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REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT: GENDER AND PROTESTS

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REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT:
GENDER AND PROTESTS

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

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Lexington, KY

2019

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT: GENDER AND PROTESTS

Why do women protest? Why do women protest “as women”? Why do some women participate in protests but not others? In the wake of the Women’s March of 2017, perhaps the largest single day protest event in history, these questions are particularly timely and deserve scholarly attention. One important but understudied and undertheorized motivation for women’s protests is state sanctioned violence, particularly repression. This dissertation explicitly theorizes about how state perpetration of violence, particularly state use of repression, both motivates and shapes women’s protests on a global scale.

In this dissertation, I argue that one key motivation for women’s protest is repression by the state, and I theorize that women will protest more frequently when the state uses repression. Repression negatively impacts members of the population, particularly relatives, friends, and communities of those targeted by the state, and this motivates those people to protest.

However, I argue that the type of repression, and more specifically how gendered the state practices repression, matters. The more that gender plays a role in determining who states target with repression, the more gender matters in the societal response to repression.

In particular, I examine the use of forced disappearances. Based on historical and contemporary accounts, I show that forced disappearance largely targets males, and thus motivates women’s protests but has no effect on protests by other groups. When the state makes use of forced disappearances, some women are motivated to protest due to their connections to victims of repression. Furthermore, opportunities to protest in these circumstances are more available to women than to men, due to their relatively lower likelihood of being targeted, as well as women’s distinctive positions in society and their ability to organize themselves as women.

Not only do women have additional space relative to men to protest when the state is repressive, but individual women recognize that their gender can serve as a resource in such contexts. Thus, individual women are more likely to participate in protests themselves when the state uses repression, closing the gender gap in protest participation between men and women.

I test my theory of women’s protest using two unique approaches. First, utilizing unique new data on women’s protests that is globally comprehensive for all countries from 1990-2009, I show that women’s protests are more frequent when the state is repressive, and that forced disappearances in particular motivate women’s protests, specifically, but do not have an observable effect on general protests. Second, I utilize
regionally comprehensive data on citizens in Latin America from 2006 and 2008 to show that women are more likely to participate in protests when the state uses forced disappearances, but that men are not more likely to participate in protests in repressive contexts.

KEYWORDS: women’s protest, women’s mobilization, gender, human rights, repression, forced disappearances
REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT: GENDER AND PROTESTS

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March 22nd, 2019

Date
In loving memory of David,
Whose love gave me a home.

And for my grandfather,
who taught me how to read.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

In 2017, just one day after the inauguration of controversial United States President Donald Trump, millions of women, largely dissatisfied with the election outcome, took to the streets in protest (Frostenson 2017). While largely focused on Washington, D.C., this wave of protests affected countless US cities. According to estimates by political scientists Jeremy Pressman and Erica Chenoweth (2017), over 4.2 million people participated in sister marches across the US, making it likely to be the largest single day demonstration in United States history. At least nine cities in the US had marches with crowds larger than 100,000, including Washington DC, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, Denver, Seattle, and Oakland (Pressman and Chenoweth 2017).

Figure 1 illustrates the data on Women’s March protests gathered by Pressman and Chenoweth (2017) graphically, showing the concentration of events. As you can see, every state in the US had at least some protest activity. The lion’s share of protests took place along the east coast of the US, with the largest concentration of protest activity in DC. Indeed, though the incoming Trump administration was a prime motivation for many participants in the Women’s March, the protest was not limited to the US and was global in scale (Frostenson 2017). Figure 1 also illustrates that every continent saw at least some protest activity from women. Women across the globe participated in solidarity with the March, with sister marches on every continent (including Antarctica), and current estimates of global numbers of participants reaching as high as 300 thousand protestors worldwide (not including protestors in the US; Frostenson 2017).
Figure 1: Map of Women’s March, January 2017

Notes: Data on Women’s March activity from Pressman and Chenoweth (2017). Protest locations geocoded using Stata command `opencagegeo` and the Open Cage Data API. Map created with CartoDB web app.
Why did women organize such a massive protest event? Of course, there are many reasons that motivated the Women’s March, including fears of reversals in reproductive rights under a Republican administration, concerns over worker’s rights and employment non-discrimination, and uncertainty about women’s rights more generally. However, there was one key motivation for the Women’s March that has been under-studied and under-theorized by the literature on women’s protests: the Women’s March was an explicit protest against state-sanctioned violence. In fact, if we look at the “Unity Principles” guiding the Women’s March, the very first item listed is entitled “Ending Violence” and reads as such:

“Women deserve to live full and healthy lives, free of all forms of violence against our bodies. We believe in accountability and justice in cases of police brutality and ending racial profiling and targeting of communities of color. It is our moral imperative to dismantle the gender and racial inequities within the criminal justice system.” - Women’s March Unity Principles (2017).

In short, though the Women’s March arose for many reasons, state sanctioned violence, particularly police violence against minorities, was a key motivation for women who protested. In this dissertation, I examine the role of state sanctioned violence in motivating and shaping women’s protests worldwide, demonstrating that the Women’s March of 2017 is not unique in this aspect: women’s protests frequently arise as a response to state violence.

Though the full consequences of the Women’s March are yet to be seen, this protest demonstrates that women are very involved in politics both in the US and worldwide, and are willing to take to the streets in order to make demands of their
government. The stated desire to end state sanctioned violence which helped to motivate the Women’s March in particular is just another timely reminder that women do not organize solely in favor of policies or reforms that explicitly favor women, or that relate to explicitly gendered forms of inequality. In fact, the Women’s March of 2017 is just the latest (and certainly largest) example in a long line of women protesting against unfavorable conditions.

History is rife with examples of women taking to the streets to demand change, from protests demanding women’s suffrage in the late 1800s (Teele 2014, Banaszak 1996), to the “Driving Protests” in Saudi Arabia in 2011 (Begum 2017). As another example, in Latin America women frequently played a huge part in pro-democracy movements from the late 1970s to the 1990s (Waylen 1994). In sub-Saharan Africa, women have disrobed in public as an act of protest against various social problems, such as rape culture (Thompson 2017). Women have also been critical participants and organizers in major recent social movements such as Black Lives Matter (Kaleem 2016), while numerous women’s groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving/MADD (Bilotta 1985) or Mom’s Demands Action for Gun Sense in America (Follman 2014) have also formed specifically to advocate for non-gendered purposes. In sum, women’s protests are a frequent occurrence, but are not always motivated by gender specific concerns, and understanding the role of gender in protest behavior more fully is critical to our understanding of contentious politics more generally.

The Puzzles of Women’s Protests

Not only are women’s protests relatively frequent, they are also puzzling for a number of reasons. In this dissertation in particular, I address three broad puzzles
regarding women’s protests. First, protests are costly and often risky endeavors (Beaulieu 2014, Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010). Taking part in a protest takes time and money at minimum. In some countries, taking part in a protest can be quite dangerous for demonstrators, particularly in places where the government does not tolerate open opposition or areas where threats of arrest or violence are commonplace. This is perhaps especially true for women, who often tend to have less access to networks of contacts and resources which enable them to protest (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997). The costs of protests are not purely born by participants, either: the government highly values quiescence from the populace, and protests constitute a breach of social order that elites would prefer to avoid if they can (Davenport 2007, Moore 1998). This raises the question: if both sides would prefer to avoid protests, why do we see women protest?

Women’s protests are additionally puzzling because they are gendered. In other words, when women and women’s groups choose to organize along explicitly gendered lines (Baldez 2002), they could be placing something of a ceiling on participation. Though men certainly can and do protest alongside women’s groups (e.g. the many men who turned out for the Women’s March in 2017), framing a protest as a “Women’s March” necessarily directs the messaging of the protest to one specific gender and could potentially halve the number of likely participants, at least in theory. Taking the opposite line of reasoning, women often protest as part of a mixed-gender group alongside men and women. If organizers of a protest have the option to organize in a mixed-gender way, including both men and women and possibly expanding the number of participants, why do women organize “as women” rather than as part of a broader, mixed-gender group?
Finally, women’s protests are puzzling because of how rarely many or most women participate in protests. Typically, women are much less likely to participate in protests than men, due to a variety of factors, such as less access to resources to lower levels of representation among political elites (Córdova and Rangel 2016, Espinal and Zhao 2015, Beauregard 2013, Barnes and Burchard 2012, Desposato and Norrander 2009). In spite of the lower likelihood of individual women participating in a protest relative to men, women’s protests are not uncommon at the country level. This raises one final question: Why do women sometimes choose to participate in protests, but not participate at other times?

This dissertation seeks to shed light on these three questions. In particular, this work focuses on the relationship of women’s protests to state sanctioned violence, specifically state repression, and on how repression used by the state can both motivate protests and shape the types of protests we observe in society. I build on previous thought about the determinants of protest in a number of ways. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I present a theory of women’s protests in three parts. The first piece of my theory addresses the question “Why do women protest?”. When explaining protests in general, scholars have argued that, one of the key motivators of protest activity is state repression, and that protests are more likely when the state uses repression (e.g. Moore 1998). I argue that this applies to women’s protests as well, and that women will be more likely to protest when the state uses repression than if the state does not use repression. The second piece of my theory focuses specifically on the question of why women frequently choose to protest “as women”, rather than seeking a potentially more inclusive non-gendered protest strategy, when the state uses repression. To answer this question, I
argue that the type of repression the state practices, and more importantly, the way gender influences the state’s practice of repression, motivates protests by women specifically. In particular, the use of forced disappearances as a repressive tactic by the state often motivates women to protest, and encourages them to do so along gender lines, because women are less likely to be targeted for disappearance and because women are able to effectively frame their activism in gendered terms. Finally, the third piece of my theory addresses the question of why women sometimes choose to participate in protests, but other times do not participate. Here I argue that state repression changes the political environment in gendered ways, and the use of forced disappearances encourages women to participate in protests while discouraging men from participating.

Chapters 3 through 5 provide empirical tests of the implications of my theory. Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship of women’s protests and repression, and finds that women are far more likely to protest when the state is being highly repressive. Chapter 4 shows that women are particularly likely to protest when the state uses forced disappearances, rather than other repressive tactics (e.g. extrajudicial killings). Chapter 5 shows that individual women in society are more likely to participate in protests, relative to men, when the state uses disappearances. Finally, I offer some conclusions about how this theory can illustrate other examples of women’s protest, such as the Women’s March of 2017, and how future research can benefit from the theory I develop.

Patterns in Women’s Protests

Using data on women’s protests from Murdie and Peksen (2014), Figure 2 shows the trend for women’s protests over time, with the number of observed women’s protests globally on the y-axis and the year on the x-axis. Based on the available data, we see that
the absolute number of women’s protests peaked at around the year 1995. Since that year, there has been a steady decline in the number of women’s protests, with intermittent upswings in 2001 and 2004.

However, I should note two things regarding this time trend. First, the available data stops in 2010, meaning that our data does not capture recent waves of massive protest like the Women’s March in 2017. Second, throughout the entire time period under consideration, there are never fewer than 400 observed protests by women in a given year, which equates to roughly two women’s protests per year for every country on earth. Thus, even as women’s protests have declined over time, they are still a frequent and important global occurrence that merits scholarly attention. Recent events such as the Women’s March of 2017 have illustrated that this observed decline is likely not permanent, or at the very least, that it does not place an effective ceiling on the size and scope of women’s protests.

In sum, when we look at the available data on women’s protests, we observe that women’s protests are frequent on a global scale, but that the number of protests by women has declined from an observed peak in the early 1990s. Recent events suggest that women’s protests may be rising in frequency. In the next section, I examine what we know about women’s protest from previous works on the subject.
Figure 2: Women’s Protests over Time

Notes: Data on women’s protests comes from Murdie and Peksen (2014). The y-axis shows the total, global number of women’s protests for a given year.
What We Know about Women’s Protests

Why do women’s protests occur? Previous works have offered three major answers to explain contentious mobilization in general: grievance, political opportunity structure, and resource mobilization (Beaulieu 2014, Murdie and Peksen 2014). In this section, I outline each theory in turn, and explain the general expectations suggested by each theoretical framework as they apply to women’s protests, specifically. In the next chapter, I lay out my theory linking state repression to women’s protests, which builds upon these previous approaches by examining the role of state repression in shaping grievances, opportunities, and resources in gendered ways, and allows for new insights into the causes of women’s protests.

The first major perspective on the origins of protests is grievance based. Grievance based theories (sometimes called “relative deprivation” theories) focus on the motivations to protest, and suggest that discontent with the current political system leads to collective dissent (Gurr 1968, 1970, Davies 1962). Thus, individuals’ feelings of discontent and dissatisfaction with the status quo are primary motivators for collective mobilization. The feeling that one’s status is not in line with one’s expectations is a necessary condition for dissent (Gurr 1970). To the extent that women perceive society as unequal and explicitly biased against them, we should expect that women would protest more and to organize as well (Simmons 2009). Explicitly discriminatory laws and policies against women have indeed motivated a large number of women’s protests. For example, many women protested in favor of women’s suffrage (Teele 2014, Banaszak 1996, Costain 1992), in favor of legal protections from violence against women (Htun and Weldon 2012), and in favor of economic equality for women (Craske 1999).
There are two key caveats to mention for this explanation of women’s protests. The first is that unfairness in the status quo, on its own, does not consistently lead to dissent. For example, research looking at marital satisfaction finds that women are not less satisfied even when expected to take on much more household work, due to socialization and low expectations (Greenstein 1996, Major 1989, 1993). Works on the gender wage gap find similar patterns (Jackson 1989). The second caveat is that women do not only mobilize in protest against gender discrimination. For example, women have been critical participants in democratization movements (Alvarez 1990, Waylen 1994, Craske 1999), women have protested general economic conditions (Safa 1990), and many women have even taken part in rebellions and led revolutionary groups (Kampwirth 2014, Jaquette 1973). In sum, though grievances caused by gender discrimination are one key motivator for women’s protests, context seems to determine when objective unfairness is perceived as unfair and thus leads to dissent, and women’s protests are often motivated by non-gender specific goals.

Political opportunity/process theories focus on the opportunity to mobilize rather than the motivation for doing so, and focus on the perceived ability to succeed in a political goal. In other words, mobilization depends on a favorable political environment: individuals must have some confidence they could succeed, and the government must be somewhat tolerant of dissent (Costain 1992, Tilly 1978, Lipset 1963). In general, this perspective suggests that we should observe more protests by women under open, democratic societies that tolerate opposition, and wherein persuasion can more easily result in reform. Past works have found that women’s protests are indeed more likely during political openings, such as periods of partisan realignment (Baldez 2002,
Macaulay 2006, Costain 1992), during transitional periods when a state is democratizing (Waylen 1994, Alvarez 1990, Molyneux 1985), and when the state is at least somewhat open (Murdie and Peksen 2014).

One important thing to note, however, is that opportunities are not objective or static: activists must perceive an opportunity, and to an extent, activists construct opportunities to protest (della Porta and Tarrow 2004, Banazak 1996). For example, under the military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America, the state was incredibly repressive, but women took to the streets in protest of both human rights violations (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). They were able to do this, in part, by strategically employing and manipulating the same cultural frames of motherhood and family used by the regime to quash dissent from other groups, such as labor unions (Navarro 1989). In short, even apparently “closed” or repressive systems are still vulnerable to dissent from creative activists.

Resource mobilization theories focus instead on the ability of groups to mobilize (rather than their motivations or opportunities for doing so). Access to resources mitigate the cost of mobilization (Boulding 2014, Bell et al. 2013, Cole 2013, Tilly 1978, McCarthy and Zald 1977). Generally, scholars looking at the role of resources in protests have focused on either individual resources (e.g. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) or group/organizational resources (e.g. Boulding 2014). Individuals require things like free-time, money, transportation, communication tools, and organizational skills to protest (Murdie and Peksen 2014, Murdie and Bhasin 2011). Groups facilitate protests by gathering, coordinating, facilitating, and distributing all the aforementioned resources to interested parties. For both individuals weighing whether to participate in protests and
groups trying to mobilize others for a protest, more resources, are thought to lead to more
protests.

In the next chapter, I build on all three theories of mobilization to examine the
causes of women’s protests specifically as they relate to practices of state repression.
The first two hypotheses I present reflect the consistency of effects of repression on
protest activity across women’s protest and protest in the general population, while the
third hypothesis reflects the distinctiveness of women protesting state repression as
women. The final two hypotheses shift the unit of analysis from the country level to the
individual level, and suggest that while it is generally the case that women are less likely
to participate in protests, women actually become at least as likely as men to participate
in protests when the state uses repression.

**Contributions of this Dissertation**

This dissertation contributes to our broader understanding of politics in at least
four ways. First, our understanding of women’s protests is still relatively
underdeveloped. While many authors have made important contributions to
understanding women’s protests, works on this subject tend to focus on a single case or a
small number of cases (Mooney 2007, Baldez 2002, Banaszak 1996, Alvarez 1990,
Molyneux 1985). This is partially because, until very recently, no globally
comprehensive data on women’s protests existed at the cross-national level (Murdie and
Peksen 2014). In this project, I seek to provide a more globally comprehensive view of
patterns women’s protests, particularly as they relate to repressive actions taken by the
state. This approach is useful because it allows me to both build my argument with as
general a scope as possible, and to test its implications on as wide a range of data as is currently available.

I contribute to our theoretical understanding of women’s protests by developing a novel theory of women’s protests which builds on past perspectives of protest. First, I apply the logic of repression and dissent to women’s protests in particular. In this respect, I argue that women’s protests are similar to other protests in that they are a reaction against the negative actions of the state. However, building upon both grievance and political opportunity structure arguments, I also argue that women’s protests are distinct, and are different in many respects from general protests that include both men and women. Because the state practices repression in gendered ways, women are affected differently by repression and react to it in different ways. In particularly repressive contexts, women actually have additional advantages for mobilizing that give them agency to protest when other groups cannot. Thus, I show that under particular political contexts, certain identity categories (in this case, womanhood) confer additional resources for mobilization to potential protestors.

My theory not only contributes to our understanding of protests but also to the scholarly understanding of the effects of repression, by suggesting that not all repression is practiced the same way and different types of repression can meet very different reactions from the public. My research suggests that we should continue the process of opening up the “black box” of repression to think about specific types of repression in order to best understand the possible consequences of repression. To date, all of the quantitative human rights scholarship which looks at specific repressive tactics has focused exclusively on the practice of torture (Conrad 2014, Conrad, Haglund, and
Moore 2014, Conrad and Ritter 2013, Conrad and Moore 2010, Vreeland 2008). This dissertation represents a first step towards broader theorizing about the other types of repressive tactics by focusing predominantly on the practice of forced disappearance. I find that the state does not apply all types of repression equally to all groups in society, and so the type of repression used matters significantly for what reactions are likely to occur and from which social groups (like protests from women, in this case).

My theory aims to be general and can be used to think about other important questions. There are three main ways in which I anticipate future research can utilize my theory. First, my theory aims to be general, and can provide a framework for integrating future work on the subject of women’s protests. For example, in the conclusions of this project, I speculate about the ways in which my theory can help us to understand the Women’s March of 2017. Secondarily, my theory can be used as a way to understand protests by other marginalized groups besides women. My theory can be applied to dynamics of protest by ethnic and racial minorities, religious minorities, and other groups where the state is using repression in a targeted manner, and it suggests that members of the group that are the most targeted may be the least able to protest, but that . Thirdly, my theory can be used to inform policy from international actors and advocacy groups concerned with human rights abuses. My research suggests that in certain repressive contexts, women and women’s groups are highly likely to protest, and thus organizations

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1 For some conceptual/qualitative work on extrajudicial killings, see Kessler and Werner (2008), Ojie (2006), and Guiora (2004). For some similar works on political imprisonment, see Pohlman (2008) and Vo (2003). Note that none of these works are cross-national or quantitative in nature.
should anticipate women’s protests in those circumstances and provide additional support and coverage to help keep women safe during protests.

Finally, I also contribute to our understanding of protests by empirically examining an as-yet underutilized source of data on women’s protests collected by Murdie and Peksen (2014). To date, only Murdie and Peksen (2014) have used this wealth of data to empirically examine the determinants of women’s protests. In addition, I also examine the determinants of women’s protests at two levels, using both country level data and individual level data. This two-level approach allows me to better illustrate the nature of protests as a group and individual level activity, that require both organizational resources and individual willingness to participate.
Chapter 2 – Theory

In this chapter, I lay out my argument. The theory I present focuses on answering three main questions. First, why do women’s protest occur? Or rather, in what ways are women’s protests similar to other, non-gendered protests? Secondarily, why do women protest “as women”? In other words, why do women sometimes choose to organize around their gender identity, and other times take part in broader protests involving both men and women? Finally, why do individual women choose to participate in protests? Put another way, in what contexts are women more likely to participate in protests, relative to men?

In the following sections, I provide additional context to these questions based on past works on contentious politics. I first define the key concepts used in this work, namely protests and women’s protests. Then, I further elaborate on the three theoretical puzzles this work seeks to illuminate. After fully setting up these theoretical puzzles, I provide my answers to these questions, creating a new theoretical framework for conceptualizing and explaining women’s protests which focuses on the role of state repression in motivating and shaping women’s activism, while integrating and building upon previous theories of repression and dissent, grievances, political opportunity structures, and resource mobilization.

What is a Protest?

Before turning to the larger theoretical questions of this dissertation, it is worth elaborating on the general conceptual framework and working definitions of key terms used in my argument. In particular, first I wish to briefly define “protests”, draw
conceptual distinctions between protests and the related concept of a “social movement”. I elaborate on the definition of “women’s protests” specifically in the following section.

Conceptually, I adopt the definition of protest from Barnes and Kaase (1979): protests are direct, political actions that are “unconventional” and non-institutional, taking place outside of formal channels for revising the status quo such as voting or legal challenges to policy. Protests must involve a person or group of people gathered in a specific location. There are various forms a protest can take, such as sit-ins, marches, vigils, rallies, or pickets. Protests are specific events, that occur over a defined time period, organized by a group of people, that seek to challenge the status quo. The key characteristic of a protest for my purposes is that it must be “revisionist” (Quaranta 2015): protests seek to change some aspect of social reality, for example, to raise wages or end child labor practices.

The major confusion present in some previous work is the distinction between a protest and a social movement. Protests are, in fact, conceptually distinct from social movements, but the distinctions between the two concepts is not always made clear in past works. Protests and social movements are herein defined as related but distinct sociopolitical phenomena. I adopt the definition of what constitutes a social movement originating within the resource mobilization perspective laid out by McCarthy and Zald (1977): a social movement is defined as “a set of opinions and beliefs which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society”. In other words, social movements are abstract changes in public opinion or perception among groups of citizens, rather than specific gatherings of people with a concrete goal. For example, the US women’s suffrage movement was the broader
philosophical and political movement which aimed to change people’s preferences in favor of giving women the right to vote, whereas the Woman Suffrage Procession of 1913 was a protest organized by members of that movement. Protests may occur in the context of a social movement (e.g. members of the Black Lives Matter movement coordinate a “die-in”), or they may arise spontaneously as a reaction to specific changes in the political environment (e.g. previously unorganized workers go on strike due to a new overtime regulation).

This work is intended to examine protests, exclusively, rather than social movements. My theory should apply equally to all protests regardless of whether they occur as part of a broader social movement or spontaneously. In this dissertation, I do not assume or hypothesize about any causal or temporal relationship between these concepts: a protest may be organized as part of a social movement, a spontaneous protest may gain momentum and eventually help to create a social movement, a social movement may not be associated with any specific protests, and likewise a protest may or may not be associated with any particular social movement. Broadly speaking, conditions thought to give rise to social movements are thought to apply equally to protests, and vice versa, and insights from scholars of social movements are critical for understanding protests.

If there are meaningful distinctions between the conditions thought to give rise to or encourage social movements and those that give rise to or encourage protests, a broad reading of the literature does not provide clues in that direction. Generally, authors who study women’s social movements or protests often treat the two concepts as essentially interchangeable. Naturally, this does not prove that there are not meaningful distinctions or differences in causal pathways between these two concepts, merely that if such
distinctions do exist, they are currently ill defined by the literature available. This work does not seek to illuminate any such differences in conceptualization or differences in causal pathways for women’s protests, movements, or both, nor to criticize past authors for treating these two concepts as one, merely to point out this prevailing implicit equivalence found in past works.

**What is a Women’s Protest?**

This dissertation is predominately an exploration of the factors that lead to women’s protests, specifically, and an attempt to situate women’s dissent in a broader understanding of social unrest. However, the definitional question of “what is a women’s protest?” deserves further consideration, because the definition used will have conceptual and theoretical implications for the rest of the work, and prior works tend to treat the meaning the concept of a “women’s protest” as self-evident. What characteristics distinguishes a “women’s protest” from the more general category of “protests”, as defined in the previous section? There are three possible attributes for defining a women’s protest.

The first condition is perhaps the most obvious. A women’s protest is a protest in which the participants are, primarily or exclusively, women. In other words, a women’s protest is a protest “of women”. I argue that this is a necessary but insufficient condition for defining a women’s protest. After all, women have enthusiastically participated in many protests that are not considered women’s protests, such as the pro-democratization movements in many regions of the world (Waylen 1994, Alvarez 1990, Baldez 2003). The heavy involvement of women in a protest, on its own, is not enough to delineate a women’s protest from other kinds of protest.
The second condition is the most important for this work. In order for a protest to “count” as a women’s protest, it must be framed as a women’s protest (Baldez 2002). Thus, a women’s protest is a protest “by women” – one that is characterized by both participants and outside observers as led by a “woman” or “women” (Murdie and Pekson 2014). In other words, a women’s protest is one in which the organizers of the protest choose to call it a women’s protest, specifically. This is arguably the most important qualification for defining women’s protests, and likely why previous authors treat the concept as given: A women’s protest is a protest that defines and frames itself as a women’s protest (leading to the “know it when you see it” approach adopted by some previous works). I argue that this, too, is a necessary but insufficient attribute for a women’s protest. It is reasonable to also require that at least some number of women be involved in a protest, on top of the protest being framed as a women’s protest. In conjunction with the first condition, these are the two conceptual conditions that I adopt to define women’s protests in this project. In other words, when I am speaking of women’s protests, I mean a protest that both involves women (primarily) and is framed as a women’s protest by the participants of the protest.

I adopt these first two conditions to define women’s protests for my purposes. However, there is a third potential way to conceptualize women’s protests, which is worth mentioning here even though I do not adopt this conceptualization. This view looks at the stated goal of the protest to see whether it is focused on women’s issues. In other words, this view is that women’s protests are protests “for women”, where the explicit goal of the protest is to improve or change the status of women, specifically.
I do not adopt this “goal focused” definition of women’s protests, for two reasons. The first is to avoid the trap of essentialism. Women have many and varied political interests (just as men do), not all of which are predominantly or even particularly gender specific. As Alvarez (1990) put it:

“When one considers that women span all social classes, ethnicities, religions, nationalities, political ideologies, and so on, then an infinite array of interests could be construed as women’s interests. Gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual preference and other social characteristics determine women’s social positioning and shape women’s interests.”

Women often do protest for gender specific reasons or goals (for example, women’s suffrage), but a “women’s protest” could theoretically be about anything – police violence, economic inequality, education policy and so on.

In addition to avoiding definitionally flattening women’s protests into only protests about “women-specific” issues, there are theoretical reasons I do not adopt this condition as part of my conceptual framework. This project seeks, in large part, to illuminate the choice of framing a protest as a “women’s protest”, especially in circumstances where the goal of, or motivation for, the protest is not specific to women. Such a question would not be possible if I defined women’s protests as only having gender specific goals, nor would such a conception capture the vast array of reasons for women’s protests. For these reasons, I reject conceptualizing women’s protests as protests about “women-specific” issues or with gender specific goals.
Why do Women’s Protests Occur?

Protesting is a costly activity. At a minimum, a participant has to have time off from work and other responsibilities, and transportation to an event that could be far from their home. Above that, there are the many activities needed to organize a protest, such as securing a location, registering necessary permits, spreading the message to as many people as possible. For women in particular, the costs for protesting can be particularly high, since women in many families are often expected to do unpaid work at home, such as childrearing and housekeeping, in addition to often working outside the home as well (Craig and Mullan 2010, Craske 1999, Safa 1990, Stevens 1973). Protests can also carry high risks for participants: national governments and local police forces are often quite hostile to opposition (Beaulieu 2014, Cunningham and Beaulieu and Beaulieu 2010). Protestors can face arrest, physical harm, or even death when the political environment is unfavorable.

However, protests are not merely costly for those participating in them or organizing them – protests are also quite costly, and risky, for the state. Protests are a sign of weak political institutions – if the state is failing to respond to the needs of citizens, they are more likely to protest (Boulding 2014). States value quiescence from the populace, because obedience and peaceful order supports the extraction of taxes, the creation of wealth, and increases the legitimacy of the state (Davenport 2007). Protest can halt or interfere with business activity in affected areas, cause blockages of traffic or trade, and otherwise disrupt the daily activities of society. At the extremes, protest can foment into full scale revolution, encourage coups d’état, and otherwise lead to a complete breakdown of political order (Johnson and Thyne 2016, Casper and Tyson 2014).
Given all these costs and risks, it is reasonable to assume that both the state and protest participants would actually prefer to avoid protesting, if at all possible. In other words, we can think of protests as inefficient bargaining outcomes: both sides (i.e. both dissidents and the state) would prefer to come to an agreement without actually needing to pay the costs, or run the risks of allowing, protest, because protest is costly (Beaulieu 2014, c.f. Fearon 1995). However, we see that protests occur rather frequently within nearly every country. This begs the question: why do women protest? I return with an answer to this question in later sections of this chapter, focusing on the undertheorized but important motivation that state repression provides for women’s protests, but first, I elaborate on this question further by asking more specific questions about women’s protests.

**Why do Women Protest “as Women”?**

Women’s protests are not only puzzling because protests in general are thought of as *ex post* inefficient or failed bargaining outcomes. Women’s protests are also interesting because they are explicitly *gendered*. Why do women choose to protest “as women”, that is, on the basis of their shared gender identity (Baldez 2002)? In other words, why do women sometimes frame a protest as a “women’s protest”, but at other times women simply take part in broader, non-gendered protests (i.e. protests that make no reference to gender and do not use gender identity as a mobilizing factor)?

This is a particularly interesting puzzle to consider, because framing a protest as a women’s protest may well limit the potential number of participants to only women (and, perhaps, those sympathetic to women as a political group). This is not to say, of course, that people who are not women can’t participate in a women’s protest, but it seems likely
that they are less willing to do so. If we assume that, all else being equal, protest organizers would prefer to organize the largest protest event possible (which seems like a reasonable assumption to make), limiting the potential number of participants by framing the protest as a women’s protest doesn’t make sense.

The most obvious answer from previous works is that women frame a protest as a women’s protest when the goal of the protest is gender specific. In other words, women may mobilize “as women” in service of their strategic gender interests (Molyneux 1985). For example, we could think of protests by women in support of something like women’s suffrage as having goals specific to, and arguably primarily beneficial to, women. For protests where the goal of the protest is explicitly gendered, and thus the protest is already unlikely to attract participants who are not women, framing the protest in explicitly gendered terms might not be seen as limiting.

However, this ignores the reality that women’s protests have occurred with as many goals as any other type of protest. Women are not a monolithic group or a unitary actor, and women participate on all sides of almost every major political conflict that exists. For example, women participate heavily in pro-democracy movements (Waylen 1994, Noonan 1995), human rights protests (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), economic equality protests (Safa 1990), and even full-scale revolutions (Kampwirth 2014, Jaquette 1973). Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that women’s protests only occur for gender specific goals.

And so the question remains: given that women’s protests occur for all kinds of reasons, why do women frame protests as women’s protests? In the rest of this chapter, I argue that women’s protests are, in some ways, similar to other forms of protest, but that
gender also plays a significant role in shaping protest behavior in ways that are not obvious. I argue that women dissidents frame some protests as “women’s protests” strategically, choosing to make the trade-off of limiting the number of potential participants in exchange for perceived benefits, but not always because the protest has gender specific goals.

**Why do Women Participate in Protests?**

Up to now, I have focused largely on the protest behavior of women as a group, and the collective framing of protests by participants. Women’s protests are fairly frequent at the country level, and women’s protests are more common in some circumstances than others. However, protests are made up of individuals, and without participants, there can be no protest. As mentioned earlier, protests are costly for participants, and women in particular can find it especially difficult to participate in protests. This is partly because women often have less access to the resources necessary to take part in protests (Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994, Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997). Economic marginalization leads women to participate less in civic life compared to men (Craske 1999). Women are often expected to take on additional responsibilities at home, even as more and more women have entered the labor force (Craske 1999, Stevens 1973). The literature generally suggests that women will be less likely to protest than men.

Empirical findings from recent works bear out this expectation. Much research using survey data to compare men and women’s political activism has found a “gender participation gap”, the consistent finding in survey-based research that women are less politically active than men. Specifically, women are less likely to participate in protests
than men (Desposato and Norrander 2009, Zetterberg 2009, Córdova and Rangel 2016). Works like Córdova and Rangel (2016) have examined the conditions under which this gender gap shrinks or disappears, and women protest at roughly equal rates as men. However, works seeking to elaborate on which political conditions can mitigate the gender gap in participation have largely focused on the role of certain institutional arrangements, namely proportional representation (Beauregard 2013), gender quotas (Barnes and Burchard 2013), and compulsory voting (Córdova and Rangel 2016) on the gap between men and women’s political participation.

Comparatively less is known about the role of other state practices in shaping the gender participation gap. So, this puzzle still remains: why do individual women take part in protests? Why do women sometimes participate in protests, but at other times tend to stay home? Later in this chapter, I look at the role of state repression in shaping an individual’s choice of whether or not to participate in a protest. Though women are usually less likely to participate in protests than men, I argue that when the state is repressive, particularly when the state practices repression in a gendered way, gender identity can serve as a resource to women and provide women with additional space to protest relative to men.

**General Theoretical Framework**

In this chapter, I have set up three major related theoretical puzzles: why do women’s protest occur, why do women protest “as women”, and why do individual women participate in protests? These are broad, complex questions with conceivably infinite answers. Rather than attempt to give a complete accounting for all the possible answers to these questions, I instead focus this dissertation on the goal of providing a few
novel, but specific, answers to these questions from an undertheorized and understudied perspective. In particular, this dissertation focuses on the links between women’s protest and repression by the state. I argue that state repressive practices both motivate protests by women, and shape the form that those protests eventually take, in meaningful ways.

Before turning to my argument, I should note how my approach differs from previous theories specifically explaining women’s protests. There are generally two previous approaches to studying the causes of women’s protests. The first, best exemplified by Murdie and Peksen (2014), is to explaining women’s protests with a gender conscious application of perspectives used to explain other protests. Murdie and Peksen (2014) thus seek to explain women’s protests by applying general explanations for protests, such as resource mobilization or political opportunity structures, to women’s protests, by looking at how those factors could be measured for women, specifically. For example, Murdie and Peksen (2014) succeed in showing that women’s protests are motivated by discrimination against women in the political and economic arena. I build on their work by examining women’s protests in the broader context of social unrest – theorizing that women’s protests can sometimes be a result of negative actions by the state which are not wholly specific to women.

The second approach generally examines women’s protests (or social movements) as uniquely gendered phenomena. Rather than treat women’s protests as similar to other protests, these works examine women’s protest in isolation. In particular, Baldez (2002) serves as a primary example of this approach. She builds her argument starting from the observation that all women’s movements share something in common: the decision to mobilize as women, on the basis of commonly held notions of women’s identity. Her
work seeks to explain why women perceive particular historical moments in gendered terms (thus choosing to frame their mobilization as women’s movements). She argues that activist women will frame their movement as a women’s movement when gender serves as a useful unifying frame, because gender is the characteristic that all women share. Baldez (2002) further argues that the single most universal aspect women share in common, despite their unique individual experiences, is a history of political marginalization. Baldez (2002) shows that women frame their movement in gendered terms strategically, but only focuses on a single condition that might incentivize that framing strategy (i.e. partisan realignments). I build on her work by returning to her observation that all women’s protests share one commonality: they were framed as women’s protests by participants. This dissertation expands on her approach by examining other conditions, besides partisan realignment, that incentivize framing a protest in gendered terms.

My theoretical approach thus differs from both of these past approaches but explicitly builds from their foundations. Rather than treat women’s protests as motivated only by woman-specific discrimination, or focus exclusively on the shared gender-specific framing that all women’s protests exhibit, I adopt an integrated approach. I explicitly theorize about circumstances that encourage women’s protests, specifically, and which circumstances might affect women’s mobilization in the same way as any other protest. This approach allows me to better situate women’s protests in a broader understanding of social unrest. I accomplish these goals by focusing on the specific relationships between women’s protests and state repressive practices.
In Figure 3, I outline the general process described by my theory. The process involves 3 key actors, the state, activists, and the citizenry. At decision point 1, the state decides whether or not to use repression. If the state uses repression, activists at point 2 decide to either organize a protest or not. Given that at least some activists seek to organize a protest, they decide at point 3 whether or not to frame the protest as a “women’s protest”. Finally, at point 4, other citizens that are observing the ongoing protest can decide whether to join in a protest, or not.
Figure 3: Theoretical Process of State Repression and Protest

1. Decision Point
   - State: Repress
     - Activists
     - Not Repress
   - Activists
     - Protest
     - Not Protest
     - Activists
     - Women’s Protest
     - General Protest
   - Citizens
     - Participate
     - Not Participate

Time
So, using the illustration in Figure 3 as a guide, what causes women’s protests? The general story goes as follows: the state first decides whether or not to engage in repression. If the state does not use repression, there may still be protests, but those protests will not be *motivated* by repression but by something else (e.g. adverse economic conditions). If the state does repress, citizens may decide to protest against the repression, or not. If the citizens decide not to protest, the process ends, and no protests are observed under the repressive context. If citizens decide to protest, they must then decide how to frame that protest. There are a potentially endless number of possible framings for protests, but for my purposes I am only interested in the choice between framing a protest as a women’s protest or not. As I will argue in more detail later in this chapter, the more gendered the practice of repression is, the more women’s protests are incentivized compared to general protests. Finally, given that either a women’s protest, general protest, or both, are occurring in a given context, individual women are then faced with the choice of joining or not joining the protest.

The rest of this chapter fills in the details for this general outline. In the next section, I contextualize decision points 1 and 2, showing that when the state is repressive, women are motivated to protest. In the following section, I examine decision point 3, by opening up the “black box” of repression to show that repression by the state is gendered, and thus certain repressive tactics are more likely to incentivize women’s protests compared to others. In the final section, I examine decision point 4, and argue that under specific repressive contexts, women’s gender identity is a salient political resource that encourages more women to take part in protests.
Women Protest Repression

First, let us examine decision points 1 and 2 from Figure 3. In this section, I argue that state repression constitutes a salient grievance against the state. Thus, I will argue, when the state is repressive, women are motivated to protest. This expectation, for the purposes of this section, is not gendered: in this respect, I argue that women’s protests are, in this way, similar to any other protest. However, note that in the following two sections, I show that the full picture is more complex than this starting point, and that gender plays a significant role in both the practice of repression by states and the experience of, and reaction to, repression by citizens.

In arguing that repression from the state motivates women’s protests, I build on a number of previous theoretical explanations for protests. In particular, I build on the grievance perspective (Gurr 1970) to argue that repression is a key motivation for women’s protests, and one that has not been thoroughly examined by those studying women’s protests. Turning first to the grievance perspective, the grievance literature suggests that people protest when they have a salient grievance against the state. As such, past works looking at women’s protests specifically have found that women protest when they have a grievance. For example, women are more likely to protest when women are not politically equal to men in a given country (Murdie and Peksen 2014).

However, protest activity within a given country generally varies a great deal over time (see, for example, the variation I showcase within Latin American countries in Figure # in Chapter 5), while women’s political status does not change much over time within any given country. Thus, I argue that we should broaden our focus from relatively static factors that constitute grievances (such as women’s legal rights which change...
infrequently and are largely stable over time) to include more fluid negative state behaviors that might cause women to have grievances against the state that might have little to do with women’s rights specifically.

In particular, I argue that state repression is another salient grievance that motivates women to protest. When the state is repressive, I expect that women will protest more frequently. When the state targets citizens with repressive tactics, women will be affected just as men are. Thus, women will be motivated to protest much the same as men would be. Protests are costly endeavors, but the possibility of a protest stopping the state from repressing further in the future provides a benefit that some citizens and some women will find valuable enough to incentivize protesting. Consider the following accounts of contemporary repression in Mexico, historical repression in Argentina, which show that state repression is one important cause of women’s protests.

**The 2014 Disappearances in Mexico**

On September 26th, 2014, 43 students in Mexico were kidnapped by police and subsequently “disappeared” (Semple 2016). The students were undergraduates at a teacher’s college, and had been *en route* to a protest event (BBC 2016). According to a recent report, the government of Mexico has detained 123 people, including many police officials, in relation to the kidnappings, and the government has also linked the local Iguala police force to a powerful drug gang (Semple 2016). While some remains have been recovered and identified, the ultimate fate of “The 43” is still largely unknown, and the government of Mexico has been characteristically uncooperative with international investigations (Wilkinson 2016, Schwartz 2015). Journalists and investigators reporting on the incident have been subjected to death threats and killed in some instances
In the wake of the disappearances, a wave of protests erupted in Iguala and elsewhere in Mexico, some of which turned violent (Wilkinson 2016, Schwartz 2015, Castillo 2014). Parents and relatives of the disappeared have been active in seeking information about their children, advocating for justice to be done, and coordinating protests against the government and its handling of the situation (Alfred 2015).

The mothers of the missing students, in particular, have been especially prominent in protesting against the government. In an interview with reporters, Maria de Jesus Tlatempa, whose son is among the missing students, said that protesters would continue to make demands to the President of Mexico: “We won’t rest, we will be a pebble in his shoes. We won’t go home” (quoted in both Alfred 2015, and Goldman 2015). Another mother, addressing a crowd of angry protesters, said “We’re poor, but we’re not stupid […] We want the truth, we don’t want any more lies […] We’ll fight until we find our sons” (quoted in Goldman 2015). One group of mothers travelled nearly 2,000 miles to the United States, attempting to meet with the Pope during his visit and ask him to speak out against the government (NBC 2015). Nor were the mothers of disappeared victims the only women to turn out in protest. Maria Antonieta Lugo, a member of a group of housewives who joined in the protests without experiencing a personal loss themselves, articulated that they had joined in "because we have children of the same age" as the students who had gone missing, "This could happen to our children as well" (quoted in Stevenson and Sherman 2014).

Even though forced disappearances first gained attention during the earlier era of military dictatorships in Latin America, the issue of forced disappearance remains gravely important in many countries, and accounts of these instances suggest that similar
dynamics still apply. While the most recent incident in Iguala, Mexico, certainly drew a great deal of international attention and domestic ire, the disappearances of the 43 students hardly represent an unusual occurrence in Mexico or Latin America more generally, even in the post-democratization period. During Mexico’s recent “war on drugs” (2006-2012), upwards of 26,000 individuals are estimated to have been disappeared (CBS 2013). Note that those numbers are the government’s official estimates, and likely represent an undercount of the cases. More than 16,000 unidentified bodies have been found, and the disappearances have continued largely unabated under the present presidential administration, despite campaign promises to end the war on drugs (Human Rights Watch 2014). Just as was the case in Argentina during the “dirty war”, most of the victims have been young, working class men with families (Human Rights Watch 2014).

Nor is Mexico alone in the region, as Colombia, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic have all recently grappled with forced disappearances. Colombia, in part due to a long running civil conflict, is perhaps the worst case in recorded history, with disappearances occurring on an unprecedented scale. Government estimates put the number of missing persons at an upwards of 51,000 (even with known underreporting), with a large number of cases occurring from 2000 to 2003 (Haugaard 2010). As with the 43 Iguala students, parents and relatives of the disappeared have advocated for justice and desperately sought information about their children’s fates (Human Rights Watch 2014).

Women’s Protests under the Military Regimes of Latin America

The contemporary accounts above, which showed women taking to the streets to make demands even as the government is highly repressive of opposition, is corroborated
by the history of Latin America during the period of military rule which saw similar accounts of women’s protests. In particular, historical evidence from Argentina suggests that repression by the state motivates women to protest. During the “dirty war” in Argentina (1974 to 1983), an estimated 10 to 30 thousand people were “disappeared” by the military dictatorship (Wilson 1993). There were at least 300 different detention centers in operation, and many of their prisoners went undocumented. Many of those taken were tortured, those prisoners that the government never released or whose bodies have not been found are presumed dead. At a time when the military was openly repressing all civil opposition, women began to meet in the open in protest, in spite of danger to their persons.

Argentina had an unusually high amount of human rights activism, especially protests and organizations of women, relative to other military regimes and newly democratizing states in Latin America (Sikkink 2008). As I have mentioned, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo are the best-known Argentine women’s human rights organization (Wilson 1993). Due to (and in spite of) rampant abuses by the government, Argentine women took to the streets in large numbers to demand change. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (and related women’s organizations) gathered weekly to shame the government’s actions and plead for information on their missing children\(^2\). Made up originally of the mothers of victims of politically motivated disappearances, this organization marched weekly near the capital wearing their distinctive white hoods to demand information on their children’s whereabouts. From 1976 to the mid-80s, during the military regime and the democratization period, organized human rights protest from

\(^2\) One offshoot organization still meets every Thursday at the Plaza.
the Mothers (and other groups) was overwhelming. Under similar conditions of civil strife, similar groups of mothers began protesting in Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, and several other Latin American states. In each case, it was the disappearance of a loved one that motivated these women to form groups, take action, and protest against the government’s repressive practices.

These cases demonstrate that repression by the state can be a powerful motivation for protests. When the state engages in repression, as it did in the examples previously discussed, this inflicts harm on victims’ families, their friends, and their communities. This harm constitutes a meaningful grievance against the state among those connected to the victims of repression. This grievance motivates some people to take action, specifically by protesting against the state. Given that women are likely represented in any large social group, and make up roughly half of any given population, women are at least as likely to be affected by repression enacted by the state, and so women should be incentivized to protest when the state uses repression, in much the same way that we expect other protests to form when the state is repressive. In this sense, I expect that women’s protests are motivated by repression in much the same way other forms of protest can be responses to repression.

**H1** – *Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government is repressive than when the government is not repressive.*

Whereas contemporary and historical evidence suggests that women react to state repression with protest, in the same way that general protests often arise from state repression (Davenport 2007, Moore 1998), the broader literature on the relationship between protest and dissent suggests further qualifications. The long line of literature on
the “repression-dissent nexus” has generally found a strong relationship between repression from the state and protest among citizens (Regan and Henderson 2002, Moore 2000). However, these works suggest that the relationship between repression and dissent is more complex than the historical evidence I have considered so far. Specifically, these works find that state repression can both motivate, and be motivated by, protests (Moore 2000). Also, though repression can anger some citizens and cause them to protest, but repression might also deter citizens from protesting. In other words, repression and dissent are endogenous. This suggests caution while interpreting any observed relationship between state repression and women’s protests. Because protests and repression are codetermined, empirical analyses may overestimate the statistical significance and substantive effect of repression on women’s protests.

However, this possibility is not a huge concern for this particular research for a number of reasons. The first is that repression and dissent are interconnected, but the specific pathway from state repression to protests is multidirectional: sometimes repression motivates protests, but sometimes repression deters protests, and sometimes no effect is observed (Davenport 2007). On the opposite side, however, the relationship is unidirectional: states generally respond to protests with repression (Davenport 2007). In fact, this relationship is so consistently observed, it is known as the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness” (Davenport 2007). This is because the state values quiescence, or peaceful obedience, by the general public. My research focuses explicitly on the first pathway, and argues that for women’s protests in particular, we should observe protests in response to repression. If repression by the state actually deters protests by women, this would only reduce the likelihood of observing the expected positive relationship
between repression and women’s protests, rather than increase the likelihood of a Type I error.

If we are to take seriously Davenport’s (2007) suggestion to begin theorizing to explain the imbalanced findings about repression causing dissent, then this dissertation represents a step in that direction by examining the types of protests which arise from dissent, focusing on women’s protests in particular. In particular, the next section unpacks the effects of different repressive tactics on protests by different groups. I argue that women’s protests have a distinct relationship to state repression as compared to general protests.

The second reason the endogeneity problem is not particularly problematic is that gender stereotypes influence states’ perceptions of political threats. In particular, as I elaborate on further in the next section, states typically do not view women as a salient political threat. Though women can and do face repressive retribution from the state, it is far more likely that women protestors will be ignored by the state. I will leave this observation for now, but I return to it later in the next step of my argument about why women might protest as women.

**Women Protest Forced Disappearances**

Having established the general expectation that the more repressive a state is, the more women will protest, I now turn to theorizing about why women choose to protest “as women”, or not, at decision point 3 (Figure 3). To explain this decision in the context of state repression, here I argue that repressive practices are gendered, that as a consequence of this, the effects of repression are gendered, and thus protests motivated by repression are likely to be gendered as well. Looking specifically at the state’s use of
forced disappearances, I show that women are less likely to be targeted by the state, but are still victimized by the loss of a family member or friend, which motivates women to protest when the state uses forced disappearances. Women consequently use their gender identity as a shield to minimize the danger to themselves of facing backlash from the state for protesting, and thus are able to effectively mobilize as women, while broader protests including both men and women would likely be vulnerable to additional repression.

**Gendered Repression and Gendered Dissent**

The Argentine case, along with many others, saw women taking to the streets even as the regime was very repressive. This begs the question: why do women, in particular, protest when the government is highly repressive? In this section, I argue that state repression is gendered in practice, and as a consequence of this, has gendered effects. In particular, when the state uses repression, it does so in ways that affect women and men differently. Due to the different effects that repression has on women and men, women’s reactions to repression, such as protesting, are different from the reactions of men. Certain repressive tactics are more likely to be associated with women’s protests. Here I focus on the use of forced disappearances, in particular, as there is clear historical and contemporary evidence demonstrating gender’s role in shaping who is targeted for disappearance and how victims and survivors respond. In this section I build upon both grievance (Gurr 1968, 1970) and political opportunity structure (Tilly 1978, Costain 1992) models of protest to argue that forced disappearances can serve as a gendered grievance, directly motivating protests by survivors, but that the actual practice of forced disappearances present a gendered opportunity structure for mobilization.
While both men and women could be motivated to protest by disappearances, women will be more likely to protest when the government uses disappearances, and men will not be more likely to do so, for three reasons. First, disappearances are gendered in their targeting, namely that typically men are victims of the practice and women were not targeted as often, thus increasing the perceived cost of protest for men and reducing the relative cost for women. Secondarily, women have unique advantages for mobilization in the face of political disappearances relative to men. Due to the “shield” of their roles as wives and mothers (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), women are able to protest when men cannot.

**What is Forced Disappearance?**

Forced disappearance³ is a particular type of repression that is particularly egregious compared to other types of repression. According to international law, forced disappearance refers specifically to

“… the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State … followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.” (“International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance” 2006).

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³ Also called “enforced disappearance” or simply “disappearance”. In this dissertation, as in other documents describing the process, “forced disappearance”, “enforced disappearance”, and “disappearance” all refer to the exact same repressive practice.
Forced disappearances were in many ways a repressive “innovation” of the Argentine junta (Sikkink 2008)\(^4\). While other regimes, like the Third Reich, had long practiced disappearances of political rivals, the Argentine military developed a massive and well-organized state apparatus to disappear people. It was Argentine human rights activists in the late 1970s and early 1980s that first coined the phrase “to disappear someone” to describe the clandestine political kidnappings used by the military regime (Sikkink 2011, 2008).

However, forced disappearance does not usually entail merely the violation of habeas corpus, even though that on its own is deeply troubling. Typically, those targeted by forced disappearance are actually subjected to a combination of other, concurrent violations of their physical integrity rights. In practice, forced disappearances essentially represent a combination of all three of the other types of repression. Forced disappearance is a subtype of unlawful imprisonment, often politically motivated and used against supposed “dissidents” (Navarro 1989). Once taken by the state, many victims of forced disappearance are tortured (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015). Nearly all those targeted are eventually killed. Given these patterns, it is arguably true that forced disappearance represents the worst possible physical integrity violation. Given the severity of treatment of victims, understanding the effects of forced disappearances is especially important, even as the practice has declined over time, and especially given the

\(^4\) Other repressive practices associated with forced disappearances in Argentina were also new, such as taking the babies of pregnant disappeared women, falsifying their identities, and adopting them into military families (Sikkink 2008). Out of an estimated five hundred babies taken in this way by the regime, only fifty had been found by their genetic families as of 1993 (Wilson 1993).
recent spread of the practice to countries like Syria (Amnesty International 2017) and the Philippines (Bautista 2018).

**Forced Disappearances as a Grievance against the State**

Theories about protests and contentious mobilization often emphasize the role of grievances that motivate certain people to act against the status quo (Gurr 1968, 1970, Davies 1962). These arguments posit that government actions, particularly repression, act as a major motivation for civil unrest (Carey 2006, Moore 1998). Disappearances, like other forms of repression, can indeed serve as a grievance that motivates survivors to act. This is because forced disappearances have particularly negative outcomes on relatives of the disappeared, and thus may motivate them to action (Navarro 1989, Sikkink 2008).

One unique factor about disappearance tactics relative to other repressive actions are the targets of this repression (Sikkink 2008). Most of the victims of this type of repression are young: in Argentina, over 80 percent of the victims were under 35 (Sikkink 2008). Recent accounts of both Colombia (Haugaard 2011) and Mexico (Human Rights Watch 2014) suggest that victims there have also been relatively young. In part because of the relative youth of victims, the use of disappearance tactics can have particularly awful psychological effects on the families of victims (Sikkink 2008). Because victims are typically young, very often the parents of the victim are still alive and are left to try to piece together what happened to their child.

Jelin (1995) characterizes the loss of a disappeared child as “uncertain harm”: the child is missing but family members do not know for certain whether they are alive or dead. This “ambiguous loss” is similar to that experienced by families of military
personnel who are missing in action, and is the most stressful type of grieving that people face (Boss 1999), making it difficult for family members to move on with their lives (Sikkink 2008). In instances when the whereabouts of a family member are known (for instance, with “ordinary” political imprisonment) and/or their death is confirmed, this ambiguity is absent. By contrast, in the face of the uncertainty caused by disappearances, many family members of the disappeared in Argentina believed their children might be alive and suffering, and this possibility motivated their activism because protesting could potentially lead to the safe return of their children (Navarro 1989). Families turned to activism as a coping mechanism to help deal with their uncertainty and grief when family members went missing (Sikkink 2008).

H2 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government uses forced disappearance as a repressive tactic than if the government does not use forced disappearance.

However, it is important to note that the pain of the loss of a child through forced disappearance is universal to men and women, mothers and fathers, and so we might expect both women’s protests and broader social protests when the state uses disappearances. Historically, however, this has not been the case, and primarily women have been most active in protesting when the state uses forced disappearances (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). This is due to two factors in the way in which forced disappearance has been practiced by the state, which I elaborate on in the next section. First, the practice of disappearances is gendered, and men are more likely to be disappeared than women are. Second, women have the unique opportunity to utilize their
identity as mothers and wives as a “shield” to provide space for them to protest (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), which men cannot do.

**Gendered Targeting of Forced Disappearances**

In addition to grievance-focused theories of protest, other works emphasize the opportunity structure within which individuals operate. These theories focus on the opportunity to protest, rather than the motivation of a protest (Eisinger 1973, Tilly 1978, Kitschelt 1986, Hirsch 1990, Costain 1992, Tarrow 1994, della Porta and Tarrow 2005, 2012, Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015, Meyer 2004). In other words, whether or not we see protest depends, in part, on how much the state will tolerate dissent. When deciding whether to protest, individuals estimate how likely the state is to repress them for taking to the streets, based in part on how the state has reacted to dissent in the past (Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010, Lichbach 1987).

The opportunity structure arguments are a major point of departure for my argument: While men and women alike feel the grief and motivation to protest caused directly by the disappearance of a loved one, the actual practice of disappearance alters the political opportunity structure in a gendered way, for two reasons. First, as I outline in this section, the state typically does not use disappearance against women. Second, as I outline in the next section, women have the ability to politicize their gender identity, and protest “as women”, when the state uses disappearances than otherwise. Due to these two factors, women actually have more space to mobilize and protest when the state uses disappearances than men do.

Disappearances are *gendered* in their targeting: men are more likely to be disappeared than women are. Historical narratives from Argentina and other countries
(Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), recent journalistic accounts (Human Rights Watch 2014), as well as available statistics on the genders of victims of forced disappearance all support the assertion that women were less likely to be disappeared than men. The UN reports that most reported cases of forced disappearance are of men, with roughly 70% to 94% of the disappeared being male, shown in Table 1 (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015). These gender breakdowns are available primarily in the pre-democratization periods of open civil conflict in the selected countries. These countries were selected due to data availability: gender breakdowns of victims were not available in other cases (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015).
**Table 1**: Estimated Percentage of Victims by Gender, Selected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table adapted from Dewhirst and Kapur (2015).
Also, consider evidence from the partial list of names of the disappeared in by the “Proyectos Disappearados”, an NGO affiliated with FEDEFAM⁵. The full list of names of victims in both Argentina and Brazil is included in Appendix C. These lists are obviously only a small sample of the total number of victims of forced disappearances in those countries, but using these lists allows us to gather some baseline information about who was targeted by the regime.

Their list of victims in Argentina includes 1,898 total victims. I examine only the first names listed, as those are most informative about the person’s gender. In Spanish speaking cultures, feminine middle names are fairly common – many men have Maria as a middle name, for example. The fifteen most common first names in the list, in order of the number of appearances, were María, which appeared 81 times, followed by Carlos and Jorge, both at 74 times each respectively, Juan at 72 times, José at 63 times, Luis at 50, Eduardo at 48, Miguel at 40, Roberto at 35, Ricardo at 31, Daniel and Julio at 30 each, and Hugo at 28 times. Indeed, if we look at the 45 most common names, which I have coded as male or female, we see that there were 928 male victims in the list but only 212 females, meaning that men were roughly 4.4 times more likely that women to appear in the list.

In addition, since many Argentine names are Spanish in origin, and Spanish is a Romance language with gendered nouns, it is possible to capture, loosely, the gender composition of the list by checking for name endings. Names ending in “-o” are typically assigned to males, and names ending in “-a” are more frequently given to women (though

⁵ Acronym for Federación Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos, an organization that works to end the practice of forced disappearances.
not always). Here, again, we see that male names appear more commonly in this list of victims, with 607 names ending in “-o” but only 476 first names ending in “-a”.

The list for Brazil is much smaller, including only 125 names. However, it is still valuable information to analyze. In this list, among all the first names which appear more than once, the most common name is José, which appears 9 times, followed by Antonio at 7 times, Paulo at 6, João at 5, Maria at 3, followed by Daniel, Joel, Luis, Orlando, Pedro, Rui, and Walter all appearing at 2 times each, respectively. This suggests that male names appear roughly 16.7 times more frequently in this list than female names. While Portuguese naming conventions differ slightly from Spanish, generally the rule of “-o” as masculine and “-a” as feminine still applies. I find that names in this list end in “-o” 52 times, but in “-a” only 14 times.

Taken as a whole, all the available evidence on the gender of victims of forced disappearances suggests that the state does not target women as often as men, at least with the use of forced disappearance. In part because many of the direct targets of disappearance are male, many of the political effects of disappearance are gendered as well. Men are taken more frequently, and women are thus more often left behind to piece together what has happened.

Since women know that the state is less likely to target them, they would see this context as an opportunity to protest with lower personal risks, increasing their likelihood of protest (Tilly 1978). In other words, in states where forced disappearances are common, the repressive tactics used by the state change the political opportunity structure in a gendered way, encouraging women to protest but not encouraging men. In fact, one member of the Madres articulated just this, saying “You have to leave.” to men who
wished to accompany the mothers, “If there are only women, the police will not dare to intervene, but if you come they will not hesitate to take you away” (quoted in Bousquet 1983, Navarro 1989). This affords women’s groups, in particular, a unique opportunity to mobilize in the face of such repressive tactics. Unlike general protests, which would usually include both men and women, women’s protests are less likely to be met with repression. Thus, women and women’s groups may be able to protest when men cannot.

H3 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government uses forced disappearance, but other protests will not be more frequent.

Women’s Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts

Finally, I wish to turn to examining decision point 4 from Figure 3, wherein citizens decide whether to join a protest or not. I argue that in repressive contexts, particularly situations where the state is using forced disappearances, women’s gender identity constitutes a valuable political resource that can enable and incentivize women to join protests. This means that the gender gap in participation between women and men actually narrows under repressive contexts.

As social movement theorists often point out, political opportunities for protest do not simply exist in the abstract. Activists must also perceive and/or construct those opportunities for themselves (Della Porta and Tarrow 2012, 2005, Tarrow 2004, Banaszak 1996). Here, too, there is reason to believe that forced disappearance changes the political context in ways women, in particular, can utilize. The military regime in Argentina used the ideal of the traditional family as a central metaphor, and the women of the Plaza saw this as an opportunity to turn that message around against the state (Navarro 1989). They subverted the regime’s message by exposing its hypocrisy in
splitting up families. The Mothers used the nuclear family and motherhood in its messages and public appeals (Jelin 2004). When the state uses forced disappearances women also have unique opportunities to emphasize their position in society as women, wives, and mothers (Mooney 2007, Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). In other words, women can organize as a group strategically.

While much prior research focuses on the negative effects of gender stereotypes, under certain circumstances, popular perceptions of women can also work to their advantage (Barnes and Beaulieu 2016, Navarro 1989). Because of the ability to “shield” themselves by politicizing their roles as wives and mothers, women were able to protest when men could not (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). Even in the context of mass repression under military regimes, women in Argentina (Sikkink 2008), Chile (Noonan 1995, Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 1998), and other countries still took to the streets to demand information on their children. This historical reality both challenges and qualifies the political opportunity structure argument (Sikkink 2008): women mobilized in spite of the fact that there was little to no chance for success in changing the regime’s behavior. Critically, in a repressive context, these groups organized “as women” strategically, and mobilized particularly as mothers, focused on the biological family and the bond between mother and child (Sikkink 2008).

In part due to their ability to organize “as women” (Navarro 1989), and thanks to the international attention to their cause (Mooney 2007), the state could not fully repress women and women’s groups the way it could repress more general dissent. At a time when thousands of men were disappearing, the government took only a small number from the Mothers group. While disappearances of women did indeed happen, they were
not nearly as frequent as one would expect given the widespread use of the practice. In
the face of political disappearances then, both because of their centrality to families that
the regime purported to value, and because of international attention to their cause,
women had better opportunities to oppose the regime openly than men had.

Heretofore, I have primarily discussed women as a group. In other words, to
borrow from rational choice terminology, I have made a “unitary actor” assumption about
women. In reality women come from all different economic classes, races and
ethnicities, social positions, geographies, and so on. Indeed, not all women are wives or
mothers, nor are they always perceived as such. However, the assumption of women as a
group is warranted by my argument for a number of reasons. While not all women are wives or
mothers, only women can be wives or mothers, at least according to the
traditional gender roles typically found in the region. Secondarily, when women are
protesting, it would be difficult or impossible for an outside observer to distinguish which
women are, in fact, wives or mothers, and which are not. Thus, while not all women are
wives or mothers, even those women who do not have children or husbands can
potentially join a protest of wives and mothers. Recall, for example, the reasoning of
Maria Antonieta Lugo, who was willing to join in a protest by local housewives because
she herself had male relatives the same age as those who had disappeared (Stevenson and
Sherman 2014). Even those without children could be persuaded by a similar logic, and
would be perceived similarly to other women in the protest by an observer even if they
did not have children.

While my earlier hypotheses focus on country level dynamics, ultimately they
require individual women to recognize and capitalize upon the political environment in
which they find themselves. When the state does not use forced disappearance, in
general, women do not typically participate in politics at the same level as men (Córdova
and Rangel 2016, Beauregard 2013, Kittilson 2016, Espinal and Zhao 2015, Gallego
2015, Barnes and Burchard 2012, Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010, Desposato and Norrander
Consider, for example, that women who had never been involved in politics prior to the
disappearance of their children originally formed the Mothers group in Argentina
(Navarro 1989). In sum, I expect that during “politics as usual” there is a gender gap
between men and women’s participation, and women are less likely to take part in
protest.

H4 – During times when the government is not very repressive, women will be
less likely to participate in protests compared to men.

However, when the state makes use of forced disappearance, it is likely that women will
recognize their lower risk for speaking out, their ability to organize as women, and the
additional space that this tactic can afford them to protest. Consequently, individual
women will be more likely to protest when the government uses disappearances.

H5 – Women will be more likely to participate in protests when the government
uses disappearances, whereas men will not be more likely to participate in
protests under those conditions.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have laid out my argument about the relationship between
women’s protests and state practices of repression. I have argued that repression by the
state is a key motivator for many protests by women, and that the practice of repression is
gendered in meaningful ways. Due to the influence of gender on how states target repression, I argue that society reacts in a gendered way. Forced disappearance, in particular, targets men more frequently than women. Due to this, protests under conditions where the state is disappearing citizens are more likely to be framed in gendered terms, and women’s protests are more likely, while general protest should not be more frequent in those conditions. Finally, due to women’s increased safety from outright repression when the state uses disappearance, women are more likely to participate in protests under those conditions.

Table 2 outlines my hypotheses, making clear what the comparison group expectation is for each. H1 is that women should protest repression, and in this sense, I argue that women’s protests are similar to general protests. H2 is that women’s protests should be more frequent when the state uses disappearance. H3 is that general protests should not be more likely when the state uses disappearance, because of how they are targeted in a gendered way. H4 is that under non-repressive conditions, women should be less likely to protest, and H5 is that women will be more likely to protest under repressive conditions, compared to men.
### Table 2: Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women’s Protests</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1 Women’s protests will be more frequent when the state is repressive</td>
<td>Women’s protests are similar to other protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2 Women’s protests will be more frequent when the state uses disappearance</td>
<td>(See H3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3 (See H2)</td>
<td>General protests are not more frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4 Women will be less likely to participate in protest when the state does not use disappearance</td>
<td>Men are more likely to participate in protests when the state does not use disappearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5 Women will be more likely to participate in protest when the state uses disappearance</td>
<td>Men are not more likely to participate in protest when the state does not use disappearance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3 – Empirics: Women Protest Repression

In this chapter, I present empirical tests of my first major hypothesis, namely that women’s protests are frequently motivated by repressive actions undertaken by the state. I first present a test of H1 on a global sample of states from 1990-2012. Secondarily, at the end of the chapter, I present a number of robustness tests, including an analysis of regional variations.

As a reminder, the hypothesis tested in this chapter is as follows:

**H1** – Women will protest more when the government is repressive than when the government is not repressive.

**Research Design**

To test my first hypothesis, I utilize a time-series cross-sectional dataset of women’s protests and covariates. These data cover the 1990 to 2012 period. Geographically, these data cover all states recognized by the US Department of State, whose reports are used to generate human rights violations data (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). The unit of analysis is country-year (e.g. “Chile-1995” is one unit).

My primary dependent variable to test H1 is a count of women’s protests in a given year, which ranges from 0 to 205 (data from Murdie and Peksen 2014). Given the nature of the dependent variable as a “count” of discrete events, the primary modelling strategy used in this chapter (and the following chapter) is negative binomial regression (King 1989). Negative binomial regression is a statistical modelling strategy used for modeling a dependent variable which accounts for the non-linearity typically found in count data (King 1989). In particular, negative binomial regression accounts for the fact that count data is bounded by a floor at zero (a discrete event cannot occur fewer than 0
times). This is preferable to a linear approach, like ordinary least squares (OLS) because OLS becomes inefficient, inconsistent, and biased when it is applied to count data.

Additionally, negative binomial models account for two of the most common issues with another common method for modelling count data, the Poisson regression. The first is that unlike a Poisson model, negative binomial approaches account for over-dispersion – a situation in which the variance of the dependent variable is greater than the mean. The second is that Poisson approaches assume independence of the dependent variable over time. Given that the dependent variable in question is over-dispersed, negative binomial is more appropriate than Poisson. Secondarily, the dependent variable is very likely to be dependent, rather than independent over time (one protest in a given year probably increases the likelihood of more protests occurring within that year). Additional testing on the dependent variable did not reveal significant zero-inflation. Zero-inflation is a situation in which there are an unusual number of non-events in the dependent variable, which are zeroes in count data, occur and can bias estimates (essentially similar to the problem of modeling a “rare event” in a logistic regression).

**Dependent Variable**

The data on women’s protest come from Murdie and Peksen (2014): prior to 2014, no comprehensive cross-national data on women’s protests existed. They utilize data from the Integrated Data for Events Analysis database (IDEA6) (Bond et al. 2003), which is an automated coding of all events in the Reuters Global News Service, organized into discrete “events” with information on “who did what to whom” for every

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6 Note this is a distinct organization from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, also called IDEA.
recorded event (Murdie and Peksen 2014, King and Lowe 2003). For further discussion of coding procedures (e.g. “why Reuters?”) see Murdie and Peksen (2014), p. 6. Prior work using this dataset has focused on violent and/or nonviolent protests (Bhasin 2008, Murdie and Bhasin 2011). In this chapter, I use a count of all women’s protests. This value ranges from zero (i.e. no protests occurred in that year) in 1,890 cases to 205 protests in one case⁷, with an average of about 5.2 protests in a given country-year.

**Independent Variables**

My theory predicts that women will protest under conditions of government repression. To measure the independent variable of interest, I use the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI; 2010) Human Rights Data. Using the CIRI data is appropriate because CIRI allows me to disaggregate their index and examine the impact of particular types of repressive actions, which is not possible with other human rights data (such as PTS, see Cingranelli and Richards 2010, Wood and Gibney 2010). The ability to break down repression into its component practices is important for my theory, and critical for the empirical tests I conduct in the next chapter. A descriptive breakdown of the types of repression measured is presented in Figure 4. As you can see, torture has been the the most common repressive tactic employed by states, with roughly 70% of all states still using the tactic in 2010. Political imprisonment is also a commonly used type of repression, with roughly 70% of states seeing use of this tactic in 1990. However, over time the use of this particular type of repression has declined dramatically, with only about 55% of states seeing use of the tactic in 2014. Extrajudicial killings are consistently used less frequently than imprisonment or torture across time, but

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⁷ The United States in 1998.
nonetheless represent extreme disrespect for human rights when they are practiced in a given state. Finally, forced disappearance is the least utilized, but arguably most severe, form of repression. Its use has declined considerably over time, with about 58% of states using the tactic in 1990 but less than 45% of states using it in 2010.
Notes: Data on repression types comes from CIRI (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). For visualization purposes, a country is coded as experiencing a type of repression in a given year if CIRI reported that a type of repression occurred “frequently” in a given country for a given year, whereas a state is coded as not experiencing a repression type if CIRI reports that type of repression only “occasionally” occurred, or did not occur, in a given year.
To test H1, I employ the additive Physical Integrity Scale. This variable is an ordinal scale that ranges from zero to eight. I have rescaled the variable so that a score of eight represents the “most repressive” government practices and zero represents “least repressive”, for ease of interpretation. I do not lag this variable, as protests are generally a rapid response to ground conditions, while all other time-varying covariates are typically lagged by one year. This does lead to concerns for the possibility of endogeneity, but I conduct additional tests to this end shown in the Appendix, and do not find evidence of a reciprocal relationship.

Figure 5 shows the observed average number of women’s protests at varying levels of state repression. In other words, the graph shows a simple bivariate regression “line of best fit” between protests and repression. As you can see, the raw data suggests that my expectation is supported. Without including any controls, we observe that women’s protests do seem to increase in frequency as a state becomes more repressive. However, we must account for the role of other variables that may affect this relationship’s strength and significance. Thus I discuss the control variables employed, and in the next section report a full model with controls.
Figure 5: Relationship between Women’s Protests and Repression

Notes: Figure plots the average observed number of women’s protests at varying observed levels of state repression. Controls are not included.
Controls

As mentioned earlier, Murdie and Peksen (2014) offer a global analysis of women’s protest based on the three major theories of political mobilization: grievances, resource mobilization, and political process. Grievance theories suggest that discontent with the current political system leads to collective dissent (Davies 1962, Gurr 1968). Thus, I want to control for whether the state respects women’s political equality (Murdie and Peksen 2014). I control for this relationship by including the CIRI measure of women’s political rights in my models. This scale ranges from zero (women’s political rights are not guaranteed in law or practice) to three (women’s political rights are guaranteed by law and are respected in practice). I expect a negative relationship: high respect for women’s political rights should decrease the need for women to protest.

Resource mobilization theories focus instead on the ability of groups to mobilize (rather than their motivation for doing so). Access to resources, such as financial and organizational support, reduces the cost of mobilization and thus increases the likelihood of protest (Tilly 1978, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Bell et al. 2013). To account for this relationship, I control for the number of women’s INGOs (from Cole, 2013), and I expect a positive relationship here: more women’s INGOs should ease the cost of collective mobilization and lead to higher levels of protest. As a secondary measure, I use women’s labor force participation. This measure is the percent of the total labor force that is female, and I again expect a positive relationship.

Political process theories focus on the opportunity to succeed in a political goal. Mobilization depends on a favorable political environment: individuals must have some confidence they could succeed, and the government must be somewhat tolerant of dissent.
(Costain 1992, see also Tilly 1978, and Lipset 1963). Historical evidence suggests this latter qualifier may not hold in the Latin American context: women could and did organize in spite of massive repression from the government in Argentina and several other countries. This is less problematic for my analysis because of the timeframe, as all Latin American states had democratized to some degree prior to 1990. In order to capture the effects of openness of the political system, I include a control for level of democracy (Polity IV). Given there may be a “ceiling effect” (Murdie and Peksen 2014), I test for robustness with a squared term (See Appendix A), and do not find substantively different results.

Additionally, I include a dichotomous measure that captures whether a given year contained a executive election. Elections have the potential to serve as “focal points” for the opposition (Beaulieu 2014), and represent a period of political openness in which real change is possible (Howard and Roessler 2006). Thus, I expect that high-profile elections should exhibit higher levels of protest. From 1990 to 2012, a total of 432 executive elections occurred in the world. The data for election years comes from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck 2001).

I control for other contextual factors that might be important. The most obvious are economic controls. Wealth, development, and inequality are important for determining the level of protests we see in many contexts (Brancati 2013). Inequality may lead to economic grievances, increasing protests. Wealth and development have less clear-cut expectations: more wealth could provide more resources with which to protest, but also remove cause for doing so. I control for these with the logged GDP of a country in a given year, the logged GDP per Capita, growth in GDP from the previous year.
Gender quotas have been on the rise across the globe since Argentina became the first to adopt such a quota in 1993 (Jones 2009, Barnes 2012). Gender quotas could represent a signal from the government that women’s participation in politics is valued, encouraging them to mobilize. Thus, I control for the presence of a legislative gender quota with a dichotomous variable taking a value of one for every year in which a quota was in effect, and zero otherwise. This variable comes from Cole (2013).

I also control for women’s level of tertiary education. To the extent that we can assume women are rational “unitary” actors, they would prefer to get their needs met without having to take to the streets, because protesting is costly (see Beaulieu 2014). One typical explanation for bargaining failure are information problems (Fearon 1995). In low information environments, women and the state cannot send clear signals about their preferences. As information increases, women are more able to use “regular” channels to get information to the government. Following Beaulieu (2014), I proxy this “information environment” by including a control for education. While education provides resources for political participation (Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995), I expect it to encourage more “regular participation” like voting and direct women away from protesting. I use the enrollment rates of women in tertiary education from the World Bank as my measure. As education levels increase, protest should decrease.

Given that the protest data are based on media reports, I also want to control for potential bias from news sources. Some countries may simply have more news stories written about them due to their geopolitical importance, news audience taste, or some other unobserved factors. To control for this possibility, I include a measure of media bias, which captures the number of reports (in thousands) about a given country in a
given year. This should reduce the possible bias towards more protests being reported in more news-saturated countries. Given that the data are created from Reuters’ reports, and the presence of foreign media has also been theorized to increase protest diffusion (see Kern 2011), this control is especially necessary.

Finally, protests are likely to be auto-correlated. In other words, it is quite likely that the protests we see in a given year are related to the protests seen in the previous year. As such, I include a control for the number of women’s protests in the previous year for each country (i.e. I include a lagged version of the dependent variable as an independent variable). I expect a positive relationship here: protests in one year should positively predict protests in the following year.

Results

Table 3 reports results for testing my first hypothesis. Recall that H1 is that women will protest against state repression. I find support for this hypothesis: in both models, state repression (as measured by CIRI’s physical integrity scale, inverted) has a positive and significant impact on the number of women’s protests. To show this effect visually, in Figure 6, I graph the predicted number of women’s protests by the level of state repression (based on Model 2). As the state moves from no repression to the highest level of repression, the predicted number of protests goes from approximately 2 protests to anywhere in the range of 5-12 protests, an incredibly sizeable increase of at least double the number of protests. In sum, I find strong statistical support in favor of H1.

Table 3 shows inconsistent evidence that levels of democracy matter. As expected, the level of women’s education is negatively, significantly related to the number of protests, suggesting that high information environments reduce overall levels
of contention. I find that overall wealth predicts higher levels of protest, but that GDP per capita predicts lower levels of protest. In robustness checks, I find that both relationships are non-linear: increasing wealth and development both encourage participation, but past a certain point the effects reach a ceiling (see Appendix B). I find no evidence that women’s political equality, NGOs, labor participation, or gender quotas matter for predicting women’s protests. Given that most of those factors are relatively constant over time within countries, those null findings are not terribly surprising.
### Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Repression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1: Women's Protests</th>
<th>Model 2: Women's Protests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests ((t - 1))</td>
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<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Political Rights</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV^{2}</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log GDP^{2}</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP per Capita</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
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<td>-0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Bias</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's INGOs</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Labor Force Female</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Tertiary Education</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>2238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.
Figure 6: Women’s Protests by Level of Repression

Notes: Predictions based on Model 2.
Robustness Tests

I consider a number of additional checks and possible alternative explanations for my findings. The first is that perhaps my findings are an artifact of the data I use to measure repression. Though this is unlikely, I check for this possibility by using two different additional measures of repression to ensure that my findings are robust to different measurements.

In particular, I use two measures from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) data to double-check my findings. The PTS data provides two measures of repression that differ slightly because they are created from two sources: State Department country reports, and Amnest International country reports (Wood and Gibney 2010). Unlike CIRI, which uses both sources for one measure, PTS provides two separate measures, henceforth called the Amnesty Scale and the State Department Scale. For both measures, the scales range from 0 to 5. A score of 1 indicates a country “under a secure rule of law” wherein people are not imprisoned for their views and torture/political murders are rare. A score of 2 indicates that there is some imprisonment for nonviolent political activity, but that torture and political murders are rare. A score of 3 indicates extensive political imprisonment, execution and political murder may be common, and unlimited detetion is accepted. A score of 4 indicates that the practices of the previous score are expanded to large numbers, and that murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life, but primarily only for politically active citizens. Finally, a score of 5 indicates that these repressive practices are extended to the entire population.

These measures differ from the similar CIRI repression scale in a few key ways. First, it does not disaggregate repression by type – there is only a general scale of how
repressive a state is, without data on specific state behaviors. Unfortunately, this means I cannot use the PTS data for testing any hypotheses except H1. Second, the PTS data incorporates information about the *scale* of repression, whereas CIRI does not (Wood and Gibney 2010). A higher score on the CIRI scale tells us that a state is practicing more types of repression, whereas a higher score in the PTS data tells us that a state is practicing repression against more people. Thus, if my theory is correct, I should expect that the observed relationship between repression and women’s protests would be even stronger using the PTS measures, as they better capture the scope of repression. Overall, however, both the CIRI and the two PTS measures of repression are highly correlated, as you can see in Table 4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical Integrity Scale</th>
<th>Amnesty Scale</th>
<th>State Dept. Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Integrity Scale (CIRI)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty Scale (PTS)</td>
<td>.7698</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Dept. Scale (PTS)</td>
<td>.8085</td>
<td>.8137</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As you see in Table 5, my findings are quite robust to these measures of repression. Whether I use the data generated from Amnesty International reports (as in Models A and B) or US State Department reports (Models C and D), I find that we observe far more women’s protests the more repressive the state is. In fact, the most striking thing about my findings is that aside from autocorrelation (the lagged measure of women’s protests) and GDP growth, repression is the only significant predictor of women’s protests, suggesting that repression might motivate women’s protests more than any other country level factor.

I represent these findings graphically in Figure 7. As you can see, when the state is not very repressive, the expected number of women’s protests is around two for any given year. However, at the highest levels of repression, the expected number of women’s protests increases dramatically to somewhere in the range of 8 to 12, a four-fold increase at minimum. Repression remains an incredibly powerful predictor of women’s protests, regardless of which measure I use to capture it.
### Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Repression (PTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression (Amnesty, PTS)</td>
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<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression (State Dep., PTS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests(t - 1)</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Political Rights</td>
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<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity IV²</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log GDP²</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log GDP per Capita</td>
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<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
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<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Bias</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
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<td>0.02+</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>Women's INGOs</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01+</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Labor Force Female</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01+</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>Female Tertiary Education</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>2701</td>
<td>2216</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
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</table>

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.
Figure 7: Women’s Protest by Level of Repression, PTS Measures

Note: Predictions based on Model 4 and Model 6, respectively. The predictions on the left use the repression scale based on Amnesty International reports from the Political Terror Scale (PTS, Wood and Gibney 2010). The predictions on the right use the repression scale based on US State Department reports from the Political Terror Scale (PTS, Wood and Gibney 2010).
In addition to measurement issues, we might also worry that this global approach to analysis is missing some of the important regional variations in the relationship between protest activity and repression. As Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2007) point out, regions of the world have particular dynamics and processes that are important within those regions, therefore it is dangerous to assume causal heterogeneity across regions without taking precautions, and secondarily, political developments in one country affect developments in nearby countries, leading to meaningful regional patterns that may not be global in scale. In particular for this work, we might worry that the theoretical framework I employ only applies to one particular region (Latin America), as most of the cases I draw from are found in that region. If the relationship observed is extremely strong, but only found in one region, a global analysis may still report a significant coefficient, masking the fact that only one region fits the expected pattern.

In order to account for these possible pitfalls, I present in Table # analyses that fit my general model to specific regions. In particular, I use the regions of the world and the inclusion rules for which countries fit into which region as they are defined by the World Bank (note that I do not run a model for the North American region, as it includes only two countries, Canada and the United States). The regional groupings employed are: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Given that I will use these regions again in later analyses, here I provide an inclusive list of the countries that fall within each region in Appendix A.
In Table 6, I present these regional analyses. As you can see, repression generally predicts women’s protests across regions, but the size and statistical significance of repression varies greatly from region to region. In particular, no statistically significant relationship is observed between repression and women’s protests in South Asia. This may indicate a meaningful regional distinction, but this might also be caused by the relatively fewer number of countries included within that region. I return to this fact in the next chapter, dealing with repression types, in much more detail, but for now, I do not find that only a single region is completely responsible for driving my findings. In conclusion, based on these robustness tests, I do not find any empirical cause for concern about the theoretical relationship I expected from H1: I find fairly consistent evidence that women protest when the state is highly repressive, with the exception of South Asia.
Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests by Repression (Regions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 7</th>
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<th>Model 9</th>
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<th>Model 11</th>
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<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>SSA</td>
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<td>Repression (CIRI)</td>
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<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests(t-1)</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>0.04+</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV²</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.00**</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.95***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>2.90*</td>
<td>3.31**</td>
<td>-2.88**</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>13.50***</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP²</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(3.56)</td>
<td>(3.01)</td>
<td>(2.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP per Capita</td>
<td>-0.05+</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Bias</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Bias²</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.
Chapter 4 – Empirics: Women Protest Disappearances

In this chapter, I provide empirical tests of H2 and H3, namely that women’s protests are motivated by state use of forced disappearances in particular, but that forced disappearances will not cause more protest in general, respectively. As with the last chapter, I first present a test of my hypotheses on a global sample of states from 1990-2012. Secondarily, at the end of the chapter, I present a number of robustness tests, including an analysis of regional variation.

As a reminder, the hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows.

**H2** – Women will protest more when the government uses forced disappearance as a repressive tactic than if the government does not use forced disappearance.

**H3** – Women will protest more when the government uses forced disappearance, but there will not be more protests from other groups.

**Research Design**

The research design employed to test my second and third hypotheses is similar to the one described in the previous chapter. I again utilize a time-series cross-sectional dataset of women’s protests and other country-level covariates. These data cover the 1990 to 2012 period, and are reported in Murdie and Peksen (2014). The unit of analysis is country-year. My primary dependent variable to test H2 is the same as the data used for H1, a count of women’s protests in a given year, and so the primary modelling strategy is again negative binomial regression\(^8\). H3, however, requires a different dependent variable – a measure of general protests. I use data on general nonviolent protests, also collected by Murdie and Peksen (2014), to test H3. Specifically, in this

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\(^8\) Additional tests did not reveal significant zero-inflation.
chapter I use negative binomial regression models to compare the predictors of women’s protests to the predictors of general protests. Note that all significance tests reported are two-tailed, and that figures show 84 percent confidence intervals (meaning that overlap between confidence intervals should be interpreted as statistical *insignificance*). Here, the main independent variable is a disaggregated measure of state use of forced disappearance, which comes from CIRI. The disaggregated measures of repression (including disappearance) are not lagged, due to the fact that protests are a rapid response to current conditions, whereas all other time-varying covariates are lagged by one year to help ease concerns about endogeneity. While this modelling decision does potentially create concerns about endogeneity between the dependent variable and my primary independent variables, I conduct further tests to examine this possibility and do not find cause for concern about a reciprocal relationship.

**Primary Dependent Variable**

The primary dependent variable, a count of women’s protests, is the same as described in the previous chapter. For a more detailed discussion of this variable, see the section Dependent Variable, in Chapter 3. This data comes from Murdie and Peksen (2014), who provide a global events data measure of women’s protests. The data is a count, ranging from 0 to 205, and thus the modeling strategy is again negative binomial regression.

**Secondary Dependent Variable**

My theory suggests that women protest “as women” rather than as part of a more general protest strategically. The empirical implication of my argument is that there will be more women’s protests when the government disappearances (H2), but general
protests are no more likely in those circumstances (H3). In order to test this hypothesis, I wish to compare the predictors of women’s protests, specifically, to protests more generally. To do this, I use the same IDEA database’s information on general nonviolent protests. This dataset provides a count of all nonviolent protests, which were not lead by women or women’s groups, in a given year. In other words, these are broader social protests organized and carried out by both men and women. I use this data on nonviolent protests, rather than a sum of violent and nonviolent protests, due to data availability limitations. Data on violent, general protests is not available from the same source. While an imperfect comparison, because the women’s protest measure includes both violent and nonviolent protests, these measures should give me a reasonable proxy for overall levels of contention. However, comparing the two should not be problematic, especially given that women are considerably less likely to support violent action in the first place (see, for instance; Caprioli 2000, de Boer 1985, Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990, Frankovic 1982, McGlen & Sarkees 1993, Mueller 1973, 1994, Shapiro & Mahajan 1986, Smith 1984, Togeby 1994). Using this variable, I can compare women’s protests to general, non-violent protests by mixed gender groups, which can demonstrate which circumstances lead to one type of protest vs. the other (or to both types).

**Independent Variable**

My theory predicts that women will protest when the state makes use of forced disappearance, and that disappearances should correlate with women’s protests but not general protests. To measure this independent variable, I use the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI, 2010) Physical Integrity Rights data, which provides a measure of whether a state made use of forced disappearances in a given year. This measure takes a
value from zero to two, which I have rescaled so that a score of zero represents no evidence of government use of forced disappearances, a score of one indicates some limited use of that tactic, and a score of two represents widespread use disappearances. I include the measures of the other repressive tactics (e.g. political imprisonment) as control variables.

Figure 8 shows the average observed number of women’s protests at varying levels of forced disappearance. In other words, it illustrates a “line of best fit” by performing a simple bivariate regression of protests onto disappearances. This shows graphically that the expected relationship between women’s protests and disappearance is supported by the raw data. Women’s protests do, in fact, appear to be more frequent when the state uses forced disappearance than when the state does not. Of course, this is a “naïve” model without controls, but it is nonetheless suggestive that the expected relationship is plausible.
**Figure 8**: Relationship between Women’s Protests and Disappearances

Notes: Figure plots the average observed number of women’s protests at varying observed levels of disappearance. Controls are not included.
Controls

In the analyses for H2 and H3, I include a number of controls thought to influence women’s protests. These controls are largely the same as those described in the previous chapter. For a detailed discussion of the measurement and expectations relevant to the other control variables which are the same as those in Chapter 3, see the section Controls in Chapter 3.

There are two new control variables to discuss for these models. First, my theory focuses on the state practice of forced disappearance. However, there are other types of repression that states employ which I wish to control for. To account for this, I include the other three disaggregated measures of repression from CIRI. In particular, these include a measure of whether a state practices torture, extrajudicial killings, and/or political imprisonment. These are measured the same way that disappearances are measure (i.e. 0 = no evidence of that repressive tactic, 1 = some use of the tactic, and 2 = widespread use of that tactic).

Second, when modeling H3, I want to account for the fact that women’s protest and general protests might be highly related phenomena. Therefore, when modeling women’s protests and general protests, I include lagged measures of both women’s and general protests as control variables. This should alleviate concerns that the two measures might be capturing the same process.

Results

Table 7 shows results for my models testing H2: that women protest more when the government uses forced disappearances. Using the CIRI index for forced disappearance, I find support for H2: the use of disappearances by the state is positively
and significantly associated with women’s protests. Figure 8 shows this effect graphically based on predictions from Model 14. As the level of forced disappearances increases, the predicted number of women’s protests goes from 1-2 to 4-8; at least double the number of expected protests by women. The finding that disappearances are associated with higher levels of women’s protests is robust to many alternative modelling specifications, as you can see in the Appendix.

Other types of repression besides forced disappearances are also associated with increased numbers of women’s protests. In particular, extrajudicial killings and political imprisonment are positively and significantly associated with more women’s protests, whereas torture is only significant in the full model. I had no specific theoretical expectations about these repressive tactics, but it is interesting to see them relate to women’s protests as well. However, I should note that the regional analysis which follows reveals that these relationships are inconsistent across regions.

Economic factors are also important. In particular, a growing GDP is associated with fewer protests, suggesting again that women are less likely to protest when the economy is improving. Surprisingly, and counter to my expectations, election years are associated with fewer protests by women. Perhaps this is due to the fact that major change is possible through voting, whereas protests are the only option for pressing reforms forward when there is not an election in the near future. None of the other controls I include show a significant influence.
Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression of Women’s Protests on Disappearance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Model 13</th>
<th>Model 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression (CIRI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrajudicial Killing</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Imprisonment</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests(t - 1)</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Political Rights</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV(^2)</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP(^2)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP per Capita</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-0.01**</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Bias</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s INGOs</td>
<td>0.01+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Labor Force Female</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quota</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Tertiary Education</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2719</td>
<td>2235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo (R^2)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.
Figure 8: Predicted Number of Women’s Protests at Levels of Disappearance

Note: Predictions based on Model 14.
Table 8 offers a test of my third hypothesis by comparing models of women’s protest to models of general protest. In these models, I also include a control variable for the lagged level of the other type of protest, because these processes could be highly related. Indeed, the pairwise correlation for women’s protest and general nonviolent protests is 0.513, which leads us to expect a positive relationship between the two.

Again, disappearances are a positive and significant predictor of women’s protests, but do not show a relationship to general protests. Figure 8 depicts the substantive effects of disappearances on the two protest types. As disappearances increase, the expected number of women’s protests increases by a factor of about 1.7 times, but the number of general protests is not significantly increased or decreased. In these models, none of the other types of repression matter for predicting either type of protest.

Interestingly, neither type of protest is predicted by the other type in the full model, in spite of their high correlation. This adds further support to the idea that women’s protests are, in fact, very distinct from general protests, suggesting that the conditions that lead to high levels of women’s protest are different from those that increase general protests.
### Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression of Protest Type on Disappearance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
<th>Model 17</th>
<th>Model 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Protests</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.12+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Protests</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests(t-1)</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.00+</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Protests(t-1)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01+++</td>
<td>0.01+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Political Rights</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.14+</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV (t)</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>1.31+</td>
<td>1.53*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP (t-1)</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-0.01+</td>
<td>-0.01+</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Bias</td>
<td>-0.03+</td>
<td>-0.03+</td>
<td>-0.08+++</td>
<td>-0.07+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's INGOs</td>
<td>0.01+</td>
<td>0.01+</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Labor Force Female</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Quota</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.27+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Tertiary Education</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>1804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo (R^2)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ \(p<.10\), * \(p<.05\), ** \(p<.01\), *** \(p<.001\). Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.
Here, again, for both types of protest, economic factors are very important. GDP exhibits a non-linear relationship with both women’s and general protests: at high and low levels of wealth, protest is lower. GDP per capita, my proxy for development, shows a depressing effect on women’s protests, and though negatively signed, GDP per capita is not significantly related to general protests. Media bias also positively predicts both types of protest, which is in line with expectations.

Interestingly, when controlling for the level of general protests, women’s labor force participation becomes negative and significant for women’s protests. This may indicate that when women have better access to the labor market they no longer organize as women, but instead as part of broad-based protests. Women’s political rights negatively predict general protests, perhaps for similar reasons: when women’s rights are already respected, there is a lower demand for change.

Women’s INGOs do not significantly predict either women’s or general protests. This is somewhat surprising given strong theoretical reasons to expect a positive relationship. However, this null finding may simply be an artifact of two things. First, by 1990, women’s INGOs may already have proliferated to the point of saturation, and so INGOs had reached their “ceiling” for affecting the level of protests. In addition, the level of women’s INGOs does not exhibit much change within countries over time (see Appendix B), and thus can be thought of as close to constant. Levels of democracy, elections, gender quotas, economic growth, and female tertiary enrollment do not exhibit statistically significant relationships to either women’s or general protests. Again, these factors are likely important globally, but may lack explanatory power within the region and timeframe.
Figure 9: Predicted Number of Women’s and General Protests by Level of Disappearance

Notes: Predictions derived from Models 16 and 18, respectively.
Robustness Tests

As in the previous chapter, I now present a few selected robustness tests. In particular, Table 9 shows the models testing H2 applied to the regional subsets described in the previous chapter. These models reveal that the relationship between forced disappearance and women’s protests is in the expected direction in all regions analyzed. However, this relationship fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance in the South Asian region. Again, this might be due to meaningful regional differences, or could be caused by the relatively fewer observations within that regional classification. All in all, the findings are remarkably consistent across regions.

In Table 10, I show regional tests for H3. Recall that H3 suggests a null relationship between disappearances and general protests. As expected, none of the regional subsets demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between disappearance and general protests. Indeed, none of the other measures of repression appear to be associated with higher levels of general protests either.
Table 9: Negative Binomial Regression of Women’s Protests on Disappearance (Regions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Model 19</th>
<th>Model 20</th>
<th>Model 21</th>
<th>Model 22</th>
<th>Model 23</th>
<th>Model 24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>SSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
<td>Women’s Protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression (CIRI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>0.35*</td>
<td>0.14+</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrajudicial</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.31*</td>
<td>0.30+</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
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<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
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<td>-0.08</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>GDP Growth</td>
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<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
<td>0.01+</td>
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+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Table 10: Negative Binomial Regression of General Protests on Disappearance (Regions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Model 25</th>
<th>Model 26</th>
<th>Model 27</th>
<th>Model 28</th>
<th>Model 29</th>
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<td>ECA</td>
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<td>General Protests</td>
<td>General Protests</td>
<td>General Protests</td>
<td>General Protests</td>
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<td>-0.01+</td>
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<td>-0.31+</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
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<td>-0.19</td>
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<td>(3.97)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
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<td>(0.08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log GDP per Capita</td>
<td>-0.54**</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
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<td>(0.19)</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>0.40**</td>
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<td>(0.14)</td>
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<td>198</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.26</td>
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+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Chapter 5 – Empirics: Women Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts

In this chapter, I provide empirical tests of H4 and H5. H4 suggests that women will be generally less likely to participate in protests, compared to men. H5, however, suggests that this relationship between gender and protest participation is conditional on state repression, specifically that women will be more likely to protest when the state uses forced disappearances, but men will not. For this chapter, I use data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to test my final two hypotheses on a sample of 18 Latin American countries in 2006 and 2008. In addition, I provide additional robustness tests and alternative model specifications at the end of the chapter.

As a reminder, the two hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows:

**H4** – *During times when the government is not repressive, women will be less likely to participate in protests compared to men.*

**H5** – *Women will be more likely to participate in protests when the government uses disappearances, whereas men will not be more likely to participate in protests under those conditions.*

**Why Latin America?**

As mentioned, in this chapter I use survey data from Latin America to test my arguments about the individual and state level factors that affect protest participation, particularly gender and repression. I choose to study this relationship within the Latin American region for a number of reasons. The first is that meaningful country level variation is present in the timeframe. Secondarily, the substantive importance of both the dependent and independent variable in the Latin American region cannot be understated. Finally, for case selection purposes, limiting my analyses to the Latin American region
allows me to control for potential unobservable confounding variables, such as the historical legacy of American foreign policy during the Cold War, and the ongoing regional conflicts surrounding the “War on Drugs”.

When looking at the Latin American region, women protest “as women” frequently. Even in the post-military regime period (1990 to 2012), there is a great deal of variation in women’s protest. Figure 10 shows trends over time in both women’s protest and state’s disrespect for physical integrity rights, which graphically shows evidence that women’s protests seem to be associated with high levels of government repression. With both measures, a higher score represents higher rates of protest and/or higher levels of repression. In terms of women’s protest, Colombia and Peru stand apart, showing massive waves of women’s protest, whereas Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have seen middling levels of women’s mobilization, and many other Latin American states saw little protest over time from women. For the most part, those states with poor physical integrity rights also had high levels of women’s protests.
Figure 10: Women’s Protests and State Repression in Latin America, 1990-2009

Note: Women’s protest is a count of all protests by women in a given country-year. The measure of repression is the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index. This comes from Cingranelli and Richards (2010), and scores range from 0-8, transformed so that a higher score means greater state repression.
In this chapter, I focus on the relationship of women’s protests and repression in the Latin American region. There are compelling reasons to limit the scope to this region, and these reasons broadly fall into normative and research design motives. Turning first to normative reasons, further exploring both the dependent variable (women’s protests) and the independent variable (repression) are critical for our understanding of Latin America. As you can see in Figure 10, women’s protests are fairly common in the region from 1990 to 2010. Given that protests are costly, both for participants and for governments, understanding what causes women to protest is critically important.

Women’s protests are especially important in the Latin American context because historically women’s participation has played a critical role in the democratization process that began in the late 1970s (Baldez, 2003, 2002, Navarro, 1989, Schirmer, 1989). Even as the government was highly repressive of opposition, women in Argentina (Navarro, 1989), Guatemala, and Uruguay (Schirmer, 1989) took to the streets to demand information about their missing children. These women’s protests took place because of – and in spite of – massively repressive government regimes that were “disappearing” thousands of citizens at the time. The history of the region shows that women’s political involvement can play a crucial role in creating social change.

Indeed, not only are women’s protests important in Latin America, but repression has been a major issue for many countries there as well. During the period of military rule, many countries in Latin America experienced a great deal of physical integrity rights violations. Even in the post-democratization period, repression is common in Latin American countries. For example, even from the period of 1990-2010, more countries
than not experienced at least one year in which there was some use of the practice of forced disappearances (see Figure 10).

In addition to the normative importance of understanding the relationship of women’s protests to repression in the region, isolating my analysis to Latin America is also advantageous from a research design perspective. In order to test my argument, I need a large number of countries over a long period of time with variation on both the dependent variable and the independent variable. Latin America provides both: women’s protests are fairly frequent but vary widely by country and over time, and repression occurs relatively often in many different countries but not in every year.

Secondarily, limiting the scope of this aspect of my study to Latin America allows me to control for many variables that might confound the relationships I seek to isolate. For example, many countries in the region have had similar historical experiences, from a shared colonial heritage as largely Spanish colonies, to a long period of military rule, to more recent shared experiences such as the “Left Turn”. Given the similarities among countries in Latin America, differences in levels of women’s protests between countries are less likely to be a result of differences in things like culture or general acceptance of unrest.

**Research Design**

While the dependent variable at the country-level utilized by the preceding empirical chapters represents an excellent opportunity to analyze women’s protests at the aggregate level, and to compare women’s protests to more general protests, we may worry about relying on this measure alone for a few reasons. First, my theory suggests that there are individual level factors at play. H4 and H5 operate at the level of
individuals deciding whether to participate in protests or not. If, at the country level, more protests by women were recorded when the state made use of forced disappearances but women, individually, were not more likely to protest under such circumstances, that might suggest that only motivated activists and those most directly affected by disappearances turned out in protest, but women generally were not more politically outspoken in those conditions. The second concern is the possibility of an “ecological fallacy” (c.f. Seligson 2002). Particularly, in this case we are concerned with the “individualistic fallacy”, wherein we falsely infer patterns at the individual level from aggregated data. Because my theory relies on both individual and country level dynamics, it should be further strengthened by investigating individual-level variation.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable, used to test H4 and H5, relies on self-reported information about individual protest participation from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for the years 2006 and 2008. While these data cover fewer years than the country level data, there is coverage of all the countries in the region. Importantly, they also exhibit variation on the primary country-level independent variable, the use of forced disappearance. Ten countries in the region experienced at least some use of forced disappearances during at least one of those two years, and Colombia experienced a high number of disappearances in both years.

This variable is coded as follows. Respondents were asked: “[…] Thinking about the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?” The variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent had participated in a protest in the last 12 months (at the time of the interview), and 0 if they had not. This variable allows me to
compare both women’s and men’s reported protest activity. Given that this variable is an individual level one, but my primary independent variable and several important controls are country level variables, the following analysis uses multi-level logistic regression, and again all tests are two-tailed.

**Primary Individual Level Independent Variable**

My theory predicts that not only will women’s groups and women activists protest when the state uses forced disappearances, but that individual women also perceive their relative advantages and women will thus be more apt to protest than men under these conditions. In other words, my theory implies a cross-level interaction between gender and the state’s use of forced disappearance. When the state uses disappearances, I expect that women will be more likely to protest than when the state does not use disappearance. Men, however, should not be more apt to protest under those conditions. In order to test this conditional hypothesis, I interact both the country level disappearance variable from CIRI (2010) and the individual respondent’s gender.

**Country Level Independent Variable**

My theory predicts that women will be more likely to participate in protest when the state makes use of forced disappearance. To measure this independent variable, I use the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI; 2010) Physical Integrity Rights data, which provides a measure of whether a state made use of forced disappearances in a given year. This measure takes a value from zero to two, which I have rescaled so that a score of zero represents no evidence of government use of forced disappearances, a score of one indicates some limited use of that tactic, and a score of two represents widespread use
disappearances. This variable is interacted with a respondent’s gender to observe whether the effects of disappearance at the country level are conditional on gender.

**Controls**

Since this analysis includes individual level data, I am able to control for additional individual level factors that might influence protest participation. I include a control for respondent’s age, as well as a squared term for age. I control for the respondent’s marital status. I control for the level of education that a respondent has attained (primary, secondary, college, and post-graduate). I also control for whether the respondent lived in a rural or urban area. People living in cities likely have easier access to public spaces where protests typically occur, and consequently a larger potential audience.

Socioeconomic status has long been theorized to influence political participation broadly (e.g. Verba, Brady, and Schlozman, 1995) and economic factors are known to influence protest activity (e.g. Brancati 2013). For personal socioeconomic status, I use the quintiles of wealth measure developed by Córdova (2009). This measure relies on physical household assets (e.g. the number of vehicles), and is preferable to an outright measure of income, because of a large non-response bias on standard income questions, particularly with LAPOP data (Córdova 2009). This provides a reasonable metric of how poor/wealthy a respondent is, in relation to their social context. In addition, I control for the respondent’s current employment status.

Additional controls for respondent ideology and subjective measures of economic and personal satisfaction are also included. I include controls for whether respondent feels their personal economic situation has declined in the last year, whether they
believed the country’s economic situation has worsened in the past year, and their current level of satisfaction with life in general. These first two would motivate more protests, whereas a generally satisfied respondent is probably less likely to protest.

**Results**

Individual-level analyses reveal similar dynamics to the country level. As predicted by H4, women are generally less likely to protest when the state is not repressive. The use of disappearances, however, changes the effect of respondent gender. Under conditions of repression, women become more likely to protest than before. In fact, as seen in Figure 12, the gender gap in protest participation at the individual level disappears, and nearly reverses and becomes positive, when the state is using forced disappearances. In other words, women are at least as likely (and very nearly more likely) than men to protest when the state uses disappearance. Individual women do seem to recognize that they have a higher ability to protest in this repressive context.

As for individual control variables, age appears to matter in some models but not others. Generally, this variable suggests that the very young and very old are less likely to protest than those in the middle age group are. Married people do not show any significant difference in protest participation relative to single people. Those with more education do tend to protest more often than those with lower education levels. Right wing respondents were less likely than those on the left to protest. Subjective feelings about the country and one’s personal economic situation do not appear to relate to protest participation, but overall satisfaction with life does lower the likelihood of protesting.

At the country level, media bias towards a country is associated with a higher level of protests among respondents. The level of democracy, captured by Polity, does
not have significant effects, but this is not surprising given that only two years are captured and so there is not much variation. For this cross-section, overall GDP is associated with higher protests at the very high and low ends of the spectrum, with fewer protests in the middle range. Finally, GDP per capita has a depressing effect: respondents in more developed countries tend to show lower levels of protest.
Table 11: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression of Protest Participation on Covariates

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 31</th>
<th>Model 32</th>
<th>Model 33</th>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.243***</td>
<td>-0.218***</td>
<td>-0.191***</td>
<td>-0.203***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>-0.661***</td>
<td>-0.407***</td>
<td>0.288**</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female X Disappearance</td>
<td>0.181**</td>
<td>0.165**</td>
<td>0.197**</td>
<td>0.181**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Level Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>0.166***</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
<td>0.143***</td>
<td>0.131***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth (Quintiles)</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.026*</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-0.151***</td>
<td>-0.081*</td>
<td>0.079*</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Wing</td>
<td>-0.040***</td>
<td>-0.038***</td>
<td>-0.026***</td>
<td>-0.030***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Economy</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Economy</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Satisfaction</td>
<td>-0.093***</td>
<td>-0.092***</td>
<td>-0.091***</td>
<td>-0.078***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Level Variables</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Bias</td>
<td>5.975***</td>
<td>5.262***</td>
<td>3.639***</td>
<td>2.433***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.557)</td>
<td>(0.531)</td>
<td>(0.547)</td>
<td>(0.550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>-0.467***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Polity IV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.297)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.548*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-127.398***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.578)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.479***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP per Capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-7.195***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.243***</td>
<td>-25.894</td>
<td>1,624.988***</td>
<td>56.129***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.118)</td>
<td>(21.746)</td>
<td>(105.517)</td>
<td>(5.267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>19,299</td>
<td>19,299</td>
<td>18,102</td>
<td>18,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chi²</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &gt; Chi²</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.
Figure 11: Effect of Respondent Gender on Likelihood of Protest Participation at Levels of Disappearance

Note: Predictions in this figure derived from Model 34.
Chapter 6 – Conclusion

This dissertation is an exploration of women’s protests that seeks to both shed light on the unique role of gender in shaping protest behavior while also recognizing the similarities between women’s protests and other forms of contentious mobilization. In this concluding chapter, I summarize the major and minor contributions of this project as I see them, I provide some of my ideas for building upon this foundation in future work, and I reiterate the importance of continuing to study women’s protests.

Contributions of this Dissertation

This dissertation presents a big picture view of women’s protests. Using the general theoretical framework I develop in Chapter 2, I derive expectations about contexts in which women’s protests are similar to other protests, as well as uncovering contexts in which women’s protests are unique. Women protest repression just as other groups do. However, when repression is gendered, and society is especially patriarchal, women are paradoxically empowered by their previously detrimental gender roles. The ability to politicize womanhood and motherhood serves as a crucial shield that protects women and encourages them to protest “as women” rather than as part of broader protests.

This dissertation demonstrates the critical importance of state repressive practices for understanding women’s protests, specifically. This is both a contribution to our understanding of women’s protests, but also a contribution to the study of the effects of repression. Previous works in this area have generally undervalued the role of gender in dissent, but this project demonstrates that both theorizing about gender and women’s participation are critical for understanding dissent in repressive contexts.
To my knowledge, this is the first project to examine women’s protests at two levels – utilizing both globally comprehensive data on women’s protests at the country-year level as well as regionally exhaustive individual level data on women’s participation in protests. This is an important departure from previous works because it allows us to examine whether patterns observed at the country level really hold at the individual level (c.f. Seligson 2002). For example, when I observed in Chapters 3 and 4 that women’s protests become more numerous in repressive states, it might have been the case that only some women were more likely to protest in those contexts. However, in Chapter 5, I find that this pattern actually holds for women in general, and that all women become more likely to protest under repressive contexts, compared to men.

Indeed, to my knowledge, this is the first large scale research endeavor that explicitly models the links between state level human rights practices to individual level behaviors and attitudes. This is a major contribution to the study of human rights, because many of the extant theories on human rights rely on assumptions about how citizens perceive and respond to state actions, but do not explicitly test those assumptions.

For example, many previous works on repression assume that citizens generally respond negatively to repression. However, preliminary analysis made possible by my data collection and multilevel modelling efforts has demonstrated that this assumption is questionable, at least within the Latin American context. Consider the following graphical representation. Using a similar model to the ones developed in Chapter 5, I model citizens’ predicted level of trust in government at varying levels of state repressiveness, interacted with citizens’ self-reported level of right-wing ideology. As
you can see, when the state is not very repressive, there is no difference in level of trust in government between left- and right-wing citizens. However, at middling and high levels of repression by the state, more right-wing citizens actually report much higher levels of trust in government, compared to left-wing citizens. This analysis is obviously very preliminary and needs a great deal of elaboration, but this is the kind of question that my approach will allow us to answer more fully in the future.
**Figure 12:** Trust In Government over Ideology and Repression

![Graph showing predicted level of trust in government over right wing ideology scale, with different lines for states with varying levels of repression.](image)

**Note:** Predictions derived from mixed effects logit model, including all controls, as seen in previous chapter.
**Avenues for Future Research**

One clear avenue for further work is to examine the decision process of the state in choosing to repress and practicing repression. This project demonstrates that gender and attitudes about women play a role in both of these processes. However, it is still unclear what the full role of gender is in determining state repressive behavior. Future works should take up the task of theorizing state repressive behavior through the lense of gender.

As I mentioned in the previous section, future avenues for research linking individual citizen attitudes and behaviors to state level repressive practices are fruitful grounds for much future work. I have demonstrated one such area, but there are likely hundreds more questions we could ask using this approach. How do citizens feel about repression? Are the effects gendered in other ways, outside of protest behavior? What citizens support the regime in spite of human rights violations, and why? These are all incredibly interesting topics for future research to tackle.

**Why Still Study Women’s Protests?**

Normatively speaking, women’s protests are incredibly important. This has never been more obvious than in the aftermath of the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Not even 24 hours after he was sworn in, a massive wave of protests, primarily organized by and for women, exploded both in Washington D.C. and cities both across the US and around the world. Women on all seven continents (including Antarctica) marched in solidarity against the new administration. While clearly a very different situation from women protesting in a highly repressive context, the logic of my argument can still shed light on this wave of protests. In this case, the loss of an election
and the transition to a more hostile new administration, rather than outright repression, is the motivating grievance that drove over 4 million women to the streets in protest.

In what ways did the political climate favor women, specifically, to organize? While I think we need to think more on this, it was probably because of the framing of the campaigns. This campaign was different in that it was the first time a woman was running on a major party ticket for the general election. Secondarily, much of the campaign season was spent litigating gender issues on both sides (for Hillary, Bill’s past infidelities and her reaction to those things, and for Trump, litigating his alleged misogyny and many accusations of past sexual misconduct towards women). This gender focus on the campaign trail probably helped to bring gender issues to the foreground after the election in way that favored women organizing specifically around their gender.

In addition, another important implication of my work is that repression is gendered, and that both governments practicing repression do so in a way that reflects and reinforces gender structures, and that men and women experience government repression differently as a consequence of this. Governments typically hesitate to disappear women because they view women as non-threatening and politically powerless. However, this perception is false, and

My research could be very useful in studying “like cases”. In particular, the current political situation in the Philippines comes to mind. Based on my argument, I would suspect that women and women’s groups are likely to be the most active in fighting against Duterte over the disappearances and other massive human rights violations that are ongoing due to his “drug war”. Human rights groups, other nations,
and international actors of all kinds should anticipate that it may be women, in particular, who are the key to changing that state’s behavior. They should also do as much as they can to mitigate the danger to women’s groups and women activists on the ground and provide them with support and resources for mobilizing.

All this is to say that women’s mobilization is frequent, it is critically important for calling out human rights violations and for democratization efforts, and it is not going away any time soon. Understanding women’s protests is a supremely important endeavor for scholars of gender, of protests, of human rights practices, of democracy, to collectively undertake. This project is meant to advance our knowledge of women’s protests in some small way, but also to provide a stepping stone for future work on the subject to build, debate, and improve upon.
Appendices

Here you can find the appendices for this dissertation. Appendix A includes both descriptive statistics and visualizations of data used in the empirical chapters, as well as supplementary information about question wordings. Appendix B includes additional robustness tests for my models of H1-H5 which are not reported within their respective empirical chapters. Finally, Appendix C includes a partial list of names of the victims of forced disappearance in Argentina and Brazil during the military regimes in those respective countries. These can be used to replicate the gender information found in Chapter 2.
### Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

#### Table A1: Regional Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region Name</th>
<th>Countries Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia (ECA)</td>
<td>Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia (SA)</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)</td>
<td>Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A1: Average Global Level of Democracy over Time

Note: Data comes from Polity IV. Scores range from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic).
Figure A2: Global Number of Women’s INGOs over Time

Note: Data on number of women’s INGOs comes from Cole (2013).
Figure A3: Average Global Respect for Women’s Rights over Time

Note: Data comes from CIRI (2010). Scores range from 0 (None of women’s political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process.”) up to 4 (“Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold more than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions”).
Appendix B: Additional Robustness Tests

Table B1: Logistic Regression of Increased Repression on Covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 35</th>
<th>Model 36</th>
<th>Model 37</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests(t)</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Protests(t-1)</td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
<td>-0.016**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity^2</td>
<td>-0.005***</td>
<td>-0.005***</td>
<td>-0.005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>-1.353***</td>
<td>-1.467***</td>
<td>-1.415***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.406)</td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
<td>(0.420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP^2</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.029***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>16.621***</td>
<td>17.814***</td>
<td>17.229***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.942)</td>
<td>(5.142)</td>
<td>(5.099)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,302</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>3,168</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psuedo-R^2</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.

Note: In these models, I check for endogeneity. Here, the dependent variable is increased repression, which takes a value of 1 if the current level of repression is higher than the previous level in a given country, and 0 otherwise. Neither the current year’s number of women’s protests nor the previous years number of women’s protests predict an increase in repression, suggesting that endogeneity is not a huge concern for H1.
### Table B2: Civil Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 38</th>
<th>Model 39</th>
<th>Model 40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disappearance</td>
<td>0.333**</td>
<td>0.340**</td>
<td>0.275**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.230***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity²</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.900)</td>
<td>(1.029)</td>
<td>(0.911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP²</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>-0.320***</td>
<td>-0.253**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-17.075</td>
<td>-9.596</td>
<td>-13.574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.960)</td>
<td>(12.318)</td>
<td>(10.871)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>2,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psuedo-R²</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.

One concern for H2 is that disappearances largely occur in the context of civil conflict, and so we might be capturing the effect of civil conflict with the disappearance measure. I use the PRIO measure of civil conflict here (0 if no conflict, 1 if more than 25 battle deaths occur). These two events are highly correlated, so including both in a model introduces collinearity. However, when I isolate the sample to only ongoing civil conflicts (Model 38), only non-civil conflicts (Model 39), or simply include both in one model (Model 40), I find that disappearances still have the expected positive relationship with women’s protests.
Appendix C: Names of the Disappeared

Names of victims of forced disappearance, for data verification.
Presented here in their memory.

Argentina
Juan Carlos Abachian
Ana Catalina Abad de Perucca
Dominga Abadía Crespo
Felicidad Abadía Crespo
José Abdala
Maria Leonor Abinet
Angel Luis Abraham
Hernan Abriata
José Ismael Acevedo
Dora Acosta
María Eliana Acosta Velasco de Badell
Elba Eva Acuña de Sáez
Marta Graciela Acuña
Sirena Acuña
Oscar Adamoli
Rolando Elías Adem
Claudio César Adur
Padre Jorge Oscar Adur
Nelson Roberto Agorio
Hugo Agosti

Américo Gines Agüero
Tomás Rodolfo Agüero Ríos
Ana Teresa del Valle Aguilar
José Aguilar Bracesco
Claudio Reyes Ahumada
Alejandro Fabian Aibar
Angela María Aieta de Gullo
Liliana Ester Aimeta
Cherif Omar Ainie Rojas
Carlos César Aiub
María Concepción Aiub
Ricardo Emir Aiub
Leticia Akselman
Genaro Alarcón
Carlos Esteban Alaye
Pablo Eduardo Albarracín
Roberto Omar Albornozr
José Antonio Alcaraz Gonzalez
Domingo Alconada Moreira
Jorge Eduardo Alday Lazcoz
Segundo Sixto Alderete
Fernando Antonio Alduvino Bolzan
José David Aleksoski
Alberto Cayetano Alfaro
Alicia Elena Alfonsín
Carlos Alberto Almada Villalba
Elvio Alberto Almada
Ricardo Avelino Almaraz
Guillermo Abel Almarza
Alejandro Almeida
Mónica Almirón de Lauroni
María Gloria Alonso Cifuentes de Sánchez
Mirta Alonso de Hueravilo
Raúl Alonso
Julio Antonio Altamirano
Lucio Bernardo Altamirano
Dominga Alvarez de Scurta
Federico Eduardo Alvarez Rojas
Gerardo Julio Alvarez
Horacio José Alvarez
Jorge Alberto Álvarez
José Carlos Alvarez González
Julio Rolando Alvarez García
Lucina Alvarez de Barros
Marcelino Alvarez
Osvaldo Angel Alvarez Alvarez
María Cristina Alvira
Raquel Alvira
María Elena Amadio
Fernando Adolfo Amarilla
Guillermo Amarilla
Nelly Ana Amato de Risso
Norberto Félix Amarturi
Salvador Leonardo Amico
Lidia Inés Amigo
Aníbal Alberto Anchepe
Carlos Alberto Andisco
José Eduardo Andrade
Jorge Luis Andreani
Juan Carlos Andreotti
Luis Alberto Angelini
Blanca Estela Angerosa
Daniel Martín Angerosa
Humberto Orlando Annone
Héctor Alberto Antelo
Daniel Antokoletz
Néstor Rubén Antoñanzas
Arturo Apaza
José Luis Appel De La Cruz
Francisca Aragón
Lidoro Oscar Aragón
Raul Araldi
Juan de Dios Aramayo Vallejos
Isauro Arancibia
Napoleón Argentino Araneda
Juan Cesáreo Arano
Héctor Antonio Araujo
Wenceslao Araujo
Miguel Sergio Arcuschin
Hugo Ardiles
Nélida Beatriz Ardito
Roberto Ardito
Luis Ramon Aredez
Alberto Francisco Arenas
Salvador Manuel Arestín
Joaquín Enrique Areta
Jorge Ignacio Areta
Alberto Arévalo
Alfredo Arévalo
Antonio Arévalo
Domingo Arévalo
Emilio Confesor Arévalo
Roberto Arfà
Jorge Raúil Arfuch
María de las Mercedes Argañaraz de Fresneded
Carlos Enrique Arias
Florentino Arias
Segundo Bonifa Arias
Julio César Arin Delacourt
Joaquín Ariño
Carlos María Aristegui
Miguel Ángel Arkatyn
Juana María Armelín
Raúl Aroldi
Miguel Angel Arra
Jorge Omar Arreche
Analía Alicia Arriola
Juan Carlos Arroyo
Horacio Antonio Arrué
Rómulo Artieda
María Asunción Artigas Nilo de Moyano
Juan José María Ascone

Pablo G Athanasiu Laschan
Alfredo Apeleleister
Nicodemus Apeleleister
Jorge Omar Astudillo Galizia
María Inés del Cármen Atim
Abdala Auad
Roberto Eduardo Aued
Floreal Edgardo Avellaneda
Lucrecia Mercedes Avellaneda Quintale
Jorgelina Aquilina Avalos de Gómez
Sara Fluvia Ayala de Morel
Vicente Ayala
Camila Elisabet Azar
Emilio Azurmendi
Esteban Benito Badell
Julio Aníbal Badell
Jorge Luis Badillo
Miguel Ángel Badoff
Adriana Bai
Arturo Baibiene
César Augusto Baldini
Angel Baldraco
Luis Alberto Baleano
Pablo Alberto Balut
Guillermo Luis Ball Llatinas
Adrián Ceferino Ballestero "Victor"
Esther Ballestrino de Careaga
Daniel Agustín Baquero
Luis Antonio Barassi  
Hector Baratti  
Liliana Ester Barbieri  
Julio Elías Barcat  
Julio César Barozzi  
Eduardo Barrera  
Juan Carlos Barrera  
Raul Barreto Capelli  
Eduardo Froilan Barrios  
Washington Javier Barrios Fernandez  
María del Carmen Barros de Zaffora  
Oscar Osvaldo Barros  
Egidio Battistiol  
Raúl Augusto Bauducco  
Rubén Santiago Bauer Chimeno  
Alberto Noé Bayarsky  
Carlos Eduardo Becker  
Susana Beatriz Becker  
Darío Oscar Bedne  
Maria Bedoian de Ikonikoff  
Guillermo José Begega  
Juan Francisco Belaustegui  
Martín Belaustegui Herrera  
Rafael José Belaustegui Herrera  
Valeria Belaustegui Herrera de Waisberg  
Fernando Alberto Belizán  
Hugo Francisco Bellagamba  
Mariana Belli  
Andrés Humberto Bellizzi Bellizzi  
Juan Pedro Belluz  
Daniel Albino Benavidez  
Daniel Eduardo Bendersky  
Aníbal Carlos Benítez  
Ramona Benítez de Amarilla  
Vicente José Benítez  
Rutilio Dardo Betancour Roth  
Amado Berardo  
Remo Carlos Berardo  
Rubén Abel Beratz  
Martín Elías Bercovich  
Carlos José Guillermo Berdini  
Graciela Alicia Beretta  
María Magdalena Beretta Pose  
Azucena Ricarda Bermejo de Rondoletto  
Alberto Bernal Tejada  
José Pablo Bernard  
María Cristina Bernat  
Juan José Berninsone  
Horacio Félix Bertholet  
Carlos Guillermo Berti Dominguez  
Juan Ricardo Bertos  
Cristina Bettanin de Colmenares  
Leonardo Bettanin  
Ramón Oscar Bianchi  
Eduardo José Bicocca  
Salvador Juan Bidegorry
Patricio Biedma Scadewaldt
Ricardo Miguel Biegkler Almendra
María Cristina Bienposto
Claudio Daniel Bignasco
Guillermo Daniel Binstock
Carlos Hugo Blanco
Viviana Avelina Blanco
Luis Rodolfo Bledel
Hugo Alberto Boca
Nestor Boca
Nilda Mabel Boca de Mansilla
Listo Ramón Bogado
Francisco Javier Bogarini
Víctor Pablo Boichenko
Adriana Silvia Boitano
Guillermo Carlos Boitano Brañas
Miguel Angel Boitano
Liliana Beatriz Bojanich
Daniel Bombara
Raúl Alfredo Bonafini
Ana María Bonatto
Jorge Alberto Bonil
Eduardo Bonín
Nelly Yolanda Borda
Raúl Edgardo Borelli Cattaneo
Rodolfo Mario Borroni
Carlos Borucio
Oscar Isidro Borzi

Juan Raúl Bourg Pineau
Eduardo Julio Bracaccini
Robert Marcel Boudet
Susana Mercedes Boulوقq Korn de Concetti
Angel Enrique Brandazza
Gabriel Braunstein
Claudio Braverman
Jesús María Bravo
Omar Fernando Bravo
Alfredo Oscar Brawerman
Juan José Brero Tolosa
Hortensia Brito
Víctor Mario Brizzi
Julia Angélica Brocca de Herrero
Fernando Ruben Brodsky
Jose Daniel Bronzel
Roberto Oscar Brullo Cea
Carlos Alberto Bruni
Aida Leonora Bruschtein Bonaparte
Irene Bruschtein Bonaparte
Victor Bruschtein Bonaparte
Arnaldo Haroldo Buffa
María Luisa Buffó
Roberto Horacio Bugatti Osvald
Eduardo Oscar Bulacio
Tomás Angel Bulacio
Alicia Raquel Burdisso
Jorge Alberto Burghard
Julio Genaro Burgos Ponce
Ada Margaret Burgueño
Osvaldo Enrique Busetto
Enrique Bustamante
Juan Carlos Bustamante
Aldo Meliton Bustos
Cármen Santiago Bustos
Edelmiro Cruz Bustos
Maria Cristina Bustos de Coronel
Miguel Ángel Bustos
Miguel Angel Butrón
José Caamaño Uzal
Eduardo Luis Caballero
Wenceslao Eduardo Caballero
Damián Cabandié
Nelson Martín Cabello Pérez
Gustavo Alejandro Cabezas
Dardo Cabo
Oscar Ramón Cabral
Ary Cabrera Prates
Hugo Cacciavillani Caligari
Jorge Eliseo Cáceres
Edgar Claudio Cadima Torrez
Eduardo Alberto Cagnola
Ricardo Luis Cagnoni
Claudio Caielli
Rafael Caielli
Liliana Beatriz Caimi de Marizcurreña
Alfredo José Cajide
Italo Américo Cali
Jorge Donato Calvo
Daniel Eduardo Calleja
Norma Estela Campano
Simón Campano
Horacio Domingo Campiglia
Horacio Raúl Campione
Julio César Campopiano
Antonia Adriana Campos de Alcaraz
María Silvia Campos
Jorge Candeloro
José María Cane
Arturo Canedo del Oso
Luis Canfaila
Ernesto Enrique Canga
José Antonio Cano
Alberto Canovas Estape
Edison Oscar Cantero Freire
Ana Beatriz Cantos de Caldera
Luis Antonio Cantos
Jorge Antonio Capello
Carlos Hugo Capitman
Julio Cesar Carboni
Alvaro Cardenas
Daniel Hugo Carignano
Eduardo Carlas Salas
Oscar Marcos Carloni
Adrián Orlando Carlovich
Laura Estela Carlotto
Carlos Alberto Carpani
Pablo Carpintero Lobo
Ricardo Carpintero Lobo
Adriana María Carranza
Carlos Alberto Carranza
Cecilia María Carranza
Gonzalo Abel Carranza
Cristina Carreño Araya
Roberto Eugenio Carri
Manuel Daniel Carricondo
Maria Inés Carrieri de Velásquez
Norma Lidia Carrizo
Carlos Roberto Carrozzino
Ana María Caruso de Carri
Gaspar Onofre Casado
María Segunda Casado
María Adriana Casajus de Gonzales Villar
Edith María Casares
Juan Carlos Casariego de Bel
Honorio Orlando Casas
Marta Beatriz Cascella
Yolanda Iris Casco Ghelpi de D'Elia
Claudio Argentino Casoy
Héctor Daniel Cassataro
Aníbal Ramón Castagno Luzardo
Roberto Castelli
Haydée María Castelltort
Miguel Ángel Castiglioni Cornes
Ana María Castillo
Liliana Graciela Castillo Barrios de Ovejero
Norberto José Castillo
Oscar Silverio Castillo
Ramón Roque Castillo
José María Castiñeiras
Alfredo Jorge Castro Montero
Héctor Castro
Hugo Alberto Castro
Luis Marcelo Castro Montero
María Antonia Castro Huerga de Martínez
Jorge Antonio Catanese
Gladys Hebe Caudet
Hector Cavallo
Elisa E. Cayul de Cugura
Jorge Omar Cazenave
Jorge Omar Cazorla
Santiago Alberto Cazón
Laura Cedola de Monteagudo
Edigo Jesús Cejas Arias
Jorge Nestor Cena
María Cenador de Rondoletto
Norberto Centeno
Francisco Tenório Cerqueira Júnior
Alicia Dora Cerrota de Ramos
Jorge Anselmo Cueto
José Esteban Cugura
Juan Oscar Cugura
Lucia Cullen
Gloria Constanza Curia
Maria Liliana Curra
Domingo Hidelgardo Chacón
José Rafael Chamas
Francisco José Changazzo
José Adhemar Changazzo
Oscar Rodolfo Changazzo Riquiflor
Juan Carlos Chaparro
Ana María Chapeta Lario
Gustavo Adolfo Chavarino
Hector Gerardo Chaves
José Guetas Chebala
Juan Carlos Chersanaz
Jacobo Chester
Carlos Alberto Chiappolini
Ricardo Chidichimo
Miguel Ricardo Chiernajowsky
Jorge Luis Chinetti
Eduardo Chizzola
Julián Choque Cahuana
Alicia Silvia Chuburu
Alicia Raquel D'ambra
Carlos Alberto D'ambra
Julio Cesar D'Elia Pallares
Luis Tomás D'Arcángelo
Gerónimo Américo Da Costa
María Cristina Da Re
Héctor Jorge Dadín Vesare
Ricardo Dakuyaku
Yolanda Mabel Damora
Alberto Dapozo
Daniel Alberto Daroqui
Jorge Arturo Daroqui
Juan Carlos Daroqui
Francoise Marie Dauthier
Carlos Alberto Davit Testa
Claudio de AchaRubén Mario De Angelis
Alicia Estela De Cicco
Eugenio Osvaldo de Cristófaro Castrillón
Luis Eduardo De Cristofaro
Jorge Luis de Iriarte
Elena de la Cuadra
Roberto José de la Cuadra
Carlos Enrique De La Fuente
Carlos Alberto De Lorenzo
Eduardo Antonio de Pedro Maldonado
Pablo Carmelo De Pino
Silvia de Raffaelli de Peralta
Victor de Raffaelli
Cristóbal Augusto Dedionigi
Raul Arturo Deget
Eduardo José Degregori
Maria del Cármen del Bosco de Allende
Julio Arnaldo Del Castillo
Eduardo José Del Fabro
Juan Domingo Del Gesso
Norma Beatriz del Missier
Néstor José del Río
Carmen Angélica Delard Cabezas
Eduardo Alberto Delfino
Juan Ramón Delgado Vial
Nora Mabel Delgado
Carlos María Denis
Hernando Deria
Graciela Josefa Devallis de Paulín
Nestor Devincenti
Oscar Alfredo Dezorzi
Miguel Angel Di Pascua
Jorge Fernando Di Pascuaje
Antonio Adolfo Díaz López
Enrique Gonzalo Díaz Macias
Fernando Díaz Cárdenas
Francisco Rafael Díaz
Guillermo Eduardo Díaz Nieto
José Raul Díaz Fernández
Luis Miguel Díaz Salazar
Manuel Julio Díaz
Maria Beatriz Diaz
Mario Alberto Díaz Moscardo

Ricardo Mario Díaz
Santiago Augusto Díaz
Cristina Diez de Celesia
Diana Carmen Diez de Rentani
Jorge Manuel Diez Díaz
Patricia Dillon de Ciancio
Luis Vicente Dimattia
Ricardo Dios
Mirta Noemí Dithurbide
Patricia Liliana Dixon
Valeria Dixon de Garat
Raul Aurelio Dobelli
Graciela María Doldan
Yves Marie Alain Domergue
Eleonora Domínguez de Cristina
Miguel Alejandro Domínguez
Porfirio Domínguez
Ricardo Eulogio Domínguez Ferreyra
María Ester Donza de Coria
Stella Maris Dorado
Pablo Hermes Dorigo
P. Carlos Dorñak
Edmundo Sabino Dossetti Techeira
Benjamín Isaac Dricas
Georgina Graciela Droz Estrada
José Alfredo Duarte
Eduardo Agustín Duclos
Aníbal Durand Martinez
Rubén Sabino Dure
Rodolfo Mario Eder
Marcelo Adolfo Eggers
Víctor Felipe Egloff
Cecilia Eguia Benavidez
Alicia Eguren de Cooke
Martha Graciela Eiroa Martiniano
Luis Enrique Eisenschlas
Américo Eiza
Luis Enrique Elgueta
Nilda Elías de Silva
Rodolfo Daniel Elías
Cladio Epelbaum
Lila Epelbaum
Luis Epelbaum
Guillermo Angel Ercolano
Marianne Erize Tisseau
Margarita Erlich Jaroszewich
Marta Esain
Eduardo Gonzalo Escabosa
Francisco Alfredo Escamez
Felix Escobar
Sergio Alberto Escot
Hernán Gregorio Escudero
Néstor Julio España
Enrique Espeche
Eduardo T. Espinosa Lever
José Guillermo Espinoza Pesantes

Mario René Espinoza Barahona
Carlos María Espoturno
Alejandro Luis Estigarría
Manuel Hugo Evequoz Fraga
Luis Alberto Fabbri
Luis Mario Fachino
Pablo Antonio Faimberg
Susana Falabella de Abdala
Dora Liliana Falco
Carlos Agustín Falcon
María Claudia Falcone
Roberto Nando Falivene
José Fernando Fanjul
Pedro Faramiñán Medina
Patricia Faraoni
Daniel Felipe Farias
Omar Rodolfo Farias
Beatriz Fariñas de Fornies
Carlos Guillermo Fassano
Daniel Omar Favero
Laura Isabel Feldman
Ester Felipe
Anahí Silvia Fernández de Mercader
Antonia Fernández de Tellez
Carlos Alfredo Fernández Bastarrica
Cecilia Fernández Riquelme
Clara Haydee Fernández
Eliseo Reynaldo Fernandez
Ernesto Fernández Vidal
Godoberto Luis Fernández
Hector Hugo Fernández Baños
Hilda Adriana Fernandez
Jesús Carlos Alberto Fernández
José Nicasio Fernández Alvarez
José Osvaldo Germán Fernández
Mabel Fernández de Hirschler
María Cristina Fernández de Pankonin
Oscar Alfredo Fernández
Rita Manuela Fernández
Claudio Arnaldo Ferraris
Elena Alicia Ferreiro
José Miguel Ferrero
Diego Ferreyra Beltrán
María Irma Ferreira
Edith Alicia Ferri
Juan José Ficarra
Alcira Gabriela Fidalgo Pizarro de Valenzuela
Gloria Susana Figueroa
Miguel Ángel Figueroa
Ernesto Mario Filgueira Strien
Marta de las Mercedes Filgueira Strien
Nélida Estela Filgueira Strien
Enrique Carlos Fimiani
Claudio Marcelo Fink
Orlando Finsterwald
Armando Alberto Fioritti
Carlos Alberto Fiorito
Jorge Oscar Firmenich
Claudia Julia Fita Miller
Jorge Abelardo Flaccavento
Walter Kenneth Fleury
Antonio Flores
Antonio Jorge Flores
Carlos Jacinto Flores
Horacio Bernardo Flores
José Francisco Flores
Mario Ivar Flores
Nelson Flores Ugarte
Pedro Ventura Flores
Patricia Teresa Flynn
Gustavo Adolfo Fochi
Graciela Noemí Folini de Villeres
Adrián Omar Follonier
Juan Carlos Follonier
Mabel Lucía Fontana de La Blunda
Adolfo Nelson Fontanella
Romero Faustino Fontenilla
Alejandro Luis Formica
Hugo Enrique Fornies
Daniel Hugo Fortunato
Jorge Horacio Foulkes
Humberto Luis Fracarolli
Osvaldo Enrique Fraga
Gustavo Ernesto Fraire
Carlos Hugo Franano
Adriana María Franconetti de Calvo
Ana María Franconetti
Eduardo Alvaro Franconetti
Amalia Rosa Franchelli de Dobelli
Generosa Fratassi
Verónica Freier
Héctor Manuel Freijo
Tomás Fresneda
Florencio Ramón Frías
Pedro Arturo Frías
Carlos Mario Frigerio
Luis M. Frutos
Aída Fuciños Rielo de Galizzi
Luis Alberto Fuentes
Julio César Fumarola
Aníbal Eduardo Gadea
Emilia Susana Gaggero Pérez de Pujals
Juan Carlos Gagliano
Ana María Gago Benedetti
Patricia Mabel Gaitán
Crescencio Galañena Hernández
Julio Isabelino Galarza
Blanca Eva Galizzi Marzzan
Juan Alberto Galizzi Machi
Juan Carlos Galván
Cristina Galzerano
Liliana Elida Galletti
Mario Guillermo Galli
Stella Maris Gallicchio de Vicario
Miguel Angel Gallinari
Carlos Alberto Gambande Ruperti
Delia Elena Garaguso
Eduardo Héctor Garat
Esteban Francisco Garat
Alejandro Horacio García Martegani
Antonio Domingo García
Diana Iris García
Ernesto García
Germán Nelson García Carcagno
Hilda Magdalena García
Horacio Oscar García Castelu
Iris Nélida García
Ileana García Ramos
María Claudia García Irureta Goyena de Gelman
Nestor Enrique García
Pablo Alberto García
Ricardo Bermundo García
Salvador García Robles
Victor Hugo García Tosoratto
Nèlida Leonor Garde de Repetto
Luis Lorenzo Garello
Adelina Noemí Gargiulo de Zibaico
Héctor Hugo Gargiulo
Arturo Martín Garín
María Adelia Garín De De Angelis
Ángel Mario Garmendia
Edgardo Roberto Garnier
José Luis Aníbal Garoni
Adriana Gatti Casal
Gerardo Gatti Antuna
Eduardo Alberto Garutti
Teresa Garzón de Rodríguez
Carlos Oscar Gatto
Padre Pablo Gazzarri
Marcelo Ariel Gelman
Julio Cesar Genoud
Claudio Martín Gerbilsky
Mirta Teresa Gerelli
Luis Román Gerez
Eduardo Raúl Germano
Esther Gersberg de Díaz Salazar
Ángel Salomón Gertel
Fernando Mario Gertel
Juan Carlos Gesualdo
Ricardo Mario Ghigliazza
Elsa Gider de Krayem
Carlos Alberto Giglio
Miguel Máximo Gil
Douglas Gillie
Nerio Deryck Gillie
Helios Gimenez Amuedo
Silvia Noemí Giménez de Guido
Tránsito Giménez
Catalina Ginder
Héctor Orlando Giordano Cortazzo
Alfredo Antonio Giorgi
Horacio Gerardo Girardello Amabilia
Mario Giribaldi
Osvaldo Giribaldi
Rómulo Carlos Giuffra
Raymundo Gleyzer
Eugenio Pablo Glovatzy Klimczuk
Carmen Nelly Godoy de Reczk
Mario Alberto Godoy
Marcela Cristina Goeytes
Julio Goitia
Franklin Lucio Goizueta Piccioni
Mónica Liliana Goldberg
Liliana Ines Goldenberg
Hugo Alberto Goldsman
Hugo Ernesto Gomensoro Josman
Carmen Gómez de Gargiulo
Daniel Osvaldo Gómez Almeida
Eva del Jesús Gómez de Agüero
Gladys Lucía Gómez
Ileana Esther Gómez Ríos
María Elena Gómez de Argañaraz
Ricardo Isidro Gómez
Gaston Roberto Goncalves
Jorge Feliberto Gonçalves Busconi
Alfredo Gonzalez
Américo González Villar
Ana María González Granada
Carlos Alberto González
Horacio Mario Gonzalez
Jesús Angel González
Jesús Manuel González
Lidia Edith González Eusebi
Manuel Angel Gonzalez
Olga Cristina González
Pedro Antonio Gonzalez
Regino Adolfo González Sandaña
Silvia Amanda Gonzalez de Mora
Socorro Irene Gonzalez
Susana Gonzalez de Weisz
Susana Raquel González
Víctor Hugo González Lemos
Silvia Beatriz Goñi de Rossi
Jorge Israel Gorfinkiel
Daniel Gorosito
Alberto Jorge Gorrini
Francisco Eduardo Gotschlich Cordero
Maria Esther Gouledzian
Hugo Alberto Goyenetche
Adela Noemí Goyochea
José Luis GoyocheaMiguel Ángel Gradaschi Camano
Sara Grande
Claudio Nicolás Grandi
Javier Gustavo Grebel Libobich
Carlos Fernando Gregori
Néstor Rubén Grill
Monica Grinspon de Logares
Daniel José Gropper
Susana Flora Grynberg
Lía Mariana Guangiroli de Genoud
Enrique Gerardo Guastavino
Carlos Alberto Gudano
Dante Guede
Héctor Ricardo Guede
Eduardo Guerci
Alicia Margarita Guerrero
Carlos Francisco Guidet Sánchez
Raul Alfredo Guido
Florenzia Guillén
Salvador Jorge Gullo
Jorge Luis Gurrea
Manuel Gutiérrez
Norberto A. Habbeger
Dagmar Hagelin
Fernando Hallgarten
Celia Ester Hanono
Alejandro Alfredo Hansen
Luisa Ana Heck De Barciocco
Hernán Jorge Henríquez
Juan Marcos Herman
Eduardo Alberto Hernández
José Hernández
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