2021

The Transnational Diffusion of Human Trafficking Policy

Glenn M. Harden
University of Kentucky, glenn.harden@juno.com
Author ORCID Identifier:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1318-522X
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2021.458

STUDENT AGREEMENT:

I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File.

I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies.

I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to register the copyright to my work.

REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE

The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student's advisor, on behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student's thesis including all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above.

Glenn M. Harden, Student

Dr. Horace A. Bartilow, Major Professor

Dr. Emily Beaulieu Bacchus, Director of Graduate Studies

THE TRANSNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING POLICY

_____

DISSERTATION

_____

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By

Glenn M. Harden

Lexington, Kentucky

Director: Dr. Horace Bartilow, Professor of Political Science

Washington, DC

2021

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1318-522X

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE TRANSNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING POLICY

Globalization has promoted the transnational diffusion of public policies. Recognizing that policies of one country are shaped by policies of others, scholars have developed several theories to explain policy diffusion. Because empirical evidence for these theories is contested, this study evaluates the relative explanatory power of the major theories of policy diffusion for human trafficking policies. To test competing theoretical claims, this study uses quantitative methods on an original, cross-national data set to analyze how human trafficking policies diffused. The results reveal that for the diffusion of human trafficking policies coercion and constructivist theories have robust support, while support is less consistent for reputation theory and altogether lacking for competition theory. Surprisingly, the findings show that irresolute sanction threats were more effective than credible threats in promoting trafficking policy diffusion. In addition, the analysis reveals a complicated relationship between regional organizations and constructivist diffusion mechanisms. By showing the explanatory power of each theory and raising new questions and puzzles, the study offers a foundation for further theoretical development. This research also has practical implications for diplomats and policymakers who wish to promote the diffusion of good practices to counter human trafficking.

KEYWORDS: policy diffusion, human trafficking, sanctions, constructivism, scorecard diplomacy

Glenn M. Harden

27 September 2021

Date

THE TRANSNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING POLICY

By

Glenn M. Harden

Dr. Horace A. Bartilow
Director of Dissertation

Dr. Emily Beaulieu Bacchus
Director of Graduate Studies

27 September 2021
Date

For Elizabeth

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

One of the many lessons I have learned in graduate school is that scholarship is a collaborative process, and this dissertation is no exception. I deeply appreciate everyone whose support made it possible. The following list of acknowledgements is an incomplete expression of my deep gratitude to the many people who have helped me grow as a scholar and teacher by sharing with me something of their wisdom, time, and grace.

I extremely grateful to my advisor, Dr. Horace Bartilow, whose patience, guidance, and high expectations always pushed me to grow as a scholar. I learned so much from you. I also wish to express my gratitude to my other committee members, Dr. Jillienne Haglund, Dr. Ellen Riggle, Dr. Janet Stamatel, for their encouragement and helpful criticism, as well as all they taught me in their classes. Many others at the University of Kentucky helped me develop the knowledge and tools necessary to complete the PhD, and I wish to thank all my professors: Dr. Clayton Thyne, Dr. Abby Córdova, Dr. Justin Wedeking, Dr. Jesse Johnson, Dr. Richard Waterman, Dr. Tiffany Barnes, Dr. Daniel Morey, Dr. Emily Beaulieu Bacchus, and Dr. Patrick Mooney. In addition, Dr. Stephen Voss offered valuable mentorship in teaching as well as some critical insights which helped improve my dissertation. As Director of Graduate Studies during most of my tenure, Dr. Wedeking also gave me much-needed advice for navigating graduate studies. I also wish to thank Eva Hicks who manages the Political Science Department, and who was always generous and kind to me.

My fellow graduate students also contributed to my growth as a scholar and teacher; I cannot express how much I learned from them. I am especially grateful to the other members of my cohort, Chip O'Connell and Damian Jones, both of whom I admire and who were very kind in their patience with me. I also wish to thank Dr. Stephen Joiner, Tasnia Symoom, and Alex Denison for their encouragement and friendship. I am grateful to Dina Klimkina for the rides and

conversation, to Dr. Helen Kras for a kind word in a difficult moment, to my office-mates Victoria Beall and Dr. Gargi Vyas for encouraging conversations, and to Dr. Jaclyn Johnson-Avalos for her generosity in sharing her wisdom.

Asbury University offered a hospitable location to teach while I finished the dissertation. I am especially grateful for my colleagues Dr. Steve Clements, Dr. David Swartz, Dr. Lisa Weaver-Swartz, and Dr. Michelle Asbill whose encouragement and friendship were and are a godsend. Steve was enormously helpful in scheduling my classes to enable me to devote time to my dissertation as well as giving me opportunities to teach classes that are close to my heart. I am also thankful for the many students both at Asbury University and the University of Kentucky who reminded me why I embarked on the journey to attain a PhD. Should any former student of mine read this, you may rest assured that I am grateful to you for joining me in the joys of teaching and learning.

I am grateful to my friend and trauma survivor, Leslie Harley. I treasure your faithful prayers and support for me more than words can say.

My parents, Richard and Marlene Harden, not only instilled in me the value of education from an early age, but also provided incalculable assistance in supporting us while I returned to school. My sister and brother-in-law, Karon Harden and Mohamadou Dabo Wakili, also helped ensure we had a place to live during my studies. My in-laws, David and Marion Drain, offered continual support and encouragement. Our five dogs gave me unconditional love and companionship, and I am especially grateful to Deenie and White Sock who did not live to see this dissertation's completion and whom I miss every day.

And finally, I express my deepest gratitude to my wife, Elizabeth, on whom the costs of this dissertation fell heavily. Your faithfulness and love have made all the difference.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation makes an empirical contribution to the theoretical literature on policy diffusion in the international system. There is a theoretical debate among scholars about the explanatory value of various theories of policy diffusion. While this literature makes competing theoretical claims, the empirical evidence is contested or lacking. This study contributes to this literature by analyzing how trafficking in persons (TIP) policy is diffused across states in the international system by using an original, cross-national data set on TIP policy covering 195 countries for the period from 1998 to 2018. This data set broadens TIP policy beyond criminalization to include capacity-building and victim protection policies and includes new indicators to better evaluate the relative merits of the various theories of policy diffusion. By empirically adjudicating the theoretical debate, this study reveals the explanatory value of the existing theories and the gaps that yet remain, laying the groundwork of further theoretical development in policy diffusion and related areas of study.

Scholars of policy diffusion generally draw on one of five theories in their explanations: constructivism, learning, coercion, competition, or reputation. For TIP policy, scholarly attention has focused on two mechanisms: (1) scorecard diplomacy, connected to reputation theory, and (2) governmental concern over the diversion of trafficking as an indirect effect of neighbors' improved policies, connected to the constructivist and competition theories. TIP policy is a useful test case in the policy diffusion literature because it is perceived as a public good which has normative, economic, and security dimensions. These dimensions suggest that TIP policy is an ideal issue area for empirically testing the predictions of theories of transnational policy diffusion.

Mechanisms associated with most of the theories of policy diffusion are potentially active given the multiple dimensions of TIP policy. The US publicly scores countries for their

performance in tackling TIP and sanctions poor performers—mechanisms associated with coercion and reputation. Countries may also be competing with their neighbors to become less attractive to criminal investment—a mechanism associated with competition. Ideas about TIP policy are also spread through a dense network of personal and institutional relationships nestled within and between international, inter-regional, regional, and domestic organizations—a mechanism associated with constructivism. Learning is the one theory of policy diffusion that is least likely to be active for TIP because of the lack of transparent data necessary to evaluate policy success. But, even here, the mechanisms associated with learning overlap with the constructivism, so evidence in favor of these mechanisms can inform our understanding of its explanatory power when these conditions are active in other policy domains.

This dissertation can make an empirical its contribution to the theoretical literature because it introduces a novel data able to test extant theories of transnational policy diffusion with survival analysis. Unlike previous studies which have focused on criminalization, this data set allows for testing hypotheses on a broader range of TIP policies, including capacity-building and victim protection policies. The data set also includes better operationalizations of existing concepts, such as fear of trafficking diversion, and enables developing models for predicting US sanctioning and scoring decisions necessary to test theories of coercion and reputation. The data set also includes variables to account for mechanisms which may explain regional variation in TIP policy diffusion, a gap in the literature which has not been well explored. Together, these features enable the dissertation to offer the most comprehensive test of existing theories of policy diffusion on TIP policy to date.

Understanding TIP policy diffusion is not only important for the theoretical contribution it can make, but also to practitioners who wish to promote TIP policy. Having a firm, empirically-grounded understanding for what encourages TIP policy diffusion is integral to the effort to

reduce the suffering caused by human trafficking. Because many other policies also have a normative dimension, understanding how TIP policies diffuse will be useful to advocates of other causes as well. For example, in human trafficking studies, scholars have contested the value of US sanctions for policy diffusion and have held that US preferences for law enforcement solutions may undermine victim protection. This study reveals the extent to which these criticisms are merited and informs advocacy strategies for promoting favored policies in the future.

This dissertation is therefore developed as follows:

Chapter 1 sets out the major theories of policy diffusion and explains how these have been applied to the diffusion of TIP policy. I evaluate the literature critically and discuss some open questions in the literature. I conclude this chapter by proposing the hypotheses to be tested in this study.

Chapter 2 describes the research design. I begin with a description of the data collection which resulted in the original data set I use in the study. I continue with an explanation of the research design. The testing of some hypotheses requires a two-step process where I first generate models that predict the US sanctioning decision or the US TIP report score. I explain how I develop these models and how the results are used in the principal analysis. I then explain the principal statistical analysis used in the dissertation to test the hypotheses by describing the dependent and independent variables, and the survival analysis model.

Chapter 3 tests coercion theory by examining whether the threat of US sanctions promotes the diffusion of TIP policy. This chapter begins with the results of the model used to predict sanctioning decisions and then continues with the models testing how the credibility of US sanctions influences TIP policy diffusion.

Chapter 4 tests reputation theory by examining whether US scorecard diplomacy beyond the threat of sanctions promotes the diffusion of TIP policy. This chapter begins with the results of the model used to explain TIP scored and then continues with the models testing how reputational or other non-coercive pressure from US diplomacy influences TIP policy diffusion.

Chapter 5 tests constructivist theory by examining whether regional policy density (which operationalizes the extent to which the policy has become taken-for-granted) promotes policy diffusion and exploring the relationship between this policy normalization and regional organizations. The models examine the extent to which policy normalization can be explained by the influence of regional policy communities.

Chapter 6 tests competition theory by examining whether countries compete to become less attractive to transnational criminal networks by implementing TIP policy. The models use a new indicator for measuring the fear of transnational trafficking to offer a better test of this hypothesis than is found in the extant literature.

Chapter 7 summarizes the findings for each hypothesis, suggests some directions for further theoretical development, and offers recommendations for diplomats, policy makers, and advocates.

CHAPTER ONE: THEORY

WHAT IS TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS POLICY?

After the end of the Cold War, law enforcement agencies began seeing an increase in cases in which people had been compelled or tricked into situations in which they were exploited, often across borders. Media exposés and diplomatic attention conceptualized this "trafficking in persons" (TIP) as a kind of forced labor, even a modern variant of slavery. Stories of sex trafficking had a special power in capturing the attention of concerned publics in the United States and elsewhere. In the late 1990s, advocates framed TIP as both a problem of crime and of protecting marginalized people and encouraged governments to act to end this "new slavery" (for this history, see Bales 1999; DeStefano 2008).

Policies for combatting trafficking in persons have since seen rapid global acceptance. In 2021, the international TIP regime is deep and complex, but in 2000 it had only two key components: The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (2000; hereafter "the Protocol") and the US Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). Both the Protocol and the TVPA, as well as subsequent global, regional, and bilateral transnational policy efforts, emphasized three policy sectors necessary to combat human trafficking: prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, and prevention, or the 3Ps.

TIP policy is not a single policy but a suite of policies. Among its articles, the Protocol requires ratifying states to (1) criminalize sex and labor trafficking as defined by the Protocol, (2) "consider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims," (3) consider adopting measures allowing transnational victims to remain in the receiving state, (4) repatriate transnational victims with due regard for their safety, (5) establish "comprehensive policies" to prevent TIP and protect victims from revictimization, (6) alleviate

factors that make people vulnerable to trafficking, (7) exchange information with one another, (8) train law enforcement, immigration, and other officials, (9) strengthen border controls to prevent and detect TIP, and (10) ensure integrity of travel documents. Examples of specific TIP policies within the United States include laws requiring posting trafficking hotline numbers in public restrooms, ensuring underage victims are not prosecuted for prostitution offenses, and permitting victims to vacate certain offenses acquired while being trafficked.

A careful reader of the Protocol will note that the requirements are stronger for law enforcement policies than for victim services policies where parties are only required to "consider" implementing measures. While some in the advocacy community have been critical of the prioritization of law enforcement strategies, the advantage of drawing on multiple frames is that it motivates diverse actors to act against TIP. Some scholars have found that law enforcement frames are more effective in motivating states to cooperate against TIP than human rights frames (Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons 2015; Simmons and Lloyd 2010), yet Schönhöfer (2014) showed that law-and-order parties are at least as likely to promote victim-centered TIP policies as social democratic parties. Implementation of TIP policies can bring together law enforcement and victim service personnel in ways that promote victim-centered policing and prosecution, though Foot (2016) noted that tensions often exist between these different sectors. In some cases, the law enforcement frame may reinforce other state objectives that undermine victims' welfare. For example, Perry (2016) found that, in response to US pressure "to produce trafficking arrests and prosecutions," Thailand created a "highly punitive law-enforcement-based approach that ended up harming the same people it purported to be helping" (212-213).

Competing state priorities in neighboring policy domains may undermine TIP policy. For example, a state's efforts to control migration by requiring employer-sponsored visas for

seasonal labor may create a power dynamic that allows employers to exploit their seasonal labor force in ways that would qualify as TIP. The Canadian Council for Refugees (2016) has complained of well-documented exploitation of migrant workers under Canada's Temporary Foreign Worker Program, including cases that ought to be considered TIP. Advocacy groups in the United States are concerned that stronger immigration enforcement, often in the name of preventing human trafficking, reduces foreign victims' incentives to cooperate with law enforcement, and that some victims have been deported while awaiting visas which would have entitled them to legally stay in the country (Dahlstrom 2018; US DoS 2019; Villarreal 2018). Thus, not only might insincere states use TIP policy in ways contrary to the intentions of the Protocol, even a sincere state's efforts to promote victim welfare may be undermined by competing policy goals.

Notwithstanding these real criticisms, the international TIP regime strongly encourages state cooperation with civil society organizations. For example, US diplomacy actively seeks out the opinion of advocacy organizations which monitor state performance and their concerns often become part of the US State Department's recommendations for TIP policy improvement. TIP policy best practices include nurturing partnerships between law enforcement and victim services to improve victim-centered policing. By promoting the role of civil society in TIP policy, the Protocol and US diplomacy seek to improve the visibility and accountability of state conduct in the implementation of TIP policy. This accountability then creates opportunities for states to correct harmful policies and improve helpful ones.

The diversity in TIP policies offers opportunities to test different theoretical approaches to policy diffusion, as different aspects of TIP policy appeal to different frames, have different costs and benefits, and empower different actors. Yet, all these policies fall under the umbrella of TIP policy and share an international regime dedicated to promoting them in order to reduce

or eliminate TIP. I turn now to the various theories of policy diffusion and consider how these have been applied specifically in the literature on TIP.

Theories of Policy Diffusion

In 2007, Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett described four theories for understanding policy diffusion: constructivism, learning, coercion, and competition. In addition to these, scholars have also developed a theory based on reputation. In this section, I describe these five theories and how they have been applied to TIP policy diffusion. Then, I describe open questions in the literature and how these theories may help in answering them.

Constructivist Theory

Constructivism posits that shared meanings about the social world, not materialism, drive international politics. According to Wendt (1999), the basic idea of constructivism is that "structures of human association" including "the identities and interests of purposive actors" are "determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces" (1). Thus, constructivism focuses on how *ideas* influence behavior.

Constructivism is an important school in international relations. In his 1992 essay "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," Wendt challenged rationalist assumptions that treat "the identities and interests of agents as exogenously given" (391). For Wendt and other constructivists, how actors form identities and interests are important research questions. Even the "logic" of self-help in anarchy is socially constructed, not an inherent feature.

Similarly, for constructivists, transnational policy diffusion is not simply a matter of rational interest but of ideas about what kinds of policies are best. A global consensus forms around certain policy goals and the means to achieve them, and the result is transnational policy diffusion. Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) suggested several constructivist mechanisms by

which policy innovations spread, including (1) follow-the-leader, (2) expert theorization, (3) network connections, and (4) tipping points which promote a "taken-for-granted" attitude.

Under follow-the-leader, countries mimic the policy of a country that appears to be doing well. This mechanism is more relevant to domains where success can be clearly defined, which is not generally the case with TIP policy since the opaque, criminal nature of trafficking makes it difficult to measure success against it.

Expert theorization is a more promising mechanism for TIP policy. Here, experts develop theoretically derived policy solutions to achieve certain policy goals. Policies are more likely to diffuse as expert agreement increases, though policy diffusion may be limited to actors that share appropriate similarities. In contrast to learning (discussed below), it is not necessary that these theories be supported by evidence—what is important is that experts find them credible. Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) argued that countries agreeing to policies they are unable to put into practice offers evidence of the power of ideas in policy diffusion.

Constructivists also hold that social networks play a role in diffusing ideas. These networks may be based on geographic proximity (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997), cultural similarities (Rose 1993), or structural equivalence (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006). One area of research is differentiating which social networks matter for the diffusion of ideas.

Finally, Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) noted "that once new policies reach a certain threshold of adoption, others will come to take the policy for granted as necessary" (454), citing the expansion of mass education as an example (Meyer, Ramirez, Rubinson, and Boli-Bennett 1977; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992). Although the level of adoption that achieves this "tipping point" is left undefined, the perception of the necessity of adoption it creates promotes policy diffusion among laggards.

Constructivist theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion

The constructivist theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion is seen in the work of Simmons, Lloyd, and colleagues, which emphasizes the importance of "frames" for the diffusion of TIP policy (Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons 2015; Simmons and Lloyd 2010; Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart 2018). Frames enable people to organize and interpret events—to give them meaning—and they motivate and guide action by labeling problems and proposing solutions (Snow et al. 1986). In the literature on TIP policy diffusion, these scholars used the concept of frames to connect ideas *about* incentives to policy decisions.

In 2015, Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons argued that policymakers chose to emphasize a transnational crime frame for human trafficking rather than victim protection or human rights frames, because the crime frame enables states to assert their authority. Their analysis of UN TIP resolutions found that crime language was associated with more sponsors and supporters. In 2018, Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart argued that the crime frame continued to matter, but here they held it was fear of the negative effects of transnational crime—especially the diversion of trafficking from neighbors with better enforcement policies—that motivated criminalization of TIP. In both studies, ideas about TIP encouraged policy diffusion.

Problems with constructivist theory

The constructivist theory is helpful in directing attention to how ideas influence interests and incentives, but the challenge is untangling ideas from incentives. The work of Simmons, Lloyd, and colleagues creatively addressed the alignment between ideas and incentives. But which comes first? Perhaps a change in ideas leads to changing preferences, or perhaps a change in incentives leads to a change in ideas. The importance of material incentives cannot be dismissed.

While theorization and framing are important for constructivists, significant overlap exists with learning theory, to which I turn next. New theorization recommending policy innovations may be directly connected with learning, but, even if not, ideas are likely to spread using the same mechanisms. For example, both theorization and learning diffuse through social networks, and follow-the-leader or tipping points may apply as much to learning as to theorization. Indeed, it is difficult to operationalize measures that distinguish between learning and theorization.

Learning Theory

Both constructivism and learning are theories that emphasize changing ideas. Despite this similarity, Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) held that learning is a distinct theory because ideas change as evidence changes, unlike constructivism where ideas change because theories change. Even so, overlap exists between the two approaches: learning depends on the visibility of both policy successes and failures, and, as noted in the discussion of constructivism above, theorization is often based upon encounters with evidence.

Various mechanisms promote policy diffusion through learning. One key mechanism is the example of the policy experiences of other countries. As these experiences are seen to be successful and appropriate for another context, policy diffuses across borders. The more consistent the evidence in favor of policy success, the more likely or more quickly policy will diffuse. One will note, however, that this mechanism appears indistinguishable from the follow-the-leader mechanism discussed under constructivism above.

As with constructivism, social networks are important for policy diffusion, as experts and policymakers learn lessons from their personal networks. For example, Honig and Weaver (2019) found that circulation of staff among aid organizations encouraged learning and fostered best practices. Other scholars have found international organizations to be effective loci of

policy diffusion (Eising 2002; Kahler 1992; Quirk 1994). Not only are international organizations at the center of global policy-focused social networks, but they can also promote policy diffusion as agents themselves or through the sharing of information among policy elites.

Learning theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion

Scholars of TIP policy diffusion have sought to consider the relevance of learning. Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2011) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) tried to control for the influence of learning in their statistical analyses of TIP policy diffusion, though the operationalization of their variables is problematic. Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer operationalized learning (or emulation) with similarity in UN voting patterns and a variable for "civilization," while Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart used regional press articles, criminalization among trading partners, and criminalization among countries at a similar developmental level, civilizational grouping, or legal family. The problem with the operationalization of learning in this way is that all these variables could be measuring other concepts. Moreover, these variables do not capture well the mechanisms noted above for policy diffusion by learning, such as observation of neighbor's policy successes or interaction among policy elites in international institutions. Table 1-1 summarizes the key measurements and findings in the literature related to learning.

Table 1-1. Learning in Studies of TIP Policy Diffusion

Study	Indicator	Operationalization	Finding
Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer 2011	Learning or emulation	UN voting similarity Civilizational dummy	Supported Partially supported
Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart 2018	Learning or emulation	Criminalization of other countries weighted by total trade Regional press articles Proportion of countries criminalizing within a given country's developmental level Proportion of countries criminalizing within a country's civilizational grouping Proportion of countries criminalizing within a country's legal family	Not supported Not supported Not supported Supported Supported

Problems with learning theory

Learning is difficult to operationalize. Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) criticized scholars for failing to differentiate between learning and "mindless emulation" and for taking

diffusion of policies as evidence of learning without showing that evidence supported the policy's efficacy (462). To some extent, we can see this problem with the operationalization of learning in Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018), though, to be fair, their primary interest was in showing the robustness of the main variable of interest rather than demonstrating that learning promoted the diffusion of TIP policy. The social networks by which learning is said to diffuse may also diffuse ideas developed from theorization—that is, many of the operative mechanisms of learning are the same as those for constructivism.

Kelley (2017) argued that socialization through learning was an important consequence of the change in incentives brought about by reputational pressure (53-55). Because she believed learning is an *effect* of changing incentives, she did not try to operationalize it in her statistical studies. This highlights the problem of determining causality: does learning change incentives or do incentives encourage learning? Both are plausible patterns, and indeed both patterns could be happening simultaneously.

Coercion Theory

In coercion theory, powerful actors create material incentives and disincentives—typically economic—for policy adoption among less powerful actors. Powerful actors can include not only powerful states, but intergovernmental organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund which can impose conditions in return for loans. Not all material incentives need be negative—carrots and sticks are both used, but positive inducements, like loans or aid, are dependent upon changes in policy.

Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) described the primary diffusion mechanism as "conditionality"—setting requirements for aid, loans, or other material benefits. Conditionality can occur directly from powerful countries or indirectly through intergovernmental organizations. Scholars debate how coercive conditionality is—for example, countries may

accept conditions because they want them (Vreeland 2003) or the conditions may not be credibly enforced (Cordella and Dell'Arriccia 2002). Conditionality is especially common for encouraging diffusion of economic policies, but it has also been used to promote democracy and human rights. For example, Hafner-Burton (2005) showed that preferential trade agreements promote improve human rights performance when those agreements have specific standards on which material benefits conditionally depend.

Dobbin, Simmons, Garrett (2007) also described two other mechanisms under the coercion: policy leadership and hegemonic ideas. Policy leadership involves solving coordination problems through the unilateral action of a powerful actor. While global coordination on TIP policy is presented as a collective action problem, it is not a classic coordination problem which one powerful actor can solve. Hegemony refers to Gramsci's understanding of cultural hegemony by which the ruling group perpetuates its rule by setting social norms and meeting people's psychological needs for meaning. While this line of research asks important questions about who benefits from policy diffusion, including TIP policy diffusion, for the purposes of this study it is operationally indistinguishable from constructivism, conditionality, or reputation. Either ideas change incentives, through the mechanisms described above, or powerful actors promote their interests by changing incentives—either material incentives through conditionality, or social incentives through reputation mechanisms (discussed below). As such, I focus on conditionality as the primary coercive mechanism relevant to the diffusion of TIP policy.

Coercion theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion

US leadership in promoting the diffusion of TIP policy through its scorecard diplomacy with its threat of sanctions has led scholars to give coercive mechanisms some attention. Outside of the US TVPA, which makes some aid and loan support conditional on a state's efforts

to improve TIP policy, conditionality is not found in trade or loan agreements. No scholar has tested whether US sanctions or threat of sanctions has promoted TIP policy diffusion, but they have given attention to material conditions that may make countries vulnerable to US (or occasionally European) pressure. In her work on scorecard diplomacy, Kelley (2017) did not find much evidence that material vulnerability to US pressure mattered for TIP policy diffusion. Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) found more support for vulnerability to US pressure than Kelley, but their measure for US pressure—receiving a low score in the TIP report—may be measuring reputational pressure (discussed below) rather than threat of sanctions. A summary of the results relating to coercion are found in table 1-2.

Table 1-2. Coercion in Studies of TIP Policy Diffusion

Study	Indicator	Operationalization	Finding
Kelley 2017	Vulnerability to US material pressure	US aid (logged) US aid as share of GDP (logged) US aid as share of total aid (logged) US trade as share of GDP (logged) US military aid (logged) US FDI (logged) Imports to US (logged)	Weak support Not supported Not supported Not supported Weak support Not supported Not supported
Simmons, Lloyd, and Steward 2018	Coercion	Trade dependence on US or EU US aid dependence Use of IMF credits US TIP tier 2 watch list or tier 3	Not supported Supported Supported Supported

Problems with coercion theory

As Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) pointed out, when considering coercion, "it is necessary to identify the coercive actors" (457). In relation to TIP policy, this is a straightforward task, as there is only one actor applying conditionality for aid (or loans) in TIP policy performance: The United States. Scholars have tried to measure how vulnerable other states are to this conditionality, but many of the ways they have operationalized this vulnerability could also be measuring other mechanisms. Findings are also inconclusive.

As yet, no scholar has analyzed the influence of sanctions or the threat of sanctions on TIP policy diffusion. The challenge with analyzing the influence of sanctions is the selection effect: sanctions are more likely to be used when they are less likely to be successful (Nooruddin

2002). Thus, actual sanctioning is not likely to be effective in promoting desired policies, but the threat of sanctions may be effective in circumstances where that threat is credible. Despite these challenges, key actors and material incentives are clear, and in this study, I directly test the relevance of the threat of sanctions for TIP policy diffusion.

Competition Theory

According to Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007), the key propositions for the economic competition theory are that (1) governments compete for "a fixed quantity of trade or investment," (2) governments "know who their competitors are," (3) governments can "connect policy choices to competitive advantages," and (4) governments focus on policies which have a short-term effects, like tax breaks, as these are most likely to influence investors' decisions (458). Competition is the mechanism: policy diffusion occurs as governments adopt policies to forestall potential advantages gained by competitors through their own policy choices.

One potential outcome of the policy diffusion through competition is convergence. An example is the adoption of the gold standard, where adoption was speeded by the share of trade with other countries that had adopted the standard (Meissner 2002). Many critics of globalization argue that competition pressure encourages a "race to the bottom" as governments decrease environmental regulations or labor protections to encourage foreign investment. But diffusion scholars have found policy divergence even where such pressures are said to exist, and they have explained differential environmental policy outcomes as contingent on such contexts as sensitivity to competition pressure (Porter 1999), industrial characteristics (Zheng and Shi 2017), or the jurisdiction's fiscal strength (Van Der Kamp, Lorentzen, and Mattingly 2017). Nor does economic competition necessarily result in policy diffusion at all—Bearce (2007) showed that, contrary to some scholar's expectations, there has not been convergence on monetary policy in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD); rather, countries have frequently chosen to pursue policy autonomy, contingent on their domestic politics.

Competition theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion

In the literature on TIP policy diffusion, economic competition is reversed. Here, scholars have assumed that countries are trying to compete in becoming *unattractive* to investment by transnational criminal trafficking organizations. The other propositions apply: countries know who their competitors are, connect their own and neighbor's policy choices to competitive advantages, and focus on short-term effects. Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2011) were the first to propose that fear of trafficking diversion (which they called "externalities") motivated TIP policy diffusion for law enforcement policies, but not for victim protection policies. They held that as policy responses to TIP escalate in one country, transnational traffickers will be incentivized to switch to less-risky transit routes or destinations. Consequently, countries vulnerable to these potential indirect effects of their neighbor's improved policy responses ought to ratchet up their own law enforcement policies to avoid the negative effects of increased trafficking flows. They found that a country's prosecution policies improved when their neighbors or bilateral trade partners had enacted better prosecution policies.

Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) connected issue framing with perceptions of the direct and indirect effects of trafficking and neighbors' policy choices. They argued that framing transnational trafficking as a crime required a law enforcement solution and contributed to the frame's rapid global diffusion. The law enforcement frame (among several alternative TIP frames) emphasized the negative effects of trafficking, both the direct threat of trafficking to governance, but also the indirect effects resulting from the policy choices of neighbors. They used density of road connections as a proxy measure for vulnerability to trafficking diversion

from neighbors which criminalized trafficking and found that these connections were associated with ratification of the Protocol and domestic criminalization, especially for transit countries.

Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) argued that the criminalization of neighbors weighted by the density of road networks was indeed a proxy for the vulnerability of a state to diversion of trafficking flows from neighbors' improved policy efforts. Conceptually, this is because human trafficking involves the movement of people (rather than ideas, goods, or money), and that means it predominately follows roads. Their proxy variable remained robust when including control variables such as criminalization among trading partners, number of regional news articles, or criminalization among a country's reference groups, such as "civilizational" group, "legal family" or developmental level. Furthermore, Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart predicted that vulnerability to trafficking diversion would matter for prosecution policy but not for protection policy; their findings indicate their proxy is positively associated with both, though the relationship is more substantive with prosecution policies. They also tested their road density variable with diffusion of money laundering laws and found no connection, as they predicted, since money laundering does not require roads. Table 1-3 summarizes the results in the literature on TIP policy diffusion related to competition.

Table 1-3. Competition in Studies of TIP Policy Diffusion

Study	Indicator	Operationalization	Finding
Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer 2011	Trafficking diversion ("externalities")	Contiguity dummy Bilateral trade	Supported Partially supported
Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart 2018	Trafficking diversion ("externalities")	Criminalization of neighbors weighted by density of road networks	Supported

Problems with competition theory

Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) criticized studies of competition theory in policy diffusion for failing to measure the pressure exerted by competitors by relying instead on proxy measures such as trade openness, as well as failing to consider alternative approaches. While

advocates for fear of trafficking diversion as a motivator for TIP policy diffusion do consider other diffusion mechanisms, their operationalization of the concept is problematic. But the greatest problem with this approach is that it is counter-intuitive because it requires that policymakers generally believe, contrary to common intuition, that the threat posed to their country is greater from neighbors who are doing *more* against traffickers. Simmons and Lloyd (2010) argued that in policy domains of prostitution and drug trafficking, crime is diverted by increased enforcement (Gros 2003; Keenan 2006). But to make the claim that policymakers are influenced by these concerns for human trafficking, they must also show that policymakers are generally aware of them. They have not done this. As I know of little discussion of TIP displacement in the advocacy or policy communities, I am skeptical that fear of it is motivating policymakers around the world.

Moreover, the variable chosen to operationalize fear of trafficking diversion—the number of road connections to neighbors which have criminalized trafficking—may be measuring other diffusion mechanisms. Constructivist and learning theory hold that ideas diffuse through transnational connections, which roads may be measuring. Moreover, reputation theory predicts that better performing neighbors encourage under-performing neighbors to improve their policies. Counts of road connections cannot tell us which mechanism is at play.

Finally, we lack clear evidence for diversion of trafficking flows via roads. When diverted trafficking exists, it often involves more complicated travel routes than can be proxied by variables relating to number of roads. The US TIP reports include some perceived or likely cases of trafficking diversion, including:

- Bangladeshis transiting Nepal to obtain Nepalese visas for employment in the Gulf (US DoS 2011, 82);

- Labor migrants from Benin using airports in Togo, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria to avoid antitrafficking screening in Benin (US DoS 2019, 99);
- Malagasy migrants and trafficking victims travelling through the Comoros or Mauritius on their way to the Middle East to avoid Madagascar's increased protective restrictions for emigrants (US DoS 2011, 241, 254; US DoS 2014, 137);
- Increasing use of the airport in Conakry, Guinea to transport victims from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to Kuwait and Qatar (US DoS 2018, 207);
- Diverting Asian trafficking victims through Lesotho to more easily reach South Africa (US DoS 2008, 273);
- Diversion of South Korean trafficking victims headed to the United States from Canada to Mexico due to increased security at Canadian airports and along the US-Canadian border (US DoS 2006, 87);
- Increasing numbers of Mongolian trafficking victims in Turkey due to visa-free travel opportunities for Mongolians in Turkey (US DoS 2011, 261);
- Increasing use of Portugal as a route for African trafficking victims into the Schengen area (US DoS 2019, 387);
- Traffickers shifting routes from Libya to Morocco (US DoS 2018, 394); and
- Increasing use of Sri Lanka as a transit point for trafficking and smuggling of Nepalis (US DoS 2017, 11, 371).

These examples illustrate the complexity of trafficking diversion. In many cases, trafficking routes include legs via air, and the policies which traffickers are trying to circumnavigate or take advantage of are border control and migration policies, not trafficking criminalization. These examples suggest that one of the primary motivators for traffickers changing routes is the change in the ease of entry and exit in the countries along the routes.

Consider again the key propositions of competition theory: First, countries may be competing to become unattractive to a fixed amount of trafficking criminal investment, but it is not clear that it is fixed. Indeed, the US TIP reports are filled with discussions of increased trafficking that suggest the total investment is not limited, and that some TIP is opportunistically driven by civil strife (e.g., in Syria) and harmful government policies (e.g., in Eritrea) that create populations of vulnerable refugees or migrants. Second, do governments know who their competitors are? While this seems plausible in some scenarios (e.g., Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya are all plausibly competitors against trafficking of African migrants to Europe), it is not clear that Nepal and Sri Lanka would see themselves as competitors against trafficking of victims to the Middle East—at least not until they observed changes on the ground. Third, countries likely do connect policy choices to competitive advantages against TIP, but these policies frequently seem to be border control and visa requirement policies, not trafficking criminalization. Fourth, the examples show that countries do seem to engage in short-term policy actions to discourage traffickers, but, again, these short-term policies are not criminalization, but border security and managing migrant flows—policies the purposes of which include more than discouraging trafficking. Thus, while we have some evidence that countries engage in policies to discourage transnational trafficking, we have grounds to question the fit of competition theory both in terms of the policies under consideration (i.e., criminalization), and in terms of the variables used to proxy the fear of trafficking (i.e., number of roads to better-performing neighbors).

Reputation Theory

Like coercion and competition theory, the final approach to policy diffusion focuses on changing incentives, but unlike them, these incentives are reputational and not necessarily directly observable or material. Başer (2020) defined reputation as "beliefs held by the international audience about an unknown underlying characteristic pertaining to that state" (2).

Concern for reputation can be extended to other actors—including individuals who engage in policymaking, and other audiences, including domestic publics and social networks. Kelley (2017) held that reputations matter as both instruments to other ends and as ends in themselves. In addition to material repercussions that can come from reputations, good reputations are worth pursuing for such difficult-to-measure concepts as a sense of belonging or moral worth.

Concern over reputation in international relations has been linked to resolving commitment problems that exist for both conflict and cooperation. For example, scholars have long sought to explain how states communicate the credibility of their alliances by investing in costly signals, thereby improving their reputation as alliance-keepers (Horowitz, Poast, and Stam 2017; Johnson and Joiner 2021; Mattes 2012; Morrow 1994). Scholars have also used reputational incentives to help explain behavior which seems inconsistent with material interests (Simmons 2000; Zartner and Ramos 2011). Başer (2020) argued that, because state preferences can change, reputational uncertainty always exists and reputational incentives are therefore greater for actors with poor or uncertain reputations, while states with good reputations are more likely to take advantage of their reputations.

Kelley and Simmons (2019) argued that reputational mechanisms assert themselves through (1) comparative global performance indicators, (2) elite networks, (3) domestic politics, and (4) transnational pressure—which can overlap with economic competition as reputations signal credibility to investors, donors, and other actors. Global performance indicators (GPIs) are increasingly common in international politics. GPIs are regular, public assessments of states (or other actors) that permit comparative performance. As such, they can activate reputational concerns, though their influence depends on the authority of the assessor, amount of consensus regarding the evaluations, and local values. Elite social networks can promote conformity to

social norms. Elites want to maintain their reputations among their own social peers. For example, Honig and Weaver (2019) found that the Aid Transparency Index motivated elites within donor organizations to improve their performance so that they could maintain status among their professional colleagues in other organizations. Domestic politics can also incentivize elites to improve their country's reputation when those domestic publics care about it. Domestic actors, such as civil society organizations or local businesses, may use negative external evaluations of their countries performance to promote their own agendas for policies that align with those advocated in GPIs. Transnational pressures are frequently those we expect in economic competition theory—external actors who make decisions based on the reputations of states. Here, reputation has a direct though diffuse connection to material incentives. The difference is that economic competition is primarily focused on short-term incentives, while building reputation need not be.

Reputation theory in explaining TIP policy diffusion

Kelley's (2017) *Scorecard Diplomacy* offers the most thorough theoretical and evidentiary defense of reputation as crucial for TIP policy diffusion. According to Kelley, the United States participates in the growing trend for influencing states' reputations through the use of "scorecard diplomacy," a method by which actors rank and compare countries with each other, motivating countries to respond to improve their reputations, especially within their "peer" group. The TVPA required the US State Department to evaluate and rank each country's TIP policy performance and thereby exercise its influence to shape the reputation of states to motivate action on TIP.

Kelley (2017) argued that concern over reputation does not deny the relevance of hard power, material incentives, or the normative environment. Indeed, states may desire to maintain a positive reputation to access material goods, and the efficacy of reputational

mechanisms depend on the normative environment. She acknowledged that the US use of scorecard diplomacy is enhanced by its "status and strength" (15). Power is not irrelevant, but, following Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990), "power is not reducible to coercive capacities" (289). For Kelley, the story is about the mechanism by which an actor like the US uses its power to get desired results, and for Kelley, that mechanism is scorecard diplomacy.

Kelley (2017) argued that the efficacy of the TIP scorecard diplomacy depends not only on sustaining diplomatic engagement, but also on (1) each government's sensitivity to reputational pressure, (2) its exposure of its policy shortfalls, and (3) its capacity to prioritize TIP policy over other concerns. Sensitivity to reputational pressure depends on practical stakes—how will having a poor reputation for TIP policy matter for governments and their people for achieving their goals? This sensitivity can include such direct material concerns as loss of US aid or loss of tourism revenue. It may also include social or normative concerns, especially if complying with the social goals of TIP policy matters to the people (e.g., on normative grounds) and whether the people's opinion of their government's TIP performance has costs for the government. Exposure to reputational concerns has to do with the extent to which the government's behavior is publicly observed. Exposure depends on the availability and clarity of information about government performance, the credibility of the scorecard evaluation, and the role of the domestic media and civil society in holding the government accountable. The government's capacity to prioritize TIP policy over other issues competing for the government's attention matters for all stages of the policy process but is especially important for policy implementation since implementing many TIP policies is complex and costly. Kelley contended that the efficacy of reputational pressure depends on these domestic characteristics, as well as the sustained pressure from the US and other external actors. For Kelley, reputation acts like a

catalyst to activate government and public attention to TIP policy. Variation in these domestic characteristics then helps explain variation in TIP policy efforts.

Kelley (2017) tested her theory with several methods, including statistical analysis, document analysis of State Department cables, survey analysis, case studies and elite interviews. She found substantial statistical evidence to support her theory that reputational concerns mattered for domestic criminalization. Inclusion in the TIP reports, as well as receiving low scores, tended to spur criminalization. A summary of Kelley's findings related to reputation are shown in table 1-4.

Table 1-4. Reputation in Studies of TIP Policy Diffusion

Study	Indicator	Operationalization	Finding
Kelley 2017	Scorecard pressure (reputation)	Presence in US TIP report	Supported
		US TIP report score of tier 2 watch list or tier 3	Supported
		Demotion in US TIP report (lagged)	Supported

Problems with reputation theory

One key problem with reputation is that it is difficult to measure: How much is reputation worth to an actor? How much reputation is gained or lost by any action? Given the difficulty in measuring the value of reputation, the danger is that it can become a catch-all category that explains everything we want to explain. Moreover, reputational concerns can coexist with the other theories. Not only can ideas shape concern over reputation, but concern over reputation may inspire learning or adoption of new ideas. Furthermore, having a good reputation can lead to material benefits, so that reputation may also overlap with coercion and competition theory. Finally, what makes for a good reputation domestically may not coincide with what makes for a good reputation internationally. Başer (2020) argued that reputation building strategies ought to matter most to actors with poor reputations, but his theory does not consider the existence of two-level games (Putnam 1988), where a government's domestic reputation may be improved by actions that harm its international reputation.

Open Questions in the Literature on TIP Policy Diffusion

Given the foregoing discussion of the different theories to understanding policy diffusion, three questions stand out: (1) what is the explanatory value of each theory for promoting TIP policy diffusion? (2) should we expect to see differential diffusion of TIP policy based on policy domain (whether it is law enforcement, capacity building, or victim services)? and (3) why do we see regional differentiation in TIP policy diffusion?

The explanatory value of each theory

Dobbins, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) argued that to understand the relative explanatory value of each theory of policy diffusion in statistical studies, it is necessary to control for the other theories. To some extent, scholars of TIP policy diffusion have tried to do this. However, in many cases, the variables which they used to represent the influence of other theories could have multiple meanings. To take one example, Simmons, Lloyd, and Garrett's (2018) used the variable "proportion of countries criminalizing within a country's civilizational grouping" to proxy for learning, but it could signify various theoretical mechanisms, including reputational pressure and constructivist "tipping points." Moreover, the variable does not necessarily include any requirement that countries are learning *from evidence* that criminalization helps solve the problems countries wish to solve with it. The extant literature on TIP policy diffusion therefore lacks tests of competing theories using the best available measures.

As exemplified above, learning is especially difficult to proxy with variables for TIP policy. This is, in part, due to the lack of empirical evidence for the success of any policy under consideration. Of course, numbers of prosecutions increase after criminalization, but the number of prosecutions does not measure the extent to which TIP is increasing or decreasing in society more broadly. Some countries can also measure the number of victims assisted, but,

again, this number does not say much about the prevalence of victims in a country. Therefore, TIP is more like policies to reduce violence against women where data is opaque than it is like policies with more transparent lines of cause and effect, such as currency controls. A good proxy variable to test learning theory for TIP policy is beyond the reach of this dissertation.

This dissertation empirically evaluates the explanatory power of each theory of policy diffusion, except for learning, by generating and testing unique theoretical predictions while controlling for the other theories. While the nature of TIP policy makes learning currently untestable, the other four theories have plausible explanatory value, and adjudicating the relative merits of each theory is useful for both grounding further theoretical development as well as policy making.

Differential diffusion based on policy type

One advantage of this dissertation over other studies of TIP policy diffusion is that I test the theories on different types of TIP policies. Previous studies have focused on criminalization, but this study uses six TIP policies related to law enforcement, capacity-building, and victim protection. Should we expect differential diffusion based on these policy types?

Existing work has argued that we should see differential diffusion by policy type. Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons (2014) found that crime language in UN General Assembly resolutions related to TIP produced more sponsors and diverse supporters than rights language. Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) found that linking TIP to transnational crime promoted criminalization among neighbors vulnerable to trafficking flows. The emphasis on law enforcement in US and global TIP policy has long been recognized and criticized (Chuang 2014; Gallagher 2001; Todres 2011). That law enforcement frames promote diffusion of criminalization can be explained from constructivist theory—that is, that certain ideas are more appealing to certain actors. Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) connected constructivism to

competition—if countries became convinced that transnational TIP was a threat, then they would be more likely to compete with neighbors to become less attractive to transnational criminal networks. They did not have the same expectation for victim service policies, but their study design found evidence that the number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization did improve an ordinal measure for generalized protection policy.

Since 2011, criminalization has been the most widespread TIP policy, but prior to 2010, intersectoral coordinating bodies diffused more rapidly (see figure 2-1 in the next chapter). Constructivists can explain the appeal of criminalization but have not considered the appeal of intersectoral coordinating bodies. Indeed, prior to this dissertation, the data had not been available to compare the prevalence of various TIP policies. Given the lack of data, and the problem of using variables that could operationalize multiple diffusion mechanisms, the empirical findings of the literature are unsettled.

How might each theory explain differentiation in diffusion by policy type? As coercion in TIP policy has only one coercive actor—the US and its sanctioning mechanism—differentiation in policy diffusion might occur because the US considers some policies as more important for meeting its minimum standards. The reputation theory of Kelley (2017) could explain the differentiation of diffusion by policy by appealing to variations in US diplomatic attention toward each policy, the work of other international organizations that generate reputational pressure, or in each government's sensitivity, exposure, or capacity to address each policy. The reputational mechanisms themselves, however, ought to produce diffusion if the inputs are the same. Learning theory could explain differentiation by pointing to variations in evidence for policy effectiveness by policy domain. As noted above, however, we do not have this evidence. Constructivist theory could explain differentiation by arguing that ideas which appeal to powerful actors are more likely to diffuse.

For most of these theories, these are simply questions of empirical data. Whether the US prefers some policies to others is not a theoretical question, but an empirical one. Similarly, which ideas are more appealing to decision-makers is an empirical question. The theoretical mechanisms of coercion, reputation, or constructivism ought to work if activated by the appropriate inputs, but whether these inputs are active is currently unknown. The only theory which offers a clear prediction is competition. Competing with neighbors to become less attractive to criminal networks should favor law enforcement policies but not impact victim protection policies.

This study's contribution to the question of differentiation by policy type is primarily inductive. Except for competition theory, we do not have *a priori* expectations about the inputs necessary to explain differentiation among policy type. Nonetheless, this dissertation can help uncover data useful for developing *post facto* explanations, improving existing theories, and informing policymakers. As such, in each chapter, I will note what the models reveal about differential diffusion by policy type. A summary of how each theory could explain differentiation in diffusion by policy type is shown in table 1-5.

Table 1-5. How the Theories Explain Differentiation in Diffusion by Policy Type

Theory	Explanation for differentiation by policy type
Coercion	Coercive mechanisms ought to work for all policy types. Differentiation among policy type depends on US preferences.
Reputation	Reputation mechanisms ought to work for all policy types. Differentiation among policy type depends on the preferences of the US as reflected in the scoring mechanism, on the availability of other reputational mechanisms (such as regional cooperation), or on the variations in domestic sensitivity, exposure, or capacity in each policy domain.
Constructivist	Constructivist mechanisms ought to work for all policy types. Differentiation among policy type depends upon the appeal of the relevant frame for decision-makers.
Learning	Learning mechanisms ought to work for all policy types but are not available in the case of TIP because evidential learning is limited for all domains.
Competition	Competition mechanisms ought to work for law enforcement policies but not victim protection policies.

Explaining regional variation in policy diffusion

The final unanswered question from the literature developed in this study is how to explain regional differentiation in TIP policy diffusion. Kelley (2017) noted the existence of "regional patterns," but did not try to explain them. Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2011) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) included a variable for "civilization" in their models, and suggested that this might operationalize learning, but did not give it any sustained theoretical attention. Yet, we know that regions vary in their extent of regional cooperation, both on TIP and more generally. Interstate organizations like the European Union, African Union, and Organization of American States engage in TIP policy coordination. What do the various theories expect for the influence of these regional organizations?

Coercion theory could explain regional variation in TIP policy diffusion by pointing to regional variation in coercive mechanisms in regional organizations. Regional organizations do provide aid to weaker partners, but no regional organization sanctions countries over its TIP policies. *If* any coercion is taking place (e.g., threats to withhold aid), it is not public. Coercive mechanisms cannot be ruled out, but neither can they be tested.

Learning theory proposes that policy diffuses through institutional and personal network connections, and so variation in regional performance could be explained by variation in the extent of these networks. However, learning also requires that actors learn from their experience. Unfortunately, measuring the success of TIP policy is challenging, and it is unlikely that TIP policy diffuses because some policies are evidentially more successful than others at reducing TIP or the prevalence of victims.

Like learning theory, constructivist theory proposes that changing ideas leads to changes in behavior and that policy diffuses through institutional and personal network connections. However, for the constructivist, changing ideas are more likely to come from theorization, a

situation which is operative for TIP. Constructivists also hold that the more an idea becomes taken-for-granted, the more rapidly it diffuses. Thus, variation in the extent of regional institutional and personal network connections, such as those found in regional organizations, could explain regional variation in TIP policy diffusion.

Competition theory proposes that countries are in competition to discourage trafficking networks, so that they respond to their neighbor's or partner's policy choices. Regional organizations may help coordinate minimum standards; however, the driver of policy diffusion is the policy choices of other countries. No clear expectations emerge for the role of regional organizations as independent actors, and moreover, the competition approach, as currently described in the literature, is not able to predict regional variation in the diffusion of TIP protection policies, as these have no relationship with deterring traffickers.

Finally, reputation theory, as currently described in the literature on TIP policy diffusion, holds that reputational pressure from scorecard diplomacy and elite networks promote policy diffusion. While a few regional organizations provide external evaluations of members' TIP policy performance, none generate scorecards like the US TIP report. Regional organizations do vary on the extent they create elite networks, but this mechanism produces the same expectations as it does for the constructivism. The reputation and constructivist theories are not incompatible—both may be valid ways of explaining empirical phenomena, but this dissertation seeks to differentiate among the theories to the extent possible. How each theory could explain regional differentiation of policy diffusion is shown in table 1-6.

Table 1-6. How the Theories Explain Differentiation in Diffusion by Region

Theory	Explanation for differentiation by region
Coercion	Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by the presence of regional coercive mechanisms, but these seem absent for TIP policy.
Reputation	Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by regional variation in the extent of interconnectedness of elite networks and the extent regional cooperation on TIP offers opportunities for improving reputations.
Constructivist	Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by regional variation in the extent of interconnectedness of elite networks and by the extent to which the policy has become "taken-for-granted" in the region (e.g., reached a tipping point).
Learning	Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by regional variation in the extent of interconnectedness of elite networks.
Competition	Regional variation in TIP policy diffusion could be explained by variation in the extent to which neighbors' policy choices create negative externalities (but only for criminalization).

The constructivist theory uniquely claims the importance of a policy idea becoming normalized for promoting policy diffusion, but to test for the influence of shared ideas, I also need to control for other mechanisms. Thus, this study takes into account the role of regional policy communities. By controlling for how much regional variation in TIP policy diffusion can be explained by regional policy communities, I can reveal how much policy normalization helps explain regional diffusion as well as gaps in the literature that need further theoretical development.

A Summary of the Theories of Policy Diffusion

In table 1-7, I have summarized the various theories of policy diffusion discussed in this chapter, the mechanisms by which they operate, and the predictions they have for TIP policy. This list is not exhaustive but shows where these predictions overlap and where they offer testable hypotheses.

Table 1-7 Summary of the Theories of Policy Diffusion and Predictions for TIP Policy

Theory	Propositions	Mechanisms	Predictions for TIP policy
Constructivism	Changing ideas leads to changes in behavior Identities and interests of actors are determined by shared ideas rather than material forces Increasing agreement about policy solutions leads to diffusion	Expert theorization Network connections	Scorecard diplomacy, regional organizations, neighbors, and civil society cooperation on TIP will promote diffusion Differentiation by policy type will occur as the attractiveness of frames varies for decision-makers Regional differentiation will occur as the extent of institutional and personal networks vary
		Tipping points	Diffusion quickens after a "tipping point" is reached Regional differentiation will occur as the extent to which a policy achieves a "taken-for-granted" status varies.
Learning	Changing ideas leads to changes in behavior Actors learn from experience (evidence)	Network connections	Scorecard diplomacy, regional organizations, neighbors, and civil society cooperation on TIP will promote diffusion for policies which are empirically successful.
Coercion	Powerful actors incentivize policy diffusion through material incentives	Conditionality through sanctions	Credible threat of sanctions will promote diffusion. Differentiation by policy type will depend on US preferences. Regional differentiation will occur if regional organizations have sanctioning mechanisms (none currently do).
Competition	Governments compete for a fixed quantity of trade or investment Governments know who their competitors are Governments connect policy choices to competitive advantages Governments focus on policies which have short-term effects	Competition to avoid traffickers (Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer 2011; Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart 2018)	Perceptions of increased or diverted transnational trafficking will promote diffusion of law enforcement policies.

Table 1-7 Summary of the Theories to Policy Diffusion and Predictions for TIP Policy, cont.

Theory	Propositions	Mechanisms	Predictions for TIP policy
Reputation	Good reputations are desired for their own sake as well as in the pursuit of material advantages Reputations can help solve collective action problems	Scorecard diplomacy (Kelley 2017; Kelley and Simmons 2019)	Global scorecards will promote diffusion for all policies for which members can expect improved scores relative to their neighbors Differentiation by policy type will occur if the scorer has differentiated preferences
		Elite networks (Kelley and Simmons 2019)	Scorecard diplomacy, regional organizations, neighbors, and civil society cooperation on TIP will promote diffusion Regional differentiation will occur as the extent to which institutional and personal networks vary by region.
		Domestic politics (Başer 2020; Kelley 2017; Kelley and Simmons 2019)	Greater government accountability will promote diffusion Civil society cooperation on TIP will promote diffusion

Policy diffusion may occur either through changing ideas and changing incentives (or both), and so no test will be able to discern which comes first. Mechanisms associated with competition or reputation depend on actors believing certain ideas about the world, and these mechanisms can also encourage actors to change their ideas. That said, some of the predictions are unique and untested. Coercion theory has never been tested in relation to sanctions, and this gap in the literature needs to be filled. The reputation theory of Kelley (2017) predicts that the states are motivated to improve their scores relative to their peers and that the reputational influence of scorecard diplomacy will be most effective for those policies which improve scores. Scholars have proposed that fear of trafficking diversion has driven policy diffusion, and this can be tested by explicitly seeing if perceived increases in transnational trafficking or diversion of trafficking flows has any influence on diffusion. Moreover, predictions about the influence of global scorecards, regional organizations, and neighborly influence have never been tested together. Next, I turn to the specific hypotheses I test in this study.

HYPOTHESES

The primary aim of this dissertation is to adjudicate the theoretical debate by evaluating the explanatory power of the theories of policy diffusion for TIP policy. Testing the hypotheses described here will also reveal data about variation in policy diffusion by policy type and by region which needs to be considered for further theoretical development. Given the nature of TIP, learning theory cannot be tested as we do not yet know whether specific policies reduce the prevalence of trafficking or its victims, though the theory's networking mechanisms are shared with constructivism.

Untested Hypotheses Unique to Coercion Theory

As I have discussed above, the main tool of coercion—sanctions—which is readily identifiable in the case of TIP has never been tested.

Hypothesis 1. Credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion.

Untested Hypotheses Unique to Reputation Theory

Kelley (2017) argued and found that US scorecard diplomacy promoted TIP policy diffusion. One finding in her research, which she called "groundbreaking," showed that countries were concerned with the relative standing of their scores with reference to their peer group, especially neighbors (128-130). Although the method for scoring countries is opaque, I can statistically determine characteristics of the reports which are likely to improve scores. This gives us a unique opportunity to test reputation against constructivism (though the two are not necessarily at odds), should the results of the investigation show that states implement policies that are likely to improve scores. Thus,

Hypothesis 2. Reputational pressure from neighbors having a better score promotes TIP policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores.

More ambiguously, scorecard diplomacy may encourage policy diffusion, not because countries are concerned with their relative performance, but because they are concerned about their reputation *vis-à-vis* the United States, because policymakers and diplomats are concerned about their personal reputations, or because US diplomacy increases the visibility and attractiveness of certain policy ideas. While these mechanisms overlap with constructivist mechanisms, we can nonetheless predict that *non-coercive* mechanisms matter for TIP policy diffusion. Thus,

Hypothesis 3. Non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy promote TIP policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores.

Untested Hypotheses Unique to Constructivist Theory

Constructivists sometimes talk about "tipping points" as ideas become taken-for-granted, spurring their diffusion. While this discussion is vague about what a tipping point might be, I can test whether a taken-for-granted attitude toward TIP policy influences diffusion. Thus,

Hypothesis 4. TIP policy diffusion increases as the regional density of countries which have the policy increases.

Untested Hypotheses Unique to Competition Theory

Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) have been keen to connect constructivism with competition by arguing that the fear of trafficking diversion from better-performing neighbors is motivating policy diffusion. As I noted in the discussion above, their operationalizations of this concept could also be measuring other mechanisms, such as reputational pressure to improve performance from better-performing neighbors. But, if the fear of negative consequences motivates policy diffusion, then reports of increased transnational trafficking or trafficking diversion should certainly do so. This motivation should apply to law enforcement policy and

possibly prevention or capacity policies, but not victim protection policy, as the latter does not disrupt criminal trafficking networks. Thus,

Hypothesis 5. Reports of increased transnational trafficking or diversion of trafficking flows promote diffusion of TIP policies which disrupt trafficking networks.

CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH DESIGN

OVERVIEW

I propose that evaluate the hypotheses presented in chapter 1 in a global statistical study of TIP policy diffusion using survival analysis, along the lines of those performed by Kelley (2017) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018). This study is different from these previous studies, however, in that (1) I am testing the explanatory value of each of the theories using variables that better capture their unique aspects, (2) I use dependent variables that capture more than criminalization so I can compare differences in diffusion among different types of TIP policy, (3) I test hypotheses using variables measuring the influence of both the region and neighbors, whereas previous studies have only included one and not the other, and (4) I use explanatory variables that better capture "fear of trafficking diversion" than those used previously.

This chapter is organized as follows: First, I begin the chapter with a description of the data collection. Next, I explain how I model the US sanctioning decision and TIP scoring so the results can inform the principal analysis in testing hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. I conclude the chapter with an explanation of the research design for the principal survival analysis used to test the hypotheses by discussing the dependent variables, explanatory variables, and model specifications.

DATA COLLECTION

Prior to this study, no extant data set existed useful for survival analysis of TIP policy beyond criminalization. Kelley (2017) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) collected data for their survival analyses, but their dependent variable is limited to criminalization. Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2011) introduced a "3P index" which uses reports from the US State Department, the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), and

the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to develop an ordinal assessment for prosecution, protection, and prevention policies, but this data is not useful for survival analysis and is limited in time from 2000 to 2015. The Global Slavery Index, produced by the NGO Walk Free, is another dataset which offers a qualitative assessment of TIP prevalence and policy responses, but like the 3P index, its data is not useful for survival analysis. To test hypotheses on other TIP policies beyond criminalization, I needed to collect data about the timing of other policy events. In the process of collecting this data, I was also able to collect additional data useful as explanatory variables for TIP policy diffusion, as well as for determining how the US TIP scores are generated and which countries were sanctioned.

Data collection involved two main components: (1) identification of country-specific policy and trafficking characteristics and (2) identification of regional organizations and characteristics of their efforts against TIP. Both components relied on the content analysis described below.

Trafficking Policy

To identify each country's TIP policies and trafficking characteristics, I primarily relied on the US TIP reports, the 2009 UNODC's *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*, and regional reports from GRETA and the Organization of American States (OAS). The US TIP reports and the 2009 UNODC report are the only qualitative assessments of trafficking characteristics and policies that are global in scope. The GRETA country monitoring reports provided excellent data for Europe. (The US TIP reports also relied on GRETA reports when available.) The OAS had a 2018 *Progress Report* that provided useful information for the Americas. I collected country data for the time period 1998 through 2018.

The data for the dependent variables is dichotomous: when a TIP policy event occurred in a given year, I marked that event as occurring. In a few cases, countries had more than one

legal revision in a single year, but as the variable is dichotomous, these multiple revisions to the law are not included in the data. The US TIP reports come out mid-year (usually June) for a period from April 1 through March 31, but I made my best efforts to locate the exact year of an event; if it was not clear, I used the year prior to the year in which the report was published.

I collected data for the following dependent variables: full criminalization, revisions to the TIP legal regime, institutionalization of intersectoral coordinating bodies, initiation of National Action Plans, formalization of operational National Referral Mechanisms, implementation of reflection periods for TIP victims, and the creation of national rapporteurs. As very few countries had national rapporteurs by 2018, statistical models are plagued by collinearity, and so I do not include their establishment in this study. Even though the data available in the four main sources was extensive, I found that I frequently had to locate additional sources to track down dates for the TIP policy events, especially for the earlier years, as data in the US TIP and GRETA reports became more comprehensive as time passed. A full list of sources used in content analysis is found in Appendix A.

Any revision to the TIP legal regime includes criminalization, but also any previous or subsequent law related to TIP, either directly or in a neighboring policy domain (such as worker rights) that is motivated, in part, by its effect on TIP. By collecting data on revisions to the law, I capture more of the policy cycle than criminalization alone. After TIP is first criminalized, implementation and evaluation of the law lead to new "problems" in need of legal solutions and, thus, revisions in the law. These changes in the law occur in the context of international discussion of best practices and policies, and so represent another outcome of transnational policy diffusion.

Effective TIP policy, as currently understood, is made possible by cross-sectoral coordination. To name one example, successful prosecution often depends on cooperation of

victims, and this cooperation depends on victim protection services which help build trust between victims and law enforcement. To meet these needs, governments have created inter-sectoral coordinating bodies to ensure that diverse agencies support rather than undermine anti-trafficking work. By establishing these bodies, governments improve their capacity to implement TIP policies; their diffusion is therefore of interest. Cross-sectoral TIP institutionalization is important for all domains of TIP policy. The US TIP reports usually discussed these bodies under "Prevention," but their work is not limited to activities which typically fall under that category (such as awareness raising campaigns or training), but also to coordinating victim services and law enforcement as well.

National Action Plans (NAPs) are another policy response that has become widespread. Frequently developed by the inter-sectoral coordinating bodies, these plans are generally comprehensive and require specific actions by various agencies and organizations. Most have specific, measurable goals, and a clear timeline by which the goals ought to be accomplished. Many are evaluated, revised, and renewed. Along with the first institutionalization of intersectoral coordinating bodies, NAPs offer an opportunity to test hypotheses for capacity-building activities that include all dimensions of TIP policy. I only include NAPs that are focused on TIP. Some countries had action plans serving broader social goals, such as women's welfare, that included anti-trafficking efforts, but I did not include these in the data.

Data collection included two victim protection policies: National Referral Mechanisms (NRMs) and reflection periods. NRMs are specific victim protection frameworks that establish procedures and responsibilities for identifying victims and referring them to services. Reflection periods give victims time to begin their recovery before deciding whether to cooperate with law enforcement. During these periods, foreign victims are granted legal residence. Together the

diffusion of NRMs and reflection periods allow us to test hypotheses for victim protection policies.

Figure 2-1 shows the total number of countries with extant criminalization, inter-sectoral coordinating bodies, NAPs, NRMs, and reflection periods over time, as well as the number of countries which revised their TIP legal regime in a given year.

Figure 2-1. TIP Policy Change over Time.



I also collected data on other TIP policy events that I used in some models, especially for predicting sanctions or TIP scores. These include whether a country had any TIP prosecutions or convictions in a given year, whether a country cooperated with civil society on TIP or whether it was hostile to civil society actors working on TIP, and whether there were reports that the government sponsored child-soldiers or engaged in abuses of TIP victims' physical integrity rights. I also recorded US or GRETA perceptions of problems in the implementation of migration or sex trade policy that further harmed victims of TIP. Even high-performing countries often faced criticism for these neighboring policy domains. For example, the United States State

Department frequently criticized the US implementation of its own migration policy as endangering victims of TIP.

No data collection effort can avoid the reality that data is more transparent and available in some regions and countries than others. While I gave my best efforts to locate dates for each TIP policy in every country, I recognize that the availability of data may bias data toward certain findings. Perhaps countries with more developed and transparent legal and institutional systems are more likely to implement the sorts of transnational policy solutions I am including in this study. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the data is biased either in favor or against findings because it potentially undercounts TIP policy events where data is less transparent. Moreover, I control for development level in all models as well as adjusting standard errors to account for possible intragroup correlation by region. We should be cautious of condemning countries which fail to implement these policies as it is possible that countries with less developed legal and institutional frameworks are better served by different sorts of policy solutions than those being considered here.

Scorecard Diplomacy and Trafficking Characteristics

The same research described above also enabled me to collect data about the US TIP reports and each country's trafficking characteristics.

I recorded the US TIP report score for each country. The US TIP reports also make recommendations to encourage governments to prioritize policies and actions. I recorded whether the US TIP report included a recommendation for full criminalization, for any legal revision (inclusive of criminalization), regarding institutionalization of an intersectoral coordinating body, or regarding instituting or improving the operation of a National Referral Mechanism.

Advocates of competition have argued that trafficking "externalities"—or the fear of them—influence the diffusion of trafficking policy. For a measure of these transnational trafficking "externalities," I recorded data from the US TIP reports on perceptions of trafficking diversion or increases in transnational trafficking within a country. In general, the reports made more references to "increases" in transnational trafficking than to diverted flows, though cases of trafficking diversion were noted. Examples of some of these cases are found in the discussion of competition in chapter 1.

Drawing mainly on the US TIP reports, but also on reports from GRETA and UNODC, I also recorded perceptions of whether a country was a source, destination, or transit country for transnational trafficking, and whether it was perceived to have a significant domestic trafficking problem.

I also collected data on the presence of child sex tourism in a country. The US TIP reports frequently mention child sex tourism, but they were not entirely consistent. I supplemented data in the TIP reports with reports of child sex tourism in the media, in scholarship, and in NGO reports.

Finally, I collected data on the US sanctioning decisions for tier 3 countries by reading the Presidential memorandums which waived TIP sanctions. For each sanctioning decision, I recorded whether a country had sanctions waived, partially waived, or experienced the full extent of TIP sanctions.

The International TIP Regime Complex

The international TIP regime complex includes both global and regional dimensions. For the global dimensions, I recorded data on Protocol accession and visits to countries by the UN Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur for TIP.

This dissertation is particularly interested in the role of regional policy communities in promoting TIP policy diffusion. I collected data from the regional organizations regarding their membership, efforts to combat TIP, level of institutionalized coordination, and whether their members submit to critical, external reviews of TIP policy. I noted that years in which coordination on TIP policy began for each organization.

The US TIP reports include a list of regional organizations working on TIP issues, but I discovered that this list was incomplete. I supplemented this list by noting the linkages between regional organizations in sponsoring conferences or other TIP policy activities. Data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) was helpful in charting some of the interrelationships between regional organizations. Bilateral agreements—of which there are many—are *not* included, as data on these is spotty.

For data on institutionalized coordination, I noted whether the regional organization had a permanent institutional coordinating body for TIP policy, as well as when this body was formed. Only three regional organizations have ongoing external evaluation of members—the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe's (COE) Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (through GRETA), and the European Union. Of these, the GRETA evaluations are the most public and extensive.

A list of all sources used to support data collection for the regional regime complexes can be found in Appendix A.

Modeling Sanctioning Decisions and TIP Scoring

Two of my hypotheses require a two-step modeling process. To test hypothesis 1, I first need to generate a variable on sanction credibility by modeling the US sanctioning decision. To test hypotheses 2 and 3, I first need to know what policies improve TIP scores. This section

presents the research design on for generating the models to provide the information necessary to evaluate these hypotheses.

Credible Sanctions

The TVPA requires that the US sanction countries which are failing to make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with minimum standards, that is, countries scored "tier 3." These targeted sanctions are limited to nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance. The law also mandates US opposition to the use of funds from development banks and the IMF, excepting those used for humanitarian or trade-related assistance. The President may waive these sanctions if doing so would harm vulnerable populations or otherwise be in the national interest of the United States. In actual practice, the US does not sanction all tier 3 countries, and those that the US does sanction are frequently targets of other US sanctions.

The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 added a "tier 2 watch list" category, the criteria of which—a country experiences a significant increase in trafficking or fails to provide evidence of efforts to combat trafficking but makes promises of future efforts—are clearly a warning that the country is in danger of being scored at tier 3 (and become sanctionable) unless it makes good on its promises to improve its performance. Thus, being placed on the tier 2 watch list means that a country risks being sanctioned in the future unless it takes some action on TIP. But given that the US President often waives at least some of the sanctions, how credible is this sanction threat?

Table 2-1. Tier 3 Sanction Frequency 2003-18

	Frequency	Percent
Sanctions waived	153	53%
Partial waiver	81	28%
Sanctioned	55	19%
Total	289	100%

Which countries were sanctioned? The data I collected revealed 289 sanctioning decisions from 2003 to 2018. Table 2-1 shows the frequency of waivers, partial waivers, and

sanctions. The twenty countries that have ever been fully sanctioned for poor TIP performance are: Bolivia, Burundi, China, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Iran, Laos, Madagascar, Mauritania, Myanmar, North Korea, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela. However, twelve of these were only sanctioned in 2018 when the Trump Administration began to aggressively use sanctions to encourage improvement in TIP performance (see Trump 2018). At one time or another forty countries have been ranked at tier 3 and never had sanctions applied. These are: Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Federated States of Micronesia, The Gambia, Georgia, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Moldova, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan. Figure 2-2 shows the number of tier 3 countries which had waivers, partial waivers, or sanctions over time.

Figure 2-2. Frequency of Sanctions, Waivers, and Partial Waivers.



From this data, I develop a model for determining the likelihood a country which is ranked tier 3 is sanctioned or has sanctions waived. Then from this model, I create a "sanction credibility" variable for countries for all countries scored at tier 2 watch list or tier 3 that I use as an explanatory variable for testing hypothesis 1 regarding the efficacy of threatening sanctions for improving TIP performance.

Modeling sanctions

As discussed above, the data I collected on the sanctioning decision was ordinal, but I found that ordered logistic regression models violated the proportional odds assumptions. Thus, from the ordinal data, I created a dichotomous variable indicating whether a country had sanctions waived or experienced any sanctions (full or partial), as this variable measures the application of some coercion on a target country.

The explanatory variables I use fall into three categories: (1) the country's general relationship with the US, (2) the country's TIP performance, and (3) other domestic considerations, both in the US and in the potential target country. For the country's relationship with the US, I considered using variables for the UN voting ideal point distance, the existence of other US sanctions, US military aid, and the ratios of both the country's total trade with the US and that of the US's total trade with the potential target.

I considered using the UN ideal point distance in the model for predicting sanctions, however, I found that inclusion of the UN ideal point distance did not improve the explanatory power of my best model, nor was it statistically significant if I included a variable for other US sanctions. Thus, I did not include it in the final model. For US military aid, I found that a dichotomous variable for whether a country had received any US military aid added more explanatory power than a variable based on the per capita value of that aid. I included the existence of other sanctions (dichotomous), and the trade ratio variables, as indicated.

However, tests of whether the logistic regression was properly specified led me to a nonlinear specification of the variable for total trade with the US.

For the country's trafficking policy, I included variables for hostility to civil society working on TIP, whether the country had any trafficking prosecutions, whether the government used child soldiers, whether the government violated trafficking victims' physical integrity rights, whether the US TIP report indicated the existence of government complicity with trafficking, and whether the country was not a member of any regional organization combatting TIP. Variables for cooperation with civil society, child sex tourism, or problematic migration or sex trade policies did not seem to play a role in whether a country was sanctioned, as these variables were not statistically significant when included in models.

For other domestic considerations, I included a measure of government accountability from V-Dem, a dichotomous variable to indicate whether a country was upper-middle or high income, and a variable for Pompeo's term as Secretary of State. Under Pompeo, the Trump administration used sanctions much more aggressively, in part responding to some pressure from domestic interests for more robust action against TIP. Figure 2-2, above, shows that US sanctions increased in 2018 under his tenure. A list of all variables used in the sanctioning decision model are shown in table 2-2.

I use logistic regression analysis with a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust standard errors to account for possible intragroup correlation by year. Observations are country-year.

Table 2-2. Sanctioning Decision Model Variables

Variable	Obs.	Freq.	Mean	SD	Med.	Min	Max
Sanctioned for TIP (*dependent variable*)	289	136	0.47			0	1
Subject to other sanctions	289	125	0.43			0	1
Recipient of US military aid in any amount	289	133	0.46			0	1
Ratio of total trade with US	289		0.070	0.112	0.027	0	0.66
Ratio of US total trade with country	289		0.003	0.016	0.000	0	0.16
Government hostility to CSOs working on TIP	289	64	0.22			0	1
Trafficking prosecutions, current year	289	81	0.28			0	1
Government sponsored child soldiers	289	70	0.24			0	1
Human rights violations of victims	289	74	0.26			0	1
Government complicity with TIP	289	221	0.76			0	1
Not a member of any regional organization combatting TIP	289	70	0.24			0	1
Government accountability	280		-0.325	0.780	-0.256	-1.95	1.78
Upper middle- or high-income country	289	114	0.39			0	1
Pompeo, Secretary of State	289	21	0.07			0	1

Sanction credibility and cost

The resulting model permits me to estimate sanction credibility from zero to one and allows the prediction of sanction credibility beyond the sample of tier 3 countries to those on the tier 2 watch list. The sanction credibility variable is then used in the principal survival analysis, with appropriate control variables, to test the hypothesis about the efficacy of US sanctions in promoting TIP policy diffusion.

If sanction credibility can be measured, what about sanction cost? US TIP sanctions, if implemented, do not restrict trade, but only certain forms of US aid and, potentially, IMF credits. But even these costs are widespread globally: Of the 1,184 cases in which a country was scored tier 2 watch list or tier 3 in either the current or previous year, only in six cases did that country not receive any US aid or IMF credits. Thus, including a measure for sanction cost does not tell us much, and I do not include it in the analysis. Hypothesis 1 is tested in chapter 3.

TIP Scores

Hypothesis 2, unique to reputation theory, proposes that the reputational pressure associated with US scorecard diplomacy promotes TIP diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve TIP scores. *If* implementation of victim protection or capacity-building

policies should improve a country's score, then the country will be more likely to implement these policies if it is truly motivated by the desire to improve its reputation. Other scholars—and critics of the TIP reports—have argued that US scorecard diplomacy promotes law enforcement policies, as the reputation scholar Kelley (2017) found, but not victim protection policies. *If* victim protection policies improve scores and *if* the TIP scores promote the diffusion of these policies, then I would have strong support in favor of reputation. To test this hypothesis, I must first learn what actions improve or lower TIP scores.

A country which is present in the TIP report may receive a score of tier 1, tier 2, tier 2 watch list (introduced in the 2004 report), tier 3, or be reported as a "special case." Tier 1 countries are those deemed to "fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking," while tier 2 countries do not meet those standards but are "making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards." Tier 2 watch list countries are those that are making "significant efforts" but either the extent of trafficking is significantly increasing, the country is failing to provide evidence of increasing efforts, or the determination of "significant efforts" is based on credible promises of future action. It is widely understood that tier 2 watch countries are in danger of slipping to tier 3. Indeed, the 2008 amendment to the TVPA set a limit of two to the number of consecutive years that a country could receive the tier 2 watch list ranking before being automatically downgraded to tier 3. Tier 3 countries are those that "do not fully meet the TVPA's minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so." As discussed above, tier 3 countries risk sanctions. Special cases are those where the US lacks information to make a judgment or where the government lacks capacity to engage in anti-trafficking efforts. The incidence of TIP scores over time are shown in figure 2-3.

Figure 2-3. TIP Scores over Time



Modeling TIP scores

How are countries scored? While the US State Department states the measures by which it evaluates countries, it does not provide a clear scoring mechanism—a source of some criticism of the reports (US GAO 2006). Moreover, the standards of evaluation have changed over the years. In 2001, the evaluation standards focused on law enforcement: criminalization, stringent punishment, vigorous prosecution, victim assistance in prosecutions, and cooperation with other governments in investigating and prosecuting trafficking (US DoS 2001, 5-6). In 2018, law enforcement was still included in the assessment, but victim protection received significantly more attention. For example, the State Department evaluated countries for proactive victim identification, cooperation with civil society in protecting victims, provision of victim services, and legal assistance for victims (US DoS 2018, 39).

Despite the opacity and changing evaluation criteria, I can nonetheless estimate the influence of a country's actions on their scores through statistical analysis. Unfortunately, tests

for ordered logistic regression models showed likely violations of the proportional hazard assumptions. To estimate the influence of variables, I use a generalized ordered regression model which allows me to relax the proportional hazard assumption for variables which violate it. The model also uses a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust standard errors for possible intragroup correlation by year. Observations are country-year.

From the data that I collected, I include in the model TIP policy actions, specifically, whether criminalization, institutionalization, NAPs, NRMs, reflection periods and rapporteurs are extant, whether a revision to the legal regime was made in the previous year, and whether trafficking prosecutions or convictions are made in the current year. I also include variables for whether a country was perceived to be a source country, was a emigrant-sending or immigrant-receiving member of an inter-regional organization coordinating migration, sponsored child soldiers, had reports of child sex tourism, was perceived to have migration or sex trade policies which were problematic for TIP victims, had reports of government complicity in TIP, cooperated with civil society on TIP or had reports of government hostility to civil society actors working against TIP, had a visit from the UN Human Rights Council special rapporteur for trafficking, or had an existing inter-sectoral institution cease to function. The US State Department states that it takes government capacity into account when scoring countries, so I also include country characteristics such as development level and democratic accountability. I also control for whether a country is a recipient of US military aid, the UN ideal voting point distance, and scoring during the Trump administration which was more likely to be worse than during the Bush and Obama administrations. A list of variables used in the model are shown in table 2-3.

Table 2-3. TIP Scoring Model Variables

Variable	Obs.	Freq.	Mean	SD	Med.	Min	Max
US TIP tier score (*ordinal dependent variable*)	2780		Mode: *Tier 2*			0	3
Criminalization extant	4066	1825	0.45			0	1
Change in TIP legal regime, previous year	3871	703	0.18			0	1
Intersectoral coordinating body extant	3945	1877	0.48			0	1
National Action Plan extant	4085	1162	0.28			0	1
National Referral Mechanism extant	3959	523	0.13			0	1
Reflection Period extant	3942	455	0.12			0	1
National Rapporteur extant	3927	128	0.03			0	1
Trafficking prosecutions, current year	2890	1981	0.69			0	1
Trafficking convictions, current year	2874	1752	0.61			0	1
Source country for transnational trafficking	3186	2132	0.67			0	1
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration policy	4095	775	0.27			0	1
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration policy	4095	1122	0.19			0	1
Government-sponsored child soldiers	4095	166	0.04			0	1
Child sex tourism	3712	798	0.21			0	1
Problematic sex trade policy	3071	560	0.18			0	1
Problematic migration policy	3096	907	0.29			0	1
Government complicity with TIP	3080	1588	0.52			0	1
Government cooperation with CSOs on TIP	3099	2369	0.76			0	1
Government hostility to CSOs on TIP	3069	152	0.05			0	1
Visit from the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Trafficking	4095	27	0.01			0	1
De-institutionalization event, current year	3080	162	0.05			0	1
UN voting ideal point distance from US, centered on mean	3974		0.000	0.871	0.249	-2.79	2.02
Recipient of US military aid in any amount	4095	2822	0.69			0	1
Government accountability	3640		0.676	0.876	0.821	-1.95	2.06
Trump administration	4095	390	0.10			0	1
World Bank income classification (*ordinal*)	4039		Mode: *Lower-Middle*			0	3

The resulting model tells us what government actions influence scores. Of course, policymakers may not make decisions based on what scientific models determine is statistically significant. Nonetheless, the model will help us determine whether and what acts do influence scores, and this will help us refine hypothesis 2 regarding the influence of reputation on promoting TIP policy diffusion. Results are discussed in chapter 4.

Testing Hypotheses

This section explains the survival analysis used for testing the hypotheses throughout the dissertation. I describe the dependent variables, the explanatory variables, and the model specification.

The Dependent Variables

Previous studies by Kelley (2017) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) used domestic criminalization of all forms of trafficking for their dependent variable. I expand on this analysis by adding five other dependent variables: any revision to the TIP legal regime, first institutionalization of an intersectoral coordinating body, initiation of a National Action Plan, formal adoption of an operational National Referral Mechanism (NRM), and establishment of a reflection period for victims. Together, these variables offer a more nuanced look at TIP policy diffusion than criminalization alone by allowing us to examine if TIP policy diffusion is different for law enforcement, capacity-building, and victim protection policies. A summary of the data I collected on the dependent variables is shown in table 2-4.

Table 2-4. Dependent Variables for Testing Hypotheses

Variable	Obs.	Freq.	Mean	Min	Max
Criminalization	2393	171	0.07	0	1
Change to the TIP legal regime	4063	736	0.18	0	1
Institutionalization of an intersectoral coordinating body	3938	294	0.07	0	1
National Action Plan initiation	4085	421	0.10	0	1
Formalization of an operational National Referral Mechanism	3934	93	0.02	0	1
Establishment of a reflection period	3475	44	0.01	0	1

Explanatory Variables

The explanatory variables come both from my own data collection, described above, and data from other sources noted below. I discuss these variables here by grouping them as variables relating to trafficking policy, US scorecard diplomacy, regional policy communities, neighborly influence, trade and migration partners, trafficking and migration characteristics, other domestic characteristics, and policy normalization. A description of all variables can be found in Appendix B.

Trafficking policy

Data regarding a country's trafficking policy is included in some models as control variables. This data includes whether the TIP policies used as dependent variables are extant,

whether the government violates the physical integrity rights of trafficking victims or uses child soldiers, and whether the country's migration or sex trade policies are perceived as further harming trafficking victims.

A key control variable for many policies is the existence of other policies. For example, National Action Plans and NRMs are often created by the country's intersectoral coordinating body, thus, whether a country has such a body may influence whether it initiates a NAP or formalizes an NRM.

As described above, I collected data on the incidences of governments violating the physical integrity rights of TIP victims, and more specifically, on governments' use of child soldiers (which involved violation of physical integrity rights). Other violations of physical integrity rights included such activities as forced labor camps, police kidnaping victims and forcing them into prostitution, or government officials raping TIP victims. These variables may indicate that a country does not have a sincere interest in promoting TIP policy.

The models for explaining TIP scores include data I collected on perceptions of problems in the implementation of migration or sex trade policy that further harmed victims of TIP.

All these variables are dichotomous. Summary data is found in table 2-5.

Table 2-5. Trafficking Policy Variables

Variable	Obs.	Freq.	Mean	Min	Max
Criminalization extant	4066	1825	0.45	0	1
Institutionalization extant	3945	1877	0.48	0	1
NAP extant	4085	1162	0.28	0	1
NRM extant	3959	523	0.13	0	1
Reflection period extant	3942	455	0.12	0	1
Human rights violated	3069	161	0.05	0	1
Government sponsored child soldiers	4095	166	0.04	0	1
Migration policy problematic	3096	907	0.29	0	1
Sex trade policy problematic	3071	560	0.18	0	1

US scorecard diplomacy

To test hypotheses related to reputation and US scorecard diplomacy, I collected data on the status of the country in the US TIP reports. Similar to Kelley (2017), I collected data on

whether a country was scored in the report and whether it received a low score (tier 2 watch list or tier 3). Kelley (2017) found that countries were concerned about their ranking in the US TIP reports relative to their neighbors and peers (128-139). To measure this reputational pressure, I created a variable indicating whether a neighboring country had received a higher score. This measure correlates strongly but not perfectly (0.73) with receiving a low score, since the lower the score the more likely a neighbor will have a better score.

I also created a variable as to whether the US made a specific recommendation for a country to fully criminalize, to make any change to its TIP legal regime, to create or reinstate an intersectoral coordinating body, or to initiate or improve a National Referral Mechanism.

For all these variables, I measured whether they applied to the current or previous year. Because the US TIP reports come out mid-year, a country may not have time to act on them in the remainder of the calendar year in which the report was published. All variables are dichotomous. Summary data is shown in table 2-6.

Table 2-6. US Scorecard Diplomacy Variables

Variable	Obs.	Freq.	Mean	Min	Max
Scored in US TIP report	3900	2801	0.72	0	1
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3 score in TIP report	3900	1190	0.31	0	1
Neighbor had better score in TIP report	3900	1439	0.37	0	1
Full criminalization recommendation	3900	645	0.17	0	1
Legal revision recommendation	3900	1168	0.30	0	1
Recommendation regarding institutionalization	3900	204	0.05	0	1
Recommendation regarding NRM	3900	934	0.24	0	1

Regional policy communities

This dissertation is particularly interested the role of regional organizations in promoting TIP policy diffusion since these are necessary as controls for the hypotheses, especially hypothesis 4. Previous studies have only included a variable denoting accession to the UN Palermo Protocol on TIP—a critical component of the international regime—and generalized variables for region or neighbors. I collected data from the regional organizations regarding their

membership, efforts to combat TIP, level of institutionalized coordination, and whether their members submit to external reviews of TIP policy.

In addition to accession to the Protocol, I generated variables for memberships in the eighteen regional organizations combatting trafficking and the seven inter-regional organizations which coordinate migration policy. I counted membership in regional organizations from the time these organizations began coordinating on TIP policy, except for the inter-regional organizations coordinating migration where I counted membership from establishment of the organization. I did not use these variables directly in the models, but rather this data was then used to generate the variables which follow.

To account for ways in which regional organizations may reinforce each other, I created variables for counts of memberships in (1) regional organizations combating TIP, (2) those organizations with institutionalized coordinating mechanisms, and (3) those organizations with external policy evaluation. These counts did not include memberships in inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy, as these organizations may have a different influence on TIP policy diffusion. To account for the influence of the inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy, I created dichotomous variables whether a country was an emigrant-sending or immigrant-receiving member of such organizations. Data on whether a country had net immigration or emigration came from the UN Population Division. I used a ratio of 1.05:1 to determine if a country was an immigrant-receiving or emigrant-sending country. Summary data is show in table 2-7.

Table 2-7. Generalized Membership Information in Regional Organizations

Variable	Obs.	Freq.	Mean	SD	Med.	Min	Max
Count of memberships in regional organizations combating TIP, excluding those focused on migration	4095		1.26	1.16	1	0	6
Count of memberships in regional organizations combating TIP with institutionalized coordination, excluding those focused on migration	4095		0.70	1.00	0	0	4
Count of memberships in regional organizations combating TIP with external policy evaluation, excluding those focused on migration	4095		0.28	0.75	0	0	3
Emigrant-sending member of an inter-regional organization coordinating migration policy	4095	1122	0.27			0	1
Immigrant-receiving member of an inter-regional organization coordinating migration policy	4095	775	0.19			0	1

Rather than using specific regional organizations as an explanatory variable in my models, I generated variables for regional TIP policy communities. Differentiating among regime complexes rather than specific regional organizations not only permits more parsimonious models but can capture any overlapping, reinforcing, or diminishing effect of membership in multiple regional organizations. I defined eight TIP regional policy communities: Africa, Americas, Europe, the Middle East, North America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the former Soviet Union. I defined these policy communities as shown in the table 2-8. Membership in a regional policy community is also dependent on the initiation of TIP coordination.

Table 2-8. Regional Policy Community Definitions

Regime complex	Definition
Africa	Any member of the African Union, EAC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD or SADC
Americas	Any member of OAS
Europe	Any member or aspirant of OSCE or the European Union in Europe (COW codes between 200-399)
Middle East	Any member of LAS
North America	Any member of OSCE in North America
Southeast Asia	Any member of ASEAN
South Asia	Any member of SAARC
Former USSR	Any member of CIS

I also created a categorical variable for primary regional policy community useful for testing interactions. Because membership in policy communities overlaps in three cases—Europe and the former USSR, Africa and the Middle East, and the Americas and North America—I had to choose which of these complexes is dominant for those countries which are members of both. For the American case, I eliminated the North American region as a distinct category and

included its two members in the American region as TIP coordination began there prior to OAS action. For the other countries in two regional communities, I prioritized their membership by ratio of trade, assigning them to the regional complex with which they conducted the most trade, excepting Russia which I assigned to the former USSR policy community. Because of this decision, the categorical variable has seven regional policy communities in addition to the base value (not being a member of any regional policy community). Use of this variable streamlines statistical models that include interactions with regional policy community membership. Summary data is shown in table 2-9.

Table 2-9. Regional Policy Community Variables

Variable	Obs.	Freq.	Mean	Min	Max
Member of African RPC	4095	777	0.19	0	1
Member of American RPC	4095	495	0.12	0	1
Member of European RPC	4095	959	0.23	0	1
Member of Middle East RPC	4095	272	0.07	0	1
Member of North American RPC	4095	40	0.01	0	1
Member of Southeast Asian RPC	4095	150	0.04	0	1
Member of South Asian RPC	4095	159	0.04	0	1
Member of Former USSR RPC	4095	129	0.03	0	1
Primary RPC (*categorical*)	4095	Mode: *None*		0	7

Some models use the regional density of the policy under consideration to control for both the influence of regional policy communities and tipping points. Discussion of these variables is found under "policy normalization," below.

Neighborly influence

Most theories of policy diffusion suggest mechanisms associated with neighborly interconnectedness may influence diffusion. As discussed in chapter one, Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) used counts of roads between neighbors as a proxy for fear that neighbors' improving policies would divert trafficking into the country. In chapter 1, I criticized the use of this variable as an inadequate operationalization for fear of trafficking diversion. I propose a better alternative below. Because neighborly interconnectedness may also measure neighborly pressure—including pressure on weaker neighbors to improve their policy or the interchange of

peoples and ideas upon which constructivism and learning are dependent—it is nonetheless important to control for this influence. This is especially important for testing the influence of regional policy communities, as it is possible that it is neighborly influence that matters. To date, no study has included variables for both neighborly and regional influence.

To operationalize this potential neighborly influence, I generated three variables: (1) counts of roads to countries which have extant the policy under consideration, (2) the ratio of roads to these countries, and (3) the counts of roads weighted by the difference in UN voting ideal points. Where data was missing as to whether a policy was extant, I counted it as not extant, under the assumption that if the presence of policy is not widely known, then it will have little influence on diffusion. I counted roads between countries using Google Maps in 2019 (for more details of how I made these counts see Appendix B, note 2). These road connections are constant—they do not vary over time because historical data was not available. However, I propose that these roads nonetheless measure connectedness between neighbors, as roads built in the time frame of this study nonetheless measure underlying connectedness between countries. That is, roads are built to meet demands for greater connectedness.

It may be that not all roads should carry equal weight, especially where relations are hostile between neighbors. To measure the warmth of relations between countries, I also generated a variable where I multiplied the number of roads by the log of the UN voting ideal point difference developed by Voeten *et alii* (2009) centered on the median, and then reversed the sign so that warmer relations were positive. I used the log of the ideal point difference because the most hostile voting differences tended to involve Israel and its neighbors, while clearly hostile relation between Russia and Ukraine or North and South Korea are closer to the median. The log function reduces the influence of the extremes while still differentiating among relations of those closer to the median. Summary data is shown in table 2-10.

Table 2-10. Neighborly Connectedness Variables.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Med.	Min	Max
Count of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization	4095	10.2	18.0	3	0	144
Count of roads to neighbors with extant institutionalization	4095	10.5	16.8	5	0	143
Count of roads to neighbors with extant NAPs	4095	6.2	11.9	1	0	122
Count of roads to neighbors with extant NRMs	4095	3.2	8.5	0	0	83
Count of roads to neighbors with extant reflection periods	4095	3.5	12.2	0	0	138
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization	4095	0.44	0.42	0.36	0	1.00
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant institutionalization	4095	0.47	0.39	0.48	0	1.00
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant NAPs	4095	0.28	0.34	0.08	0	1.00
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant NRMs	4095	0.14	0.25	0	0	1.00
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant reflection periods	4095	0.09	0.22	0	0	1.00
Count of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization weighted by log of UN voting ideal point distance centered at the median	3974	7.0	17.2	0.5	-79.8	170.9
Count of roads to neighbors with extant institutionalization weighted by log of UN voting ideal point distance centered at the median	3974	7.7	16.5	1.7	-78.5	151.4
Count of roads to neighbors with extant NAPs weighted by log of UN voting ideal point distance centered at the median	3974	4.9	11.7	0	-50.5	133.7
Count of roads to neighbors with extant NRMs weighted by log of UN voting ideal point distance centered at the median	3974	2.2	7.8	0	-44.6	88.1
Count of roads to neighbors with extant reflection periods weighted by log of UN voting ideal point distance centered at the median	3974	2.9	11.8	0	-76.2	150.5

Trade and migration partners

Trade and migration partners may be alternative measures of connectedness between countries, and so I control for their influence in some models. Transnational trafficking tends to follow general patterns of migration. Therefore, I generated variables measuring the ratio of total value of trade (imports and exports) and shared migration stock (emigrants and immigrants) with countries in which the relevant policy was extant. Where data was missing as to whether a policy was extant, I counted it as not extant, under the assumption that if the presence of policy is not widely known, then it will have little influence on diffusion. When data for shared migration stock was not available, I used the most recent data available. Summary data is shown in table 2-11.

Table 2-11. Trade and Migration Partner Variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Med	Min	Max
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant criminalization	3715	0.52	0.30	0.56	0	1.00
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant institutionalization	3715	0.62	0.26	0.70	0	1.00
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant NAP	3715	0.35	0.27	0.34	0	0.99
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant NRM	3715	0.20	0.23	0.10	0	0.96
Ratio of total trade with trade partners with extant reflection period	3715	0.16	0.16	0.11	0	0.84
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant criminalization	3860	0.57	0.37	0.64	0	1.00
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant institutionalization	3860	0.59	0.33	0.65	0	1.00
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant NAP	3860	0.32	0.30	0.25	0	1.00
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant NRM	3860	0.20	0.26	0.06	0	0.98
Ratio of shared migrant stock with migration partners with extant reflection period	3860	0.15	0.21	0.05	0	0.95

Trafficking and migration characteristics

Advocates of competition theory have argued that trafficking "externalities"—or the fear of them—influence the diffusion of trafficking policy. As transnational trafficking follows migration patterns, a country's migration characteristics may also motivate trafficking policy. Thus, I have included variables related to these concerns.

As described in the section on data collection above, I collected data on perceptions increased or diverted transnational trafficking, whether a country is considered a source country for transnational trafficking, whether it had a significant domestic trafficking problem, and whether child sex tourism occurred. I include the variable for significant domestic trafficking in all models as a standard control variable. Summary data for these variables is presented in table 2-12.

Table 2-12. Trafficking Characteristic Variables

Variable	Obs.	Freq.	Mean	Min	Max
Reported increased or diverted transnational trafficking, current or previous year	3900	536	0.14	0	1
Perceived source/origin country for transnational trafficking	3186	2132	0.67	0	1
Perceived significant domestic trafficking	3150	2374	0.75	0	1
Reports of child sex tourism	3712	798	0.21	0	1

Other domestic considerations

Domestic characteristics may motivate trafficking policy independently or in conjunction with transnational diffusion mechanisms. I include measures for government cooperation with civil society on TIP, government accountability, freedom of expression, government corruption, civil society participation, women's political empowerment, women's participation in civil society, level of development, major war extant, and population. These variables may impact the trafficking environment, a government's sensitivity to transnational influences, or government capacity to initiate and implement TIP policies.

For government cooperation with or hostility toward civil society on TIP, I collected data as described in the section on data collection above. From Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2020), I use its accountability index (to what extent is the ideal of government accountability achieved?), public sector corruption index (to what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements?), legislative corrupt activities (do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?), women's political empowerment index (how politically empowered are women?), women's participation in civil society (are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations?), and the freedom of expression index (to what extent does the government respect press and media freedom, the freedom to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, and the freedom of academic and cultural expression?). From the World Bank, I use GDP per capita (in thousands), or more commonly, the World Bank income classification (low to high income), and the natural log of total population. From UCDP Prio, I use data for whether a country experienced a major war (more than 1,000 battle deaths) in a given year. Summary data is shown in table 2-13.

Table 2-13. Domestic Variables

Variable	Obs.	Freq.	Mean	SD	Med.	Min	Max
CSO cooperation on TIP	3099	2369	0.76			0	1
Government hostility to CSO work on TIP	3069	152	0.05			0	1
Accountability index (V-Dem: v2x_accountability)	3640		0.67	0.88	0.82	-1.95	2.06
Political corruption index (V-Dem: v2x_corr)	3630		0.53	0.31	0.60	0.01	0.97
Public sector corruption index (V-Dem: v2x_pubcorr)	3637		0.51	0.31	0.58	0.01	0.98
Legislative corrupt activities (V-Dem: v2lgcrrpt)	3521		-0.19	1.39	-0.55	-3.38	3.50
Civil society women's participation (V-Dem: v2csgender)	3640		1.16	0.89	1.34	-3.01	2.52
Women's political empowerment index (V-Dem: v2x_gender)	3601		0.72	0.19	0.77	0.05	0.98
Freedom of expression index (V-Dem: v2x_freexp)	3640		0.68	0.28	0.77	0.02	0.99
GDP per capita (in thousands)	3615		17.96	19.8	10.53	0.59	115.42
World Bank income classification (0= *low income*)	4039		Mode: *Lower-Middle*			0	3
Total population, natural log	3836		15.48	2.15	15.78	9.14	21.05
Major war (1000+ battle deaths)	4095	155	0.04			0	1

To maintain consistency, I use a standard set of domestic control variables in all models (excepting some robustness checks where specific control variables are substituted). First, as noted above, I include reports of significant domestic trafficking in all models. Second, scholars have argued that corruption is an important cause of TIP and an influence on government policy (Avdeyeva 2012; Jonsson 2018; Van Dijk and Mierlo 2011; Zhang and Pineda 2008), and so I control for legislative corruption in the models for criminalization and any change to the TIP legal regime, and public sector corruption in the models for the other four policies. Third, Bartilow (2010) found that the ratio of women in the legislature encouraged criminalization and his finding has been duplicated widely, so I include women's political empowerment in all models. Fourth, studies have also shown the importance of democratic governance for compliance with international law in general (Koh 1997) and motivating action against TIP specifically (Avdeyeva 2012). Das *et alii* (2013) argued that freedom of the press was important in mediating international and domestic pressure for action on TIP while Kelley (2017) argued that government transparency exposed governments to reputational pressure. To account for all these concepts, I include the measure for government accountability in all models. Fifth, I consider that governments which violate the physical integrity of TIP victims may be insincere in

their efforts against TIP. Thus, I include reports of these rights violations in all models, except those for reflection periods where the variable is negatively collinear with the dependent variable. Sixth, constructivism holds that ideas are shared and spread through social networks, which may include connections between civil society and government actors. Moreover, Perry (2016) found that for US pressure to be successful, it needed to be combined with pressure from civil society and Kelley (2017) argued that civil society engagement increased government sensitivity to reputational pressure. Thus, in all models, I include cooperation with civil society on TIP. Finally, as a general measure for government capacity, I include the World Bank income classification in all models, except for reflection periods where I use GDP per capita.

Policy normalization

Finally, to test constructivist theory, I use the regional density of the dependent variable under consideration. If constructivists are correct, then as the density of TIP policy increases, the more it is "taken-for-granted" and likely to be emulated, though models may need to account for non-linear effects. I use measures for the regional density of the policy rather than the global density because studies have shown influence of regional patterns of compliance with international legal commitments (Simmons 2000) and the nature of TIP is likely to promote a regional or neighborly horizon for most countries rather than a global horizon. Defining "regions" is itself an exercise in judgment. I used two measures of regions, both available from V-Dem: one that divides the world into nineteen geographic regions, and one that divides the world into ten cultural-political regions. I use geographic regions in most models, but test robustness of results with the cultural-political regions. If data was not available regarding whether a policy was extant, I assumed that it was not, on the assumption that if a country's policies are not widely known, then it is not likely to have much influence on its neighbors. Summary data is shown in table 2-14.

Table 2-14. Policy Normalization Variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Med.	Min	Max
Regional (geographic) density of criminalization	4095	0.45	0.37	0.44	0	1.00
Regional (geographic) density of institutionalization	4095	0.46	0.32	0.50	0	1.00
Regional (geographic) density of NAPs	4095	0.28	0.28	0.22	0	1.00
Regional (geographic) density of NRMs	4095	0.13	0.13	0.00	0	0.87
Regional (geographic) density of reflection periods	4095	0.11	0.11	0.00	0	0.80
Regional (cultural) density of criminalization	4095	0.45	0.36	0.43	0	1.00
Regional (cultural) density of institutionalization	4095	0.46	0.31	0.50	0	1.00
Regional (cultural) density of NAPs	4095	0.28	0.27	0.22	0	0.91
Regional (cultural) density of NRMs	4095	0.13	0.13	0.00	0	0.70
Regional (cultural) density of reflection periods	4095	0.11	0.21	0.00	0	0.75

Model Specification

Like the other leading works in the literature (Kelley 2017; Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart 2018), I use event history models which focus on the length of time until events occur. In these models, the explanatory variables influence the risk of the event's occurrence. Specifically, I employ a Cox proportional hazard model, a semi-parametric model that has the advantage of making no assumptions about the underlying shape of the baseline hazard rate (e.g., whether it is increasing or decreasing with time), though the baseline hazard is assumed to be the same for all cases.

In event history models, we calculate the "hazard function" which tells us the probability that the event occurs during a given interval, conditional on the subject having survived to the beginning of that interval. The Cox proportional hazards regression model (Cox 1972) asserts that the hazard rate for the j^{th} subject in the data is:

$$h(t \mid x_j) = h_0(t)\exp(x_j\beta_x)$$

where the regression coefficients β_x are estimated from the data (Cleves et al. 2010, 129). The covariates are easily interpreted for how they change the probability of event occurrence within the given time interval.

Cases in which the event never occurs will be "right-censored" meaning that the event is unobserved during the time period under study. The Palermo Protocol was established in 2000

and very few TIP policy events occur prior to that time. Therefore, the time frame I use for models is that from 1998 to 2018. In most models, events can occur only once, and so cases are removed the sample; however, for legal revisions and NAPS, events can occur multiple times, and so these cases are kept in the sample. Note that the sample sizes are larger for the models where cases are kept in the sample than for those for which events can occur only once. Sample sizes are also larger when policy adoption tended to occur later in time; thus, the sample sizes for first institutionalization are the smallest because this was one of the first policies adopted.

Cox proportional hazard models assume that ratio of hazards for any two subjects is constant and proportional over time. In some models, the influence of variables has time-variant hazard ratios. For example, I might find that the influence of explanatory variable decays over time. Under such circumstances, I evaluate hypotheses with the time-varying hazard ratio.

In all models, I use a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust standard errors for possible intra-group correlation by region. Different regions of the world have different patterns of transnational and domestic trafficking, legal regimes, civil society relations, etc. Thus, it is possible that observations are partly dependent upon each other for reasons that are difficult to quantify, justifying the standard error adjustment. The primary models account for intragroup correlation in nineteen geographical regions while the robustness checks include an alternative political-cultural definition of region.

Observations are country-year for the period 1998 to 2018.

Plan for Testing Hypotheses

In the next chapter, I examine coercion theory by testing hypothesis 1 which holds that credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion. As described in chapter 1, other scholars have used variables which proxy vulnerability to US (or sometimes European) pressure. Rather than using these proxy variables, I test the threat of sanctions directly by

developing a model predicting the credibility of sanctions for all tier 2 watch list and tier 3 countries and then including this sanction credibility variable in the model while controlling for the imposition of sanctions and reputational concerns.

In chapter 4, I proceed to test the hypotheses derived from reputation theory for the influence of scorecard diplomacy. These are:

- Hypothesis 2. Reputational pressure from neighbors having a better score promotes TIP policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores, and
- Hypothesis 3. Non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy promote TIP policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores.

In chapter 5, I test the constructivist hypothesis that TIP policy diffusion increases as the regional policy density of the policy increases. To single out this "taken-for-granted" effect, I control for the influence of regional policy communities as another likely mechanism for explaining regional variation in policy diffusion.

The focus of chapter 6 is the hypothesis developed from competition theory that reports of increased transnational trafficking or diversion of trafficking flows promote diffusion of TIP policies which disrupt trafficking networks.

In the final chapter, I will discuss how well each hypotheses fared, what this tells us about the explanatory value of each theory of policy diffusion, and what we have learned about differentiation by policy type and region. I will reflect on how theoretical explanations for policy diffusion may be improved and make recommendations for further research. Finally, I will consider what the findings suggest for diplomats, policymakers, and practitioners.

CHAPTER THREE: SANCTIONS

OVERVIEW

Some scholars have criticized the TVPA for its sanctioning mechanism, especially in its practical implementation (Berman 2006; Chuang 2006; Feve and Finzel 2001; Kapstein 2006; US GAO 2006). More generally, Peksen (2009) found that economic sanctions led to greater human rights abuses, arguing that sanctions were counter-productive (see also Pape 1997; 1998). Yet other scholars have found conditionality to be effective in promoting desired norms (Cleveland 2001; Hafner-Burton 2005). As discussed in chapter 1, scholars of TIP diffusion have recognized that coercion in the form of sanctions may promote policy diffusion, but, to date, the variables used to operationalize this concept have been related to the supposed vulnerability to US sanctions. The efficacy of targeted US sanctions for promoting TIP policy has not been tested. This chapter seeks to address this imbalance in the literature by testing hypothesis 1: credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion.

SANCTIONS AND SELECTION BIAS

Nooruddin (2002) and Drezner (2003) showed that selection bias is a problem which haunts studies of sanctioning efficacy. It is not enough to know when sanctions were used; I must also know when sanctions were considered but not used. The threat of sanctions may be enough to promote the desired change. Sanctions are more likely to be imposed where they are least likely to succeed. So, I have a selection bias problem: I am more likely to observe sanctioning failures than successes because sanctions are imposed in the most difficult cases. In the case of TIP, the category of "tier 2 watch list" gives us a special opportunity to evaluate the threat of sanctions. The reauthorization of the TVPA added the tier 2 watch list category in 2003. As discussed in chapter two, this category implies a clear warning that the country may fall into tier 3 and be sanctioned. However, as discussed in chapter one, it is also possible that receiving

a low score is motivating policy diffusion because it harms a country's reputation, so I also control for this alternative explanation.

In addition to the tier 2 watch list, I also know which tier 3 sanctionable countries were, in fact, sanctioned. This allows me to create a statistical model explaining the sanction decision and thereby reveal how likely a sanctionable country was to be sanctioned. This model can then be used to predict the credibility of sanctions for tier 2 watch list countries as well. Game theoretic models suggest that the threat of sanctions is more likely to succeed when costs are high for the target and low for the sender, but for that threat to be succeed, it must be credible—some of the same dynamics which work to make the threat more costly to the target also make it more costly to the sender, and thus less credible. The sanctions available under the TVPA are targeted sanctions; they are not meant to be very costly to the United States. Trade support and humanitarian aid are not sanctioned. In evaluating sanctions costs for both the sender and target, scholars have focused on trade interdependence, strategic interests, and domestic institutions (Drezner 1999; Jeong and Peksen 2019; Lektzian and Souva 2007; McLean and Whang 2010; Nooruddin 2002, Peksen 2019). Drawing on this literature, in the next section, I discuss the model of sanction decision-making.

WHO IS SANCTIONED?

The Model

To develop the sanctioning decision model, I use the variables and model described in chapter 2. As a reminder, for this model, I use a dichotomous dependent variable for whether a tier 3 country incurred partial or full sanctions under the TVPA. Explanatory variables fall into three categories: (1) the country's general relationship with the US, (2) the country's TIP performance, and (3) other domestic considerations, both in the US and in the potential target

country. I use a logistic regression model with a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust standard errors to allow for intragroup correlation by year. Observations are country-year.

Results and Discussion

The results of the model developed above are shown in table 3-1. In the table, odds ratios greater than one indicate that a country is more likely to be sanctioned. The model has good explanatory value, correctly predicting 251 of 289 (87%) of the cases. Of the fifteen cases (5%) where the prediction was that sanctions would be waived, only in four cases did countries receive full sanctions (Russia in 2014, Madagascar in 2011 and 2012, and Comoros in 2018). In another fourteen cases (5%), the model predicts sanctioning, but sanctions were waived. Belarus from 2015-2018 represents four of these cases. Nine cases (3%) had missing data and could not be predicted by the model.

Table 3-1. Sanctioning Decision Model

Variable	Coefficient	Odds ratio	z	P>|z|
Already subject to other US sanctions	2.948	19.07	3.83	0.000
US military aid	-3.213	0.04	-6.33	0.000
Ratio of target's trade with US	41.202	7.83×10^{17}	6.92	0.000
Ratio of target's trade with US^2	-56.402	3.20×10^{-25}	-6.61	0.000
Ratio of US trade with target	-23.836	4.45×10^{-10}	-2.98	0.003
Hostility to CSOs working on TIP	0.780	2.18	1.51	0.131
Trafficking prosecution(s)	-0.919	0.40	-1.54	0.124
Government sponsored child soldiers	-1.913	0.15	-1.82	0.069
Human rights violations of victims	2.669	14.42	4.17	0.000
Government complicity in TIP	2.662	14.32	3.59	0.000
Not a member of any regional org combatting TIP	2.176	8.81	2.93	0.003
Government accountability	-1.651	0.19	-3.64	0.000
Upper-middle- or high-income country	-1.051	0.35	-1.72	0.085
Pompeo	5.198	180.90	7.64	0.000
Constant (baseline)	-4.687	0.01	-3.79	0.000
Observations	280			
Adjusted r^2	0.64			

Logistic regression. Standard errors are adjusted for possible intragroup correlation by year.

If the potential target is already the target of other US sanctions, then it is more likely it will also be sanctioned for TIP. This finding is not surprising. The sanctions literature has long found that sanctions are more likely to be imposed where they are less likely to be effective. If the target already has other sanctions imposed, it is not likely that TIP sanctions will be effective

either and, given the existing strain in relations between the countries, less costly for the US to decide to impose additional targeted sanctions.

If the country receives US military aid, it is less likely to be sanctioned. This result is also expected as the existence of US military aid implies strategic interests that may be jeopardized by a deterioration in the bilateral relationship; that is, sanctions represent a higher cost to the US.

While TIP sanctions are not trade-related, the trading relationship between the US and the target helps explain the sanctioning decision. I find that as the ratio of the target's trade with the US to its total trade increases, it is more likely to be sanctioned, until that ratio surpasses about 0.4, after which it falls (only a few cases exist where the trade ratio is greater than this threshold). The more the target depends on the US economy, the more vulnerable it is to sanctions, and thus the more likely the threat of sanctions will be effective. The greater the ratio of US trade with the target is to US total trade, the less likely the US is to impose sanctions. Again, this accords with game theoretic models that the more costly sanctions are for the sending state, the less likely sanctions will be imposed. While TIP sanctions do not affect trade, the trading relationship appears to signal something about the underlying value of the bilateral relationship.

The implementation of TIP policy in the target country also helps explain the imposition of sanctions. While some of these variables are not statistically significant at the conventional levels used in social science, it is nonetheless likely that diplomats are attuned to possible relationships in which social scientists may lack statistical confidence. Most of these variables—hostility to CSOs, trafficking prosecutions, use of child soldiers, violating victims' physical integrity rights, and government complicity in TIP—relate to the country's costs of compliance with US demands for improving TIP policy. Egregious abuse of TIP victims and government

complicity in TIP help explain the US decision to sanction. Of interest is that government-sponsored child soldiers may reduce the likelihood of sanctions being imposed (though significant only at p=.069), suggesting that it is the other human rights abuses—e.g., enslaving portions of the population—which motivate US officials to sanction.

Democracies are less likely to be sanctioned, and it is possible that wealthier countries are also less likely to be sanctioned though this result fails to meet conventional levels of confidence. As noted in chapter one, under Secretary of State Pompeo, the Trump administration became much more likely to sanction tier 3 countries for domestic political reasons, a consideration which is evident in the results.

In summary, the sanctioning decision model conforms to the theoretical expectations of the sanctions literature and provides a reasonable method to calculate the credibility of the sanction threat beyond the sample of tier 3 countries.

Does the Threat of Sanctions Promote Diffusion of TIP Policy?

Having generated a variable which measures the credibility of the threat of sanctions, I turn to modeling the influence of the threat of sanctions on TIP policy diffusion to test hypothesis 3. To create a useful test of the hypothesis, I need to account for sanction credibility, develop a model to overcome selection bias, and include a measure for reputation as an alternative explanation for policy diffusion.

Sanction Credibility

Sanction credibility, as a measure between zero and one, does not consistently have a linear function for explaining policy diffusion. To capture these non-linear effects, I generated an ordinal variable, generally dividing credibility into quartiles, but with an additional category for the most credible sanctions above 0.95. The summary data is shown in table 3-2. As is evident from the table, even when sanctions are threatened, credibility is generally low: out of 1,131

cases in which sanction credibility in the current or previous year was greater than zero, 758 (67%), have a credibility of less than 0.25. The second most common category with 111 cases (10%) are those with the highest sanction credibility (greater than 0.95).

Table 3-2. Sanction Credibility, Ordinal Variable

Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year	Frequency	Percent
Credibility = 0	2,922	72.09
Credibility >0 <0.25	758	18.70
Credibility >=0.25 <0.50	104	2.57
Credibility >=0.50 <0.75	73	1.80
Credibility >=0.75 <0.95	85	2.10
Credibility >=0.95	111	2.74
Total	4,053	100.00
Total sanctioning threats	1,131	27.91

Overcoming Selection Bias

As discussed above, testing the efficacy of sanctions is complicated by selection bias. The cases in which sanctions are imposed are likely to be the most difficult cases. I take the sanctions credibility formula discussed above and apply it to countries on the tier 2 watch list in addition to those ranked tier 3. Tier 2 watch list countries are not sanctionable, but are being warned that without action on TIP, they may become sanctionable. By including both a measure for those countries on which sanctions were imposed and sanction credibility on the entire sample, I can determine if the credible threat of sanctions influences TIP policy diffusions.

Reputation or Coercion?

In the next chapter, I will examine the influence of reputation more closely, but here I control for reputational pressure in the models. Kelley (2017) found that targets of US scorecard diplomacy were concerned about how their TIP tier ranks compared to their neighbors. So, to operationalize the impact of reputation, I include a dichotomous measure for whether a country had a neighbor which received a higher score. Thus, the measure includes countries which are

not sanctionable (i.e., tier 2) but had neighbors with better scores. If reputation matters, then these countries should also be motivated to improve their performance against TIP.

Other Variables of Interest

Regional and neighborly dynamics will be explored in more depth in a later chapter, but in these models, I include the regional density of the policy under consideration (or criminalization for any change to the TIP legal regime), except in the case of reflection periods where I use the variable for the European policy community (which is where reflection periods are most common). I also include the variable for neighborly interconnectedness used by Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018): road counts to neighbors in which the policy is extant. Other domestic control variables include accession to the Protocol, implementation of certain TIP policies, measures for corruption, women's political empowerment, government accountability, significant domestic trafficking, reported violations of the physical integrity rights of victims, cooperation with civil society on TIP, and an ordinal variable for the World Bank income classification with the default set to upper income countries (except for reflection periods where I use GDP per capita).

Threat of Sanctions and the Law

Table 3-3 presents the findings of the Cox proportional hazards model testing the influence of the threat of sanctions on time to criminalization and time to any revision in the TIP legal regime. The model uses an ordinal representation for the credibility of sanctions and controls for the imposition of sanctions, reputational influence (as measured by a neighbor having a better score), a specific US recommendation to criminalize or implement a change in the law, regional density of criminalization, connectedness to neighbors where criminalization is extant, Protocol accession, and domestic characteristics. The model for legal revisions is similar to that for criminalization, except that each country can revise their legal code more than once,

so observations are not removed from the sample. I have also added a variable for an extant intersectoral coordinating body ("institutionalization") as such bodies may be a source for recommending changes to the legal regime.

Table 3-3. Threat of Sanctions and the Law

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Any Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none)		
Low (< 0.25)	2.036 ***0.000	1.123 *0.072
Middling (0.25 – 0.50)	1.357 0.510	0.915 0.724
High (0.50 – 0.75)	0.210 0.136	0.784 0.452
Very high (0.75 – 0.95)	0.717 0.550	0.888 0.680
Highest (> 0.95)	0.947 0.957	0.992 0.980
Sanctioned, current or previous year	*Collinear (-)*	0.545 0.165
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.120 0.556	1.284 *0.061
US recommended policy action	1.744 **0.016	1.394 ***0.000
Regional density of criminalization	23.119 ***0.000	2.228 ***0.008
Road count to neighbors with criminalization extant	1.000 0.999	1.003 *0.057
Protocol accession	1.868 ***0.000	1.099 0.405
Institutionalization extant		1.105 0.279
Legislative corruption	0.856 0.205	0.927 *0.078
Women's political empowerment	5.399 ***0.003	2.814 ***0.001
Government accountability	0.968 0.827	0.985 0.829
Significant domestic trafficking	0.700 0.199	0.858 0.220
Human rights violations of victims	0.868 0.702	0.769 0.235
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.094 0.738	1.254 *0.068
World Bank income classification (base = high income)		
Low income	0.805 0.517	0.603 **0.021
Lower middle income	1.529 0.201	0.678 **0.021
Upper middle income	0.637 0.116	0.767 0.139
Subjects	165	171
Observations	1,347	2,829
Number of failures	146	648

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

The results of these models offer evidence that threat of sanctions *does* matter for TIP criminalization, but, contrary to expectations, low threat credibility motivates policy change. Those countries which had a low but non-zero chance of having sanctions imposed were, on average, twice as likely to criminalize as those countries which faced no threat of sanctions. Other levels of sanctions credibility, however, did not have statistically significant results. The results for legal revisions were similar though not as substantial and not statistically significant at conventional thresholds. For criminalization, the variable for sanctioned countries was negatively collinear with the dependent variable indicating that the no or almost no cases exist where sanctioned countries criminalized in response to sanctions. The evidence suggests that the threat of sanctions had the most impact for countries which were least likely to be sanctioned.

Are countries with low sanctions credibility being motivated by threat of sanctions or are other factors in play? The control variable for reputational pressure—those countries that have a neighbor with a better score—is positive but not statistically significant. I will investigate reputational pressure in more depth in the next chapter, but here, controlling for it adds evidence that it is the threat of sanctions which is encouraging criminalization, not concern over the country's relative low score in comparison with its neighbors.

Threat of Sanctions and Increasing Institutional Capacity

I turn now to evaluating if sanctions promote institutional capacity against TIP by examining their influence on the first instituting of an intersectoral coordinating body ("institutionalization") and initiating National Action Plans (NAPs). These activities are cross-sectoral: they can improve law enforcement, support victim protection, and engage in prevention activities, such as raising awareness. The models follow the same pattern as those used for criminalization and revisions to the TIP legal regime. However, I included extant

criminalization in the model for first institutionalization, as countries which have criminalized are more likely to create intersectoral coordinating bodies (sometimes these bodies are created by law with criminalization). As NAPs are typically set for a specific time period, countries could have repeated NAP initiation events. As the results show, NAPs are far more likely to be initiated if they are already extant—that is, they are likely to be renewed. To account for this, I included both extant NAPs and extant institutionalization in this model and interacted the terms. Results are shown in table 3-4.

The results offer qualified support of hypothesis 1. Those countries with low but non-zero threats of sanctions are more likely to create intersectoral coordinating bodies and initiate NAPs than those countries which face no threat of sanctions. For countries with higher credibility for threat of sanctions, the results are more mixed. The results offer support that countries facing very credible threats of sanctions are more likely to initiate NAPs, when controlling for those countries which have sanctions imposed. For institutionalization, being sanctioned or credibly threatened with sanctions, does not have a statistically significant impact on TIP policy diffusion. Reputation, as measured by having a neighbor with a better score, does not seem to be a viable alternative explanation in these models. As such, it appears that some countries are responding to the threat of sanctions by instituting intersectoral coordinating bodies or initiating NAPs. However, the credibility of that threat does not follow expectations. While countries facing a highly credible sanctions threat are more likely to initiate NAPs than countries under no threat of sanctions, countries facing low threats are also likely to do so, and they are more likely to establish intersectoral coordinating bodies than countries facing higher threat credibility.

Table 3-4. Threat of Sanctions and Institutional Capacity

Variables	Institutionalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	National Action Plan Hazard ratio P > |z|
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none)		
Low (< 0.25)	3.103 ***0.000	1.445 ***0.000
Middling (0.25 – 0.50)	5.520 ***0.000	1.836 **0.017
High (0.50 – 0.75)	2.765 0.133	1.202 0.646
Very high (0.75 – 0.95)	1.974 0.256	1.774 ***0.005
Highest (> 0.95)	1.366 0.803	2.480 **0.018
Sanctioned, current or previous year	0.476 0.623	*Collinear (-)*
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	0.945 0.775	0.947 0.384
US recommended policy action	0.897 0.710	
Regional density of institutionalization or NAP	27.873 ***0.000	1.006 0.983
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	0.981 ***0.003	0.997 0.319
Criminalization extant	2.252 ***0.000	
Institutionalization extant		3.376 ***0.000
National Action Plan extant		25.367 ***0.000
Institutionalization X NAP extant		0.279 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	1.190 0.702	1.544 0.189
Women's political empowerment	2.992 0.163	1.259 0.576
Government accountability	1.614 ***0.001	1.136 0.120
Significant domestic trafficking	0.735 0.224	1.153 0.210
Human rights violations of victims	0.361 0.206	0.565 *0.055
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	0.907 0.601	0.891 0.423
World Bank income classification (base = high income)		
Low income	2.840 ***0.006	0.985 0.956
Lower middle income	1.694 0.170	0.851 0.585
Upper middle income	1.157 0.493	1.022 0.913
Subjects	166	172
Observations	1,002	2,899
Number of failures	153	396

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

The victim protection policies analyzed here—National Referral Mechanisms (NRMs) and reflection periods—are less widespread than criminalization, intersectoral coordinating bodies, and NAPs. As such, I adjusted the models for reflection periods somewhat to minimize collinearity problems. For reflection periods, I combined all categories of sanctions credibility above 0.25 into one category. I dropped several other variables from the model as well, including those for significant domestic trafficking, human rights abuses, and cooperation with CSOs on TIP, and I substituted GDP per capita for the World Bank income classification. To control for regional influence, I used the variable for NRM regional density for evaluating time to NRMs, but this variable had a time-variant decay function which I incorporated into the model. For reflection periods, I used membership in the European policy community and interacted it with low sanction credibility. Results are shown in table 3-5.

The results for NRMs do not support hypothesis 1. Neither threat of sanctions nor imposing sanctions encourage the diffusion of NRMs. While a Schoenfeld residual test of proportional-hazards assumptions does not reveal any red flags, a graphical examination of time-variant hazard ratios for sanction imposition does show that it is positive and statistically significant before decaying to a statistically significant and negative relationship. This is likely due to one case—Bolivia in 2018—in which a sanctioned country formalized its victim referral protocol in the same year in which it was sanctioned. (In 2019, Bolivia was rewarded with a promotion to tier 2 watch list, and in 2020 to tier 2.) Thus, while I do not find statistical evidence to support the efficacy of the threat of sanctions in promoting NRMs, it is possible that in the singular case of Bolivia in 2018 imposition of sanctions generated urgency for its adoption of a victim referral protocol that had been in development for some time.

Table 3-5. Threat of Sanctions and Victim Protection Policy

Variables	NRMs Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Periods Hazard ratio P > |z|
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none)		
Low (< 0.25)	0.474 **0.021	0.167 0.114
Middling (0.25 – 0.50)	0.394 0.143	*Collinear (-)*
High (0.50 – 0.75)	0.648 0.524	
Very high (0.75 – 0.95)	0.341 0.277	
Highest (> 0.95)	0.584 0.554	
Sanctioned, current or previous year	0.866 0.874	*Collinear (-)*
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.338 0.284	1.068 0.858
US recommended policy action	1.514 *0.071	
Regional density of NRMs interacted with exp(-0.15*t*) †	1.67x10[19] ***0.000	
European Regional Policy Community		7.591 ***0.000
X Low sanction credibility		8.748 *0.081
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	0.982 **0.049	0.972 **0.011
National Action Plan extant	3.008 ***0.000	
Public sector corruption	0.465 0.511	0.774 0.794
Women's political empowerment	0.652 0.712	0.920 0.973
Government accountability	1.053 0.858	1.620 *0.074
X Government accountability	0.706 *0.072	
Significant domestic trafficking	1.420 0.140	
Human rights violations of victims	0.926 0.921	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.605 *0.063	
GDP per capita (in thousands)		1.012 **0.024
World Bank income classification (base = high income)		
Low income	0.526 0.266	
Lower middle income	1.229 0.663	
Upper middle income	0.994 0.987	
Subjects	171	160
Observations	2,463	2,777
Number of failures	87	42

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This interaction models a decay in the variable's influence over time.

The results for reflection periods offer conditional and qualified support of hypothesis 1. Generally, the credible threat of sanctions is not associated with decreasing time to policy initiation. No case exists of a country with a sanction credibility over 0.25 having implemented a reflection period in the time frame of this study, but six cases exist in which countries with a non-zero but small threat of sanctions did implement reflection periods. Five of these six cases are in the European policy community. An interaction between a low threat of sanctions and membership in the European regional policy community shows a magnifying effect, but this interaction is outside standard levels of significance at p=0.081. However, an examination of the time-variant hazard ratio for this interaction, shown in figure 3-1, reveals that the interaction is statistically significant until year 7 after treatment. The finding suggests that the US threat of sanctions reinforces the work of the European regional policy community. In Europe, GRETA has pushed the signatories of the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings to implement reflection periods, as is evident in the results which show that members of the European regional policy community are more likely to implement reflection periods.

Figure 3-1. Sanction Threats: Time Variant Hazard Ratio for Reflection Periods



Note that while the influence of the European regional policy community is consistently supportive of the diffusion of reflection periods, threat of US sanctions is not. Outside of Europe, the threat of sanctions does nothing to promote reflection periods; it is only in Europe that it promotes diffusion. And as we have seen for the other policies, it is only in cases where sanction

credibility is relatively low that countries respond with policy adjustment. As with the other policies, the measure for reputational pressure is not statistically significant, suggesting that it is the sanction threat rather than a more general concern over reputation that is motivating policy change.

Robustness Checks

I tested the robustness of these results by applying five tests: (1) adjusting the standard errors by ten political-cultural regions rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) dropping the US policy recommendation variable from the four models that included it, (3) substituting all regional policy communities in the model for regional density of the policy under investigation, (4) substituting control variables for women's participation in civil society and freedom of expression for women's political power and government accountability, respectively, and (5) adding control variables for major war and total population (natural log) to the models. Tables showing the results for these robustness checks can be found in Appendix C.

The results for the sanction credibility variables of interest are robust to all these tests. Dropping the US policy recommendation did not have a substantial influence on the results, suggesting that it is measuring something other than threat of sanctions. Regional policy communities will be explored in more detail in chapter 5, but here I find that including all of them does not change the results for sanction credibility. The variables for the presence of a major war and total population are not statistically significant, except for the NAPs where total population is found to have a negative influence and for reflection periods where major war is negatively collinear with the dependent variable.

Discussion

Hypothesis 1 proposes that credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion. I developed a measure for sanctions credibility by examining which countries ranked

at tier 3 were sanctioned and then applied the formula to countries on the tier 2 watch list as well. By including this measure of sanction credibility along with a measure for sanctions imposition and for reputation, I evaluated whether the threat of sanctions encourages policy diffusion. The findings offer qualified support for this hypothesis. A summary of the findings is shown in table 3-6.

Table 3-6. Hypothesis 1 Results

Policy	Findings
Criminalization	Supported for countries with low threat credibility.
Any legal revision	Not supported.
Institutionalization	Supported for countries with low threat credibility.
National Action Plan	Supported for countries with low and high threat credibility.
National Referral Mechanism	Not supported.
Reflection period	Conditionally supported for members of the European regional policy community with low threat credibility.

Support for hypothesis 1 is qualified because, while the threat of sanctions does promote policy diffusion, the credibility of that threat does not follow expectations. Qualified support for hypothesis 1 was strongest for criminalization, institutionalization, and initiation of NAPs. In each of these cases, countries which faced a threat of sanctions that was small, but non-zero, were more likely to implement these policies than countries which did not face any threat of sanctions, when controlling for both the imposition of sanctions and the influence of reputational concerns. For initiation of NAPs, statistical evidence shows that countries which faced more credible threats were also more likely implement the policy than countries not under threat of sanctions.

The finding that *low* threat credibility is associated with policy adjustment presents a puzzle because it runs contrary to other findings and theoretical predictions in the sanctioning literature. Peterson (2013) found that sanctioning targets were more likely to yield when the US threats were more credible. He concluded that "even in cases where the target prefers backing down to enduring sanctions, all else equal, it will only acquiesce if it believes the sender's threat

is credible" (674). In the case of TIP, however, I find that, in general, the less credible threats of sanctions are more effective in promoting desired policy change.

Why? Since the sanctioning decision is made, in part, based on actual TIP performance, more credible threats also mean higher costs to the target. Similarly, countries already embroiled in conflict with the US, as measured by existing sanctions, are more likely to also be sanctioned for TIP. The sanctioning literature notes that sanctioning threats are less likely to be effective under conditions of rivalry, again, because they represent high costs for the target. In the context of these high costs, we do find that countries respond to more credible threats of sanctions by developing National Action Plans, a relatively low-cost policy option. High threat credibility thus measures difficult cases where the cost of compliance is high, even when controlling for imposition of sanctions.

The puzzle is why states respond to low threat credibility with policy adjustment. In these cases, it seems likely that they do not believe the US wants to sanction them, and, indeed, they have examples of the US waiving sanctions which reinforces the low credibility of the sanctions threat. According to Peterson (2013), the target ought not to acquiesce since policy adjustment has some cost and the US is not likely to impose sanctions. Moreover, I have controlled for the influence of reputational concerns about scoring, generalized US recommendations, and other domestic characteristics which influence domestic motivations for implementing TIP policy.

Several possibilities deserver further investigation. One possibility is that target risk tolerance is influenced either by inaccurate risk assessments or a desire to reduce even a small risk to zero, especially if the costs are low. Meanwhile, targets under a more credible threat may not believe that any action will avoid sanctions. Another possibility is that in the domain of TIP policy, countries wish to avoid the costs associated with the *threat* of sanctions, either to their

reputation with the US specifically or in the international community more broadly. This concern for reputation would be something that measures for underperforming scorecards does not capture. Finally, the threat of sanctions may aid certain actors within a country to achieve their goals for TIP policy promotion by providing them a justification for speedy policy action.

Support for hypothesis 1 is also uneven. I do not have evidence that the threat of sanctions promotes revisions to the TIP legal regime beyond criminalization nor the adoption of a National Referral Mechanism. For reflection periods, the influence of the threat of sanctions is conditional on the targets being members of the European regional policy community. Outside of Europe, threat of sanctions has no influence on diffusion of reflection periods. The likely explanation for the variation in the influence of the sanction threat by policy type is that US diplomacy does not seriously threaten sanctions for failure to have these victim protection policies. For the purposes of US diplomacy, it is possible for countries to be making significant progress toward meeting minimum standards without revisions to their legal codes, NRMs or reflection periods (outside of Europe). These policies are not "minimum standards," and it seems likely that the US is not using the threat of sanctions to promote them. Another factor influencing differentiation by policy type could be the cost of the policy. I found that countries with credible threat of sanctions did respond by implementing NAPs, quite likely because these are a rather low-cost and rapid policy option. In the case of TIP, countries under threat of sanctions have a range of policy options from which they may choose to satisfy US preferences, and it seems that for countries facing the most credible threats, a low-cost option is selected.

I did not have an expectation that the US threat of sanctions would explain regional differentiation in TIP policy diffusion. However, the results for reflection periods suggest that the threat of US sanctions interacts with existing European efforts to promote policy diffusion.

One possibility for the conditionality of this finding is that it reflects some regional differentiation in US expectations for reflection periods.

Conclusion

This chapter advances the literature in several important ways. I have directly tested whether the threat of sanctions promotes TIP policy diffusion, and I have found support that it does. In so doing, I find support for the idea that the threat of sanctions can be used to promote norm-based policies, as Cleveland (2001) argued. Second, because I controlled for reputational concerns, the test has also revealed that the influence of reputation may not be as powerful as Kelley (2017) believed. At least part of the influence of scorecard diplomacy may come from the threat of sanctions, though reputation will receive more attention in the next chapter. Third, I have found that the threat of sanctions does not necessarily act most effectively on those countries facing the most credible threat, but rather on those facing low, but uncertain threats, a finding that is something of a puzzle for the literature on sanctions.

These results have practical implications. First, despite many criticisms of the US sanctioning regime, it does seem that threats of sanctions have been useful in encouraging some TIP policies. Second, the effect is uneven, so that the threat of sanctions tends to favor policies which improve legal and institutional capacity—criminalization, institutionalization, and NAPs—rather than victim protection policies like NRMs and reflection periods. Third, diplomats may wish to consider the value of uncertainty in its use of sanctions. In 2018, the Trump administration began to aggressively use sanctions to encourage implementation of TIP policies. The evidence here does not suggest that higher credibility for the threat of sanctions is what is motivating policy change; indeed, it is not clear that this tactic will promote policy diffusion, as near-certainty of sanctions may ultimately discourage action.

CHAPTER FOUR: REPUTATION AND SCORECARD DIPLOMACY

OVERVIEW

In this chapter I set out to test the hypotheses related to reputation theory and US scorecard diplomacy. Hypothesis 2 is the stronger test as it holds that reputational pressure from neighbors having a better score in the US TIP reports will promote policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores. Kelley (2017) found that concerns over neighbors' scores characterized conversations between US diplomats and their counterparts in discussions about TIP (128-130). Hypothesis 3 holds that non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy promote policy diffusion for policies which are most likely to improve scores. Here, these non-coercive aspects are (1) being scored in the TIP report and (2) specific US recommendations for policy action. This is not as strong a test as hypothesis 2 because these non-coercive aspects may also represent mechanisms associated with constructivism by generating a taken-for-granted quality of certain policy recommendations. However, if countries respond to the US TIP reports by focusing on those policy actions which improve scores, I can reasonably attribute diffusion to concern over reputation.

Testing these hypotheses is a two-step process. First, I need to see *which* policies improve scores. Then, I can test if the reputational pressure inherent in scorecard diplomacy is motivating action on TIP. Thus, in this chapter I first show the results of a model for what shapes the scores in the US TIP reports, and then I turn to testing the hypotheses on US scorecard diplomacy and reputation.

GENERATING US TIP REPORT SCORES

The Model

A discussion of the issues surrounding the modeling of TIP scores is found in chapter 2. As described there, I use a generalized ordered logistic model that relaxes the proportional

hazards assumptions for those variables which violate it. For some variables, it was not necessary to relax the assumption, permitting a more parsimonious model. The model uses a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors for possible intra-group correlation by year. Observations are country-year.

Results and Discussion

The results for determining US TIP report scores are shown in table 4-1. The pseudo r^2 statistic for this model is 0.35, indicating that considerable variance in the scores is yet unexplained. As noted in chapter 2, a more determinative model is unlikely given the opacity of the scoring mechanism and the likelihood that it changed over time. Nonetheless, the model does clearly indicate specific policies which are likely to improve TIP scores. While implementing these policies will not altogether reduce uncertainty over the scoring, it seems reasonable that diplomats wishing to improve their scores would recognize the implementation of such policies as potentially useful. In interpreting the results, the higher value of the independent variable produces the indicated odds ratio for increasing the value of the dependent variable which is a worse score. Thus, those odds ratios less than 1 indicate variables which improve TIP scores, while odds ratios greater than 1 indicate variables which lower TIP scores.

Table 4-1. Generating US TIP Scores

	Tier 3 v. tier 2 watch list, tier 2, tier 1		Tier 3, tier 2 watch list v. tier 2, tier 1		Tier 3, tier 2 watch list, tier 2 v. tier 1	
	Odds ratio	P>|z|	Odds ratio	P>|z|	Odds ratio	P>|z|
Criminalization extant	1.233	0.176	0.872	0.359	0.578	***0.001
Legal revision, previous year	0.947	0.605	0.947	0.605	0.947	0.605
Institutionalization extant	1.574	***0.000	1.574	***0.000	1.574	***0.000
NAP extant	0.481	***0.000	0.994	0.954	1.038	0.830
NRM extant	0.582	***0.000	0.582	***0.000	0.582	***0.000
Reflection period extant	0.237	0.225	0.390	***0.000	0.787	0.182
National rapporteur extant	6.04×10^{-7}	***0.000	0.120	**0.010	0.151	***0.000
Trafficking prosecution, current year	0.420	***0.000	0.722	**0.033	0.541	**0.018
Trafficking conviction, current year	0.503	***0.000	0.503	***0.000	0.503	***0.000
Source country	1.283	***0.000	1.283	***0.000	1.283	***0.008
Inter-regional migration org: Immigrant-receiving member	0.879	0.388	0.879	0.388	0.879	0.388
Emigrant-sending member	0.503	***0.002	0.551	***0.000	1.092	0.552
Government sponsored child soldiers	2.980	***0.000	4.551	***0.000	677,080.1	***0.000
Child sex tourism reported	0.861	0.313	1.290	**0.018	1.839	***0.003
Sex trade policy problematic	1.007	0.971	1.007	0.968	1.846	***0.004
Migration policy problematic	1.238	*0.055	1.238	*0.055	1.238	*0.055
Government complicity in TIP	2.331	***0.000	2.331	***0.000	2.331	***0.000
Cooperation with CSOs on TIP	0.517	***0.000	0.517	***0.000	0.517	***0.000
Hostility to CSOs on TIP	1.897	***0.000	1.897	***0.000	1.897	***0.000
Visit from UN HCR TIP rapporteur	3.24×10^{-7}	***0.000	0.720	0.639	1.280	0.600
De-institutionalization event	1.521	**0.019	1.521	**0.019	1.521	**0.019
UN ideal point distance, centered	1.204	0.385	1.055	0.637	1.750	***0.000
US military aid recipient	0.361	***0.000	0.632	***0.002	2.582	***0.000
Government accountability	0.385	***0.000	0.458	***0.000	0.265	***0.000
Trump administration	1.322	***0.000	1.322	***0.000	1.322	***0.000
World Bank income class Low income	0.949	0.874	1.011	0.970	3.800	***0.000
Lower middle income	1.258	0.270	1.258	0.270	1.258	0.270
Upper middle income	1.778	***0.000	1.778	***0.000	1.778	***0.000
Constant	0.413	***0.002	1.458	0.316	28.928	***0.000
Number of observations	2,423					
Pseudo r^2	0.3519					

Generalized ordered logistic model. Odds ratios greater than 1 signify a greater likelihood for lower scores, while odds ratios less than 1 signify a greater likelihood for better scores. Standard errors are adjusted for possible intragroup correlation by year.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

What policies matter? Superficially, criminalization is only statistically significant in increasing the likelihood of being scored at tier 1 over the other categories, but it does not differentiate among the other groupings. However, trafficking prosecutions and convictions are consistently helpful in improving scores across the continuum. As criminalization makes criminal prosecutions more likely, it is safe to say that a country which has criminalized—and uses its criminal laws to prosecute and convict traffickers—is likely to improve its scores. The same

cannot be said for any legal revision in the previous year. Revising the TIP legal code in the previous year does not seem to have any bearing on TIP scores.

I find little evidence that the policies which increase TIP capacity—institutionalization and active National Action Plans—improve TIP scores. Indeed, having an extant intersectoral coordinating body is associated with lower scores. It is not clear why this would be the case, especially given the evidence from chapter 3 that the threat of sanctions promotes these policies. Perhaps, these bodies increase data transparency and reveal more damning portraits of trafficking and government inaction. Or perhaps institutional capacity has been overlooked or under-emphasized in US diplomacy. Table 2-7 suggests as much: US TIP report recommendations regarding institutionalization are far rarer than those for criminalization, legal revisions, or NRMs. I do find evidence that countries with extant NAPs are far less likely to be scored at tier 3, though NAPs do not seem to be related to improving scores at other tier ranks.

I find evidence that victim protection policies improve TIP scores. This evidence is especially strong for NRMs which are consistently associated with improving scores at all tiers. Reflection periods are only statistically significant in reducing the likelihood that countries are scored as tier 2 watch list or tier 3.

Given these findings, I can refine hypotheses 2 and 3. Initiating NAPs or reflection periods has the most impact for countries which receive low scores—these countries are threatened with sanctions, thus countries which implement these policies may be responding to the desire to avoid sanctions rather than improve their scores and, thereby, their reputations. Indeed, I found in chapter 3 that the threat of sanctions did motivate NAP initiation. Thus, it is with NRMs that the power of reputation ought to be most strongly seen. NRMs consistently improve scores. If a country wants to improve its tier rank and its reputation, it should implement a functional NRM. Moreover, constructivists have argued that states favor law

enforcement policies, so a finding that countries initiate NRMs in response to scorecard diplomacy would offer strong support for the influence of reputation.

What else matters for determining TIP scores? The following policy and trafficking characteristics increase the likelihood of worse scores: being a source country, government sponsorship of child soldiers, government complicity in TIP, government hostility to civil society working in TIP, problematic migration policy (though significant only at p=0.055), and the collapse of intersectoral coordinating bodies. Child sex tourism and problematic sex trade policy tend to depress scores, but not consistently at all tier levels. Countries which want to improve scores can also cooperate with civil society on TIP or join inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy, but only if they are emigrant-sending nations. Countries which receive US military aid are less likely to be ranked at tier 3 or tier 2 watch list, but also less likely to be ranked at tier 1. Democracies are more likely to have higher scores. The Trump administration was harsher in its scoring than either the Bush or Obama administrations. Among the development levels, it is upper middle-income countries which are consistently more likely to have worse TIP rankings than high-income countries, while poor countries are less likely to be found at tier 1. Lower-middle income countries are not statistically distinguishable from high-income countries. The greater the distance in UN voting ideal points, the more likely a country would not be ranked tier 1, but otherwise, this does not seem to have influenced their tier rank.

Overall, we have a picture of a ranking system which has much to commend it yet may be vulnerable to political considerations as well as criticism over its opacity. Country policies do seem to matter—countries that protect victims and work with civil society are ranked higher. Countries that sponsor child soldiers or have problematic migration policy are ranked lower. But there are glaring blind spots—the demerit for institutionalization mentioned above is obvious, but the role international cooperation is also understated. The fact that countries which receive

military aid are less likely to be under threat of sanctions, but also less likely to be ranked at tier 1 also suggests the possibility of political concerns which gives some military partners a pass.

Scorecard Diplomacy and TIP Policy Diffusion

The effectiveness of scorecard diplomacy may be explained by various theories of policy diffusion. For constructivism or learning, scorecard diplomacy may promote certain ideas about trafficking that prompt policy diffusion. Alternatively, coercive pressure from sanctions or reputational pressure may be encouraging policy diffusion. Can we discern among these competing mechanisms?

As discussed in chapter 3, the threat of sanctions is dependent upon a country being scored at tier 2 watch list or tier 3. As I explored various models, I found that variables for sanctions credibility and low TIP scores (tier 2 watch list or tier 3) were substitutable, showing essentially the same effect. It seems best to assume that low TIP scores represent the coercive threat of sanctions.

Following the qualitative findings of Kelley (2017), I use whether a neighbor receives a better score to operationalize reputational pressure. While it is the case that countries which receive low scores are more likely to have neighbors with better scores, if it is primarily the embarrassment of receiving a low score that motivates action in TIP, then countries which receive tier 2 scores will also be motivated to improve policy if their neighbors are perceived to be doing better. It is possible that other mechanisms are also at play—perhaps a better-performing neighbor is pressuring the country to improve its TIP performance, but that can be controlled for by the measures for regional policy cooperation and for the number of road connections to neighbors where the policy in question is extant.

Two other variables are also relevant—whether a country is scored in the report and whether the US has made a specific recommendation for policy action. These variables could

represent any of the constructivist, learning, or reputational theories, but they are not likely to measure coercion. As the TIP reports engage elite networks, the information and recommendations in the reports may influence changing norms and ideas about appropriate policy solutions—patterns I expect from the constructivist and learning theories. Being scored in the report or drawing attention to a specific policy recommendation also puts a country on notice that its action on TIP is being observed, which may motivate action, either to guard the reputations of elites or of the country as a whole. The US recommendations for policy action are not necessarily independent but frequently depend on domestic or regional actors. For example, the US often echoed the GRETA reports regarding NRMs or encouraged certain legal changes that anti-trafficking civil society organizations desired. Here again is the confluence of pressure from various actors: the domestic networks channeling transnational policy solutions along with the attention drawn to these solutions by the United States. The constructivist, learning, and reputation theories are not mutually exclusive. As such, it is best to see these variables as measuring pressures that cannot be neatly categorized under a single theory of policy diffusion but are not likely to represent coercion. However, if countries are responding to these mechanisms by implementing policies *which are most likely to improve scores*, we have grounds to favor reputation as offering the most explanatory power.

For control variables, I use the regional density of the policy to account for the influence of regional policy communities and the extent that the policy was taken for granted, except for reflection periods, where I use membership in the European regional regime complex (and interact it with poor TIP scores). I also include road counts to neighbors with the policy extant and the standard set of control variables described in chapter 2. Each specific policy includes several other relevant variables, such as Protocol accession or the existence of other TIP policies (such as criminalization or institutionalization). Because relatively few countries have adopted

reflection periods, some control variables are collinear with the dependent variable (i.e., inclusion entirely predicts a negative outcome), so these variables are excluded from the models. All models have standard errors adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.

In addition to the base model, I include two models which interact the measure for reputational pressure with government accountability and CSO cooperation, respectively. The interaction with government accountability tests for the possibility that democratic governments, which turnover more frequently than autocratic governments, are more sensitive to reputational pressure, as Başer (2020) argued. The interaction with CSO cooperation tests for the generalizability of Perry's (2016) finding in his qualitative study that for US pressure to be successful it needed to be combined with pressure from civil society.

Criminalization

Table 4-2 shows the results for testing scorecard diplomacy for time to criminalization. Like Kelley (2017), I find that having a low score in the reports promotes criminalization, as does an explicit recommendation to criminalize. However, I find no statistical support that a neighbor with a better score or simply being scored in the report encourages diffusion. For criminalization, US scorecard diplomacy is most effective when sanctions are threatened or when the US specifically recommends criminalization. Criminalization (with prosecutions) does improve TIP scores; thus the importance of the US recommendation does show support for hypothesis 3. Interacting reputational pressure with either government accountability or CSO cooperation is not statistically significant. These findings are robust to the variant models which are shown in Appendix C.

Table 4-2. Scorecard Diplomacy and Time to Criminalization

Variables	Model 4-2-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-2-2 Reputation X Accountability Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-2-3 Reputation X CSO cooperation Hazard ratio P > |z|
Scored in US TIP report, current or previous year	2.408 0.247	2.482 0.263	2.254 0.277
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	0.990 0.956	0.903 0.788	1.180 0.766
US recommended criminalization, current or previous year	1.655 **0.015	1.645 **0.014	1.676 **0.014
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.760 ***0.001	1.783 ***0.001	1.772 ***0.001
Regional density of criminalization	23.714 ***0.000	23.749 ***0.000	23.394 ***0.000
Road count to neighbors with criminalization extant	1.000 0.967	1.000 1.000	1.000 0.967
Protocol accession	1.917 ***0.000	1.918 ***0.000	1.919 ***0.000
Legislative corruption	0.886 0.276	0.891 0.315	0.883 0.258
Women's political empowerment	3.849 **0.013	3.760 **0.019	3.830 **0.014
Government accountability	1.134 0.394	1.062 0.789	1.139 0.377
X Neighbor had a better score		1.099 0.740	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.680 0.171	0.679 0.169	0.682 0.167
Human rights violations of victims	0.608 0.269	0.618 0.267	0.601 0.259
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.056 0.834	1.059 0.828	1.229 0.697
X Neighbor had a better score			0.805 0.711
World Bank income classification (base = high income)			
Low income	0.921 0.806	0.913 0.783	0.918 0.797
Lower middle income	1.648 0.128	1.641 0.130	1.643 0.127
Upper middle income	0.589 *0.068	0.591 *0.069	0.586 *0.062
Subjects	165	165	165
Observations	1,349	1,349	1,349
Number of failures	146	146	146

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

Other relevant variables are the regional density of criminalization, protocol accession, and women's political empowerment. These results are generally consistent with the findings of Kelley (2017) and Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018).

Cox proportional hazard models assume that ratio of the hazards for any two cases is constant over time, however this assumption can sometimes be violated. Tests for the violations of the assumptions do indicate that being scored in the report, a neighbor with a better score,

and receiving a low score may violate the assumptions. Graphical representations of the time-variant hazard ratios for these key variables of interest in the base model are shown in figure 4-1. A closer look at these time varying hazard ratios suggests that being scored in the report has a magnifying effect: the longer a country is scored in the TIP report, the more likely it is to criminalize. This effect is statistically significant after 9 years. The other two variables show a decaying effect. A neighbor receiving a better score seems to vacillate between having a positive influence and having a negative influence, though it is only statistically significant in later years. Receiving a low score is statistically significant and a positive influence on time to criminalization in years nine to thirteen after treatment.

Figure 4-1. Scorecard Diplomacy and Criminalization: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios



Overall, I do find support for hypothesis 3. The non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy—explicit recommendations and being scored in the report—do promote criminalization. I do not find support for hypothesis 2. Reputational pressure, as measured by a neighbor having a better score, does not seem to influence time to criminalization.

Revisions to the TIP Legal Regime

One of the limitations in the literature has been the focus on criminalization. I turn now to see how scorecard diplomacy has influenced the diffusion of other TIP policies, beginning with any revision to the TIP legal regime. Results are shown in table 4-3. As noted in the discussion earlier in the chapter, TIP scores do not seem substantially influenced by these revisions, so I do not expect scorecard diplomacy to have influence.

Contrary to these expectations, the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy do have influence in promoting changes in the law. An explicit recommendation for a revision to the TIP legal regime is consistently statistically significant. While the tests of the proportional odds assumptions for the other key variables of interest are not especially problematic, a closer look at their time-varying hazard ratios, shown in figure 4-2, does reveal some interesting findings. Like criminalization, being scored in the report seems to have a magnifying effect, and one that is statistically significant after ten years. Though its influence vacillates, the reputational embarrassment of a neighbor with a better score is also positive and statistically significant in years 6 to 11 after treatment. Receiving a low score in the TIP report—and thus being under threat for sanctions—has both a positive influence in the middling years and a negative influence in later years, suggesting that some countries do respond to the threat of sanctions by revising their laws, but difficult cases do not.

Figure 4-2. Scorecard Diplomacy and Legal Revisions: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios



Table 4-3. Scorecard Diplomacy and Time to Revisions in the TIP Legal Regime

Variables	Model 4-3-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-3-2 Reputation X Accountability Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-3-3 Reputation X CSO cooperation Hazard ratio P > |z|
Scored in US TIP report, current or previous year	1.367 0.147	1.337 0.199	1.133 0.530
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.260 *0.083	1.436 0.101	2.684 ***0.000
US recommended TIP legal change, current or previous year	1.399 ***0.000	1.408 ***0.000	1.406 ***0.000
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.062 0.291	1.028 0.690	1.062 0.341
Regional density of criminalization	2.253 ***0.009	2.276 ***0.007	2.234 ***0.007
Road count to neighbors with criminalization extant	1.003 *0.074	1.002 0.140	1.003 0.138
Protocol accession	1.098 0.405	1.090 0.444	1.111 0.350
Institutionalization extant	1.123 0.198	1.133 0.192	1.147 0.143
Legislative corruption	0.922 *0.062	0.914 **0.037	0.913 **0.031
Women's political empowerment	2.568 ***0.001	2.553 ***0.001	2.535 ***0.001
Government accountability	1.020 0.767	1.107 0.327	1.031 0.656
X Neighbor had a better score		0.883 0.309	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.852 0.195	0.853 0.204	0.855 0.210
Human rights violations of victims	0.706 0.133	0.689 0.110	0.664 *0.079
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.258 *0.070	1.256 *0.075	2.245 ***0.001
X Neighbor had a better score			0.427 ***0.002
World Bank income classification (base = high income)			
Low income	0.605 **0.013	0.613 **0.015	0.600 **0.011
Lower middle income	0.678 **0.020	0.683 **0.023	0.672 **0.015
Upper middle income	0.763 0.132	0.766 0.140	0.756 0.124
Subjects	171	171	171
Observations	2,828	2,828	2,828
Number of failures	648	648	648

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

Model 4-3-3 shows the results when the variable for a neighbor having a better score is interacted with CSO cooperation. The effect of interacting the two variables is illustrated in figure 4-3. Countries with *neither* reputational pressure nor CSO cooperation are much less likely to revise their TIP legal regime. While this does not duplicate Perry's (2016) finding that the

efficacy of US pressure depended upon domestic CSO pressure, it does suggest that having either foreign or domestic pressure does help promote legal change.

Figure 4-3. Reputation and CSO Interactions for Legal Revisions



Overall, I do find support that non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy encourage revisions to the legal regime, even though I did not expect it as revising laws does not improve scores. The support is especially strong for US recommendations but being scored in the report and reputational pressure from having a neighbor with a better score also have positive and statistically significant hazard ratios for some periods of time after treatment. Moreover, the model which interacts reputational pressure with CSO cooperation also offers evidence for the positive influence of having a neighbor with a better score on time to legal revision.

Institutionalization

As noted in the discussion of the TIP scores above, I do not expect US scorecard diplomacy to motivate the first institutionalization of an intersectoral coordinating body.

Countries which had these institutions tended to receive lower scores, and, while the US did from time to time encourage countries to create these institutions, this recommendation was not as common as were recommendations for criminalization, legal revisions, or NRMs. It seems that US scorecard diplomacy has not been emphasized the creation of these coordinating bodies. Contrary to these expectations, however, I do find some evidence that non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy have motivated institutionalization. Results are shown in table 4-4.

Being scored in the TIP report is positively associated with first institutionalization, as is the coercive threat of sanctions as measured by receiving a low TIP score. Neither US recommendations nor having neighbors with a better TIP score have any statistically significant effect in the base model 4-4-1. Tests of the proportional hazard assumptions for the key variables of interest do indicate caution for being scored in the report and for a neighbor receiving a better score. Time-varying hazard ratios for these variables are shown in figure 4-4. Being scored in the report shows some vacillation in influence, with a statistically significant positive effect from years ten to thirteen following treatment. The time-varying hazard ratio for a neighbor receiving a better score does not appear especially problematic graphically and is never statistically significant. Being scored at tier 2 watch list or tier 3 is generally positive and statistically significant, except in the earliest and latest time periods.

Table 4-4. Scorecard Diplomacy and Time to First Institutionalization

Variables	Model 4-4-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-4-2 Reputation X Accountability Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-4-3 Reputation X CSO cooperation Hazard ratio P > |z|
Scored in US TIP report, current or previous year	2.546 **0.031	2.557 **0.037	3.111 **0.012
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	0.871 0.461	0.563 **0.034	0.465 **0.032
US recommended institutionalization, current or previous year	0.838 0.485	0.836 0.489	0.789 0.347
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	2.721 ***0.000	3.022 ***0.000	2.659 ***0.000
Regional density of institutionalization interacted with exp(-0.10*t*) †	4312.584 ***0.000	4567.774 ***0.000	4755.583 ***0.000
Road count to neighbors with institutionalization extant	0.978 ***0.001	0.980 ***0.005	0.978 ***0.001
Criminalization extant	2.300 ***0.000	2.249 ***0.000	2.351 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	1.138 0.749	1.129 0.760	1.270 0.576
Women's political empowerment	2.203 0.423	2.396 0.373	2.570 0.349
Government accountability	1.618 ***0.000	1.240 0.202	1.612 ***0.000
X Neighbor had a better score		1.557 **0.046	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.829 0.476	0.844 0.516	0.806 0.377
Human rights violations of victims	0.261 **0.045	0.325 *0.061	0.309 *0.070
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	0.893 0.613	0.911 0.676	0.555 **0.035
X Neighbor had a better score			2.245 **0.025
World Bank income classification (base = high income)			
Low income	2.479 **0.026	2.185 *0.057	2.354 **0.033
Lower middle income	1.517 0.292	1.372 0.448	1.425 0.377
Upper middle income	0.938 0.788	0.904 0.672	0.917 0.690
Subjects	166	166	166
Observations	1,002	1,002	1,002
Number of failures	154	154	154

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This interaction models a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Figure 4-4. Scorecard Diplomacy and Institutionalization: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios



Interacting the variable for neighbor with better score with both government accountability and CSO cooperation on TIP has a statistically significant effect, graphically demonstrated in figure 4-5. Perry (2016) argued that US pressure depended upon the pressure from domestic civil society organizations. I do not see evidence for this confluence of pressure for first institutionalization. For government accountability, reputational pressure had little impact on countries in the 75th percentile (e.g., Czechia in 2018), but countries in the 25th percentile were more likely to institutionalize if they did not have reputational pressure. This finding runs counter to expectations.

Figure 4-5. Influence of Interactions for Institutionalization



Figure 4-5 also shows that a country which has neither reputational pressure nor CSO cooperation has the highest likelihood of first institutionalization of an intersectoral coordinating body. Despite the counter-intuitive nature of this finding, it is not especially surprising because creating an intersectoral coordinating body was often the first TIP policy action for many countries, especially those countries with the highest commitment to combatting TIP. It seems that in some cases, the chain of causality moves from institutionalization to cooperation with CSOs.

Nonetheless, the non-coercive influence of scorecard diplomacy most clearly derives from the transparency of being scored. Since having an intersectoral coordinating body does not

improve TIP scores, the finding offers some support for the constructivist and learning mechanisms as having explanatory power. The widespread implementation of intersectoral coordinating bodies became the thing to do—once countries were on notice that their anti-trafficking efforts were being observed, they took action to form such bodies. It may be that these bodies are also a relatively low-cost policy option. Low-income countries were more than twice as likely to form one than upper income countries.

Other variables that promote institutionalization include density of regional institutionalization, criminalization, and government accountability (i.e., democracy).

Overall, I find support for the influence of non-coercive scorecard diplomacy through being scored in the TIP reports and the coercive pressure of receiving a low score. I do not find support that a neighbor receiving a better score or making an explicit recommendation promoted institutionalization.

National Action Plans

The models for TIP scoring suggested that NAPs will be initiated to avoid sanctions but not to improve scores more generally. The results support this picture. As I found in chapter 2, low TIP scores do encourage NAP initiation, but neither being scored in the report nor reputational pressure from having a better score is statistically significant in its influence on NAP initiation. (I did not collect data on US recommendations regarding NAPs.) Interactions between reputation and government accountability or CSO cooperation are not statistically significant. Results are shown in table 4-5.

Table 4-5. Scorecard Diplomacy and Time to NAP Initiation

Variables	Model 4-5-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-5-2 Reputation X Accountability Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-5-3 Reputation X CSO cooperation Hazard ratio P > |z|
Scored in US TIP report, current or previous year	1.268 0.758	1.274 0.753	1.293 0.750
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	0.939 0.239	0.900 0.283	0.856 0.493
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.491 ***0.000	1.502 ***0.000	1.491 ***0.000
Regional density of extant NAPs	1.030 0.917	1.027 0.927	1.032 0.914
Road count to neighbors with NAPs extant	0.997 0.246	0.997 0.265	0.997 0.254
Institutionalization extant	3.383 ***0.000	3.382 ***0.000	3.376 ***0.000
NAP extant	25.590 ***0.000	25.659 ***0.000	25.513 ***0.000
Institutionalization X NAP extant	0.274 ***0.000	0.273 ***0.000	0.275 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	1.610 0.151	1.601 0.148	1.602 0.152
Women's political empowerment	1.307 0.489	1.307 0.491	1.307 0.490
Government accountability	1.137 *0.095	1.114 0.213	1.135 0.101
X Neighbor had a better score		1.032 0.680	
Significant domestic trafficking	1.162 0.175	1.161 0.183	1.161 0.183
Human rights violations of victims	0.573 *0.058	0.577 *0.056	0.576 *0.055
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	0.872 0.322	0.873 0.322	0.822 0.425
X Neighbor had a better score			1.098 0.695
World Bank income classification (base = high income)			
Low income	0.966 0.903	0.960 0.885	0.969 0.911
Lower middle income	0.839 0.563	0.835 0.553	0.840 0.565
Upper middle income	1.005 0.981	1.001 0.994	1.007 0.974
Subjects	172	172	172
Observations	2,898	2,898	2,898
Number of failures	396	396	396

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

Tests of the proportional odds assumption for the key variables of interest warrant caution only for low TIP scores, though a graphical representation of time-varying hazard ratios, shown in figure 4-6, do reveal that being scored in the report seems to follow a magnifying function. Nonetheless, the time-varying hazard ratios reveal the same findings as shown in the table 4-5.

Figure 4-6. Scorecard Diplomacy and National Action Plans: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios



What matters most for NAP initiation is having an extant NAP. Countries with NAPs tend to renew them. Having an intersectoral coordinating body encourages the first NAP initiation. In the models, I interacted extant NAP with extant intersectoral coordinating committee because the influence of both is not multiplicative: having an extant intersectoral coordinating body helps launch the first NAP, after which the NAP is likely to be renewed.

The only aspect of scorecard diplomacy which seems to promote initiation of NAPs is the coercive pressure of receiving a low score in the report. I did not expect, nor do I have evidence that the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy promote NAPs.

National Referral Mechanisms

As discussed above, having a NRM will improve a country's US TIP tier ranking. If countries are motivated to improve their scores in US TIP reports, then I should expect to see them formalize NRMs. This hypothesis stands in contrast to the claims made by constructivists that law enforcement policies ought to diffuse more rapidly than victim protection policies. Results are shown in table 4-6.

Table 4-6. Scorecard Diplomacy and National Referral Mechanisms

Variables	Model 4-6-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-6-2 Reputation X Accountability Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-6-3 Reputation X CSO cooperation Hazard ratio P > |z|
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.343 0.312	0.893 0.823	0.247 **0.011
US recommendation on NRM, current of previous year	1.549 **0.048	1.559 **0.043	1.739 **0.014
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	0.474 **0.045	0.559 0.142	0.499 **0.045
Regional density of extant NRMs interacted with exp(-0.25*t*) †	1.09×10^{60} ***0.000	9.89×10^{59} ***0.000	5.14×10^{60} ***0.000
Road count to neighbors with NRM extant	0.988 0.158	0.990 0.237	0.990 0.225
NAP extant	2.969 ***0.000	2.948 ***0.000	2.974 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	0.474 0.314	0.465 0.294	0.512 0.392
Women's political empowerment	0.782 0.829	1.044 0.972	0.797 0.853
Government accountability	1.050 0.860	0.602 *0.079	1.038 0.898
X Government accountability	0.711 **0.048	0.883 0.527	0.758 *0.093
X Neighbor had a better score		‡ 2.200 **0.012	
Significant domestic trafficking	1.470 0.111	1.451 0.129	1.489 0.124
Human rights violations of victims	0.898 0.878	0.986 0.984	1.146 0.830
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.519 0.119	1.510 0.127	0.536 0.145
X Neighbor had a better score			6.980 ***0.003
World Bank income classification (base = high income)			
Low income	0.378 *0.084	0.372 *0.081	0.368 *0.072
Lower middle income	1.016 0.973	1.030 0.948	1.001 0.999
Upper middle income	0.878 0.732	0.922 0.825	0.854 0.668
Subjects	171	171	171
Observations	2,461	2,461	2,461
Number of failures	87	87	87

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This interaction models a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ The interaction between the square of government accountability and a neighbor having a better score is not statistically significant and not shown.

Regarding the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy, US recommendations for NRMs do promote their establishment, supporting hypothesis 3. The influence of reputational pressure is more ambiguous and conditional. As found in chapter 3, the coercive threat of sanctions does not influence NRMs.

Tests for violations of the proportional odds assumptions did not reveal any problems for the key variables of interest, though it did reveal a sharp decay function for the influence of the regional density of extant NRMs. (As noted in table 4-6, I included a decay function in the model for this control variable so as to improve the overall model specification.) Figure 4-7 shows the time-varying hazard ratios for a neighbor with a better score and receiving a low score. These graphs reinforce the results shown in table 4-6. However, receiving a low score is statistically significant and positive at treatment, after which it rapidly decays into a statistically significant and negative influence on formalization of NRMs. Thus, if threat of sanctions is going to work, it does so very quickly. As noted in chapter 3, I can point to the case of Bolivia which formalized its NRM in the same year that it was scored at tier 3 and sanctioned as a potential outlying example where coercion promoted formalization of an NRM.

Figure 4-7. Scorecard Diplomacy and NRMs: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios



Results from the base model 4-6-1 show that having a neighbor with a better score is not statistically significant, thus I do not find support for hypothesis 2 where I most expected to find it. The interactions between the variable for a neighbor with a better score and both government accountability and CSO cooperation are also statistically significant, but as can be seen in the graphical representation of the interaction (figure 4-8), these results are ambiguous. In the interaction with government accountability, reputational pressure increases the hazard

for both countries with lower and higher accountability. Interestingly, countries with lower government accountability are more likely to institute NRMs than countries with higher accountability, while controlling for all other factors. But, in both cases, reputational pressure encourages establishment of NRMs.

Figure 4-8. Influence of Interactions for NRMs



The interaction between reputational pressure and CSO cooperation is particularly ambiguous. Cases with neither reputational pressure nor CSO cooperation formalize NRMs with approximately the same hazard function as countries with both. Countries with both reputational pressure and CSO cooperation do formalize NRMs more rapidly than countries with only one of these factors. Unlike with intersectoral coordinating bodies where we might expect to see institutionalization promoting CSO cooperation, NRMs were not a policy response adopted early nor does it seem to be a low-cost option for countries. Thus, I have some evidence that the conjunction of reputational and domestic CSO pressure may promote NRMs, as Perry (2016) argued, but I have no explanation for the equivalence in hazard ratios for countries that have both reputational pressure with those that have neither.

If countries are seeking to improve their relative standing in response to the reputational pressure generated by the TIP scores, then they should be especially eager to implement NRMs. A specific US recommendation for an NRM does promote their formalization,

supporting hypothesis 3. The role of reputational pressure for promoting NRMs is ambiguous. Given that having an NRM substantially improves TIP scores, countries feeling reputational pressure ought to implement them. The strongest evidence in favor of this reputational pressure comes from model 4-6-2 where the interaction between reputational pressure and government accountability shows that reputational pressure promotes NRMs for countries with low and high levels of government accountability. The interaction with CSO cooperation is more ambiguous since countries with neither reputational pressure nor CSO cooperation establish NRMs with the same hazard ratio as countries with both. Thus, results for hypothesis 2 are ambiguous. What support exists in its favor is not robust.

Other variables that promote NRMs include regional density of NRMs, having an extant NAP, and government accountability (though this effect is not linear). GRETA in Europe has emphasized NRMs and many of the first movers are located in Europe, so the importance of regional influence comes as no surprise.

Overall, hypothesis 3 is supported; the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy do promote NRMs, as evidence by the positive contribution of explicit recommendations. The results for hypothesis 2 are less clear, as the findings for reputational pressure are ambiguous and depend on which model is used.

Reflection Periods

The analysis of TIP scores generated suggested that scorecard diplomacy should motivate countries which receive low scores to implement reflection periods for victims to avoid sanctions. However, I do not expect countries to implement reflection periods to improve their scores beyond what is needed to avoid sanctions. The results offer some qualified support for the expectations and are shown in table 4-7. Paralleling the results of the models in chapter 3, countries which receive low scores are *less* likely to implement reflection periods, *except* for

countries in the European regime complex which are *more* likely to do so. Thus, it seems that US scorecard diplomacy may be reinforcing the work of the European policy community to promote the diffusion of reflection periods among its members, but this support comes from its coercive dimension. Having a neighbor with a better score has no statistically significant influence on the diffusion of reflection periods in the base model, though it encourages establishment of reflection periods when interacting the variable with CSO cooperation.

Table 4-7. Scorecard Diplomacy and Reflection Periods

Variables	Model 4-7-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-7-2 Reputation X Accountability Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 4-7-3 Reputation X CSO cooperation Hazard ratio P > |z|
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.108 0.793	0.877 0.889	$5.58x10^{8}$ ***0.000
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	0.120 *0.059	0.130 *0.072	0.108 *0.054
European Regional Policy Community for TIP, member	6.688 ***0.000	6.870 ***0.000	6.420 ***0.000
X low TIP score	11.401 **0.043	11.024 **0.050	12.286 **0.040
Road count to neighbors with NRM extant	0.972 **0.010	0.972 **0.019	0.973 **0.010
Public sector corruption	0.777 0.803	0.781 0.804	0.824 0.853
Women's political empowerment	0.265 0.575	0.287 0.612	0.220 0.551
Government accountability	2.039 ***0.005	1.865 0.137	2.076 ***0.005
X Neighbor had a better score		1.183 0.762	
Significant domestic trafficking	1.013 0.978	1.019 0.966	0.980 0.963
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.650 0.459	1.652 0.456	$4.81x10^{8}$ ***0.000
X Neighbor had a better score			*Collinear (-)*
GDP per capita	1.012 **0.032	1.012 **0.029	1.011 *0.073
Subjects	157	157	157
Observations	2,321	2,321	2,321
Number of failures	41	41	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

While statistical tests for the proportional hazards assumptions do not reveal any concerns for the key variables of interest, graphs of the time-varying hazard ratios, shown in figure 4-9, do reveal some vacillating influence, especially for the interaction between the

European regional policy community and low TIP scores. Threat of sanctions is especially likely to promote reflection periods in the European policy community shortly after treatment.

Figure 4-9. Scorecard Diplomacy and Reflection Periods: Time-Variant Hazard Ratios



A neighbor having a better score has not statistically influence in models 4-7-1 and 4-7-2. However, the results for model 4-7-3 which interacts the variable with CSO cooperation do show that reputational influence and the interaction are statistically significant. The results are difficult to interpret in the chart, but figure 4-10 graphically shows its impact. Here we see that no country has implemented a reflection period without either reputational pressure or CSO cooperation, or both. Reputational pressure makes no difference when countries cooperate with CSOs, but it does matter for countries which do not cooperate with CSOs. Indeed, it appears that, in the case of reflection periods, reputational pressure can act as a substitute for CSO cooperation.

Figure 4-10. Influence of Interactions for Reflection Periods



Figure 4-10 graphically represents that interaction between TIP scores and membership in the European policy community. Overall, members of the European RPC are much more likely to implement a reflection period. Indeed, reflection periods have been a special emphasis of GRETA, while few countries outside of Europe have them. Within Europe, countries under threat of US sanctions are more likely to implement reflection periods than countries which are scored at tier 1 or 2. As noted in chapter 3, this finding suggests that the congruence of pressure from both within Europe and from the United States has worked to promote the diffusion of reflection periods.

The paucity of cases which have instituted reflection periods makes it challenging to test for all aspects of scorecard diplomacy. While we did not expect reputational pressure to promote diffusion of reflection periods, I have found conditional support that it does matter for those countries which do not cooperate with CSOs on TIP.

Robustness Checks

These findings are robust to variant models which are shown in Appendix C. To test the robustness, I include three alternative base models. In the first model, I adjust standard errors for political-cultural regions rather than geographic regions to see if results are robust to an alternative conception of region. In the second model, I substitute the measure for sanctions credibility I used in chapter 3 for low TIP scores to determine if results are robust to an alternative operationalization of coercive pressure. In the third models, I interact the variable for a neighbor with a better score with CSO cooperation with a measure for freedom of expression (which replaces Government Accountability). For institutionalization, the model which interacted reputation and freedom of expression found that interaction to be statistically significant, supporting the finding shown in model 4-4-3 interacting reputation and CSO cooperation. For NRMs, interacting reputational pressure and freedom of expression produces

results similar to those shown herein for interacting reputational pressure with CSO cooperation of model 4-6-3. The results of all robustness tests are found in Appendix C.

Discussion

In this chapter, I test the efficacy of reputational pressure and the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy for the promotion of TIP policies. Hypotheses 2 and 3 hold that the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy ought to influence policy diffusion when the policies improve TIP scores. The TIP scoring model showed that criminalization (with prosecutions) and NRMs consistently improved TIP scores while NAPs and reflection periods helped countries avoid the threat of sanctions from having poor TIP scores. Table 4-8 presents the overall findings.

Table 4-8. Hypotheses 2 and 3 Findings Summary

TIP policy	Does policy improve scores?	Hypothesis 2: Reputation	Hypothesis 3: Non-coercive	Coercive
Criminalization (with prosecutions)	Yes	Not supported	Supported	Supported
Legal revisions	No	Supported	Supported	Not supported
Institutionalization	No	Not supported	Supported	Supported
NAP	To avoid tier 3	Not supported	Not supported	Supported
NRM	Yes	Ambiguous	Supported	Not supported
Reflection period	To avoid tier 2 watch list / tier 3	Conditional support	Not tested	Conditional support

I find evidence that non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy in general and reputational pressure specifically do help promote TIP policy diffusion. However, these effects are not closely tied to policies which help improve scores. Thus, while we can say with some confidence that non-coercive diplomacy is useful in promoting TIP policy, we cannot say with confidence that *scorecard* diplomacy is helpful.

The strongest support for the influence of a neighbor having a better score in promoting TIP policy diffusion comes from its role in encouraging revisions to the TIP legal regime. However, these revisions do not seem to matter for improving TIP scores. Similarly, I expected

that reputational pressure to motivate establishment of NRMs since it has such a strong effect on improving scores. But the finding here was much more ambiguous. Only in the model interacting reputational pressure with government accountability did it promote NRMs.

The influence of the non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy—explicit recommendations and being scored in the report—were more consistently supported than the measure for a neighbor having a better score. Indeed, some non-coercive aspect was influential in all models where it was tested except for NAPs. Thus, these non-coercive aspects were influential for both policies which improved TIP scores and those that did not.

It may be that diplomats and policymakers have no clear idea what policies improve TIP scores, and their efforts in response to the non-coercive aspects of US diplomacy are intended to improve their scores, even when the evidence suggests that their policy choices will not have an impact. Another possibility is that the reputational concerns of *scorecard* diplomacy does not offer as much explanatory value as its advocates hold. Perhaps it is simply sustained US diplomatic attention that is activating reputational concerns rather than scorecards.

According to the scoring model, the US values both law enforcement and victim protection policies. In chapter 3, I found that the US seems reluctant to sanction a country for its lack of specific victim protection policies, but victim protection policies do improve scores. Somewhat surprisingly, the US seems to undervalue building institutional capacity. Having a functional intersectoral coordinating body does not improve scores and National Action Plans only do so inasmuch as they can keep a country from being scored at tier 3. Moreover, US recommendations regarding intersectoral coordinating bodies are not only made less frequently than other policies but are the only recommendations that have no statistically discernible impact on policy diffusion. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the only non-coercive aspect of the TIP reports that has any impact on the diffusion on either of the capacity-building policies is that of

being scored in the report which promotes institutionalization. (The threat of sanctions, however, still promotes diffusion of these policies.) Given that the scoring in the US TIP reports does credit victim protection policy and that, to some extent, US diplomacy is promoting the diffusion of victim protection policies, differences in diffusion by policy type cannot be explained by simple appeals to US policy preferences. US diplomacy has underemphasized capacity-building policies, but both intersectoral coordinating bodies and NAPs are more widespread than either NRMs or reflection periods. Thus, it does not seem that non-coercive US diplomacy is the primary cause of differential diffusion rates for different policies.

US diplomacy cannot explain regional differentiation in policy diffusion. While US diplomacy may interact with the work of regional organizations, the explanation for regional differentiation is likely to come from differences in regional contexts, such as variations in regional policy coordination. I will explore regional differentiation in the next chapter.

Conclusion

In *Scorecard Diplomacy*, Kelley (2017) offered substantial qualitative and quantitative evidence that reputational concerns do matter in the conduct for diplomacy. The statistical evidence presented here is less sanguine, however. Alternative measures for reputation and clearer distinctions between reputation and other theories and mechanisms have not demonstrated the power of GPIs for promoting TIP policy diffusion, except inasmuch as they signal a country may be sanctioned. While I find evidence that being scored in the TIP report or receiving a specific US recommendation has some influence on promoting TIP policy, this influence is not limited to those policies which improve scores, thus these variables may also be measuring the influence of mechanisms associated with constructivist or learning theories. The constructivist, learning and reputation mechanisms overlap, so it is possible that reputation

matters, but it is less apparent that the reputational influence of GPIs matter to the extent hypothesized by Kelley.

CHAPTER FIVE: POLICY NORMALIZATION AND REGIONAL POLICY COMMUNITIES

Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to test hypothesis 4 that TIP policy diffusion increases as the regional density of countries which have the policy increases. To test this constructivist hypothesis, I control for characteristics of regional policy communities to see to what extent the work of these communities can be explained by constructivism and what yet needs to be explained. In the process, this chapter offers the most thorough analysis of regional differentiation in policy diffusion available in the literature on TIP policy diffusion.

Testing Competing Theories

Regional Policy Communities and Tipping Points

Constructivism holds that once policy acceptance reaches a "tipping point," its adoption will accelerate. Given that I have no *a priori* expectation as to what the tipping point threshold is, I use the regional density of policy implementation to measure the concept of policy normalization, that is, how much the policy is taken-for-granted. But how do policies become taken-for-granted?

One likely candidate for constructivist mechanisms associated with policy normalization is the international TIP policy regime in that it creates a network of institutions and individuals through which ideas may diffuse. A literature on "regime complexes" understands international institutions *as actors* in the international system. Building on an earlier literature on "international regimes"—the "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area" (Krasner 1983, 186)—scholars began noting the rapidly increasing complexity of interrelationships among international institutions since the end of the Cold War. Henning (2017) defined a regime complex as "a set of international institutions that operate in a common issue area and the informal mechanisms

that coordinate them" (19). This definition has the advantage over other earlier definitions by allowing inter-institutional relations to vary along a continuum of hierarchy.

For TIP policy, the international regime complex includes such institutions as the Protocol, the International Organization for Migration, the International Labor Organization, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as many regional organizations that coordinate TIP policy among various subsets of the international community. These regional organizations—or regional policy communities—are one potential source of policy normalization that could explain regional variation in TIP policy diffusion.

Scholars of regime complexes have examined how the institutional contexts shape state strategies for pursuing their interests (Alter and Meunier 2009; Biermann et al. 2009; Gehring and Faude 2014; Gómez-Mera 2016; Hafner-Burton 2009; Henning and Pratt 2021; Keohane and Victor 2011; Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013). In contexts of contestation, *more* is not necessarily *better* for policy adjustment. Thus, rather than trying to capture the influence of specific regional organizations, I use variables for regional policy communities to capture any overlapping, reinforcing, or diminishing effect of membership in multiple regional organizations. As Gómez-Mera (2016) argued, the neighboring domain of migration policy may be less cooperative and have different effects for TIP policy than the generalized regional organizations, so I use separate variables for the emigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving members of inter-regional organizations coordinating migration. I also include measurements for the number of memberships in regional organizations coordinating TIP policy, the number of those memberships which have institutionalized coordination on TIP policy, and the number of those that have critical and external TIP policy evaluation. Together, these variables help measure how regime complexity may influence TIP policy diffusion. A list of all regional and inter-regional organizations that address TIP policy can be found in Appendix D.

To weigh the various explanatory power of policy density and regional policy communities, I use four models. The first model includes variables for participation in each of the regional policy communities, but it does not include the variable for regional policy density. The second model adds the regional policy density variable. By comparing the first and second models, we should be able to see whether policy normalization or regional policy communities carry more explanatory power for TIP policy diffusion.

In the third and fourth models for each policy, I include more variables related to regional policy coordination that may influence policy diffusion to control for other mechanisms and offer more vigorous tests of the policy density variable. In these models I add variables for emigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving members of interregional organizations coordinating migration policy. In the third model, I also add a variable for the number of memberships in regional organizations combatting TIP, while in the fourth model, I add the number of memberships in those regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation and the number of memberships in regional organization with external policy evaluation (all of which are in Europe).

Selection Problems and Causal Inference

States do not enter into international agreements randomly; they self-select into them. This selection bias can undermine causal inference. As Von Stein (2005) argued, whatever leads states to self-select into treaties will also influence their cooperation with those treaties. However, in the case of TIP, all the existing regional regime complexes existed prior to initiation of policy coordination. Thus, while countries do self-select into these regional organizations, they did so for reasons independent of TIP policy cooperation. In only two cases did states create regional organizations to coordinate TIP policy: The Convention on Action against Human Trafficking in Human Beings, fruit of the Council of Europe, and the Coordinated Mekong

Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking, a UN initiative. By using regional policy community as the independent variable rather than specific regional organizations, I aim to minimize the potential self-selection problem, as in both Europe and Southeast Asia policy coordination began in the extant regional organizations before or concurrent with participation in the trafficking-specific institutions.

While self-selection into TIP policy cooperation is not a major concern for regional regime complexes, it may nonetheless exist for participation in inter-regional organizations promoting cooperation on migration policy. While the Budapest Process and the Regional Conference on Migration were established prior to the UN Trafficking Protocol, the other inter-regional migration organizations came later, and some, such as the Bali Process, explicitly included trafficking issues in its purview from their founding. Thus, causal inference may be undermined as any effect from participating in inter-regional migration organizations might not be attributed to the influence of the organization itself, but the underlying causes that motivated a country to participate in the organization. I have tried to account for this possibility by including a robustness check with variables that might explain participation in inter-regional migration organizations. Moreover, the fact that states coordinate migration policy for reasons other than to coordinate trafficking policy also partially mitigates concerns that the influence of these organizations of trafficking policy diffusion is contaminated by self-selection.

Time-Varying Hazard Ratios and Hypothesis Testing

I have included graphs of time-varying hazard ratios to help with hypothesis testing. The Cox model assumes that the hazards are proportional over time, but this assumption can sometimes be violated. Not only do graphs of time-varying hazard ratios help reveal potential problems in the model specification, but they also permit a more fluid assessment of the influence of a variable over time.

To improve model specification, I have also introduced interactions to model decay functions in the hazard, so that the influence of the hazard decreases over time. When decay functions are modelled, the odds ratio begins as a very high number at time zero (this is the number reported in the table), but the reader should understand that the decay function results in a rapid decrease in the influence of the variable over time.

Notes on the Models

In some cases, statistical results show that the dependent variable is collinear with an explanatory variable. For example, no low-income country has instituted a reflection period, so were I to include a categorical income variable in the model (i.e., by World Bank income classification), the resulting statistical result for low-income countries would show an extremely low number, and it would not be possible to calculate *z* or confidence intervals. (In this case, I use GDP per capita rather than income categories.) Collinearity problems arise more frequently for NRMs and reflection periods where the number of events is lower. Where collinearity exists, I simply report it on the tables which follow.

For control variables, I use the standard controls for domestic characteristics used for all models. For the influence of US scorecard diplomacy and threat of sanctions, I use the variables found to be statistically significant in chapter 4. I also include the variable for count of roads to neighbors with the policy extant.

Finally, a note about the North American regional policy community: As this comprises only two countries—the United States and Canada—its statistical influence is highly susceptible to the actions of either country. In many models, I have simply left out this variable.

Criminalization

Table 5-1 shows the results of the four models testing the influence of policy density and regional policy communities on time to criminalization. In the base model 5-1-1 which does not include the regional density of criminalization, both the European and Southeast Asian regional policy communities promote criminalization. But when the density of criminalization is added in model 5-1-2, the influence of these policy communities is no longer statistically significant. The density of criminalization is statistically significant and highly influential, providing support for hypothesis 4.

Model 5-1-3 adds in memberships in the inter-regional migration organizations and the number of memberships in regional organizations that coordinate trafficking policy. Here, I find that membership in the inter-regional migration organizations promotes criminalization for both emigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving countries. The number of memberships in regional organizations is not significant and its sign is negative, suggesting that multiplying regional organizations coordinating TIP policy has little effect on promoting criminalization.

Table 5-1. Regional Policy Communities and Criminalization

Variables	Model 5-1-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-1-2 Tipping point Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-1-3 Inter-regional migration organizations Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-1-4 Level of institutionalization Hazard ratio P > |z|
African RPC	0.710 0.286	1.041 0.897	1.780 *0.088	2.217 **0.034
American RPC	0.921 0.683	0.640 0.100	0.871 0.608	0.731 0.369
European RPC	2.412 ***0.008	0.804 0.323	0.856 0.680	0.616 *0.052
Middle East/North African RPC	0.995 0.985	0.939 0.843	0.928 0.786	0.982 0.952
North American RPC	1.263 0.790	0.652 0.733	0.470 0.548	0.430 0.524
Former USSR RPC	1.689 0.281	1.237 0.413	1.113 0.661	0.994 0.990
South Asian RPC	0.835 0.447	1.249 0.426	1.070 0.785	1.036 0.864
Southeast Asian RPC	1.905 **0.034	0.861 0.661	0.759 0.461	0.688 0.226
Regional density of criminalization		29.656 ***0.000	30.460 ***0.000	43.594 ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			1.956 ***0.008	2.113 **0.010
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			1.877 **0.015	1.928 **0.018
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations			0.863 0.329	
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation				0.640 **0.036
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy				2.219 ***0.002
US recommended criminalization, current or previous year	1.883 ***0.005	1.717 **0.018	1.761 **0.026	1.764 **0.024
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.846 ***0.002	1.944 ***0.002	1.895 ***0.002	1.886 ***0.003
Road count to neighbors with criminalization extant	1.014 0.143	1.000 0.995	1.001 0.934	1.002 0.918
Protocol accession	2.114 ***0.000	2.028 ***0.000	1.984 ***0.000	1.906 ***0.001
Legislative corruption	0.894 0.311	0.859 0.181	0.886 0.308	0.889 0.320
Women's political empowerment	4.053 **0.010	5.397 ***0.009	4.670 ***0.009	5.901 ***0.006
Government accountability	1.274 *0.086	1.159 0.432	1.101 0.595	1.119 0.523
Significant domestic trafficking	0.606 **0.046	0.736 0.283	0.769 0.360	0.666 0.114
Human rights violations of victims	0.351 **0.042	0.629 0.301	0.565 0.205	0.562 0.253
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.037 0.897	1.155 0.577	1.141 0.645	1.206 0.500
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	1.213 0.541	0.706 0.245	0.688 0.153	0.793 0.388
Lower middle income	1.715 *0.051	1.423 0.292	1.310 0.366	1.562 0.142
Upper middle income	0.649 *0.060	0.549 **0.029	0.544 **0.017	0.598 *0.064
Subjects	165	165	165	165
Observations	1,349	1,349	1,349	1,349
Number of failures	146	146	146	146

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

The full model 5-1-4 replaces the number of memberships in regional organizations with two variables, one for the number of memberships in regional organizations with institutionalized coordination and one for the number of memberships in regional organizations that offer external policy evaluations. For the latter, all these organizations are in Europe (and for the OSCE, North America). Here I find that external evaluation of policy is statistically

significant and more than doubles the hazard, while membership in institutionalized regional organizations reduces the hazard ratio. Participation in inter-regional migration organizations remains significant and influential, while, interestingly, membership in the African regional policy community is now statistically significant and more than doubles the hazard ratio, suggesting that African policy coordination is relatively effective.

For criminalization, hypothesis 4 is supported. The regional density of criminalization promotes policy diffusion. When this variable is added to the model, the variables for specific regional policy communities are no longer statistically significant. This suggests that constructivist mechanisms are operational in regional policy communities. The full model adds variables for the inter-regional organizations coordinating migration and various levels of institutionalization. These variables could be measuring mechanisms associated with either the reputation or constructivist theories, or both. As it stands, participation in inter-regional cooperation does seem to promote criminalization, as does external policy evaluation. Institutionalized coordination, however, tends to delay diffusion. This may be because increasing regime complexity undermines policy adjustment by giving actors more options to protect their reputations without needing to take concrete action. The results also show that regional policy communities are not equally effective. Without the policy density variable, members of the European and Southeast Asian policy communities are more likely to criminalize, while in the full model the African policy community is relatively effective at promoting criminalization when taking the other variables into account.

Revisions to the TIP Legal Regime

Table 5-2 shows the results for the four models testing the influence of policy normalization and regional policy communities on time to any revision to the TIP legal regime. The results offer no support for hypothesis 4. In the full model 5-2-4, no policy community has

any statistically robust influence on time to legal change except for the North American regional policy community. Neither does participation in inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy or the number of memberships in regional organizations in their varying levels of institutionalization or the density of criminalization.

Table 5-2. Regional Policy Communities and Legal Revisions

Variables	Model 5-2-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-2-2 Tipping point Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-2-3 Inter-regional migration organizations Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-2-4 Level of institutionalization Hazard ratio P > |z|
African RPC	0.711 *0.074	0.746 *0.096	0.872 0.546	0.905 0.646
American RPC	0.692 ***0.007	0.675 **0.015	0.735 0.121	0.736 0.133
European RPC	1.459 ***0.000	1.305 *0.053	1.292 0.225	1.129 0.440
Middle East/North African RPC	1.239 0.127	1.214 0.198	1.227 0.153	1.249 0.109
North American RPC	2.749 ***0.000	2.473 ***0.000	2.256 ***0.000	2.130 ***0.001
Former USSR RPC	1.038 0.870	0.995 0.982	0.990 0.963	0.983 0.918
South Asian RPC	0.975 0.876	1.025 0.873	0.955 0.791	0.983 0.918
Southeast Asian RPC	1.074 0.545	0.986 0.924	0.957 0.807	0.955 0.745
Regional density of criminalization		1.597 0.138	1.546 0.133	1.661 *0.098
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			1.289 0.139	1.292 0.136
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			1.188 0.289	1.206 0.256
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations			0.974 0.662	
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation				0.966 0.642
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy				1.108 0.186
Neighbor had better TIP report score, current or previous year	1.259 *0.065	1.228 0.111	1.226 0.104	1.234 0.103
US recommended legal revision, current or previous year	1.451 ***0.000	1.463 ***0.000	1.467 ***0.000	1.462 ***0.000
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.105 0.107	1.133 *0.075	1.144 *0.066	1.155 *0.058
Road count to neighbors with criminalization extant	1.000 0.772	1.000 0.912	1.000 0.958	1.000 0.874
Protocol accession	1.188 0.130	1.156 0.214	1.153 0.214	1.146 0.242
Institutionalization extant	1.131 0.133	1.112 0.204	1.086 0.332	1.092 0.302
Legislative corruption	0.925 *0.095	0.921 *0.084	0.932 0.156	0.931 0.139
Women's political empowerment	2.711 ***0.001	2.793 ***0.001	2.692 ***0.000	2.803 ***0.000
Government accountability	1.068 0.377	1.064 0.404	1.071 0.337	1.067 0.373
Significant domestic trafficking	0.881 0.222	0.891 0.299	0.891 0.297	0.870 0.201
Human rights violations of victims	0.666 *0.092	0.687 0.126	0.671 0.110	0.679 0.112
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.312 *0.051	1.296 *0.057	1.298 *0.053	1.293 *0.058
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	0.826 0.253	0.789 0.151	0.781 0.153	0.789 0.169
Lower middle income	0.822 0.194	0.803 0.152	0.765 *0.084	0.794 0.140
Upper middle income	0.930 0.684	0.906 0.569	0.882 0.471	0.910 0.560
Subjects	171	171	171	171
Observations	2,828	2,828	2,828	2,828
Number of failures	648	648	648	648

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

The policy density variable I use in these models is for criminalization. It is not statistically significant, but it is not perfect representation of the concept of policy normalization because density of criminalization is only one kind of change to the TIP legal regime. In models 5-2-1 and 5-2-2, the European and American regional policy communities are statistically significant, though the influence on TIP policy diffusion of the American community is negative. These variables are no longer statistically significant once membership in inter-regional organizations is included in models 5-2-3 and 5-2-4.

Figure 5-1 shows select time varying hazard ratios for the key variables of interest from model 5-2-4. The time varying hazard ratios complicate the picture only slightly. The South Asian regional policy community shows some positive influence on time to legal change, but this influence decays rapidly. The Southeast Asian regional policy community shows a negative influence that eventually becomes positive at the end of the time period. Otherwise, the time-variant hazard ratios are not statistically significant.

Figure 5-1. Time-Variant Hazard Ratios from Model 5-2-4



For any change to the TIP legal regime, hypothesis 4 is not supported, but neither do we find much evidence that regional policy communities or inter-regional organizations coordinating migration encourage TIP policy diffusion. While the USA and Canada are more likely to revise their TIP legal regimes, these two nations are also highly developed countries

with intricate and complicated legal infrastructures. As such, I am reluctant to consider the finding that they are more likely to revise their TIP legal regime as offering support for the influence of the regional policy community in North America.

Institutionalization

Table 5-3 shows the results of four models testing the influence of tipping points and regional policy communities on time to first institutionalization of an intersectoral coordinating body. The results support hypothesis 4. The density of institutionalization is robustly statistically significant in the models in which it is included. No regional policy community is robustly influential in the model though membership in the former Soviet Union is negatively collinear with the institutionalization and the Southeast Asian regional policy community is statistically significant but of negative influence in some models. Membership in inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy is not statistically significant, nor is the number of memberships in regional organizations, whether or not they are institutionalized or offer external policy accountability, though when these variables approach conventional levels of statistical significance, their influence is negative.

Table 5-3. Regional Policy Communities and Institutionalization

Variables	Model 5-3-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-3-2 Tipping point Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-3-3 Inter-regional migration organizations Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-3-4 Level of institutionalization Hazard ratio P > |z|
African RPC	0.965 0.902	0.911 0.723	1.271 0.447	1.009 0.973
American RPC	1.328 0.268	1.002 0.995	1.218 0.569	0.864 0.659
European RPC	1.398 0.128	0.793 0.358	1.420 0.410	1.006 0.984
Middle East/North African RPC	1.279 0.450	1.612 0.356	1.866 0.228	1.517 0.448
Former USSR RPC	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*
South Asian RPC	1.154 0.648	1.009 0.979	1.297 0.486	1.097 0.801
Southeast Asian RPC	0.796 0.427	0.430 **0.014	0.616 0.256	0.499 *0.069
Regional density of institutionalization		34.435 ***0.000	38.260 ***0.000	40.726 ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			0.873 0.555	0.879 0.572
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			0.841 0.552	0.843 0.566
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations			0.750 *0.060	
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation				0.721 *0.073
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy				1.107 0.475
Scored in US TIP report, current or previous year	2.991 **0.020	2.454 **0.035	2.483 **0.031	2.420 **0.037
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	2.268 ***0.001	2.528 ***0.000	2.416 ***0.000	2.473 ***0.000
Road count to neighbors with institutionalization extant	0.990 ***0.007	0.983 ***0.001	0.983 **0.012	0.984 **0.012
Criminalization extant	2.251 ***0.000	2.431 ***0.000	2.636 ***0.000	2.609 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	1.497 0.342	1.281 0.556	1.288 0.586	1.313 0.565
Women's political empowerment	2.045 0.484	5.271 0.186	4.764 0.210	5.157 0.192
Government accountability	1.629 ***0.001	1.432 **0.029	1.455 **0.035	1.490 **0.023
Significant domestic trafficking	0.647 0.120	0.779 0.359	0.796 0.420	0.812 0.475
Human rights violations of victims	0.231 **0.027	0.247 *0.065	0.257 *0.085	0.232 *0.073
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.040 0.854	0.936 0.749	0.935 0.747	0.931 0.730
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	2.486 **0.013	2.372 *0.055	2.101 *0.077	2.294 **0.042
Lower middle income	1.656 0.208	1.463 0.376	1.293 0.522	1.425 0.376
Upper middle income	1.023 0.917	0.946 0.809	0.806 0.342	0.861 0.531
Subjects	166	166	166	166
Observations	1,002	1,002	1,002	1,002
Number of failures	154	154	154	154

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

A look at select time varying hazard ratios for model 5-3-4, shown in figure 5-2, only complicates the picture slightly. The African regional policy community does show a statistically significant and positive influence on first institutionalization until year 3 after treatment, while the Southeast Asian policy community has a negative influence when it is statistically significant. Number of memberships in regional organizations which offer external policy evaluations is also statistically significant and positive until year 8 after treatment.

Figure 5-2. Time-Variant Hazard Ratios for Model 5-3-4



Institutionalization offers strong support for hypothesis 4. The regional density of extant intersectoral coordinating bodies promotes their diffusion. Interestingly, this effect does not seem to be interchangeable with the role regional policy communities may play. Indeed, except in Europe where some regional organizations offer external evaluation of TIP policy and possibly Africa, these communities do not seem to play a significant role in the diffusion of intersectoral bodies. In general, constructivism, as measured by the taken-for-granted nature of institutionalization, offers a better explanation of regional differentiation than that offered by regional policy communities.

National Action Plans

Table 5-4 presents the results of the four models testing the influence of tipping points and regional policy communities on initiation of a National Action Plan. Hypothesis 4 is not supported. These results diverge from the findings of previous policies in that the policy density variable is not statistically significant, while the influence of four of the regional policy communities are significant in all four models. The African, American, and European regional policy communities all have a positive effect, increasing the likelihood that members will institute a National Action Plan. The Middle Eastern regional policy community, however, has a negative influence, indicating policy divergence. Inter-regional migration organizations also had a positive influence on time to NAP initiation, but this finding was statistically significant only for

emigrant-sending countries. The number of memberships in regional organizations of any level of institutionalization was not statistically significant.

Examination of select time varying hazard ratios, shown in figure 5-3, only complicates the above findings slightly. The South Asian and Southeast Asian regional policy communities show a bifurcated influence on policy diffusion. In earlier years following treatment, these communities are associated with a lower likelihood of NAP initiation, but in later years they become more likely to promote the initiation of NAPs. Findings like these suggest that the prioritization of policies within regional policy communities may influence their diffusion.

Figure 5-3. Time-Variant Hazard Ratios from Model 5-4-4



Table 5-4. Regional Policy Communities and National Action Plans

Variables	Model 5-4-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-4-2 Tipping point Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-4-3 Inter-regional migration organizations Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-4-4 Level of institutionalization Hazard ratio P > |z|
African RPC	1.720 ***0.000	1.774 ***0.000	2.179 ***0.000	2.305 ***0.000
American RPC	1.490 **0.012	1.502 **0.013	1.661 **0.014	1.687 ***0.005
European RPC	1.801 ***0.000	1.788 ***0.000	1.650 ***0.001	1.551 ***0.001
Middle East/North African RPC	0.711 **0.020	0.702 **0.011	0.675 ***0.004	0.684 ***0.006
North American RPC	1.251 0.432	1.259 0.435	1.137 0.704	1.109 0.764
Former USSR RPC	1.133 0.568	1.140 0.539	1.118 0.589	1.123 0.592
South Asian RPC	1.193 0.140	1.201 0.124	1.140 0.352	1.168 0.223
Southeast Asian RPC	1.075 0.469	1.058 0.607	1.036 0.820	1.064 0.649
Regional density of National Action Plans		1.225 0.390	1.102 0.676	1.166 0.551
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			1.394 **0.010	1.381 **0.010
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			1.125 0.434	1.125 0.432
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations			1.001 0.987	
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation				0.977 0.787
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy				1.083 0.410
Neighbor had better TIP score, current or previous year	0.882 **0.016	0.873 **0.011	0.887 **0.028	0.888 **0.036
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.513 ***0.000	1.522 ***0.000	1.526 ***0.000	1.530 ***0.000
Road count to neighbors with extant NAPs	0.993 **0.024	0.992 **0.032	0.992 **0.041	0.992 **0.048
Institutionalization extant	3.552 ***0.000	3.558 ***0.000	3.448 ***0.000	3.471 ***0.000
NAP extant	26.830 ***0.000	26.155 ***0.000	25.470 ***0.000	25.755 ***0.000
Institutionalization X NAP	0.264 ***0.000	0.263 ***0.000	0.270 ***0.000	0.268 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	1.453 0.278	1.452 0.283	1.357 0.348	1.326 0.397
Women's political empowerment	0.735 0.348	0.712 0.304	0.663 0.231	0.661 0.235
Government accountability	1.074 0.552	1.070 0.570	1.089 0.484	1.081 0.517
Significant domestic trafficking	1.144 0.202	1.146 0.200	1.101 0.346	1.069 0.572
Human rights violations of victims	0.551 *0.051	0.551 *0.055	0.543 *0.055	0.546 *0.057
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	0.779 **0.045	0.784 **0.049	0.787 *0.055	0.790 *0.069
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	0.885 0.678	0.872 0.640	0.804 0.452	0.819 0.498
Lower middle income	0.809 0.474	0.799 0.446	0.722 0.268	0.748 0.346
Upper middle income	0.964 0.869	0.951 0.810	0.893 0.589	0.918 0.698
Subjects	172	172	172	172
Observations	2,898	2,898	2,898	2,898
Number of failures	396	396	396	396

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

The results for NAPs are the mirror-image of our results for institutionalization. For institutionalization, the regional density of intersectoral coordinating bodies was highly influential in promoting their diffusion, while the role of regional policy communities seemed minimal. Here, the regional density of NAPs offers no explanatory value for their diffusion while

regional differentiation in the diffusion of NAPs can be explained by the variation in effectiveness of regional policy communities in promoting them. Also of interest is the finding that emigrant-sending members—and only these members—of inter-regional organizations coordinating migration were also more likely to initiate NAPs.

National Referral Mechanisms

Table 5-5 shows the results of the four models for testing the influence of tipping points and regional policy communities on the diffusion of National Referral Mechanisms. Hypothesis 4 is supported. The results show that both the regional density of NRMs and some of the regional policy communities do promote their diffusion. Without the policy density variable, only the European regional policy community has a positive effect on the implementation of NRMs (while South Asia has a negative effect). The influence of the European policy community is not eclipsed by the regional density of NRMs in the full model (5-5-4), and the African policy community is also statistically significant, while the influence of two other policy communities hover just outside of conventional levels of statistical significance. Thus, while the taken-for-granted nature of the NRMs offers good explanatory value, regional policy communities also offer independent explanatory value as well.

The influence of inter-regional organizations coordinating migration and the number of memberships in regional organizations with external policy evaluations is not statistically significant in the model, but a look at the time-variant hazard ratios in figure 5-4 complicates the picture. For both emigrant-sending members of inter-regional migration organizations and number of memberships in regional organizations with external policy evaluations, I find positive and statistically significant time-varying hazard ratios in the early years after treatment, but decay into statistical insignificance in later years. Interestingly, immigrant-receiving participants in inter-regional migration organizations are not more likely to implement NRMs,

perhaps because protecting immigrants is more politically problematic in immigrant-receiving countries.

Table 5-5. Regional Policy Communities and National Referral Mechanisms

Variables	Model 5-5-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-5-2 Tipping point Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-5-3 Inter-regional migration organizations Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-5-4 Level of institutionalization Hazard ratio P > |z|
African RPC	1.112 0.786	2.280 *0.083	4.750 ***0.006	4.168 **0.010
American RPC	1.305 0.396	1.784 0.177	2.365 **0.048	1.795 0.167
European RPC	2.648 **0.010	1.582 0.207	2.627 ***0.006	2.601 **0.019
Middle East/North African RPC	0.802 0.470	0.655 0.187	0.665 0.258	0.758 0.391
Former USSR RPC	1.703 0.363	2.022 0.168	2.299 0.100	2.509 *0.082
South Asian RPC	0.313 ***0.002	0.659 0.411	0.704 0.523	0.572 0.261
Southeast Asian RPC	1.129 0.697	1.547 0.264	1.940 *0.099	1.976 *0.075
Regional density of National Referral Mechanisms interacted with exp(-0.20t) †		5.88×10^{38} ***0.000	4.51×10^{36} ***0.000	2.12×10^{37} ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			1.803 *0.095	1.827 *0.084
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			1.123 0.793	1.097 0.824
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations			0.761 0.131	
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation				0.724 0.202
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy				0.996 0.990
US recommendation for NRM, current or previous year	1.566 **0.021	1.400 0.140	1.437 0.147	1.427 0.156
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	0.546 **0.016	0.545 **0.013	0.590 **0.039	0.592 **0.046
Road count to neighbors with extant NRMs	0.991 0.430	0.979 **0.032	0.981 *0.074	0.982 *0.079
NAP extant	3.643 ***0.000	2.969 ***0.000	2.785 ***0.000	2.804 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	0.504 0.352	0.460 0.307	0.439 0.302	0.483 0.369
Women's political empowerment	0.262 0.324	0.165 0.248	0.111 0.172	0.136 0.205
Government accountability	1.251 0.500	1.290 0.489	1.328 0.471	1.355 0.438
X Government accountability	0.608 ***0.002	0.657 **0.014	0.698 *0.073	0.694 **0.044
Significant domestic trafficking	1.731 **0.032	1.443 0.115	1.305 0.299	1.355 0.276
Human rights violations of victims	0.741 0.662	0.786 0.746	0.788 0.739	0.820 0.782
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.271 0.370	1.386 0.220	1.496 0.153	1.474 0.175
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	0.320 0.106	0.294 *0.092	0.226 *0.058	0.235 *0.073
Lower middle income	0.800 0.679	0.877 0.811	0.586 0.407	0.597 0.444
Upper middle income	0.795 0.631	0.792 0.632	0.599 0.325	0.595 0.377
Subjects	171	171	171	171
Observations	2,461	2,461	2,461	2,461
Number of failures	87	87	87	87

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.2t) to model a decay function and improve model specification.

Figure 5-4. Time-Variant Hazard Ratios from Model 5-5-4



For NRMs, the policy density measure goes part way in explaining regional differentiation but is not sufficient alone. Regional policy communities and inter-regional organizations coordinating migration also offer independent explanatory value. Like with NAPs, emigrant-sending members of inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy—and only these members—are more likely to establish NRMs.

Reflection Periods

Of the six policies under consideration, reflection periods are the least common and geographically concentrated in Europe. The results of the four models testing for the influence of policy normalization and regional policy communities are shown in table 5-6. Hypothesis 4 is supported. Only the European regional policy community has a statistically significant positive influence on the diffusion of reflection periods, but this influence is eclipsed once the regional density of reflection periods is included in the model. Membership in inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy do not have a statistically significant effect, and neither does the number memberships in regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation or external evaluation of TIP policy.

Table 5-6. Regional Policy Communities and Reflection Periods

Variables	Model 5-6-1 Base Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-6-2 Tipping point Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-6-3 Inter-regional migration organizations Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 5-6-4 Level of institutionalization Hazard ratio P > |z|
African RPC	0.154 0.101	0.139 *0.080	0.127 0.125	0.106 0.148
American RPC	0.977 0.970	0.919 0.895	0.567 0.544	0.430 0.406
European RPC	4.342 ***0.004	1.319 0.696	1.900 0.424	1.676 0.627
Middle East/North African RPC	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*
Former USSR RPC	0.413 0.268	0.630 0.583	0.982 0.985	0.963 0.977
South Asian RPC	0.683 0.516	0.439 *0.077	0.462 *0.087	0.396 0.102
Southeast Asian RPC	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*
Regional density of Reflection Periods interacted with exp(-0.20t) †		$2.90x10^{23}$ ***0.000	$3.03x10^{25}$ ***0.000	$7.25x10^{24}$ ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			0.644 0.602	0.615 0.558
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration			0.278 0.133	0.274 0.138
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations			0.731 *0.070	
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation				0.695 0.403
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy				1.100 0.881
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	0.165 *0.098	0.148 *0.084	0.159 *0.095	0.156 *0.091
X European RPC	8.482 *0.057	9.605 *0.061	9.982 *0.053	10.967 **0.048
Road count to neighbors with extant Reflection Periods	0.971 ***0.003	0.959 ***0.008	0.959 **0.013	0.958 **0.039
Public sector corruption	0.893 0.924	0.971 0.985	0.814 0.901	0.858 0.926
Women's political empowerment	0.402 0.742	0.078 0.421	0.085 0.470	0.099 0.482
Government accountability	1.300 0.444	1.629 0.120	2.237 ***0.001	1.986 **0.030
Significant domestic trafficking	0.861 0.698	0.682 0.272	0.522 *0.053	0.544 *0.084
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.771 0.414	1.269 0.760	1.388 0.677	1.411 0.674
GDP per capita (in thousands)	1.014 ***0.003	0.998 0.697	1.005 0.562	1.004 0.651
Subjects	157	157	157	157
Observations	2,321	2,321	2,321	2,321
Number of failures	41	41	41	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.2t) to model a decay function and improve model specification.

In the case of reflection periods, their regional policy density offers better explanatory value for their diffusion than membership in any regional policy community, inter-regional organizations coordinating migration, or generalized characteristics of regional organizations. As such, these organizations seem to coincide with constructivist diffusion mechanisms.

Robustness Checks

I checked the robustness of the results with four models, the results of which can be found in Appendix C. The first model adjusted standard errors by political-cultural regions rather than geographical regions. The second model interacted the number of memberships in regional

organizations with the primary regional policy community. The third interacted cooperation with civil society with the primary regional policy community. The final model added three variables which might potentially explain membership in inter-regional organizations coordinating migration: emigrant-sending countries, countries perceived to be sources of transnational victims, and the ratio of trade with advanced economies. All robustness checks included variables for regional density of the policy, membership in inter-regional organizations coordinating migration, and number of memberships in regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation and with external evaluations of policy. In general, the main findings were robust to these alternative model specifications.

When adjusting standard errors by political-cultural regions, the influence of the African regional policy community was no longer significant for criminalization, though it remained significant for NAPs and NRMs. Cooperation with civil society was also statistically significant and positive for changes in the TIP legal regime and the establishment of reflection periods, but negative for NAPs.

Interacting primary regional policy communities with number of regional organizations tended to produce results which indicated that increasing the number of memberships in regional organizations combating TIP resulted in lower likelihood of policy implementation, but this result was not consistent. In two cases, that for NAPs in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, increasing memberships enhanced policy diffusion. But for criminalization, legal revisions, and first institutionalization, when the interaction variable was statistically significant, it meant a lower likelihood of policy implementation.

Interacting the primary regional policy community with cooperation with civil society on TIP also produced inconsistent results. Most interactions were not statistically significant. Civil society cooperation promoted criminalization in the Middle Eastern policy community, but

discouraged legal change in Africa, institutionalization in Southeast Asia, and NAPs in South Asia. Only four countries instituted reflection periods without noted cooperation with civil society (Andorra, Cyprus, Romania, and Finland), resulting in lots of collinearity in the model for reflection periods.

Including additional variables to model for selection into inter-regional organizations coordinating migration, especially emigrant-sending nations, did not alter the findings of influence for emigrant-sending members of these organizations. In no case were the additional variables statistically significant, and neither did their inclusion change the statistical significance or magnitude of influence for those cases where the variable had been found to be influential.

Discussion

The foregoing results show some complexity in the role of policy density and regional policy communities in promoting the transnational diffusion of TIP policy. Hypothesis 4 was supported for criminalization, institutionalization, NRMs, and reflection periods, indicating that the policy normalization offers substantial explanatory value. However, no clear relation emerged between the influence of regional policy density and that of the regional policy communities. A summary of the findings is shown in table 5-7.

Table 5-7. Hypothesis 4 Summary.

	Hypothesis 4: Regional density of policy	Relation to regional policy communities:
Criminalization	Supported	Policy density eclipses influence of RPCs when included in the model.
Legal revisions	Not supported	Policy density eclipses influence of RPCs, but neither offers much explanatory value.
Institutionalization	Supported	Policy density offers explanatory value; RPCs do not offer explanatory value, even when policy density is not included in the model.
NAPs	Not supported	RPCs offer explanatory power; policy density does not.
NRMs	Supported	Both policy density and RPCs offer independent explanatory power.
Reflection periods	Supported	Policy density eclipses influence of RPCs when included in the model.

In the case of criminalization and reflection periods, policy density offers a better explanation of policy diffusion than participation in regional policy communities. When policy density is included in these models, the influence of regional policy communities disappears. In the case of NAPs, however, regional policy communities offer more explanatory power; regional policy density is not statistically significant when both are included in the model. And in the case of institutionalization, regional policy communities had no influence for policy density to eclipse, but regional policy density does offer explanatory value. For NRMs, both policy density and regional policy communities help explain policy diffusion. And finally, in the case of legal revisions, neither regional policy communities nor policy density offer much explanatory value, though, to be fair, the density of criminalization is an imperfect measure of the taken-for-granted nature of policy change.

Given that policies which become more taken-for-granted are more likely to diffuse and that, in some cases, this effect replaces the influence of regional policy communities, the findings support the constructivist proposition that ideas diffuse through elite social networks, such as those created in regional policy communities. However, policy density alone is insufficient to explain policy differentiation. Other findings which relate to regional policy differentiation are shown in table 5-8.

Table 5-8. Other Influences on Regional Policy Differentiation

	Regional policy communities (controlling for policy density)	Inter-regional organizations coordinating migration	Number of memberships in regional organizations with…	
			Institutionalized cooperation	External policy evaluation
Criminalization	Africa	Positive	Negative	Positive
Legal revisions	N. America	None	None	None
Institutionalization	Africa	None	None	Positive
NAPs	Africa, Americas, Europe	Positive for emigrant-sending members	None	None
NRMs	Africa, Europe	Positive for emigrant-sending members	None	Positive
Reflection periods	None	None	None	None

Some regional policy communities promote TIP policy diffusion, even when controlling for the influence of regional policy density. For four of the TIP policies, membership in the African regional policy community promotes policy diffusion. Other policy communities (not listed in table 5-8) underperform. It seems that some regional policy communities are doing more (or less) than what can be captured from the policy density measure.

Specific characteristics of regional organizations also influence policy diffusion. This is strongest with mechanisms for external policy evaluation, which currently exist only in Europe. This policy accountability has promoted policy diffusion of criminalization, institutionalization, and NRMs. The number of memberships in organizations with institutionalized cooperation is negatively associated with criminalization, but otherwise does not offer much explanatory power.

Inter-regional cooperation on migration policy also promotes some TIP policy, but this effect is much larger for emigrant-sending members than immigrant-receiving members. Indeed, emigrant-sending members are more likely to adopt NRMs, a victim protection policy which helps immigrants, perhaps because helping immigrants is unpopular politically while emigrant-sending countries have fewer immigrants to help.

Some of these variables seem, at least superficially, to be well-explained by reputation mechanisms. External policy evaluation without threat of sanctions ought to generate reputational pressure for policy change, and the finding that, in some cases, emigrant-sending countries cooperating on migration are more likely to implement TIP policies could also be explained by reputational pressure, as emigrant-sending countries have weaker economies than immigrant-receiving countries. Yet even when controlling for specific characteristics of regional organizations, such as policy evaluation, some regional organizations do better at promoting

policy diffusion than others. While constructivist mechanisms help explain regional variation, much yet remains to be explained.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that a taken-for-granted attitude toward TIP policy helps promote its diffusion, as constructivists argue. Moreover, the influence of regional policy communities can be partly explained by this mechanism, suggesting that their social networks are vehicles for policy normalization, as constructivists propose. Yet, policy normalization alone is insufficient for explaining regional variation in policy diffusion. Some aspects of regional or inter-regional cooperation matter beyond what can be explained by policy density, and even when taking these into account, some regional policy communities over- or underperform. These findings are useful for supporting the explanatory power of constructivism as well as revealing gaps demanding further theoretical development.

CHAPTER SIX: NEIGHBORS AND COMPETITION THEORY

OVERVIEW

In this chapter I test the hypothesis derived from competition theory. Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) argued that a fear that TIP would be diverted from better-performing neighbors into one's own country motivated policymakers to criminalize TIP. They found empirical support that the number of road connections to neighbors with criminalization extant promoted its diffusion. As I described in chapter 1, I found fault with some of their claims and measurements, and so this chapter seeks a better test of competition theory. Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart argued that improved action against TIP in one's neighbors would promote TIP policy diffusion because trafficking had been socially constructed as a transnational threat requiring law enforcement solutions. As described in chapter 2, I collected data on reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking from the US TIP reports. I believe this to be a better measure for the concept that Simmons Lloyd, and Stewart were seeking to measure with counts of roads to neighbors. If fear of TIP is indeed driving TIP policy, then we ought to see reports of increasing or diverted transnational TIP motivating policy initiation for those policies which disrupt trafficking networks (i.e., criminalization), as hypothesis 5 proposes.

THE MODELS

In all models, I include the variable I collected on reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking. For those convinced that the number of road connections to neighbors with the TIP policy extant is a good measure for the fear of trafficking diversion, I include this variable in one of the models. I also use three alternative measures to road counts: the *ratio* of road connections to neighbors with the policy extant, the ratio of migrant partners with policy extant weighted by shared migrant stock, and the ratio of trading partners weighted by shared

total trade. For controls, I use variables developed from the results of earlier chapters, as well as the standard set of control variables for each policy.

RESULTS

Overall, the results do not support hypothesis 5. In no model, including those for criminalization, are reports of increased or diverted TIP statistically significant. When the variables for road, migration, or trade connections are statistically significant, they delay implementation of the TIP policy rather than promote it.

Criminalization

The results for criminalization are shown in table 6-1. Reported increases or diversion of transnational TIP is not statistically significant. The number of roads to neighbors with criminalization is also not statistically significant. The other three variables: ratio of roads to neighbor with criminalization, ratio of migrant partners with criminalization and ratio of trading partners with criminalization are statistically significant, but their effect is negative, contrary to expectations. I thus find no support for hypothesis 5.

Table 6-1. Competition and Criminalization

Variables	Model 6-1-1 With number of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-1-2 With ratio of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-1-3 With migration partners Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-1-4 With trade partners Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases or diversion of transnational TIP	0.674 0.153	0.662 0.159	0.689 0.166	0.670 0.153
Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization	1.000 0.980			
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization		0.389 ***0.004		
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by shared migrant stock			0.362 **0.015	
Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total trade				0.244 **0.026
Regional density of criminalization	17.420 ***0.000	39.646 ***0.000	26.477 ***0.000	24.545 ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.550 ***0.009	1.536 **0.010	1.741 ***0.001	1.574 ***0.008
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.617 **0.037	1.795 ***0.005	1.724 ***0.005	1.728 ***0.005
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	1.465 **0.010	1.576 ***0.002	1.498 ***0.002	1.702 ***0.000
Protocol accession	1.945 ***0.000	2.127 ***0.000	2.163 ***0.000	2.143 ***0.000
US recommended criminalization, current or previous year	1.967 ***0.003	1.891 ***0.005	1.845 ***0.007	1.876 ***0.008
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.878 ***0.002	1.903 ***0.002	1.921 ***0.001	1.838 ***0.005
Legislative corruption	0.881 0.235	0.846 0.158	0.886 0.246	0.883 0.253
Women's political empowerment	4.494 ***0.005	4.945 ***0.002	5.697 ***0.001	4.679 ***0.005
Government accountability	1.161 0.263	1.129 0.389	1.115 0.423	1.220 0.161
Significant domestic trafficking	0.625 *0.061	0.629 *0.068	0.691 *0.094	0.642 *0.067
Human rights violations of victims	0.537 0.165	0.566 0.182	0.564 0.191	0.473 0.127
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.129 0.636	1.155 0.556	1.149 0.615	1.147 0.620
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	1.207 0.499	1.244 0.477	1.230 0.451	1.369 0.289
Lower middle income	1.909 **0.026	1.964 **0.037	2.195 ***0.007	2.288 ***0.003
Upper middle income	0.688 0.187	0.700 0.262	0.762 0.358	0.807 0.458
Subjects	165	165	164	163
Observations	1,349	1,349	1,339	1,321
Number of failures	146	146	145	144

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.

According to Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018), criminalization is where we ought to expect the fear of transnational trafficking to be most evident. Criminalization directly threatens criminal networks by increasing law enforcement attention and legal options against traffickers. If governments are competing to make their countries unattractive to trafficking networks, then criminalization is the principal trafficking policy necessary to disrupt their networks. Here, however, we find no evidence that fear of transnational trafficking is motivating criminalization, whether measured by explicit reports of transnational trafficking threats or by road, migration, or trade connections.

Revisions to the TIP Legal Regime

Results for the any legal revision to the TIP legal regime are shown in table 6-2. It is not as clear that legal revisions are as directly related to disrupting trafficking networks as criminalization, but, as with criminalization, I find no evidence that fear of transnational trafficking is motivating these changes. Reports of increased or diverted trafficking are not statistically significant. The number or ratio of roads to neighbors with criminalization are not statistically significant, nor is the ratio of migration partners. The only variable that is statistically significant is the ratio of trade partners weighted by trade, but, contrary to expectations, legal change is delayed by trade with partners that have criminalized. Hypothesis 5 remains unsupported.

Table 6-2. Competition and Revisions to the TIP Legal Regime

Variables	Model 6-2-1 With number of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-2-2 With ratio of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-2-3 With migration partners Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-2-4 With trade partners Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases/diversion of transnational TIP	0.985 0.913	0.976 0.864	0.997 0.980	0.984 0.905
Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization	1.001 0.483			
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization		0.790 0.185		
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by shared migrant stock			1.069 0.733	
Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total trade				0.581 **0.047
Regional density of criminalization	1.740 **0.037	2.238 **0.011	1.753 **0.014	2.138 ***0.002
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.368 **0.018	1.377 **0.016	1.414 **0.012	1.374 **0.020
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.281 *0.070	1.331 **0.029	1.354 **0.019	1.306 **0.045
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	1.112 ***0.009	1.128 ***0.004	1.131 ***0.002	1.157 ***0.002
Protocol accession	1.140 0.285	1.155 0.238	1.222 *0.098	1.195 0.154
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	† 2.651 ***0.006	† 2.680 ***0.004	† 2.597 ***0.006	† 2.663 ***0.007
US recommended legal change, current or previous year	1.453 ***0.000	1.452 ***0.000	1.455 ***0.000	1.430 ***0.000
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.083 0.194	1.078 0.203	1.105 0.107	1.078 0.266
Institutionalization extant	1.089 0.194	1.092 0.316	1.065 0.476	1.078 0.400
Legislative corruption	0.942 0.189	0.938 0.155	0.949 0.242	0.943 0.180
Women's political empowerment	2.163 ***0.005	2.143 ***0.006	2.109 **0.016	2.229 ***0.005
Government accountability	1.048 0.473	1.053 0.450	1.047 0.506	1.063 0.358
Significant domestic trafficking	0.849 0.131	0.849 0.119	0.861 0.145	0.858 0.151
Human rights violations of victims	0.668 0.101	0.688 0.128	0.672 0.119	0.651 0.102
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.250 *0.074	1.258 *0.066	1.234 *0.092	1.241 *0.074
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	0.724 0.104	0.720 0.105	0.760 0.166	0.747 0.152
Lower middle income	0.727 *0.051	0.734 *0.071	0.737 *0.065	0.763 0.124
Upper middle income	0.839 0.298	0.845 0.333	0.847 0.314	0.888 0.487
Subjects	171	171	169	169
Observations	2,828	2,828	2,804	2,788
Number of failures	648	648	639	638

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.1t) to model a decay function and improve model specification.

Institutionalization

The results for the establishment of an intersectoral coordinating body are shown in table 6-3. As with criminalization and legal change, I do not find evidence that fear of transnational trafficking is motivating the establishment of intersectoral coordinating bodies. Reports of increased or diverted trafficking are not statistically significant. The number of roads to neighbors with extant coordinating bodies is statistically significant, but it has a negative influence on institutionalization. The ratio of roads and trading partners are also negative

though just outside conventional levels of statistical significance. Migration partners have no statistically significant relation with the establishment of intersectoral coordinating bodies.

Table 6-3. Competition and Institutionalization

Variables	Model 6-3-1 With number of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-3-2 With ratio of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-3-3 With migration partners Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-3-4 With trade partners Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases/diversion of transnational TIP	0.757 0.317	0.718 0.224	0.744 0.289	0.789 0.359
Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization	0.980 ***0.003			
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization		0.564 *0.055		
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by shared migrant stock			0.991 0.979	
Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total trade				0.378 *0.083
Regional density of institutionalization	† 6624.409 ***0.000	† 7999.206 ***0.000	† 2731.170 ***0.000	† 4021.892 ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	0.735 0.115	0.794 0.215	0.725 *0.089	0.699 *0.058
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	0.787 0.434	0.638 0.138	0.574 *0.067	0.546 **0.043
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	0.911 0.418	0.865 0.377	0.834 0.256	0.829 0.270
Scored in US TIP report, current or previous year	2.548 **0.020	2.384 **0.036	2.477 **0.022	2.520 **0.028
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	2.385 ***0.000	2.407 ***0.000	2.361 ***0.000	2.312 ***0.000
Criminalization extant	2.619 ***0.000	2.358 ***0.000	2.321 ***0.000	2.273 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	1.033 0.936	0.824 0.665	0.723 0.442	0.809 0.597
Women's political empowerment	1.990 0.417	1.703 0.520	1.514 0.632	1.663 0.583
Government accountability	1.588 ***0.002	1.570 ***0.001	1.598 ***0.002	1.721 ***0.000
Significant domestic trafficking	0.809 0.438	0.779 0.357	0.745 0.320	0.746 0.318
Human rights violations of victims	0.275 *0.058	0.250 **0.032	0.260 **0.046	0.275 *0.052
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	0.935 0.733	0.884 0.537	0.882 0.532	0.872 0.489
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	2.235 **0.035	2.500 **0.014	2.547 ***0.009	2.449 **0.018
Lower middle income	1.474 0.295	1.613 0.181	1.809 0.104	1.903 *0.081
Upper middle income	0.856 0.486	0.839 0.326	0.908 0.641	0.972 0.891
Subjects	166	166	165	164
Observations	1,002	1,002	994	975
Number of failures	154	154	153	152

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.1t) to model a decay function and improve model specification.

National Action Plans

The results for National Action Plans are shown in table 6-4. While reports of increased or diverted trafficking have a positive coefficient for the first time, it is not statistically significant. The number of road connections is negative but just outside conventional levels of statistical significance, while the ratio of roads is negative and statistically significant, delaying

NAP initiation rather than promoting it. Migrant and trade partners have no statistically discernible relationship with time to NAP initiation.

Table 6-4. Competition and National Action Plans

Variables	Model 6-4-1 With number of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-4-2 With ratio of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-4-3 With migration partners Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-4-4 With trade partners Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases/diversion of transnational TIP	1.116 0.474	1.101 0.530	1.110 0.497	1.112 0.487
Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization	0.995 *0.073			
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization		0.734 **0.049		
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by shared migrant stock			0.970 0.879	
Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total trade				0.803 0.646
Regional density of NAPs	1.032 0.914	1.224 0.472	0.917 0.746	0.933 0.783
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.003 0.980	0.992 0.949	0.997 0.979	1.006 0.964
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	0.902 0.458	0.893 0.406	0.865 0.329	0.881 0.398
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	1.139 **0.049	1.123 **0.048	1.103 *0.082	1.095 0.179
Neighbor had better TIP score, current or previous year	0.920 0.175	0.939 0.279	0.920 0.179	0.915 0.155
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.552 ***0.000	1.518 ***0.000	1.545 ***0.000	1.557 ***0.000
Institutionalization extant	3.539 ***0.000	3.585 ***0.000	3.475 ***0.000	3.433 ***0.000
NAP extant	26.746 ***0.000	26.666 ***0.000	26.441 ***0.000	26.252 ***0.000
X Institutionalization	0.259 ***0.000	0.258 ***0.000	0.269 ***0.000	0.268 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	1.447 0.262	1.439 0.276	1.391 0.306	1.394 0.303
Women's political empowerment	0.997 0.995	0.988 0.977	0.945 0.891	0.972 0.945
Government accountability	1.156 *0.077	1.156 *0.094	1.169 *0.077	1.167 *0.082
Significant domestic trafficking	1.110 0.285	1.069 0.506	1.087 0.419	1.087 0.414
Human rights violations of victims	0.546 **0.036	0.548 **0.037	0.544 **0.034	0.540 **0.033
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	0.836 0.192	0.844 0.226	0.837 0.201	0.832 0.187
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	1.073 0.828	1.109 0.755	1.053 0.872	1.061 0.855
Lower middle income	0.929 0.826	0.964 0.914	0.903 0.761	0.913 0.784
Upper middle income	1.092 0.700	1.125 0.609	1.074 0.753	1.064 0.790
Subjects	172	172	170	170
Observations	2,898	2,898	2,874	2,858
Number of failures	396	396	393	391

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.1t) to model a decay function and improve model specification.

National Referral Mechanisms

The results for NRMs are shown in table 6-5. The results do not support hypothesis 5. No variable of interest has a statistically significant relationship to the formalization of NRMs, and the coefficients are negative.

Table 6-5. Competition and National Referral Mechanisms

Variables	Model 6-5-1 With number of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-5-2 With ratio of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-5-3 With migration partners Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-5-4 With trade partners Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases/diversion of transnational TIP	0.933 0.821	0.903 0.742	0.900 0.744	0.885 0.702
Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization	0.986 0.161			
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization		0.685 0.483		
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by shared migrant stock			0.759 0.645	
Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total trade				0.223 0.141
Regional density of NRMs	† $3.64x10^{36}$ ***0.000	† $2.86x10^{36}$ ***0.000	† $3.96x10^{36}$ ***0.000	† $1.47x10^{36}$ ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.120 0.700	1.077 0.817	1.168 0.610	1.123 0.719
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	0.835 0.644	0.768 0.506	0.827 0.603	0.832 0.602
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	0.926 0.737	0.893 0.576	0.896 0.579	0.865 0.454
US recommendation regarding NRM, current or previous year	1.504 0.105	1.522 *0.094	1.544 *0.096	1.570 *0.099
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	0.606 **0.047	0.607 **0.047	0.578 **0.024	0.579 **0.027
NAP extant	2.943 ***0.000	3.027 ***0.000	2.880 ***0.000	2.931 ***0.000
Public sector corruption	0.471 0.312	0.473 0.311	0.453 0.291	0.496 0.286
Women's political empowerment	0.635 0.691	0.601 0.651	0.602 0.642	0.653 0.709
Government accountability	1.077 0.796	1.089 0.761	1.089 0.772	1.139 0.640
X Government accountability	0.729 *0.071	0.732 *0.069	0.739 *0.089	0.693 **0.043
Significant domestic trafficking	1.443 0.165	1.329 0.313	1.438 0.221	1.433 0.194
Human rights violations of victims	0.904 0.881	0.886 0.854	0.828 0.782	0.813 0.763
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.576 *0.077	1.561 *0.089	1.488 0.147	1.494 0.137
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	0.366 0.165	0.374 0.178	0.406 0.183	0.346 0.120
Lower middle income	0.900 0.874	0.925 0.908	1.012 0.986	0.948 0.937
Upper middle income	0.854 0.783	0.869 0.810	0.936 0.907	0.871 0.812
Subjects	171	171	170	169
Observations	2,461	2,461	2,454	2,437
Number of failures	87	87	86	85

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.2t) to model a decay function and improve model specification.

Reflection Periods

Finally, the results for the establishment of reflection periods are shown in table 6-6. Reports of increased or diverted trafficking have no statistically significant effect on reflection periods. The number of roads to neighbors with reflection periods is statistically significant but has a negative influence. Trade partners with reflection periods also have a negative influence on the establishment of a reflection period. The ratio of roads is not statistically significant, nor do migration partners have any influence on the establishment of reflection periods.

Table 6-6. Competition and Reflection Periods

Variables	Model 6-6-1 With number of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-6-2 With ratio of roads Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-6-3 With migration partners Hazard ratio P > |z|	Model 6-6-4 With trade partners Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases/diversion of transnational TIP	0.993 0.986	1.071 0.861	1.225 0.601	1.058 0.880
Number of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization	0.965 **0.022			
Ratio of roads to neighbors with extant criminalization		0.369 0.407		
Ratio of migration partners with extant criminalization, weighted by shared migrant stock			0.119 *0.099	
Ratio of trade partners with extant criminalization, weighted by total trade				0.002 ***0.008
Regional density of Reflection Periods	† 3.86×10^{26} ***0.000	† 7.87×10^{24} ***0.000	† 3.93×10^{22} ***0.000	† 6.81×10^{27} ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.650 0.293	1.745 0.252	1.957 0.222	1.134 0.780
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	0.571 0.301	0.440 0.166	0.324 0.144	0.249 **0.036
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	1.162 0.568	1.136 0.581	1.247 0.452	1.630 *0.055
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	0.619 0.169	0.613 0.144	0.697 0.334	0.587 0.130
Public sector corruption	1.068 0.962	1.052 0.971	0.849 0.893	0.797 0.842
Women's political empowerment	0.838 0.923	0.880 0.942	0.824 0.910	0.770 0.865
Government accountability	1.934 **0.022	1.887 *0.053	2.199 **0.032	2.252 ***0.007
Significant domestic trafficking	0.600 *0.083	0.519 ***0.003	0.504 **0.027	0.509 **0.025
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.369 0.693	1.465 0.612	1.235 0.777	1.437 0.646
GDP per capita	1.005 0.498	1.008 0.369	1.014 0.139	1.013 0.252
Subjects	157	157	156	156
Observations	2,321	2,321	2,319	2,300
Number of failures	41	41	40	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.2t) to model a decay function and improve model specification.

Robustness Checks

I tested the robustness of these results with five models which can be found in Appendix C. First, I adjusted standard errors by political-cultural regions rather than geographically defined regions. The results are essentially the same as those presented here. The only exception is that reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking has a statistically significant but negative influence on time to criminalization, which is contrary to the expectations.

In the second model, I included road connections, and migration and trade partners in the same model. The results are consistent with the results shown in the chapter. However, for changes to the TIP legal regime, migration partners did promote legal change, although this finding depends on modeling the variable with a decay function, as suggested by an examination

of time-variant hazard ratios. This is the only positive and statistically significant variable of interest in any model in this chapter. While we might generate explanations as to why migration partners may encourage each other to improve their TIP policies, it is difficult to explain why this would only matter for changes in the TIP legal regime and not for any other TIP policy.

In the third model, I used only the variable for reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking, while dropping the variables the road and migration or trade partner variables. Reports of increased or diverted trafficking were never statistically significant in these models.

In the fourth model, I weighted each road connection by UN voting affinity to magnify the influence of friendly neighbors and reduce the influence of hostile neighbors. The results did not change.

In the final model, I removed all regional control variables. In this model, I was able to duplicate Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart's (2018) findings that road connections to neighbors with criminalization extant promote the diffusion of criminalization, as well as any legal change, but they do not promote capacity-building or victim protection policies. However, the reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking were not statistically significant in any model. The results of this model show that inclusion of control variables for regional influence are better explanations than the number of road connections since when they are included the influence of road connections is reduced to statistical insignificance, and, in some cases, becomes negative.

Discussion

I find no support for hypothesis 5 which proposes that reports of increased or diverted trafficking should promote diffusion of TIP policies which disrupt trafficking networks, such as criminalization. Reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking is never statistically

significant, or, when it is significant in one of the robustness checks, it has a negative influence on policy diffusion. Variables measuring number of road connections to neighbors with the policy extant that Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) argued proxied fear of trafficking diversion are either not statistically significant or negative in influence. So are alternative measures such as ratio of road connections and ratio of migrant or trading partners with the policy extant. Granted, we did not expect fear of transnational trafficking to have an impact on victim protection policies since these do not disrupt trafficking networks, but we have no evidence that it matters for *any* TIP policy.

What should we make of the findings of Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart? As the robustness check shows, their variable for measuring neighborly connectedness also includes everything that comes with regional efforts to promote TIP policy. When variables capturing regional influence are included in the models, the measure for road connections is no longer influential or significant. Of course, Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart may be right that fear of trafficking motivates policy diffusion—in their essay, they combine constructivist and competition theory, and regardless of the specific rationale, I have found strong evidence that constructivism helps explain TIP policy diffusion. Moreover, regional policy communities may promote TIP policy among their members because they construct trafficking as something to fear—and a problem that cooperation will help solve. But, as for countries acting independently, motivated by fear of better policies in their neighbors, or by widely-disseminated reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking in their own country, I simply do not find any evidence that this matters.

Conclusion

This chapter has not offered any evidence for the relevance of competition for TIP policy diffusion. While this neither means that competition is irrelevant when considering other

threats to national security from crime, nor that fear of trafficking is irrelevant in promoting policy diffusion, it does undermine the idea that states are acting *independently* as policy competitors with their neighbors and that the number of roads to neighboring countries with extant policies is a useful measure for understanding TIP policy diffusion. I find the results of Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) to be better explained by regional policy coordination, rather than states acting in isolation. This chapter ought to be seen as a corrective in their measurements and findings of relevance for competition as a driver of TIP policy diffusion.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

In this final chapter, I summarize the findings for each hypothesis, describe key findings, discuss directions for future research, make recommendations for diplomats and policy advocates, and close with a few remarks on how this dissertation has added to our knowledge.

How the Hypotheses Fared

Hypothesis 1

Under coercion theory, conditionality in the form of sanctions ought to promote policy diffusion. While, in the past, scholars have used variables to proxy vulnerability to US pressure, no one had yet tested whether the threat of US sanctions promoted policy diffusion. Hypothesis 1 held that credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion. As discussed in chapter 3, I found qualified support for this hypothesis for criminalization, institutionalization, NAP initiation, and conditionally for the establishment of reflection periods in Europe. Threats of sanctions do not seem to motivate policy diffusion for any legal revision, NRMs, or reflection periods generally, likely because these policies are not seen as policy "minimums." However, the support for hypothesis 1 is qualified because I found that it was not the credible threats of sanctions that promoted policy diffusion, but rather the cases where sanctions were unlikely to be imposed. Thus, threats of sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion, but these threats do not need to be credible. This finding is puzzling.

The findings for hypothesis 1 do offer support for the explanatory value of coercion for policy diffusion. While coercion cannot explain TIP policy diffusion alone, it is nonetheless an important factor that must be included in any holistic explanation. Differences in the influence of coercion for various policy types can be explained by US preferences for using the threat of sanctions for some policy types and not others, as well as the cost of the policy involved. In the

case of TIP, coercion is less successful in explaining regional differentiation, though for reflection periods, the possibility exists that US preferences vary by region.

Hypothesis 2

Reputation theory holds that countries seek to improve their global performance indicators (GPIs), such as their tier rank in the US TIP reports. Kelley (2017) found in the conduct of US diplomacy surrounding the TIP report that the diplomatic staff of other countries wanted to improve their standing relative to their neighbors or peers. Thus, hypothesis 2 held that reputational pressure from neighbors having a better score promotes TIP policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores. To test this hypothesis, I first developed a model predicting how each policy affected the TIP tier score. Countries which are eager to improve their scores ought to enact those policies which are most likely to do so. I found that criminalization (with prosecutions) and NRMs consistently helped improve scores, while other legal changes and intersectoral coordinating bodies did not improve scores. NAPs and reflection periods were helpful in avoiding the threat of sanctions, but not achieving a high rank of tier 1.

The results for hypothesis 2 are ambiguous and are shown in table 7-1. I expected to find reputational concerns to matter for criminalization and the establishment of NRMs, but they had no influence on criminalization and the findings for NRMs were ambiguous. In one model for NRMs, reputational pressure interacted with government accountability to promote diffusion of NRMs, but not in another model interacting reputational pressure and CSO cooperation. The importance of reputational pressure for NRMs is sensitive to model specification; findings are not robust. Only with legal change did we find support for the influence of reputational pressure. Here, reputational pressure was especially important for those countries which lacked CSO cooperation. But given that changes to the TIP legal regime do not change TIP scores, it is not clear why reputational influence would be most evident here. As

with change in the TIP legal regime, a neighbor having a better score helped compensate for the lack of CSO cooperation in the promotion of reflection periods.

Table 7-1. Results for Hypotheses 2 and 3

TIP policy	Does policy improve scores?	Hypothesis 2: Reputation	Hypothesis 3: Non-coercive
Criminalization (with prosecutions)	Yes	Not supported	Supported
Legal revisions	No	Supported	Supported
Institutionalization	No	Not supported	Supported
NAP	To avoid tier 3	Not supported	Not supported
NRM	Yes	Ambiguous	Supported
Reflection period	To avoid tier 2 watch list / tier 3	Conditional support	Not tested

Thus, for hypothesis 2, we seldom see a direct impact of a neighbor having a better score on TIP policy diffusion, and where we do find it, it is not for those policies that matter most for improving scores. The results also suggest that the influence of this reputational pressure is interacting with domestic conditions, and, at least in some cases, helping to compensate for the lack of CSO cooperation. Perry (2016) found that the efficacy of US diplomatic pressure depended upon the presence of domestic civil society pressure. The results here suggest something a little different: that, for some TIP policies, reputational pressure can promote policy diffusion when CSO cooperation is absent. Kelley (2017) argued that reputational pressure depended on a country's sensitivity to pressure, its exposure of policy shortfalls, and its capacity to implement policy. The evidence we have for interactions with reputational pressure and CSO cooperation also offer some support for her theorization.

The main finding is that reputational pressure, at least as measured by having a neighbor with a better score, is far less influential than expected. Variables for coercive pressure or other non-coercive aspects of US diplomacy are more consistently supported and have a more substantial impact on policy diffusion. The *scores* in scorecard diplomacy do not add much explanatory power, especially where we most expect to find it. It is not self-evidently clear why

reputational concerns matter for some policies but not those for which we expected it, nor does it help to explain regional differentiation.

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 held that non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy promote TIP policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores. Unlike with the reputational pressure from having a neighbor with a better score, we cannot discern whether these aspects are best considered expressions of reputation or constructivist theories. We do know, however, that they do not appeal to the coercive threat of sanctions. If these aspects had favored those policies which improve TIP scores, we would have had more support for the reputation approach, at least inasmuch as improving reputations can be equated with improving scores. However, as shown above in table 7-1, non-coercive aspects of scorecard diplomacy are active in all dimensions of TIP policy under investigation, except that for NAPs. They matter for TIP policies which improve scores and those that do not.

I tested (to the extent possible) being scored in the report and specific recommendations for TIP policies. Specific recommendations promoted the diffusion of criminalization, legal revisions, and NRMs, but not the establishment of intersectoral coordinating bodies. However, being scored in the TIP report did promote institutionalization. (I was unable to test either variable on reflection periods.) Specific recommendations were sometimes made to reinforce recommendations from regional or domestic actors, so it is difficult to untangle their influence from that of other parts of the international TIP regime complex. These components of US diplomacy help explain TIP policy diffusion, but they do not help explain differentiation by policy type or region.

Hypothesis 3 shows us that US diplomacy influences TIP policy diffusion beyond the coercive function of sanctions. Since this influence was not limited to those policies which help

improve scores, plausibly either or both reputation and constructivist theories could claim these as relevant mechanisms. These theories are compatible, and the mechanisms are not unique to either one. Coercion alone is insufficient to explain the influence of US diplomacy for promoting TIP policy diffusion.

Hypothesis 4

Constructivists propose that as an idea becomes normalized after passing a "tipping point," policy diffusion accelerates. Hypothesis 4 held that TIP policy diffusion increases as the regional density of the policy increases. For all policies except any change to the TIP legal regime and NAP initiation, the regional density of the policy motivated policy diffusion. This offers strong evidence for constructivism.

Chapter 5 also considered the role of regional policy communities. As the literature on regime complexes suggest, these communities offer one mechanism to explain regional differentiation in policy diffusion. To determine whether they are vehicles for constructivism, I included variables for these communities together with the variable for policy density. I found that, for some policies, policy density fully eclipsed the role of regional policy communities, while for others, regional policy communities had some effect independent of that of policy density. Moreover, regional organizations that had external policy review and inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy also helped promote the diffusion of some TIP policies.

Thus, I find that constructivism has explanatory power, that its influence is at least partly expressed through the role of regional policy communities, and that, for some policies, regional policy communities and other components of the international TIP regime complex also help explain differentiation in diffusion by region and policy domain.

Hypothesis 5

Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) argued that fear of transnational trafficking motivated criminalization as countries competed to discourage criminal networks from activity within a country. While they had used road counts to neighbors with criminalization extant as a proxy for this fear, I preferred to use actual reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking as a better measure. Hypothesis 5 held that reports of increased transnational trafficking or diversion of trafficking flows promote TIP policy diffusion for those policies which disrupt transnational trafficking networks. As discussed in chapter 6, this hypothesis was not supported. I have no evidence that reports of increased or diverted transnational trafficking matters in any way for the diffusion of TIP policy. The role of road networks in promoting policy diffusion appears to be wholly explained by the influence of regional policy communities which Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) did not include in their study.

Summary

An overall summary of the hypotheses and whether they were supported is found in table 7-2. When considering the various theories to policy diffusion, coercion and constructivism had the most explanatory power for TIP policy. Reputation theory offered some explanatory power, but not as much as one might expect from Kelley's *Scorecard Diplomacy* (2017). Competition theory did not help explain the diffusion of TIP policy. The international TIP policy regime—represented by US diplomacy under the TVPA, regional policy communities, and inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy—were all relevant actors for the transnational promotion of TIP policy.

Table 7-2. Summary of Results

Hypothesis	Theory	Results
Hypothesis 1. Credible threats of costly US sanctions promote TIP policy diffusion.	Coercion	Qualified support. Threats with low credibility promote diffusion.
Hypothesis 2. Reputational pressure from neighbors having a better score promotes TIP policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores.	Reputation	Conditional support but not for policies which improve scores.
Hypothesis 3. Non-coercive aspects of US scorecard diplomacy promote TIP policy diffusion for those policies which are most likely to improve scores.	Reputation or Constructivism	Supported but for both policies which improve scores and those that do not.
Hypothesis 4. TIP policy diffusion increases as the regional density of the policy increases.	Constructivism	Supported.
Hypothesis 5. Reports of increased transnational trafficking or diversion of trafficking flows promote TIP policy diffusion for policies which disrupt transnational networks.	Competition	Not supported.

More broadly, the findings support the claims that both *power* and *ideas* matter for policy diffusion. The findings for hypotheses 2 and 3 which showed that non-coercive US diplomacy promotes TIP policy diffusion are congruent with an understanding of the world where weaker actors respond to the desires of more powerful actors in the international system. Other evidence for this dynamic can be seen in the greater influence of inter-regional organizations coordinating migration for policy diffusion on emigrant-sending members than on immigrant-receiving members. Moreover, for many policies, low-income and lower-middle income countries are more likely to implement TIP policies than upper-middle income countries. Weaker countries seem to be adjusting policy to accord with the desires of more powerful countries. But ideas also matter, as is evidenced by the strong support for the influence of policy normalization, a constructivist mechanism. As such, the findings here are congruent with a picture of international politics where both power and ideas matter for transnational policy diffusion.

The findings have also produced surprises. Where I expected that highly credible threats of sanctions to promote policy diffusion, I found rather that it was threats of low credibility that promoted policy diffusion. Where I expected that reputational pressure would encourage the adoption of TIP policies which improved scores, I found rather that reputational pressure was disconnected from scores. I also found a complicated relationship between regional policy communities and policy normalization. These findings raise further questions for future research.

Directions for Future Research

For the Literature on Policy Diffusion

Mechanisms associated with the coercion, reputation, and constructivist theories help promote TIP policy diffusion. Indeed, none of these theories claim to be comprehensive explanations of policy diffusion, and, in some cases, mechanisms of diffusion are claimed by multiple theories. This dissertation considered four principal diffusion mechanisms—the threat of sanctions, US scorecard diplomacy, regional policy communities, and competition with neighbors—and found that the first three mattered. However, each mechanism did not matter in the way it was expected to matter. For sanctions, it was threats of low credibility that promoted diffusion. For scorecard diplomacy, the role of scores seemed to matter less than US diplomatic engagement. And, while regional policy communities do seem to be a constructivist vehicle in helping policy solutions achieve a taken-for-granted status, they also seem to matter in ways that are not well explored and could be claimed by various theories. For TIP policy, the learning theory did not seem to apply, and I did not find any evidence that competition mattered.

One way forward toward a more comprehensive theoretical approach to policy diffusion may be to consider how variations in a policy domain matter for which diffusion mechanisms

apply. Because success against TIP is not easily measurable, it is not a good candidate for learning theory. This lack of transparent measurability also makes it a difficult issue over which to compete. Issues like foreign direct investment or refugee resettlement are easier to measure than underground criminal activity like transnational trafficking. Without clear comparative measures, it is difficult to compete with neighbors to become less attractive to criminal networks, just as it is difficult to learn from policy successes. One dimension, then, that shapes which mechanisms matter for policy diffusion is the extent to which both the problem and policy solutions can be measured and compared.

Another dimension on which policy domains vary is the extent to which they are perceived as a public good that creates collective action problems. Combating TIP is typically described as a public good, but it is not clear that disruption of transnational trafficking networks and protection of victims are transnational public goods in the same degree. Moreover, the extent to which a public good may be seen as global, regional, or neighborly may also influence policy diffusion. TIP seems to be considered both a global and regional public good—global by the US which expends significant diplomatic effort on it, and regional by most other actors. I did not find evidence that neighbors influence policy diffusion except inasmuch as they belong to the same regional policy communities. The horizon for any policy domain—global, regional, or bilateral—will influence which mechanisms matter for policy diffusion, as well as help explain regional variation or divergence in policy diffusion.

Public goods also vary in how they are supplied. Generally, the provision of a public good is assumed to depend on the sum of contributions from all individual members. But some public goods are supplied to the extent their best- or worst-performing member provides the good. "Best shot" public goods—like asteroid deflection—do not need much cooperation; the best performing member will provide the good. "Weakest link" public goods depend on the

weakest performing member; security of nuclear materials or smallpox eradication are examples (Hirshleifer 1983). The mechanisms associated with policy diffusion may vary depending on the cooperation dynamics. For example, conditionality may be more conflictual in the context of summation public goods than for weakest-link public goods. In the former, costs of policy adjustment fall more heavily on some members of the community than others, while in the latter, better-performing members will be more likely to aid the weaker-performing members to improve their performance. To some extent, TIP policy resembles a weakest-link public good. Powerful countries and regional policy communities offer aid to help weaker members improve their TIP policy performance. For example, I found that, in some cases, emigrant-sending members of inter-regional organizations coordinating migration were more likely to implement some TIP policies than immigrant-receiving members or nonmembers. Such a finding could be explained by the efforts of the wealthier, immigrant-receiving members to encourage the weaker members to improve policy performance.

Together, the measurability of the problem and policy solutions, the extent to which an issue is viewed as a public good with a global, regional, or neighborly horizon, and the function of public good provision may help us understand the constraints confronting various diffusion mechanisms. And while some mechanisms may be claimed by multiple theories, it is the mechanisms that activate diffusion. Thus, the context of public goods provision and the measurability of policy performance can temper our expectations and help us refine our theories.

Another recommendation for scholars of policy diffusion is to better integrate the literature of regime complexes. The variation in diffusion of TIP policy by region is not stochastic, and the evidence offered in this study is that regional policy communities influence diffusion rates. Explaining regional variation in policy diffusion, especially of TIP policy, has not received

the attention it deserves. This study goes part way in helping offer explanations by showing that, to some extent, regional policy communities help policies achieve a taken-for-granted status. But we do not yet know why some policy communities are better at this than others.

The findings also raise other questions: Why is the European policy community the most successful in promoting the diffusion of TIP victim protection policies? Why is the African policy community relatively better at promoting diffusion than most other policy communities? Why do some regional policy communities seem to undermine policy diffusion? Why do inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy promote diffusion of some policies among emigrant-sending members but not immigrant-receiving members? What characteristics of regional policy communities are the most important for policy diffusion? These are all questions worthy of further investigation. Integrating the literature on policy diffusion with that on regime complexes may help answer them.

Another question tangentially raised herein is why do regional organizations choose to coordinate TIP policy? That is, why do policy choices diffuse in regional organizations? In this analysis, I used the regional policy community as an independent variable. But the choices of international and intergovernmental organizations may also be studied as the dependent variable. Simmons, Lloyd, and Stewart (2018) argued that the fear of increased or diverted trafficking motivated policy diffusion. Perhaps this fear motivated regional policy coordination, rather than the mechanisms of competition, as they argued. Or perhaps the regional organizations are vehicles for the will of the most powerful countries in each region. Understanding how and why regional organizations choose to coordinate some policies but not others is an area for future research that will clarify how policies diffuse.

In addition to the theoretical suggestions above, additional empirical work may also prove valuable for testing or refining theories. Three ways in which it may do so are

investigating tipping point thresholds, considering how policy options may compete with each other, and examining subnational policy diffusion for transnational policies such as TIP.

Constructivists argue that after acceptance of an idea passes a "tipping point," diffusion accelerates. I found that policy diffuses as an idea becomes taken-for-granted, as measured by policy density. However, a distinction can be made between tipping points and the taken-for-granted nature of an idea. More empirical work on the existence of specific tipping points for TIP policy diffusion may help demonstrate this idea.

The approach to TIP policy diffusion taken herein did not seriously consider whether various TIP policies compete with each other or with other policy choices in neighboring domains. While empirical evidence shows that, for the most part, adoption of one policy further increases the adoption of other TIP policies, this is not necessarily always the case. One possible explanation for regional differentiation in policy adoption is policy divergence. The TIP policies I selected for study show regional differentiation in adoption rates, and, for some policies, divergence. This finding may be an artifact of data collection which relied primarily on US and European sources but, in so doing, assumes that North American and European policy choices are normative and worthy of adoption globally. This may not be the case. The study of TIP policy diffusion could benefit by a broader selection of policy options with special attention given to policy choices made by actors outside of North America and Europe. Moreover, identifying which policy choices are *not* diffused could be important for understanding policy diffusion.

Finally, a natural extension of this research is to consider how much explanatory power each theory offers for subnational TIP policy diffusion. Many countries, like the US, Mexico, and Brazil, have federal systems. For TIP policy to be effectively diffused, the subnational governing units must also change their policies. The various theories of policy diffusion—conditionality, constructivism, reputation, and competition—could all play a role in the diffusion of TIP policy at

the subnational level. Understanding the multi-level dimensions of TIP policy diffusion may be of interest to both scholars of policy diffusion and policy advocates.

For the Literature on Sanctions

This dissertation also has implications for the literature on sanctions, as the findings in chapter 3 both reinforce and challenge the existing literature on sanctions. Consistent with the findings of this literature, the US selects which countries to threaten with sanctions, and countries which are more difficult cases—that is, have higher costs of compliance—are more likely to be threatened with sanctions and have sanctions imposed. Moreover, I found that the threat of sanctions does promote policy diffusion while imposing sanctions does not. Inconsistent with the literature, I found that having a low threat credibility was more efficacious in promoting policy diffusion than a high threat credibility. This puzzle presents opportunities to further refine sanctions theory.

The literature on sanctions relies heavily on game theory, but in doing so tends to assume conflictual theoretic models. It is not clear that the US sanctioning threats related to TIP are as conflictual as the models assume. The TVPA requires the US to evaluate other countries' TIP performance and to sanction poor performers. And while the President and the US diplomatic corps have some freedom to score and sanction countries, this freedom is not absolute. Some countries really do underperform on TIP, and while diplomatic concerns influence both the scoring and the sanctioning, it is also clear that perceived performance on TIP also matters. Indeed, for the US to achieve its goals, its TIP evaluations must have some grounding in reality. Thus, poor TIP policy performance can create a point of contention between the US and the target that neither country really wants. In this sense, even threatening sanctions creates costs and uncertainty for both the sender and target country that, in many cases, both countries may wish to avoid. Under such circumstances, perhaps countries with a

low threat credibility would nonetheless rather avoid conflict and reduce uncertainty, especially if it could be done relatively cheaply or if it generates benefits for domestic or regional actors. The repeat-play of US TIP sanctions may also matter here. Every year, countries are reevaluated for their TIP performance, and so countries may be considering time horizons in their evaluation of costs and benefits. Game theoretic models for sanctioning threat and decisions already include both the costs of target compliance and sender credibility, but these models might be improved by (1) incorporating the cost of diplomatic conflict, (2) short- and long-term costs associated with annual repeat-play sanctioning decisions and (3) more recognition of the relative power of those domestic actors who stand to gain from compliance. If diplomatic conflict has costs, even when sanctions are not likely to be imposed, then removing diplomatic conflict may motivate actors to policy action even when the threat of sanctions is not credible, especially when at least some domestic actors stand to gain from the policy.

Another area for further research is that of policy choice in the face of sanctions threat. Unlike some other sanctioning threats, in the case of TIP, the targets have multiple policy options with which they may improve TIP performance and avoid sanctions or diplomatic conflict over TIP altogether. I found that NAPs, a relatively low-cost policy option, were used by targets with both low and high threat credibility, while more costly (or at least more time-consuming) policy options—criminalization and establishment of intersectoral coordinating bodies—were used by targets only with low threat credibility. NRMs, a relatively high-cost policy option requiring extensive coordination and capacity—were not used to avoid sanctions (with the possible exception of the singular case of Bolivia in 2018). This policy choice is likely a result of the interplay between US policy preferences and target policy preferences. Why or how the actors reach the policy decisions they do is an area ripe for more theoretical development which could improve our understanding of the use of coercive conditionality in international relations.

Recommendations for Diplomats and Policy Advocates

The findings of this research have implications for diplomats, policy makers, and TIP policy advocates, both in government and transnational civil society. I encourage these actors to (1) focus on *good* policy, (2) build institutional capacity, and (3) promote transparency and external evaluation of policy. I also have specific recommendations for US diplomacy in its coercive and reputational capacities.

First, focus on good policy. Key actors in TIP policy diffusion, such as the US State Department, pay relatively little attention to changing conditions that directly empower people to free themselves, though this is likely to have the greatest long-term impact on TIP (e.g., see Choi-Fitzpatrick 2017). Many scholars have criticized global efforts against TIP as focusing too much on law enforcement solutions that do little to reduce overall suffering (e.g., see Chapkis 2005; Chuang 2014; Shih 2016). Bernstein (2010; 2012) holds that "carceral feminism" with its punitive model of social justice, while popular with both feminist and religious constituencies, is not the most effective way to reduce harm to marginalized people. Indeed, the law enforcement approach can further victimize the very people it is trying to help (e.g., Perry 2016). As Charnysh, Lloyd, and Simmons (2014) argued, law enforcement frames are also popular with government officials because it increases the power of the state. In my own conversations with those who work with trafficking victims, I have heard criticisms of how much the law enforcement frame dominates intersectoral cooperation. In my own experience participating on the Kentucky human trafficking task force, I can attest that law enforcement solutions are generally unquestioned and prioritized.

While I am sympathetic to these criticisms of the transnational TIP policy regime, one advantage of relying on multiple frames is that it motivates action on TIP from diverse actors, including actors with significant power, and brings them together in conversation. *Given the*

transnational TIP policy regime that we have, we can and ought to shape it by promoting good policies that help empower people to avoid or escape trafficking. While intersectoral cooperation may be dominated by law enforcement frames, it also provides opportunities to raise issues with law enforcement and policymakers that go beyond punitive strategies to reduce TIP. Since the findings of this dissertation show that ideas about the value of TIP policies diffuse across borders, diplomats and advocates ought to promote the policies believed to have the most positive impact.

Second, build institutional capacity. In my research, I was surprised at how undervalued intersectoral coordinating bodies were in the US TIP reports. Not only did US diplomats make relatively few recommendations to form or reinstate these bodies but having a functioning intersectoral coordinating body was associated with *worse* TIP scores. Moreover, in many parts of the world, the transnational institutional capacity of regional organizations is either lacking or focused on law enforcement or migration coordination. While African and European regional efforts to promote transnational cooperation have born some fruit, improving the regional coordinating capacity in the Americas, the Middle East, or much of Asia ought to be a focus of regional organizations coordinating TIP policy in those regions.

Third, outside of Europe and the US TIP reports, transparency and external evaluation of TIP policy is lacking. Results show that policy transparency and accountability—both from the US TIP reports and regional organizations that offer external evaluations—do help promote policy diffusion. But the US TIP reports alone are vulnerable to being dismissed as politically motivated or hypocritical. As such, most regional organizations could do much more to offer their members opportunities for policy transparency and accountability.

Finally, US diplomacy under the TVPA could be improved in various ways. As noted above, much more attention ought to be given to institutional capacity. Indeed, this should be

moved out from under the "Prevention" subheading and placed under its own subheading which should come earlier in the report. And of course, countries should not have their scores punished for having functional institutions. Moreover, the TIP reports could do more to highlight international coordination and cooperation than it currently does. By highlighting efforts of each regional organization that promotes TIP policy coordination, US diplomacy may perhaps encourage more vigorous regional cooperation.

This study has shown that the threat of US sanctions has been effective at promoting some TIP policies—especially those deemed necessary to meet certain minimum standards. However, in the case of TIP, it is not clear that credibly threatening or imposing sanctions is as important as sustained diplomatic engagement which is created by a country receiving a low TIP score. While generating some uncertainty in the sanctioning decision is likely to continue, the evidence does not indicate that the US must consistently sanction underperforming countries to achieve its aims to promote policy diffusion. The US may also wish to consider differentiating minimum standards by development level so that it expects more from wealthy countries like itself than it does from poorer ones. For example, tier ranks could be explicitly tied to the World Bank income classifications, so that an upper income country would need to do more to earn a tier 1 rank than a lower income country. The US could also add an "exemplary" tier rank for countries going beyond the minimums and thereby highlight policy options that might be worthy of emulation elsewhere.

Conclusion

The primary contribution of this dissertation is empirical. I created a unique dataset of TIP policy on which to adjudicate theoretical claims by testing the explanatory power of the existing theories of policy diffusion. Unlike previous studies, I was able to test these theories with advanced statistical models on a broader range of TIP policies than criminalization.

Moreover, in my dataset, I was able to include more variables related to the conduct of US diplomacy and regional organizations. As such, this dissertation offers the best test of the explanatory value of the various theories of policy diffusion for TIP policy to date. Understanding how much is explained by each theory and what gaps remain offers a foundation for further study.

The findings not only help demonstrate the explanatory value of each theory, but also reveal data useful for understanding differences in diffusion by policy type and region. Such information raises new questions and puzzles and is therefore useful for the further theoretical refinement or development.

Finally, my research has practical implications for diplomatic and policy practitioners who wish to promote the best policies for reducing TIP and helping those harmed by it. Human trafficking scholars have criticized the heavy emphasis on law enforcement policies, but I found that diffusion mechanisms also promote capacity-building and victim protection policies. As such, policy advocates have opportunities to improve TIP policy so that they better promote human welfare.

APPENDIX A: DATA COLLECTION

FOR VARIABLES RELATING TO US SCORECARD DIPLOMACY, TRAFFICKING POLICY, AND TRAFFICKING CHARACTERISTICS

The content analysis drew primarily on these sources:

United States Department of State. 2001-19. *Trafficking in Persons Report*. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ (16 December 2020).

Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. 2011-20. Country Monitoring Reports and Government Replies to GRETA Questionnaires. https://www.coe.int/en/web/anti-human-trafficking/country-monitoring-work (16 December 2020).

Organization of American States. 2018. *Progress Report Based on the Second Work Plan against Trafficking in Persons in the Western Hemisphere 2015-2018*. http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2019/CP40376EREPORTTRAFFICKING.pdf (16 January 2021).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2009. *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/glotip_2009.html (16 January 2021).

I also consulted these sources:

Arab.org. "Qatar Foundation for Combating Human Trafficking." https://arab.org/directory/qatar-foundation-combating-human-trafficking/ (16 December 2020).

Attorney General of Canada. 2007. Government Response to the Twelfth Report of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women. https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/39-1/FEWO/report-12/response-8512-391-171 (16 December 2020).

Bahamas National Trafficking in Persons Task Force. "About." https://www.facebook.com/242TIP/about/ (16 December 2020).

Commonwealth of Australia. 2015. *National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking and Slavery 2015-19*. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/trafficking-national-action-plan-combat-human-trafficking-slavery-2015-19.pdf (16 December 2020).

Consejo Plurinacional contra la Trata y Tráfico de Personas. 2013. *Politica Plurinacional de Lucha Contra Trata y Trafico de Personas 2013-2017*.

ECPAT International. 2013. *Global Monitoring: Status of Action against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children: Kazakhstan*. https://www.ecpat.org/resources (16 December 2020).

ECPAT International. 2016. *Executive Summary: South Korea*. https://www.ecpat.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Ex_Summary_EAP_SOUTH%20KOREA_FINAL.pdf (16 December 2020).

European Commission. "Together Against Trafficking in Human Beings." https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/node/4598_en (16 December 2020).

Gobierno de Colombia Ministerio del Interior. Comité Interinstitucional. https://tratadepersonas.mininterior.gov.co/comite-interinstitucional (16 December 2020).

Government of Canada. 2012. *National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking*. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ntnl-ctn-pln-cmbt/index-en.aspx (16 December 2020).

Government of Estonia. Aliens Act. 2009. https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/518112013013/consolide (16 December 2020).

Government of India Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Women and Child Development. 2002. *Annual Report 2002-2003*. https://wcd.nic.in/annual-report (16 December 2020).

Government of Israel Ministry of Justice. "Office of the National Anti-Trafficking Coordinator." https://www.justice.gov.il/En/Units/Trafficking/Pages/Default.aspx (16 December 2020).

Government of Jamaica Ministry of Justice. "Combating Trafficking in Persons in Jamaica." https://moj.gov.jm/content/human-trafficing (16 December 2020).

Government of Jamaica. The Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression and Punishment) Act. 2007. https://moj.gov.jm/laws/trafficking-persons-prevention-supression-and-punishment (16 December 2020).

Government of Kosovo Ministry of Internal Affairs, Office of the National Anti-Trafficking Coordinator. 2008. *Standard Operating Procedures for Trafficked Persons in Kosovo*. https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/18619 (16 December 2020).

Government of Sierra Leone. Anti-Human Trafficking Act. 2005. https://sierralii.org/sl/legislation/act/2005/7 (16 December 2020).

Government of Trinidad and Tobago Counter-Trafficking Unit. "About." https://www.facebook.com/CTUtnt/about/ (16 December 2020).

Government of Tuvalu. Counter Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime Act of 2009. http://tuvalu-legislation.tv/cms/images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/2009/2009-0006/CounterTerrorismandTransnationalOrganisedCrimeAct2009_1.pdf (16 December 2020)

Government of Uruguay. Ley de Prevencion y Combate de la Trata de Personas. 2018. http://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/19643-2018 (16 December 2020).

Gutman, W. E. 2010. "Sex Tourism Threatens Central America's Youth." https://lab.org.uk/sex-tourism-threatens-central-america%E2%80%99s-youth/ (16 December 2020).

Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer. 2005. Decreto No 114. – Créase el Comité Nacional Contra la Trata de Personas. http://www.isdemu.gob.sv/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=33%3Alegislacion-decretos&download=35%3Acomite-trata&Itemid=1&lang=es (16 December 2020).

International Justice Mission. 2018. "Dominican Government Launches a New Action Plan to End Sex Trafficking." https://www.ijm.org/news/dominican-government-launches-a-new-action-plan-to-end-sex-trafficking (16 December 2020).

International Labor Organization Committee of Experts. 2018. Direct Request, Forced Labour Convention – Myanmar. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID:3957008 (16 December 2020).

International Labour Organization. "Saint Kitts and Nevis." *Database of National Labour, Social Security and Related Human Rights Legislation*. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=107616&p_count=5&p_classification=01 (16 December 2020).

Ireland, Kevin. 1993. Sexual Exploitation of Children and International Travel and Tourism. *Child Abuse Review* 2.4:263-70.

Koopman, Andre. 1999. "Child-sex Tours a Growing Business in SA." https://www.iol.co.za/travel/south-africa/child-sex-tours-a-growing-business-in-sa-12132 (16 December 2020).

Kooy, Hannah, and Sanne Terlingen. 2016. "Djibouti: The Next Thailand?" https://humantraffickingcenter.org/djibouti-next-thailand/ (16 December 2020).

Lesa, Mata'afa Keni. 2018. "Alleged Slavery? Human Trafficking? Surely not in Samoa!" https://www.samoaobserver.ws/category/editorial/21112 (16 December 2020).

Mendoza, Alberto. 2006. "Guatemala: Where Sexual Exploitation of Minors Is Not a Crime." http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/10/guatemala-where-sexual-exploitation-of-minors-is-not-a-crime/ (16 December 2020).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2004. " Japan's Action Plan of Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons." https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/i_crime/people/action.html (16 December 2020).

News24. 2001. "India's Child Sex Tourism Booms." https://www.news24.com/News24/Indias-child-sex-tourism-booms-20010411 (16 December 2020).

Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, Misión Ecuador. 2013. Protocolo Nacional Unificado para la Protección Asistencia Integral a Personas Víctimas de Trata. https://www.oim.org.ec/2016/iomtemplate2/news/protocolo-nacional-unificado-para-la-protecci%C3%B3n-y-asistencia-integral-v%C3%ADctimas-de-trata-de (16 December 2020).

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2001. "Anti-trafficking Legislation in Kosovo." https://www.osce.org/kosovo/57804 (16 December 2020).

Pacific Islands Report. 2000. "Group Warns of Child Sex Tourism, Names Fiji, Solomons, Samoa." http://www.pireport.org/articles/2000/08/22/group-warns-child-sex-tourism-names-fiji-solomons-samoa (16 December 2020).

Patt, Martin. "Child Prostitution—Czech Republic." http://gvnet.com/childprostitution/CzechRepublic.htm (16 December 2020).

Phillips, Janet. 2008. *People Trafficking: An Update on Australia's Response*. https://bit.ly/2wf9JZU (16 December 2020).

Refworld. "Slovenia: Aliens Act." https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c407cbd2.html (16 December 2020).

Republic of the Philippines. An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8042, Otherwise Known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as Amended, Further Improving the Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, Their Families and Overseas Filipinos in Distress, and for Other Purposes. 2009. https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2010/ra_10022_2010.html (16 December 2020).

Republica de Costa Rica Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería. Coalición Nacional Contra el Tráfico Ilícito de Migrantes y Trate de Personas (CONATT). https://www.migracion.go.cr/Paginas/CONATT.aspx (16 December 2020).

Rudnick, Carolina. 2018. Human Trafficking in Chile (and Elsewhere): It's All about Justice. https://medium.com/@crudnick/human-trafficking-in-chile-and-elsewhere-its-all-about-justice-361c4264a402 (16 December 2020).

Severance, Kristi. 2003. *Survey of Legislative Frameworks for Combating Trafficking in Persons.* American Bar Association Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative Research Paper Series 158.

Singh, Shailendra. 2008. "South Pacific: Poverty Breeds Child Labour and Sex Tourism." http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/06/south-pacific-poverty-breeds-child-labour-and-sex-tourism/ (16 December 2020).

Situmorang, Mosgan. 2011. *Koordinasi antar lembaga dalam pemberantasan perdagangan anak* ("Coordination between institutions in combating child trafficking"). https://bphn.go.id/data/documents/koordinasi_antar_lembaga_dalam_pemberantasan_perdagangan_anak.pdf (16 December 2020).

The Jamaica Observer. 2002. "Child Prostitution Widespread in Jamaica." https://www.ilo.org/caribbean/projects/WCMS_311028/lang--en/index.htm (16 December 2020).

The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative. Child Soldiers World Index. https://childsoldiersworldindex.org/ (16 December 2020).

United Nations Children's Fund, Pacific Office. 2017. *Situation Analysis of Children in Tuvalu*. https://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/media/1266/file/Situation-Analysis-of-Children-Tuvalu.pdf (16 December 2020).

United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child. 2009. Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 44 of the Convention: Republic of Korea. http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1303249657_crc-c-kor-3-4-1.pdf (16 December 2020).

United Nations General Assembly. 1999. Report on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. A/54/411. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Children/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx (16 December 2020).

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. "Country Visits." https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Trafficking/Pages/visits.aspx (16 December 2020).

United Nations Information Service. 2001. "Philippines Government Launches a National Action Plan against Trafficking in Human Beings." UNIS/CP/398. https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2001/cp398.html (16 December 2020).

United Nations Women. "Consejo Nacional contra la Trata de Personas (El Salvador)." Global Database on Violence against Women. https://evaw-global-

database.unwomen.org/en/countries/americas/el-salvador/2012/consejo-nacional-contra-la-trata-de-personas (16 December 2020).

United Nations Women. "Mesa Interinstitucional para la Prevencion y el Combate a la Trata de Personas (Paraguay)." Global Database on Violence against Women. https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/en/countries/americas/paraguay/2005/mesa-interinstitucional-para-la-prevencion-y-el-combate-a-la-trata-de-personas (16 December 2020).

United Nations World Tourism Organization. 2004. "14th Meeting of the Task Force for the Protection of Children in Tourism." https://www.unwto.org/archive/global/event/14th-meeting-task-force-protection-children-tourism (16 December 2020).

US Department of Labor. 2002. *2001 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor – Cambodia*. https://www.refworld.org/docid/48c8c9bf37.html (16 December 2020).

US Department of Labor Bureau of International Labor Affairs. 2019. *Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor*. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings (16 December 2020).

US Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. 2019. *United States Advisory Council on Human Trafficking Annual Report 2019*. https://www.state.gov/united-states-advisory-council-on-human-trafficking-annual-report-2019 (16 December 2020).

US Department of State. 2009. "Jordan: Input for the Ninth Annual Trafficking in Persons Report." https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09AMMAN459_a.html (16 December 2020).

US Department of State. 2010. "2010 Trafficking in Persons Information for Iraq." https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10BAGHDAD385_a.html (16 December 2020).

Abu Dhabi Dialogue. http://abudhabidialogue.org.ae/ (16 January 2021).

African Union. https://au.int/ (16 January 2021).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2004. *ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children*. https://cil.nus.edu.sg/databasecil/2004-asean-declaration-against-trafficking-in-persons-particularly-women-and-children/?id=73 (16 January 2021).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2011. *ASEAN Leaders' Joint Statement in Enhancing Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons in Southeast Asia*. https://cil.nus.edu.sg/databasecil/2011-asean-leaders-joint-statement-in-enhancing-cooperation-against-trafficking-in-persons-in-southeast-asia/?id=616 (16 January 2021).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2011. *ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime Working Group on Trafficking in Persons*. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/DOC-9-ADOPTED-TOR-for-WG-on-TIP.pdf (16 January 2021).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2015. *ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children*. https://cil.nus.edu.sg/databasecil/2015-asean-convention-against-trafficking-in-persons-especially-women-and-children/?id=195 (16 January 2021).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2015. *ASEAN Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children*. https://cil.nus.edu.sg/databasecil/2015-asean-plan-of-action-against-trafficking-in-persons-especially-women-and-children/ (16 January 2021).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2017. *Bohol TIP Work Plan 2017-2020*. https://cil.nus.edu.sg/databasecil/2017-2020-bohol-tip-work-plan/?id=19083 (16 January 2021).

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. https://asean.org/ (16 January 2021).

Bali Process. https://www.baliprocess.net/ (16 January 2021).

Budapest Process Secretariat. https://www.budapestprocess.org/ (16 January 2021).

Colombo Process. http://www.colomboprocess.org/ (16 January 2021).

Commonwealth of Independent States. https://cis.minsk.by/ (16 January 2021). [Russian].

Council of Europe. "Action against Trafficking in Human Beings." https://www.coe.int/en/web/anti-human-trafficking (16 January 2021).

Council of the Baltic Sea States Expert Group for Cooperation on Children at Risk. https://www.childrenatrisk.eu/ (16 January 2021).

Council of the Baltic Sea States. https://cbss.org/news/?tag=anti-trafficking&cbss_filter=1 (16 January 2021).

Cui, Corina. 2013. "Arab League Combating Human Trafficking." https://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/en/schede/Arab-League-combating-human-trafficking/300 (16 January 2021).

East African Community. https://www.eac.int/ (16 January 2021).

East African Legislative Assembly. 2016. *EAC Counter-trafficking in Persons Bill*. https://www.eala.org/uploads/Traffic_14-Sep-2016_10-06-51(1).pdf (16 January 2021).

Economic Community of Central African States. https://ceeac-eccas.org/en/ (16 January 2021).

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). https://www.ecowas.int/ (16 January 2021).

Economic Community of West African States. 2001. *ECOWAS Initial Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons (2002-2003)*. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/trafficking/Minimum_Plano_CEDEAO.pdf (16 January 2021).

European Commission. "Together Against Trafficking in Human Beings." https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/node/4598_en (16 January 2021).

European Commission. 2012. *The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-2016*. https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/eu_strategy_towards_the_eradication_of_trafficking_in_human_beings_2012-2016_1.pdf (16 January 2021).

European Parliament. 1995. Resolution on Trafficking in Human Beings. A4-0326/95. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:51995IP0326 (16 January 2021).

European Parliament. 2011. Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/36/oj (16 January 2021).

Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 2012. *IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework*. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/icp/igad-regional-migration-policy-framework1.pdf (16 January 2021).

Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 2014. *IGAD-Migration Action Plan 2015-2020*. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/RCP/2018/igad/igadmigrationactionplan2015-2020.pdf (16 January 2021).

Intergovernmental Authority on Development. https://igad.int/ (16 January 2021).

International Organization for Migration Office in the Russian Federation. 2015. "Международная конференция по борьбе с торговлей людьми." http://moscow.iom.int/ru/news/mezhdunarodnaya-konferenciya-po-borbe-s-torgovley-lyudmi (16 January 2021).

International Organization of Migration – Nepal. 2010. "IOM Conducts Review of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Convention on Human Trafficking." https://www.iom.int/news/iom-conducts-review-south-asian-association-regional-cooperation-saarc-convention-human (16 January 2021).

International Organization on Migration. "Regional Consultative Processes on Migration." (16 January 2021).

IOM Special Liaison Mission in Addis Ababa. 2008. *Inter-State and Intra-Regional Cooperation on Migration Management in the IGAD Region*. https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/rcps/igad/Workshop%20Report%20Inter-State%20and%20Intra-Regional%20Cooperation%20on%20Migration%20Management%20in%20the%20IGAD%20Region.pdf (16 January 2021).

JVAP Follow-up Support Team. "The Joint Valletta Action Plan Follow-up" https://www.jvapfollowup.org/jvap/ (16 January 2021).

Kumar, Chanchal. 2015. "Human Trafficking in the South Asian Region: SAARC's Response and Initiatives." *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 1.1: 14-31.

League of Arab States in Washington DC. http://arableague-us.org/wp/ (16 January 2021).

Nordic Council of Ministers. https://www.norden.org/en/search?query=human+trafficking (16 January 2021).

OECD Secretary General. 2017. Report to Ministers. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/secretary-general-s-report-to-ministers-2017_sg_report-2017-en (16 January 2021).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. "Human Trafficking and Corruption." https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/human-trafficking.htm (16 January 2021).

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. "Combating Trafficking in Human Beings." https://www.osce.org/cthb (16 January 2021).

Organization of American States. "Reunión de Autoridades Nacionales de Trata de Personas." http://www.oas.org/es/sms/dps/prog-trata-de-Personas.asp (16 January 2021).

Rabat Process. https://www.rabat-process.org/en (16 January 2021).

Regional Conference on Migration. https://portal.crmsv.org/en (16 January 2021).

South African Development Community. https://www.sadc.int/ (16 January 2021).

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. "Areas of Cooperation: Social Affairs." https://www.saarc-sec.org/index.php/areas-of-cooperation/social-affairs (16 January 2021).

UN Global Database on Violence against Women. "Regional Task Force – Implementation of International Conventions on Trafficking." https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/en/countries/asia/india/2007/regional-task-force---implementation-of-international-conventions-on-trafficking (16 January 2021).

United Nations Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons. "Laws and Agreements." http://un-act.org/laws-agreements-download/ (16 January 2021).

United Nations Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons. http://un-act.org/ (16 January 2021).

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. "Country Visits." https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Trafficking/Pages/visits.aspx (16 December 2020).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "Strengthening the Framework of the Arab Region to Prevent and Combat Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling" https://www.unodc.org/middleeastandnorthafrica/en/project-profiles/xmex19.html (16 January 2021).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "The Arab Initiative to Build National Capacities to Combat Human Trafficking in the Arab Countries." https://www.unodc.org/middleeastandnorthafrica/en/project-profiles/xamx59.html (16 January 2021).

United Nations Treaty Collection. Status of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&lang=en (10 February 2021).

APPENDIX B: VARIABLES

LIST OF VARIABLES

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Child sex tourism CST	TIP tier scoring model: Trafficking characteristics	Reports of child sex tourism with a country. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, various other sources	4
Criminalization event CRIM	Hypothesis testing: Dependent variable	Whether a country fully criminalized human trafficking in a given year. Full criminalization includes both sex and labor trafficking, both domestic and transnational trafficking, and trafficking of men, women, and children. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	3, 4, 5, 6
Criminalization extant CREX	Hypothesis testing: TIP policy performance TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether a country has fully criminalized human trafficking. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	3, 4, 5, 6
Criminalization recommended, current or previous year CRIMREC_L	Hypothesis testing: Scorecard diplomacy	Whether the US recommended that a country fully criminalize TIP in the current or previous year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4, 5, 6
De-institutionalization event DINST	TIP tier scoring model: TIP performance	Whether a country's previously instituted inter-ministerial or intersectoral TIP coordinating institution ceased to operate in a given year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	4
Domestic trafficking DOMHT	Hypothesis testing: Trafficking characteristics	Whether a country is perceived to have a significant domestic trafficking market. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports	3, 4, 5, 6
Emigrant-sending member of an inter-regional migration-focused organization MPC_EM	Hypothesis testing: Inter-regional policy coordination TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Countries for which the ratio of emigrants to immigrant is more than 1.05 and which are also members of one of the 7 inter-regional organizations coordinating policy on immigration (dichotomous).	Regional organization websites, UN Population Division	4, 5, 6

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Freedom of Expression V2X_FREEXP	Hypothesis testing: Government accountability	The extent to which the government respects press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss politics in the public sphere, and the freedom of academic and cultural expression. Continuous.	Varieties of Democracy	4*
GDP per capita GDPPC	Hypothesis testing: State capacity	GDP in constant 2010 international dollars per capita, in thousands. Continuous.	World Bank	3, 4, 5, 6
Government abuse of victims' physical integrity rights HRTV	Hypothesis testing: Domestic sincerity Sanctioning decision model: TIP policy performance	Whether a country is reported to have violated TIP victims' physical integrity rights. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4, 5, 6
Government accountability V2X_ACC	Hypothesis testing: Government accountability Sanctioning decision model: Government accountability TIP tier scoring model: Government accountability	The extent to which the ideal of government accountability is achieved. Continuous.	Varieties of Democracy	3, 4, 5, 6
Government complicity with TIP GIHT	Sanctioning decision model: TIP policy performance	Reported government complicity with TIP. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3
Government cooperation with CSO on TIP NGOCOOP	Hypothesis testing: Elite networks, constructivism. TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Reported government cooperation with CSOs on TIP. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports	3, 4, 5, 6
Government hostility with CSO on TIP NGOHOST	Sanctioning decision model: TIP policy performance TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Reported government hostility toward CSOs on TIP. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4
Immigrant-receiving member of an inter-regional migration-focused organization MPC_IM	Hypothesis testing: Inter-regional policy coordination TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Countries for which the ratio of immigrants to emigrants is more than 1.05 and which are also members of one of the 7 inter-regional organizations coordinating policy on immigration (dichotomous).	Regional organization websites, UN Population Division	4, 5, 6

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Institutionalization event INST	Hypothesis testing: Dependent variable	Whether a country instituted an inter-ministerial or intersectoral TIP coordinating institution in a given year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	3, 4, 5, 6
Institutionalization extant INSTEX	Hypothesis testing: Capacity TIP tier scoring model: TIP performance	Whether a country has an inter-ministerial or intersectoral TIP coordinating institution extant. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	3, 4, 5, 6
Institutionalization recommendation, current or previous year INSTREC_L	Hypothesis testing: Scorecard diplomacy	Whether the US recommended institutionalization (or re-institutionalization) of an inter-ministerial or intersectoral coordinating body in the current or previous year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4, 5, 6
Legal revision event, previous year. LREV_PY	TIP tier scoring model: TIP performance	Whether a country revised its legal regime on TIP in a way that is believed to improve TIP policy in the previous year. For neighboring policy domains, the legal revision must be partly motivated to address TIP. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	4
Legal revision recommended, current or previous year LREVREC_L	Hypothesis testing: Scorecard diplomacy	Whether the US recommended that a country revise its TIP legal regime in the current or previous year. This variable is inclusive of recommendations for criminalization. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4, 5, 6
Legislative corruption V2LGCRRPT	Hypothesis testing: State capacity	The extent to which members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain. Continuous.	Varieties of Democracy	3, 4, 5, 6
Low scores in the US TIP report, current or previous year. TIPBAD_L	Hypothesis testing: Coercion	Whether a country received a score of "tier 2 watch list" or "tier 3" in the US TIP report in the current or previous year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4, 5, 6
Major war WAR_MAJOR	Hypothesis testing: State capacity	Whether the country is in the midst of a major foreign or civil war (more than 1000 battle deaths). Dichotomous.	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset	3*

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Migration policy harms victims MTV	TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether a country's migration policy as practiced is perceived to further endanger TIP victims. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	4
National Action Plan extant NAPEX	Hypothesis testing: Capacity TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether a country has an operational National Action Plan extant. Plans without definite timeframes are excluded. Dichotomous	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	3, 4, 5, 6
National Action Plan initiation event NAP	Hypothesis testing: Dependent variable	Whether a country initiated a National Action Plan or Strategy for TIP in a given year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	3, 4, 5, 6
National Rapporteur extant RAPEX	TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether a country has a national rapporteur for TIP to evaluate policy performance. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	4
National Referral Mechanism recommendation, current or previous year NRMREC_L	Hypothesis testing: Scorecard diplomacy	Whether the US made a recommendation for instituting or improving a National Referral Mechanism in the current or previous year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4, 5, 6
National Referral Mechanism, formal adoption FNRM	Hypothesis testing: Dependent variable	Whether a country formally adopted an operational National Referral Mechanism in a given year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	3, 4, 5, 6
National Referral Mechanism, operational NRMEX	TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether a country has an operational (even if flawed) National Referral Mechanism. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	4
Neighbor scored better in US TIP report REP_L	Hypothesis testing: Reputational pressure	Whether a country had a neighbor or peer country receive a better score in the US TIP report in the current or previous year. Dichotomous. For detailed criteria, see note 1.	US TIP reports	3, 4, 5, 6
Neighbors with (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods) weighted by the number of roads RNCRIM, RNINST, RNNAP, RNNRM, RNRP	Hypothesis testing: Neighborly connectedness	The total number of road connections with neighbors that had extant (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods). Missing data was considered to mean the specified policy was not extant. Road connections were counted from 2019 maps. Count. See note 2.	Google Maps	3, 4, 5, 6

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Neighbors with (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods) weighted by the ratio of roads RRCRIM, RRINST, RRNAP, RRNRM, RRRP	Hypothesis testing: Neighborly connectedness	The total ratio of road connections with neighbors that had extant (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods). Missing data was considered to mean the specified policy was not extant. Road connections were counted from 2019 maps. Ratio. See note 2.	Google Maps	6
Neighbors with extant (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods) weighted by the number of roads and UN ideal point distance UNRNCRIM, UNRNINST, UNRNNAP, UNRNNRM, UNRNRP	Hypothesis testing: Neighborly connectedness	The total number of road connections with neighbors that had extant (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods) multiplied by the natural log of the UN ideal point distance centered at the median ideal point. The sign is reversed so that friendlier countries had positive scores. Missing data was considered to mean the specified policy was not extant. Road connections were counted from 2019 maps. See note 2.	Google Maps Voeten et al. 2009, UN General Assembly Voting Data	6*
Not a member of any regional organization combatting TIP REG_NO	Sanctioning decision model: TIP performance	Country is not a member of any regional organization combatting TIP. Dichotomous.	Regional organization websites, various other sources	3
Other US sanctions OTHSANC	Sanctioning decision model: Relationship with US	Whether a country is sanctioned by the US for other non-TIP reasons in a given year. Dichotomous.	US Treasury Sanctions Programs and Country Information, US Federal Register notices	3
Perceived increased or diverted transnational trafficking, current or previous year TDEX_L	Hypothesis testing: Fear of transnational trafficking	Whether the country has reports of trafficking diversion or increased transnational trafficking in the current or previous year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	6
Pompeo, US Secretary of State POMPEO	Sanctioning decision model: US country characteristics	The US Secretary of State is Pompeo. Dichotomous.		3

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Primary regional policy community RPC	Hypothesis testing: Regional policy coordination	Whether a country is a member of one of 7 regional TIP policy communities. For this variable, a country can only be a member of one regional policy community, so the North American community is folded into the American community, and otherwise when a country is in more than one, the community which receives more of its total trade is considered the primary community. Categorical.	Regional organization websites, IMF Direction of Trade statistics.	5*
Public sector corruption V2X_PUBCORR	Hypothesis testing: State capacity	The extent to which public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes and how often they steal public funds for personal use. Continuous.	Varieties of Democracy	3, 4, 5, 6
Ratio of total migrant stock with migration partners with extant (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods) RMCRIM, RMINST, RMNAP, RMNRM, RMRP	Hypothesis testing: Demographic connectedness	The ratio of each country's total migrant stock (emigrant and immigrant) shared with migration partners that had extant (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods). Missing data was considered to mean the specified policy was not extant. When migrant stock data was not available, the most recent data was used. Ratio.	UN Population Division	6
Ratio of total trade with trading partners with extant (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods) RTTCRIM, RTTINST, RTTNAP, RTTNRM, RTTRP	Hypothesis testing: Trade connectedness	The ratio of each country's total trade (imports and exports) with trading partners that had extant (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods). Missing data was considered to mean the specified policy was not extant. Ratio.	IMF Direction of Trade Statistics	6
Ratio of total trade with US RTT_US	Sanctioning decision model: Relationship with US	The ratio of the country's trade with the US over its total trade. Ratio.	IMF Direction of Trade Statistics	3

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Ratio of trade with a country to US total trade UST	Sanctioning decision model: Relationship with US	The ratio of US trade with a country over US total trade. Ratio.	IMF Direction of Trade Statistics	3
Ratio of trade with advanced economies. RTT_AE	Hypothesis testing: Trade characteristics	The ratio of a country's trade with advanced economies, defined as countries in the Euro area, and Australia, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Hong Kong, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom and the United States. Ratio.	IMF Direction of Trade Statistics	5*
Reflection Period extant RPEX	TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether a country has a reflection period for victims. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	4
Reflection Period institutionalization event RP	Hypothesis testing: Dependent variable	Whether a country institutionalized a reflection period for victims in a given year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	3, 4, 5, 6
Regional density of (criminalization, institutionalization, National Action Plans, National Referral Mechanisms, or reflection periods) RGTP_CREX, RGTP_INSTEX, RGTP_NAPEX, RGTP_NRMEX, RGTP_RPEX, RPTP_CREX, RPTP_INSTEX, RPTP_NAPEX, RPTP_NRMEX, RPTP_RPEX	Hypothesis testing: Policy density	The regional density of countries with the referenced policy extant. Countries for which data on the policy was missing were considered to not have the policy extant. Two interpretations of region are used: a geographic and political-cultural. Ratio.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports, various other sources	3, 4, 5, 6
Regional policy community RPC_AFRICA, RPC_AMER, RPC_EURO, RPC_ME, RPC_NA, RPC_RUS, RPC_SASIA, RPC_SEASIA	Hypothesis testing: Regional policy coordination	Whether a country is a member in each of the 8 regional regime TIP policy communities. Dichotomous. See note 3.	Regional organization websites	3, 4, 5, 6
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year SC_L SCO_L	Hypothesis testing: Coercion	Predicted credibility of US TIP sanctions. Ratio and ordinal.	Prediction of the sanctioning decision model in chapter 3	3

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Sanctioned for TIP (partial or full) S2	Sanctioning decision model: Dependent variable	Whether a country that received a tier 3 score in the TIP report was sanctioned, either full or partial. Dichotomous.	US Presidential Memorandums relating to TVPA sanctions	3
Sanctioned for TIP, current or previous year S_L	Hypothesis testing: Coercion	Whether a country that received a tier 3 score in the TIP report was sanctioned, either full or partial, in the current or previous year. Dichotomous.	US Presidential Memorandums relating to TVPA sanctions	3
Scored in the US TIP report, current or previous year. TIPSCORE_L	Hypothesis testing: Scorecard diplomacy	Whether a country was scored in the US TIP report in the current or previous year. This excludes "special cases." Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4, 5, 6
Sex trade policy harms victims STV	TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether a country's sex trade policy as practiced is perceived to further endanger TIP victims. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	4
Source SOURCE	TIP tier scoring model: Trafficking characteristics	Whether a country is perceived to be a source for transnational trafficking. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports, GRETA reports	4, 5*
Sum of memberships in regional organizations combatting TIP REG_SUM	Hypothesis testing: Regional policy coordination	The sum of the number of regional organizations taking action on TIP (but excluding organizations focused on inter-regional migration) in which the country is a member or participant. Count.	Regional organization websites, various other sources	5
Sum of memberships in regional organizations combatting TIP with a TIP coordinating institution REG_INST_MED	Hypothesis testing: Regional policy coordination	The sum of the number of regional organizations in which the country is a member which are taking action on TIP (but excluding organizations focused on inter-regional migration) and have coordinating institution. Count.	Regional organization websites, various other sources	5
Sum of memberships in regional organizations combatting TIP with external policy evaluations REG_INST_HIGH	Hypothesis testing: Regional policy coordination	The sum of the number of regional organizations in which the country is a member which are taking action on TIP (but excluding organizations focused on inter-regional migration) that have an external evaluation of a member's TIP policy. Count.	Regional organization websites, various other sources	5, 6
Total population TPOPLN	Hypothesis testing: State capacity	The total population, natural log. Continuous.	World Bank	3*

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Trafficking convictions TC	TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether the target country had any trafficking convictions in a given year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	4
Trafficking prosecutions TP	Sanctioning decision model: TIP policy performance TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether the target country initiated any trafficking prosecutions in a given year. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4
Trafficking Protocol TPAEX	Hypothesis testing: International policy regime	Whether a country has acceded to the UN Trafficking Protocol. Dichotomous.	UN Treaties Collection	3, 4, 5, 6
Trump administration 3.PRES	TIP tier scoring model: US characteristics	US TIP report was issued during Trump's Presidential administration. Dichotomous.		4
UN ideal point distance with US, centered on the mean UNIPD_C	Sanctioning decision model: Relationship with US TIP tier scoring model: Relationship with US	The absolute distance between the voting ideal points of the target and the US centered on the mean. The ideal points are calculated per Bailey *et alii* 2017. Continuous.	Voeten et al. 2009; Bailey et al. 2017; UN General Assembly Voting Data	3, 4
Upper-middle or high-income countries HI	Sanctioning decision model: Country characteristics	Country is classified as either an upper-middle- or high-income country according to the World Bank. Dichotomous.	World Bank	3
US military aid, any amount USMILAIDD	Sanctioning decision model: Relationship with US TIP tier scoring model: Relationship with US	Country receives US military aid in any amount. Dichotomous.	US AID Foreign Aid Explorer, World Bank	3, 4
US TIP tier score TT	TIP tier scoring model: Dependent variable	Whether a country was scored at tier 1, tier 2, tier 2 watch list, or tier 3 in the US TIP report in a given year. Ordinal.	US TIP reports	4
Use of government-sponsored child soldiers GSCS	Sanctioning decision model: TIP policy performance TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Reported use of government-sponsored child soldiers. Dichotomous.	US TIP reports	3, 4

Indicator	Concept	Operationalization	Source	Chapters
Visit from the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Trafficking VSR	TIP tier scoring model: TIP policy performance	Whether a country hosted an evaluative visit from the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Trafficking in a given year. Dichotomous.	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.	4
Women's participation in civil society V2CSGENDER	Hypothesis testing: Women's political power	The extent to which women are participate in or are excluded from civil society organizations. Continuous.	Varieties of Democracy	3*
Women's political empowerment V2X_GENDER	Hypothesis testing: Women's political power	The capacity for women's agency and social participation, along the dimensions of fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions. Continuous.	Varieties of Democracy	3, 4, 5, 6
World Bank income classification WBINC	Hypothesis testing: State capacity TIP tier scoring model: State capacity	Whether a country is considered low-income, lower-middle income, upper-middle, or high income. Ordinal.	World Bank	3, 4, 5, 6

* The variable is used only in robustness checks for the chapter (see Appendix C).
"Various other sources" are listed in Appendix A.
The variable codes used in my Stata *do* files are listed in ALL CAPS in the "Indicator" column.

Note 1. Neighbor-peers for the application of reputational pressure

Neighbor-peers: For determining whether a country was a "neighbor" to another for reputational pressure to apply, the following rules were applied in order to take into account a country's peer group:

In general, all direct neighbors (by land and within 150 miles via sea) are considered neighbors, except:

- Canada and the USA are neighbors, but they are not neighbors with any other countries.
- Spain and Morocco are not neighbors, but Turkey is neighbors with Greece and Bulgaria, as well as Syria, Iraq, Armenia and Georgia.

- Russia is only considered a neighbor to Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan & China.
- The micro nations in the Pacific are neighbors with each other.
- The island nations of the eastern Caribbean are neighbors with each other.
- All seven nations of Central America are neighbors with each other.
- All five countries of Scandinavia (including Iceland) are neighbors with each other, but not Russia.
- All three Baltic States are neighbors of each other but not Russia.
- Bosnia is a neighbor to Albania and Kosovo.
- Greece & Cyprus are neighbors.
- Cabo Verde is neighbors with Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.
- Algeria is not neighbors across the Sahara, but Libya is neighbor with Chad, and Egypt with Sudan.
- Lesotho and Eswatini are neighbors with each other.
- Bhutan and Nepal are neighbors with each other (and India) but not with China.

Note 2. Method for counting road connections.

I used Google Maps and Google Earth (2019) to count road connections according to the following rules:

- A major road (color yellow) crossed the border
- A minor road (color white) crossed the border but was within a short distance of major roads on both sides of the border
- An urban area existed on both sides of the border
- A ferry route connecting major roads
- In some cases in developing countries, Google Earth was consulted to determine if roads existed or seemed the equivalent size on both sides of the border

- Two countries with no major road connections but at least one minor road connection counted for one connection
- A sea route of 150 miles or less existed between the two countries
    - However, this is not additive if an existing ferry route exists
    - A sea route was not counted between Russia and the United States

For counting roads, I considered French Guinea a part of France.

Note 3. Regional regime TIP policy complexes.

The regional regime complexes are defined as follows:

Africa: Any member of the African Union, East African Community, ECOWAS, ECCAS, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or the Southern African Development Community once these organizations begin coordination on TIP policy.

Americas: Any member of the Organization of American States once it begins coordination on TIP policy.

Europe: Any member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe or the European Union once these organizations begin coordination on TIP policy. Countries must be located in Europe (i.e., have Correlates of War country codes between 200 and 399). Aspirants to the European Union are also included.

Middle East and North Africa: Any member of the League of Arab States once it begins coordination on TIP policy.

North America: Any member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe located in North America (i.e., Canada and the United States).

Russia & Central Asia: Any member of the Commonwealth of Independent States once it begins coordination on TIP policy.

Southeast Asia: Any member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations once it begins coordination on TIP policy.

South Asia: Any member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation once it begins coordination on TIP policy.

APPENDIX C: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR CHAPTER 3

To test the robustness of the results in chapter 3, I applied five tests: (1) using a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors by ten political-cultural regions rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) dropping the US policy recommendation variable from the four models that included it, (3) substituting regional policy communities in the model for regional density of the dependent variable, (4) substituting control variables for women's participation in civil society and freedom of expression for women's political power and government accountability, respectively, and (5) adding control variables for major war and total population (natural log) to the models. These results are shown on the tables that follow.

Table AC-3-1. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 1: Adjust Standard Errors by Cultural Regions

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none)						
Low (< 0.25)	1.674 ***0.006	1.134 0.217	2.561 ***0.000	1.474 ***0.000	0.457 **0.043	0.167 0.129
Middling (0.25 – 0.50)	1.133 0.860	0.890 0.520	5.042 ***0.000	1.867 *0.059	0.342 0.163	
High (0.50 – 0.75)	0.185 *0.072	0.803 0.471	2.307 **0.065	1.226 0.639	0.582 0.371	*Collinear (-)*
Very High (0.75 – 0.95)	0.558 *0.099	0.872 0.645	1.836 *0.095	1.838 ***0.000	0.400 0.184	
Highest (> 0.95)	0.999 0.998	1.059 0.908	1.250 0.876	2.521 **0.026	0.593 0.525	
Sanctioned, current or previous year	*Collinear (-)*	0.536 0.214	0.490 0.664	*Collinear (-)*	0.762 0.832	*Collinear (-)*
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.452 0.152	1.282 0.228	1.123 0.453	0.934 0.347	1.432 0.382	1.068 0.908
US recommended policy	1.924 ***0.000	1.437 ***0.000	1.115 0.616		1.651 ***0.000	
Regional density of policy	8.710 ***0.000	3.648 ***0.008	9.424 ***0.000	1.229 0.601	† $7.87x10^{11}$ ***0.000	
European RPC						7.591 **0.018
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe						8.748 *0.080
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	1.014 *0.076	1.003 0.350	0.986 ***0.000	0.996 0.115	0.995 0.645	0.972 **0.048
Protocol accession	1.813 ***0.000	1.055 0.627				
Criminalization extant			2.082 ***0.001			
Institutionalization extant		1.112 **0.046		3.370 ***0.000		
NAP extant				24.517 ***0.000	3.083 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.279 ***0.001		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.901 0.474	0.933 **0.045	1.257 0.741	1.541 **0.038	0.484 *0.083	0.774 0.851
Women's political empowerment	3.490 0.265	1.886 **0.011	1.673 0.415	1.155 0.691	0.571 0.574	0.920 0.960
Government accountability	1.165 *0.094	1.056 0.377	1.841 ***0.000	1.156 *0.065	1.185 0.602	1.620 *0.076
X Government accountability					0.615 **0.018	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.543 ***0.000	0.859 0.220	0.598 0.107	1.152 *0.098	1.326 0.112	
Human rights violations of victims	0.591 0.248	0.717 **0.042	0.312 *0.088	0.549 **0.021	0.732 0.730	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	0.989 0.973	1.217 *0.084	1.033 0.868	0.889 0.326	1.464 **0.042	
GDP per capita, in thousands						1.012 ***0.000
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	0.962 0.811	0.664 ***0.002	2.813 **0.022	0.996 0.981	0.361 ***0.005	
Lower middle income	1.525 *0.062	0.692 ***0.000	1.871 0.267	0.853 0.390	0.824 0.655	
Upper middle income	0.627 **0.012	0.790 0.258	1.049 0.857	1.012 0.938	0.751 0.508	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	160
Observations	1,347	2,829	1,002	2,899	2,463	2,777
Number of failures	146	648	153	396	87	42

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 10 political-culturally defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.15t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-3-2. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 2: Drop US Recommendation from Models

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none)				
Low (< 0.25)	2.293 ***0.000	1.138 **0.045	3.073 ***0.000	0.500 **0.045
Middling (0.25 – 0.50)	1.432 0.431	0.887 0.645	5.525 ***0.000	0.448 0.229
High (0.50 – 0.75)	0.246 0.182	0.804 0.521	2.760 0.134	0.687 0.596
Very High (0.75 – 0.95)	0.810 0.694	0.865 0.611	1.965 0.258	0.378 0.331
Highest (> 0.95)	1.241 0.829	0.984 0.959	1.347 0.812	0.628 0.619
Sanctioned, current or previous year	*Collinear (-)*	0.524 0.131	0.489 0.634	0.837 0.843
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.101 0.614	1.304 **0.048	0.950 0.797	1.288 0.356
Regional density of policy	20.016 ***0.000	2.017 **0.014	27.549 ***0.000	† 1.18×10^{20} ***0.000
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	0.999 0.910	1.003 **0.047	0.981 ***0.003	0.981 **0.040
Protocol accession	1.921 ***0.001	1.092 0.443		
Criminalization extant			2.269 ***0.000	
Institutionalization extant		1.094 0.303		
NAP extant				2.930 ***0.000
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.864 0.217	0.941 0.149	1.180 0.713	0.501 0.339
Women's political empowerment	5.977 ***0.005	2.447 ***0.002	2.919 0.175	0.686 0.745
Government accountability	0.984 0.910	0.982 0.768	1.615 ***0.001	1.079 0.785
X Government accountability				0.701 *0.065
Significant domestic trafficking	0.726 0.258	0.872 0.282	0.732 0.215	1.417 0.169
Human rights violations of victims	0.822 0.604	0.748 0.201	0.352 0.198	0.919 0.913
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.133 0.618	1.262 *0.069	0.913 0.629	1.610 *0.060
World Bank income classification (base = high income)				
Low income	0.865 0.642	0.624 **0.022	2.812 ***0.007	0.562 0.307
Lower middle income	1.525 0.160	0.695 **0.030	1.687 0.178	1.353 0.486
Upper middle income	0.608 *0.078	0.786 0.199	1.146 0.528	1.086 0.828
Subjects	165	171	166	171
Observations	1,347	2,829	1,000	2,463
Number of failures	146	648	153	87

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.15t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-3-3. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 3: Include All Regional Policy Communities

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none)						
Low (< 0.25)	1.796 ***0.000	1.158 **0.027	2.504 ***0.001	1.467 ***0.000	0.410 ***0.005	0.286 0.260
Middling (0.25 – 0.50)	1.287 0.603	1.007 0.978	4.309 ***0.003	1.863 **0.028	0.310 *0.069	*Collinear (-)*
High (0.50 – 0.75)	0.185 0.110	0.851 0.643	1.868 0.260	1.068 0.869	0.431 0.269	
Very High (0.75 – 0.95)	0.563 0.304	0.893 0.692	1.607 0.369	1.696 **0.010	0.291 0.120	
Highest (> 0.95)	1.034 0.974	1.049 0.889	0.845 0.899	2.595 **0.029	0.579 0.523	
Sanctioned, current or previous year	*Collinear (-)*	0.514 0.140	0.580 0.709	*Collinear (-)*	0.609 0.628	*Collinear (-)*
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.316 0.262	1.258 *0.068	1.193 0.401	0.897 **0.043	1.436 0.211	0.891 0.318
US recommended policy	1.867 ***0.004	1.439 ***0.000	1.115 0.705		1.624 ***0.008	
RPC for TIP, member						
Africa	0.708 0.261	0.706 *0.062	0.861 0.678	1.755 ***0.000	1.210 0.646	0.177 0.147
Americas	1.141 0.528	0.713 **0.011	1.219 0.518	1.480 **0.021	1.254 0.512	1.115 0.857
Europe	2.401 **0.013	1.481 ***0.000	1.282 0.271	1.784 ***0.000	2.437 **0.010	7.022 ***0.001
Middle East & North Africa	0.993 0.981	1.195 0.215	1.159 0.594	0.687 **0.031	0.837 0.539	*Collinear (-)*
North America	1.345 0.747	2.639 ***0.000		1.137 0.656		10.868 ***0.000
Former USSR	1.237 0.662	1.012 0.955	*Collinear (-)*	1.128 0.595	1.920 0.273	0.540 0.314
South Asia	0.672 *0.079	0.936 0.679	1.177 0.609	1.185 0.198	0.349 ***0.003	0.742 0.654
Southeast Asia	1.641 0.156	1.057 0.650	0.714 0.259	1.078 0.505	1.218 0.524	*Collinear (-)*
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe						5.042 0.167
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	1.015 0.143	1.001 0.665	0.992 **0.049	0.994 **0.038	0.994 0.614	0.966 ***0.002
Protocol accession	1.939 ***0.000	1.172 0.165				
Criminalization extant			2.313 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.102 0.265		3.484 ***0.000		
NAP extant				26.186 ***0.000	3.522 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.272 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.900 0.350	0.932 0.123	1.570 0.355	1.383 0.346	0.468 0.303	1.022 0.987
Women's political empowerment	4.426 **0.013	2.710 ***0.000	3.120 0.147	0.661 0.283	0.273 0.352	0.723 0.915
Government accountability	1.084 0.625	1.030 0.677	1.533 ***0.002	1.074 0.585	1.241 0.537	1.233 0.489
X Government accountability					0.600 ***0.002	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.581 **0.042	0.891 0.276	0.634 *0.083	1.142 0.215	1.629 **0.043	
Human rights violations of victims	0.576 0.169	0.718 0.157	0.341 0.115	0.544 **0.048	0.755 0.713	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.012 0.970	1.282 *0.076	1.049 0.796	0.795 *0.086	1.298 0.320	
GDP per capital, in thousands						1.014 **0.010
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	1.223 0.535	0.834 0.270	2.415 ***0.009	0.885 0.677	0.320 0.105	
Lower middle income	1.740 **0.050	0.828 0.203	1.598 0.231	0.813 0.476	0.813 0.703	
Upper middle income	0.682 0.118	0.936 0.705	1.095 0.657	0.975 0.909	0.774 0.586	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	160
Observations	1,347	2,829	1,000	2,899	2,463	2,777
Number of failures	146	648	153	396	87	42

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others.

Table AC-3-4. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 4: Substitute Women's Civil Society Participation and Free Expression for Women's Political Empowerment and Government Accountability, Respectively

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none)						
Low (< 0.25)	1.963 ***0.000	1.101 0.125	3.062 ***0.000	1.443 ***0.000	0.507 **0.038	0.164 0.118
Middling (0.25 – 0.50)	1.238 0.646	0.890 0.659	5.297 ***0.000	1.985 **0.015	0.420 0.187	*Collinear (-)*
High (0.50 – 0.75)	0.201 0.121	0.848 0.565	2.535 0.155	1.202 0.646	0.666 0.550	
Very High (0.75 – 0.95)	0.753 0.590	0.966 0.888	2.594 *0.078	1.782 ***0.008	0.381 0.330	
Highest (> 0.95)	0.935 0.946	0.994 0.984	1.313 0.836	2.415 **0.019	0.467 0.395	
Sanctioned, current or previous year	*Collinear (-)*	0.559 0.187	0.480 0.630	*Collinear (-)*	0.878 0.885	*Collinear (-)*
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.125 0.526	1.288 **0.050	0.968 0.864	0.955 0.481	1.345 0.336	1.056 0.877
US recommended policy	1.757 **0.013	1.381 ***0.000	0.871 0.650		1.522 *0.072	
Regional density of policy†	24.248 ***0.000	2.299 ***0.006	28.304 ***0.000	1.016 0.957	† $3.73x10^{19}$ ***0.000	
European RPC						7.611 ***0.000
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe						8.694 *0.087
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	1.000 0.975	1.003 **0.024	0.981 ***0.001	0.997 0.260	0.983 **0.047	0.973 ***0.009
Protocol accession	1.876 ***0.001	1.092 0.438				
Criminalization extant			2.121 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.116 0.240		3.263 ***0.000		
NAP extant				24.011 ***0.000	3.037 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.289 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.891 0.280	0.937 0.173	1.086 0.817	1.518 0.198	0.704 0.679	0.548 0.553
Women's participation in civil society	1.254 **0.022	1.111 **0.013	1.411 ***0.009	1.092 0.165	0.875 0.574	0.952 0.883
Freedom of expression	1.210 0.602	1.227 0.191	3.991 ***0.006	1.403 0.188	0.826 0.777	3.088 0.103
Significant domestic trafficking	0.686 0.138	0.848 0.182	0.699 0.133	1.137 0.222	1.424 0.210	
Human rights violations of victims	0.845 0.669	0.730 0.147	0.387 0.242	0.559 *0.057	1.424 0.210	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.182 0.525	1.288 **0.027	0.889 0.519	0.864 0.281	0.907 0.902	
GDP per capita, in thousands						1.012 **0.049
World Bank income classification (base = high)						
Low income	0.816 0.549	0.595 **0.012	2.538 **0.013	0.950 0.842	0.714 0.516	
Lower middle income	1.657 0.125	0.685 **0.027	1.718 0.158	0.832 0.495	1.614 0.277	
Upper middle income	0.678 0.167	0.794 0.187	1.137 0.602	0.996 0.982	1.259 0.482	
Subjects	166	171	168	172	171	160
Observations	1,359	2,850	1,011	2,920	2,478	2,810
Number of failures	147	654	155	400	87	42

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.15t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-3-5. Chapter 3 Robustness Check 5: Add Major War and Total Population

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none)						
Low (< 0.25)	2.105 ***0.000	1.110 *0.088	3.170 ***0.000	1.391 ***0.001	0.505 **0.037	0.167 0.112
Middling (0.25 – 0.50)	1.650 0.275	0.893 0.622	6.079 ***0.000	1.828 **0.029	0.445 0.219	*Collinear (-)*
High (0.50 – 0.75)	*Collinear (-)*	0.843 0.638	2.304 0.265	0.776 0.666	1.024 0.972	
Very High (0.75 – 0.95)	0.802 0.722	0.906 0.756	2.411 0.156	1.797 ***0.006	0.434 0.415	
Highest (> 0.95)	0.986 0.989	0.956 0.898	1.882 0.623	2.529 **0.012	0.699 0.703	
Sanctioned, current or previous year	*Collinear (-)*	0.730 0.898	0.581 0.733	*Collinear (-)*	0.961 0.966	*Collinear (-)*
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.120 0.519	1.311 **0.034	0.914 0.662	0.962 0.611	1.237 0.456	1.060 0.873
US recommended policy	1.732 **0.022	1.368 ***0.000	0.800 0.387		1.437 0.123	
Regional density of policy	28.590 ***0.000	2.455 ***0.004	30.483 ***0.000	0.884 0.692	$5.59x10^{19}$ ***0.000	
European RPC						8.099 ***0.000
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe						9.055 *0.079
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	1.000 0.949	1.004 **0.020	0.979 ***0.000	1.001 0.792	0.985 *0.076	0.969 **0.012
Protocol accession	1.888 ***0.001	1.110 0.346				
Criminalization extant			2.467 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant				3.125 ***0.000		
NAP extant				23.388 ***0.000	3.075 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.314 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.866 0.214	0.928 0.112	1.086 0.861	1.579 0.142	0.374 0.242	0.737 0.770
Women's political empowerment	3.723 *0.078	2.359 ***0.004	3.063 0.154	1.156 0.704	0.332 0.470	0.700 0.887
Government accountability	1.022 0.890	1.013 0.853	1.643 ***0.002	1.172 **0.049	1.069 0.820	1.617 0.120
X Government accountability					0.755 0.181	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.712 0.219	0.846 0.199	0.694 0.138	1.180 *0.091	1.492 0.112	
Human rights violations of victims	0.715 0.564	0.811 0.292	0.571 0.555	0.626 0.136	0.527 0.538	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.078 0.789	1.197 0.116	0.928 0.677	0.848 0.251	1.486 0.117	
Major war	0.624 0.466	0.876 0.571	0.610 0.186	0.749 0.461	1.290 0.774	*Collinear (-)*
Total population, natural log	1.018 0.787	0.980 0.403	1.071 0.255	0.917 ***0.000	0.997 0.963	1.060 0.546
GDP per capita, in thousands						1.012 **0.033
World Bank income classification (base = high)						
Low income	0.870 0.698	0.668 *0.055	3.214 ***0.001	1.067 0.809	0.689 0.555	
Lower middle income	1.577 0.200	0.718 *0.066	1.835 0.132	0.910 0.744	1.562 0.367	
Upper middle income	0.670 0.175	0.807 0.216	1.250 0.311	1.032 0.873	1.185 0.689	
Subjects	157	163	158	164	163	160
Observations	1,251	2,702	921	2,759	2,344	2,777
Number of failures	142	631	149	386	84	42

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.15t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Robustness Checks for Chapter 4

To test the robustness of the results in chapter 4, I applied three tests: (1) using a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors by ten political-cultural regions rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) substituting the sanction credibility measure I developed in chapter 3 for low TIP scores, and (3) interacting the measure for reputational pressure with freedom of expression, which was substituted for government accountability. These results are shown in the tables that follow.

Table AC-4-1. Chapter 4 Robustness Check 1: Adjust Standard Errors by Cultural Regions

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Scored in US TIP report, current or previous year	2.432 *0.065	1.406 *0.070	2.824 **0.026	1.265 0.709		
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.278 0.314	1.258 0.277	1.023 0.905	0.918 0.256	1.329 0.502	1.108 0.862
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.864 ***0.000	1.442 ***0.000	1.038 0.837		1.567 ***0.001	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.455 **0.028	1.071 0.452	2.225 ***0.001	1.520 ***0.000	0.505 0.108	0.120 *0.072
Regional density of policy	9.809 ***0.000	3.622 **0.013	† 378.867 ***0.000	1.234 0.585	‡ $6.04x10^{48}$ ***0.000	
European Regional Policy Community member						6.688 **0.028
Low TIP score X RPC Europe						11.401 *0.051
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	1.012 0.108	1.003 0.397	0.984 ***0.000	0.996 *0.067	0.995 0.639	0.972 **0.033
Protocol accession	1.863 ***0.000	1.055 0.630				
Criminalization extant			2.008 ***0.002			
Institutionalization extant		1.128 **0.017		3.379 ***0.000		
NAP extant				24.827 ***0.000	2.890 ***0.001	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.274 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.919 0.496	0.928 **0.050	1.337 0.639	1.608 **0.032	0.547 0.189	0.777 0.866
Women's political empowerment	2.830 0.158	1.759 **0.043	1.094 0.898	1.204 0.580	0.597 0.613	0.265 0.419
Government accountability	1.293 *0.097	1.090 0.137	1.870 ***0.000	1.157 **0.024	1.167 0.560	2.039 ***0.006
X Government accountability					0.640 **0.014	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.532 ***0.000	0.850 0.193	0.619 0.122	1.163 *0.067	1.391 **0.041	1.013 0.952
Human rights violations of victims	0.369 0.119	0.656 **0.015	0.238 **0.030	0.558 **0.014	0.754 0.718	1.650 0.242
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	0.954 0.871	1.218 *0.095	1.021 0.925	0.869 0.215	1.453 *0.071	
GDP per capita						1.012 ***0.000
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	1.070 0.756	0.665 ***0.002	2.518 **0.039	0.978 0.883	0.322 ***0.002	
Lower middle income	1.638 **0.023	0.693 ***0.001	1.723 0.319	0.840 0.387	0.742 0.470	
Upper middle income	0.611 ***0.005	0.787 0.254	0.877 0.636	0.996 0.982	0.677 0.365	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	157
Observations	1,349	2,828	1,002	2,898	2,461	2,321
Number of failures	146	648	154	396	87	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 10 political-culturally defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.25t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-4-2. Chapter 4 Robustness Check 2: Substitute Sanction Credibility for Low TIP Score

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Scored in US TIP report, current or previous year	2.636 0.207	1.403 0.121	2.621 **0.024	1.273 0.756		
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	1.058 0.777	1.266 *0.081	0.859 0.425	0.943 0.352	1.397 0.242	1.112 0.782
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.676 **0.019	1.382 ***0.000	0.815 0.448		1.571 **0.042	
Sanction credibility, highest of current or previous year (base = none)						
Low (< 0.25)	1.943 ***0.000	1.114 *0.089	2.763 ***0.000	1.442 ***0.000	0.422 **0.010	0.148 *0.086
Middling (0.25 – 0.50)	1.242 0.644	0.903 0.682	4.952 ***0.000	1.829 **0.019	0.372 0.127	*Collinear (-)*
High (0.50 – 0.75)	0.196 0.117	0.775 0.430	2.436 0.192	1.196 0.657	0.628 0.521	*Collinear (-)*
Very High (0.75 – 0.95)	0.679 0.485	0.873 0.641	1.742 0.371	1.767 ***0.006	0.382 0.296	*Collinear (-)*
Highest (> 0.95)	0.872 0.894	0.970 0.926	1.257 0.856	2.462 **0.022	0.605 0.580	*Collinear (-)*
Sanctioned in current or previous year	*Collinear (-)*	0.543 0.159	0.477 0.618	*Collinear (-)*	0.798 0.812	*Collinear (-)*
Regional density of policy	23.661 ***0.000	2.235 ***0.008	† 4205.489 ***0.000	1.002 0.994	‡ 9.80×10^{59} ***0.000	
European Regional Policy Community member						6.583 ***0.000
Low sanction credibility X RPC Europe						10.218 *0.056
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	0.999 0.914	1.003 *0.060	0.979 ***0.002	0.997 0.314	0.986 0.171	0.972 **0.012
Protocol accession	1.872 ***0.000	1.094 0.419				
Criminalization extant			2.326 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.091 0.360		3.308 ***0.000		
NAP extant				24.754 ***0.000	2.962 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.285 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.868 0.210	0.927 *0.076	1.275 0.566	1.544 0.187	0.450 0.289	0.677 0.681
Women's political empowerment	4.667 ***0.005	2.679 ***0.001	2.501 0.280	1.246 0.591	0.786 0.841	0.482 0.778
Government accountability	0.959 0.777	0.988 0.866	1.613 ***0.000	1.137 0.118	1.056 0.855	1.672 *0.066
X Government accountability					0.694 *0.053	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.725 0.249	0.867 0.252	0.811 0.399	1.157 0.187	1.459 0.118	0.991 0.984
Human rights violations of victims	0.855 0.679	0.764 0.222	0.342 0.176	0.565 *0.054	0.882 0.871	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.034 0.902	1.232 0.100	0.812 0.300	0.889 0.420	1.534 0.106	1.608 0.488
GDP per capita						1.011 **0.044
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	0.803 0.510	0.603 **0.014	2.550 ***0.007	0.980 0.944	0.387 *0.094	
Lower middle income	1.554 0.189	0.679 **0.023	1.515 0.276	0.850 0.581	1.024 0.958	
Upper middle income	0.637 0.116	0.767 0.138	1.014 0.950	1.021 0.918	0.885 0.748	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	157
Observations	1,347	2,826	1,000	2,896	2,461	2,320
Number of failures	146	647	153	396	87	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.25t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-4-3. Chapter 4 Robustness Check 3: Interact Neighbor with Better Score with Freedom of Expression

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Scored in US TIP report, current or previous year	2.492 0.261	1.350 0.174	2.614 **0.030	1.256 0.765		
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year	0.801 0.763	1.522 0.263	0.352 **0.032	0.926 0.780	0.330 *0.058	0.875 0.945
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.642 **0.016	1.404 ***0.000	0.803 0.410		1.572 **0.045	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.769 **0.001	1.046 0.524	2.914 ***0.000	1.494 ***0.000	0.622 0.207	0.123 *0.073
Regional density of policy	24.081 ***0.000	2.272 ***0.007	† 4421.326 ***0.000	1.049 0.870	‡ $1.06x10^{61}$ ***0.000	
European Regional Policy Community member						6.104 ***0.000
Low TIP score X RPC Europe						10.694 *0.055
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	1.000 0.981	1.003 *0.096	0.981 ***0.004	0.997 0.221	0.991 0.305	0.973 **0.014
Protocol accession	1.919 ***0.000	1.094 0.422				
Criminalization extant			2.230 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.127 0.210		3.384 ***0.000		
NAP extant				25.607 ***0.000	3.017 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.272 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.899 0.333	0.920 *0.052	0.953 0.898	1.521 0.157	0.661 0.599	0.596 0.611
Women's political empowerment	3.727 **0.012	2.468 ***0.000	1.699 0.558	1.292 0.483	0.731 0.818	0.519 0.767
Freedom of Expression	1.197 0.754	1.286 0.363	2.456 0.128	1.443 0.210	0.304 0.239	4.792 0.198
X Neighbor had better score	**1.316** **0.747**	**0.786** **0.526**	**3.210** ***0.057**	**1.000** **1.000**	**5.847** ****0.002**[2]	**1.317** **0.889**
Significant domestic trafficking	0.679 0.175	0.851 0.189	0.850 0.525	1.166 0.166	1.450 0.195	0.932 0.871
Human rights violations of victims	0.629 0.296	0.696 0.115	0.336 *0.073	0.579 *0.057	0.979 0.975	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.051 0.849	1.256 *0.076	0.894 0.604	0.876 0.333	1.400 0.210	
GDP per capita						1.013 ***0.006
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	0.909 0.774	0.608 **0.013	2.083 *0.075	0.956 0.875	0.473 0.153	
Lower middle income	1.638 0.132	0.681 **0.019	1.426 0.379	0.831 0.548	1.287 0.575	
Upper middle income	0.591 *0.074	0.766 0.130	0.923 0.740	0.998 0.993	1.098 0.772	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	157
Observations	1,349	2,828	1,002	2,898	2,461	2,321
Number of failures	146	648	154	396	87	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. [2] See Figure AC-4-3 for a graphical interpretation of the interaction. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.25t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Figure AC-4-3. NRM: Reputation and Freedom of Expression Interaction



Robustness Checks for Chapter 5

To test the robustness of the results in chapter 5, I applied four tests: (1) using a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors by ten political-cultural regions rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) interacting the number of memberships in regional organizations with the primary regional policy community, (3) interacting CSO cooperation with the primary regional policy community, and (4) including additional variables which might explain participation in inter-regional organizations coordinating migration policy. These results are shown in the tables that follow.

Table AC-5-1. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 1: Adjust Standard Errors by Cultural Regions

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
African RPC	1.530 0.175	0.944 0.722	1.306 0.401	2.522 ***0.000	3.792 **0.014	0.131 0.114
American RPC	1.171 0.512	0.746 *0.058	1.039 0.874	1.767 ***0.001	1.790 0.139	0.876 0.913
European RPC	1.145 0.576	0.994 0.962	0.871 0.588	1.467 ***0.000	2.866 **0.018	4.453 *0.078
Middle East/North African RPC	0.945 0.855	1.255 0.231	1.212 0.654	0.704 ***0.002	0.843 0.640	*Collinear (-)*
North American RPC	0.815 0.829	2.138 **0.040		1.075 0.749		
Former USSR RPC	0.884 0.754	0.998 0.989	*Collinear (-)*	1.087 0.535	1.841 0.299	0.385 **0.026
South Asian RPC	1.139 0.526	1.157 0.488	0.940 0.810	1.162 0.331	0.467 0.145	0.628 0.533
Southeast Asian RPC	1.222 0.489	0.955 0.819	0.572 ***0.004	1.064 0.559	1.963 *0.057	*Collinear (-)*
Regional density of policy	7.152 ***0.000	2.637 **0.016	31.089 **0.010	1.560 0.120	‡$7.68x10^{24}$ ***0.004	‡$6.24x10^{27}$ ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.821 ***0.001	1.211 0.159	0.851 0.614	1.370 **0.044	2.010 **0.012	0.610 0.282
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.797 **0.020	1.141 0.279	0.753 0.366	1.128 0.410	1.145 0.720	0.277 **0.038
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation	0.784 0.224	0.962 0.501	0.837 0.138	0.969 0.533	0.696 0.159	0.997 0.989
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	2.016 **0.010	1.130 0.125	1.070 0.507	1.112 *0.082	1.021 0.949	0.671 0.454
Scored in US TIP report			2.854 **0.035			
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year		†2.831 0.102		0.885 *0.062		
US recommended policy, current or previous year	2.189 ***0.000	1.472 ***0.000			1.512 **0.047	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.830 ***0.000	1.069 0.542	2.260 ***0.002	1.553 ***0.000	0.624 0.100	0.178 0.123
X RPC Europe						7.632 *0.084
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	1.014 0.255	1.000 0.963	0.990 ***0.000	0.992 ***0.003	0.991 0.418	0.975 **0.020
Protocol accession	1.923 ***0.000	1.126 0.295				
Criminalization extant			2.260 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.090 0.117		3.476 ***0.000		
NAP extant				25.172 ***0.000	2.776 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.270 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.916 0.519	0.937 *0.092	1.340 0.658	1.322 0.183	0.449 0.288	0.682 0.789
Women's political empowerment	3.081 0.329	2.253 ***0.001	1.242 0.728	0.617 **0.022	0.165 0.225	0.075 0.254
Government accountability	1.268 0.156	1.103 0.103	1.751 ***0.002	1.099 0.363	1.371 0.387	1.401 0.351
X Government accountability					0.632 **0.010	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.505 ***0.000	0.848 0.117	0.606 0.136	1.050 0.647	1.281 0.384	1.121 0.402
Human rights violations of victims	0.338 *0.090	0.653 **0.025	0.222 **0.042	0.533 ***0.004	0.708 0.605	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	0.970 0.919	†2.337 ***0.000	1.015 0.951	0.791 **0.031	1.336 0.310	2.873 **0.011
GDP per capita						1.006 0.281
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	1.257 0.272	0.782 0.141	1.935 0.158↑	0.803 *0.090	0.221 **0.046	
Lower middle income	1.785 ***0.007	0.767 *0.053	1.460 0.510	0.739 0.114	0.481 0.239	
Upper middle income	0.690 *0.069	0.900 0.616	0.735 0.365	0.898 0.499	0.518 0.247	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	157
Observations	1,349	2,828	1,002	2,898	2,461	2,321
Number of failures	146	648	154	396	87	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 10 political-culturally defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.20t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-5-2. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 2: Interact Memberships with Regional Organizations with Primary Regional Policy Community

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
African Primary RPC	2.775 ***0.006	0.846 0.664	1.461 0.331	1.531 0.284	1.404 0.786	0.024 **0.013
X Number of memberships in regional organizations	0.379 **0.030	0.805 0.540	0.332 ***0.002	1.350 *0.085	2.036 0.383	0.475 0.151
American Primary RPC	0.242 0.250	0.414 ***0.002	0.346 **0.016	2.327 0.257	*Collinear (+)*	0.003 ***0.003
X Number of memberships in regional organizations	1.103 0.923	1.471 0.161	*Omitted*	0.830 0.746	$3.35x10^{-9}$ ***0.000	34.751 ***0.000
European Primary RPC	0.794 0.644	1.448 **0.034	1.964 0.150	2.099 ***0.000	3.049 0.100↑	11.052 **0.028
X Number of memberships in regional organizations	0.449 *0.055	0.723 0.240	0.290 ***0.004	0.962 0.786	0.964 0.958	0.320 ***0.007
Middle East/North African Primary RPC	0.264 **0.037	1.234 0.527	1.526 0.478	0.256 ***0.008	0.603 0.601	*Collinear*
X Number of memberships in regional organizations	1.357 0.564	0.803 0.567	0.370 ***0.005	2.778 ***0.003	2.191 0.333	*Collinear*
Former USSR Primary RPC	0.237 *0.086	4.484 ***0.000	*Collinear (-)*	4.774 ***0.000	0.039 0.190	*Collinear*
X Number of memberships in regional organizations	*Omitted*	0.412 ***0.006	0.169 0.260	0.631 **0.018	4.719 0.141	*Collinear*
South Asian Primary RPC	0.505 **0.014	0.867 0.632	0.458 *0.053	1.390 ***0.003	0.882 0.874	0.170 ***0.004
X Number of memberships in regional organizations	*Omitted*	*Omitted*	*Omitted*	*Omitted*	*Omitted*	*Omitted*
Southeast Asian Primary RPC	0.824 0.661	0.932 0.714	0.732 0.606	0.633 **0.040	0.836 0.809	*Collinear*
X Number of memberships in regional organizations	0.446 **0.014	0.849 0.548	0.368 ***0.002	1.600 ***0.002	1.878 0.477	*Collinear*
Regional density of policy	56.506 ***0.000	1.674 *0.079	†5155.392 ***0.000	1.251 0.404	‡$7.49x10^{37}$ ***0.000	‡$9.24x10^{20}$ ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.722 *0.063	1.179 0.344	0.748 0.192	1.295 **0.045	1.912 **0.034	0.354 0.280
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.608 *0.084	1.149 0.404	0.785 0.378	1.076 0.639	1.173 0.639	0.157 **0.045
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	1.982 **0.030	1.228 0.465	2.328 ***0.006	0.933 0.591	0.771 0.686	2.137 0.118

Table AC-5-2. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 2: Interact Memberships in Regional Organizations with Primary Regional Policy Community, continued

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Scored in US TIP report			2.469 **0.035			
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year		†2.453 **0.023		0.877 **0.020		
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.849 **0.022	1.465 ***0.000			1.400 0.240	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.970 ***0.001	1.125 0.110	2.248 ***0.000	1.531 ***0.000	0.592 *0.055	0.805 0.617
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	0.998 0.914	1.000 0.883	0.981 **0.015	0.993 0.128	0.990 0.561	0.953 ***0.007
Protocol accession	2.013 ***0.001	1.173 0.166				
Criminalization extant			2.791 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.066 0.500		3.437 ***0.000		
NAP extant				25.936 ***0.000	2.726 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.266 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.875 0.259	0.940 0.197	†2.855 0.153	1.289 0.432	0.363 0.266	0.893 0.944
Women's political empowerment	5.487 ***0.008	2.892 ***0.001	3.918 0.213	0.621 0.149	0.325 0.520	0.415 0.738
Government accountability	1.224 0.223	1.075 0.397	1.607 ***0.004	1.110 0.405	0.987 0.970	1.578 0.221
X Government accountability					0.799 0.224	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.631 *0.089	0.874 0.187	0.946 0.853	1.056 0.634	1.467 0.141	0.444 **0.011
Human rights violations of victims	0.625 0.292	0.672 *0.071	0.298 0.112	0.533 **0.045	0.870 0.860	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.191 0.527	†2.339 **0.015	0.904 0.627	0.799 *0.083	1.615 *0.085	1.431 0.682
GDP per capita						1.005 0.598
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	0.842 0.541	0.782 0.174	1.459 0.374	0.767 0.316	0.238 *0.076	
Lower middle income	1.671 0.108	0.767 *0.080	1.017 0.965	0.715 0.268	0.648 0.508	
Upper middle income	0.632 *0.087	0.878 0.442	0.649 **0.042	0.874 0.550	0.603 0.419	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	157
Observations	1,349	2,828	1,002	2,898	2,461	2,321
Number of failures	146	648	154	396	87	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.20t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-5-3. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 3: Interact CSO Cooperation with Primary Regional Policy Community

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
African Primary RPC	2.214 0.159	1.995 *0.083	2.143 0.296	2.782 ***0.000	4.422 **0.013	0.180 0.258
X CSO cooperation	0.658 0.463	0.360 ***0.005	0.337 0.159	0.712 0.421	0.669 0.626	*Collinear*
American Primary RPC	0.449 0.357	0.869 0.404	1.826 0.340	2.925 **0.017	3.254 *0.060	*Collinear*
X CSO cooperation	1.422 0.644	0.833 0.528	0.333 0.131	0.787 0.503	0.506 0.246	0.793 0.802
European Primary RPC	0.642 0.507	1.878 **0.028	1.500 0.502	2.043 *0.094	1.182 0.811	*Collinear (+)*
X CSO cooperation	0.954 0.947	0.502 *0.057	0.478 0.352	0.799 0.628	2.265 0.184	*Collinear (-)*
Middle East/North African Primary RPC	0.434 0.150	1.475 0.111	1.795 0.444	1.401 0.392	1.124 0.881	*Collinear (-)*
X CSO cooperation	4.664 ***0.003	0.855 0.653	0.515 0.441	0.800 0.576	1.330 0.798	*Collinear (-)*
Former USSR Primary RPC	1.002 0.997	1.838 0.198	*Collinear (-)*	2.229 **0.012	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*
X CSO cooperation	*Collinear (-)*	0.402 *0.066	0.529 0.349	0.649 0.161	*Collinear (+)*	*Collinear (-)*
South Asian Primary RPC	0.470 *0.070	1.256 0.267	1.112 0.891	2.391 ***0.000	1.044 0.959	0.220 **0.002
X CSO cooperation	2.407 0.116	0.735 0.300	0.751 0.707	0.375 ***0.000	0.341 *0.070	*Collinear*
Southeast Asian Primary RPC	1.520 0.354	1.430 *0.076	2.185 0.253	1.641 0.186	*Collinear (-)*	*Collinear (-)*
X CSO cooperation	0.398 0.108	0.586 *0.063	0.175 **0.012	0.621 0.242	*Collinear (+)*	*Collinear (-)*
Regional density of policy	36.175 ***0.000	1.752 *0.065	†4552.498 ***0.005	1.056 0.828	‡$2.27x10^{40}$ ***0.000	‡$5.53x10^{24}$ ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.909 **0.039	1.275 0.166	0.846 0.411	1.316 **0.020	1.811 *0.065	0.684 0.620
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.798 **0.048	1.233 0.192	0.833 0.555	1.067 0.612	1.030 0.945	0.327 0.208
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation	0.691 *0.067	0.976 0.725	0.739 *0.054	0.994 0.942	0.855 0.580	0.942 0.853
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	1.965 **0.016	1.091 0.214	1.129 **0.012	1.035 0.727	0.879 0.686	0.849 0.768

Table AC-5-3. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 3: Interact CSO Cooperation with Primary Regional Policy Community, continued

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Scored in US TIP report			2.305 **0.048			
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year		†2.592 **0.012		0.896 **0.036		
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.862 **0.018	1.431 ***0.000			1.521 0.118	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.873 ***0.006	1.082 0.255	2.228 ***0.000	1.530 ***0.000	0.636 *0.091	0.762 0.496
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	1.001 0.924	1.002 0.414	0.984 **0.028	0.993 **0.026	0.984 0.137	0.964 ***0.009
Protocol accession	1.978 ***0.002	1.138 0.256				
Criminalization extant			2.758 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.090 0.298		3.276 ***0.000		
NAP extant				24.279 ***0.000	2.664 ***0.001	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.280 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.864 0.240	0.942 0.190	†1.963 0.344	1.327 0.372	0.360 0.222	1.265 0.886
Women's political empowerment	5.913 ***0.006	2.828 ***0.001	3.325 0.245	0.818 0.576	0.363 0.460	0.426 0.744
Government accountability	1.147 0.408	1.036 0.632	1.465 **0.027	1.104 0.348	1.058 0.881	1.287 0.541
X Government accountability					0.701 *0.058	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.645 0.120	0.887 0.246	0.902 0.732	1.122 0.342	1.458 0.165	0.550 *0.057
Human rights violations of victims	0.511 0.261	0.670 0.103	0.244 *0.088	0.563 0.157	1.159 0.840	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.025 0.959	1.961 **0.022	1.767 0.420	1.104 0.737	1.512 0.454	*Collinear (+)*
GDP per capita						1.006 0.506
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	0.826 0.502	0.810 0.269	1.780 0.157	0.901 0.715	0.284 *0.097	
Lower middle income	1.471 0.244	0.777 0.134	1.246 0.571	0.824 0.535	0.757 0.682	
Upper middle income	0.576 **0.032	0.899 0.536	0.758 0.238	0.951 0.814	0.685 0.533	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	157
Observations	1,349	2,828	1,002	2,898	2,461	2,321
Number of failures	146	648	154	396	87	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.20t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-5-4 Chapter 5 Robustness Check 4: Include Additional Variables for Explaining Inter-regional Migration Organizations

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
African RPC	2.259 **0.037	0.955 0.822	0.866 0.639	2.321 ***0.000	4.193 ***0.008	0.218 0.211
American RPC	0.811 0.512	0.795 0.171	0.868 0.741	1.620 ***0.008	1.726 0.180	1.394 0.756
European RPC	0.541 **0.019	1.115 0.494	0.798 0.549	1.599 ***0.001	3.204 ***0.003	2.620 0.317
Middle East/North African RPC	1.022 0.941	1.281 *0.072	1.504 0.424	0.678 **0.010	0.650 0.229	*Collinear (-)*
North American RPC	0.268 0.357	2.217 ***0.001		1.247 0.475		
Former USSR RPC	1.065 0.910	0.954 0.790	*Collinear (-)*	1.092 0.716	2.335 0.185	0.961 0.974
South Asian RPC	1.212 0.349	1.040 0.798	1.001 0.998	1.153 0.255	0.547 0.192	0.482 0.246
Southeast Asian RPC	0.641 0.165	1.062 0.677	0.610 0.218	1.085 0.556	1.889 0.123	*Collinear (-)*
Regional density of policy	59.574 ***0.000	1.523 0.178	† 11608.16 ***0.000	1.070 0.790	‡ 6.10×10^{35} ***0.000	‡ 9.03×10^{23} ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	2.133 **0.034	1.288 0.247	0.837 0.491	1.364 **0.015	1.639 0.126	1.694 0.587
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.901 *0.094	1.280 0.111	0.571 0.148	1.194 0.359	1.769 0.158	0.235 *0.068
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with institutionalized cooperation	0.653 **0.037	1.000 0.995	0.774 0.122	0.975 0.762	0.780 0.327	0.777 0.604
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	2.220 ***0.003	1.131 0.119	1.162 0.438	1.079 0.419	0.891 0.735	1.051 0.933
Emigrant-sending county	0.952 0.907	1.058 0.701	0.657 0.281	1.063 0.736	1.831 *0.091	0.354 0.210
Source country	0.791 0.285	1.029 0.815	1.493 0.143	1.124 0.419	0.858 0.682	0.644 0.392
Ratio of trade with advanced economies	1.717 0.400	0.665 0.285	1.075 0.920	0.792 0.561	1.064 0.934	0.314 *0.097
Scored in US TIP report			2.402 *0.053			
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year		† 2.785 **0.011		0.863 **0.014		
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.766 **0.023	1.446 ***0.000			1.466 0.184	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.956 ***0.002	1.082 0.301	2.355 ***0.000	1.570 ***0.000	0.539 **0.020	0.182 0.122
X RPC Europe						9.875 *0.058
Road count to neighbors with policy extant	1.003 0.877	1.000 0.846	0.984 **0.024	0.992 **0.033	0.981 *0.093	0.960 **0.040
Protocol accession	1.988 ***0.001	1.222 *0.099				
Criminalization extant			2.529 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.063 0.473		3.424 ***0.000		
NAP extant				24.766 ***0.000	2.646 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.280 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.902 0.394	0.941 0.212	† 3.314 0.137	1.358 0.337	0.439 0.334	0.760 0.865
Women's political empowerment	5.690 ***0.004	2.610 ***0.007	4.467 0.222	0.635 0.247	0.104 0.155	0.055 0.392
Government accountability	1.091 0.643	1.087 0.294	1.743 ***0.000	1.099 0.441	1.320 0.491	2.372 ***0.004
X Government accountability					0.654 **0.022	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.735 0.243	0.847 0.177	0.807 0.506	1.042 0.678	1.517 0.117	0.629 0.274
Human rights violations of victims	0.600 0.279	0.666 *0.095	0.290 0.128	0.541 *0.052	0.813 0.772	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.196 0.523	† 2.308 **0.022	0.863 0.475	0.782 *0.068	1.515 0.171	1.421 0.647

Table AC-5-4. Chapter 5 Robustness Check 4: Include Additional Variables for Explaining Inter-regional Migration Organizations, continued

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
GDP per capita						1.004 0.687
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	1.046 0.912	0.722 *0.088	1.510 0.413	0.704 0.211	0.218 *0.055	
Lower middle income	1.936 **0.044	0.732 **0.031	1.049 0.916	0.667 0.186	0.598 0.470	
Upper middle income	0.653 0.119	0.896 0.487	0.682 0.202	0.847 0.492	0.567 0.342	
Subjects	163	168	164	169	169	155
Observations	1,321	2,783	975	2,853	2,437	2,296
Number of failures	144	635	152	390	85	40

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.20t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Robustness Checks for Chapter 6

To test the robustness of the results in chapter 6, I applied four tests: (1) using a clustered sandwich estimator to adjust the standard errors by ten political-cultural regions rather than nineteen geographic regions, (2) including road networks, migration partners, and trade partners in the same model, (3) including only reports of increased or diverted trafficking as the only variable of interest, (4) using road counts weighted by UN voting affinity, and (5) excluding all regional control variables. These results are shown in the tables that follow.

Table AC-6-1. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 1: Adjust Standard Errors by Cultural Regions

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases or diversion of transnational TIP	0.646 ***0.008	0.980 0.854	0.796 0.191	1.104 0.417	0.978 0.943	1.126 0.746
Number of roads to neighbors with extant policy	1.011 0.179	1.001 0.679	0.986 ***0.000	0.993 ***0.001	0.995 0.669	0.979 ***0.000
Regional density of policy	† 128.918 ***0.000	† 10.549 **0.014	† 1454.677 ***0.000	‡ 34.682 *0.093	‡ $3.76x10^{26}$ ***0.004	‡ $1.60x10^{35}$ ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.539 ***0.002	1.301 **0.016	0.690 0.160	0.947 0.721	1.191 0.573	1.207 0.664
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.602 **0.050	1.234 **0.028	0.643 **0.097	0.883 0.297	0.820 0.621	0.340 *0.063
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	1.807 ***0.003	1.131 **0.016	0.917 0.589	1.152 ***0.000	0.908 0.636	1.231 0.137
Protocol accession	1.951 ***0.000	1.123 0.296				
Scored in US TIP report			3.022 **0.019			
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year		† 2.228 0.215		0.899 0.163		
US recommended policy, current or previous year	2.185 ***0.000	1.464 ***0.000			1.561 **0.009	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.838 ***0.000	† 1.657 0.194	2.138 ***0.002	1.590 ***0.000	0.641 *0.095	0.672 0.399
Criminalization extant			2.234 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.089 *0.070		3.472 ***0.000		
NAP extant				24.793 ***0.000	2.933 ***0.002	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.267 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.906 0.432	0.941 0.152	1.278 0.697	1.510 *0.083	0.496 0.124	0.792 0.857
Women's political empowerment	4.183 0.168	1.836 **0.012	0.899 0.874	0.900 0.772	0.496 0.478	0.590 0.828
Government accountability	1.283 *0.073	1.085 0.182	1.889 ***0.000	1.184 **0.018	1.217 0.469	1.718 **0.020
X Government accountability					0.641 **0.030	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.510 ***0.000	0.862 0.203	0.594 *0.099	1.132 *0.081	1.336 0.124	1.134 0.485
Human rights violations of victims	0.356 *0.086	0.641 **0.011	0.257 **0.049	0.535 ***0.005	0.715 0.675	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.024 0.935	1.229 *0.091	1.048 0.836	0.823 *0.074	1.481 0.101	2.763 **0.015
GDP per capita (in thousands)						1.006 0.123
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	1.329 0.146	0.730 **0.015	2.154 **0.039	1.064 0.740	0.280 ***0.004	
Lower middle income	1.869 ***0.002	0.707 **0.006	1.602 0.330	0.914 0.677	0.603 0.310	
Upper middle income	0.677 **0.016	0.838 0.375	0.762 0.288	1.066 0.696	0.639 0.372	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	157
Observations	1,349	2,828	1,002	2,898	2,461	2,321
Number of failures	146	648	154	396	87	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 10 political-culturally defined regions. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.20t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-6-2. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 2: Include Both Migration and Trade Partners in the Same Model

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases or diversion of transnational TIP	0.665 0.101	0.984 0.904	0.790 0.397	1.093 0.574	0.919 0.789	1.086 0.838
Number of roads to neighbors with extant policy	1.003 0.836	1.001 0.508	0.989 0.166	0.993 **0.033	0.990 0.368	0.974 **0.030
Ratio of migration partners with extant policy, weighted by shared migrant stock	0.723 0.492	† 2.883 ***0.011	0.892 0.791	† 2.305 0.261	1.145 0.851	0.367 0.350
Ratio of trade partners with extant policy, weighted by total trade	0.262 *0.077	0.410 ***0.002	0.725 0.629	0.673 0.434	0.272 0.325	0.007 **0.010
Regional density of policy	† 3776.502 ***0.000	† 7.315 ***0.007	† 4118.877 ***0.000	† 2.837 0.436	‡ $6.94x10^{36}$ ***0.000	‡ $1.52x10^{28}$ ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.502 **0.020	1.347 **0.027	0.691 *0.091	0.953 0.715	1.138 0.692	1.347 0.585
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.595 **0.019	1.284 *0.073	0.615 0.151	0.866 0.354	0.885 0.728	0.375 0.179
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	2.032 ***0.000	1.210 ***0.000	0.952 0.681	1.132 0.109	0.901 0.657	1.884 **0.018
Protocol accession	2.159 ***0.000	1.230 *0.094				
Scored in US TIP report			2.583 **0.018			
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year		† 2.217 *0.077		0.886 *0.067		
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.808 **0.013	1.447 ***0.000			1.561 0.101	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.895 ***0.004	† 1.695 *0.062	2.335 ***0.000	1.575 ***0.000	0.573 **0.024	0.693 0.338
Criminalization extant			2.380 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.056 0.534		3.440 ***0.000		
NAP extant				24.982 ***0.000	2.928 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.267 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.901 0.317	0.942 0.180	0.926 0.866	1.455 0.257	0.504 0.309	0.973 0.981
Women's political empowerment	4.952 ***0.003	2.093 **0.017	1.944 0.454	1.002 0.996	0.652 0.702	0.964 0.984
Government accountability	1.166 0.267	1.073 0.282	1.702 ***0.000	1.140 0.143	1.113 0.703	2.673 ***0.001
X Government accountability					0.693 **0.041	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.691 0.102	0.854 0.168	0.788 0.419	1.123 0.283	1.492 0.150	0.639 0.198
Human rights violations of victims	0.371 **0.044	0.611 *0.070	0.284 *0.058	0.541 **0.037	0.844 0.810	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.099 0.730	1.235 *0.080	0.867 0.475	0.839 0.198	1.531 0.113	1.287 0.745
GDP per capita (in thousands)						1.015 *0.070
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	1.355 0.218	0.764 0.183	2.189 **0.046	1.076 0.822	0.347 0.115	
Lower middle income	2.212 ***0.003	0.731 *0.068	1.720 0.154	0.932 0.835	0.918 0.899	
Upper middle income	0.761 0.342	0.881 0.433	0.927 0.739	1.069 0.771	0.861 0.799	
Subjects	163	169	164	170	169	155
Observations	1,321	2,783	975	2,853	2,437	2,299
Number of failures	144	638	152	391	85	40

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.20t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-6-3. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 3: Only Reports of Increased Trafficking

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases or diversion of transnational TIP	0.674 0.148	0.987 0.925	0.743 0.290	1.110 0.503	0.921 0.793	1.095 0.812
Regional density of policy	‡ 2907803 ***0.000	† 7.065 ***0.003	† 3010.272 ***0.000	† 1.776 0.580	$3.36x10^{34}$ ***0.000	$5.14x10^{22}$ ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.519 **0.025	1.355 **0.025	0.719 *0.078	0.959 0.742	1.127 0.675	1.794 0.214
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.501 0.165	1.289 *0.060	0.571 *0.064	0.867 0.289	0.778 0.531	0.385 0.119
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	2.011 ***0.000	1.146 ***0.001	0.835 0.256	1.125 **0.050	0.888 0.538	1.001 0.997
Protocol accession	1.950 ***0.000	1.145 0.280				
Scored in US TIP report			2.447 **0.026			
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year		† 2.116 *0.069		0.912 0.145		
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.879 **0.011	1.451 ***0.000			1.518 *0.099	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.891 ***0.003	† 1.742 **0.034	2.409 ***0.000	1.572 ***0.000	0.622 *0.057	0.605 0.164
Criminalization extant			2.296 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.077 0.399		3.495 ***0.000		
NAP extant				26.177 ***0.000	2.911 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.260 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.907 0.342	0.939 0.167	0.708 0.428	1.374 0.325	0.438 0.268	0.825 0.885
Women's political empowerment	4.517 ***0.003	2.144 ***0.008	1.532 0.625	0.870 0.740	0.572 0.624	0.835 0.916
Government accountability	1.122 0.315	1.050 0.473	1.595 ***0.002	1.170 *0.081	1.092 0.752	1.731 **0.047
X Government accountability					0.731 *0.075	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.660 *0.093	0.874 0.211	0.742 0.315	1.108 0.297	1.335 0.319	0.503 ***0.009
Human rights violations of victims	0.385 **0.041	0.661 *0.098	0.260 **0.047	0.541 **0.035	0.870 0.832	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.096 0.726	1.248 *0.075	0.888 0.546	0.829 0.171	1.534 0.106	1.375 0.686
GDP per capita (in thousands)						1.007 0.375
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	1.209 0.386	0.716 *0.095	2.561 **0.012	1.110 0.744	0.389 0.192	
Lower middle income	1.768 **0.028	0.713 **0.043	1.811 0.110	0.945 0.863	0.963 0.954	
Upper middle income	0.636 0.106	0.834 0.291	0.910 0.644	1.099 0.676	0.877 0.816	
Subjects	165	171	166	172	171	157
Observations	1,349	2,828	1,002	2,898	2,461	2,321
Number of failures	146	648	154	396	87	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.20t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-6-4. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 4: With Road Counts Weighted by UN Voting Affinity

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases or diversion of transnational TIP	0.644 0.119	0.997 0.984	0.730 0.251	1.101 0.546	0.945 0.860	1.236 0.634
Number of roads to neighbors with extant policy, weighted by UN Voting Affinity	1.008 0.403	0.997 *0.076	0.989 *0.072	1.000 0.905	0.995 0.619	0.978 0.103
Regional density of policy	† 1124.446 ***0.000	† 8.142 ***0.003	† 4738.380 ***0.000	† 1.687 0.634	‡ $1.97x10^{34}$ ***0.000	$3.00x10^{23}$ ***0.000
Emigrant-sending member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.427 *0.058	1.410 **0.014	0.723 *0.086	0.954 0.721	1.176 0.575	2.125 0.157
Immigrant-receiving member of inter-regional organization coordinating migration	1.546 *0.099	1.358 **0.019	0.653 0.190	0.842 0.240	0.848 0.652	0.493 0.298
Number of memberships in anti-trafficking regional organizations with external evaluations of policy	1.692 ***0.001	1.184 ***0.000	0.839 0.218	1.113 *0.072	0.930 0.755	1.193 0.512
Protocol accession	1.983 ***0.000	1.222 0.100				
Scored in US TIP report			2.491 **0.020			
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year		† 2.116 *0.065		0.904 0.119		
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.898 ***0.008	1.457 ***0.000			1.543 *0.093	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.945 ***0.002	† 1.768 **0.026	2.307 ***0.000	1.563 ***0.000	0.581 **0.028	0.718 0.410
Criminalization extant			2.469 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.063 0.485		3.451 ***0.000		
NAP extant				25.449 ***0.000	2.905 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.270 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.901 0.292	0.944 0.211	0.820 0.634	1.385 0.326	0.451 0.297	1.022 0.988
Women's political empowerment	3.789 ***0.005	2.114 **0.018	1.695 0.553	0.900 0.779	0.510 0.572	1.044 0.983
Government accountability	1.118 0.348	1.054 0.459	1.638 ***0.001	1.168 *0.079	1.085 0.779	2.087 **0.048
X Government accountability					0.741 *0.099	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.715 0.163	0.875 0.178	0.793 0.443	1.097 0.366	1.432 0.219	0.459 **0.024
Human rights violations of victims	0.417 *0.065	0.671 0.118	0.270 *0.061	0.544 **0.035	0.827 0.769	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.075 0.785	1.231 *0.096	0.907 0.623	0.838 0.198	1.499 0.117	1.256 0.772
GDP per capita (in thousands)						1.004 0.496
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	1.147 0.583	0.762 0.171	2.413 **0.027	1.070 0.836	0.429 0.242	
Lower middle income	1.776 **0.038	0.731 *0.057	1.620 0.201	0.913 0.788	1.030 0.965	
Upper middle income	0.613 0.103	0.845 0.300	0.831 0.402	1.076 0.749	0.945 0.922	
Subjects	164	169	165	170	170	156
Observations	1,332	2,797	986	2,866	2,446	2,311
Number of failures	145	639	153	393	86	40

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time. ‡ This variable is interacted with exp(-0.20t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time.

Table AC-6-5. Chapter 6 Robustness Check 5: Exclude All Regional Variables

Variables	Criminalization Hazard ratio P > |z|	Legal Revision Hazard ratio P > |z|	Institution Hazard ratio P > |z|	NAP Hazard ratio P > |z|	NRM Hazard ratio P > |z|	Reflection Period Hazard ratio P > |z|
Reported increases or diversion of transnational TIP	0.739 0.202	1.019 0.885	0.815 0.353	1.120 0.441	1.123 0.645	1.120 0.740
Number of roads to neighbors with extant policy	1.022 ***0.000	1.005 ***0.000	0.990 **0.016	0.997 0.204	0.998 0.839	0.988 *0.060
Protocol accession	2.146 ***0.000	1.188 0.103				
Scored in US TIP report			2.962 **0.015			
Neighbor had better score, current or previous year		† 3.557 ***0.001		0.939 0.297		
US recommended policy, current or previous year	1.465 *0.051	1.357 ***0.000			1.752 **0.012	
Tier 2 watch list or tier 3, current or previous year	1.902 ***0.001	0.955 0.396	2.295 ***0.000	1.493 ***0.000	0.560 **0.025	0.514 **0.029
Criminalization extant			2.322 ***0.000			
Institutionalization extant		1.170 0.102		3.465 ***0.000		
NAP extant				26.445 ***0.000	3.897 ***0.000	
Institutionalization X NAP				0.268 ***0.000		
Legislative corruption *or* Public sector corruption[1]	0.901 0.338	0.925 *0.065	1.240 0.590	1.625 0.152	0.716 0.647	0.819 0.843
Women's political empowerment	6.809 ***0.002	3.050 ***0.000	1.688 0.582	1.296 0.505	1.515 0.731	53.324 0.106
Government accountability	1.189 0.167	0.989 0.867	1.826 ***0.000	1.142 *0.093	0.964 0.890	1.372 0.360
X Government accountability					0.696 **0.022	
Significant domestic trafficking	0.460 ***0.000	0.815 *0.066	0.592 *0.077	1.177 0.120	1.652 *0.073	0.662 0.347
Human rights violations of victims	0.383 *0.081	0.688 0.109	0.269 **0.034	0.559 **0.044	0.859 0.814	
Cooperation with civil society on TIP	1.140 0.649	1.314 **0.030	1.062 0.774	0.862 0.295	1.488 0.134	1.606 0.419
GDP per capita (in thousands)						1.016 ***0.006
World Bank income classification (base = high income)						
Low income	0.835 0.461	0.572 ***0.001	2.587 **0.010	0.951 0.857	0.193 ***0.001	
Lower middle income	1.454 0.152	0.652 ***0.005	1.840 0.107	0.827 0.526	0.516 0.135	
Upper middle income	0.501 ***0.001	0.756 0.114	1.044 0.848	0.996 0.983	0.603 0.219	
Subjects	165	171	165	172	171	157
Observations	1,349	2,828	986	2,898	2,461	2,321
Number of failures	146	648	153	396	87	41

Cox Proportional Hazard regression model using the efron method for ties. Standard errors are adjusted for possible correlation in 19 geographically defined regions.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. [1] Legislative corruption was used for the criminalization and legal revision models, while public sector was used for all others. † This variable is interacted with exp(-0.10t) to model a decay in the variable's influence over time

APPENDIX D: REGIONAL AND INTER-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

BROAD REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS WHICH ADDRESS TIP

Africa

African Union (AU), established 2001, TIP first addressed in 2006.

East African Community (EAC), established 2000, TIP first addressed in 2014

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), established 1983, TIP first addressed in 2006.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established 1975, TIP first addressed in 2001.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), established 1996, TIP first addressed in 2008.

South African Developmental Community (SADC), established 1980, TIP first addressed in 2009.

Americas

Organization of American States (OAS), established 1948, TIP first addressed in 2004.

Europe

Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), established 1992, TIP first addressed in 2003.

European Union (EU), established 1958, TIP first addressed in 1995.

Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), established 1971, TIP first addressed in 2001.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), established 1973, TIP first addressed in 1999.

Former Soviet Union

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established 1991, TIP first addressed in 2005.

Middle East and North Africa

League of Arab States (LAS), established 1945, TIP first addressed in 2005.

South Asia

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established 1985, TIP first addressed in 1997.

Southeast Asia

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established 1967, TIP first addressed in 2004.

Regional Institutions Dedicated to TIP

Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CATHB), 2008.

Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT), 2004.

Inter-Regional Forums on Migration

Abu-Dhabi Dialogue, established 2008.

Budapest Process, established 1991.

Bali Process, established 2002.

Colombo Process, established 2003.

Khartoum Process, established 2014.

Rabat Process, established 2006.

Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) (Puebla Process), established 1996

REFERENCES

African Union Department of Social Affairs. 2012. "AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking Campaign." Press release. https://au.int/en/newsevents/28064/au-commission-initiative-against-trafficking-aucommit-campaign (5 May 2021).

Alter, Karen J., and Sophie Meunier. 2009. "The Politics of International Regime Complexity." *Perspectives on Politics* 7(1): 13-24.

Avdeyeva, Olga A. 2012. "Does Reputation Matter for States' Compliance with International Treaties? States Enforcement of Anti-Trafficking Norms." *The International Journal of Human Rights* 16 (2): 298-320.

Bailey, Michael A., Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten. 2017. "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (2): 430-456.

Bales, Kevin. 1999. *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bartilow, Horace A. 2010. "Gender Representation and International Compliance Against Human Trafficking." Mimeo.

Başer, Ekrem T. 2020. "Reputations in International Conflict and Cooperation." Working paper. https://ekrembaser.com/ (21 November 2020).

Bearce, David H. 2007. *Monetary Divergence: Domestic Policy Autonomy in the Post-Bretton Woods Era*. The University of Michigan Press.

Berman, Jacqueline. 2006. "The Left, the Right, and the Prostitute: The Making of US Antitrafficking in Persons Policy." *Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law.* 14: 269-278.

Bernstein, Elizabeth. 2010. "Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 36 (1): 45-71.

Bernstein, Elizabeth. 2012. "Carceral Politics as Gender Justice? The 'Traffic in Women' and Neoliberal Circuits of Crime, Sex, and Rights." *Theory and Society* 41 (3): 233-259.

Biermann, Frank, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli. 2009. "The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis." *Global Environmental Politics* 9 (4): 14-40.

Canadian Council for Refugees. 2016. "Temporary Foreign Worker Program: A Submission by the Canadian Council for Refugees to the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities." https://ccrweb.ca/en/submission-TFWP-review (4 May 2021).

Chapkis, Wendy. 2005. "Soft Glove, Punishing Fist: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000." In *Regulating Sex: The Politics of Intimacy and Identity*, ed. Elizabeth Bernstein and Laurie Schaffner, 51–66. New York: Routledge.

Charnysh, Volha, Paulette Lloyd, and Beth A. Simmons. 2015. "Frames and Consensus Formation in International Relations: The Case of Trafficking in Persons." *European Journal of International Relations* 21 (2): 323-351.

Cho, Seo-Young, Axel Dreher and Eric Neumayer. 2011. "The Spread of Anti-Trafficking Policies—Evidence from a New Index." CEGE Discussion Papers, No. 119. University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/70211/1/65377124X.pdf (5 May 2021).

Choi-Fitzpatrick, Austin. 2017. *What Slaveholders Think: How Contemporary Perpetrators Rationalize What They Do*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chuang, Janie A. 2006. "The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking." *Michigan Journal of International Law* 27.2: 437-94.

Chuang, Janie A. 2014. "Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law." *American Journal of International Law* 108 (4): 609-649.

Cleveland, Sarah H. 2001. "Norm Internalization and US Economic Sanctions." *Yale Journal of International Law*. 26 (1):1-102.

Cleves, Mario, Roberto G. Gutierrez, William Gould, and Yulia V. Marchenko. 2010. *An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata*, 3rd edition. Stata Press.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Anna Luhrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Steven Wilson, Agnes Cornell, Nazifa Alizada, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Laura Maxwell, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Johannes von Römer, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2020. "V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20 (5 May 2021).

Cordella, Tito, and Giovanni Dell'Ariccia. 2002. "Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs." IMF staff papers 49.1: 68-86.

Cox, David R. 1972. "Regression Models and Life-Tables." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Methodological)* 34 (2): 187-202.

Dahlstrom, Julie. 2018, July 12. "Trump's Harsh Immigration Policies Are a Gift for Human Traffickers." *The Hill.* Available at: https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/396781-trumps-harsh-immigration-policies-are-a-gift-for-human-traffickers (4 May 2021).

Das, Jayoti, Cassandra DiRienzo, Danny Lanier Jr., and Coleman Rich. 2013. "Anti-human Trafficking Policies and Freedom of the Press: A Cross-Country Study." *International Journal of Management and Marketing Research* 6 (2): 1-10.

DeStefano, Anthony M. 2008. *The War on Human Trafficking: U.S. Policy Assessed*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Dobbin, Frank, Beth Simmons, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2007. "The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?" *Annual Review of Sociology* 33: 449-472.

Drezner, Daniel W. 1999. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. Cambridge University Press.

Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion." *International Organization* 57 (3): 643-659.

Eising, Rainer. 2002. "Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization." *International Organization* 56 (1): 85-120.

Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000." *International Organization* 60 (4): 811-846.

Foot, Kirsten A. 2016. *Collaborating Against Human Trafficking: Cross-Sector Challenges and Practices*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Gallagher, Anne. 2001. "Trafficking in persons report." *Human Rights Quarterly* 23 (4): 1135-1141.

Gehring, Thomas, and Benjamin Faude. 2014. "A Theory of Emerging Order within Institutional Complexes: How Competition among Regulatory International Institutions Leads to

Institutional Adaptation and Division of Labor." *The Review of International Organizations* 9 (4): 471-498.

Gómez-Mera, Laura. 2016. "Regime Complexity and Global Governance: The Case of Trafficking in Persons." *European Journal of International Relations* 22 (3): 566-595.

Gros, Jean-German. 2003. "Trouble in Paradise: Crime and Collapsed States in the Age of Globalization." *The British Journal of Criminology* 43 (1): 63-80.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *International Organization* 59 (3): 593-629.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2009. "The Power Politics of Regime Complexity: Human Rights Trade Conditionality in Europe." Perspectives on Politics 7 (1): 33-37

Henning, C. Randall. 2017. *Tangled Governance: International Regime Complexity, the Troika, and the Euro Crisis*. Oxford University Press.

Henning, C. Randall, and Tyler Pratt. 2021. "Hierarchy and Differentiation in International Regime Complexes: A Theoretical Framework for Comparative Research." Unpublished manuscript. https://www.tylerbpratt.com/s/HenninPratt_Feb252021.pdf (5 May 2021).

Hirshleifer, Jack. 1983. "From Weakest-Link to Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods." *Public Choice* 41 (3): 371-386.

Honig, Dan, and Catherine Weaver. 2019. "A Race to the Top? The Aid Transparency Index and the Social Power of Global Performance Indicators." *International Organization* 73.3 (2019): 579-610.

Horowitz, Michael C., Paul Poast, and Allan C. Stam. 2017. "Domestic Signaling of Commitment Credibility: Military Recruitment and Alliance Formation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (8): 1682-1710.

Ikenberry, G. John, and Charles A. Kupchan. 1990. "Socialization and Hegemonic Power." *International Organization* 44 (3): 283-315.

Jeong, Jin Mun and Dursun Peksen. 2019. "Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63 (1): 194-217.

Johnson, Jesse C., and Stephen Joiner. 2021. "Power Changes, Alliance Credibility, and Extended Deterrence." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 38 (2): 178-199.

Jonsson, Sofia. 2019. "The Complex Relationship between Police Corruption and Sex Trafficking in Origin Countries." *Journal of Human Trafficking* 5 (2): 109-129.

Kahler, Miles. 1992. "External Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of Adjustment." In *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State*, eds. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman. Princeton University Press.

Kapstein, Ethan B. 2006. "The New Global Slave Trade." *Foreign Affairs* 85 (6): 103-115.

Keenan, Patrick J. 2006. "The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of Globalization." *Iowa Law Review* 91 (2): 505-560.

Keohane, Robert O., and David G. Victor. 2011. "The Regime Complex for Climate Change." *Perspectives on Politics* 9 (1): 7-23.

Kelley, Judith G. 2017. *Scorecard Diplomacy: Grading States to Influence Their Reputation and Behavior*. Cambridge University Press.

Kelley, Judith G. and Beth A. Simmons. 2019. "Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators." *International Organization* 73 (3): 491-510.

Koh, Harold Hongju. 1997. "Why Do Nations Obey International Law?" *The Yale Law Journal* 106: 2599-2659.

Krasner, Steven D. 1983. "Structural Causes and Regimes Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." In *International Regimes*, ed. Steven Krasner. NY: Cornell University Press.

Lektzian, David, and Mark Souva. 2007. "An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (6): 848-871.

McLean, Elena V., and Taehee Whang. 2010. "Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2): 427-447.

Mattes, Michaela. 2012. "Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design." *International Organization* 66 (4): 679-707.

Meissner, Christopher M. 2002. "A New World Order: Explaining the Emergence of the Classical Gold Standard." NBER Working Paper Series. http://www.nber.org/papers/w9233 (5 May 2021).

Meyer, John W., Francisco O. Ramirez, Richard Rubinson, and John Boli-Bennett. 1977. "The World Educational Revolution, 1950-1970." *Sociology of Education* 50 (4): 242-258.

Meyer, John W., Francisco O. Ramirez, and Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal. 1992. "World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980." *Sociology of Education* 65: 128-149.

Morrow, James D. 1994. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (2): 270-297.

Nooruddin, Irfan. 2002. "Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy." *International Interactions* 28 (1): 59-75.

Organization of American States. 2018. *Progress Report Based on the Second Work Plan against Trafficking in Persons in the Western Hemisphere 2015-2018*. http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2019/CP40376EREPORTTRAFFICKING.pdf (16 January 2021).

Orsini, Amandine, Jean-Frédéric Morin, and Oran Young. 2013. "Regime complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance?" *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 19 (1): 27-39.

Pape, Robert A. 1997. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not work." *International security* 22 (2): 90-136.

Pape, Robert A. 1998. "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work." *International Security* 23 (1): 66-77.

Peksen, Dursun. 2009. "Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights." *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (1): 59-77.

Peksen, Dursun. 2019. "Autocracies and Economic Sanctions: The Divergent Impact of Authoritarian Regime Type on Sanctions Success." *Defence and Peace Economics* 30 (3): 253-268.

Peterson, Timothy M. 2013. "Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 57: 672-682.

Perry, Noam. 2016. *The Promise and Pitfalls of Unilateral Pressure to Combat Human Trafficking: US Pressure on Israel, the Philippines, and Thailand*. Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University.

Porter, Gareth. 1999. "Trade Competition and Pollution Standards: 'Race to the Bottom' or 'Stuck at the Bottom'." *The Journal of Environment & Development* 8 (2): 133-151.

Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organizations* 42 (3): 427-460.

Quirk, Peter J. 1994. *Adopting Currency Convertibility: Experiences and Monetary Policy Considerations for Advanced Developing Countries*. International Monetary Fund.

Ramirez, Francisco O., Yasemin Soysal, and Suzanne Shanahan. 1997. "The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-national Acquisition of Women's Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990." *American Sociological Review* 62: 735-745.

Rose, Richard. 1993. *Lesson-drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning across Time and Space*. CQ Press.

Schönhöfer, Johanna. 2014. "Determinants of Victim-Centered Policies towards Human Trafficking. A Cross-National Comparison." European Consortium for Political Research General Conference 2014, Glasgow, Scotland.

Shih, Elena. 2016. "Not in My 'Backyard Abolitionism': Vigilante Rescue against American Sex Trafficking." *Sociological Perspectives* 59 (1): 66-90.

Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 819-835.

Simmons, Beth A., and Paulette Lloyd. 2010. "Intersubjective Frames and Rational Choice: Transnational Crime and the Case of Human Trafficking." *Hauser Globalization Colloquium Fall 2010*.

Simmons, Beth A., Paulette Lloyd, and Brandon M. Stewart. 2018. "The Global Diffusion of Law: Transnational Crime and the Case of Human Trafficking." *International Organization* 72 (2): 249-281.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51: 464-481.

Todres, Jonathan. 2011. "Widening Our Lens: Incorporating Essential Perspectives in the Fight against Human Trafficking." *Michigan Journal of International Law.* 33: 53-76.

Trump, Ivanka. 2018. "The Trump Administration Is Taking Bold Action to Combat the Evil of Human Trafficking." Opinion. *The Washington Post*. November 29. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-trump-administration-is-taking-bold-

action-to-combat-the-evil-of-human-trafficking/2018/11/29/3e21685c-f411-11e8-80d0-f7e1948d55f4_story.html (10 February 2021).

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2000. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 15 November. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/protocoltraffickinginpersons.aspx (4 May 2021).

United States Congress. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Public Law 106-386. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-106publ386/pdf/PLAW-106publ386.pdf (4 May 2021).

United States Department of State. 2001. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2001*. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ (16 December 2020).

United States Department of State. 2006. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2006*. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ (16 December 2020).

United States Department of State. 2008. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2008*. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ (16 December 2020).

United States Department of State. 2011. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011*. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ (16 December 2020).

United States Department of State. 2014. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2014*. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ (16 December 2020).

United States Department of State. 2017. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2017*. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ (16 December 2020).

United States Department of State. 2018. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2018*. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ (16 December 2020).

United States Department of State. 2019. *Trafficking in Persons Report 2019*. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ (16 December 2020).

US Government Accountability Office. 2006. *Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to Enhance US Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad*. GAO-06-825. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-06-825 (5 May 2021).

Van Der Kamp, Denise, Peter Lorentzen, and Daniel Mattingly. 2017. "Racing to the Bottom or to the Top? Decentralization, Revenue Pressures, and Governance Reform in China." *World Development* 95: 164-176.

Van Dijk, Jan and Fanny Klerx-Van Mierlo. 2011. "Indicators of Corruption: Further Explorations of the Link between Corruption and Implementation Failure in Anti-trafficking Policies." Mimeo, International Victimology Institute (INTERVICT), University of Tilburg, the Netherlands.

Villarreal, Alexandra. 2018, July 19. "US Deporting Crime Victims While They Wait for Special Visa." *AP News*. Available at: https://www.apnews.com/81e9280f78bb4f899d7ad2f64a0240a8 (accessed March 2019).

Voeten, Erik, Anton Strezhnev, and Michael Bailey. 2009. *United Nations General Assembly Voting Data*. Available at hdl:1902.1/12379.

Von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." American Political Science Review 99 (4): 611-622.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. Cambridge University Press.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization.* 46.2: 391-425.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Zartner, Dana and Jennifer Ramos. 2011. "Human Rights as Reputation Builder: Compliance with the Convention against Torture." *Human Rights Review* 12 (1): 71-92.

Zhang, Sheldon X. and Samuel L. Pineda. 2008. "Corruption as a Causal Factor in Human Trafficking." In *Organized Crime: Culture, Markets and Policies*, eds. Dina Siegel and Hans Nelen. Springer.

Zheng, Dan and Minjun Shi. 2017. "Multiple Environmental Policies and Pollution Haven Hypothesis: Evidence from China's Polluting Industries." *Journal of Cleaner Production* 141 (10): 295-304.

VITA

Glenn M Harden

Wilmore, Kentucky

Education

MA Political Science, 2019
University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky

MA Theological Studies, 2011
Asbury Theological Seminary, Wilmore, Kentucky

MA History, 2001
George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia

Teaching Licensure Program, 2001
James Madison University, Harrisonburg, Virginia

BA International Affairs, 1992
The George Washington University, Washington, DC

Select Professional Experience

Lecturer, *Asbury University*

Graduate Research Fellow, *United Nations University*

Director, *Priceless International*

Adjunct Instructor, *Baker College Online*

Writing Tutor, *NCS Pearson*

Classroom Teacher, *Wilson Memorial High School*

Supervisory Contract Specialist & Contract Specialist, *Fleet & Industrial Supply Center Norfolk Detachment Washington*

Select Publications

The Sex Trade, Evil and Christian Theology. Wipf & Stock 2016.

'Men and Women of Their Own Kind': Historians and Antebellum Reform. Dissertation.com 2003.