (Hull 2012: 253), but also as an instrument of privilege and exclusion (Huffman 2013). As De Genova (2002 cited by Reeves 2013) suggests, as an anthropologist I do not pretend to become a legal historian in examining the statelessness of Dominican-Haitians in relation to Dominican law, but I believe that the knowledge of the legal context allows me to apprehend prior moments and movements (Coutin and Yngvesson 2006) that are at the root of these people’s statelessness. In fact, for many decades, the Dominican Republic has recognized *jus soli*, which gave the opportunity to anyone born on Dominican soil, except children of people in transit such as tourists or diplomats, to be entitled with birthright citizenship. This principle was consecrated by Dominican constitution in its article 11, “all persons born in the territory of the Dominican Republic” are Dominican citizens (Human Rights Watch 2002). However, children born of Haitian parents have been the object of discrimination and were not automatically recognized as citizens of the country although their right to citizenship was clearly stipulated by the law. They had to satisfy a number of requirements, which is a complex process. When a child is born, Haitian parents need to obtain a paper that identifies the date and location of the birth of their children from the hospital’s maternity ward or visit a civil registry to obtain a birth certificate. The registry requires maternity papers or an affidavit to prove the birth in the country, both of which are difficult for applicants to find. In addition, at the registry, parents are expected to
show proof of Dominican citizenship, which officials sometimes reject, presuming that a child’s parents are Haitian because they are black. Therefore, many Dominican-Haitians could not obtain a Dominican identity document. This means that the majority of these people of Haitian origin were stateless and, according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, were living in a state of permanent illegality (Human Rights Watch 2002). Dominican-Haitians found themselves in the same category as people in transit who include children of foreign diplomats or of foreigners who were in transit in the Dominican Republic at the time of birth (22). Those discriminatory practices have been institutionalized and in 2004, a new immigration law was promulgated, officially treating temporary foreign workers and undocumented migrant workers as "in transit (Amnesty International 2015: 6)," which put an end to any possibility for Haitian parents to register their children born in Dominican territory acquiring Dominican nationality. The refusal of legal status to Dominican-Haitians forced them out of the Dominican Republic.

Between 2015 and 2016, hundreds of these people arrived in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti where they expect to be provided with an identity document and conferred Haitian nationality. In Haiti, they need to go through the civil registry, which is the main state institution in charge of delivering basic legal documents.

3.2 The Haitian civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres

We cannot talk about documentation in Anse-à-Pitres without talking about the civil registry, which is in charge of registering people, providing them with birth, death, and marriage certificates. Generally, the civil registry plays a significant role in the control of populations in a nation-state. For instance, since 1972, the legislative assembly of France showed its interest in regulating its citizens’ civil status by adopting a decree
that stated that “[t]he legislative authority will establish for all inhabitants, without distinction, the manner in which births, marriages, and deaths will be certified; and it will designate the public officials who will receive and maintain these files.” (Gérard Noiriel in Caplan and Torpey 2001: 28. The registration of members of the population was a governing strategy of the French government but also a way for an individual to become a member of the civil community. Therefore, the civil registry plays a significant role in integrating people into society. Following Noiriel (2001) today, the formalities of civil status are part of administrative routine and constitute the basis for the entire logic of modern identification practices in society. As a former French colony, Haiti has been greatly influenced by France in many domains including law. This can be seen with the creation of Haitian civil registry. Indeed, since the 1970s, Haiti has established a civil registry, which is evident in the Haitian civil code that requires that each commune has a civil registrar in office at the center of the community. The tenured civil official is authorized to receive birth, marriage, recognition, adoption and death certificates, and to make modifications or rectifications requested by a justice decision. The civil status is facing many challenges such as the lack of budget and personnel, which prevents it from responding people who want to obtain a birth certificate. This causes a great number of the Haitian population to live in effective statelessness. By effective statelessness, I refer to the type of statelessness that affects children who are living within the country but whose birth has never been registered (Bhabha, 2011). Indeed, a significant percentage of the Haitian population is not registered due to problems that are attributable to the dysfunction of the civil registry.
Bertin and Drogue (2012), volunteers at the GARR and a representative at a Haitian community in France respectively, allude to structural and sociological factors in order to explain the malfunction of the Haitian civil status. First, structurally, they discuss the lack of civil status offices covering the whole Haitian territory. The registrars and their clerks are often not qualified for the work because there is not a school they can go for this purpose. The choice to fill these positions is often political. In addition, there is no budget to fund the civil registry. This lack of funding is typical of Anse-à-Pitres, where there is no state investment to support the civil status. Second, they mention that the population often ignores the procedures and do not value or see the importance of identity documents. Accordingly, people are often illiterate and do not know what to do when the procedure to obtain a document is complicated. However, their argument that Haitians do not give too much importance to documentation does not match the behavior of people of Anse-à-Pitres toward documentation, especially the forced migrants. The attitude of forced migrants towards documentation suggests that they possess documentary literacy, which is the set of skills required to possess and store documents, so they can be easily accessed (Robertson 2014: 75). For example during my home visits, some displaced people would pull an identification card or a small piece of paper that they were given by such organizations as the GARR or UNCHR that serves as identification out from their wallet. They preserved their identity documents. Besides the structural and sociological aspects mentioned by Bertin and Drogue, I see, in the dysfunction of the Haitian civil status, a political line adopted by Haitian political leaders for decades, that concentrates all efforts in the urban area while abandoning the countryside (Stepick 1982). This allows urban people to get a birth certificate more
quickly than people living in the remote areas of the country, including Anse-à-Pitres, that lack material support and funding. For example, the only press that provides materials to registries is located in Port-au-Prince, the capital. The difficulty forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres faced in obtaining a birth certificate is the consequence of the politics of marginalization of the state towards a category of Haitian citizens.

Trouillot (1990) gives an idea of how those political and economic choices worked in poor people’s lives during the Duvalier dictatorship period of 1957-1986 in Haiti. The Haitian peasants were politically marginalized while they were the productive force of the country, providing surplus to rich civil servants. Besides taxes that the peasants had to pay to the state, landlords could also extract additional surplus from them through various forms of sharecropping (Trouillot 1990: 77). This split of the Haitian population between urban people and peasants promoted by the former leaders after the independence of the country was also evidenced in the civil status. Carl Denis argues: “Even from the point of view of civil status, the difference is clear. The birth certificate and other civil status documents contain mentions defining the origin of the Haitian. The native has a "birth certificate (city-dweller)", the peasant a "birth certificate (peasant) (Pierre 2006: 12).” The politics that consisted in dividing the Haitian people into two categories have favored urban dwellers over marginalized peasants, who are facing challenges to register their birth at the civil status in many areas of the country. The politics of documentation makes peasants doubly marginalized: legally and socially. This is not without any consequence on the civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres, which works in poor conditions without any substantial state budget.
I visited the office of the civil status in downtown Anse-à-Pitres during my fieldwork to learn more about the challenges that it was facing and how it worked to provide people with legal documents. A small room in the house of the registrar was used for the office. When I arrived, there was a clerk working, but there were not many people with him. In this tiny room, there is no electricity, nor any ventilation in a tropical country where temperature can escalate to 90-95°F Fahrenheit. In the middle of the day, people are simply sweating. According to the civil registrar, the state does not provide him with the necessary means to work, such as an office to house the civil status and forms to do certificates. Therefore, he is using a room in his own house to house the civil status, because the state gives him only 500 gourdes (USD 31) to rent a location. The dreadful circumstances in which the registrar is working attest to the negligence of the state, which does not care about serving its people, and also to the lack of importance granted to people’s documents that can be easily lost in an insecure place. Almost everyone I met in Anse-à-Pitres was complaining about the inefficiency of the civil status in responding to their needs for identity documents. Some people possess a birth certificate, but they maintain that it is not registered in the national archives located in Port-au-Prince, which makes it difficult for them to obtain an official copy of their birth certificate when they need to obtain a passport, for instance. This may be one reason some institutions, including the French embassy, are suspicious about legal documents issued in Haiti (Bertin and Drogue 2012). Due to all these difficulties and administrative problems, many people in Anse-à-Pitres end up not having an identity document or any valid documentation. This makes Anse-à-Pitres a city of unregistered people, a fact that is
reflected in people’s stories about their challenges to obtain a birth certificate or a passport.

In fact, there are two problems that people commonly face in Anse-à-Pitres when they want to obtain a passport. Some people do not have a birth certificate and others do have one, but it is not registered in the national archives, so people consider it just a piece of paper. In fact, an unregistered birth certificate does not have any legal standing.

Missolo lives in Fond-Jeannette and may be considered one of the elites because he is one of the most educated people in the area. He guided many forced migrants to Fond-Jeannette after they were forced out of the Dominican Republic. As a result, all forced migrants in the area know him as he has continued to support them in the absence of the state. During a focus group, Missolo talked about his own experience when he wanted to get a passport. He paid about 12,500 HT gourdes (USD 208), 25 times higher than the normal price, for a passport that was supposed to cost him 500 HT gourdes. During a visit with an SJM employee, Missolo said: “I am happy you come here. In Fond-Jeannette only my brother and I have a birth certificate. I had to pay 12,500 HT gourdes to have a passport, spending much to go to Port-au-Prince.” In Anse-à-Pitres, all categories of the population are the victims of the lack of documentation. Among the migrant population, though, the absence of documentation is more blatant.

The majority of forced migrants did not have a birth certificate at the time of my research in Anse-à-Pitres, between 2016 and 2017. Even though their children were born in the Dominican Republic, they could not register them because the Dominican state rules out this possibility. They could not obtain a delivery certificate from the hospital, which pushed many people to give birth at home. Without such a document, they were
not able to register their children at the Dominican local civil registry. Their fate was sealed when, in 2010, the Dominican state abrogated the *jus soli* replacing it by *jus sanguinis* (right of blood), ruled to prevent Haitian children from being registered at the Dominican civil status, and removed the citizenship of people of Haitian descent. In 2014, due to pressure from human rights organizations, the Dominican Constitutional court that declared Dominican-Haitians stateless has ordered the National Council of Immigration to create a regularization plan called PNRE (National Alien Regulation Plan) in order to allow the stateless people to apply to re-acquire Dominican nationality. However, the procedure was complicated, considering that the documents required by the Dominican state constitute a barrier to these people who do not have any identification papers and the short deadline within which people had to submit applications. At the end of this program of regularization in 2015, organizations of Dominican and Haitian civil society such as GARR (Groupe d’Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Rapatriés) and CEDESO (Centro de Desarrollo Sostenible) simply considered it a failure by maintaining that: “We express our grave concern over the closing date of the National Alien Regulation Plan (PNRE), which leads to the acceleration of abusive and illegal deportations by CESFRONT’s immigration agents and soldiers in the Dominican Republic (Jean Baptiste 2015).” As a consequence, thousands of Dominicans born of Haitian descent were already stateless before they became displaced in Anse-à-Pitres. When adding these forced migrants to long-term residents without documentation a significant number of stateless people now live in Anse-à-Pitres.

In 2017, after a visit in the Dominican Republic, where many thousands of people of Haitian backgrounds were facing a lack of documentation preventing them from
applying for the regulation of their status, the elected Haitian president, Jovenel Moïse, promised to facilitate these people’s acquisition of identity documents, particularly ID cards and passports. With the intervention of the president, structures were created in Port-au-Prince, with the hope that they would be extended to the rest of the country, in order to deliver identity documents. However, in reality, the documentation crisis persisted, as the system remains corrupt and slow to respond to peoples’ requests for documentation. In Anse-à-Pitres, some organizations or agencies, such as SJM and GARR, entered the process in order to help vulnerable people acquire documentation, especially birth certificates. The SJM has launched campaigns of mobilization about documentation, organizing meetings and focus groups to which it invited local representatives and representatives of the national state. However, these representatives failed to attend apart from some local authorities from the rural area (CASEC) who do not exercise any real power. The intervention of the SJM came in support to a state that remains passive and sluggish despite the increased number of stateless people in the commune after the arrival of the forced migrants.

3.2.1 Towards supporting the civil status: SJM’s documentation project of *PwoKontram*

When the forced migrants were entering Anse-à-Pitres in 2015, representatives of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] were present at various border crossings. The UNHCR workers issued papers to some families, that contained individual’s names and pictures of family members, but those papers did not indicate places of birth. The purpose was limited, but essential, namely to provide something from the United Nations that recognized these migrants and refugees and enabled them to
request replacement birth certificates from civil registrar’s offices in Haiti. Also in the border region, particularly in Anse-à-Pitres, the SJM, a non-profit, lay organization, dedicated to the realization of social work, accompanies migrants, supports them, and helps them resettle and re-establish their lives.

The alarming situation of people without documents in Anse-à-Pitres has been taken seriously by the SJM, which, with the support of the CRS and USDOL, implemented a project called *PwoKontram* (Literally Protecting humans’ work conditions) to provide birth certificates to a few forced migrant families and other vulnerable persons in the commune of Anse-à-Pitres. To launch the project, the SJM, through its promoter and monitors on the ground, organized information sessions with local authorities, the civil registrar, representatives of local and international organizations, and members of the civil society of Anse-à-Pitres. It also organized three focus groups: one in Fond-Jeannette and two in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, during which people discuss the documentation issue. According to SJM agents in Anse-à-Pitres, *PwoKontram* is the continuation of a documentation project that started in 2013. At that time, the project worked in a specific area in Anse-à-Pitres called *Bas-Réfugiés* with people who were repatriated from the Dominican Republic. These people were given a birth certificate by the SJM. *PwoKontram* is more inclusive though. It encompasses not only migrants, but also vulnerable people throughout the commune of Anse-à-Pitres. SJM also hired more monitors and increased the number of birth certificates issued. PwoKontram was a continuing opportunity to prove the usefulness of SJM/SFw-Haïti’s accompaniment mission. Through this program, SJM used a bottom up approach, whereby its employees went to meet with people seeking the best way to serve them.
During the course of the documentation project, SJM staff met with different categories of the population through informational sessions and focus groups, inviting people to discuss how they would like SJM to assist them in the process of obtaining a birth certificate. People underlined many issues that result from the fact that people do not have documentation. For example, schoolteachers and directors, who were at an SJM meeting, complained that children came to register at school without any documentation. At a certain level of primary school, these children need at least a birth certificate in order to be allowed to participate in official state exams. The lack of documentation also affects adults of various ages. For adults, the birth certificate cost is higher, as the registrar asked them to pay a sum of money that covers all years since their birth to the present year.

People at the meeting raised another problem concerning the place that people have chosen to obtain their birth certificates. The challenges faced by many people attempting to obtain birth certificates in the commune of Anse-à-Pitres has led some parents to try to acquire birth certificates for them and their children in other places, such as Thiottes or Port-au-Prince, which causes a jurisdictional problem. For instance, one man who participated in a focus group, declared “here (in Fond-Jeannette), people don’t have birth certificates. Some people go to make “a piece of paper” in Thiottes. They don’t know if it is registered or not. They won’t be able to have any service in Anse-à-Pitres.” As a matter of fact, the change of jurisdiction does not change their nationality and their belonging to the Haitian state, but it can affect their belonging to their local community, for example, if they want to vote or be elected in that place. Their participation can be contested by long-term residents.
The SJM considered people’s complaints and promised to help them acquire a birth certificate and probably a certificate from the national archives. However, the SJM national representatives recognize their limits in terms of the resources available. Even when discounting the thousands stateless in the border region, the United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF] estimates that approximately twenty percent of all children under five years of age actually born in Haiti do not have proper identification such as birth certificates (Joseph 2015). This failure of the state has adverse and lifelong consequences for Haitians, children and parents alike. Simply put, SJM feels compelled to provide such parents and their children the opportunity to acquire identification in the form of birth certificates. Children will need them to attend school in Haiti. During interviews, one woman explained that her children were refused admission to a Haitian school due to the lack of identity papers for her children. Therefore, at least by providing birth certificates, SJM hopes to promote migrant integration into community life in Anse-à-Pitres, where most of them already feel ostracized. To accomplish this, SJM collaborates with representatives of other local organizations such as OJIDACA (Organisation des Jeunes Dévoués pour l’Avancement de la Commune de l’Anse-à-Pitres), Espace Jeune, Kore Fanmi, and local authorities. The legal process, however, can be complicated. Here is a typical chain of events leading to issuance of a birth certificate by SJM:

1. Registration of people’s personal information by an SJM promoter and monitors in Anse-à-Pitres and in the migrant camps

2. Delivery of the registration forms to the civil registrar, the civil status representative in Anse-à-Pitres
3. Transfer of registers from the civil registrar to the public prosecutor’s department in Jacmel

4. Sending of these registers by the government commissioner to the ministry of Justice in Port-au-Prince

5. Consignment of these documents by the ministry of Justice to the national archives, which register the birth certificates

Of note, the civil registrar of Anse-à-Pitres has publicly stated his willingness to facilitate and accept the issuance of birth certificates for migrants and refugees who lack them. Encouraged by this, SJM has opened an office in Anse-à-Pitres, from where its migration and human rights monitors and a promoter spread through different camps in order to register people and transfer the forms to the office of the civil registrar. This humanitarian response is all happening at the local level, without intervention or interest from the national government.

This action is nonetheless happening in relatively peaceful fashion, albeit in the midst of serious challenges. Tens of thousands of people have escaped one hardship for another. Their legal marginalization is likely to continue with a lack of state intervention, in what some would call a state of “civil death.” Despite this, organizations such as SJM and its partners continue with its mission, hoping to impart the human rights spirit to those living in the far southeast corner of Haiti. Many of those who have crossed the border have already suffered identity deprivation and persecution in the Dominican Republic. For lack of documentation, some have been denied education, work protection or healthcare (Bartlett 2012, as cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, Amnesty...
International 2007, Lozano and Wooding 2008; Wooding and Mosley-Williams 2004) or have been expelled from the country after being discriminated against.

3.3 **Statelessness and its social corollary in the lives of the displaced people**

Having a nationality has been recognized as a fundamental right under international law (Dembour 2015) because it is intertwined with the enjoyment of human rights and integration into society. Otherwise, without a nationality, people become stateless, which exposes them to multiple forms of vulnerability, precarity, and displacement. In general, statelessness is referred to as the condition of having no nationality or legal citizenship (Weissbrodt and Collins 2006). Following Kerber (2007), I argue that statelessness may be conceived not only as a status, but also as a practice, based on the consequences that may result from it. For instance, Agamben (1998) argues that the rejection of a stateless person by the state makes them an outcast, taboo, and dangerous in their own society. This rejection of stateless people seems to be apparent in Anse-à-Pitres where forced migrants are ostracized and considered the main cause of violence and insecurity by the Haitian state and long-term residents in Anse-à-Pitres. In addition, the forced migrants arrived in a country that continues to strive to get back on its feet after the devastating 2010 earthquake and ongoing social and political instabilities.

While in Anse-à-Pitres in 2016, Hurricane Matthew hit the country and claimed the lives of about 1,000 Haitian people (Le Figaro 2016). Although their lives were spared and the hurricane damage was less extensive in comparison to the rest of the country, the community is still living with fear considering the fragility of their small
houses made of cardboard, pieces of clothes, and covered with tarpaulin; in other terms, the incapacity of their slums to stand when natural disasters threaten. Even if being in Haiti provides them a sense of freedom escaping Dominican fear and the reminiscence of the terror created by the Dominican dictator Trujillo with the pogrom of the 1930s, their lives in Haiti remain insecure and precarious. Food insecurity, poor lodging, poor access to drinkable water, and the inability to work due to being stateless are among all the issues they have to deal with in order to start a new life in Haiti. Medi’s statement, during a focus group at the camp of Parc Cadeau #1, describes his experience of displacement and the paradox of Anse-à-Pitres as a place that juxtaposes sense of freedom and suffering when he maintains: “We are quiet. We see that we are living well but there is no change. We have hunger in our stomach, morning, noon, and night.” It should be noted that by “living well,” Medi is referring to the sense of freedom that being in Anse-à-Pitres provided him, but his experience since his displacement is one of precarity and uncertainty.

I use the expression: “having peace in their heart [sense of freedom] but not in their stomach [meaning hunger]” to summarize the meaning people give to their transition from the Dominican Republic to Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, where they continue to live in precarious conditions. This peace is basic and equates to the simple fact that they are not living with the fear of deportation. It has nothing to do with the enjoyment of social and economic rights in Haiti. In other words, it does not palliate their needs of being legally integrated into the community. Their situation reminds me of Breton and Yelvington (1999), who saw the emancipation of the former enslaved as a road strewn with pitfalls when they argued that “by the end of 19th century, if Caribbean people were indeed free,
everywhere they were in chains.” Those chains for displaced people correlate with capitalist-driven processes and the enactment of migration laws that rendered them stateless, but also with their conditions in Anse-à-Pitres, where both residents and the local state see their future as uncertain and their presence as illegitimate and flawed (Zayas 2015).

The precarity\(^6\) of the people displaced in Anse-à-Pitres can be defined within the parameters of those structural circumstances linked with the world of neoliberal capitalism and the adoption of unfair laws, but also their condition of living in a state of civil death that prevents them from reaching human development, which is the satisfaction of their multidimensional well-beings. Without a legal identity or a valid identity that is registered in the national archives, the displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres liken their lives to animals, or as people who are living, but do not exist. For instance, I went to participated in a focus group about documentation with SJM staff in Fond-Jeannette, a remote place located in the periphery of Anse-à-Pitres. During the meeting, a man living in the area put all people’s complaints together and claimed that “Animals

\(^6\) Precarity has been linked with ‘anomie, anger, anxiety, and alienation’ in the face of contemporary politics, what is conceived as ‘a class-in-the-making’ (Lazar and Sanchez 2019). Allison (2013) refers to precarity as a form of suffering that is the outcome of being trapped by the instabilities and inequalities of neoliberal globalism. For instance, she shows how many Japanese accepted to do dangerous jobs that entail risks and death in order to take advantage of job opportunities generated by the 2011 earthquake. In Haiti, forced migrants find themselves in this kind of society that she describes where hope has turned scarce and the future has become bleak or inconceivable altogether (Allison 2013). The displaced people’s precarity and uncertainty can be defined according to circumstances that include the migration law taken by the Dominican state that not only displaced these people but also led to their dispossession, the absence of the Haitian state to care for their well-being and the political and economic choices of the leaders of that country that only increased inequalities and endemic poverty, their vulnerability to exploitation by outsiders, and the lack of opportunities in Haiti, particularly Anse-à-Pitres.
have paper, but we as people, we don’t have a birth certificate.” His statement is reminiscent of Gordillo (2006)’s observation, whereby he has shown how not having documents discriminated against Toba and Wichi, making them vulnerable to violence. These people simply saw themselves as animals, when they entrusted to him: “Without documentos, you can do nothing. That's the custom of this law. We didn't have documentos. They treated us like dogs.” The Haitian state proves to be lax in providing its citizens with ID papers. The generalized lack of documentation of people in Anse-à-Pitres attests to the absence of a state that cares for the wellbeing of its people, which consequently leads to the marginalization of a wide range of members of its population.

Forced migrants blame the Haitian state for their state of precarious existence because according to them, the state does not support them. In Anse-à-Pitres, it is not easy to locate the state. Upon the arrival of the forced migrants in Haiti, in a discourse held by the former president Michel Joseph Martelly on June 2015, the state promised to welcome the forced migrants with dignity contending: “Haiti is ready to stand up straight to receive with dignity its children, our brothers (Alphonse 2015)”. However, I did not notice any involvement of the state with the forced migrants. In Anse-à-Pitres, there are two ways one may locate the state in the forced migrants’ lives. Its inefficiency creates a vacuum for falseness and racketeering and its absence leads to the intervention of private organizations that come to fill the gap. On the one hand, the inefficiency of the state can be located in its incapacity to deliver legal or good documents to people, who have to turn to a lawyer for the legality of birth certificates written by a registrar. On the other hand, the absence of the state is expressed in people’s narratives that show the retreat of the state from caring for people’s wellbeing. For instance, Anissa finished her journey in
the Dominican Republic when she was deported by the authorities of this country. After coming to Haiti, she lived with her family in Tête Source. However, those family ties do not constitute a network that can help her mitigate poverty. She feels that she lacks the support of the state as she contends: “I don’t find any support from the state. We are here; we are living badly. When we find something, we take it; when we don’t find anything, we accept. We are in our country.” By expressing her belonging to the country even without a legal document that can establish this identification, Anissa is demonstrating that she depends on a state which disappeared shortly after the displaced people have arrived in Anse-à-Pitres.

**Conclusion**

In Anse-à-Pitres, most forced migrants continued to live without any legal identity. The civil registry, which is endowed with the attribution to document people, is facing many structural problems including the lack of materials and state funding. The SJM provided the institution with some material support, but this was far from solving the evils that erode the civil registry. These challenges can help explain why many people in Anse-à-Pitres are undocumented. Drogue and Bertin (2012) contend that, sociologically, many Haitian people do not value documentation because they do not see its importance in their lives. People of Anse-à-Pitres, particularly the displaced people, develop a different behavior towards documentation though. As people who are crossing the border frequently, they consider having an identity document a door to the freedom of movement and job opportunities.
When seeking to understand the causes behind the generalized statelessness in Anse-à-Pitres, while some think that the lack of documentation is attributable to the parents who do not declare their children after birth or to the illiteracy problems in Haiti, the majority consider it to be the state’s fault. The state is represented by the civil status, which is the institution invested with the power to issue birth certificates. However, through the structural aspects I explained earlier, the state demonstrates a lot of deficiency in this role of documenting people. It is by referring to the weakness of the civil status in Anse-à-Pitres and the intervention of organizations in the lives of the displaced people that we may locate the state. First, people could not understand why the state, represented by the civil registrar, delivered birth certificates that are not good to thousands of people. Second, people maintain that they did not see any willingness of the state to contribute to the functioning of the civil state. For instance, the civil registrar of Anse-à-Pitres maintained that for a long time the office had been running out of materials such as registry forms, which should be provided by the National Press, a state-owned institution. According to the registrar, the state owes the National Press many million Haitian gourdes, which made people at a meeting ironically say “the state owes the state.”

The incapacity of the Haitian state to meet the needs of its population forces it to comply with the rules of organizations that are often accountable to their donors and their funding state rather than to local people. For instance, SJM received funding from CRS and the US department of labor (USDOL) for the documentation program. While the SJM develops direct proximity to the local people that it is supporting, at the same time, it has to be accountable to its donors; this was visible to me through the visits made by CRS representatives in Anse-à-Pitres to obtain a report of the documentation program.
executed by the SJM. The intervention of private organizations in matters of
documentation is an outcome of the inefficiency of the state in making social, political
and economic choices, including providing people with a legal identity that could help
them integrate into society and benefit from basic services. As Bhabha (2011) suggests,
legal identity does not guarantee a good life, but its absence is a serious impediment to it.
As I argue in this chapter, the absence of a legal identity or a nationality puts the
displaced and stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres in a state of civil death, that is, the
impossibility to enjoy basic social and civil rights, which contributes to their
marginalization.

By exploring the materiality and the interactions between people and the state, I
show that documentation can constitute a form of governmentality. This contributes to
anthropological inquiry into documentation. This legal dimension of documentation can
be expanded to a larger perspective where documentation and borders intersect to
broaden our understanding of the interactions between people and the modern state, but
also our understanding of how documentation governs the lives of both documented and
undocumented people. As I discuss in the next chapter, because of the lack of legal
documentation, many forced migrants found it necessary to seek opportunities in the
informal economy.
I was sitting at the SJM office helping the staff with the registration of people for the documentation program I described earlier. It was at that time I met Bonèl, a man in his late fifties, who went to the Dominican Republic in 1992. He entered Haiti during the mass expulsion in 2015 and took up residence at the camp of Maletchipe in Anse-à-Pitres. With six children, Bonèl had to work hard to start a new life. During our conversation, he told me: “We have a family. We can’t stay home. I need to do something to earn the bread to give to the children. Someone can give you 50 gourdes but it is not every day. You need to do something.”

Bonèl shows the struggle the forced migrants endure just to survive from day to day, in spite of the poor access to resources. As an old man, Bonèl may not be able to work as hard as he used to in the past, but he understands the obligation to do something in order to not be dependent on other people. In Anse-à-Pitres, the only way he can create a livelihood to support his family is through the informal economy. This is the same desire that defines Bonèl and many forced migrants as agents of their own development, in the absence of support from the state and organizations.

This chapter examines the everyday survival practices of the forced migrants. I argue that the displaced people exercise important forms of agency in and over their lives by mobilizing resources through undertaking informal economic practices instead of relying on the increasingly strained resources in Anse-à-Pitres. I show how using the informal economy as a source of survival brings meaning to the displaced people’s lives, and that this meaning is more valuable than the money they generate from it.
meaning that these people found in the informal economy includes values and beliefs that infuse their everyday matter of living (Browne and Milgram 2009).

The informal economy refers to economic activities that are not regulated by the state (Neve 2005) and are generally used by poor people who face barriers to their participation in the formal economy. While the informal economy is to be found in north and global south countries, it has become very important in global south countries with the collapse of the state (Meagher 2010). As Saskia Sassen (2014) argues, this expansion of the informal economy may, in some ways, be considered an outcome of diverse forms of expulsions in the global economy causing displacement, unemployment and impoverishment. The engagement of forced migrants in the informal economy can be understood within this context, as their expulsion from the Dominican Republic also excluded them from a Dominican economy driven by global capital and neoliberalism, which has spread throughout the global south. For instance, neoliberal measures adopted by the Bolivian state led to disastrous effects such as the destruction of agricultural production and the discontinuation of subsidy programs for farmers, which forced the majority of the population into poverty and unemployment. As a consequence, Bolivia has become home to the largest informal sector of any country in Latin America, with nearly 80% of employment in both rural and urban areas being in the informal economy (Goldstein 2016: 33). The informal sector includes activities that many people engage in daily, including unregulated commerce and more illicit activities such as drug dealing, smuggling, and prostitution (Goldstein 2016). In Haiti, the informal economy constitutes the main sector of activity for the majority of the population, who suffers from high unemployment. The informal economic practices of the forced migrants are part of the
Haitian informal sector. However, for the forced migrants, they take place both in and beyond their communities in Haiti.

In this chapter, first, I demonstrate that colonial history has shaped forced migrants contemporary informal economic activities. Working on the side has been used by Caribbean enslaved people as a strategy to reproduce themselves and avoid being dependent solely on poor nutrition provided by colonizers.

Second, I trace the economic practices of the forced migrants while they were living in the Dominican Republic. I refer to their past economic experiences to examine how they shape present dynamics.

Third, I look at the picture of the local economy in Anse-à-Pitres, which rests upon fishing, commercial activities, and, to a small extent, agriculture. The deficiency of these sectors of activities demonstrates the lack of production in Anse-à-Pitres and explains why the local economy is mostly about consumption.

Fourth, I discuss the activities the forced migrants undertake in the Dominican Republic, and how these activities allow them to generate sources of income that help them sustain their lives.

Fifth, in the absence of state support, the SJM has intervened in the lives of the forced migrants, providing some development aid to them in the form of microcredit that consists more of a form of aid than a credit.

Finally, I show that forced migrants’ informal economic practices are far from helping them achieve material well being. What really helps them survive is the meaning that the engagement in those activities brings to their lives.
4.1 Present economic behavior and colonial history

Colonial history has shaped the present-day informal economy of Caribbean poor people, including the forced migrants, in particular ways. The slave-based economies in the Caribbean region were part of the capitalist system with the Caribbean people as producers for the European market, making this region an appendage of the world economy (Bonham 1992). In this form of global economy, the producers, in their position of colonized, were powerless in comparison to the wealthy consumers. They were simply accumulating capital for European colonizers. As a result, they did not own their labor and were marginalized. In order to survive, these enslaved people were forced to develop informal economic practices outside the plantations. For instance, Wolf (1982) suggests that former slaves worked personal gardens and later, following emancipation, employed their labor as market forces of production for their own subsistence.

Furthermore, some scholars have documented how slaves have developed underground economies out of the main economic stream of the plantations in order to respond to their needs. Their informal economic practices included dedicating themselves to agricultural activities and trading that allowed them to compensate for the lack of support they received from the colonizers. For example, slaves developed household economies by devoting their free time to activities such as tending gardens, collecting firewood and making charcoal, repairing houses, making handicrafts, engaging in food collecting activities, and marketing and trading (Handler and Wallman 2014: 448). According to Forret (2004), many slaves diligently raised and sold their own crops, and tended horses and livestock throughout the antebellum South. They also traded a wide range of commodities stolen from their masters or produce from their gardens that
included chickens, turkeys, beef to poor whites, and, which helped them to acquire nonessential luxuries or specialty foodstuffs that were not as readily obtained on the plantation (790-791).

Finally, after emancipation, white elites of the Caribbean region continued to have an upper hand on major economic resources. As a result of these colonial and neocolonial processes that made and continue to make resources the prerogative of small dominant groups, former enslaved tried to develop several different income sources such as working for wages on the plantation, or renting or squatting on small pieces of land which would be cultivated by the women and children, and which helped them to carve out new lives on their own terms (Bridget and Yelvington 1999: 6). These examples, rooted in colonial history, highlight the agency of marginalized people. In the same vein, forced migrants show combativeness and agency despite economic and social constraints, drawing upon informal economic practices that range from selling their labor, making charcoal, logging, and gardening in order to build lives of their own making in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti.

4.2 Economic activities back in the Dominican Republic

During a visit to the camp of Parc Cadeau, I met with Anicia, a woman in her forties, who was born in Altagracias, Dominican Republic. Her father died and left her undocumented. She complained to me about her situation of having neither Dominican documentation nor a Haitian ID card. She has a deep regret that as a Dominican born, she could not secure a Dominican legal identity and it was because of this that she was deported to Anse-à-Pitres. I was interested in knowing how she made a living in such a
situation. We were sitting on a bench at the entrance of the camp Parc Cadeau #2 on a sunny day, talking. Physically, Anicia appears strong and determined even though she was pushed by the deep poverty in the camp. Anicia agreed that her life was not the same in the Dominican Republic. She remembered her life just two years from the time I met with her: “In the Dominican Republic, I worked at people’s houses. My husband did agricultural work. Sometimes, I did small commerce but it is not big thing. I used to sell small sweets on the street.” Without any legal document, the economic activities performed by Anicia and her husband were part of the informal sector. They were the strategies she used to provide for the family. Interestingly, her sources of income were diversified because of her husband who engaged in agricultural labor. Now, sitting in Anse-à-Pitres without undertaking any economic activity, Anicia does not feel comfortable. Even though she was not earning much in the Dominican Republic, she could have done something to “make do.” Many Haitians who were living in the Dominican Republic had a similar experience, where they managed to make a living through working off the books.

The displaced population found in Anse-à-Pitres is composed of many young people in their twenties who were born in the Dominican Republic, and adult men and women between their thirties and sixties originating from proximate areas such as Belle-Anse, Thiottes, and Fonds-Verretes, who migrated to the Dominican Republic during the twentieth and twenty first century to work mainly in the agricultural sector. The majority of their labor was informal and uncontrolled, as most crossed the border without legal documents and integrated into the unregulated work available in the country (Wooding and Bridget 2004: 15). However, some migrants entered with temporary work permits, as
the Haitian government signed agreements with Dominican companies to recruit Haitian workers, among other West Indians, as a source of cheap labor. Emigration fees and recruiting permits became the Haitian government’s largest internal source of revenue (Martinez 1999). For example, in 1980 around 200,000 Haitians were permanently residing in the Dominican Republic, of which 70,000 were workers in various sectors, but especially in agricultural work (Grasmuck and Pesar 1991). This suggests that before being driven out of the country, forced migrants’ labor was a significant contribution to Dominican agriculture. This trend is confirmed by Lauren Derby (1994: 516), who argued that Haitians constituted the very center of economic life in the various Dominican border economies, which were rooted in agriculture and pastoralism. In the Dominican Republic, most forced migrants lived in the mountainous regions and worked the land and could have their own gardens even though they had to share the harvest with Dominican landowners. Besides this, they raised cattle and owned horses, pigs, goats and chickens. Therefore, the forced migrants have not always been totally dispossessed. Even though they earned very little, many of them attested that their life was better in the Dominican Republic than in Haiti. Economically, they had more opportunities as they could work in the agricultural sector, have small businesses, and perform domestic labor. They felt that they had some control over their lives and were able to take care of themselves and their families.

Mina was brought to the Dominican Republic by her mother when she was a child. She was forced to leave the country in the summer of 2015 because of Dominican threat and is living in the camp of Parc Cadeau with four children. She arrived in Anse-à-Pitres with nothing: “I didn’t take anything. I came with nothing. The gardens I did
stayed down there, my old animals stayed behind; robbers took them. We came like this with our empty hands.” Being displaced in Haiti in such a state of material dispossession, her situation went from bad to worse. In the Dominican Republic, she had different sources of income with her husband. She told me: “In the Dominican Republic, I used to do commerce. My husband did agriculture.” These activities allowed the family to survive in the country and support themselves in the face of marginalization.

Some forced migrants who had a family contend that, in the Dominican Republic, they were able to combine salaries from agricultural work and other activities. For instance, sometimes, the husband cultivated the earth while the wife managed a small business. She could sell at home or in the street as a mobile merchant. Lwiz is living at the camp of Tête-à-l’Eau, which is located on the Anse-à-Pitres-Pedernales border. She was brought to the Dominican Republic when she was only one year old by her mother, who went in search of a better life in the 1980s. Lwiz had spent her entire life there, from being raised to giving birth to her four children, before she was displaced to Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti in 2015. When she was living in the Dominican Republic, the family’s income came from both her selling and her husband’s agricultural labor; as she put it: “When I was in the Dominican Republic, my husband was working the land. Me, I was doing small businesses. I used to sell rice, all things, flour, and oil. I sold in wholesale.” She felt good about her life experience in the Dominican Republic: “We were good because we were working doing businesses, gardening, harvesting our peas, many quintals of peas. We used to get money.” Lwiz was able to diversify the household economy rather than depend only on agricultural work, which helped the family survive.
For Anicia and other forced migrants, living in the Dominican Republic had both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, the Dominican Republic offered them some economic opportunities, as they could perform some informal odd jobs and raise cattle, but on the other hand, this country remains in their memory as one that marginalized, excluded, and materially dispossessed them, and that, in return, took back what it economically gave them. Carmelia translates this situation of the Dominican Republic as both positive and negative for the forced migrants. Her entire life was spent in the Dominican Republic and her contribution to the Dominican agricultural economy bears indelible prints as she had an active life working, gardening: “In the Dominican Republic, I used to cultivate the earth planting fruit trees. We had a big yard with avocado trees, coffee, and mango trees.” In this sense, in the Dominican Republic, she could generate some income in the margins of the formal economy. However, she was forced to leave on the spot. When a Dominican soldier asked her to leave, she said: “How should we go without any money? We gardened and it was lost.” The Dominican Republic represents the country that gave them something and at the same time that brutally dispossessed them. This dispossession is apparent through the system of sharecropping, which consists of working on the property Dominican owners and also giving the owners a fifth of the harvest.

The conditions of the sharecropping system between workers and their landowners vary. If, for example, the worker bought the seed himself/herself, he/she could keep a great part of the harvest, but if, on the contrary, it was the landowner who gave the seed, the worker would obtain a very small part of the harvest after the landowner had retrieved their profit and the equivalent of their investment. In 2016, I met
Ruben, a man in his fifties, at the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. He went to the Dominican Republic in 2003 and was forced to return to Anse-à-Pitres in 2015. During his 12 years in the Dominican Republic, he worked as a sharecropper on Dominican land: “When I was in the Dominican Republic, I grew peas and corn. The landowner gave me the seed. He put everything on his notebook. During the harvest, he took off everything that he invested. You almost had nothing left. You only had something to eat.” In the case of Ruben, the landowner was the one who decided to retrieve his part of the harvest. Some Dominican owners did not strictly observe the one-fifth rule though. According to some forced migrants who worked in the system, even though they provided the seed, some landowners left everything to the discretion of the workers as far as the sharing of the harvest is concerned; the workers decided the quantity they wanted to give to the landowners. Anous’ Dominican boss was good because Anous could borrow money from him to buy the seed. However, after getting his money back from the harvest, there was almost nothing left for him. These kinds of unequal relationships demonstrate how it was hard for Haitian agricultural workers to make a profit from their own labor. Entering into a contract with a landowner was the only way they could have access to the land, which gives Dominicans total control over the labor of these workers. This control of workers’ labor by owners makes the Dominican Republic look a society, where the transition from slave labor to free wage still persisted after emancipation (Martinez 1999). This idea is also reinforced by the fact that the Haitian laborers were constrained to sell the harvest either to Dominican wholesalers, who came to pick them with their trucks, or at the binational market controlled by Dominicans. As Anous said, “the harvest was sold in Pedernales at the binational market. Dominicans also came to buy our goods with their
trucks. Then, we could go to the market to buy what we need.” This means that the Haitian workers sold their products for a cheap price to Dominican buyers and earned very little from their participation in agricultural labor.

As discussed above, the displaced people explain that the Dominican Republic offered them economic opportunities, especially in the agricultural sector. Both men and women were engaged in informal economic practices that allowed them to live on a day-to-day basis. However, these opportunities were often eclipsed by exploitation by Dominican landowners and the constant fear they were going through. Despite everything, they did not stop to compare their lives in the Dominican Republic with their lives in Anse-à-Pitres, where the economic opportunities are lacking.

4.3 Sector of activities and economic opportunities in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti

The Anse-à-Pitres local economy rests upon fishing, commercial exchange with the Dominican Republic, and, to a lesser extent, agriculture.

Because of its accessible coasts, some peasants of Anse-à-Pitres are able to practice artisanal fishing. Requiring only low-technology such as small boats and nets, this activity can primarily be considered part of fishermen’s own subsistence and sales, whereby they feed themselves and sell the surplus at the local market. There does not exist an installed fishing industry in this border city, nor any sort of funding for people

7 Anse-à-Pitres is located in the south-east of Haiti and close to Pedernales, Dominican Republic. This proximity facilitates commercial exchange between the two cities, which constitutes a great part of the local economy.
who undertake this activity. The fishermen work in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In Anse-à-Pitres, this activity mainly takes place in an area called Récif, and to a much lower degree in Anse-à-Pitres downtown area. A significant number of coastal people of the city live on fishing. In the Dominican Republic, Haitian people in Anse-à-Pitres, who have the Dominican identification called cédula, or Haitians with the complicity of Dominican friends, can have their fishing boats registered by the Dominican local state. This allows them to conduct fishing activity in the Dominican sea.

I had a conversation with a local fisherman in Anse-à-Pitres, whom I call Natan. At that time, he was preparing a fish trap. He said: “I work with a Dominican. I stretch out my fish trap in the sea and go to retrieve it after many days later. The Dominican boss shares the fishing harvest with me.” Despite interdiction from the Dominican state, some unauthorized people from Anse-à-Pitres circumvent Dominican soldiers and go to fish at night. According to local people, because of the implementation of fishing regulations, the Dominican sea is less exploited, and as a consequence, is richer in fish than the Haitian side, which is why it attracts Haitian fishers. Sometimes conflicts happen between Haitians and Dominicans. In January 2015, Dominican soldiers arrested seven Haitian fishermen and confiscated their boats. Haitians retaliated by closing the Dominican consulate in Anse-à-Pitres. The situation escalated to violence between the two peoples, whereby Dominican authorities prevented Haitian businessmen and women from crossing the border to conduct their commercial activities (GARR 2015) until they found an agreement. This situation affected the border economy, including fishing, that is vital to the two peoples.
Generally, local fishermen sell their products to wholesalers in Anse-à-Pitres, who, in turn, sell them to other cities such as Jacmel and Port-au-Prince. Dominicans also buy from Haitian fishermen, but they only buy the most expensive marine products such as lobsters, crab etc. There are very few Haitian merchants selling seafood at the binational market. According to Makdo, an SJM monitor, who was born and raised in Anse-à-Pitres, seafood is one of the many products that Dominicans forbid Haitians from selling at the binational market. Artisanal fishing constitutes a survival strategy for some peasants in Anse-à-Pitres, who sell their marine products. Even though the fishing activity helps local fishermen generate individual income, it does not dramatically strengthen the local economy due to the lack of a well-established industry and the regulations set by Dominicans that ban Haitian products at the binational market.

The other sector which constitutes the backbone of the local economy is commercial activities with Pedernales, Dominican Republic. The binational market, which brings together people from the two cities of Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales, is the place where most of these activities take place. On a particular Monday and Friday, if someone is crossing the border from Haiti to the Dominican Republic to go to the binational market, they will encounter the following. On one’s way ahead, motorcycles are sounding the horn constantly, carrying bundles of merchandise for Haitian merchants from the market to their home in Anse-à-Pitres. In front of the gate on the Haitian side, many currency traders, who change Haitian gourdes and pesos, take their seat in the open air next to the taxi moto station. Generally, people have to change their gourdes into pesos to enter the market because, ironically, even Haitian merchants (with some rare
exceptions) do not accept the Haitian currency. A small bridge gives access to the Dominican side where the binational market is located.

Of all commercial transactions, the commerce of Dominican-manufactured second-hand clothes called pèpè in Creole ranks first. The commerce of Pèpè (basically all kinds of clothes and shoes for men, women, and children) is vital to the economic life in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. Every week, it is possible to see trucks of second-hand clothes crossing the border from Pedernales to Anse-à-Pitres. Most of this merchandise goes to warehouse storage to be unloaded. People from Anse-à-Pitres buy pèpè from Dominican textile industries to resell to other places in Haiti. These pèpè, once they have arrived in Anse-à-Pitres, they are wrapped up and sent to be sold in other cities such as Jacmel and Port-au-Prince. Sellers also bring them to the binational market where both Dominicans and Haitians purchase them. Actually, second-hand clothes are the most imported products by people in Anse-à-Pitres, who also display them at the binational market.

Third, besides fishing and commerce, agriculture is understood as one of the most basic economic activities of Anse-à-Pitres. However, agricultural production in Anse-à-Pitres and its surrounding areas is almost negligible, such that local people have to buy Dominican food products such as vegetables, plantains, and other tubers. Anse-à-Pitres is composed of plateaus and mountains. One of the biggest obstacles to agricultural exploitation in the area is its lack of irrigation facilities. There is one canal, that was drilled from the Pedernales river and that runs straight through Anse-à-Pitres downtown, but it is overused by people, who rely on the water for household tasks such as laundry, dishes, bathing etc. Practicing agriculture in the mountains requires using motors to drive the water up there, but local agricultural workers do not have access to this technology.
However, people who live close to or in the mountainous areas, such as Bois-d’Ormes, Fond-Jeannette, or Tête-Source practice limited agricultural activities that include the production of coffee, market gardens, and vegetables. Most of the land in Anse-à-Pitres, plateaus or mountains, is arid, and during my research it rarely rained. Therefore, laborers could not rely on the rain for gardening, and when it rains, like all the coastal cities in Haiti, the risk of flooding is high, which is not good for the harvest. In such circumstances, undertaking agricultural activity in Anse-à-Pitres is not a credible option for forced migrants. Moreover, the land does not belong to them and nothing was done by the local state to employ the forced migrants as a productive force, something that many wished for. In the end, forced migrants turned towards the Dominican Republic to do agricultural work and collect wood to generate some income in order to make a living in Anse-à-Pitres.

4.4 Agriculture and wood collection as sources of income

Agriculture constitutes one, if not the dominant, source of income for the forced migrants who go to the Dominican Republic on a daily basis to work the land. The weight of agricultural work in maintaining most migrants’ families in Anse-à-Pitres is considerable. Many displaced persons maintain that if they do not put in a day’s work, they and their children will not eat, as many forced migrants rely on selling their labor to make a living. In the Dominican Republic, they can clandestinely work for Dominicans, who pay them in cash to avoid state regulation. The significance of these income-generating activities is evidenced by Canine, who stated: “here (Anse-à-Pitres), there are no means of livelihood. There is no way to sell a day’s work. My husband always goes to sell a day’s work. Our survival depends on that.” For those days of work, forced migrants
are often underpaid or not paid at all by Dominican bosses who know that they are undocumented. Mérinord, who works in the agricultural sector to make a living, explains this exploitation: “we are obliged to work for 125 gourdes a day to make a living. It is not what they were supposed to pay us because you work from 6:00 a.m. to 4 p.m.” In fact, not all migrants were as lucky as Mérinord to find a place to put in a day’s work, despite the underpayment. As a result, they ended up gathering wood or making charcoal so that they could earn a little something.

Wood gathering has always been a significant survival strategy for forced migrants. They go to the Dominican Republic to look for dry firewood to sell to people in Anse-à-Pitres for cooking with or for dry-cleaning businesses. They also make charcoal out of the pieces of wood they have collected, which they sell to local businessmen in Anse-à-Pitres who export it to other cities, particularly Port-au-Prince. Many forced migrants maintained that they were looking for wood in the Dominican Republic when Dominican soldiers ran after them. For instance, Fanie was complaining to me about the fact that they no longer receive support from organizations. Their only alternative to this abandonment is to continue to take risks crossing the border. However, loggers and charcoal makers are warned by Dominican soldiers watching the border and the forests, who are capable of the worst. Fanie showed much concern about this situation, as there is no work in Anse-à-Pitres and going to gather pieces of wood on the Dominican side is risky as she said, “If your husband goes to look for a package of wood, Dominican soldiers run after him.” During a focus group with forced migrants in the camp of Parc Cadeau #2, people related the story of a man who went to make charcoal in the Dominican Republic, and who was apprehended by the soldiers. According to people at
the camp, they beat him, attached him with a rope to a truck, and pulled him. The wood can be sold for different prices, including 50 HT gourdes (USD 0.83) for a small package of wood and 750 gourdes (USD 12.50) for a sack of charcoal. For example, Kannèl often collected wood and sold to people in Anse-à-Pitres in order to earn some money to buy basic food for his family: “People from Anse-à-Pitres may need a package of wood; they take it. They give you 25-50 gourdes.” Recently, the migrants discovered flanbo (Figure 6), which are dry branches that come from a Dominican tree called Cornel according to some local people. In comparison to the other kinds of wood, flanbo is more expensive, and it constitutes a rare item that loggers look for in the Dominican Republic.

[Figure 6 Packages of Flanbo assembled to be sold].

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8 I talked to different people in order to find out the exact name of the tree that flanbo comes from, but it is not known to them. According to some local people in Anse-à-Pitres, Dominicans call it Cornel Tree, something that I could not confirm though.
4.4.1 *Flanbo* in the informal economy

*Flanbo* is not a piece of wood like others used for fire or charcoal. *Flanbo* has a name and it costs money. *Flanbo* is a dry piece of wood, which for some reason is not found in Haiti, but in the Dominican Republic. Almost everywhere in the camps, especially at Parc Cadeau #2, a package of *flanbo* is erected in front of each migrant’s home. At first sight, I thought it was forced migrants’ wood to prepare fire to cook their food. Later, I learned from them that it was *flanbo*, the new gold for wood collectors. The “considerable” price of *flanbo* and the interest of factories from Port-au-Prince in it make the *flanbo* the most wanted type of wood by the forced migrants on their trip to the Dominican forests.

According to migrants, *flanbo* is used to make perfume, plywood, and a kind of oil for airplanes (which I could not confirm). It is recovered in the Dominican Republic, brought to the camp where forced migrants assembled it to sell by meters with one meter worth up to 3,000 HT gourdes (USD 50). With self-employment as the principal mode of employment in the informal sector (Breman 1996), *flanbo* offers some forced migrants a strategy to undertake an activity that is not based on wage-earning. It palliates the lack of formal jobs on the agricultural fields, which primarily attract the forced migrants.

One morning, I visited the camp. I stopped by Lijan’s home. In a typical morning, his wife was in the kitchen and the smell of the coffee perfumed the place. Lijan was sitting in front of the house, neighboring three other tents, talking to friends and family members. He invited me and Zamy to join and gave me a seat. A while later, his wife brought coffee to everyone. Around us, people were cutting pieces of wood, packing and arranging them properly to be ready to be loaded onto trucks. In front of Lijan’s house, a package was already prepared. When I asked him about the gathered wood, he said that it
was the new business in the camp and if customs detected them, they would make their owners pay.

The commercialization of *flanbo* involves better-off long-term residents of Anse-à-Pitres, who buy it from forced migrants. Therefore, in the *flanbo* business, the forced migrants can be considered simple workers located at the bottom of a hierarchy, while at the top are people who have direct contact with factories in Port-au-Prince to deliver the merchandise. At least, *flanbo* creates jobs for migrants who cross the border to gather it, truck drivers, and those who sell it to companies. Once forced migrants have arrived in the camp with the *flanbo*, they pack it for trucks to pick up. According to forced migrants, they are paid 2,500 to 3,000 HT gourdes per meter, a price that has very much increased; at the beginning it was a much lower price. Even though forced migrants showed that they were satisfied with their pay, *flanbo* is a profitable business for the buyers. Some buyers/sellers go to Port-au-Prince and resell it to companies in US dollars. The connection that the *flanbo* business creates between the forced migrants and people in the city of Anse-à-Pitres and others such as Port-au-Prince demonstrates that the informal sector is also part of the urban economy (Breman 1996). When considering what forced migrants have risked in bringing this piece of wood to Anse-à-Pitres, they are very much under-paid in comparison to those who bought it from them to resell to factories in Port-au-Prince. This dry piece of wood that used to be disregarded by Dominicans, as they were scattered on the ground, began to be important to Dominicans as they saw Haitians were recovering the wood, and clearing their environment. According to forced migrants, Dominican soldiers clearly warn them of the consequences if they are caught gathering *flanbo*. Some people said that the sanctions could go up to 30 months in prison.
People have already started to feel that, as Rita said, “Now the bush is hot (there is trouble). We are forced to sit down in the house because there is nothing to do.” For example, Likilik, a 20-year-old boy, who was born in the Dominican Republic, is now living in the camp of Parc Cadeau where many members of his family are also living. He was already caught by Dominican soldiers while going to pick off wood in the Dominican Republic; he explained: “they took me and put me in jail. I paid 2,000 pesos. I didn’t have money. Some friends collected money for me in the camp.” In downtown Anse-à-Pitres, one day, a man crossed the border but did not come back home. When people were informed, they learned that he was arrested because he went to collect *flanbo*. His wife was worried. However, one day after his arrest, he was freed. Some people said that he must have paid to be released. As a result of this threat, people are very careful when they are crossing the border with their *flanbo*. For instance, during a visit to the camp of Parc Cadeau, I ran into two men cutting their pieces of wood. They said that the pieces came from Pedernales and arrived in Anse-à-Pitres at night when the soldiers are not there, because if they are apprehended, they will spend up to thirty years in prison.

The significance of wood selling as part of the informal economy has been demonstrated by Yadav (2018). In the examination of Gonds’ livelihoods in the Indian village of Mahalapur, Yadav shows how forest-based activities such as the collection of wood play an important role in these people’s lives. The Gonds use wood for different purposes including cooking, making homes and making fences in their agricultural fields but also for selling. Yadav contends that it is mostly woman’s job to collect forest wood and then sell it next day by walking 10 km to Panna town, carrying it on their foreheads.
Selling wood helps to keep Gonds’ cost of living low and to raise their children. Flanbo plays a similar role in the lives of forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres for whom flanbo constitutes a source of income. However, it is mostly a male activity. This may be explained by the risk that collecting it entails. Outside the formal economy, flanbo, like other pieces of wood, help the forced migrants diversify their sources of income, but at the same time wood collecting has the potential for severe violence and risk, which impedes people with limited mobility to engage in those economic practices. In addition to these income generating activities, in 2016, the SJM decided to provide forced migrants with some financial support through a microcredit program so that a few people can run small businesses.

4.5 Starting your own small business, micro-credit allocation, economic independence

Many poor countries, including Haiti, rely on foreign aid to stimulate their development. However, the efficiency of these countries in contributing to the improvement of poor people’s lives remains questionable, as very often, development money does not benefit the persons being targeted. An innovative and promising new direction in development that consists of making small loans, sometimes only a few dollars, directly to poor individuals and families, which they can invest in their own products or businesses (Eller 2009), has appeared since the 1970s. At the heart of this approach is microcredit: a way to foster self-reliant individuals rather than persons dependent on charity (Watanabe 2015: 470 citing Austin 2007; Robinson 2001).

Microfinancing has become a global phenomenon in international development circles since the Grameen Bank launched the microcredit model into global debates about
poverty, aid, and the inclusion of the poor in financial markets (Schuster 2014: 564). For instance, according to Karim (2001), Bangladeshi NGOs have made impressive strides in microcredit alongside non-formal primary education, sanitation, reproductive healthcare, and potable water provisioning. However, microcredit has been strongly criticized by scholars, including anthropologists.

Specifically, the critics call into question the goal of microcredit as a way of empowering poor people, especially women, who comprise the highest number of beneficiaries, on the view that they have restricted access to the wage labor market or are more responsible borrowers than men (Pitt et al. 2006). Women are also considered flexible in accepting informal, precarious work and juggling family obligations with outside economic activities (Schuster 2014 cited by Huang 2017: 607). One critique raised against microcredit is its attribution to a form of governmental strategy or ‘subjection’ in so far as it aims to align the personal goals of individual women with those set out by economic reformers (Katherine Rankin 2001: 30). Effectively, microcredit is a replication of neoliberalism ideals tied with open market, accumulation, freedom, and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, research indicates that microcredit constitutes an entanglement of people into cycles of indebtedness in which individuals come to adhere to neoliber al principles of market entrepreneurialism and self-help, unmoored from social binds of relationality, and individuals are usually not better off than before they were indebted (Watanabe. 2015: 471). I suggest that in the case of the forced migrants of Anse-à-Pitres, who were granted small loans by the SJM, microcredit is more about providing people with a form of aid to help themselves, than it is about credit. In order to understand the results of microcredit in the lives of these displaced
people, it is important to conceive of microcredit as not just an “economic” arrangement (Moodie 2008) or a form of economic empowerment, but also as a form of cultural empowerment for people. For instance, the involvement of women in microfinance programs has expanded their agency in the development process with the diminishing role of the state (Fernando 2006).

4.5.1 The SJM micro-credit program

The SJM office, through the intermediary of its promoters and monitors in Anse-à-Pitres, implemented a program of financial assistance for the forced migrants by selecting a few of them, mostly women, to be the beneficiaries. For SJM, it was a pilot program that will later be extended to more people, depending on its success. Members of the national office of the SJM organization, headquartered in Port-au-Prince, went to Anse-à-Pitres to gather information about the selected forced migrants and discuss with them the conditions and the management of the loan.

The SJM gave a loan that comprised between 10,000 HT gourdes (USD 166) and 12,500 HT gourdes (USD 208) to the selected forced migrants. Each month, they had to give back 2,100 HT gourdes (USD 35) until they finished repaying the loan. They also had to give another 125 HT gourdes to a special fund, which would be saved for the forced migrant to use in case of emergency. With this money, many people started a small business or invested in agricultural work. For those who undertook a small business, they bought small items from shopkeepers or wholesalers and sold them at the binational market, in front of their house, or simply turned themselves into mobile merchants. Their small business is a bit of everything: from rice, bread, candies and cookies to detergent and soaps for laundry. Magda, who received a loan, understood that
she had to do something with this money, unlike some people who simply spent the money on their basic needs without investing it. She tried everything in order to make the little money progress, and so that she could pay it back: “when I owe, I can’t sleep. I bought small things to put in front of the house and took part in money rotation\textsuperscript{9}.” Even though it does not help Magda make any profit, it helps her save and manage her money to be able to repay it on the due date. Many of the forced migrants’ small businesses are portable as they can carry them on their head and sell them in the street. For instance, while crossing to Pedernales one day, I met with Vilna. She was carrying a small basin. When I stopped to talk to her a while, she told me that she came from selling in Pedernales and now she was on her way back home. The empty basin that she carried under her armpit is the size of her small business. The varying activities the forced migrants undertake in order to meet family needs and repayments are typical of microloan borrowers, who invest in several different activities at once to mitigate risk, expand their social networks, fill income gaps, and meet microloan repayment deadlines (Hayes 2017: 25). Even though all borrowers do not sell the same products, they enter a local market full of microbusinesses, which creates an environment of hypercompetition among small vendors (Hayes 2017). The forced migrants use their loans to buy and resell mostly food products such as rice, oil, and vegetables, which already abound on the market. I found that that the engagement of these forced migrants in microcredit enterprise provides them little as income according to what they described to me during a focus group, but it does allow them to be dynamic in their constant search of seeking to offer something to themselves and their families.

\textsuperscript{9} Money rotation is a system of cash to cash cycle very common in Haiti that consists of rotating money among a group of people until everyone receives their part.
Coping strategies through these economic practices are very common among poor Caribbean people, which Senior (1991) refers to as ‘making do,’ meaning ‘make something from nothing’ in order to show how women in the English-speaking Caribbean, for example, develop strategies to meet their needs and support their families. Forced migrants’ strategies are similar in that they started with almost nothing hoping that they could generate some income to keep them afloat in the face of their precarious economic conditions in Anse-à-Pitres. Manrèz is a skinny woman, who must be in her early 60s but still looks strong. Her example is very inspiring and motivating. Manrèz received a small loan from SJM. She took this money and started a small business buying from Haitian shop keepers and re-selling at the local market. On my walk, I already met Manrèz carrying a box of rice on her head and a gallon of oil in her hand. Thanks to this activity, she managed to pay the rent and survive. She could have made more progress, but the death of her brother made her spend almost everything she had. She is one of the rare persons who have finished paying back the money. Even in times of adversity, she was able to develop a kind of flexibility that helped her fulfill her family needs. Sometimes, these people are also lenders, as they sell their products to other people on credit. For instance, Simone was participating in a focus group I was organizing. She had many problems. IOM did not renew her rent and she was uncertain about her future in Anse-à-Pitres. Worse, her husband borrowed 250 HT gourdes from her loan, but ran away, leaving her with the debt and the children. She said: “he borrowed 250 HT gourdes from me leaving his card and saying that he will give me more money. Tomorrow the 14th of February will be exactly two months since he took the money. Yet I need this money to go to reimburse my loan.” What Simone describes typifies the reality of some
women who may be the bearers of credit but not its users (Karim 2001); the users of the credit are often none other than their husbands. Manrèz’s experience illustrates the courage of most female forced migrants involved in microcredit. They earned very little income from this microcredit enterprise, while they have to satisfy multiple needs. Above all, it only constitutes an activity that motivates them to keep going amid the fundamental challenges of everyday life.

4.5.2 The use of the loan

Many forced migrants showed that the loan was beneficial in helping them feed their children and survive. Duvercia was in a precarious situation and her money was almost entirely consumed for household needs. IOM rented a place for her, but did not renew the rent. Therefore, she took from the loan money to pay the rent in order to avoid expulsion, to pay for the children’s school, and buy food and soap: “I still owe a part of the money. I thought it was a gift. Each 100 gourdes profit I made out of the little money, the children ate them (spent for the children). I don’t have a husband. I paid 6 months of rent.”

Like Duvercia, many forced migrants explained that they encountered difficulty reimbursing the money, as they were in need even before they got this money. Between paying the rent and children’s school, providing food in the household, and going to the hospital, forced migrants found out that the money disappeared in the blink of an eye, while they still owed part of it. However, the SJM staff never took action to force people to pay back the money, which seems to confirm what Inès said to me, that is, the money was not a loan although this was not revealed to the forced migrants in order to encourage them to work with it. As these narratives showcase, the loan was practical in helping the
beneficiaries with some fundamental needs, but it put people into debt and could not help them recover from their economic dispossession. The microcredit experience of the forced migrants reflects Feldman (2010) who argues that projects such as self-help and others that were meant to transform often ended up looking more like relief projects. However, above all, I suggest that the engagement of the displaced people in the informal economy, in general, produces social lives beyond economic logic (Moodie 2008). These dynamics are translated in a philosophy I call “ti degaje or m’ap degaje m” that infuses their daily lives with meanings and dynamics.

4.6 “Ti degaje, M’ap degaje m:” the philosophy of life of the forced migrants

“Ti degaje, m’ap degaje m” is a common expression in Haitian larger society that basically means “a little something, I am doing a little something to survive.” People often resort to this expression to convey that they are coping with life despite fundamental challenges. For example, when I saw Manrèz and asked her how she was doing, she answered: “n’ap longonni.” Manrèz undoubtedly wants to highlight that things are hard but she is keeping going. “N’ap Longonni” is literally that life is agony for her, as a forced migrant who entered Anse-à-Pitres with almost nothing where she has to settle or start from scratch. However, this does not mean she is a defeatist. On the contrary, she clings to her new environment with all her strength as an agentive woman. The vigor in her became visible to me when I noticed all that she was undertaking despite the weight of her age: buying items with that little money she had, carrying her business on her head, and always on the move, even though people bought her products on credit and did not pay her. This expression translates a willingness to survive at any cost or making a living in bad times. This can be understood with a migrant who, for example,
said: “Si nou pa degaje nou (if we don’t do a little something), the children won’t eat.” Degaje is “making do,” a rule of survival, a philosophy of life. You cannot be loafing around. You “gotta” move yourself. For Titine, when she received financial aid from the IOM to rent a place, she started a ti degaje with it (a small business) in order to provide food for her family.

“Degaje” can be equated to debrouillardism, a concept used by Browne (2004) to express the capacity for one to use his or her intelligence to transform possibilities into opportunities. When forced migrants received a little financial loan, their first goal was to start a ti degaje (small business) enhancing their debrouillardism, their capacity of management and entrepreneurship. For those who did not receive any loan, they did not hang around but looked for a ti degaje (small jobs). Maude is an example of someone who felt disappointed, as she could not get any support for her life while she was hungry in her new place of settlement. Her life story is telling. Maude is the mother of seven children, who are spread throughout Anse-à-Pitres. She was living with her youngest son when I visited her at her house. This son developed cholera when she entered Anse-à-Pitres in 2016, a period that reminds a bad memory to the Haitian people. Cholera killed some of the forced migrants after they settled in the camps in 2015 (Bonicet 2015). The vibrio virus responsible for cholera has been linked to the Nepalese UN battalion present in Haiti (Mazzeo and Chierici 2013), and was reported to have killed thousands of Haitians in the wake of the devastating earthquake of January 2010 (Schuller and Morales 2012). Fortunately, Maude’s son recovered from the disease. While living in Anse-à-Pitres, she walked to the camp of Maletchipe, which is three to four miles from home, almost every day, where she spent the entire day hoping that the aid apparatus
would stop by. When this strategy did not work, she looked for alternatives. She started to look for *ti degaje* (small jobs) in order to not starve. She then crossed the border to go to do laundry for Dominicans, an experience that is sometimes disappointing according to her: “They may say that they are giving you 300 pesos but they finally give you 150 pesos. After two trips to this person’s house you still don’t get the rest of your money.” Despite fundamental challenges, hunger, poverty, insecurity, and uncertainty, forced migrants keep their spirits up and develop survival strategies to create and reconstruct livelihoods in their living communities, showing that human agency is not the property and privilege of political and economic elites, but an equal opportunity (Kottak and Kozaitis 1999). This is evidenced by Maude’s experience working for Dominican employers who profit from her situation of poverty and precarity, but she never gives up trying and is constantly moving across the border in an attempt to improve her life.

Browne argues that Creole economics endows Martinicans with moral permission to violate (2004: 132), as it constitutes a means of survival for many people outside the formal economy. Similarly in Haitian culture, *degaje* has moral value when referring to the saying: *Degaje pa peche*, meaning literally doing something outside the formal to help ourselves is not a sin. For example, when people go to the Dominican Republic to look for wood, they know that they are violating a rule doing something that they should not. Some forced migrants think of that as stealing, but they have no choice. It is a means of survival. Anicia contended that “I entered here on June 11, 2015. I still go to Pedernales. I go to work as a housewife. My husband goes to do small gardens. It is stealing but he still does it. They haven’t run after him yet.” Richard Price (2006:64) wrote about how Martinicans assigned a double meaning to stealing when they talk about
their past history: “Over and over, in speaking about the recent past, people stressed that it was stealing from poor people, from other rural folk, that was criminal. Taking from a sugar factory, or from any béké or white folks’ enterprise, was seen rather as getting one’s due.” This way of thinking of stealing as not simply a means of survival, but also as a due compensation may have the same resonance when talking about forced migrants’ illegal crossing to gather, for example, a package of wood in the Dominican Republic. Under pressure, threat and fear, the forced migrants left all their belongings and goods behind, sometimes to those who used to be their bosses and who exploited them. Stealing may morally mean getting something back for them in a context of total dispossession. As stated in the framework of the chapter, it is also important to refer to colonial history in order to really understand the meaning of these strategies employed by the forced migrants. Similarly, when studying the economic activities of former slaves, historians as well as archaeologists have found evidence of a slave underground economy that consisted in the trading and marketing of products that came from their independent gardens, and also of articles stolen from the plantations where they were working. Forret (2004) describes how slaves of the rural Carolinas supplemented their inadequate diets with produce from their gardens, but also with foodstuffs secretly taken from their masters or their neighbors, which they also sold to poor whites. These practices, that are part of marginalized people’s survival strategies, can better be compared to what Scott (1985) called the ordinary weapon of the weak, which is a constant struggle for them to create livelihoods, but also to resist those who worked to extract their labor.
Conclusion

Finally, in addition to being a philosophy of life as it guides people in their daily actions, *ti degaje* can also be considered a means of survival, as it pushes people towards micro-entrepreneurship and economic engineering. Far from discouraging them, the lack of support and state abandon motivated them to create and mobilize resources for self-reliance. They try everything that lies in their power to create livelihoods in Anse-à-Pitres showing a lot of *debrouillardism* and dynamic. One forced migrant contended that he went to the seaside, gathered stones, and sold them to local residents, who exported them to the Dominican Republic. Another migrant bought a motorcycle using the financial aid he received from one organization and gave it to someone to ride. When the driver paid him, he managed to buy food for his household. Others went to the garbage where wholesalers threw away the zaza (unwanted second-hand clothes), salvaged them and resold them to make a little money. This is the case of Felicia, who lives in Parc Cadeau #2. Felicia was born in the Dominican Republic, but did not hold any Dominican documentation when she was forced in a truck to Haiti by Dominican soldiers. She categorically refused to leave because she had never been to Haiti before, but she was powerless to resist the soldiers. People informed her about the camp and she made a small tent in which to stay. Her worry can be understood for someone who was born in the Dominican Republic and had to leave everything behind to go to a new environment where she does not even know how to locate and mobilize resources. In such a complicated situation, her only weapon remained her capacity for agency, which she never hesitated to make the best of. Even though she is far from recovering from her displacement, she has never given up trying to make ends meet. One of her strategies is to collect zaza (the unwanted second-hand clothes by wholesalers of Anse-à-Pitres) and
resold them at the Haitian-Dominican border; she said: “I went to sort out old pants, old shirts, old things and I made a big package. I went to the door (the border); I sold small pieces for 20 or 25 Haitian HT gourdes.” People call this very small activity *ti degaje* or *vire men* meaning something that is worth almost nothing. “*Ti degaje*” is about showing *debrouillardism*, exercising agency by finding disjunctures or holes in the formal economy in order to transform very few possibilities into opportunities. As these examples show, the economic practices of the forced migrants is not about how much someone makes for their survival, but about how people learn to be agentive, resilient, and to live with hope amid social and economic precarity, insecurity and uncertainty. They live because of the philosophy that is behind everything they do in their daily lives. This philosophy makes sense and when combined with local and moral values, it simply constitutes a form of social capital for forced migrants. Survival for the forced migrants is not simply about earning a lot of money, but a state of mind or a philosophy.

The forced migrants are aware that the Dominican Republic offered them better economic activities than Haiti. However, they were under constant fear of persecution and deportation. Therefore, they considered that they were not free. It is only in Haiti that they felt a sense of freedom despite hunger, precarity, insecurity and uncertainty of life; as Charles put it: “For me, I feel that my country is better even though when I was in the Dominican Republic, I found work more easily and I ate better. You were in a place where you were eating well but you couldn’t sleep well. Each time you were sleeping, you were thinking.” Like Charles, many other forced migrants express their sense of being independent in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, even though limited economic resources are available to them. The creation of ODRA (Organization for the Defense of the
Repatriated of Anse-à-Pitres) is set to rally their interest and formalize their claims for a descent life. The forced migrants have goals and know what they want for their lives. Living a precarious life in Anse-à-Pitres does not take away their sense of being emancipated and liberated. Their multiple ways of creating living strategies suggest that they are not hopeless people or victims, but agents of their self-development. Getting involved in neoliberal enterprises through micro-credit or self-help programs, gardening on Dominican plots of land, and doing other casual work selling their labor allows them to exercise some kind of agency and set goals for their self-reliance through a philosophy of life ingrained in a series of expressions, such as *ti degaje, degaje pa peche, vire men*, found in Haitian larger culture. Their tactics and ingenuity for survival despite constraints appears in their engagement in everyday labor mobilities between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales.
“It is because of a lack of economic resources. If I had the resources, I wouldn’t cross to the Dominican Republic. I was supposed to be working at home (Anse-à-Pitres). In the same way as I am going to work in the Dominican Republic, I would be working at home. I would cross only a day but not the way I am crossing to the Dominican Republic morning and afternoon. It wouldn’t be like this.”

Louman clearly describes his experiences with border jumping between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Louman is from Tête Source, which is very close to the region of Pedernales, specifically Lamencer, where he had been living since he migrated to the Dominican Republic. After his displacement, he continued to return to Lamencer to work, moving back and forth between Tête Source and Lamencer. Louman’s story demonstrates three dimensions of our study in this chapter: mobility, forced mobility, and place. First, his story shows how someone’s life can involve daily back and forth movements across borders translatable in a local expression *monte desann* (literally going back and forth) that describes the constant instability and mobility of the displaced people for labor purpose. Their engagement in daily mobility evidences their capacity to make decisions to transform their lives. I consider this a form of power and agency. Second, his story shows that mobility is not something that people feel free to choose but something that they are forced into because they do not have viable alternatives with which to build lives. Therefore, mobility is also about constraint. Third, Louman suggests that he would not go to the Dominican Republic should he have better choices. He would stay in Anse-
à-Pitres. This means that mobility does not eclipse the importance of place, which symbolizes not only immobility, but also stability and settlement for the forced migrants. In this sense labor mobility is important in order to help them acquire the resources to achieve this goal of getting settled.

In this chapter, I am concerned with mobility as something imposed upon the forced migrants (Gill, Caletrio, Mason 2011) and as a form of power which is reflected in the capacity of the displaced people to transform and act in the world despite dangerous obstacles. Accordingly, mobility is undertaken under constraints that can be explained by the risks it entails. Despite all constraints, the forced migrants make labor mobility a significant livelihood strategy. I argue that the engagement of the forced migrants in everyday labor mobility is an exercise of agency and power. Building on Miller and Tilley (1984), I refer to this form of power that consists of relying on mobility in order to pursue specific goals in their lives as “power to” that constitutes the precondition of agency (Thomas 2002). This form of power describes the ability of these people to take actions. For both the men and women of the displaced population, everyday mobility becomes a means to create survival strategies and an attempt to settle in Anse-à-Pitres, which is a new place to most of them. If generally, men are seen as the agents of mobility, among the displaced people, in the same way as men, women draw upon mobility as a resource with which to pursue income for their households, which empowers them and increases not only their visibility in labor migration, but also their agency.

Besides using mobility as a means to survive from day to day, forced migrants also have long-term goals that include buying a piece of land to establish themselves in
Anse-à-Pitres; mobility sits side by side with place that symbolizes immobility and emplacement. This notion of emplacement is underexplored in the mobility literature (Chell 2000), which, I suggest, may be an outcome of a new mobility paradigm that undermines theories that conceive of place as normal stability (Sheller and Urry 2006), and which is reinforced by the world’s celebration of a liquid modernity that redirects research away from static structures of the modern world (Bauman, 2000). However, mobility is never simply about moving across borders, it is also about regrounding (Ahmed et al. 2003 cited by Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006), reterritorialization (Laguerre 1998), and attachments of various kinds (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006 citing Shurmer-Smith & Hannam, 1994; Sheller, 2004a). Therefore, both mobility and place have meaning in the displaced people’s lives.

Forced migrants’ involvement in labor mobility was visible to me when I went to the camps. During visits in the camps, especially in the morning, I mostly found children, sometimes with women. Many people were absent because they went to work in the Dominican Republic. Some people may go and stay for a short period of time, especially if they are plowing fields or harvesting their gardens. Many people stated that they often went in the morning and came back in the afternoon. Effectively, in the afternoon, there was a more vibrant life in the camps. At this time, I often saw people who were coming back from work wearing used clothes, a pair of boots, machetes in a sheath, and other digging tools, with sometimes a package of wood or a sack on their back. Later, some people sat down in groups socializing, playing dominoes while listening to the music. On the other hand, women were preparing food in a small kitchen made of bundles, rags, pieces of cloth, and twigs with the rise of smoke. Sometimes, they had to prepare food so
that the husband could find something when he came back from work. Some women complained when they could not do that. For example, Yverose’s husband supports the house through his agricultural labor. Like her, many women attested that the household or the kindred was maintained by their husband’s agricultural work in the Dominican Republic. Polòn, who was born in the Dominican Republic but now finds herself in the camp of Parc Cadeau is clear about how much the husband’s labor mobility weighs in the maintenance of the family, as she is doing nothing herself. She said: “I don’t have money to do a small business or to cultivate a garden. I have nothing. If the man (husband) doesn’t go down there (in the Dominican Republic) where soldiers are running after them, you won’t get a Haitian gourde. I feel that I am not at ease because if the man doesn’t give you five gourdes, you don’t eat and you don’t drink.” As indicated in these narratives, men are at the forefront of labor mobility in most families of the forced migrants. However, women are also actors and increase their visibility through their movements across borders. In the end, nothing can stop forced migrants from getting involved in crossing the border between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales to go to work regardless of facing violence, arrest, and deportation.

Despite constant surveillance, border patrol, and the establishment of checkpoints by the Dominican state in order to control the movement of illegal migrants across the Dominican-Haitian border, forced migrants manage to be hypermobile between the Haitian city of Anse-à-Pitres and the Dominican city of Pedernales. Even though their everyday border crossings aim to fulfill many functions in their lives, the nature of their mobility is mostly economic; they go to sell their labor in the Dominican Republic. While they move daily to the Dominican Republic to work in different sectors, such as domestic
work and selling goods, agriculture constitutes the main sector in which they work. In their agricultural practices, the displaced people continued to work as waged day laborers and according to the system of sharecropping regulated by Dominican landowners. Besides working on a particular land, forced migrants also sell their labor working, just during a day, for a person, who pays them in cash on the spot, or may owe them the money. All of them are engaged in the same types of job they had before they were displaced from the Dominican Republic. The lack of jobs in Anse-à-Pitres forced them to undertake these labor practices in order to meet the daily challenges of their lives. The mobility of the forced migrants constitutes both a form of agency and constraint. On one hand, their involvement in labor mobility expresses their capacity to challenge marginalization and forced displacement. In this sense, it is an expression of power which, in a way, constitutes a form of agency. On the other hand, the forced migrants long for a stable life in Anse-à-Pitres and conceive of their border crossings as a form of constraint considering that mobility is a risky adventure into which they are forced as it represents the only option available for them to create survival strategies.

In the first section of the chapter, I examine everyday labor mobility as an exercise of power and agency for the forced migrants because it shows their ability to act in the world.

In the second section, I show that mobility is not an expression of freedom for the forced migrants, but something that is imposed upon them and that they manage to use to improve their lives.

Finally, I demonstrate that forced migrant men and women gain agency using corporeal mobility across borders in an attempt to support themselves and their families.
Their risk-taking is an expression of their ability to make choices despite constraints and of combativeness when it comes to fulfilling their households’ multiple needs.

5.1 **Everyday labor mobility as an exercise of power and agency**

With contemporary global dynamics, millions of people are involved in movements across border; Urry and Sheller (2006) proclaim that all the world seems to be on the move. Creswell (2006) makes a similar observation by arguing that mobility is everywhere. In the mobility literature, mobility has different meanings. For instance, mobility is sometimes construed as an expression of progress, freedom, or liberation from space and place (Sheller and Urry 2006). It is also conceived of as a resource that reinforces power (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006 citing Skeggs, 2004; Morley, 2002) and that implies forms of social control described in a concept of power geometry (Gogia 2006; Massey 1994). This means that mobility constitutes a resource to which not everyone has an equal relationship (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006). For instance, Gogia (2006) demonstrates how the mobilities of Canadians travelling to Mexico for tourist purposes and those of Mexicans migrating to Canada for labor purposes are not created equally because of unequal juridical regulations that shape the ways these people move. These latter attributions convey a Marxist meaning of power as something associated with domination and what the archeologists Miller and Tilley (1984) refer to as “power over,” as opposed to “power to.”

I draw on this literature regarding mobility, but with an understanding of mobility as an expression of power and agency. However, the power I am engaging in this chapter differs from its association with coercion or domination. Power is an expression of the
capacity of forced migrants to initiate actions that engage their everyday lives in spite of marginalization. Miller and Tilley (1984) conceive of this form of power that enables people as “power to,” which, according to them, constitutes an inherent component of all social interaction and also a feature embedded in all social practices. This form of power differs from power over, for example, that is embodied in the exercise of the legitimate means of violence by Dominican soldiers. As such, unlike “power over,” “power to” describes the ability of the displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres to draw on everyday mobility to make decisions that impact their daily lives. Forced migrants’ practices, which include crossing dangerous borders even if it means being arrested, fined, or killed, are expressions of power and agency because they evade established border power. As suggested by Foucault (1982 cited by Miller and Tilley 1984), this form of power that enables people to act is something that belongs to everyone and that forced migrants exercise through daily movements across borders despite surveillance and “illegality,” following several ‘devious paths’, which avoid official checkpoints in the border zone in order to avoid state officials at the entry and exit point (Musoni 2016).

The engagement of displaced people in everyday labor mobility is a matter of being in charge of their own lives and being self-reliant. It represents a strategic resource for the forced migrants to carry out their goals of surviving in Anse-à-Pitres whatever it takes. Most forced migrants I talked to recognize the danger involved in crossing the border to go to work in the Dominican Republic, but they maintain that this choice is imposed upon them. Taking actions in the face of threats to safety and menace is what defines forced migrants’ labor mobility as a form of power and agency. Frequent
movement to pursue labor in the Dominican Republic shows how their lives are intertwined with constant mobility and instabilities.

Despite the absence of juridical and spatial conditions that could facilitate their mobility across the border (Gogia 2006), the forced migrants manage to make mobility a defining factor of their daily lives. The ability to move beyond geographical borders represents the daily experience of various categories of the population of the forced migrants, young and old, men as well as women. The continuous moving back and forth for daily accomplishment and goals appears in a forced migrant’s statement: “For any small thing, it is in the Dominican Republic to go to look for it; from the small piece of wood, it is over there to go to look for it. To sell a day of labor to feed the children, it is over there to go.” These words come from Renaldo, who lived at the camp of Parc Cadeau# 2 with eight children to feed; he conveys that his life is an everyday experience of constant mobility which he relies upon for economic purposes. The daily dynamics of forced migrants describe not only the instability of their lives, which are not located in particular spaces or within particular boundaries (Verstraet, T Cresswell 2002 citing Malkki 1992), but also “power to” that enables them to take actions and use labor mobility as an imposed choice according to their own will. Moving on a regular basis is the materialization of “power to” and creates life dynamics, which is expressive of the local expression “monte desann.”

5.1.1 Monte desann as “power to”

Forced migrants’ everyday labor mobility is translated in the common expression of “monte desann” meaning “coming and going back and forth.” The lives of the forced migrants are a daily exercise that monte desann, as a process of labor mobility, describes.
*Monte dessann* is “power to” because it is about being active in order to stimulate change in their lives. This exercise requires people to develop the ability to run so that they can be ready to run away any time circumstances require them to do so. For example, during a focus group with some forced migrants who had relocated to downtown Anse-à-Pitres, people were talking about how making charcoal in the Dominican Republic is not safe and sometimes they have to abandon their charcoal and run away. A woman in her fifties, Alouna, made people laugh as she maintained that: “my husband can’t run, neither can he speak Spanish.” Alouna’s story demonstrates the risks of getting involved in those practices that require physical strength and the capacity to negotiate with Dominican soldiers, who can catch them in the forests. Even though her husband still goes to the Dominican Republic to work, his incapacity to run obviously limits his labor mobility. *Monte desann* also means that even though forced migrants are able to connect with Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales thanks to their corporeal mobility, neither of these two places offer them security or stability. Anse-à-Pitres lacks opportunities, so they cannot create a stable life there, and the Dominican Republic is a dangerous place for them in which they are only a bird of passage. Therefore, their life is more a construction of the in-between than a construction of one specific place, because of constant back and forth movements across the border to locate opportunities.

Living close to the border contributes to the instability created by *monte desann*, which, despite everything, constitutes a strategy of empowerment for forced migrants. Louman is a forced migrant who lives at the camp of Tête Source. Originally from Mapou, another part of Haiti, but in the same geographical department as Anse-à-Pitres, he recognizes that the proximity to Tête Source is essential to his major activities across
the border. For five years, he has been in a process of monte desann, i.e., a back and forth movement between Tête Source and the mountainous region of Pedernales, in search of making a living: “M’ap monte desann (I am coming and going). I come to Haiti but there is no work; I am going back and forth in the Dominican Republic to look for an activity (work). I am coming and going back and forth between the two sides of the border to see what life has in its store.” As Louman explained, his life is tied to these back and forth movements which change the dynamics of his previous life when he was in Mapou: “when I was in Mapou, I stayed put.” His statement suggests that he was not used to such frequent labor mobility, let alone connecting with places across borders. Being in Anse-à-Pitres endows him with this capacity of movement, which becomes an integral part of his habitus and his subsistence strategy.

Back and forth movements across borders and the expressions that forced migrants use, such as monte desann, to describe their daily labor mobility demonstrates their determination in pursuing their goal to change their lives in a world of economic precarity and uncertainty. Everyday labor mobility is a way for them to create a glimmer of hope using their corporeal and mobile ability as agents amid their precarious social and economic conditions in a place that does not offer them much. The everyday mobility is constitutive of “power to” in that it is used as a resource by the forced migrants with the aim of being self-reliant and sustaining their lives. As Urry (Gogia 2006 citing Urry 2000) argues, mobility is becoming the defining factor in the reconstitution of social life. This is reflected in the way that the forced migrants embrace mobility as a vital resource. However, mobility for them is not an expression of freedom, but something that is imposed upon them, which is discussed in the next section. Here, I make a distinction
between freedom and agency. I do not consider the movement of the forced migrants an expression of freedom because getting involved in labor mobility is risky and dangerous for them. Rather, labor mobility is a form of agency because it goes against established structures such as border power and is used according to the forced migrants’ own agenda in order to create survival strategies in Anse-à-Pitres.

5.2 Mobility as constraint and a survival strategy

Forced migrants do not engage in labor mobility because the Dominican Republic is attractive to them, but because of life’s demands. While mobility expresses a form of power and agency as I demonstrated, it is also the result of a form of constraint. This can be explained in various ways. Considering past working conditions, the kinds of relationships they developed with Dominican owners, and the risks that their mobility across the border entails, returning to the Dominican Republic for labor purposes simply represents a necessary evil for the displaced people. Their previous experiences do not encourage them to go back to the Dominican Republic.

According to some former workers, Dominican bosses needed only their labor power. For instance, if they were sick and were not productive, they were not taken care of, but sent to Haiti to finish their days. In a sense, this indicates that while Haitian workers were contributing to increasing the wealth of Dominican landowners and boosting Dominican economy, they were not provided with the means to maintain and reproduce themselves, something that is related to Marx (1867)’s criticism of the capitalist system whereby workers are simply used as commodities. Simmons (2010) has described the situation of Haitian agricultural workers as horrible. Haitians were reported
to be living in the worst conditions in the Dominican Republic with no basic infrastructure such as potable water, electricity, no means of waste disposal, constant surveillance and policing by Dominican authorities, and endemic diseases such as dengue, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and malaria to name a few (Simmons 2010:11). Before being displaced in Anse-à-Pitres, the forced migrants experienced all the awful working conditions in the Dominican Republic where they did not have any form of social security in the workplace. Tiva exemplifies how Haitian people’s bare lives were totally exposed to all forms of danger and torture. In the Dominican Republic, Tiva was working and living with his wife and children on Sergo’s estate. Sergo is a Dominican landowner. One day, a stone hurt Tiva’s leg while he was working in the field and he could not stand up. His child’s godmother took him to the hospital in a distant city called Barahona where he had surgery. People at the hospital, sometimes patients’ families, shared their food with him and gave him a little money during his stay at the hospital. When he left hospital, a pastor paid the trip for him and he went back to the estate where he was working and living with his family. However, Sergo, the Dominican boss, was totally indifferent to him and forced him to leave for Haiti. Tiva explained to me: “My child’s godmother who was working on the same estate as me took me to Barahona. I had no one, no family to help me. People in the hospital helped me. When I was leaving the hospital, a Dominican pastor paid the bus for me to go to Pedernales. There, I took a taxi to Aguas Negras. When I arrived at the estate, Sergo (the Dominican boss) said that he was not keeping me and he sent me to Haiti.” As a result, he had to be separated from his wife and his children who stayed on the estate. I visited him twice during my research in Anse-à-Pitres; he was living alone and was still in pain. Because of the lack of money, he
was never able to return to the hospital. The lack of social and legal protection for these workers makes the workforce the most vulnerable to mortal accidents in Dominican society, which, for the most part, result in temporary incapacity (Baez Evertsz 1985 cited by Simmons 2010). In the end, the relations between forced migrants and Dominican bosses deteriorated during their last days on Dominican soil, even though there were exceptions whereby some landowners tried to hide them in the bateys (plantations) in order to not be sent to Haiti. Some people I talked to admitted that they left the Dominican Republic because their landowner forced them to do so. For example, after her 33 years living in the Dominican Republic, Jezula understood that she had to leave after a message communicated to her by the Dominican boss: “if you don’t live, you go to hide instead, I’ll be in prison and I’ll have to pay 50,000 pesos.” These words could not be clearer to Jezula. Besides past experiences that are not conducive to undertaking labor mobility to the Dominican Republic, there is also the securitization of the border that instills fear in the forced migrants.

Going to the Dominican Republic is one of the most humiliating experiences for forced migrants; it is a place where they are exposed to all kinds of danger, violence, torture, and even death. Many people admitted that Dominicans never treated them well. To put it another way, forced migrants are not welcomed in the Dominican Republic, and they are under constant fear of having to run; sometimes they worked for Dominicans but did not get paid. Calixte, a young man in his mid twenties, and a woman mentioned to me respectively that they were the victims of one or another of these kinds of abuse. Calixte contended that “sometimes, I work, they delay in paying me or I may finish working with them, they may take the little money, they don’t give it to me.” The woman talked about
the violence that her husband suffered at the hands of Dominicans: “They took my husband in the neck and beat him with machetes.” These experiences are discouraging, and they give evidence that people are simply forced into labor mobility. According to Cresswell (2001 cited by Gogia 2006) corporeal mobility is embedded in specific geographies and economic conditions that produce how people move and are received differently across the globe. Forced migrants’ corporeal mobility is a result of not only political institutions that work to push them down, but also of economic precarity that produces how and why they move.

Effectively, the lack of economic opportunities in Anse-à-Pitres constitutes a significant push factor that explains the displaced persons’ labor mobility. Many maintained that they would not go to the Dominican Republic should they be able to build their lives in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. Due to the lack of resources in the communities where they are displaced, they are forced to turn towards the neighboring country in an attempt to improve their lives. To summarize, life circumstances oblige them to get involved in everyday labor mobility. The determination to cross the border is shown by Roussell, who insisted that “I will always cross the border looking for a better life until they kill me.” For forced migrants involved in labor mobility, their lives do not exist outside the activities they are undertaking. For Resias, the Dominican Republic is at the center of her survival, as it is the place of economic activities for Haitians in Anse-à-Pitres: “Well, there is no life in Haiti. I can say that there isn’t even food. So you must go to the Dominican Republic; everything is in the Dominican Republic.” In this context, people, who are engaged in daily movements across the border, have little to no choice.
Rejected and abandoned by the Dominican and the Haitian state, and with the withdrawal of many nongovernmental organizations, forced migrants can only rely on themselves and what they have at their disposal as resources, which demonstrates their capacity to challenge displacement, marginalization, and statelessness in the form of “power to”. This situation leaves them little choice about how to sustain their livelihoods. For many of them, the choice is either staying in Anse-à-Pitres where their existence remains a gray area or risking their lives crossing to the Dominican Republic. Either choice is evil; many choose to draw upon forced mobility and exercise a form of power by acting in an uncertain world to strive for improvement and stability. Everyday labor mobility for them is a matter of survival strategy. Their mobility is forced and risky, something in which they would not get involved should they have a better situation in Anse-à-Pitres. Louman expressed: “If I had resources here in Anse-à-Pitres, I wouldn’t cross to the Dominican Republic. I would be working at home. I wouldn’t have to cross to the Dominican Republic every morning and evening.” His everyday labor mobility is not a deliberate choice, but something imposed upon him in an attempt to improve his life and that of his family.

In this way, many forced migrants maintain that if they do not pursue labor opportunities in the Dominican Republic, their children or the family will not eat. Gilo, a man in his late fifties, had spent almost his entire life in the Dominican Republic where he was brought by his father as a child, and came to Anse-à-Pitres in June 2015. During a focus group, the stories he shared demonstrated the ways in which his life intertwined with everyday labor mobility and how it was essential to support his family:
“It is in the Dominican Republic to do all you have to do to find a little food to give to the children and to earn a little money to buy small soaps. I can say that I work on Dominican land. All I can do now is on Dominican land in order to earn two HT gourdes. Me, as a poor, it is on Dominican land I make a living to give something to the children.”

Gilo’s experience tells us what labor mobility means in the attempt to survive. Despite being undocumented and not legally authorized to cross the border, the life of his family depends on his clandestine trips to the Dominican Republic, particularly in the mountainous region of Pedernales, to work in the agricultural fields. Therefore, labor mobility represents the most viable yet imposed choice for forced migrants to support themselves and their families.

The role of everyday labor mobility for families hanging by a thread is described by Molina, a roughly 20-year-old girl, who still lives with her parents in Tête-à-l’Eau. Molina underlines the importance of those crossing practices for the family or the household when she maintained that “I live badly. If my parents don’t go out as day laborers to give us food, we don’t find food.” This example shows that these labor practices offer a double challenge to the agent, both changing their life and that of the whole family. When the man goes to the Dominican Republic to sell his labor, the rest of the family waits. For many families, it is a daily routine. Their daily bread is the fruit of the man’s labor mobilities. While forced migrant women contribute to maintaining the household either by their labor mobility or by their unwaged labor in families and households that produce laborers themselves (Collins 2013), they acknowledge the weight of the movements undertaken by their husbands, who maintain the whole family.
Solène, a woman, who lives in the camp of Tête Source, felt tired of life after losing all her means of livelihoods in the Dominican Republic, and she now has nothing with which to generate income in Anse-à-Pitres. She is one among so many other women who are living with fear for their husbands who have to cross the border for labor purposes, but also who have to sit down on the threshold of their small tents every evening to wait for the family’s daily bread. As Solène said, she could only rely on her husband’s everyday labor mobility: “If the man doesn’t go to look for a place to sell his labor, we can’t buy a can of rice. Merchants won’t sell us a can of rice.” Even though the Dominican Republic seems to have become repulsive to Solène after her forced removal and the loss of her possessions, she is being fed by her husband’s forced labor mobility. In that sense, the role of labor mobility in the lives of the forced migrants is reminiscent of Fouron’s experience, a scholar of transnationalism who shows how a migrant can become a central support to their family. Fouron experienced this firsthand as an immigrant in the United States; while he was living abroad, he considered himself a support for both his family and his nation by contending that “I represent the whole nation, not just my family. Your obligation to the nation begins with the obligation to improve yourself and your family (Fouron 2001).” In this sense, the men’s labor mobility aims to improve the whole family’s lives, as they do not have other economic alternatives.

As shown through these examples, forced migrants use mobility as a resource with which to create livelihoods, because for many, mobility is the unique thread to which they hold. The upkeep of the family depends on those trips to the Dominican Republic, in activities such as gardening, gathering wood, making charcoal, selling their
labor, and selling goods in the street. This mobility was imposed upon Roussel. He was born in Los Arroyos, Dominican Republic and raised by a Dominican who did not provide him an identity document, which led Dominican migration agents to deport him to Anse-à-Pitres in 2015. Since then, he has taken residence in a small house that he built himself with wood and straw at the camp of Parc Cadeau, a place in which he has to make a living. He does not know anyone in Haiti to whom he could reach out for help. With all the fundamental challenges of living in the camp, he has no choice other than sharing his life between Haiti and the Dominican Republic through labor mobility. Despite humiliation and threat by Dominicans, forced mobility to the Dominican Republic becomes his strategy to survive: “It is on the Dominican side you have to go to make a living. You will always find Dominicans who will do unpleasant things to you but you have to fake that you accept the shame. When this happens, you feel bad but it is on the Dominican side that you have to go.” Forced migrants are in a very different position from privileged travelers who may see mobility as freedom or liberation from space (Sheller and Urry 2006). The push factors of the everyday labor mobility of the forced migrants are located in their poor economic conditions and the lack of viable alternatives in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti.

5.3 Women in everyday labor mobility: peddlers and other informal activities

Among forced migrants, as I have described in previous sections, men tend to move more than women in order to work in the Dominican Republic. The unequal frequency of mobility between genders may be explained by the danger involved in crossing the border illegally. However, a few women also rely on everyday labor mobility as a resource for empowerment. These women do not get involved in everyday
mobility as "followers" of their migrated husbands and male relatives, but they go out on their own to find work, leaving their families behind (De Regt 2010). Their daily movements show their willingness to escape the patriarchal structures that make them subjects of male dependency (Anthias and Lazaridis 2000) and attest to the great responsibilities they assume in supporting their households (Rasmussen 2002). Their involvement in everyday labor mobility as an attempt to meet the needs of their daily lives challenges studies that often describe labor mobility as an activity dominated by male breadwinners who migrate to save or remit money home (Paerregaard 2012). In Anse-à-Pitres, the experience of women in labor mobility is diverse, as they cross the border to do different work in the Dominican Republic. They cross the border to go to sell their labor in agricultural work, to do domestic work, or to sell their own merchandise by turning themselves into mobile merchants. The diversification of their work gives more space to women's agency in terms of how they make choices and the strategies they employ to improve their living conditions (De Regt 2010).

Similar to forced migrant men, but at a much lower scale, a few women cross the border to the Dominican Republic in order to work in gardens. Many women used to work in the Dominican Republic prior to their displacement in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. They did not stay at home, as, when they did not run their small businesses at home, they usually accompanied their husbands to the agricultural fields. In Haiti, they participate in labor mobility, not in relation to men, but in their own right, which demonstrates their capacity to make independent choices and look for practical solutions to their precarity. Luciana, a woman in her late forties, was displaced in Anse-à-Pitres after having spent 31 years in the Dominican Republic, where she used to do agricultural work. At the camp of
Parc Cadeau, she was getting through a natural calamity when she arrived. The roof of her small makeshift house became a watering can when it rained, which prevented her from sleeping at night and attending to the household tasks during the day. As a woman who already had experience working in the Dominican Republic, she was obliged to cross the border, despite having to face the danger of crossing illegally, in order to sell her labor so that she could repair her small house. It was through monte desann, a constant back and forth movement across the border, that she earned money to materialize her project of repairing her small house. She reported this to me during an interview: “I don’t get wet thanks to God because I, as a woman, made this old house crossing the border to sell my labor to Dominicans for 200 pesos every day so that I could cover it with some sheets of metal.” As this example demonstrates, women are equally agents of everyday labor mobility. They experience the same challenges as men taking the risks of crossing the border, which shows their ability to exercise forms of agency drawing upon everyday labor mobility.

In addition, women draw upon labor mobility to create not only survival strategies but also self-autonomy. In many cases, women are struggling but do not want to depend on other people. They use their able-bodies to make and remake their lives. Through hardship, suffering, and precarity, they try to ‘make do’ braving the danger and risks of crossing the border in order to reach the Dominican Republic through corporeal mobility. This situation describes the experience of Manchina in the camp of Parc Cadeau #2. Born in the Dominican Republic, she was raised watching her father do agricultural work and her mother run a small business. When Manchina became older, she started to manage a small business, like her mother, in the Dominican Republic. Unfortunately, her business
did not last; she was a victim of racism from Dominican people yelling at her telling her: “Morena (dark-skinned woman), go to your country.” She could not spend all her life hiding in her home to avoid being discriminated against. With the abrupt removal of her Dominican citizenship and her displacement by the Dominican state, she decided to follow other forced migrants, and she became displaced in Haiti at the camp of Parc Cadeau where she built a small tent to be able to sleep with her six children. Without any help, Manchina had to find ways to support herself and her children. She was forced to return to the Dominican Republic, but this time it was not as a resident of the country she was born in. Rather, it was as a transnational woman whose life became entangled with everyday labor mobility across borders to go to do domestic work for Dominicans as she explained:

“I still go to the Dominican Republic even though you go secretly as you can’t make a living over here. For instance, me, I have six children with me. I don’t have a husband. I must still go secretly to find something to give to the children. Sometimes, I go to do laundry for Dominicans; they give us small food.”

Manchina was forced into everyday labor mobility to help her household and assume her responsibility as an independent woman. The women involved in domestic work are often the victims of abuse by not being paid by their employers. For instance, a woman I call Kerline, who crossed to work with Dominicans, maintained that:

“I worked with many Dominicans. Some people you work for pay you, but others don’t pay you. When they don’t pay you, you look for another work. After you finish working, the person may say that they couldn’t pay; they don’t have money. If you go to the police, they won’t say anything.”

150
Kerline raised an important issue when she underlined that even though they report the abuse to the state, no further action is taken. The denial of these women’s claims is because their work takes place in the informal economy and is based upon verbal agreements with employers. This gives room to the employers to control the labor power of female domestic workers; migrant domestic workers are not just "victims of globalization" but also of power dynamics involved in paid domestic labor (De Regt 2010). However, besides domestic labor, women draw upon mobility to develop other strategies to sustain their livelihoods. For instance, many women rely on their experiences back in the Dominican Republic and everyday mobility to run small transnational businesses.

Despite limited economic resources available to them, some women find ways to start small transnational businesses going from Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti to Pedernales, Dominican Republic. They may go to sell their goods at the binational market on the Dominican-Haitian border on Mondays and Fridays or turn themselves into peddlers wandering the street of Pedernales with their products on their head. For example, one day as I was in Pedernales with two friends, Mirta and Inès, we met with a woman walking with a bundle of merchandize displayed on her arms and her head. She mainly had clothes and belts. That was her small business. It was a transnational woman who crossed the border trying to attract buyers in the streets of Pedernales. Usually, these women go to the Dominican Republic on an everyday basis, except during market days, when they can stay and sell their products at the binational market. That is also the strategy used by Mata, a long-term female resident of Anse-à-Pitres, but also a temporary migrant. I met her for the first time at the binational market and continued to see her
twice a week on market days. She became a seller from whom Inès and I bought vegetables such as carrots, onions, cabbages, garlic, and pepper. Originally, some of those products that she was selling were bought in Port-au-Prince; she had to hide these products because Dominican soldiers watch the type of products being sold at the market.

Mata does not stay in one place because during other days of the week, she turns herself into a mobile merchant and keeps moving. Her whole life and that of her family depend on those everyday mobility practices to keep going. Even though her situation as a long-term resident is quite different from many forced migrant women, as a migrant and a transnational woman, her back and forth movements and her combativeness show a lot of similarities with forced migrant women who are involved in everyday labor mobility. Mata’s description of her mobile life across the border can be considered a summary of what being a transnational migrant in Anse-à-Pitres is, and how those women straddle two spaces simultaneously through everyday corporeal mobility in an attempt to create survival strategies. Mata explained what everyday labor mobility does for her and the family:

“Monte desann (coming back and forth) between Anse-à-Pitres and the Dominican side is not bad for me. It is from that, with my basin, I pay the school of the children. They are always mistreating men. They may have some consideration for you as a woman. It is better that you, as a woman, go for this fight.”

Despite humiliation and stories of violence and torture against Haitians in the Dominican Republic, nothing prevents Mata from expanding her life across the border. Being a transnational woman requires a lot of strength and perseverance. When Mata compares
these movements of *monte desann* (back and forth) as a fight, she means that everyday labor mobility for a woman is about determination, combativeness and bravery to face dangerous situations, which symbolizes the power and agency that those women exercise. These labor mobilities are constitutive of power and agency. Their unsettled lives produce new forms of social life (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006) and challenge ideas of dependency and resignation to despair and uncertainty. This is the form of power that describes the ability of these women to act in their daily lives using corporeal mobility as a reliable resource. By pointing to all the risks that those daily practices imply for a woman, Mata’s example shows that mobility is not an expression of freedom, but only a strategic tool that is imposed upon forced migrants and that they are required to use according to their agendas to attempt to reconstruct their lives. When the situation really gets worse and they are forced to stay away from the border, it is a hard blow to these women who live off everyday labor mobility. Everyday mobility remains an imperative to them to weave in and out between small spaces that become their battlefield and their field of economic activities. While getting in mobility increases their agency, there is a price that comes with it, which is assuming the main responsibility for their own and their children’s survival (Pauli 2008), because most of these women are either single mothers or wives who must complement their husbands’ meager income if the their husbands ever had income. Therefore, everyday labor mobility is the strategic tool for these women to accumulate the necessary resources to meet their multiple needs, which include improving their lives, feeding their children, and sustaining the livelihoods of the whole family.
Conclusion

Everyday labor mobility defines the way of life for many forced migrants living in Anse-à-Pitres. Their daily crossings constitute the choice imposed upon them as they attempt to create new ways of life in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti and allows them to exercise some kind of power and agency. In addition, these dynamics lead to a form of emplacement, that is, re-territorialization as opposed to displacement, which is deterritorialization. I conceive of this emplacement as a form of immobility in comparison to a need to be constantly moving under constraints and threat. As such, both place and mobility have meaning in the lives of the forced migrants.

Furthermore, their involvement in labor mobility shows how the forced migrants are engaged towards shaping the direction of their lives, something that is attested by their creation of an alternative form of citizenship that I conceive of as substantive citizenship.
CHAPTER 6: FORCED MIGRANTS AND CITIZENSHIP FORMATION BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE JURIDICO-LEGAL

“To me, I am Haitian but I can say I am half Dominican and half Haitian because I drink water in Haiti and I eat in Saint Domingue. I eat in Saint Domingue and I drink in Haiti, too. Even though I am in Haiti, I still go (to the Dominican Republic) because I don’t have any job to do here. If I found a job, I wouldn’t go. But it is in Saint Domingue that you earn a living. Even though Panyòl (Dominicans) are humiliating you, it is there you can have a better life.”

During my fieldwork in Anse-à-Pitres, I made weekly visits to the camp of Parc Cadeau #1 but one day I decided to have one-on-one interviews with individuals in order to have more insight into their experiences. It was on that occasion that Medi made the point I highlighted above. Medi was born in the Dominican Republic, but he did not have the right to a Dominican birth certificate or a cedula (Dominican ID). Yet, at his age (he was in his forties), he should have automatically been considered a Dominican citizen, according to the Dominican constitution that was in force before 2010, which recognized the jus soli. The exclusion of children of Haitian parents by the Dominican state prevented him from having legal citizenship. Despite not having legal citizenship, Medi feels a sense of belonging in Haiti, but also in the Dominican Republic. This sense of belonging is part of a kind of citizenship construction outside the legal category that may be conceived of as substantive citizenship. There is an important transnational dimension in what Medi said: “I am half Dominican and half Haitian.” Therefore his sense of connection is not only with Haiti but also with the Dominican Republic, with which he develops a form of economic citizenship. Moreover, considering this shifting in social
and economic belonging between the two countries, this is a *transnational substantive citizenship*. It is this notion of substantive citizenship that this chapter examines, particularly how Dominican-Haitians, who have been the victims of a politics of exclusion put in place by the Dominican state, create citizenship beyond the legal category though personal and collective practices in Anse-à-Pitres.

In its legal aspect, citizenship is generally referred to as a set of duties and political rights granted to an individual by a state. Accordingly, the state has the capacity to regulate its population and to define who belongs and who does not belong to the national territory. In its regulation of legal citizenship, the state often adopts a political asymmetry, excluding many people residing within its territory. Therefore, legal citizenship, at its most basic level, constitutes a mechanism for inclusion and exclusion, and thus a means for establishing or prohibiting membership in political entities that varies in scale from supranational to local (Somers 2008: 21). These mechanisms of exclusion can be seen in societies such as France and Italy, where legal citizenship encourages inequality, racism, and exclusion.

Silverstein (2008) demonstrates how, historically, French citizenship has been exclusive. While citizenship was determined by the principle of *jus soli*, which allowed someone born in French territory to become a French citizen, the process for obtaining this citizenship was guided by a logic of morality and loyalty. For example, in colonial Algeria, Silverstein contends that Muslims were denied French citizenship on the basis of their religious “local civil status” in spite of the fact that Algeria was part of France after 1880 and thus subject to the same juridical regime as the metropole (2008: 27). Today, racial exclusion is still manifest where discourses of race are an integral part of processes.
of belonging to the French nation-state (Danahay and Brettell 2008). Distinctions between white rooted French and racialized French or paper French remains a mainstay of French political discourse, which outlines different forms of political belonging for first- and second-generation, as well as other racially or ethnically hyphenated men and women (2008: 25). Similarly, Stanley (2008) demonstrates how italianness is used to define belonging in Italy and broadly in the European supranational territory.

Following Stanley (2008), italianness has become a marker to distinguish not only Italian identity, but also legal and political belonging, which is expressed through the exclusion of those who do not look and act Italian, especially, non-Italian and non-European immigrants. As a result, if one’s nationality is assumed to be non-Italian, then one is most likely to be not only a non-Italian noncitizen but also a non-European noncitizen.

Divisions around the racial line and discourses such as these exclude people from nation-states and from citizenship. Dominican-Haitians were the victims of similar kinds of exclusion in the Dominican Republic, where the state adopted a constitutional amendment to officially strip people of Haitian origin of their Dominican citizenship and displace them to Haiti.

In my examination of these people’s building of citizenship, I go beyond the legal category in which citizenship is considered to relate someone to a state, extending the definition of citizenship to include people’s daily practices and their acts of organizing themselves in their communities as an expression of being in common. I use the notion of substantive citizenship to conceptualize this alternative form of citizenship that is not granted by the state, but results from people’s experiences that attest to their belonging to
society. This substantive citizenship is an alternative form of citizenship that is built by the forced migrants in a collective and individual making process. The collective substantive citizenship making happened with the creation of ODRA (Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres) that serves as a voice for them to express themselves as concerned citizens. In its role of disciplining and training, ODRA sets to educate its members as substantive citizens for society. ODRA negotiates with local and international organizations in order to make the displaced people’s claims heard. This provides these people with some recognition. On their own making, stateless people take actions, whereby they resist systems of power, particularly the local state that wanted to arbitrarily displace them from the camps. Through these social dynamics, stateless people create substantive citizenship rather than formally through the enactment of law.

In this chapter, first, I look at the daily practices of the stateless and displaced people living in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti and how their actions demonstrate a kind of substantive citizenship.

Second, I demonstrate that these people meet and interact with local and international organizations, which not only provide them with assistance, but also incorporate them in their activities. This process contributes to legitimating their substantive citizenship.

Third, I show that while the organizations on the ground participate in the legitimization of the forced migrants’ substantive citizenship, they also contribute to making them unequal substantive citizens through the creation of inequality and processes of exclusion.
Finally, through their involvement in practices that go beyond their communities in Anse-à-Pitres, I show that these people are transnational substantive citizens. This transnational substantive citizenship is defined by a mitigated feeling of belonging to Haiti, their new country of residence and to the Dominican Republic.

6.1 Substantive citizenship through people’s practices

People lacking legal citizenship create substantive citizenship through exercising socio-economic and cultural rights (Holston 1999, Vora 2013). For instance, Vora (2013) has shown how the impossibility of obtaining legal citizenship for members of Dubai’s Indian diaspora places them outside of the Emirati nation. However, the economic rights they acquire through their participation in the formal economy, forms of narratives and practices of belonging, and their claims to historic-cultural and geographic impacts in the city of residence produce forms of substantive citizenship. In the context of stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres, their substantive citizenship follows a different logic. It is based on narratives of belonging but also on claims to rights to the city, protests, and the recognition these people receive from organizations. I understand belonging as both a human and a social right for the displaced people in that it involves the enjoyment of a certain freedom of being in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, but also the claim to the right to participate in the city life like other legal citizens. According to Bloch (2014), citizenship is culturally contingent and inextricably linked with ‘partial citizenship’ or ‘noncitizenship’ and ideals about belonging. According to this logic, forced migrants’ substantive citizenship is an outcome of social practices (Isin and Wood 1999) that result from personal and collective enterprises that express belonging to and engagement with their living communities.
Stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres create substantive citizenship through the informal and outside of the juridical or political realms of citizenship (Canning 2008). This substantive citizenship is a complex bundle of practices that includes the forced migrants’ attestation of membership in the community and a common vision (Lazar 2013), even though they lack political rights (Holston 2001). Unlike Indian substantive citizens in Dubai, forced migrants cannot draw on the formal economy to enjoy special social and economic rights. Their creation of substantive citizenship is an individual and collective making process of which they are the initiators and the finishers, meaning that they are the ones who seek to establish new social cultural orders that allow them to assert a presence in society (Olwig 2005). Therefore, this alternative citizenship is defined by the displaced people’s actions and formed through daily experiences and narratives that ensure them an “absent-presence” (Witberger 2014) within the public space, i.e., the city, their resistance to projects of displacement and relocation that are imposed from above, and the collective actions undertaken through their organizations that make them visible to other non-governmental organizations and agencies that work with them. By transcending both Haitian and Dominican society, these personal and social actions challenge discreet boundaries around what it means to be a citizen of a single state (Bloch 2014). In what follows, I outline the facets of substantive citizenship as a personal and collective action, starting with the creation of ODRA (the Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates) which attests to the displaced people’s sharing of a common vision, then their actions to protest local systems of power, and the visibility they acquire through other organizations.
6.2 Networking and organizing as a claim of citizenship: the Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres (ODRA)

A few weeks after I arrived in Anse-à-Pitres, I went to visit the Catholic Church and found myself talking with Evanès and Cator, two young men serving at the church. It was about 5 p.m. and suddenly, I saw a group of people coming and gathering in the yard of the church. Evanès told me they are people who usually come to see Father Leconte, who frequently organized food distribution for them. I approached them, presenting myself and asking them some basic information. I found that they were migrants. That day, they stayed a long time but Father Leconte did not come out. They showed a strong interest in me when they learned that I was doing research with the displaced people. One man I will call Miguel told me: “you have to come to our organization; I am the founder and the promoter.” He gave me a phone number and the address where they gathered. Later I met him one day in a meeting at the organization. It was through Miguel, a sixty-year-old man, that I discovered the forced migrants’ organization created in 2016.

On a Sunday afternoon, I was dropped off by a moto taxi driver in front of a relatively nice, pink and white church made of concrete, with a spacious yard that also houses a restaurant. I was already some minutes late, so I inserted myself gently and took a seat at the back. I remember the first words I heard from a committee member “We have to be dynamic. If we are a part of an organization, we have to help one another. If we have an organization, other organizations (international) will collaborate with us and help us. We have same ideas, same thoughts, and same words. We have to behave well if they have to help us.”
The assembly applauded but I could also hear the murmur from the attendees that followed. While I paid attention to these first words, during my first visit I was mostly concerned about taking a look at the physical space. The church is very spacious and well ventilated thanks to its doors and windows that let the fresh air in and help with the sweltering heat and the dust. The church is arranged in two rows. During the meetings women sit on the left row and men on the right. I cannot determine why the physical space is gendered, but according to what I have seen, this way of distributing people was at least helpful for members of the committee when they are selecting between men and women for external meetings. ODRA stands for Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres and it was the only migrant organization I noticed in Anse-à-Pitres during my research between 2016 and 2017. Even though the name of the organization states “repatriates,” the organization also includes stateless Dominican-Haitians. Talking about repatriates in this context may be problematic as many Dominican-Haitian forced migrants have never been to Haiti and cannot be considered as repatriates. Most members of ODRA live in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, where they relocated after the IOM granted them the financial support to rent a room. The organization has a board composed of five members: a president, a vice-president, a secretary, a treasurer, a counselor, and a delegate. The president is not a migrant. He is a well-known citizen of Anse-à-Pitres. According to members, they chose him because of his support when they were living in the camps where the organization began its first activities. The president, who is a pastor, is the owner of a church and allowed forced migrants to gather in the premises, for free, every week. Therefore, the organization
meets at the church based on the existing relationship that was built in the camp, not because the forced and relocated migrants were members of the church.

The speech I heard during my first visit highlighted three dimensions that can help understand the raison d’être of the organization. First, the statement demonstrates that the organization constitutes a way for forced migrants to be socially productive and dynamic in their community. Second, members expect that the organization will give them some visibility through, for example, collaborating with international organizations. Third, the organization is set to articulate members’ vision and form them as citizens for society. As such, ODRA serves as a place to meet and to network, but also to coherently put their life goals together.

As far as networking is concerned, many forced migrants have lived all their lives in the Dominican Republic and do not have ties in Haiti. It is one of many reasons they stayed in the camps. For instance, Matilda was born in Abila, Dominican Republic and arrived in Haiti on June 2015. During an interview, she said: “I don’t have any contacts with people in the Dominican Republic. I didn’t have contacts with people in Haiti before I came here.” When I met Matilda, she had already left the Dominican Republic about one year ago, so she had lost her Dominican contacts. She still found it difficult to identify herself with Haiti, except with the Haitian flag. She considered herself a lost sheep in this new country. She added: “What makes me feel I am at home it is because I am under my flag but I am not in my land.” In fact, this lack of identification with the country is in part due to the fact that Matilda was not born and raised in Haiti. Like her, many Dominican-Haitians remain marginalized in Anse-à-Pitres by living apart and not being integrated into the larger community. As a consequence, they do not develop any
networks with local citizens. Their isolation is reinforced by long-term residents, who have accused forced migrants, particularly those who reside in the camps located on the main road that lead to the entrance gate of the city, of being an element of insecurity or physical attacks against passengers going to the city. This criminalization of the forced migrants contributes to destroying their reputation and narrowing their network to fellow forced migrants who were in the Dominican Republic and who also experienced statelessness and displacement. In such a situation of loneliness and marginalization, ODRA offers opportunity for the forced migrants to network and interact with fellows and eventually with outsiders.

The organization represents a second family to many members. Some forced migrants I interviewed said that ODRA is the only group they attend. For example, I visited Jean Mars, a man in his early fifties who is on the committee, to talk about his experience in Anse-à-Pitres, a new place for him. He lives in a small house, which I found empty and dark, with one door, but without windows, and with no furniture except a small bed. According to him, ODRA is the only place he goes to besides church. He showed me his church card and said: “I don’t have families here. That’s why I go to church and ODRA.” Jean Mars is not from the city of Anse-à-Pitres and is alone there. Often, he went to spend time at the SJM office or at a friend’s house. This lack of community led many displaced people like him to become a member of the organization. At the ODRA meetings, men and women of the displaced population gather every Sunday and socialize among themselves in a very congenial atmosphere. Getting together encourages people to have informal conversations with each other and share basic information. People often share stories about the Dominican Republic, informing each
other of potential risks and threat. Following meetings, many people would look for a friend to talk with before going back home, or would seek to make acquainctance with a new person. Some people would wait for me and come to speak with me in a corner at the church or outside. I walked around to greet and meet people and sometimes accompanied them to their home. People were always asking me to visit their homes. The networking role of the organization is emphasized by a board member I called Brevil. He sees the organization as an important place for forced migrants to define their goals and compensate for the absence of ties in Haiti. He states: “The organization is for the repatriates who have nobody, no father, and no mother. When we are members of an organization, we are one family.” Like Jean Mars, Brevil conceives of the organization as a family. I would go further to perceive the organization as a way to build relationships with others and create community. For Caglar (2004), the community and the relationship that exists between members of society are fundamental to the construction of citizenship. For the stateless people, ODRA offers them a space to build this citizenship by being able to gather and put their goals together.

6.2.1 The goals of ODRA and the agency of citizenship

Through ODRA, the forced migrants define their goals, which include having legal documentation, education for their children, housing, and jobs in Anse-à-Pitres. They identify those elements as the fundamental needs to realize their potential as human beings. The president justifies those goals in a statement he made during an ODRA meeting:

“The most important thing to consider is the person. The biggest problem is having a home and helping the children. Food is also important but education
and a place to live are important. These people are human beings. They deserve to live like everybody. These migrants are workers. They were working in agriculture, construction, and hotels. Dominicans would like to have them again. The state has to invest in construction, land, beaches, and the environment. If there is work, these problems will be solved. If they are working, there won’t be any problem.”

These are the main claims of ODRA; forced migrants want to avoid dependency and give evidence that they believe in long-term development. Despite their limited economic resources, the forced migrants contribute towards this achievement by mobilizing their own scant resources through raising money during ODRA meetings. ODRA asks each member to pay a contribution of five Haitian gourdes (USD 0.083) with the aim of creating a fund for the organization and appealing to other organizations’ generosity. Even though displaced and stateless people have to solve their problems of housing and food insecurity in the short-term, they understand that the improvement of their lives can only be the result of a durable project that differs from being provided with little food. Establishing specific goals demonstrates their role as responsible citizens, who feel the right to live as decent human beings.

ODRA is the only significant space of freedom where many forced migrants can express themselves like legal citizens and decide their future. The creation of this organization emphasizes their agency in carrying social projects to change their lives. They do not want others to define their goals and seek to avoid intruders among them. The president warns the organization against including false migrants among them, stating: “be careful of people you are putting on your list. There are so many false
repatriates. Their house is here in Anse-à-Pitres and they go to sleep at the camp of Parc Cadeau. They are *abołochos* (false migrants).” As the president said, I learned about this situation where long-term residents often go to build their tents at the camps in order to benefit from humanitarian aid. The critical poverty in which people are living and the lack of economic opportunities in Anse-à-Pitres encourage this behavior, whereby people are trying to take advantage of the migration crisis that led to statelessness and displacement. Above all, by grouping themselves and displaying their vision about their future in Anse-à-Pitres, the forced migrants think of themselves as agents of their own destiny and show their sense of responsibility and their willingness to be autonomous in their movement. This autonomy is defined by the organization as the possibility for forced migrants to work in order to have resources and be self-reliant. For instance, they want to force the state and organizations to create job opportunities for all the forced migrants. This claim is expressed by committee members:

“...The international organizations should create jobs. Those people (forced migrants) practiced agriculture when they were in the Dominican Republic. They should help people in these kinds of activities: job creation, education, housing etc. It is not just giving them little food. When you receive a salary each 15th of the month, you expect something. You can go to a bank and borrow money. That’s what the state and organizations have to do. If you don’t have 250 HT gourdes to go to Thiottes, you are not independent. You are not free. It is when you have money that you are autonomous.”

In accordance with the committee’s definition of autonomy, being independent for forced migrants is tied to an increase in their ability to make decisions over their lives, such as
enjoying the same rights and economic opportunities as legal citizens. Even though forced migrants are conceived of as unauthorized in the community (Sassen 2002), ODRA offers them some kind of freedom that allows them to make their voice heard by the state and demonstrate their valuable membership in society. ODRA does not simply provide a place for members to make claims on basic human rights (such as having the opportunity to educate their children, to work, and to have a place to stay), but it also works towards making its members better substantive citizens through disciplining them.

As such, ODRA’s focus on the development of the person does not reduce well-being to material belongings; the organization also works to discipline its members in order to make them better citizens. The organization, through its actions and its discourses, exercises some forms of power over its members. The members become dependent subjects that can be managed, disciplined, or simply ignored (Striffler 2002) by the organization. For instance, one of the committee members reveals the disciplining and punishing role of the organization when he maintains:

“If you don’t have discipline, you can’t be a member of an organization. In the organization, you must be respectful. You are under control. If you aren’t, we will take the member badge from you. When you are a member of an organization, you can’t do whatever you want. If you have a problem, before going to the court, you have to talk to the founder of the organization. We will judge you. If you do things on your own, we will reject you.”

As a result, ODRA can be defined as a space of citizen-making. ODRA’s goal of educating, managing, and controlling people is central to the building of their substantive
citizenship. Members have become more dependent on ODRA than the local state, with which they seem to have a distant relationship in Anse-à-Pitres.

ODRA seeks to make people new citizens by providing them training based on church ethics. Accordingly, members are expected to attend church services to be imbued with moral guidance that will form the proper social conduct desired by the organization. For instance, the president contended: “We do training for people on how to live in society. I will tell you farewell if you don’t want to go to church and I won’t be part of the board of the organization. If you are church people, you don’t fight. You must report your conflicts to the organization and the church.” As such, the training offered by the organization is deeply rooted in moral principles. The implications of this coercive attitude of ODRA constitute a way of making forced migrants into new people, substantive citizens, or responsible subjects for society (Zigon 2010). This appears in a statement made by a member of the committee: “When people come at the organization such as the mayor, they are observing us. We must behave well if they have to help us.” ODRA members understand their role in substantive citizenship making, which includes working on the self in order to become docile, respectful, and thus, better citizens. This way they can prove they have the sense of responsibility for themselves and for their community. This also shows that members seem to support the organization in its leading role and its goal of impacting their lives in the external world, influencing decisions they are making and negotiating on their behalf.

The organization wants to be the representative of members in negotiations with outsiders by being their voice and speaking on their behalf. Some migrants went to see the local priest, who usually organizes food distribution at the Catholic Church. When
they heard this, board members of ODRA were not happy because the priest dealt with forced migrants directly without consulting ODRA. The president stated: “He (the priest) could meet with the committee of the organization. We would give him a list of migrants and he would prepare food Kitts for them. But if going to his office, people are being whipped, it is not good. People are already in misery. They can’t be whipped. People have to be respected.” In this respect, I have assisted with food distribution at the Catholic Church; I did not see people being whipped, but there were three police officers who were reprimanding people and forcing them to stay in line. ODRA attempts to reduce people’s autonomy and also promotes a form of paternalism, whereby the forced migrants’ well-being can only be decided by ODRA. First, forced migrants must submit themselves to the authority of the organization, which then exercises power and domination over them. Second, ODRA members are advised against making decisions themselves, which makes them dependent subjects. The ODRA board requires members to inform the organization of all potential negotiations with outsiders about projects or programs from which they can benefit. The constant need to inform ODRA of personal activities reinforces the subjectification of forced migrants towards the organization. However, the organization’s attempt to reduce the freedom of the forced migrants does not prevent the forced migrants from making independent choices; displaced people continue to look for aid without informing the organization. By acting deliberately as autonomous individuals the displaced people demonstrate that they have obligations towards a bigger community than ODRA, a society of which they are part as equally as legal citizens, even though they do not enjoy the same rights. While ODRA plays a significant role as a maker of substantive citizenship through disciplining and training
people to prepare them for society, forced migrants also act independently to make themselves substantive citizens, such as when they opposed a relocation project imposed by local authorities, thereby resisting a form of power.

6.3 Resisting displacement and relocation: the making of substantive citizenship

The forced migrants, especially those who resided in the camps, found a way to break their silence and raise their voices by refusing to collaborate with local authorities on a project that aimed to displace them from the camps, demonstrating that they have rights to the city of Anse-à-Pitres just the same as other local citizens. In 2017, the SJM, in a partnership with the City Hall, proposed a project to relocate the forced migrants from the camps of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc Cadeau #2. Project goals included helping the residents of these camps to travel to their places of origin in Haiti and settle into a new life there. While the SJM was in charge of carrying out the program on the ground, UNICEF, USDOL, and Cross International were listed as the potential sources of financing. With vulnerable migrant families as its target, the project aimed to improve the conditions of the migrant population, which had already been displaced from the Dominican Republic. The project envisaged offering socio-economic support to 67 vulnerable migrant families in the two aforementioned camps in order to enable them travel to their places of origin in Haiti. The City Hall, with which SJM partnered in the program, was responsible for providing the technical support on the ground. National representatives of the SJM from Port-au-Prince went to Anse-à-Pitres to discuss the project with the City Hall, specifically who would benefit from the project and how much money would be allocated to the selected persons. The City Hall answered these questions and provided its responses to SJM.
First and foremost, there is the issue of identifying the recipients of the project. In the description of the project, SJM listed people in the camps of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc Cadeau #2 as the potential beneficiaries and intended to reach 67 vulnerable families. However, after meeting with ODRA president, the City Hall also included forced migrants living in downtown Anse-à-Pitres who, in 2016, had been relocated by the IOM. The City Hall promised to provide these people with the financial assistance needed to renew their expiring rent as IOM had withdrawn from helping them. Through ODRA, the mayors invited the relocated people to produce a document with their names and the receipts with which they were provided by their landlords. The president of ODRA then informed the relocated forced migrants of the agreement about the renewal of their rent with the City Hall. However, this conclusion between the two parties is in conflict with SJM’s definition of the recipients of the project.

The second issue is that while SJM wanted to provide socio-economic support to people, it did not stipulate the amount of money assigned to relocation funding. Therefore, it remained at the discretion of the City Hall to decide how much to allocate to each person being displaced from the camps. In the description of the project, the SJM stated that the project would cost USD 27,143 and that they had requested USD 25,000, but the amount allocated for each recipient was not confirmed. The City Hall calculated allocation amounts to reflect the transport fees for a forced migrant to travel from Anse-à-Pitres to their place of origin, but this did not match the goal of the project, which originally intended to help people improve their lives. One of the mayors simply imagined an amount that each person should be given for their displacement, but it was not realistic, as people complained that the sum of money announced did not cater to their
transportation need, let alone help them live in a place they had left many years ago and where they often did not have any ties.

In addition, there are stateless displaced people among forced migrants, who have never been to Haiti and who did not have any connection with a place in Haiti that they would consider their place of origin. People in this category seem to have no other choice than to stay in the camps. After the difficulties to put the project into operation, the City Hall became the sole true executor.

6.3.1 Execution of the project

The relocation process did not go the way SJM intended in its project roadmap; there were many contradictions between the project described and what the local state did on the ground.

First, while the project emphasized the two camps of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc Cadeau #2 as beneficiaries of the program, the City Hall decided to displace only people of the camp of Parc Cadeau #2, maintaining that people in Parc Cadeau #1 were from Anse-à-Pitres and were not migrants. Hence, according to the City Hall, they could return to their homes.

Second, according to a few residents I talked to at the camp of Parc Cadeau #2, the City Hall adopted an arbitrary method to expel people from the camp instead of relocating them. People claimed that the city hall came unexpectedly to the camp with a minibus and a driver. They prepared envelopes that contained about 3,000 Haitian gourdes (USD 50) each and gave one to each person, forcing them to get on the minibus. One of the goals of the City Hall through the project was to prevent the re-construction of
the camp or the construction of new tents once the forced migrants left. People maintained that the City Hall hired people and burnt their small tents after the forced migrants had been given the envelope containing their money. I talked to a group of people who stayed at the camp and they contended:

“The City Hall came to expel us. They gave each of us 3,100 HT gourdes (USD 52) and burnt our houses. They came with gas. They said that the owner of the land asked for it. Each person they gave the money, they destroyed their house. They said that the money was for transportation and they would give extra money but they didn’t do that.”

Thus, the project of relocation has become one of expulsion. The way the event occurred meant that the City Hall’s only goal was to get rid of the forced migrants. Some people explained that they were expelled from the camp because the camps projected a bad image of the city of Anse-à-Pitres. They were informed of this allegation by representatives of the City Hall, who said: “We are worried because people are saying that the city has problems.” For the city hall, this relocation had nothing to do with supporting the displaced persons and improving their lives. Relocation simply represented a way to destroy the camps in order to erase the image of desolation and poverty of the city of Anse-à-Pitres. The project went from “resettlement with compensation” to “resettlement with impoverishment” (Cernea and Maldonado 2018). Despite the City Hall’s pressure to displace camp residents, the forced migrants opposed the project.
6.3.2 Collective consciousness or substantive citizenship engagement

The forced migrants’ reactions to contest the power of the local state enhanced their agency and their status as substantive citizens. Some of the forced migrants refused to take the money and get on the minibus that was set to take them to their place of origin. Others, who took the money, did not go, despite pressure from those who were to displace them, because they did not believe in the project. A group of people, who chose to stay in the camp and did not get money from the city hall, maintained:

“From the 3,100 HT gourdes, the driver took 1,000 HT gourdes. He was going to drop us in the middle of the road. The driver pulled out his weapon and threatened us. They were forcing us to get on the minibus. Everybody got off the bus. They kept the money. They didn’t give the 1,000 HT gourdes back to us.”

The local authorities used a top down approach, making decisions for the beneficiaries without consulting them. This resulted in violence, and the residents totally objected to their forced displacement from the camps.

The residents of Parc Cadeau #2 blocked the road as a way to protest, causing tensions between them and people who were hired by the City Hall to displace them and destroy the camp. A group of residents explained the situation, “the same day, we blocked the road to traffic. In order to open the road, a man offered us 10 boxes of rice. He and the driver also offered us 7,500 HT gourdes but we didn’t take them. The driver pulled out his weapon at us.” On the surface, this way of displacing the residents while the state pretended to welcome them when they first arrived in the city is reminiscent of the expulsions of Haitians from the Dominican Republic that took place not only in 2015,
but also in past decades. In the 1990s, for example, while conducting a round-up, Dominican police and soldiers forcibly took many Haitians from their houses and violently pushed some of them onto buses destined for Haiti (Camejo et al. 1992). This brutality was also repeated in 2015 and led to the forced migration to Haiti. These experiences suggest that the everyday life of these people, whether in the Dominican Republic or in Haiti, has always been rife with challenges.

The camp residents also resisted by taking the money from the city hall and faking going to their place of origin. After a few days, they returned to the camp from which they were evicted and started to rebuild their tents. A young man in his late twenties has parents from Jacmel, a Haitian main city located in the southeast but far from Anse-à-Pitres. He took the money and he traveled to Jacmel, but returned quickly to the camp. He explained: “They gave me 4,330 HT gourdes. The same day, I went to Jacmel. I returned because I have my friends and my activity in the bush where I can gather wood. Here, the bush is public but in Jacmel, you can’t cut down trees.” The strategy employed by this young man demonstrates his ability to circumvent the power of the local state, which attests to a form of personal agency.

I met with residents of the camp Parc Cadeau #2 in order to learn more about their refusal to leave, despite the intervention of the local state. They gave many reasons. First, the money offered to them was not enough to pay for transportation when they needed support so that they could start small businesses in their new homes. Therefore, people preferred to stay in the camp so that they could continue to take advantage of border activities. Melia lived in the Dominican Republic all her life, but had been in Parc Cadeau #2 since she came to Haiti. She said:
“When you left a small land 27 or 28 years ago, what do you know about it? Wherever you are you can live. They say they will give us 3,000 HT gourdes, which can’t even buy sandals. Where will I put in a day of work in Marouge, my place of origin? Here my husband can put in a day of work in the Dominican Republic. If I have some money, I can buy a small land. I can do business to give food to the children. 3,000 HT gourdes are nothing. When the money was higher, people didn’t leave, and now they expect them to leave for 3,000 HT gourdes. I come from very far; the transportation fee is more than 3,000 HT gourdes. According to me, 3,000 HT gourdes are like 15 Dominican pesos considering my responsibilities.”

Melia’s statement summarizes the arguments made by many camp residents to explain their opposition to the project of dislocation. People expressed a feeling of being settled in the camp in comparison to going to a place they left many years ago and where they would have to start from scratch to make a living.

Second, forced migrants who were born in the Dominican Republic or who arrived in the Dominican Republic when they were a child, like Melia, doubted that their families in Haiti would welcome them without money, something revealed in Yanick’s statement: “I prefer to live among foreigners than to live among family. The family loves you as much as you have something.” Despite their challenges, the displaced people avoided having a project imposed upon them when that project did not contribute to their human development.

We may refer to the forced migrants’ forms of resistance—that include refusing to take the money that is offered to them, blocking the road, faking displacement, or
responding negatively to local authorities—as a way to boycott the dislocation project as outright protest. The reactions of the stateless and displaced people express both a social and a human right that translates the desire of belonging to the city of Anse-à-Pitres as members like legal citizens and the freedom to live in a place of their choice by refusing choices that the local state attempts to impose on them. By these dynamics, the displaced and stateless people also express their capacity to take actions that come from a collective consciousness the same way as any other citizens of the city. This is what may be conceived of as the agency of citizenship (Lazar 2013. Their substantive citizenship has found some recognition from organizations that attempted to negotiate and collaborate with them.

6.4 The role of organizations in legitimating the stateless people’s substantive citizenship

Indeed, forced migrants’ substantive citizenship has been validated by organizations that collaborated and negotiated with them and by the local state in the personage of the mayors who also entered into discussions with the displaced people before intervening to displace them. In this section, when referring to NGOs, I am simply considering at how NGOs endow the forced migrants’ substantive citizenship with some form of recognition. For instance, the SJM sought to establish direct contact with the forced migrants, inviting them to their meetings, supporting them in the defense of their human rights, and working for their social and economic integration. The president and the vice president of ODRA took part, stood up, raised their voices and asked questions in meetings organized by the SJM. Both ODRA representatives asked SJM to make a plea for the force migrants. In the course of the documentation program, *PwoKontram,*
representatives of the SJM from the national office headquartered in Port-au-Prince organized focus groups with the forced migrants, asking them for advice in order to serve them better. In this way, ODRA is considered an important participant in the execution of the documentation project in Anse-à-Pitres with SJM. The participatory approach that included sitting with the SJM attests to the role that forced migrants play in the community and, specifically, in their own development as substantive citizens.

The SJM is not the only organization that met and negotiated with the forced migrants as a way of legitimating their citizenship. One day, during a usual meeting, two representatives of GARR on behalf of UNHCR came to meet with ODRA members to discuss a project that aimed to reunify separated families and decrease the global number of stateless people. Representatives of ODRA also met with the City Hall in order to negotiate the future of the forced migrants. The president of ODRA had met with local authorities many times before the execution of the relocation project, when many forced migrants started to be expelled by landlords in Anse-à-Pitres. ODRA intervened to help the tenants, assuming its leading role in the migrant community and seeking an alternative to the IOM’s refusal to renew the forced migrants’ rent. Furthermore, ODRA has a delegate, who can represent the organization in meetings. However, the delegate is not authorized to make decisions on behalf of ODRA. The delegate is only responsible for reporting to the board and to members of the organization. Although these actions did not bring a solution to the problems of the forced migrants, they contributed to helping the stateless and displaced people become engaged in negotiating and renegotiating their lives, despite their lack of legal citizenship. These examples attest to forced migrants impact upon communities and the recognition of a limited form of citizenship for them.
The capacity of the forced migrant organization to expand their claims beyond the local community illustrates the refusal of the forced migrants to restrict themselves to a state of illegality and their ability to renegotiate statelessness. The rapport they built with a society outside their world of displacement has brought some small victories; after meeting with representatives of organizations, they have obtained various kinds of support. According to the president of ODRA, Fondasyon pou Lapè (Foundation for Peace) has provided financial aid, which he confirmed during an ODRA general meeting: “Fondasyon pou Lapè gave us 12,000 Dominican pesos, and Dr. Lamothe also helped us. We (as the head of a local school) paid school fees for 100 children and we gave 4,000 to 4,500 Haitian gourdes to teachers. This is how we get money to pay teachers for the children.” The organizations, such as the SJM, IOM, and Fondasyon pou Lapè, which negotiated with forced migrants, granted them a significant form of collective agency, giving them the ability to act together and to plan their future, and also endowing them with certain visibility and recognition in the community of Anse-à-Pitres; this may be considered a form of limited citizenship. The possibility of earning citizenship through contexts other than the law has also been demonstrated by Tsuda (2006) in his study of local citizenship in countries such as Spain, South Korea, Japan, and the like. He shows that in Japan, for example, the national government is more concerned with controlling its borders than integrating immigrants defined as temporary residents and considered as not assimilated enough within the nation-state. As a result, it falls to local governments and NGOs to take care of these immigrants by granting them limited rights such as health care, language classes, and public housing. Unauthorized immigrants experience poor working conditions and low wages; they lack standard worker rights and protection, and
have no access to adequate medical insurance or care because the local government does not recognize them. While they are unrecognized by the local government, NGOs do provide these undocumented migrants with basic services such as human rights protection, which grants them a limited form of local citizenship. I suggest that while nongovernmental organizations play a significant role in supporting stateless people in their absence of legal citizenship, they are also instrumental in promoting inequalities in the lives of poor people through, for example, their role as administrators of humanitarian aid to refugees.

NGOs have been subject to criticism that views them as increasing inequalities among the population they are serving, creating economic elites (Yarrow 2011), who appropriate resources based on the idea that they are the skilled ones. For example, in Haiti, Schuller (2016) examines how Haitians working for NGOs were aware of socio-economic inequalities between them and their foreign counterparts with the latter enjoying great economic privileges and also seeking to exercise their power. The power of NGOs in Haiti has been prevalent after the 2010 earthquake. Foreign donors have chosen to rely on NGOs and contractors to lead the reconstruction of the country, for which 9.9 billion dollars were pledged, while the state only had to vet projects, inspect progress, and resolve land-title disputes (Farmer 2012). According to Farmer, leaving reconstruction solely in the hands of private contractors, including large international NGOs is to continue the same dysfunctional cycle. The only way that money was reported to move from the donors to survivors of the earthquake was through the creation of jobs. However, the UN reported that agencies only created only thirty-five thousand jobs while five hundred thousand or more were needed (Farmer 2012). In this sense,
money does not always go to those in need. In Anse-à-Pitres, the relationship that the stateless people build with organizations in the field help them earn a limited form of citizenship or a kind of “local citizenship,” which is part of their substantive citizenship construction, but the NGOs, at the same time, make these people unequal substantive citizens. This was evidenced by the inclusion of some forced migrants in local projects and the exclusion of others even though, in some circumstances, this process was inevitable.

6.5 Producing unequal substantive citizenship

Unequal substantive citizenship results from the unequal treatment of citizens that become officially or unofficially institutionalized in a nation-state. For instance, the state has recently developed a new type of citizenship tied to “firms and markets, located not in individuals or citizens, but in global economic actors” (Hansen 2005; Sassen 1996, 38). Ong (2006) explores this form of economic citizenship and the role of the state in promoting inequality among its citizens, examining how the nation-state has realigned itself with market-driven institutions in order to promote an economic logic and at the same time define and redefine citizenship. As a result, citizenship has become something less fixed, or more flexible, and able to incorporate the disruptions and flows of globalization. This rupture in citizenship or disaggregation, according to Ong, is related to the dynamic and varied conditions engendered by mobile neoliberal technologies of governing and self-governing (16), which is done in many ways. One way is the intervention of the state, which practices a politics of differentiation towards its population by deliberately favoring certain categories of subjects over others. According to Ong, through this approach, only bearers of marketable talents can enjoy special rights
and benefits. Those who are not marketable are excluded. Hence, being simply a member of the polity as a legal citizen does not guarantee one the access to these special rights and benefits. This neoliberal logic has reconfigured the territory of citizenship. In Anse-à-Pitres, one may also observe a process by which people are making differential citizens, but with a different logic, which is established not only by a state that treats its population unequally, but also by organizations on the ground. These organizations provide forced migrants with some support, but at the same time create inequalities among them. In addition, the capacity to mobilize resources also differentiates the forced migrants. By examining how both external and personal factors contribute to this process of differentiation, my research develops an understanding of differential citizenship as something both created and involuntarily self-provoking.

First and foremost, differentiation among the displaced people begins with the IOM and its program of relocation. In 2016 in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, the IOM relocated about 200 forced migrants, according to the local community and ODRA. Despite its efforts, the IOM program neglected many displaced people, who were living in the different camps, but in the same conditions as those who were selected. I had not yet arrived in Anse-à-Pitres when the program was implemented. However, I found many residents in the camps, who complained about the arbitrariness of a program that did not explain the rationale behind its choices. Even though some forced migrants contended that they were not selected because they were absent on the day of the census, others believed they deserved the IOM assistance in the same way as those who received the assistance. Standing in front of the SJM office one afternoon, I met a Dominican-Haitian, a man in his late thirties, who resided in the camp of Maletchipe close to the camp of
Parc Cadeau #2. During a short conversation, he told me: “We were nine families in Maletchipe. Then IOM relocated three, and six of us were left in the camp. I have four children; two are with me and two are with their mother. Their mother left me because she saw that things were not good.” This man was not unique in complaining that he was left out of the IOM relocation program. Other residents in the camps made the same remark, maintaining that they may have been working outside their homes when the IOM staff passed through the camps, and false migrants were selected in their stead. A worker from another organization also pointed out the fact that some false migrants were selected to benefit from the program of relocation. He stated: “There is some money being given but I don’t know anything. We (our organization) were here before the IOM. When they were giving the money, they put us out and put in false migrants.” As this example denotes, financial aid does not always go to whom it is intended and may divide the population. In Anse-à-Pitres, almost everyone is poor and vulnerable, which may explain why many long-term residents seek to take advantage of aid opportunities using a false migrant identity. However, at least these people belong to the land and appear to be in a slightly better situation than the forced migrants, who are experiencing displacement and statelessness. In this sense, helping the poor can sometimes produce unexpected results, such as inequalities in excluding impoverished people. The inability of the IOM to satisfy all the forced migrants’ needs contributed to differentiating them. Other organizations serving people in the camps also received criticisms by the forced migrants.

Some forced migrants contend that some organizations favored one category of people over others in their programs of assistance. They cited physical appearance and being a woman as privileged criteria for receiving support. When visiting the camp of
Parc Cadeau #2 some residents reported: “In the camp, beautiful women eat and good-looking men eat. Ugly women and ugly men don’t eat. GARR gave 10,350 Haitian gourdes (USD 172.5) but only the beautiful women got this money. The project is for women.” A man was more direct, when he stated that: “IOM and GARR came and gave some money, but it was based on partisanship.” These reports suggest a double standard or gender inequality promoted by the two organizations. My presence on the ground did not allow me to confirm these people’s statements and this gender inequality because these programs no longer existed by the time of my arrival. However, I heard from workers of organizations that financial support has not always been fairly distributed, maintaining that many needy residents in the camp were excluded. I did observe that the majority of people of Anse-à-Pitres are involved in everyday migration, which complicates the task of organizations to distinguish recently displaced migrants from long-term resident migrants. In this sense, creating inequalities through giving financial assistance may result when organizations use a top down approach, do not use local people to help them identify the recently displaced people, or when they do not explain the rationality behind their choice. Even though these organizations may not intend to create differentiation among people, their approach, lacking rationality and transparency, promotes this process and encourages unequal substantive citizenship.

The creation of differentiation also arose with the micro-credit program, launched by the SJM. When I arrived in Anse-à-Pitres in 2016, SJM was one of the most loyal organizations to the forced migrants. While the mission of this organization is to accompany and defend the rights and dignity of migrants and those who are the victims of assaults, abuse, and violence, it also gives economic support to the forced migrants.
Through the micro-credit program, SJM granted loans of 10,000 HT gourdes (167 USD) to a few forced migrants in order to start small businesses. Those who did not benefit from the program were not happy, considering that they were qualified to receive the loan but were snubbed. I met two board members of ODRA and they showed concern about not being selected as beneficiaries of the program. They discussed the matter with me and one said:

“I heard that people have received money. There are some people who can’t do business, who don’t know how to manage the money. Unfortunately the givers don’t work with ODRA. We could have told them who could be a good person to manage and work with the money. I deserve to have that money because I have a large family and I can work.”

Individuals frequently try to differentiate themselves from others in order to justify why they should be the selected beneficiaries. In this example, the two forced migrants expressed their capacity to manage a business while ignoring others’ capacity to do the same thing. In this way, differentiation is not only created by the organizations, but it is also created by the people, who see themselves as different substantive citizens from others. The state also played a role in promoting inequalities and differentiation among the displaced and stateless people, especially through the program of relocation, of which it was the executor on the ground.

The relocation program sought to displace forced migrants from the camp of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc Cadeau #2. When it came to implementing the project, the City Hall decided to exclude residents of the Parc Cadeau #1 maintaining that they were from Anse-à-Pitres and could return to their home without any economic support. While this
may have been true for some residents in the camp considered as false migrants, there was no survey that clearly said who the true and false migrants were and where they were from. Moreover, the hyper-mobility of people in the region to the Dominican Republic, especially to Pedernales, made it difficult to distinguish migrant status in Anse-à-Pitres. The majority of people in Anse-à-Pitres are in the same precarious economic condition and draw upon practices of everyday ‘border jumping’ in order to create livelihoods. The decision to include one camp and exclude another appears to be arbitrary and aims to create differential substantive citizens among the displaced. Most people who were excluded had been in the camps for a long time and have been facing the same social and economic challenges as people in Parc Cadeau #2.

As a matter of fact, the development of differentiation among the displaced people is inevitable, as organizations are not generally able to satisfy everyone’s needs. As Fassin (2010:51) argues, referring to nongovernmental workers, “we therefore cannot hold these groups entirely responsible for the complex tensions and insurmountable problems with which they are confronted. But we can expect them to be more clear-sighted than they often appear.” In this sense, SJM and IOM have limited resources and are only filling a gap left by the state, which has contributed to promoting differentiation among citizens. By considering that residents at the camps are factors of insecurity in the city, the state qualifies them as undesired people, or people out of place, who are not equal to the long-term citizens of Anse-à-Pitres. Throughout Anse-à-Pitres, rumors have also spread that some long-term residents have a positive reaction concerning the burning and the destruction of the small houses of forced migrants in the camps. I talked to residents of the city informally have heard them articulate that people living in the camps
are the cause of insecurity and theft in the area; in this sense, the differentiation among citizens can be the result of how the displaced people are perceived compared to others. Differentiation is also an outcome of where one stands economically in society; some forced migrants were able to respond to displacement better than others, which is visible among the residents in the camp of Parc Cadeau #1.

Some forced migrants do better than others because of their ability to mobilize and manage resources in order to improve their lives. This differentiation is reflected in the residents’ small houses in the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. While the majority of houses are made of straw and cardboard, there are a few houses that are bigger and covered with iron sheets. Some of these houses are located on an isolated piece of land and they are inhabited by a very small group of forced migrants. They are bigger and better built than those on the rest of the main camp. While some people explain that they were given iron sheets by an organization, which makes their houses look different than others in the camp, I learned that a few people bought their pieces of land from someone they consider to be the owner of the land. Josemar whom, people consider the head of the camp, has his house on this secluded piece of land, away from the main camp, although I consider it an extension of Parc Cadeau #1. During a visit, I stopped at the first yard where there was a garden of corn, a big house, and a small tent in front of which I met Karl, who is the home owner. Karl was in the main camp and benefited from the IOM relocation program. He explained, “When IOM gave me the little money, I didn’t eat it (spend). I bought this piece of land. I moved from the camp to here. People who are providing assistance don’t know this area. They don’t come because they say that people who live here are well off; they don’t need help.” Moving from the main camp meant two important things for Karl.
First, it equated to a social and economic mobility, which in turn guarantees his independence and some kind of stability. Second, this mobility puts Karl in a position that allows him to enjoy substantive citizenship to a different degree from the rest of the displaced and stateless people living in the main camps. Furthermore, Karl extended his activities to the Dominican Republic, as he said: “I continue to go to the Dominican Republic. I make gardens. I plant squashes, which I sold to build this house.” This transnational aspect of Karl’s life is significant, as it is extended to two different realities involving two distinct societies, making him a transnational substantive citizen.

6.6 Transnational substantive citizenship: A continuum between life in Anse-à-Pitres (Haiti) and Pedernales (Dominican Republic)

Forced migrants’ lives are split between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It is difficult to define belonging for forced migrants because of their everyday “jumping border” practices. While many assert that they feel better in Haiti because they are not running to escape soldiers, they continue to go to work in the Dominican Republic on a daily basis. Their constant movements between the two countries make it difficult to locate them in a specific space where they belong. Even though their feelings are important in defining their belonging, we cannot ignore the significance of their daily practices in making them substantive citizens. As Lazar (2013) suggests, citizenship is tied to what people do in their daily lives. Indeed, the daily activities of the forced migrants are intertwined with both Haitian and Dominican societies. This makes them transnational substantive citizens, which suggests a sort of belonging that is defined through their being subject to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Schiller (2005: 52) argued that the adoption of dual citizenship by an impressive number of states has
contributed to the development of a transborder form of citizenship (transnational citizenship) that also goes beyond legal citizenship into the subject of cultural and social citizenship and its transnational extensions. Similarly, the displaced people’s transnational substantive citizenship is formed outside the legal category, but expressed in two ways: first, through residing in Haiti, a country that offers them a sense of freedom and second, through crossing to the Dominican Republic, where they go for their survival.

The forced migrants feel at home in Anse-à-Pitres because this is the place that guarantees them a sense of physical security. In the Dominican Republic, many contend that they were worried about their lives because they were persecuted by soldiers and Dominican civilians. While leaving the Dominican Republic was involuntary, some migrants feel less worried about their lives since their arrival in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. Zalo, a young man in his twenties, was born in the Dominican Republic, but had never been able to obtain a Dominican identity card (called *cédula*). According to him, living in the Dominican Republic was an experience of insecurity and fear, as Haitians were constantly attacked in the street and at their homes. For Zalo, coming to Haiti was a relief; he said: “I feel good where I am now. I feel good because I sleep at ease. I get up with happiness and I go to sleep with happiness. No one will tell me ‘go to your home.” The feeling that being in Haiti gives Zalo is one of belonging to Anse-à-Pitres because the city offers him security for his life. In this sense belonging equates to freedom, which can be considered an element of substantive citizenship for Zalo, who became stateless after he was stripped of his citizenship by the Dominican state. His experience of belonging is inflected by his experience residing in the city and his identity, something
that is directly related to citizenship (Bloch, 2014). Zalo, who lived his whole life in the Dominican Republic, did not reject his past experience, though, as he considers himself half Haitian, half Dominican. Even though he said that he felt better in Haiti, he has still kept a door open to the Dominican Republic. He said: “I can say that I am not on my land but I feel at home.” Being on “his land,” for Zalo, would mean being in the Dominican Republic, where he was born. When considering Zalo’s notion of land and home, it is possible to deduce that the meaning of Haiti as a place of freedom, belonging, and home can be perceived differently by people.

For some people, being free also means feeling at home in Anse-à-Pitres. Resias was born in Barahona, Dominican Republic but did not have a Dominican cédula. Since the Dominican state adopted the 2010 migration law that led to displaced people’s statelessness, being born in the Dominican Republic is no longer a condition to be Dominican. Like other people who became “illegal”, she was not allowed to reside in the Dominican Republic; she became displaced in Haiti. When I asked her in an interview if she felt at home in Anse-à-Pitres, she answered:

“Well, we feel that we are at home because we are all together. In the Dominican Republic they are threatening us. When someone crosses and comes over here (Anse-à-Pitres), you feel a little bit more peaceful. In the Dominican Republic, each time there is something happening. When there is a tumult, you are not at peace because Dominicans do not care about you.”

Resias describes her feeling toward Anse-à-Pitres through an expression of being at home that is synonymous with peace, which may, in a certain way, be interpreted as a sense of belonging.
For another group of people, feeling good or free in Anse-à-Pitres does not mean being at home. This is the case for Renaldo, a Dominican-Haitian, who considers being in Anse-à-Pitres only an object of peace. He contends: “I am not at home. As I am in my country, this makes me a bit quiet but when I am over there (Dominican Republic), I feel more at ease. Here (in Haiti), I am just suffering.” Whatever feelings people develop about their presence in Anse-à-Pitres, their impact as temporary residents participates in the creation of substantive citizenship. In the same vein, Vora (2013) showed how members of the Indian diaspora, who are denied Emirati citizenship, participate in the history of the country through being residents in Dubai, which makes them worthy of the status of substantive citizens. Despite the fact that displaced people do not share the same opinion of their relationship to Anse-à-Pitres, almost all of them have something in common. Their lives continue to be a continuum between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales. Anse-à-Pitres represents a place of residency that attests to their belonging to Haiti, regardless of their feelings toward this place, and Pedernales, where they cross every day to sell their labor, depicts a place of economic influence for them. While going to the Dominican Republic is considered a survival strategy for the forced migrants, their border jumping is also constitutive of substantive citizenship.

Although the displaced people consider that being in Haiti gives them a sense of physical security because they are not being harassed by Dominican soldiers and civilians, the Dominican Republic still plays an important role in their lives. Manchina was born in the Dominican Republic. After living her whole life in the Dominican Republic, she struggled to adapt to life in Haiti. While she likes Haiti, the country of her parents, she missed the Dominican Republic, where she still feels she belongs. She said:
“I am at home. That’s true because I am in my country. However, I am more familiar with Dominicans. My moves are with Dominicans. I can’t humiliate my country but the true place I come from is Abila (Dominican Republic).” Manchina’s belonging in Haiti is defined through her parents who are Haitian and her residing in Anse-à-Pitres, but her daily activities take place in the Dominican Republic. Even though she was rejected by the state of the Dominican Republic, she considers the Dominican Republic is still important to her. Similarly, Jadana, a Dominican-Haitian, who was in Haiti for the first time, is connected to Haiti through her Haitian parents. However, she expresses her attachment to the Dominican Republic, the country where she was born and raised, even though she does not legally belong there. She stated: “It seems that life is better in the Dominican Republic. Here, I don’t do anything. I want to return to St Domingue (Dominican Republic) because it is the country I know.” While Jadna resides in Haiti, she feels that the Dominican Republic offers more opportunities, especially for making a living. Her transnational substantive citizenship cannot be defined out of those two experiences.

For the majority of the displaced people, the importance of the Dominican Republic resides in the role it plays in the creation of livelihoods. Jeannel, who was born in the Dominican Republic, feels better in Haiti because he feels free. However, he cannot erase the Dominican Republic from his life. Moving across the border to create a livelihood continues to be a prerequisite for him as he stated: “To have the resources to survive, you must go to the Dominican Republic. Haiti has no resources. If Haiti had opportunities, you would be so at ease. It is in the Dominican Republic one must create livelihoods. I still go. It is there I must go to put in a day of work. Haiti has nothing I can
do.” Crossing to the Dominican Republic is a way for forced migrants to make a living. Those daily practices also count as life experiences and show the impact they have on both Anse-à-Pitres and the Dominican Republic. Forced migrants undertake other significant activities in the Dominican Republic besides going to work. Fabiola sent her children to school in Pedernales while she resides in Anse-à-Pitres. She crossed the border everyday with her children or asked someone to take them to school when she was blocked by soldiers on the border. Granting her children a Dominican education constitutes a way of preparing them for Dominican citizenship. Fabiola continued to go to the Dominican Republic to do domestic work. With these kinds of life dynamics and experiences, forced migrants actively participate in and contribute to both societies. Through forms of engagement such as going to work, selling, or sending children to school in the Dominican Republic, those stateless people residing in Anse-à-Pitres create substantive citizenship that goes beyond borders. This is why they can be conceived of as transnational substantive citizens. Transnational substantive citizenship is an outcome of the exclusion from legal citizenship that produces multiple logics of citizenship. What is at stake here is that being able to produce belonging in more than one society gives the displaced people some flexibility that they can take advantage of amid all the constraints that structure their lives.

Finally, while the state may deploy multiple forms of governance to regulate its citizenry, it also proliferates several types of citizenship (Vora 2013: 21). Accordingly, the emergence of an alternative form of citizenship for the stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres is a consequence of a selective politics of the Dominican Republic that consisted of excluding people of Haitian backgrounds, but also of the failure of the Haitian state to
legally integrate these people into the Haitian state. As an alternative to the absence of legal citizenship, these people trigger actions that emanated from both personal and collective consciousness, such as organizing themselves and resisting the power system in Anse-à-Pitres, enhancing claims of belonging to the city, and freedom, all of which are social and human rights. These strategies produce a kind of substantive citizenship outside the juridico-legal category. Substantive citizenship, as something that can be formed by people’s social and economic actions in a city, shows how people can be productive members of society despite the absence of legal connection with the state. Furthermore, their involvement into two societies makes them transnational substantive citizens, which gives them some flexibility in a context where they are politically and socially constrained.
Conclusions

In this dissertation, I have examined how displaced people mobilize resources within and across their communities as a survival strategy and how they create a form of substantive citizenship in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. I have shown that in order to develop an understanding of the displaced people’s experiences of displacement and statelessness, it is fundamental to go to where their journey started: the Dominican Republic. Indeed, while the expulsion of thousands of people of Haitian background from the Dominican Republic was sudden, all the mechanisms that led to this brutal decision were already at work in Dominican society. A series of internal and external factors that have their origin in Dominican and Haitian history and in current world development need to be taken into account. Like many Caribbean countries, both Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been shaped as nations by shared experiences of colonialism, postcolonialism, slavery, class, racial and gender stratification. However, their two distinct colonial experiences make them not an undifferentiated whole.

The two countries used to be one country, which belonged to Spain, before being separated with the introduction of France on the island. For more than one century (1600s-1800s), the two countries have been submitted to the fierce regime of the colonial system. Haiti proclaimed its independence from France in 1804, and the Dominican Republic proclaimed its independence from Spain in 1821, to then become occupied by Haiti from 1822 to 1844. Dominicans have not digested this Haitian occupation, which they refer to as “the Haitian Domination” (Martinez 2005), and which was central to the formation of a sentiment of “anti-Haitianismo” (antihaitianism). In this racial ideology, being Dominican has to come to be defined as not Haitian (Howard 2001). Racial
thinking has been used in the process of Dominican nation building by the dictator Trujillo, who finally opted for the elimination of Haitians through a state-sponsored massacre in 1937. In recent years, the removal of Haitians by the Dominican state has been achieved through the institutionalization of racial prejudice and the enactment of law, specifically the Constitutional court decision in 2013 that revoked birthright citizenship to thousands of Dominicans and forced them out of the country with other undocumented Haitian migrants. Even though these people were not massacred as citizens were during the Trujillo era, the process was still violent because it entailed the separation of families, the loss of means of livelihoods, material dispossession, and the forced displacement of people of Haitian backgrounds to Haiti, a country many had not known before or had left many years ago in search of a better life.

These people entered Haiti, a country that had been devastated by the 2010 earthquake and was struggling with continuous political and economic instability; their arrival in Haiti collided with grave social, political, and economic challenges including an absent or quasi-inexistent state, which could not even provide them with the ID papers they needed to enjoy, at least, some basic social and human rights. This means that from the Dominican Republic to Anse-à-Pitres, the displaced people found themselves between Scylla and Charybdis. In Anse-à-Pitres, the only real contact that the Haitian state developed with the displaced people was intervening in their lives, such as when local authorities were expelling them from the camp of Parc Cadeau #2 to erase their ugly image from the city. Legally, the state retreats from the well-being of these people, which makes them dependent subjects more of themselves than of the state.
Despite state marginalization, displacement, and statelessness, the forced migrants have strived to improve their lives by looking for opportunities where there seem to be none. As I demonstrated throughout this dissertation, they have undertaken many informal economic activities that include selling goods, selling their labor, taking microcredit loans, or going to do agricultural work in the Dominican Republic, drawing on daily labor mobility that I described in the expression of monte desann, in order to capture their back and forth movements between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. All these survival strategies are poor income generating activities for the displaced people. However, what counts in those practices is more the meaning they bring to these people’s lives than the money they earn from them. They endow them with a philosophy of life that is conveyed in expressions such as m’ap degaje m, ti degaje, and vire men, to describe their lives as not static but as an ongoing process towards achieving something with which to keep going.

The forced migrants’ involvement in everyday labor mobility, even if it means facing the danger involved in crossing the border, is an example of their ability to carry out actions in the world, which allows them to exercise power and agency in and over their lives. The strength, resilience, agency and emancipation of these forced migrants through these practices appear in one forced migrant’s assertion: “What happens is that Haitians have something in them, wherever they are, they live. That’s why we are here but it is not that we have a good activity.” This forced migrant man I call Charyba implies that the reason for their survival is not because they have a job or they are earning money, but it is because they are an enduring people who remain hopeful.
The conception of how people survive based on the hope that they feel can be understood in the light of Ortner’s (2016: 59) support for an inquiry “into what gives lives a sense of purpose or direction, or how people search for the best way to live—even in dire and hostile circumstances.” That is to say, for forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres, it is more their agentive, stubborn, and energy-giving behavior that helps them survive day-to-day, rather than their income. The informal economy is, in this sense, a process, or an assemblage of practices that embrace their total life as humans. Their coping and survival strategies, through their informal economic practices, lead us to redefine a good life not as a state to be obtained but an ongoing aspiration for something better (Fisher 2014). As such, Fisher associates well being with non-material qualities that embrace the hopes, fears, and other subjective factors that define engagement with the world. Human development is not simply defined by the material resources or stable wages and salaried labor that are often touted as a condition of development process (Ferguson and Li, T. M. 2018). In a context where stable-waged labor is disappearing, Ferguson and Li suggest that making livelihood is not defined by a proper job. They even argued for a renewed political-economic analysis of life beyond the “proper job” that is both global and differentiated. These ideas help understand the informal economic practices of the forced migrants not as something that guarantees a somewhat material well-being, but as something that helps them remain hopeful. This hope is expressed through the forced migrants’ collective actions that lead them to demand their right to the city of Anse-à-Pitres.

Indeed, in the absence of legal citizenship, these stateless people forge a kind of substantive citizenship, which is defined beyond the legal realm through acting
personally and collectively in a way that demonstrates their valuable representation in their displaced communities. Their daily activities in Anse-à-Pitres, the change they bring to the demography of the city, what they do to build a durable life, the trial to get settled, and the narratives they produced daily are ways by which they build substantive citizenship. This limited form of substantive citizenship is also fed by feelings of belonging, formulation of claims through their organization (ODRA), forms of reaction and resistance to systems of power and daily live dynamics that have impacts in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which makes them transnational substantive citizens.

By doing research with these displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, I have learned what it means to be displaced and stateless. Each time I observed them, met with them, or interviewed them, I had the opportunity to review their journey and the storms they have endured just to be there. Even though my understanding of their reality is very much limited because of my positionality as an outsider, after 14 months living with them, I have come to draw a new cartography of their lives in comparison to when I first arrived in Anse-à-Pitres for my research. My long-term immersion into their community has allowed me to develop a kind of cultural intuition in their lives such as understanding their expressions, that include *n'ap longonni* (to literally mean we are trying to survive) or *mwen pa gen rele, mwen pa gen reponn* (meaning I have no support). In this sense, I have carved out a niche for myself not only in their reality but also in their lives. It was evidenced in the simple words that people conveyed to me *Apa w lage nou*, i.e., you forgot about us. Listening to them has made me feel more indebted to them, a burden that weighs more than my back can bear. In the field, I was moved by their desire for something better, their agency, and their combativeness. I see their life through a binary
opposition that I translate as power in oppression, light in darkness, hope in despair, and potentiality in precarity and poverty. Their social and economic dynamics in Anse-à-Pitres exemplify this contrasting reality.

This dissertation contributes to anthropological studies of displaced people and the anthropology of citizenship. First, often times, economic injustice and state laws and policies contribute to exacerbating marginalized and disenfranchised people’s vulnerability and precarity. These practices dehumanize these people, who are often accused of being a threat to the jobs (Lewellen 2002) of formal citizens in host countries. My work develops an understanding of these people as not being hopeless, passive, or inactive. Their engagement in socio-cultural practices and forms of informal or Creole economics as an outcome of being excluded from the formal economy provides them with the tools needed to develop survival strategies. Those practices attest to their agency to build self-reliance and self-development in the face of precarity and displacement. In this way, what I am developing in my work are theories that actually contest the anthropology of the “suffering slot” by showing how displaced people strive to create good in their lives (Robbins 2013).

In addition, these people build an alternative form of citizenship that translates their capacity of taking actions in the world. I conceptualize this as substantive citizenship and it goes beyond the legal scope of citizenship. This citizenship is a personal and collective experience. First, it results from actions that people undertake in order to direct their lives. Second, it results from how people’s common vision in the nation-state produces actions that challenge established power structures. Through these informal, personal, and collective channels, stateless people in the world build
substantive citizenship that can also become transnational based on the multiple links that they maintain with others across the world.
Appendix: Interview Guides

Interview Guide-English

1- Do you have any contacts in Haiti and abroad, and how do you stay in touch with them?
2- What kind of social or economic exchanges are you involved in with your contacts abroad and other members of the community?
3- How do these practices help you make ends meet?
4- In what ways are you still connected to the Dominican Republic?
5- What is this process of making a living in Haiti like for you?
6- How do you compare your life back in the Dominican Republic to your current life in Haiti?
7- What kind of support do you receive from NGOs?
8- In what kind of community activities are you engaged? How do you feel about them?
9- Do you feel belonging here in Anse-à-Pitres and in what ways?
10- How did you find out that you would have to leave the Dominican Republic because your citizenship had been revoked?

B- Interview Guide-Creole

1- Eske ou gen kontak ak moun an Ayiti oubyen aletranje e kijan oufè pou kenbe kontak avèk yo?
2- Ki jan de echanj sosyal oswa ekonomik ou gen ak moun aletranje oubyen lòt manm nan kominote a?
3- Ki jan pratik sa yo ede w nan lavi chak jou w?
4- Ki fason ou santi ou konekte ak Repiblik Dominikèn?
5- Ki jan sa ye pou ou mennen yon vi an Ayiti ?
6- Ki konparezon ou kapab fè ant jan ou t’ap viv an Repiblik Dominikèn ak fason w’ap viv kounya an Ayiti?
7- Ki sipò ou jwenn nan men ONG?
8- Nan ki aktivite ou patisipe nan kominote a? Sa w panse de aktivite sa yo?

9- Eske ou santi w lakay ou isit Ansapit? Kòman w ka eksplode sa?

10- Ki reyaksyon w lè w aprann ke ou dwe kite Repiblik Dominikèn akoz yo retire nasyonalite w?

C-Inteview Guide-Spanish

1- ¿Tiene contactos en Haití y en el extranjero, y cómo se queda Usted en contacto con ellos?

2- ¿Qué tipo de intercambios sociales o económicos Usted tiene con sus contactos en el extranjero y otros miembros de la comunidad?

3- ¿Cómo estas prácticas le ayudan a sobrevivir?

4- ¿De qué manera está conectado con la República Dominicana?

5- ¿Cuál es el proceso de fabricación de una vida en Haití para Usted?

6- ¿Cómo se compara su vida en la República Dominicana a su vida actual en Haití?

7- ¿Qué tipo de apoyo recibe de las ONG?

8- ¿En qué tipo de actividades de la comunidad que se dedica? ¿Cómo se siente acerca de ellas?

9- ¿Se siente que pertenece aquí en Anse-à-Pitres y de qué manera?

10- ¿Cómo se sentía cuando aprendía que tendría que dejar la República Dominicana debido a su ciudadanía que había sido revocada?
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VITA

Educational institutions attended and degrees awarded

- **M.A.,** Foreign Cultures and Societies: Europe and Americas, University of Poitiers, France. 2013
- **B.A.,** Modern Languages, Ecole Normale Superieure (Haiti State University). 2007

Professional positions held

- Primary Instructor. Anthropology 160: Cultural Diversity in the Modern World. University of Kentucky. Spring 2018
- English Instructor. Ecole Normale d'Instituteurs des Sœurs Salésiennes de l’Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti (ENI). 2016-17
- Teaching Assistant. Anthropology 160-220 (Online): Cultural Diversity in the Modern World University of Kentucky. 2014
- Language Teacher (Spanish). Institution Françoise et René de la Serre, Haiti. 2009-2010
- Language Teacher (English/Spanish). Lycée Fritz Pierre Louis, Haiti. 2009-2010
- Language Teacher (English). Collège Saint Charles, Haiti. 2008-2010
- Language Teacher (English/Creole). Collège Cœur de Jésus, Haiti. 2006-2008
Scholastic and professional honors

- Margaret Lantis Award for Excellence in Original Research by a Graduate Student. Department of Anthropology at the University of Kentucky. Spring 2019
- Graduate Student Conference Travel Award. Department of Anthropology at the University of Kentucky. Fall 2018

- College of Arts and Sciences Dean's Competitive Graduate Fellowship. Fall 2018
- Michael Cernea Involuntary Resettlement Student Travel Award. Society for Applied Anthropology. Spring 2018
- Teaching Assistantship, Department of Anthropology, University of Kentucky. 2018
- Legacy Graduate Travel Award-Department Conference Travel Award. Spring 2018
- Lambda Alpha Paper Competition. Honorable Mention. 2018
- National Science Foundation Grant, Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant. 2017
- Dissertation Enhancement Award (DEA). 2016
- Teaching Assistantship, Department of Anthropology, University of Kentucky. 2016
- International Student Tuition Scholarship. International Student and Scholar Services (ISSS). University of Kentucky. 2016
- The Kentucky Academy of Science. Graduate Research Competition Award: Anthropology and Sociology. 2015
- Teaching Assistantship, Department of Anthropology, University of Kentucky. 2015
- Susan Abbot-Jamieson: pre-Dissertation Research Fund Award. Department of Anthropology, University of Kentucky. 2015
- Teaching Assistantship, Department of Anthropology, University of Kentucky. 2014
- Teaching Assistantship, Department of Anthropology, University of Kentucky.
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- Teaching Assistantship, Department of French and Italian, University of Iowa. 2013

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- French Government Scholarship (Bourse du Gouvernement Français). 2010

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**Publications**

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