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State Violence, Mobility and Everyday Life in Cairo, Egypt

Christine E. Smith

University of Kentucky, Cesmit5@uky.edu

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Christine E. Smith, Student

Dr. Anna Secor, Major Professor

Dr. Patricia Ehrkamp, Director of Graduate Studies
STATE VIOLENCE, MOBILITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN CAIRO, EGYPT

DISSEYESTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By
Christine Elizabeth Smith
Lexington, Kentucky

Director: Dr. Anna J. Secor, Professor of Geography
Lexington, Kentucky

2015

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STATE VIOLENCE, MOBILITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN CAIRO, EGYPT

State violence in Egypt is an embedded part of daily life and popular culture, and well documented in social and news media. The uprisings of January 11, which took place in Egypt were organized in large part against violence and torture regularly delivered by police forces. In this dissertation I examine the implications of chronic state violence on everyday life for low-income Egyptians. In doing so, this dissertation provides analysis of how violence shapes forms of intimacy within social life, how it shapes urban landscapes and the politics therein and how it informs individual piety and banal practices of security. This work contributes to studies within feminist geopolitics, memory and emotion within geography by understanding the lives of Cairenes through their experience of the landscape and places they inhabit, maneuver through, and create with the memory and threat of state violence.

The project focuses on four selected sites in Greater Cairo: Kholousy Street in Shoubra, Musky Market in Old Cairo, Cairo University in Giza, and Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo. These sites have been chosen because they represent different nodes of daily life (shopping, leisure, education, and political participation) for low-income Cairenes. Research methods include participant observation at the four sites, eleven focus groups and thirty-one interviews with low-income Cairo residents in two age cohorts: one group of participants between the ages of 18 and 26, and a second cohort between the ages of 49 and 57.

For each of these questions, this project provides a gender sensitive comparison of the two age cohorts in order to gain insight into the role of youth and memory and gender in Cairenes’ interpretations and representations of the Mubarak era and the recent revolution.

KEYWORDS: State Violence, Mobility, Cairo, Everyday Life, Urban Space

Christine Elizabeth Smith
Student’s Signature

April 13, 2015
Date
STATE VIOLENCE, MOBILITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN CAIRO, EGYPT

By

Christine Elizabeth Smith

Dr. Anna J. Secor
Director of Dissertation

Dr. Patricia Erhkamp
Director of Graduate Studies

April 27th, 2015
For mother who taught me to love beautiful things
For Sandy who became my brother
For Anna and her wild belief in me
For Giant and lazy afternoons spent with Matlock and sub sandwiches
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Chapter One: Introduction

In February of 2011, Egyptians were jubilant after President Hosni Mubarak, ruler of Egypt for thirty years stepped down. Massive demonstrations against him and his regime made it impossible for him to remain. Egyptians were eager to move toward a reformation of government that would weed out the corruption and violence that were routinely inflicted upon them. In the time since 2011, Egypt has had a democratic election, bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to power and further popular uprisings that subsequently removed them from power. After experiments with the raiment of democracy, the country of Egypt now finds itself in a familiar position. Today, as I write this introduction, several of the young activists that were critical to the downfall of Hosni Mubarak have been jailed, some with life sentences. The Muslim Brotherhood is now banned (again) and its members are being actively hunted and arrested. Its leaders, including former President Mohammad Morsi, are now behind bars and will likely remain there on life sentences. Through it all, violence committed by the state against civilians has continued.

This project is about that violence and its effects on urban daily life amongst low-income Cairenes. The issue this project investigates is how mobilities, urban landscapes and relationships therein have been affected, understood and coped with under the weight of this violence. The three primary goals of this project were 1) to understand the emotional implications of state violence and political change amongst low-income Cairenes, 2) to examine how the urban environment and practices of moving through the city are shaped by a legacy of state violence, and finally, 3) to investigate how personal
interpretations of state violence and political upheaval are refracted by generational differences and gender.

I pursued these goals by utilizing three primary research methods: interviews, focus groups and participant observation. Interviews were held with the target research population (low income Caïreenes) in addition to political activists, artists and representatives of human rights organizations. Those interviewed include the artists Mohammed Abla and Ganzeer, and the head of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Hafez Abu Seada. Data collection was aided through the use of interpreters and translators. In order to get a sense of daily life in the city and its functioning as a urban metropolis, I focused on four primary sites located within the greater Cairo area: Tahrir Square, Musky Market, Kholousy Street and Cairo University.

In this introductory chapter I will provide a foundational overview of modern Egyptian history that highlights its role as a political power in the Middle East and charts its development into an authoritarian state. Second, I will describe in more depth the period of emergency law under Hosni Mubarak and the transformations brought about by the ‘Arab Spring.’ I then move toward an exploration of what it means to study everyday life in urban space. Finally, I conclude with the theoretical contributions of my work and an outline of the dissertation.

The Mubarak Era and the Arab Spring: a Review

Cairo’s importance for the country of Egypt cannot be understated. Politically, economically and socially the country of Egypt is tightly wound with what happens in Cairo. Subsequently, the city, to an extent, acts as a bellwether of Egyptian society. To understand Cairo today, the major issues that are important to daily life and shape the
landscape of the city, as well as the constantly changing and somewhat baffling nature of politics, I lay out a brief review of major political transitions that have occurred since Egypt’s founding as a Republic in 1952. In doing so, this section serves as context for the rest of the dissertation.

**The rise of the military in political life**

Egypt was ripe for change when military officers seized power in a swift coup during the summer in 1952. The Free Officers, a secret group of military officers, had been planning for months against Egypt’s monarchy and the colonial rule of the British. While “officially” independent, Egypt’s foreign affairs and foreign minorities in the country remained under British control. Through this arrangement, the monarchy was rendered ineffectual. Of the officers who worked together to overthrow the government, two would become prominent figures in Egyptian and Middle Eastern history, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat (Cleveland and Bunton 2013).

After assuming power, the officers instituted themselves as the revolutionary command council. During their initial years, they effectively moved to restrict the power of landowners and other competitors for power, namely the Muslim Brotherhood. By 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser was able to strategically outstrip his fellow council members in loyalty and popularity and became President of Egypt. Regionally, Nasser became a hero for his resistance against colonialism and Western powers as well as for his refusal to accept the creation of Israel in Palestine. Although the end of his time in office saw his reputation diminished due to military failures, he remains a revered figure within Egyptian politics and set the precedent for the presence of the military in political life.

During Nasser’s presidency he nationalized the Suez Canal, limited the power and wealth
of the country’s elite, and initiated a series of reforms that sought to produce an Arab form of socialism. All Egyptians were promised access to an education and university graduates were guaranteed government jobs (Cleveland and Bunton 2013, Al-Marsot 2010). He also arrested or killed prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood, officially banning them from public life.

The death of Nasser in 1970 signaled the official end of socialism in Egypt. This sea-change was made apparent in the rule of his successor Anwar Sadat. While Nasser shut down political opposition and instead produced a political machine that supported his policies, Sadat allowed limited political pluralism. In contrast to the socialist policies advocated by Nasser and an orientation toward the Soviet Union, Sadat re-opened Egypt to foreign investment. Equally as important, Sadat moved to sign an official peace treaty with Israel. The June War of 1967 and arguably the October War of 1973 showed the inability of the Egyptian military to mount a truly effective offensive against Israel and its backer, the United States. Subsequently, Egypt under Sadat signed a series of agreements with Israel that not only returned land lost to Israel during the 1967 war but which also provided economic aid. The most important of these were the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel that was negotiated by the United States.

The promises of Nasser to the Egyptian middle class were undone during the era of Sadat. In the process, economic polarization became prominent throughout the country. Historian Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot describes Egypt during the 1970s thus:

The number of luxury high-rise apartments grew rapidly, while middle- and lower-income housing was totally neglected. Local goods disappeared from the shops to make way for more expensive foreign imports. The bourgeoisie encouraged the growth of shops and restaurants which featured foreign goods and foods….Thus affluence existed side by side with abject poverty and there was a growing gap between the new rich, said to number 27,000 millionaires, and the poor. (Al Sayyid Marsot, 2010: 161-162)
Sadat’s regime bred anger over the widening wealth gap in the country as well as anger over the peace accords with Israel. Further, the rampant westernization occurring in the country lead to a sense of alienation by many, notably Islamists. Members of the terrorist group Al-Jihad assassinated Sadat in 1981 during a military demonstration. In the aftermath of the assassination, vice President and former military officer Hosni Mubarak took his place as President and promptly instituted emergency law, formally known as Law no. 162 of 1958. Mubarak’s rule continued for the next 30 years.

Violence

Egypt has been under forms of Emergency law repeatedly throughout the 20th century (Goldschmidt 2004 and Reza 2007) and the years under Mubarak represented its longest period in force. For thirty years, this law suspended civil liberties and led to widespread unjustified detentions (Human Rights Watch 2010, Amnesty International 2010). Instead of targeting terrorists, the law was used to target civilians. Activists, artists, intellectuals, homosexuals, the poor and anyone who may have simply been unlucky fell under its force (Singerman 2002, Amar 2011, 2013). Simultaneously during this period, government continued to attract private sector investments while neglecting public sector services. As inflation rose and wages froze many Egyptians who once thought of themselves as middle class saw their hold on their economic positions slip.

As evident within Cairo today, there are upper class individuals who are well versed in foreign languages such as German and English who attend private international schools and live in gated communities. These individuals co-exist with other urban citizens who cannot afford to eat in western fast food outlets and who inhabit informal
housing units that in many cases have only provisional connections to sewage and electrical infrastructure (de Koning 2009).

During Mubarak’s time in office he continued the neo-liberal reforms initiated by Sadat and solidified Egypt’s alliance with the United States, maintaining Egypt’s position as one of the highest recipients of U.S. foreign aid and becoming a central partner of the U.S. in the war on terror. Annually, Egypt receives 1.3 billion in military aid. Between 1948 and 2015, Egypt has received a total of 76 billion U.S. dollars (Sharp 2015). These aid dollars have been used to bolster military equipment, which has undeniably been used on Egyptian protesters. Additionally, Egypt is part of the U.S. rendition network that relocates U.S. detainees to foreign sites where they are interrogated, tortured and held without recourse to U.S. laws of due process (Weaver 2015).

The Mubarak period of emergency law is the focus of the present study, which focuses on two generations or Cairenes who have come of age during this time. While the title ‘emergency law’ indicates law enacted during an exceptional moment, by 2011, it was widely acknowledged that emergency law had become normal law. Human Rights Watch reported in 2009 that the estimates of those held without charge was around 10,000 (Human rights watch 2010). It is important to note that these numbers are based on data that human rights organizations have been able to collect and not on any official governmental reports, thus the true number of people unjustly detained or killed behind bars may remain unknown.

Beyond the high profile cases of torture and murder that were prominent on the world stage (such as the death of Khaled Said in August 2010), the everyday moments of violence that confronted Egyptians were made possible by a bloated security apparatus.
In a study conducted in 2012 by the Nile Institute, it was estimated that there was one employee from the Ministry of Interior for every 45 citizens within the country, making Egypt one of the biggest security states in the world (Farouk 2012). The following table shows the breakdown of the Ministry of Interior:

Table 1.1 Employees with the Egyptian Ministry of Interior (Farouk 2012)

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The Arab Spring

During the protests of 2011, the violence of the Egyptian state toward its civilians was catapulted onto the world stage. Both President Hosni Mubarak and his party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), were removed from their elite positions of power. The police forces in urban areas, and particularly in Cairo, were left in a state of disarray, with some remaining shuttered well into the summer of 2013 during my fieldwork. In the period after Mubarak’s removal, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces took command of the country and began the process of moving toward elections. This process was conducted under the intermittent use of emergency rule. This period was also marked by the death of many protesters. One of the most notable incidents to occur during this period was the killing of 25 Coptic protesters by the military on October 9th, 2011, in downtown Cairo (Tadros 2011). Remembered as ‘Black Sunday,’ it stands as a reminder of the indiscriminate brutality of the Egyptian security apparatus.

The controversial and deadly rule of SCAF continued until Presidential elections in the summer of 2012 resulted in the election of Mohammad Morsi to the office of
President. This was an historic election that resulted not only in the first democratically elected President of Egypt, but also in the ascent of the Muslim Brotherhood to the arena of formal politics (Londono and Brulliard 2012). In the period after 2011 a space of political freedom opened and narratives, photos, and videos of violence committed against civilians became more common. During my fieldwork between 2012-2013, this was apparent in the social activity present in the media and in urban space. Despite this openness toward discussing state violence and advocating against it, violence continued to occur and, in all but the most extraordinary of these cases, it was still expected (Ahram Online 2012, Mosireen 2013). This painful fact was on full display during the protest in front of the Presidential palace in December of 2012 (Hussein 2012). Violence erupted between central security forces, supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and protesters who called for the end of Morsi’s Presidential term (Human Rights Watch 2012). During these protests, a driver was stripped naked by central security forces and sodomized. Others were beaten.

As Morsi’s year in power became increasingly untenable due to political and energy crises that were racking the country, activists began to organize a campaign to launch a referendum vote against his tenure. The Tamarod campaign, meaning, rebel, announced that they wished to collect 15 million signatures from citizens around the country. Armed with petitions, activists and civilians with links to the movement moved through the country collecting signatures. By June, the movement announced that it had reached its goals and actively called for all Egyptians to enter public squares and protest against the regime on June 30, exactly one year since Morsi had entered office (BBC 2013). To be clear, the movement campaigned for a referendum vote. However, the
widespread popularity of the protest led to calls for Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s immediate removal from office. Tamorod was able to coalesce a broad coalition of different political movements and important political figures behind their call for the end of the Morsi regime.

On June 1, the military, led by General Abdel Fattah el Sisi gave President Morsi an ultimatum: that he had to find a political solution within 48 hours or face removal and the installation of a transition government. This ultimatum became a coup by popular demand as there was no political faction willing to work with President Morsi or the Muslim Brotherhood to find a political solution. On June 3, Morsi and members of the Muslim brotherhood were put under arrest. Their offices were closed and again they found themselves banned.

A transition government was installed under the direction of former judge Adly Monsour, but undeniably the military was back in a role of leadership and general Sisi enjoyed wide popularity and favor (Karimi, 2013). During this period, Islamist groups regrouped and began to organize against the coup, setting up camps in various parts of the city. Their two major camps were in front of Cairo University and at the mosque Rabiaa Al-Adiwiya in Nasser city. These camps grew in number and were sites of speeches and near daily demonstrations. Further, the brotherhood and Islamist groups that supported them launched actions throughout the city that disrupted transport networks.

As the summer progressed, the sites were prone to attack. Melees with the republican guards resulted in a number of deaths for Islamists protesters. On the other hand, the camps of the Islamists protesters were sites of brutality against innocent civilians (Mada Masr 2013a, Mada Masr 2013b, Mada Masr 2013c, Egypt Independent
2013). To end their protests, Islamists demanded the freedom of Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership and their restoration to power. Attempts at a political solution failed. On the morning of August 3 2013, security forces stormed Muslim Brotherhood camps throughout Cairo, killing hundreds. In the bloodiest day in Egyptian history, it is estimated that over 600 people were killed. The following days were filled more with violence and the country was put under curfew. Retaliation targeted police stations and Coptic churches. Forty-two Coptic churches where attacked; the authorities were accused of failing to provide adequate protection.

What was exceptional about Morsi’s year in power, in addition to the energy and political crises in the country, was the increase in violence between civilians. According to research participants and what I witnessed, there were more fights, both verbal and physical, that sometimes devolved into mob conflicts. Several people I met indicated that this breakdown in mutual aid and increase in violence was tied to fears and pressures that emanated from the government being in a transitional state. Thus while there was a sense of fearlessness with regard to the state that had become noticeable amongst many of the research participants, there was also fear about being in the city: living, working and moving through it. While 2011 seemed to irrevocably change the political and social landscape in Egypt, there persisted a sense of inevitability and a lack of surprise at the resurgence of support and power for the police and military rule.

Since this period, Egypt has undergone attacks against police and military installations in urban space and in the Sinai. These acts have only served to bolster the popularity of General Sisi who launched a successful Presidential campaign and is now the 6th President of the Republic of Egypt. Currently, political protest are banned unless
they have government permission, activists and human rights organizations are being intimidated and detained and according to reports from human rights groups in the country torture continues (EIPR 2014).

Figure 1.1 Map of Cairo and research sites
A Constantly Changing City

The city of Cairo is one of the world’s mega cities, home to a population of 11.7 million people (Sims 2010). The urban agglomeration that is Cairo dwarfs other urban areas and is the political and cultural capital of Egypt (Sims 2010, Raymond 2000, Kipper and Fischer 2009). Cairo’s primacy is also dependent upon its geographical location within the Nile river valley (Sims 2010). The city’s economic and social importance has led to a massive growth in population. Between 1935 and 1965, net-in-migration represented 35% of Cairo’s growth. Today 80% of the city’s population growth is from the natural increase of the city’s residents (Kipper and Fischer 2009).

Discernible within the city’s landscape are the divides between wealth and poverty and, more acutely, signs of the government’s refusal to provide adequate services to the country’s citizens, namely housing. Beginning with Sadat’s policies to attract international foreign investment and initiatives aimed at making Cairo a center for business, leisure and tourism, housing for the poor and middle class was ignored. This was despite the fact that the population of the city was rapidly growing (Sims 2010). For the private sector, building low or middle-income housing was and is unprofitable. Consequently, builders have focused on creating housing for the wealthy on the outskirts of the city (Batran and Arandel 1998). The division of class in urban space mirrors trends elsewhere in the global south where the wealthy are leaving the traditional urban centers for gated compounds (Gough and Franch 2005).

Cairo’s residents have increased the city’s housing capacity through the building of informal housing units called Aswiyyiats in Egyptian colloquial Arabic. These units are usually built without government permission on what is either private or state owned
land. These forms of housing now form a major part of the Cairo landscape (Sims 2010). They are also stigmatized as being crime riddled, hotbeds for Islamic extremism, and centers of poverty.

Thus Cairo’s urban landscape appears as a mash up of historic architecture from the late 19th and early 20th century (now in a state of decline) and the proliferation of informal settlements. Dotted within the city and around it are enclaves for the wealthy and upper middle class. A growing population is taxing infrastructure, with private and public forms of mass transportation and private cars causing intense congestion. Often, the rhetoric of chaos is deployed in order to reign in the city and bring it under control. Yet as Diane Singerman has written “The real problem with chaos then is that it suggests disorder and pushes Cairo back in time to a ‘traditional,’ non-modern pre-history. Chaos is threatening to Cairo’s image and understanding of itself as a modern, global city, and a regional power and international ‘player’” (Singerman 2011: 17).

Walking and Everyday Life

When I arrived in Cairo, it was the end of Ramadan and Mohammad Morsi had been in power for over a month. As a geographer in Cairo wishing to study violence within everyday life, my most immediate tool was to walk and ride around the city. Sometimes there were points to my trips and sometimes there were none. Through walking and riding the various means of transport the city had to offer, I wanted to understand the rhythms of Cairo; indeed, I wanted to know if Cairo had a rhythm. As the Middle East’s largest city, Cairo is often described as a cacophony of dissonant sounds, movements and stoppages. In my journeys through the city, I experienced this first hand. However, Cairo’s rhythm or proof that it had one was not revealed to me through my
own bodily experience. It was revealed through the expressed feelings of exasperation from drivers on the road and fellow pedestrians who were upset because of road closures or protests that blocked Cairo’s subway system from functioning. I knew that Cairo had a rhythm because of its felt absence. For many, the city was not working.

My work takes the everyday to be of critical importance. I share this in common with a vast array of scholars throughout the social sciences and particularly within geography who within the last twenty years have incorporated analyses of the everyday into their work or at the very least into the titles of their work. The everyday, however, is difficult to study. By becoming a resident of Cairo, I was enmeshed in it. Yet, simultaneously its vastness made it intangible.

Figure 1.2 Al Muski
Michel de Certeau literally glimpsed the parameters of this problem as he stood on the 110th floor of the World Trade Center looking over Manhattan. In his chapter entitled ‘Walking in the City’ in *The Practice of Everyday Life*, de Certeau writes that the act of walking and the innumerable steps performed by random and anonymous individuals is the essence of everyday life in a city. The everyday is something performed and felt. From his vantage point at one of the highest places in the world overlooking these movements, de Certeau had to have felt a certain longing. In his work he identifies three elements of walking: its power to ‘perform’ a space, its appropriation of that space, and its ability to reveal contrasting relations to space. However, if one wanted to study this activity simply by watching, one would only be left with a series of paths and traces emptied of their essential quality. In my work, to study everyday life meant I had to actively engage in the experiences the city had to offer.

However, to be clear, I, as a foreigner and as a researcher, could never hope to approximate the daily experiences of my interlocutors by walking city streets. Yet, I argue that in walking through the city some of the challenges of urban life in one of the world’s mega cities became my own. My body in urban space served as an instrument that assisted me when I asked questions and influenced the way I looked at scenes in the streets. My body was looked at in return by fellow pedestrians as I was something truly different within the everyday of their lives: I am a black woman with dreads and an American accent. It was through my own movements in space that then gave me insights necessary for my research.

My travels through the city were not limited to walking but encompassed a wide breadth of transport means: taxis, tuk tuk, Metro (Cairo’s subway system), service buses,
and public buses were all part of the way in which I moved. Each means of transport serviced different functions and revealed other parts of the city to me. Cairo is renowned for its traffic woes, the city’s population of 11.7 million (Sims 2010) must be channeled through a dizzying array of modes of transport and roadways both formal and informal. In short, mobility practices within Cairo should not be underestimated.

However, investigating violence and politics through mobility practices may seem to be approaching it in a mundane and boring fashion—certainly far away from spaces more conducive to incidences of state violence or discussions about political transition and democracy. Indeed, urban transportation is boring and mundane. Yet, it is also filled with surprise. The everyday does not consist solely of a string of mundane or locally oriented practices performed by individuals but also consists of various cultural, political, and social practices that shape everyday life (Highmore 2002). Indeed, the act of moving (and not moving) is one that is fully drenched with assumptions, prejudices and politics (Law 1999, Hanson 2010). The new mobilities paradigm, inaugurated in the early 2000s, turned toward such analyses as a departure from earlier work that focused on autonomous subjects that moved uneventfully and rationally through space (Cresswell 2010). In this work, the sensory and sensual aspects of moving found a place (Saville 2008, Middleton 2009). In acknowledging that movement is invested with more than departures and arrivals, a theoretical space was opened that allowed scholars to study the way in which movement (and concomitantly aspects of everyday life) are surveilled, regulated and policed (Monroe 2011, Highmore 2002, Cresswell 2010). Movement through space (and importantly non-movement) is regulated at various scales, from the level of the body to various forms of transportation. Hence, it presents a potent tool for studying everyday life.
and issues of violence and politics because it draws on heterogeneous elements—those both extraordinary and ordinary in its functioning. Instead of looking at the actual events of violence and typical political discussions, it allows one to look askance at the details, trends and beliefs that serve as a backdrop to these problems.

**The nature of violence**

I conceptualize violence as an act committed against a being or entity that destabilizes their physical, mental, and emotional well-being. This wide definition of violence is prevalent within human rights discourse (Tjaden 2005). Acts of violence can happen immediately or be built into social and political structures. Violence has the ability to transform understandings of space and interpersonal relationships as well as perceptions of the self (Scarry 1985). During the design process of this project, I read deeply into ideas about affect wishing to incorporate emerging theories into the research design. While I felt unable to do so at the time, it influenced how I thought about violence—as a force that has an ability to imbue the worlds in which it takes place with its residue. Violence can and does influence emotional encounters and interactions well after its occurrence. The residue of violence has the ability to influence movement consciously and subconsciously. But to be clear, moments of violence are not interpreted the same way by all who encounter them. And what is considered violence is different depending on cultural and social practices.
Figure 1.3 Violence

Landscapes are a result of human activity and resultantly are imbued with histories of violence. In Cairo, objects both fixed and mobile form the landscape. Those elements carry memories, and emotions related to personal experiences. Indeed, research on violence in urban space indicates that the landscapes of the city, performed and apprehended through movement, evokes memory through which the personal and collective memory are woven together. However, not all emotions are considered equally. Rachel Pain and Susan J Smith (2008) explain that the emotion of fear and who gets to define what is fearful is steeped in particular forms of privilege: one’s geopolitical location, race, wealth and gender come to delimit what is legitimately fearful. In the years of Hosni Mubarak’s reign in Egypt and its immediate aftermath, research by social scientists and human rights organizations have mapped a topography of fear: spaces of violence embedded within urban landscapes of Egypt that are connected with global security regimes, particularly the ongoing war on terror (Amar 2013, Ismail 2006,
Singerman 2002). This project engages directly with the fear of low-income citizens and sets out to understand the violence and dangers they encounter in their daily lives.

In this dissertation, I bring nuance into these narratives and question perceptions of violence amidst political change and the moral assumptions that accompany them. In doing so, I present other logics of love and care that ultimately pose questions about how the state should care for its citizens. Secondly, another aspect of this dissertation is an investigation of different aspects of an urban landscape transformed by political change and narratives of violence. I look at changes in how urban space has been used, interpreted and represented by civilians in the thirty years that Mubarak has ruled Egypt and in particular, in the period immediately following Mubarak’s removal from office. And finally, I look at what it means to move through space with forms of objective and subjective violence.

Figure 1.4 Protest Against Torture, 6/6/2013
Outline of dissertation

The compilation of this dissertation follows the guidelines of the three-article dissertation option provided by the geography department at the University of Kentucky. This dissertation’s empirical chapters; chapters three, four and five have either been published or submitted for publication to three different journals. These papers have been reproduced here as dissertation chapters and joined by a chapter on methodology.

In Chapter two I review the methodology deployed for this study as well as aspects of research that influenced data collection. I also provide detailed information on my use of interpreters as field assistants and information about the recruitment process of research participants.

In Chapter three, I assess the ways in which Cairene’s conceptualize forms of security and insecurity in their daily lives. Special attention here is paid to insecurity felt in relation to crime from other civilians and dangers faced on various means of transportation throughout the city. In response to forms of insecurity, I show how research participants rely on spirituality as a tool that moderates the behavior of the self and others who are deemed to be behaving inappropriately, including government. Further, I present data that shows how interlocutors negotiate the means for their own security through their debates over the use of shari’ah law in daily life. The work presented here has been submitted to the journal *Space and Polity*.

In chapter four, I segue from understandings of violence and danger that happen publicly to a consideration of domestic violence. In so doing, I show how forms of violence in the home run parallel to violence committed by the state against its citizens, thus mapping a multi-scalar relationship between state violence and domestic violence. Because I at times held different understandings of violence than those of my
interlocutors, keen attention is paid to the language used to define, explain and justify violence. Findings show that definitions of violence are contingent upon factors such as context and emotions involved. In the accounts of research participants, ‘violence’, is often understood as being devoid of care and is juxtaposed against ‘discipline’, generally understood as an act of care meant to correct inappropriate behavior, this chapter has been submitted to the journal *Gender, Place and Culture*.

Finally in chapter five I interrogate how public art has transformed Cairo’s urban landscape after the fall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Here, I argue that negotiations around public art interventions indicate changing political trends and fault lines that are not only significant for urban residents but for Egyptian society as a whole. More than serving as documentation of what has taken place or as acts of protest, public art can serve as a diagnostic of issues that simmer underneath the surface of national politics. Here I explore tensions regarding class, gender and increasing political polarization. This chapter has been published in the journal *Cultural and Social Geography*.

**Contributions of dissertation research**

This dissertation is designed within a framework of feminist geopolitics. Egypt’s recent political transformations and their political and cultural importance have asserted Egypt’s longstanding position as a major player within regional and international politics. It has been a key ally of the of the United States since the signing of the Camp David accords and has received billions of dollars in aid for the development of military and development projects (Plumer 2013). Egypt’s current political transformations have served as a model for activists throughout the region as well as for other governments. Through the use of feminist geopolitics, I integrate politics occurring at regional and international scales with the moments and spaces of daily life. Simply, feminist
geopolitics demonstrates that politics is embodied and therefore contingent on the spaces and places that bodies move through and imagine (Hyndman and de Alwis 2004, Hyndman 2007, Secor 2004b, Mountz 2011, Fluri 2011). In using this framework, I show how scalar analogies implode in the moment in which they are mapped. For example, violence in the home is directly linked with the violence of the state. The body, the home, and the state collide and cannot be unpicked from each other. Indeed the narratives of research participants show how political arguments, no matter how extraordinary or ‘distant,’ cannot be disembodied or disconnected from the lives that experience it (Dowler and Sharp 2001, Marston et. al 2005).

Most notably, this study considers psychic relationships within space through an analysis of emotion, memories, art and spirituality. These elements serve to connect and reorient individuals to space and are therefore intensely political. Yet, these elements also at times exceed the political. As I show in chapter three, piety is used as a form of security that is beyond anything that can be provided on earth while simultaneously reflecting on the Egyptian government’s refusal to provide adequate social service or infrastructural maintenance. Again, in contrast to analyses that focused purely on politics at the level of national and international politics, a lens of feminist geopolitics can demonstrate the rich texture that animates politics and daily life (Pain et al 2010, Pain 2009). What is notable throughout are the webs of connection drawn between the interactions of the state and civilians. These connections are made possible through desires for care, recognition, expression, justice, and ultimately love.

Although it is not possible to predict how the political landscape of the country and the region will continue to transform, the data presented here highlights how debates
over violence will continue to influence governance. Yes, the demands that protesters made for a life without torture and brutality during the pivotal days of the Arab spring seem distant to many. Yet, I do not believe those demands have disappeared or grown less potent. What we are seeing in Egypt now is an active grappling with violence and its perceived limits. On all fronts, violence is being confronted now more than ever: in terms of public sexual harassment and sexual violence, instances of police torture, and unlawful detentions. Indeed, the gaze on social and political violence in Egypt is stronger than it has been in recent memory and I maintain that in the post-2011 Egypt, Egyptians are now more at ease in labeling, discussing and advocating against violence in all walks of life. While this may sound naïve and out of touch to many who lament Egypt’s current situation, I feel that when assessing the longer historical picture, this moment in Egypt stands out for its pregnant possibilities.
Chapter Two: Methodology

This project’s focus on low-income Egyptians was not coincidental. In a report published jointly by the forum of independent Human Rights NGOs (2010), it states that it is overwhelmingly the poor who are abused by various state actors and who often have no avenue for aid. While many of the most well-known cases of violence involve individuals who can be categorized as middle class civilians such as Khaled Said, it is the particular circumstances of the poor that make them the overwhelming targets. To make a living and to live, they must utilize and appropriate the public spaces of the city as well as land that is privately held. Many of the people recruited for this project worked informally as street sellers and lived in informal housing that in some cases was not structurally sound. While their sheer number at times gives them safety, the precarity of their lives -- their informality, lack of resources and lack of connections -- leaves them open to harassment, corruption and physical violence.

Further, this project sought to focus on generational differences between two age cohorts, Participants between the ages of 18-26 and 49-57, in order to understand the ways in which collective memory about Mubarak’s regime, political change and state violence differed among the generational groups. Specifically, I wanted to compare these two generations to see if age was important in forming a political identity and how age impacted understandings of the city and the changing political scene.

However, to be clear, not all of the research participants in this study experienced acts of direct violence and it would be disingenuous to say that memories or the threat of violence formed a central part of their daily lives. Rather, what I point out, similar to the findings of Jegnathan (2004) and Bilbija et al (2005), is that an environment where state
brutality against civilians and corruption are routine events, a semiotic system emerges wherein individuals learn to read cues, avoid possible negative interactions, and create a language through jokes and storytelling. In a sense these practices become naturalized—not so much that they become a forgotten habit, but to the extent that people understand violence as a normal occurrence and prepare for it accordingly. To understand these maneuvers I employ three primary research methods: interviews, focus groups and participant observation at four select sites within the city. In what follows, I provide detailed information on the primary research sites that I routinely frequented in order to conduct observations and recruit research participants. Further, I describe the process through which I conducted interviews and focus groups. I go into particular detail about the use of walking interviews and film in the research process. I end the chapter with a discussion on my experience with research assistants and how they influenced data collection.

**Research Site Description**

To ground the project within the vast city of Cairo and to understand processes of mobility and everyday life, I frequented four areas of Cairo regularly: Musky Market, Kholousy Street in Shubra, Cairo University and Tahrir Square. I chose these areas because they were central to forms of sociality and forms of social reproduction for youth and older urban residents alike. Further the use of participant observation at these sites was helpful in understanding popular political sentiments and events that have national importance (Bodgewic 1999, Bernard 2006). These areas are all popular centers that are on the main route of several transportation lines thus they also serve as central nodal points for Cairenes who are moving through the city. Below is a description of each site.
Musky Market: Musky Market is located in old Cairo bordering Khan al-khalili, a famous shopping complex that is largely oriented toward tourists. In historical accounts, Musky was the site of jewelers and silversmiths (Lane-Poole 1898). Today, Musky is a bustling shopping area that provides low-cost mundane goods for Cairenes. The area is also home to several Islamic and Christian places of worship.

Kholousy Street: Kholousy Street is located in the Cairo neighborhood of Shoubra. Before its urban development in the 1900s Shoubra was the palatial country residence of Muhammed Ali and noted for its architecture and planning (Raymond 2000). Today Shoubra is a densely populated, low-income residential area with a high concentration of Coptic Christians. Kholousy Street is a popular shopping street within the area.

Cairo University: Cairo University is one of the oldest institutions of higher learning in Egypt. Today it is a public institution with a total student body population of 257,200 (www.cu.edu). Attending public universities in Egypt is free, although the quality of this education is reputed to be poor due to over-crowding and a deficit of funds. Since Gamal Abdel Nasser’s reforms, attending university has been seen as a way for low-income Egyptians to advance socially and economically. Additionally, the university has been a site for political organizing of youth against state and school policies. Consequently, it has been heavily policed by state security forces (El Meshad 2011).

Tahrir Square: Tahrir square is a traffic roundabout that leads into Cairo’s downtown area. Currently, the square is used for political debate, campaigning, rallies, shopping and as a ‘hang-out’ spot for youth. Tahrir is also a politically symbolic site within Egypt
because it was one of the primary sites from which protesters agitated against the regime of Hosni Mubarak.

I spent time at each research site during both day and nighttime hours. I spoke with street sellers and people waiting for transportation. These two groups were the easiest for me to communicate with because they were routinely in the same locations and over time I became a familiar figure to them. Observation at each location was documented with photographs and through note taking. It was difficult to perform such note taking without arousing the suspicions of those around me. Even though the use of technology to record and photograph public occurrences was common place, I was a foreigner. I felt awkward and paranoid taking photos because I felt I would draw unwanted attention to myself and to the event that I was witnessing. Half way through research, I decided to buy an ipad mini because it was easier to disguise my actions with the tablet device.

**Phases of Research**

This project was carried out in two distinct phases. Phase 1 lasted from July 2012-August 2013 and was financed with funds from the National Science Foundation’s Graduate Research Fellowship program. During this phase of research 5 focus groups were successfully conducted along with walking interviews, and participant observation. 8 focus groups in all were conducted but due to faulty audio, recorded data from three of the initial focus groups could not be used for this project. Further, the bulk of interviews (31 total) and participant observation were carried out during this time. I also volunteered with the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) located in Cairo. This organization routinely helps low-income clients resolve cases related to government misconduct and state violence.
Phase 1 spanned the year in which Mohammad Morsi was in power in Egypt. During Morsi’s time in office, the city was gripped by a series of crises linked to infrastructure and politics. Politically, protests were routine occurrences and police services, which had fallen in the aftermath of the January 2011 uprisings, were not fully restored to all parts of Cairo. There was a sense amongst interlocutors and in the popular press that government was not functioning. Morsi’s party, the Muslim Brotherhood, won the popular vote in the first open Presidential elections in Egypt’s history but they could not effectively build and maintain coalitions with other factions within government. Distrust of the Muslim Brotherhood was pervasive. Concerns focused largely on the drafting of the constitution and whether Egypt would maintain its secular dimensions or pursue a more pronounced Islamic path.

Resultantly, the atmosphere during this time was more open than I had ever experienced in Egypt before. My work required that I occupy street spaces in Cairo and interact with individuals about the changes that were happening, their experiences and their memories. With fear of the authorities minimal, I did this relatively comfortably. Individuals were open in speaking with me, a foreigner, because foreigners asking questions about change for Western news outlets had become a common occurrence.

This period of ‘openness’ came to an end with the removal of Mohammed Morsi from power. Research for Phase 1 had to end in the early days of July because the mobilizations against the Morsi government and the intense polarization and violence that occurred after his removal made it impossible to do otherwise.

Phase 2 of the research occurred between January and February of 2014. This phase was funded by the National Science Foundation’s Doctoral Dissertation Research
Improvement Grant. In contrast to Phase 1 and the atmosphere of openness and political debate, the police were now back in full force along with state security and even military personnel stationed in heavily trafficked areas of the city. There were random bomb detonations reported at police stations and transportation hubs. Political conversation was avoided unless it was supportive of the military, specifically, General Abdel Fattah Al Sisi. In contrast to the explosion of arts related activity after the fall of Mubarak, the streets of Cairo were now dominated by signs that were overwhelmingly supportive of General Sisi. It was as if the need to bring a sense of ‘order’ back to the country necessitated preventing protests and preventing arts based interventions throughout city space.

In this Cairo, I found street recruitment impossible. It became taboo to speak to me about the state of urban life and violence for the individuals who I targeted in the street and, for the first time, I felt scared to do work. I encountered hostility on the streets when I attempted to engage individuals and I developed feelings of paranoia as I heard stories of academics, journalists, and amateur filmmakers who got arrested.

To add to this, I could not get in contact with the majority of previous research participants. Their cellular numbers had either changed or their phones belonged to someone else. I found that the work I had done in building relationships and trust during Phase 1 could not be carried over into Phase 2. I was starting from scratch in the worst of circumstances.

Based on my experience with street recruitment and my own growing fear, I cancelled all planned walking tours. Instead, I turned my attention to focus groups and was able to conduct them with the help of a research firm. The El Nagy Research firm
located in Maadi, a suburb of Cairo, specializes in market and academic research. For Phase 2 they helped in the recruitment of focus groups participants, provided office space and audio/visual equipment for recording sessions. I supplied my own moderators and interpreters. With El Nagy research firm, I conducted 6 focus groups over a three-week period. In addition to the focus groups, I was able to re-connect with EOHR and interview organization head Hafez Abu Seada.

The second phase of research was scheduled to last from January-March 2014. I shortened the trip significantly and departed Egypt on February 13, 2014 after the completion of focus groups.

**Recruitment**

During Phase 1 of the research I recruited participants through my time volunteering at EOHR, participant observation on Cairo streets, and through snowball sampling. Founded in 1985, EOHR has a long track record of documenting corruption, violence and censorship practices by the government and its related institutions. Another function that EOHR serves is that of legal aid and resource center for those who cannot afford legal services otherwise. In my time there I performed editing work and assisted in researching and applying for grants. It was through this opportunity that I was able to meet and recruit research participants. Of those whom I recruited from EOHR, initial interviews had to be conducted in the office. Although I was not sure of the reason why, I presumed it was for the protection of the center’s clients and for the sake of their comfort. This arrangement, however, prevented me from asking participants about their experience and treatment from the center. After initial interviews, I invited participants to participate in focus group discussions and follow up interviews (discussed below).
I conducted interviews with the assistance of an interpreter. In incidences when an interpreter could not be obtained, I asked the center’s interpreter for help. These initial interviews at the center were purposely short, usually lasting for 20 to 30 minutes. This was done because interviewees knew that I could in no way help them with their case—that I was simply a researcher. Questions for those initial interviews were designed to get familiar with their cases, to learn why they decided to seek help from EOHR, and to learn about the next steps they were taking.

The second way of recruiting research participants was through street recruitment. I trafficked each of my four field sites weekly and often spent time walking through these areas and the adjacent streets and neighborhoods. Daily, I greeted sellers of fruit, vegetables, flowers, tissues and small household items. Through talking to them daily and shopping with them, I built a relationship and was able to recruit them for interviews and/or focus group conversation. Sometimes, I asked them to participate through the help of an interpreter and sometimes I was on my own.

My final method of recruiting research participants was through the use of snowball sampling. Although I was able to recruit participants through EOHR and through my walks at the four research sites—there were not enough participants for the number of focus groups I wanted to conduct. Further, although I received many willing participants, they did not always show up on time (if at all) to focus groups. To ensure that I filled focus groups and got an adequate number of interviews with research participants, I asked each person I recruited to bring a friend with them to focus group sessions or to recommend someone who would be interested in answering questions about their lives in the city. Snowball sampling was extremely helpful during Phase 1 of research because
there was an overwhelming fear at the time about foreign spies and the desire of outside influences (mainly the U.S.) to disturb progress in the country. By asking participants to recruit their friends, recruitment was able to occur between trusted parties.

Participation in focus groups was the only aspect of the project that resulted in compensation for participants. All participants in focus groups were given 100 Egyptian pounds for their participation (at the time this was equivalent to approximately U.S. $17).

All material was open coded soon after its collection. This process helped to locate main themes that reoccurred and helped in the creation of a more focused coding scheme (Esterberg 2002). Initially my codes were broad. I used terms such as State-Civilian interaction, violence, and coping mechanism. As research progressed, these terms became more fine-tuned. For example, violence was divided to represent state violence, public violence (non-state), or domestic violence (non-state).

Focus groups

Phase 1 focus groups were conducted on Friday and Saturday mornings at the Misr Public Library located near Cairo University. It is located in between the Nile River, the Saudi Embassy and Cairo University and therefore an easy location to get to. Although security was located at the entrance to the library and the space in its design and policing was distinctly geared toward the middle class, it was a space where research participants were allowed in without trouble. Focus groups were held in a conference room with a hired moderator and a hired interpreter. The moderator used a script that I created in English that they would then translate into Arabic during the session. The interpreter sat next to me and translated as the discussion took place. For all of the focus groups conducted during Phase 1, I was present and in the room during discussions.
Focus groups lasted for two hours. All of Phase 1 focus groups were recorded with audio recorders. During this phase, eight focus groups were conducted. However it was not discovered until the end of the third focus group that the audio quality of the early groups was poor and could not be translated.

During focus groups I showed photo images of daily life: women or men walking, pictures of traffic including traffic officers and film clips. In the next section, I turn to the method of utilizing film as a way to evoke memory and discussions about violence. For phase 1 of research, I successfully held five focus groups that were transcribed and analyzed. During one scheduled focus group with older men, only two participants showed up. Through the rest of this dissertation, I refer to it as a conversation. In Phase 2 of research, six focus groups were held with the help of El Nagy Research Firm. All focus groups were designed with regard for age and gender. Table 2.2 below demonstrates the composition of groups during phase 1.

Focus groups served three primary purposes: to detect specific generational differences and similarities with regards to opinions about state violence and politics, to investigate the collectively held memories of the Mubarak period and recent political transformations, and to discuss shared aspects of urban everyday life. In the following sections I will describe the use of film in the focus groups I conducted during phase 1. In a separate section I will describe the process of conducting focus groups with a research firm during Phase 2.

Table 2.2 Phase 1 focus groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male (18-26)</th>
<th>Male 42-59</th>
<th>Women 18-26</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mix Male (18-26) (49-57)</td>
<td>Women (49-57)</td>
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</table>
**The use of film in focus groups**

Images, whether of the historical present or the past play a powerful role in the invocation of personal and collective memory (Hoelscher 2008). The Egyptian film industry is a source of pride for Egyptians of all classes and its trajectory as an industry in Egypt is closely aligned with the social, political and geopolitical transformations of the country during the 20th century (Armburst 2002, Masood 2001, Dickinson 2007). The Egyptian film industry is one of the oldest film industries and currently the fourth largest film industry in the world. In the Middle East it is the leading center for film, both currently and historically (Saradar 2007, Mehrez 2010). While Egyptian film occupies a prestigious position regionally and globally, it is not an innocent medium. Nationalization and censorship of Egyptian films has meant that only certain narratives make it to the level of national consumption. While the arts are given some leeway in their ability to be critical of society and politics, such critique is rarely allowed to cross the line into territory that may incite attempts at change. In other cases, film backers including the state use film to push particular ideologies and political viewpoints (Armburst 2002). Egyptian interlocutors from various class backgrounds had in-depth familiarity with Egyptian film both contemporary and classic. In Egypt, watching films, particular older ones, is a widely shared pasttime. Films that are released often find their way onto cable television and are also widely available for free on the Internet. Movie lines are quoted from memorable films and inserted into conversations, jokes, and political slogans. Many of the most popular films are such because they represent the élan of Egyptian popular culture, often through comedic formats.
During my time in Egypt, although there was an unprecedented openness when discussing issues of violence, particularly violence committed by state actors, there was also a simultaneous fear of spies and foreigners. Mohammad Morsi’s one year in power was marked by a great deal of economic and political instability and rumors circulated that this was due to foreign influences that were attempting to undermine the country. Regardless of the veracity of these rumors, asking questions about the police and state violence proved to be uncomfortable for myself and perceptibly, for research participants. Further, as I was learning, violence as an idea held by interlocutors was viewed differently than what I envisioned and the nuance and complexities of those ideas exceeded the questions I designed for focus groups. Admittedly, embedded within the language that I used to design this research project were assumptions about what defined violence, instability and political freedom. Coming to the realization of these factors after my initial focus groups, I relied more routinely on the use of film to discuss urban life, violence and political change in Cairo.

I used two films that roughly bookended Hosni Mubarak’s time in power: Hena il Qahira Here is Cairo (1985) and Asl Iswed Black Honey (2010). Both films explore daily life in Cairo through a process of de-familiarization (Highmore 2002). The protagonists in both films are Egyptians who are completely unaware of the trials of life in the capital city. Even worse, they have idealistic expectations of what the city has to offer. Their naïve expectations are revealed in the mishaps they experience.

Films

The 1985 film Hena il-Qahira documents the travails of a middle-class couple from upper Egypt. The couple travel to Cairo from their home in Luxor for a work related project. In their imaginings of Cairo they display an enthusiasm and naïveté
stereotypically characteristic of first-time city visitors. Quickly upon entry into the city, they encounter crooked taxi drivers, intrusive street sellers, street fights and thieves. Over the course of the day they lose their money, luggage and illusions of Cairo. Shot in the mid-eighties, the scenes demonstrate a period when the city was less crowded yet very much in the midst of rapid urban growth that veered further into the desert surrounding Cairo.

Similarly, Asl Iswed depicts the journey of Masry, an Egyptian who spends his early youth in Egypt before moving to America. He returns to Egypt as an adult in order to learn more about his culture and connect with family members. While journeying through Cairo he is subject to a string of indignities: he is robbed, unjustly arrested, taken advantage of, and beaten. He experiences the trials of Egyptian transportation and bureaucracy. A central plank of the story is that Masry is thoroughly Americanized. He speaks Arabic badly, often to comedic effect. His tattoos, forms of dress, and adornment indicate his foreign-ness. Yet, his name is Masry—the Arabic word for Egyptian. Even as his visible appearance contains the marks of Americanization he is permanently marked as Egyptian. In contrast to the dogged determination to survive life in Cairo and succeed at personal goals that seems almost insurmountable in Hena ail-Qahira, Asl Iswed also depicted the beautiful side of life in Cairo: the kindness of people, religious customs, and the bonds of family.

Two clips from each film were shown during focus group research completed during Phase 1 of fieldwork. Besides the penetrating look into the urban life of Cairo, each film reflected two distinct time periods that aligned approximately with the generational groups that I addressed. Showing clips from the two films during focus
group sessions allowed me to compare and contrast changes in urban experience as well as changes in the morphology of the city.

As I mentioned above, the films were not innocent in the sense of being apolitical vehicles of entertainment. Focus groups demonstrated that viewers debated over the scenes watched and whether or not they were believable. Further, I do concede that these films provide a particular view of Cairo as a city that is chaotic, dangerous, and corrupt. However, I feel that their utility comes through in their ability to make the everyday appear strange and unfamiliar. Through this recasting of familiar sights, sounds and interactions, they are made anew for research participants long enough for them to question the views that had become ordinary scenes in their everyday lives. To demonstrate this, here is an excerpt from one focus group where the moderator wishes to know their first thoughts after watching a clip:

Male 18-26 (6/1/2013)

Moderator: Ok, what was the first thing that came to your mind after the clip is over?

Nabil: I have been in a similar situation. It was not quite like that one, but I was with a driver that was high on something. He was driving on Salah Salem street and I felt that I was going to die for sure. He was not looking at where he was driving and we were hearing strong comments from the people driving with us on the road like “You son of $#%$” this is the first thing I thought of.

Moderator: And what about you?

Adel: I don’t think that it happens like that. When you started to play the movie I told you that this is a sad comedy film and anywhere in the world it will be exaggerating to a high level as it tries to picture the situation in a comedic fashion.
Further, the films presented the opportunity to convey a broader sense of violence. Violence did not come solely from the physical violence of state actors but was portrayed as more diffuse throughout society. The films showed that there was violence threaded through the difficulties and pressures of daily life (Kleinman 2000). Scenes in both films show a Cairo split between worlds of desperation and exclusion that signify poverty and elite governance. In effect, these films offer a counterpoint to my own inquires on violence from the state and give participants room to express experiences of violence that extend beyond the parameters of my specific research questions.
The nature of focus groups

Focus groups were my major methodological tool. The groups allowed participants to converse amongst themselves, debate, share stories, and joke (Maxwell 2007). Focus groups are limited in their ability to mimic real world conditions but they often provided room for the discussion of the problems of daily life. At times, I believed that the focus groups were helpful to participants in the sense that, for many of them, this was the first time their comments and opinions were listened to. However, they did not always work out as I planned. Recruitment for focus groups was a challenging enterprise and often not all of the confirmed participants would show up.

Further, although I performed recruitment based on age specifications, I could not confirm that participants were telling the truth. There were two instances when I was suspicious about the age of participants. In each instance, I decided not to ask for identification because I wanted all participants to believe that their participation in the project would remain confidential and most importantly, that talking to me would not get them in trouble. In other instances, during recruitment I asked potential participants for their age but when they arrived at the focus group and I asked them for their ages again, they would give me a different number. The promise of 100 Egyptian pounds may have influenced some to lie about their age. Also, through snowballing, participants invited friends and family members. On many occasions these individuals would not fit neatly into my age brackets.

Over time I managed to regularly hold groups of four or more participants because I established relationships of trust but age remained a difficult issue. Throughout
this dissertation, I continue to use the age brackets because the majority of focus group participants fell within those categories.

When it was recognized that a focus group would not work, these moments did not always mean failure. Mostly, my standard rule was to continue and have a conversation as long as I had two participants. Sometimes, if focus groups fell below three participants, I would try to find extras on the streets adjacent to the library or on the library grounds. I was successful at this on one occasion. In a mixed-age female focus group, only one woman name Fatima, a tea-seller, and her eighteen year old daughter Sara appeared. Finding this insufficient, especially due to their relationship, I went downstairs into the library garden and was able to recruit three women. Again, the library was a distinctly middle class space and in taking participants from the library I introduced a sharp contrast into that particular focus group. Of the three women, there was Aisha, a teacher, and two others who were stay at home moms, Um Ibrahim and Yasmine. They were conservatively dressed in burkas and were waiting for their children who were taking English lessons. Upon their entrance into the conference room, the tea seller’s face had changed visibly. After our conversation, I suspected that the conservative dress of Um Ibrahim and Shaimaa marked them politically as supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and for the tea seller this may have been a point of annoyance. Issues of morality and good governance were discussed and debated. Less explicitly, the issue of class and the flexibility of social memory were on display. Below is a section from my notes detailing part of the exchange:

The conversation really took off with the discussion of current politics when Sara wished to have Hosni Mubarak return to power and expressed the opinion that Mohammad Morsi should leave office because “Everything was working with Mubarak”. Shaimaa, a woman that Fatima did not
seem to like said that it was not good to say such things and that it was ‘feloul’ who were trying to destabilize the country. At the mention of feloul, Fatima demanded a clear definition of the term and for someone to tell her who exactly is ‘feloul’. She asked out loud “are we not all feloul?” Aisha then chimed in with a long monologue on globalization that was somehow linked with her non-support of Morsi. Um Ibrahim and Shaimaa defended President Morsi, saying that it is not possible to fix all of the country’s problems and that he was doing all he could. At this point Fatima interjected and said that Morsi was “travelling East and West and hasn’t managed to solve a single problem.” It was here that I fell into uncontrollable laughter and tears.

Initial focus groups were stressful, as I did not know until the time of the focus group whether I would have a sufficient number of participants. However, these moments that did not work out were revelatory in ways that assisted with my growing analysis of the political dynamics at play in the country. For Fatima’s daughter, her oldest of three, she had only lived life under Mubarak and the contrast between Mubarak and Morsi was not framed in terms of politics or rights but through the feeling that daily life had become broken and unrecognizable. Fatima, who daily occupied a table where she sold tea in Tahrir Square, was equally upset with President Morsi and the then current political and social atmosphere. Resultantly, she felt that the other women were out of touch or at the very least being unrealistic. Fatima’s question “Are we not all feloul?” opens up the term to broader contemplation. In effect she is saying that they all lived under Mubarak for a great portion of their lives and in doing so, whether willingly or not, were part of a system and a way of life. Um Ibrahim and Shaimaa’s rejection of ‘feloul’ appeared as a rewriting of history for Fatima.

**Phase Two Focus Groups**

Phase 2 interviews were conducted in the offices of El Nagy Research Firm located in Maadi, Egypt. The firm recruited participants who lived in Cairo. Notably,

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1 The term feloul refers to supporters and politicians of the Mubarak’s party who remained public officials or in prominent positions after the fall of the Mubarak regime.
more of the participants had more secure employment even though they fit the profile of being low-income. For example, there were a number of factory workers and drivers. Six focus groups were conducted with the firm and recorded on video tape. All groups had between 6-7 participants. Focus group material was transcribed by the research firm and translated from Arabic to English.

I was not in the room for these focus groups, but I did meet with all the participants before the start of each group. Admittedly, these groups lacked the comfort of the groups in Phase 1 largely because many of the participants in the previous set of groups had grown to become more comfortable with me. They knew from their friends or family members who I was and what I was doing if they were recommended to me through snowball sampling. Focus groups during Phase 2 were completed in a time span of three weeks. Table 2.3 shows the composition of these groups.

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<th>Table 2.3 Phase 2 focus groups</th>
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<tr>
<td>Male and female (18-26)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male and Female 49-57</td>
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<td>Mixed 49-57</td>
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**Interviews**

I conducted 31 interviews with activists, religious scholars, artists, and research participants. Interviews for this project consisted of structured and semi-structured interviews. Participants were recruited from designated research sites and through volunteering at EOHR. In addition to direct research participants, I spoke with actors at human rights organizations including the Nadeem Center, the Hesham Mubarak Law Center and leadership at EOHR. Finally, to understand how the landscape of the city was
transforming, literally and socially, I spoke with artists and political activists who had been engaging in public activities designed to educate Egyptians about the changing nature of politics, and pressing social issues within the country.

Additionally, 10 interviews were scheduled as walking interviews, but only 7 were conducted. In these walking interviews I would ask participants if I could follow them along some routine journey they take daily. Walking interviews, through the bodily experience of walking through the city, helped to reveal memories and personally held opinions (Legg 2005), hence the walking tours satisfied a number of objectives. With participants, I could discuss transformations happening in the city as we walked through them and glean their opinions. Walking or riding through particular spaces brought up memories that participants shared with me, both of the distant and recent past. Also through walking with participants, I got to see firsthand some of the difficulties they experienced on their journeys around the city. Importantly, in moving through the city and witnessing transformations in social habits and in the visual landscape, participants more readily discussed aspects of social memory about the past and the current political period. Even for those who did not directly experience violence at the hands of the state, narratives of violence and injustice still wound their way into their narratives as they described their neighborhoods to me.

The use of Interpreters and translators

During the course of fieldwork I employed seven interpreters and two translators. These interpreters were between 21 and 35, both male and female. They assisted in various tasks including focus group moderation, transcription and translation of focus
group data, transcription and translation of interview data, as well as simultaneous interpretation during interviews and focus groups. They also assisted in street recruitment.

Interpreters were helpful beyond their translation and transcription services. In reviewing focus group and interview scripts they helped to point out concepts that did not translate into Arabic or those that did not correlate to the Egyptian context. For example in one instance I was conducting a follow up interview with two women who had male family members harassed by the police. I wanted to ask them about the concept of citizenship and if they felt they were treated as citizens. At this my interpreter asked me what I meant and I haltingly attempted to explain that citizenship was not just a marker of country of birth but also a set of reciprocal rights and duties between nation states and the recognized populations that live within them. My interpreter replied that this idea of citizenship could not be neatly translated into Arabic. After a few moments of confusion, I realized an assumption that I was holding on to: a belief that all states guaranteed basic rights for citizens and that citizens ‘owed’ or felt they owed duties to the state or even that obligations were framed in terms of ‘rights.’

As a lot of my work was on the street in different neighborhoods, interpreters helped to familiarize me with the various stereotypes that neighborhoods had or bits of historical fact. They were also helpful in the political analysis and opinions they provided. All of the interpreters I worked with were young and almost all of them were either politically active during the uprising or had since affiliated with different political groups around town. Also, all of the interpreters were firmly middle class, college educated (some with multiple degrees), and with experience in North American or
European culture. In the wrap-up conversations on the way home from interviews or focus groups, they would provide their own opinions on the stories heard in the course of the day’s work. Although these conversations were not recorded (unfortunately) they provided another narrative and highlighted differences in class and gender. These social differences were both particularly helpful and at times destructive during focus groups. Conversation during focus groups would often veer toward the discussion of topics such as sexual harassment, or to topics about the politics of the moment. Moderators, sometimes unable to control themselves, would enter the focus group conversation and engage off script with participants. At times this led to fruitful moments but most of the time when it happened, it shut down the feeling of openness within the conversation - as if the moderator, an “official” in this particular space, was disciplining or correcting participants for their incorrect views. At other moments it would stop conversation on a topic abruptly.

During one memorable moment during Phase 1 of research, a focus group with mixed men was discussing women’s rights. Discourse about women’s rights has been popularly framed as western discourse as opposed to indigenous and Islamically influenced guidelines. The conversation proceeded thus:

Mixed Male (6/1/2013)

Omar: Well it’s not the guy’s fault entirely. Girls have their share too. Especially the generation of Suzanne Mubarak.

Moderator: Just hold up. Because whatever you are going to say next is dismissible. Because the Westerners who we say are infidels and who don’t have values or ethics, any of their women can walk in the street wearing whatever she likes no matter how short or tight her clothes are and absolutely no one would bother her with even a look. Because they know that it’s inappropriate to gaze. They are not Muslims but they are imposing
Islam. And we are Muslims but we are not imposing Islam. How else do you want to look at it?

Omar: We are in an Islamic country. And we have girls walking in the street some of them are covered—meaning the hair is covered—and some are not. Who would you gaze at?

There are multiple problems here: the injection of the personal opinion of the moderator, that opinion’s gross inaccuracy, the moderator preventing the participant from expressing his view, and the moderator’s disciplining of what is and what is not Islamic. Thankfully, conversation continued but it is impossible to know how the conversation would have progressed if the moderator had not inappropriately intervened.

The choice to work with seven interpreters and two translators was not a purposeful choice but reflected the difficulties of scheduling and the fact that sometimes interpreters did not show up. Sometimes, when given documents to translate, hired translators did not translate them in a timely manner, leaving me to rely on my own skill or the skill of another. Professional translators and interpreters were extremely costly and not feasible for this project. I relied on recruiting non-professionals who worked part-time as interpreters through the popular listserv ‘Cairo Scholars.’ It is a service geared toward individuals doing research or work in Cairo where members can advertise for housing, furniture, or various skills. Many researchers recruit ‘fixers’ and interpreters through this service. Initially, my only requirements for interpreters was fluency in English and comfort with traveling to areas of town that were informal settlements or known for crime. I received CVs from all recruits listing education and previous experience. For a few, this was their first time not working exclusively with documents. For me, it was the first time to work with interpreters at all.
All interpreters were briefed on my work and very broadly on what I expected regarding the privacy of research participants and the different products I expected them to produce, whether it be interpretation or documents translated from Arabic into English. It wasn’t until after I finished fieldwork that I realized that interpreters, professional ones, had standard practices and that by hiring untrained interpreters, I had taken their services for granted and opened up this research project to moments such as the one outlined above where conversation, data collection, and the comfort of participants was put in jeopardy by a well-meaning yet nevertheless inappropriate interaction. In acknowledging some of the difficulties I had with the interpreters I hired, I wish to not only make them visible but to also point out the various power relations that impacted the data collected (Temple and Young 2004; Crang et al. 2009).

During Phase 2 of research, the process of conducting focus groups was easier and without the irregularity that characterized phase 1. I used interpreters and translators from Phase 1 who proved themselves to be reliable and who had extensive experience in interpretation and translation. Also, I was able to use the recruitment services and facilities of El Nagy research firm.

Conclusion

In documenting my process as well as the political climate and logistical hurdles of the project, I wish to show the various contingencies that arose as well as the moments that were particularly beneficial. To summarize, this research project used three qualitative research methods: interviews, focus groups and participant observation. The project, approximately 14 months in duration, was broken into two phases that spanned between 2012 and 2014. Despite a wealth of data collected on aspects of gender, urban
change, violence and mobility, this project’s attention to age was jeopardized by inaccuracies provided by research participants. This could be a reflection of the monetary payment that focus groups promised, honest confusion or lack of clarity from me during the recruitment process. Further, using amateur interpreters and translators resulted in inappropriate focus group exchanges that negatively impacted the conversation and feelings of openness.

Fieldwork included uncertainty and risks and subsequently a lot of stress. Yet what I want the reader to take away from this account is that it was also incredibly fun and exciting—an odd thought considering the subject matter. The Arab spring produced a political opening within society that was present in the conversations I had with the people I met. In an earlier trip to Egypt in 2010, I remember speaking with a friend about politics in the U.S. and asking her of her opinion on politics in Egypt. Her curt answer was that she did not involve herself in politics. It was understood as a waste of time. In contrast, during my year of fieldwork, everyone talked about politics and became a political analyst of what would happen next. Tahrir Square was transformed into an open air salon, where individuals (mostly male) would gather to debate and watch debates about politics. You were not immune from politics no matter where you went. The only way I can describe the feeling is like this: Imagine walking into a house you knew so well and gravity no longer existed. You are in a state of awe and fear as you wonder if and when everything will fall.

This uncertainty made life stressful for research participants and Egyptian society more broadly. But it was also a time of experimentation: new identities were crafted based on one’s activist credentials and what political party you were aligned with. Artists
were publicly transforming the streets and people who were trained to think otherwise came to see themselves as important political actors. The work presented here provides one view into that period.
Chapter Three: Looking for the State and Finding God: Conceptions of security among low-income Cairenes

Introduction

For most of the modern history of Egypt, the state has been largely unreliable for the masses of low-income Egyptians. In many instances, the state was and is the primary source of threats to the security of the poor. Both before and after Mubarak’s removal from office, poor Egyptians have had to rely upon themselves, each other, and their collective creative energies for housing, income generating schemes, marriage, and political change as well as a sense of physical and emotional well-being (Bayat 2009, Ghannam 2002, Singerman 1996).

Nonetheless, political turmoil has changed the way the poor feel about their personal security. Respondents in focus groups conducted between 2012-2013 report that they feel less secure and are increasingly afraid of violence and crime committed by other civilians. Their demands for security echo claims made by human security theorists who argue that threats facing civilians include not only threats from foreign agents, but also threats from within states (Newman 2010, Thomas and Wilkin 1999). The framework of human security brings attention to issues such as poverty and daily threats civilians encounter and experience (Fukuda-Parr 2004: 35). However, scholarship has also demonstrated that government attempts to address human security have often done more to hurt the vulnerable; through the guise of safe-guarding human security, states have been able to engage in and intensify efforts that put vulnerable individuals at a greater risk for abuse (Amar 2013, Newman 2010).

Instead of trying to find a way out of this debate, I take a different route by assessing how low-income individuals in Cairo, Egypt, assess their own (in) security and
the means by which they attempt to secure a sense of their own safety. Primarily, I focus on the use of religion as a way of achieving a meaningful sense of inviolability. Here, Islam is understood as a guide for shaping ethical behavior and as a tool to convince others—including government officials—to conduct their duties honestly, with awareness of god and subsequently according to what is right and just.

Taking a cue from Claudia Aradau (2004), who comments that securitization is very much a speech act, I focus on the articulations of research participants in which they see God as a method of achieving security. Within that focus I examine security concerns related to physical violence and crumbling public infrastructure, two prominent themes that arose during focus group discussions as threatening to participants’ already tenuous capacities for social reproduction. By social reproduction I mean the ways in which individuals reproduce themselves (clothing, food, shelter), their social relationships, and their political subjectivities (Feldman et al. 2011). When asked to articulate what security would look like, research participants turn to God as an entity that can provide both just solutions for the difficulties that they face and, more broadly, lasting peace and stability. In the following, I will trace the ways in which God is called upon as a salve against the abuses and neglect of the state and as a method toward achieving a greater sense of security that goes beyond the capabilities of the state and civil society organizations. In doing so, I argue that articulations about security are linked tightly with religious injunctions that aim to regulate the self as well as others suspected of wrongdoing. Here, Cairene’s with few financial resources or connections rely on the certainty of god. They draw on different religious interpretations of Islam’s
primary principles and continue the process of interpretation through the contingencies and practices of their everyday lives.

**Methodology**

The data for the paper was collected during two phases of fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2014 in Cairo, Egypt. The project utilized a mixed-methods design that included 11 focus groups and 31 interviews with research participants, activists and human rights NGOs. There were also several hours of participant observation at the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), on public and private transportation and at select research sites in Cairo, Egypt: Musky Market, Tahrir Square, Cairo University and Khoulosy Street in Shubra. These sites were selected because of their importance for social and political everyday life and because of their popularity with the target research group. The target group for this project was low-income Egyptians. In Egypt defining one's class distinction includes factors related to social and cultural capital, in addition to one's disposable income. For example, it is possible to have few financial resources but have connections to individuals with political status and cultural influence in turn allowing one to claim a higher-class status. Further, one's behavior—gestures, ways of talking, frames of reference and sociality indicate class position (Elyachar 2013). During the first phase of research from which data for this paper is drawn, research participants were recruited by the author and an interpreter from the select research sites. Attention was paid to occupation as well as particular behaviors. Daily participant observation helped to reveal behaviors such as whether targeted individuals ate inexpensive street foods or whether they patronized more upscale establishments, whether they rode public transport or if they used personal taxis, their
particular occupations, as well as their personalized gestures and ways of speaking. Subsequently, several research participants were individuals who routinely occupied public spaces such as sellers and car valets.

Additional research participants were recruited through snowball sampling where I asked personally recruited individuals to recommend friends who may be interested in the study. Focus group participants were paid 100 Egyptian pounds for their participation (at the time of research this was equivalent to about $17 U.S. dollars) and these sessions were held at a centrally located library in Greater Cairo. Focus groups were divided up along axes of age and gender. Interviews were held at public sites as well as in the homes of research participants. Data was variously collected through audio recordings, photographs and field notes.

**Infrastructure, economics and the state**

The first and only year of rule for President Mohammad Morsi took place under great economic and social strain. At the time, police forces had not returned to full capacity since the downfall of Hosni Mubarak. Further, to keep the country solvent, Egypt borrowed significant sums of money from Gulf-states. These problems in governance were coupled with the widespread sense that there was no order—that social services, and more broadly the state, were rapidly deteriorating or was in the process of being sold away to gulf countries such as Qatar (Al Arabiya 2013, Abi-Habib and Abdel Latif 2013, Global Policy 2012).

Egypt has a current population over 85 million. The area with the largest share of Egypt’s population is the Cairo governorate with a population of 11.7 million (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, Sims 2010). Since the 1960s, Cairo’s
population has grown exponentially while state services have failed to keep up. Under the reign of Gamal Abd al Nasser, Egyptians who had been locked out of opportunities for social mobility were given the opportunity for advancement through free public higher education and promised employment within government. During the 1970s, the policies of Nasser were eclipsed by policies reoriented to the West and toward capitalist free market reforms under succeeding President Anwar Sadat. Sadat’s program, called *Infitah*, meaning ‘opening’, opened Egypt to global market influences. This directly impacted national companies and led to a massive migration of Egyptian men to work in Gulf States in order to supplement family incomes, achieve and maintain a higher social status and enable plans for marriage (Al- Sayyid Marsot 2007, Beinin 2005, Ghannam 2002). Under the program of Infitah, the gap between rich and poor widened and this trend has continued up to the current moment (Benin 2005, Al Ahram Online 2012). As Egypt opened itself to foreign investment, the middle classes found that they were increasingly unable to hold onto their positions in the shifting economy and the poor sank deeper into poverty. One prominent sign of this trend has been the spread of informality in housing. Informal housing called *Aswaiyyat* in Egyptian colloquial Arabic, became a visible phenomenon to state authorities in the 1980s as they rose upon agricultural and state owned land. (Elyachar 2003, Sims 2010). Built without government approval or oversight, whole communities of informal housing have risen throughout Egypt and especially in Cairo where it is now estimated that 62% of the population occupies informal housing structures as a lower cost alternative to formal housing options (Dorman 2011:272). This transformation has been dramatic especially considering that in 1950 all of Cairo was “considered as formal” (Sims 2010:46). Consequently, these
transformations have applied pressure to Cairo’s infrastructure with government at times unable to keep up and reluctant to try.

The process of economic restructuring continued under the reign of Hosni Mubarak. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Egypt touted its economic successes and became a model for IMF reforms. However, the truth was that Egypt was in increasing economic trouble (Mitchell 1999). Instead of increasing exports, government invested funds in desert reclamation projects while Egyptian investors participated in real estate speculation by building high-end gated communities (Mitchell 1999, Sims 2010). These ventures failed to relieve housing pressures or provide substantial realistic low-cost options. Concomitantly, wages and government services were shrinking, leading to growing impoverishment.

W.J. Dorman has proposed that instead of seeing Egypt as a weak state captive to financiers and structural adjustments (and consequently without funds for social initiatives), Egypt should be seen as a neglectful state (Dorman 2011). Here it is argued that Egypt has been the beneficiary of billions of dollars in international aid from the United States since the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords and the European Union. Thus, the problem lies not with Egypt’s ability to address the present concerns afflicting governance, rather the problem is that government lacks the will to do so and at times profits from inaction (Dorman 2011). While poverty and informality have been wrapped in a discourse of chaos and danger for Egyptian society, state officials have systematically repressed opportunities for political representation amongst individuals living in informal areas and thus political empowerment. They have blocked processes of formalization while simultaneously using these communities as money-making
opportunities through corruption (Ben Nefissa 2011; Dorman 2011). Cairo’s governance structure has been described as clientelistic, with citizens dependent on specific local figures who mediate for them (Dorman 2011). Reforms to undo this situation have been met with resistance, leaving Cairenes to largely depend on each other. From my focus group conversations and interviews, it was apparent that this situation had not changed but has only grown more dire as the various crises in government since 2011 scrambled these traditional lines of assistance. Further, economic precarity matched with physical violence and abuse by individuals of the state has led to desperation among some who are not able to find alternative forms of assistance (author, under review). As a last resort, many turn to non-governmental organizations to provide aid in finding work, healthcare and legal assistance. For example, during my time volunteering at the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) in 2012–2013, one client received financial assistance getting a blood transfusion, including blood for the actual transfusion, from a lawyer who was helping her with legal documents. In another instance, two women turned to EOHR as a last resort when it seemed that the Egyptian legal system had broken down. Here is an excerpt of the client explaining her ordeal of trying to get a family member out of jail who had been rounded up in a street sweep by security forces as he was coming home from work:

When younger things were better. Now things are worse after the revolution. And it is many issues not just security. We went to another lawyer before coming here. The lawyer said that before the revolution ‘I could see the judge and convince the judge to free him. Now there is not a system. All I can do is file the papers’. He told us to pray to God. The police are using my husband in order to get others to feel bad and confess to a crime. The police are trying to get people to not get involved in conflicts and to have bad manners. (11/10/2012)

Here, the experiences expressed by the woman in question highlight the position of many low-income Egyptians vis-a-vis the government. Traditional lines of assistance,
that of the lawyer having a chat with the judge, have broken down and it is not clear whether the filed document will be viewed. In the absence of any possible assistance, the client is told to “pray to God”; only the divine can help.

Can we characterize the above, an absent judicial system, as violence? If yes, what makes it different from physical violence such as torture? In order to explain the violence of daily life in Egypt, I use the idea of ‘regimes of violence’ (Fleming 2012), which understands forms of structural and subjective oppression as violence. For Fleming, subjective violence must be understood as linked to attendant forms of systemic or structural violence. By utilizing the idea of ‘regimes of violence’ it is possible to delineate configurations of violence within the places and historical moments of their occurrence. Violence from unequal legal practices, governmental neglect and torture, can be seen as part of a spectrum of violence that impacts daily life and creates feelings of insecurity and diminished potential. These actions are taking place during a historical period in which Egyptians are trying to craft a new more just political system and during a period in which Egypt’s economy is still in the midst of economic restructuring to facilitate the entrance of global capital into domestic space. In turn, the relationship between Egyptians and the state is continuing to transform with Egyptians being increasingly seen as mobile units who are solely responsible for their own well-being despite the presence of unjust economic systems (Feldman et. all 2011). Additionally, these transformations are being wrought under forms of dictatorship and routine physical abuse.

While the forms these violent regimes take are highly specific to place and history, there are shared characteristics that are particularly visible within the world’s
mega-cities, namely in the form of decreasing social programs and increasing informality (Koonings and Kruitt 2009). Indeed, the theatre of urban space has become a nodal point for international economic policies, as well as experiments in international humanitarianism and geopolitics (Amar 2013, Fregonese 2009).

Violence is not isolated to the moment in which it takes place. It ripples across daily life into the actions and speech of urban citizens. Whether it is manifest in the actions that people take to avoid the eruption of violence, acts of piety, or common jokes that make light of forms of oppression, violence delivered via the state finds its way into the intimate moments of everyday life and shapes interpersonal relationships. Anthropologist Veena Das (2007) vividly portrays this process in her work on violence and daily life in India. She argues that language creates the world and that it is through agreed upon terms and words that language works and enables social relations. This is also the case in Egypt where, in focus groups and casual conversations on bribery, the term shai bil yasmine, which means ‘tea with Jasmine’, was often repeated as a joke. The term comes from the Egyptian film, ‘Morgan Ahmed Morgan’ with venerable actor Adel Imam where he is expected to pay a bribe to a government employee. Instead of discussing bribery directly, the government employee uses the term shai bil yasmine, to seek payment. The use of shai bil yasmine to discuss bribery by my interlocutors’ places an irritating fact of daily life in Egypt within a humorous frame that also conveys a set of widely understood meanings.

Violence and an atmosphere of insecurity linked with the state negatively affects the ability of Cairenes to carry out the necessary activities for their own social reproduction. Low-income Cairenes face precariousness on transport networks, in their
encounters with government and security officials, and even in ordinary encounters with each other. Research participants often described the year under President Morsi as lacking a system, and expressed the feeling that there was no safety outside of the space of the home or local neighborhood where they knew their neighbors. Indeed, because of the sense that the police had disappeared, many participants came to view other civilians outside of their known networks with suspicion.

This perception of danger has negative ramifications on the ability of individuals to pursue life affirming possibilities and development. Since the 1990s, increasing attention has been paid to forms of violence and security at the human level. Scholarship within international relations since 1948 has characterized security at the level of the state: war, threats to sovereignty and international terrorism (Macfarlane and Khong 2005, Krause 1998). Particularly, within international and civil society organizations arose the realization that security threats are not limited to inter-state conflict alone. (Philo 2011, Macfarlane and Khong 2005, Booth 2005). International and humanitarian organizations from the 1990s into the millennium began to argue that poverty, infrastructure, environment and intra-state conflict have negative implications for human beings and the ability to live a life without insecurity. The development of the field of human security corresponded with transformations in the social sciences, including in the field of international relations, which saw a growth in feminist and critical perspectives. In particular, the development of feminist geopolitics saw the need to account for the ways in which actual lives were shaped by national and international security concerns (Secor 2001, Secor 2004, Secor 2007). While much work within international relations persists in utilizing primarily state centered realist analyses and refuses to accommodate a
growing chorus of human oriented and critical work, actors on the ground in Egypt are moving to secure a local sense of security which will have a definite impact on the future political and social trajectory of the country.

Islamic Piety and daily life

At the beginning of Mohammad Morsi’s term, there was hope among many of the former President’s supporters that Islam would play a greater role in shaping public life. Egypt is a predominantly Sunni Muslim country with a sizeable Christian minority. Since the 1970s, an Islamic revival movement spread out across the Middle East and North Africa. This development was not new and could be traced to the early part of the 20th century (Cleveland and Bunton 2013). New articulations of Islam rose in part as a response to the failures of social and economic transformations to improve the quality of life, military failures, and the systematic de-legitimatization of Islam as part of political and civil life (Lapidus 1997: 446). The general thrust of this movement does not seek a return to the past as much as it seeks to re-establish Islam as a structuring frame throughout daily life and action. This transformation is to be guided, in part, by the implementation of Shari’ah within government and through Islamically guided transformations of the self and society. Notable aspects of this transformation have been the growing prominence of visible and audible forms of piety as reflected in the increase in veiling, audio sermons, Quran study groups, Islamic television programming, and religious organizations that provide aid in the absence of the state (Hirschkind 2006, Mahmood 2005, Macleod 1993, McDaniel 2012).

In Egypt, the Islamic revival and its proponents have a complex relationship with the state. On the one hand, this movement goes beyond the purview of the state, which
has attempted to control and restrict Islamic institutions by placing them under government oversight. Indeed, many of the popular preachers of this movement arise informally, that is, not through official schools of religious learning. They represent a kind-of-grassroots emergence that increasingly fills local mosques, religious study groups, and audio-cassette sermons (Hirschkind 2006). On the other hand, popular preachers within this movement have at times held government posts. This mixture, highlights the degree of nuance necessary when assessing the role of the state and their ability to completely censor or control the cultural and social scene in Egypt.

The Egyptian government’s history of trying to censor content and organizations marked as Islamic is part of an historical trend of the 20th century to contain the political impact of Islamic discourses and Islamists politics. This is particularly so in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood who has been able, in the past, to effectively deliver social services that the state could not (McDaniel 2012).

The use of religion by individuals within their daily lives should not be viewed solely as a response to state actions or global social and economic change. Religion also provides emotional and mental well-being (Wellman and Lombardi 2012). Solace, comfort, and a sense of care are provided through religion, as well as an enduring sense of justice that is often not available in earthly form for those experiencing daily inequity. Remembrance of God in conducting oneself and various speech acts pull God more fully within the orbit of daily life, assisting individuals though difficulties. Even mundane and cliché phrases that are uttered multiple times a day such as Al hamdullilah, meaning ‘Praise God,’ or Ma sha’allah, meaning ‘it is as God willed it,’ are understood to re-orient
individual behavior and outlook. One of my interlocutors who spent 3 ½ years in jail for a crime he claims he did not commit explains:

My mother is a graduate of Al Azhar University and she taught us this way. During the first month [in jail], I had a very difficult time and my mother would ask me to call out to God but I said ‘no,’ it is he who did this to me. Now I am fine, thank God. In Egypt we think of God a lot, we call for him several times throughout the day…it comes naturally—you start the day by saying there is no God but God and someone would complete it for you, Mohammed is the prophet of God. And throughout the day when someone is trying to fight with you, you will tell him ‘have some fear of God’ or ‘God forgive me’ and this helps to calm you down. (Interview, 6/26/2013)

The remembrance of God and the performative act of invoking the name of God reflects the agency of individuals in shaping and influencing the outcomes of their daily lives (Mahmood 2001). These acts work as methods to restrain and train the self, a way to soothe and a way to mitigate conflict. These forms of social mediation and agency are different than those that security theorist based within a liberal tradition might recommend. But they are important to recognize because they are holistic tools that are easily available to Cairenes—they not only acknowledge the need to procure physical safety but also spiritual relief. Further, in the focus on the self it provides a sense of empowerment and control over the perception and experiences of one’s environment.

In the following section, I will explore more in depth how low-income individuals call on God and Islamic traditions more generally to cope with the difficulties faced in daily life. I will draw on two issues that arose in my focus group discussions with low-income Cairenes during fieldwork: transportation and the lack of physical security. In each, participants articulate their personal view on what security means to them.
Mobilities in Cairo

Transportation in Egypt is severely strained. Government has not kept up with the population’s demands for transportation nor provided adequate updated infrastructure. The number of major transportation accidents, particularly train accidents, has made this fact alarmingly clear. From June to January 2013, five major transport accidents occurred on Egyptian rail lines (El Gundy and Adel-Baky 2013). Movement through the mega city of Cairo is one of the hugest obstacles that urban residents face in their daily lives. A lack of funding for transportation has led to the physical deterioration of city-owned bus fleets as well as an inadequate number of buses to serve customers who use them daily. Further, the damaged state of Egyptian roads and traffic has led to an increasing lack of attention paid to regulations and driving procedures (Cervero 2000). According to a report on transportation in the Global South, Egypt had a low ranking of 4 (out of ten) in terms of enforcement of driving regulations (World Health Organization 2013). Within this environment several privately-owned sources of transport have developed. These include microbuses, taxis and small tuk-tuks that can easily navigate the unpaved, narrow streets of informal areas. These new sources of transport have helped fill some of the needs of transportation in Egypt, while also leading to increased congestion and road danger.

Indeed, the death rate from road related accidents in Egypt are quite high. In 2011, there were 16,380 traffic accidents in Egypt, with 7,115 accidents resulting in deaths. In 2010, there were 9,608 traffic fatalities reported (Al Ahram Online 2012, World Health Organization 2013).

In addition to the structural dangers of the road and the lack of government enforcement of regulations, there are also many dangers present within the various modes of transportation. Many of the buses are in various states of disrepair (see figure 3.7)
presenting serious dangers, not to mention discomfort for the passengers. Also, in the period after the 2011 uprisings, there had been an increase in incidents of high jackings, thievery, harassment and fights on public and private buses. For research participants, the lack of government oversight has led to a situation where Egyptians fear other civilians, and express a growing cynicism as to whether the system of transportation is salvageable. The following excerpts are from two focus groups, one all male with men between the ages of 18-57 and one all female between the ages of 18-26 which demonstrate the dangers of transportation in Egypt:

Male, mixed age

Moderator: Are there specific situations that upset you while riding the bus? Like, do you prepare yourself to confront situations or people while riding the bus?

Nasser: Thieves. Once I rode a bus, and I saw two people robbing a guy. I tried speaking out and I got injured. No one in the bus spoke. They let them off without doing anything. When I tried to speak out, they injured me and no one took my side. They just let them off. (6/1/2013)

Here, Nasser laments not only the danger of transport due to crime but also the widespread fear that prevents others from intervening and that punishes those who do. Millions of the city’s residents must use the available and often unsafe transit options because there is no other safer inexpensive choice. Subsequently, with the large pool of potential patrons, there exists a reckless culture of driving that attempts to maximize profit by speeding and over packing buses. Below is the account of one such incident

Female Group, 18-26

Ragwa: The road to Mounira has accidents all the time. Everyone is driving against one another. I saw a 4-year-old die in front of my eyes. The driver was going the wrong way.

Miriam: He hit her.

Ragwa: Her family came and they beat anyone passing by!

Hanaan: Now drivers are always high and on drugs. They take passengers and roll over with them with no care in the world.

Miriam: The road to Mounira is horrible.
Ragwa: He can be high and have passengers. He doesn’t care. Whoever dies, dies and whoever lives, lives. He says it is not my fault!
Hanaan: They hit people and continue driving.
Miriam: They flee.
Ragwa: There is no hope! He says: ‘I am not the one who killed them, it was their destiny!’
(6/21/2013)

As the above dialogues show, moving through Cairo is dangerous on multiple levels, not just from infrastructure; reckless driving and crime threaten passengers and pedestrians alike. After the revolution and throughout the regime of President Mohammad Morsi, research participants noted that several police stations in the areas where they lived were closed and officers in many instances disappeared from the streets, or if they were present refused to perform their basic duties such as regulating traffic. On the other hand, respondents viewed low-ranking traffic officers who were present and working with a sense of pity. The traffic officer was seen, as one participant put it “[as] a tool in his superior’s hand who is sitting in the shade”, (6/1/2013) and working within an incomprehensible system, unable to effectively manage traffic. The absence, inability, or indifference of the state in regulating movement has led to a higher degree of criminality in Cairo’s streets that were already plagued by congestion and a high rate of road accidents.

Also, notable from focus group conversations was the feeling that there was an increasing disappearance of responsibility and mutual aid amongst civilians. In Nasser’s situation mentioned above, individuals choose not to get involved or help fight against the thieves. In the second example, the driver claimed that it was the destiny of the small child to die, instead of owning responsibility for the act. These illustrations, in their strong emphasis on the lack of responsibility, can be seen to speak toward a larger sense that justice and redress no longer exist and that a traditional bastion of support, the strong
tradition of mutual aid amongst Egyptians had disappeared in an atmosphere of political uncertainty and insecurity.

And God?

During focus groups, after respondents indicated a problem or concern, the moderator was prompted to ask how the participants would attempt to resolve the problem and to whom they would complain. While the responses to these questions varied somewhat, it was clear that respondents, through their sense of desperation, relied upon God. In the focus group session with young women, they clearly stated this when discussing the overcrowded nature of transportation and harassment:

Moderator: In your opinion, who is in charge, who do you want to complain to about this crowdedness?
Ragwa: Morsi
Moderator: I mean, what would you tell him?
Ragwa: I will say give us a break! Show us some mercy for what we put up with, we are women and after God we have no other Savior!
Moderator: This is your complaint?
Hanaan: We complain to God and no one else, for he will protect us. (6/21/2013)

With a fall in mutual aid and the absence of the state, God is the last arbiter in disputes, the only one capable of providing a true and lasting sense of justice. On the other hand, rhetorically, the use of God is also a tool to demonstrate desperation. Ragwa states, “We are women and after God we have no other Savior!” In her appeals to Morsi she is attempting to demonstrate the severity of her situation. Unsurprisingly, some participants within the mixed-age male focus group became frustrated with appeals made to God and saw these appeals as a detour that prevented fundamental changes in Egyptian society. One respondent comments:

We tell each other that everything is by God’s hand or let us see what will happen. Aren’t these the common phrases that we frequently use? …We can change that when the state starts to be
persistent and everything starts on time and the individual finds himself forced to stick to the general plan. (6/1/2013)

The respondent here is not calling for a turning away from God; rather, he sees a reliance on God as leading to paralysis and inaction on both the part of the state and individuals who fail to take responsibility for the current condition of the transport system. However, in the pleas of the women above, mentioning God can also be read as a tool of activism; the name of God can remind state officials of their duties, perhaps guilt them into doing their jobs, and is therefore not to be taken as a sign of inaction at all. In complaining about transportation, it is not incidental that the woman above chose Morsi to complain to, since Morsi did enter power as part of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political organization. Also, President Morsi implemented a 100-day renaissance project to solve infrastructural problems that plague daily life in Egypt (BBC 2013, Ikhwan Web 2012). The women in the focus group are using one of the few, if not only, devices at their disposal to get their needs met.
Implementing God’s will

By the end of the summer of 2013, Egypt had undergone two popular uprisings against the governments of Hosni Mubarak and Mohammad Morsi. For low-income Egyptians, the regime changes did not lead to significant improvements in their lives. Rather, the changes represented itself in the increasing degree of physical danger, abuse, and harassment. The steady rise in prices for basic foodstuffs, the ambivalent nature of the police forces, and ongoing political instability created an atmosphere of mounting depression (El-Rashidi 2013). In focus group sessions, interviews, and casual conversations during my time in Cairo, it became clear that many feared violent encounters with other Egyptians equally, if not more than, encounters with police forces. Stuck between the insecurity endemic within daily life and the danger of the police forces, low-income Egyptians were at times conflicted about how to attain security. One female napkin seller who regularly worked in the vicinity of Cairo University sums up the difficult relationship with the state and the desire for security:

M: Do you want more police on the street?
R: Yes, I wish they would work on traffic, but I don’t want them on the street! They would drive us away and give us a hard time without any alternatives….Back in the past they would abuse us, they would collect us all and make us clean the police station, or make us report on who sells drugs and this of course creates trouble for us. They called us names and treated us badly. I feel sorry for myself. (3/2013)

Other participants called for a complete reformation of policing through the enforcement of shari’ah law as a way of attaining security. This may seem somewhat surprising, as Egypt employs a mixed legal system in which shari’ah is the chief source for legislation (Otto 2013). However, the actual application of shari’ah has been a
fraught process in Egypt between members of the Supreme Constitutional Court who have used a broad interpretation of what shari’ah is and Islamists who prefer a stricter interpretation (Lombardi 1998).

Defining exactly what shari’ah is has been just as problematic for Islamic scholars as it has been for the courts and Islamists political figures. Indeed, Islamic scholars have varying opinions on shari’ah, and for the masses, interpretations of shari’ah are received from a variety of sources which are filtered through their everyday lives leading to a multiplicity of viewpoints on what shari’ah is and how it applies (Otto 2013).

Shari’ah itself is broadly understood as a legal system that attempts to understand and discover God’s desires for human action. The foundational sources of shari’ah come from the Quran and the Sunnah, which contains the recorded actions of the Prophet Mohammad. With these two sources, Islamic jurists also utilize qiyas, (analogy) and ijma (consensus of the community of Islamic scholars) in an attempt to arrive at their best understanding of God’s will (Cleveland and Bunton 2013, Brown 2009). Despite the detailed system for arriving at legal decisions, there are conflicts in interpretation and different schools of thought, as shari’ah is, after all, a human effort to understand the will of God. In this section, I focus on a discussion amongst female focus group participants between the ages of 49-57. Here, I wish to highlight the way that shari’ah, and attendantly, an awareness of God in daily life is understood as a way of achieving a sense of personal security, particularly against the abuses and forms of violence which penetrate political and social life. Indeed, discussions about shari’ah and its definitions are not abstract, but instead are articulated through political opinions, personal fears and the needs of the moment.
“No Islam, No Shariah, No Nothing”  

During the focus group session, I utilized two popular Egyptian films to discuss the Mubarak Era: Hena il-Qahira (Here is Cairo) filmed in 1985 and Asl Iswed (Black Honey) filmed in 2010. Roughly, bookending the period of Hosni Mubarak’s reign, both films depict life in the capital city at the time of their filming. During the focus group with women, we discussed daily difficulties, their opinions on life in Cairo in general, and their comparisons of the present moment to moments in their youth. The particular film clip shown from Asl Iswed, showed the character Masry being arrested after taking photos on the Nile. This arrest occurs after he confirms that his nationality is Egyptian (the assumption being that if he was a tourist then he would be left alone). His belongings are seized and he is roughly thrown into the back of a police van. In jail, other prisoners beat him and the police destroy his photos.

In response to the clip, most of the women comment that oppression and a life without dignity are commonplace realities for Egyptians. At this point, the moderator is instructed to probe participants on this point particularly as religion has been referenced throughout the conversation:

Moderator: When you say that Egyptians are the most humiliated people, we live in an Islamic state—
Fatima: Where is that?
Um Mohammad: Where is Islam? When you go to take money you’re owed from someone and they lie to you…where is it?
Farida: But we are devoted Muslims
Moderator: I didn’t mean that, I meant the state follows shari’ah and Islamic Laws
Fatima: Not true
Um Mohammad: Islamic Shari’ah should be enforced. Theives hands should be cut off.
Um Ahmed: Islam should be applied.
Um Mohammad: People who commit adultery are executed. This is what we want
Multiple participants: Yes, this is what we want
Moderator: But now, the country’s rulers come from an Islamic political party
Farida: Yes
Um Mohammad: But he is not behaving like it!
Fatima: No he is not!
Um Mohammad: He was thirsty for power, he got the authority and that’s it
Fatima: Yes, he doesn’t care. No Islam, no shari’ah, no nothing. (6/7/2013)

There are multiple levels in which the excerpt must be understood. First, for this group of low-income women, many of them feel that there is no justice and that their share of daily burdens is especially difficult to bear. In lieu of having outside financial or social supports, they put their faith in that which is linked to the divine. In Islam, God is understood as having 99 attributes or names. The names Al-Adl, the just one, Al Hakim, the decider, Al-Basir, the all-seeing one and Al-Muqsit, the upholder of Equity, describe God as an entity whose very essence is perfect justice and the only one capable of delivering it (Ghazzali 1998). For Um Mohammad and the women, turning to God is safer and more certain than relying on politicians.

On another level, these women can be seen as advocating a personal notion of shari’ah. The words of the women at first seem swift and brutal. During an earlier section of the focus group where we were discussing an incident in which a small child was beaten and her brother killed because of a Pepsi bottle dispute, Um Mohammad stated: “For that to never happen again, that killer must be shot in the middle of the street, in public so that no one does it ever again. The must apply shari’ah, but no…” In fact, the actual application of punishment in shari’ah is usually not so direct. Justice within shari’ah rest on three elements: reciprocity, equality, and context (Rosen 2000). With regards to context, punishment for an offense must be measured against the conditions that it occurs within. In shari’ah, situations of coercion or necessity may render a criminal act permissible (Sanad 1991). With the example of thievery, if someone is hungry and steals and has no other recourse for obtaining food, then it is not permissible to brutally punish the individual.
Um Mohammad’s interpretation of shari’ah and its proper application is reflective of the transformative relationship between elite and traditional text on Shari’ah and its usage among low-income Egyptians. Scholar Saba Mahmood argues that the path of Islamic doctrines and traditions which traverse the social field demonstrates not only how Islamic traditions are being deployed by various groups and individuals in their daily lives but also the new meanings given to Islamic traditions and the ways in which these meanings are contested (Mahmood 2005). Um Mohammad’s interpretation can be seen as a response to a situation that she feels is anarchic and lacking in awareness of God. For her, divine justice is sharp and swift. There are no gray areas between right and wrong.

In contesting the religious credibility of dominant political forces in the country, which is at the time of the focus group the Muslim Brotherhood, the women are giving what they view to be a more substantial definition of what shari’ah is and defining how it should be implemented based on their own life experiences. Take for example their cynical description of the Islamist political position:

Moderator: so you want the shari’ah to be applied
All: Yes
Moderator: But they did want to apply shari’ah in other things
Farida: Yes, other things.
Moderator: For example a guy walking with a girl must prove they are married…
Farida: And no tourism
Um Mohammad: And TV is haram²
Fatima: Of course this is Haram (6/7/2013)

For the women, Islamist politicians are concerned with superficial issues, especially ones that appear out of sync with their lives. Mingling between the sexes is unavoidable for low-income Egyptians who must occupy public spaces and work with members of the opposite sex. Further, in Egypt, tourism is an important sector within the

² Forbidden by Islam
economy, an area to which many middle class and low-income individuals turn in order to make a living.

At the same time, some within the group did not agree with the version of Shari’ah that was being discussed:

Mona: Everyone wouldn’t want that, hands to be chopped off and so forth...this is the Shari’ah that you want Um Mohammad?!
Sunaa: That’s not fair.
Fatima: Half the country has become thieves’ woman!
Um Mohammad: When you punish someone this way, no one will do it again! He will be a lesson and won’t steal again. When you find people are executed in the squares, you will fear even thinking about killing someone...I swear, no one will kill or steal. Believe me. If shari’ah is applied, everything will be right. (6/7/2013)

In turning to shari’ah, Um Mohammad and the women who agree with her are looking for solutions to what they perceive as an extremely unsettling moment in the country, where figures of the state and civilians are seen as creating instability and taking advantage. But the objections of Mona and Sunaa illustrate the opinion that the particular version of shari’ah as advocated by Um Mohammad is harsh and that it goes against fairness and, ultimately, true justice. It is clear here that there are different ideas as to how the will of God should be interpreted and implemented and ultimately what security for individuals and society means.

The comment of Fatima puts an interesting spin on that particular interpretation of shari’ah and inadvertently highlights the contradictions at hand. Fatima here supports the comments of Um Mohammad when she exclaims, “Half the country have become thieves woman!” If Um Mohammad’s version of Shari’ah were to be implemented, would half the country then go limb-less to teach the other half not to kill or steal? Would this judgment be just in light of the ongoing political and economic turmoil in the country? Um Mohammed feels that with shari’ah the country’s problems will be solved, ‘that
everything will be alright’ as the thought of breaking the law will trigger the need for self-preservation and bring an awareness of God into the actions and thoughts of citizens. However the words of Fatima, Mona, and Sunaa show that implementing shari’ah would continue to be a debatable enterprise and that the presence of God through law within daily life may not be an infallible method toward attaining stability, justice and well-being.

Conclusion

The reasons behind insecurity in Cairo are numerous. Unsurprisingly, it is the poor who bear the brunt of these insecurities as threats to their modes of social reproduction come from a number of different directions: little to no regulation of transportation, diminishing social services, and a corrupt and inoperable legal and political system. In response to these challenges, Egyptians express their own solution to the situation of insecurity often through the frame of religion. Specifically, in calling on God or divinely inspired interpretations of the will of God such as the shari’ah, individuals seek remedies that are lasting and fair and that sit outside the realm of politics. Further, calling on God serves the purpose of training individuals, both government and civilian, to be fair and just with each other, and to train oneself against wrong-doing and inappropriate behavior. In this way, calling on God is deployed as a method to urge people to do what is right. This injunction is a tool for those who have no other means of getting their needs met.

These expressions of (in)security provide an alternate frame of reference within security debates. By attending to how ordinary Cairenes frame questions of security and insecurity, my goal is to provide an analysis ‘from below’ (Amar 2013) that takes into consideration how individuals impacted by various forms of violence see and understand
their own possible emancipation from insecurity. Hence the security debate is shifted from the place of elite international forums to the lived practices and experiences of everyday life, where notions of security are developed and debated. From this perspective, security not only encompasses a need for safe infrastructure and protection from physical violence but also a sense of spiritual nourishment and awareness—factors that are often not discussed by security theorists (Wellman and Lombardi 2012).

It is important to note that these expressions are not accepted amongst Cairenes without debate. A relationship with God and religious tradition is a communal as well as a deeply solitary activity. Different understandings of God and various interpretations of God’s will inevitably lead to debates about how God is to be understood within daily life—the important point being that there is not a blanket conceptualization of God’s role within daily life for Egyptians. Rather, the role of God within society has various meanings, and, as shown by the illustrations above, is debated over and understood through personal frames of reference based on practice and experience.

By demanding a religious order and an increased awareness of God, participants are attempting to make themselves visible, both to the state and those who would do them harm. This is not for the purpose of exposing themselves to more violence but to reveal themselves as subjects deserving of respect and if required, care. The tactics and practices of individuals within everyday life possess the potential to disrupt and challenge dominant discourses and practices (Secor 2004). By calling on God, research participants are referencing a set of understood notions, dictates, and injunctions that condemn a range of abuses and inappropriate behaviors that have become common place. Further, in respect to Egypt’s political history, a reliance on God indicates a desire for a system that
is lasting and more substantial than the various political systems, both secular and Islamist, which Egyptians have been exposed to.
Chapter four: Violence and discipline: The connections between state and domestic violence in Cairo, Egypt

Introduction

In Egypt, state violence has been a part of the narrative of everyday life for many of the country’s civilians. Particularly in urban areas, violence from the police, *shurta* in Arabic, is an acknowledged feature of life in the city. The uprisings in 2011 that saw the departure of then President Hosni Mubarak brought the issue of state violence, ‘*unf el dawla*’, to the world’s attention.

The violence of the state is often compounded by violence in the home. According to a study conducted in 2005, 47% of ever-married women claimed that they experienced physical, emotional, or verbal abuse since the age of 15 (NCW 2009). In this article I present these two issues together to demonstrate how they are intertwined and are similar in their modes and effects. In demonstrating the connection between these two issues, this paper opens an inquiry into how ideas of care influence perceptions of violence and discipline and more specifically, questions how and to what extent government is supposed to care for its citizens.

In focus group discussions conducted in 2013 with low-income Cairo residents, research participants defined violence as a form of excessive behavior. In contrast, participants understood discipline as an act of care, that is, action through which forms of misbehavior were corrected. These definitions were applied both to intimate family relationships as well as to analyses of state actors and their actions. What arose through analysis of focus group dialogues was that there was no clear dividing line or factor that distinguished violence from care. What distinguished violence from discipline was contingent upon the actors involved in an incident and the context. These findings raise a
key question: What relations of power underlie how an incident is coded as either violent or disciplinary? The vague and shifting boundary between violence and discipline or violence and care, results in physical and emotional harm and sometimes the death of individuals. Yet, how violence is experienced, discussed and interpreted within daily life is the ground upon which activists, politicians, and non-governmental organizations must work to transform the legacy of authoritarianism and violence.

Part of what this paper aims to show is that ideas of violence are not static; they change through interaction, through experience and retelling as well as through social and cultural lenses. This paper proceeds by giving an overview of methods and Egypt’s particular manifestations of state and domestic violence. I then turn to the words of research participants to demonstrate the ways in which violence is understood and how it informs their opinions about familial and state relationships.

Methods

Fieldwork for this paper was conducted between July 2012 and August 2013 in Cairo, Egypt. Low-income civilians, men and women, between the ages of 18-26 and 48-56 were recruited to participate in a series of five focus groups held at a public library in Cairo. I focused on the poor because they are most often exposed to state abuse. 16 semi-structured interviews were also conducted with the target research population. I recruited participants by frequenting four sites: Tahrir Square, Cairo University and its immediate environs, Kholousy Street in Shubra and Musky Market. I also volunteered at the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), an organization that, in part, provides basic legal services and advice for individuals who cannot otherwise afford it.
Defining just who is low-income, *al-fakireen*, can be a fraught process. During the recruitment process, I relied on social and cultural cues to indicate who was low-income. Indeed, class distinctions rely on income in addition to levels of education, dress, social networks, taste as well as practices of movement and gesture (Bourdieu 1987; Elyachar 2011). As argued by Julia Elyachar, the trifecta of habitus, gesture and movement creates the seemingly ineffable yet nonetheless discernible recognition of difference and commonality in Cairo. More simply, how we move through and occupy the world matters—it communicates information about who we are. For this project I specifically recruited individuals who sold items on public thoroughfares such as tissues, fruit, and other common household goods in addition to clothing accessories. I also targeted individuals who performed service jobs such as trash collection or valet service. Finally, to recruit more participants for the study, I used snowball sampling, wherein I asked participants to invite their friends.

I utilized focus groups and interviews to assist in developing a fuller view of the daily lives of research participants (Bernard 2006; Kvale 1996; Pratt 2002). In addition to focus groups I also conducted walking ‘tours.’ During tours, with the help of an interpreter, an audio recorder and/or a small notebook, I followed research participants through the routine paths they travelled daily. These journeys consisted primarily of riding city transportation and walking with them through their neighborhoods. I usually met them at their place of work or at a bus or subway stop that they routinely used. From there I followed them through the city to their destination, which was in most instances their home. During travel time, I conducted semi-structured interviews with them. These interviews were primarily designed to understand their experience while moving along
those routine paths as well as to evoke storytelling about previous experiences encountered moving through the city. Research on mobility has shown that walking is not a dispassionate affair. It is filled with emotions, memories, interruptions, randomness, and expectation (Middleton 2009). The combination of these methods enabled me to receive a fuller picture of each individual’s practices and interpretations of city space—more than what would have been gleaned through an interview alone.

**Feminism and the emotional vibrancy of place**

The analytic of feminist geopolitics has demonstrated that the performances and movements of the body through space are crucial for providing grounded political insights into politics at multiple scales (Mountz 2011; Hyndman and de Alwis 2004; Secor 2004). Indeed, feminist and other critical geographers have critiqued the field of political geography for its predilection to view the home, the everyday, or the personal as politically unimportant, instead valuing political engagements such as war or international diplomacy as more worthy of attention (Dittmer and Gray 2010; England 2003). In focusing on how domestic violence and state violence both impinge upon the body in daily life and inform logics of governance both within the family and society at large, I build on the work of other feminist geographers who analyzing more closely the relationship between forms of governance and intimacy—how bonds, obligations and requests for care exceed the familial relationship. In doing so I add to the discussion that supports upgrading the status of the corporeal and the emotional within political discussion (Pain 2009, 2013; Fluri 2011; Secor 2004). For my purposes, assessing the violence inflicted on bodies and the words spoken by those bodies about the pain they have witnessed and experienced provides insight into how smaller ‘everyday events’ are
folded into political and social issues at other scales and the different practices that individuals undertake to survive and continue to live in the world. (Brickell 2008; Fluri 2011a, 2011b; Das 2007).

Moreover, this work contributes to the field of Middle East studies, which has relied heavily on the binary of public/private and modern vs. traditional (Meriwether and Tucker 1999). In the field, women have often been simplistically discussed through the context of the home and placed behind curtains and veils. Here, the home is painted as a place of safety, familiarity and stability (Pieris 2012). In the data collected here, I show that in contrast to being a place of safety and familiarity, the home can also be just as dangerous as the public spaces that bring individuals into contact with uncertainty and possible violence. Indeed, acts of violence are so powerful in part because they can strike anywhere and at any time. Spaces such as the home are open for the intrusion and violence of state actors. Similarly, violence that emanates from the home can trail victims into spaces deemed as public, complicating these spatial distinctions.

The produced emotion of fear, *khouf*, is a salient feature within these manifestations (Pain 2014). The emotions that result from violence are not compartmentalized into boxes marked state and home. Rather, they are intertwined with one another and feminist geography has shown that emotions are integral to relationships and experiences of place (Bondi 2005). Further emotions do not belong exclusively to women or the victims of violence (Rose 1993; Wulff 2007). There is a complex relationship between emotions and gender wherein emotions have been used to emasculate men, distance individuals from responsibility for acts of violence, and label
the social and political claims of women and minority groups as irrational (Rose 1993; Fluri 2011b, 285).

Just as feminist geopolitics has been instrumental in complicating the lives of women in relation to broader national and political issues, it has also helped in understanding the multiple ways in which gender identity is constructed. Gender is composed of social relations and symbolic meanings, making its lived everyday performance inseparable from the histories that have helped to shape it (Macdowell 1999). These social relations involved intimate social relations as well as broader societal trends and popular beliefs. In her ethnography of a popular Cairo neighborhood, Anthropologist Farha Ghannam (2013) recorded instances where masculinity was actively shaped by societal pressures as well as the pressures of female family members. Here, female family members are just as critical in the formation of masculine identities as are the peer groups of men. Mothers and sisters coached the men on behavior, suitable masculine emotions and the knowledge they needed to possess in order to be streetwise and independent. Women training men to ‘be men’, and instructing them on how to appropriately access the privileges and power of patriarchy was understood as critical for male survival and competency outside and within the home. These negotiations can also be seen as part of a patriarchal bargain in which women participate within the dominant system in order to guarantee potential care, love, stability and political leverage within their family unit (Kandiyoti 1988).

The site of the home and the relations therein allow men to access the power and affirmation of patriarchy. In contrast, however, spaces where men come into contact with state actors presents a different set of challenges. In relation to the state, men can be
demasculinized, abused, and seen as subordinate to the state, while women are doubly oppressed both in the expectation that they be subservient in the home and subservient to the state (Han and Ling 1998; Hafez 2012). The particular formation of patriarchy in Egypt encourages a feminization of society, wherein state figures such as the police or the President are seen as ultimate father figures. Suad Joseph’s analysis of patterns of kinship-based patriarchy within the broader Middle East are instructive here; she argues that middle-eastern patriarchy is present within all domains of society leading to the “gendering of citizenship” (Joseph 2000, 11).

**Violence of the State**

Torture, corruption and harassment are hallmarks of daily state practice in various parts of the world. In Egypt the political system can be characterized as authoritarian due to political power being largely invested within the hands of selected political elites, the absence of clear legal limits, and the absence of regulation and discipline for the police and security services (Linz 2000). Civil society organizations are restricted in their ability to operate as an effective government watchdogs. Even in this post-2011 period, activists and human rights NGOs face repression and arbitrary detention (Ahram Online 2014).

Using the pretext of fighting terrorism from Islamic fundamentalists, the Egyptian government instituted emergency law in 1981. Under emergency law, non-governmental organizations, opposition activists, prominent political figures and parties, homosexuals, artists, and ordinary civilians have been heavily policed and intimidated (Singerman 2002; Amar 2013). Currently, many activists who participated in the downfall of former President Hosni Mubarak are in detention under current President Abdel Fattah el Sisi.
Outside of spaces of detention, daily life is marked by unpredictable abuse by police forces and corruption. Low-ranking police officers, traffic officers, central security forces have all engaged in forms of corruption that range from bribery to kidnapping (Kienle 2001; Farouk 2012). These actions have targeted the most vulnerable: street sellers, civilians seeking government services, the poor, drivers of informal transportation, and the unlucky. Additionally, swaths of the population suffer social and economic neglect and lack channels for redress except through local patronage networks (Singerman 2011). Emergency law’s long period of implementation has created an atmosphere of immunity in which abuses of basic civil rights have been normalized. At time of this writing, under President Sisi, emergency rule has been lifted in Egypt, however intimidation and unjustified detentions continue, particularly of those suspected of having ties with the Muslim Brotherhood or those who are in opposition to the growing political powers of the President.

Over a 16-year period, from 1993-2008, there were 460 torture cases that were officially documented (Loftis 2011). A 2006 police report from the Nadim center describes state violence under the regime of Hosni Mubarak, and the environment of impunity the officers’ operated within:

In Egypt, torture is not restricted to political dissent. It is practiced against those suspected of committing crimes, and against many who are not suspects of anything. It is done as a compliment for those in power and as a form of intimidation and “teaching a lesson” to others who are of a lesser social status. (El Nadim 2006, 6)

A review of testimonies by victims of state violence shows that they often have to endure physical and psychological violence that degraded them based on their gender and age. Detainees are made to feel powerless and if they are male, powerlessness often comes in the guise of being infantilized or compared to being a woman. In an interview
with a 23-year-old torture victim he describes his ordeal thus (I include a description of his emotional state and physical scars from my notes):

There is a police problem, they are not fair. The last day of Ramadan, the day before the Eid, in Embaba (Hadea Helwan), there were a lot of police who came to the cafe of my father and the police started shooting. I asked why they came to the cafe and they said “This is not your business, this is ours and we can do anything we want.” And one of the police officers hit me in the back of the head with a gun and put me in a police car (11/10/2012).

While in jail he states that the police verbally abused him and attacked him. He describes himself as depressed because “They told me I was not a man, just a kid.” On his arms he has marks from cigarettes burned into his arms, “they ripped my clothes and threatened to find the people in my cell phone.”

With physical abuse, there are also the intended effects of powerlessness and shame. It has been argued that ‘waiting’ is a chronic condition in countries of the global south due to political and economic structures (Jeffrey 2008). Through the narratives of research participants, it is clear that waiting is also the result of states of exception where civilians are left to wait for some sense of justice for their claims of abuse. My concern throughout is: What does this waiting give way to? How are civilians transformed in this atmosphere of violence and waiting where the exceptional becomes part of the fabric of everyday life? In sociological and anthropological studies of Cairo, residents adapt to the atmosphere by outwardly altering their movements and pursuing life opportunities secretly (although not invisibly) despite the possibility of violence (Bayat 2009; Ismail 2006). These changes (such as informal housing) have had a dramatic impact on the built environment of the city. But how has a chronic state of violence reshaped intimacy: the civilian-state relationships and relationships within families?

Domestic Violence in Egypt
The World Health Organization has identified domestic violence as a global phenomenon. In Egypt, almost half of all married women have experienced domestic violence at one point in their lives. Although domestic violence cuts across class lines, it is most prevalent among low-income individuals and those who have received minimal to no formal education (NCW 2009; Habib et al. 2011). Research and debates have largely focused on violence within matrimonial relations. However, to be clear, violence also erupts between parents and children, within extended familial relations and is inflicted by both men and women (NCW 2009; Habib et al. 2011). Further, domestic violence also takes the form of psychological harm. In a quantitative study that recorded the opinions and experiences of 4,408 Egyptians, both married and unmarried, 50.2 percent of married women claimed that they experienced psychological violence in the last 12 months before the study while 63.7 percent of married men admitted to committing psychological violence which included verbal insults and threats in addition to controlling and isolating behavior (NCW 2009).

Bodily and emotional injuries are the most immediate results of domestic violence. Not immediately detected are the long-term behavioral and mental health issues, such as depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (Douki et al. 2003; Habib et al. 2011). The impact of domestic violence may also result in mental health issues for witnesses and bystanders within the home, for example, the children who witness it (Ammar 2006; Poutiainen and Homa 2013). Violence in the home creates a series of public health and community concerns that tax government resources and negatively impacts the fabric of social life (Yount and Li 2011, 2010). Sexually transmitted Infections, gynecological disorders, low self-esteem and unwanted pregnancies are
especially prevalent in married women who experienced domestic violence (Karmaliani et. Al 2008; Monazea and Khalek 2010).

The majority of victims express reticence and fear about reporting the crime to social agencies. The Egyptian penal code allows for the use of violence in the home if it is determined that good intentions are the motivations for its use. As the director of the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights, Nehad Abu el-Komsan explained, “One of the reasons why it is accepted can be found in the fact that violence is most of the time considered as well-intentioned discipline getting out of hand” (NCW 2009). For the women that do report it, it is understood by authorities as a family affair and often leads to a continuation of the violence as many family members urge victims to bear their ordeal (NCW 2009). Outside of the family, societal mores increase pressure on victims to stay within violent relationships. Divorce and familial conflict becoming public knowledge are often markers of shame and dishonor for the families involved. These dynamics also prevent victims from seeking aid (Ammar 2006). Indeed, the life of a divorcee may bring an additional set of difficulties, including the risk that the divorced woman will become even more prone to violence, slander and a damaged reputation within the community (Yamawaki et al. 2012). These trends are not isolated to Egypt and the Middle East but are typical within cases of domestic violence around the world (Pain 2013a, 2013b). Victims within these relationships often live in a chronic state of fear, feeling that the abuse is their fault and that it is their own responsibility to fix the abuser and the abuse by making behavioral changes (Pain 2013a).

The Language of Violence
It is difficult to pinpoint just what violence is. In listening to research participants and attempting to analyze their accounts and the language they used, there arose gaps in understanding that could not be bridged with additional explanations by an interpreter. However, the language that we use to speak about violence shapes how the world is reconstructed and lived in afterwards (Das 2007).

In my work to understand how my research participants understand violence, I am not attempting to recover a culturally specific definitional origin of violence. Such a project would be impossible due to the interlocking webs of representations of violence that are woven through the modern and colonial history of Egypt (Spivak 2010). Rather, my focus is on how research participants actively interpreted violence both in their view of politics and in their personal lives.

In order to grapple with this issue, it is necessary for me to be clear regarding my own perspective. The definition of violence that I bring to my work aligns with that provided in 2015 by the Violence Prevention Alliance (VPA), a subsidiary of the World Health Organization. For the VPA, violence is defined as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.” Further, I understand that violence can be plural. That it can be subjective, symbolic and systemic (Zizek 2008). Violence, its actuality and its anticipation, can haunt daily life and it can have multi-generational ramifications, altering relationships in its wake (Jegnathan 2004; Secor 2007; Till 2005, 2012). I understand that violence is often deployed in order to uphold particular relations of power such as patriarchy and authoritarianism but that it can also be productive of new
subjectivities and forms of resistance (Ennaji and Sadiqi 2011; Secor 2004).

Subsequently, violence has distinctly spatial ramifications that upend scalar distinctions that separate the affairs of the state from the affairs that take place within the process of daily life and shrinks distance (the ubiquitous ‘over there’ vs. ‘here’, us vs. them) (Fluri 2011; Secor 2004; Hyndman 2001).

Notably, participants in my focus groups did not feel that the intentional use of physical force that resulted in injury necessarily translated into an act of violence. For them, use of physical force or power could indicate care, an attempt to correct inappropriate behavior that may be harmful to the family, community, or state. How violence is understood and rendered in language is culturally nuanced and based on religious, political, and social traditions (Das and Nandy 1985). Further the immediate context and emotions around an issue are also a factor in understandings of violence (Ghannam 2013). Hence, definitions of violence shift and take on additional meanings. This is not to say that violence is illogical. Rather, conceptions of violence hold a degree of ambivalence as they are often times viewed simultaneously from a number of different perspectives. To be clear, this does not signal an argument for relativism or a reluctance towards political engagement. Rather it means:

[T]hat we must hone our intellectual resources much more carefully, making many more distinctions, subtleties, and nuances in our understanding than any binarized or dialectically structured model will allow. And refuse the knee-jerk reactions of straightforward or outward condemnation before we understand the structure and history of that modality of violence, its modes of strategic functioning, its vulnerabilities and values—(Grosz 2003, 141)

Through an interrogation of narratives of encounter with physical force—whether they concern assault from the state or the infliction of pain and injury within intimate
relationships—we can understand the particular logics by which acts are condoned, go unspoken, or are challenged and overturned. Through an attention to these conversations we can glean important points of concern for the reformation of the Egyptian legal system. One central question that emerges is: What is care and how should the state care for its citizens? And concomitantly, what are appropriate forms of discipline? For although interpretations of violence may differ, the use of physical force and power still results in bruises, wounds, psychological distress, and even death. In my focus group conversations with low-income Cairenes, the sentiment of ‘getting carried away’ was utilized to discuss the point at which care transforms into violence. But it turns out that discerning this point may not be possible. It is this indiscernibility and its dangers to which I now turn.

**Men and Violence**

The family is a central social construct within Egyptian society and culture. Conjugal relationships between men and women are largely understood as women caring for the home and children and men providing protection and financial stability for the family (Ahmed 1992). If there is a dispute within the nuclear family, it is preferable to have extended family members moderate and help solve them (Douki et. al 2003). However, if these problems extend outside of the family unit, there are distinct differences in the rights that men and women possess. Within Egyptian law and through social mores, the ability of women to receive just treatment with regard to violence is restricted by laws that favor men over women and by de facto legal practices in which judges disregard legal penalties for violence against women (NCW 2009).
During a conversation with two male research participants between the age of 48 and 56, I showed film clips from two films that bookend Hosni Mubarak’s time in power: Hona al Qahira *This is Cairo* released in 1981 and ‘Asal Iswid *Black Honey* released in 2010. From the film ‘Asl Iswid, I show a scene in which the main character, Masry, is detained on suspicion of being a spy. He is arrested without fully understanding what he did wrong: his possessions are seized and partially destroyed. Physically, he is roughly handled by police officers and beaten in his cell presumably by other inmates. Below, is a section of the resulting conversation that erupted between the two participants and which demonstrates ideas about violence committed by police officers.

Moderator: What do you think about what happened to Masry?
Waleed: He was humiliated
Khaled: Yea
Waleed: And this is what really happens. Some officers suffer an inferiority complex.
Khaled: No, there is something. Not anyone can just take pictures of Egypt. The officer saw a guy who clearly doesn’t look Egyptian, with his hair down and his clothes—so he took him, maybe he’s a spy, you will never know…But the officer got carried away. A well-behaved officer or director of investigations should behave in a civilized manner, but he got his mindset fixed that this guy is a spy or whatever…
Waleed: Officers used to be treated in superiority, in the past you had to take your shoes off when you go into an officer’s office, as if you are walking in a mosque. And at the same time, you stand a few meters away from him while the low-ranking officer is standing behind you and beating you.

A few moments later, when speaking about violence more generally within Egyptian society:

Moderator: Do you think that the police sought the use of violence? Especially against the public and civilians?
Waleed: Especially Habib El Adly. He ran a tight-ship.
Khaled: whether it was needed or not.
Waleed: Good peaceful people were afraid more than the deviated criminals
Interpreter: What do you think is the reason that a regime uses violence this way?
Khaled: They are entitled. If they arrest someone with drugs, it is okay. Someone stealing from a shop or stealing on the bus, or someone’s bag, that’s okay.
Waleed: Because it’s wrong.
Khaled: You must be punished for any crime you commit. But if you hold a checkpoint, for instance to show that Embaba station is working and you search everyone.
Waleed: They arrest everyone—old people and many others.

Within this conversation there are several ideas: that of superiority, ‘getting carried away,’ rightful entitlement to power and the importance of discipline. The officer,
because of his station, assumes an elevated and somewhat mystical social position over
civilians: “You had to take your shoes off when you go into an officer's office, as if you
are walking in a mosque.” For Waleed and Khaled, there is the intimate sense of
familiarity with abuse by police officers. They use as an example the area of Embaba, an
area with a large number of informal settlements and historically the site of contestations
between residents and police officers (Singerman 2011). For both men, the police
wielded their powers over civilians whether “it was needed or not” but the men never
questioned the use of physical and verbal abuse as a form of discipline. For them, beating
was synonymous with punishment and the police had the right to use such force as long
as a wrong was committed. Further, the respondents never defined the line between
beating for the sake of punishment and getting carried away.

The idea of beating for wrongdoing is similarly transferred into the home.
Although Khaled is over 50, an age by which he should be married with his own
household, he is single. Despite not having a wife, he still holds very strong opinions on
the role of women and punishment within the household. Here, he discusses beating in
the household and when it is appropriate.

Moderator: we will go one question back; we spoke about the relationship between a father and a son.
How about the husband and wife? Is he is allowed to beat her, to treat her with violence?
Khaled: yes
Moderator: I mean to be violent with her
Khaled: yea
Moderator: why?
Khaled: her morals.
Moderator: what allowed him to do so?
Khaled: she is not obedient, she is careless, and she is looking forward to other women. All those stories, I
can tell you about them in detail.
Moderator: so that allows him to slap her.
Khaled: to beat her and he is entitled to prevent her from sitting with him when he eats, she should be
waiting on him.
Waleed: not in this life Khaled!
Khaled: I will tell you something, when some lady speaks about her household and things’ happening in it,
[she] is not a good woman.
Moderator: God defined rules for how we can deal with these sorts of things. Khaled: certainly, but sometimes you get fed up.

Here, the husband, similarly to the officer, has disciplinary power and assumes an extremely elevated status based on Khaleed’s comments. Despite religious guidelines for restraint, Waleed explains that men forget these rules and get ‘fed up.’ Further evident within Khaleed’s comments is the desire to silence and subsequently erase the feelings and experiences of women and what they experience as abuse. Under this particular manifestation of patriarchy, to be a good woman is to silently accept and endure the actions of the husband. The space of the home comes to delimit what is speakable and thus what is recognizable as violent action.

Interestingly, the objection to the wife’s speaking outside of the home mimicks the earlier objection of Khaled to the character Masry in the film. Khaled, supports police officers handling Masry roughly due to the suspicion he might be a spy and speak about the affairs of Egypt to the outside world. Although there is acknowledgement that officers abuse their power and that husbands ‘get fed up,’ the problem of speaking and communicating one’s experience is equally if not more problematic.

Two things must be noted however: Khaled could be ‘performing’ a particular version of masculinity that he would never exercise in a marital relationship. Due to Khaled’s single status it is impossible to know how he would act in an actual relationship. What is important for my argument is the logic he uses to explain wife-beating, a logic that rest on the ultimate moral superiority of the husband and his entitlement to disciplinary power. The idea that particular individuals are entitled to power no matter how irresponsible or cruel highlights the difficulty in attempts at regulating authority figures and their actions. Secondly, it must be noted that although Khaled advocates a
particular kind of masculinity, this version is by no means the only version. Waleed indicates in his exclamation that the comments of Waleed are absurd. While men are certainly the main beneficiaries of patriarchal systems, not all men are equally interested in the upkeep of its various aspects. Waleed’s interjection, while small, demonstrates changing perceptions and that other models of masculinity exist.

**Beating too hard: Women on violence**

Interpreter: if you like your husband’s to beat you, what is the problem or the difference when police officers beat people in the street?
Reem: Police officers beat too hard

The above comments came mid-way through a focus group with young women between the ages of 18 and 26. The topic of domestic violence arose because one participant’s husband was in jail after a major fight that they had had. There was laughter as the conversation continued and the women detailed how their husbands beat them.

Reem: When my husband beats me up, he brings the house to pieces.
Do’aa: Her sister's husband, when he beats her, he almost always breaks something in her—her arms, legs, anything. He always breaks something.
All laugh
Reem: This is how things are in Egypt. This is reality, come live with us for a while…
Do’aa: Like your husband beats you up when you have done something wrong, but an officer might beat you wrongfully when you have done nothing wrong.
Sherine: And your husband makes up with you and reconciles but the officer keeps calling you bad names.
Interpreter: but when an officer beats you he does it because of—
Reem: They beat with sticks. They beat too hard.
Rasha: When your husband slaps you, you won't be hurt.
Reem: Police officers drag you in the street in front of everyone and put cuffs on your hands.
Miriam: And they may search you

As the women detail, the beatings of their husbands are viewed as corrective, as a loving action which will eventually lead to reconciliation at the end of the day.

Throughout the conversation, the women used the word *darb*, meaning to beat or strike, to describe the actions of police officers and their husbands. Above, the actions of the
husband can be seen as more gentle in comparison to police officers, who are viewed as not having the best interests of citizens at heart. Their beatings are brutal for no apparent reason and, as the women argue, much more physically damaging. However, this distinction is debatable, especially in light of Do’aa comment and/or joke: “Her sister's husband, when he beats her, he almost always breaks something in her: her arms, legs, anything. He always breaks something.” This indicates that beatings are interpreted differently based on a variety of factors: the degree of intimacy between who is involved, the extent of the beating (is it too hard) and whether there was wrong doing which justified the beating.

Later, during this same focus group, Reem’s comments seem to suggest that she preferred to be beaten regularly:

Reem: Me, if my husband doesn’t beat me, I fall ill
All laugh
Reem: Yeah, I swear

Interpreter: If he doesn’t beat you, you fall ill?
Reem: I provoke him and fight with him and I irritate him.

Room in interpretation must be made for exaggerations and joking in the context of the focus group. Further, as earlier stated by the women, beating represents a form of care and attention. Research indicates that individuals who are low-income are very likely to witness and experience beating within their childhood homes; in this context, such behavior can be seen as normal aspect of being a father or a husband and may be expected behavior (NCW 2009; Habib et al. 2011), Hence, Reem’s actions can be understood as a request for her husband to perform a version of masculinity and subsequently show care. On the other hand, Reem’s words present a picture that is also complex: “I provoke him and fight with him and I irritate him.” I believe these words
also indicate someone seeking to make sense of the beatings that she received, providing herself as the cause for actions that may lack clear reasons.

The police were viewed as being oppressive for going too far, for beating too much, for using accessories such as sticks. The embarrassment from the beatings and the potential dishonor it caused was also a concern for the women. However, the issue of being beaten was not debated except with the mention of the law and its severity. Within the entire conversation, the line between beating as a punishment and beating as an oppressive act remained vague and contradictory, with the only distinctive factor being the degree of publicity of a beating and its severity.

Accepting beatings as normal and at times necessary can damage an individual’s sense of self-importance. Reem’s comments indicate that she does not trust that her concerns or wants are legitimate; instead she sees them as provoking. Yet, as the research participants explain, beatings or slaps can also serve an ethical purpose. From their perspectives, the infliction of blows can be a caring action that helps to improve the behavior of the one receiving them.

In a similar fashion, civilians can come to see their concerns or demands as silly, as fodder for provocation, possible detention, and abuse when engaging with members of the state. During one focus group with all male participants between the ages of 18 and 26, participants were asked if they would complain to a government official if they encountered structural problems with transportation during their journey through the city. One participant exclaimed: “Of course not! For example the Minister of Media, when a reporter asked him where there is freedom of speech, he responded to the female reporter, ‘Come to my office and I will show you.’ So this is an example of the ministers, what do
“you expect!” Every day civic participation and interaction becomes an impossibility due to fear of abuse. Violence enacted within the space of everyday life, whether in the home or on the street, breeds an atmosphere of fear that undermines social action and political transition.

**Home as an assemblage of violence**

My husband works as a mechanic, one day he fixed a car for a police officer in a complementary manner; for he didn’t charge him. But the 2nd time, the same officer asked him to fix it for free, my husband told him that he’s financially insecure with kids and rent to cover… It was a Thursday night, when a gang of officers attacked our household, electrically-shocking our kids. Even the dog we used to have couldn’t escape their brutality, and they killed it! --Huda (Interview, 1/17/2013)

I met Huda at the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR). On the particular day we met, she had come with her two small children to search for work and a government apartment. After our initial meeting, I met with Huda individually on two other occasions: once to follow up on her case and on a second occasion when she provided a tour of her home and neighborhood in Dar el Salam. Dar el Salam is an impoverished neighborhood located just south of Cairo’s Ring Road. Many of the roads are unpaved and narrow and the homes are located in buildings that are deteriorating. Many of the people I met while there with Huda, were either unemployed or working as housecleaners or street sellers.

In my meetings with Huda, her two children were always present as well as any paper documents of her husband’s case. And in all of my meetings with her, three concerns were always present: legally clearing their name of any wrongdoing, finding stable work, and finding a safe apartment. Her apartment building, planks of wood
supported the weight of the stairs. The walls of her apartment were filled with major cracks that let in light and air from the outside and a water leak inside of the kitchen wall posed an imminent electrical danger.

EOHR had become a space where she often tried to accomplish all three of her goals. In the time spent waiting to accomplish these tasks, Huda supported her family by working as a stair cleaner in apartment buildings around Cairo and in other random cleaning jobs that she heard about through her close network of neighbors and friends in Dar el Salaam. In contrast, her husband did not return to work. By the time of my visit to her home, it became clear that he vacillated between not being able to find work and choosing not to. Huda mentioned briefly in focus group conversation that her husband beat her. When I visited her home, her husband was away and I took the opportunity to follow up with Huda on her experiences with her husband:

Huda: Our fights are: I tell him we need this money for the house and he says he needs them for cigarettes. It is our life. What are we going to do? We have to live it the way it is. I am an orphan and because of that I have no one. I only have god and my husband and kids. If I decided to leave, where will I go? I will stay in the streets.

Me: Do you have any safe place, even in the house?

Huda: It is better for me when he beats me to stay at home and not to show people… I stay in the room and I avoid him. A month before I had labor he hit me with a metal bar on my back, and then when I told him ‘I will leave you’ he said to leave, to go anywhere I want. But I didn’t have anywhere to go. I stayed outside for a bit but I brought my suitcase and came back.

In response to her outward expression of laughter, I asked her:

Me: How do you smile when you are telling these stories?

Huda: What am I going to do? This is life and I am not going to sit and cry all day. We are all about suffering. If you open my heart you will find suffering there. We call god and pray for god. What else are we going to do? Now I am breastfeeding my child and I smile when I do so because I don’t want to feed sadness to the child.

At the end of my home visit with Huda, I asked her about her husband’s case and whether there had been any updates. She informed me that they did not have the funds for lawyer fees and more importantly, “We need the money for a new apartment.”
Huda’s home had become an assemblage of violence (Springer 2011) where the structural violence of state neglect through absent adequate affordable housing schemes intertwines with direct subjective violence from the state and domestic violence from her husband. Beyond the space of the home, she actively negotiates a range of roles that are shaped by these dimensions of violence. She is a victim of her husband’s violence and, although she attempts to hide his violence from her immediate neighbors, she publicly advocates for him and shares the story of the police attack on her home. Socially and religiously, Huda is supposed to be able to rely on her husband to provide financial support for the family. In exchange, she is supposed to be responsible for the running of the household. However, it is Huda who is the breadwinner. She effectively uses her network of friends to get work and to keep her family sheltered while also supporting her husband’s habits. Additionally, Huda has been active in trying to find a safe home for her family while she herself lacks safe spaces from her husband’s violence. Finally, the very authorities who are supposed to provide aid and protection provide another layer of abuse.

The ramifications of authoritarianism and domestic violence also affect multiple generations. Huda’s two small children, a son who is three years old, and a daughter of primary school age, were physically attacked by the police officers when they raided Huda’s home. They are also witnesses to the violence inflicted upon their mother by their father. While these instances of violence are imprinted upon their childhood, the image of their mother and the work she is doing must also be taken into account. Inarguably, ordinary Egyptians felt newly able to challenge state corruption and violence, often in creative ways, during and immediately following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings.
Optimism spread amongst many that it was in fact possible to influence politics and dramatically alter state policies. However, despite this optimism and the changes within the country, practices of violence do continue. As the moment of the Arab spring recedes further into the past, change will rest increasingly with citizens like Huda who persist in seeking justice (and survival) for their families, despite the atmosphere of uncertainty and terror.

**Conclusion**

Mina: Torture now has a new dimension where the public who stand by authorities are indirectly supporting torture… people who support the authorities have now started torturing by their own hands and even in the streets. (5/19/2013)

The words used by research participants who provided their thoughts and opinions on discipline and violence highlight the difficulty and even impossibility of fixing these terms as distinct from one another. At times, their words indicate a constantly shifting negotiation and reasoning that evaluates actions in terms of the motives of care that underlay them. Moreover, their words mark the space within which acts of incredible brutality continue, the space where forms of discipline bleed into the potential to abuse, humiliate, physically injure, and even kill. After the removal of Mohammed Morsi from the office of President, military general Abdel Fatah el Sisi has replaced him. It is notable that many officials within this new government were previous appointees under the rule of Mubarak. Torture and arbitrary detentions have also continued unabated (EIPR 2014). In the quote above from Kareem, a political activist, torture is even worse now than before because, from his perspective, the figures in power have changed, but the ideas that undergird and support torture have not.
What is significant in the accounts of my research participants (men and women, activists and ordinary citizens) is the desire to be cared for, whether it is by the state or by loved ones, despite personal experiences of violence. The desire for care helps to show that these forms of violence are not separate or hierarchically ordered. Rather, this desire and the fear that it will not be fulfilled shapes the actions that individuals perform within several areas of their daily lives. The want of care and the fear of violence break down divisions between what is considered public and that which is considered intimate and the stereotypical associations often paired with them. Analysis within feminist geopolitics has done much to disturb this binary. Practically, one of the lessons from this study is that listening to personal experiences and interpretations of what is considered violence can help us to design more effective tools to combat its pervasiveness, especially since these interpretations are integral to how we design, cope and interpret the world that we live in. Such an analysis has the capacity to push past blanket calls to eradicate torture and other acts of violence committed by the state towards an understanding of how state violence is part of a system in which it is indirectly but profoundly supported by the intimate forms of violence that are present within homes and communities.
Chapter five: Art as a diagnostic

Introduction

What does it mean to say that art can serve as a diagnostic? Certainly, artists have used their work to communicate changing societal values and politics while at the same time affecting understandings of these transformations. Works such as the propaganda art of Gustav Klucis that celebrated industrialization under Stalin, the publicly displayed photographs of Daniel Hernandez Salazar in Guatemala City recalling national traumas, and the sculptural work of Robert Graham that highlights past and contemporary race relations in the USA all serve as vehicles to effect the emotions of viewers, deliver political commentary, and gesture toward the future (Becker & Caiger-Smith, 1995; Graves, 1998; Hoelscher, 2008). This has been the case in Cairo, Egypt, where art has become an important lens through which to view different perspectives on the political changes taking place. Art has also been used to ensure that the goals of January 2011 do not get lost within current political battles. Such artistic engagements are not unlike established traditions within the art world, where artists use their medium for engagements with political and cultural questions (Anreus, Linden, & Weinberg, 2006; Bal, 2006). Yet more than this, using or seeing art as a diagnostic of transformation looks beyond the message of art and artists toward the field of relationships that are created and take place around and through art (Abu-Lughod, 1990).

Nowhere is the role of art within the field of political and social relations more apparent than where art engages with public space. When art enters public spaces, it also enters the public sphere. Here, public space and the public sphere share a mutual
relationship, although to be clear, they are not the same. Public space is at once a location and an entity to be made or ‘produced’ (Staeheli & Mitchell, 2008). Public locations such as a square may be considered public space to the degree in which they allow for the randomness and diversity of difference within daily interactions. Herein lies the relationship of public space with the public sphere. As conceptualized by Habermas (1989), the public sphere is a space for citizens to dialogue and debate as to how a polity should be governed and led. Critiques of Habermas’s public sphere argue that it relied on universalizing notions regarding language and the makings of rational debate (Sinekopova, 2006). Further, it was located within spaces of bourgeois existence. Under the weight of critique, Habermas’s initial conceptualization of the public sphere has since given way to more fluid definitions which embrace diverse forms of communication that cover multiple levels of thought, emotion, and expression and take place in multiple domains such as newspapers, the Internet, and in public space (Ibid.).

When art appears in public rather than being confined to art institutions, the audiences of artistic interventions become unstable. In the free for all of public art, an artistic work must engage and find footing amongst present societal concerns. In addition to the increase in the diversity of the audience, as the audience opens up and become more diverse, public art becomes ever more polysemic. In the context of the public field, art is endowed with the possibility of becoming a powerful tool for social and political advocacy. Art in public can also serve as an incubator for irritating behavior (Metcalfe, 2012). It is in watching what art does in the public sphere that we can get a sense of the challenges and debates that a society faces. It is in this sense that public art and the interactions it engenders become a diagnostic. Public art thus not only indicates change,
but also illuminates the dynamics of these transformations and the social, cultural, and political stakes involved. More so than art created for a museum or gallery, art in public must be ‘made sense of’ by the uncontrolled and various audiences brought together through their shared usage of public space. It is this ‘sense making’ of public art that provides a diagnostic through which we can trace and apprehend the different dynamics of social change.

In this article, I analyze the relationship between artists, public artworks, and the audiences who perceive them in Cairo, Egypt. I borrow the idea of art being a diagnostic from Lila Abu Lughod’s 1990 article The romance of resistance: tracing transformations of power. Abu Lughod analyzes the content and performance of Bedouin women’s acts of resistance as a diagnostic of changing power dynamics within Bedouin Society. In a similar fashion, this article analyzes the content, performance, and reception of public art in Cairo, and utilizes this as a diagnostic of the political and social changes taking place in the country at large.

Art as a diagnostic of change is particularly fruitful considering the current tumultuous and seemingly confusing political period in Egypt. Since the downfall of former President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the country has been run by three different governments: The Supreme Council of the Armed forces, The Muslim Brotherhood, a transition government which is again was backed by the Armed Forces and now the presidency of former general Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. During this period, the Egyptian art world has taken a leading role in challenging these different governments and their policies. These artistic events have served as a magnet of social interaction for different segments of society: the general public, political organizations, and state entities.
In this article, I argue public art in urban spaces and the interactions that it gives rise to can be a diagnostic of the shifts occurring in society and their consequences. Methodologically, using art as a diagnostic intervenes in debates over the political efficacy of art and whether it is truly accessible for all (Miles, 1997; Ranciere, 2010). This article is based on fieldwork conducted from 2011 through 2013 in the form of interviews with artists and observations of different public art events as well as Egyptian and international news reports. The cases presented in this article were selected because they generated a large amount of publicity in local and international media outlets with regard to their artistic activities. Artists were approached during observations at protests, sit-ins, and advertised public events.

**Life in the city**

Cairo is a massive city with a population that as of 2006 consisted of approximately 6 million people (CAPMAS). Cairo is often described as a city on the brink of implosion due to overpopulation, government neglect, diminishing public services, and a growing subset of the population in poverty (Amar & Singerman, 2009; Osman, 2010). Public space in Cairo has been significantly shaped by the state of emergency rule in Egypt from 1981 to 2012.

During the emergency rule, political gatherings and public demonstrations could only be conducted with the permission of government officials, and civilians have been subject to police harassment and torture. Arrest and detention under emergency law are also unpredictable, leading to a breakdown in civilian confidence for engaging in public activities, particularly in terms of providing forms of mutual aid (Golia, 2004). In addition to the impacts of emergency law, life in Cairo is marked by surreptitious forms
of discrimination against the disabled, those who wear religious attire, and against individuals who appear to be of a lower class (El Meshad, 2012). The stress of emergency law in conjunction with rising poverty and discrimination has shaped unequal feelings of ownership over the spaces of the city. Yet, while a large number of Cairenes at the margins of urban society struggle with poverty and social exclusion (Raymond, 2000), higher income Egyptians live in another Cairo, dotted with upscale coffee shops, private international schools, and Western styled shopping outlets (de Koning, 2009; Peterson, 2011). The patrons of these spaces navigate urban space by avoiding areas of visible poverty—making daily decisions about their mobility practices in order to publicly reinforce their social standing (de Koning, 2009).

In contrast to the image of Cairo as a city on the brink or a city riven by static inequality, there is another narrative that portrays the city as being full of possibility, a place where ordinary people dramatically challenge urban planning, become competent and successful political actors, address their own needs, and even successfully topple governmental regimes (Bayat, 2009; Sims, 2010; Singerman, 1996). Ingenuity and imagination play an important, if sometimes silent role within the machinations of daily life. Life in the city, despite all of it problems, is more than mere survival. Art and various artists working in the city help to contribute other stories about urban life and provide detailed glimpses into the dynamic changes taking place.

**Art and urban space**

Can art be a diagnostic of the pressing challenges and tensions that face a society? What special analysis does art bring? Art can be a diagnostic because it is through the cultural field that we come to understand the social nuances that animate politics and vice
versa. Culture and politics are embedded within one another. Through the use of public space, these nuances become visible, creating a field or site through which they may be contested and debated. These openings present opportunities for grappling with the messages conveyed through art and ultimately with politics.

The broadest definition of public art is anything outside of the formal spaces of a gallery or museum, but this definition is not uncontested. Miles (1997) suggests that there are a series of contradictions and questions within the idea and definition of public art: Does site alone guarantee the publicness of art? Who is the public? And to be ‘public,’ does an artwork require the participation and input of the public, which it hopes to address? Moreover, does publicness imply that the work is intellectually and socially accessible for all? For my purposes here, I turn to the work of Doreen Massey and Gillian Rose who argue that it is the coming together of difference and interactions that mark a work as public. Through public art, there is the possibility to facilitate the meeting of individuals from different backgrounds. It is through these interactions that political ideas and notions of what is and is not appropriate are debated and subsequently shape places and the relationships that compose them (Massey & Rose, 2003: 19). In other words, a statue located in a wood that no one visits would not qualify as public art.

Within the context of Egypt, debates and interactions around public art can provide significant information on the changing social and political relationships taking place in urban space. It is now a trend within the arts to operate outside of formal channels and traditional spaces such as museums and galleries in order to display work to broader audiences. These projects have been both individualistic and community based addressing a range of issues from beautification to tackling political and social concerns.
A notable example is the 2009 shoe sculpture by Iraqi artist Laith Al-Amiri. Al-Amiri, with the help of war orphans, constructed for an orphanage complex in Tikrit a fiber glass and copper shoe sculpture to honor the Iraqi journalist Muntazer al-Zaidi. Al Zaidi became famous for throwing his shoes at George W. Bush during a speech in Iraq (‘Shoe throwing monument,’ 2009). In this vein, it has been suggested that art can help transform public spaces, transform the relationships between the individuals who inhabit that space, and subsequently transform politics. Scholars and planners have written that art can rejuvenate neighborhoods, attract tourists, help in the formation of imagined communities, help build bonds across social divides, address social ills, and contribute to the healing process after traumatic events (Minty, 2006; Sharp, Pollock, & Paddison, 2005; Till, 2005; Zebracki, Van Der Vaart, & Van Aalst, 2010). Yet at the same time, over the last decade, some have raised questions regarding public art’s impact on politics and whether art can have any significant societal effect (Beyes, 2010; Peteet, 1996; Pinder, 2008). Theorist Jacques Ranciere has argued that art has become weighted with too many expectations of its efficacy, that there is an assumption that art can change politics because it critiques or mocks unequal power relations, and that in its content it can urge viewers into action (Ranciere, 2010). For Ranciere, art becomes political when it disturbs what is sensible and commonplace, bringing to the fore what was once unthought and unrealized. With the disturbance of the sensible, what was once unspeakable enters language and the realm of possibility. More simply, critical or thoughtful art does not in itself make or effect political change. It is likely that most art created for and operating in public space will not, on its own, have a direct impact on the social and political environments in which it is located. However, art in public does have the ability to affect
unsuspecting individuals and bring them into communication with others regarding the message and purposes of the piece. Art presents the possibility of an impromptu public forum for the exploration of thoughts and ideas concerning pertinent cultural and political issues. Additionally, these encounters hold the potential to disturb what is sensible and reorient previously held perspectives. These encounters are further encouraged by the fact that art in public, especially in urban space, becomes an unavoidable spectacle, confronting individuals as they move through the city.

The potential of art to be a diagnostic of social issues and change rests on the degree to which it is public or engages with publicness. The publicness of an artwork is typically reliant in part on its visibility, openness, and the type of interactions that it engenders. However, writing on the question of politics and public space, Rosalyn Deutsche cautions readers against defining what ‘public’ means and in believing that it is inherently open and free for all. For Deutsche and the democratic theorists upon whom she draws, discussions and celebrations of the public have in fact actually crippled the potential of public space by enforcing set definitions and parameters. As opposed to being a defined entity, public space has always been marked by questions and contestations that seek to fix its meanings. Having art in public does not necessarily define a space as democratic and open for all. There is no stable answer to what public space is; in fact, attempts to define it threaten the very existence of such a space. From this perspective, public space and contestations over its meaning are intimately linked with the practice of politics (in all of its messy forms) and by extension with the practice and making of democracy. Deutsche takes this line of thought further to demonstrate that, just as a ‘public’ is constructed through debates and appropriations, subjects (whether
they are general audience members, artists, planners, or others) are also constructed in relationship to each other and to the work or scene being apprehended. ‘In these respects, the term public implies that viewers and images are socially constructed, that meaning is public, not private ...It describes a space in the meanings of images and the identities of subjects are radically open, contingent, and incomplete’ (Deutsche, 1996: 303). This definition challenges the mainstream idea of public and private, breaking down the idea of one ‘public’ in exchange for a consideration of multiple and emergent publics. Art in the spaces of the city, on streets, sidewalks, walls, both mobile and immobile, can highlight the forms of meaning making that define and redefine publicness, audiences, and the role of art.

Besides issues concerning the efficacy of their art, artists in Egypt must grapple with the question of what it means to be an artist within the national Egyptian context. Anthropologist Winegar (2008) has noted that Egyptian artists operate within a field in which western secular values and westernized stereotypes of an artist hold sway. In this vision, art and artists are supposed to be fiercely independent, disconnected from formal political activities, and naturally talented. This view of artistic development is divorced from the context of Egypt and the traditional position of the arts within the process of nation building. The Egyptian Nahda (Cultural Revolution) of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was in part designed to bring ideals of the enlightenment and modernity to Egyptian society through the arts, a trend that continued throughout the Mubarak regime. This practice was utilized by the state to project the image of a modern Egypt, leading to the heavy and sometimes contradictory involvement of the state within cultural production and vice versa, with many Egyptian artists accepting roles within the
An important figure suturing the relationship between the arts and government in Egypt is the Minister of Culture. This position is usually held by an artist or someone closely linked to the art world. This post not only advocates for art within the Egyptian state but also censors works of art published in Egypt. However, the Minister of Culture position should not be read simply as a government enforcer. For example, Moneim El Sawy, Minister of Culture under President Anwar El-Sadat, served Sadat while simultaneously disliking the policies of both Sadat and President Gamal Abd El Nasser (Interview with Mohamed El Sawy 2010). Further, the El Sawy Cultural Wheel, a popular and widely respected cultural institution within government and social circles in Egypt run by former Minister of Culture, Mohamed El Sawy, showed early support for the Egyptian revolution. This act positioned the institution on treacherous political terrain until Mubarak stepped down. Despite the interlinked relationship between the arts and government in Egypt, artists and the works they create do not mindlessly reproduce or support the state. Accordingly, the increasing use of public art in Egypt should be understood within the context of the Egyptian art world since the late nineteenth century.

The scope of government involvement within the Egyptian arts scene has meant that censorship and intimidation are ever-present realities. The intimidation and outright prohibition of certain forms of artistic work has led to artists who censor their own work before allowing it to go public. Literary critic and scholar, Samia Mehrez (2010) shares part of the testimony of writer and publisher Hamdi Abu Golayyel:

"Given the number of prohibitions and my inability to determine them I have resorted to a legal adviser, a young lawyer who is my neighbor. He reads every story I write and every book I publish especially when written by a naive writer. My agony begins as soon as the book enters the..."
Egyptian artists are increasingly seeking outlets that provide cover from the control of the state, and the rise of public art has become one of the outlets to provide artists with a temporary reprieve. Instead of relying on governmental channels for publicity and publishing, the interventions of artists in urban space since 25 January are immediate.

A live performance or a work of graffiti occurs instantly, leaving no time for censors to block its reception by the public or to interpret its meaning without public debate. Public art has the ability to be anonymous and simultaneously to deliver a message. The use of the Internet to map and document these performative bursts signifies the state’s growing inability, especially in a post-25 January atmosphere, to completely censor ideas and images assumed to be a threat to Egyptian society. As noted by Mehrez (2010), censorship previously worked both to preserve Egypt’s modern image and to appease conservative concerns about the content of cultural products. However, censorship was also carried out primarily by an authoritarian state keen to control intellectuals and all opposition movements. Public space in Egypt is being reimagined as a site that provides artistic freedom and as a site where the relationship between artistic works, audiences, and the government can develop in a visible and direct manner. This is in distinction to the hidden hand of censors that capture and transform works of art quietly within the halls of government before the public sees them. The increasing public visibility of art in Egypt (state approved or not) and challenges to the idea of public space indicate that art and urban spaces will be a critical battleground in the struggle for Egypt’s future. In the remainder of this paper, I provide a window into the dynamics of
public art in Cairo during a particular moment, the tumultuous period between 2011, when the Mubarak regime fell, and 2013, when the military ousted President Morsi.

**Paint and Chaos in Cairo**

During the January 2011 uprisings and after, artists claimed the walls of downtown, especially Tahrir Square with scribbles, graffiti, and eventually murals. In response, during the summer of 2011, soldiers under the rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) painted over the walls with white paint. It was a clear attempt to bring a sense of order back to downtown, as if the essence of chaos existed in the actual spray-painted images and words that adorned downtown walls. In turn, artists, both professional and amateur, came back and painted new images. Artists producing work for public space were clearly contemplating and entertaining the tension between disorder and order in their attempts to claim space, mirroring the larger societal struggle that was unfolding as Egyptians attempted to solve problems that have festered over the last 30 years. In the back and forth process between artists and the security forces over the painted walls, it became clear that the experiments of artists and state officials to capture and control space were diagnostic of the tension between definitions of order and disorder.

These actions lead to a set of vexing questions such as who gets to define what is public, what is allowable in public, and more importantly, what kind of politics is possible in a post-2011 Egypt. These questions carried and continue to carry a fresh sense of urgency in a country trying to free itself from authoritarianism.

Undeniably, the most dominant narrative coming out of Egypt since the 25 January uprising is the narrative of chaos and the need to get it under control. In the year
before the disposal of Mohammad Morsi, there were almost daily protests, strikes, overwhelming pollution, an epidemic of sexual harassment, and a seemingly uncontrollable traffic scene.

Take for example the statements of former development minister Ahmed Zaki Abdin on the failed efforts to implement nationwide electricity curfews:

> You can’t have people staying up all night in cafes. People should be going to bed early so they can do their work ... We can’t just keep on doing whatever we want whenever we want... We’re passing through tough circumstances... We have problems everywhere, strikes, unrest, demands. (El-Deeb & Keath 2012)

Now, under the government of El Sisi, discourses on order and chaos have escalated into a ‘War on Terror’. Ironically, these changes have achieved what the Morsi government could not – control over space and public manifestations of dissent.

In the following, I compare two examples that demonstrate how public art and its attendant interactions provide a window into the issues that animate the current political moment in Egypt. The first example is of the Mohammed Mahmoud Street Mural in downtown Cairo, where the artists and their artistic activities seem to thrive by actively playing with key definitions that structure methods of governance: public and private and order and disorder. The second example is the recent gallery show of graffiti artist Ganzeer where he attempts to infect the space of a gallery with the ‘chaos’ of street art. I include this example because it highlights questions of publicness – the visibility of art and its ability to engender diverse interactions, to reproduce and remake public space with new definitions and parameters – which Malcolm Miles and Rosalyn Deutsche discuss. Further, both of these examples are diagnostic of the political stakes involved for those who consider it a priority to claim the spaces of the city.
Street art and political possibilities

Mohammed Mahmoud Street is one of the streets that radiate from Tahrir Square. The street is shared by the American University in Cairo (AUC), Lycee Al-Horreya bab-allouk, a now closed Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant, and a McDonalds. This street was an un-extraordinary street until it became the site of a series of clashes after the revolution that resulted in the injuries and deaths of several protesters. These tragedies were followed by the Port Said football massacre in February 2012 in which scores of victims were trapped in a football stadium and killed with little intervention from security forces. On the side of the street that houses AUC, there is a large wall that encloses the campus, which has become the site of a large, impromptu and constantly changing mural. On this wall, artists have painted scenes of mourning from Egypt’s pharonic past, the names and faces of martyrs who were killed, Quranic verses, critiques of politicians, and commentary on events happening in the Middle East and North Africa region. The artists took on the mural project for various individual reasons that reflected a common need to mourn those who died and to comment on the ongoing difficulties that Egyptians face. Although the artists themselves created this mural without the cooperation or permission of AUC, the university now finds itself in the murky zone between order and disorder. AUC has taken confusing stances toward the mural: there are media reports that document the times in which AUC has failed to stop city officials who painted over portions of the work (El-Din, 2012), but at the same time, faculty members have celebrated the mural in their lectures and projects and the university has made attempts to preserve it (Abaza, 2012, 2013).
In a lecture hosted by AUC in 2012, the artists behind the mural conveyed through their comments that there was no single catalyst or reason for wanting to create a mural. Each person had a different perspective and reason for their actions. This lack of a direct purpose could be explained by the fact that, for the various artists, the mural is a form of protest, not simply an art project (Mousa, 2013). Through my observations, I have seen how the wall has become a permanent artist studio and a canvas: artists return and paint over old images, creating new ones that respond to current political realities. This makes preservation attempts difficult, except by photographically archiving past images. The wall is now a landmark and it is not uncommon to see tourists, students, and young people taking photos and hanging out in front of the mural.

Almost despite itself, it has taken on markers of formality by becoming a site for commemoration, fun, artistic collaboration and tourism, even as its continual existence is only guaranteed by the extent to which the artists, the public, and AUC will fight to keep it. Thus, the mural exists both as a symbol of disorder and as a semi-formal, publicly evolving artwork. For the artists of Mohammed Mahmoud Street and those who support their ongoing creativity, there is now a strong coalition vehement about protecting the wall in remembrance of what has passed in Egypt since 2011. Yet, they also know that nothing is guaranteed. So, they taunt the police and the government with their creations, paint over their own work, chat or argue about politics with passers-by, or paint – because they have something to say or because they just want to paint. The artists have placed themselves within the blurry border between order and disorder. They utilize space not as something to be permanently captured or demarcated, but as a medium to convey their solidarities, opinions, and emotions. It is because the wall can never be
completely appropriated, either by the artists or the police, that the mural of Mohammed Mahmoud Street thrives and has become a major landmark.

Yet, a notable feature of the wall is what is absent, namely the viewpoints of those who support Islamist politics, specifically the democratically elected Mohammad Morsi and his party the Muslim Brotherhood. As much as the muralists defy the definitions of order and disorder, they are clear on the type of politics that they desire and have been successful in claiming a space through which to express their opinions. When Islamist political figures appear on the wall, it is usually in a critical, mocking fashion (Mousa, 2013) or in a way that characterizes Islamists as authoritarian. This seeming refusal to allow a place for Islamic politics is indicative of the uneven topography of the city, which is spatially differentiated by the various degrees to which certain places are open to difference, debate, and dialogue. Cairo is in the midst of an ideological carving up of city space in which various political groups have attempted to seize sections of the city in order to make place for their political view. For example, after the removal of former President Mohammad Morsi, his supporters set up sit-ins in two sections of the city: the environs of Cairo University and Nasr City. It was widely reported that torture and intimidation were used against outsiders who were in proximity to the sit-in camps or who visited to learn more about the demands and the conditions of the protesters (‘Bodies of 11 Torture,’ 2013; Mohammad, 2013). In this case, the political dynamics of the Mohammad Mahmoud street mural highlight the crucial political problem of dialogue in the public sphere. The entrenchment of particular viewpoints in city space has increasingly grown into a desperate situation wherein those who feel excluded from representation may turn to more violent means in order to be seen and heard. In this
context, Tahrir can be seen as the domain of one group representing liberals, secularists, and those generally against the governments of Mubarak, the SCAF, and Morsi, while the area surrounding Cairo University and within Nasr city becomes a center for Islamist political activity and representation.

**Where is the public?**

In contrast to the interactions between the artists, the art and the public on Mohammad Mahmoud Street, the artist Ganzeer toyed with the idea of street art and its political efficacy in his gallery exhibition ‘The virus is spreading’ (2012). Along with other Cairene graffiti artists, Ganzeer (which means bike chain in Arabic) rose to international prominence after the revolution. He was part of the trend that rapidly metamorphosed the city’s walls into bright and colorful commentary on the country’s transformation. In Ganzeer’s gallery show, the overall theme is the movement or spread of the graffiti and ‘chaos’ of the streets to other spaces, in this case the formal space of an art gallery. During the exhibition, the first floor was transformed into a street-like area that was layered with random drawings, pieces of paper and bright yellow ‘do not enter’ tape that crisscrossed the walls. Although Ganzeer received sole billing for the event, it was actually a collaborative project drawing in graffiti artists such as Sad Panda, El Teneen, and others (Kashef, 2012). On the flyer of the show is the title with a background image suggesting both a post-apocalyptic scenario and the death of authoritarianism (note in Figure 8 the small image on the trash can of a pharaoh who is about to be bitten or choked by a large snake).
Graffiti has traditionally been understood as any work of art applied to any space where it is not requested or wanted. Undoubtedly, its global popularity is due to its anti-authoritarian application techniques, its accessibility to individuals of different economic means and artistic skills, and its capacity to publicize a message to a broad spectrum of individuals who happen to pass by it. A tag, a message, or an image painted on a visible surface within a heavily trafficked space is simply unavoidable, forcing the viewer to deal with its presence. And indeed, viewers must reckon with graffiti – whether it is to stop and look or to ignore the image, relegating it to background scenery. Graffiti and graffiti artists force their unsuspecting audience into ethical and aesthetic questions and decisions, leaving them to cope with the affective repercussions.

Unsurprisingly, graffiti has been used broadly for a number of social issues around the world. Since 2011, it has become a prominent feature of streetscapes in Cairo.
Comparatively, graffiti was minimal in the city before the fall of Hosni Mubarak. However, after his fall, it spread rapidly throughout the city and became an internationally noted phenomenon. Artists have coated sections of the city in graffiti that mostly offers political commentary or comical critiques of the mundane. The desire to take walls in the city and coat them with graffiti can be seen in part as a response to the years of social and artistic restriction under authoritarianism. In an interview with Ganzeer in the summer of 2011, he describes the practices through which urban space was understood before the revolution:

“[T]his city never felt like a place that you would hang out in as much as it’s a place you temporarily exists in, to move from one place to another place – so from your house to your work or from your house to the coffee shop there is always a place that you go to but very rarely do you just go and sit and I don’t know, whatever... it seemed like everything was owned by someone, so the kiosk is owned by the kiosk owner who sells the stuff and the coffee shop is owned by the coffee shop guy... so all these places you go to, and even if you go to a park, what’s supposed to be a public park, it’s owned by the government, everything is owned by somebody and your just like, whenever you use it, you get permission from the kiosk guy to hang out... it’s an understanding that he lets you hang around his kiosk if you’re drinking his soda.”
Figure 5.9 Mohammad Mahmoud Street.

Here, pre-revolution Cairo is cast as a city where inhabitants are alienated from forms of participation within the built environment, except through modes of mobility from one place to another. Grids of property ownership and police surveillance made just ‘hanging out’ a difficulty unless one secured permission from kiosk owners or by paying an entrance fee to enter public parks.

In this place-based and historical context, graffiti has been intimately tied with inhabiting the city in creative ways. Yet, as discussed by Geographer Tim Cresswell (1996), graffiti art also has a tradition of being linked with the spread of disease and what is aesthetically displeasing. At the root of these discussions lies complex power dynamics: Whose space is being appropriated and what tastes decide if a piece of graffiti is visually pleasing or not? In the context of Cairo, graffiti can be seen as an affront to the restrictions of emergency rule. It is part of a larger political and social project to redefine how the spaces of the city and daily life are lived and performed in an attempt to prevent the authoritarianism that has plagued Egypt from returning.

It is with this background that Ganzeer’s exhibit can be scrutinized. On one level, the movement of Ganzeer’s work from the street to the gallery is not a sign of ‘selling out’ or, as Cresswell (1996) argues, graffiti being put in its ‘proper place,’ but rather can be seen as part of an ethos in which occupying space is now strongly identified with countering state abuse and the restriction of rights. I understand ‘virus’ here as the movement of an organized yet disruptive force; the place of the gallery is not strictly understood as a gallery. Rather, it takes on symbolic dimensions, representing an escalation in political technique such that the political actions and movements of the
street that shook the country’s structure of government can rise beyond ‘the streets’ and can move into other places and institutions of daily activity, ‘infecting’ these locations with the fervor that the 25 January uprisings unleashed.

Figure 5.10 Ganzeer presents: the virus is spreading.

Second, it challenges the divisions between public and private and attempts to disturb the subjectivities of the gallery’s audience. If the chaos of the streets can move into a gallery, what then differentiates the two spaces? What differentiates their audiences? Here, Ganzeer actively challenged assumptions of order, stability, and chaos, mirroring the determination of many who continued to sit-in, strike, protest, and stay up late, despite calls for regulatory structures. Through this method, Ganzeer and the artists who worked with him can be seen as trying to address and create what Fraser (1995) has termed a counter-public through their gallery show as they challenge definitions of order and graffiti and innovate upon previously held techniques of protest. On another level, the significance and limits of place, and specifically urban space, are being taken for granted. The power of graffiti, and public art more generally, that resides in its capacity
to force people to grapple with it and which encourages diverse social interaction is largely missing in the space of the gallery. When I visited Ganzeer’s show, I was the only person in the gallery at the time. Instead of the virus spreading, the virus seemed as though it was neatly contained within the four walls of the gallery space. Like all shows that visit the gallery, it would be taken down after a month or so and neatly replaced with another show as if it never existed. Here, the mistake is in believing that, by simply taking over a gallery space, the ethos of graffiti art, its sense of ‘chaos’ and antiauthoritarian activism, can be moved from streets and the open spaces of the city into other spaces such as a gallery. It suggests that differences such as structure, atmosphere, history, interactions, unspoken assumptions, and rules do not exist for different places and therefore that all spaces are equal and unchanging. In contrast to the necessity of moving through streets and squares, there is nothing to bring someone through the doors of a gallery except personal interests. There is something intrinsic in the relationship between art and its location in public: the challenges, surprises, and interactions that a city street can bring do not transfer to a gallery space.

The success of Ganzeer’s show relies on a denial of difference. Relatedly, there is an overwhelming reliance on the idea of unity or sameness, and consequently a fear of difference or disunity within Egyptian political life. It is an idea that extends from considerations of space to considerations of political subjects. Although this is not exclusive to Egypt, it is a strong feature of political protest and action. Slogans such as ‘The military and the people are one hand’ and ‘The people want the fall of the regime’ as well as massive protests which unite swaths of the population behind a set of commonly shared demands are significant features of Egyptian public life. Yet, in this
reliance on unity, difference is elided, and this elision subsequently threatens political goals. For example, despite the widespread popularity and reverence of January 2011, there are now growing questions about for whom the revolution was waged, as a group of low-income correspondents bluntly stated in the early summer of 2013:

Sunaa: Ms., the People who went to the revolution are the rich not needy
Rehab: We paid for it
Salma: Yes we did
(focus group 6/14/2013)

Class was not the only difference ignored. In the months following January 25th, the graffiti artists covered by popular media were predominantly male (El Shimi, Gutierrez, Hassoun & Roda, 2012; Viney, 2011; Wood 2011). The dominance of male graffiti artists is but one diagnostic of the differing levels of perceived ownership of public space between men and women. It is also illustrative of a bias in media coverage against women graffiti artists. However, the absence of discussions about women and their role in public space spurred a group of artists (men and women) to initiate a campaign called NooNeswa that painted famous popular female stars from the fifties and sixties on city walls. The purpose of NooNeswa was to bring attention to women’s discomfort in Cairo’s public spaces due to violence and harassment and the gender inequalities that exist therein (Fecteau, 2012). Additionally, much of the artwork being covered in the press or in blogs has English and western cultural references. In the blog ‘Suzee in the City,’ (Morayef, 2011) an entry called ‘Cairo Graffiti for whom exactly?’ points out this fact and brings the issue of class into stark relief:

Stop taking photographs of this, go to a museum,” he mutters as he walks past me. I’m standing in front of the American University in Cairo’s library wall, photographing a graffiti piece depicting video game characters Ryu and Mr. Bison, the latter wearing a Tantawi face that has been neatly slashed with red paint. I look at his dark, unwashed face. Six months ago, I would have ignored his comments as the usual banter I get from a street kid trying to hawk tissue papers
or spew rough, crude sexual commentary. Yes, I’m quick to judge like that; but so are you. Things have changed, and I understand now that Mohamed Mahmoud Street is his as much as it is mine ... He shrugs and stares at the graffiti with a frown. He may have never played a videogame in his life or watched any of the Street Fighter cartoons. He was probably part of Egypt’s booming child labour force while cushy comfortable middle-class Egyptians like me sat lazily in front of the TV.

Here, perceptions of art reveal class divisions and issues of ownership over public space.

In a similar fashion, Ganzeer’s gallery exhibit where he attempts to bring the power of public art (here graffiti) into the gallery excludes a large portion of the urban population who may feel unwelcome within the spaces of a gallery in an upscale section of Cairo.

Art that engages with degrees of publicness does not automatically engender equal opportunities for understanding and debate in the public sphere. Despite art’s public presence within the city, it can signify realms of experience and knowledge closed off to many of the city’s inhabitants, producing new feelings of estrangement and alienation within the urban landscape and possibly feelings of exclusion from participation in the making of a new political future.

**Interactions and political fragility**

Educating and exposing fellow Egyptians to various political trends and ideologies is one of the traditional roles of Egyptian artists. When artist Mohammed Abla speaks of his activities within Tahrir square during January 2011, he speaks directly to his perceived role as an educator:

I recognized in the square, there are many people that came, families with children and mothers, and so there were many people ... many artists, many intellectuals who wanted to talk with people about the situation, about the future and it was a way for me to attract adults, to talk with adults through involving the children. So we created this area for children to draw and then the parents are out of the circle watching and then we start to talk with the parents. So it was a way to use art for another message and in the meantime it was also for the children, for them to express themselves through drawings and paintings and it was very interesting the ideas they expressed. It was kind of a performance. It had multiple purposes, for the children, the parents and for us to express ideas to organize them, because we were still in the square, we didn’t know what was going to happen. So we have to prepare people for what’s coming...
For Abla, the role of an artist is an intellectual cum educator with a responsibility to engage in pertinent political battles and actively educate and organize others about the best courses of action. This section will focus on interactive public art spaces, the ‘Museum of the Revolution’ and El Fann-Midan (Art is Square), in order to explore what it means to create spaces that are both educational and artistic. I contend that in utilizing public space, the interventions highlighted below sought to safeguard the revolution and particular political ideals. The arts were used as a channel for education and political mobilization. These interactions, and their content, provide a diagnostic of current national challenges and troubling unspoken trends that have implications for continued political transformation and notions of the public sphere.

**Protecting the revolution**

The ‘Museum of the Revolution’ appeared within Tahrir Square during the winter of 2012. In December of that year, there were massive protests against the constitutional declarations of President Morsi to give himself additional political powers that would protect him from legislative challenges. Tahrir was an obvious nodal point for these protests, wherein opposition groups initiated a sit-in on the square. In contrast to the movement of street art into gallery spaces, protesters created a ‘Museum of the Revolution’ on the square. The Museum was located within a large tent with walls made of plastic sheeting. On the walls were protest signs, pictures, drawings, and jokes created by protesters and collected by the museum’s organizers. It presented both an affective and educational attempt to inspire and shape emotions and solidarities.

Sitting at a small table within the museum were two middle-aged men who were the organizers of the museum. When asked why this project was important, they stated
that they were ‘certain the government [would] corrupt the revolution’ and that the museum was there to ensure otherwise. They also expressed their hope that the museum would unify the public; as one organizer said, ‘I believe that people will be unified in feeling from this place and that it gives the opportunity for advancement, to create new chances and new understandings.’ In addition to the Museum on the Square, another one was constructed in front of the President’s house in Heliopolis – another site for the massive protests of opposition groups.

Its audience was not entirely receptive to the museum’s attempted message. The views of spectators were mixed on the purpose of the museum. For one spectator, the Museum was a great idea because it served as a reminder of ‘what should have come to pass but did not.’ Yet, there were others who felt otherwise. Two young men whom I interviewed within the museum commented, “This is a waste of time, the President was elected. Whatever he says, we should listen.” Here, there is chafing at the notion that Morsi and, by extension, the Muslim Brotherhood somehow does not represent a positive aspect of the 2011 uprisings. As his proponents proclaim, he was elected in the first open and democratic elections that took place in Egypt and this achievement should be considered a success. Despite this fact, the museum presents a sense of nostalgia and disappointment that comes to serve as a portmanteau for all of the perceived failures, setbacks, and nonchanges that have occurred since January 2011.

Despite the differences in audience viewpoints, it is clear that the interventions of Abla and the museum have created open and public forums to discuss political issues and explore differences. Abla’s interventions in Tahrir Square as well as the building of the Museum of the Revolution took the space of the square and created events that
communicated the fears of their creators as well as symbols of freedom and life without authoritarian rule. It is an attempt to embed political viewpoints within space, and perhaps in doing so it is an attempt to make these narratives more concrete and true (Rose 2007).

This is no less true for the monthly art festival, Al-Fann Midan (Art is Square). Al-Fann Midan is a concept that came together after the revolution to showcase poetry, music, and art in public spaces throughout Egypt. Its purpose is to pursue and create art that is not censored by governing authorities, to preserve the ethos of 25 January, and to spread knowledge of the arts to the widest possible audience. According to one of the organizers, Basma El-Hussieny, El Fann Midan is an initiative by the Independent Culture Coalition in which we use public areas on the street and transform them into art and culture sites and anyone can attend. Admission is free, without a dress code and without being stopped by some security person asking where are they going, so that we can eventually bring art back to Egyptian daily life (Images of Freedom, 2012). The festival took place the first Saturday of every month in front of Abdeen Palace, located in downtown Cairo. The festival operated with the strong belief that freedom of expression should be completely free of all forms of censorship.

In contrast to the usual festive atmosphere, however, the first show of 2013 was a somber occasion. The day 5 January 2013 marked the 40th day since the death of ‘Gika,’ a politically active youth of the April 6 movement who was killed by officers on Mohammed Mahmoud Street. Ironically, he was killed during the commemoration of the Mohammed Mahmoud Street Martyrs who were killed the year before during clashes with security forces. Instead of lively music performances, there were Quranic
recitations, angry speeches from the family members of the martyrs, poetry and videos of the dead, mixed with pointed critiques of the Muslim Brothers and their perceived attempts at using religion to divide Egyptians. In fact, the issue of censorship and religion in politics were the two most prominent themes of the evening. The makeshift walls surrounding the square were adorned with the drawings of newspaper cartoonist Doaa al-Adl. Al-Adl, whose drawings have been critical of the current government, had been officially reprimanded for her drawings, which were said to insult religion. On another wall, there were a series of drawings that pointedly commented on how the country’s Islamists were allegedly using lies and religion for political gain. In contrast to Islamist forces, who have advocated for the strong presence of religion within legislation and decision making, many opposition groups argue that religion should be disconnected from politics. This stance presents an image of Islam as something that can be compartmentalized and, in a sense, censored from the issues and concerns that impact daily life (except in the case of death).

This standoff over the place of religion also erupted in the drafting of the new constitution where opposition and minority groups were worried about the several vaguely worded amendments to the document that left the question of basic rights to be decided in the future through parliament and courts of law. Sonali Pahwa and Jessica Winegar have argued that government authorities, artists, and political figures in the post-revolution atmosphere must adjust ‘for the fact that Egyptians draw cultural references from religious texts, Muslim and Christian, no less than from European artistic traditions’ (Pahwa and Winegar 2012). Religion is crucial element in the daily lives, decisions, and behaviors of citizens and, according to some, cannot be divided from politics.
The story of public performances in Cairo is not only a diagnostic of the precarious place of debate and dialogue in Egyptian society. It is also symptomatic of contradictory stances that can threaten some of the popularly articulated goals of the revolution. Undoubtedly, the Egyptian art scene has been in the midst of a space craze since January 25. Since the ouster of Mubarak, urban space became the de rigueur place to be, to claim, to sit-in – and rightfully so, given that the control of space is also indicative of political and governmental power. However, despite these tactics, artists have remained entrenched in their traditional role as prime educators and enlighteners of the masses. In line with the arguments of Pahwa and Winegar (2012), this tactic, patriarchal in its form despite the best of intentions, replicates the paternalistic ideologies held by the government under previous rulers. This educational role also continues to make artists in Egypt direct targets for intimidation, manipulation, and control, just as they were in the Mubarak era. By failing to interrogate and transform their roles vis-a-vis their intended audience and their linkages with the old regime, they continue to limit the political possibilities that can result from new forms of engagement. Most importantly, these tactics show a distrust of the decision-making skills of the masses. It betrays the suspicion that, if left alone, ordinary Egyptians may make unwise decisions for themselves and the country. Indeed, distrust of what citizens may do and the resulting threats to political and elite power have fuelled the various periods of emergency rule in Egypt, whether under Mubarak or the new transitional regime.

These moments in which artists use the urban landscape to project and solidify their aims underscore what geographer Mitch Rose has called the politics of landscape: a ‘story of power attempting to actualize’ (Rose, 2007: 462). However, even when art aims
to communicate political commentary or encourage particular forms of engagement with urban spaces, there is always the possibility that the outcome will be unintended, that the message will not be received, or that it is understood in an entirely different way.

Tellingly, one audience member at Al-Fann Midan, when asked about how she felt about the message of the speakers who had spoken on stage and the current political situation, responded, ‘I am confused. Each side speaks as if they are right. And there are many people like me within the country.’ Her comments are representative of widespread feelings of confusion about the divisions being made through religion and the acrimonious divisions between Islamist and opposition figures. If politics and democracy are built upon dialogue, disagreement, debates, battles, strikes, and demonstrations, then the emotional fallout of fatigue, confusion, and even irritation must be one of democracy’s primary features. The weariness of Egyptians was evident in the low-voter turnout for the constitutional referendum, where only 31.62% of over 51 million eligible voters turned out to vote (‘Unofficial count sees Egypt Constitution,’ 2012).

Further, the growing divisions – and, increasingly attendant violence – are threatening the very use of urban space that has blossomed since the revolution. For example, HALA is a 25-member troupe of actors who create street performances. Members are diverse in their political outlook; the group encompasses leftists, liberals, and Islamists, and in addition to participating in the troupe, all the members are linked with multiple political parties. When I asked one of the troupe members why it was important to have public performances and what street theatre contributed to the on-going political transformations, my respondent replied that the purpose was simply ‘to be happy, to make people happy, and say the opinions of people in a sarcastic way opposing
the regime.’ However, around the time of the interview, the troupe had to move their performances into a theatre space because troupe members deemed it unsafe to perform on the streets. Further, when discussing performance ideas, my informant noted that members try to avoid overt ideological topics that may cause difficulty within the group and between the performers and their audiences. HALA’s decision to move their show indoors demonstrates a fear that civilians will attack and harm them for their satirical performances. The reticence to perform in public and to openly discuss different political and ideological viewpoints amongst themselves echoes forms of self-censorship that happened during the rule of Mubarak and simultaneously a broader fundamental issue of censorship and violence that plagues Egypt’s current transition period. Indeed, this violence is not simply directed from the governing authorities to the population; civilians increasingly inflict it upon each other (Sharnoubi et al., 2013).

Conclusion
This paper has sought to demonstrate how art can serve as a diagnostic of societal transformations and conflict. The interactions between the artists, artworks, the audience, and public space reveal challenges that Egyptians must bear and grapple with as they move forward. Here, urban space is not incidental to these processes, but rather is a key factor in uncovering and exploring the changes that have taken place since January 2011.

Most often, art is unable to significantly alter or transform politics, but when art uses and engages public space, it has the potential to engender interaction and debate within the public sphere. Public art can also bring to the fore social dynamics that have been overlooked or unrealized. While the meanings and messages behind various art works that occupy public space may not be equally accessible to all, art in city spaces casts a wide net, drawing in diverse individuals who then must contend with the work.
When this happens, these moments lead to a reconfiguration of political subjectivities that may directly challenge the premises of political debate.

Using art as a diagnostic is not simply to read the messages of artistic works or to indicate whether the political situation is getting better or worse. Instead, art as a diagnostic becomes a tool to understand the complex social relationships that shape the politics of an era. In the context of Egypt, this method is particularly fitting due to the long interrelationship between government, the arts, and the Egyptian public. The explosion of art claiming space within the spaces of the city was both a response to the flood of optimism and personal freedom felt after the downfall of Mubarak and also an attempt to harness a range of techniques to improve the country and claim it as a place that belonged to its citizens. By the time of this writing, however, the optimism of 2011 has faded, and artists largely find themselves either in the role of opposition to the current government or in their old roles of being educators of the masses.

Within these roles, the artists mentioned in this article have reproduced the relationships established for them by previous governments with regard to their responsibility to be modernizers and educators on behalf of the state. Further, within the use of public space, we can glimpse troubling trends that risk foreclosing the political (and artistic) possibilities that can be found within the question that is public space. Artists as well as political figures have attempted to define public space, democracy, and what is speakable in political discussions. In the process, democratic possibilities become ever narrower.

Importantly, all of the cases highlighted within this article indicate the precariousness of politics in Egypt where, since 2011, everyone is attempting to lay claim
to the ideals that launched the country’s current trajectory. These attempts to capture the meaning of the revolution have actively created deep fissures that are now clearly present in the divisive nature of Egyptian politics and reflected in the ideological carving up of urban space. With the desire to lay claim to the revolution and its goals, public space as well as political debate have become increasingly divided and violent.

Yet the question remains: How will Egyptians craft a political culture that reflects their society, culture, needs, and desires? Similar to public space, this is not a goal to be established but something to be continuously sought after and debated. Rosalyn Deutsche has written, drawing on scholar Claude Lefort that Totalitarianism ruins democracy by attempting to fill the void created by democratic revolution and banish the indeterminacy of the social. It invests “the people” with an essential interest, an “oneness” with which the state identifies itself, thus closing down the public space, encircling it in what Lefort calls “the loving grip of the good society.” (Deutsche 1996: 326).

The practice of democracy cannot be contained within the efforts of artists and government officials to mark and define the revolution, the spaces of the city, what is orderly and not, or what is acceptable. Rather, the practice of democracy creates effects that spill over, at once stoking feelings of frustration and uncertainty while opening the potential for innovative, creative, and just futures.
Chapter six: Conclusion

In this dissertation I have looked at the way in which violence by the state is woven throughout everyday urban life in Cairo, Egypt. To speak of the origins of this violence—that it originates with the state is a fruitless and inaccurate argument. However, the state does serve as a major point of dispersion. This violence is both physical, economic and political. It creates an environment where people, even if they do not have direct experience with such violence, come to expect and plan for it. It devalues the worth and quality of human life. It limits in the eyes of many the horizon of what is possible for them and for the country they live in.

In chapter three I discussed how Cairene’s conceptualize their own security and insecurity. Specifically, I focus on mobility via public and private transportation in order to explore the violence of urban life for the poor. This can include violent crime and incidents that result from government neglect. As a response to their own feelings of insecurity, Cairenes rely on god as a way of providing a personal sense of lasting security and perfect justice. However, interpretations of what this looks like differ among individuals and in some cases can be seen as perpetuating violence. Primarily, I show how religion factors into conceptions of security and how the desire for security is also a desire to be cared for.

In Chapter four, I look more directly at personal violence within the home. Here I demonstrate how logics that justify state violence against citizens are also deployed in intimate spaces. I argue violence is supported by the patriarchal idea of family in both domestic and a national political construct and by the dynamics of care. The deployment of violence is understood to be good for the sake of discipline. To discipline women,
children and civilians is seen as an act of love and care, an act that can help them to behave properly. Concomitantly these acts are incredibly violent and potentially fatal. Further, I show how individuals, particularly women often have to juggle violence both from intimate partners and from the state. As a result of the embedded nature of care within beatings, the distinctions between what is intimate versus what is public or non-intimate are broken down.

Finally in chapter five I look more broadly at the urban scene and the ongoing political transformations that the country is undergoing. Here I argue that public art projects around the city can serve as a diagnostic of the political changes, and ideological conflicts that Egyptians must face if they wish to build a political system that is distinct from the past. The art works that were created during and after the fall of Mubarak were colorful responses to violence and political repression. They also put forward a series of questions regarding class, gender divisions, and the role of religion in public space and in politics.

By showing how violence affects society, the major contribution of this work is that I show that it is not possible to eradicate violence and that campaigns to do so are inutile until they realized the multiple ways in which practices of violence are embedded within daily life and the multiple ways in which practices of violence have been productive as well as destructive. Violence structures interpersonal relationships and concepts of care and love. In defining violence as that which acts against the physical, mental, and social well-being of another, both intentionally and unintentionally, I have given myself wide berth in assessing violence in urban space but this definition of violence is one that only works in the hand of the individual who contends that a violence
has been committed against them. It is in grappling with the values behind incidences of violence, its parameters and its acceptability, that we really engage not only in politics but also, I think, real social transformation. By looking at violence honestly and realistically, we may only then begin to transform it and some of the various effects it has over social life.

For example, Egypt is a party to the ‘Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ as well as the ‘Convention for the Eradication of Discrimination against Women.’ Thus on a theoretical level, Egypt’s governing authorities have presented themselves as having an awareness of the impact and effect of violence. However, this has not stopped Egypt from being a reliable torture center for the U.S. in the war on terror nor has it stopped security and judicial bodies turning a blind eye to violence committed against Egyptian civilians (Amnesty International 2012, Weaver 2014).

So, on one level, I argue that societies must be able to look at violence and honestly admit what forms of violence they deem acceptable and the justifications of why or why not. Simultaneously, I argue that we need to be open to different experiences and understandings of violence and that we need to be prepared to recognize these different forms. As I showed in Chapter four, this does not mean becoming a careless relativist. Rather it means that we must perform the very hard work of thinking, engaging and being open to other views on what it means to be human and the different precepts and foundations upon which people build relationships with each other and with the state.

It is in thinking about the relationship that individuals build and rely upon and the constitutive part that violence plays in some of these relationships that I began to think
about role of love. One of the most ready excuses for the intentional use of violence is the excuse of care. I would like to conclude this dissertation with some thoughts on love and how it is equally important to consider when thinking of the remaking of a society in the wake of acts of violence.

Movements toward Love

When I see that people want to listen to me and when I feel that they are supporting the goals that I am committed to, then I am very pleased. This love of the people is a new experience for me. I had never experienced it before in my past life in the army, which involved issuing orders or carrying them out. (Interview with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi, Der Speigel 2/9/2015)

“Love is not a feeling” - M. Scott Peck

In the days after the removal of Mohammad Morsi from power, the Egyptian Air Force flew through Cairo’s sky and gave the city’s residents a series of air shows. With red, black and white paint representing Egypt’s flag, they colored the sky with long streaks or they drew symbols and words. One of their shows included a display of hearts. The air show was meant to convey the love of the military for the Egyptian people and people reciprocated in kind. It was jarring to walk around the city and see individuals embracing soldiers who were standing guard. Even more shocking to see people hugging members of the security forces and traffic officers. Were the intervening years between 2011 and 2013 just a major bump in a normally loving relationship between the security apparatus of the country and civilians? Was this love’s return?

It appeared that the growing animosity toward the Muslim Brotherhood had served to reorganize the Egyptian nation. Suddenly the differences and political cleavages that threatened the stability of the country were repaired and previous wrongs forgiven. In a live television address the day after Morsi’s removal, the mise-en-scene was set to portray the unity of the political field. Sitting side by side were the grand Imam of Al-
Azhar, Pope Tawadros of the Coptic Church, and leaders of various political currents. They looked on as then General Abdel Fattah El Sisi announced the making of a new transitional government and the desire to work together for the benefit of Egypt’s future.

In the vision of this Egyptian future, the Brotherhood had absolutely no place. In Sara Ahmed’s work *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (2014), she explains that the formation of an “I” or of a collective takes place in the same moment that we form feelings and place value on others. It is through being affected by the other that we come into being or formation. These feelings and values arise through ‘affective atmospheres’ that are not spontaneous but are invested with the emotional work that fear, love and ambivalence necessitate and create. The Muslim Brotherhood, while a pivotal part of modern Egyptian history—were always on the ‘outside’ in regard to the country’s body politic. Their year in power represented not only an attempt at formal entry into that body, but also the desire to transform it. However, that year’s political and energy crises marked the Brotherhood as separate from and potentially as a threat to the beloved nation.

It was in the casting of the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat, that the Egyptian nation became ‘whole’ again (see figure 11). In this period el-Sisi rapidly became a popular figure. In his person, he became a figure for earthly salvation since many of the problems that were plaguing Egypt and subsequently civilians was blamed on Morsi’s presidency. Politically, for research participants, political change did not mean rearranging the political system so that no one party or individual could monopolize it nor did it mean a move to democracy. Rather, they wanted direct solutions for the problems they faced in their lives, they were looking for care.
However, as I show, care is not enough. Care on its own can result in a particular kind of brutality that is worse than direct violence. Under the banner of care we can be robbed of our ability to express anger and sadness over the pain that we experience. Further, in the name of care acts of unjust violence can be committed.

In our interpersonal relationships and in the relationships we hold with figures of authority words such as care are used recklessly, love even more so. Love has come to have a bad reputation as something that is untrustworthy and certainly not a foundation upon which to discuss politics. In this final section, I want to turn toward love and sketch out what a politics of love would look like. I suggest love not as a panacea for violence or society’s ills. Rather, the suggestion here serves as an engagement with the undeniable fact that issues of love and care play a pivotal role in concepts of politics and social relationships beyond the family (Povinelli 2006). Similar to my call to engage with ideas and practices of violence, I suggest the same process for love. By attending to what love is and its importance for our social and political lives, I think it can help in thinking through violence and its role in our lives. More importantly, I think the work of love can help in surviving and moving past violence. To do so I engage with cultural theorists who have been a critical part of the discussion emotion in public life, particularly Sara Ahmed and Bell Hooks.
For Sara Ahmed, love is the inverse of hate. It is because one loves that they hate whatever threatens the loved object. In their initial formation, these emotions may be linked to a specific referent but emotions do travel and in that ability there is the possibility for emotions to get stuck to other objects: an ideology, organizations and communities. Ahmed’s analysis is helpful for thinking through the emotionally drenched political changes that have occurred in Egypt and, while I do not disagree with Ahmed’s analysis on the work that love or hate perform, I do posit that these are not the only things that they do.

In what defines love, Ahmed is quite opaque. She writes that it is not her purpose to define exactly what love is rather it is to look at the affective work that it performs. To be fair love is a difficult topic. This move however provides an incomplete image of love, even perhaps a false image. I contend that we must engage with the question of what love is in order to adequately critique it and pull on its transformational potential.
Based on readings in psychoanalysis and the emotional reasoning of hate groups and governments, Ahmed constructs a picture of love as a form of identification, anxiety, narcissism, fantasy and prophesy. The lover loves an ideal and in the love of that ideal attempts to move closer to it through mimicking behaviors and affectations. If that love is unrequited, the lover loves harder and creates a world of explanations and excuses that create a location for love and a path to secure its future return. Indeed, these are emotions done in the name of love, but I hesitate to label it love. Cultural critic and theorist bell hooks argues that “to truly love we must learn to mix various ingredients—care, affection, recognition, respect, commitment, and trust, as well as honest and open communication” (hooks 2000:5). Notice that, in her definition, care and affection are but part of the definition of love. They do not stand in for love in its entirety. The definition provided by hooks reads as though it is from a relationship handbook and not rigorous enough for the difficult work of politics. This however is not the case; hooks is actively working out of a tradition founded within the political struggles and brutal violence that relate to race and sexism in the United States. In particular, she draws on the methodology of leaders such as Martin Luther King. For hooks, love is not a feeling, but a long and risky process that promises no ready answers or solutions. Yes, it includes the emotions of warmth, connection and happiness but love does not just happen. It is choice that is constantly repeated.

Indeed, this form of love is so difficult because it may seem like self-annihilation. The choice to love leads to a host of questions: Why? Is there an obligation to love? And what about love and care for the self? Love is so difficult to understand because love is an orientation that is at once directed to the other and to the self. It does not result in
instant gratification. To engage in the act of love is not synonymous with doing or feeling something pleasing. But when we do engage in the acts of love – as hooks (2000:5) would say, in acts of “care, affection, recognition, respect, commitment and trust” -- we are making a commitment to listen to the other, to respect their needs for well-being, and subsequently to recognize our own needs. Drawing directly from the work of M. Scott Peck, hooks explains that love is, at its most basic definition, the extension of oneself for the growth of another. This is not annihilation of the self for the other and this is not charity. This act is conceptualized as a difficult and risky move that not only wants the needs of the other to be fulfilled but also desires the growth of the self.

The will to love and the desire to be loved are not exclusive to interpersonal relationships but take places at multiple scales within politics and everyday sociality. This is not something that any of us can avoid. In the desire for discipline, in the drawing of hearts in the sky and in the call for recognition and acceptance as our expressive selves, we are making an appeal for love. Yet, love alone cannot solve all of the problems of the research participants documented in this dissertation, but neither will the state. What the work of love does offer are tools to help cope with difficulty and the dimensions of violence and the possibility of individuals and societies recovering from it.

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Appendix A:

Phase 1-Sample focus group interview schedule for male, youth cohort.

Script and questions for moderator:
Start at 4pm

Welcome to this focus group session. This project focuses on everyday life in Cairo, Egypt and Christine Smith, a Ph.D. student at the university of Kentucky in the United States, designed it. My name is Ahmed and I will be the moderator today for this discussion. The other translator in the room is Nana and she will be doing simultaneous translation with Christine.

Before we begin, I’d like to inform you about your rights regarding this research session and obligations. You are being invited to take part in a research study about daily mobility practices in Cairo, Egypt. You are being invited to take part in this research study because you are between the ages of 18-50. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be one of about 66 people to do so. By doing this study, we hope to learn about the daily travel practices of Cairo’s residents through the city. By utilizing focus groups we will gather first hand data about the emotional and physical factors that influence daily trips around the city. In light of the recent political changes occurring in the country, we hope to compare mobility practices of Cairo residents during Hosni Mubarak’s regime and current mobility practices taking place during Egypt’s political transition. During focus group sessions, participants will be asked to share their opinions or thoughts on travel within Cairo. Participants will be prompted by a series of questions or photographs to speak about both specific and broad topics as it relates to their personal travel experiences. To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would experience in everyday life. If you find some questions we ask you to be upsetting or stressful, we can tell you about some people who may be able to help you with these feelings.

You will receive 100 Egyptian Pounds for taking part in this study. If the research participant chooses to withdraw from group sessions early, the monetary reward will be pro-rated as follows: 50 pounds per hour. If you leave an hour early or come an hour late you will receive only 50 pounds. Due to the nature of the focus group, we cannot guarantee your confidentiality. However, we will make every effort to keep private all research records that identify you to persons not affiliated with this project to the extent allowed by law. However, there are some circumstances in which we may have to show your information to other people. We may be required to show information which identifies you to people who need to be sure we have done the research correctly; these would be people from such organizations as the University. If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no longer want to continue. You will not be treated differently if you decide to stop taking part in the study.
The individuals conducting the study may need to withdraw you from the study. This may occur if you are not able to follow the directions they give you or if they find that your being in the study is more risk than benefit to you.

If there are no questions we will begin. This discussion session will end at 12:30. If you feel any discomfort about what is being asked or if you need to leave for any emergency reason please let us know immediately. Compensation for your time here today will be given at the end of the session.

This session will be broken into sections where you will view video and photographic images. After viewing them, you will be asked questions about what you have seen. None of these images are extraordinary or different from images seen daily on television or in the newspaper. We ask that you pay close attention to each image and please let us know now if you have any questions.

**Questions**

10:00- Section 1: Photograph

Give them a minute to look at it and think.

When you see this photograph what are your initial thoughts? Initial feelings?

Have you ever been in a situation like this? If yes, how exactly does it feel?

What are the specific challenges that you face while riding transportation in Cairo?
If you have a complaint do you go to the authorities to complain? If yes, what responses have you gotten? If no, why not?

Do you feel safe riding public transport? Why or why not?

While you are riding public transport, what are you usually doing? (If they don’t know what you mean, ask them if they spend the time reading a book, talking to a friend, thinking, nothing etc.)?

When do you usually use public transport?

How long do you usually spend waiting for public transport?

Do you use other forms of transport besides riding public transport such as a taxi, car, walking?

While you are moving around the city, are there any areas that are significant to you such as a place with a nice memory attached to it? A place that you pass frequently? A Place where you feel comfortable moving around in?

While moving through public transport, we often see large sections of the city that we live in. From your perspective as a rider of public transport, what is your opinion of the city that you experience daily?

10:30—Section 2: The arrival in Cairo, Hena il-Qahira. The Clip Is 10 minutes long, discussion afterward will be for 10 minutes

What are your initial thoughts on this scene? What stood out to you?

What did you think of the relationship between the driver and the passengers?

How does this relate to your experiences, whether in a taxi or another form of transportation such as a tuk tuk?

In this scene, there were several glimpses of the city of Cairo as the two main characters arrived. Can you describe these images? Was there anything notable about them?

For those of you who are older and were alive during this period, 1979-1981, what are your memories of the city? What was it like? Think about the buildings, the streets, the transportation, and the sounds (i.e. honking, radios, voices). If they have changed, how?

Do you plan in advance for different errands you perform on a given day? Are you successful in accomplishing your various plans?

Is violence common during your movements through the city? What kind of violence do you see? And have you ever been involved in a violent situation while moving through the city?
Are there places in the city that are known for violence or trouble? Where are they? Do you avoid them?

How does this clip make you feel, for example does it make you want laugh, do you feel bored, sad, a sense of fatigue? (Ahmed, please stress to participants that I want to understand their emotions when they see this clip, not what they think about it. For example, you may think rising food prices is bad for the country and bad for your wallet but seeing the price of bread double makes you feel stressed out and cynical and/or it makes you want to cry and laugh). Feeling nothing is okay too. Please explain your feelings to the best of your ability.

11:00—Section 3: Photo

Do you have a story of interacting with a member of government (e.g., the police, a politician, a traffic officer) in order to receive assistance? If yes, and AND IF YOU FEEL COMFORTABLE SHARING THAT STORY can you tell us?

If you have a problem while you are in the public space of the city (such as having a bag stolen, or getting into an accident) how do you resolve the problem?

How do you feel about the application of the law within daily life? How have you witness the law being applied? If so how?
What are the challenges you face as young men moving through the city? How do you think these experiences are different from those of older residents, such as your parents?

11:30—Section 4: The jail scene, asl iswed. Scene is 6 minutes. Discussion 22 minutes.
What are your general opinions of this scene? Did anything stick out?
How did it make you feel to watch it?

This movie was filmed in 2010. Is this clip in anyway representative of its time? Now?
Explain your answer

How do you feel watching this clip?

What do you think about the actions of Masry in this clip? Did he do the right thing? (if not addressed by this point in the conversation) What do you think about the relationship between Masry and the police officers?

How would you define torture or violence? Would anything in this scene indicate torture or violence?

Do you think that torture or violence is ever allowable? From the government or from others on the street? If so when?

When you see this photo, what are your immediate thoughts? Can you explain them?

Do you feel ‘free’ in public space to do as you like within the limits of the law?
What are some leisure activities that you do outside of your home in public space?
What are some challenges you face when you are in public space? Are these problems specific to men? Or do you think everyone faces these issues

How has public space and your feeling about it changed since the revolution?
For the young men in the room: I would like you all now to think of your fathers or someone in your life who is around the age 35-50. If you don’t have anyone that age, use the men in the picture. What do you think their lives were like in Cairo during their youth? Similar to your youth? Different? In what way?

For the older men: I would like you to think about young men, 18-34 and about their lives today? Is it different from yours? In what way? How has the city changed from your memories of it? What are the challenges that you feel young men face in the city? What advice do you have for them?

Are any of you politically active (i.e attending demonstrations or organizing with political parties?) If so, why? If no, why not?

What is your opinion of the political changes currently taking place in the country?

What do you think when you see this picture. Please feel comfortable to respond in an honest way. You won’t get in trouble.

Some of you may have sisters or other family members who are teenagers or young adults, do you think they have the same experiences as you? Please explain?

What advice would you give to the women in your life about moving through public space?

Do men face harassment (harassment does not have to be sexual only) in the street? If so from whom? And for what reason?

Where do you feel safest and why?

If there is time!—Section 5: The bus scene, asl iswed. Scene is 2 minutes. Discussion to last until 12:00p.

What are your immediate thoughts about this scene?

Is this interaction a normal occurrence on public transport? Explain your answer.
Compare the two time periods in which these films were shot, the early 1980s- the early 2000s. What is different? What is the same?

Are any of the issues we saw in the films connected to current political issues? If so, how?

What are the biggest issues affecting your life as it relates to life in the city?

How do you feel about the future?

If you were President, what would you change about life in the city? What would you keep the same?

Is there anything you would like to ask, share, or suggest before we wrap up?

12:00pm—wrap up.

As we wrap up, I would like to let you know that there are more opportunities to be involved with this project. These opportunities are without monetary compensation but would be helpful in contributing to knowledge on mobility through urban space in Egypt. We would like to do one-on-one interviews with you and travel with you to the places you frequent daily: work, home, leisure spaces. If you are interested in participating further, please stay and talk to us about the days you are available and leave your information. We will add you to our list of continuing research participants.
Appendix B:

Phase 2-Sample focus group schedule and transcription

FG 2- Low Income class Transportation- Friday 7th Feb 2014
Respondents In order (anti-clock wise; from the right of the moderator to the left)
A: Ragab
B: Abd
C: Saeed
D: Khalaf
E: Abdallah
F: Abaas
G: Romany

Moderator: What are the specific challenges that you currently face while riding transportation in Cairo?
Respondent C: the most common problem is El tahrir station because it’s always closed also Giza this is the 1st problem, the 2nd problem is El Salam Bridge always crowded
Respondent F: yes El Tahrir station is closed due to the safety procedures
Respondent C: yes for me if I want to go to El Giza I have to go to EL shohadaa and go back again so it takes a lot of time, so I cancel my plans instead of going all around to reach Giza
Respondent C: also the bad attitude of the drivers in the Ahmed Zaki area
Respondent D: yes we all see bullying everywhere
Respondent C: they have to go to jail so it will be a warning to the others even execution
Respondent G: all the Metro stations are very dirty
Respondent D: yes they even smoke the metro stations
Moderator: If you have a complaint do you go to the authorities to complain? If yes, what responses have you gotten?
Respondent F: I will go to the station manager
Respondent C: Nobody would listen to us
Respondent B: yes even if you complained who will listen
Respondent G: yes nobody listens
Respondent F: even the security men they are not doing their work well. You asked them about any safety procedures they don’t listen and say its none of my business and that it is the police work
Respondent E: I made a complaint the day before yesterday, but they did not listen and they didn’t give any reaction to what I said
Respondent A: regarding the safety procedures, the security men cannot control it all
Moderator: Do you feel safe riding public transport?
Respondent A: These days, I don’t feel safe
Respondent C: yes I am a man and still I don’t feel safe
Respondent B: after the revolution we don’t feel safe riding public transport
Respondent F: I told my daughter to not to take Tuktuk ever
Respondent D: No
Respondent G: No
Respondent C: before the revolution it was even safe for the girls to walk around at 2am for example but now it’s not safe even at 10Pm before 25 January revolution I mean…
Respondent A: before the revolution it was very safe so you can even leave your house doors open but now it’s not safe at all
Respondent B: and it’s not safe at all now for girls or women
**Moderator:** While you are riding public transport, what are you usually doing?
Respondent E: I read the newspapers
Respondent C: just waiting
Respondent B: waiting
**Moderator:** When do you usually use public transport?
Respondent C: always
Respondent F: everyday to go to the work
Respondent G: the safest transportation is the Metro
Respondent F: yes it is the best
Respondent G: it was very good before and arrives on time, but now it’s getting worse
**Moderator:** How long do you usually spend waiting for public transport?
Respondent D: at 7am I wait for the metro from 7 to 8 minutes
Respondent F: as for the buses you might wait for an hour
Respondent B: yes around an hour
Respondent C: it arrives late always due to crowds
**Moderator:** Which word would best describe your emotional state when moving through the city: Bored, Relaxed, No feeling, Alert, Stressed
Respondent C: bored
Respondent D: bored
Respondent E: bored
Respondent F: stressed when the driver goes through the Ring road because they drive very fast
Respondent E: actually the transportation in Egypt is really bad
Respondent G: yes and sometimes stressed about time, because you don’t want to arrive late
**Moderator:** Do you use other forms of transport besides riding public transport such as a taxi?
Respondent D: No
Respondent E: No
Respondent F: No
Respondent G: No
**Moderator:** While you are moving around the city, are there any areas that are significant to you such as a place with a nice memory attached to it? A place that you pass frequently? A place where you feel comfortable moving around in?
Respondent C: Now, no
Respondent F: Nothing lasts the same, everything changed
Respondent E: No
Respondent G: even the zoo became very bad and dirty
Respondent F: even El Tahrir square it was very nice before, but after the revolution it became the worst
Moderator: Do you plan in advance for different errands you perform on a given day?
Respondent E: As for me I plan in advance
Respondent C: yes I plan in advance
Respondent F: yes
Respondent D: sometime you make your daily plans but still you couldn’t accomplish them

Moderator: While moving through public transport, we often see large sections of the city that we live in. From your perspective as a rider of public transport, what is your opinion of the city that you experience daily?
Respondent A: it is a very good city but the problem is in the government and the rulers but my country is the best
Respondent B: it is a beautiful country but the government is really bad and it is getting worse after the revolution and unsafe
Respondent C: just like what Abd el ghani said but even the ambulances can’t reach the patients due to crowds
Respondent D: just like what they said
Respondent E: let’s say it is very hard to live on it, everything is really hard to do here
Respondent F: they threw dirty on the streets, it needs to be stable and to respect each other
Respondent G: I just want to live in peace, as for Cairo, anyone who lives in Cairo really handles a lot

Moderator: Since June 30 things have changed, take a minute to think about all the changes that have taken place, not just political. When you think about the current period what are your initial thoughts?
Respondent C: As I told you it’s a very good country the only problem is safety
Respondent G: Also to be understandable to the situation
Respondent E: After 30 June things started to go on its way
Respondent C: yes only the safety issue
Respondent F: yes and when you see the police in the squares you feel happy and want to thank them for their efforts

Moderator: Has it changed your daily life, how you move through the city?
Respondent B: yes it’s better now
Respondent E: yes better
Respondent F: better
Respondent A: yes it’s safer now, so we go out a lot

Moderator: When you move through the city, do you pay attention to the street scenes around you? The way the city looks?
Respondent G: No because of the crowds
Respondent C: it’s our country so we already know it, but visitors pay attention to it
Respondent C: before 25 January Egyptians couldn’t visit the pyramids because the police will refuse because it’s only for tourism but now we can go anytime
Respondent F: yes I go and I even pay less than the foreigners
Respondent B: yes the Tourist Police prevent us from going inside
Respondent C: also before 25 January it was very hard to go to Sharm El Sheik
Moderator: Have there been differences in the city, its appearance, the traffic, etc. between the time of Mubarak and the current period?
Respondent C: everything is getting better
Respondent D: things are getting worse, Neglect on everything from the government
Respondent A: After the revolution the thugs increased it was very rare before the revolution
Respondent c: especially in poor areas, they might even kill each other during fights
Respondent D: it wasn’t like that before, now a day you can’t control it
Moderator: How do you define violence?
Respondent A: actually violence increasing and morals are disappearing
Respondent G: it was better before 25 January, Mubarak days were defiantly better
Moderator: What is the difference between violence and punishment or self-defense?
Respondent C: your attitude
Respondent D: the way you are talking and your attitude so you control it all, self defense is by rules not attitudes but on some situations you will have to defend your self
Respondent E: you control it all by your attitude, and to not to start fights
Respondent C: yes like what they just said
Respondent B: I agree
Respondent A: but if you start the fight I should have a reaction for that am not going to wait for you to kill me I will defend my self
Respondent F: also by your good attitude you could end any fight
Respondent G: it is better to decrease any contact with thugs, to not to face any fight
Moderator: Is violence common during your movements through the city? What kind of violence do you see?
Respondent G: the gun shots
Respondent C: yes the gun shots
Respondent A: yes you see blood everywhere, you find a 12 year old kid holding weapons
Respondent G: as for me I told my children to not to go to El Arab areas in Azbet El Nakhal because it is not safe at all
Respondent F: also here in Maadi El Gyaar area and el salam road those are not safe at all
Moderator: what are the quiet areas in Egypt?
Respondent F: Heliopolis
Respondent G: Shubra
Respondent E: Abdeen
Moderator: what if I gave you 1 million Egyptian pounds where would you live?
Respondent D: Heliopolis
Respondent C: Fifth District
Respondent B: the same Heliopolis
Respondent A: As for me EL Maadi
Moderator: Ok now we will watch the movie!!
Moderator: what is the difference between Cairo then and now? What are your memories of the city? What was it like?
Respondent C: I wish we could go back to those days
Respondent G: those days were the best
Respondent D: we wish to go back to those days
Respondent G: may be because the population is increasing everyday
Respondent B: there is no comparison between Cairo now and before
Respondent A: we wish that Cairo become like how it was before
Respondent F: yes and may be even better

**Moderator:** Think about the buildings, the streets, the transportation, and the sounds (i.e. honking, radios, voices). How they have changed?
Respondent G: the crowds, it is crowded everywhere
Respondent F: Also it was clean before; they used to clean the streets but now no, also the buildings was about 5 or 6 floors but now they even build on agriculture lands
Respondent C: Nothing is like before, everything changed
Respondent D: also slums increased
Respondent F: also the presence of the coffee shops under buildings is not acceptable

**Moderator:** how do you see the rose’s seller attitude?
Respondent G: he was silly
Respondent F: it happens every day inside the metro before sellers were not allowed to sell anything inside the metros but now they sell everything, they even through the things on you

**Moderator:** How to you see the taxi driver attitude?
Respondent E: the driver attitude is the attitude they use now a day
Respondent C: yes they have the same attitude now
Respondent D: yes
Respondent G: when I moved to Cairo and on my 1st time to take the bus my wallet was on my back pocket as it used to be and it got stolen

**Moderator:** If you have a problem while you are in the public space of the city (such as having a bag stolen, or getting into an accident) how do you resolve the problem?
Respondent E: As for me when I see those things I prefer to keep silent because they might hurt me with anything
Respondent G: me too I keep silent, I avoid anything that might get me in a problem

**Moderator:** How do you feel about the application of the law within daily life – whether it is traffic laws or otherwise? Give a percentage?
Respondent C: not more than 20%
Respondent F: actually less than 10%

**Moderator:** is there a difference between now and previous political periods? (Think about all the good and bad that have occurred since the time of Hosni Mubarak), Do you find it easier to solve problems?
Respondent F: the traffic police now work very well; yesterday they caught about 50 motorcycles without numbers because they are the reason behind most of the accidents
Respondent G: everything is going by bribes all of the time

**Moderator:** have you witness the law being applied?
Respondent C: Now a day no
Respondent B: No
Respondent A: No it is not applied, I know a case that has been now for 1 year and half and still not done yet and this will encourage people to do whatever they want
Moderator: I would like you all to think about the specific challenges that you face, whether you are a woman, a youth, a man etc. What are the specific challenges you face moving through the city? Or what would you like to do from 20 years ago?

Respondent G: I wished to travel to Europe, I raised my children here but I didn’t do anything of my dreams

Respondent E: we still have good opportunities but you need to work hard, but the most common challenge is the health because we are getting older

Respondent C: there are no opportunities

Respondent G: even on the other countries they take care of old people but here no

Respondent B: I only need to raise my children well

Respondent A: I wish the lives of the new generation would be better than ours

Moderator: How many of you use microbuses, or non-official forms of transport?

Respondent E: I prefer microbuses; the official buses are really crowded

Respondent C: I also prefer microbuses

Respondent E: the official buses are cheaper than the microbuses

Respondent E: also the official drivers are better than the non-official drivers

Respondent C: and you wait for the buses for 2 hrs so microbuses defintaly better

Respondent E: and I prefer the official mini buses than the buses

Moderator: Are there more violent incidences on non-official forms of transport than official ones?

Respondent B: yes it’s more violent on microbuses

Respondent C: yes

Respondent C: it is safer at the official buses

Respondent B: the official buses are safer

Respondent F: yes

Respondent E: yes

Respondent A: but also it’s not very safe at buses they steal your money in crowds

Moderator: Think about the drivers of these official buses, can you describe them?

Respondent E: Respectable

Respondent F: yes they are respectable

Respondent C: yes and those who drive the non-official forms are such thugs and you also know the exact amount of money you are going to pay at the buses but the microbuses no-- it depends on the driver

Moderator: What are the effects of microbuses on traffic in general? Are they good or bad?

Respondent C: it is the main cause of crowds

Respondent B: it causes a lot of problems

Respondent A: but also it helps in transportation

Respondent B: they drive very badly

Moderator: When you see this photo, what are your immediate thoughts? Can you explain them?

Respondent F: relaxing

Respondent E: yes relaxing

Respondent G: they look relaxed but a bit worried

Respondent C: I wish our country can become like this photo
Respondent B: the same to be relaxed like this
Moderator: Do you feel ‘free’ in public space to do as you like within the limits of the law?
Respondent E: yes in some places in the random and poor areas yes, but the sophisticated areas no
Respondent F: we like to go to the sophisticated areas where there are respectable people
Respondent C: yes in random areas
Respondent B: yes
Respondent A: yes

Moderator: What are some leisure activities that you do outside of your home in public space?
Respondent C: as for me I go to the coffee shop and sometimes I go to visit my family
Respondent B: I only go to visit my parents or my brother
Respondent A: to visit my family
Respondent D: to visit my mother
Respondent E: to cultural places where I can read books downtown with my friends
Respondent F: I take my wife and go to visit my married daughter every Friday
Respondent G: I visit my daughter

Moderator: How do you envision the future?
Respondent F: work otherwise you will get sick at home
Respondent E: when I get older I will quit the work and I will go back to Aswan
Respondent D: I will keep working I don’t have a specific plan, God plans it all
Respondent G: like what he said I don’t have a specific plan and am waiting for god’s plans and as for my kids I wish to raise them well to depend on them selves, so my responsibilities will decrease
Respondent C: to raise my kids till they get married, I really want to see them better than me
Respondent A: to make my own business
Respondent B: I am not educated, I have 2 girls and I want to educate them

Moderator: For the older people in the room, think about the lives of the youth around you. Based on your lives and what you know about the city, what advice would you give to them about navigating and living in the city?
Respondent A: to complete his studies and to work on his future and to be responsible and to do the best to achieve his targets
Respondent E: to be motivated to work hard for the future
Respondent G: now a day youth are careless, about 99% of them, I advise them to be careful about their studies and to be responsible to get better
Respondent F: to be responsible about his studies and to help him to get better
Respondent E: to choose their friends well and to help his parents
Respondent D: to be responsible and careful
Respondent C: to be responsible and to concentrate on his work and to follow god’s plans and to avoid careless friends
Respondent A: I advise him to work hard and to complete his studies and go to university, then to work and also to choose his friends
Respondent B: the situation today in Egypt is hard for the girls because they have to choose their friends very well to avoid problems, and the education is the most important.

Moderator: How do you see the girl's future in Egypt?

Respondent G: my daughter was very clever and intelligent, but her school was in EL Matarya and we were facing problems everyday so she didn’t continue. She took only a Diploma of Commerce, she couldn’t go to university however she was very clever.

Respondent B: to be under the control of the parents

Respondent F: to be under the control of the parents and especially the mother because the father will be at work most of the time

Respondent B: as for me I don’t let the control go only to the mother I have to be close to my daughter so she won’t ever lie to me

Respondent A: I agree with him we should talk to our daughters and be close to them, to be friends more than father and a daughter

Respondent C: As for me the control should be from the mother and the father, as for me I see that mothers do not control their daughters well and the father works most of the time so the mother should raise their daughter well

Respondent A: also I should punish my daughter when she does anything wrong

Moderator: There have been many protests since 2011, how have the impacted your daily lives and movements?

Respondent E: we get disappointed from them

Respondent C: to stop and keep the country from moving on, we want stability

Moderator: Is there anything you would like to ask, share, or suggest?

Respondent C: I wish for our country to be better

Respondent F: yes I wish it will even be better than before

Respondent C: I wish for my country to be like the picture you showed us before

Respondent F: to care and to ask about each other

Thank You
Bibliography:


Cresswell, T. 1996. *In place/out of place: Geography, ideology, and transgression*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.


Dickinson, K. 2007 I have One Daughter and that is Egyptian Cinema’: Aziza Amir amid the Histories and Geographies of National Allegory. Camera Obscura Feminism Culture and Media Studies 22 (1):137–177.


Islamist Wins Egyptian Presidency.


Vita
Christine Elizabeth Smith

EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

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<tr>
<th>College/University</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Certificate/ Degree &amp; Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>Syracuse University</td>
<td>Geography and International Relations</td>
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<td>University of Kentucky</td>
<td>Geography</td>
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GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

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<td>National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant</td>
<td>The Effect of State Violence on Mobility and Urban Space</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
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<td>National Science Foundation’s Graduate Research Fellowship</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>$2,250</td>
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PUBLICATIONS


Smith, C. & Lane, R. Much Ado About Mutton: An Interview with Deborah Gewertz and Frederick Errington, Disclosure: A Journal of Social Theory, 19, 2010

BOOK REVIEWS


ACADEMIC CONFERENCES


2009 “Landscapes of Beauty in Lexington, Kentucky.” 4th Annual Landscape, Space, and Place Conference. Indiana University, Bloomington


INVITED LECTURES AND COLLOQUIA


TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant Geo 220: US Cities, University of Kentucky, Department of Geography. Spring 2015

Instructor Geo 328: Geography of the Middle East, University of Kentucky, Department of Geography. Fall 2013

Teaching Assistant Geo 328: Geography of the Middle East, University of Kentucky, department of geography. Spring 2009, Supervisor: Anna Secor

Teaching Assistant Geo 322: Cities of the World, University of Kentucky, Department of Geography, Fall 2010, Supervisor: Trushna Parekh

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