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BETTER DEVILS OF OUR NATURE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE-JUSTIFYING IDEOLOGIES IN OPINION FORMATION

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BETTER DEVILS OF OUR NATURE:
THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE-JUSTIFYING IDEOLOGIES IN OPINION FORMATION

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

BETTER DEVILS OF OUR NATURE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE-JUSTIFYING IDEOLOGIES IN OPINION FORMATION

Extensive theoretical and empirical research has examined the role that violence-justifying ideologies play in generating violent behavior. Yet, a substantial body of this work employs measures that are consistently associated with sexist attitudes and gender stereotypes. As a consequence, scholars are limited in our ability to fully comprehend individuals' propensity to endorse, or even promote violent behavior – or how these attitudes influence perceptions of victims and related policy preferences.

I contribute to this line of research by creating a gender-neutral battery of anti-violence questions, in large part divorced from sexist stereotypes, to assess the consequence of those attitudes for politics and public policy in the United States. This flexible new measure of "violence-rejecting sentiment" can travel across policy areas and disciplines. Individuals scoring higher on this scale are less comfortable with violence as a social tool. My new instrument builds upon a common measure of "honor codes", commonly used in research on rape and rape victims (Saucier et al. 2015) but it requires fewer question items (7 vs. 35), and in large part isolates attitudes toward violence from gender role expectations. Finally, I use survey experiments and regression analyses to examine how these attitudes (toward gender and violence respectively) independently *and* interactively impact opinion formation; this includes evaluations of victims of sexual and police violence, but also assessments of support for public policies to address these issues in the United States. I find that violence-justifying ideologies – sexism and racism in particular – attenuate the normatively positive effects of anti-violence values in many circumstances. This includes support for policies and services to assist victims and reduce violence.

KEYWORDS: Attitudes toward Violence, Violence against Women, Rape, Police Violence, Opinion Formation

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1.1 Introduction

When the petite brunette stepped into her apartment-complex elevator in April 2007 and found 31-year-old Robert Williams waiting there, she did not anticipate the unspeakable horror that awaited her. Williams got off on the same floor as the 23-year-old Columbia University journalism student, followed her to her door, and shoved his way into her apartment, where he repeatedly raped and sodomized the young woman for 19 torturous hours. Williams doused his victim in bleach and boiling water, forced pills down her throat, glued her mouth shut, and bound her with shoelaces and duct tape. This vicious attack, which began around 10 p.m., continued late into the following afternoon. Williams then hurled the woman into her bathtub and demanded she gouge out her own eyes with a pair of scissors. After trying to end her life instead, by attempting to stab herself in the throat, Williams cracked her skull open with a heavy object and slit her face and eyes with a butcher knife (Eligon 2008).

The violence Williams delivered on his 23-year-old victim might be exceptionally horrendous, but violent attacks – including murders, attempted murders, and forcible rapes – appear in the news media from around the globe every day. Violence remains a devastating feature of modern society that impacts millions of individuals year after year, and the damage that these events inflict upon victims is immeasurable.

Despite the fact that violent attacks occur on what seems to be a day to-day, if not hour-to-hour, basis, evidence indicates that acts of violence may actually be declining over time (Elias, 2000; Krieken, 1989; and Pinker, 2011). Circumstantial evidence from

the United States might back up this optimism. While victimizations have been on the rise in the United States lately – the total number of violent crimes increased from 2015 to 2016, and again from 2016 to 2018 – this uptick follows a 62% decline from 1994 to 2015 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2019).

The Pinker school of thought attributes the decline of violence to changing cultural norms. It's not just that opportunities for violence have declined, or that the incentives for violence have changed. Rather, "civilizing" influences are winning out. People are socialized into a value system that teaches them to abhor violence. These anti-violence values constrain their own behavior, and also aggregate up so that governments and social groups behave less violently as well.

This dissertation focuses on the behavioral mechanism that supposedly explains declining violence. One observable implication of the Pinker school of thought is that cultural norms ought to shape public opinion in a fashion that alters public policy. At the individual level, therefore, whether someone rejects or embraces violence-justifying attitudes ought to shape that person's policy-relevant opinions. I am skeptical about the extent to which abstract values actually constrain politically relevant behavior, however, including how an individual processes a specific act of violence as well as how the individual evaluates public policies rooted in violence. This question of *why* violence has declined has both practical implications for policy makers (as a guide for attempts to prevent future violence) and scientific value for scholars (as a contribution to our understanding of mass behavior).

1.2 Values about Violence

Optimists argue that attitudes lead the way, and that a decline in citizens' tolerance of violence has produced a corresponding increase in support for public policies that assist victims and promote equitable judicial outcomes. My data are cross-sectional, so I cannot observe how these attitudes and policy preferences have changed over time. Rather, I contribute to this line of research by focusing in on the individual-level linkage between abstract values and politically relevant opinions. I do so by 1. creating a short-scale measure of anti-violence values; 2. observing the explanatory power of such values in predicting politically relevant opinions; and 3. examining how violence-justifying attitudinal constructs, such as gender and racial stereotypes, allows an individual to get around or ignore broad cultural values.

While there are infinite forms of human violence and depravity in the world, I focus exclusively on violence against women and police violence in the United States. Addressing each in separate empirical chapters, I find that once other attitudinal packages (e.g. gender and racial stereotypes) are considered, an individual's orientation toward violence (or non-violence) has minimal bearing on opinion formation. This is true for both individuals' perceptions of victims and propensity to support public policies to address the violence. More specifically, when I employ experimental methods to bring gender and racial stereotypes to the fore, making them salient for survey respondents, these predispositions undermine the meaningfulness of abstract cultural values toward violence. These violence-justifying ideologies dominate when it comes to explaining opinions toward victims, perpetrators, punishments, and policies.

Stephen Pinker (2011) argues, in his seminal work *The Better Angels of our Nature*, that violence has declined over time and that we are living in the most-peaceful era of human existence. One important implication of this thinking, if true, is that our present is less sinister than our past. The peace we enjoy today is a result of past generations, appalled by the brutality of their time, working hard to reduce it – a change in values encouraged by a torrent of historical forces (e.g., the growth of government power, commerce, feminization, and cosmopolitanism).

Other scholars offer a less-optimistic view of human nature and its mutability. Wrangham and Peterson (1996), for example – in a book that also attracted popular attention in its day – argue that aggressive behavior is hard-wired in humans and rooted in our ties to primate ancestors. Perceived in this way, violent (or non-violent) behavior is not a result of prevailing cultural norms or values, which may change quickly or adapt to laws and customs, but instead biologically based.

Theoretically, these views are not mutually exclusive, but they do suggest the need for a multi-pronged approach to reducing violence (e.g. identifying effective and persuasive techniques to decrease violence-justifying attitudes in the first place and implementing effective institutional reforms to deter violent behavior and punish perpetrators). We must also address the possibility that individuals will justify violence when it suits their (perceived) interests – that it is not values, but material incentives that explain changes in violence.

The Slow Policy Progress against Violence

Some scholars do consider incentives and opportunities for violence (Elias 2000; Krieken 1989). They credit the decline in humans' taste for violence with the mass expansion of public policies designed to protect classes of victims that faced extreme persecution in earlier times. I argue that while conditions certainly have improved over time, the codification of laws to combat violence – especially violence against women and racial minorities – has proven painstakingly slow in the United States. Racism and sexism provide longstanding, culturally resonant excuses for resorting to the use of force, and as I demonstrate in later chapters, gender and racial stereotypes continue to shape individuals' perceptions of victims and evaluations of crimes – much more so than attitudes toward violence (or non-violence) in the abstract.

1.2.1 Violence against Women

In the not-too-distant past, legal and cultural norms protected the right of a man to control his wife's sexuality. Prior to the 1970s, men usually were not prosecuted for murdering an adulterous wife, forcibly preventing her from leaving the house, or using intimidation, coercion, and violence to control her movements. In fact, until the late 1970s, marital rape was not a crime in any state. And despite the codification of laws to protect women, the judicial system has often failed victims of rape and sexual assault. For example, jurors have been known to let sexist attitudes toward women affect their deliberations in rape trials (Jacobsen & Popovich 1983), including sentencing decisions (Mazella & Feingold 1994; Spohn & Spears 1996). Eventually, it took a wave of feminism in the late 1970s to help shift public perceptions of rape, and today the criminal justice system is required to take these crimes seriously (Rivera, 1996).

Htun & Weldon (2012) found that feminist mobilization – more so than progressive parties, women in government, or other political and economic advancements – explains variation in the development of policies to address violence against women internationally. In other words, VAW is rarely raised as a priority among social justice and human rights organizations *without* pressure from feminists demanding laws that alter the opportunities and incentives for such violence. The authors point out that most human rights groups did not recognize rape as a violation of women's rights until pressured by feminists in the 1990s to do so. And it was not until the Violence against Women Act of 1994 that policies providing funding for rape prevention, the use of DNA tests and rape kits, and the implementation of laws putting first-time rapists behind bars took hold (Pinker 2011, 403).

In sum, it takes a strong women's movement to command the attention and support of the general public and, equally as important, to convince politicians to place institutional reforms on legislative agendas. This is certainly true of movements to combat violence against women in the United States. That progress continues today, as new organizations have emerged to support victims of sexual violence. Perhaps most well-known, the #Me Too movement began with the goal to "address both the dearth in resources for survivors of sexual violence and to build a community of advocates, driven by survivors, who will be at the forefront for creating solutions to interrupt sexual violence in their communities" (Me Too 2018).

1.2.2 Anti-Black Violence

Police violence is another phenomenon that dominates media coverage in the United States. These stories often include a racial component, with the victims being

young black males. That African-Americans face racial disparities in the criminal justice system is nothing new. Post-slavery, in many regions of the United States, the government turned a blind eye as raging mobs publicly tortured and executed victims in the street. These violent lynchings – thousands of recorded incidents exist – remain a blight on American history. Despite the fact that between 1882 and 1968 almost 200 anti-lynching bills were introduced in Congress, not a single bill was enacted. It was not until June of 2005 that the U.S. Senate apologized for its' failure to enact anti-lynching bills when they were most needed (Associated Press 2005). And it would take until 2018 for Senators to propose the "Justice for Victims of Lynching Act", designating lynching a Federal hate crime (Garcia 2018).

While we have definitely made substantial progress in terms of race relations over time, racial disparities in the criminal justice system continue to strain the American fabric. The Sentencing Project, a non-profit organization dedicated to criminal sentencing reform, for instance, claims that African-Americans experience racial bias at nearly every level of the criminal justice system – from their initial interactions with law enforcement officers, to adjudication and sentencing, to parole and re-entry (Sentencing Project 2008). Police shootings involving white officers and black suspects spark mass protests and riots nationwide, and numerous organizations have emerged to address perceived injustices. Perhaps most prominent, *Black Lives Matter* began as a "call to action in response to state-sanctioned violence and anti-black racism. The impetus for that commitment was, and still is, the rampant and deliberate violence inflicted on us by the state" (Black Lives Matter 2018).

While it is true that the Supreme Court, Congress, and state legislatures have produced or defined laws to curb and punish violent acts, the extent and durability of this "cultural shift" is less clear. Do the top-down, elite-imposed policies truly enjoy mass consent? Have the bottom-up, citizen-led social justice movements changed hearts and minds? Or, do both lack a strong popular foundation?

1.3 Explaining Policy Preferences Related to Violence

Given the astonishingly slow and tentative progress exhibited by policies intended to stop violence against women and racial minorities, social science would benefit from a better understanding of why the public does or does not support policies to protect victims of violent crimes and punish perpetrators. Isolating the attitudes that may erode public support for such policies should be equally important. And because the two efforts have something in common – both involve the public's tolerance for violent action, whether at the hands of a predator, or to punish that predator – the discipline's approach to each policy question should not take place entirely in isolation. Instead, this dissertation tries to explain a handful of politically relevant attitudes and opinions using a unified framework, including similar explanatory variables.

Do individual attitudes rejecting violence matter in terms of politics and public policy? And if so, does a broad decline in violence-justifying attitudes translate to public support for policies to support victims and punish perpetrators? What role do racial and gender stereotypes play in terms of public perceptions of victims and suspects, or support for violence-related public policies? In the United States these are important and timely questions – questions I address directly in this project.

The possibility that prejudice and stereotyping – common justifications for treating other people badly – might be hidden because elites consider them socially undesirable is troubling. The implication is that when people make actual decisions, such as whether to discriminate, those underlying prejudices may rival facts and circumstances, or general anti-violence values, when it comes to criminal justice outcomes and the treatment of victims and perpetrators

I will not be the first researcher to consider how an individual's attitudes might influence policy-relevant behavior, but I will contribute to the literature on opinion formation by using experimental studies and issue framing to examine the factors that help shape support for policies to assist survivors and punish criminals. More specifically, I contribute to prior research by 1. creating a short-scale measure of anti-violence values, distinct from sexist stereotypes surrounding male behavior; 2. employing experimental survey designs to investigate additional factors that influence perceptions of violent crime victims; and 3. examining the impact of gender and racial stereotypes on citizen support for victim services and punitive policies.

Political scientists (Bartels 1998; Druckman 2001) have demonstrated that public policy preferences often depend on how an issue is framed. This holds for a range of policies including affirmative action (Kinder & Sanders 1990), spending on the poor (Sniderman & Theriault 1999), and citizen support for war (Hetherington & Suhay 2011), to name a few. Related work suggests that "for most people – most of the time" attitudes are not stable, that when completing surveys "they are responding to the issue as they see it at the moment of the response", and that different frames produce different results (Zaller 1992, 94-95).

Early work on survey response and mass opinion (Converse 1962; Achen 1975; Taylor & Fiske 1978) questioned the American public's ability to construct and maintain stable attitudes on a range of political issues and led Zaller to conclude that individuals "…do not typically possess 'true attitudes' on issues as conventional theorizing assumes, but a series of partially independent and often inconsistent ones. Which of a person's attitudes is expressed at different times depends on which has been made most immediately salient by chance and the details of questionnaire construction, especially the order and framing of questions" (1992, 93). Related research suggests that the way issues are framed by elites has a strong influence on public opinion (Druckman 2001; Slothuus & DeVreese 2010), and that political opinions are not always either positive or negative but ambivalent, or simultaneously positive and negative (Lavine 2001). Applied to my research, the implication is that attitudes against violence might be little more than lip service, while politically relevant opinions will actually depend on how an event or policy is framed and which particular biases sway the individual in each case.

Both my methodological contribution and my substantive contribution to the study of opinion formation stem from my attempt to unify these disparate literatures (violence against women *vis à vis* police violence) under the umbrella of the broader theoretical debate about the power of cultural norms. Rather than rely solely upon existing measures for attitudes toward violence, which are often confounded with gender or racial attitudes (e.g. sexist attitudes toward women in the study of rape, or racial stereotypes toward minorities in the study of police violence), I develop and test a truncated measure of anti-violence values that ought to span those subjects if, as some suggest, individuals (men *or* women) really are bound by their inherent distaste for

violence. Then, I apply that new measure to two existing literatures – rape and police violence – that have nibbled at the idea that cultural norms are predictive of violence-related policy preferences.

1.4 Outline to Dissertation

The dissertation will proceed as follows: In Chapter 2, I briefly review the scholarship crediting cultural shifts and civilizing influences with a gradual conquest of violence, as well as competing theories suggesting that violent behavior is biologically rooted and enduring. Despite the growth of anti-violence cultural norms, research suggests that people will find ways to justify violence, sometimes directly through out-group formation and sometimes indirectly through institutions that insulate them from or provide cover for the violence (Wolgast 1992). I briefly review work examining how people build these ideological and institutional waivers to escape anti-violence norms.

In Chapter 3, I summarily review the problems with some popular measures for attitudes that scholars use, and develop and test a unique, flexible scale of "anti-violence values" that can travel across policy areas and disciplines. My new instrument builds upon a prominent measure of "honor codes" used in the literature on sexual assault (Saucier et al. 2016), but it requires fewer question items (7 vs. 35), and in large part disentangles attitudes toward violence from attitudes toward gender.

In Chapter 4, I use this simple scale of anti-violence values, built from gender-neutral question wording, to help model perceptions of sexual assault and rape, including factors that influence sentencing in court cases involving these crimes. My work contributes to this literature by: 1. providing theoretical and empirical support for my claim that a *gender-neutral* survey instrument should be used in studies predicting

perceptions of rape victims and other rape-related outcomes of interest, at least as a control variable; 2. examining how other attitudinal orientations (e.g. hostile and benevolent sexism, rape myths, and victim characteristics) shape perceptions of a victim – as somehow having precipitated her victimization, and support for related policies (e.g. expenditures on services and support for institutional reforms); and 3. Assessing the influence of victim behavior and other characteristics on the decision to increase or decrease a defendant's recommended sentence.

In Chapter 5, I examine what shapes attitudes toward victims of police violence as well as factors that influence citizens' evaluations of police shootings. In this study, I move beyond simple racial manipulations of officers and suspects – common in the literature – to incorporate many other factors believed to shape evaluations of use-of-force incidents, including the prevailing narratives, or issue frames describing these events. I will provide theoretical support for my claim that anti-violence values are one important predictor in models measuring support for criminal justice policies. Additionally, racial considerations, perceptions of the criminal justice system, issue framing of the event under consideration, and authoritarianism will explain variation in support for policy reforms. By including these factors and experimental treatments in empirical models I will be able to examine the impact that each have on respondents' evaluations. Finally, in Chapter 6, I provide a brief conclusion.

CHAPTER 2. OUR BETTER ANGELS

2.1 Introduction

Empirically, this thesis asks one overarching question: Does the embrace of cultural values abhorring violence help predict evaluations of real-life circumstances that involve the use of physical force, or correlate with related public policy preferences? In asking and answering that focused research question, however, I hope for this thesis to speak to a much broader debate over the success of the civilizing process and its likely durability. Finding that these abstractions are more than just lip service, that they genuinely constrain people – that they shape policy preferences or govern politically relevant judgements about predators and victims of violence – would offer some hope that the relative peacefulness of today's world is a construct that can be passed down through socialization to future generations. On the other hand, if people can partition these abstract values from their practical assessments of real-life circumstances, or apply them only to certain groups of people, then the civilizing process would seem to be more vulnerable to changes in context.

To position my research within that big-picture scholarly discourse, I begin by setting up the debate between optimistic and pessimistic theories of human nature – specifically, the relationship human beings have with violence. Next, I lay out my theoretical argument that social constructions, individual notions of a deviant "other" (e.g. out-group formation), and support for violent policies perpetrated by institutions at the hands of "others" – artificial persons – provide waivers that allow people to escape anti-violent social norms. I argue that individuals can be more punitive toward, and relatively tolerant of violence committed against, perpetrators that they fear, loathe, or

view as "outsiders" – and less sympathetic toward victims of crime who do not conform to traditional social, cultural, or gender expectations. In other words, the significance of abstract anti-violence values will be conditional on real-life circumstances. Gender stereotypes will shape evaluations of female rape victims, for example – and racial stereotypes will influence evaluations of police shootings – more powerfully than attitudes toward violence in general.

2.2 A Theory of Forward Progress

Stephen Pinker (2011) is hardly the only scholar to take an optimistic view of the trajectory of human civilization (Elias 2000; True 2015), but as a public intellectual who wrote a book-length treatise on the subject less than a decade ago, one that compiled evidence from a wide variety of disciplines, he stands out for having modernized and popularized the concept.

Pinker's wide-ranging book poses some difficulty, because he is not explicitly theoretical, and he does not isolate the underlying hypotheses being offered to explain why violence has declined. However, as my attempt to tease out his tacit theory will show, he attributes declining violence in large part to changes in values. For each time period he discusses, cultural norms serve as part of his explanation for why conditions improve, and for some periods, those norms represent the dominant explanation. It is that hypothesized causal linkage – anti-violent attitudes result in less willingness to commit violent acts or to endorse them when committed by others – which I will test in the empirical portion of this dissertation.

The first transition period that Pinker offers for the decline in violence – when human beings transitioned from hunter-gatherer societies to civilizations with organized governments – conflates two causes that he views as related: a change in food source, and the change in political forms that resulted. Evidence strongly supports the first part of this argument. Today, evolutionary scientists examine the many ways that violence among hunter-gatherer societies may have helped shape the evolution of social behaviors (Bowles 2009; Mirazon et al. 2016; Lambert 1997), and contemporary researchers are scrambling to document mortality rates among the few remaining hunter-gatherer societies before they disappear altogether. There is little doubt, however, that the stability provided by a transition to agriculture allowed the development of the state, which could suppress human violence in ways that tribal organizations did not.

His second argument is that, beginning in the late Middle Ages and into the 20th century, homicide rates in much of Europe dramatically declined. This claim is more description than explanation, and on its face seems to contradict the praise for agricultural-based societies implied in the previous discussion. Feudal Europe was, in fact, an extraordinarily violent place where the head of the state (e.g. the king) had little direct control over the people. Pinker describes medieval people in general as impulsive, crude, inconsiderate, dirty, and animalistic. He dubs the subsequent psychological and cultural shift away from these behaviors as the "civilizing process." Thus, the causal explanation lurking under the surface is that values changed. Furthermore, this change was internalized and reinforced because the new circumstances altered individual psychology. "To take advantage of the opportunities, people had to plan for the future,

control their impulses, take other people's perspectives, and exercise the other social and cognitive skills needed to prosper in social networks" Pinker claims (2011,77).

Slavery becomes important in the Enlightenment era. For much of human history, slavery as an institution – the legal right of one person to *own* another – was the rule, not the exception. Upheld in the Bible, justified by Plato and Aristotle, and practiced across the globe, slavery persisted in some states until as recently as 1980. Slave systems perpetuate violence. The rise of anti-slavery (and also anti-torture) activism therefore also represented a battle against interpersonal violence. As Pinker notes, during the Enlightenment period, large numbers of like-minded individuals organized against these previously sanctioned forms of violence, resulting in mass rejection of them.

Economic considerations helped influence the mass movement that began in the 18th century to combat state support for slavery. Serfdom and sharecropping had become less expensive than forced bondage in many places. Yet humanitarian concerns were the driving force behind the abolition of slavery. Intellectuals, and their "advocacy of liberty, equality, and the universal rights of man let a genie out of the bottle and made it increasingly awkward for anyone to justify the practice" (Pinker 2011, 155). This is clearly a cultural explanation for the abolition of an inherently violent economic system.

As for torture, from ancient to early modern times torture was viewed as an acceptable form of punishment. Many states had few, and ineffective, means to control crime – so punishments were designed to be as brutal as possible to deter others from breaking the law. As was the case with slavery, intellectuals and writers took up the cause against human torture. Reformers railed against institutional cruelty that they viewed as primitive, savage, and barbaric. Their growing appeal to the humanity of the people

throughout the 18th century led to the abolition of punitive torture in every Western country by 1850.

Pinker reminds us that there have been no wars among the major powers since the end of World War II, more than two-thirds of a century often referred to as the "Long Peace" (2011, 249). Political scientists continue to debate the determinants of this extended period of international accord. Some scholars (Kinsella 2005; Slantchev & Alexandrova 2005) call it a "democratic peace" based on their claim that "democracies rarely fight one another because they share common norms of live-and-let-live and domestic institutions that constrain the recourse to war" (Rosato 2005, 585). Democratic countries build strong economic ties to each other as well, through international trade, a pattern that might or might not stem from a value-based preference for mutual cooperation (Bartilow & Voss 2009).

It is possible to explain away the Democratic Peace as being a strategic outgrowth of the Cold War (Farber & Gowa 1997). During that period, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in proxy wars while carefully avoiding extreme escalations, and only fought each other on battlefields in neutral nations – in part due to a persistent fear of imminent nuclear war. However, it would seem unfair to attribute the Long Peace entirely to concern with self-preservation. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of American economic dominance brought this bipolar international system to a close in the early 1990s, the major powers continued to avoid interstate war with one another. Empire building by violent conquest appears to have come to an end. Even terrorism, around which fears have escalated, has declined sharply both internationally and domestically over time.

Pinker again emphasizes behavioral causes that are a mixture of cultural values and psychology. He argues that this "long peace" is a "result of one of those psychological re-tunings that take place now and again over the course of history and cause violence to decline" (2011, 251). The panic and fear – or psychological damage – that terrorism generates is actually a symptom of this changed mindset; because humans today are so horrified by violence, they make a big deal of it when it happens, obscuring the relatively low death tolls from terror attacks worldwide.

Finally, the "Rights Revolution" marked a moral shift in humanity, a movement toward non-violence and an emerging organized defense of minorities and other out-groups who might have been likely targets for violence. A product of the Enlightenment and humanism, this movement grew from prosperity, democratic government, expanding economies, and technologies that made ideas and people more mobile. Increased capital for law enforcement, education, and social services expanded during economic booms. Democracies provided a space where historically disadvantaged groups could finally participate fully in society. The shift away from an economy based primarily on trade, Pinker argues, produced the "hidden hand of an information economy that may have made institutions more receptive to women, minorities, and gays, but it still took government muscle in the form of antidiscrimination laws to integrate them fully" (2011,477).

Categorizing this complicated story that spans five different eras might seem impossible – economics, politics, technology, values, and psychology swirl around in it – but at a minimum it seems clear that Pinker considers "civilizing" anti-violent values to be a significant causal explanation for why violence has declined in practice. His work,

and the work of like-minded scholars, therefore, sets up the hypothesis that this dissertation will test: Adherence to a humanistic abhorrence for violence should influence evaluations of real-life circumstances that involve the use of force, and help shape related public policy preferences relevant to social and political perspectives.

2.3 A Theory of Biological Determination

Some scholarship casts doubt on whether violent impulses can be so easily purged from human interactions. Wrangham and Peterson (1996), for example, underscore the evolutionary roots of violent human behavior, tracing it not to youthful socialization or psychological adaptations but to inbred biological imperatives. The authors' account of human violence contrasts with Pinker's rosy story of evolving cultural norms and values, focusing instead on reproductive competition, defense of scarce resources, and natural selection.

Recent research in this vein has shown that the animal genetically closest to human beings, the chimpanzee, is especially violent. Chimpanzees engage in murder, rape, and lethal raids that are similar to human war. By the early 1970s, Jane Goodall was observing these behaviors in Tanzanian chimps, a development that marked a profound shift in the study of human behavior because it undermined a romanticized view of humans in their natural state that blamed society for corrupting humankind. Of thousands of mammals, and millions of other animal species, the violent behaviors described in this research exist only among humans and chimpanzees.

Richard Dawkins (1976), in his controversial book *The Selfish Gene*, similarly argued that selfish and violent behavior – especially in males – is a product of human

beings' instinctive struggle for survival. Other evolutionary scholars examine violent human behavior in the context of genetic fitness. Raine points out that "despite what we may think of our good-naturedness, we are, it could be argued, little more than selfish gene machines that will, when the time is ripe, readily use violence and rape to ensure that our genes will be reproduced in the next generation" (2013, 14). Viewed in this way, the influence of evolution on behavior is a story of genetic competition and the hard-wired capacity for violence required for successful reproduction.

Biological explanations for rape, as a specific act of violence, have been dismissed in the literature (Brownmiller 1975; Dworkin 1981). Gender is a social construct, so feminist theory casts doubt on whether biological imperatives can explain cross-gender interactions. At some level, a man's decision to rape a woman must be rooted in socially and politically structured gender systems (Vogelman & Eagle 1991, 213). Nevertheless, even if the particular expression of violence might have social origins, the rapists' underlying impulse to engage in violence may not.

Optimism about changing human nature seems to be undermined by what happens whenever civilization temporarily collapses. Arquilla (2015) looked at trends in violence in terms of wars and found that those in which a million people or more died doubled between 1900 and 1950. These "big kill" wars include the Spanish Civil War, the two World Wars, and the civil war in China. During the second half of the 20th century, the so-called Long Peace, the number of "big kill" wars doubled again. Six of these devastating wars occurred in Africa, a continent then emerging from a period of colonization that exposed residents to Western values. Smaller conflicts that cause the death of hundreds of thousands also are trending upward. Violent impulses appear to

remain widespread, even if the devastating nature of modern technology often can be sufficient to deter nations from indulging those impulses.

Focusing on wars involving 10 million casualties or more does not seem to support optimistic conclusions either. After doing so, Cirillo and Taleb challenge the claim that human belligerence has changed in some kind of structural way. The methodology of war may have changed, such that battle deaths no longer serve as the best indicator of hostile conflict, but the pattern of deadly events does not appear different. In technical terms, they argue that "inter-arrival times among major conflicts are extremely long, and consistent with a homogenous Poisson process: therefore, no trend can be established – we as humans cannot be deemed less belligerent than usual" (2015, 1). The shift away from battlefield deaths, a narrow indicator of declining violence, masks the evolving nature of war toward state-sponsored assassinations and the increasing use of remote-controlled drones.

2.4 Ideological Waivers Justifying Violence

Even if we believe that anti-violence cultural norms mark the contemporary zeitgeist – that a random person is indeed less willing in contemporary times to commit violence against another random person – it may be that people dodge those norms to tolerate (if not endorse or even demand) violence when their predispositions encourage it. In particular, people build ideological waivers that allow them to escape principles of non-violence in certain circumstances or against specific groups (Wolgast 1992; Schneider et al. in Sabatier & Weible 2014; Nisbett & Cohen 1996). In doing so, they can conform to civilized norms while doing little or nothing to stop violence that they think will benefit them. Accordingly, I argue that even if culture makes a difference, attitudes

toward specific groups of people (out-groups) will more powerfully shape evaluations of real-life circumstances that involve the use of force, and opinions regarding relevant public policies.

2.4.1 Social Constructions

Long ago, scholars realized that much of the political landscape is socially constructed – drawing on emotions and symbols – rather than objective reality (Luke 1989). The social construction of target populations, either positive or negative, often determines how politicians and policymakers allocate benefits and burdens to specific groups (Chanley & Alozie 2001; Barrilleaux & Bernick 2003). Closely related to out-group prejudice, "social constructions are powerful images or stereotypes that help explain why public policy, which can have such a positive effect on society, sometimes – and often deliberately – fails in its nominal purposes, fails to solve important public problems, perpetuates injustice, fails to support democratic institutions, and produces unequal citizenship" (Schneider et al. in Sabatier & Weible 2014, 105).

The allocation of benefits and burdens that a target group receives is closely tied to whether the public and political elites view the group as "deserving" or "undeserving" of resources (Gilens 1996; Feldman & Huddy 2005). Conceptually, social constructions are similar to individual perceptions of in-groups and out-groups: groups with which the individual identifies and groups from which the individual feels alienated. Out-groups are often racially, ethnically, religiously, or behaviorally defined. Positive or negative stereotypes may be attributed to distinct social groups such as members of the military, the elderly, mothers, the unemployed, criminals, etc.

Social-identity theory attempts to explain how these categorizations can shape individual behavior. It focuses on how one defines the "self" in terms of group membership, group processes, and intergroup relations (Hogg 2018). An individual's social identity is based upon that individual's belief that he or she belongs to a specific group. Accordingly, subjectively similar individuals represent the in-group, while individuals who differ represent the out-group. Intergroup categorization, and the social comparison process which it requires, produce predictable consequences: In-group members are judged positively, and out-group members are judged negatively (Stets & Burke 2000). The concept of identity is of great interest to political psychologists who study political behavior. These socially constructed groups may contend with each other over a variety of resources – political, economic, or cultural – depending on the context in which they find themselves (Voss 1996). Political demands for group respect (e.g. racial minorities and gays and lesbians) require explanations that incorporate identity (Taylor 1994; Monroe et al. 2000; Huddy 2001).

One approach tries to expand beyond the dual categorization of in-group vs. out-group. That approach sorts groups into several distinct social roles. The social-construction framework (Schneider & Ingram 1988; 1993; 1997), partitions target populations into four subgroups: the advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants. The advantaged (e.g. doctors, homeowners, the elderly) enjoy high levels of political power, a larger share of resources and benefits, and very few burdens. Contenders (e.g. activists, banks, and labor unions) also receive more benefits than burdens but are viewed negatively by much of society. Dependents (e.g. mothers, the handicap, and the poor) are constructed as deserving of resources and benefits; however, these groups have very little

political power and may be overlooked by policymakers. Deviants (e.g. drug dealers, criminals, dropouts) also receive very few benefits, have very little political power, suffer much greater burdens, and are often targets in terms of punitive policy. Much of society blames deviants for social ills in the United States, which affords politicians and policymakers cover to target these groups with little consequence. As Schneider et al. point out, "policymakers stand to gain considerable political capital from punishing those who do not have the power or wherewithal to fight back and whom the broader public believes are undeserving of anything better" (2014, 112).

In the following pages, I develop my theory that social constructions and identities are categorizations that produce a wide-range of "ideological waivers" individuals can build to forgive violent behavior, violence they otherwise claim to abhor. By categorizing a victim as part of an out-group, violence can be justified. If true, this theory provides additional evidence that individuals' attitudes toward violence (or non-violence) in the abstract, are interlinked with their attitudes toward specific "types" of victims and predators when it comes to preferences involving punitive policies.

2.4.2 Racial Stereotypes

Racial prejudice is one example of an ideological waiver (out-group formation) that allows individuals to overlook violence against – or the targeting of – specific groups of people. For instance, some whites believe that blacks are more likely to be criminals, are inherently more violent; those whites view the criminal justice system as a satisfactory means to control them (Gilliam & Iyengar 2000; Weaver 2007). Accordingly, "racial prejudice contributes to whites' support for police use of force, and this

relationship should be stronger for the use of excessive force than for the use of reasonable force" (Barkan & Cohn 1998, 749).

Additional research on *implicit* racial bias suggests that individuals link blacks and other minority groups to a range of social problems including crime, violence, and undesirability as neighbors (Bobo & Kluegel 1997; Bobo 2001; Quillian & Pager 2001). Or, as Loury explains, "race is a mode of perceptual categorization people use to navigate through a murky, uncertain world" (2002, 17). Racial bias in this form can persist regardless of conscious prejudice towards blacks or other minorities, a concept that many scholars refer to as "symbolic racism" (McConahay 1976; Kinder & Sears 1981; Sears 1988; Devine 1989). And, the idea that some whites believe blacks should be treated equally, but unavoidably harbor negative attitudes toward blacks at the same time, has strong effects on whites' racial policy preferences. This should extend to attitudes toward crime and punishment policy.

Blacks, on the other hand, are more likely to report being victimized by the police (Weitzer & Tuch 2004) and are less likely to trust law enforcement (Rosenbaum et al. 2005). They tend to view law enforcement as an institution designed to protect dominant (white) group interests and equate law enforcement with the institutionalized maltreatment of minorities and the neglect of subordinate (black) interests. Accordingly, some blacks endorse what Anderson (1999) coins a "code of the street" – an ideology that justifies violence and aggression by certain people in certain contexts.

Anderson examines the informal rules that govern behavior in economically depressed urban areas, which often exhibit particularly high levels of violence and an "ethic emerges where the influence of the police ends and personal responsibility for

one's safety is felt to begin…a quite primitive form of social exchange that holds would-be perpetrators accountable by promising an 'eye-for-an-eye', or a certain payback (1999, 10). Residents of many inner-cities face serious challenges and an increased risk of being victimized. These beliefs are a byproduct of a widespread fear and lack of trust in the police and criminal justice system in the United States. This is especially true of young black individuals living in crime ridden inner-cities.

2.4.3 Gender Stereotypes

Sexism and perceived gender expectations are ideological waivers for violence that allow individuals to target victims and reward predators. For example, research suggests (Glick & Fiske 1996; Viki & Abrams 2002) that hostile sexism is associated with greater endorsement of rape myths, and "benevolent sexism" seems to indicate that when women violate traditional gender stereotypes they are perceived to be at least partially to blame for being attacked sexually. In other words, individuals are able to forgive violent behavior that otherwise they may have been inclined to abhor. In a practical sense, scholars have found a link between negative perceptions of victims and juror decisions in rape trials (Brownmiller 1975; Ellison et al. 2009). When jurors perceive victims as deviants based upon evidentiary considerations like sexual history (Barber 1974), level of resistance (Deitz et al. 1984), or alcohol consumption (Norris et al. 1992), they are much less likely to sympathize with the victim or severely punish the perpetrator.

As Peacock & Barker point out, "Across much of the world, rigid gender norms and harmful perceptions of what it means to be a man or woman, encourage men to engage in high-risk behaviors, condone gender-based violence, grant men the power to

initiate and dictate the terms of sex, and make it difficult to for women to protect themselves from either human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or violence and to seek health services" (2014, 2). Other research (Murnen et al. 2002, Flood 2011) suggests that men's adherence to sexist, patriarchal, and sexually hostile attitudes increase the likelihood that they may commit violence against women. In short, negative constructions of masculinity and gender-inequitable attitudes harm women.

2.4.4 Honor Codes

Honor codes provide yet another example of an ideological waiver that relaxes non-violent norms – one that justifies violence less based on the identity of the target and more based on the violation of other social norms. Existing social science research on honor codes already documents the role they play in shaping individuals' support for violence and violent public policies (Barnes et al. 2012; Cohen & Nisbett 1997). This line of research suggests that for some people, a set of moral values (honor beliefs) require that individuals respond aggressively to insult, threat, or provocation to maintain a reputation for strength and toughness (Osterman & Brown 2011). Accepting personal responsibility for one's own safety reflects a form of social exchange where affronts and provocation are met with swift and aggressive retaliation. Cultural adaptations of honor include behavior that is organized around pride and respect backed by the credible threat of violence. Far from preventing violence, this form of civilized behavior sometimes can require it.

Large bodies of work examine cultural differences in these beliefs, and the evidence suggests that some human groups perpetuate violence more than others (Nisbett & Cohen 1996; Anderson 1999). These belief systems can attach to perceived gender

roles (Rodriguez et al. 2002; Saucier et al. 2015), to cultural identity (Nisbett & Cohen 1996), or to individual-level needs (Vandello et al. 2008). Whatever the source, this sort of violence-justifying belief system can aggregate up to explain different social outcomes across entire regions (e.g. higher levels of violence in the American South and parts of the West than elsewhere in the United States).

The shared assumption that violence is often justified, if not required, also helps shape laws and public policy outcomes in these regions. Examples include "opposition to gun control, support for laws allowing for violence in protection of self, home, and property; a preference for a strong national defense; a comfort with the institutional use of violence in socializing children; and a willingness to carry out capital punishment and other forms of state violence to prevent crime and maintain social order" (Nisbett & Cohen 1996, 83). More recently, stand-your-ground laws found in the South have generated controversy nationally (Lave 2012).

The research on violence-justifying ideologies traces them to the same sort of economic and technological circumstances that dominated Pinker's optimistic book. Scholars root the origins of honor culture to the prevalence of herding economies among early settlers. Nisbett and Cohen suggest that honor cultures "should be found wherever the possibility exists that scarcity will be produced by the predatory actions of others, especially when the state is unwilling or unable to provide protection from such predation" (1996, 89). If conditions change, the context-dependent "civilizing process" can change with it, so that it is not so civilizing.

2.4.5 The Artificial Person

While it may not be apparent immediately, I will make the case here that representatives or institutions (artificial persons) at times provide cover or justification for violent behaviors. Identities are constructed through the process of "othering" to generate difference. In fact, 'identity' is not conceivable without difference. For instance, in terms of individuals, it would not make sense to say "I am white" if it did not imply a difference from being a different race or ethnicity. My focus in this section, however, is on the modern state as a political identity, and the persons and institutions that maintain the monopolization of violence enjoyed by the government (Diez 2004).

American citizens in large part accept – if only grudgingly at times – the concentration of authority and power vested in those who represent the 'state' (e.g. politicians, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and even juries of their peers). These are the actors who maintain the state's monopolization of violence, the ones who make laws, punish criminals, declare war and peace, and perform all the other actions necessary for maintaining the safety of the people (Skinner 1999, 2). The sovereign state and its overreaching tentacles has been described as an 'artificial person', but a necessary improvement to a world where competing identities produced constant war and a life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes 1968, 186). Others, however, worry about the power of the 'state', through its representatives and institutions, to impose selective violence.

Wolgast provides an excellent example of the artificial person as a problematic facet of society. She points out that the "more we practice the substitution of one person for another, the more natural the practice becomes. And the variety of artificial persons

becomes greater…military actions [for example] are seen as the deeds of citizens in whose name they are done, whether these authors command them or not" (1992, 14). She certainly is correct that the idea of the artificial person is applicable to a variety of representatives. For example, law enforcement or agents of the criminal courts should be viewed as artificial persons. For that matter, the same could be said of vigilantes – those outside the law who deal in violence. And, to turn Wolgast's point on its head, while some individuals may be alarmed by the behavior of representatives whose behavior they are assumed to endorse, others may approve of those same behaviors while at the same time escaping personal responsibility for the consequences they produce. This is how the concept of the artificial person can serve as a waiver, or justification for violent behavior.

Cops and courts purportedly act out the will of the people. Yet, this arrangement allows individuals to escape responsibility while (indirectly) endorsing violence. It also can allow us to avoid conscious awareness of what's being done in our names. One can claim to abhor violent behavior, and at the same time tolerate if not embrace the brutality of others' actions – whether it is a police officer killing a suspect, a judge imposing the death penalty, or a soldier wiping out foreign enemies. More worrisome, perhaps, is the likelihood that some individuals endorse such secondary actions, or indirect violence, against only some (out-groups) of people about whom they may know relatively little. I examine this possibility empirically in later chapters.

2.5 Conclusion

Violence-justifying ideologies come in a variety of forms and allow individuals to respond aggressively – or allow others to do so in their place – while still retaining a surface-level commitment to civilized norms. The examples discussed in this chapter are

part-and-parcel of American culture but looking across time or place would furnish an array of additional examples. The overall point, however, is that societies have constructed justifications for violence before – and when they do so, it does not require the collapse of civilization or the reversal of the entire "civilizing process" to permit such backsliding. Norms against violence may not have the constraining power that Pinker gives them credit for having, either because people conform to them without really drawing on the values or because they can abandon them based on a variety of convenient excuses.

My goal with this dissertation is to test for those possibilities as best I can using survey experiments. In the following chapters, I will contribute to that enterprise theoretically and empirically in several ways. First, I will develop and validate a generalized, flexible scale of "anti-violence values" that can travel across policy areas and disciplines, *and* which serves to disentangle attitudes towards violence from gender-attitudes. Then, I will test my theory that other stereotypical attitudes about specific groups (e.g. blacks, women, law enforcement officers), interact with attitudes about anti-violence, bias evaluations of victims and predators, and have serious implications in terms of politics and public policy. Ultimately, my conclusions about the civilizing process will lean toward the pessimistic side of the debate outlined in this chapter.

CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING HONOR-BASED ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE

3.1 Introduction

Violent crime continues to be a serious problem nationwide, and research shows (Flood & Pease 2009) that public policies designed to decrease violent crime rates *must* address the underlying attitudes that overtly normalize and justify violent behavior. It might seem straightforward to create and use a scale that directly asks people about their attitudes toward violence, but that is harder than it seems. Aside from the most abstract of questions, most survey items designed to assess attitudes toward violence already frame them in policy terms, distracting from the underlying cultural values that supposedly motivate policy preferences.

This problem arose as a detour in my own empirical work for this dissertation. I tried using an adapted General Violence measure already appearing in the literature (Schnabel 2018), but the question items did not hold together well as a scale and, instead of capturing broad attitudes toward interpersonal violence, they appeared to reflect political ideology.

A different option and the path that ultimately I will follow in the research to come, builds from a scale used in the Honor Beliefs literature (Saucier 2016). That scale initially posed a major problem as well, because it did not use gender-neutral question wording. Instead, it specifically framed honor in terms of how men should behave. Conflating attitudes toward violence with attitudes toward gender is problematic because core beliefs about the appropriate roles of men and women are an important and consistent predictor of support for certain, very specific forms of violence. For example,

in their investigation of gender-role attitudes, religion, and spirituality as predictors of beliefs about violence against women, Berkel et al. found that "gender role attitudes were the best overall predictor of domestic violence beliefs" (2004, 119). Their study, however, did not assess respondents' attitudes toward violence more generally.

The focus of this chapter, therefore, is on conceptualizing and measuring individuals' attitudes toward violence and gender as independently as possible to determine the role that each plays in predicting perceptions of victims, perpetrators, and violence-related public policy preferences. This requires developing a survey instrument that does not confound the two explicitly. Doing so will allow me to examine, in later chapters, across social groups and beyond gender, important mediating factors (i.e. "ideological waivers") that help shape public opinion and policy related to violence.

Measuring Attitudes toward Violence

Research on violence cannot get away from gender entirely. We know that males are disproportionately to blame for crimes of all kinds, and research suggests that cultural norms influence violent behavior among men (Vandello et al. 2008). Gendered violence, in particular is overwhelmingly committed by males (Flood & Pease 2009), so from a policy standpoint it is understandable that scholars focus on mysoginistic or patriarchal culture – and the behaviors of men – when they study violence against women.

While other research (Curry 1998; Jones 2009; Strauss 2008; Howard 2015) shows that women sometimes do perpetrate violence, they certainly do not commit violent acts at rates comparable to men. What many women do, on the other hand, is participate in the masculine honor codes advanced by Saucier et al. (2016) that endorse

and teach violence. Men may be the ones specifically expected to build a reputation for strength and toughness (Cohen & Nisbett 1996), but women perpetuate this value system. As Vandello and Cohen point out, "Women are clearly very much a part of all cultures of honor – teaching it to their sons, enforcing it on their menfolk and, quite often, even participating in its violent behavior patterns themselves. This was true historically and it appears to be true in many cultures of honor today" (2003, 86).

The Honor Belief literature therefore examines closely the consequences of gender expectations and the endorsement of male violence. Scholars have used the Masculine Honor Belief Scale (MHBS) developed by Saucier et al. (2016) to examine whether honor codes correlate with violence-justifying attitudes. Their scale consists of 7 distinct factors related to masculine honor beliefs including (1) masculine courage (e.g. "a man should not be afraid to fight"); (2) pride in manhood (e.g. "a man should be expected to fight for himself"); (3) socialization (e.g. "you would want your son to stand up to bullies"); (4) virtue (e.g. "a man who 'doesn't take any crap from anybody is an admirable reputation to have'"); (5) protection (e.g. "it is a male's responsibility to protect his family"); (6) provocation (e.g. "if a man's spouse is insulted, his manhood is insulted"); and (7) family and community bonds (e.g. "a man's family should be his number one priority"). The resulting measure, therefore, consists of 35-items, most of them explicitly mentioning gender.

The Masculine Honor Belief Scale successfully predicts behavior-related attitudes in both domestic and international research. This includes published work suggesting that masculine honor beliefs are associated with men's assertion that offensive slurs warrant violent reprisal (Saucier et al. 2014) and that walking away from a fight is "non-manly"

(O'Dea et al. 2017). It also predicts attitudes toward rape and rape victims (Saucier et al. 2015), war and peace (Saucier et al. 2018), and gun enthusiasm and aggression (Matson et al. 2019). In terms of American electoral politics, Matson et al. (2019) also found that masculine honor beliefs helped to predict positive perceptions of Donald Trump, and negative perceptions of Hillary Clinton.

While this masculine measure of honor is quite useful for studying the role of gender expectations in predicting violent behavior perpetrated by men, it does not allow the researcher to focus on general anti-violent attitudes. The gendered (i.e., sexist) attitudes about who should engage in violence contaminate any attempt to measure whether violence should take place at all. To parse out those two distinct types of attitudes, I employ a pair of strategies:

- First, I will re-word the questions in the honor scale so that they are gender-neutral. Instead of asking about men, husbands, and sons, I will ask about people more generally. Respondents may make assumptions about who would or would not be engaging in the actions they are endorsing, but at least I will not be imposing that judgment on them.
- Second, to counteract any remaining gender-based attitudes in those scales – which could appear, for instance, if a respondent asked about violence assumes that it would be men engaging in it – my analysis will include more explicit measures of gender attitudes as well. With controls included for two measures of sexism, the independent variation remaining in my honor-based, but adapted, anti-violence scale ought to be the portion reflecting generalized attitudes against violence.

This adapted scale allows me to address my primary research question directly, which is whether individuals who condemn violence, on average, are more likely to support public policies to assist victims and punish perpetrators. The correlational results presented in this chapter support my use of the new scale in the analyses presented in chapters four (sexual assault and rape), and five (police violence).

Admittedly, I found it rather difficult, if not impossible to *completely* disentangle gender attitudes and attitudes toward violence. This is likely because in the United States individuals are, in large part, socialized to believe that honor codes apply mainly to men. I do, however, defend the value and scholarly utility of asking violence-related questions without imposing gender roles upon survey respondents, and I will provide support for my neutrally worded scale. Specifically, using gender-neutral question items produces a sharp decline in the association between honor beliefs and benevolent sexism for both males and females, thereby picking up the influence that gender has on a person's sympathy toward violent crime victims – a relationship that remains hidden when using the masculine honor belief scale. The new measure also produces a notable decline in association with conservatism, compared to the original.

It follows then that honor codes should be assessed beyond the narrow sets of beliefs that many people have in terms of male behavior. Research should be robust to the possibility that a respondent's expectations of *anyone*, male or female, in terms of violent behavior, are not much different from the respondent's expectations of *males* in certain situations – which, if true, should inform theories of violence. On the other hand, adherence to specifically masculine honor codes might be nothing more than an indirect way to express sexist values. The argument I advance in this chapter is that more research

is needed to examine gender-neutral attitudes towards honor-based violence and the role they play in shaping public opinion and violence-related public policy preferences.

It's not even clear that a narrowly masculine measure of honor could provide a full picture of attitudes related to gender-based issues. In particular, conflating gender attitudes and attitudes toward violence seems problematic when attempting to predict attitudes toward sexual assault or rape victims. A man with a strong sense of honor, and therefore a willingness to fight if necessary, might also hold highly protective attitudes toward women (what scholars sometimes call benevolent sexism) – or, he might carry his comfort with the use of force when resolving conflicts over to conflict between a man and woman. A man who feels distaste toward violence might similarly abhor sexual assault – or, alternatively he might harbor feelings of a misogynist nature (what scholars sometimes call hostile sexism) that encourage him to diminish the significance of sexual assaults, especially if something about the circumstances prevent them from becoming openly violent.

For research contexts in which the theoretical distinction between gender attitudes and honor attitudes could matter, scholars ought to employ a different measure. Accordingly, my research moves beyond the gender-specific orientation typical of most work in this realm, to develop a non-gendered anti-violence measure that could predict attitudes toward victims of violence and toward violence-related public policies.

3.2 Seeking Gender-Neutral Honor Questions

My primary argument, thus far, is that attitudes toward violence should be assessed independently of someone's attitudes about male behavior, or for that matter

about other social groups. That said, a common theme unites research in this realm. The respect for strength – the idea that an individual should maintain a willingness to risk serious injury or death in defense of symbolic as well as tangible goals – is common in many of the world's cultures. Such a belief system provides the justification for why individuals employ violent acts when resolving disputes. Broadened to a societal level, the need for a community or a country to exhibit such strength may be employed to justify aggressive public policies, including those that allow the state to impose harsh punishments or that tolerate acts of violence by individuals in positions of power.

In the remainder of this chapter, I set out to examine (in an explicitly gender-neutral way) the implications of an individual's belief that violence is not acceptable. To pursue this approach to honor and violence, I first needed to disentangle gender roles from attitudes toward violence that are commonly conflated in prior research. To do so, I decided to build explicitly on the widely used Masculine Honor Belief Scale (MHBS) developed by Saucier et al. (2016), but to modify it by altering the language in a gender-neutral way. The original masculine question wording is displayed in bold face, while the non-gendered replacement wording is displayed in italics (Table 3.2.1).

The measure I propose exploits all of the advantages of the MHBS but ought to help scholars better understand the complexity of honor beliefs as they relate to perceptions of aggression and violence – not only with regard to rape or other crimes that typically target women, but also in unrelated policy areas such as police violence. This modification will allow me to parse out the independent role of honor beliefs and other violence-justifying attitudes (e.g. those built from racism, sexism, or authoritarianism) in predicting support for relevant public policies.

Table 3.2.1 | Honor Belief Question Items

Masculine Courage	It is important for **a man** *(an individual)* to act bravely. **A man** *(an individual)* should not be afraid to fight. It is important for **a man** *(an individual)* to be able to face danger. It is important for **a man** *(an individual)* to be able to take pain. It is important for **a man** *(an individual)* to be courageous.
Pride in Manhood	It is important for **a man** *(a person)* to be **more masculine** *(tougher)* than other **men** *(people).* ** **A man** *(a person)* should be embarrassed if someone calls him a wimp. ** **A man** *(a person)* should be expected to fight for **himself** *(themselves).* If **a man** *(a person)* does not defend **his wife** *(their spouse),* they are not a very strong **man** *(person).* If **a man** *(a person)* does not defend **himself** *(themselves),* they are not a very strong **man** *(person).*
Socialization	If your **son** *(child)* got into a fight, you would be glad that **he** *(they)* stood up for **himself** *(themselves).* You would want your **son** *(child)* to stand up to bullies. As a child you were taught that **boys** *(you)* should defend **girls** *(other children).* If your **son** *(child)* got into a fight to defend **his sister** *(a sibling),* you would be glad they did so. As a child you were taught that **boys** *(people)* should always defend themselves.
Virtue	You would praise **a man** *(a person)* who reacted aggressively to an insult. ** Physical aggression is always admirable and acceptable *(no change).* ** It is morally wrong for **a man** *(a person)* to walk away from a fight. ** **A man** *(a person)* who doesn't "take any crap from anybody" is an admirable reputation to have. ** Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself *(no change).* **
Protection	A **man** *(person)* should protect **his wife** *(their spouse)* because it is the right thing to do. If a **man** *(person)* cares about **his wife** *(their spouse),* **he** *(they)* should protect **her** *(them)* even if everyone else thinks it's wrong. **A man** *(a person)* should stand up for **a female** *(anyone)* who is in the family or is a close friend. It's a **male's** *(person's)* responsibility to protect **his** *(their)* family. **A man** *(a person)* should protect **his wife** *(their spouse).*
Provocation/Insult	If **a man's wife** *(a person's spouse)* is insulted, **his manhood** *(that person's pride)* is insulted. If **a man's** *(a person's)* mother is insulted, **his manhood** *(that person's pride)* is insulted. If **a man's** *(a person's)* father is insulted, **his manhood** *(that person's pride)* is insulted. If **a man** *(a person)* is insulted, **his manhood** *(that person's pride)* is insulted. If **a man's** *(a person's)* brother is insulted, **his manhood** *(that person's pride*) is insulted.
Family Bonds	It is important to spend time with the members of your family *(no change).* It is important for **a man** *(an individual)* to be loyal to **his** *(their)* family. **A man's** *(an individual's)* family should be **his** *(their)* number one priority. It is important to interact with other members of your community *(no change).* It is **a man's** *(a person's)* responsibility to respect **his** *(their)* family.

This chapter also describes the development of a short-form version of the gender-neutral anti-violence scale. This is useful for a number of reasons. First, it consumes much less space on a survey instrument, which either lessens the cost of research or allows the inclusion of other useful questions (I will exploit that property in chapters 4 and 5). Second, the subscales of the original measure include a relatively large number of questions (5-items) dealing with similar issues, which could try the patience of respondents who dislike the feeling that they are being asked the same thing multiple times, ultimately producing less-reliable data. We can be more confident in survey responses given to an instrument of more reasonable length. Finally, the question items included in the MHBS are inherently sensitive in nature because they focus on individuals' willingness to endorse violence. I argue that the truncated version I propose is less likely to prompt participants to provide what they believe to be socially desirable responses.

My first pass at developing a new honor & violence scale focused on that explanatory variable, along with related scales also employed by Saucier et al. (2016):

- **Hostile sexism** (e.g. "women fail to appreciate all men do for them")
- **Benevolent sexism** (e.g. "every man ought to have a woman he adores")
- **Trait aggression** (e.g. "given enough provocation, I might hit another person"), and
- **Conservatism** (e.g. "how liberal or conservative do you perceive yourself to be on foreign policy issues, economic issues, and social issues?)

To examine the criterion validity of the MHBS, the authors included measures they believed *would* be associated with the honor inventory: benevolent sexism and aggressive personality traits. To examine discriminant validity, the authors included measures they believed *would not* be associated with the inventory: conservatism and hostile sexism.

Gender Attitudes

The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), created by Glick & Fiske (1996) includes two correlated components of sexism that, nevertheless, represent contrasting orientations toward women. The questionnaire involves sexism, both sexist animosity (or hostile sexism) and a subjectively positive alignment (benevolent sexism). Each, the authors claim, encompass three sources of ambivalence: paternalism, gender differentiation, and heterosexuality. The ASI is the most frequently used measure of ambivalence toward women, with 3785 citations between 1996 and 2019 (Pennsylvania State University 2019). Saucier et al. included the ASI in their original questionnaire, which was designed to identify reliable items to include in the MHBS. While the authors did not expect their measure would significantly correlate with hostile sexism, they did hypothesize that higher levels of masculine honor would be associated with benevolent sexism because it is "characterized by role restrictive behaviors that include men's protection of women" (2016, 9).

Aggressive Behavior

The Aggression Questionnaire, constructed by Buss & Perry (1992), is the most frequently used inventory on human aggression, with 6019 citations between 1992 and

2019 (CiteSeerX, 2019). Factor analysis yielded four distinct scales: physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger, and hostility. This scale, however, focuses on individuals' propensity to *behave* violently or be verbally abusive. Saucier et al. included the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry 1992) in their original study constructing the masculine honor scale because the authors' "conceptualization of masculine honor includes the belief that physical aggression is sometimes appropriate, and even necessary, we hypothesize that higher levels of masculine honor beliefs would be associated with higher levels of trait aggression" (2016, 9).

Because the focus of my dissertation lies squarely on the predictive role of *anti-violence attitudes* and not *propensity to behave* violently, I chose not to model my new scale on the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry 1992). I also decided against modeling other popular measures of attitudes toward violence to create my scale because either the question items tapped policy orientations closely related to my dependent variables of interest in later chapters (Velicer et. al 1989; Anderson et. al 2006) or were specifically designed for children and adolescents (Funk et. al 1999; 2003).

Expectations for My New Measure

Having stripped the original MHBS of its gendered orientation and role-restrictive language, I expect a much weaker strength of association between my new measure and sexism, particularly benevolent sexism. I expect the same dip in correlation strength with conservatism and, in both cases, I expect this to be true of male and female respondents. Including these additional measures allows me to better understand what the MHBS as well as my scale really are capturing. The primary purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to present and evaluate a modified and updated, gender-neutral measure of honor-based

anti-violence attitudes. Data from a large Mechanical Turk survey (N = 1049) is reported, and my analysis lends support for my gender-neutral scale among adult populations in the United States.[1]

3.3 Implementing the Gender-Neutral Honor Battery

Thousands of social scientists have published studies using data from Amazon's Mechanical Turk survey platform. Conducting research in this way is both efficient, and relatively inexpensive. Perhaps more importantly, however, scholars have found evidence that MTurk participants "provide data that meets or exceeds the psychometric standards set by data collected using other means including student samples" (Buhrmester et al. 2018, 149), and that "relative to other convenience samples often used in experimental research in Political Science, MTurk subjects are often more representative of the general population" (Berinsky et al. 2012, 366).

Despite these advantages, other scholars (Dennis et al. 2019) have found that an alarming number of participants circumvent conventional screening methods and provide low-quality responses. Accordingly, I took additional steps to detect and delete fraudulent responses from any "bad actors" who participated in my survey. Not only did I identify multiple responses that originated from a single IP address, but I also identified multiple responses that originated from a single geographic location using latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates. This led me to exclude 294 potentially fraudulent observations.

[1] Berinsky et al. (2012) examined the benefits, and potential limitations of using Amazon's Mechanical Turk web-based platform for subject recruitment in Political Science Research. When the authors used Mechanical Turk samples to replicate previous experimental studies, they found that the average treatment effects were very similar. In sum, the authors argue that the potential limitations to Mechanical Turk samples – including subject attentiveness and the prevalence of repeat survey-takers – are not much of a problem in practice.

After closely inspecting my remaining data, I uncovered an additional 26 obvious response-set observations and excluded those as well, which resulted in a final sample size (N = 1049).

Participants and Materials

M-Turk Workers were given the opportunity to earn $0.25 for completing my survey on Amazon's research survey platform. Participants reported their level of agreement with various statements endorsing honor beliefs. In total, data were collected with a survey instrument given to 1,049 workers: 43% male, 79% white, 95% between the ages of 18 and 65, with a median age of 39.38 and a standard deviation of 13.18. Respondents were also asked to complete the scales on hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, trait aggression, conservatism, and rape myth acceptance.

Workers were randomly assigned to complete one of two scales, the original MHBS, or my modified, non-gendered version. That randomization produced little variation in the two pools. The 523 workers who received the original MHBS were 44% male, 79% white, 95% between the ages of 18 and 64, with a median age of 39.39 and a standard deviation of 13.12. By contrast, the 526 workers who received my modified scale were 42% male, 79% white, 95% between the ages of 18 and 65, with a median age of 39.37 and a standard deviation of 13.24. The goal was to see how different the patterns were across the two otherwise identical scales, allowing me to confirm – with data from a non-student sample – that the MHBS conflates multiple attitudinal dimensions.

Results – Masculine Honor Beliefs

The original MHBS items were highly reliable overall, with excellent internal consistency (α = .95), and the items on each of the seven subscales also achieved satisfactory levels of internal consistency, although it sometimes fell below the level seen with the overall battery: masculine courage (α = .89); pride in manhood (α = .85); socialization (α = .76); virtue (α = .85); protection (α = .87); provocation and insult (α = .96); and family and community bonds (α = .85).[2]

Principal Component Analysis

Recall that Saucier et al. (2016) reported that the MHBS question items in their study yielded seven factors – or subscales – containing five question items each, which combine to form a 35-item measure of masculine honor beliefs. However, I did not want to assume that the question items went together or grouped as they did in the original study. Some items clearly pertain to honor beliefs, while others clearly get at individual's attitudes toward violence specifically. Principal component analysis with varimax rotation determined that the items actually produce a six-factor (rather than the seven-factor) solution as reported by Saucier et al. (2016).

Provocation and Insult loaded strongest on the first factor (Eigenvalue = 13.09) and explained 37% of the variance in the scale. The second factor (Eigenvalue = 5.06) was mostly Protection items and explained an additional 14% of the variance. Courage

[2] Alpha was developed to provide a measure of the internal consistency of a scale and is expressed as a number between 0 and 1 (Cronbach, 1951). Analysts use the statistic to judge whether question items included in a scale likely measure the same concept. The more that question items correlate with each other, the higher alpha will be. Researchers typically employ a rule of thumb that alphas ranging between .70 and .95 indicate a good scale (Bland, 1997; DeVellis, 2003). Alpha is also affected by the number of question items; when there are very few items, alpha is reduced (Streiner, 2003). Such a scale may be overly susceptible to the idiosyncratic focus of the few questions.

loaded strongest on the third factor (Eigenvalue = 1.73) explaining an additional 5% of variation in the scale. The fourth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.39) was mostly comprised of Virtue items (or attitudes toward violence specifically) and explained 4% of scale variance. Family and Community Bonds loaded strongest on the fifth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.19) and explained 3% of the variance in the scale. Finally, the sixth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.12) was overwhelmingly driven by two of the Socialization items and explained an additional 3% of scale variance. No other factors emerged with an Eigenvalue of 1.0 or higher.

Sex Differences

Male respondents scored significantly higher on Masculine Courage ($t = 6.37$, $p = .00$), Masculine Pride ($t = 4.89$, $p = .00$), Masculine Virtue ($t = 4.35$, $p = .00$), Masculine Protection ($t = 4.57$, $p = .00$), and Masculine Provocation/Insult ($t = 4.28$, $p = .00$). Males and females posted similar scores on Masculine Socialization ($t = 1.27$, $p = .10$); and Family and Community Bonds ($t = -1.51$, $p = .07$). In sum, male respondents were more likely to endorse masculine honor beliefs on a range of issues, but females were equally likely to agree that boys should defend themselves and others – with violence if necessary, and that men should prioritize and defend their family. Males scored significantly higher on the full 35-item masculine honor belief inventory compared to females ($t = 4.98$, with 521 degrees of freedom, $p < .001$).

These results align with much of what Saucier et al. (2016, 10) reported in the original study. Scores on the masculinity scale were strongly associated with measures of trait aggression and benevolent sexism. However, contrary to their findings, data from

this study suggest that scores on the scale also are strongly correlated with hostile sexism and the conservatism measure (see Table 3.3.1 below).

Table 3.3.1 | Masculine Honor Intercorrelations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. MHBS	1				
2. Trait Aggression	0.384***	1			
3. Benevolent Sexism	0.731***	0.256***	1		
4. Hostile Sexism	0.529***	0.347***	0.416***	1	
5. Conservatism	0.426***	0.151*	0.332***	0.560***	1

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ *35-Item Full Inventory* N = 526

In this first pass, I replicated the original 35-item measure of masculine honor beliefs, including seven 5-item subscales. Like the original creators of the masculine honor scale, I found that the overall combined measure demonstrated acceptable internal consistency, as did each of the subscales. In sum, higher levels of masculine honor beliefs were significantly, and positively associated with higher levels of trait aggression, hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, and conservatism.

Results – Gender Neutral Honor Beliefs

The gender-neutral additive scale works well overall – although notably, without the gendered language to tie it together, my measure of internal consistency dipped a bit (α = .93). The items on each of the seven subscales also achieved acceptable levels of internal consistency: Courage (α = .83); Pride (α = .78); Socialization (α = .76); Virtue (α = .81); Protection (α = .85); Provocation/Insult (α = .95); and Family and Community Bonds (α = .79).

Principal Component Analysis

Again, I conducted principal component analysis and determined that the data produced a six-factor solution (rather than the seven-factor) solution suggested by Saucier et al. (2016). The first factor (Eigenvalue = 11.15) picked up some Family and Community Bonds items along with Protection items and explained 32% of the variance in the scale. The second factor (Eigenvalue = 3.65) was entirely comprised of the Provocation and Insult items and explains an additional 11% of the variance. Courage and Pride items loaded strongest on the third factor (Eigenvalue = 2.48) explaining an additional 7% of variation in the scale. The fourth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) was mostly Virtue with two Pride items (or attitudes toward violence, and maintenance of a reputation for being tough), and explained 5% of scale variance. The fifth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.51) was mostly Socialization and an additional item relating to reputation, and it explained an additional 4% of the variance in the scale. The sixth, and final factor (Eigenvalue = 1.28) contained the remaining Family and Community Bond items and explained an additional 4% of scale variance. However, the final factor revealed that the question about obligation to the *community* does not fit well with those about obligation to the *family*. This appears to represent respondents' sense of responsibility to self and family at the expense of the broader community – a finding that did not emerge from the original gendered items. No other factors emerged with an Eigenvalue of 1.0 or higher.

Interestingly, respondents did not score highly on items endorsing the stereotype that individuals should maintain a credible reputation for aggressive behavior, or that violence is often acceptable if not required. This suggests that, on average, respondents

do *not* believe that violence is an acceptable social tool, providing preliminary support for some scholars' broader claim (Elias 2000; Pinker 2011) that humans have lost their appetite for violence. What remains to be seen, however, is whether or not a distaste for violence influences individuals' perceptions of victims and perpetrators or helps shape public policy preferences in any meaningful way.

While the additive index is adequate, it does not come together so neatly without the gendered language structuring responses, which illustrates that my gender-neutral wording is removing a problem. Contrary to my analysis of the masculine scale, which produced one meaningful factor followed by statistical noise that required varimax rotation to make sense of it, in this case, principal component analysis showed clear factors emerging prior to rotation. Notably, the question items most directly tied to violence held together and stood out more clearly.[3]

Sex Differences

Male respondents again scored significantly higher on Courage ($t = 4.17$, $p < .001$), Pride ($t = 5.59$, $p < .001$), Virtue ($t = 5.37$, $p < .001$), Protection ($t = 4.02$, $p < .001$), and Provocation/Insult ($t = 3.21$, $p < .001$). Males and females again posted similar scores on Socialization ($t = 1.60$, $p = .06$) and Family and Community Bonds ($t = 0.15$, $p = .44$). Males scored significantly higher on the full 35-item gender-neutral honor inventory compared to females ($t = 4.92$, with 524 degrees of freedom, $p < .001$). When gender was not imposed upon respondents, females scored higher on most items, the exception being family bonds and willingness to physically fight. Scores on the modified

[3] Rotating principal components can improve their interpretability but also presents drawbacks. For instance, because the variation between individual components is spread more evenly after rotation, information on the most dominant individual sources of variation in the data may be lost (Joliffe 1989).

honor & violence scale again correlated significantly with the measures of trait aggression, hostile sexism, and benevolent sexism. However, in most cases, the correlation coefficients are much smaller than those found using the original masculine honor belief questions (see Table 3.3.2).

Table 3.3.2 | Gender-Neutral Honor Intercorrelations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. HBS	1				
2. Trait Aggression	0.465***	1			
3. Benevolent Sexism	0.587***	0.278***	1		
4. Hostile Sexism	0.458***	0.417***	0.391***	1	
5. Conservatism	0.319***	0.124**	0.329***	0.428***	1

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ *35-Item Full Inventory (Gender-Neutral)* N = 523

With the gendered language removed, my new measure correlates stronger with trait aggression (+.08), but the correlations with benevolent sexism (-.15), hostile sexism (-.07), and conservatism (-.11) decline sharply. This illustrates clearly that the original scale was conflating a sense of honor with sexist attitudes reported by respondents who might or might not have been open to the use of force more generally. This is particularly true of the relationship between the modified scale and the measure of benevolent sexism, the orientation that I most believed was contaminating the MHBS. Removal of the gendered and role-restrictive language of the questions produced a notable drop in the strength of association with benevolent sexism (-.15), and this was true of both males (-.17) and females (-.15). Nevertheless, scholars who equate masculine traits with tolerance for violence clearly are *not* wrong – even with gendered language removed, respondents endorsing the use of force tend to be more likely to envision a division in gender roles as well.

3.4 Trimming the Honor Scale

Having compared the data produced using the competing measures, I now turn to the selection of a short-form version of my gender-neutral scale. My goal in this section is to choose the simplest scientific measure of unobserved anti-violence attitudes using the fewest possible observed variables. To achieve this parsimony statistically, I began by removing question items included in my gender-neutral scale that are not directly related to individual attitudes toward violence.

Recall that principal component analysis indicated a six-factor solution, and that the fourth factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) was comprised mostly of Virtue with two Pride items, which explained roughly 5% of scale variance. These seven items tap either the belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is often acceptable if not required. Remember, these were also the least popular question items, which suggests that on average, respondents do *not* endorse violence as a social tool. This question set should allow me to investigate further whether anti-violence values influence perceptions of victims and perpetrators or help shape related public policy preferences (see Table 3.4.1).

Table 3.4.1 | Principal Component Analysis Factor Loadings

	Component 1	Component 2	Component 3	Component 4	Component 5	Component 6
Courage 1			0.3671			
Courage 2			0.3949			
Courage 3			0.4393			
Courage 4			0.414			
Courage 5			0.388			
Pride 1				**0.2765**		
Pride 2				**0.3039**		
Pride 3			0.2363			
Pride 4						0.4394
Pride 5						0.3896
Socialization 1					0.4468	
Socialization 2					0.4446	
Socialization 3					0.3299	-0.3790
Socialization 4					0.4255	
Socialization 5					0.3793	
Virtue 1				**0.4101**		
Virtue 2				**0.3156**	0.2234	
Virtue 3				**0.4911**		
Virtue 4				**0.3195**		
Virtue 5				**0.4693**		
Protection 1						0.3024
Protection 2						0.3312
Protection 3	0.2764					
Protection 4	0.3504					
Protection 5	0.336					
Provocation/Insult 1		0.4182				
Provocation/Insult 2		0.459				
Provocation/Insult 3		0.4595				
Provocation/Insult 4		0.415				
Provocation/Insult 5		0.4409				
Family Bonds 1	0.3479					
Family Bonds 2	0.4019					
Family Bonds 3	0.3889					
Family Bonds 4	0.2088					-0.3165
Family Bonds 5	0.3002					

The seven items that I retained for my short scale are the ones that loaded most-heavily on the virtue/violence factor. They are as follows: (1) "It is important for a person to be tougher than other people"; (2) "A person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp"; (3) "You would praise a person who reacted aggressively to an insult"; (4) "Sometimes aggression is admirable and acceptable"; (5) "It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight"; (6) "A person who doesn't 'take any crap' from

anyone is an admirable reputation to have"; and (7) "Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself".

These questions nicely capture an individual's abhorrence of violence. My argument is that a new short scale estimated from these questions, while derived from closely related honor beliefs, is cleaner not only because it does not impose gender expectations on respondents, but because it is comprised of items directly related to violence and not honor more broadly. To determine goodness of fit, I used structural equation modeling to examine the construct validity of my new, truncated scale. Fit indices for the scale determined an acceptable fit: ($p > X^2 = .00$; RMSEA = .08; CFI = .95; TLI .93; SRMR = .03). Each of these diagnostic tests confirmed that my gender-neutral short scale meets or exceeds standards for fit indices laid out in prior literature (Hair et al. 2010; Awang 2012; and Hu & Bentler, 1999).

Sex Differences

Despite the removal of gendered language, male respondents again scored significantly higher on "It is important for a person to be tougher than other people" ($t = 4.66$, $p < .001$); "A person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp" ($t = 6.32$, $p < .001$); "You would praise a person who reacted aggressively to an insult" ($t = 4.76$, $p < .001$); "Sometimes aggression is admirable and acceptable" ($t = 3.26$, $p < .001$); "It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight" ($t = 5.19$, $p < .001$); "A person who doesn't 'take any crap' from anyone is an admirable reputation to have" ($t = 1.76$, $p = .04$); and "Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself" ($t = 5.22$, $p < .001$).

This is not especially surprising because despite the gender-neutral question items, many respondents are likely envisioning male behavior when reading these statements. Male respondents were more likely to endorse these gender-neutral attitudes toward violence and scored significantly higher than females on the full 7-item non-gendered scale ($t = 6.25$, with 1047 degrees of freedom, $p < .001$).

Recall that the full 35-item gender-neutral honor scale produced sharp declines in the strength of association with benevolent sexism (-.15); hostile sexism (-.07); and conservatism (-.11). While scores on the truncated 7-item violence scale again correlated significantly with these other variables, the strength of correlation dropped markedly further with benevolent sexism (-.18); hostile sexism (-.13); and conservatism (-.17). This lends further support for my claim that my new scale is capturing attitudes toward violence rather than honor beliefs or gender stereotypes. For a comparison of correlation coefficients across the 35-item masculine honor scale (MHBS); the 35-item gender-neutral honor scale (HBS); and the truncated 7-item anti-violence scale (ATV); (see Table 3.4.2 below).

Table 3.4.2 | Correlation Coefficients across Scales

	MHBS	HBS	ATV
Trait Agression	0.384***	0.465***	0.408***
Benevolent Sexism	0.731***	0.587***	0.280***
Hostile Sexism	0.529***	0.458***	0.324***
Conservatism	0.426***	0.319***	0.154***

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

This new short-form scale was constructed to measure a person's attitudes toward violence as independently from other attitudes as possible. The truncated version of my scale is a worthy and defensible modification of both the full-item MHBS and the gender-

neutral HBS for the purposes of this project. I expected that the short scale would exhibit weaker correlations with benevolent sexism, hostile sexism, and conservatism when compared to the long form MHBS and the long form gender neutral HBS respectively. Table 3.4.1 supports my expectations.

It was not possible to produce a measure of attitudes toward violence *entirely* free from gender-role expectations, most likely because people in the United States are often socialized to believe that violence is a male-exclusive behavior. However, the gender-neutral short scale produced sharp declines in correlation strength with the other variables as I predicted it should. This new scale should help me better understand how attitudes toward gender and attitudes toward violence, independently and/or interactively, help shape violence-related policy preferences and perceptions of victims and perpetrators.

Some might argue that the impressive declines in correlation I did find are a result of the shorter scale itself – that fewer question items produced a poorly measured concept of gender-neutral attitudes toward violence. To address this possibility, I created a *masculine* short scale using the same question items I retained for the short-form gender-neutral scale, but with their original wording intact. The gender-neutral short scale again produced sharp declines in correlation strength, compared to the gendered parallel, with benevolent sexism (-.11); hostile sexism (-.09); and conservatism (-.11) compared to the masculine version of the same questions.

Others might question whether gender-neutral honor beliefs will correlate with or help predict something that the original MHBS will not (or vice-versa). Saucier et al. (2015) demonstrate that masculine honor beliefs are associated with perceptions of rape and women who have been raped. If my new measures for gender-neutral honor are

cleaner (i.e. less tangled up with gender stereotypes) they should correlate with rape myth acceptance less strongly than the masculine worded versions.

Recall that respondents were also asked to complete question items involving rape myth acceptance (Gerger et al. 2007). Intercorrelations for the full 35-item masculine honor scale (MHBS), the 7-item masculine anti-violence short scale (MATV), the full 35-item gender-neutral honor scale (HBS), and my 7-item gender-neutral anti-violence scale (ATV), are provided; (see Table 3.4.3 below).

Table 3.4.3 | Correlations Including Rape Myth Acceptance

	MHBS	MATV	HBS	ATV
Trait Agression	0.384***	0.336***	0.465***	0.408***
Benevolent Sexism	0.731***	0.394***	0.587***	0.280***
Hostile Sexism	0.529***	0.411***	0.458***	0.324***
Conservatism	0.426***	0.263***	0.319***	0.154***
Rape Myth Acceptance	**0.455*** **	**0.397*** **	**0.439*** **	**0.319*** **

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Stripping the gendered imposed language from the questions produced a subtle decline in the strength of association with individuals' endorsement of rape myth acceptance on the 35-item gender-neutral scale (-.02), and the 7-item gender-neutral short scale (-.08). While the decline in correlation strength across these scales played out as expected, multiple regression analysis should allow me to determine whether my gender-neutral scales predict something that the masculine versions do not – that is – respondents' propensity to endorse rape myths while controlling for other factors.

Rape Myth Acceptance

While early research on sexual violence focused primarily on perceptions of victims and blame attributions for incidents of stranger rape (Acock & Ireland 1983),

date, acquaintance, and marital rape have gained attention more recently (Russell 1990). We know that gender role expectations are one set of underlying attitudes that contribute to the occurrence of sexual violence. For example, as Simonson and Subich point out, "For men to fulfill the role expected of them by society they must be dominant, powerful, sexually aggressive, and able to gain sexual access to reluctant women. In order for women to fulfill their expected societal role, they must be fragile, passive, submissive, yet still responsible for controlling the extent of their sexual activity (1999, 1).

Research shows (Mayerson & Taylor 1987) that individuals who embrace stereotypical gender roles are more likely to endorse rape myths. Because both forms of sexism included in this study serve to justify and maintain traditional gender roles, I predict that respondents scoring higher on the overall measure of Ambivalent Sexism will be more likely to endorse rape myths. Thus, I derive the following hypothesis:

H1. *On average, respondents scoring higher on Ambivalent Sexism will be more accepting of rape myths.*

However, I also argue that it is important to partition out the Ambivalent Sexism subscales to examine the independent effects of hostile versus benevolent sexism. While closely related, hostile sexists seek to *punish* non-traditional women, while benevolent sexists seek to *protect* women in traditional roles. As the creators of the scale point out, "BS is the 'carrot' – the reward of positive affect, esteem, and protectiveness given to women who embrace traditional gender roles; HS is the 'stick' – the hostility that women who reject traditional roles in favor of taking on traditionally masculine roles face from those wishing to 'keep them in their place' (Glick & Fiske 1996, 129). Because both forms of sexism endorse coercion as a tool to maintain traditional gender roles, I predict

that respondents scoring higher on my measures of benevolent and hostile sexism will be more likely to endorse rape myths. However, I expect that hostile sexism will have a greater effect than benevolent sexism. Based on these insights I derive the following hypothesis:

> H2. *On average, respondents scoring higher on Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism will be more accepting of rape myths. However, this correlation will be greater for those scoring higher on Hostile Sexism.*

Recall that the goal of this analysis is to determine whether my gender-neutral honor scale predicts something that the masculine version does not predict. Because both versions measure honor beliefs, and because both are positively associated with rape myth acceptance, it is likely that respondents scoring higher on *either* scale will be more accepting of rape myths. However, the gender-imposed nature of the masculine honor scale likely masks the differences we should see between males and females when it comes to rape attitudes. We know, for instance that females, on average, are much less likely than males to endorse rape myths (Burt 1980; Anderson & Cummings 1993), but early studies did not include measures for gender-role expectations or traditionalism. More recent work (Simonson & Subich 1999) provides evidence that gender role beliefs, and the embrace of traditionalism that one acquires through early socialization, may be a better predictor of rape attitudes than an individual's biological sex. If true, removing the gendered language from the masculine honor scale should unmask the fact that females, on average, are less likely than males to endorse rape myths. In light of these propositions I derive the following hypotheses:

$H3_a$. *On average, an individual's gender will not add significantly to the prediction of rape attitudes beyond masculine honor beliefs.*

$H3_b$. *Because the gender-neutral nature of my modified scale extracts gender-role beliefs it will allow us to see that females, on average, are less likely than males to endorse rape myths.*

The first column of Table 3.4.4 shows the results of a regression analysis of rape myth acceptance on ambivalent sexism. The results provide support for H1: that *on average, respondents scoring higher on Ambivalent Sexism are more accepting of rape myths*. Rape myth acceptance increased by (+0.04) for every one unit increase in ambivalent sexism. I then partitioned out hostile sexism from benevolent sexism to obtain the independent effects of each on respondents' rape attitudes. The second column shows the results of a multiple-regression analysis which provides support for H2: *On average, respondents scoring higher on Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism are more accepting of rape myths. However, this effect is greater for those scoring higher on Hostile Sexism.* Rape myth acceptance increased by (+0.61) for every one unit increase in hostile sexism and increased by (+0.25) for every one unit increase in benevolent sexism.

Next, to explore the differences between the original masculine honor scale and my modified gender-neutral version, I dropped the sexism measures to examine the effect of honor beliefs and other control variables. In the third column of Table 3.4.3, I report the results of a multiple-regression analysis of rape myth acceptance on masculine honor. As expected, masculine honor beliefs had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that respondents would accept rape myths, all else equal. Respondents' likelihood to accept these myths increased by (+0.59) for every one unit increase in

masculine honor. Additionally, these results provide support for $H3_a$; that *on average, an individual's gender will not add significantly to the prediction of rape attitudes beyond masculine honor beliefs.* Respondents' sex did not have a significant effect on their likelihood to endorse rape myths when controlling for masculine honor beliefs and other factors. Females were no more likely to reject rape myths than males!

Finally, in the fourth column in Table 3.4.3, I report the results of a multiple-regression analysis of rape myth acceptance on gender-neutral honor. As expected, gender-neutral honor beliefs also had a positive and significant effect on respondents' belief in rape myths. The likelihood to accept these myths increased by (+0.63) for every one unit increase in gender-neutral honor, all else equal. However, these results provide support for $H3_b$; that *because the gender-neutral nature of my modified scale extracts gender-role beliefs it will allow us to see that females, on average, are less likely than males to endorse rape myths.* In this model, respondents' sex *was* a positive and significant predictor of their likelihood to endorse rape myths when controlling for gender-neutral honor and other factors. Female respondents scored (-0.43) lower, on average, on rape myth acceptance, all else equal. However, once hostile and benevolent sexism were incorporated in Model 5 and Model 6, biological sex is was no longer a significant predictor of rape myth acceptance.

Table 3.4.4 | Effect of Honor Beliefs and Sexism on Rape Myth Acceptance

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 6
Ambivalent Sexism	0.04 **					
	(0.019)					
Hostile Sexism		0.606 ***			0.545 ***	0.593 ***
		(0.029)			*(0.051)*	*(0.048)*
Benevolent Sexism		0.251 ***			0.144 **	0.216 ***
		(0.030)			*(0.057)*	*(0.051)*
Age			-0.009 **	0.006	-0.006 *	-0.008 *
			(0.004)	*(0.004)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.004)*
Income			-0.007	-0.015	-0.001	-0.013
			(0.022)	*(0.023)*	*(0.020)*	*(0.020)*
Education			0.06	0.036	0.088 **	0.125 ***
			(0.048)	*(0.049)*	*(0.043)*	*(0.043)*
Female			-0.135	-0.428 ***	-0.011	-0.123
			(0.121)	*(0.126)*	*(0.110)*	*(0.111)*
White			0.221	-0.092	0.244	-0.104
			(0.178)	*(0.002)*	*(0.161)*	*(0.169)*
Black			0.194	0.348	0.299	0.087
			(0.266)	*(0.260)*	*(0.241)*	*(0.226)*
Married			0.041	0.094	0.012	-0.012
			(0.132)	*(0.131)*	*(0.12)*	*(0.113)*
Masculine Honor Beliefs			0.585 ***		0.174 **	
			(0.066)		*(0.083)*	
Gender-Neutral Honor Beliefs				0.634 ***		0.158 *
				(0.077)		*(0.080)*
Observations	1049	1049	523	526	523	526
Adj. R^2	0.42	0.42	0.28	0.24	0.41	0.42

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

Anti-Violence Values

In the previous analysis I was able to demonstrate that my new measure, in large part, removes the gender role expectations that the masculine honor beliefs scale (MHBS) was created to capture (Saucier et al. 2016). My reason for doing so, ultimately, was to create a shorter battery by retaining only those question items most directly related to attitudes toward violence. As I stated earlier in the chapter, it might seem straightforward to use an existing scale that directly asks people about their attitudes toward violence, but that is actually much more difficult than it seems. Most existing survey items designed to

assess attitudes toward violence inevitably frame them in policy terms that distract from the underlying cultural values of interest to me. I tried using an adapted General Violence measure already appearing in the literature (Schnabel 2018), but the question items did not hold together well as a scale and, instead of capturing attitudes toward violence they appeared to reflect political ideology (Conservatism). Rather than use those measures, therefore, I turned to a scale used in the Honor Beliefs literature (Saucier 2016) that – with adaption – got me much closer to what I needed.

To this point, however, I have not tested the predictive power of my anti-violence values scale. Recall that my new, gender-neutral scale includes seven question items assessing individuals' level of abhorrence toward violence. These seven items tap either the belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is often acceptable if not required. Remember, these were also the least popular question items, which suggests that on average, respondents do *not* endorse violence as a social tool. Accordingly, I scaled these items such that higher scores on the scale indicate a greater aversion to violence. My goal in subsequent chapters, therefore, is to examine whether anti-violence values help shape individuals' perceptions of victims and perpetrators of violence, or personal preferences in terms of violence-related public policies. Steven Pinker argues that the steep decline in human beings' taste for violence has "been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence, and often the attitudes are in the lead" (2011, xxii). While I do not have the necessary data to engage the author's claim that violence has declined over time, I have created a scale that will allow me to test the substantive importance of anti-violence attitudes in subsequent chapters.

My new measure represents an individual's abhorrence of violence in the abstract. My argument is that this new short scale, while derived from closely related honor beliefs, is cleaner – not only because it does not impose gender expectations on respondents, but because it is comprised of items directly related to violence and not honor more broadly. If true, I would expect my scale to help predict individuals' willingness to endorse rape myths. Specifically, I expect that the more an individual rejects violence, the less likely they are to endorse attitudes that vilify (or blame) victims of sexual assault and/or rape. Stated as a formal hypothesis:

H4. *On average, respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely to endorse beliefs that blame victims of rape, all else equal.*

Table 3.4.5 | Effect of Anti-Violence Values on Rape Myth Acceptance

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5
Age	-0.006 *	0.008 *	0.008 *	0.008 **	0.008 **
	(0.003)	*(0.004)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.033)*
Education	0.042	0.001	0.013	0.028	0.109 **
	(0.036)	*(0.049)*	*(0.048)*	*(0.047)*	*(0.012)*
Income	0.001	0.011	-0.014	-0.009	-0.013
	(0.017)	*(0.022)*	*(0.022)*	*(0.022)*	*(0.019)*
Female	-0.474 ***	-0.351 ***	-0.316 **	-0.298 **	-0.085
	(0.091)	*(0.126)*	*(0.124)*	*(0.122)*	*(0.111)*
Black	0.562 ***	0.358	0.291	0.166	0.071
	(0.196)	*(0.257)*	*(0.254)*	*(0.251)*	*(0.224)*
White	0.029	-0.091	-0.091	-0.054	-0.102
	(0.141)	*(0.194)*	*(0.191)*	*(0.188)*	*(0.168)*
Married	0.118	0.089	0.084	0.044	-0.011
	(0.009)	*(0.129)*	*(0.127)*	*(0.125)*	*(0.112)*
Conservative	0.319 ***	0.211 ***	0.176 ***	0.144 ***	0.026
	(0.027)	*(0.036)*	*(0.036)*	*(0.036)*	*(0.034)*
Anti-Violence		-0.305 ***	-0.215 ***	-0.202 ***	-0.105 ***
		(0.033)	*(0.039)*	*(0.039)*	*(0.035)*
Gender-Neutral Honor			0.371 ***	0.187 **	0.052
			(0.089)	*(0.097)*	*(0.087)*
Benevolent Sexism				0.249 ***	0.208 ***
				(0.056)	*(0.050)*
Hostile Sexism					0.559 ***
					(0.048)
Observations	1049	526	526	526	526
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.26	0.28	0.31	0.45

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

In Model 1 of Table 3.4.5, I report the results of a multi-regression analysis of rape myth acceptance on control variables commonly used in related studies. As expected, females were significantly less likely (-.47) than males to endorse rape myths. Additionally, conservatism produced a positive and significant effect such that for every one unit increase in conservatism, on average, respondents were more likely (+.32) to endorse rape myths.

In Model 2, I incorporate my measure of anti-violence values and find a significant and *negative* effect such that for every one unit increase in anti-violence sentiment, on average, respondents were less likely (-.31) to endorse rape myths. On its face, it would seem as though anti-violence values are the real thing. In Model 3, gender-neutral honor beliefs had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that respondents would accept rape myths, all else equal. Respondents' likelihood to accept these myths increased (+.37) for every one unit increase in gender-neutral honor. In the fourth column, I incorporated benevolent sexism into the analysis. I found a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that respondents would accept rape myths, all else equal. Respondents' likelihood to accept these myths increased (+.25) for every one unit increase in gender-neutral honor, all else equal.

Model 5 represents my fully specified model and provides strong support for H4; that *on average, respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely to endorse beliefs that blame victims of rape, all else equal.* Respondents' likelihood to accept these myths decreased (-.11) for every one unit increase in anti-violence values. This effect remained significant despite the inclusion of measures for benevolent (+.21) and hostile (+.56) sexism which, when included in the fully specified model, resulted in a

respondent's sex not producing a significant effect on their likelihood to endorse rape myths, all else equal.

3.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was twofold; first, to develop and test a gender-neutral honor scale in large part free from expectations of male behavior and next, to extract from that battery a reliable measure for anti-violence values. In this section, I was able to demonstrate that my new measure is well equipped to parse out the independent and/or interactive roles of sexism and attitudes toward violence, and I was able to do so using data collected from a substantial sample of Mechanical Turk workers.

My modifications to a popular measure of masculine honor (Saucier et al. 2016) produced sharp declines in the overall strength of association between my gender-neutral honor scale and both hostile, and benevolent, sexism compared to the masculine version. This finding was consistent for both males and females. The gender-neutral scale also produced sharp declines in the overall strength of association between conservatism and the original measure. While I must admit that I was not able to *entirely* divorce gender attitudes from honor beliefs, I did provide strong support for the utility of my scale and evidence that it performs in a consistent manner theoretically distinct from its gendered counterpart.

Using principal component analysis, I was able to then extract from the 35-item gender-neutral honor questions the 7 items most directly focused on attitudes toward violence. I scaled this variable such that higher scores indicate individuals' increasing abhorrence of violence. My new measure performed as theoretically expected when

included in a multiple regression model predicting rape myth acceptance. In subsequent chapters, it will allow me to more clearly examine the independent roles that stereotypes (e.g. sexism and racism) and attitudes toward violence play in predicting perceptions of victims and violence-related public policy preferences.

CHAPTER 4. PERCEPTIONS OF RAPE VICTIMS AND SUPPORT FOR RELATED PUBLIC POLICIES

4.1 Introduction

Brock Turner, a former swimmer at Stanford University was found guilty in 2015 of sexually assaulting, with intent to rape, an unconscious woman behind a campus dumpster. The victim, known to the public only as "Emily Doe", provided a lengthy and emotional impact statement detailing the horror of her experience. In part the statement read: "You took away my worth, my privacy, my energy, my time, my intimacy, my confidence, and my own voice" ("Doe" in Bever 2016). Judge Aaron Persky sentenced Turner to only six months in jail followed by probation. He reasoned that a harsher prison sentence would have a severe impact on *Turner* who, in the end, served only three months.[4]

First person accounts given by rape victims exhibit a recurring theme: The trauma does not end when the attack ceases but is perpetuated through the reactions exhibited by others who learn of the tragic event. Insensitive police officers, aloof medical staff, and avoidant family members all contribute to a sense of alienation experienced by victims. Yet, despite the central role played by individual attitudes in shaping the perpetuation, experience, and policy environment in which sexual assault and rape occurs, the public-opinion literature offers only limited guidance for understanding it.

Sexual violence and rape are notoriously difficult to measure and there is no single source of data available to provide researchers a clear, or entirely accurate picture of these crimes. Researchers often rely on both the Bureau of Justice Statistics' National

[4] In mid-July (2018) Judge Persky was recalled from office. The last time a California jurist was recalled from the bench was 86 years prior.

Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) – which measures crimes reported, and not reported to law enforcement – and the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program administered by the FBI, which measures those that are reported in order to estimate the prevalence of sexual violence in America. These crimes are underreported for a variety of reasons including the belief that police would not or could not do anything to help. In fact, research suggests that rape is the most underreported crime of all, and that 63% of incidents go unreported (Rennison 2002). According to one study, the conviction rate for reported rapes is less than 10% (Frazier et al. 1994) and based on the 2018 NCVS, the percentage of sexual victimizations reported to police declined from 40% in 2017, to 25% the following year.

Even though the UCR and the NCVS provide a complementary assessment of sexual violence in the United States, the official numbers they produce are often much lower than those obtained by other agencies and private organizations. Additionally, statistics alone fail to capture the looming danger that individuals face, females in particular, when it comes to violent victimization.[5] For example, approximately one in five women will be raped at some point during their lives, and 20% - 25% of college women will become victims of forced sex during their time in college (Cullen et al. 2000; Black et al. 2011). Because negative stigmas are often placed upon victims of sexual violence, and because they often fear that they will not be believed, many of these crimes go unreported. These incidents of violence not only cause serious psychological damage and significant short or long-term impacts on victims, such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD); they cost the United States more money than any other crime ($127

[5] 91% of victims of rape and sexual assault are female and 9% are male (Rennison 2002).

billion annually) outpacing assault, murder, and even drunk driving (Miller et al. 1996; Black et al. 2011).

Contributions to, and Extensions of Prior Literature

Rape is widely recognized as an act of power and violence (Anderson & Swainson 2001) rather than eroticism, yet research in this realm tends to focus solely on gender attitudes and stereotypes while ignoring individuals' orientations toward violence. For instance, much of this scholarship, (Spence et al. 1973; Muehlenhard et al. 1985) centers on gender attitudes and stereotypes *alone* as explanations for perceptions of rape victims and evaluations of sexual crimes. However, tolerance for a violent sexual act might reflect attitudes toward violence rather than attitudes toward gender. In this chapter, I use my adapted anti-violence values scale (created in Chapter 3) to determine whether individuals who condemn violence, on average, are more likely to:

- Believe a victim's claim that she was raped;
- Recommend a long prison sentence for her convicted rapist;
- Support increased spending on policies to assist victims of sexual violence; and
- Personally advocate for those victims

I extend and contribute to this literature by: 1) providing theoretical and empirical support for my claim that anti-violence values do not always translate to positive perceptions of rape victims or support for policies and services to assist those victims; 2) providing additional empirical support for my broader argument that any normatively

positive effects of anti-violence values are (in most cases) absent once moderator variables (violence-justifying ideologies) are included in the model; 3) examining whether violence-justifying ideologies also moderate individuals decision to (not to) impose harsh prison sentences on convicted rapists; and 4) replicating most of these findings across multiple large *N* datasets. To the best of my knowledge these important factors have never been incorporated into empirical models predicting support for victims of sexual violence, policies to assist those victims, or punitive measures to crack down on sexual predators. This research builds on recent work on ambivalent sexism and attitudes toward rape victims (Brown & Pehrson 2019; Becker & Wright 2011) but expands on this research by: 1) including a large, and more representative sample (not just undergraduates), and 2) incorporating my new measure of anti-violence values.

The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I provide an historical overview of interest group efforts to influence public opinion and promote institutional reforms to address violence against women. These are formal, and informal groups that collaborate to influence public policy and provide information and resources to the public and to lawmakers. Many of these advocates play pivotal roles reducing violence against women and fostering social and institutional change in the United States. Next, I review some of the difficulties advocates encounter as they navigate an ever-changing political landscape. For example, it is challenging to convince lawmakers to support – and ultimately implement – programs and policies that require significant increases in government spending. Without strong public support for policies to reduce sexual violence and assist victims, lawmakers often lack the political will to act. Finally, extending upon my analyses in chapter three, I re-introduce specific violence-justifying

ideologies (e.g. hostile and benevolent sexism) which I argue attenuate the otherwise positive force of anti-violence values. I present empirical evidence that those who endorse violence-justifying attitudes (sexism in the current analysis) are less likely to support victims of sexual violence, or policies and services to assist those victims. This is *especially* true for those most opposed to violence.

4.2 Feminist Movements to Redress Violence against Women

Violence against women – sexual or otherwise – is a serious problem worldwide and is now viewed as a question of human rights. While most people would agree that such violence should be prohibited by law, this was not always so. In fact, as recently as 1999 the Eurobarometer survey indicated that one in three Europeans believed violence against women should not be considered a crime (Htun & Weldon 2012). And in the United States, prior to the Violence against Women Act signed into law by President Clinton in 1994, the criminal justice system did not provide strong legal protections for victims. In the not-too-distant past rape was regarded only as a crime against a man's property; it was not until the 1960s that the feminist movement helped to achieve significant reforms in American rape law.

Htun & Weldon (2012) suggest that VAW is rarely raised as a priority among social justice and human rights organizations without pressure from feminists. They remind us that many human rights groups did not even recognize rape as a violation of women's rights until pressured by feminists in the 1990s to do so. VAW advocates face many obstacles, however, because their efforts challenge male privilege and male domination (Elman 1996). In fact, efforts to address violence against women represent a direct threat to established gender roles in most places (Gelb & Palley 1996).

Policy scholars (Kingdon 1984; Heikkila & Gerlak 2013) understand that social movements play a primary role in getting new issues onto legislative agendas. Feminist movements in particular work tirelessly to foment broad support for policies to address violence against women, but to address these problems requires direct challenges to historical social and legal norms that perpetuate women's vulnerability (Rochon & Mazmanian 1993). From a policy standpoint legal reforms, counseling and shelter, training for first responders and judges, and public education are all important tools to address VAW (Htun & Weldon 2012, 550).

The authors argue that feminist mobilization – more so than progressive parties, women in government, or other political and economic arrangements – explains variation in the development of policies to address violence against women internationally. Additional research suggests that interest organizations and social movements play a pivotal role in terms of democratic responsiveness, which enhances the impact of public opinion. In a sweeping review on the topic, Burstein found that the "impact of opinion on policy is most likely to be statistically significant when more than one organization is taken into account…less when only one organization is included…and least likely when no organizations are included in the movement (2003, 35). The transnational movement fighting violence against women, spearheaded by feminist activists, has successfully mobilized to promote several international agreements. Their continued success, however, will require the sustained support of the broader public in general, and law makers in particular.

Decreasing violence requires the efforts of transnational organizations demanding reforms from the outside and working to change negative perceptions of victims. That is,

legal reforms alone will be insufficient without parallel changes in attitudes due to the role that police play in arresting, district attorneys in charging, and judges and jurors in determining guilt and sentencing. Combating "rape culture" requires targeted efforts to break down stereotypes and educate citizens. As Htun and Weldon point out, "In places with less active feminist movements (such as Kuwait), as many women as men support 'rape myths', that is, commonly believed falsehoods about sexual assault" (2012, 553). A strong women's movement can capture the attention and support of the general public and convince politicians to place institutional reforms on legislative agendas. This is true worldwide; in their exhaustive analysis of social movements spanning 70 countries over four decades, the authors discovered that feminist mobilization had the greatest impact on the development of programs to address VAW (2012). Yet, all of these programs require substantial funding, and lawmakers often lack the political will to address social issues without broad support from the public.

4.3 Political Science and VAW Policy Implications

Mayhew recognized politicians as "single-minded seekers of re-election" who pay close attention to the preferences of their constituents (1974). This helps explain why congruence between shifts in public opinion and subsequent public policy adoptions are common, especially when opinion on salient issues is stable (Page & Shapiro 1983; Burstein 2003). Responsiveness to public opinion on specific legislation can be more difficult, however, because it is hard for legislators to predict how the public will view specific narrow bills. Instead, politicians will focus on the liberal versus conservative "mood" of their constituents as most issues can be situated on this single dimension (Poole & Rosenthal 1997; Peterson et al. 2003; Nicholas-Crotty et al. 2009). However,

other research suggests that public opinion on some issues of politics and policy does not fit so neatly on a single dimension (Stimson 1999), and that citizens are capable of finer distinctions, beyond the ideological, when evaluating policies (Jacobs & Shapiro 2000).

For instance, some scholars argue that public opinion toward punitive criminal justice policies is stable and reluctant to change (Mooney & Lee 1999; 2000; Stimson 2004). As Nicholson-Crotty et al. put it, "Because criminal justice policy is an area where the public exhibits stable and genuine opinions and are likely to use these considerations on election day, policy-makers are likely to be able to sense general attitudes about crime and punishment that are separate from broader preferences for more or less spending, and will adjust criminal justice policy in response to shifts in these attitudes" (2009, 631).

We know that many individuals have well-developed opinions on government spending. Jacoby (1994) examined public attitudes across a set of ten public policies and determined that citizens support spending on a wide range of social programs. He looked at program specific spending preferences – welfare versus non-welfare initiatives – and found that these represent two different components of public opinion toward government spending. In regards to welfare related programs, Jacoby determined that "government spending attitudes are responsive to most of the same factors that affect other political attitudes, such as party identification, ideology, etc."; and when asked about spending in the abstract, "most citizens seem to translate the phrase 'government spending' into 'government spending on programs that could benefit the poor, blacks, and other disadvantaged groups" (1994, 354). As a result, there is a significant level of public opposition to such spending. While Jacoby did not include services for crime victims in his analysis, one might surmise that individuals who are receptive to increased

government spending in the abstract would also support increased spending to serve victims of violent crime specifically.

Attitudes toward government spending are important to consider because, as I mentioned before, programs to address violence against women and assist survivors require substantial funding, and lawmakers often lack the political will to address social issues without public support. Morrow et al. (2004) examined Canadian spending and found a direct link between cuts in social entitlements and threats to women who are attempting to escape or evade sexual violence. The authors concluded that the "dismantling of the social welfare state alongside policy changes that are affecting how the state responds to violence against women is significantly undermining women's equality, their safety, and the feminist anti-violence movement" (2004, 358). Survivors of sexual violence often depend upon social welfare benefits as they attempt to escape violent partners and rebuild their lives; budget cuts or decreased spending on social services erodes the capacity of women's organizations to assist victims. Reductions in funding for health care, education, women's shelters, grass roots feminist organizations, legal aid, and many other services including economic support, transportation, and childcare assistance make it difficult for victims to break the chains of violence.

Looking at budget cuts in Britain, Towers and Walby (2012) found that reductions in spending led to sharp declines in the number of victims that women's shelters were able to accommodate, a decline in police and court services, a drop in programs available to educate perpetrators upon re-entry, and a steep reduction across a wide range of additional government funded services to assist victims of sexual violence. The authors warned, "There have been and continue to be significant cuts in the funds for

VAW services and services used in relation to VAW. These cuts in service provisions are expected to lead to increases in this violence" (2012, 40).

4.4 Anti-Violence Values, Sexual Assault, and Rape

An individual's orientation toward violence should help shape their attitudes toward victims – and perpetrators – of sexual violence. Specifically, I expect that individuals who are averse to violence will sympathize more with victims, and advocate for more resources to assist survivors and decrease the frequency of these crimes in the United States. It is less clear, however, whether violence averse individuals would support harsh prison sentences for convicted rapists. For instance, violence averse individuals who for some reason doubt a victim's claim that she was actually raped might consider a lengthy prison term for the "falsely accused" a form of violence.

To empirically test the numerous hypotheses that I present in this chapter, I draw upon data from four unique surveys. Anti-violence values were assessed with the inductively specified scale presented in chapter 3 (see Table 4.4.1). Independent and dependent variables of interest are not uniform in all cases (sample A and B included the inferior deductive ant-violence scale) or across all survey samples, so findings are reported where available throughout the relevant subsections herein. Sample A administered pilot items, in online questionnaire form, to 221 students enrolled in an introductory American Government course at the University of Kentucky. Sample B

administered additional question items to 311 unique Mechanical Turk workers.[6] Sample C included the seven-item anti-violence values measure which I produced using principal component analysis to narrow the range of violence related questions in the full honor beliefs battery to seven empirically identified items. This survey was administered to 1,049 unique Mechanical Turk workers. Finally, sample D also included the inductive seven-item anti-violence values measure and was administered to 923 unique Mechanical Turk workers.[7]

Table 4.4.1 | Survey Samples for Sexual Violence Analyses [8]

SURVEY	DATE	SAMPLE	TYPE	MHBS	HBS	DEDUCTIVE ANTI-VIOLENCE	INDUCTIVE ANTI-VIOLENCE
Sample A	4/21/2018	N = 221	Student Pilot	✗	✗	✓	✗
Sample B	5/11/2018	N = 311	M-Turk	✗	✗	✓	✗
Sample C	10/14/2019	N = 1049	M-Turk	✓	✓	✗	✓
Sample D	2/10/2020	N = 923	M-Turk	✗	✗	✗	✓

[6] Deductive Scale: "An individual should not be afraid to fight"; "People should be expected to fight for themselves"; "You would want your child to stand up to bullies"; "A person who doesn't 'take any crap' from anybody is an admirable reputation to have"; "It is a person's responsibility to protect their family"; "If an individual is insulted, that person's pride is insulted"; "A person's family should be their number one priority".

[7] Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: "It is important for a person to be tougher than other people"; A person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp"; You would praise a person who acted aggressively to an insult"; "Epstein did not kill himself"; "Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable"; "It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight"; "A person who doesn't take any crap from anybody is an admirable reputation to have"; and "Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself".

[8] Data for sample A, B, and C were collected for project entitled *"How Attitudes toward Violence and Race Influence Public Policy Preferences"*; University of Kentucky IRB approval # 16-0045-P45. Data for sample D was collected for project entitled *"Violence Justifying Attitudes"*; University of Kentucky IRB approval # 50335.

The anti-violence values short-scale that I created in chapter 3 does not impose gender expectations on respondents – it is comprised of question items directly measuring individuals' rejection of violence broadly. Because female respondents scored significantly higher on this scale, compared to males in the previous chapter, I derive the following hypothesis:

> $H1_{a:}$ "*On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values when compared to males."*

The correlational findings and regression analyses performed in chapter three provide other clues for how I might expect my inductively derived anti-violence values measure to perform. However, I have not yet examined the role of those values in shaping individual evaluations of specific *acts* of violence. In the current chapter, therefore, I present and empirically test several theories to explain not only perceptions of a victim of rape, but willingness to impose harsh punitive consequences upon her rapist.

We know that negative stigmas are commonly placed upon victims of sexual violence, and because victims often fear that they will not be believed, many of these crimes go unreported. Extensive research (Lonsway & Fitzgerald 1994; Temkin 2010) suggests that rape myths, or false stereotypes about rapists and rape victims, can lead individuals to blame a victim of sexual violence, or at least question (her) honesty. Perhaps the most troubling of these falsehoods is the belief that women commonly or routinely lie about rape (Hayes et al. 2013). You will recall from chapter 3 that on average, respondents who reported a greater aversion to violence were significantly less likely to endorse rape myths. Because violence-averse individuals are significantly less likely to endorse prejudicial beliefs that cast doubt upon victims of sexual violence - and

more likely to sympathize with and support such victims - I derive the following hypotheses:

> $H1_{b:}$ **"***Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped."*
>
> $H1_{c:}$ *"Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."*

While I expect that violence-averse individuals will be more likely to believe a victim's rape claim, there will inevitably be some who question whether the rape actually occurred. Believing the victim's claim is possibly the most obvious reason that individuals might recommend a lengthy prison term. Thus, the following hypothesis:

> $H1_{d:}$ **"***Respondents who believe the victim will be more likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for (her) convicted rapist"*

Much of my focus in this chapter is on whether individuals who condemn violence are more likely to support public policies to assist victims and punish perpetrators. I expect that the answer is "yes", in many cases violence-averse individuals will be significantly more likely to sympathize with, support, and demand justice for victims. However, I argue that violence-justifying ideologies have the power to dampen the effects of anti-violence sentiment. In the following pages I examine additional factors that should attenuate the otherwise positive effects of anti-violence values. When it comes to questions of sexual violence, two prejudicial belief systems (violence-justifying ideologies) warrant additional discussion. *Rape myths* and *sexism* can lead people to

excuse sexual violence and be hostile toward victims. Determination of the guilt of sexual predators, and the sentencing for their crimes are also influenced by these stereotypical beliefs (Satish 2016); I discuss each in more detail in the following sections.

4.5 Rape Myth Acceptance

Researchers have long studied the underlying causes of rape to better understand its persistence in civil society (Lalumiere 2005). Negative attitudes toward victims help perpetuate rape, and rape myths enable a perpetrator to justify his/her behavior (Buddie and Miller 2001). These negative stereotypes and misinterpretations of victims (i.e. blaming the victim) have serious implications. Beyond the fact that they cause harmful psychological damage, these prejudicial attitudes can also bleed into public policy decisions (e.g. trial outcomes and rape-related services expenditures). Social scientists have examined the consequences predispositions using a variety of research designs including mock trials (Field 1978; Ellison and Munro 2009; Mazella and Feingold 1994), rape vignettes (Sundberg and Barbaree 1991; Malamuth and Check 1980), videotape and written scenarios (Sleed et al. 2002), and newspaper reports (Seligman et al. 1977).

Across these studies there is wide consensus that on average, men are more likely than women to blame victims of sexual assault and rape, and that victim attributes (e.g. sexual experience, level of resistance, clothing and dress etc.) influence individuals' perceptions of victim credibility (Ward 1988). Such attitudes are in stark contrast to the message feminists have been working to advance for years. As Harding points out, "If the real crime of rape is the violation of another person's autonomy, the use of another person's body against their wishes, then it shouldn't matter what the victim was wearing, if she was drinking, how much sexual experience she's had before, or whether she fought

hard enough to get bruises on her knuckles and skin under her fingernails" (2015, 12). Based on these insights I derive the following hypotheses:

> $H2_{a.}$ *"On average, males will score higher on rape myth acceptance when compared to females."*
>
> $H2_{b.}$ "*Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped."*
>
> $H2_{c.}$ "*Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist."*
>
> $H2_{d.}$ *Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."*

4.6 Gender Stereotypes and Sexism

Glick and Fiske (1996) suggest that sexist attitudes include two positively associated components which, nevertheless, reflect *opposite* orientations toward women. Both sets of sexist attitudes produce negative perceptions of victims of sexual violence. The authors developed the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) to measure hostile and benevolent sexism. While hostile sexism needs little explanation, they describe benevolent sexism as "a set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms of viewing women stereotypically and in restricted roles, but that are subjectively

positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver) and also tend to elicit behavior typically characterized as pro-social (e.g. helping) or intimacy-seeking (e.g. self-disclosure)" (491).

Chapleau et al. (2007) interviewed a sample of 420 college students to examine the effect of ambivalent sexism on rape myth acceptance. The authors found evidence that hostile sexism is associated with greater endorsement of rape myths, but benevolent sexism (when operationalized as a unitary construct) had no significant effect. However, the component of benevolent sexism focused on the belief that women are "refined" ladies was positively and significantly associated, which seems to indicate that when women violate this stereotype, they are perceived to be at least partially responsible for being attacked sexually.

Another study of men and women in Turkey and Brazil (Glick et al. 2002) honed on ambivalent sexism and attitudes about wife abuse. Again, both forms of sexism were demonstrated to positively correlate with attitudes legitimizing violence. Once more, benevolent sexism was unrelated to such attitudes when hostile sexism was controlled for in the model. The authors reasoned that "the ostensible protectiveness of benevolent sexism is contingent, failing to shield women from abuse if they are deemed to have challenged a husband's authority or violated conventional gender roles" (Glick et al. 2002, 292). Or as Harding puts it, "If the real crime of rape is sullying a pure woman with the filth and sin of sex – making her 'damaged goods' in the eyes of other men – then of course it matters whether she was a virgin, and what kind of situations she willingly "put herself" in, and whether she deliberately risked further physical injury to demonstrate her refusal" (2015, 12).

Important to the current discussion is the idea that "ambivalence may be evident in both an unconflicted form, in which different subtypes of women elicit either extremely negative reactions, as well as a conflicted form, in which particular female targets activate both hostile and benevolent motives" (Glick & Fiske 1996, 494). Thus, survey items attempting to tap benevolent sexism may suffer because they return positive responses for different reasons from different people: from hostile sexists because they seem to put a woman in her place, from others because they feel genuinely supportive or protective. In sum, research involving hostile and benevolent sexism (e.g. Sakalh 2007; Chapleau 2007) provides consistent support for the fact that higher levels of each produce negative attitudes toward rape victims, but numerous studies (Glick et al. 2002; Abrams et al. 2003; Sakalh 2007; and Chapleau et al. 2007) have found that benevolent sexism is *not* related to attitudes toward a victim once hostile sexism is included in the model. Based upon these studies, I derive the following hypotheses:

> $H3_{a.}$ "*On average, males will score higher on both benevolent, and hostile sexism when compared to females."*
>
> $H3_{b.}$ "*Respondents who score higher on benevolent sexism will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence. However, benevolent sexism will no longer predict that support (or advocacy) once hostile sexism is controlled for in the model."*
>
> $H3_{c.}$ "*Respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."*

H3$_{d:}$ "*Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped."*

H3$_{e.}$ "*Because hostile sexists tend to blame victims, respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist."*

H3$_{f.}$ *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a rape claim."*

H3$_{g.}$ *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist."*

H3$_{h.}$ *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."*

4.7 Victim Characteristics

Research suggests a tendency for people to believe that female victims of sexual violence are at least partially to blame for the attack (Muehlenhard 1988; Whatley 1996). A females clothing, character, and demeanor are examples of variables that shape some individuals' impulse to blame her, rather than her assailant. And despite the fact that there is no longer a legal requirement that a female vigorously resist a male's sexual attempts

in order to prove that she was raped, courts continue to evaluate victim resistance when judging two critical elements of rape – non-consent and force (Anderson 1998). In fact, several scholars have noted the importance of, and link between victim characteristics and juror decisions (Brownmiller 1975; Ellison et al. 2009) and found that rape trials are especially sensitive to the influence of extra-evidential factors.

To test these hypotheses, I included a realistic experimental design for assessing the effect of victim characteristics on rape related opinion. In some of my samples respondents were asked whether they believed the victim's rape claim, and in every survey, respondents were asked to place themselves in the role of a juror and recommend a prison sentence for a convicted rapist. Each unique survey also included items to assess respondents' support for government spending on services to address sexual violence and assist victims. Participants were randomly assigned to either a control, or one of two treatment conditions which varied the characteristics and behaviors of a rape victim prior to, and after her attack. In the "Control" condition, very little information about the victim or her behavior was provided. In the "Non-Precipitory" condition, respondents heard about a "moral" victim who was portrayed as cautious, doing everything possible not only to avoid, but to resist her assailant. Finally, those who received the "Precipitory" condition were presented with a victim who might be viewed as overly accommodating and minimally resistant to her assailant.

This experimental manipulation allowed me to establish the causal effect of victim characteristics and behaviors on belief in that victim and willingness to impose a harsh sentence upon her rapist, among other sexual violence related questions of interest. Random assignment is often used to study the effects of issue framing and priming

(Iyengar et al. 1984; Kinder 1998; Druckman 2004) and, in the present analysis, any differences between the treatment groups can be directly attributed to the victim's characteristics and behavior, all else equal. Based on prior research assessing extra-evidentiary considerations common to rape cases, I derived the following hypotheses:

> $H4_{a:}$ "*Respondents presented with the "Non-Precipitory" treatment will be more likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the control."*
>
> $H4_{b:}$ "*Respondents presented with the "Non-Precipitory" treatment will be more likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to those presented the control."*
>
> $H4_{c:}$ "*Respondents presented with the "Precipitory" treatment will be less likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the control."*
>
> $H4_{d:}$ "*Respondents presented with the "Precipitory" treatment will be less likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to those presented the control."*

4.8 Data and Measurements

To test my hypotheses, I administered two pilot surveys. The first was an online questionnaire to students enrolled in an introductory American Government course at the University of Kentucky (N = 221); the second was an online questionnaire to a small sample of Mechanical Turk workers (N = 311) which prior research (Berinsky et al.

2012) concludes is acceptable for peer-reviewed projects.[9] Having gained valuable insights from those pilots, I composed additional question items and fielded two novel large sample surveys (N = 1,049; N = 923) via Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform. As noted earlier, independent and dependent variables of interest are not uniform in all cases or across all survey samples, so findings are reported where available and when appropriate.

I controlled for the effects of variables common to most empirical analyses in the social sciences including individuals' age, biological sex, education, income, marital status, and political ideology. Based on prior research, I also included several items which should be useful in characterizing individuals and their views of rape, or that might influence attitudes toward victims, perpetrators, and policies to address sexual violence. Following Jacoby (2000) I included a control for attitudes toward government spending which asked respondents to place themselves on a continuum between the following positions: 0 "Government should provide many fewer services, reduce spending a lot", and 10 "Government should provide many more services, increase spending a lot".[10] This is a crucial control variable; it is likely that some individuals who sympathize with victims of sexual violence, nevertheless, broadly oppose increases in government spending.

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[9] Berinsky et al. (2012) examined the benefits, and potential limitations of using Amazon's Mechanical Turk web-based platform for subject recruitment in Political Science Research. They found that the demographic characteristics of Mechanical Turk workers are more representative than student, or other convenience samples often used in Political Science research. When the authors used Mechanical Turk samples to replicate previous experimental studies, they found that the average treatment effects were very similar. In sum, the authors argue that the potential limitations to Mechanical Turk samples – including subject attentiveness and the prevalence of repeat survey-takers – are not much of a problem in practice.

[10] The measure for government spending preferences was included in sample A, B, and D.

In Sample D, I included a control for authoritarianism, a set of beliefs scholars have long struggled to measure. Adorno et al. (1950) developed the original F-scale (fascism) to measure the authoritarian personality. This scale was not always reliable in its time and is now considered conceptually obsolete. The most popular measure today is Altemeyer's Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale (Altemeyer 1981; 1988, 1996). However, critics argue that the RWA confounds social conservatism and authoritarianism, and that the attitudes the scale was designed to assess are often very similar to the dependent variables it is used to predict (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005).[11]

Following Hetherington et al. (2011) I used the four-item authoritarianism index which asks respondents to indicate which of two positive traits is most important for a child to have: "respect for elders" versus "independence"; "obedience" versus "self-reliance"; "curiosity" versus "good manners"; and "being considerate" versus "being well-behaved". As the authors point out, these values are "fairly well-divorced from political ideology and attitudes; therefore, the measure is unlikely to be conflated with social conservatism and is easily distinguishable from the dependent variables" (551).

In samples C and D respondents' level of aversion to violence was examined using the *inductively* derived anti-violence measure.[12] Recall that principal component analysis in Chapter 3 produced a 7-item attitudes toward violence factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) which was comprised mostly of question items from what Saucier et al. (2016)

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[11] Only sample D includes the authoritarianism scale.

[12] Sample C includes (N=526) rather than (N=1,049). This is because half of those surveyed in that batch were randomly assigned to receive the Masculine Honor Beliefs (MHBS) scale (Saucier et al. 2016) and were excluded. Data from the full sample are reported whenever possible.

identified as the "virtue" and "pride" subscales of their 35-item honor beliefs battery.[13] These seven items tap either the belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is often acceptable if not required. These also happened to be the least popular question items which suggests that most individuals do not condone violence. Respondents reported their agreement with these statements on seven-point scales ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree", and the scale was then recoded so that higher scores indicated a greater aversion to violence.

Sex Differences:

Recall $H1_{a,}$ that "*On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values when compared to males".* An independent t-test was run on each dataset to determine if there were differences in the endorsement of anti-violence values based upon the respondent's biological sex. $H1_a$ was fully supported and is visually displayed in Figure 4.8.1 below.

[13] The deductively derived scale administered in sample A and B proved inferior to the inductively derived version administered in sample C and D and is, I suspect, not really capturing attitudes toward violence. Some question items (e.g. "It is a person's responsibility to protect their family"; "If an individual is insulted, that person's pride is insulted"; "A person's family should be their number one priority") are likely not related to individuals' orientation toward violence. Results from sample A and B are omitted.

Figure 4.8.1 | Anti-Violence Values, by Sex





Females, on average, scored significantly higher on anti-violence values when compared to males in sample C and D.

Respondents' endorsement of rape myths was assessed using a truncated, 7-item version of the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale Short Form (IRMA-SF) developed by Payne et al. (1999). The original IRMA-SF is a 20-item questionnaire that taps respondents' agreement with common rape myths. The scale was designed to incorporate issues that fall under a number of subscales (i.e. "she asked for it", "it wasn't really rape", "he didn't mean to", "she wanted it", "she lied", and "rape is a trivial event").[14]

Sex Differences

Recall $H2_{a,}$ that *"On average, males will score higher on rape myth acceptance when compared to females".* An independent t-test was run on each dataset to determine if there were differences in the endorsement of rape myths based upon the respondent's biological sex across each of the four datasets and is visually displayed in Figure 4.8.2.

[14] Truncated Rape Myth Acceptance Scale: "When it comes to sexual contacts, women expect men to take the lead"; "A lot of women strongly complain about sexual infringements for no real reason, just to feel emancipated"; "Interpreting harmless gestures as sexual harassment is a popular weapon in the battle of the sexes"; "If a woman invites a man to her home for a cup of coffee after a night out, this means that she wants to have sex"; "Any woman who is careless enough to walk alone through dark alleys at night is at least partly to blame if she is raped"; "Many women tend to misinterpret a well-meant gesture as a sexual assault"; and "Alcohol is often the culprit when a man rapes a woman".

Figure 4.8.2 | Rape Myth Acceptance









Males, on average, scored significantly higher on rape myth acceptance when compared to males in sample A, B, C, and D.[15]

Respondents' endorsement of sexist stereotypes was assessed using the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) developed by Glick and Fiske (1996). The ASI is a 22-item questionnaire which asks respondents to agree or disagree, on a seven-point scale ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree" with sexist attitudes toward women.[16] These question items were used to create two distinct 11-item scales measuring hostile and benevolent sexism respectfully.

Sex Differences

Recall $H3_{a,}$ that *"On average, males will score higher on both benevolent, and hostile sexism when compared to females.".* An independent t-test was run on each dataset to determine if there were differences in the scores on either benevolent, or hostile sexism based upon the respondent's biological sex.[17] $H3_a$ was supported across each of

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[15] Rape Myth Acceptance
Sample A: (t = 7.38, with 219 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample B: (t = 3.34, with 317 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample C: (t = 6.45, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample D: (t = 6.47, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001)

[16] Sample "A" and Sample "B" included a nine-point scale ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree".

[17] Benevolent Sexism
Sample A: (t = 2.98, with 219 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample B: (t = 2.03, with 309 degrees of freedom, p < .05)
Sample C: (t = 5.36, with 1047 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample D: (t = 5.15, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001)

the four datasets for both forms of sexism and is visually displayed in the Figures 4.8.3 and 4.8.4 below.

Hostile Sexism
Sample A: (t = 7.39, with 219 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample B: (t = 3.07, with 309 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample C: (t = 7.52, with 1047 degrees of freedom, p < .001)
Sample D: (t = 8.32, with 921 degrees of freedom, p < .001)

Figure 4.8.3 | Benevolent Sexism



Figure 4.8.3 | Benevolent Sexism (Continued)





Figure 4.8.4 | Hostile Sexism





Figure 4.8.4 | Hostile Sexism (Continued)





4.9 Dependent Variables

If you recall, respondents were randomly assigned to either a baseline condition with very little information about the victim, or one of two treatment conditions varying victim characteristics and behavior. Each of these rape case treatments is included in "Appendix A", with altered language in bold italics.

I then asked respondents about a range of sexual violence-related topics of interest. The first two items measured the effect of a victim's characteristics and behavior on respondents' evaluations in their role as a juror in a rape trial, including whether they believe the rape occurred, and the number of years in prison they believe the convicted rapist should serve (5-50).[18] Respondents were also asked whether they would support increases in government spending for services and policies to assist victims of sexual violence – and whether they would donate materials or volunteer personal time to advocate for victims.[19]

4.10 Empirical Results – Belief in a Victim's Rape Claim

Drawing on data from survey sample C (N = 1,049) I conducted a one-way between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondent's belief that the reported rape actually occurred. There was a significant effect of characteristics on belief at the $p < 0.05$ level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 1,047) = 105.67, p = 0.00].

---

[18] Sample C and D included the item measuring respondents' belief that the rape occurred, while sample A, B, C, and D each included the item asking how many years in prison respondents would impose at sentencing.

[19] Sample B, C, and D included items measuring support for increased government funding. Sample C and D included additional items measuring willingness to actively advocate for or donate resources to victims.

Because I found a statistically significant result , I computed a Tukey post hoc test to compare each of my conditions against every other condition.[20] Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 6.2, SD = 1.1) and baseline (M = 5.2, SD = 1.4) groups differed significantly at $p < .05$; the mean score for the precipitory (M = 4.7, SD = 1.7) and baseline groups differed significantly at $p < .05$, and the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory groups also achieved statistical significance at $p < .05$. This provides support for $H4_{a.}$ "*Respondents presented with the "Non-Precipitory" treatment will be more likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the control."* (Table 4.10.1).

Table 4.10.1 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions

Belief in Victim

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	428.76	2.00	214.38	105.67	0.00
Within Groups	2122.11	1047.00	2.03		
Total	2550.86	1049.00	2.43		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
Baseline	322	5.20	1.37
Non-Precipitory	341	6.20	1.09
Precipitory	386	4.70	1.69
Total	1049	5.30	1.56

Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline	0.97	0.11	8.79	0.00	0.73	1.23
Precipitory v. Baseline	-0.56	0.11	-5.17	0.00	-0.81	-0.30
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory	-1.53	0.11	-14.44	0.00	-1.78	-1.28

Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)

[20] The Tukey's honestly significant difference test (Tukey's HSD) is used to test differences among sample means for significance. The Tukey's HSD tests all pairwise differences while controlling the probability of making one or more Type I errors.

Turning to data from survey sample D ($N = 923$) I conducted a one-way between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondent's belief that the reported rape actually occurred. There was a significant effect of characteristics on belief at the $p < 0.05$ level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 921) = 139.78, $p = 0.00$].

Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 6.3, SD = 1.2) and baseline (M = 5.1, SD = 1.5) groups differed significantly at $p < .05$; the mean score for the precipitory (M = 4.3, SD = 1.7) and baseline groups differed significantly at $p < .05$, and the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory groups also achieved statistical significance at $p < .05$. This provides additional support for $H4_{a.}$ "*Respondents presented with the "Non-Precipitory" treatment will be more likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the control."* (Table 4.10.2).

Table 4.10.2 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions

Belief in Victim

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	590.04	2.00	295.02	139.78	0.00
Within Groups	1941.84	921.00	2.11		
Total	2531.88	923.00	2.75		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
Baseline	313	5.10	1.47
Non-Precipitory	322	6.29	1.16
Precipitory	288	4.34	1.70
Total	923	5.28	1.66

Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline	1.19	0.12	10.29	0.00	0.92	1.46
Precipitory v. Baseline	-0.76	0.12	-6.39	0.00	-1.04	-0.48
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory	-1.95	0.12	-16.51	0.00	-2.22	-1.67

Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

Next, I included a control for the respondents' biological sex. In survey sample C, females were significantly more likely to believe the victim's rape claim in the "Control" condition ($F = 3.82$, $p = 0.05$); and the "Non-Precipitory" treatment ($F = 22.71$, $p = 0.00$); but only slightly significantly more likely than males to believe the victim's rape claim when given the "Precipitory" treatment ($F = 3.26$, $p = 0.07$).[21] Taken together, females were more likely, on average, to take a non-descript victim of rape, or a victim who came across as someone who did nothing to contribute to her attack at her word. However, females were only slightly significantly different than males in their assessment of a victim who appeared "careless" or somehow "complacent" in her own attack.

In survey sample D, females were significantly more likely to believe the victim's rape claim in the "Control" condition ($F = 6.45$, $p = 0.01$), the "Non-Precipitory" condition ($F = 17.55$, $p = 0.00$), and the "Precipitory" condition ($F = 7.87$, $p = 0.00$). In sum, females were significantly more likely, on average, to accept a rape claim– regardless of the victim's characteristics or behavior – when compared to males. In both survey samples $H4_a$ "*Respondents presented with the "Non-Precipitory" treatment will be more likely, on average, to believe the victim when compared to those presented the control"* was supported. Comparisons of means, by biological sex are presented in Figure 4.10.1below.

[21] If respondents do not believe the victim, it's not a result of how she behaved prior to the attack, but whether they think it really was an attack. Presumably they're using precipitory behaviors to help them infer whether she might have had a consensual interest that's only afterward being ignored to pretend what happened was an attack. The effect size was bigger than for the control – fewer in the category may have caused the significance to be less.

Figure 4.10.1 | Belief in a Rape Victim





Multiple-Regression Models

In the previous analysis I was able to demonstrate that, on average, individuals base much of their belief in victims of sexual violence on the victim's personal characteristics and behavior both before and after the rape transpires. When a victim conforms to traditional gender expectations (e.g. does not live with a romantic partner out of wedlock), when it is clear that she was cautious not to put herself in danger (e.g. does not allow a stranger into her home to use the telephone), when there is evidence that she fought fiercely to prevent being violated (e.g. physical evidence of a struggle), and when she reports the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males and females are more likely to believe the victim's claim that she was raped. On the other hand, when a victim does not conform to traditional gender expectations when it appears that she put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, when there is no physical evidence that she put up fierce resistance, and when she does not report the incident to law enforcement immediately both males and females are less likely to believe that the victim was actually raped.

Thus far I have examined differences in individuals' belief in a victim based upon her characteristics and behavior – controlling for respondents' biological sex – but absent any additional covariates. I now turn to testing the additional hypotheses presented throughout this chapter. Specifically, $H2_{b:}$ "*Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped";* and $H3_{d:}$ "*Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on*

hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped."

My overarching argument throughout this project is that violence-justifying ideologies (primarily sexism in the current analysis) should cancel out the normatively positive outcomes that individuals' aversion to violence might otherwise produce. Assessing the attitudes that help determine individuals' belief in a rape victim provides the first opportunity to empirically test my theory. Specifically, $H3_{f:}$ *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a rape claim."* Sample C and D included the question item assessing respondents' belief in the victim's claim that she was raped.

Mechanical Turk Sample C

In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated six models. My key independent variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 11-item measure of hostile sexism. To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power of individuals' aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile sexism and anti-violence values. I expect hostile sexism to produce negative signs: the more sexist a respondent is, the less likely they will be to believe the victim. Anti-violence values should produce positive signs: the more a respondent abhors violence, the more likely they will be to believe the victim. My key hypothesis, however, is that

interacting these variables will have an attenuating effect; as sexism increases, the normatively positive force of anti-violence values will diminish.

I also included numerous control variables including victim characteristics (Control/Non-Precipitory/Precipitory), age, education, income, biological sex, marital status, political ideology (conservatism), and rape myth acceptance. I used multiple regression to estimate relationships in each of these models, and the results are reported below in Table 4.10.3.

In the fully specified model (Model 6) we see that victim characteristics and behavior continue to have a strong impact on whether respondents believe the victim's rape claim. Those given the "Non-Precipitory" treatment were significantly more likely (+0.99) than those in the "Control" condition to accept the rape claim, all else equal. Respondents given the "Precipitory" treatment were significantly less likely (-0.53) than those in the "Control" condition to believe the victim, all else equal. Respondents reporting higher levels of education were also significantly more likely to believe the victim. For every one unit increase in education respondents scored higher (+0.14) on belief, all else equal. Females were significantly more likely to believe the victim (+0.40) when compared to men, all else equal.

Model 6 provides support for $H1_{b:}$ *"Individuals who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped"*. For every one unit increase in anti-violence values respondents were, on average, more likely to believe the victim (+0.34), all else equal. The model does not provide support for $H2_{b:}$ *Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims,*

respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped.

The relationship does go in the expected direction; for every one unit increase in rape-myth acceptance respondents were, on average, less likely to believe the victim (-.13), but the coefficient did not achieve significance.[22] I found this particular result highly counterintuitive; if rape myths do not independently predict belief in a rape claim, what does? It looks as though these two things do: hostile sexism and anti-violence values. I suspect that hostility to women prevents respondents from developing the sympathy toward a potential rape victim that anti-violence values normally generate, such that it works only among respondents who score low on hostile sexism.

As expected, $H3_{d:}$ "*Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped"* was supported. For every one unit increase in hostile sexism respondents were, on average, significantly less likely to believe the victim (-.13) all else equal.

My key hypothesis was fully supported, $H3_{f.}$ *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a rape claim."* The

[22] This non-finding may be a result of my using a 7-item truncated version of the original 20-item rape myth battery.

estimates of the anti-violence slope decrease as function of hostile sexism.[23] For example, at the lowest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence values slope is at (+0.24), and at the highest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence values slope is at (-0.38), a decrease of (-0.62). For every one unit increase in hostile sexism, the anti-violence values slope decreases by (-0.10). What we are likely seeing here is that the power of hostile sexism is greatest in the case when the respondent is on the high end of anti-violence values; not only do we have the general ill effect of hostility to women, the potential victim also loses the sympathy that otherwise accompanies anti-violence values. Perhaps this is because respondents are focused on the bad (violent) things that will happen to the accused if wrongly convicted. That said, the interpretation of interactive effects can be challenging. To visually display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of the adjusted means placing hostile sexism on the *x*-axis with separate graphs for "low", "medium", and "high" levels of anti-violence values (See Figure 4.10.2).

[23] I tested to see whether the interaction was significant across all three of my experimental treatment conditions. In the baseline group, the interaction term was statistically significant at $p < 0.10$, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.12). In the non-precipitory group, the interaction term did not achieve statistical significance. Finally, in the precipitory group, the interaction term was significant at $p < 0.10$, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.13).

Table 4.10.3 | Explaining Belief in a Victim's Rape Claim - Survey C (N=526)

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 6
Victim Condition						
Non-Precipitory	0.985 ***	1 ***	0.997 ***	0.991 ***	0.993 ***	0.987 ***
	(0.107)	*(0.155)*	*(0.155)*	*(0.151)*	*(0.152)*	*(0.135)*
Precipitory	-0.571 ***	-0.541 ***	-0.541 ***	-0.530 ***	-0.530 ***	-0.528 ***
	(0.104)	*(0.144)*	*(0.144)*	*(0.141)*	*(0.141)*	*(0.147)*
Age	0.007 **	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004
	(0.003)	*(0.005)*	*(0.005)*	*(0.005)*	*(0.005)*	*(0.005)*
Education	0.059 *	0.183 ***	0.176 ***	0.137 ***	0.143 ***	0.142 ***
	(0.035)	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*	*(0.053)*
Income	0.018	0.035	0.033	0.036	0.034	0.034
	(0.016)	*(0.023)*	*(0.023)*	*(0.023)*	*(0.023)*	*(0.023)*
Female	0.355 ***	0.487 ***	0.479 ***	0.38 ***	0.373 ***	0.404 ***
	(0.087)	*(0.129)*	*(0.129)*	*(0.128)*	*(0.128)*	*(0.135)*
Married	-0.169 *	-0.083	-0.173	-0.146	-0.148	-0.163
	(0.094)	*(0.132)*	*(0.132)*	*(0.130)*	*(0.130)*	*(0.132)*
Conservatism	-0.178 ***	-0.131 ***	-0.118 ***	-0.062	-0.060	-0.048
	(0.026)	*(0.037)*	*(0.038)*	*(0.039)*	*(0.039)*	*(0.045)*
Anti-Violence		0.107 *	0.074	-0.034	-0.051	0.345 *
		(0.060)	*(0.064)*	*(0.068)*	*(0.069)*	*(0.179)*
Benevolent Sexism			-0.074	-0.042	-0.026	-0.004
			(0.053)	*(0.052)*	*(0.053)*	*(0.057)*
Hostile Sexism				-0.256 ***	-0.191 ***	-0.486 ***
				(0.057)	*(0.072)*	*(0.146)*
Rape Myth					-0.123	-0.134
					(0.084)	*(0.091)*
Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence						-0.103 ***
						(0.044)
Adj. R^2	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.29

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1 Mechanical Turk Sample C (N = 526)

Figure 4.10.2 | Predictive Margins Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence - Survey C

I also tested to see whether the interaction was significant across all three of my experimental treatment conditions. In the baseline group, the interaction term was statistically significant at $p < 0.10$, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.12). In the non-precipitory group, the interaction term did not achieve statistical significance. Finally, in the precipitory group, the interaction term was significant at $p < 0.10$, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.13) (Figure 4.10.3 – 4.10.5).

Figure 4.10.3 | Predictive Margins for Control Group



Figure 4.10.4 | Predictive Margins for Non-Precipitory Condition



Figure 4.10.5 | Predictive Margins for Precipitory Condition



Mechanical Turk Survey Sample D

In survey Sample D, authoritarianism was added as a control variable. I performed multiple regression analysis to estimate relationships in each of my models, and the results are reported below in Table 4.10.4.

Table 4.10.4 | Explaining Belief in a Victim's Rape Claim - Survey D (N=923)

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 6	MODEL 7
Victim Condition							
Non-Precipitory	1.207 ***	1.217 ***	1.219 ***	1.219 ***	1.206 ***	1.184 ***	1.19 ***
	(0.112)	*(0.114)*	*(0.110)*	*(0.110)*	*(0.108)*	*(0.108)*	*(0.100)*
Precipitory	-0.749 ***	-0.764 ***	-0.789 ***	-0.789 ***	-0.833 ***	-0.835 ***	-0.824 ***
	(0.115)	*(0.114)*	*(0.114)*	*(0.114)*	*(0.111)*	*(0.111)*	*(0.118)*
Age	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.004)	*(0.004)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.016)*	*(0.003)*	*(0.004)*
Education	0.091 ***	0.076 **	0.083 **	0.083 **	0.051	0.054	0.052
	(0.038)	*(0.038)*	*(0.038)*	*(0.038)*	*(0.037)*	*(0.037)*	*(0.039)*
Income	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.003
	(0.017)	*(0.016)*	*(0.016)*	*(0.016)*	*(0.016)*	*(0.016)*	*(0.015)*
Female	0.484 ***	0.482 ***	0.411 ***	0.411 ***	0.272 ***	0.261 ***	0.276 ***
	(0.096)	*(0.095)*	*(0.096)*	*(0.096)*	*(0.097)*	*(0.111)*	*(0.100)*
Married	-0.088	-0.082	-0.078	-0.078	-0.053	-0.059	-0.064
	(0.101)	*(0.101)*	*(0.110)*	*(0.110)*	*(0.098)*	*(0.097)*	*(0.098)*
Conservatism	-0.054 ***	-0.039 ***	-0.033 ***	-0.033 ***	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.009)	*(0.010)*	*(0.010)*	*(0.011)*	*(0.111)*	*(0.111)*	*(0.111)*
Authoritarianism		-0.548 ***	-0.463 ***	-0.462 ***	-0.336 ***	-0.328 ***	-0.331 **
		(0.141)	*(0.142)*	*(0.150)*	*(0.147)*	*(0.147)*	*(0.153)*
Anti-Violence			0.174 ***	0.174 ***	0.042	0.006	0.34 **
			(0.047)	*(0.049)*	*(0.052)*	*(0.054)*	*(0.137)*
Benevolent Sexism				-0.002	-0.022	0.037	0.061
				(0.050)	*(0.048)*	*(0.048)*	*(0.050)*
Hostile Sexism					-0.325 ***	-0.228 ***	-0.455 ***
					(0.048)	*(0.063)*	*(0.109)*
Rape Myth						-0.161 ***	-0.177 **
						(0.067)	*(0.075)*
Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence							-0.089 ***
							(0.035)
Adj. R^2	0.28	0.29	0.3	0.3	0.33	0.34	0.35

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1 Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

In the fully specified model (Model 7) we see that victim characteristics and behavior have a strong impact on whether respondents will believe the victim's rape claim. Those given the "Non-Precipitory" treatment were, on average, significantly more likely (+1.19) than those in the "Control" condition to believe the victim, all else equal. Respondents given the "Precipitory" treatment were significantly less likely (-0.82) than those in the "Control" condition to believe the victim, all else equal. This time around, respondents reporting higher levels of education were no more likely to believe the victim. Females were significantly more likely to believe the victim (+0.28), on average, when compared to men. Finally, respondents who scored higher on authoritarianism were significantly less likely (-0.33) to believe the victim, all else equal.

Model 7 provides additional support for $H1_{b:}$ **"***Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped."* For every one unit increase in anti-violence values respondents were, on average, more likely to believe the victim (+0.34), all else equal. The model also provides support for $H2_{b:}$ "*Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped."* For every one unit increase in rape myth acceptance respondents were, on average, less likely to believe the victim (-0.08). $H3_{e:}$ "*Because hostile sexists tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to believe a victim's claim that she was raped"* was supported. For every one unit increase in hostile sexism respondents were significantly less likely to believe the victim (-.46) all else equal. Finally, my key hypothesis was fully supported, $H3_{f.}$ *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively*

positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to believe a rape claim."

The estimates of the anti-violence slope decrease as a function of hostile sexism. For example, at the lowest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence slope is at (+0.25), and at the highest level the slope is at (-0.28), a decrease of (-0.53). For every one unit increase in hostile sexism, the anti-violence slope decreases by (-0.09). To visually display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of the adjusted means placing hostile sexism on the *x*-axis with separate graphs for "low", "medium", and "high" levels of anti-violence (See Figure 4.10.6).

Figure 4.10.6 | Predictive Margins Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence - Survey D



I also tested to see whether the interaction was significant across each of my experimental treatment conditions. In the baseline group, the interaction term was

statistically significant at $p < 0.05$, and the coefficient was in the expected direction (-0.14). In the non-precipitory group, and the precipitory group, the interaction term coefficient did not achieve statistical significance (See Figure 4.10.7 – 4.10.9).

Figure 4.10.7 | Predictive Margins for Control Group

Figure 4.10.8 | Predictive Margins for Non-Precipitory Condition

Figure 4.10.9 | Predictive Margins for Precipitory Condition

In this section, I found strong support for my theory that violence-justifying ideologies (hostile sexism specifically) have the power to cancel out the normatively positive outcomes that individuals' aversion of violence would otherwise produce. To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power of individuals' aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile sexism and anti-violence values. In samples C and D, as expected, hostile sexism produced negative coefficients: the more sexist a respondent was, the less likely they were to believe the victim. Anti-violence values also performed as expected; they produced positive signs: the more violence averse an individual is, the more likely they were to believe the victim. Most importantly, my key hypothesis – which speaks to my underlying theory of violence – was that interacting these variables would produce a

negative sign: as sexism increased, the normatively positive force of anti-violence values diminished.

4.11 Empirical Results – Prison Sentence for a Convicted Rapist

Drawing on data from survey sample A ($N = 221$) I conducted a one-way between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents' recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of characteristics on belief at the $p < 0.05$ level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 219) = 11.52, $p = 0.00$].

Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 22.5, SD = 12.9) and baseline (M = 15.7, SD = 11.5) groups differed significantly at $p < .05$. The mean score for the precipitory (M = 14.2, SD = 8.8) and baseline groups, however, were not significantly different. Finally, the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory groups was statistically significant at $p < .05$.

Table 4.11.1 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions

Recommended Prison Time

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	2796.43	2.00	1398.21	11.52	0.00
Within Groups	26461.69	219.00	121.38		
Total	29258.12	221.00	132.94		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
Baseline	71	15.69	11.45
Non-Precipitory	66	22.54	12.96
Precipitory	84	14.21	8.75
Total	221	17.18	11.53

Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=221)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline	6.86	1.88	3.64	0.00	2.41	11.30
Precipitory v. Baseline	-1.48	1.78	-0.83	0.68	-5.67	2.72
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory	-8.33	1.81	-4.60	0.00	-12.61	-4.05

Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=221)

Turning to data from survey sample B ($N = 312$) I conducted a one-way between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents' recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of characteristics on belief at the $p < 0.05$ level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 309) = 11.06, $p = 0.00$].

Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 24.3, SD = 13.9) and baseline (M = 19.6, SD = 13.6) groups differed significantly at $p <$ .05. The mean score for the precipitory (M = 15.8, SD = 10.9) and baseline groups, however, were not significantly different. Finally, the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory groups was statistically significant at $p < .05$.

Table 4.11.2 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions

Recommended Prison Time

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	3676.21	2.00	1838.10	11.06	0.00
Within Groups	51336.26	309.00	166.14		
Total	55012.46	311.00	176.89		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
Baseline	106	19.56	13.56
Non-Precipitory	101	24.27	13.99
Precipitory	105	15.81	10.94
Total	312	19.81	13.30

Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=312)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline	4.71	1.79	2.63	0.02	0.48	8.93
Precipitory v. Baseline	-3.75	1.77	-2.12	0.09	-7.92	0.42
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory	-8.46	1.80	-4.70	0.00	-12.71	-4.22

Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=312)

For survey sample C (N = 1,049) I conducted a one-way between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents' recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of characteristics on belief at the $p < 0.05$ level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 1,047) = 25.06, p = 0.00].

Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 20.6, SD = 13.4) and baseline (M = 15.6, SD = 11.7) groups differed significantly at $p <$ .05. The mean score for the precipitory (M = 14.3, SD = 12.5) and baseline groups did not differ significantly, but the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory groups was statistically significant at $p < .05$.

Table 4.11.3 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions

Recommended Prison Time

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	7882.62	2.00	3941.31	25.06	0.00
Within Groups	164525.40	1047.00	157.29		
Total	172408.02	1049.00	164.51		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
Baseline	322	15.64	11.67
Non-Precipitory	341	20.61	13.39
Precipitory	386	14.25	12.47
Total	1049	16.74	12.83

Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline	4.96	0.97	5.09	0.00	2.68	7.25
Precipitory v. Baseline	-1.39	0.95	-1.47	0.30	-3.62	0.83
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory	-6.36	0.93	-6.82	0.00	-8.55	-4.17

Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)

Finally, turning to data from survey sample D ($N = 923$) I conducted a one-way between subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of victim characteristics on respondents' recommended prison sentence for her rapist. There was a significant effect of characteristics on belief at the $p < 0.05$ level for the three experimental conditions [F (2, 921) = 63.23, $p = 0.00$].

Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the non-precipitory (M = 24.1, SD = 14.0) and baseline (M = 16.2, SD = 13.2) groups differed significantly at $p <$ .05; the mean score for the precipitory (M = 12.8, SD = 10.8) and baseline groups differed significantly at $p < .05$, and the difference in means for the precipitory and non-precipitory groups also achieved statistical significance at $p < .05$.

Table 4.11.4 | ANOVA for Victim Characteristics Experimental Conditions

Recommended Prison Time

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	20671.01	2.00	10335.51	63.23	0.00
Within Groups	150390.33	921.00	163.47		
Total	171061.34	923.00	185.53		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
Baseline	313	16.17	13.18
Non-Precipitory	322	24.06	13.98
Precipitory	288	12.78	10.79
Total	923	17.87	13.62

Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
Non-Precipitory v. Baseline	7.88	1.01	7.77	0.00	5.50	10.27
Precipitory v. Baseline	-3.39	1.04	-3.25	0.00	-5.84	-0.94
Precipitory v. Non-Precipitory	-11.27	1.04	-10.87	0.00	-13.71	-8.84

Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

Next, I examined differences based on the respondents' biological sex. In survey sample A, females were significantly no different than males in proposed sentence length in the "Control" condition ($F = 3.51$, $p = 0.07$); but did propose significantly more years imprisonment in the "Non-Precipitory" group ($F = 12.90$, $p = 0.00$); yet were significantly no different from males in terms of proposed sentence in the "Precipitory" group ($F = 0.00$, $p = 0.98$). In sum, females were more likely, on average, to propose a longer sentence when the victim was cautious, when she resisted her assailant, and when she immediately reported the assault to law enforcement, compared to men. However, females did not propose significantly longer sentences when the victim was non-descript, or when the victim could be seen as "careless" or somehow "complacent" in her attack.

In survey sample B, females were significantly no different than males in recommended sentence length in the "Control" condition ($F = 2.85$, $p = 0.09$); the "Non-

Precipitory" group ($F = 1.34$, $p = 0.25$); or the "Precipitory" group ($F = 1.17$, $p = 0.19$). Overall, females were no more likely, on average, to propose a longer sentence when faced with a non-descript victim, a cautious victim, or a victim that some might view as "careless" or somehow "complacent" in her attack, compared to men.

In survey sample C, females were significantly no different than males in proposed sentence length in the "Control" condition ($F = 0.13$, $p = 0.72$); the "Non-Precipitory" group ($F = 1.98$, $p = 0.16$); or the "Precipitory" group ($F = 0.02$, $p = 0.90$). Once more, females were no more likely, on average, to propose a longer sentence, regardless of victim type, compared to men.

Finally, in survey sample D, females were significantly more likely than males to propose longer sentences in the "Control" condition ($F = 6.45$, $p = 0.01$); the "Non-Precipitory" group ($F = 17.55$, $p = 0.00$); and in the "Precipitory" group ($F = 7.87$, $p = 0.00$). This time around, females were more likely, on average, to propose a longer sentence regardless of victim characteristics and behavior.

$H4_{b:}$ "*Respondents presented with the "Non-Precipitory" treatment will be more likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to those presented the control"* was supported; respondents in the "Non-Precipitory" group recommended significantly longer prison sentences when compared to those in the "Control" group, and this was true for every sample. $H4_{d:}$ "*Respondents presented with the "Precipitory" treatment will be less likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to those presented the control"* was only partially supported; respondents in the "Precipitory" group consistently recommended a significantly shorter prison sentence compared to those in "Non-Precipitory" group, but this was not always

the case compared to those in the "Control" group as I hypothesized. The big news here appears to be that what really separates males from females is not how they treat the "honorable" versus "unethical" victim. It's that males are not willing to be as harsh against the convicted rapist – regardless of her characteristics and behavior. Overall results by biological sex are presented visually in Figure 4.11.1.

Figure 4.11.1 | Proposed Prison Sentence for a Convicted Rapist



Multiple-Regression Models

In the previous section, I demonstrated that a victim's personal characteristics and behavior have a significant impact on whether others believe the rape occurred. In the current section, I extended the analysis and found that these factors also significantly impact recommended prison sentences. When a victim conforms to traditional gender expectations, is cautious not to put herself in danger, fights fiercely to prevent being violated, and then reports the incident to law enforcement promptly both males and females recommend significantly longer prison sentences for her rapist. On the other hand, when a victim does not conform to traditional gender expectations, is perceived to put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, fails to resist, and does not report the incident to law enforcement promptly both males and females recommend significantly shorter prison sentences. This alarming finding was true across each of the four survey samples reported in my analysis. When it comes to sentencing a convicted rapist, individuals are placed in an uncomfortable position. If they doubt that the rape occurred, they may focus on the consequences the accused will suffer if wrongly convicted. On the other hand, if they believe the victim, they may focus instead on punishing her perpetrator. I now test the additional hypotheses presented in this chapter. Specifically, $H1_{d:}$ **"***Respondents who believe the victim will be more likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for (her) convicted rapist"";* $H2_{c:}$ "*Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist."*; and $H3_{e:}$ "*Because hostile sexists tend to blame victims, respondents who score higher on*

hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist."

My overarching argument is that violence-justifying ideologies (sexism in the current analysis) will cancel out the normatively positive outcomes that individuals' aversion to violence might otherwise produce. Assessing the attitudes that help determine the length of prison sentence a juror might impose upon a convicted rapist provides my second opportunity to empirically test this theory. Specifically, $H3_{g:}$ *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist."*

In order to test these hypotheses, I specified a full model for survey sample C and D.[24] My key independent variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 11-item measure of hostile sexism. To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power of individuals' aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile sexism and anti-violence values. My key hypothesis is that interacting these variables will produce a negative sign: as sexism increases, anti-violence values normatively positive force will diminish.

Once more, I incorporated numerous control variables including victim characteristics (non-precipitory/precipitory), age, education, income, biological sex, marital status, political ideology (conservatism), rape myth acceptance, and

[24] Sample A and sample B are excluded from the analysis for two reasons. Neither sample included the question item tapping "belief" in the victim; both survey samples include the inferior (deductive) anti-violence values scale.

authoritarianism. I used multiple regression analysis to estimate relationships in each of these models, and the results are reported below in Table 4.11.5.[25]

Table 4.11.5 | Explaining Prison Sentencing for a Convicted Rapist

	SAMPLE C	SAMPLE C	SAMPLE D	SAMPLE D
Victim Condition				
Non-Precipitory	4.847 ***	2.693 **	7.721 ***	5.03 ***
	(1.342)	*(1.356)*	*(0.995)*	*(1.027)*
Precipitory	-.673	0.475	-3.51 ***	-1.61
	(1.247)	*(1.227)*	*(1.026)*	*(1.026)*
Age	-0.022	-0.033	-0.070 *	-0.070 **
	(0.041)	*(0.040)*	*(0.033)*	*(0.033)*
Education	0.481	0.171	0.981 ***	0.861 **
	(0.446)	*(0.437)*	*(0.342)*	*(0.332)*
Income	0.185	0.111	-0.178	-0.181
	(0.204)	*(0.198)*	*(0.146)*	*(0.142)*
Female	1.076	0.267	1.75 **	1.16
	(1.136)	*(1.111)*	*(0.894)*	*(0.870)*
Married	-0.527	-0.205	0.6	0.74
	(1.148)	*(1.116)*	*(0.900)*	*(0.873)*
Conservatism	-0.219	-0.089	-0.12	-0.11
	(0.348)	*(0.339)*	*(0.103)*	*(0.090)*
Authoritarianism			0.268	1.023
			(1.357)	*(1.320)*
Anti-Violence	-2.94 ***	-2.828 ***	-0.73	-0.74
	(0.607)	*(0.589)*	*(0.494)*	*(0.479)*
Benevolent Sexism	0.441	0.496	0.865 *	0.782 *
	(0.473)	*(0.459)*	*(0.446)*	*(0.432)*
Hostile Sexism	-0.395	-0.018	-1.65 ***	-1.13 **
	(0.637)	*(0.622)*	*(0.582)*	*(0.568)*
Rape Myth	-2.318 ***	-2.053 ***	-0.37 ***	-0.01
	(0.740)	*(0.719)*	*(0.621)*	*(0.604)*
Belief		2.169 ***		2.27 **
		(0.379)		*(0.297)*
Adj. R^2	0.09	0.14	0.16	0.2

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Samples C (N=1,049); and D (N=923)

[25] If an independent variable does not appear in a model it is because those items were not included in that sample. Covariates that did not achieve significance in any of the models (except the authoritarianism scale) were excluded to preserve space.

The results are unsettling; respondents relied heavily upon the victim's characteristics and behavior when deciding how harshly to punish her rapist. Did she allow a stranger into her home? Did she attempt to physically defend herself? Did she report the rape immediately? When the answers to those questions were "yes", respondents were willing to impose a significantly longer prison sentence – they did not afford the same level of justice to the "Precipitory" victim. This was true despite the fact that I controlled for "belief" in both fully specified models. Recall that sample C, and D featured an additional question item asking respondents whether they believe that the reported rape actually occurred.[26] For every one unit increase in respondents' belief in the victim, respondents recommended an additional (+2.17) years in sample C, and an additional (+2.27) years in sample D. Thus, $H1_{d:}$ **"***Respondents who believe the victim will be more likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for (her) convicted rapist"* was fully supported in both samples. This suggests to me that "I bet she is making this up" is, in fact, conceptually distinct from "She brought this on herself".

In the fully specified models for samples C and D victim characteristics and behavior have a significant impact on individuals' decision to impose more (or less) years in prison. In both cases, respondents in the "Non-Precipitory" group recommended significantly *more* prison time - C (+2.69) and D (+5.03) – for the rapist compared to those in the "Control" condition..[27] Thus, $H4_{b:}$ "*Respondents presented with the "Non-*

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[26] Respondents were asked: "Based on the evidence provided, how likely is it that Jim Reynolds raped his accuser. Responses ranged between "Extremely Unlikely" and "Extremely Likely" on a 7-point Likert scale.

[27] Regression results for sample A and B not shown. These samples included my deductively derived measure for anti-violence values. As indicated earlier, I suspect, that this measure is not really capturing attitudes toward violence. Some question items (e.g. "It is a person's responsibility to protect their family"; "If an individual is insulted, that person's pride is insulted"; "A person's family should be their number one priority") are likely not related to individuals' orientation toward violence.

Precipitory" treatment will be more likely, on average, to recommend a longer prison sentence when compared to those presented the control" was supported.

In sample C, violence averse respondents actually recommended significantly *less* (-2.83) prison time, on average, all else equal.[28] Older respondents imposed significantly shorter sentences in sample D (-0.07). For every one unit increase in education respondents in sample D called for an additional (+0.86) years. Sexism was not a significant predictor of sentencing in sample C, however, in sample D, those scoring higher on benevolent sexism called for significantly more time (+0.78), and those scoring higher on hostile sexism recommended significantly less (-1.13) prison time. Those who endorse the belief that women are often at least partially to blame for their own victimization recommended significantly more lenient sentences, thus, $H2_c$ "*Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist."* was partially supported. Respondents who endorse rape myths preferred significantly shorter sentences in sample C (-2.05).

My key hypothesis, $H3_g$: *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to recommend a long prison sentence for a convicted rapist."* was not supported in the full model in any of my survey samples. The interaction term (*anti-violence values * hostile sexism*) had no significant effect across any of my models (not shown).

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[28] I did test for a moderating effect between anti-violence values and belief in the victim. In neither case was the interaction significant.

4.12 Support to Assist and Advocate for Victims of Sexual Violence

In this section I test additional hypotheses concerning support for government spending on services to assist victims, and individuals' willingness to personally advocate for victims of sexual violence which I discussed in detail at the beginning of the chapter.[29] It is important to note that I expect each of my independent variables to predict both (non)support for spending, and (un)willingness to advocate in a similar manner. Thus, the analyses are presented in tandem. Specifically,

> H1$_{c:}$ *"Individuals who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."*
>
> H2$_{d.}$ *Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."*
>
> H3$_{b.}$ "*Respondents who score higher on benevolent sexism will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence. However, benevolent sexism will no longer predict that support (or advocacy) once hostile sexism is controlled for in the model"; and*

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[29] Respondents were asked whether they think government funding should be higher or lower for the following initiatives: Rape crisis centers, rape kit processing, first responder training, rape-prevention education. In Sample C and D, respondents were asked how likely they are personally advocate for victims in the following ways: Volunteer to work with victims in a rape crisis center, donate money to shelters, donate other resources to shelters, demonstrate to raise awareness of sexual violence.

H3$_{c.}$ "*Respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."*

Assessing the attitudes that help determine whether an individual supports increases in government support for victims, and whether an individual is willing to actively advocate for or donate resources to victims provides my third opportunity to empirically test my overarching theory of anti-violence values. Specifically, H3$_{h.}$ *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."*

To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about women on the predictive power of individuals' aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between hostile sexism and anti-violence values. I expect hostile sexism to produce negative signs, while anti-violence values should produce positive signs. My key assumption, however, is that interacting these variables will produce a negative sign: as sexism increases, anti-violence values will no longer predict support for increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, or willingness to advocate for victims of sexual violence.

Once more, I incorporated numerous control variables including age, education, income, biological sex, marital status, political ideology (conservatism), rape myth acceptance, government spending preferences, and authoritarianism. I used multiple

regression analysis to estimate relationships in each of these models, and the results are reported below in Table 4.12.1.[30]

Table 4.12.1 | Support to Fund Policies and Advocate for Victims of Violence

	ADVOCATE		FUND	
	Sample C	Sample D	Sample C	Sample D
Age	-0.013 ***	-0.007 **	0.005	0.002
	(0.004)	*(0.003)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.003)*
Education	0.036	-0.023	-0.008	-0.033
	(0.053)	*(0.035)*	*(0.040)*	*(0.028)*
Female	0.554 ***	0.515 ***	0.329 ***	0.122 *
	(0.134)	*(0.092)*	*(0.102)*	*(0.072)*
Conservatism	-0.144 ***	-0.01	-0.077 **	-0.005
	(0.041)	*(0.012)*	*(0.031)*	*(0.009)*
Anti-Violence	-0.223 ***	-0.01	0.036	0.35 ***
	(0.072)	*(0.051)*	*(0.055)*	*(0.101)*
Benevolent Sexism	0.161 ***	0.198 ***	0.002	0.073 **
	(0.056)	*(0.046)*	*(0.043)*	*(0.037)*
Hostile Sexism	-0.168 **	-0.244 ***	-0.253 ***	-0.263 ***
	(0.075)	*(0.060)*	*(0.058)*	*(0.080)*
Rape Myth	-0.164 *	-0.81 **	-0.155 ***	-0.21 ***
	(0.087)	*(0.064)*	*(0.740)*	*(0.050)*
Government Spending		0.127 ***		0.121 ***
		(0.020)		*(0.016)*
Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence				-0.08 ***
				(0.030)
Adj. R^2	0.16	0.2	0.26	0.29

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample C (N=1,049)
Mechanical Turk Sample D (N=923)

Anti-violence values did not perform as expected in my models to predict support for increased government spending to assist victims and combat sexual violence. Specifically, $H1_{c:}$ *"Individuals who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services, and to*

[30] If an independent variable does not appear in one of the models it is because those items were not included in that sample. Covariates that did not achieve significance in either of the models were excluded to preserve space.

advocate for victims of sexual violence." was only partially supported. In Sample D; for every one unit increase in violence aversion individuals were significantly more (+0.35) supportive of increased spending, all else equal. Additionally, in both models, the more violence averse respondents were significantly *less* likely, on average, to personally engage and advocate for victims. A one unit increase in anti-violence in Sample C produced a drop of (-0.22), and a one unit increase in anti-violence in Sample D (although not significant) produced a drop of (-0.01) in willingness to advocate for victims of sexual violence, all else equal.

My key hypothesis was supported only partially in Sample D, $H3_{h:}$ *"Hostile sexism will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence-averse individuals who are hostile toward females will be less likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."* The estimates of the anti-violence slope decrease as a function of hostile sexism in terms of increased funding. For example, at the lowest level of hostile sexism the anti-violence slope is at (+0.34), and at the highest level the slope is at (-0.16), a decrease of (-0.50). For every one unit increase in hostile sexism, the anti-violence slope decreases by (-0.08). To visually display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of the adjusted means placing hostile sexism on the *x*-axis and separate graphs for "low", "medium", and "high" levels of anti-violence (See Figure 4.12.1).

My measure for rape myth acceptance performed as expected, and $H2_{d:}$ "*Because individuals who endorse rape myths tend to blame/doubt victims, respondents who score higher on rape myth acceptance will be less likely, on average, to support increased*

spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence" was fully supported across both of my samples. For every one unit increase in Sample C, individuals were significantly less (-0.16) supportive of increased spending and (-0.16) less willing to advocate, all else equal. Inn Sample D, individuals were significantly less (-0.21) supportive of increased spending and (-0.81) less willing to personally advocate for victims., all else equal.

Figure 4.12.1 | Predictive Margins Hostile Sexism * Anti-Violence - Survey D



My measure for benevolent sexism did not perform as expected, and $H3_{b:}$ "*Respondents who score higher on benevolent sexism will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence. However, benevolent sexism will no longer predict that support (or advocacy) once hostile sexism is controlled for in the model"* was only partially supported. Benevolent sexism was not significant in Sample C – with *or*

without – hostile sexism included in the model in terms of increased funding. On the other hand, in the fully specified model (including hostile sexism), a one unit increase in benevolent sexism in Sample C produced a significant increase (+0.16) in willingness to advocate for victims of sexual violence, all else equal. Additionally, a one unit increase in benevolent sexism in Sample D also produced a significant increase (+0.20) in willingness to personally advocate for victims of sexual violence, all else equal. Unexpectedly, the coefficients for benevolent sexism, in both samples, remained significant, in terms of advocacy, in the fully specified model.

$H3_{c:}$ "*Respondents who score higher on hostile sexism will be less likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to address sexual violence, and to advocate for victims of sexual violence."* was supported across the board in Sample C and D. For every one unit increase in Sample C, individuals were significantly less (-0.25) supportive of increased spending and (-0.17) less willing to advocate, all else equal. Inn Sample D, individuals were significantly less (-0.26) supportive of increased spending and (-0.24) less willing to advocate, all else equal.

Females were significantly more supportive of increases in government spending in Sample C (+0.33) and Sample D (+0.12), all else equal. Females were significantly more willing to advocate for victims in Sample C (+0.55) and Sample D (+0.52), all else equal. Additionally, individuals' broader attitudes toward government spending were a significant predictor of their support for very specific services to assist victims and to decrease the prevalence of sexual violence in society. Those scoring higher on government spending were significantly more supportive of targeted spending efforts in sample D (+0.12) and in willingness to advocate (+0.13).

4.13 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I empirically tested my assumption that individual's orientation toward violence should help shape their attitudes toward victims – and perpetrators – of sexual violence. I expected that individuals who are more averse to violence would sympathize more with victims, support harsher punishments for perpetrators, and advocate more for resources to assist survivors and decrease the rate of these crimes in the United States. Anti-violence values were assessed with the inductively specified scale which I produced, using principal component analysis, in Chapter 3.[31]

Intuitively, one might surmise that aversion to violence is a good thing. And, I did find empirical support for the expectation that anti-violence values will produce normatively positive results in terms of sexual violence-related outcomes of interest. On the other hand, I also found empirical support for my overarching theory, that violence-justifying ideologies (e.g. sexism 'hostile in particular', rape myth acceptance, etc.) often diminish any normatively positive force that anti-violence values would otherwise produce.

Respondents were randomly assigned to either a "Control" group which featured a non-descript victim and very little information about the circumstances surrounding her rape, a treatment group "Non-Precipitory" which featured a cautious victim who physically resisted her attacker and immediately reported her rape to law enforcement, or a treatment group "Precipitory" which featured a victim who did not behave cautiously,

[31] Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: "It is important for a person to be tougher than other people"; A person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp"; You would praise a person who acted aggressively to an insult"; "Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable"; "It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight"; "A person who doesn't take any crap from anybody is an admirable reputation to have"; and "Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself".

did not put up fierce physical resistance to her attacker, and did not immediately report her rape to law enforcement. Respondents were asked to put themselves in the role of a juror as they reviewed this incident.

After reading these fictitious rape scenarios, respondents were asked to report whether they believed that the rape occurred. In both survey samples that included this question, those who scored higher on anti-violence values were significantly more likely to believe the victim, all else equal. However, I also found that hostile sexism diminished the positive effects of anti-violence values to the point that they no longer produced significantly more belief in the victim.

My experimental findings also produced unsettling results. When the victim appeared to conform to traditional gender expectations, when it was clear that she was cautious to not put herself in danger, when there was evidence that she fought fiercely to prevent being violated, and when she reported the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males and females were significantly more likely to believe her rape claim. On the other hand, when a victim did not conform to traditional gender expectations, when it appeared that she put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, when there was no physical evidence that she put up fierce resistance, and when she did not report the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males and females were significantly less likely to believe that the victim was actually raped.

After respondents were informed that the rapist had been found guilty, they were asked to recommend a sentence of no less than 5, and no more than 50 years in prison for the perpetrator. Examining the data across four unique surveys I found little evidence that anti-violence values significantly impact how harshly respondents believe a perpetrator

should be punished. In fact, violence averse individuals might view incarceration itself as a form of violence. In one model, for every one unit increase in anti-violence respondents recommended significantly less (-2.94 years) time in prison, perhaps sparing the perpetrator.

My experimental findings, once more, produced troubling results. When the victim conformed to traditional gender expectations, when she was cautious, when there was evidence that she fought back, and when she reported the incident immediately, both males and females recommended significantly more time in prison. When the victim did not conform to traditional gender expectations, when she put herself at risk of danger, when there was no evidence of resistance, and when she did not report the incident immediately, both males and females recommended significantly less time in prison.

Survivors of sexual violence often depend upon social welfare benefits as they attempt to escape violent partners and rebuild their lives and budget cuts or decreased spending on social services erodes the capacity of women's organizations to assist victims (Wasco, et al. 2004). Reductions in funding for health care, education, women's shelters, grass roots feminist organizations, legal aid, and many other services including economic support, transportation, and childcare assistance make it difficult for victims to break the chains of violence.

Respondents were asked about their support for increases in government funding to assist victims of sexual violence and help prevent rape in the United States. Those claiming to be more averse to violence supported significantly more federal funding in only one sample, and in two other samples the violent averse supported significantly less federal funding to assist victims and reduce sexual violence, all else equal. Respondents

were also asked whether they would personally advocate for victims or donate time and money to organizations that assist victims. In both samples that asked this question, respondents were significantly less likely to advocate for victims or donate time and resources to the cause, all else equal.

Negative attitudes toward victims help perpetuate rape, and rape myths enable a perpetrator to justify his behavior. These negative stereotypes and misinterpretations of victims have serious implications. Beyond the fact that they cause harmful psychological damage, these prejudicial attitudes can also bleed into public policy decisions (e.g. trial outcomes and rape-related services expenditures). Throughout this analysis, those who endorsed rape myths and other negative stereotypes about women were consistently more likely to blame the victim, to be more lenient on her perpetrator, to resist increased government spending to assist victims and reduce sexual violence, and to decline to engage in any way personally to advocate or support victims. Individuals' aversion to violence did little of substance to benefit victims or punish perpetrators, and when it did produce significantly positive outcomes those effects were easily diminished by violence-justifying ideology – hostile sexism in particular.

Efforts intended to decrease rape in the United States should focus on breaking down the stereotypes that allow individuals to justify violence against women. Whether an individual condones violence appears to have little impact on their perception of victims, their support for serious consequences for perpetrators, or their willingness to actively engage in efforts to combat the problem of sexual violence in the United States – once we account for the violence-justifying ideologies that work to diminish any benefits of aversion to violence. Additionally, a victim's characteristics and behaviors have a

significant impact on whether she is believed in the first place, but also on whether her perpetrator will be justly punished.

Victims' advocates suggest that the standard for conviction in rape cases should require only the "preponderance of the evidence" standard applied in civil cases. Rather than demanding an absence of doubt, verdicts should depend on what jurists believe most strongly. In other words, if a victim's testimony leads jurists to believe that they did not consent to sex, this would be sufficient to convict the defendant. One thing appears certain; efforts to reduce rape should focus on breaking down the stereotypes that allow people to overlook violent behavior, and reforming policies that make it difficult for a victim to receive justice. Absent those efforts, it appears unlikely that widespread aversion to violence will make any substantive difference.

CHAPTER 5. PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE VIOLENCE AND SUPPORT FOR RELATED PUBLIC POLICIES

5.1 Introduction

During the summer of 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri a white police officer named Darren Wilson fired 12 shots into 18-year-old Michael Brown, an unarmed black man. His lifeless body lay in the street for more than four hours as detectives completed their investigation. Ultimately, a St. Louis County grand jury would fail to indict Officer Wilson and the United States Justice Department launched a civil-rights probe of its own (Bell & Hunn 2014). Following his adjudication in state court violent waves of protest and riots erupted in numerous American cities where outraged citizens vandalized, looted, and burned businesses to the ground. Police donning military-grade riot gear responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and flash grenades. Protesters adopted the slogan "Hands Up, Don't Shoot" in reference to eye-witness testimony that Brown had his hands in the air attempting to surrender (Hartmann 2014).[32]

Brown's death sparked heated debate over policing in the United States and incidents of police violence continue to dominate national media coverage. One might assume that a national database of information about lethal and non-lethal police encounters exists, but this was not so until late 2018. In fact, as recently as 2016, then-FBI Director James Comey admitted to a gathering of police chiefs that "Americans actually have no idea about how often police use force because nobody has collected enough data" (Berman 2016). This lack of data on police violence remains a problem in 2020. While the FBI now collaborates with law enforcement agencies across the country

[32] The Department of Justice concluded that Brown did not attempt to surrender, and the civil rights probe officially cleared Wilson's actions.

to collect this information, individual police agencies are *not* required to participate. James Gagliano, writing for *the Hill* describes this as a 'fundamental flaw' in data collection; he worries that incomplete datasets "lead to inaccurate results and fuel speculation that statistics are skewed to protect law enforcement" (2018). Fortunately for those who research police violence there are other sources that compile use of force statistics.

Journalists for the Washington Post and the Guardian began compiling data on officer-involved-shootings (OIS) in 2015. The Post found that police fatally shoot approximately 1,000 individuals per year – this comports with the 1,134 deaths that the Guardian chronicled in 2015. Alarmingly, the death rate for young black men was five times that of white men the same age, but we know little of lesser force incidents because the Post and the Guardian did not collect data on non-fatal encounters with the police (Swaine et al. 2015). VICE News collected data directly from the 50 largest police departments in the United States – including statistics on non-fatal shootings. Journalists for VICE found that "Police shootings aren't just undercounted – police in these departments shoot black people at a higher rate and shoot unarmed people far more often than any data have shown (Arthur et al. 2017).

The datasets compiled by the Washington Post, the Guardian, and VICE provide important information, but it is not clear whether the OIS statistics they report are a direct result of racial bias. That said, even the perception that the police are unjust leads many people to question their legitimacy. Public reactions to the non-stop news coverage of these incidents varies by race and many other factors (Dahlgren 1988; Eschholz et al 2002), but frequent exposure is believed to create the misperception that they occur more

frequently than they actually do, and news organizations are known to emphasize the racial elements of the events they cover (Gilliam & Iyengar 2000; Weitzer & Tuch 2004).

Explaining racial disparities in police violence is not as straightforward as one might think. While descriptive statistics are instructive, researchers must also account for additional factors including race-specific crime rates and the behavior a suspect exhibits prior to the shooting. On the other hand, it is not clear that police departments are providing reliable data; we do not know how often officers "bend the truth about the context of a particular interaction so as to justify their own actions – for instance, indicating a suspect was threatening when they were calmly following an officer's commands" (Fryer Jr. 2018, 4). In sum, the spotty data on OIS makes it difficult for researchers to examine the role that race plays in officers' decision to pull the trigger and take a life.

One thing is certain; OIS are a serious problem in America that routinely spark widespread outrage. Violent protests of law enforcement swept the country following the shooting of 18-year-old Michael Brown, and each new body has the potential to produce additional violence – violence that threatens civility and democracy in the United States. Public scrutiny is an important check on police behavior, especially in the age of smart phones and streaming video, and fact-based reporting on these incidents is essential. Individuals must be willing to evaluate incidents of OIS objectively in order to determine whether the actions of the officer involved were justified. Additionally, evaluations of these incidents cut both ways in many instances, since the officer(s) sometimes are minorities as well. This chapter examines the complex considerations that help shape

individual evaluations of OIS and support for policies to prevent unnecessary incidents of police violence.

Contributions to, and Extensions of Prior Literature

Police shootings – justified or not – are acts of violence (Williams 2015; Seigel 2018) yet research on OIS evaluations tends to focus mostly on the racial aspects of these incidents while ignoring broader attitudes toward violence. For instance, most scholarship focuses on racial attitudes and stereotypes *alone* as explanations for perceptions of law enforcement officers (Huang & Vaughn 1996) and criminal suspects (Barkan & Cohn 1998). In this chapter, I use my adapted anti-violence values scale (created in Chapter 3) to determine whether individuals who condemn violence, on average, are more likely to:

- Believe that a lethal officer involved shooting is inappropriate;
- Believe that a lethal officer involved shooting was unlawful; and
- Support increased spending on policies to reduce police violence

I extend and contribute to the police violence literature by 1) providing theoretical and empirical support for my claim that anti-violence values do not always translate to outrage over police violence, or support for policies to reduce its prevalence; 2) providing additional empirical support for my broader argument that the normatively positive effects of anti-violence values often diminish once additional factors (violence-justifying ideologies) are incorporated in the model; 3) empirically demonstrating that it is the level of threat a suspect poses – rather than the amalgamation of race between the officer and suspect – which has the greatest impact on individual evaluations of OIS; and 4) moving beyond student samples to include Mechanical Turk workers, which prior research

(Berinsky et al. 2012) concludes is acceptable for peer-reviewed projects.[33] To the best of my knowledge, individuals' orientations toward violence in the abstract have never been incorporated into empirical models predicting reactions to police violence, policies to reduce that violence, or support for increased government spending to improve policing. This research builds on recent work on racial attributions in the justice system (Peffley et al. 2017) and law enforcement policy (Ariel et al. 2015) but expands on this research by incorporating my new measure of anti-violence values.

The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I briefly discuss public perceptions of the police, and the implications of breakdowns in trust and legitimacy between officers and citizens for democratic society. Next, I examine closely the role that the media plays in helping shape individual evaluations of incidents of OIS specifically, and public opinion of law enforcement broadly. Then, I provide a brief overview of racial disparities in the criminal justice system that have always disproportionately impacted blacks – disparities which persist today. Turning to the importance of interest groups, I review recent efforts to influence public opinion, including members of the public demanding institutional reforms to address police violence, but also law enforcement groups working to build and maintain public support for the police. Next, I examine various policies and reforms intended to minimize racial bias among law enforcement and ultimately, decrease instances of police violence in the United States. As it turns out, a majority of the public

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[33] Berinsky et al. (2012) examined the benefits, and potential limitations of using Amazon's Mechanical Turk web-based platform for subject recruitment in Political Science Research. They found that the demographic characteristics of Mechanical Turk workers are more representative than student, or other convenience samples often used in Political Science research. When the authors used Mechanical Turk samples to replicate previous experimental studies, they found that the average treatment effects were very similar. In sum, the authors argue that the potential limitations to Mechanical Turk samples – including subject attentiveness and the prevalence of repeat survey-takers – are not much of a problem in practice.

– and large percentages of the police – support serious institutional reform. Finally, extending upon my analyses in chapter three and four, I re-introduce specific violence-justifying ideologies (racial stereotypes in particular) which I argue attenuate the otherwise positive force of anti-violence values. I present empirical evidence that those who endorse violence-justifying attitudes (racial stereotypes in the current analysis) are less likely to question acts of police violence, or policies and services to quell this violence. This is *especially* true for those most opposed to violence in the abstract.

5.2 Perceptions of Police and Law Enforcement

In order to perform their duties effectively police require the cooperation and support of the community. Citizens who question the legitimacy of law enforcement are less likely to comply with the law or cooperate with the police. Establishing and maintaining that legitimacy requires fair and consistent behavior; officers must be respectful of the public, perform their duties in an impartial manner, and act within the limits of the law. Positive and frequent interactions with the community help police officers earn the support of the citizens they are sworn to protect. This reservoir of goodwill, in turn, allows them to more effectively perform their duties (Tyler 2004).

Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence across the country suggests a widespread breakdown in the development of trust and legitimacy between officers and citizens. In a number of recently publicized interactions, officers were denied services by employees of major businesses across the United States, a trend that some experts argue is a reaction to highly publicized incidents of police misconduct. An employee working the drive-through window at an Arby's in Pembroke Pines, Florida refused to serve a uniformed

police officer, and cops were also denied services at a Chuck E. Cheese in Bowling Green, Kentucky and a Starbucks in Philadelphia, PA (Bromwich, 2015).

Violent, targeted attacks on law enforcement officers are also on the rise. For example, following a Black Lives Matter protest in Dallas, TX, during the summer of 2016, Micah Xavier Johnson opened fire on a group of police officers killing five and injuring seven others. Johnson fled to a building located on the campus of El Centro College where he was quickly surrounded by police. Negotiators claim that Johnson was furious over police shootings involving black men, and that he wanted to target and kill white officers. The standoff ended when police used a remote controlled bomb to kill the suspect (Glum, 2016).

Research on race and attitudes toward the police is extensive, and it suggests that Blacks are more likely to report being victimized by police (Weitzer and Tuch 2004, Arthur 1993; Nelson & Kinder 1996; Epp et al. 2014; Ramirez 2015) and to view the police less favorably (Rosenbaum 2005; Weitzer 2000; Reisig and Parks 2000; Huang and Vaughn 1996). Blacks are also more likely than whites to live in high crime areas where police misconduct is more common (Mastrofski et al. 2002). Research (Scherer & Curry, 2010) suggests that "by virtue of their racial group consciousness, African Americans experience a "linked fate" with fellow black citizens when evaluating salient political issues" (93). This, of course, should transfer to attitudes toward the criminal justice system generally, and law enforcement officers in particular. Taken together, extant scholarship provides a host of reasons we might expect blacks to be suspicious of, and negatively evaluate incidents involving police use of force.

Others argue that racial disparity is not a result of law enforcement "targeting" blacks, but a consequence of blacks committing a disproportional percentage of crime, which results in more frequent interactions with the police. Some whites believe that blacks are more likely to be criminals, and that the justice system is a satisfactory means to control subordinate races. As Barkan and Cohn point out, "racial prejudice contributes to whites' support for police use of force, and this relationship should be stronger for the use of excessive force than for the use of reasonable force" (1998, 749).

5.3 Media Coverage of Police Use of Force Incidents

Media coverage of OIS and other use of force incidents helps shape evaluations of law enforcement officers more broadly. Media portrayals seldom provide a complete picture of these incidents, but instead deliver what Gamson and Modigliani describe as a frame, or "central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events" (1989, 143). Entman explains that framing strategies select "some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (1993, 52). So, when it comes to police violence, the media clearly have the power to shape the narrative and to influence the way consumers perceive events. This is not new; scholarship on bounded rationality (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) supports the idea that when individuals make a decision, they are limited by the information available, the cognitive limits of their brains, and the brevity of time they have to decide (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Individuals will

interpret information differently depending on which interpretive schema applies, and individual perceptions are reference dependent (Druckman 2001, Iyengar 1991).

Other work (Schlesinger et al. 1994) examines media coverage of law enforcement specifically and its effect on public opinion, but the results are mixed. Some findings (Chermak et al. 2006) suggest that the more a citizen reads the newspaper, or a high-profile case of police misconduct, the more likely they are to think that the officers involved are guilty. Others (Graziano et al. 2010) found evidence that attitudes about the prevalence of racial profiling are susceptible to the manner in which the media construct incidents of police misconduct. There is, however, widespread consensus that both television and newspaper coverage of crime tends to focus on the most sensational and violent cases (Roberts & Doob 1990). Even coverage that is not related to a specific case can shape public opinion in that case (Greene 1990). Media coverage and the way that violent incidents are framed has a powerful impact on individual evaluations of law enforcement and, as Hans and Dee point out, because most of the public has little direct experience with the justice system, knowledge and views of law enforcement are largely dependent on media representations – and the media presents a distorted view of the legal system (1991).

Alternatively, some media coverage of OIS has directly contributed to efforts to better track and reduce police violence. The *Washington Post*, *Vice News*, and the *Guardian's* in-depth investigations of people killed by police in the US convinced the federal government to collect better data on police use of force incidents and OIS. Announcing those reforms in 2016, then-FBI director James Comey remarked that it was "unacceptable, embarrassing, and ridiculous" that media organizations held better data on

the issue than his own officials. Prior to those reforms, the FBI relied on police chiefs voluntarily submitting their statistics – a method it turned out was capturing less than half of all killings nationwide. Under the new government program, the Department of Justice logged more than twice the rate previously reported for 2015 (Swaine & McCarthy 2016).

While the federal government is doing a much better job of tracking police violence, there is concern that data alone will not be sufficient to bring about widespread reforms in law enforcement. Stephen Rushin argues that newly amassed statistics should be publicly available; this would incentivize local departments to prioritize declines in violence (2016). But it would not guarantee that some of the more problematic departments will voluntarily make expensive reforms. On the other hand, the Attorney General could use civil rights litigation against law enforcement agencies to incentivize the implementation of steps to reduce police violence. As Rushin points out, "Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Attorney General has the power to seek equitable relief against police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional mis-conduct, including excessive uses of force" (2016, 117).

5.4 Blacks, Law Enforcement, and Political Activism in the United States

The relationship between blacks and the police – beginning with laws controlling the movement of slaves – has been adversarial throughout American history. From slavery, to Reconstruction, to the modern era of mass incarceration, issues of race and law enforcement persist. The high-profile shooting of Michael Brown during the summer of 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri may have been the catalyst that sparked violent protests

across American cities, but political activists in 2012 were already organizing to protest the death of another young black teenager. Outraged by the shooting death of seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin, community organizers Patrisse Cullors, Opal Tometi, and Alicia Garza created *#BlackLivesMatter* calling for accountability when unarmed blacks are murdered (Smith 2015). Black Lives Matter began as little more than scattered conversations on social media, but as the deaths of unarmed men mounted the movement gained national popularity. More vocal leaders joined the group fomenting strong opposition to law enforcement, and between 2014 and 2015 more than 950 protests took place nationwide – some of them quite violent (Ruffin 2016).

Documents from the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security released in 2017 revealed that the United States government viewed Black Lives Matter as a potential threat. Emails and internal documents, obtained through a lawsuit filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights and Color of Change, detailed the monitoring of Black Lives Matter protests. In one of those emails, the FBI assessed that "…it is very likely Black Identity Extremists perceptions of police brutality against African Americans spurred an increase in premeditated retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement and will likely serve as a justification for such violence" (Vohra 2017). The Black Lives Matter website, however, makes it explicitly clear that the group is not anti-police, saying "This movement is not an anti-people movement; therefore, it is not an anti-police movement. Most police officers are just everyday people who want to do their jobs, make a living for their families, and come home safely at the end of their shifts" (Black Lives Matter 2020).

Blue Lives Matter, founded and run by current and former police officers, was created to honor law enforcement, bolster public support, and provide resources for police officers and their families. They formed in response to the Ferguson protests, and claim that the nature of the profession makes them easy targets who are consequently "bullied by slander, illegitimate complaints, frivolous law suits, and physical attacks" and that "America watched as criminals destroyed property, and assaulted and murdered innocent people, and they labeled these criminals as victims" (Blue Lives Matter 2020). The group worries that much of the media and many politicians have damaged community relations and made their job more difficult. They tout officer Darren Wilson – who killed Michael Brown – as a hero, a man doing his job and forced to defend himself. Citing an unprecedented number of attacks on police in 2016, Blue Lives Matter created a membership program so that interested members of the public could become actively involved in supporting law enforcement; the money is directed toward life-saving equipment and training for police officers (Blue Lives Matter 2020).

The director at the Washington D.C. based Advancement Project, Thomas Mariadason, claims that officer deaths in the line of duty have recently declined, while the number of people killed by police has not. He argues that Blue Lives Matter is promoting a dangerous narrative that "…any and all criticisms of police tactics constitutes attacks on and a lack of respect for police officers is counterproductive, undemocratic, and hinders efforts to fix this broken system" (Guha 2017).

5.5 Policies to Better Track, and Decrease the Rate of Police Violence

Access to detailed information about police shootings and the officers involved is crucial if we want to create policies that minimize racial bias among police. In a recent

evaluation of fatal police shootings, Nix et al. (2017) found that white civilians were more likely to have been attacking the officer, and blacks were two times more likely to have been unarmed at the time of the shooting. The authors argue that new training programs and community engagement initiatives should be implemented to address implicit bias among law enforcement officers. Cox et al. (2014) argue that implicit bias is a factor that makes police *less* hesitant to shoot black suspects, while James et al. (2016) counters that reverse racism, or the "Ferguson Effect" is a racial bias that makes police *more* hesitant to shoot black suspects.

Ariel et al. (2015) randomly assigned police officers to "experimental shifts" during which all contacts with the public were recorded on body-worn cameras. Officers not equipped with body-worn cameras comprised the control group. The authors found that officers in the control group were almost twice as likely to use force over the course of the experiment. Other research demonstrates that officers believe that policies requiring body-worn cameras would lead to improved interactions with citizens in the community (Jennings et al. 2014). The successful implementation of new training programs and community engagement initiatives for law enforcement agencies that Nix et al. (2017) propose will depend, in large part, upon public support for these policies.

While discontent with police misconduct is widely documented (Chappell et al. 2004; Chermak et al. 2006) less is known about public support for reform. Weitzer and Tuch examined attitudes toward corrective measures in policing and found that "Respondents who believe that police corruption, unwarranted stops, and verbal and physical abuse of citizens are common are more likely to favor reforms. The same is true for those who are frequently exposed to news media coverage of incidents of police

misconduct (2004, 391). Additionally, whites were reluctant to accept and support policies giving minorities preferences in hiring to increase diversity in police departments while close to half of blacks and Hispanics supported doing so. More than 75 percent of blacks and Latinos said that more minority officers should be assigned to minority neighborhoods, while less than half of whites agreed. On the other hand, the vast majority of the public favored early warning measures to identify rogue officers and agreed that stronger punishments for those officers would improve policing.

In 2017, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey of police, and public opinion on policing and related policies in the United States. The majority of the public (60 percent) said that the deaths of blacks during encounters with police in recent years are signs of much broader problems, while a majority of police (67 percent) said that fatal police-black encounters are isolated incidents. There were, however, large racial differences on perceptions of deadly black-police encounters among both groups. The majority of black citizens (79 percent) claimed that OIS deaths are signs of much broader problems, and a majority of black police officers (57 percent) shared this view. The survey also found that a clear majority of officers and a much larger share of the public support the use of body-worn cameras. Two-thirds of police (66 percent) and most of the public (93 percent) favor the use of body cameras by police. Large percentages in both groups believe that police officers would be more likely to act appropriately, and that members of the public would be more likely to cooperate with police wearing body cameras. Finally, most of the public (73 percent) agreed that body cameras would help to reduce incidents of police violence (Morin et al. 2017).

5.6 Anti-Violence Values and Police Use of Force

An individual's orientation toward violence generally should help shape their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding recurring incidents of police violence. Specifically, those who are averse to violence should sympathize more with suspects, be less likely to approve of an officer's use of deadly force and be more likely to advocate for more resources to better track and ultimately decrease the rate of police violence in the United States.

The correlational findings and regression analyses performed in previous chapters helped inform my expectations for my inductively derived measure. Recall that on average, females were significantly more averse to violence than males. Individuals who deplore violence were significantly more likely to believe a victim of violence, but violence-justifying ideology moderated anti-violence values such that they no longer produced the normatively positive outcomes they otherwise would. In the present context, those who abhor violence should disapprove of a deadly police shooting and support increased spending on efforts to better track and prevent police violence. Racial prejudice, however, should attenuate the positive force of anti-violence values – especially when the suspect is black. It is not clear, however, whether violence-averse individuals would be persuaded one way or the other by varying arguments against police use of deadly force. It is also not clear whether violence-averse individuals would approve of a police shooting when the suspect imposes a high level of threat upon an officer. Based upon the limited information about the nature of anti-violence values that I gained in the previous chapters, I derive the following hypotheses:

$H1_{a:}$ "On average, *females will score higher on anti-violence values when compared to males."*

$H1_{b:}$ *"Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect is appropriate or legal."*

$H1_{c:}$ *"Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to reduce police violence."*

Much of my focus in this chapter is on whether individuals who condemn violence are more likely to support public policies to decrease the prevalence of police violence in the United States. I expect that the answer is "yes", in many cases violence-averse individuals will be significantly more likely to sympathize with, support, and demand justice for victims. However, I argue that violence-justifying ideologies have the power to dampen the effects of anti-violence sentiment. In the following pages I examine additional factors that should attenuate the otherwise positive effects of anti-violence values. When it comes to questions of police violence, one prejudicial belief system (violence-justifying ideologies) warrants additional discussion. *Racial Stereotypes* can lead people to excuse police violence and be unsympathetic to victims. I discuss facets of race and police violence in more detail in the following sections.

5.7 Racial Attributions and Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System

Research examining the role of racial resentment and stereotypes in predicting white individuals' evaluations of the criminal justice system is extensive (Johnson 2008;

Ghandnoosh 2014; Hutchings 2015; Filindra & Kaplan 2016). And, the idea that racism drives many individuals' crime policy preferences has serious implications; institutional legitimacy is based on the idea that in a "democratic society it is unacceptable for racial prejudice to guide public policy. Insofar as racial prejudice motivates calls by the public and perhaps public officials for the harsher treatment of criminals, such treatment is unjustified" (Barkan and Cohn 1998, 751). We know, for instance, that the punitive attitudes of whites toward criminals are based partially on racial prejudice (Cohn et al. 1991; Aguirre & Baker 1993; Green et al. 2006; Peffley et al. 2017), and that racial prejudice conditions many whites' fear of being criminally victimized (St. John & Heald-Moore 1996; Oliver & Fonash 2002; Farrell et al. 2009).

Research suggests that support for capital punishment also varies by race, and that whites are more likely than blacks to support the death penalty (Young 1991; Soss et al. 2003; Barkan & Cohn 2005). This is not surprising; like much of the justice system in the United States, capital punishment takes a disproportionate toll on people of color. It could be argued, from a historical standpoint, that racial disparities in capital punishment represent an institutional extension of the barbarous lynching of blacks beginning in the 19th century. Today, numerous southern states – including Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana – are part of what scholars call the "death belt" because of the "high correlation they find between the history of lynching against African-Americans and today's disproportionate arrests, prosecution, and sentencing to death of African-Americans" (Mikulich 2015).

Research beyond the United States provides additional evidence that minority group-members oppose the death penalty more than members of the majority. Focusing

on Eastern Europe, Peshkopia and Voss found that "attitudes toward the death penalty depend on the extent to which one identifies with the rulers who would control the instruments of death" (2016, 39).

While the association between racial attitudes and policy preferences is well-documented, so too are the weaknesses of common measures for racial stereotypes and resentment (Huddy & Feldman 2009). In a recent study, Peffley et al. (2017) used dispositional attribution in place of common stereotype measures to overcome a major problem – they ignore perceptions of racial discrimination. The authors constructed two separate, and distinct measures of racial attributes, "one that focuses on blacks' dispositions (e.g. blacks' tendency toward violence and crime) and another focusing on discrimination against blacks (e.g. whether police and courts are biased against blacks)" (2017, 1). To test the new measures, they examined racial disparities in support for capital punishment.

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three arguments against the death penalty. They were presented either a "racial argument" that blacks are more likely to be put to death, a "innocent argument" that too many innocent people are being put to death, or a "no argument" baseline that simply asked whether the respondent favors or opposes capital punishment. Among black respondents, they found that both arguments decreased support for capital punishment. Across all groups, racial dispositions had no significant effect on support for capital punishment in the baseline condition. On the other hand, results indicated that whites who blame blacks' harsh treatment by the criminal justice system on their disposition, when presented the "racial argument", became *more* supportive of the death penalty compared to those in the baseline condition – what

scholars call the "backlash effect" (Knoll et al. 2011). This research provides important insight on how arguments against punitive policies are received by different audiences. If individuals, interest groups, politicians, and policymakers want to gain support for criminal justice reforms, issue-framing suggests that tailoring policy proposals to specific audiences is one way to increase support. This should apply to reforms intended to decrease incidents of lethal officer-involved shootings.

Numerous cities in the United States have implemented training programs to prepare law enforcement officers to de-escalate and safely manage crises. When an individual poses a serious threat to an officer or others the officer is authorized to use lethal force, yet de-escalation methods enable officers to manage many dangerous encounters without discharging a firearm. Effective communication and active listening are sometimes sufficient, but if an individual resists verbal commands an officer could use "soft" bodily force (e.g. grabbing, restraining), or "hard" bodily force (e.g. hitting, kicking) if necessary, to gain control of the situation. When these methods are not enough, officers have a range of non-lethal technologies including batons, chemical sprays, and high-voltage tasers. If officers use these methods appropriately the need for using deadly force decreases (Oliva et al. 2010). Convincing officers on the beat that less aggressive measures can be effective, however, may be difficult. In a 2016 survey of law enforcement, 56 percent of officers agreed that "in certain areas of the city it is more useful for an officer to be aggressive than to be courteous", and 44 percent agreed that "some people can only be brought to reason the hard, physical way" (Morin et al. 2017). Officers' tendency to be aggressive could be rooted in self-preservation; recent research

suggests that law enforcement officers working for departments with de-escalation policies are more likely to be killed or injured in the line of duty (Douliery 2017).

Following the Michael Brown shooting in 2014 public demands for police reforms reached a fever pitch, leading then-President Barack Obama to order a Presidential Task Force on 21st Century Policing to conduct nationwide inquiries of law enforcement agencies. The final report, released in 2015, included 60 recommendations to improve police-community relations. One of those recommendations was a call to designate de-escalation a core element of police training and practice (President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing 2015). Research suggests that de-escalation will help decrease use-of-force incidents and improve officers' ability to resolve conflicts without violence (Oliva et al. 2010). Others argue that de-escalation training is as important as academy training in physical force and self-defense (Walker & Katz 2013). Much like the death penalty and other punitive policies, it is likely that support for police reforms varies by race. In order to gain support for police reforms, issue-framing suggests that tailoring policy proposals to specific audiences is one way to increase support. Based on prior research I derive the following hypotheses:

> $H2_{a.}$ "*Blacks and other minorities will be more likely, on average, to attribute racial disparities in the justice system to racial discrimination when compared to whites."*
>
> $H2_{b.}$ "*Because discrimination attributions focus on racial bias among police and courts, individuals who embrace the idea that the justice system is biased against blacks will be less likely, on average, to approve of a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect."*

$H2_{c.}$ "*Because dispositional attributions focus on racial stereotypes, whites who embrace negative stereotypes about blacks, when presented the "racial argument" will be less likely, on average, to support institutional reforms to decrease police violence when compared to those in the baseline condition."*

$H2_{d.}$ **"***Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect."*

$H2_{e.}$ **"***Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to track and reduce police violence."*

5.8 Racial Amalgamation of Officer and Suspect

Researchers, activists, and interested members of the public do not have access to definitive statistics on police-involved fatalities in the United States. While detailed information is not always available, journalists and organizations that maintain data on police killings agree that around 1,000 to 1,200 occur annually. Young black males – particularly those in their 20s – are at greatest risk of being killed by police, and minorities in general are more likely to be killed than white individuals (Edwards 2019). The amalgamation of race between an officer and suspect in OIS incidents matters – especially when the officer is white, and the suspect is black. Debates over shootings exhibit a recurring theme; white officers are primarily to blame for the death of young

black males. Yet, it is difficult to test whether racial disparities vary by officer characteristics because most available databases do not include details about the officers involved. Johnson et al. (2019) spent more than 1500 hours collecting data for their paper on racial disparities in OIS. Armed with the information reported by the *Washington Post* and the *Guardian*, the authors contacted listed police departments (more than 650 in total) to uncover the characteristics of the officers involved. They used that information to create a national database for every fatal OIS (more than 900) that occurred in the United States in 2015, and it includes the race/ethnicity of the officer involved. After close examination of the data, the authors found "no evidence of anti-black or anti-Hispanic disparities across shootings, and white officers are not more likely to shoot minority civilians than non-white officers. Instead, race-specific crime strongly predicts civilian race. That is, as crime rates increase for a given group (e.g. blacks or Hispanics) the odds that a person belonging to that group will be killed by police increases as well (2019, 15877). The authors admit, however, that their analyses examine racial disparities only in shootings that result in deaths, and not officers' decision to use force more generally.

Extant research provides many reasons blacks might be suspicious of, and negatively evaluate incidents involving police use of force (Weitzer and Tuch 1999; Reisig and Parks 2000; Rosenbaum 2005). Shootings involving a white officer and a black civilian often spark additional violence and destruction. From Ferguson, Baltimore, and Charlotte we know that local protests of police violence sometimes transform to widespread riots. Following the announcement that Officer Darren Wilson would not be indicted for killing Michael Brown more than 25 buildings in and around Ferguson were

burned and many more were vandalized and looted. Hundreds of vehicles, and entire car lots were also set ablaze (New York Times 2014). Widespread riots in Baltimore in protest to the death of Freddie Gray while in police custody caused an estimated $9 million in damages. More than 100 vehicles and 15 buildings were incinerated as violence swept the city (Toppa 2015). Finally, protests turned to riots lasting weeks in Charlotte after police shot and killed Keith Lamont Scott in an apartment complex parking lot. Damage to buildings, including the Nascar Hall of Fame and the Convention Center, along with overtime pay for police and firefighters cost taxpayers upwards of $4.6 million (Harrison 2016).

In its 2017 survey of police and the public, the Pew Research Center asked, "How much of the protest over deaths of blacks during encounters with the police are motivated by long-standing bias against the police?" 95 percent of white officers and 85 percent of whites believe that protests are at least somewhat motivated by anti-police bias, and 64 percent of black officers agree. However, 64 percent of blacks believe that protests are motivated by a genuine desire to hold police accountable for their actions. Understanding the factors that contribute to evaluations of police violence is crucial from a policy standpoint. If citizens believe that racial disparities in OIS are a direct result of discrimination by white officers, policies to increase the diversity of those officers might improve community-police relations. Based on prior research assessing attitudes toward law enforcement, I derive the following hypotheses:

> $H3_{a.}$ *"Police shootings involving a white officer and a black suspect are common in the news. When a black suspect is killed by a white officer respondents will be less likely, on average, to agree that the use of deadly force was appropriate."*

H3b. "*In some cases, officers have no choice but to use lethal force. When a suspect imposes a high level of threat on an officer respondents will be more likely, on average, to believe that the use of deadly force was legal."*

To examine the role of race and other factors in citizens' evaluations of police violence I utilized a 2 * 2 * 3 experimental survey design. Participants were randomly assigned to either a control, or one of four treatment conditions which varied the racial amalgamation of a police officer and a suspect ("baseline" vs. "BO / BS" vs. "BO / WS" vs. "WO / WS" vs. "WO / BS), and media frames depicting the level of threat imposed by a suspect ("low" vs. "medium", vs. "high") as the independent variables.[34] The photo variation is important; respondents were told nothing explicitly to make them focus on race. Threat was portrayed using four fictitious police shooting scenarios. In each scenario, the suspect was wanted on felony charges for assault with a deadly weapon. In the "low threat" condition, he exits his vehicle and advances toward the responding officer before suddenly stopping and running in the opposite direction. In the "medium threat" condition the suspect also advances on the officer before stopping and reaching for his inside jacket pocket. Finally, in the "high threat" condition, our suspect advances, stops, but then reaches for a firearm protruding from his waistband. The treatments I employed in the survey experiment are included in "Appendix B", and examples of each are included in Figure 5.8.1, and 5.8.2 below.[35]

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[34] In sample A, the threat condition was presented as a fictional newspaper account of a police shooting. In sample B, the threat condition was presented textually in the body of the survey.

[35] Racial amalgamations: baseline: race-neutral control group; BO/BS: black officer/black suspect; BO/WS: black officer/white suspect; WO/WS: white officer/white suspect; WO/BS: white officer/black suspect. Threat: low; medium; high.

Figure 5.8.1 | Image Frame for White Officer / Black Suspect

Figure 5.8.2 | Image Frame for High Threat to Officer



The Nashvi

Monday, August 14, 2017

New video sheds light on con

David Grossman

NASHVILLE, Tenn. (WZTV) - Metro Nashville Police have released a new video that they say shows Anthony Taylor did not have a physical confrontation with police officers before Officer Tim Hinkle fatally shot him. The suspect was wanted on felony charges for assault with a deadly weapon in Davidson County. The video shows the suspect exit his vehicle and advance toward the officer before stopping short and reaching for a gun stuffed in his front waist band. Officer Hinkle then fired two rounds - instantly killing Taylor. Police also said that they recovered a second firearm from the suspect after he was shot. Hinkle was placed on administrative leave after the incident.

This experimental manipulation allowed me to establish the causal effect of racial characteristics and threat on individuals' belief that the officer acted not only appropriately, but legally.

5.9 Data and Measurements

To test my assumptions about anti-violence values, racial attributions in the justice system, confidence in the police, and experience with law enforcement – along with the level of threat a suspect imposes, the racial amalgamation of an officer and suspect, on respondents' evaluations of an officer involved shooting incident, and support for policies to reform policing, I administered two surveys.

Data from two unique surveys are reported throughout this chapter. Anti-violence values were assessed with one of two measures, but my primary focus is on the inductively specified scale produced in chapter 3 (see Table 5.9.1). Independent and dependent variables of interest are not uniform across each survey sample, so findings are reported where available throughout the relevant subsections herein. Sample A administered question items in an online questionnaire form to 736 unique Mechanical Turk workers. This survey included a seven-item honor-based measure which I constructed using deductive reasoning (i.e. choosing the question items from the full honor beliefs scale which I premised would best capture a person's orientation toward violence).[36]

[36] Deductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: "An individual should not be afraid to fight"; "People should be expected to fight for themselves"; "You would want your child to stand up to bullies"; "A person who doesn't 'take any crap' from anybody is an admirable reputation to have"; "It is a person's responsibility to protect their family"; "If an individual is insulted, that person's pride is insulted"; "A person's family should be their number one priority".

Sample B administered additional question items, including the seven-item inductive version of anti-violence values to 1,120 unique Mechanical Turk workers.[37] violence).[38] Sample B administered additional question items, including the seven-item inductive version of anti-violence values to 1,120 unique Mechanical Turk workers.[39]

Table 5.9.1 | Survey Samples for Police Violence Analyses

SURVEY	DATE	SAMPLE	TYPE	MHBS	HBS	INDUCTIVE ANTI-VIOLENCE	DEDUCTIVE ANTI-VIOLENCE
Sample A	5/21/2018	N = 737	M-Turk	✗	✗	✗	✓
Sample B	3/10/2020	N = (1,120)	M-Turk	✗	✗	✓	✗

I controlled for the effects of factors common to most empirical analyses in the social sciences including individuals' age, biological sex, education, income, and political ideology. Based on prior research, I also included several items which should be useful in characterizing individuals and their views of the justice system, or that might influence

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[37] Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: "It is important for a person to be tougher than other people"; A person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp"; You would praise a person who acted aggressively to an insult"; "Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable"; "It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight"; "A person who doesn't take any crap from anybody is an admirable reputation to have"; and "Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself".

[38] Deductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: "An individual should not be afraid to fight"; "People should be expected to fight for themselves"; "You would want your child to stand up to bullies"; "A person who doesn't 'take any crap' from anybody is an admirable reputation to have"; "It is a person's responsibility to protect their family"; "If an individual is insulted, that person's pride is insulted"; "A person's family should be their number one priority".

[39] Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: "It is important for a person to be tougher than other people"; A person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp"; You would praise a person who acted aggressively to an insult"; "Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable"; "It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight"; "A person who doesn't take any crap from anybody is an admirable reputation to have"; and "Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself".

attitudes toward suspects, law enforcement, and policies to address police violence. Following Jacoby (2000) I included a control for attitudes toward government spending which asked respondents to place themselves on a continuum between the following positions: 0 “Government should provide many fewer services, reduce spending a lot”, and 10 “Government should provide many more services, increase spending a lot”.

In both samples I included a control for authoritarianism. The most popular measure today is Altemeyer’s Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale (Altemeyer 1981; 1988, 1996), but critics argue that it confounds social conservatism and authoritarianism (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). While much of the extant research suggests that authoritarianism is a uniquely right-wing phenomena, recent research (Conway III et al. 2017) supports the idea that left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) is also a viable construct in ordinary United States samples.

Conway III et al. found that left-wing authoritarianism significantly correlates with measures of liberalism, prejudice, dogmatism, and attitude strength which “largely paralleled those correlating with RWA with identical conservative-focused measurements, and an overall effect-size measurement showed LWA was similarly related to those constructs” (2017, 1). In sample A, I included a truncated version of both the right-wing (Altemeyer 1996) and the left-wing (Conway III et al. 2017) authoritarianism scales. Respondents were randomly assigned to complete either the RWA, or LWA battery.

In sample B, following Hetherington et al. (2011) I used the four-item authoritarianism index included in the American National Election Survey (ANES) which asks respondents to indicate which of two positive traits is most important for a child to

have: “respect for elders” versus “independence”; “obedience” versus “self-reliance”; “curiosity” versus “good manners”; and “being considerate” versus “being well-behaved”. As the authors point out, these values are “fairly well-divorced from political ideology and attitudes; therefore, the measure is unlikely to be conflated with social conservatism and is easily distinguishable from the dependent variables” (551).

Where anti-violence values play a primary role in my analysis, I focus solely on sample B, which includes the *inductively* derived anti-violence measure. Recall that principal component analysis in Chapter 3 produced a 7-item attitudes toward violence factor (Eigenvalue = 1.85) including items that tap either the belief that individuals should maintain a no-nonsense reputation, or that violence is often acceptable. These were the least popular question items suggesting that most individuals do not condone violence. Respondents reported their agreement with these statements on seven-point scales ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”, and the scale was then recoded so that higher scores indicated a greater aversion to violence.

Sex Differences:

Recall $H1_a$, that “*On average, females will score higher on anti-violence values when compared to males”.* An independent t-test was run on the data from Sample B to determine if there were differences in the endorsement of anti-violence values based upon the respondent’s biological sex. $H1_a$ was supported and is visually displayed in Figure 5.9.2 below.[40]

[40] Sample B: (t = 7.12, with 1,119 degrees of freedom, p < .001)

Figure 5.9.1 | Anti-Violence Values



Females, on average, scored significantly higher on anti-violence values when compared to males in sample B. Because the deductively derived scale administered in sample A is statistically inferior to the inductively derived version administered in sample B, results for the former were excluded.[41]

Respondents' dispositional (internal) and systemic (external) explanations for racial disparities in the justice system were measured following Peffley et al. (2017). The "blacks discriminated against" items tap respondents' agreement with the idea that the police and the justice system are biased against blacks. The "blacks' negative dispositions" items tap respondents' agreement with the idea that blacks are more aggressive by nature, and more likely to commit crimes.

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[41] Some question items (e.g. "It is a person's responsibility to protect their family"; "If an individual is insulted, that person's pride is insulted"; "A person's family should be their number one priority") are likely not related to individuals' orientation toward violence, which might explain the lower scores on these scales for both sexes when compared to the statistically constructed scale in sample B.

Recall $H2_a$. *Blacks and other minorities will be more likely, on average, to attribute racial disparities in the justice system to racial discrimination when compared to whites.* A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine whether individual perceptions of discrimination in the justice system varied by respondents' race/ethnicity. Data is mean +/- standard error.

In sample A, participants were classified into four groups: white (n= 562), black (n= 52), Hispanic/Latino (n= 43), and other (n= 79). Despite the fact that the number of respondents in most groups is relatively small, and disproportionately so compared to the "white" group, these numbers are high enough to warrant subgroup analyses.[42] Preliminary analyses showed that there were statistically significant differences between group means (F (3, 732) = 12.99, $p < .001$), and a Tukey post-hoc test revealed that blacks (0.82 +/- 0.14, $p < .001$), and Hispanics/Latinos (0.38 +/- 0.15, $p = .060$), are significantly more likely than whites to believe that the police and the justice system are biased against blacks.[43] However, those who identified as "other" were significantly less likely than blacks to believe that the police and the justice system are biased against blacks (-0.38 +/- 0.17, $p < .001$). There were no statistically significant differences between the remaining racial/ethnic groups. An additional analysis was conducted to

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[42] Six assumptions must be met to obtain valid results using a one-way Anova: 1) the dependent variable should be continuous; 2) the independent variable should consist of three or more unrelated groups; 3) there should be independence of observations; 4) there should be no significant outliers; 5) data should be normally distributed in each group; and 6) there should be homogeneity of variance. While unequal/small sample sizes can affect the homogeneity of variance assumption, a Bartlett's test for equal variance indicated that heterogeneity of variance is not a problem. For sample A, all six assumptions for a valid one-way Anova analysis were satisfied.

[43] A Tukey post-hoc test is used to examine the specific differences between three or more groups when an analysis of variance (ANOVA) produces a significant F-test. ANOVA alone will not reveal exactly *where* those differences lie.

determine whether individual perceptions of blacks' dispositions varied by respondents' race.

Preliminary analyses showed that there were statistically significant differences between group means (F (3, 732) = 2.65, $p < .05$), and a Tukey post-hoc test revealed that blacks are significantly less likely than whites to believe that blacks are more aggressive by nature and more likely to commit crimes (-0.30 +/- 0.12, $p < .05$). However, those who identified as "other" were significantly more likely than blacks to embrace negative black stereotypes (0.37 +/- 0.15, $p < .05$) see Table 5.9.2 below.

Table 5.9.2 | ANOVA for Justice System Discriminatory, by Race/Ethnicity

Justice System Discriminatory

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	36.17	3.00	12.06	12.99	0.00
Within Groups	679.57	733.00	0.93		
Total	715.74	736.00	0.98		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
White	563	2.47	0.97
Black	52	3.29	0.79
Hispanic/Latino	43	2.85	1.09
Other	79	2.51	0.96
Total	736	2.55	0.99

Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
Black v. White	0.82	0.14	5.88	0.00	0.46	1.18
Hispanic/Latino v. White	0.38	0.15	2.50	0.06	-0.01	0.77
Other v. White	0.05	0.12	0.39	0.98	-0.25	0.34
Hispanic/Latino v. Black	-0.44	0.20	-2.21	0.12	-0.95	0.07
Other v. Black	-0.78	0.17	-4.51	0.00	-1.21	-0.33
Other v. Hispanic/Latino	-0.34	0.18	-1.84	0.26	-0.81	0.13

Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)

In sample B, participants were classified into four groups: white (n= 837), black (n= 92), Hispanic/Latino (n= 63), and other (n= 127). Preliminary analyses showed that

there were statistically significant differences between group means (F (3, 1115) = 7.99, $p < .001$), however, the data did not meet the six assumptions required for a valid ANOVA. As a result, I was not able to conduct sub-group analyses for sample B.[44]

Overall, $H2_a$ was partially supported. In sample A, blacks (0.82 +/- 0.14, $p < .001$), and Hispanics/Latinos (0.38 +/- 0.15, $p = .060$), were significantly more likely than whites to believe that the police and the justice system are biased against blacks. However, respondents who identified as "other" were not statistically different from whites. Additionally, blacks were significantly less likely than whites to believe that blacks are more aggressive by nature and more likely to commit crimes (-0.30 +/- 0.12, $p < .05$). In sample B, however, I was not able to conduct sub-group analyses because the ANOVA assumptions were not satisfied.

Recall $H3_a$, that *"Police shootings involving a white officer and a black suspect are common in the news. When a black suspect is killed by a white officer individuals will be less likely, on average, to agree that the officers' use of deadly force was appropriate".* Additionally, while the racial characteristics of an officer and suspect likely impacts individuals' evaluation of a lethal OIS, the level of threat imposed by a suspect should be an important consideration as well. Thus, $H3_b$, "*In some cases, officers have no choice but to use lethal force. When a suspect imposes a high level of threat upon an officer individuals will be more likely, on average, to believe that the officer's use of lethal force was appropriate or legal".*

[44] The data for sample B did not meet the six assumptions required for valid ANOVA results. The unequal/small sample sizes in sample B affected the homogeneity of variance assumption. Although ANOVA is considered robust to moderate departures from this assumption, they should be small when the sample sizes are vastly different. Additionally, a Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the data for "whites" and "blacks" was not normally distributed – another assumption required to obtain valid ANOVA results (Pierce et al. 2004).

Respondents were randomly assigned to either a baseline condition with very little information about the suspect or officer in a fictional account of a deadly OIS, or one of four treatment conditions varying the racial amalgamation of the officer and suspect involved. Using an experimental design, I examined the effect of the racial amalgamation of an officer and suspect, and the level of threat imposed upon an officer, on respondents' evaluations of a police shooting – including whether they believe the officer's actions were *appropriate* or *legal*.[45] The distinction is important; some OIS are determined to be technically legal, but not necessarily appropriate (e.g. some form of non-lethal force may have been sufficient).

I also developed four fictitious police shooting scenarios to examine the impact of the level of threat imposed. In each scenario, the suspect was wanted on felony charges for assault with a deadly weapon. In the "low threat" condition, he exits his vehicle and advances toward the responding officer before suddenly stopping and running in the opposite direction. In the "medium threat" condition the suspect also advances on the officer before stopping and reaching for his inside jacket pocket. Finally, in the "high threat" condition, our suspect advances, stops, but then reaches for a firearm protruding from his waistband.

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[45] Control: No racial information provided; BO/BS: Black officer; black suspect; BO/WS: Black officer; white suspect; WO/WS: White officer; white suspect; WO/BS: White officer; black suspect. In survey sample A, whether the officer acted appropriately was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1. "Inappropriately" to 5. "Appropriately".

Whether the officer acted within the law was a dichotomous measure: 0. "No" and 1. "Yes". Because this is not a continuous variable, I did not conduct ANOVA to examine differences in group means. Evaluations of legality are assessed using logistic regression in the following section.

5.10 Experimental Results – Belief that a Lethal OIS was Appropriate

Racial Amalgamation of Officer and Suspect

Respondents were randomly assigned to view either the control, or one of four treatment conditions. In survey sample A (N= 736), the difference in the average score on "appropriate" between treatment groups was significant (F (4, 732) = 6.46, $p < 0.001$). The Post Hoc results are displayed in Table 5.10.1.[46]

Table 5.10.1 | ANOVA for Racial Amalgamation Experimental Conditions

Officer Acted Appropriately

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	48.80	4.00	12.20	6.46	0.00
Within Groups	1381.46	732.00	1.89		
Total	1430.26	736.00	1.95		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
Baseline	129	2.24	1.43
Black Officer/Black Suspect	136	2.51	1.33
Black Officer/White Suspect	153	2.80	1.44
White Officer/White Suspect	148	2.45	1.44
White Officer/Black Suspect	170	2.07	1.23
Total	736	2.41	1.39

Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
BO/WS v. Baseline	0.56	0.16	3.43	0.01	0.11	1.01
WO/BS v. BO/BS	-0.44	0.16	-2.81	0.04	-0.88	-0.01
WO/BS v. BO/WS	-0.73	0.15	-4.79	0.01	-1.15	-0.31

Mechanical Turk Sample A (N=736)

[46] Differences in group means are excluded if the difference did not achieve statistical significance.

In survey sample B (N= 1120), the difference in the average score between treatment groups on "appropriate" was significant (F (4, 731) = 6.46, $p < 0.001$). The Post Hoc results are displayed in Table 5.10.2.[47]

Table 5.10.2 | ANOVA for Racial Amalgamation Experimental Conditions

Officer Acted Appropriately

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	48.88	4.00	12.22	3.39	0.01
Within Groups	4000.11	1016.00	3.61		
Total	4048.99	1120.00	3.64		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
Baseline	211	4.36	1.88
Black Officer/Black Suspect	205	4.58	1.86
Black Officer/White Suspect	239	4.78	1.89
White Officer/White Suspect	223	4.23	1.98
White Officer/Black Suspect	240	4.71	1.88
Total	1120	4.54	1.91

Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
WO/BS v. BO/BS	-0.55	0.18	-3.11	0.02	-1.03	-0.07
BO/WS v. WO/BS	0.48	0.17	2.70	0.04	-0.01	0.97

Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

Overall, $H3_a$ *"Police shootings involving a white officer and a black suspect are common in the news. When a black suspect is killed by a white officer respondents will be less likely, on average, to agree that the use of deadly force was appropriate"* was partially supported. In many cases, respondents were prejudiced against white police officers dealing with African-American suspects. In sample A, respondents who received the "WO/BS" treatment were significantly less likely than those who received the "BO/BS" to believe the officer's actions were appropriate (-0.44 +/- 0.16, $p < .05$). Those

[47] Differences in group means are excluded if the difference did not achieve statistical significance. In survey sample B, whether the officer acted appropriately was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1. "Extremely Inappropriately" to 7. "Extremely Appropriately".

who received the "WO/BS" treatment were significantly less likely than those who received the "BO/WS" to believe the officer's actions were appropriate (-0.73 +/- 0.15, $p < .001$). Those who received the "BO/WS" treatment were significantly more likely than those who received the "Control" to believe the officer's actions were appropriate (0.56 +/- 0.16, $p < .001$). However, respondents who received the "WO/BS" treatment were *not* significantly more likely to disapprove of the officer's actions compared to those in the "Control" group (F (-0.17) = 0.16, $p = .828$).

To unpack these results in more detail, treatment group means for sample A – broken down by respondents' race/ethnicity, on belief the officer acted appropriately – compared to control group means – are displayed in figure 5.10.1 below. Surprisingly, significant differences in evaluations of the officer's actions, across treatment groups, emerged only among white respondents.

In sample B, preliminary analyses showed that there were statistically significant differences between group means (F (3, 1115) = 7.99, $p < .001$), however, the data did not meet the six assumptions required for a valid ANOVA. As a result, I was not able to conduct sub-group analyses for sample B.[48]

[48] The data for sample B did not meet the six assumptions required for valid ANOVA results. The unequal/small sample sizes in sample B affected the homogeneity of variance assumption. Although ANOVA is considered robust to moderate departures from this assumption, they should be small when the sample sizes are vastly different. Additionally, a Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the data for "whites" and "blacks" was not normally distributed – another assumption required to obtain valid ANOVA results (Pierce et al. 2004).

Figure 5.10.1 | Belief that the Officer Acted Appropriately, by Race/Ethnicity



Level of Threat Imposed by the Suspect

Respondents were randomly assigned to view one of three treatment conditions varying the level of threat imposed upon the officer. In survey sample A (N = 736), the difference in the average score on "appropriate" between treatment groups was not significant (F (2, 734) = 0.15, p = 0.86). In survey sample B (N = 1,120), however, the difference in the average score on "appropriate" between treatment groups was significant (F (2, 1,118) = 20.90, p = 0.00). The Post Hoc results are displayed in Table 5.10.3.[49]

[49] Differences in group means are excluded if the difference did not achieve statistical significance.

Table 5.10.3 | ANOVA for Threat Imposed Experimental Conditions

Threat Imposed by Suspect

	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	Prob > F
Between Groups	146.83	2.00	73.42	20.90	0.00
Within Groups	3902.16	1018.00	3.51		
Total	4048.99	1120.00	3.64		

Group Means

	N	Mean	SD
Low Threat	369	4.06	1.89
Medium Threat	356	4.58	1.85
High Threat	395	4.94	1.88
Total	1120	4.54	1.91

Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

Differences in Means

	Contrast	Std. Err.	t	p > |t|	Lower	Upper
Medium v. Low Threat	0.52	0.14	3.69	0.00	0.19	0.84
High v. Low Threat	0.88	0.14	6.45	0.00	0.56	1.20
High v. Medium Threat	0.36	0.14	2.65	0.02	0.04	0.68

Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

Overall, $H3_b$ "*In some cases, officers have no choice but to use lethal force. When a suspect imposes a high level of threat on an officer respondents will be more likely, on average, to believe that the use of deadly force was legal."* was partially supported. In sample B, respondents who received the "Medium Threat" treatment were significantly more likely than those who received the "Low Threat" to believe the officer's actions were appropriate (+0.52 +/- 0.14, $p = 0.00$). Those who received the "High Threat" treatment were significantly more likely than those who received the "Low Threat" to believe the officer's actions were appropriate (+0.88 +/- 0.14, $p < 0.00$). Finally, those who received the "High Threat" treatment were significantly more likely than those who received the "Medium Threat" to believe the officer's actions were appropriate (+0.36 +/- 0.14, $p < 0.02$).

Multiple-Regression Models

Overall, ANOVA indicated that when it comes to evaluations of lethal officer-involved shootings the racial amalgamation of the officer and the suspect involved matter. When the officer is white, people tend to be more suspicious and less likely to view his actions favorably. On the other hand, when the officer is black, people tend to be less skeptical and more likely to believe the officer's actions were appropriate. The treatment that garnered the strongest opposition, as expected, was the lethal OIS involving a white officer and a black suspect. For the reasons put forth throughout this chapter, it is not surprising that people are often apprehensive when a white officer kills a black suspect.

When it comes to assessments of the level of threat the suspect imposes, the results were mixed. In sample A, there were no significant differences in evaluations of the officer's actions based upon "threat". I suspect, however, that this was because respondents failed to closely read the fictitious newspaper accounts of the OIS, which rendered the treatment ineffective. In sample B, threat was transmitted textually within the body of the survey. As a result, approval of the officer's actions increased significantly as the level of threat increased.

My results thus far are unfolded mostly as expected, however, I have examined differences in individuals' evaluation of an OIS based *only* on the racial characteristics of the officer and suspect – and the level of threat imposed by the suspect – independently, absent additional covariates. I now turn to testing my remaining hypotheses for

evaluations of a lethal OIS. Specifically, $H1_{b:}$ *"Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect is appropriate or legal", and* $H2_{b.}$ "*Because discrimination attributions focus on racial bias among police and courts, individuals who embrace the idea that the justice system is biased against blacks will be less likely, on average, to approve of a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect.*

My overarching argument throughout this project is that violence-justifying ideologies (primarily racial animus in the current analysis) will cancel out any normatively positive outcomes that individuals' aversion to violence might otherwise produce. Assessing the attitudes that help determine individuals' assessment of a lethal police encounter provide another opportunity to empirically test my theory. Specifically, $H2_{d:}$ **"***Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect."*

In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated five models.[50] My key independent variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 2-item measure of negative stereotypes (blacks' negative dispositions). To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about blacks on the predictive power of individuals' aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between blacks' negative dispositions and anti-violence values. I expect racial stereotypes to produce negative signs: respondents who believe that blacks are to

[50] In the first model, I looked only at the racial amalgamation of the officer and suspect, and the race/ethnicity of the respondents. Model 2 incorporates the level of threat imposed upon the officer. Model 3 includes my measure of anti-violence values to examine its function absent competing covariates. Model 4 incorporates the remaining independent variables that I believe help shape evaluations of police violence, and Model 5, which I discuss in detail, includes my interaction term of blacks negative dispositions * anti-violence values.

blame for racial disparities in the justice system, will be more likely to endorse police violence. Anti-violence values should produce positive signs: the more a respondent abhors violence, the more likely they will be to disapprove of a lethal officer-involved shooting. My underlying assumption, however, is that interacting these variables will produce a negative sign; as racism increases, anti-violence values will no longer predict disapproval of the officer's actions.

I included additional experimental variables including the racial amalgamation of the officer and suspect (Control, BO/BS, BO/WS, WO/WS, WO/BS), and the level of threat imposed by the suspect (Low, Medium, High). The models also include age, education, income, biological sex, race/ethnicity, blacks' negative dispositions, blacks discriminated against, political ideology (conservatism), and authoritarianism.[51] Results from the fully specified model are reported for sample B; entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors.

[51] In the interest of saving space age, education, income, and biological sex (not significant) were omitted from the regression table.

Mechanical Turk Sample B

Table 5.10.4 | Belief that the Officer Acted Appropriately

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5
Racial Amalgamation					
Black Officer / Black Suspect	0.418 **	0.384 **	0.413 **	0.437 **	0.439 **
	(0.179)	*(0.176)*	*(0.176)*	*(0.171)*	*(0.172)*
Black Officer / White Suspect	0.354 **	0.313 **	0.342 **	0.399 **	0.403 **
	(0.179)	*(0.177)*	*(0.172)*	*(0.171)*	*(0.172)*
White Officer / White Suspect	0.207	0.203	0.208	0.216	0.217
	(0.186)	*(0.183)*	*(0.183)*	*(0.178)*	*(0.178)*
White Officer / Black Suspect	-0.118	-0.118	-0.095	-0.021	-0.017
	(0.182)	*(0.179)*	*(0.179)*	*(0.174)*	*(0.174)*
Level of Threat Imposed					
Medium		0.511 ***	0.516 ***	0.573 ***	0.571 ***
		(0.139)	*(0.138)*	*(0.134)*	*(0.134)*
High		0.852 ***	0.843 ***	0.851 ***	0.849 ***
		(0.136)	*(0.135)*	*(0.131)*	*(0.131)*
White	0.516 ***	0.517 ***	0.503 ***	0.298 *	0.293 *
	(0.180)	*(0.177)*	*(0.177)*	*(0.173)*	*(0.173)*
Black	0.125	0.152	0.074	0.04	0.036
	(0.261)	*(0.257)*	*(0.259)*	*(0.254)*	*(0.255)*
Hispanic / Latino	0.346	0.424	0.398	0.397	0.384
	(0.292)	*(0.288)*	*(0.281)*	*(0.255)*	*(0.283)*
Anti-Violence			-0.117 **	0.009	0.061
			(0.049)	*(0.053)*	*(0.129)*
Blacks Discriminated Against				-0.28 ***	-0.286 ***
				(0.066)	*(0.068)*
Blacks' Negative Dispositions				0.211 ***	0.133
				(0.074)	*(0.190)*
Conservatism				0.493 ***	0.493 ***
				(0.132)	*(0.132)*
Authoritarianism				0.146	0.15
				(0.244)	*(0.244)*
Blacks Negative Dispositions * Anti-Violence					-0.025
					(0.055)
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.13	0.13

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

In the fully specified model for sample B, we see that the racial characteristics of the officer and suspect have a significant impact on individuals' belief that the officer's

actions were appropriate.[52] Respondents in the "Black Officer / White Suspect" group (+0.40), and the "Black Officer / Black Suspect" (+0.44) groups were significantly more likely to believe the officer acted appropriately. White respondents were significantly more likely to agree (+0.29), all else equal. $H2_{b.}$ "*Because discrimination attributions focus on racial bias among police and courts, individuals who embrace the idea that the justice system is biased against blacks will be less likely, on average, to approve of a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect"* was supported. For every one unit increase in a respondent's belief that blacks are discriminated against respondents were less likely (-0.29) to approve of the officer's actions. $H1_{b:}$ **"***Individuals who embrace anti-violence values will be less likely to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect is appropriate or legal";* was not supported. Additionally, conservatives (+0.49) were more likely to side with the officer.

Respondents presented with a medium level of threat (+0.57), or a high level of threat (+0.85) to the officer approved of the shooting significantly more than those presented with the low threat scenario. I found no empirical evidence to support $H2_{d:}$ that **"***Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect."* The

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[52] In the first model, I looked only at the racial amalgamation of the officer and suspect, and the race/ethnicity of the respondents. Model 2 incorporates the level of threat imposed upon the officer. Model 3 includes my measure of anti-violence values to examine its function absent competing covariates. Model 4 incorporates the remaining independent variables that I believe help shape evaluations of police violence, and Model 5, which I discuss in detail, includes my interaction term of blacks negative dispositions * anti-violence values.

coefficient for my interaction of blacks' *negative dispositions * anti-violence values* performed as expected (-0.03) but was not significant.

Table 5.10.5 | Belief that the Officer's Actions were Legal

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5
Racial Amalgamation					
Black Officer / Black Suspect	0.087 **	0.082 *	0.077 *	0.089 **	0.089 **
	(0.043)	*(0.042)*	*(0.042)*	*(0.041)*	*(0.042)*
Black Officer / White Suspect	0.004	-0.003	-0.007	0.003	0.005
	(0.043)	*(0.042)*	*(0.043)*	*(0.041)*	*(0.042)*
White Officer / White Suspect	0.033	0.029	0.025	0.025	0.026
	(0.044)	*(0.044)*	*(0.044)*	*(0.043)*	*(0.043)*
White Officer / Black Suspect	-0.024	-0.025	-0.022	-0.025	-0.031
	(0.043)	*(0.043)*	*(0.043)*	*(0.043)*	*(0.042)*
Level of Threat Imposed					
Medium		0.125 ***	0.124 ***	0.138 ***	0.137 ***
		(0.033)	*(0.033)*	*(0.032)*	*(0.032)*
High		0.167 ***	0.168 ***	0.174 ***	0.174 ***
		(0.032)	*(0.032)*	*(0.032)*	*(0.032)*
White	0.077 *	0.077 *	0.079 *	0.02	0.019
	(0.043)	*(0.420)*	*(0.042)*	*(0.042)*	*(0.042)*
Black	-0.066	-0.063	-0.051	-0.040	-0.041
	(0.062)	*(0.062)*	*(0.062)*	*(0.062)*	*(0.062)*
Hispanic / Latino	0.108	0.122	0.126 *	0.096	0.094
	(0.070)	*(0.069)*	*(0.069)*	*(0.068)*	*(0.068)*
Anti-Violence			0.017	0.032 **	0.042
			(0.012)	*(0.012)*	*(0.031)*
Blacks Discriminated Against				-0.061 ***	-0.062 ***
				(0.016)	*(0.016)*
Blacks' Negative Dispositions				0.009	0.005
				(0.018)	*(0.046)*
Conservatism				0.097 ***	0.097 ***
				(0.032)	*(0.032)*
Authoritarianism				0.111	0.111
				(0.059)	*(0.061)*
Blacks Negative Dispositions * Anti-Violence					-0.005
					(0.013)
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.09	0.1

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B (N=1,120)

In the fully specified model for sample B, we see that the racial characteristics of the officer and suspect have a significant impact on individuals' belief that the officer's actions were legal. Respondents in the "Black Officer / Black Suspect" group were significantly more likely (+0.44) to believe the officer acted within the law. $H2_{b.}$

"*Because discrimination attributions focus on racial bias among police and courts, individuals who embrace the idea that the justice system is biased against blacks will be less likely to approve of a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect"* was supported. For every one unit increase in a respondent's belief that blacks are discriminated against respondents were less likely (-0.06) to believe the officer's actions were legal. $H1_{b:}$ *"Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect is appropriate or legal"* was not supported.

Respondents presented with a medium level of threat (+0.14), or a high level of threat (+0.18) to the officer approved of the shooting significantly more than those presented with the low threat scenario. I found no empirical evidence to support $H2_{d:}$ **"***Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to condemn a police officer shooting – and killing – a black suspect."* The coefficient for my interaction of blacks' *negative dispositions * anti-violence values* performed opposite as expected (-0.03) but was not significant.

In sum, the findings from sample B reveal consistent factors that impact individual evaluations of incidents of lethal OIS. Anti-violence values were not in this category; they were not a significant factor once other important predictors were included in the model. Respondents were not significantly more likely to disapprove of a shooting when the officer is white and the suspect is black, yet in every analysis, respondents were more likely to approve of the shooting when a black officer was involved. When the level of threat was measured in a straightforward manner, the perceived danger to the officer

pulling the trigger was an important factor. As the level of threat increased, respondents were significantly more likely to approve of the shooting and believe that the officer acted within the law. Those who believe that racial disparities in the criminal justice system result from discrimination against blacks were consistently less likely to approve of the shooting or believe that it was legal. Finally, conservatives were consistently and significantly more likely to condone police violence – regardless of the circumstances.

5.11 Support for Policies to Better Track and Reduce Police Violence

I now assess additional hypotheses concerning support for policies to better track and reduce police violence.[53] Specifically, $H1_{c:}$ *"Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to reduce police violence"* and $H2_{c.}$ "*Because dispositional attributions focus on racial stereotypes, whites who embrace negative stereotypes about blacks, when presented the "racial argument" will be less likely, on average, to support institutional reforms to decrease police violence when compared to those in the baseline condition."*

My overarching argument throughout this project is that violence-justifying ideologies (racial animus in the current analysis) will cancel out any normatively positive outcomes that individuals' aversion to violence might otherwise produce. Specifically, $H2_{e:}$ **"***Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence*

[53] Responses ranged between "strongly disagree", and "strongly agree" on a 7-point Likert scale. Full question battery is included in Appendix A. Additional items measuring support for increased government funding were included in sample B. Respondents were asked "In terms of policies to help investigate and prevent police violence please indicate whether you believe that government funding for the following initiatives should be higher, or lower than the current levels". Responses ranged between "much lower" and "much higher" on a 7-point Likert scale. Full question batteries are included in Appendix B.

values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to track and reduce police violence."

In order to test my hypotheses, I estimated four models. My key independent variables are the 7-item anti-violence values battery and the 2-item measure of negative stereotypes (blacks' negative dispositions). To assess the effect of negative stereotypes about blacks on the predictive power of individuals' aversion to violence, I included an interaction term between blacks' negative dispositions and anti-violence values. I expect racial stereotypes to produce negative signs: respondents who believe that blacks are to blame for racial disparities in the justice system, will be less likely to support policies to better track and reduce police violence. Anti-violence values should produce positive signs: the more a respondent rejects violence, the more likely they will be to support those policies. My underlying assumption, however, is that interacting these variables will produce a negative sign; as racism increases, anti-violence values will no longer predict support for policies to address police violence.

I also included an issue-framing experiment following Peffley et al.'s (2017) examination of support for the death penalty, but to assess instead the power of negative stereotypes about blacks to influence support for policies to decrease incidents of police violence.[54] The authors found that "when presented with the argument that the death penalty is biased against blacks, whites who blame blacks' harsh treatment on their dispositional shortcomings actually become more, not less, supportive of the death

[54] Control Argument: Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to use non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is non-compliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual? Treatment conditions included in Appendix B.

penalty compared with the baseline condition" (1046). In my analysis, I suspect that whites who blame blacks' harsh treatment on their dispositional shortcomings, when presented with the "racial argument" will be less supportive of institutional reforms to decrease police violence compared to those in the baseline condition. Results from the fully specified model are reported; entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors.

Table 5.11.1 | Policies to Track, and Decrease Instances of Police Violence

	SAMPLE B	SAMPLE B (Interactive)
Age	0.006 ***	0.006 **
	(0.002)	*(0.002)*
Female	0.086	0.085
	(0.064)	*(0.064)*
Income	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.015)	*(0.015)*
Education	-0.023	-0.026
	(0.022)	*(0.022)*
White	-0.168 *	-0.182 *
	(0.098)	*(0.098)*
Black	-0.099	-0.112
	(0.144)	*(0.144)*
Hispanic / Latino	-0.384 ***	-0.428 ***
	(0.159)	*(0.159)*
Anti-Violence	0.154 ***	0.329 ***
	(0.030)	*(0.073)*
Government Spending	0.09 ***	0.087 ***
	(0.013)	*(0.013)*
Blacks Discriminated Against	0.397 ***	0.377 ***
	(0.039)	*(0.044)*
Blacks' Negative Dispositions	-0.115 **	-0.377 ***
	(0.042)	*(0.040)*
Conservatism	0.063	0.059
	(0.076)	*(0.076)*
Authoritarianism	0.092	0.079
	(0.139)	*(0.138)*
Blacks Negative Dispositions * Anti-Violence		-0.082 ***
		(0.031)
Adj. R^2	0.25	0.25

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B; (N=1,120)

In the fully specified model for sample B, we see that whites were significantly *less likely* (-0.17) to support police reforms as were Hispanics/Latinos (-0.38). The more violent-averse were (as expected) more likely to support policy changes (+0.15), all else equal. Those who blame racial disparities in the justice system on blacks' dispositional shortcomings were significantly less likely to favor reforms (-0.12). For every one unit increase in a respondent's belief that government should provide increase funding for additional services support for policies to reduce police violence increased (+0.08). In sample B, $H1_{c:}$ *"Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be more likely, on average, to support increased spending on policies and services to reduce police violence"* was supported. For every one unit increase in anti-violence values, support for policies to reduce police violence increased (+0.33).

My primary hypothesis, $H2_{e:}$ **"***Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to track and reduce police violence."* was fully supported in the interactive model of sample B. The estimates of the anti-violence slope decrease as a function of blacks' negative dispositions. For example, at the lowest level of blacks' negative dispositions the anti-violence slope is at (+0.25), and at the highest level the slope is at (0.00), a decrease of (-0.25). For every one unit increase in blacks' negative dispositions, the anti-violence slope decreases by (-0.08). To visually display the impact of this interaction term I created a graph of the adjusted means placing blacks' negative dispositions on the *x*-axis and separate lines for "low", "medium", and "high" levels of anti-violence (See Figure 5.11.1).

Figure 5.11.1 | Predictive Margins Negative Black Dispositions * Anti-Violence



I now turn to the issue-framing experiment to assess the power of negative stereotypes about blacks to influence support for policies to decrease incidents of police violence. In my analysis, I theorized that whites who blame blacks' harsh treatment on their dispositional shortcomings, when presented with the "racial argument" would be less supportive of police reforms to decrease police violence compared to those in the baseline condition. $H2_{c.}$ "*Because dispositional attributions focus on racial stereotypes, whites who embrace negative stereotypes about blacks, when presented the "racial argument" will be less likely, on average, to support institutional reforms to decrease police violence when compared to those in the baseline condition"* was not supported. There was no significant difference between support for police reform between the baseline and racial argument conditions along the negative blacks' dispositions scale among white respondents. Results from the fully specified and interactive model (whites only) are reported; entries are logistic coefficients with standard errors.

Table 5.11.2 | Support for Police Reforms to Decrease Violence

	SAMPLE B	SAMPLE B (Interactive)
Age	0.023 ***	0.023 ***
	(0.008)	*(0.008)*
Female	0.035	0.032
	(0.202)	*(0.204)*
Education	0.007	0.006
	(0.064)	*(0.065)*
Blacks Discriminated Against	1.501 ***	1.53 ***
	(0.386)	*(0.387)*
Blacks' Negative Dispositions	-0.643 *	-0.343
	(0.377)	*(0.499)*
Conservatism	0.091	0.093
	(0.224)	*(0.224)*
Authoritarianism	0.11	0.101
	(0.444)	*(0.442)*
Blacks Negative Dispositions * Racial Argument		-0.290
		(0.556)
Blacks Negative Dispositions * Innocence Argument		-0.516
		(0.538)
Pseudo R^2	0.05	0.05

Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1
Mechanical Turk Sample B; Whites (n=595)

5.12 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I empirically tested my argument that individual's orientation toward violence should help shape their evaluations of police violence. I expected that individuals who are more averse to violence would be more likely to disapprove of a police shooting, and more likely to support policies and spending to better track and reduce incidents of police violence. Anti-violence values were assessed

with my inductively specified scale which I produced using principal component analysis in Chapter 3.[55]

As was the case in the previous chapter on sexual violence, I found empirical support for the expectation that anti-violence values will produce normatively positive results in terms of police violence-related outcomes of interest. On the other hand, I also found empirical support for my overarching theory, that violence-justifying ideologies (e.g. racial stereotypes) often diminish the normatively positive force that anti-violence values would otherwise produce.

Across two empirical models, $H1_{b:}$ *"Respondents who score higher on anti-violence values will be less likely, on average, to believe a police officer shooting – and killing – a suspect is appropriate or legal"* was supported in only one model. Overall, I found little evidence that violence averse individuals were more (or less) likely to disapprove of the lethal OIS, or to believe that the officer acted outside of the law. Additionally, I did not find any support for my claim that interacting anti-violence values and negative black dispositions would produce negative signs; as racism increased, anti-violence values would no longer predict disapproval of the officer's actions. The interaction term did not achieve significance in any of my models.

On the other hand, my primary hypothesis, $H2_{e:}$ **"***Racist stereotypes will attenuate the normatively positive force of anti-violence values. Violence averse individuals who endorse negative black dispositions will be less likely, on average, to support policies to*

[55] Inductive Anti-Violence Values Scale: "It is important for a person to be tougher than other people"; A person should be embarrassed if someone calls them a wimp"; You would praise a person who acted aggressively to an insult"; "Physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable"; "It is morally wrong for a person to walk away from a fight"; "A person who doesn't take any crap from anybody is an admirable reputation to have"; and "Physical violence is the most admirable way to defend yourself".

track and reduce police violence." was fully supported in the interactive model of sample B. The estimates of the anti-violence slope decreased as a function blacks' negative dispositions. Throughout this analysis, those who endorsed negative stereotypes about blacks and were often more likely to approve of police violence, to resist police reform policies and increased government spending to reduce that violence. Individuals' aversion to violence did not translate to a propensity to question police violence, and when it did produce significantly positive outcomes those effects were often diminished by violence-justifying ideology – racism in particular.

Efforts intended to decrease police violence in the United States should focus on breaking down the stereotypes that allow individuals to justify violence. Whether an individual condones violence appears to have little impact on their perception of victims, or their support for policies to better track and reduce OIS incidents once we account for the violence-justifying ideologies that diminish the benefits of aversion to violence. Victims' advocates suggest that there should be a greater number of minorities in law enforcement. I found some evidence that this would help police, community relations – especially when a racially charged OIS takes place. In every case, respondents were significantly more likely to say that the officer's actions were both legal, and appropriate when the officer involved was black. Absent efforts to break down violence-justifying ideologies, it appears unlikely that widespread aversion to violence will make any substantive difference.

CHAPTER 6. DISSERTATION CONCLUSION

6.1 Conclusion

Stephen Pinker (2011) argues, in his seminal work *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, that violence has declined over time and that we are living in the most-peaceful era of human existence. He attributes the decline in violence to changing cultural norms. It's not just that opportunities for violence have declined, or that incentives for violence have changed. Rather, "civilizing" influences are winning out. People are socialized into a value system that teaches them to reject violence. This project focused on the behavioral mechanism that supposedly explains declining violence – cultural norms and anti-violence values. I was skeptical from the start about the extent to which abstract values actually constrain politically relevant behavior, including how an individual processes specific acts of violence or evaluates public policies rooted in violence.

Optimists argue that attitudes lead the way, that a decline in citizens' tolerance of violence has produced a corresponding increase in support for public policies that assist victims and promote equitable judicial outcomes. Whether this is true is an important and timely question in the United States. Do individual attitudes rejecting violence matter in terms of politics and public policy? If so, does a broad decline in violence-justifying attitudes actually translate to public support for policies to support victims and punish perpetrators? What role do racial and gender stereotypes play in terms of public perceptions of victims and suspects, or support for violence-related public policies? I addressed these questions directly in this project.

I developed a theory that a wide-range of "ideological waivers" allow individuals to forgive violent behavior – behavior they otherwise claim to abhor. To test my theory

required that I create a gender-neutral measure of anti-violence values. Rather than ask about men, husbands, or sons I asked about people more generally. Respondents may have made assumptions about who would or would not be engaging in the actions I presented, but I did not impose that judgement on them.[56] While I must admit that I was not able to *entirely* divorce gender attitudes from attitudes toward violence, I did provide strong support for the utility of my scale and evidence that it performs in a consistent manner theoretically distinct from its gendered counterpart. I then used my new scale to examine individual attitudes toward victims and support for public policies to reduce violence.

Throughout chapter 4, I empirically tested my assumption that individual's orientation toward violence should help shape their attitudes toward victims – and perpetrators – of sexual violence. I expected that individuals who are more averse to violence would sympathize more with victims, support harsher punishments for perpetrators, and advocate more for resources to assist survivors and decrease the rate of these crimes in the United States. I *did* find empirical support for the expectation that anti-violence values will produce normatively positive results in terms of sexual violence-related outcomes of interest. On the other hand, I also found empirical support for my overarching theory, that violence-justifying ideologies (e.g. sexism 'hostile in particular', rape myth acceptance, etc.) often diminish the normatively positive force that anti-violence values would otherwise produce.

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[56] In one of my surveys (N=923) the final question item asked respondents "When you were answering the questions about violence (e.g. physical aggression is sometimes admirable and acceptable) were you primarily thinking about… 1. Male and female behavior; 2. Male behavior; or 3. Female behavior? 52.11 percent (481) said male and female behavior; 43.88 percent (405) said male behavior; 4.01 percent (37) were thinking primarily of female behavior.

My experimental findings produced unsettling results. When a victim appeared to conform to traditional gender expectations, when it was clear that she was cautious to not put herself in danger, when there was evidence that she fought fiercely to prevent being violated, and when she reported the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males and females were significantly more likely to believe her rape claim. On the other hand, when a victim did not conform to traditional gender expectations, when it appeared that she put herself at unnecessary risk of danger, when there was no physical evidence that she put up fierce resistance, and when she did not report the incident to law enforcement immediately, both males and females were significantly less likely to believe that the victim was actually raped.

Respondents were also asked to recommend a sentence of no less than 5, and no more than 50 years in prison for the perpetrator. Examining the data across four unique surveys I found little evidence that anti-violence values significantly impact how harshly respondents believe a perpetrator should be punished. In fact, violence averse individuals might view incarceration itself as a form of violence. In one model, for every one unit increase in anti-violence respondents recommended significantly less (-2.94 years) time in prison, perhaps sparing the perpetrator.

Throughout my analyses, those who endorsed rape myths and other negative stereotypes about women were consistently more likely to blame the victim, to be more lenient on her perpetrator, to resist increased government spending to assist victims and reduce sexual violence, and to decline to engage in any way personally to advocate or support victims. Individuals' anti-violence values did little of substance to benefit victims or punish perpetrators, and when it did produce significantly positive outcomes those

effects were easily diminished by violence-justifying ideology – hostile sexism in particular. Efforts to reduce rape should focus on breaking down the stereotypes that allow people to overlook violent behavior, and reforming policies that make it difficult for a victim to receive justice. Absent those efforts, it appears unlikely that widespread aversion to violence will make any substantive difference.

Throughout chapter 5, I empirically tested whether an individual's orientation toward violence would help shape their evaluations of police violence. I expected that individuals who are more averse to violence would be more likely to disapprove of a police shooting, and more likely to support policies and spending to better track and reduce incidents of police violence. Overall, I found very little evidence that violence averse individuals were more (or less) likely to disapprove of a lethal officer-involved shooting, or to believe that the officer acted outside of the law. Throughout my analyses, those who endorsed negative stereotypes about blacks were often more likely to approve of police violence, to resist police reform and increased government expenditures to reduce that violence. Individuals' aversion to violence did not translate to a propensity to question police violence, and when it did produce normatively positive outcomes those effects were often diminished by violence-justifying ideology – racism in particular.

Victims' advocates suggest that there should be a greater number of minorities in law enforcement. I found some evidence that this would help police, community relations – especially when a racially charged OIS takes place. In every case, respondents were significantly more likely to say that the officer's actions were both legal, and appropriate when the officer involved was black. Absent efforts to break down violence-justifying

ideologies, it appears unlikely that widespread aversion to violence will make any substantive difference.

This dissertation speaks to a much broader debate over the success of the "civilizing process" and its likely durability. Had I found that anti-violence values are more than just lip service, that they genuinely constrain people – that they shape policy preferences or govern politically relevant judgements about predators and victims of violence – would have offered some hope that the relative peacefulness of today's world is a construct that can be passed down through socialization to future generations. Unfortunately, my empirical evidence suggests that people can partition these abstract values from their practical assessments of real-life circumstances, and apply them only to certain groups of people, and only some of the time. The "civilizing process", therefore, seems to be more vulnerable to changes in context than the optimists let on.

My data are cross-sectional, so I cannot observe how these attitudes and policy preferences have changed over time. Additionally, I am limited to a "snap-shot" – a single moment in time when public opinion is shaped, in part, by the current events of the day. Additionally, my analysis was limited strictly to officer-involved shootings that resulted in the suspect's death; I did not include scenarios involving excessive physical force by the police. Finally, each of my experimental vignettes portrayed a suspect imposing some level of threat upon an officer prior to the shooting. As that level of threat increased, respondents were more sympathetic to the officer's use of deadly force. Future research designs should include scenarios depicting a victim who is in police custody when the incident occurs; people are much less likely to endorse police violence when the officer involved is not in serious danger.

As it was, I collected my survey data well before May 25, 2020 when George Floyd, a 46-year-old African American man, was choked to death by Derek Chauvin, a white Minneapolis police officer. All four officers involved in Floyd's arrest have been fired and criminally charged and Chauvin, who was filmed kneeling on Floyd's neck for almost eight minutes faces second-degree unintentional murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter. He faces a combined maximum of 35 years in prison. Floyd's death represents an additional decline in threat that I would have predicted to undermine public support even more than occurred in my experimental design. Much like the instances I detailed in chapter 5, his death sparked a new surge in both peaceful protest and outright violence.

In June, a large but peaceful group of Black Lives Matter demonstrators gathered in front of a police station in Seattle, Washington. They were quickly met by riot officers donning combat helmets and brandishing batons. While police are given broad discretion in responding to demonstrations that get out of hand, an arbitrary or excessive response sometimes escalates violence unnecessarily. Protesters were given no warning before police deployed flash-bang grenades, tear gas, and pepper spray to disperse the crowd. During a subsequent protest weeks later and at the same location, police scaled back their response and protesters ultimately dispersed without incident (Del Pozo, 2020).

In other cases, the lines have blurred as other groups with ulterior motives have hijacked peaceful protests calling for racial justice. Thousands of people have swarmed the streets in at least 140 American cities. Protests have descended into absolute chaos in some cases including shootings, lootings, and wide-spread vandalism. In at least 21 states the National Guard was activated to restore order (Silverstein 2020). Demonstrators

vandalized police vehicles with graffiti in Minneapolis where officers used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds. In Atlanta, protesters threw bottles and other projectiles at police, and when crowds gathered outside the White House President Trump was moved to an underground bunker intended for terrorist attacks. Reacting to violence in major cities across America, President Trump threatened to deploy the military, saying "If a city or a state refuses to take the actions that are necessary to defend the life and property of their residents, then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them" (Taylor 2020, 10).

This dissertation focused on the behavioral mechanism that supposedly explains declining violence. One observable implication of the Pinker school of thought is that cultural norms ought to shape public opinion in a fashion that alters public policy. At the individual level, therefore, whether someone rejects, or embraces violence-justifying attitudes ought to shape that person's policy-relevant opinions. I remain skeptical about the extent to which abstract anti-violence values actually constrain politically relevant behavior, including how an individual processes a specific act of violence as well as how the individual evaluates public policies rooted in violence. It seems instead that individuals' "better devils" quite easily diminish the otherwise positive force of anti-violence sentiment. The evidence suggests that we must confront these darker forces if we want to reduce violence in the United States.

APPENDIX A: SEXUAL VIOLENCE EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES

Setting the Scene (Everyone Views)

The following pages provide a brief summary of a trial involving a rape allegation. We would like you to put yourself in the role of a juror as you evaluate the evidence in this case. When determining the severity of the prison sentence you impose, please be realistic - as if you were an actual juror at the sentencing phase of this trial. Thank you for your time and help with our research.

A middle-aged female answered a knock at her apartment door late one Friday night. She opened the door to a stranger who explained that he was having car trouble and wanted to borrow her phone to call AAA. She agreed, and after placing his call, the man claimed that it would be about two hours before a tow truck would arrive.

Baseline (Control)

While waiting for the tow truck, the accuser claimed that the man raped her and then fled the apartment. She immediately called the police to report the rape. Later the next day, the police arrested a suspect who fit the description given. The suspect, a man named Jim Reynolds admitted that he'd had sexual intercourse with the accuser, but claimed it was consensual. Nonetheless, police charged Reynolds with rape.

Non-Precipitory Vignette

While waiting for the tow truck, she told the man that he would have to wait on her front porch until the driver arrived. The woman alleges that the suspect then forced his way in, raped her in her own living room, and then fled the apartment. She immediately called the police to report the rape. Later the next day, the police arrested a suspect who fit the description given. The suspect, a man named Jim Reynolds, admitted that they had sexual intercourse, but claimed it was consensual. Nonetheless, police charged Reynolds with rape.

At the trial, the accuser's attorney revealed that the she had never lived with a male, and that she has developed a deep fear of men since the attack. Her attorney argued that a medical examination provided evidence that she had put up physical resistance to Reynolds. She showed bruising and had skin under her fingernails. Her attorney argued that the reason his client resisted was that she feared for her life.

Precipitory Vignette

While waiting for the tow truck, she asked the man if he would care to wait in her apartment and watch television until the driver arrived. The woman alleges that at some point between 10:30 and 11:00 pm the suspect forcibly raped her in her own living room, then fled the apartment. She called the police a few days later to report the alleged rape. Later that week, the police arrested a suspect who fit the description given. The suspect, a

man named Jim Reynolds admitted that they had sexual intercourse, but claimed it was consensual. Nonetheless, police charged Reynolds with rape.

At the trial, Reynold's attorney revealed that the accuser had previously lived with other men to whom she was not married. During cross examination, she also admitted to having sexual relations with other men since the alleged attack. The defense team argued that a medical examination did not provide evidence that the accuser had put up any resistance to Reynolds. She showed no bruising and did not have skin under her fingernails. Her attorney argued that the reason his client did not resist was that she feared for her life.

Trial and Sentencing Phase (Everyone Views)

In the courtroom, the accuser positively identified Reynolds as the offender. After careful deliberation, a jury found Jim Reynolds guilty of rape in the first degree. During the sentencing phase, the judge informed jury members that the punishment they impose for this felony could range from 5 to 50 years in prison. Reynolds continues to maintain that the sex was consensual.

We would like you to put yourself in the role of a juror and indicate how many years you think the perpetrator should be confined to prison based on the facts provided. When determining the severity of the sentence you recommend, please be realistic - as if you were an actual juror at the sentencing phase of this trial.

Threat. Participants were exposed to one of three newspaper accounts of a police shooting, which varied in the level of threat imposed by the suspect (pictured below).



The Nashui

Monday, August 14, 2017

New video sheds light on con

David Grossman

NASHVILLE, Tenn. (WZTV) - Metro Nashville Police have released a new video that they say shows Anthony Taylor did not have a physical confrontation with police officers before Officer Tim Hinkle fatally shot him. The suspect was wanted on felony charges for assault with a deadly weapon in Davidson County. The video shows the suspect exit his vehicle and advance toward the officer before stopping short and running in the opposite direction. Officer Hinkle then fired two rounds - instantly killing Taylor. Police also said that they did not recover any weapons from the suspect after he was shot. Hinkle was placed on administrative leave after the incident.

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

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In the "low threat" condition, he exits his vehicle and advances toward the responding officer before suddenly stopping and running in the opposite direction. In the "medium threat" condition the suspect also advances on the officer before stopping and reaching for his inside jacket pocket. Finally, in the "high threat" condition, our suspect advances, stops, but then reaches for a firearm protruding from his waistband.

Racial Amalgamation of Officer/Suspect. In this project I varied the race of the officer involved in the shooting, and the race of the suspect. Respondents were not explicitly

directed to focus on race. I randomly assigned respondents to be exposed to one of the racial manipulations below:



Police Reforms.

Sample A:

1. "Law enforcement agencies, in every state, should be required to collect and share the details of each and every incident involving police use-of-force so that this information can be stored in a national database."
2. "The details of incidents involving police use-of-force should include not only offender characteristics, but officer characteristics as well, including race, age, gender, rank, and education."
3. "Police departments should require body-worn cameras for officers in the field so that each and every citizen engagement will be recorded from the officer's standpoint."
4. "Police departments should require that officers take part in racial sensitivity and bias training at least twice annually."

Funding Preferences (Sample B)

1. "Funding to help police departments adopt Department of Justice recommended reforms that stress the importance of de-escalation and the sanctity of life."
2. "Funding to create civilian review boards to provide independent oversight of police use-of-force incidents."
3. "Funding to provide police departments body-worn cameras for officers in the field."
4. "Funding to provide police departments dash cameras for all squad cars active in the field."

Issue Framing Experiment

Control Argument: Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to use non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is non-compliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual?

Racial Argument: Some people say that police kill a disproportionate number of blacks, compared to whites. Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to use non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is non-compliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual?

Innocence Argument: Some people say that police kill a disproportionate number of innocent people. Do you favor or oppose a requirement that police officers attempt to use non-lethal methods first (e.g. a baton, pepper spray, a taser) when a suspect is non-compliant and being physically aggressive toward an officer or other individual?

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