INTERPRETING THE *REPUBLIC* AS A PROTREPTIC DIALOGUE

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INTERPRETING THE *REPUBLIC* AS A PROTREPTIC DIALOGUE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

INTERPRETING THE REPUBLIC AS A PROTREPTIC DIALOGUE

Protreptic is a form of rhetoric, textual and oral in form, which exhorts its recipients to reorient their lives both morally and intellectually. Plato frequently portrays Socrates' use of this rhetoric with interlocutors who are enticed by the moral and political views of figures from Athens' intellectual culture. During these conversations Socrates attempts to persuade his interlocutors to reorient their lives in a way that conforms more closely to his own moral and intellectual practice of philosophy. Plato's depiction of protreptic, however, also exerts a protreptic effect on readers of his dialogues. Plato's writing thus performs a dual function, simultaneously depicting instances of protreptic at work and attempting to exert a protreptic effect on readers.

In this dissertation I argue that this dual function of Plato's writing is inseparable from his conception of philosophy. I analyze the structure of protreptic in Plato's writing by identifying four aspects essential to an interpretive method that takes full stock of the protreptic function of Plato's dialogues. These aspects are (1) the proper recipient of protreptic; (2) the persuasive means available to protreptic; (3) the immediate target of persuasion; (4) the ultimate philosophical aim toward which protreptic advances the recipient. While some of these aspects must be determined with respect to particular dialogues, those that concern the form of Plato's writing—such as the means of persuasion and ultimate philosophical goals—can inform a general approach to Plato's dialogues. The means that Socrates uses to persuade his interlocutors are sometimes affective, influencing their emotions, and other times intellectual, appealing to them exclusively with logical argument. I argue that a combination of these means in form that I call "provocative-aporetic" better accounts for the means that Plato uses to exert a protreptic effect on readers. Aporia is a simultaneously intellectual and affective experience, and the way that readers choose to respond to aporia has a greater protreptic effect than either affective or intellectual means alone.

The Republic is a crucial dialogue for studying protreptic because it addresses the ultimate moral and intellectual ends toward which Plato hopes to reorient readers, and puts the various protreptic means at Socrates' and Plato's disposal on full display. The dialogue offers both an argument for a life committed to virtue, and an outline of the theoretical insights—mathematical and dialectical—that philosophers may hope to gain from more serious study. It also portrays Socrates in conversation with characters of a variety sufficient to show his rhetorical and argumentative repertoire. In this dissertation I carry out a reading of the Republic according to the four aspects of the structure of
protreptic discussed above. More specifically, I identify moments at which Glaucon and Adeimantus answer Socrates' questions in such a way that they concede to Socrates the truth of premises that contradict their defense of the unjust life. These moments reveal that the central point of dispute in the Republic concerns the nature of moral agency—particularly the functions of reason, desire, and habituation for moral agents. Accordingly, I identify two models of agency—a Technē Model and a Virtue Model—that ground their respective defenses of justice and injustice, and hold their own assumptions about reason, desire, and habituation within their respective moral psychologies. Glaucon and Adeimantus' moments of capitulation function as moments of aporia for readers, who are then provoked to overcome the aporia by explaining why the capitulation is reasonable. In doing so, we gain an account of how Glaucon and Adeimantus are coaxed to abandon their original views about justice, injustice, and moral agency and to accept those of Socrates. This account in turn yields insight into protreptic by depicting how Socrates brings about a reorientation toward philosophy from within a non-philosophical perspective.

KEYWORDS: Protreptic, Plato, Tripartite Psychology, Virtue Ethics, Plato's Moral Psychology

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancient Texts:</th>
<th>Modern Texts:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apol. Apology</td>
<td>Philosopher Kings = Philosopher Kings:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euth. Euthyphro</td>
<td>The Argument of the Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grg. Gorgias</td>
<td>Plato = Plato on the Rhetoric of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il. Iliad</td>
<td>Philosophers and Sophists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lach. Laches</td>
<td>Turning = Turning Toward Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men. Meno</td>
<td>Plato's Utopia = Plato's Utopia Recast: His</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Od. Odyssey</td>
<td>Later Ethics and Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phd. Phaedo</td>
<td>Introduction = An Introduction to Plato's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phdr. Phaedrus</td>
<td>Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prt. Protagoras</td>
<td>Exhortations = Exhortations to Philosophy:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Republic</td>
<td>The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symp. Symposium</td>
<td>Aristotle.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conversion = Plato's Parmenides: The</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Conversion of the Soul</td>
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Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own, in consultation with the translations by Tom Griffith (Republic), Lamb, W.R.M. (Symposium) and Harvey Yunis (Phaedrus). For the text of Plato's Republic, I use the edition of John Adams, Cambridge Library Collection (Cambridge, 2009).

**Introduction**

Plato's dialogues present a difficulty that one does not typically face when studying the writings of other philosophers. The simultaneous charm and frustration of Plato's writing lies in its intertwining of challenging logical argument with such dramatic details as historical contexts and figures, narrative arcs, and the complex psychologies of interlocutors with whom Socrates speaks. We might conjecture that Plato's mixing of these elements is explained by his commitment to truth καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ—“in both word and deed”: his philosophy strives to satisfy our intellectual demands, while also remaining true to life.

These features of Plato's writing demand that one cultivate, to an extent not demanded by the writings of other philosophers, an awareness of the hermeneutic principles that one uses to study the dialogues. In contrast, the majority of philosophical writings that a student in philosophy typically reads take the form of treatises or discourses. When we read these genres, we tend to rely on a principle of sincerity: the works are attempts by their authors to represent, as unambiguously as possible, their views on a topic, and to persuade us of the same. Questions of interpretation arise in this genre from issues in translation, ambiguity in the terms of an author's argument, and logical soundness. These questions are challenging in their own right, but in a certain sense they can be approached with straightforward investigative methods. An issue of translation might be resolved by studying the way an author uses a certain word in the contexts of the same work and other works. Ambiguities in the meaning of a particular term might also be resolved by examining the kinds of examples an author uses to demonstrate the meaning of a term, and by testing examples against each other to see
whether the terms can be defined in a way that accommodates the variety of its referents.

We assume these problems arise because (a) the author was not aware of them; or (b) was aware of them but lacked the acumen to resolve them himself; or (c) couldn't have anticipated the interpretive problem that we face (as in the case of translation)—not because of an author's deliberate attempts to confuse us.\(^1\)

But the sincerity principle is not absolute; there are many legitimate reasons for abandoning it. Some genres, such as comedy and satire, are constituted by insincerity. In these genres an author can disavow much of what he says, and our taking the author seriously would indicate a failure on our part to properly understand that genre. We might also believe that political, historical, and psychological circumstances have affected the composition of the work in such a way that to properly interpret it, we must abandon the sincerity principle. For example, in a work published under a regime with strict censorship laws, an author might express allegiance to the regime, but secretly be trying to subvert it. In that case, we should not believe the authors professions of allegiance. If we have reason to believe a letter was written under duress, then we might doubt the sincerity of its author and disbelieve its contents. If we believe an author was psychologically deranged, we might not have as much reason to disbelieve the contents of the his writings, but we might doubt whether the views are really his own, especially if we have other writings that we consider representative of the author's sanity. We might also abandon the sincerity principle if we were in the grip of some form of skepticism.

\(^1\) One might object that studying a text in this way does not require that we speculate about the internal life of the author; all that matters is what the text actually says, and whether it is internally consistent. I do not think this objection can stand, however, because whether we think an author is deliberately misleading us or misrepresenting his intentions can affect how we conduct these tests. For example, if we believe an author is telling a joke in a passage where an ambiguous term appears, we might take this as a reason not to consider that passage in our inquiry.
Maybe sincerity is impossible, or maybe an author made it his personal project to pretend to be sincere in his writings, and was so good at pretending that he escaped detection in being insincere. Moreover, these considerations need not apply to a work as a whole; they might apply to portions of the same work.2

As philosophers, however, we tend to take the sincerity principle as the rule rather than as the exception. The fact that we expect an argument to justify allowing an exception to the sincerity principle, and demand that these arguments conform to high standards, implies our commitment to this principle. For example, if Machiavelli's the Prince is a satire, someone must make the argument that it is a satire, and the argument must say more than that it would just be interesting to read the work as a satire.3 Many works could be made more interesting if we read them without the sincerity principle, but we would fault such whimsical readings for being bad scholarship, maybe even bad philosophy: this kind of reading would miss the mark of truth.

Throughout the history of Plato scholarship, interpreters have found reasons to exempt Plato from the sincerity principle by referring to some of the exceptions mentioned above. The influential thesis regarding “esoteric doctrines,” for example, relies on both Plato's own writings and testimony from historical contemporaries to argue that Plato taught doctrines to his students that were not included in the dialogues.4 This does

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2 For example, Scholars debate about whether the speech of Lysias in the Phaedrus was a genuine speech of Lysias' or an invention of Plato's. If it was an invention of Plato's, we might also wonder whether it was meant as a satire of Lysias' speeches: maybe Plato wanted to ridicule Lysias' style by exaggerating certain themes and rhetorical tropes. For an informative discussion of this debate concerning the speech of Lysias, see Harvey Yunis, ed. and commentator, Plato: Phaedrus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 98.


4 Plato expresses doubts about the value of writing in his own writings, most notably the Seventh Letter and the Phaedrus. The testimony about Plato often come from students in close-enough proximity to Plato's time to be trusted. See Aristotle's Physics, 209b13–15; Metaphysics, A.5-6. Another source is the
not immediately imply that Plato was deliberately trying to deceive readers; however, it does imply that he chose not to disclose something to readers. Of course, non-disclosure alone does not provide a reason to abandon the sincerity principle; for example, the fact that I do not disclose intimate details about myself in this dissertation does not imply that I am insincere in writing it. No one would expect me to disclose such details. However, subsequent attempts at reconstructing the esoteric doctrines do seem to require an exception to the sincerity principle. For these attempts would allow scholars to say of particular passages that “If Plato were being totally sincere with us, he would say X in this passage because X is what he really believes.” The attempt at reconstruction thus makes Plato's non-disclosure a matter of insincerity, rather than a failure to disclose a contingency that we would not expect him to disclose in the first place.

Others have argued that the dramatic structure of Plato's dialogues licenses our interpreting them as comedies, tragedies, or even as novels. This sort of interpretation challenges the sincerity principle because authors of works in these genres might primarily intend that their audience have an aesthetic experience, rather than adopt a particular belief. A tragedian does not need to endorse political revolution in order to write a play about political revolution that affects an audience in an aesthetic way. Moreover, the fact that the dialogues contain *dramatis personae* provides another reason for granting an exception to the sincerity principle. How do we know which character represents Plato's views? Across the dialogues, too, Socrates argues for apparently

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5 Nussbaum does not endorse the view the dialogues are tragedies, but she discusses ways in which they bear a strong resemblance to tragedies in the effect they have on readers See Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 128-129. Blondell suggests the novel form as a genre for the dialogues; see *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 17.
contradictory positions. This observation might lead us to ask whether we should take Socrates as the same Socrates in each dialogue. A common way of dealing with this difficulty is to treat each dialogue as “hermeneutically sealed:” we ought not to refer to other dialogues or external sources to interpret a particular dialogue. However, even if we take this approach and consider Plato's dialogues as pastiches of other genres, we still must ask whether he is trying to induce an aesthetic experience in readers, or engaging them in an activity and way of thinking we would consider philosophical.

The purpose of this discussion is simply to point out that the unique difficulty in studying Plato lies in the demand that the dialogues place on scholars to first become aware of the principles they use to interpret these dialogues, and then decide which interpretive principles are appropriate. Moreover, these questions of interpretation are inseparable from the question of what philosophy is for Plato. For example, perhaps we ought to give up the principle of sincerity as an interpretive principle, and give up the project of trying to discover what Plato really believed. Perhaps a principle of organic unity of a dialogue is more philosophically fruitful than the principle of sincerity. On this assumption, we should not worry about whether Plato is revealing his true face, and instead try to construct meaning out of whatever Plato happened to write—sincerely or not—by explaining how the different parts of a dialogue—argumentative, dramatic, historical—contribute to a harmonious whole.

The very notion of what counts at philosophy is at stake in these principles because they compel us to ask whether philosophy is an exclusively intellectual exercise,

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6 E.g., Socrates' accounts of virtue in the Protagoras and in the Republic.
7 See Blondell, 6-9; for her argument for the differentiation of various Socrateses throughout the dialogues, 10.
8 For good summary of the use of this principle in the scholarship, see Blondell, 4.
or necessarily requires certain moral practices and commitments. Consider, for example, an irony that arises from exempting Plato from the sincerity principle. A refrain of Socrates' in the conversations that Plato portrays is that the interlocutor ought to answer his questions by stating what he really believes. So the Socrates that Plato himself portrays at least appears to hold his interlocutors to a principle of sincerity as a requirement for doing philosophy with him. Socrates' reasons for this demand are explicitly moral: his interlocutor's soul would benefit more from answering sincerely, because even if he is refuted, he stands to benefit from becoming aware of his own ignorance. Moreover, the matters under discussion—justice, *eros*, beauty—and are of the greatest importance to the way the participants in the conversation conduct their lives. Requiring that the interlocutor answer sincerely ensures that he has a personal stake in the conversation, and maintains the possibility that he could be genuinely transformed by the conversation. Why shouldn't we require sincerity of Plato if we are to do philosophy with him? Clearly, Plato is long-dead and can no longer have a *personal* stake in any conversation; nonetheless he was once alive and seemed to have had enough of a personal stake in the debates of his own time to respond to them. If we exempt Plato from the sincerity principle, much of his moral-philosophical project loses its normative force—he rather begins to resemble a hypocrite for demanding sincerity of his imaginary characters, but not of himself. Of course, it is as possible that Plato was a hypocrite as it is for anyone to be a hypocrite. But if we abandon the sincerity principle and opt exclusively for the unity principle, then we risk approaching his dialogues as merely

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9 Blondell, *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues*, 21, also observes that Plato does not heed Socrates' imperative regarding sincerity, and rightly identifies this violation of the imperative as a necessary feature of the dramatic form of Plato's writings. I differ here in calling attention to the way that the sincerity principle works as an assumption for doing philosophy, rather than as a feature of dramatic form.
interesting aesthetic artifacts that engage our intellects in a hunt for coherence amid a strange complex of arguments and drama.

My own approach to reading Plato assumes both principles. Plato weaves logical argument, dramatic forms, historical events, poetic metaphors, and the complex psychologies of interlocutors into artistic masterpieces, and the most responsible way to interpret these works is to begin from the assumption that there is a real unity among these parts. On the other hand, when we read the dialogues, certain patterns emerge that are difficult to explain without the sincerity principle. As we have seen, however, this interpretive principle immediately raises the problem of determining what Plato really believed—a question that may well be unanswerable, given the nature of his writing. But if we alter the thing we think Plato was sincere about, we might avoid that implication. Even if we do not receive the doctrines of the “real” Plato from the dialogues, Plato seems sincere about his commitment to the value of the examined life. Perhaps what Plato really believes in is not a system of doctrines, but a way of living that cannot be easily communicated or taught by means of argument. And perhaps the dialogues better interpreted as exhortations that attempt to persuade readers to adopt this way of life.

Another term for this kind of exhortation is “protreptic.” In Plato’s time, protreptic had developed into something of genre of its own right among the academic schools of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle. For this reason protreptic is often likened to a kind of

10 Blondell argues that there is an “internal structure of the works themselves, a structure recurring often enough to constitute a pattern.” She suggests the elenchos as one such pattern that functions as a “central strand in Plato’s thinking about how to do philosophy” (The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues, 13).

11 See Also Dimitri Nikulin, The Other Plato: The Tübingen Interpretation of Plato’s Inner-Academic Teachings (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012), 15. I am not persuaded that Plato had no “doctrines” whatsoever, such as—most notably—a theory of forms. My only suggestion here is that for the purpose of interpretation, altering our expectations about what Plato was sincere about would be fruitful.

12 A thesis that James Henderson Collins II establishes very convincingly in Exhortations to Philosophy:
rhetoric that might have functioned as a sort of “advertisement” for a philosophical school to the literary, non-philosophical public. While there is some truth in this claim, I do not think it fully describes the aims Plato had for the protreptic rhetoric of his dialogues. For example, the Republic—the subject of this dissertation—has been interpreted as protreptic dialogue primarily for its central books, where Plato alludes to a more advanced education that awaits those who pursue philosophy more seriously. The implication of this view is that the Republic aims primarily to make its readers enthusiastic about the mathematical and dialectical studies that comprise philosophical education proper. In this dissertation, I dispute these views of both Plato's use of protreptic in general and the protreptic rhetoric of the Republic. While Plato may have been interested in attracting students, this end does not really explain the distinctive character of his writing. In Chapter I, I propose some distinctions concerning the recipient of protreptic; the means of persuasion; the conviction of which the recipient is to be persuaded; and the learning that a recipient might engage in to become persuaded. I argue for a conception of “provocative-aporetic” means of persuasion that Plato uses to convince readers of the value of his moral-philosophical project, whether or not he hopes to recruit them as students. Briefly put, these means use the experience of aporia that follows on refutation as a provocation to readers to explore the arguments on their own. These means are helpful in persuading readers of various philosophical claims because they encourage readers to see the truth of the claims for themselves.

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The *Republic* is a particularly challenging dialogue to study because, although it is clearly organized around an inquiry about justice, it contains such a wide variety of topics—thories about political institutions, moral psychology, virtue, pedagogy, childhood education, and philosophical education—that thoroughly exploring all of these topics is not feasible. It is also difficult to say much novel about the *Republic*, given the quality and quantity of scholarship. For this reason it is probably inevitable that to some I will appear to have neglected certain aspects of the *Republic*'s argument—most notably the theoretical education of the philosophers in Books V-VII and the degeneration of regimes in Books VIII and IX. My reasons for overlooking these sections of the *Republic* in this dissertation are that they do not play an essential role in convincing Glaucon and Adeimantus of the tripartite psychology that grounds their acknowledgment that justice is the health of the soul in Book IV. In other words, by Book IV the brothers are already persuaded that justice is intrinsically desirable. Thus, viewing the dialogue as a protreptic work indicates that much of the persuasive work is happening in Books II-IV.

In this study of the *Republic* I argue for three theses about Books II-IV. First, I argue that the primary function of these Books is to settle a dispute about the nature of moral agency. I identify two distinct models of agency—what I call the Technē Model and the Virtue Model of justice and agency—each with its own commitments regarding the relation between reason and desire, motives that are psychologically basic, and the normative status of nomoi. From an argumentative standpoint, my dissertation tracks Glaucon and Adeimantus' gradual transition of commitment from the Technē Model to the Virtue Model. Second, I argue that studying the provocative-aporetic means by which Socrates persuades them to adopt the Virtue Model of justice yields crucial insights in to
the way Plato exerts a protreptic influence on his Readers. Most curious about the arguments in Books II-IV are moments of capitulation on the part of Glaucon and Adeimantus—moments at which they concede Socrates' premises for the Virtue Model of agency and justice, and neglect to defend their own Technē Model of agency and justice. A large portion of this dissertation is devoted to identifying these moments and carefully assessing the reasons why, at those moments, Glaucon and Adeimantus concede the points that they do.

The third thesis for which I argue is that tripartite psychology, despite its share of significant interpretive difficulties, yields deep insights into moral psychology. With respect to the protreptic function of Books II-IV, I argue that Socrates' arguments for tripartite psychology yield a convincing argument for why reason is not instrumental to desire. This conclusion is crucial in gaining Glaucon and Adeimantus' consent to the Virtue Model of justice. However, I also argue that tripartite psychology tasks the brothers with a project of its own—what I call the “project of psychic integration.” This project, along with the accompanying virtues that support it—sophrosunē, courage, justice, and wisdom—functions as a preparatory education for the person of a philosophical nature, who will pursue the mathematical-dialectical studies described in Books VI and VII. Briefly put, I argue that the hypothesizing power of the logistikon introduced in Book IV threatens the soul with a disintegration more harmful than the threat of disintegration that the soul faces from the epithumotikon and thumos alone. Without the virtues that support the project of psychic integration, the potential philosopher risks allowing his intellectual talents to be recruited in the service of wicked ends.
Chapter I: Situating the *Republic* as a Protreptic Dialogue

Moral arguments are unique among philosophical arguments in that they aim not only to persuade someone of the truth of some claim, but also to affect a person's conduct. While ethical arguments may aim to persuade a person of a particularly limited claim, such as the justice of a particular action, or the value of a specific custom for a community, it would be a mistake for people who make moral arguments to limit their concerns to the finer points of their respective disputes, which may be of interest only to professional philosophers. When we advance moral arguments, we also have a concern for moral education, because, at the very least, we have an interest in cultivating the kind of person who would be receptive to a moral argument. But when we turn our attention to moral education, the end toward which we hope a moral education will guide a person becomes more difficult to define. It would not suffice to say that the end of moral education is to persuade a person of all the specific moral rules he or she ought to follow in his or her life; for circumstances may change in such a way that the old rules are no longer applicable. If it is correct to say that we want someone who is responsive to changes in the ethical landscape, then we mean that we hope a moral education imparts not simply the specific rules of moral life, but a more fundamental moral orientation. This concern about fundamental orientation is the reason we debate about the values we wish to see an education impart; we believe these values influence the whole trajectory of both an individual life and the life of a community.

The *Republic* offers an argument on behalf of justice that touches on these two

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14 *Republic* I shows us the significance of even this achievement. When Polemarchus issues the veiled threat that if Socrates does not come to the house of Cephalus, he and his followers will take Socrates by force, Socrates suggests that he might persuade them to let him go. Polemarchus replies by pointing out that he wouldn't be able to persuade them if they weren't willing to listen (327c8-9).
interests of moral argument. It portrays Socrates' attempt to persuade Glaucon and Adeimantus of the truth of the specific claim that justice is intrinsically good for a person, and offers an account of the effect of a moral education on their overall moral orientation, such that they would see the value in being practically committed to justice. But the *Republic* also cautions us not to trust the simplicity of this story about the effect of education on a person. Plato's allegory of the cave, which provides a metaphor for the effect of education on a human being, raises difficult questions about the effect of moral education and philosophical argument on a person. Quite strikingly, a process of education that might take years or decades is summed up in two actions: a prisoner in the cave is released from chains and compelled to exit the cave. These details of the allegory raise two important questions: who or what, in non-allegorical terms, does the releasing, and why must a person be compelled to exit the cave? The image Plato provides is deceptive because it gives the impression that a teacher could release us by simply imparting some instruction. In reality, the thing that releases us from the chains might be years of study, reflection, and gradually re-habituation in light of the conclusions we reach. And it might be that we must be “forced” out of the cave because aligning our most basic orientation with these insights requires counter-acting the power of habit and the familiarity of custom, both of which may hinder us when see the truth of some insight and want to align our lives with that truth. In a sense, then, the efficacy of moral persuasion and education rests on the efforts of an individual who takes these such persuasion and education seriously. No teacher or system of education can force a

15 *Rep.*, 515c1-e1; we are asked to imagine that the prisoner is “compelled suddenly to stand up” (ἀναγκάζοιτα ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαί, 515c5); “compelled to look at the light” of the fire (πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι αὐτὸν βλέπειν, 515e); and “dragged by force” out of the cave (ἕλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ, 515e4-5).
reorientation; it must come about through an individual's own effort.

Protreptic is a type of discourse that attempts to effect this reorientation of a person's life. The word “protreptic” comes from the Greek verb προτρέπειν, the literal meaning of which is to “turn toward.”¹⁶ The literal sense provides an apt metaphor for the kind of “reorientation” that we aim to instill by moral arguments and education. But protreptic attempts to be intellectually persuasive in addition to being exhortatory; it tries to persuade us of the truth of some claim, or the value of some practice, and encourages us to re-orient our lives around this new conviction. That this strategy is one that Plato and Plato's Socrates exercise is apparent throughout the dialogues. The *Phaedrus* contains a conversation in which Socrates attempts to persuade the dialogue's namesake that eros is a “good” kind of madness and a form of desire essential to a philosophical life. This claim represents a value that might regulate an entire life. At the midpoint of the dialogue, Socrates offers a prayer that Phaedrus might “turn to philosophy.”¹⁷ We can interpret this as a way of exhorting Phaedrus to re-orient his life around the *eros* for wisdom. In the *Apology*, Socrates defends his unpopular practice of exposing others' ignorance by arguing that he is doing a service to the city of Athens. This service is to remind people that care for the soul and virtue is more important than money and honors.¹⁸ In other words, Socrates denies that his philosophizing amounts to clever word games and rhetorical manipulation; his purpose is to effect a moral transformation in his interlocutor. The *Republic* portrays Socrates' attempt to dissuade Thrasymachus of his praise of injustice, and, although Socrates may have failed to “turn” Thrasymachus on

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¹⁷ *Phaedrus*, 257b4-8.

¹⁸ *Apology*, 30a9-b4
that particular occasion, Socrates later alludes to reconciliation, or at least attempt at
reconciliation, with Thrasymachus.¹⁹ We can interpret this expression of good will as a
sign of Socrates' commitment to caring for an interlocutor's soul. His aim in the
conversation with Thrasymachus is not simply to win the argument, but to effect a re-
orientation of Thrasymachus' character.²⁰

However, to say that protreptic attempts to effect a reorientation “from within” is
not very philosophically precise, because it is not clear what we mean by “within.” To
make progress in understanding the effect that protreptic may have on an interlocutor in a
Platonic dialogue, we must drop metaphorical language; we must parse the phenomenon
of protreptic--a complex interaction between a speaker, a recipient, and a form of
discourse—into logical parts. I propose four questions for the purpose of studying the
protreptic effect of a Platonic dialogue. In what follows, I explain the reasons for posing
these particular questions:

1) Who is the recipient of protreptic?

2) What are the means of persuasion?

3) What is the recipient being persuaded of?

4) What does the recipient learn from protreptic?²¹

¹⁹ Republic, 498c.
²⁰ Basil O’Neill argues that even Thrasymachus “turns” to philosophy, at least to a small degree, because
Socrates “prods” the rational part of Thrasymachus' soul in order to “develop its rational-social
tendencies.” See “The Struggle for the Soul of Thrasymachus,” in Ancient Philosophy 8 (Mathesis
²¹ Collins argues that protreptic discourse has four features. It is (1) dialogic, in the sense that it includes
the voices of its competition; (2) agonistic, in that it self-consciously competes with other protreptic
discourses; (3) situational, in that its “shape and content” depends on its audience; (4) rhetorical, in that
it has a “unique objective and persuasive means” (Exhortations, 17-18). It should be clear that the
questions I have posed overlap to a great extent with these features; however, I diverge from his
framework because a primary concern of mine in this dissertation lies in differentiating philosophical
discourse from rhetoric. Collins construes protreptic as a genre whose purpose is for “marketing,” i.e.,
for winning students over from competing intellectuals (Exhortations, 41). That there is some truth in
this description of the historical circumstances of protreptic is indisputable; nonetheless, the
As the examples above indicate, Plato portrays Socrates in conversation with a variety of interlocutors. Some of these interlocutors are nearly strangers to philosophy; some are followers of Socrates who aspire for his wisdom; and some are philosophical-types who have theoretical and practical commitments that are antithetical to those of Socrates. This variety in the types of interlocutors Socrates faces raises a problem for Socrates' protreptic efforts. Not every interlocutor will respond in the same way to the type of argument that Socrates might prefer to give if that person were more philosophically mature. The dialogues often show how certain argumentative strategies are more persuasive for one interlocutor than for another; Socrates is carefully attuned to the personality of his interlocutor, and tailors his speech to be maximally persuasive to that interlocutor. However, Plato seems to prefer a particular type of subject in his portrayals of Socrates' protreptic efforts. A frequent recipient of Socrates' protreptic efforts is an interlocutor who respects and admires Socrates, but who appears to be enticed by the views of sophists. The reason for this interest is probably that such an interlocutor is more likely to be influenced by protreptic than a committed sophist is.

consequence seems to be that philosophy is indistinguishable from rhetoric.
22 Euthyphro is a good example of the first type; Glaucon, Aristodemus, and Hippocrates are examples of the second; and Callicles and Thrasymachus are examples of the third.
23 Socrates describes this matching of means to character as an essential aspect of the practice of rhetoric and dialectic in the Phaedrus (271d-e). In asserting this, however, Socrates does not disavow the strategy as non-philosophical. He seems to acknowledge the value of rhetoric when it is used in the service of philosophy. Marina McCoy argues that Socrates uses rhetorical devices that correspond to many of the devices mentioned in rhetorical handbooks, and that there is no easy way to distinguish purely philosophical, i.e., “rhetoric free,” discourse from rhetorical discourse in Socrates' speeches (Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists, [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008], 3-4).
24 Interlocutors of this sort appear all over Plato's corpus. In the opening scene of the Protagoras, Hippocrates asks Socrates to introduce him to Protagoras. Socrates then engages Hippocrates in a conversation about what he expects to learn from Protagoras. Although Hippocrates is passive for the remainder of the dialogue, Plato clearly shows his concern for the fate of a budding intellectual whose allegiance—either to Socrates or the sophists—is uncertain. In the Republic, Glaucon seems to waver between his commitment to justice and the enticement of Thrasymachus' argument against justice. Although he expresses a commitment to justice, the fact that he restates Thrasymachus' argument in a more convincing way than Thrasymachus could indicates that he finds the arguments against justice compelling.
In the most general sense, then, protreptic can be described as a kind of rhetoric, in that it consists in speech that aims to persuade someone of something. This aspect of Socrates' efforts is on full display in the dialogues: Socrates offers arguments for the purpose of either dissuading interlocutors of some belief they hold or persuading them to adopt some belief he considers true and vital to the practice of philosophy. But it would be wrong to limit Socrates' protreptic efforts to persuasive speech alone, because in addition to changing his interloctuor's beliefs he is interested in affecting his interlocutor's character and life-conduct. So, it is more accurate to describe protreptic as an effort to persuade someone, using speech, of the truth of some view, and to affect that person's character such that his actions align with that belief.

If we limit speech to the context of purely logical argument, explaining how the latter aspect occurs is not immediately clear. This is not to say that the use of speech to alter a person's conduct is mysterious. In dealings with friends people regularly use speech in ways that alter conduct. For example, I might explain to a friend that I find some of his jokes offensive. This complaint might prompt my friend to re-evaluate his sense of humor, and as a result, cease telling such jokes. But philosophical conversation often takes place—as it does for Socrates—between two people who are not friends at all, and who are perhaps even hostile to each other. Nonetheless, there is an expectation that one person ought to be able to persuade the other of his point of view without resorting to any feelings of common affection. In that case, how can speech alone affect a person's character and conduct?

These considerations about the variety of interlocutors, the concern for individuals whose allegiance to either philosophy or sophistry is uncertain, and the exhortatory
aspect of protreptic, require that we ask questions (1) and (2). Because Socrates often speaks with multiple interlocutors, we must identify the one to whom he is seriously applying his effort at protreptic. Moreover, we must identify what kind of person this interlocutor is, such that Socrates might think his effort is better spent with that person rather than another.25 Because this interlocutor has certain characteristics and certain commitments which make him unique, we must ask what means Socrates has at his disposal to make his arguments maximally persuasive.

Questions (3) and (4), however, arise from a worry about the means available to Socrates for persuading an interlocutor to reorient his life around Socrates' vision of philosophy: is false speech a permissible means—if it would be more effective in bringing about this reorientation—than true speech? For example, suppose that the only aim of protreptic was to persuade an individual to adopt a belief and corresponding reorientation. Could a philosopher be just as unscrupulous as a sophist and deliberately use a false logos to bring about this change? Although the difference between (3) and (4) may seem small, I suggest that this distinction is crucial because it separates protreptic from mere rhetoric and makes the use of rhetoric philosophically responsible.26 Besides this concern about the responsible use of logos, however, there is a good logical reason for differentiating these questions. Suppose that someone wants to persuade me that vaccines are effective in developing immunity to infectious agents. To persuade me of

25 This does not necessarily imply that some souls are not worth the trouble, or that only certain souls are truly “worthy” of protreptic. Brickhouse and Smith use standard features of Plato's moral psychology to argue that some individuals are, from a Platonic perspective “incurable,” as if no amount of reasoned argument, or even punishment, could persuade such individuals to adopt a moral attitude (“Incurable Souls in Socratic Psychology,” in Ancient Philosophy 22 [2002]: 34-35). Their claim is that some individuals may become so habituated to satisfying their appetites in spite of other demands that not even punishment could help form the belief that certain behaviors are wrong. While this description of the “incurable” person might be correct, I question whether such a person could exist in actuality.

26 Below I argue that this distinction is crucial for properly understanding the protreptic effect of Socrates' arguments in the Republic on Glaucon.
this, the person might convey to me the current theory about how the immune system works. So, in order to be persuaded of the specific claim about vaccines, I have to learn about something else, namely, the immune system. Similarly, to be persuaded of some typically Socratic claim, an interlocutor may have to learn about some other subject. For example, to persuade Protagoras of the claim that knowledge is virtue, Socrates must lead him through an investigation of the “art of measurement,” with reference to pleasure and pain. It is the study of pleasure and pain that lends plausibility to the claim of which Socrates hopes to persuade Protagoras. Thus, the use of a false logos would not be responsible, because the recipient expects to be persuaded by learning something true.

§ 1. The Means of Persuasion: Affective, Intellectual, and Provocative-Aporetic

As I suggested above, Socrates appears to tailor his speech to the character of his interlocutor to make his arguments maximally persuasive. Therefore we must examine what means are at his disposal, and what effects they may have on interlocutors. In what follows, I discuss the means of persuasion that I identify as affective and intellectual. I argue that neither means is sufficient of its own accord to exert a protreptic effect in the sense discussed above, i.e., to persuade or dissuade an interlocutor of a certain view and to reorient that interlocutor's life around this new conviction. Instead, I propose that “provocative-aporetic” means are an amalgamation of the intellectual and affective means. Furthermore, these means best account for the dramatic and literary features of Plato's dialogues, and exert a greater protreptic effect in virtue of the unique intellectual and affective state that aporia brings about.

28 Robert E. Cushman proposes that aporia brings about a moment of “affectional suspension,” wherein the interlocutor has the choice to cultivate his intellectual appetite for wisdom and the pleasure of
Affective means of persuasion. Socrates sometimes dissuades or persuades interlocutors of certain commitments by arousing such emotions as anger, shame, and fear. Socrates may also exploit affective states that seem to have distinct interests, such as thumotic and erotic interests, in order to elicit logical concessions. Examples of Socrates' use of these means are numerous in the dialogues. For example, in the *Phaedrus* Socrates embarrasses Phaedrus by demanding that Phaedrus reveal the text of Lysias' speech, which he had been hiding in his cloak. This embarrassment reveals that Phaedrus' true intention was to test his oratorical skill on Socrates—an intention he tried to conceal by hiding the text of Lysias' speech. In the *Republic*, Socrates seems to exploit Glaucon's sense of shame and erotic interests to elicit his agreement that a lover is a lover of the whole class of the thing that he loves, and not picky about particular instances. Socrates refers to Glaucon's love of young boys to elicit this agreement, and Glaucon seems

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29 Jill Gordon identifies Socrates' conversations with Callicles, Thrasy machus, and Meno, and Alcibiades' confession in the *Symposium* that Socrates alone could make him feel ashamed, as evidence that shame, rather than pure argumentation, is one of the chief tools that Socrates uses to refute his interlocutors (*Turning Toward Philosophy: Literary Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato's Dialogues*, [University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999], 21-28).

30 Yunis argues that Socrates must resort to affective means of persuasion because many of Socrates' arguments run counter to deeply-held conventional norms. For example, the arguments concerning marriage and property arrangements in *Republic* V—Socrates encounters a “fundamental protreptic problem: if the interlocutors— and the reader—see the validity of Socrates’ argument on justice but are reluctant to accept it because it strikes them as impossibly far-fetched, how can they—interlocutors and reader—be encouraged to overcome their reluctance and accept the argument anyway?” Yunis' answer is that Plato and Socrates rely on the emotions of both reader and interlocutor to “tip the scales,” so to speak, in favor of rational assent, and thereby get the reader or interlocutor to conduct his or her life differently (“The Protreptic Rhetoric of the *Republic*” in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 21-22).

31 *Republic*, 475c1; Gordon, drawing from the *Meno*, argues that Socrates' purpose with the slave is to show that Meno's answers are no better than those of the slave, who answers confidently, but incorrectly. When Meno sees himself in the example of the slave, he feels shame as a result, and changes his comportment in the second half of the dialogue. (*Turning*, 108-109). McCoy argues that Socrates defeats or silences his interlocutors in the *Gorgias* and *Protagoras* by shaming them. For example, he curbs Hippocrates' enthusiasm by forcing him to admit that if he learns from Protagoras, he will become a sophist. Hippocrates experiences shame upon admitting this (*Plato*, 78-79).
embarrassed about Socrates' use of his tastes as an example.\(^{32}\) This teasing may help persuade Glaucon that he ought to turn his erotic interests toward wisdom. In the *Apology*, Socrates seems to deliberately provoke the jury with his proposal that he ought to be honored as an Olympic victor for his service to the city.\(^{33}\) This strategy would be counterproductive if Socrates' goal were an acquittal, but if Socrates' goal is to compel the members of the jury to realize their own lack of virtue, then this strategy might gain some traction. By comparing himself to an Olympic victor, Socrates suggests that Athens excels in a sort of competition with other cities in virtue of his philosophizing. This implication fits well with his injunction that Athenians ought to give up the love of money and honor. Finally, David Gallagher has argued that Socrates uses fear and pity to dissuade Glaucon of Thrasymachus' views. He proposes that *Republic* VIII and IX function as a “slippery slope” argument about an erotic person who seeks luxury and public honors: the lesson is that such a person “boards a train of rapid degeneration in character that leads straight, and almost irreversibly, to the tyrant.”\(^{34}\) The effect of this argument, even if unsound, is to cause Glaucon to fear the consequences of adopting Thrasymachus' approval of the tyrant.\(^{35}\)

I include erotic and thumotic interests as two types of affective conditions because they both have distinct emotions, pleasures, and pains inherent to them. Socrates often

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\(^{32}\) Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσι, συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου χάριν (*Rep.*, 4754a2-4). Glaucon says he will “concede for the sake of the argument” Socrates' use of him as an example. Glaucon's choice of the verb συγχωρῶ suggests a definite concession here. Probably he would prefer that his erotic tastes not be matter of public of examination, conducted by none other than Socrates.

\(^{33}\) *Apology*, 36d-e.


\(^{35}\) Gallagher argues that Glaucon does not answer Socrates' question about what man corresponds to the timocratic regime because he seeks Socrates' esteem and is thus ashamed to admit that he is, in fact, a lover of honor (“Protreptic Aims of Plato's *Republic*,” 297). The implication is that shame could be instrumental in coaxing Glaucon away from the love of honor. For an analysis of the specific emotions that Socrates arouses to “turn” Glaucon to the philosophical life, see 306-307.
appeals to these interests, and these appeals differ from direct attempts to elicit an emotional response. Nonetheless, we should consider Socrates' appeal to these interests as an instance of the use of affective means to exert a protreptic effect. The characteristic emotions of thumos appear to be pride in what brings honor and good repute, shame at dishonorable things, and anger at perceived moral injury. It is a challenge to explain why precisely these emotions are characteristic of thumos, but a tentative answer is that they all stem from a sort of “social consciousness,” or one's consciousness of oneself among others. Honor and disgrace are terms that depend upon the consciousness of the judgment of others, whether those others are real or imagined. For example, Marina McCoy has documented Socrates' use of epithets that appeal to Glaucon's thumos in their discussion of the sun analogy and the divided line. Socrates describes the Sun—which is the analogue for the form of the Good—as “most honorable” in an effort to get Glaucon to see the value, in terms that he can understand, of knowledge of the Good. Likewise in the *Protagoras*, Socrates exploits Protagoras' reputation as a teacher of virtue to raise the stakes on their conversation, and intensify the effect of his eventual *elenchos*. It is not

36 Another reason for Socrates' appeal to thumotic interests may lie in his conviction that the training of thumos is essential for the development of the proper moral character. Christopher Gill argues that the first portion of education in *Republic* II-IV applies primarily to the training of the *θυμοειδές*, since this portion of education is meant for children and adolescents who have not reached full rationality, so that they must first learn the right emotional reaction to social norms, so as to “ensure by a kind of aesthetic habituation that these norms become ingrained in the ψυχή” (“Plato and the Education of Character,” *Archive für Geschicte der Philosophie* 67 [1985], 11). Gill rightly identifies the aim of education in the Republic as “psychic harmony,” but faults Plato's account for lacking continuity between the program for the training of the *θυμοειδές* and the program for developing a critical power of reason.

37 The discussion of poetry in Book X provides some basis for distinguishing thumotic emotions from the emotional life of the soul generally. In this discussion Socrates identifies pity as most relevant to analysis of drama, and describes a “pitying element” of the soul. On the basis of Book X and the example of Leontius in *Republic* IV, Rana Saadi Liebert makes a good case that the example of Leontius in Book IV shows that one function of thumos is to restrain undue pity for others (“Pity and Disgust in Plato's Republic: The Case of Leontius,” in *Classical Philology* Vol. 108, No.3 [July 2013]: 179-201). Pity is of course directed towards others, but it does not require the same degree of self-awareness that shame does. On her reading, this explains why Leontius rebukes himself from looking at the bodies specifically of dead criminals.

simply because Protagoras is debating someone in a public setting that he has an interest in winning the argument; the very nature of Socrates' question—whether virtue is teachable—触碰了一个雄辩家的兴趣。如果Protagoras无法辩护他的论点，那么他将没有资格成为该美德的老师。因此，通过将Protagoras的一个雄辩家利益置于险境，Socrates进一步增强了他在讨论美德问题时与之交流的人的个人投资。

While it is undeniable that Socrates uses affective means to influence his interlocutors' responses and to steer the direction of a conversation, these means cannot suffice alone to exert the full protreptic effect that Socrates desires. Eliciting concessions by manipulating an interlocutor's affective responses does not require that the interlocutor examine his assumptions from a logical perspective. For example, while Socrates' likening of himself to an Olympic victor may prompt a few to self-reflection, many will likely be annoyed by the proposal. Moreover, interlocutors must have genuine curiosity about the direction of Socrates' argument; if they did not have this curiosity, it would seem more appropriate for them to cease conversing, especially if they really believed that Socrates was manipulating them emotionally. For example, while Glaucon is embarrassed by Socrates' teasing in the Republic, he lets himself be used as an example for the sake of the argument, presumably because he recognizes something true in

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39 In as at least a public setting as he can be without being in the law courts. In the dialogue Protagoras is staying with Callias, and when Socrates and Hippocrates arrive at Callias' house, they discover a large gathering of potential students and other sophists.

40 One might question whether Protagoras, rather than Hippocrates, is the proper recipient of protreptic in that dialogue. McCoy points out that Socrates curbs Hippocrates' enthusiasm for Protagoras by forcing him to admit that if he learns from Protagoras, he will become a sophist. Hippocrates experiences shame upon admitting this (Plato, 78-79).

41 David L. Blank goes so far as to suggest that Socrates purposely manipulates the affective sensibilities of his interlocutors, and that the emotions themselves "eventually lead them to the cathartic experience of aporia, at which point they typically experience the sort of anger just described" (“The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues,” in The Classical Quarterly, vol.43, no.2 1993): 436).
Socrates' claim. Socrates' claim about that effect that eros has on the total orientation of a person affects Glaucon personally, but Glaucon may not feel emotionally manipulated because he has the virtue to see contingencies about himself as exemplary for an educational purpose. Thus, Glaucon's investment in the conversation goes beyond his affective states; he is genuinely curious to see the argument through.

**Intellectual Means of Persuasion.** Intellectual means of persuasion refer to Socrates' use of purely logical arguments to persuade his interlocutors of certain propositions that belong to his moral-philosophical project; for example, that “wisdom is virtue” or “there is such a thing as the equal itself.” That Socrates tries to persuade his interlocutors by logical argument is undeniable; the assumption that he uses primarily intellectual means of persuasion explains why so much literature on the dialogues tests Socrates' arguments for features such as soundness and validity. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which intellectual means alone cannot suffice to

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43 A conviction Socrates expresses when describing his “maieutic” practice in the *Theaetetus*. Socrates says that some people become angry with him for depriving them of their false intellectual “offspring,” and he defends himself by saying that he does this out of kindness to them, because it is better to rid oneself of a false belief (151b-c).
exert a protreptic effect on an interlocutor. One shortcoming of the use of intellectual means is that it presupposes that the interlocutor has achieved a condition of soul in which reason “rules,” or functions as the primary influence on their beliefs and actions. Euthyphro and Thrasymachus provide good examples of this shortcoming. Euthyphro hears Socrates' argument and participates in Socrates' reasoning about piety, but when he discovers that his answers are causing them to circle back on the definitions of piety that were tried and discarded, he opts out of the conversation.44 Rather than let the conclusions of the argument affect him, he buries his head in the sand and chooses to ignore those conclusions. In other words, Euthyphro seems to lack a sense of the value of a life committed to reason—a life in which the best logical arguments ought to function as the standard for his beliefs. Without this conviction, it is difficult for Socrates to reach him by reasoned argument alone. By contrast, Thrasymachus seems to acknowledge the primacy of reason in determining one's beliefs. Throughout his conversation with Socrates, he insists that injustice is “wisdom” and in general more reasonable than justice. But when Socrates defeats him in argument, he shuts down and becomes overly-conciliatory in his responses. Reason does not “rule” his soul because he is not willing to let the best argument—one to which he has no reply—determine his character. When we speak of Socrates' attempt to “turn the soul,” it is this very achievement of the rule of reason which we have in mind, namely, that which the practice of philosophy presupposes. Thus, if Socrates relies primarily on intellectual means to exert a protreptic effect on an interlocutor, he seems to be caught in a circle: one must be persuaded to develop a condition of soul in which reason rules (so as to be able to practice philosophy), but attempting to persuade a person (by argument) seems to already

44 *Euthyphro*, 15d-e.
§2. Provocative-Aporetic Means and Provocative Aporetic Reading

In the preceding sections I argued that neither intellectual nor affective means alone would suffice to have a protreptic effect on an interlocutor, because (a) emotional manipulation is unlikely to impart a lasting conviction about some matter of philosophical importance and (b) intellectual means presuppose an intellectual disposition that many recipients of protreptic may not have achieved yet. There is, however, a philosophical experience that has a protreptic effect by unifying these two means. This experience is *aporia*. From an intellectual point of view, *aporia* is an experience of confusion, bewilderment, or uncertainty that results from an *elenchos* (refutation) and thereby makes the interlocutor aware that some one of his beliefs entails a contradiction with another belief.45 This experience is unique because it makes the interlocutor aware of the need to re-examine his assumptions in a way that simply

45 Not all interlocutors acknowledge their ignorance and re-examine their beliefs; Euthyphro, for example, fails to do so. Examples of *aporia* abound in the dialogues. Meno likens his refutation by Socrates to being stung by an electric ray, as though he cannot reply because his tongue has been numbed (*Meno*, 80b); in the *Republic*, Thrasydachus shows a blush of embarrassment when Socrates refutes his claim that injustice is wisdom and goodness (*Rep.*, 350d). His capitulation to Socrates at this point suggests an experience of *aporia*; he falls silent and blushes because he realizes he can no longer answer Socrates in a coherent way. These observations motivate a line of interpretation which characterizes “aporetic” dialogues entirely negative; they tear down an interlocutor's beliefs and offer no replacements. For a good summary of this view of the aporetic dialogues, See Terence Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 35. Blank suggests that the “beneficial” result being refuted in dialectical inquiry is that “the respondents are not said to learn any thesis or doctrine, but only that they should blame their confusion on themselves and seek their salvation in philosophy” (“The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues,” 431). In contrast with the negative interpretation, Francisco Gonzalez argues that aporetic dialogues are constructive because *aporia* can issue in a positive insight into virtue by interpreting a number of traditionally-regarded “aporetic” dialogues, such as *Laches* and *Charmides*. Regarding the discussion of temperance in the *Charmides*, he concludes that “though the dialogue succeeds in showing us this knowledge [of temperance] at work, it must end in *aporia* because this knowledge is non-propositional” (*Dialogue and Dialectic: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry* [Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press, 1998], 58). Gonzalez proposes that *aporia* results in this conversations only because the interlocutors expect that knowledge of virtue is propositional. But if knowledge of virtue is non-propositional, and *aporia* turns out to be necessary for the eventual insight into the performance of the virtue, then *aporia* may issue forth a positive insight.
receiving an argument cannot: the intellectual pay-off in re-examining one's beliefs consists in seeing for oneself which of one's assumptions need correcting. This is more effective than receiving an argument because it invites the interlocutor to participate in the construction of a philosophical position that will correct his former assumptions.46

Aporia also produces a unique affective response; for example, it may produce feelings of anger or embarrassment. But the character of aporetic anger is different from thumotic anger. Although anger is typically identified as a thumotic emotion—because it is usually a response to the perception of some moral wrong—aporetic anger differs in that it lacks a target. Interlocutors may feel embarrassed or vulnerable after having their ignorance exposed, but they often have difficulty identifying a clear moral injury as the cause of their anger. Thus their anger lacks a target; they have no one to blame. After all, Socrates does not insult, threaten, or lie to them; he only asks questions that his interlocutors cannot answer.47 Meno's comparison of Socrates to an electric sting-ray is telling here, for it suggests that the interlocutors struggle to identify the harm that they

46 The Republic provides an instance of a character correcting an interlocutor's claims. In Book I, Cleitophon tries to defend Thrasymachus after Socrates' first counter-argument by suggesting that what Thrasy machus “meant” to say was that rulers fashion those laws that seem most advantageous to them (340b5). It should be noted that views differ with respect to the intellectual benefit of aporia. The basic point of disagreement is whether aporia yields positive or negative insight. The view that aporia results in negative insight is encapsulated in the idea that aporia does nothing more than expose an interlocutor's ignorance. The view is so influential that it provides the basis for differentiating “early” from “middle” dialogues. Others, however, utilize the negative aspect of aporia for different purposes. McCoy suggests that Socrates uses provocative-aporetic means because he believes virtue cannot be taught. Since virtue allegedly cannot be taught, Socrates must attempt to get interlocutors to care about virtue in some way. Socrates does this by inducing “a kind of intellectual and emotional disequilibrium in the souls of those to whom he speaks, with the hope that his audience will emerge from this disequilibrium with a commitment to seek the truth” (Plato, 24). Again, the inducement of “intellectual and emotional disequilibrium” is unmistakable as a characterization of aporia.

47 Plato often likens the power of rhetoric to “charm” or “bewitch” an interlocutor. In the Phaedrus, Socrates says that he was “bewitched” (καταφαρμακευθέντος, 242e2) by the demand to produce a Lysianic speech; in the Republic, Glaucon suggests that Thrasy machus was “charmed like a snake” ( ámbερ δέ κηληθηναι, 358b3) by Socrates' words in Book I. Interlocutors may feel anger because they feel Socrates has somehow used some verbal trick that they fail to identify because they lack expertise. This sense of being at a disadvantage might account for a thumotic kind of anger; however, it is still the interlocutor's lack of ability which is to blame for his difficulty in answering Socrates' questions.
believe Socrates has inflected on them when he refutes them. If the harm is the sort one receives from accidentally stepping on a torpedo fish, then moral indignation is not really the appropriate response—hence the puzzling character of the anger they feel. One proposal is that Socrates' ultimate goal in bringing about this strange affective state is that the intended effect of *aporia* is to retrain the interlocutor's anger on himself.48 This is likely true, but it requires an explanation of how it is possible to retrain one's anger oneself. The problem is remedied if we notice that aporetic anger lacks a proper target, and thus primes the interlocutor to recognize his own inability to answer Socrates' questions as the proper target of his anger. In unifying the intellectual and affective means of protreptic, *aporia* can provoke an interlocutor both personally, by putting something at stake for him, and intellectually, by revealing the need to re-examine his beliefs and commitments. For this reason I identify a third kind of means as “provocative-aporetic”: *aporia* is meant to provoke an interlocutor both intellectually and emotionally.

Having discussed the three means by which Socrates attempts to exert a protreptic effect on an interlocutor, it is necessary to complicate this account of the means of protreptic by examining the protreptic effect of Plato's dialogues on readers. So far, I have limited the analysis of the means of protreptic to the relations that we, as readers, observe between Socrates and interlocutors. But this restriction neglects the fact that Plato likely wrote his dialogues in the hopes of helping both his contemporaries and future generations to at least recognize the value of philosophy, if not to become philosophers.

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48 Blank's proposal in “The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues,” *The Classical Quarterly* 43, no.2 (1993): 436. Yunis also acknowledges Plato's use of devices that arouse certain emotions as well, though he attributes a slightly different function to those devices. He argues that because many of Socrates' arguments run counter to deeply-held conventional norms—for example, the arguments concerning marriage and property relations in *Republic* V—Socrates must resort to emotional means to “tip the balance” in favor of his own views (“The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic,” 22).
themselves. The *Phaedrus*—a dialogue that contains Plato's critique of the value of
writing for philosophers—provides especially good evidence for thinking Plato may have
had such hopes for his dialogues. There is an unmistakable irony in the fact that Plato has
Socrates argue that a philosopher would not seriously attempt to educate others in *written
form*, since in doing so he performs the very contradiction of that which his character
Socrates advises.49 Accounting for the full bearing of this irony on the dialogue would
require a chapter in itself, but a few observations about the relationship between Socrates
and Phaedrus will lend credence to the claim that Plato's dialogues also exert a protreptic
effect on readers. Plato portrays Phaedrus as an admirer of the *logographoi*, or
professional speech-writers. In one of the first scenes of the dialogue, Phaedrus reads, at
Socrates' request, a speech of one such well-known speech writer, Lysias.50 The two
discuss the qualities of good and bad speeches and written compositions, and Socrates
tries to convince Phaedrus that Lysias' speech lacks these features. In the midst of this
conversation, Socrates offers his critique of writing: writing only “repeats the same thing”
and cannot respond to the specific needs and questions of a reader in the way that an
interlocutor can; readers may *think* they have acquired expertise when they read
something, even though they haven't; and writing may make readers forgetful since it
functions as a kind of externalized memory that prevents them from exercising their
internal power of memory.51 Whether these were Socrates' specific worries about writing
is impossible to say; but Plato's rebuttal is not to abandon writing, but rather to write in

49 Socrates likens the writings of a philosopher to the plants that a farmer might sow in the “Garden of
Adonis” (*Phaedrus*, 276b3). Yunis suggests that because these plants likely would have been used as
decorations for a festival, the farmer would not have been interested in their ability to produce fruit. By
analogy, the philosopher would realize that his writings would only serve the purpose of entertainment.
232.
50 *Phaedrus*, 231a-234d.
51 These criticisms begin with Socrates' telling of the myth of Theuth and Thamus (274d-275b).
such a way that the dialogue mimics a living interlocutor. If a philosophical dialogue can perform the role of interlocutors for readers, then it has the potential to exert a protreptic effect on readers.

Mitchell Miller provides a useful framework for thinking about the place that readers occupy in the relation to a Platonic dialogue. He describes the structure of a typical dialogue between Socrates and an interlocutor as “mimetic irony.” According to Miller, mimetic irony is structured by four moments:

1. Elicitation; the “basic position of the non-philosopher” is laid forth in its strongest form.
2. Refutation by the philosopher; the philosopher argues with the non-philosopher, inducing him into aporia. According to Miller, “this refutation characteristically brings the non-philosopher into aporia and appears to bring dialogue itself to a decisive impasse.”
3. Reorientation; “the philosopher makes his most basic contribution, a reorienting insight that shows a path through the aporia. This insight is characteristically the most profound and original of the dialogue.”
4. Return; the philosopher steers the conversation back “to issues or difficulties or, even, the plane of discourse prior to the basic refutation.”

Miller points out that the most curious aspect of mimetic irony lies in the fourth moment. Why do Platonic dialogues contain a “return” to the level of discourse prior to the

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52 Socrates proposes as a requirement for a good logos that it be organized like a living being ( […] δεὶν πάντα λόγον σπερ ζωον συνεστάναι, 264c3-5). Readers might take this as a hermeneutic principle and apply it to the logos of the Phaedrus itself. Cf. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 126.
54 Miller, Conversion, 7.
philosopher's refutation of that discourse? Miller suggest that Plato offers this as a test to his readers: “The failure of an interlocutor to meet the philosopher's test within the drama is, in its basic function, Plato's test and provocation of his hearer.”

If the reader's task is to perform the “return” to the non-philosopher's level of discourse in the way that the interlocutor should, but fails to do, then the reader is effectively being invited to respond to Socrates on behalf of the interlocutor who has failed to carry out the return to non-philosophical discourse. What makes this possible is the privileged perspective that readers have on the written conversation: they may review the conversation, the interlocutor's governing assumptions, and the philosopher's “reorienting insight.” They are then tasked with explaining how certain governing assumptions of the interlocutor's position are either overturned or re-contextualized within a new framework for understanding the issue at hand. Readers find themselves in an improved epistemic state as a result of this exercise because they have benefited from the mistakes of the interlocutor portrayed in the dialogue. That is, the insight readers gain is not negative, i.e., not simply a discovery of their own ignorance; rather, they are presented with a compelling—though ultimately false—view about some issue of philosophical importance. They are then tasked with explaining for themselves why that view is ultimately false, and how Socrates' insight points beyond the *aporeia*.

Having considered only the protreptic effect of provocative-aporetic means on readers, I should conclude this section with a few remarks about the effect of affective and intellectual means on readers. The new layer of complexity that the reader

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contributes arises from fact that the affective or intellectual means of protreptic that Socrates exercises on an interlocutor need not be the same that Plato exercises on the reader.⁵⁷ For example, we may pity an interlocutor who himself feels shame or anger at having been refuted by Socrates; we may also experience a sort of anticipatory pity, or feeling of suspense because we foresee an interlocutor's *elenchos* even before the interlocutor is aware of it.⁵⁸ Finally, our ironic relation to the text may also play on our sense of humor, as we may find it difficult to refrain from laughing at interlocutors who are oblivious to their own ignorance.⁵⁹ With respect to intellectual means, the question we must ask is whether the argument Socrates uses to persuade an interlocutor is the same argument that Plato intends to persuade his readers. In this way a reading of a dialogue that hopes to account for the protreptic effect of the dialogue must differentiate between the views of Socrates and the views of Plato for structural reasons, rather than for merely historical reasons, e.g., for the purpose of assigning a chronology to the dialogues. The difference between these two readings is the difference between an “earnest” and “ironic” readings of Plato's work. On the earnest reading, the arguments and teachings of the dialogues are explicit, while on the ironic reading, the arguments and lessons are concealed from immediate view. A good example of the divergent conclusions that these two ways of reading draw about Plato's beliefs can be found in the *Protagoras*. Vlastos,

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⁵⁷ Gordon also distinguishes between “two levels of action with respect to the Platonic text: there is the action depicted within the dialogue, that is, the plot, and there is the inter-action, between the reader and the dialogue. Both levels of action in Plato's dialogues bear on his philosophical aim of turning souls toward the life of philosophy” (Gordon, *Turning*, 80).

⁵⁸ Blank, 434

⁵⁹ *Euthyphro* provides an excellent example of this sort of phenomenon. Miller explores the problem that the comedic aspects of the dialogues raise for Socrates' “moral-philosophical” project. Briefly put, laughing at the ignorance of others does not seem to make us more virtuous, even if those whom we laugh at are fictional characters in a dialogue. This raises a question about how readers are to interact with Plato's dialogues in such a way that they do not unknowingly engage in vice. See Mitchell Miller, “The Pleasures of the Comic and of Socratic Inquiry: Aporetic Reflections on *Philebus* 48A–50B” in *Arethousa*, Vol. 41, No.2 (Spring 2008): 266.
adhering to a developmental chronology of Plato's corpus, identifies differing views on the \textit{akrasia} phenomenon as evidence for situating \textit{Protagoras} as an early dialogue and \textit{Republic} as a middle dialogue.\textsuperscript{60} In the \textit{Protagoras}, the claim that no one is “overcome by pleasure” in spite of knowing or believing that they ought to act otherwise depends upon the success of Socrates' argument for the “art of measurement.” Thus, the view that wisdom consists in knowledge of a hedonic calculus is identified as an “early” Platonic doctrine. On an ironic reading, however, Plato might not have been advancing this view in the \textit{Protagoras}. Socrates uses the art of measurement in fundamentally eristic conversation with Protagoras, to refute Protagoras' claim that most of the virtues are similar, though courage is unique and “separate.” Plato underscores this eristic aspect by portraying the humorous realization that Socrates and Protagoras have unknowingly switched the positions for which they were arguing: both were so caught up in refuting each other that they forgot the respective positions they were arguing for.\textsuperscript{61} When Socrates realizes this, he suggest that they continue their conversation to see what went wrong.\textsuperscript{62} If readers take up that suggestion, then they are forced to re-examine the arguments for the art of measurement on account of the support it provides for Socrates' unintentionally reversed position, i.e., that virtue is teachable. Thus, an “earnest” reading can maintain the hedonic calculus as an “early doctrine” only by ignoring dramatic

\textsuperscript{60} Gregory Vlastos, \textit{Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 48. Although Vlastos devotes the first chapter of his book to a defense of an “ordinary” sense of irony, he tends to perform “earnest” readings of Plato's dialogues. He defends the “hypothesis” that “[...] Plato in those early works of his, sharing Socrates' basic philosophical convictions, sets out to think through for himself their central affirmations, denials, and reasons suspensions of belief by pitting them in elenctic encounter against the views voiced by a variety of interlocutors. In doing this Plato is producing, not reproducing, Socratic philosophizing. Employing a literary medium which allows Socrates to speak for himself, Plato makes him say whatever he—Plato—thinks at the time of writing would be the most reasonable thing for Socrates to be saying just then in expounding and defending his own philosophy” (\textit{Socrates}, 50).

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Prt.}, 361a-c; namely, that virtue is teachable (Protagoras) and virtue is not teachable (Socrates).

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Prt.}, 361c-d.
features of the dialogue.

§ 3. Studying the Protreptic Effect of the Republic

I argued above that four questions ought to guide a study of the protreptic effect of a Platonic dialogue:

1) Who is the recipient of protreptic?
2) What are the means of persuasion?
3) What is the recipient being persuaded of?
4) What does the recipient learn from protreptic?

In the following I outline answers that inform this study of the protreptic effect of the Republic.

There is some difficulty in determining the recipient of protreptic in the Republic because multiple interpretations seem to be supported by the content of the inquiry of the Republic and the variety of interlocutors with whom Socrates speaks. For example, one possibility is that an immoralist or moral skeptic is the recipient of the argument of the Republic. Thrasymachus is, not unreasonably, often presented as the representative of this personality, and Socrates seems sincere about trying to dissuade Thrasymachus of his views.⁶³ Since the argument that Socrates makes in the remainder of the dialogue seems to be intended to refute the immoralist's position, the immoralist would seem to be the recipient of protreptic. Even though Socrates speaks primarily with Glaucon and

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⁶³ O'Neill rightly disputes this characterization, arguing that Thrasymachus' commitment to wisdom (of a sort) in fact provides a "lever" for Socrates ("The Struggle for the Soul of Thrasymachus," 177). At the very least, Thrasymachus wants to appear admirable to Socrates—that is, he implicitly acknowledges Socrates' approval as a kind of normative standard. O'Neill's argument could be represented by the stronger claim that the Republic contains an argument that no one could be a thoroughgoing immoralist and have an interest in vindicating the immoralist position in debate.
Adeimantus after Book I, it is possible that he still has the immoralist in mind as the person he hopes to persuade to see the value of justice.

Another possibility is that Glaucon and Adeimantus are the primary recipients of Socrates' protreptic efforts. I argue that this interpretation makes better sense of the content of Socrates' argument and the silencing of Thrasymachus in Book I. To begin, the view that the immoralist or moral skeptic is the immediate recipient of Socrates' protreptic efforts encounters a difficulty I call the “problem of incommensurability.” Simply put, the problem is that Socrates and the immoralists and moral-skeptics he encounters—interlocutors such as Thrasymachus and Callicles—hold beliefs about each other that are accessible only from their respective points of view. For example, Callicles and Thrasymachus both view philosophers like Socrates, who have commitments to moral principles and do not use their rhetorical skills to manipulate the polis, as fools and incomplete sophists. From the perspective of the philosopher, however, sophists such as Thrasymachus and Callicles are, in a sense, incomplete philosophers. To get either Socrates or a sophist of Thrasymachus' ilk to sincerely adopt the other's view would seem to require a kind of gestalt-shift; it seems that no rational argument could persuade the one to adopt the perspective of the other.66 To effect such a “shift,” Socrates must either

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64 As evinced by Thrasymachus' taunts in the Republic (336c1; 343a5) and Callicles' assertion in the Gorgias that philosophy is only good when studied “moderately in young age,” but not good as a life-long pursuit (μετρίως ἅψητεαι ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, 484c8).
65 McCoy argues for this point: “the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist only makes sense from the point of view of the philosopher. That is, to the philosopher, the sophist is something like an incomplete philosopher. But only the philosopher can know this because only the philosopher has the greater context of the whole for understanding what the human being really desires. From the point of view of the sophist, however, the philosopher might only appear to be a bad sophist. […] the way in which the distinction between philosophy and sophistry is understood depends upon one's prior theoretical stance—a theoretical vision defined less in terms of precise characterizations of the forms and more by understanding one's own deepest desires as a human being” (McCoy, Plato, 133).
66 This conclusion results especially for those who argue that Thrasymachus holds a logically coherent position. C.D.C. Reeve suggests that Socrates' arguments in Book I are all flawed, so that they in fact fail to show any inconsistencies in Thrasymachus' view. Thus he concludes that it is “not sheer
rely on entirely affective means, or find leverage in the form of a prior commitment to even the most minimal commitment to normativity, and show that this commitment implicitly commits the interlocutor to some proposition closer to Socrates' position. If Socrates relies solely on affective means, then “protreptic” resembles emotional manipulation, and if he cannot leverage some minimal commitment of the interlocutor's to gain consent to a proposition closer to his own view, then it is difficult to see how meaningful dialogue, with the potential to fundamentally reorient an interlocutor, could even get off the ground.67

The problem of incommensurability can be avoided by identifying Glaucon and Adeimantus as the primary recipients of Socrates' protreptic efforts.68 Although Glaucon revives Thrasymachus' position in Book II, he does so insincerely because he is not actually committed to Thrasymachus' view.69 Rather, he seeks a counterargument against Thrasymachus that can withstand his strongest defense of the immoralist's position.

dogmatism on his [Thrasymachus'] part” when Thrasymachus remains unconvinced. In Reeve's view, Socrates has only refuted “the man,” but not the theory (Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006], 21-22). McCoy argues that “Thrasymachus gives an internally consistent picture of the human being: we all desire power, honor, and material gain. Just laws and the consequences of disobeying them are obstacles to this for everyone who is not a ruler. […] Thrasymachus' position remains a coherent, if immoral, alternative to the Socratic position that it is better to be just than unjust because his main claim that the unjust person is happier than the just person still has not been addressed” (Plato, 117). McCoy arrives at this conclusion on the grounds that Socrates' elenchoi in Book I are flawed, so that Thrasymachus' position simply hasn't been refuted. 67 McCoy identifies this problem as the cause of the breakdown in conversations between Socrates and committed sophists such as Callicles and Thrasymachus (Plato, 100). The two parties simply lack common assumptions that can serve as a starting point for persuading one or the other. For example, one of the chief disagreements between Socrates and Callicles concerns the relation between pleasure and the good. Socrates denies that pleasure is identical with the good, while Callicles identifies the two (Gorgias, 495d).

68 Reeve and Yunis share this view with me. See Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 35-40. Yunis argues that “Protreptic discourse is not educational discourse as a whole and does not by itself bring about education in virtue. Rather, protreptic addresses the initial or preparatory stages of education. It aims to get education in virtue under way, to get the reader or auditor turned and moving in the right direction, and to make the acquisition of virtue an urgent priority.” See Harvey Yunis, “The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3-4.

69 Republic, 358c7
Socrates' argument in the *Republic* simply isn't intended to persuade an immoralist to adopt a moral point of view; rather, it aims to persuade individuals who are already practically committed to justice, but who are troubled by their lack of reply to individuals like Thrasymachus. On this approach, the argument of the *Republic* aims to show that Glaucon's conviction that the just life is better is right, not that the immoralist is wrong.70

Glaucon and Adeimantus' possession of conversational and epistemic virtues provides another reason to believe that the brothers are the primary recipients of Socrates' protreptic efforts. Book I is striking for its portrayal of the kinds of people with whom Socrates cannot carry on sustained conversation. Cephalus, the first interlocutor, is willing to participate in a conversation only on the condition that it will not expose him to the rigor of Socrates' questioning. Thus, when pressed to define justice, he turns the conversation over to his son, Polemarchus. Polemarchus proves an unsuitable interlocutor as well, though for different reasons. He is willing to subject himself to Socrates' *elenchos*, but his reasoning about justice remains too wedded to conventional ideas of retribution and recompense. This is apparent in the way that Polemarchus' initial definition of justice—giving what is due to friends and enemies—is partially reaffirmed in Book IV, where Socrates argues that judges enact a type of restorative justice by giving what is due to each class.71 But this reaffirmation comes about only after a long *logos* through which Glaucon and Adeimantus construct a theoretical city. Because Polemarchus' thinking relies too much on convention, he is not ready to think about justice “in itself,” for that task will require the flexibility in thinking that can tolerate the

71 *Republic*, 433e.
annihilation of conventions, at least in thought. Polemarchus lacks this flexibility, which is why he is not the proper interlocutor for a sustained conversation about justice.

Thrasymachus, being an anti-conventionalist, thus represents the opposite extreme. It is this anti-conventionalism that makes Thrasymachus' proposal more interesting, and somewhat compelling, since he recognizes that appeals to traditional authorities do not carry much evidential weight in philosophical arguments. But the extremity of Thrasymachus' anti-conventionalism precludes his practice of the virtue of courage or “spiritedness,” a virtue that Socrates identifies as crucial for philosophical conversation in many dialogues. This is apparent in his reaction to Socrates' first challenge to his argument that justice is the “advantage of the stronger.” Thrasymachus is clearly stunned by Socrates' response, and Cleitophon tries to save him by saying that “he meant what the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger thinks is good for himself; this is what the weaker must do, and he posited justice as this.” Polemarchus, however, points out that “that's not how it was said.” Thus we see in this response that Thrasymachus is not willing to accept the risk that comes with advancing a philosophical position, because the other participants must hold him accountable to his own words. Unwillingness to accept the risk that comes with philosophical conversation, however, betrays a lack of courage in the sense that Socrates means. A second scene that shows Thrasymachus' lack of courage occurs at the end of the elenchos in Book I, when

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72 Reeve argues that Polemarchus' dependence upon conventional morality but lack of tools with which he might encounter “moral skepticism” reveals the “problematic nature of Socratic elenchos.” The elenchos cannot benefit Polemarchus because it simply seems to destroy his belief in convention without replacing it with anything new. By introducing him into moral skepticism, Socrates may in fact be corrupting Polemarchus rather than helping him (Philosopher-Kings, 8-9).

73 See Theaetetus. 145b; Republic, 357a2; Laches, 194a1.

74 [...] τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐλεγεν ὅ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὑτῷ ἐξισιφέρει ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἠτέον, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐπιθετο (340b4-7).

75 Ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἤ δ' ὃς ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἐλεγετο (340b7-c1).
Socrates takes his turn at advancing his own argument about justice. Rather than answer honestly, Thrasymachus simply answers in a way that will humor Socrates and finish the argument as quickly as possible. This refusal to answer honestly also shows his unwillingness to take risks in philosophical conversation. Though he offers no resistance in his answers, he is unwilling to assume the risk of the new hypothesis that Socrates proposes because he only answers to spare himself further embarrassment; he thus remains dissociated from the argument. This reaction stands in contrast with that of Glaucon, who accepts the hypothesis of the city-soul analogy because he is genuinely willing to see where it leads for the sake of the argument, not for the sake of sparing himself embarrassment. The willingness to genuinely accept a hypothesis indicates a kind of courage that is indispensable to philosophical conversation, and this is why Glaucon is a suitable interlocutor for the remainder of the Republic. In short, Glaucon represents a person whose thinking is flexible enough to tolerate the erosion of traditional authority in thought, but not so anti-conventional that he cannot simply accept or receive a new starting point for inquiry.

In short, Glaucon and Adeimantus are the primary recipients of Socrates' protreptic efforts because (a) they have the right intellectual temperament and conversational virtues, and (b) they are already practically committed to the just life, but seek an argument to defend this commitment against immoralists like Thrasymachus.

Harvey Yunis argues that readers of the Republic too may have been the intended

76 After the final refutation, Thrasymachus says that he'll behave with Socrates “as one does with old women telling stories” (350d, Griffith). When Socrates draws the conclusion that injustice is “never more profitable than justice,” Thrasymachus quips that “It's Bendis' Day. Make a real feast of it,” as if to imply that he has simply been letting Socrates have his way (354a, Griffith).

77 It is worth noting that the word for “tradition,” παράδοση, is related to the verb παραδίδωμι, to “hand over.” The metaphor suggests that we are “recipients” of cultural authorities.

audience of this argument. He proposes that readers who stand to benefit most from the
dialogue are those who, like Glaucon, are intellectually curious, have some familiarity
with the way philosophical conversations proceed, and seek a more intellectually
responsible argument for the value of justice than appeals to traditional authority
provide.\footnote{Yunis, “The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic,” 5.} However, this identification of the prior commitments of Glaucon,
Adeimantus, and the intended audience of the Republic raises a worry about what these
audiences actually gain from the argument of the Republic. Glaucon's sympathy for
Socrates' views raises the worry that he is, in a sense, already persuaded of Socrates'
view. If that is so, then it would seem that Glaucon is “persuaded” of something he
already believes. But to learn something, one must become persuaded of something one
did not already believe. Therefore, it would seem that Glaucon and like-minded readers
do not really learn anything from Socrates' protreptic efforts. This worry forces us to
clarify what the recipients of protreptic—Glaucon, Adeimantus, and readers—learn; for
otherwise, the manner in which they are persuaded appears circular.\footnote{I raise this worry on the basis of Yunis' analysis of the protreptic function of the Republic. Yunis argues that “Protreptic discourse is not educational discourse as a whole and does not by itself bring about education in virtue. Rather, protreptic addresses the initial or preparatory stages of education. It aims to get education in virtue under way, to get the reader or auditor turned and moving in the right direction, and to make the acquisition of virtue an urgent priority.” See Yunis, “The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic,” 3-4.}

To answer this worry we must attend to the distinction between what protreptic is
meant to persuade a recipient of, and what the recipient learns from protreptic. With
regard to the Republic, the claim which Glaucon and readers are meant to be persuaded of
is that justice is a good desirable both for its own sake and for its consequences. Socrates
of course also hopes to persuade Glaucon and readers of the superior value of the
philosophical life, but this goal seems to be secondary to the former, as the inquiry
concerning justice receives the greatest continuity of treatment across the ten books of the
Republic. Moreover, while Socrates describes the intellectual and moral character of the
philosophy and outlines a program of studies for such a person, his aim might not be to
persuade Glaucon to follow the path of the philosopher, but rather to recognize the value
of having philosophers in political life. If the point of which Glaucon and readers are to
be persuaded is clear, then the question remains as to what the recipients of protreptic
learn from the argument of the Republic. In the following chapters, I argue that Glaucon
and readers learn about a moral psychology that explains why the characteristics such as
courage, self-control, wisdom, and justice, are virtues; that is, why these characteristics
belong to soul that is in good condition. In a certain sense, then, the questions that guide
the inquiry of the Republic are really quite simple: (1) what is good for me? And (2) what
am I such that X is good for me? An argument of this sort is crucial to the inquiry of the
Republic because the immoraliast denies that these virtues in the conventional sense are
good for a person, and instead posits something like “anti-virtues” of his own. On my
reading of the Republic, readers are witness to argument between people who, as a
consequence of their holding contrary assumptions about the relation between reason and
appetite, arrive at two different models for understanding what justice is. I call these two
models the “Technē Model” and “Virtue Model” of justice. Glaucon accepts justice as a
virtue in the way Socrates means—as an inner ordering of the parts of the soul—only on

81 Contra Yunis, 15-17. Yunis argues that the Republic is meant to persuade the literate public that they
would benefit from the rule of philosophers. Book VI certainly contains an argument of this sort, but it
is not clear that this argument is the central argument of the Republic. The nature of the philosopher also
bears on the question concerning the happiness of the just life. Irwin argues that Socrates is committed
to a “comparative thesis” about the happiness of just and unjust lives (Plato’s Ethics, 192-193). Socrates
wants to show that the just life is happier than the unjust life, but not necessarily that justice is sufficient
for happiness. If this is correct, then the ranking of the lives—money-making, honor-loving, and
philosophical—in Book XI according to quality and quantity of pleasure (581c-588a) could be read as an
argument for the comparative thesis.
the condition that he accept a quite different conception of agency than he endorsed at the beginning of the dialogue. I suggest that the same lessons about agency as Glaucon and Adeimantus receive are offered to readers of the *Republic*.  

So far I have answered three of the four questions for a study of the *Republic* as a protreptic dialogue: (1) who the recipients of protreptic are (readers, Glaucon and Adeimantus); (3) what the recipient is to be persuaded of (the intrinsic value of justice); and (4) what the recipient learns from protreptic (a theory of moral agency that explains why justice and the virtues are virtues). What remains is a discussion of the means of protreptic that Plato may utilize with respect his readers. Here I suggest the answer diverges from the previous three, because readers partake in the structure of mimetic irony, and thus their vantage point differs from interlocutors. Nonetheless, the transition between Books I and II provides a model, in the ways that interlocutors converse and change roles in a provocative-aporetic way, for the way Plato may apply provocative-aporetic means to readers. Book I ends as a typically aporetic dialogue might end: Thrasymachus is refuted and silenced, and Socrates offers a glimpse of his own view of justice, but we still lack a definitive view of what justice is. Book II begins, however, with Glaucon's attempt to represent Thrasymachus' views better than Thrasymachus could himself; that is, Glacuon notices a moment of *aporia* and attempts to answer for the interlocutor who was refuted in such a way that *aporia* might be overcome. Glaucon, therefore, is performing the structure of mimetic irony for readers. If readers are to engage with the provocative-aporetic means that Plato offers for the re-orientation of
their lives, they must mimic this role that Glaucon performs for them. My reading of the Republic in this dissertation therefore proceeds in accordance with these provocative-aporetic means. My strategy for reading the Republic is as follows.

1. Identify moments of aporia and moments when interlocutors need the reader's assistance to correct their answers.
2. Identify the governing assumptions that lead to aporia, and whether the response to aporia can maintain coherency among the initial governing assumptions (Chapter 2; primarily Republic I-II)
3. Identify moments at which interlocutors (typically Glaucon or Adeimantus) reply in ways that contradict the governing assumptions of the aporetic portion of the dialogue (Chapter 3; primarily Republic III-IV);
4. Identify the replacements for the initial governing assumptions (Chapter 4; primarily Republic IV).

One concern remains, however, with respect to this schema for analyzing the protreptic effect of Plato's dialogues: what is the overall conception of philosophy with which recipients are being encouraged to engage? This question should concern us because, while Socrates and Plato may offer their own respective lessons for interlocutors and readers, we might wonder what the purpose of these lessons is. Do they lead somewhere, perhaps to a more “advanced” program of study, or do they serve to initiate us into a general practice of philosophy? An examination of the significance of these alternatives for protreptic is well suited to a reading of the Republic because the dialogue seems to offer both to readers. The dialogue is somewhat jarringly divided by two separate inquiries: an ethical and psychological inquiry about justice, and an intellectual
and metaphysical inquiry about the nature and wisdom of the philosopher. On the one hand, in Book VII Socrates describes a program of mathematical and dialectical studies (524d-534c), ostensibly as a kind of advanced training for those guardians who are to be philosopher-kings. But he seems to hold open the possibility that these studies are crucial for anyone who is lover of wisdom, whether or not political conditions would allow that person to have any political influence. The end-result of these studies is insight into the “first principle itself” (αὐτὴ τὴ ἀρχὴν, 533c8), and the ability to “grasp the account of the being of each thing” (καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας, 534b2-3), especially of the good (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, 534b6). Moreover, Socrates proposes that these studies play a role in securing the virtue of the guardians in a way that musical and physical education could not. Socrates contrasts intellectual virtues—such as natural intelligence, good memory, and the like—with “virtues of the body,” and suggests that the former can affect the latter:

rational thought […] becomes useful and beneficial, or useless and harmful, depending on which way it is facing. Think of those people who have the reputation of being evil but clever.  

Here, then, the worry is that when intellectual virtues are recruited in service of the wrong ends, they wrongly reorient the virtues of the body. There is some question about what Plato means by “virtues of the body,” but a decent conjecture is that he has in mind the virtues we acquire by habituation. For example, if courage just refers to the ability to endure fear without panicking, then the worry seems to be that “rational thought” might

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83 The allegory of the cave suggests this possibility by presenting the philosopher as someone who could emerge from a political context that is in fact hostile philosophy, e.g., one in which non-philosophers try to kill the philosopher (Rep., 517a).
84 518e, Griffith
recruit courage in the service of some utterly wicked project. Therefore, some ultimate
metaphysical insight into the good is necessary to prevent the corruption of these
virtues.85

On the other hand, Socrates continually flags the inadequacy of his metaphors for
describing both the effect of mathematical-dialectical education on a person, and the type
of knowledge these studies yield. For example, he calls the sun-analogy for the form of
the Good a “child of the good” (ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, 506e3), and reveals that
throughout the conversation about mathematical-dialectical studies, he has only been
showing Glaucon an “image” (εἰκόνα, 533a2) of the things that dialectic studies. In light
of Socrates' description of dialectic as that which will test who is “capable of giving up
eyesight,” one might note the irony in the fact that Plato offers images as a way to
encourage –protrepein—us to give up our eyesight. This is like offering someone a
drawing by Escher in order to persuade him that he ought not to use his eyes. If the
ultimate goal of philosophy is at odds with the means of protreptic, then how do these
means usher people toward that end? Some interpret these cautionary signs as an

85 This function of insight into the forms is evident at least in the Republic, Symposium, and Phaedo. In
the Symposium, Diotima concludes her speech by saying that whoever glimpses the Beautiful itself
gives birth not to “images of virtue” (εἴδωλα ἀρτεῆς, 212e6) but “true virtue” (ἀρετή ἀληθῆ, 212e7).
“True virtue” is often contrasted with the virtue of the honor-lovers of the “lower mysteries” (See
Sheffield, Plato's Symposium: The Ethics of Desire.). In the Phaedo, Socrates distinguishes between the
“slavish” virtue of those who have not freed themselves from the calculation of bodily pleasures and
pains, and the true virtue of philosophers who have (Phaedo, 69c-69d). What Christopher Bobonich
calls the “dependency thesis” is one way of understanding how metaphysical insight yields true rather
than spurious virtue. On his view, “True virtue requires that (i) a person aim at wisdom for its own sake,
and (ii) wisdom govern all the person's exchanges involving other things, that is, that the person choose
and act on the basis of wisdom” (Plato's Utopia Recast, 16). True virtue requires that one be a
philosopher—a lover of wisdom—and that one have insight into the forms (i.e., have wisdom). These
qualities allow the philosopher to use what Bobonich calls “dependent” goods: “x is a Dependent Good
if and only if x is good for a person who possesses wisdom (phronēsis) or knowledge of the good and x
is bad or at least not good for a person who lacks wisdom or knowledge of the good” (Plato's Utopia,
40). Stated briefly, goods such as bodily pleasure, wealth, and honor can only be goods for the person
who uses them with wisdom. Thus philosophical conversion is necessary to become the kind of person
who can use such goods. See also Irwin, who also appears to endorse a version of the dependency thesis
(Plato's Moral Theory, 224; 233-238).
indication that the conception of philosophy toward which Plato wants us to “turn” lies somewhere in his portrayal of Socrates' practice of caring for the soul and performance of various conversational and epistemic virtues, rather than in an ultimate metaphysical insight. For example, Socrates induces aporia in his interlocutors in order to make them aware of their own ignorance and open their beliefs to revision, and he encourages interlocutors to say what they really believe in conversation, rather than to argue for a view that they don't hold from a detached perspective. Socrates demonstrates this practice in the Republic by educating Glaucon's spirit (thumos) and re-orienting his eros away from appetitive pleasures toward intellectual pleasures. Glaucon genuinely benefits from this reorientation because this alliance of thumos and eros puts him at risk of becoming a tyrant.

I refer to these two ways of interpreting the ultimate project of philosophy as “metaphysical” and “methodological” interpretations. On the metaphysical interpretation, the ultimate aim of the project of philosophy is a kind of metaphysical insight that we have interest in both for its own sake and in order to perfect our virtues. On the methodological interpretation, the practice of caring for the soul—both one's own and

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86 Annas cautions readers not to put too much stock in the use of images in Republic VI-VII (An Introduction to Plato's Republic [New York: Clarendon Press, 1981]: 238). McCoy argues for this conception of Plato's philosophy in general. She reaches this conclusion by studying the rhetorical tools that sophists and philosophers—as Plato portrays them—use, and denies that any “foundational knowledge” (e.g., of the forms) distinguishes philosophers from sophists in the use of rhetoric (Plato on the Rhetoric of Sophists and Philosophers, 5; 132). Jill Gordon argues that Socrates' way of seeking knowledge in the dialogues does not really resemble dialectic. She suggests that he relies on something like a method of falsification instead (Turning Toward Philosophy, 83-84). Moreover, she argues that Socrates seems to justify some of his beliefs on ethical rather than purely logical grounds, e.g., the belief that there is even knowledge to be found (Cf. Phaedo, 90d-e, the “misology” passage; See Gordon, 39).

87 These features are on full-display in the Republic. Both Thrasymachus and Polemarchus encounter aporia, and Socrates says that he would prefer Thrasymachus say what he really believes in response to his questions (350e5).

others'--is the ultimate aim of the project of philosophy. These two interpretations are not contradictory. A metaphysical interpretation can accommodate an account of how the philosopher cares for the soul, and a philosopher who makes it his task to care for the soul could possess metaphysical insight. Nonetheless, these two interpretations express requirements about virtue that are difficult to combine. On the metaphysical view, anything short of metaphysical insight into the good seems to imply that whatever virtue one possesses is spurious, whereas on the methodological view, genuine epistemic and dialogical virtues seem to be possible regardless of whether one possesses metaphysical insight, and perhaps even before one could have the metaphysical insight that would make one's virtue non-spurious.89

A final goal for this dissertation is therefore to propose a way in which the Republic might reconcile these interpretations of the Plato's general conception of philosophy. In Chapter 4, I argue that tripartite psychology and the moral project of psychic integration offer the tools for reconciling these interpretations. More specifically, I argue for two points that make this reconciliation possible. First, I argue that tripartite psychology's analysis of the moral virtues in terms of relations between parts of the soul also provides a model for understanding what is virtuous in the dialogical and epistemic practices Plato encourages us to adopt, and in this way provides the materials to explain how the moral virtues are necessary preliminaries to intellectual virtues. Second, I argue that an interest in metaphysical insight must arise from within the project of psychic integration, because the logistikon's power of hypothesizing threatens the success of this

89 Cf. Annas, who argues that moral virtues are necessary in order for a person to even be interested in the form (Introduction, 237). Iakovos Vasiliou rightly disputes the strictness of the condition that the metaphysical interpretation places on the possession of true virtue (From Phaedo to the Republic” in Plato and the Divided Self; ed. Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan and Charles Brittain [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012], 20-22).
project. I propose that this interest in metaphysical insight is spurred by an aspect of dianoia, or mathematical thinking, already present in tripartite psychology.
Chapter II: A Provocative-Aporetic Reading of Republic 1: Defining the Technē Model of Justice

The purpose of this chapter is to carry out a provocative-aporetic reading of Book I of the Republic. In what follows, I argue that an unacknowledged dispute between two conceptual models of justice causes the aporia that Polemarchus and Thrasymachus encounter in their separate conversations with Socrates. The model to which Polemarchus and Thrasymachus subscribe I call the “technē model” of justice, while the model to which Socrates subscribes I call the “virtue model” of justice. Both models say something about (a) what justice is and (b) what kinds of beings agents are such that they have either a use or a need for justice. By the end of the chapter, I will define the governing assumptions of these two models, as well as of their corresponding notions of agency. On my reading of Book I, Socrates refutes both Polemarchus' and Thrasymachus' variations of the technē model of justice by showing that justice cannot be what they claim it is in light of their commitments regarding (c) the ways that agents relate to knowledge and (d) the kinds of knowledge that agents draw upon for action. Finally, I shall argue that while Socrates' concluding proposal of a virtue model of justice results in aporia, this aporia is provocative rather than negative: Socrates' proposal exhibits the third aspect of mimetic irony by foreshadowing key moments in the overall argument of the Republic--such as the city-soul analogy and tripartite psychology--which help establish the virtue model of justice. For this reason we ought to carefully study the emergence of the technē model of justice in order to understand what aspects of the technē model Socrates' later arguments address.
§1. Elenchos of Polemarchus: the Origins of the Technē Model of Justice

The technē or craft analogy likens virtue to the kind of knowledge and reasoning a craftsman might use to create a product. A craft defines for a craftsman what the product is, what materials should be used, and what guidelines the craftsman should follow to reliably produce that product. Thus the craftsman primarily exercises instrumental reasoning, since the means are the focus of his reasoning. Knowledge or expertise on this model consists in the ability to reason well about the means and to reliably produce the product of the respective technē. As an analogy for virtue, the craft metaphor suggests that virtue consists in the application of certain guidelines to certain materials in order to produce an action that is virtuous.90 A person earns the characteristic virtue (courage, justice, etc.) as an epithet if he can follow these guidelines in the right way and produce reliably virtuous actions.

The technē model of justice first appears when Polemarchus agrees that justice is “giving any individual what is appropriate for him” (...τοῦτ’ εἴη δίκαιον, τὸ προσῆκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, 332c1-2). It is Socrates’ initiative which connects the idea of “the appropriate” (τὸ προσῆκον) with methods in the arts (τέχναι), such as “medicine” (ἰατρική, 332c5) and “cooking” (μαγειρική, 332d1). Two terms appear to determine the

90 There is a well-established line of interpretation concerning Plato’s use of the craft analogy in the Republic. Irwin argues that Plato introduces the craft analogy in Book I for the purpose of rejecting it later. He interprets this rejection as an indication that the craft analogy was a Socratic thesis which Plato found implausible by the time he wrote the Republic. On this line of interpretation, the problem of akrasia offers the primary reason for rejecting the craft analogy. The craft analogy comes with certain psychological assumptions, for example, that happiness is the determinate end which all men seek, and about which there is no disagreement (Socratic eudaimonism); that virtue is the means to achieving happiness; and that ignorance of these means is the of vice and unhappiness (Socratic intellectualism). Akrasia is impossible on this account because knowledge is the primary psychological motivator, and is therefore sufficient for achieving the aim of happiness. See Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 6-10; 166-172; Brickhouse & Smith, “Reply to Rowe” in The Journal of Ethics, Vol.16, No.3 (September 2012): 327-328. For a detailed treatment of varieties of Socratic intellectualism, see Rowe, “Socrates on Reason, Appetite, and Passion: A Response to Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology, in The Journal of Ethics 16, No.3 (September 2012): 305-324.
“appropriate” in the practice of a technē: the “what” (τί) that the art gives that is due or appropriate, and the recipient (τίσιν) of the thing given. For example, in medicine the recipient is the body, and the things given are “drugs and food and drink” (332c6-7). By defining technai according to their distinctive “gifts” and “recipients,” Socrates is able to ask what gifts and recipients make justice a technē. Polemarchus replies in a way that retains the gift-recipient paradigm: justice gives benefits to friends and injuries to enemies. In light of Polemarchus' parentage, this definition of justice is unsurprising. Cephalus—his father—was an arms manufacturer who supplied the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. Polemarchus' definition of justice is thus shaped by his father's ideals and his experience in business: justice is primarily about maintaining partnerships and stifling competition for the sake of benefit for oneself and one's allies.

Socrates, however, renders the usefulness of justice uncertain by pointing out that help for friends and harm for enemies is best secured by expert practitioners of other technai. For example, a doctor is best for helping a friend who is sick; a ship's captain is best at helping friends who are going on a voyage at sea; the person who knows agriculture is best for helping friends make a livelihood in peacetime. What benefit could justice possibly give, since it seems that other arts already procure most, if not all, of the important benefits for life? Here Polemarchus replies that justice is useful in “contracts,” specifically in the safe-keeping of money and possessions that are not currently in use. In this way Polemarchus limits the technē of justice to helping friends and harming enemies.

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91 Socrates asks [...] ἡ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη ιατρική καλεῖται; “by giving to whom and what thing owed and appropriate, is the art of medicine so-called?” I translate the participle as causative because Socrates appears to be asking what means and what recipient define the art of medicine.

92 [...] ἡ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδοῦσα (332d4-5). The article ἡ refers back to δικαιοσύνη (332d2).

in a very narrow range of activities. In response to this limitation, Socrates makes an observation about the morally-neutral status technical knowledge that prepares the ground for the aoria that Polemarchus will encounter: the same technē that doctors use to heal their friends may also be used to poison their enemies; similarly, the same art that helps the military strategist guard a camp can help him discover weaknesses in the enemy camp. Thus, if a practitioner of the technē of justice can benefit friends by keeping their possessions and money safe, he can harm enemies by having the corresponding expertise about how to steal things that are kept in safety. Thus, Socrates concludes by pointing out that on this line of reasoning, justice must be “some art of stealing” (ἡ δικαιοσύνη [...] κλεπτικὴ τις εἶναι, 334b3-4). For that is what it must be if it is to benefit friends and harm enemies.

On the technē model of justice, agents are portrayed as knowers and users of various skills, whose explicit products are various goods, such as health in the case of medicine and security in the case of military strategy. These technai give agents knowledge about the means to use and the guidelines to follow to produce a good for a certain thing, e.g., health for a human body or security for a city, but the same knowledge can be used to the opposite effect—to bring about what is bad for an object of the technē—by deliberately failing either to use one of the necessary means or to apply the proper guideline to the right circumstances. For example, a doctor might deliberately use an emetic to harm a patient when he ought to use a laxative. But the knowledge of these technai appears to be morally neutral, because according to Polemarchus expertise in the technē requires knowledge of both how to cause both harm and help to the same object:

94 Καὶ περὶ τάλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἑκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρήσιμος (333d6-7); “And in all other things justice is useless in the use of each, but useful in the non-use [of each thing]?”
the exemplar of rational insight is precisely the ability to see the double-edged nature of technical knowledge, and a practitioner would be a deficient knower if he lacked knowledge of how to cause harm with the technē. This understanding of technē is, moreover, necessary to Polemarchus' definition of justice as giving what is due to friends and enemies. For consider a person who lacked insight into the capacity for harm that each technē affords, and used technai only for the good they produce, oblivious to the harm they can cause. Polemarchus would have to admit that such a person would perhaps not make the most useful friend—not because the person lacks moral qualities that are important to friendship, but because he lacks a kind of insight that one would want one's friend to possess, if the goodness of a friend consists also in the ability to harm mutual enemies.

Since the knowledge of technē as Polemarchus construes it is morally neutral, “friend” and “enemy” are the relations that must determine the use of the technē, for otherwise the practitioner will not know whether to use the technē to help or harm in any given situation. “Friend” and “enemy” thus function as coordinating terms that determine when someone should use medicine to poison a rival, and when to use cooking to please a business-partner. But technē plays no role in determining the meanings of these terms.

From the above we have established that the practice of justice as a technē relies on antecedent decisions about who one's friends and enemies are. Socrates proposes that

95 Julia Annas remarks on this feature of technē in Polemarchus' argument, but she fails to notice that Polemarchus must construe technē as double-edged if it is to satisfy the demand that his definition of justice places on individuals, i.e., to help friends and harm enemies (An Introduction to Plato's Republic [New York: Clarendon Press, 1981], 28). Contrast this with Thrasymachus' conception of technē. Thrasymachus agrees with Socrates that every technē seeks the good of the object under its care, but subordinates technē to the self-interested ends of the user (342c-343c). Shepherds kill their sheep not because the art of shepherding includes knowledge of how to harm the sheep, but because the art of shepherding is ultimately subordinate to the self-interested ends of the user.
these decisions in turn rely upon judgments about a person's basic moral character, as we
tend to “think dear” (φιλεῖν, 334c4) those we think are good (χρήστους, 334c4) and
“hate” (μισεῖν, 344c5) those we think are bad (πονηρούς, 334c5). This raises that
possibility that we might be mistaken in our judgments about who is good and who is
bad, and this possibility results in consequences that Polemarchus considers undesirable.
For example, we might wrongly take to be an enemy someone whom we think is bad, but
who really is good. One immediate consequence of this admission is that it would be just
for a person to “benefit the wicked, and harm the good.” Polemarchus refuses to accept
this consequence, so Socrates revises his argument to say that “it must be just to harm the
unjust, and benefit the just.” This revision leads to another consequence Polemarchus
will not accept, because one might be mistaken about the nature of one's friends; for
example, if it turned out that one's judgment about one's friend was incorrect, and one's
friend was actually unjust, then it would be just to harm that friend. This consequence
contradicts Polemarchus' initial assertion that it is just to harm one's enemies and help
one's friends.

What I would like to observe here is that the question as to who one's friends and
enemies are is crucial to understanding the cause of Polemarchus' *aporia* not only
because it reveals that Polemarchus holds unexamined assumptions about who friends
and enemies are, but because it reveals a deeper contradiction in the conception of agents

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96 Εἰκὸς μὲν ἔρη, οὗς ᾧς τε ἐν τις ἠγῆται χρηστοὺς, φιλεῖν, οὗς δ' ᾧς πονηρούς, μισεῖν (334c4-5).
97 Αλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτος, τοὺς μὲν πονηρούς ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν (334c7-d2).
98 Τοὺς ἁδίκους ἀρα, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δίκαιους ὠφελεῖν (334d5-60). Annas also notes
that Polemarchus is upset by the implication that his definition of justice fails to guarantee that just
actions will always be good. Rather than reaching this point by way of the discussion about friends,
however, she reaches it by way of an analysis of *technē* as instrumental, “means-ends” reasoning that
does not distinguish between good and bad ends (Annas, *Introduction*, 28). She suggests that
Polemarchus is shocked by the realization that his definition implies that justice is also an “art of
stealing.” That assessment appears to be correct, but Annas overlooks the more devastating character of
the critique of Polemarchus' assumptions about friends and enemies.
as users of morally-neutral *technē*. Polemarchus initially describes moral agency as an interaction of a particular motivation and type of intelligence. Agents are motivated to increase their own resources and maintain the social capital that gives them access to these resources. Their intelligence consists in an insight into the double-edged nature *technē*, and this insight is necessary for them to actually fulfill the imperative to help their friends and harm their enemies. But when Socrates examines the qualities for which we choose our friends—that we like people we think are good, and dislike people we think are bad—he reveals the possibility that we may be ignorant of what “good” and “bad” mean with reference to persons, and that we *care* about whether our friends are good or bad. In this way Polemarchus admits that one could not be just in circumstances that, for entirely contingent reasons, place one in partnership with bad people and enmity with good people. This admission contradicts the *prima facie* morally-neutral status of the *technē* of justice, because if justice as a *technē* were a morally-neutral form of knowledge, then it would not matter whether one “used” this *technē* to help wicked friends and harm virtuous enemies.

The contradictions to Polemarchus' initial definition that follow from the use of this observation about the possibility of ignorance show that ignorance of “good” and “bad” threatens the very possibility of reliably practicing the *technē* of justice. This shows us that agents on the *technē* model must have both an interest in and access to a type of knowledge that is not a *technē*, viz., knowledge of what makes a person good and what makes a person bad. Without this knowledge, they risk committing injustice. Given this breakdown in the analogy of justice with *technē*, I suggest it is no accident that at this point in the conversation Socrates proposes that justice is a virtue: virtue seems to capture
the orientation toward the good that was absent from Polemarchus' definition of justice. 99 With this proposal, Socrates opens a new set of possible argumentative moves, which may demand actions that contradict Polemarchus' definition of justice according to the technē model. For example, if the technē model is correct, then if I am an accountant and in a position to help my friend become extraordinarily wealthy, then I ought to do so. But concern about whether my friend is a good person might cause me to wonder whether making him extraordinarily wealthy would actually be good for him. Out of concern for the good of my friend, therefore, I might not use my skills in accounting to make him extraordinarily wealthy. This example helps identify what is at stake in Polemarchus' agreeing that justice is a virtue, a premise that Socrates uses to reach a final refutation of Polemarchus' position. 100 Polemarchus agrees that people who have an arete cannot make others worse at the technē in which they have an excellence by means of the very technē at which they are excellent; for example, a musician cannot “by means of music” (τῇ μουσικῇ, 335c5-6) make a person “unmusical,” or worse at music. We should notice something peculiar in Polemarchus' agreement to this claim: he has contradicted his initial presentation of technē as a morally-neutral form of knowledge. Now his claim is that a person who has an arete in a technē cannot use that technē to produce something contrary to that good which the technē is supposed to produce. What has changed

99 Socrates asks Ἀλλ' ἡ δικαισύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή (335с3); “Isn't justice a human virtue?” Annas puzzles over Polemarchus' acceptance of the premise that justice is a virtue and that what is good can cause no harm (Introduction, 32-34). But it is easily explained if we attend to the problem that the question of friends and enemies raises for Polemarchus. C.D.C Reeve notices a common strategy in Socrates' use of the craft analogy in his elenchoi. He argues that the elenchos has the following form: “(1) Socrates and his interlocutor assume that the conventionally recognized virtue under discussion is also a genuine virtue. (2) They conclude either that it is a craft or that it is good, admirable, and self-beneficial. (3) Socrates argues that if the virtue is what the interlocutor says it is, either it lacks some feature that the crafts possess, or it is not good, admirable, or self-beneficial. (4) The interlocutor is refuted” (Philosopher Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1988], 4). The devastating effect of problem of ignorance of “good” and “bad” with reference to persons suggests that something like this strategy may be operative in the elenchos of Polemarchus.

100 335c4
Polemarchus' mind in this matter appears to be his acknowledgment that justice is a virtue. Polemarchus may accept this claim because justice is conventionally named as a virtue; however, I suggest that the preceding discussion concerning friends and enemies has influenced his thinking. Virtue captures the concern that people have for the good as something that orients their conduct, and it is this concern that peeks through Polemarchus' unwillingness to accept the implication that a just person might, in doing justice, harm a good person.\textsuperscript{101}

§2. First Elenchos of Thrasymachus: Reasserting the Technē Model of Justice

Thrasymachus provides the first illustration in the \textit{Republic} of someone who has an affective response to \textit{aporia}. Plato likens him to a “wild beast” springing at its prey,\textsuperscript{102} and he appears angry at the way Socrates has led Polemarchus around in circles in the search for justice. Although the \textit{aporia} is not Thrasymachus' own \textit{aporia}, but Polemarchus', Thrasymachus expresses a reaction that might be typical for an interlocutor who experiences his own \textit{aporia}: anger at the person who led him into this condition. Although Thrasymachus initially plays coy, it soon becomes apparent that he wants to propose his own definition of justice, one that will remove the \textit{aporia} that resulted from the conversation he just witnessed between Socrates and Polemarchus. In the following, I will argue that Thrasymachus tries to remove this \textit{aporia} by reasserting the technē model's notion of agency, which Socrates had made dubious in his conversation with

\textsuperscript{101}Annas faults Socrates for this final argument because it requires that (a) we construe justice as a power, much like heat, that cannot produce its opposite, and (b) other crafts be “examples of skills which are impartible and can be passed over from one person to another without regard for any motivation other than the sharing of the requisite common aim” (\textit{Introduction}, 33). I agree with her assessment of the argument, but I suggest that we should draw the conclusion that the difficulties follow because the technē model of justice is inadequate for the inquiry into justice, not because Socrates is deliberately equivocating.

\textsuperscript{102}[…] ὥσπερ θηρίον ἤκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς (336b5)
Polemarchus. Thrasymachus reasserts the *technē* model of justice by raising a skeptical objection against Socrates' claim that justice is a virtue. The argument on which Thrasymachus' objection rests can be put quite simply: the just person harms himself and helps others (primarily the rulers), while the unjust person helps himself and harms others; if justice were a virtue or an excellence, it would not harm its possessor; therefore, justice cannot be a virtue. Thus, in Thrasymachus' opinion, there is nothing particularly impressive or excellent about just people; to the contrary, he argues that they are simple-minded dupes who serve the interests of another person (the ruler)--and there is nothing particularly *kalon* about that.

As we shall see, the set of considerations that leads Thrasymachus to argue that the unjust person helps himself concerns precisely (a) the type of knowledge and insight the unjust person has and (b) the nature of rational action as such.

To raise this skeptical objection, however, Thrasymachus must lay the political and psychological foundations that make it plausible. The distinctness of these points is unfortunately complicated by the fact that he appears to change his position as Socrates questions him. First, he says that justice is the “interest of the stronger,” a definition...

103 [...] οἱ δ’ ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνου ξιμφέρον κρείτοννος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἑκείνον ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν (343c5-d2). “…the ruled do the advantage of that person who is strong, and make him happy by serving him, but make themselves not at all [happy].”

104 This becomes apparent when Thrasymachus claims that the tyrant brings himself the “greatest happiness” through unjust actions, and the “greatest misery” to those who suffer his actions (344a).

105 Another way of putting the question is whether Thrasymachus is a conventionalist or an immoralist. The point of dispute between these two readings concerns the meaning of the terms “just” and “unjust,” and whether actions which are called just or unjust are so *really* or apparently. Support for reading him as a conventionalist is found in Thrasymachus’ first definition of justice: justice is simply conformity to the laws, and there is no non-conventional (e.g., natural, deontological) source of approbation of characteristically just actions. Support for the immoralist reading is found in Thrasymachus' second definition, where injustice is said to be more profitable than injustice. On this view, just and unjust actions have some distinction and basis in nature, but unjust actions just turn out to be more advantageous profitable for the agent who performs them. For a discussion of conventionalism and immoralism, see Annas, *Introduction*, 36-37; For an argument that these options are not mutually exclusive, see McCoy, *Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists* (New York: Cambridge...
that he proposes on the basis of observing the politics of city-states; later he claims that injustice is “more profitable” than justice, and that the unjust person is happier than the just person. Since the first definition concerns the relation of rulers to the ruled in communities, while the second concerns the welfare of the individual person, it seems that Thrasymachus is simply talking about two different things. Moreover, the first claim appears to be descriptive, while the second appears to be normative, offering a recommendation for how one ought to live if one wants to live well. Consequently, some scholars have argued that Thrasymachus' view is actually incoherent, since he seems to be talking about two different things. I shall argue that Thrasymachus in fact offers a logically consistent view in which the political and psychological underpinnings of his objection mutually reinforce each other. On my analysis the problem with Thrasymachus' view is not logical inconsistency, but its reliance on a false description of agency—a description that Socrates in the remainder of the Republic endeavors to overturn.

The political aspect of Thrasymachus' objection appears in his first definition of justice, i.e., that “justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger.” When pressed to explain what he means, Thrasymachus offers what appears to be simply a description of what is common to all types of political regimes: in aristocracies, democracies, and oligarchies, the rulers fashion the laws for their own advantage and interest, and “make it clear that what is an advantage for themselves, the rulers, is what is

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University Press, 2008), 112-113.
106 [...] φήμι γὰρ ἐγώ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον, (338c1-2).
107 Annas holds this view, saying that “His [Thrasymachus'] real position is the immoralist one, but he begins by stating it in a confused way which appears to lead to conventionalism, and Socrates' initial arguments are directed at making him clarify what he really holds and reveal it as immoralism” (Introduction, 37).
108 [...] φήμι γὰρ ἐγώ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον (338c1-2).
just for the ruled.” Superficially, Thrasymachus appears to be offering a merely descriptive thesis. Gerasimos Santas describes Thrasymachus' method as an “empirical generalization” of the trends observed in the “aims of the laws and the motives and practices of the legislators in each state.” Santas is correct in characterizing the way that Thrasymachus reaches his definition as a type of “empirical generalization,” a description of trends he has observed in other poleis. Where he errs, however, is in attributing to Thrasymachus “the assumption that the positive laws of a state determine completely what justice is in that state.” This assumption does not seem to me to accurately characterize Thrasymachus' view of the laws in poleis. It is crucial to note here that Thrasymachus also says that justice is “for the ruled” when he is asked to explain himself, as this clarification indicates that, in his view, justice describes a power differential that separates rulers from ruled. Positive (written, institutionalized) laws are one manifestation of this power dynamic, but unwritten, conventional morality is just as much a part of this power dynamic. Thrasymachus thus maintains a sharp distinction between the rulers and the ruled as far as the behavior of each is concerned. Justice is “for the ruled” in the sense that the subjects must comply with the laws on pain of being

109[...] θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, το σφίσι ξυμφέρον (338e3-4).
111Santas, Understanding Plato's Republic, 18.
112I disagree primarily with Gerasimos Santas in my interpretation here. Santas suggests that Thrasymachus offers an “empirical generalization” of all the different types of constitutions, and draws the conclusion that, simply as a matter of fact, the rulers of every sort of regime behave in this way (Understanding Plato's Republic, 17). From this point in Thrasymachus' argument, Santas infers that “this argument reveals a method for finding out what justice is: on the assumption that the positive laws of a state determine completely what justice is in that state, the method consists in an empirical investigation of the aims of the laws and the motives and practices of legislators in each state, and then generalizing from the results to what is common to the justice of all states” (18). While it is certainly true that Thrasymachus makes an empirical generalization, Santas imposes a notion of justice alien to Thrasymachus' view when he says that Thrasymachus works from the “assumption that the positive laws of a state determine completely what justice is in that state.” What Santas fails to notice here is that justice is for the ruled and not, a feature of the laws themselves. He makes the mistake, however, of thinking that Thrasymachus conceives of justice as a feature of the laws themselves.
punished; justice is “the advantage of the stronger” in the sense that the rulers derive benefits from the *obedience of their subjects* to laws, while rulers themselves—as Thrasymachus will later celebrate—are free from any constraints the laws might put on their behavior. Both aspects of the definition are necessary to describe a power dynamic that Thrasymachus thinks obtains in any *polis* where there is a distinction between ruler and ruled.

But is Thrasymachus' initial definition of justice solely a descriptive “empirical generalization”? Although it does not appear immediately from the first set of exchanges between Socrates and Thrasymachus, I suggest that the first definition in fact contains a prescription: fashioning the laws so as to be advantageous to themselves is not only how rulers tend act, but how they *ought* to act. Although this dimension will not come into full view until we examine the exchanges in Socrates' *elenchos*, at the very least we can observe how Thrasymachus later admits that what makes these rulers happy are the *liberties* they have to commit crimes, amass wealth and luxuries, and get away with the crimes by convincing their subjects that they have done something *just*. In other words, injustice is not only politically expedient, but also brings personal happiness. Even if Thrasymachus' empirical generalization is false—as Santas suggests it is113—and it turns out that as a matter of fact rulers in most regimes tend to legislate for the good of the governed, or at least not exclusively for their own advantage, Thrasymachus can still reply that these people are not ruling as they *ought* to rule, because they fail to secure their own happiness in some way. Thus, Thrasymachus' claim that only rulers who practice injustice on a “mass scale” can properly be considered happy bestows the first

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113 Santas argues that the generalization might be false of participatory democracies, where in a sense everyone is a ruler and everyone is ruled (*Understanding Plato's Republic*, 18).
definition with normative force. Any ruler who really knows what he's about—

Thrasymachus can reply—will choose to rule in the way that he has described, by making laws in his advantage and deceiving the populace into the belief that obeying these laws is just.

Thrasymachus reasserts the *technē* model of justice when he responds to Socrates' challenge that rulers sometimes make mistakes about what laws will be to their advantage. If justice is for the subjects to comply with the laws regardless of the actual consequence of those laws for the rulers, then justice will not also bring advantage of the stronger in cases where the ruler is mistaken. Thrasymachus must respond to this challenge by explaining what sort of knowledge rulers draw upon so as to avoid mistakes. Thus we find ourselves reconsidering essential features of agency: what kinds of knowledge agents draw upon, and how this knowledge determines what kinds of actions they perform. Thrasymachus begins his response by clarifying what makes someone both *stronger* and a *ruler*. Digging in his heels, he replies “do you think that I call 'stronger' the person who makes a mistake, whenever he makes a mistake?” Thrasymachus appears to draw some connection between strength and knowledge. In drawing this association between strength and knowledge, however, Thrasymachus places a crucial demand on the conversation, one that remains operative throughout the entirety of Socrates' *elenchos*. He and Socrates are to think technical knowledge “in precise language” (κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, 340e2), by imagining agents as idealized users who adhere both perfectly and exclusively to the constitutive norms of the *technē*

114 [...] ἀλλὰ κρείττω μὲ οἴει καλεῖν τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνη, (340e6-7).
they practice. To explain his meaning, Thrasymachus resorts to examples of practitioners of different arts, such as a doctor or an accountant. We do not attribute such titles to people in virtue of the mistakes they make. “The person who makes a mistake makes a mistake,” he explains, “when his knowledge fails him, at which point he is not a practitioner of his skill.”\footnote{[…] ἐπιλιποῦσης γαρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός, (340e4-5).} If the same relation between expertise and title holds in the case of the strong, then the implication with respect to rulers must be that only those who are stronger in virtue of a technē that gives them political insight are properly qualified as rulers. For ease of reference, let us refer to this technē as the politikē technē, or the “political art.”\footnote{Reeve also construes the rule-qualifying knowledge as knowledge of a craft, but he does not name this craft the πολιτκή τέχνη (Philosopher Kings, 12).}

Posing knowledge of the political art as the condition that makes a person stronger puts Thrasymachus' conception of who rulers are in a new light, as it appears to rely on an implicit distinction between rightful rulers and de-facto rulers.\footnote{See also Santas, Understanding Plato's Republic, 20. Santas notices the same distinction and correctly points out the ambiguity about who the stronger are in Thrasymachus' theory. Are the stronger merely the de facto political authorities at any given moment? Or are the stronger, as Thrasymachus suggests here, those intelligent enough to judge which laws will be in their advantage, regardless of whether these individuals hold authority? Cf. Weiss, who argues that by “stronger” Thrasymachus just means whoever happens to have political power (“Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2, 94).} For example, a ruler or ruling party in a state might have the political and military power to rule securely, yet lack the knowledge that Thrasymachus says is necessary to make them strong in the sense he means. Conversely, an individual might possess the knowledge or wisdom of the politikē technē that makes him strong in Thrasymachus' sense, yet lack the political or military power that would secure his rule. Thus, what makes a person strong is not merely power, whether it be military, political, or some other type; rather, Thrasymachus appears to be suggesting that knowledge of some kind of politikē technē is
what makes an individual “truly” strong, and thus qualified to rule. Unless Thrasymachus is simply misspeaking, we must acknowledge this implication of his use of the technē model to describe political wisdom.

The claim that knowledge of the politikē technē qualifies a person for rule by providing him with strength offers yet another indication that agency is a central, if unacknowledged, point of dispute in Book I. Thrasymachus appears to deny (or at least demote to a secondary status) that conventional indicators of political strength—such as military power, wealth, reputation, and birth—bestow rule-qualifying strength. The reason for this denial may simply be that these indicators are often distributed arbitrarily, to individuals who lack political wisdom, while knowledge is essential to agency as such. People can receive indicators of power by chance, whereas their possession of knowledge seems to be something achieved through their own effort. The suggestion that we think of rulers as “stronger” on analogy with knowledgeable practitioners (δημιουργός, 340e5) of different technai (ιατρόν 340d3; λογιστικόν, 340d4) also provides a model for thinking about what role justice has in the application of rule-qualifying knowledge, i.e., the politikē technē. Specifically, I suggest it implies a commitment to what I call the “artificiality thesis,” or the view that nomoi are not worthy of moral respect because they are artifacts. Rulers, like doctors and accountants, have knowledge of certain principles by which they correctly determine the laws that will be to their advantage. Successfully implementing the advantageous law requires the use of justice, since the subjects must be persuaded to obey such a law and not rebel. Thus, on the technē model, rulers use justice in the same way that a doctor might apply a balm to lessen the pain of some other treatment. That is to say, on the technē model, justice is a kind of product and instrument
that rulers knowledgeable about politikē technē both create and use. “Rightful” rulers are those who possess the knowledge of how to use justice to dupe their subjects into believing that it is just for them to obey the law and that the laws are fair; though they, from their “enlightened” perspective, know justice is more like a poison for keeping the ruled in ignorance about the truth of justice. If “justice” refers to the conviction that subjects have in their obligation to obey the rulers, then Thrasymachus' position is that this belief is an artifact, a tool that rulers use to manipulate subjects. Only the “simpletons” believe that the laws express real obligations. Finally, we can note a return to the portrait of agency that we received from Polemarchus: agents are users of a kind of knowledge (technē). But unlike Polemarchus, Thrasymachus does not posit “friend” and “enemy” as relational terms that would determine the specific use of the technē. Instead, a fundamentally exploitative relation between ruler and ruled determines those for whom the technē is a help and those for whom it is a harm.

Another implicit distinction that arises from making knowledge of the politikē technē a qualification for rule is that between the ignorant and the wise, the gullible “simpletons” and the enlightened. As a matter of necessity, some—indeed most—people must take the laws seriously; if everyone treated justice as an artifact and instrument, then there would be neither subjects to speak of, nor any place for rulers of the sort

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118Thrasymachus is a conventionalist, but in a limited sense. He is a conventionalist—i.e., believes that just behavior is that defined by the laws—about one aspect of justice, i.e., that justice is obeying the laws. If one of the laws is “subjects must obey the laws!” then Thrasymachus can be a conventionalist about that law, since he can maintain that it is one that rulers invent, and that obeying it grants subjects the title “just.” But, as we shall see, this does not require him to be a conventionalist about pleonetic actions; some actions really are pleonetic, not by convention, but by nature. The question that decides whether Thrasymachus is an immoralist is whether pleonetic actions are really unjust (immoralism), or only apparently unjust (conventionalism). But here Thrasymachus isn't talking about pleonetic action; he has in mind only the belief that subjects have in their obligation to obey the laws. That obligation, he suggests here, has no basis in nature.

119This view of the artificiality of justice forms the basis of what I will later call the “artificiality thesis.”
Thrasymachus has in mind. That Thrasymachus holds this distinction finds confirmation at two moments. The first is when he admits that the person who practices injustice is happiest. That is to say, Thrasymachus actually esteems the life of injustice when he insists that selfishness and injustice “on a mass scale” earn tyrants the titles “happy” and “blessed.” In order for the tyrant to be able to act as he does, some people must either believe that justice is obeying the laws, or at least be too afraid to disobey. The second moment occurs when Thrasymachus flouts the traditional associations of wisdom and goodness with justice, claiming instead that injustice is “good judgment” (εὐβουλίαν, 348d1), while justice is “noble simple-mindedness” (γενναίαν εὐήθειαν, 348d2). To be a ruler after Thrasymachus' manner, one must be among the “enlightened” who know that in fact they practice injustice, and in fact “injustice is profitable and advantage for oneself,” though as a matter of necessity one must conceal one's injustice with the justice in which only “simpletons” believe.

Although Thrasymachus' initial intention was to offer a simple and universal definition of justice in political regimes, Socrates' elenchos uncovered a number of crucial, though unstated, commitments that Thrasymachus has concerning governance and political wisdom. Socrates began by offering a counterexample to Thrasymachus' first definition in the form of cases where rulers are mistaken about their advantage, and their subjects obey. In that case, justice would not be the advantage of the stronger.

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120 Reeve captures this point well by describing Thrasymachus' position as “an insightful theory of the polis as a kind of exploitation machine in which both social behaviour and the standards by which it is evaluated are arranged by those who have the power to rule so as to benefit themselves” (Philosopher Kings, 15).

121 [... ἥ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ (344a5).

122 [... ἐυδαιμόνες καὶ μακάριοι κύκληγαται (344b7-c1).

123 [...] τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἐαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ἐξιμήρεσον (344c7-8). For a similar remark about the enlightened status of the unjust, see also Weiss, “Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2,” 94; 97.
Thrasy

Thrasy

Thrasy

§3. Second Elenchos of Thrasy: Instrumental Normativity and Enlightened Self-Interest

Before proceeding with Socrates' more sophisticated elenchoi, we should consider what options are available for a critique of Thrasy's position. First, one could question whether knowledge of the political art entails strength in the sense that Thrasymachus means, i.e., as the right to assert an exploitative relation to ruled. Second, one could question whether the agent actually receives the sort of advantage or benefit

124Reeve reaches a similar conclusion, though he emphasizes the pleonktic desire of the ruler Thrasy idealizes as that around which Thrasymachus constructs his politics (Philosopher Kings, 15).
that Thrasymachus claims the agent will receive when he treats justice as an instrument. Socrates pursues both strategies in his *elenchoi*. In likening rulers to practitioners of a *technē* (e.g., the *politikē téchnη*) who use justice in the same manner that doctors use medicine, Thrasymachus opens his position up to the first possible critique. Socrates begins by pointing out that every *technē*, strictly speaking, seeks the good of the object under its care.125 Doctors, for example, consider only what is good for the patient; they make the patient's body stronger, not themselves. Similarly, horse-trainers make horses strong and healthy, not themselves. If the generalization holds, then the implication will be that the *politikē technē* strictly speaking, prioritizes the good of the ruled, not the ruler.126 Thus, rulers who know the *politikē technē* would be wiser, but not “stronger” in the sense Thrasymachus means; nor would justice be the “advantage of the stronger,” since rulers would not be “stronger,” and the ruled would be the beneficiaries.

If this line of reasoning is correct, then *technai* do not give strength to their practitioners, but rather to the objects under their care. Of course, Thrasymachus might define strength as the insight into the “double-edged” nature of *technē*, as in Socrates’ conversation with Polemarchus: *technē* gives ability to hurt and harm, and strength is simply the possession of this double power. But Socrates’ *elenchos* here can block this response with the point he makes about the success conditions and constitutive norms of *technai* in general.127 *Technai* have specific materials and products: a doctor works on

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125[...]* Οὐδὲ ἄλλη τέχνη οὐδεμία ἑαυτῇ οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν* (342c2-3): “Nor does any other art need in addition [the advantage] for itself, but rather for that thing of which it is a *technē*.”

126 A conclusion Socrates draws when he says that “no one in any position of rule, to the extent that he is ruling, seeks out or imposes the advantage for himself, but rather the advantage for the person ruled and for whatever thing he crafts.” [...]* οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδείς ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ ἁργῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, τὸ αὐτῷ ἐξωμερόν σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὸ ἄργομένον καὶ ὃ ἃν αὐτός ἐξιστήριον* (342e5-7).

127 A point Socrates makes when he defines the *technē* of the doctor in the “exact sense.” Socrates points out that “it has been agreed that the exact [ ἀκριβὴς] doctor is an authority over bodies, but not a
bodies and tries to produce health in them; the cook works on food and tries to make it pleasant to taste, etc. The practitioner of the technē then uses the principles of the technē to bring about what is good for the product, not for himself. For example, when a watch breaks, a person will bring it to the watch-maker to restore, or make the watch whole again. The person who knows a technē but who uses it to harm or destroy the object of proper care isn't really using the technē when he destroys or harms the object. The fact that it often requires very little skill to harm or destroy anything provides some evidence that this is true. And if no technical skill is required to harm and destroy objects that fall under the care of distinct technai, then technai do not bestow strength in the “double” sense, since the technē simply does not bestow the power to harm and destroy.

Thrasymachus replies by pointing out that no one adheres strictly to the constitutive norms of the technai he or she practices: the doctor must make a living, and shepherds slaughter their sheep. The essence of this reply is that the interests of human life take precedence over the constitutive norm of any particular technē. Ultimately, technai serve the purposes and the interests of the user—for what other reason would humans invent technai than their own benefit? This sort of reply should be familiar by now; the resemblance it bears to Polemarchus' answers is unmistakable. Like Polemarchus, Thrasymachus is simply stressing the priority of the ends of the user of any technē. The various technai themselves may have certain constitutive norms, but the

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*businessman.* ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβὴς ἰατρὸς σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής, 342d5-6). By differentiating the doctor from other craftsmen, Socrates seems to be making the point that technai have constitutive norms of their own. Failing to act in accordance with those norms entails that one is simply not practicing the technē one took one's to be practicing. Defining the constitutive norms of technē in general is quite difficult. One of the main distinctions that a definition must address is that between doing an activity poorly and simply failing to do the activity; for example, the difference between playing chess badly and failing to play chess at all. It is not necessary for my purposes to resolve this difference, however, because what is more important is seeking “the advantage for oneself” is definitely not a constitutive norm of the technai Socrates mentions. 128343b1-2.
interests of the user eventually defeat these norms. Although he does not exploit this line of reasoning, Thrasymachus could make an even more radical claim: on the technē model, no one can practice perfect justice because the interests of life eventually require the betrayal of the constitutive norms of other distinct technai. Enlightened rulers simply draw this insight to its logical extreme. They realize that selfish interests—and hence injustice—must take precedence over the constitutive norms of any particular technē, so that these norms do not inspire any unconditional respect by themselves. Enlightenment thus consists in being honest with oneself about the ultimate priority of self-interest, in addition to having knowledge about the true benefit of injustice.

Happiness enters Thrasymachus' argument about the superiority of injustice by way of this claim about enlightened self-interest. Thrasymachus presents several lines of evidence to suggest that those who practice injustice—enlightened rulers in particular—are alone truly happy. First, he argues that the “just man has less than the unjust in every situation.” In contracts, for example, he says that the unjust person always comes out with more than the just person. Although Thrasymachus is unclear about why he thinks this is the case, Socrates' earlier allusion to the Odyssey might be of some help, where Odysseus' grandfather Autolykos is said to have “exceeded men in stealing and oaths” (ὁς ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκεστο κλεπτοσύνῃ ὁρκῷ τε, Od., 19.395-396). To interpret this line in a way that conforms with Socrates' conclusion that justice was an “art of stealing,” we might imagine that Autolykos exceeded other men “in oaths” by negotiating agreements in such a way that he always managed to get a “greater share” for himself than might be considered fair, or in such a way that he could avoid fulfilling his promises. So too with

129[...] δίκαιος ἀνήρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει (343d3). A loose translation of πανταχοῦ, but appropriate to the context.
130In his conversation with Polemarchus (334b1-3). Socrates alludes to Odyssey 19.395-396.
the just man when it comes to contracts.

Second, Thrasyphuchus argues that the unjust person benefits more than the just person when holding political office because the just person's "personal property falls into a sorry state because of his neglect, and on account of his being a just man he receives no benefit from public funds." In other words, it is the just person's unwillingness to embezzle money and accept bribes which allegedly puts him in a worse financial position, and thus makes him less happy. Finally, Thrasyphuchus says that the unjust person has "the opposite" (τἀναντία, 343e7) of all the disadvantages that the just person has. He then describes the unjust person as "the one able to pleonekteĩn on a mass scale," and attributes this behavior to the tyrant. Because this person is willing to commit injustice, he embezzles funds, accepts bribes, and steals from others in order to benefit himself. If he does not, then he will suffer the disadvantages that the just person suffers. Thus, the "enlightened" perspective of the unjust person is an essential feature of Thrasyphuchus' view. Doing work in political office, such as taking care of budgets and so forth, might benefit other people, but only a fool would practice justice while doing unpaid work, and positively harm himself; hence Thrasyphuchus' view that the just person is clueless about what his real interests are.

Socrates responds to this assertion of the priority of self-interest by trying to account for self-beneficial activity in terms of the technē model, so as to avoid the problem that agents will always be unjust for seeking their own advantage contrary to the

131 [...] τά γε οἰκεία δι’ ἀμέλειαν μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὑφελεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι [...]  
132 Thrasyphuchus says that the unjust person has "the opposite" (τἀναντία, 343e7) of all the disadvantages that the just person has. He clarifies by saying that he means "just the person I was now talking about, the one able to pleonekteĩn on a mass scale" (λέγω γὰρ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν, 344a1).
they practice. He proposes that self-beneficial and self-interested actions are accounted for by the practice of a distinct technē—the “art of earning a wage” (τὴν μισθωτικήν, 346b6). In this way Socrates can acknowledge that people make their livelihoods by practicing various technai, but still maintain that the technai they practice benefit solely the objects under their care. Socrates then uses on this distinction to argue that the politikē technē does not of itself benefit its practitioner. Proof of this, he says, lies in the fact that rulers demand payment for their services, and there is a penalty on others who refuse to partake in ruling. Moreover, the reluctance many people have to holding political office attests to fact that ruling—in the “precise” sense—consists in doing what is good for someone else. Governing is difficult; far easier is letting others govern while enjoying the benefits of social order for oneself.

There is something quite awkward in Socrates' reply, though Thrasymachus apparently lacks the argumentative finesse to point out the problem. To begin, the misthōtikē technē functions as a counterexample to Socrates' own principle that no technē benefits its practitioner. Moreover, the proposal does not escape the question of the prioritization of the ends that individuals will pursue as practitioners of multiple technai. Thus Thrasymachus could reply, “yes, Socrates, you have discovered exactly what I mean. In any pursuit, the misthōtikē technē trumps the constitutive norms of other technai. Rulers do things for the benefit of the ruled to the extent that is practically necessary. They sponsor festivals and give other sorts of pleasures to the citizens in order to maintain the illusion that they govern with a view to the good of the governed; but in reality they maintain their own interests. Eventually the interests of the user supersede the

133 347a.
134 I Rely on Reeve's insight for this point (Philosopher Kings, 19).
constitutive norms of any technē he may use. And what this means is that only self-interest, only one's own desires and aims, deserve unconditional respect.” As a matter of practical necessity, people eventually betray the constitutive norms of the activities in which they engage for the sake of benefiting themselves; that is, all normativity is ultimately instrumental to selfish ends. This is what the enlightened ruler realizes about justice: it has no unconditional claim upon him, but rather is another instrument for manipulating other people. Thus, Socrates' use of the μισθωτική τέχνη does not address the problem that, in Thrasymachus' view, this activity always eventually takes priority over other activities, whether people admit it or not.

Even if Thrasymachus has a decent reply at his disposal, Socrates' point nonetheless reveals an important limitation on the notion of agency that Thrasymachus assumes. This limitation is revealed in the awkwardness of the proposal of the misthōtikē technē. In likening self-care and self-benefiting activity to a technē, we are encouraged to view self-benefiting goods as sort of consumable product, and ourselves as consumers. Every other technē produces some effect in some object by means of certain instruments; thus, if self-beneficial activity is a technē, then it must construe agents as beings that utilize certain means to produce some state in themselves. Seasoned readers of the Republic should recognize the assumptions that accompany the technē model of agency as the very terms of dispute of the dialogue: what state is good to produce (e.g., pleasure or psychic equilibrium?), and what goods produce it (e.g., money, honor, or wisdom?) Is

135Reeve is correct to identify the “art of wage-earning” as a counterexample to Socrates' first principle about technē, but he errs in thinking that Socrates' position is untenable because he neglects the governing role that technē model plays in Book I. The awkwardness of Socrates' proposal lies in the fact that the technē analogy is not the correct model for thinking about self-beneficial activity, the goods of human life and how one acquires them—in short, agency itself. In other words, Socrates' initial principle about technē is true, and there can be no technē that benefits its practitioners. But if we are interested in learning what kind of knowledge, goods, and activities are needed to benefit ourselves, then the technē model cannot properly account for our agency.
the part of the self that “uses” the means the same as that which benefits? What is being benefited when I say that I am being benefited? One goal of Plato's argument—which I intend to spell out—in the Republic is to disabuse us of the view that self-beneficial activity is primarily consumption by proposing an alternative conception of self-beneficial activity as psychic equilibrium. Although the reasons for favoring this alternative are not yet apparent, we can see how the questions that the Republic sets out to answer arise from shortcomings with the technē model of justice as early as Book I.

§4. Third Elenchos of Thrasymachus: Pleonexia as the Psychological Foundation of Happiness

In response to Socrates' second elenchos, Thrasymachus tried to maintain his position by arguing that an agent enlightened about the true source of normativity would practice injustice: self-interest eventually supersedes all other activities that may require one to temporarily suspend self-benefiting actions for the sake of actions that promote some other good (as in the practice of a technē). He developed this claim from the kernel of the idea that justice is the product of a technē—the art of ruling, or the politikē technē—and thus has the status of an artifact for human use. Since the aims and interests of the user eventually supersedes the constitutive norms of the tool, the only ends that can have unconditional value are the user's own aims and interests, whatever they may be. In Thrasymachus' view, these realizations amount to a kind of wisdom, and thus explain his insistence throughout Book I that injustice is knowledge and wisdom. In the third

136Reeve has argued that Socrates actually makes a mistake in suggesting the “wage-making art,” since this art serves as a counterexample to Socrates' own principle that no art benefits its practitioner (Philosopher Kings, 19). While Reeve is correct to point out the awkwardness of Socrates suggestion, he misses the insight that an investigation into the cause of this “awkwardness” can reveal. The awkwardness of the suggestion results from the limitation of the technē model for accounting for self-beneficial activity, and for all the terms that are assumed in that activity, such as “self” and “benefit.”
elenchos, however, Socrates shows how this claim conflicts with the demand from the first elenchos that they consider agents as idealized users of technai. Taking this demand as premise, Socrates will argue that unjust actions cannot result from knowledge of technē. In this way he will try to show that Thrasymachus' claim that injustice is wisdom is false; to the contrary, it is actually a mode of desire, i.e., pleonexia. As I interpret the third elenchos, I shall argue that the chief point of dispute is whether or not pleonexia is psychologically basic, that is, whether it is both the motivation that explains all other human actions and the mode of desire that brings happiness.

Unfortunately, clarifying what Socrates and Thrasymachus mean by pleonexia and the related phrases “pleon echein” and “pleonektein” presents the greatest challenge for interpreting the third elenchos. Thrasymachus first uses the verb pleonektein to describe the action of the tyrant, the ruler who “is able to get more than his fair share in great things” (τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν, 344a1). In this passage, the verb classifies the unjust action as derivative of a more basic violation of limits or deserved apportion. Pleonexia makes a second appearance in the third elenchos when Socrates asks whether a just man “would think it right to pleonektein an unjust man” (349b2). Thrasymachus replies that even the just person would “think it just and right—but he wouldn't be able to do it” (349b6-7), but that the unjust person would try to pleon echein everyone and think it right to do so.
This response echoes a complaint that Thrasymachus made about those who censure injustice when he was praising the tyrant; namely, that people who censure injustice do so not because they fear committing injustice, but because they fear suffering it. In other words, Thrasymachus' view is that the just person betrays, on account of his cowardice, a desire which he himself both has and considers authentic, i.e., the desire to pleonektein. These two commitments yield the premise that:

The just man does not try to pleonektein what is like him, but only what is unlike him, whereas the unjust man tries to pleonektein both what is like him and what is unlike him.

But in the elenchos that follows, the examples that Socrates uses of practitioners of technai (musicians tuning lyres, doctors) suggest a different sense for the phrase pleonektein. For example, Thrasymachus agrees that if two musicians were tuning lyres, neither would pleonektein the other in the tightening and loosening of the strings. The allows us to construe Thrasymachus as an immoralist as well. For Thrasymachus, pleonectic actions and non-pleonectic actions—actions that result in a greater or a lesser share of the available social goods—correspond to real states of affairs. Moreover, the (alleged) advantages and disadvantages that correspond to having a greater or lesser share are real as well. Thrasymachus is an immoralist because he thinks that pleonectic actions are more profitable for those who perform them, and this profitability provides a non-conventional sanction for those actions. Thus, one ought to perform pleonicectic actions. Of course, this result in a tenuous position in relation to conventionalism, since conventions typically label pleonectic actions “unjust,” and “prohibited.” Thus, Thrasymachus would have to maintain that conventions incorrectly assign prohibitions and approval to pleonectic actions, even though they are the actions one ought to perform. There is, however, a way to reconcile Thrasymachus' views of conventionalism and immoralism by referring to the distinction between the enlightened rulers and the simpleton subjects. For the immoralist the profit, most other people must be conventionalists. Thus, Thrasymachus' view amounts to something like “conventionalism for the many” and “immoralism for the few.”

140 οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι όνειδίζουσιν οἱ όνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν (344c2-4). “Those who censure injustice censure it because they fear suffering injustice, not doing it.”

141 Ο δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἄνομοιο, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἄνομοιο (349d-2). “The just man does not have an advantage over the person like him, but over the person unlike him; but the unjust person has an advantage over the person both unlike him and the person like him.”

142 Δοκεῖ ὁ άγος τίς σοι ὁ ἄριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνήρ ἀρμοτόμενος λόραν ἐθέλειν μουσικοῦ ἄνδρος ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χόρδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἄξιον πλέον ἔχειν (349e5-7). “Does someone seem to you, say a musical man tuning a lyre, willing to have an advantage over a musical man in the tightening
sense of *pleonektein* here appears to be “to have an advantage over,” e.g., as a taller person has an advantage over a shorter person in a race. So, Socrates' claim—to which Thrasymanchus agrees—is that expert practitioners of a *technē* will not have an advantage over other expert practitioners in practicing the activities that define that *technē*. But an expert practitioner of a *technē* will “have an advantage over” (*pleonektein*) a non-practitioner in the activity of the *technē*, because the practitioner knows what he is doing.

Santas argues that Socrates is equivocating in this *elenchos* by using *pleonektein* to include more senses than Thrasymanchus intends. For example, Thrasymanchus agrees when Socrates says that the unjust person “will get the advantage over both the unjust person and [unjust] action, and he will strive so that he himself may take the greatest share of everything.” But this claim concerns primarily the distribution of goods—of which unjust people try to get more than everyone else—while Socrates' claims about musical and non-musical people appear to concern whether a person practices a *technē* well or poorly. Thus, it might be true that a musical person has a *pleonektēma* (advantage) over the non-musical person with respect to the ability to play an instrument, while equally expert musicians lack such a *pleonektēma* over each other, but this sense of *pleonektein* (advantage over someone) is not the same as that which Thrasymanchus meant when he said the unjust person will try to *pleonektein* the unjust person; for when he

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143 This is an argument by analogy and so cannot prove conclusively Socrates' conclusion. But even as an argument by analogy, it seems weak: the main notion Socrates uses, to outdo or overreach (*pleonektein*), can mean different things when applied to justice and the arts; Thrasymanchus uses it to refer to getting and having more (than one's share, more than the just, and even other unjust men) of the good things of life—this is its standard use; whereas Socrates stretches its application to the arts to refer to outdoing or overreaching in the activities of healing or tuning a lyre. In the one case we have the notion of doing things well and doing them ill (the arts), in the other case we have the notion of not getting more good things (justice) and getting more than others (injustice).” (Santas, *Understanding the Republic*, 29).

144 [...] οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἀδίκος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἁμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλείστων αὐτῶς λάβη (349c5-6).
made that claim, he meant only that the unjust person would always take a larger share than he deserves, while the just person would always come out with less than he deserves.

The charge of equivocation does not seem correct to me, however, because Thrasymachus agrees that the unjust person will try to *pleon echeîn everyone*, and this statement may accommodate the senses that Santas says are excluded. For example, when Socrates asks whether Thrasymachus agrees that some people are musical, and others not musical, this is an indication that by “everyone” Thrasymachus may include any person who has acquired some form of expertise, such as a musician or a doctor. Moreover, it would be strange for Thrasymachus to suddenly back down and say that *pleonexia* does not apply to musicians, as if musicians could not also be unjust. Although there is little by way of an explanation of Thrasymachus' acceptance of the examples of musicians and doctors not having an advantage over each other, I propose that it is possible to reconcile the two senses of *pleonekteîn* in these passages. The two senses are in fact united in a common activity, namely, any sort of competition. In a race, for example, runners compete for a prize, and in order to win the prize they seek even the slightest of advantages over each other. Suppose that a runner who acquires a decisive but illegal advantage defeats all the other runners. Then that person can be said to *pleonekteîn* in both senses: he has gotten an advantage over the other runners, and taken more than his fair share by undeservedly winning the prize. Moreover, there is a clearly instrumental relation between the two senses: having an advantage over others in a competition is conducive to having the prize.

That Thrasymachus intends competition as the context that unites both senses of
pleonektein is corroborated by his use of the verb hamillaomai when describing the behavior of the unjust person, who “will get the advantage over both the unjust person and [unjust] action, and [he] will vie/compete [ἀμιλλήσεται] so that he himself may take the greatest share of everything.”145 This proposal also conforms to his view that individuals compete for goods and political power in a zero-sum game. I propose that there is no equivocation in Socrates' argument if we keep the following two points in mind. First, Thrasymachus and Socrates are still abiding by the requirement that they describe practitioners of technai in the “strict” sense, i.e., as idealized agents who adhere strictly to the constitutive norms of their technē and no other norms.146 Second, we should interpret pleon echein as suggested above, i.e., as a reference to the instrumental relation between illicit advantage and undeserved gain. If these two principles are true, then, Socrates' claims about the differences between practitioners and non-practitioners of arts make sense.

For Socrates' argument here to work, four sets of relations must be explained: (1) the practitioner's advantage over the non-practitioner; (2) the practitioner's non-advantage over the equally expert practitioner; (3) the non-practitioner's advantage over the non-practitioner, and (4) the non-practitioner's advantage over the practitioner. Socrates uses the example of two musician tuning their lyres to demonstrate relations (1) and (2). The point of the example seems to be this. If we consider two musicians of equal expertise, both aim simply at a standard that is defined by the structure of the instrument. Acting as musicians in the “strict” sense, neither musician tries to have an undeserved share in the

145οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἁμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ, (349c5-6).
146Thrasymachus demanded this “precision” in order to finesse his way out of Socrates' first challenge, and the demand appears to be in play throughout the whole of Book I.
distribution of goods or an illicit advantage over the other. There is no “reward” for achieving the correct tuning; either they correctly apply the rules of the technē and achieve the proper tuning, or they fail. Moreover, obtaining an illicit advantage would mean departing from musical knowledge in the “strict” sense. On the other hand, a musician has a clear advantage over the non-musician because the non-musician is ignorant of both the standard and the means for achieving the standard. To explain relations (3) and (4) in terms of the same example, I suggest that we focus on the idea of musicians in the “strict” sense. Consider how a non-musician might achieve the proper tuning in comparison with a musician. First, the non-musician could achieve it by accident; second, he might try to prevent the musician from achieving the proper standard by secretly loosening the strings on the musician's lyre. The second method would amount to an illicit advantage, and so would count as an attempt to pleonektein.

Notice, moreover, what this suggests about the way that a non-practitioner could try to pleonektein a practitioner of a technē. The non-practitioner might try to prevent the practitioner from achieving the standard that technē provides the mean to achieve. But this strategy is quite different from achieving the standard for oneself; hence it is pleonctic. Finally, the non-practitioner could try to pleonektein the non-practitioner in the same way, i.e., by preventing the other from achieving the standard.147

147As example of these four relations, consider wrestlers and non-wrestlers. There is a sense in which two equally-matched opponents don't lack an advantage over each other by means of the technē they practice. Often equally-matched (and thus equally-expert) opponents compete without either achieving a decisive win. In such cases factors such as physical characteristics and luck create the conditions for applying a winning technique or throw. But the trained wrestler clearly has an advantage over the untrained wrestler. The non-wrestler, on the other hand, must πλεονεκτεῖν the person like and unlike himself for the following reasons. The person like the non-wrestler is another untrained wrestler. In such competitions the advantage amounts to preventing the opponent from winning in some way; for example, by applying a hold that would be normally ineffective against a trained opponent, or by attaining some illicit advantage. Preventing another person from winning by some means unrelated to the skills that the technē imparts is quite different, however, from recognizing an opportunity to apply a
But notice that the non-practitioner has to be “unjust” in a certain sense in order to obtain an advantage over the practitioner and the non-practitioner. Such a person lacks knowledge of the relevant technē (i.e., is “ignorant”), and so his actions do not correlate with the characteristic actions of the practitioner in the “precise” sense. This is the sense in which the ignorant person resembles the unjust person—a conclusion that Socrates draws when he points out that both the ignorant person and the unjust person try to pleonekteīn those like themselves and unlike themselves. For example, suppose an accountant accepts bribes in exchange for falsifying the records of expenditures in a political office. There is a sense in which his action stems from ignorance, because writing numbers that do not accurately represent the expenses of a company does not require that he utilize his knowledge of arithmetic, compound interest, and the like—writing any random number would do! His action is unjust precisely by failing to conform the constitutive norms of his technē and the organizational function he is supposed to perform.148

Socrates uses this resemblance between the unjust person and the ignorant person to develop a contradiction out of Thrasymachus’ premises. At the beginning of the elenchos, Thrasymachus agreed that the just person resembles the knowledgeable technique in a complex of chance factors. Finally, the non-wrestler has to πλεονεκτεῖν the trained wrestler by seeking an illicit advantage, and thereby achieve an undeserved prize, since otherwise he stands no chance.

148Reeve argues that Socrates’ argument in the third elenchos is fallacious because Socrates has failed to show that injustice is not a craft (Philosopher Kings, 20). I dispute Reeve’s claim that Socrates has failed to show that injustice is not a craft. Reeve challenges Socrates’ claim that the unjust man tries to pleonekteīn the unjust man by suggesting that injustice is a craft that the unjust person practices, and, just as two practitioners of the same technē do not pleonekteīn each other by going “beyond the principle of their craft,” so too do unjust men abide by the same principles of their own craft, viz., injustice (20). Here Reeve is introducing more than is contained in Thrasymachus’ position, however, because Thrasymachus did not argue that injustice is a technē; rather, he argued that unjust people use the politikē technē to fashion laws that are advantageous to them and condition the population to obey these laws. Glaucon, on the other hand, construes injustice as a craft by describing success and failure conditions for the practice of injustice.
practitioner in that he “has an advantage” (pleonekteîn) over the person unlike himself (the unjust person) but not the person like himself (the just person); the unjust person, however, resembles the ignorant non-practitioner of a technē in “having an advantage” (pleonekteîn) over the person like himself (the unjust person) and the person unlike himself (the just person). Since Thrasymachus also agrees that the knowledgeable person (ὁ ἐπιστήμων) is wise and good (350b2-3), and that “each person [the just person and the unjust person] has the qualities of the person he is like” (350c), Socrates is able to infer that the just person is also “wise and good,” while the unjust person is “ignorant and bad.” These conclusions complete the elenchos.

149 “Ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός; Ψήμι. Ὁ σοφός αγαθός; Ψήμι” (350b2-3).
150 Socrates' argument here contains significant problems. Most notably, his interpretation of the likeness relation seems to be false. Acknowledging the flaw in the argument is crucial to understanding why Glaucon and Adeimantus revive Thrasymachus' position. I have recapitulated the whole of the argument below, and explain Socrates problematic interpretation of the likeness relation.

(P1) “The unjust man is wise and good, while the just man is neither of these things” (349d).
(P2) “The unjust man is like the wise and good man, while the just man is unlike the wise and good man” (349d). Socrates later clarifies this to mean that “we agreed that each of them [the just person and the unjust person] has the qualities of the person he was like.” Agreeing to this premise proves to be the decisive misstep for Thrasymachus.
(P3): the knowledgeable person (ὁ ἐπιστήμων) is wise and good (350b2-3).
(P4): The “wise and good” person, or expert practitioner of a technē does not πλεονεκτεῖ the person like himself, but only the person unlike himself; The ignorant person or non-practitioner of a technē πλεονεκτεῖ the person like himself and the person unlike himself (from discussion of examples).
(C1): The wise person and the just person resemble each other in the following respect: both are people who do not pleonekteîn the person like themselves, but only the one unlike themselves. Call this aspect of resemblance aspect a.

From a purely logical perspective the most controversial aspect of this argument is Socrates' interpretation of P3. When Socrates first introduces the premise, Thrasymachus agrees because it seems self-evident that if the unjust person is wise and good, then such a person is like the wise and good person (likewise for the just person). Thrasymachus thus interprets the premise to mean that

(P3) If X has properties p and q, and Y has p and q, then X resembles Y in respect of p and q.

This interpretation of the premise cannot furnish Socrates' conclusion, because Socrates uses the fact that the just person resembles the expert practitioner in aspect a to attribute additional qualities to the just person, namely, that the just person is good and wise. This becomes apparent when Socrates reminds Thrasymachus that they agreed that “each of them had the qualities of the person he was like” (350c), as Socrates uses this reminder to conclude that because the just person resembles the expert practitioner in aspect a, the just person also has the qualities, or is “good and wise.” But this does not follow from P3, because all that follows from P3 is that the just person and the expert practitioner resemble each other in aspect a, not that the just person is also wise and good. Thus, Socrates must assume a different interpretation of P3 to complete his elenchos:

(P3): If some X resembles Y in respect a, and Y has qualities b and c, then X also has qualities
If Socrates' examples are correct descriptions of how practitioners and non-practitioners differ with respect to pleonektic actions, then it suggests that there is some connection between non-pleonektic action and technical knowledge, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between pleonektic action and ignorance on the other. Socrates tries to understand the difference between pleonektic action and non-pleonektic action by adhering to Thrasymachus' requirement that we think of practitioners of arts, and practitioners of justice (as a technē) in the “strict” sense, that is, by thinking of agents as idealized users of technai. But on this model, pleonastic actions appear incoherent from the perspective of a knower, and seem to be indescribable according to the terms of the technē in question. For this reason, Socrates argues that the unjust person resembles the ignorant non-practitioner of a technē: the unjust person acts as if he had no knowledge whatsoever of the technē in question. If we proceed on the same assumption that agents are idealized users of technai, and the proposal that justice is a technē is still operative, then the pleonastic action of the unjust person appears to stem from ignorance, not knowledge.

Reeve has suggested that Book I contains Plato's refutation of Socrates' (his teacher's) views on virtue.151 If that is correct, then the third elenchos may represent an

\textit{b} and \textit{c}.

On this interpretation of P3, Socrates can claim that because the just person and the expert practitioner resemble each other in aspect \textit{a}, the just person has the other qualities that belong to the expert practitioner, i.e., “good” and “wise.” So,

(C2): The just person is wise and good, while the unjust person is ignorant and bad (contradicts P1).

But there is a clear counter-example to Socrates' interpretation of P3:

(P1) Muscly athletes are strong and swift.
(P2) This statue of an athlete is muscly
(C): Therefore, by P,3, this statue is also strong and swift.

While it might make sense to call a statue of an athlete muscly—if “muscly” refers to an aesthetic feature and not a quality of flesh—it would be wrong to call it strong and swift, because statues cannot move.

151 \textit{Philosopher Kings}, 23.
old vestige of the idea that no one knowingly and willingly does evil. But even on this proposal a difficulty remains, namely, that pleonektic actions appear simply incoherent when we consider the differences between the knowledgeable practitioner and ignorant non-practitioner of justice. In the attempt to reconcile this difficulty, however, we discover a significant conflict in the concepts of agency that Thrasymachus and Socrates appear to hold. For Thrasymachus, pleonektic desire needs no explanation; it is psychologically basic it is the explanatory principle for complex behaviors, from the tyrant's pursuit of luxury and ruthless political strategy, to the just person's cowardice. On my reading of the *elenchos*, Socrates tries to exploit Thrasymachus' commitment to thinking of agents as idealized users of *technai* to cast doubt on the assertion that pleonektic desire is psychologically basic. The knowledgeable practitioner acquires accidental advantages in relation to non-practitioners on account of the skills (*technai*) he has, but the pleonektic actions of non-practitioners in relation to practitioners and other non-practitioners are not acquired by knowledge. Thus the unjust person is “ignorant” because his pleonektic actions are not *caused* by knowledge. Thus, on Socrates' analysis, it is pleonektic desire which actually needs explaining, since that is what appears mysterious from the perspective of knowledge; and if pleonektic desire needs explaining, then Socrates has derived a contradiction with one of Thrasymachus' fundamental commitments.

There are no indications of a reconciliation of these two incompatible perspectives in Book I. Thus, the *aporia* of the third *elenchos* runs deeper than most scholars have appreciated. Rather than merely sophistical refutation on Socrates' part, we discover a fatal limitation of the *technē* model of agency. On the *technē* model, it becomes difficult
to understand how desire and knowledge cohere in the same person. Thrasymachus and
Socrates present two extremes of the technē model in their attempt to account for the
factors that determine a person's actions. For Thrasymachus, wisdom amounts to insight
into (a) the psychological basicality of pleonexia and (b) the artificiality of norms. This
insight results in the deliberate practice of injustice. But if Socrates' third elenchos is
correct, then pleonektic violation of the constitutive norms of technai is not action from
knowledge. Rather, pleonektic action appears to stem from a mode of desire. For
Thrasymachus, the unjust person exhibits a desire to “have more,” and this desire appears
incompatible with the demand that we think of agents as users of knowledge in the “strict
sense,” for the unjust person is unjust precisely by exceeding the “strict sense” in which
agents use knowledge. Thus, it becomes unclear how agents whose primary motivation is
pleonexia can also be described as users of knowledge—and yet the founding insight of
the technē model of justice is that agents are primarily users of knowledge. On the other
hand, when Socrates carries the same demand to consider agents as idealized users of
technai to its logical extreme, he seems to neglect the legitimate role that desire plays in
self-beneficial action. The ends that agents desire are fragmented among the many
technai, while desires related to self-interest are accounted for by the awkward proposal
of a misthōtikē technē. Desire appears to be swallowed up in a description of the ends of
various technai, rather than allowed a role in the psychology of the agent. As a result,
desires lack unity in an overarching prioritization, since in the “strict” sense that
Thrasymachus demands, we can speak of the ends that agents have as musicians, as
shepherds, or as wage-earners, but not of the ways agents prioritize these ends. Thus,
from the perspective of agents as knowledge-users, desires appear as accidental features
of the agent, as though they were inexplicable appendages to rational action.

§5. Provocative Aporia in Republic 1: Turning towards a Virtue Model of Justice and Agency

The preceding analysis of the causes of aporia in Socrates' conversations with Polemarchus and Thrasydamus had two purposes. The first was to uncover three crucial assumptions about justice and agency on the technē model:

1. The artificiality thesis (first elenchos). Justice is an instrument of individuals who are experts in the politikē technē. As in any other relationship of the user to an instrument, the ends of the user direct the use of the tool. Thus, if justice is an instrument for making political subjects obey, those rules do not deserve unconditional respect from the rulers, since showing such respect would be akin to letting the tool dictate the ends of the user, as if hammers demanded that carpenters ought to build houses.

2. Instrumental rationality as enlightened self-interest (second elenchos). On Thrasydamus' account, the unjust are wise because they realize that justice means serving the interests of another rather than themselves. Practicing justice is therefore irrational because it is premised on a failure to understand one's true interests. Conversely, rationality is the exploitation of normativity for one's own benefit.152

3. Pleonexia as psychologically basic (third elenchos). Since all normativity is artificial and instrumental to one's own benefit, the only source of value

152 See Santas, Understanding Plato's Republic, 94; Burnyeat, “The Truth of Tripartition” 13. Both identify this premise as a key premise that Plato intends to prove false.
is the satisfaction of one's own desire. Thus, *pleonexia* is psychologically basic, and manifests itself in both desire and action. First, since justice restrains desire by demanding a limit on one's share in goods, and the rational person rejects justice, it is also rational to reject all limits on desire; therefore, desire is *pleonektic*. Second, since the rejection of limits on one's share of goods puts one in irreconcilable conflict with others who desire those goods, one must “out-do,” or obtain an advantage over others by any means possible; therefore action is *pleonektic*.

In the foregoing, I will argue that a significant portion of Plato's argument in the *Republic* is devoted to demonstrating the falsity of these assumptions. Although Book I does not yet offer arguments against these assumptions, it at least offers reasons to think that the *technē* model has shortcomings, and that we ought to seek the nature of justice on a different model. Thus, the first purpose of the preceding analysis was to show that an unacknowledged dispute about the correct model of agency for discovering the nature of justice was responsible for each moment of *aporia*. This dispute became apparent in disparity between (a) the limitations that the *technē* model encounters when accounting for the roles that such terms as “friendship,” “interest,” and “self-care,” and (b) Socrates' attempts at overcoming these limitations by means of the *technē* model. For example, Polemarchus discovered that on the *technē* model, a person might set out to practice justice according to the *technē* he defined at the outset, and yet actually practice injustice on account of being ignorant of who his true friends and enemies are. Socrates tried to remedy this problem by proposing that justice is a virtue, but an (unfulfilled) result of this proposal was that he and Polemarchus would have to revise their conception of agents as
users of morally-neutral *technē*, because justice appears to require an interest in
knowledge of what makes those with whom one hopes to be friends good people.

In the *elenchoi* with Thrasymachus, Socrates continually pushes the limits of the
*technē* model in order to reveal incoherencies in its conception of agency. Most notably,
the requirement that we think of agents as users of *technai* in the “strict sense” results in
(1) the awkward bifurcation of purpose-driven behavior and self-care, and (2) a mystery
about how desire and reason can cohere in the same person. Socrates tries to remedy this
problem by introducing the *misthōtikē technē* as a gloss for the activity of self-care, but
the proposal construes the self-beneficial as a consumable product, while leaving
unspecified an account of the fit between the nature of the thing that benefits and the
nature of the self or soul that is benefited. Finally, while Socrates produces a verbal
contradiction in the third *elenchos*, he obscures the role of desire with his analogy
between the just person and the expert practitioner, and the unjust person and the non-
practitioner. From the perspective of expert knowledge in the “strict sense” that
Thrasymachus demanded, *pleonektic* actions appear to stem from ignorance because they
do not require any expertise to perform. In this sense, we might attribute the cause of
*pleonektic* actions to the mode of desire that Thrasymachus himself champions, i.e., the
desire always to have the greater share. But if that is true, then desires appear useless for
agents *qua* idealized users of *technai*. This is an odd result, however, because it implies
that desires would be useless for those expert practitioners of the *misthōtikē technē*, the
art which Socrates reserves for self-beneficial activity. In other words, Socrates' adherenee
to the demand that they conceive of agents as idealized users of *technē* results
in the exclusion of desire from the soul, as though it were a useless appendage to reason.
I suggest that Plato leaves these perplexities as invitations to readers to examine the insufficiency of the *technē* model's conception of agency for an account of justice. Simply put, all of the *aporiai* concern questions crucial to the notion of agency, such as the role of knowledge in action and the proper methods of self-care—and as we ponder these perplexities, we find the nature of justice eludes us all the more. The failure of the *technē* model explains why Socrates proposes, just after the third *elenchos*, to ask “the same thing as before,” namely, “what kind of thing justice really is in relation to injustice”—as if the preceding conversations made little or no progress on that question.\(^{153}\)

Thus, with a capitulating Thrasymachus as interlocutor, Socrates steers the conversation towards the notion that justice is a virtue (ἀρετή) of the soul—rather than a *technē*. Contrasting his own position with that of Thrasymachus, he says that “for it was said that injustice was both more powerful and stronger than justice; but just now I said since (εἴπερ) justice is wisdom and virtue (ἀρετή), it will easily appear stronger than injustice as well, because injustice is ignorance.”\(^{154}\) That Socrates presents justice as virtue should not appear as a surprise, since the same assertion appeared as early as his *elenchos* of Polemarchus. We should therefore appreciate the fresh start in the inquiry, as is indicated by Socrates' abandonment of analogies with technical expertise.\(^{155}\) Socrates focuses on three points from Thrasymachus' arguments about the superiority of injustice:

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153[...] τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξής διασκεψώμεθα τὸν λόγον, ὅποιόν τι τινήσασθαι ἐπὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς ἀδικίαν (349e8-350a1).
154Ἐλέχθη γάρ ποι, ὅτι καὶ δυνατότερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἶπ ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης: νῦν δὲ γ', ἔφην, εἴπερ σοφίᾳ τε καὶ ἀρετῇ ἐστιν δικαιοσύνη ῥαδίως, οἷμαι, φανήσεται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστιν ἁμαθία ἢ ἀδίκια (351a2-5).
155Socrates uses the example of the pruning knife (353a1), which would seem to indicate a return to the *technē* model. But as Santas observes, the purpose of this example is to make an argument about exclusive and optimal functions rather than about the expertise of the user of the tool (*Understanding Plato's Republic, 65*)
1. Justice is stronger (ἰσχυρότερον, 351a4) than injustice;

2. Justice, rather than injustice, makes its possessor happy;

3. Justice is a virtue or excellence of soul, not a vice.

(1) *Justice stronger than injustice.* The argument that justice is stronger than injustice is the first indication that Socrates is offering an alternative conception of agency.

Foreshadowing the city-soul analogy, Socrates argues that justice is more powerful in both groups and individuals. Justice produces “oneness of mind and friendship” (ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν, 351d3-4), and this cohesion permits coordinated action; injustice, however, produces “faction and hatred” (μίση καὶ μάχας, 351d3), and these significantly hamper—if they don't altogether preclude—coordinated action. Concerning group action, this proposal is quite plausible, but it requires a re-conception of community. On Socrates' analysis, individuals compose groups, and justice is the principle of unity: by permitting coordinated action, justice lets the group be something more than an arbitrary aggregate of individuals.

Socrates then suggests that this same type of analysis applies to the individual. Though he does not explain himself here, he appears to rely on a generalization to draw the conclusion: since injustice makes “a city, a clan (γένος) and army-camp (στρατόπεδον)” incapable of action, it must do the same when “in one” (ἐνὶ, 352a4). Thus, injustice will make a person “incapable of action” (ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν, 352a5) and “not of one mind with himself” (οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, 352a6). What should be clear by now is that if injustice has the same effect in the individual as it has in groups, then the individual must also be a complex whole of parts. Although Socrates will

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156 Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon provides an example of this truth that the ancient Greeks would recognize. As a result of the quarrel, Achilles retires from battle, and as a result the Achaean camp is nearly destroyed.
not argue for the complexity of the soul until Book IV, we can at least note the contrast
with Thrasymachus' “idealize user” theory: for Socrates, agents are complex, and justice
coordinates the parts of the agent; for Thrasymachus, agents are simple “users,” and
justice is a tool for use.

(2 - 3) Justice makes its possessor happy; the function argument. To make the
argument that justice is an excellence of soul that makes its possessor happy, Socrates
relies on a method for discovering the function (ἔργον, 352e1) of any object whatsoever.
He begins by differentiating between exclusive functions and optimal functions,157 so that
we may discover the functions in different types of objects, i.e., natural and artificial
objects. We can say an object performs some function if one of the following conditions
holds: if the object is the only one that can do the work in question, or if it is the object
that does that work best.158 Socrates then provides examples from different part-whole
complexes to make his point. The eye's exclusive function is to see, because no other
organ is specialized so as to perform just that function. A horse's work is to carry riders
into battle. Even though this might not be a horse's exclusive function, it may be its
“optimal” function in the sense that the horse is best suited to the task. Finally, the
pruning knife is best for tending to vines, not because it cannot cut anything else, but
because it is optimally suited for that task.

Socrates' use of the pruning knife of as an example of a thing's function resembles
a return to the technē model, since a craftsman must make the knife for a gardener to

157 I rely on Santas for this distinction (Understanding Plato's Republic, 30).
158 Socrates asks, “Would you define this as the function of a horse and of anything else, as that which
someone does either through that thing alone, or best?” (...τοῦτο ἄν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν
ἔργον, δ ᾃν ᾃ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιή τις ἢ ἀριστά; 352e1-2) Thrasymachus agrees to this definition of
function.
use. But his use of the eye—a bodily organ—should dissuade us from this view. Santas uses these examples to argue that Socrates is in fact offering a new method to investigate the nature of justice:

(1) Find out what the functions of such objects are; (2) determine (by observation, experiment, or even thought experiment) cases where objects of such a kind perform their functions well and cases where they perform them poorly; and (3) finally find out the qualities that enable them to perform such functions well (and in the absence of which they perform poorly), and these are their virtues.

A crucial difference between this method and technē model of justice lies in the interpretation that each assigns to the realm of human artifacts. Polemarchus and Thrasymachus both assume that the technē is unique as a form of knowledge for the power and control that it offers users. In Polemarchus' case, the technē of justice, “helping friends and harming enemies,” may be interpreted as a description of a method for gaining political power within a traditional framework of communal life, which assumes the oikos as the basic unit of power. Those families that help their friends and harm their enemies thrive. Thrasymachus, on the other hand, emphasizes the ways that technai grant users the power to exploit nature to further their own, distinctively individual ends. Thus, the shepherd exploits the sheep to make a livelihood for himself. Socrates' approach differs from these by re-casting “mastery” over nature as submission to norms that structure the natural world. For example, many factors contribute to making

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159 This points to a distinction Socrates draws in Book X between producers and users of artifacts. He uses the example of the blacksmith who makes a bridle and the horseman who uses the bridle to argue that production and use correspond to two gradations of knowledge (601c). The ultimate purpose of the example is to provide a metaphor—using the craft analogy—for identifying gradations of knowledge on a copy-original paradigm of the form-participant relation.

the pruning knife the optimal tool for cutting vines: the shape of the human hand, the thickness and shape of the vines, and the metal of the blade. Likewise, in order for horses to optimally perform their “work,” they must be healthy and strong. The conditions that bring about their health and strength are not up to us, however; “control” only comes about through the recognition of natural norms. Thus technē is a type of knowledge that coordinates structures in nature; it is not an unlimited source of power.

Socrates’ inclusion of the human soul among those things that have a function is the more controversial aspect of function argument. Socrates says that the functions of the soul are “to engage in care-taking, ruling, and deliberation” and, later, simply “to live” (τὸ ζῆν, 353d6). But the difficulty seems to be this: the functions of pruning knives, horses, and bodily organs are determined with respect to a limited and fairly unambiguous context that is already defined for them. But what is this context with respect to the soul of a human individual? One answer might be that the social world—politics—provides the context that defines the soul's function, just as the needs of the human organism define the context in which the eye can perform a function. But here a challenger might reply that in aristocracies, oligarchies, and democracies, “care-taking, ruling, and deliberation” are utilized for different ends; in these contexts, individual souls might have different functions, according to the “needs” that these different regimes have. Alternatively, one might deny altogether that the human soul has a function: the distinctive feature of human beings might be their position “outside” of nature. Thus, even if Socrates' description of the soul's function is accurate, it is too general to be really informative; Socrates must offer more details for the function argument to be convincing. Nonetheless, the idea that justice is a condition that lets the soul perform its functions is a

161[...] τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι (353d3).
significant departure from the *technē* model of justice, and one that will remain throughout the argument of the *Republic*. As far as Book I is concerned, “justice” functions as a placeholder for that condition of soul which permits the soul to perform its functions well. What that condition is, however, remains unknown.

I suggest that for this reason Plato has Socrates concludes the book by likening himself to a “glutton” (ὦσπερ οἱ λίχνοι, 354b1), who takes another dish before “moderately enjoying the previous” serving (πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαύσαι, 354b2-3). For Socrates wanted to know what *effects* the optimal condition of soul would bring about before knowing what the condition itself is. Thus Book I concludes in *aporia*, but not, as has been suggested, in a way that betrays the dialogue's lack of unity.162 To the contrary, the *aporia* clearly foreshadows the argument that Socrates will make about the soul in Book IV, namely, that the soul is a complex whole of parts (an unstated implication of the “justice is stronger” argument), and that justice is the condition that allows this complex whole be integrated to a superlative degree. Thus, Book I does not conclude negatively, but rather provides the resources for going beyond the *technē* model of justice, which is the primary cause of Polemarchus and Thrasymachus' encounter with *aporia* in Book I.163

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163See also Weiss, “Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in *Republic* 1 and 2,” 93. Weiss argues that throughout conversation of the *Republic*, Socrates does not really alter the arguments he gave for justice in Book I, but rather states them in a different way.
Chapter III: Moments of Capitulation in Republic II and III

In the preceding chapter, I argued that Thrasymachus and Socrates disagree about certain fundamental assumptions concerning the nature of agency. More specifically, these assumptions concerned (1) the relation between reason and desire; (2) the normative status of nomos; and (3) the psychological foundations of happiness. I then characterized this dispute as one between two models of agency, each with its own corresponding notion of what justice is, as well as about what value justice has for individual agents. On the Technē Model, (T1) reason stands in an instrumental relation to desire, in that its primary function is to calculate the means for achieving the objects of desires; (T2) nomoi do not deserve respect because they are human artifacts (the artificiality thesis) and (T3) pleonektic desire is the psychologically basic, and therefore the authentic mode of human desire that, when satisfied, brings happiness. On the Virtue Model, (V1) Justice is a “power” that produces “oneness of mind” and “friendship” among the parts of the soul, and cooperation is best promoted when reason rules desire;164 (V2) nomoi deserve respect because their function is to habituate individuals into certain patterns of behavior, and habituation is an essential aspect of education;165 (V3) egoism, or some form of eudaimonism, is psychologically basic: the soul's ergon is “to have care over, rule, and deliberate” (τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι 353d3-4), and the excellence of this function brings happiness.

In this chapter, I continue a provocative-aporetic reading of the Republic by studying three aspects of Books II-III. First, I begin by explaining the significance of

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164In Book IV these functions will be assigned “the calculative part” (λογιστκόν, 439d4).
165It is not possible to deduce this answer form Socrates' arguments in Book I. This premise of the virtue model of justice will become apparent in the discussion of the musical and physical education in Books II-III.
Glacon's renewal of the argument for injustice as a response to the *aporia* of Book I. As we saw in the preceding chapter, Socrates admits that his treatment of the arguments on behalf of justice was too hasty—he was acting like a “glutton” (ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι, 354b1) and not really savoring these arguments. This also suggests that Socrates was not practicing *sophrosunê*, or moderation, following his dispute with Thrasymachus. Since *sophrosunê* concerns the pleasures of “food, drink, and sex,” we might put the point this way: Socrates wanted to experience the pleasure that the arguments bring, but because he was too hasty, he scarcely enjoyed any of the arguments. From a dramatic perspective this suggests that the way out of *aporia* in Book I is to correct Socrates' lapse in virtue by forcing him to “savor” the arguments he impulsively “devoured.” Glacon and Adeimantus perform this role by presenting a new, more sophisticated argument on behalf of injustice, along with specific counterarguments to Socrates' arguments for justice. In this sense, they recognize that Socrates' haste resulted in *aporia* concerning the nature of justice, despite the fact that Socrates has both silenced Thrasymachus and offered some arguments for the virtue model of justice. Thus they compel both Socrates and readers to endure the “pain” of examination in order to overcome this *aporia*. As we shall see, Socrates' arguments from Book I contain flaws that Glacon and Adeimantus recognize and exploit in order to raise their challenge. In reviving Thrasymachus'

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167389e1.

168Socrates describes the gluttons as people who “always taste and grasp what is set before them, before they enjoying what preceded [thing they tasted] in due measure.” […] άει παραφερομένου αποχέονται ἃρπάζοντας, πριν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαύσαται (354b2-3).
argument and identifying the flaws in Socrates' argument, they perform the same role for Thrasygymatus as Thrasygymatus performed for Polemarchus; i.e., they try to correct the former's account in order to overcome Socrates' *elenchos*. This moment of *aporia* also functions as a provocation for readers, because from the reader's perspective there is a question concerning Plato's reasons for reviving the argument for injustice: why didn't Socrates' arguments against Thrasygymatus suffice for Glaucon and Adeimantus?

Second, I carry out a provocative-aporetic reading of Books II-III by identifying and examining moments of capitulation—moments at which Glaucon and Adeimantus concede some fundamental premise of their challenge, and which they ought not to concede if they are to defend their challenge properly. At these moments in the conversation they ought to resist some suggestion or inference, because the claim for which Socrates is arguing directly contradicts some aspect of the *Technē* Model of justice, which, as we shall see, they adopt whole-heartedly in their defense of injustice. By studying these moments of capitulation, we gain insight into which theoretical commitments Glaucon and Adeimantus give up, and which they adopt, in the process of hearing Socrates’ argument. More specifically, I argue that in Books II and III, Glaucon and Adeimantus give up the theses that *pleonexia* is psychologically basic and that *nomoi* do not deserve moral respect because they are artificial.\(^{169}\) I suggest that these moments function as moments of *aporia* for readers as well because they elicit a response that mimics Glaucon and Adeimantus' response to the *elenchos* of Thrasygymatus. After hearing both Thrasygymatus' arguments and Socrates' *elenchoi*, Glaucon says that

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\(^{169}\)Cf. Weiss, “Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in *Republic* 1 and 2,” 93. Weiss argues that Socrates does not refute the “new points” that Glaucon and Adeimantus make. I am arguing that he does precisely this throughout Books II-IV.
Thrasymachus was “bewitched by [Socrates], just as a snake is.”\textsuperscript{170} Thrasymachus, in other words, did not put up enough of a fight. As spectators of the conversation in Book I, the brothers were able to evaluate the quality of the arguments on both sides, and their judgment that Thrasymachus had not adequately defended the argument for injustice prompted their revival of his position. Readers, who in Book II stand as spectators to the conversation between Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus, stand in a similar position: they too are able to identify moments at which Glaucon and Adeimantus failed to defend their own position. However, the reader's study of these moments must attend to a crucial difference in the brothers' performance of this corrective role: they revive Thrasymachus' argument not to refute Socrates, but in the hopes of being persuaded “truly” that “in every way the just man is better than the unjust man.”\textsuperscript{171} Therefore, the assistance that readers must give to Glaucon and Adeimantus is not to defend their position against Socrates' elenchos, but rather to explain the reasonableness of their capitulations, which is not apparent to the brothers themselves.\textsuperscript{172}

Third, I offer an argument for a way in which the discussion of musical education in Books II-III can have a protreptic effect on readers, who are not receiving the

\textsuperscript{170}[... ] ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι (358b1).
\textsuperscript{171}Glaucon opens Book II by saying “Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us, or to persuade us truly that in every way a just man is better than an unjust man? Ὡ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἁδικον (357b1-2).
\textsuperscript{172}One question that might be asked of my reading is the following. If Glaucon and Adeimantus are \textit{unaware} of what is at stake at these moments when they concede some point to Socrates, is it accurate to say that they are “really persuaded” by the end of the argument? Isn’t the case rather that they have been led to a certain conclusion—Socrates’ conviction about the superiority of the just life—without properly understanding all the reasons for adopting that conclusion? How could that be “true persuasion”? This is a point where I must state my hermeneutical principles for reading Plato. Glaucon and Adeimantus may be “really persuaded” in the sense of having adopted Socrates’ conviction about justice, without having understood all the reasons for it. A typical feature of Plato’s writing is the appearance of unexplained inferences, which the reader then has the opportunity to investigate. I believe something like that is going on in the \textit{Republic}. Glaucon and Adeimantus are not aware of all the reasons that stand behind their \textit{new} conviction that justice is superior to injustice, but we may study their responses to controversial steps in Socrates’ reasoning in order that \textit{we ourselves} may be “really persuaded,” precisely by having tested every step of the argument for ourselves.
education described. For although the moments of capitulation I identify represent the gradual erosion of the brothers' commitment to the premises that define the Technē Model of justice, the concessions occur in the context of an outline of the beliefs and behaviors they think ought to be instilled in people from the earliest age, because these behaviors and beliefs have social utility. This feature of the concessions points to a tension between musical education—which is primarily habituative—and protreptic. Glaucon and Adeimantus demand to be truly persuaded that justice is better than injustice, not simply told that it would be socially useful to inculcate certain virtuous behaviors and beliefs about justice, such as the belief they hope to be persuaded of, i.e., that “the just man is in every way better than the unjust man.” The tension here concerns the role of receptivity in persuasion: musical-habituative education is a receiving of norms and moral convictions, but it is not a receiving that Glaucon and Adeimantus would consider an instance of “true persuasion.” Habituated education resembles the type of indoctrination of which Thrasymachus disapproves, because it keeps people in ignorance of their true, pleonektic nature. Protreptic, other hand, should effect a re-orientation of perspective by getting the recipient to see for himself the truth of the perspective which he is to adopt; it should be in some sense critical, not merely receptive. I will argue that the discussion of habituative education has a protreptic effect on Glaucon and Adeimantus because in this discussion Socrates re-frames the artificiality thesis in a way that emphasizes the reflexive relation that Glaucon and Adeimantus have with respect to their own habituation: in this discussion, they are both recipients and designers of a habituative education. Once they recognize their position, they can accept that musical-habituative education does not merely indoctrinate. Rather, because musical education is supposed to
instill a love for the “well-formed” (εὐσχήμονα, 401d6), and an ability to “keenly perceive deficiencies and what is not well-crafted,” a musical-habituative education must also provide the tools for recognizing which habits one has received are “deficient.”

Glaucot and Adeimantus carry out this exercise in recognizing deficiencies by critiquing their own education in music and poetry. Readers, on the other hand, participate in a kind of “musical exercise” too by receiving Socrates’ argument and correcting what is “deficient” in Glaucot and Adeimantus’ responses to this argument.

§1. Glaucot and Adeimantus’ Challenge: the Revival of the Technē Model of Justice

Several problematic inferences in Socrates’ elenchoi may cause Glaucot and Adeimantus to hesitate in their acceptance of Socrates’ refutation of Thrasymachus. In the second elenchos, Socrates argued that every practitioner of a technē, considered as a practitioner in the precise sense, considers only the good of the object under the care of their respective technē. This restriction on their thinking about technical practice in Book I led to difficulties in Socrates’ ability to account for self-interested action. Socrates proposed that the misthōtikē technē accounts for self-interested action, but this proposal does not answer the question concerning the prioritization of the different ends which agents may pursue as practitioners of multiple technai. Thrasymachus can easily reply that the ends of the misthōtikē technē necessarily supersede the ends of the other technai that agents may practice, because no agent can be so committed to the good of the object of the technē he practices that he neglects his own interests. The awkwardness of this account of self-interested action also exposed a problem in unity of reason and desire in

173καὶ ὅτι ἀδὶ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἄν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ ταφεῖς ὡς ἐδει […] (401e1-3).
the third elenchos. There Socrates argued, in essence, that pleonectic actions are not caused by knowledge of any technē; rather, they are caused by a particular mode of desire. This contradicted Thrasymachus' assertion that the pleonectic person—identified earlier with the unjust person—is “wise and good;” since pleonectic actions are not caused by knowledge, the pleonectic person is not “wise.” On this account, however, desire appears to play no real function in the psychology of the agent, since technical knowledge accounts for the just agent's non-pleonectic actions. Thus, if the misthōtikē technē accounts for self-interested actions, it apparently does so without reference to the agent's desires. This is an odd conclusion, since prima facia self-interested actions would seem to stem from desires.174 Finally, the third elenchos contains the invalid inference from likeness to being. Socrates used the premise that “if some X resembles Y in respect a, and Y has qualities b and c, then X also has qualities b and c” to show that the unjust person is “ignorant and bad.”175 Even if Glaucon lacks the dialectical finesse to expose this fallacy, he likely intuists something strange, and perhaps recognizes the haste of the argument as a sign that Socrates' intended only to produce a verbal contradiction to which Thrasymachus has no immediate counter-argument.

Plato has constructed Glaucon's challenge so as to provide counterarguments to the three premises of the virtue model of justice mentioned above. As I recapitulate Glaucon's challenge, I will show how each of Socrates' proposals about justice from Book I is undermined. Glaucon begins by arguing against the claim that justice is the

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174 If Socrates claims that self-interested actions are caused by a person's judgment of what is best for himself, and not by desires, then he still must argue for this position. We do not receive a proper argument for Socratic intellectualism until the arguments for tripartition in Book IV.
175 See Chapter 1, footnote 44, for a detailed treatment of this fallacy.
power that produces “cooperation and friendship,” (V1). He argues against this claim by offering a prototype of a social-contractarian account of the origin of justice. On this view, justice is an “in-between” (μεταξύ, 359a6), a compromise that people make to avoid the extremes of suffering wrongdoing and committing wrongdoing. To make this argument, Glaucron must assert that pleonexia is psychologically basic, which he indicates by saying that it is “by nature good to commit wrong (ἀδικεῖν), but bad to be wronged (ἀδικεῖσθαι).” Glaucron provides no argument for this claim, but instead presents it as the assertion of an anonymous “myriad of others” (μυρίων ἄλλων, 358c7) who argue like Thrasymachus. Nonetheless, the connection with pleonexia is clear: committing injustice would be “good” by nature because people by nature desire to maximize their possession of available goods, and maximizing the size of one’s share requires taking from the share others have in the available goods. But “as a result” (ὥστε, 358e5) of the greater desirability of committing injustice, people “wrong each other and are wronged, and get a taste of both” (ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσι τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύωνται, 358e5-359a1). Glaucron then compares the “measures” of both extremes, and concludes that “being wronged, to the extent that it is worse, exceeds committing wrong, to the extent that it is good (πλέον δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἤ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν 358e4-5).” This consideration, it seems, compels the agreement that Glaucron says results in

176 The interpretation of Glaucron's arguments that I propose here does not exclude other readings. Reeve reads this argument about the origin of justice as an argument for the claim that injustice is intrinsically desirable even when stripped of its consequences, while justice is intrinsically undesirable and only desirable for its consequences (Philosopher-Kings, 27). This reading nicely connects the argument with Glaucron's division of goods at the opening of Book II (357b4-358a2). For a discussion of the division of goods, see Annas, Introduction, 60-61; Reeve, 25-25; Santas, Understanding Plato's Republic, 46-47. Santas imposes a Hobbesian interpretation on the state of affairs before the contract: (1) the competition for goods was a zero-sum game; individuals were “self-seeking,” and individuals were equally able to achieve their aims (38-39).

177 Reading the datives as a “measure of difference” (Smyth, 348; [1513]). The translation is a bit awkward, but it should be clear that Glaucron is saying that the measure by which being wronged is
the creation of justice. A specific group of people decides to make an agreement
(ξυνθέσθαι, 359a2): those who are not able to escape the one (suffering wrongdoing) and
commit the other (injustice) find it more “profitable to reach an agreement” not to
commit injustice and not to be treated unjustly (λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι, 359a2).\(^\text{178}\)

Although Glaucon omits the specifics of the rules of the agreement, at the very
least he seems to be proposing rules that will guarantee the security of one's person and
property. On this account, the agreement to establish security creates a context of non-
interference in which individuals may pursue their aims without fear of sabotage. But
non-interference is a far cry from the highly coordinated actions of, say, an army or a
ship's crew, that Socrates cited as paradigmatic cases of the greater “capability for acting”
(δυνατότεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι, 352δ6-7) that justice produces in comparison to
injustice. These cooperative efforts require the apportioning of functional roles,
responsibilities, and authority in addition to the pledge not to harm others in the group; in
other words, justice is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for concerted action.
Nothing in Glaucon's scenario suggests the establishment of the other conditions for
higher-order organization. That Glaucon offers a genuine alternative here can also be seen
in the way it mediates between the extremes that Thrasymachus and Socrates represent.
Thrasymachus boasted that the unjust person would seek to outdo everyone, and thereby
sabotage any cooperative effort; Socrates, on the other hand, attributes more power to
justice than it actually has, saying that it is a sufficient condition for cooperative effort.
With this prototype of contract theory, Glaucon can explain how justice may provide a

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\(^\text{178}\) Santas takes this statement as an indication that at least one group, those who do have the power to
commit injustice and escape suffering injustice, are effectively forced into a political context. In other
words, the agreement is not unanimous (Understanding Plato's Republic, 40).
loose cohesion among a group, even as it maintains a background of competitive pleonexia.

The second stage of Glaucon's challenge consists in reaffirming that pleonexia is psychologically basic (T3) and re-establishing the artificiality thesis (challenges V2). To show this, he uses the example of Gyges' ring. What is striking about this argument is not only its reassertion of a fundamental premise of the Technē Model of justice, but its position in the order of Glaucon's challenge. First, Glaucon re-establishes the artificiality of justice; then, in this next argument, he subtracts this artificial layer in thought in order to show that pleonexia is psychologically basic. To subtract the influence of nomos, Glaucon proposes that we “give authority [ἔξουσίαν] to each—to the just man and the unjust man—to do whatever he pleases, and then follow and look where desire [ἐπιθυμία] will lead each one.” The rest of the thought-experiment consists in supplying both the just and the unjust man with a ring that makes them invisible. The ring, which conceals them from the scrutiny of others, functions as a symbolic representation of exousia. Although exousia primarily represents political power and authority, Glaucon's choice of this word suggests that he associates political power with freedom from the scrutiny of others. This is not an unreasonable association if we consider the hostility governments have shown toward transparency throughout history.

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179 The agreement requires some minimal cohesion, because individuals must at least identify as members of this group, which has these rules.
180 Reeve interprets the story of Gyges' ring as an argument that simply reinforces the claim that injustice is intrinsically preferable to justice if we subtract the consequences from each (Cf. Philosopher-Kings, 27). I suggest his view overlooks the significance of the power of exousia to undo habituation. Annas asks why Socrates does not reject the story about Gyges as “avowedly unreal or fantastic,” and suggests that Socrates would be within his rights to reject the demand that he show that just person would behave justly even if he had Gyges' ring (Introduction, 69); Also Santas, who questions the extremity of this example (Understanding Plato's Republic, 47). On my reading Socrates must answer this demand because the ring is really a metaphor for the invisibility that political power (exousia) affords.
181 [...] δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἐκείνην ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἄν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἶτ’ ἐπακολουθήσαμεν θεώμενοι ποιήσωμεν ἐπίθυμια ἐκτέρον ἅξει (359c1-2).
Glauccon argues that if both the just man and the unjust man received the same type of ring, their actions would be indistinguishable. Gyges, a simple shepherd, functions as the story's “everyman,” the average person who has been habituated to act justly.\textsuperscript{182} When Glauccon advises us to follow the desire (ἐπιθυμία) of both the just and unjust man, he indicates that the nature of the soul lies somewhere in its desire, a desire whose authenticity we must discover by abstracting away the artificiality of nomos. He claims that if we carried out the test he recommends, “we would catch the just man pursuing the same thing as the unjust man because of his pleonexia, which is wholly natural to pursue as good, but by force of convention he is diverted towards the honor of equality.”\textsuperscript{183} According to Glauccon's method, we are to strip away the artificiality of nomos “in thought” (τῇ διανοίᾳ, 359c1) by giving each exousia—power, authority, and license—to do whatever he pleases. The “everyman” who receives such exousia, he claims, will soon forget all the habituation that caused him to act justly, and act on his “true” desires—desires which he might not have even known he possessed. Thus, like Thrasymachus, Glauccon suggests that we must become enlightened about our true nature; it is the lack of exousia that conceals our true desires and true inclinations from us—conceals the fact that pleonexia is psychologically basic.

Glauccon's first and second arguments, then, reassert both the artificiality thesis and the basicality of pleonexia (T\textsubscript{2} and T\textsubscript{3}). The third part of the challenge contains an argument for the instrumentality of reason (T\textsubscript{1}) in the revival of Thrasymachus' claim that

\textsuperscript{182}The flaw in Glauccon's use of an “everyman” type story is that it neglects a third type of person, the exceptionally virtuous person. Socrates can easily admit that the average person will commit injustice when he or she has the chance. But the person whom Glauccon must test is not the average person, but the exceptionally virtuous person. If it turned out that the behavior of even this person was indistinguishable from the behavior of the unjust person, the Glauccon could justifiably claim that, given exousia, the just person will inevitably revert to his “authentic” desires and inclinations.

\textsuperscript{183}[...] ἐπ᾿ αὐτοφόρῳ οὖν λάβομεν ἄν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταὐτόν ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ὁ πάσας φύσις διόκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν νόμῳ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν (359c3-6).
justice itself is the instrument of the _politikē technē_. Glaucon first proposes a test in which we imagine the “perfect” (τέλεον, 360e4) examples of the just and the unjust man, for determining whether the just life is preferable to the unjust life. We are to imagine these two individuals receiving the reputation for the opposite quality of their true character: the unjust person will have the reputation for perfect justice, while the just person will have the reputation for perfect injustice. He then recalls the discussion of _technē_ from Book I by suggesting that we think of the unjust man as we think of “skilled craftsmen” (ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοί δημιουργοί, 360e6-7), such as a ship's captain or a doctor. With this reference to the craftsman (δημιουργοί), Glaucon clearly flags technical knowledge in a way that challenges Socrates’ _elenchoi_ from Book I. There, Socrates argued that injustice could not really be a _technē_, because injustice consists in the betrayal of the constitutive norms of any particular _technē_; moreover, any _technē_ benefits the “weaker,” or the object under its care. This _elenchos_ succeeded because Thrasymachus held that the _technē_ that qualifies individuals for rule is the knowledge about which laws are truly advantageous for oneself. But here, Glaucon suggests that the unjust person practices a different _technē_: he commits unjust acts and gets away with them by disguising them as just acts (361a). To practice injustice, then, one needs a _technē_ for disguising unjust acts as just acts—something like the “shadow-painting” technique that makes images in two-dimensions appear three-dimensional. Defined this way, the _technē_ of injustice does appear to have success and failure conditions, and hence a kind of constitutive norm: a _good_ practitioner of injustice gets away with wrongdoings, while a _bad_ practitioner of injustice fails to get away with wrongdoings. Finally, Glaucon presents a set of virtues that are supposed to compliment the practice of dissemblance:

184 Socrates likens poetry to this painting technique in Book X (602d1).
Before proceeding to Socrates' response to the revival of the Technē Model, I would like to compare the positions of Thrasymachus and Glaucon, so that it may become clear how the fundamental assumptions of the Technē Model underlie both positions, despite the difference between these positions. Consider how Thrasymachus and Glaucon assert different versions of the artificiality thesis (T2) On Thrasymachus' view, justice is the artifact that rulers create, while on Glaucon's view, justice is an artifact that results from an agreement that many individuals make, prior to any distinction between ruler and ruled. Thrasymachus' definition of justice thus lends itself to an authoritarian style of politics, while Glaucon's lends itself to democratic politics.

Nonetheless, both assert that justice is an artifact that conceals some more fundamental aspect of human nature. This more fundamental aspect of human nature is, of course, pleonexia. Thus both assert that pleonexia is psychologically basic (T3), though they differ in the evidence they offer for this view. This difference becomes clear from the way that each construes how justice conceals one's true nature by means of habituation and social conditioning. On Thrasymachus' view, it is primarily the ruled who acquire the belief that it is just to obey the rulers, while on Glaucon's view, anyone who participates in the community founded on agreement will be habituated to believe that the rules of that agreement are just. These different accounts of habituation also entail different accounts of how individuals overcome their habituation and realize their “true” nature.

185 Glaucon says that “if the unjust man makes any mistake, it is necessary to allow for him to be able to correct it, and to be capable of speaking with the goal of persuading” (361a6-b2, Griffith).
186 Like Thrasymachus, Adeimantus claims that the lack of courage explains why people are just rather than unjust (366b).
For Thrasymachus, it is the exceptional individual who realizes his true nature—the tyrant who has both the insight into the artificiality of justice, and the “courage” to commit injustice. For Glaucon, however, overcoming one’s habituation for justice does not require an exceptional character; it may require some luck in gaining *exousia* and the supplementary virtues mentioned above, but these virtues and *exousia* are in principle available to anyone participating in democratic politics. Moreover, neither courage or nor exceptional character undid Gyges’ habituation for justice; rather, *exousia* did. Presumably, anyone who possesses *exousia* will experience the same change, not only exceptional individuals. Finally, the reassertion of the instrumental role of reason (T₁) appears in need for *technai* to practice justice. For Thrasymachus, the *politikē technē* is the knowledge of truly advantageous legislation; for Glaucon, reason plays an instrumental role in the form of rhetoric, which the unjust person uses to portray his unjust deeds as just.

§2. First Capitulation: Pleonexia not Psychologically Basic

Socrates begins his response to Glaucon and Thrasymachus by proposing the city-soul analogy as a method for discovering the power that justice has in the soul by itself.¹⁸⁸ Socrates justifies his use of this analogy by likening the difficulty of their

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¹⁸⁸ The interpretive challenges that this analogy poses are well-documented. It is not necessary for my purposes to defend the city-soul analogy because what matters for the protreptic effect of the *Republic* is that Glaucon, Adeimantus, and readers come to be persuaded of the virtue model of justice. Socrates accomplishes this goal by (a) arguing against the model of agency that grounds the *Technē* Model of justice, and (b) providing a new model of agency that grounds the virtue model of justice. The arguments against these models of agency can be isolated from the interpretive challenges that have commonly been raised against the city-soul analogy. Norbert Blössner argues that Socrates does not use the city-soul analogy consistently. On his reading, the isomorphism of city and soul is introduced as “hypothesis” to be tested, but is taken as a fact in Book IV, despite not having been established (“The City Soul Analogy,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic*, ed. G.R.F Ferrari [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007]: 347). Equivocation is another charge commonly made of this
inquiry to the difficulty that someone who has poor eyesight faces when trying to read a word written with very small letters. 189 This grammatical aspect of the city-soul analogy immediately suggests a crucial difference in the way Socrates will analyze the city. The city-soul analogy asks readers to consider justice as a unity of functional parts that are fit for interplay, just as a word is a unity of grammata that have their own rules governing their combinations. On Glaucon's account of the origin of justice, individual agents are something like the monads of political community—not inherently fit for interplay, but rather showing a tendency toward disunity—and communities arise only as a result of agreements between these monads. In the following chapter, I will argue that this functional analysis of the parts of the city and soul is instrumental in persuading Glaucon that reason ought to rule the soul (V1). In this chapter, however, I examine the means that Socrates uses to persuade Glaucon and Adeimantus that egoism—rather than pleonexia—is psychologically basic (refutes T3), and that nomoi deserve respect because they habituate individuals into certain patterns of behavior (Refutes T2 and establishes V2).

The initial construction of the city, up to the discussion of the Guardians' education (369b-376e), contains their first, and perhaps most important, concession. 190 Socrates' first step is to explain the reasons people have for associating and cooperating—to a minimal extent—in their city. The reason, we learn, is that no person is totally self-

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189 368c-d.
190 Annas argues that Plato fails to give the first city “a clear place in the Republic's moral argument” (Introduction, 78). In reaching this conclusion, however, she overlooks the difference between pleonexia and egoism.
sufficient (οὐκ αὐτάρκης, 369b6) in his ability to procure for himself all the material goods necessary for life, and everyone is “in need of many things” (πολλῶν ἐνδεής, 369b5). Thus “one person associates with another for one purpose, and another with another for a different purpose” (παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου, 369c1) in order to meet their many needs. Socrates concludes from this that people in this city share (μεταδίδωσι, 369c4) with others and receive shares (μεταλαμβάνει, 369c5) from others because they “think it better for themselves” (οἰόμενος αὐτῷ ἀμείνον, 369c5). If Glaucon and Adeimantus are paying attention, however, they ought to raise some questions about this account of the origin of the city. They may accept the premise that individuals are not self-sufficient, but reject the inference that individuals will cooperate voluntarily, and on equal terms, to meet all their needs. For example, they might propose instead that in such a situation, people will take what they need—and more—from others by force and theft. They might reply that the fact that individual agents are not self-sufficient does not imply anything about how agents do in fact associate, or how they ought to associate with each other in order to satisfy their wants. Therefore, we should notice here that Socrates wants Glaucon and Adeimantus to accept that egoism, rather than pleonexia, is psychologically basic; that is, people are motivated by desire to do what they judge is best for themselves (egoism), not by the desire to have the greater share than everyone else (pleonexia).191

Finally, another difference between the two accounts of the origin of the city is reflected in the difference between (limited) cooperative association and non-interference. On Glaucon's account of the origin of justice, individuals do not agree to a reason for

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191 Cf. Santas, who says that when interpreting Glaucon's picture of the state of nature, we must “infer [...] at least predominant psychological egoism” (Understanding Plato's Republic, 39). The point for which I am arguing here is subtle, but crucial: Socrates introduces egoism as psychologically basic, while Glaucon presumes pleonexia to be psychologically basic. No inference is necessary to attribute this presumption to Glaucon, because he himself endorses it.
association so much as they agree to follow certain rules of non-interference. He might maintain instead that families are self-sufficient, but need only security to keep the material goods they need. Why, then, do the brothers agree to this founding moment of the city, given what's at stake for their own position?

On a provocative-aporetic reading, this question presents readers with an opportunity to think of reasons why Glaucon and Adeimantus accept egoism as psychologically basic. One reason I suggest is that they may recognize pleonexia as a version of egoism either (a) subjected to extreme circumstances or (b) gone psychologically awry. According to Glaucon's account of the origin of justice, the competition for goods appears to be a zero-sum game; that is, agents can acquire goods for themselves only by taking goods from others.192 But there is no reason to think that the competition for goods is a zero-sum game; a zero-sum game of competition for goods could very well be an exception rather than a rule. Moreover, agents motivated by pleonexia can easily create an artificial shortage of goods, since nothing short of all available goods would satisfy such a person's pleonexia. In this sense pleonexia becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating the very scarcity which the pleonektic person says necessitates his pleonexia. Pleonexia may also result if an egoist thinks that what is “best for himself” is the possession of an unlimited amount of the available goods. But this argument begs the question as to whether the absence of an upper limit on one's possession of goods really is best for oneself.

A second reason for the brothers' acceptance of egoism as psychologically basic is that self-interest remains (so far, at least) the chief motivation and reason for association

192 Santas also suggests this interpretation of the “state of nature” in Glaucon's account of the origin of justice (Understanding Plato's Republic, 38).
in Socrates' city, and this preserves the intuition behind Glaucon's claim that people think that it is by nature better to commit injustice. But in accepting egoism as psychologically basic, they take a step away from *pleonexia* as the allegedly “natural” or authentic mode of desire. Moreover, egoism allows for a more rational foundation of the city. If an inescapable feature of human nature is that no individual is self-sufficient, and egoism is psychologically basic, then mutually-beneficial cooperation looks like a quite reasonable arrangement for individuals to adopt in order to supply their material needs.

After proposing the mutually-beneficial activity of trade as the reason for association in the most basic form of “cohabitation” (cıνοικίᾳ ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα, 369c3-4), Socrates proposes a principle for the division of labor known as the “one man, one task” principle. He later identifies this way of life organized by this principle as an “image” (εἴδωλον, 443c3) of justice in Book IV. According to the principle, each individual ought to devote himself exclusively to one task, the one to which his talents are best suited. Socrates argues for this principle by a straightforward appeal to efficiency: presumably, individuals will produce one good in both greater quantity and better quality if they devote themselves solely to the production of that good, than if they divide their efforts and produce multiple goods. As with the reason for association in

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193 Annas overlooks the subtle but crucial concession that Adeimantus is making in accepting egoism as the reason for association in the first city. She (wrongly, I think) proposes that “the first city adds nothing, except a context in which the Principle of Specialization is introduced in a plausible way” (*Introduction*, 79).
194 Rep., 443c3
195 There is some uncertainty about how to interpret this principle. Reeve helpfully distinguishes between two readings, a “unique aptitude doctrine” (UAD) and the “unique upper-bound doctrine” (UBD) On the former reading, the “one man, one task” principle posits that each person is born with a natural aptitude for a unique craft or type of work. On the latter, the principle posits that “a person's ruling desires set a unique upper limit to his cognitive development.” Reeve rejects the argues for the UBD because Plato proposes selecting the guardians on the basis of cognitive powers that they might have in addition to an aptitude for some craft (*Philosopher-Kings*, 172-174). Annas leans toward the UBD in her reading as well (*Introduction*, 76-79).
196 “It follows from this that in any enterprise more is produced—and that it is better and more easily
the city, however, Glaucon and Adeimantus might raise an objection to the division of labor. They might say that they disagree with the way Socrates construes the “one man, one task” principle, and propose instead that someone might have the idea that it is better for himself to enslave some people to provide material goods for him. This proposal would be consistent with both egoism in the sense Socrates means it, and the “one man, one task” principle, since one person would be the master, and one person would be the slave. Glaucon and Adeimantus' failure to raise this objection presents us with an opportunity to consider some reasons why they might be persuaded by Socrates' principle for the division of labor. To begin, while the person who decides to enslave others judges that doing so will be “better for himself,” and thus appears to act consistently with egoism, it is almost certainly false that the people enslaved will think it is better for them to be enslaved. This consideration points to a similarity between the “one man, one task” principle and the Glaucon's social-contractarian account of justice, which may explain the brothers' acceptance of the principle. Both principles limit the liberty of individuals for the sake of the common good. Since the enslaved would not agree to “suffering wrongdoing,” and the division of labor that Socrates proposes would not allow for slavery, we must discover a principle for the division of labor that would be consistent with egoism. The “one man, one task principle” is consistent with egoism because (1) the restriction it places on liberty is one to which most people would agree, and (2) one could argue that it really is better for oneself if every individual maximizes his productivity by devoting himself to just one task.197

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197 I am relying on Glaucon's implicit denial that unanimous consent is necessary to make the contract. A majority might very well agree to the “one man, one task” principle, and that would suffice for Glaucon.
§3. Second Capitulation: Philia

On the basis of the two reasons for association—egoism and the lack of self-sufficiency—discussed above, Socrates and Adeimantus build a city that has moderate prosperity, avoids poverty and war, and provides a stable future for its children. Socrates calls this city “healthy” (ὑγιὴς, 372e7) and “true” (ἀληθινὴ πόλις, 372e6), and suggests that Adeimantus look for justice in it. Adeimantus guesses that justice may come about “through some sort of need which those elements have of one another,” but before they can explore this idea, Glaucon interrupts and calls this city a “city of pigs” (ὑῶν πόλιν, 372d4). His chief complaint is that the city lacks the luxuries that “people today have” (οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι, 372e2), such as couches, cooked dishes, and deserts. Socrates only comments that the city Glaucon wants to build is “luxurious” (τρυφῶσαν πόλιν, 372e4) and “inflamed,” (φλεγμαίνουσαν, 372e8) but proceeds to build such a city anyway, which they will fill with “things which are no longer what cities must have as a matter of necessity.”

Socrates tries to explain the emergence of the “sick” city out of the “healthy” city by saying that “for some, these things will not be enough” (ταῦτα [...] οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει, 373a1). This explanation, though brief, is crucial for understanding the difference between the healthy and the unhealthy cities. Socrates does not clarify who the “some” are for whom “the necessary” (τἀναγκαῖ, 373a4) will not be enough. Nonetheless, the necessary psychological conditions for the perception that something is “not enough” are available to us from the story of Poros and Penia in the Symposium, which Socrates uses...
to explain the origin of eros. The parents of eros are Poros (resource) and Penia (poverty), and eros, as the child of these parents, is mixture of both. More specifically, Eros lacks what it desires (is impoverished), but does not remain entirely impoverished because it is aware of its lack, and has some idea of how to acquire what it lacks (thus it has some “resource” or “means”). What I would like to suggest here is that while it is true that Glaucon complains of the absence of luxuries—items that satisfy unnecessary desires—in the city, he contributes something more than just unnecessary desires; he also contributes the psychological conditions for Eros to the city. In contrast, Adeimantus helped construct a city whose activities are oriented around necessary desires, but the problem is that it is artificially idyllic. The healthy city perpetuates itself through the generations, and maintains moderate prosperity, but it does so only because it seems to be unaware of other possibilities. The citizens in Adeimantus’ city acquire the material possessions that they lack, but they remain unaware that they lack anything else, and this is why they perceive their possessions as “enough.” We might say that the appetite of citizens in Adeimantus' city functions according to the paradigm of depletion and replenishment. Many appetitive desires function according to this model: hunger and thirst communicate the lack of food and drink, and a person fills this lack by eating or drinking, until the point when satisfaction sets in. The perception of satisfaction thus functions as an internal regulator of the amount one consumes to fill the lack. If one lacked perception, that is, if one continued to remain aware of a lack even when one had consumed an amount that would normally provide satisfaction, then one would desire more than is necessary. Glaucon thus introduces a type of perception which is essential to

erotic desire, i.e., the perception of lack beyond the necessary.

But the contribution of *eros* to the city comes with the cost of a new kind of vulnerability. The city now acquires a competitive relation with its neighbors (previously they only traded), and thereby opens itself to attacking and being attacked.202 The necessity of the Guardians stems from the vulnerability that Eros impinges upon the city.203 Not only can the city attack, but it can *be attacked* for the wealth that other cities covet. This latter possibility necessitates the introduction of the guardians. Someone must defend the city, and Glaucon agrees that the “one man, one task” principle dictates that one group of people, whose character best suits warfare, ought to take up the task of the city's defense. As such, the guardians must be aggressive and spirited in nature. But the introduction of a class professional soldiers with this characteristic poses a new problem: the guardians might turn their aggression against their own, prey upon the citizens, and enjoy the wealth for themselves. The guardians must also, therefore, be “gentle” toward the citizens. We should notice here, however, that the threat of predation is also a threat of the guardians' own *eros*. The proposed function of the guardians is to act as protectors from the *eros* of other cities, but to do so perfectly, without posing a threat to the city, the guardians would have to have an utterly non-erotic way of life; that is, they would have to experience no feeling of *lack* with respect to their share of the goods that the city has to offer. Socrates, however, raises the crucial question as to whether such a type of guardian

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202 Socrates asks “Do we need, then, to care ourselves a slice of our neighbours' territory, if we are going to have enough for pasturage and ploughing? And do they in turn need a slice of our land, if they too give themselves up to the pursuit of unlimited wealth, not confining themselves to necessities?” (373d, Griffith).

203 Cf. Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings*, 178; Tad Brennan, “The Nature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its Object” in *Plato and the Divided Self* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 105-109. Brennan imagines the perspective of a hypothetical demiurge in order to argue that *thumos* is a necessary feature for a being that finds itself in competition for resources. *Thumos* helps mitigate this competition by way of honor, which creates a system for distributing appetitive goods.
is even possible—they are, after all, only human, and their characteristic mixture of aggressiveness and gentleness is difficult to achieve.204

The solution that Socrates proposes to avoid the threat of predation is a new form of association for the city, namely, philia. This becomes apparent when Socrates likens the guardians to “noble hounds” (γεγεναίων κυνῶν, 375e2) and “lovers of wisdom by nature” (φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν, 375e8-9). If the guardians are like philosophers, and distinguish friend from enemy by whether they know the person or not,205 there is a better chance they will be gentle toward those who are “their own and familiar” (πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρᾶὸς 376b8-9). Without this bond, it is difficult to imagine that individuals would willingly sacrifice their lives so that others may enjoy prosperity.

Philia, a sense of love and fondness for one's own, is the new bond that will unify the city, rather than mutually-beneficial self-interest.206

204 There are other reasons, not immediately apparent in Book II, why the solution to the threat that the guardians pose is not to neuter them, so to speak, of their Eros. Doing so would also foreclose the emergence of the love of wisdom. David Rochnik emphasizes eros' willingness to encounter the unknown “other,” and argues that this willingness is what makes philosophical eros is open to the possibility that what is “one’s own,” e.g., the forms, might at first appear strange and unfamiliar (Beautiful City: The Dialectical Character of Plato’s Republic [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003], 54). Book V is relevant here, as it details the process by which the Eros of the guardians is utilized for public benefit. For instance, soldiers who show exceptional courage are allowed to kiss whomever they like. This policy, Socrates says, “should make anyone who is in fact in love with someone else—whether that someone is male or female—all the more determined to win a prize” (468c, Griffith). Paul Ludwig argues that Book V shows the separation of thumos from eros, and that this separation is crucial for the development of non-possessive, philosophical Eros. Thumos, Ludwig argues, “seems to be at the root of all possessiveness,” and is responsible for the failure of philia to attain “perfect justice” (“Eros in the Republic,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, ed. G.R.F Ferrari, [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 224).

205[...] Οὐδένι ἄλλῳ φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν διακρίνει, ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν καταμαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀγνοῆσαι (376b2-3).

206 Cf. Gregory Vlastos, “The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato,” in Platonic Studies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 12-15. Vlastos argues that philia is perfectly suited to the definition of justice that eventually emerges in the Republic. However, he relies on the Lysis to extract a Platonic conception of philia, which he summarizes with the formula that “you will be loved if and only if you are useful” (12). Philia under this description suits the definition of justice in the Republic because the one’s “usefulness” is determined by one’s fulfilling some task that was specified as necessary to the good of the whole. Vlastos, however, alleges that philia in the Republic eventually becomes oppressive, on the grounds that Socrates callously disposes of those who can no longer perform their function because they suffer from illness (410a). On Vlastos’ reading, philia in the Republic just postulates that one will receive affection from another on the condition that one fulfills
Here we find a second moment at which Glaucon and Adeimantus should object if they are to properly defend the unjust life. They should reply here that exploiting the citizens is exactly what the guardians should do: they should, for example, enrich themselves by demanding tribute for protecting the city, and then run a public-relations campaign to convince the citizens of the justice of this policy. So why doesn't Glaucon interrupt here? First, I suggest that Socrates' use of hounds as an example of the combination of gentleness and aggressiveness in the same nature is convincing because it shows that associations based on *philia* are in fact a natural phenomenon. Although cultivating such a bond of association may be more complex in human beings than in hounds, the bond itself is not against nature. Second, Glaucon may agree to the instituting of guardians because he still identifies with the erotic and appetitive part of the city; that is, he imagines himself primarily among the citizens who will be living in luxury, rather than as a guardian type. From this perspective he can recognize both the threat that the guardians pose, and the need to keep them in check. As in Book IV, where Glaucon likens *thumos* to desire, so too here he holds the conviction that the function of *thumos* is to serve the *eros*. One of Socrates' lessons for Glaucon in the *Republic* concerns the proper function of *thumos* as subordinate to *reason* rather than desire, and at this early stage in the dialogue it is clear that Glaucon still adheres to the subordination of *thumos* to appetite.

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207 See also Reeve, who argues that the “First Polis is that part of the Kallipolis in which money-lovers, and only money-lovers, are made as happy as it is possible for them to be” (*Philosopher-Kings*, 176).

208 439e3-5; Socrates corrects Glaucon's thinking and persuades him that *thumos* is properly subordinate to the *logistikon*. I will discuss this argument in more detail in the next chapter. Cf. Ludwig, who argues that the conversation of the *Republic* unveils the danger of the bond between *eros* and *thumos*: Glaucon experiences this bond himself and thus risks becoming a tyrant (“Eros in the *Republic*,” 225-230).

The hound analogy presents the need to describe a program for educating and habituating the guardians—a task that Adeimantus and Socrates immediately pursue.209 Hounds must be trained to perform certain behaviors, and habituated regularly in the presence of certain people in order to recognize those people as “familiar” and “friend” on the one hand, and consider other people “unfamiliar” and “enemy” on the other hand. Socrates uses this analogy to make a quite limited—though crucial—point for eventually refuting the artificiality thesis: he means only to persuade Glaucon and Adeimantus that the plasticity of human character is natural because other natural species are receptive to habituation.210 Accepting this retrieves human nomoi from a domain somehow “outside” of nature. The musical and physical education of the guardians, which Glaucon and Adeimantus begin to describe here in Book II, performs this habituative function, as is clear from their explicit acknowledgment that they are designing the “molds” or “patterns” (τύποις, 379a2) of stories that will be told to children, who are most susceptible to habituation, and not capable of philosophical reasoning.211 More specifically, the patterns will define the ways that stories may portray paradigmatic instances of the virtues of wisdom (377e-385e), courage (386a-389d), and moderation

209 Θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα τρόπον (376c5-d1);
210 Annas overlooks the importance of this analogy for refuting the artificiality thesis; she describes the analogy as “odd” on the grounds that the analogy seems to exclude the possibility that guardians might have the type of conversation that Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Socrates are having in the Republic (Introduction, 81).
211 Plato’s choice of metaphor is apt here; a τύπος typically refers to a seal for imprinting an insignia in wax, or a mold or some sort (LSJ, “τύπος”). The suggestion that they are “molding” children with these stories is unmistakable. One reason that Socrates forbids the telling of certain stories is that “the young are incapable of judging what is allegory and what is not, and the opinions they form at that age tend to be ineradicable and unchangeable” (378d, Griffith). Thus, children are most susceptible to habituation, and least capable of exercising critical reasoning about whatever they receive as true. There is a tendency among commentators to ignore the account of the τύποι. The unfortunate result is a loss of perspective on the emergence of the more subtle psychological features of the virtues and the gradual erosion of Glaucon and Adeimantus’ commitments to the Technē Model of justice
Early in this discussion, however, Socrates and Adeimantus encounter a sort of paradox in the nature of education itself. When they arrive at the stories that they will tell about mankind and the virtue of justice—the other stories having been about “the gods, about daemones, heroes, and those in Hades”\(^{212}\)—Socrates steers the discussion away from stories about mankind because:

[...] poets and speech-makers speak badly concerning the most important things about mankind, [saying] that many people are unjust and happy, that the just are miserable, that committing injustice is profitable—if it goes unnoticed—and that justice is another person’s advantage and damaging to oneself.\(^{213}\)

Socrates then points out to Adeimantus that if they decide that the pattern of stories about humankind would forbid them to repeat what the poets (typically) say, they will have effectively answered the question as to whether the just life is better than the unjust life. Thus, they must postpone a discussion of the stories about humankind until they “have discovered [εὐρῶμεν] what sort of thing justice is, and shown that by nature it is profitable for the person who possesses it, whether it seems or does not seem to be this sort of thing.”\(^{214}\)

I suggest that we read this passage as another provocative-aporetic moment for several reasons. First, accepting Socrates’ proposals about the stories the poets should tell about humankind would amount to accepting a form of indoctrination that Thrasymachus

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\(^{212}\) περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι εἴρηται καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου (392a4).

\(^{213}\) ὡς ἄρα καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσιν περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ μέγιστα, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄδικοι μὲν εὐδαιμόνες δὲ πολλοὶ, δίκαιοι δὲ ἄθλοι, καὶ ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τὸ ἄδικεν ἐὰν λανθάνη, ὡς δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἄλλοτριον μὲν ἁγαθόν, οἰκεία δὲ ζῆµα (392a7-b4).

\(^{214}\) Οὐκοῦν περὶ ἀνθρώπων ὅτι τοιούτος δεῖ λόγους λέγεσθαι, τὸτε διοµολογσόμεθα, ὅτα εύροµεν οὐν ἐστιν δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ὡς φύσει λυσιτελοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι, ἐὰν τε δοκῇ ἐὰν τε μὴ τοιοῦτος εἶναι (392c1-4).
criticized for keeping people ignorant about their true—pleonektic—nature. Second, Socrates has raised several questions concerning the nature of habituation in general and the protreptic function of the company's inquiry into justice. With regard to the nature of habituative education, a few alternatives are at stake: either (a) habituative education is a form of indoctrination that imparts false beliefs that have social utility; (b) habituative education is a form of indoctrination that imparts true beliefs that simply lack justification; or (c) habituative education imparts characteristics that prepare students for eventual insight into the beliefs they in fact hold, but of which they are not yet aware. Throughout the discussion of the τύποι, Adeimantus appears to hold position (a).

Acknowledging that the beliefs that these stories inculcate have social utility does not require him to hold that justice in fact has intrinsic worth for the soul. It may be true that there is social utility in peoples' believing that justice has intrinsic worth, but the fact that these beliefs have social utility does not prove that justice is beneficial for the individual. This view would, in fact, conform more closely to both Thrasyvachus' and Glaucon's insistence on the need for “simpletons” so that others may practice injustice. An unjust person would want others to act as if justice were profitable for the individual, since they would be easier to manipulate and less likely to compete with him.

There is also in this dilemma something at stake for the protreptic function of the inquiry into justice. Whether habituative education imparts true or false beliefs, Socrates and Adeimantus both proceed on the assumption that habituation demands un-resisting receptivity to certain practices and beliefs—much like wax receives an imprint. But this assumption seems to counteract the educational aim of making philosophers critically examine their beliefs, indeed precisely those which they have received from the nomoi.
Thus the receptivity of habituative education seems to be at odds with the very conversation which Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus perform. This raises the question as to whether the education that Glaucon and Adeimantus design for the guardians’ lives up to the same protreptic they receive from Socrates. If it does, then their new-found trust in nomoi might be strengthened by the conviction that habituative education is not simply another form of indoctrination.215

At this point Socrates returns to the grammatical aspect of the city-soul analogy, and suggests a way in which this analogy might refute the artificiality thesis. Socrates draws an analogy between reading and education in the virtues, saying that the purpose of musical education is to teach the guardians to “read” (διαγιγνώσκειν, 402b1) the virtues, as if they were “letters.” The significance of this analogy with letters and reading is that Socrates relies on an implicit distinction between the authentic “original” of a virtue and the inauthentic distortion of the original. Thus he points out that we will not recognize (οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, 402b4) the “images of letters” (εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, 402b3) until we know the “letters themselves” (πρίν ἂν αὐτὰ [τὰ γράμματα] γνῶμεν, 402b5). We are encouraged to conceive of our education into virtue in the same way that we conceive learning how to read: first we have to receive images of well-formed letters, and learn to recognize such letters, before we can recognize letters that are ill-formed. We need to be familiar with the good model, or παράδειγμα, before we can recognize poorly formed “images” or “copies” of the original.

If we extend this analogy include the position of Glaucon and Adeimantus as designers of the guardians' education, then we may discover a provisional answer to the

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215 See Annas, who rightly identifies the risk that this education will create “a Polemarchus, with rigid principles and no real understanding of them” (Introduction, 84).
question of the protreptic function of the tension between the two goals of education. When Socrates reviews stories from Greek mythology, with which Adeimantus and Glaucon are undoubtedly familiar, he in effect asks them to review their own musical education to see whether it was well-designed, that is, to see whether they received well-formed paradigms of the virtues. I suggest that this grammatical metaphor, which Socrates uses to describe the stories about the virtues, also describes the reader's position with respect to the Republic: as readers we are receiving an account about how to design an education that would impart virtue. To participate in this inquiry, it would be irresponsible of readers to assume that they had already received the virtues properly formed; therefore, they must turn a critical eye toward their own habituation.

So, while Glaucon and Adeimantus are being shown that habituation is an unavoidable aspect of education, they are also being shown a way to think critically about their habituation without categorically rejecting what they have received from their habituation (though they reject much of it). They themselves are not being habituated in the process of the conversation; rather, they are exercising a kind of critical reflection on whether their own education has provided them with the characteristics that they truly value, and how they might instill those characteristics in themselves and others. But in accepting this task, they are also admitting that the artificiality of the nomoi that effect this habituation does not provide a reason for thinking that nomoi do not deserve respect and the individual's compliance. The artificiality of nomoi does not provide a reason to dispute the normative status of the nomoi; rather, nomoi that fail to instill truly virtuous qualities do not deserve a normative status because they fail to achieve their pedagogical aim. Thus, Socrates has persuaded them to give up the artificiality thesis (T3). Laws,
despite being human artifacts, deserve respect because they provide habituation into a preliminary sort of virtue.

In what follows, I point out several important capitulations that Glaucon and Adeimantus make as they take the role of “recipients” and “designers” in the discussion of the musical and poetic education. I organize these capitulations by virtue, and provide the definition of each virtue in the political sense, as is given in the Book IV. The essence of the point that I will make here is that Glaucon and Adeimantus concede nearly the entirety of Socrates' position in the course of this discussion: almost everything they idealized in the unjust person, they admit to be somehow vicious. In a sense, the argument for the intrinsic worth of justice in Book IV simply re-describes the concessions they have already made. However, because they concede these points under the assumption that they are discussing a purely habituative stage of education—a stage that is justified because of its social utility—Socrates has not yet answered their demand to know the power of “justice itself” in the soul. Nonetheless, their concessions may be interpreted as the process by which Socrates releases them from the illusion that injustice is better for a person. Finally, I shall point out ways in which the virtues described in books II-III function as preliminary virtues for eventual philosophers.

§5. Piety and the Simplicity of the Divine: Preliminaries to Wisdom

Socrates and Adeimantus agree on two “patterns” that will guide the poets' compositions in the habituative education. Santas argues that Plato distinguishes the virtues of wisdom, courage, and sophrosunē by identifying each as the excellence of one of the functions of the city. The functions of the city on his analysis are provision, defend, and rule itself (Understanding Plato's Republic, 68-71). It is clear how courage and wisdom could count as the virtues of the function of defending and ruling, but on this analysis sophrosunē seems not to fit because it is not clear how it is the excellence of the function of provisioning. This sort of analysis also overlooks the subtler psychological features of these virtues, such as the ways that they regulate pleasure and pain.
of stories about the gods. The first pattern stipulates that (a) “the god is good in reality, and it is necessary to say so” (ἀγαθός ὅ γε θεός τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω, 379b1); (b) “he [the god] […] could not be the cause of bad”; and (c) the good is cause of things holding well, but not the cause of bad things” ([…] τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον, 379b6-7). In this sense Socrates construes god as an agent that has the power to “do” (ποιεῖ) and “be responsible for” (αἴτιον) good. The second pattern stipulates that divinity is “simple” (ἁπλοῦν, 382e5) and “whollyundeceptive” (πάντῃ ἄρα ἀψευδὲς, 382e4). These patterns explain in what ways various famous stories from Greek mythology wrongly portray the nature of divinity, while the justification for censoring the stories from Homer and Hesiod lies in the social utility of the behaviors that the correct portrayals of divinity allegedly encourage. The first pattern excludes stories about Kronos’ castration of Ouranos (378a); in-fighting among the Olympian family; and Zeus’ distribution of both goods and evils in different proportions to individuals. Censoring stories like these will allegedly prevent citizens from believing that by committing horrible crimes “they wouldn't be doing anything out of the ordinary, not even if they inflicted every kind of punishment on a father who treated them badly” (378b, Griffith), while portraying unity among the family of the gods will convince people that “no citizen has ever quarreled with another citizen” (378d, Griffith). Finally, regarding divinity as the cause of solely good things will help convince people that when

217 Socrates likens the poets who portray the gods badly to painters (γραφεύς) “who paint things that in no way bear resemblance to whatever things they wanted to paint” (ὅταν εἰκάζῇ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἥρωων οἷοί εἰσίν, ὡς περὶ γραφεύς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἀν ὁμοίοι γράφαι, 377e2-3).

218 Socrates has two stories in mind here: (1) Hephaestus’ binding of Hera and (2) Zeus’ hurling Hephaestus from mount Olympus (Iliad, I.586-5940).

219 Achilles’ lament at Iliad, XXIV.527-532.
they are punished, they are at fault, and the punishment is good for them (380b).\textsuperscript{220} The second pattern, on the other hand, excludes stories about the gods disguising themselves as humans or as other beings,\textsuperscript{221} or changing form, either because something else causes them to, or from their own initiative.

Socrates argues that a god would not deceive us by disguising itself because the gods, as well as mortals, hate “the true falsehood,” i.e., having mistaken notions about “the chiepest matters” (περὶ τὰ κυριωτάτα, 382a4-5) in “the chiepest part of himself” (τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, 382a4). Disguising oneself would be structurally similar to “the false in speech” (τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος, 382c4), a use of falsehood that Socrates calls an “image” (εἴδωλον, 382c1) of the “unmixed falsehood” (ἄκρατον ψεῦδος, 382c2). It is not clear in what sense verbal falsehoods are an “image” of the more primary falsehood, but some speculation may shed light on the matter. Socrates defends the use of “the false in speech” by pointing out that lies may be useful “just as medicine is useful” (ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον, 382d1), and the myths they have discussed may convey some truth, even if the people and events they describe are not real.\textsuperscript{222} Verbal falsehoods may imitate the unmixed falsehood because they do not concern the most important things and do not take root in the most important part of oneself. Although the question of justice is still undecided, it seems correct to include beliefs about justice among the “most important” things. Beliefs about justice can be said to take root in the most important part of a person.

\textsuperscript{220} A claim that has some precedent on Homer. In the Odyssey Zeus laments that mortals blame the gods when things go badly, when they ought to blame their own recklessness (Od., I.30-35).
\textsuperscript{221} Socrates mentions Proteus, who has an episode in the Odyssey (IV.412).
\textsuperscript{222} Kamtekar interprets this passage as an indication that Plato was willing to accept tripartite psychology as a kind of useful “falsehood in words” (“Speaking with the Same Voice as Reason,” in Plato and the Divided Self, eds. Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan, Charles Brittain [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012], 199). This interpretation is questionable, however, because tripartite psychology might be one of the things that takes root in “the most important part” of oneself, and it is in this “place” of oneself that Socrates says one must guard against falsehood.
because they dictate the whole of a person's conduct, and ultimately his or her character. Verbal falsehoods misrepresent certain facts, but they do not misrepresent truths about the “most important things;” moreover, they do not take root in the “most important part” of oneself, as they may be fairly easily discarded.

Adeimantus agrees that any stories told contrary to these patterns would not be “pious” (οὔτε ὅσια ἄν λεγόμενα, 380c2-3)—an agreement that suggests piety as the operative virtue in this discussion. If we look carefully, Adeimantus has conceded two quite significant points in this discussion. First, he concedes that skill in dissemblance—at which Glaucon says the unjust person must excel—is not really a virtue. This concession becomes apparent when he agrees that the social utility of the second pattern lies in its potential to make the guardians “god-fearing and godlike, to the greatest extent possible for a human being” (383c3-4). But divinity was just described as “simple” (ἁπλοῦν 382e5) and “wholly undeceptive” (382e5); the gods do not deceive others or disguise themselves. In striving for this simplicity of character, the guardians must refuse to engage in dissemblance, and therefore could not practice the virtue that is necessary to commit injustice and maintain a reputation for perfect justice. Second, Adeimantus gives up his view of the traditional representation of the gods that he held in his portion of the challenge. There he observed that if the gods exist and are interested in human beings, then “our only knowledge or hearsay of them comes from custom and the poets who sing of the gods' family histories” (365e, Griffith). But according to the traditional representation, the gods “give many good people unhappiness and a wretched life, while

223 The prohibition of stories about intra-familial violence among the gods will allegedly prevent intra-familial conflict among those in the city. These stories recall the context of the Euthyphro, in which a conflict between father and son introduces the question about piety.
224 [...] εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θείοι γένεσθαι καθ' ὅσον ἰσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἷόν τε (383c3-4).
to their opposites they give a life which is quite different” (364b, Griffith), and are in fact so inconstant that one may bribe them with sacrifices to dole out either good or evil to whomever on wishes.225 Adeimantus argued that these characteristics of the gods imply that the best policy for a person to follow is to act unjustly, because any way one looks at it, there appear to be ways for the unjust person neutralize divine powers. Why, then, does Adeimantus agree to Socrates' portrayal of the nature of divinity? I suggest that one reason he agrees is that he in fact disrespects the hypocrisy of those who subscribe to the traditional portrayal of the gods. The traditional conception does not give people a reason to respect justice, even though the poets who represent that tradition pay lip-service to virtues by portraying rewards for the virtuous in the afterlife. The reward for those who practice just and piety, for instance, is “perpetual drunkenness” in Hades.226 But if that is the greatest good for human beings, then why wait for the afterlife to partake in it? Adeimantus thus approves of Socrates' arguments for the simplicity of both the divine and the guardians who are properly educated, because this education may prevent the duplicity of those who subscribe to the traditional Homeric conception of the gods.

Finally, I would like to point out ways that the two patterns anticipate some of Socrates' descriptions of the virtue of wisdom. The simplicity and causal power (for good) of the divine anticipates the form of the Good, which receives the same description in Book VI, and mimics other standard descriptions of forms in Plato's dialogues. In the Republic, the good is the “cause of knowledge and truth” (αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, 508e3) and the “first principle of everything” (παντὸς ἀρχὴν, 511b6); in the

225 Cf. Annas, Introduction, 65. Annas may be right to describe Adeimantus' contribution to Glaucon's challenge as “minor,” but I suggest his dissatisfaction with the hypocrisy of the poets is crucial to understanding how Socrates exerts a protreptic effect on him.
226 Rep., 363c3-d2
Symposium, the form of the beautiful is neither beautiful nor ugly either in part, or at one point in time but not another, but rather appears as an unadulterated simple. Thus we may view these two patterns about the divine as mythological placeholders for the forms. In yet another way, the behaviors that these stories encourage help develop the virtue of the logistikon, which in Book IV Socrates describes as “forethought over the good of the whole.” Although these stories might not develop the virtue of forethought, they at least instill a sense of reverence for the good as a demand that supersedes all other interests.

§6. Courage

Socrates eventually defines courage as the “preservation of the opinion that has come about by education, under the power of law, about fearful things, what sorts of things they are. By ‘preserving [of this opinion] through everything’ I meant really preserving the opinion among pains, pleasures, desires, and fears, and not casting it out.” In what follows I will explain how the patterns regarding courage anticipate and elucidate this definition. The patterns that guide the poets' composition of stories for courage are two: (a) they must say something “positive,” rather than “negative” about the underworld and (b) they must portray courageous people as emotionally centered, prone neither to excessive grief when experiencing personal loss (377d-378e), nor to “being overcome by laughter” (κρατουμένους ὑπὸ γέλωτος, 388e6). The social utility of the first pattern is grounded on the assumption that the traditional form of courage is an ability to

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227 Sym., 210e5-211b6
228 Rep., 441e.
229 Τὴν [σωτηρίαν] τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγονούς περί τῶν δεινῶν, ἃ τε ἐστι καὶ ὀλίγα διὰ παντός ἔλεγον αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν τὸ ἐν τε λύπαις ὄντα διασῴζεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἠδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἔπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλεσθαι (429c5-d2).
endure the prospect of sudden death in battle. If guardians believe that something more glorious awaits them in the afterlife, then they will be less afraid to confront the prospect of death. The social utility of the second pattern, however, is not quite so clear. For example, one might argue that grief is an indication of one's love for another person, and thus an indication of one's commitment to that person. How could someone risk his life without this feeling of commitment? Grief might also spur the desire for revenge, which might make the guardians fiercer in battle. It is also not clear why easy amusement would threaten the guardians' cultivation of courage—surely amusements and laughter provide relief from the horror of war.

The social utility of the second pattern does not become apparent until later in Book III, when Socrates discusses the influences that cause people to change their convictions (413b). Two of these causes are “magic” and “force” (413b1): people give up their convictions under the influence of “magic” when they experience pleasure, and under the influence of “force” when they experience “pain or grief” (413b6).230 Socrates then proposes that they test an individual's ability to maintain his or her convictions in the midst of pains and pleasures that accompany different emotional states before they make that person a guardian. More specifically, they will test for a conviction that qualifies a person to be a guardian, i.e., the conviction to act in the best interests of the city as a whole. Evidently, the purpose of this test is to gauge a person's ability to maintain a sort of emotional centeredness under certain stresses, lest they give up this guardian-qualifying conviction. In light of these considerations, the desirability of emotional centeredness becomes more apparent and, as a result, Socrates overturns some of the Homeric qualities of courage. For example, a guardian who experienced excessive grief

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230 The third cause, “theft,” is persuasion and forgetfulness.
over a personal loss might fail to fulfill his duties to others. Achilles' reaction to Patroklos' death in the *Iliad* provides a good illustration of this danger. In one particularly brutal scene, Achilles kills Lycaon, even though the latter has clasped Achilles' knees in religious supplication.\(^{231}\) Thus, one might argue that a kind of emotional derangement caused Achilles to commit an impiety. On the other hand, a person who was easily overcome by laughter might fail to perceive what is at stake in a situation that calls for seriousness. For example, in his work on Greek comedy, Stephen Halliwell observes that ancient Greek humor typically features an object of derision, so that humor may be predicated on a differentiation between superior and inferior.\(^{232}\) A guardian who is too easily overcome with laughter might become captivated by this dynamic, and secretly despise the citizens whom he is supposed to defend.

The repetition of the portrait of emotionally centered individuals shows that courage performs the function of maintaining the diachronic identity of the guardians, by preserving their characteristic conviction as they experience pleasure, pain, and different emotions. Thus, the prohibition of stories that portray as courageous those individuals who experience emotional extremes is consistent with the definition of courage that Socrates later provides. In accepting these patterns for the stories about courage, however, Glaucon and Adeimantus effectively reject their assertion that just people fail to practice injustice only because of their cowardice. The greatest injustice that the guardians risk committing is the plundering of the citizenry, but the identification of pleasure and pain as the causes of a kind of false courage help explain why true courage

\(^{231}\) *Iliad*, XXI.1-200.

could not commit injustice against the city. For example, a guardian who took excessive pleasure in the material wealth of the laboring class might be tempted by that pleasure to take an undeserved share of the wealth. On the other hand, a guardian who experienced excessive grief over the loss of a friend in battle might feel resentment toward citizens who did not fight on the city's behalf, and lay claim to a greater share of the city's wealth than they deserve—or worse, come to see the citizens as unworthy of defense. Here Glaucon and Adeimantus have acknowledge that courage in the conventional sense requires accepting constraints on one's experience of emotions; there are, in other words, norms that indicate the appropriateness of the type or quantity of emotion to a circumstance. The failure to observe these norms may directly interfere with a guardian's ability to properly act in the city's best interest. Therefore, they must admit the falsity of the Thrasymachus' assertion that people fail to commit injustice because they are cowards.

Nonetheless, the conviction which defines the guardians' courage falls short of the demand to be “really persuaded” that justice is intrinsically desirable. Presumably, guardians must go through some form of training to acquire a sense of these norms. But this only means that they have aligned their emotional life with their duty; they have minimized the conflict between what their duties demand and whatever resistance their emotions may offer to fulfilling these demands. So, while they avoid practicing injustice, they may still lack a positive sense of the worth of justice. On the other hand, the courage

233 These dangers also point to the great care which must be taken not to waste the Guardians' courage in pointless wars. It may be that the only way to guarantee that they act with the courage Plato describes is by limiting their combat to the defense of the city. Although Socrates seems to describe offensive campaigns in Book V (στρατεύσοντα, 466e2; a word that describes marching and camp-making), he also proposes that these campaigns will be training exercises for the young, and not reckless offensive exploits.

234 Another point that Halliwell discusses at length; see his discussion of the philosophical “agelast,” Greek Laughter, 39-40; 271-274.
describe here appears to be preparatory for the philosopher's courage in the practice of
dialectic in that both require the same emotional centeredness. Socrates says that the
philosopher must “fight through all attempts to disprove his theory in his eagerness to test
it by the standard of being rather than the standard of opinion” (534c1-3, Griffith). The
two extremes of rage and grief seem possible in relation to this defense of one's theory:
(a) one might become so disheartened at suffering a defeat that one ceases trying to argue
for one's ideas; (b) one might become so enraged at one's interlocutor that one derides
him and refuses to recognize that one's theory has been refuted.235

§7. Sophrosunē

When Socrates defines sophrosunē in Book IV, he begins by describing it as
something “more like to a harmony or musical mode”236 than the other virtues (courage
and wisdom). He then defines the virtue as agreement among the parts of the city and
soul about which part is to rule, and which part is to be ruled.237 Before defining
sophrosunē as an “agreement,” however, he first describes it as “being obedient to the
rulers (ἀρχόντων) and being a ruler with respect to the pleasures of food, sex, and
drink.238 Superficially, then, it is not apparent how the stories about sophrosunē in the
musical education promote “harmony” and “agreement” among the parts of the city and
soul. Although we will not receive a full account of the agreement about which part in the
soul is to rule, and which to be ruled, until Book IV, I suggest an interpretation of the

235 It takes no stretch of the imagination to recognize Thrasymachus as a good illustration of the latter
extreme.
236 [...] ἐν δὲ τοιάδε μέγιστα, ἄρχοντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας
tῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἔδωδας ἥδεν, 389d8-e2.
stories about *sophrosunē* and the purging of the city of musical and dietetic luxuries in Book III that shows how they anticipate and elucidate the definition from Book IV. Finally, I argue that Glaucon and Adeimantus give up some of their prior commitments in this conversation because they see an essential connection between *sophrosunē* and philosophy.

The patterns for this virtue appear to require that the stories depict two sorts of behaviors: (1) actions that are paradigmatically *sphrón*, and (2) the use of *persuasion* as the proper means for dealing with behavior that exceeds proper measure, or is *aphrón*. The first point appears in the suggestion that they forbid stories like the one Homer tells about Zeus in the *Iliad*, in which Zeus is so overcome with sexual desire for Hera that he forgets about his plan to help the Achaeans. Although this episode deals with sexual desire, Socrates extends the lesson beyond appetitive pleasures to corruption and avarice, suggesting that *sophrosunē* lessens the likelihood that the citizens will take bribes and be swayed by gifts. In connection with this point, he suggests that they must censor numerous episodes from the *Iliad* about Achilles, such as his acceptance of gifts from Agamemnon and his killing of live prisoners at Patroklos' funeral. In a similar vein, Socrates forbids the poets to say that gods or descendants of the gods commit abductions and other crimes. The problem with these sorts of stories, Socrates points out, is that they encourage people to forgive themselves for doing wrong, and may “implant a proclivity for wickedness in the young.”

The use of persuasion in the stories about *sophrosunē* is apparent in Socrates’s approval of another episode from the *Iliad*, involving Diomedes and Sthenelus. The

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239 […] ὧν ἕνεκα παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὴν εὐχερείαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις πονηρίαις (391e11-d1).
context of the episode is a scene in which Agamemnon is exhorting the troops to fight, and suggests that Diomedes is not living up to the courage of his own father.\textsuperscript{240} Sthenelus replies to Agamemnon and boasts that they are better men than their fathers,\textsuperscript{241} but Diomedes rebukes Sthenelus, saying that it is entirely understandable that Agamemnon should exhort the soldiers by shaming them,\textsuperscript{242} since whether they succeed or fail, Agamemnon will take the responsibility. In other words, if the Achaeans lose, no one will fault the soldiers because they held back from the fray—but everyone will blame Agamemnon for losing the battle. In this sense, Diomedes is rebuking Sthenelus for questioning his \textit{archon}. With this story Socrates wants to demonstrate that \textit{sophron} actions display an obedience that comes about by \textit{persuasion} rather than by force. The point, it seems, is that the virtuousness of a moderate action consists in part in one's heeding \textit{logos}.\textsuperscript{243}

Socrates' insistence on the rule of persuasion in paradigmatically \textit{sophron} actions is pivotal in revealing the depth of Adeimantus' as yet unacknowledged commitment to \textit{sophrosunē}. Since Glaucon and Adeimantus have already conceded that \textit{pleonexia} is not psychologically basic, they need an account of how the guardians' desires will be conditioned. The stories about \textit{sophrosunē} have the superficial function of conditioning the appetitive desires (i.e. for food, drink, and sex) by providing details about what sorts of appetites are appropriate to satisfy, and in what quantities. But the specific requirement that the stories portray the virtue of obeying persuasion (as in the episode with Sthenelus and Diomedes) suggests that \textit{sophrosunē} has a deeper function, in that it conditions the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{240} \textit{Iliad}, IV.368-400.
\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Iliad}, IV.404-411
\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Iliad}, IV.412-418
\textsuperscript{243} In Chapter 4 I argue that \textit{thumos} performs this function of representing accountability to authoritative persons, but not yet to reasons or \textit{logoi}.
\end{flushleft}
guardians to be receptive to logos. The logos that they receive, however, may not be wholly rational, and their way of receiving it might not be wholly reason-responsive; rather, it might be necessary that the logos come from a particular person, such as a figure of authority, in order to have a compelling effect. Nonetheless, the figure whose logos the guardians heed may function as a surrogate for the authority of reasons, which are internal to logos.

Sophrosunē remains under consideration as the discussion proceeds to the question of musical modes, rhythms, and narrative styles. In this portion of the discussion, Glaucon and Adeimantus capitulate on their claim that the satisfaction of appetitive desires and desires for luxuries is a constituent of the virtuous life. They make this concession when they purge the city of both poetic and dietetic luxuries—a purging that is not without some irony, since they remove the very luxuries that initiated the construction of the “inflamed” city. As I suggest below, the reason for this concession is not simply that they agree that the pleasures that accompany such desires are bad (though they may be); rather, they come to see that sophrosunē regulates the pleasures that accompany these desires because it promotes pleasure in the kosmion, or the “well-ordered.” This pleasure in turn makes available the intellectual pleasure of philosophical argument—a pleasure which Glaucon's practical commitment to the very conversation of the Republic presupposes.

Socrates proposes that they should ban poets who use too much imitation, and prefer poets who use mostly direct narration and imitate only the good man, and, quite amazingly, Adeimantus agrees to this restriction, even though Socrates points out that the “mixed variety [of narration] is also pleasant” (ἡδύς γε καὶ ὁ κεκραμένος, 3974-5).
Socrates then notes the irony in Adeimantus' willingness to accept such restrictions on the arts by saying that “we have gone undetected in purging again the city which we just said was luxurious!” Adeimantus' reply to Socrates' irony is telling: they were “acting with sophrosunē [or showing soundness of mind],” he says, in so purging the city (σωφρονοῦντες γε ἣμεῖς, 399e6). Likewise, Glaucon commits another act of “purging,” this time related to diet and physical education, when he agrees to forbid the guardian-soldiers eat such foods as Sicilian cuisine (Σικελικὴν ποικιλιάν ὄψου, 404d2). The moment is not only comic for its portrayal of Glaucon's about-face on his original demand for luxurious foods; it also drives home the concession that the brothers have made with respect to their views on the need of the pleasures that attend such luxuries. The satisfaction of such appetites is not necessary, and perhaps even inimical to, the virtuous life.

Why don't Glaucon and Adeimantus resist these concessions, which represent clear reversals of their position in Book II? I suggest that the reason Glaucon, in particular, revokes his demand for luxuries is that he eventually realizes the necessity of sophrosunē for philosophy. This connection between sophrosunē and philosophy appears in the intrusion that eros makes in the conversation when Socrates describes the type of character that musical education will create. Such a person will be “well formed” (εὐσχήμονα, 401d6) and kalos te kagathos, (καλὸς τε κἀκαθὸς, 402a1), a colloquial phrase that might be translated as “a noble gentleman.” And it is this type of person that “the musically-educated would love most of all,” but not someone who is “out of tune” (ἀξύμφονος, 402d6). Socrates employs affective means of persuasion by teasing Glaucon.

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244 λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἣν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν, (399e5).
245 Τῶν δὴ ὃ τι μᾶλλα τοιούτων ἀθρώπων ὃ γε μουσικὸς ἐρῶς ἄν (402d6-7).
with the rumor that Glaucon was a lover of a boy who had a beautiful soul, but a “defect” in body.\textsuperscript{246} The two conclude that “the right love is by nature to love the well-ordered (κόσμιον) and beautiful” \textsuperscript{247} and that “the musical must end in erotics of the beautiful.”\textsuperscript{248} These agreements represent a concession on Glaucon’s part. When Glaucon insisted on a \textit{luxurious} city, he expressed his desire and appreciation for the products of the \textit{technai} that the city of pigs lacked. His desire for luxuries stemmed from a love of the \textit{kosmion} in crafts and cuisine, but as they discuss musical and physical education, Glaucon comes to realize his greater esteem for the \textit{soul} that is \textit{kosmion}. Among the chief benefits of the musical education is the guiding of students into “friendship and harmony with the beauty of speech and thought” \textsuperscript{249} (401d). It is these characteristics of the soul that Glaucon must value more than Attic pastries, since he himself is a formidable speaker and appreciates the company of \textit{other} formidable speakers, such as Socrates and Thrasymachus.

The censoring of famous stories from the \textit{Iliad} that portray the gods being overcome by sexual desires reinforces this connection between \textit{sophrosunē} and philosophy by calling our attention to distinctions among pleasures. We might interpret the prohibition of stories about gods experiencing sexual pleasures as an introductory lesson about pleasures that have a “lesser share of being,” which form a crucial part of Socrates argument for the greater pleasantness of the philosophical life in Book IX.\textsuperscript{249} It would be wrong to portray the gods succumbing to sexual pleasure because it would

\textsuperscript{246} 402e1-2.  
\textsuperscript{247} Ὁ δὲ ὀρθὸς ἔρως πέφυκε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μουσικῶς ἐρᾶν (403a4-5)  
\textsuperscript{248} “δεὶ δὲ ποιεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν μουσικόν ἐπὶ τὸν καλὸν ἀμερικοὰ” (403c4-5). An excessively literal translation, but one that may preserve the intellectual character of the educated person’s “love” of the beautiful. Τὰ ἀριστικὰ invokes a passage from the \textit{Symposium} where Socrates says “I claim to know [about] nothing other than love-matters” (οὐδὲν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστησθαι ἢ τὰ ἀριστικὰ, 177e1).  
\textsuperscript{249} Socrates discusses the three types of pleasures corresponding to the three types of lives (philosophical, honor-loving, and money-loving) at 581c-587a.
suggest that sexual pleasures are the best of all available pleasures, without even raising the question as to whether intellectual pleasures are better or more satisfying. The very fact that Glaucon participates in the conversation of the Republic, and is instrumental in propelling the conversation, attests to the sincerity of his commitment to intellectual pleasure and the beauty of speech and thought, since otherwise it would be difficult to account for his carrying on the conversation for so long, when he might have retired, as Cephalus did. Thus, what Glaucon realizes through the discussion of education is not only his own commitment to the “beauty of speech and thought,” and greater esteem for the pleasure that comes from engaging with a kosmia psuchē, but also the recognition that the condition of soul that allows for this comes about through an educational program that imposes limits on the appetites and pleasures of its pupils. He realizes, in other words, that sophrosunē regulates the pleasures of food, drink, and sex, but only by cultivating greater esteem for intellectual pleasure and the kosmia psuchē.

§8. Reading the Virtues as Musical Exercise: The Protreptic Function of Republic II and III

The accumulation of concessions that Glaucon and Adeimantus make in Books II-III results in a near reversal of their position regarding justice and injustice, even before Socrates has defined justice as a virtue of the soul and argued for its intrinsic worth. This is apparent in the way that their concessions imply, on the one hand, the contradiction of fundamental premises of the Technē Model of justice, and on the other hand, the recognition of certain characteristics of the perfectly unjust person as vicious. With the founding of the city according to the “one man, one task” principle, the brothers concede
that egoism, not *pleonexia*, is psychologically basic. The introduction of the Guardians implies the need for laws that deserve respect not simply because they are artifacts, but because they play a necessary role in habituative education. And when the brothers discuss the specific patterns of habituation that they think the guardians should receive, they concede that simplicity, not duplicity, is a virtue; that courage does not assist the practice of injustice; and that the acceptance of limits on one's appetites and reorientation of *eros* toward the *kosmia psuchē* produces exceptional character.

These concessions do not yet furnish an argument that justice is a good desirable both for its own sake and for its consequences, but they perhaps offer a kind of proof of the negative, i.e., that injustice is not “good” by nature. Although we do not yet have a view of the effect of injustice on the soul, we have an account of the damage that *pleonexia* may inflict on a *polis*, and of the ways different vices might compromise the ability of the guardians to act as true defenders of the city. But as we noticed, these moments of capitulation occur in the discussion of a habituative education—a stage of education that relies on uncritical receptivity. On the one hand, education has a purely habituative portion, which consists in using what Socrates calls “the false in words” (τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος 382с4) to inculcate beliefs and behaviors that have social utility; on the other hand, Socrates says that the goal of philosophical education is the “turning of the soul from becoming to being,” a turning that must occur spontaneously because it is not possible to “put knowledge in” (ἐντιθέναι, 518с2) the soul, as one might “put sight into blind eyes.”

The tension between these two goals of education becomes apparent when we consider the kind of attitude that habituation demands in contrast with philosophical inquiry. Habituation in early education requires that one inhabit a receptive,
rather than critical, attitude. A person who played the moral skeptic, demanding at every turn a justification for the moral rules that comprise early education, might fail to become habituated in the way the educational program intends. But on the other hand, a receptive attitude counteracts the goal of a philosophical education, which is to demand a rational justification for those rules. This same tension is reflected in the conditions that Glaucon and Adeimantus set upon their inquiry into justice, and the subsequent line of argument that they pursue in Book III. Glaucon and Adeimantus demand to be truly persuaded of the superiority of the just life, and challenge Socrates with an argument that exposes the hypocrisy of the arguments that the poets and traditional authorities offer for justice.251 More specifically, they would be satisfied if they knew what power justice has in the soul “by itself,” and if they could be persuaded that justice is the type of good that is desirable both in itself and for its consequences. But habituative education does not meet their demand because it shows only that the behaviors and beliefs that people receive are socially useful, not that these beliefs and behaviors have intrinsic worth for the soul.

The question we must now pose and try to answer is whether the program of habituative education that Socrates describes in Books II-III lives up to Plato’s own provocative-aporetic model of protreptic; that is, whether it provides the tools for superseding itself. In order to answer this question, we must draw on the distinctions we made in Chapter One regarding the means and the recipients of protreptic. In what follows I shall argue that two aspects of musical education qualify habituation as a provocative-aporetic means of protreptic: (a) the practice of imitation and (b) the development of an intellectual capacity to perceive incompleteness and deficiency in an object. The combination of these two aspects allows us to interpret as instruction in a

251 Especially Adeimantus’ portion of the challenge (363a-367e).
protreptic education those moments at which Socrates discloses the fact that Glaucon and Adeimantus are conceding points of their challenge. However, we must take care to distinguish between readers and interlocutors in order to determine for whom the discussion of habituation may have a protreptic effect. As I have argued throughout this chapter, Glaucon and Adeimantus remain unaware of the concessions they make in the course of the discussion in Books II-III, and the inadequacies of their own answers to Socrates' questions. They receive arguments—of a sort—from Socrates, but precisely because they fail to take up the provocation of Socrates' disclosure of their concessions, the means by which Socrates “turns” them are intellectual rather than provocative-aporetic. As I shall argue below, Glaucon and Adeimantus receive Socrates' argument “on trust,” rather than critically. For readers, on the other hand, Socrates' argument may have a protreptic effect by provocative-aporetic means: the observer-position that readers occupy in relation to interlocutors allows for the critical distance which prompts their recognition of Socrates' disclosures of the concessions as provocations.

To begin, I would like to point out the significance of the lesson that Socrates teaches by disclosing to Adeimantus the concession he would be making if he allowed Socrates to define the patterns for stories about mankind. This disclosure provides instruction in the type of philosophical inquiry that Glaucon and Adeimantus demand from Socrates, because it reveals that they have been failing to provide answers to Socrates' questions that are consistent with their challenge; in fact, they seem to be answering in ways that directly contradict some of the fundamental assumptions of their challenge. Thus they are operating in a receptive, rather than critical, mode with respect to Socrates' own proposals. However, their trust in Socrates, and thus their receptivity to
Socrates' arguments, is also a quality that makes Glaucon and Adeimantus more appropriate interlocutors than Thrasymachus. This suggests that receptivity itself is not the problem with habituative education, but rather *receiving in the wrong way*. This casts the moment discussed above in a new light, as it suggests that to properly conduct the inquiry into justice, Glaucon and Adeimantus must receive Socrates' argument in the right way.

Naturally, this raises the question as to the right way of receiving. To answer this question, I suggest that we examine Socrates' statements about the effects of musical education on the soul. After restricting the modes of narration and variety of imitation that poets will be allowed to practice (394d-401d), Socrates explains that the effect of musical education is to “make a person graceful” (ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, 401d6) and able to “most keenly perceive deficiencies and things not well-crafted, or not fine by nature.”252 One way of construing the ability to perceive “deficiencies” might be as the ability to perceive incompleteness in an object. For example, a well-trained composer might perceive that a particular orchestration of a melody lacks the right “texture” of sound—perhaps the trumpets ought to play with mutes in order to produce the right texture. In this sense, the composer who hears the bad orchestration has the feeling that something that *ought* to be there is missing.

Thus, while musical education demands receptivity of its students, its goal is actually to encourage creativity and spontaneity, in the sense that *what* is lacking from an object may require some imagination to specify.253 With this in mind, we can return to the

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252 [...] καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλὸς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλὸς φόντων ὀξύτατ’ ἄν αἰσθάνοιτο (401e1-3).
253 This proposal may assuage Annas' worry that Plato's education is authoritarian because it demands receptivity without developing critical faculties (*Introduction*, 90).
question of the significance of Socrates' disclosure to Adeimantus that if they define the patterns for stories about humankind, then he and Glaucon will have conceded the argument about justice to Socrates. In making this disclosure, Socrates is asking the brothers to receive his argument in a “musical” way. When Socrates points out that Glaucon and Adeimantus are conceding key premises of their challenge in their discussion of habituative education, it is as if he is beckoning them to perceive that something is missing from their answers to his questions—something that would transform these answers into a real argument against their challenge if they supplied it. This exercise in perceiving deficiencies helps us utilize the grammatical analogy for the virtues, with which Socrates began the discussion about habituative education. In asking Glaucon and Adeimantus to think of themselves as students learning to read, Socrates was putting them in what seemed to be a receptive position: they would seem to be receiving well-formed images of the virtues from Socrates, just as students receive well-formed images of the letters they must learn to read. As they continued the conversation, they did not really perform this relation; Socrates did not simply give them images of the well-formed virtues, but instead asked them to reflect on stories that they would prohibit on account of the “distorted” images of the virtues that these stories contain. They agree to these restrictions, and in the process give up key premises of their challenge. But they make these concessions without recognizing that their prohibition of distorted images of the virtues must rely on some comprehension of the properly-formed virtues. The “musical” exercise that we are now asked to carry out by recognizing deficiencies in Glaucon and Adeimantus' answers structurally compliments the first analogy by helping us explain why the “molds” (τύποι) that Socrates recommends produce well-formed
images of the virtues. This exercise has a protreptic effect for readers because we gain
this explanation not by merely receiving Socrates' argument, as if our souls were wax
being poured into the mold, but by perceiving and correcting deficiencies in the argument
for ourselves.

An essential feature of this musical exercise, then, is that it demands that readers
mimic the receptivity of their habituative education by receiving the argument about
justice from Socrates. But the purpose of this imitation is not simply to receive, but rather
to supersede a merely receptive attitude by exercising one's ability to perceive
deficiencies. This exercise, I suggest, also functions as a preliminary to the intellectual
exercises that Socrates says comprise philosophical education “proper,” particularly with
regard to the exercise of hypothesizing. 254 Socrates identifies geometry as a preliminary
to dialectic because those who engage in it posit things such as “odd and even, figures
and the three types of angles” as simply “known,” and “see no need to justify them either
to themselves or to anyone else” (510c3-4, Griffith). We might, then, distinguish this
“musical” exercise from the way geometrical reasoning posits assumptions in the
following way. The assumptions that geometers make about lines and angles appear to be
“self-given,” in the sense that the evidence for their truth does not depend on any
traditional or cultural authority. 255 In contrast, Glaucón and Adeimantus receive Socrates'

254 My proposal contains a reply to Christopher Gill's complaint that the musical and philosophical
portions of education are discontinuous. More specifically, he claims that Plato fails to explain how the
logistikón is educated, because the first portion of education developed only “the passive capacity of the
mind to absorb correct opinions” (See “Plato and the Education Of Character,” Archive für Geschichte
der Philosophie 67 [1985]: 14). On my reading, the musical education in fact prepares the guardians for
the kind of “musical exercise” that I discuss in this paper. If this musical exercise relies on a kind of
hypothesizing, then it is a kind of training for the logistikón. In the following chapter I will suggest
other ways in which the logistikón receives training in hypothesizing even before it engages in the more
disciplined hypothesizing that philosophers practice.
255 I rely on Mitchell Miller's insightful discussion of mathematical education for this point. See Mitchell
argument, and treat his claims as “hypotheses” on the basis of their trust in his wisdom. Thus their relation as interlocutors with Socrates still mimics the relation of a young student to a cultural authority; they accept Socrates' arguments on trust. What distinguishes the readers' reception of Socrates' argument as “musical” is their recognition of Socrates' disclosure of his interlocutors’ concessions as a provocation, a moment for critical reflection on the argument that grounds the concession. In this way, the habituative and musical education that Socrates describes in Books II-III can live up to Plato's provocative-aporetic ideal of education when readers take up the same discussion as a “musical” exercise.
Chapter IV: Tripartite Psychology and the Virtue Model of Justice

In the preceding chapter I argued that Glaucon and Adeimantus conceded two primary commitments of the Technē Model of justice and moral agency. Specifically, they conceded that the artificiality thesis concerning nomoi (T2) and the psychological basicity of pleonexia (T3) are false. In this chapter, I argue that the tripartite psychology of Book IV targets the assumption that reason stands in an instrumental relation to appetite (T1), an assumption the falsity of which Glaucon admits when he agrees that “it is appropriate for the calculative part to rule, on account of its being wise and having forethought over the whole soul.”256 Socrates' arguments for tripartite psychology are crucial to his protreptic efforts because they perform two logical functions. First, they force Glaucon's concession that the instrumentality thesis is false; second, they also persuade Glaucon to accept that justice and the virtues are conditions analogous to the health of the soul.257 In other words, tripartite psychology plays the dual role of overturning Glaucon's former commitments to the Technē Model of justice and replacing them with moral commitments that stem from a new conception of agency. More specifically, Glaucon's former commitments are replaced by the project of psychic integration. This project becomes apparent in the way that the arguments for tripartite psychology identify threats to the coherence of appetitive and thumotic interests, and show that the logistikion is crucial to integrating these two interests. Thus on the virtue model, the distinctive feature of justice is its promotion of the project of psychic

256 […] λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὀντί καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπερ ἀπασις τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν (441e3-4). In this chapter I will refer to “appetite” as the epithumotikon.
257 Rep., 444e1; Glaucon agrees that “life is not worth living” when “the nature of that very thing by which we live is disturbed and corrupted, even if someone does whatever he wishes.” […] τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου ὦ ἐζόμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης, ἐάνπερ τις ποιῇ ὁ ἢν βουλήθη (445a8-445b2). Santas also identifies the instrumentality of reason as a chief point of dispute (Understanding Plato's Republic, 123).
integration, inasmuch as it demarcates the proper functions of thumos and epithumotikon, and prepares the way for the exercise of other virtues—courage and sophrosunē—that contribute to the project of psychic integration.

Tripartite psychology also functions as a provocative-aporetic means for persuading readers of the assumptions of the Virtue Model of justice and agency. As we read Socrates' arguments for dividing the soul and assigning the functions he assigns to each part, we notice in particular that Glaucon grants two points to Socrates that contradict his commitments to the Technē Model of justice: that the logistikon rules the soul and is not instrumental to desire, and that thumos is properly subservient to the logistikon. But because Socrates qualifies this psychology as provisional and imprecise, and because it is essential to answering Glaucon's challenge, we must ask whether Plato intends some other protreptic effect by offering us this psychology.²⁵⁸ Thus, we must inquire more generally about the conception of philosophy into which Plato means to initiate us.²⁵⁹ Is it the protreptic function of tripartite psychology to issue in a practical commitment to certain dialogical and epistemic virtues, and is this psychology preparatory for a more “advanced” stage of philosophy? Or does this psychology only encourage enthusiasm for philosophy “proper,” so that its arguments are only rhetorical rather than educative, and the virtues it imparts “spurious” rather than true? My aim in this chapter is to argue for a third option concerning the protreptic function of tripartite psychology: Glaucon is persuaded to adopt the project of psychic integration as a new practical commitment because of a genuine insight he gains into moral agency, and his commitment to the project of psychic integration will help prepare him for the study of

²⁵⁸ For Socrates' claims about the inadequacy of tripartite psychology, see Republic, 506a4-b8.
²⁵⁹ I am referring to the methodological and metaphysical interpretations discussed in Chapter 1.
dialectic described in Book VI. In this way, I will have identified what Glaucon is persuaded of and the learning that persuades him. Stated briefly, I argue that the *logistikon* in Book IV has a power of hypothesis—a power that opens up the possibility of self-opposition within reason, and that is continuous with the portrayal of reason in Book VII.260 This possibility of self-opposition, however, threatens the soul with disintegration of a kind fundamentally different from the disintegration which the poor managing of *thumos* and *epithumotikon* threatens. The commitment to psychic integrity in the face of division within reason itself stands as the contribution that justifies the characterization of Glaucon's accepting the virtue model of justice as a “turn from becoming to being.”261

§1. Tripartite Psychology and The Principle of Non-Opposition

Interpreters of tripartite psychology often express doubts about the explanatory power of tripartition on account of its disanalogies with the tripartite city and discontinuity with both the portrait of the philosopher in Books V-VII.262 The problem of

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260 To avoid confusion, I will use the term “*logistikon*” when referring to the deliberative and calculative power portrayed in Book IV, while I will use the term “reason” when discussing the portrait of a philosophically mature individual who possess *phronēsis*.

261 This commitment is crucial for the eventual engagement with philosophy, since philosophical thinking requires inhabiting perspectives that may fundamentally contradict one's own commitments, but which must be tolerated for the sake of pursuing truth. The *Republic* in fact provides an example of this aspect of philosophical inquiry when Glaucon prefaces his revival of Thrasymachus' position by denying a commitment to what Thrasymachus “and thousands like him” say about justice, but that for the sake of argument he will make the argument for injustice as strong as possible (Rep., 358d).

262 A common criticism of the explanatory power is found in the infinite regress or “homunculus” problem. Socrates divides the soul to explain psychic conflict, but attributes desires and motivations to the different parts. As a result, the parts resemble autonomous agents in their own right, susceptible to their own tripartite divisions. For a discussion of this problem see Irwin, *Plato's Ethics*, 217-218; Annas, *Introduction*, 144-146; Bobonich, *Plato's Utopia Recast*, 221-28; Kamtekar, “Speaking with the Same Voice as Reason,” 174-176. Another issue of concern is the discontinuity between the *logistikon* of tripartite psychology and the reason of the philosopher portrayed in Books V and VI, who seems to have distinct interest and *eros* of his own (480a; 485b). Ferrari argues that Socrates' examples fail to draw a sharp distinction between *thumos* and reason, and suggests that “for the motivations of non-philosophers a bipartite psychological analysis would suffice. There are the goals of self-respect and
most immediate concern for my project lies in the apparent discontinuity between the
logistikon's function in tripartite psychology and reason's philosophical interests in the
central books. A common worry is that the logistikon lacks philosophical interests, and
functions only as an algorithm for ordering the priorities of thumos and epithumotikon.
This concern about the function of the logistikon relates to the protreptic effect of
Socrates' arguments on Glaucon because Socrates needs to show that reason rules the
soul, and “ruling” ought to mean more than simply managing the interests of the other
parts of the soul. If reason is to rule the soul, it ought to have interests of its own, and
these interests ought to regulate a person's life.

To address this problem, I will show how, for each division of the soul, the
hypothesizing power of the logistikon maintains psychic integration when the satisfaction
of the interests of thumos and epithumotikon threatens those same parts with self-
annihilation. I argue that this observation allows us to attribute a unique—even if
limited—interest of the logistikon in maintaining psychic integration. This interest in the
project of psychic integration will answer the worry that the logistikon functions as a
mere manager of other interests of the soul. Second, I will explain how each division
refutes the assumption of the Technē Model of justice, viz., that the logistikon is
instrumental to the epithumotikon. In this way we will see how Socrates completes the

there are material goals, and reason is a mere executive, balancing the two for their mutual benefit, but
without goals of its own.” (City and Soul in Plato's Republic, [Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005], 112). Annas argues that the argument for the first division between reason and appetite “gives an
inadequate and potentially misleading characterization of reason” (Introduction, 140; 135-140).
Roochnik argues that the addition of the love of learning “Powerfully revise[s] and enrich[es] the
tripartite psychology of book 4. There reason was reduced to calculation and radically separated from
desire. There the 'love of learning' (435e7) was mentioned but could not be fully accounted for. Here
reason has expanded and has itself become animated by Eros.” (Beautiful City, 20; 63). Finally,
regarding the disanalogies between tripartite city and tripartite soul, see Bernard Williams, “The
Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic” in Kraut, 1997, and David Sachs, “A Fallacy in Plato's
refutation of the *Technē* Model of justice. However, as one feature of my position is that Glaucon's turn from becoming to being entails that Glaucon positively learns something, I must show that Socrates' arguments against the instrumentality of the *logistikon* have some plausibility, and avoid construing them as *ad hoc*, or rhetorically useful but unsound. Since a significant hurdle to understanding the division arguments lies in explaining the function of the Principle of Non-Opposition that Socrates states, I provide a reading of this principle that is consistent with the examples that Socrates uses to draw his division. In this section I will argue that in addition to being crucial to Socrates' arguments for dividing the soul, the PNO functions as a provocative-aporetic means for getting readers to re-conceptualize the way they think about psychic integration. The PNO applies this provocative-aporetic means to readers by compelling readers to engage in hypothesizing, a power that Socrates attributes exclusively to the *logistikon*. Readers thus exercise their *logistikon* in a setting where neither the interests of *thumos* nor the interests of *epithumotikon* are the terms to be hypothesized about.

Socrates begins the argument for the division of the soul by positing the Principle of Non-Opposition (PNO):

> It is clear that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites, in the same part, in relation to the same thing, at the same time; so that if we find these [conditions] coming to be in these [αὐτοῖς], we will know that it is not the same thing but rather more [than one].

δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν τὰναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτὸν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἁμα, ὥστε ἂν που εὑρίσκομεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι
οὐ ταύτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω. 263

Two questions about this principle are have defined much of the scholarship about the tripartite soul: (1) what kind of requirement does the principle actually express, and (2) does the PNO suffice to both differentiate the parts of the soul and justify what Socrates calls the proper hierarchy of those parts, or does it only suffice to differentiate the parts of the soul?264 The first question focuses on whether Socrates' principle is a straightforward principle of non-contradiction, or a principle of non-opposition. The interpretation as a principle of non-opposition emerges from the argument that Socrates' examples of psychic conflict cannot actually differentiate psychic elements if we read the principle as a principle of non-contradiction. Smith articulates this problem in the example of a person who “wants to drink, but refuses” (Rep., 439a1-e1). He argues that reading the principle as a principle of non-contradiction would not yield the description of the kind of conflict that Socrates intends. For the proposition that contradicts “X

263 436b8-436c1
264 Santas argues for the latter option (Understanding Plato’s Republic [Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2010], 80). He reasons that the PNO differentiates different psychic activities, but fails to say which activities are the “exclusive functions” of a certain power. For example, the PNO differentiates anger from the desire for a drink, but when we attribute anger to the “spirited element,” we also grant the power to “restrain” to that element. But why should “getting angry” belong exclusively to thumos, and not also to the epithumotikon? Glaucott, after all, initially supposes that the spirit is not really a distinct element, since its nature is the same as desire (Rep., 339e). Socrates, however, corrects this mistake with the example of Leontius. It seems to me that Santas actually means to find some argument for the hierarchy of the parts of the soul. On his reading, if we can show that an element, whether of the city or the soul, can perform some function best, then it ought to perform that function. Consequently, Santas reconstructs Socrates' argument for the virtue-bestowing hierarchy of the soul's elements by trying to show that psychic activities, such as calculating, getting angry, causing “motion toward,” can belong only to an element that has a certain nature. If these activities are exclusive to certain elements of the soul, then no other hierarchy of the soul's parts is possible. Irwin argues that the PNO (which he calls the “Principal of Contraries”) fails to capture “asymmetries” between the parts of the soul, and for this reason is not the most convincing principle to use to divide the soul. A symmetrical opposition is one in which A opposes B and B opposes A—for example, when statements p and q contradict each other. An asymmetrical opposition is one in which only A opposes B, such as when a political party opposes the government, but the government does not oppose that political party. Irwin argues that the opposition between the epithumotikon and the other two parts of the soul—thumos and logistikon—is asymmetrical because the epithumotikon does not oppose reason and thumos, while reason and thumos actively oppose the epithumotikon (Plato's Ethics, 217).
desires Y” is “X does not desire Y,” and “X does not desire” could mean “X lacks a desire for Y.” Thus, if the principle describes a rule about non-contradiction, then a case in which a person simultaneous desired and lacked a desire for some object should be the paradigmatic case of conflict. Socrates does not appear to have this sort of description in mind; rather, Smith suggests that he has in mind “the person seems to have two desires, which appear to oppose on another.”^265 Presumably, the person wants to drink and wants not to drink. Indeed, what Socrates seems to have in mind as a demonstration of his principle is the scenario in which a person desires A and desires ~A. In this scenario, the person hosts two desires for mutually exclusive states of affairs or objects. This reading conforms with what we commonly mean when we speak of our desires and aversions: when I say I “don't want” something—say, perhaps, dressing on my salad—I don't mean that I lack the desire for dressing, but, more commonly, that I desire that there not be dressing on my salad. Of course, the ambiguity that when I say “I don't want X,” I could mean that I simply lack the desire for X remains. Smith simply points out that Socrates' first example does not demonstrate a straightforward contradiction, and for this reason we ought to reject a reading of the PNO as a principle of non-contradiction.

However, when we examine the way that Socrates groups variations of desiring and variations of not desiring and unwillingness, we see that the principle actually resolves into a principle of non-contradiction. I argue that this is evident in the way that readers are encouraged to utilize the principle to differentiate the parts of any spatio-temporal object whatsoever. Quite strikingly, Socrates justifies his reliance on the PNO by citing an example of a geometric figure, namely a spinning top:

If he said, of a spinning top with its centre fixed in one place, or of anything else rotating on the same spot, that the whole thing is both at rest and in motion, we would not accept that. In cases like this, the parts in respect of which they are both stationary and in motion are not the same parts. We would say they possess both a vertical axis and a circumference. With respect to the axis they are at rest, since they remain upright. With respect to the circumference they are rotating.\footnote{436e, Griffith. This passage is of considerable importance to interpretations of the PNO. Bobonich helpfully differentiates the possible views on this passage. One is that the principle lets us resolve instances of apparent contrariety by “distinguishing two different subjects for complete contraries that are non-coinstantiable.” On this view, the apparent contradiction in the top's being at motion and at rest is resolved by differentiating between two distinct subjects: the axis and the circumference (Philosopher-Kings, 223). Another view is that the PNO does not differentiate subjects, but rather “different ways in which the same subject is qualified” (224). Bobonich settles on the first view (232-234).}

Considering this example is useful for answering Smith's interpretation because it shows how Smith's conclusions follow from hypothesizing about the example using a principle of non-contradiction. The challenge concerning the spinning top comes from someone who claims that the top as a whole is both in motion and at rest. Prima facie, this claim represents the top as being in two mutually-exclusive states: in motion and not in motion (at rest). Socrates asks us to consider whether we would let this assertion stand in order to help us see the need to posit the condition “in respect to the same.” When we add this condition, the prima facie contradiction disappears. If we consider the soul as a whole in like manner, without any conviction about whether it has parts or not, we could say that prima facie, when a soul experiences psychic conflict, it both desires and lacks a desire as a whole soul. But just as in the example of the top, so too with respect to the soul does the PNO give us reason to seek a resolution of the prima facie contradiction: it is not that the whole soul both desires and lacks a desire, but rather that it seems to desire with
respect to $A$ and desire with respect to $\neg A$. The “with respect to” clause thus puts us in the territory that we typically have in mind when we think of examples of psychic conflict: cases in which a person seems to have a desire and an aversion to the same object.

In thinking through this use of the PNO, we should notice that we are taking up a question which Socrates poses to Glaucon, but which Glaucon fails to take up; namely, whether we engage in learning, spirited activities, and desires “with our entire soul,” or with a separate part for each.\footnote{267} In this sense, Socrates' arguments about the PNO function as provocative-aporetic means for getting readers to re-conceptualize psychic integration—acting as a whole person—in terms of a more abstract discipline, such as geometry. Moreover, we seem to be exercising the \textit{logistikon} by hypothesizing about the possible states of the parts of the soul \textit{rather than} about the implications of satisfying the practical interests that \textit{thumos} and \textit{epithumotikon} provide for us.

Locating examples of psychic conflict by use of the “with respect to” condition of the PNO helps explain the next phase of Socrates' argument. Socrates proceeds by categorizing variations of desiring and aversion under the more general \textit{actions} of “drawing toward oneself” ($\pi pos \acute{a}g\varepsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$) and “pushing away from oneself” ($\acute{a}p\omega\theta\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$):

- saying yes [together] with saying no, and trying to grasp something with refusing,
- and \textbf{drawing towards oneself [together] with pushing away}—all these sorts of opposites would you not place with each other, whether they are doings or undergoings [activities or states]?

\begin{quote}
to $\acute{e}p\nu\varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\nu$ $\tilde{\alpha}n\alpha\nu\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\nu$ kai to $\acute{e}f\acute{i}\acute{e}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ tino$\varsigma$ $\lambda\alpha\beta\epsilon\iota$ to $\acute{a}p\ar\nu\nu\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ kai to \textit{\pi pos \acute{a}g\varepsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota} to $\acute{a}p\omega\theta\varepsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha$ ta toia$\acute{u}$ta to$\acute{o}$n $\acute{e}n\alpha\nu\tau\iota$on $\acute{a}n$ $\acute{a}l\lambda\ell\acute{h}\lambda$oi$\zeta$ $\theta\epsilon\iota$hs
\end{quote}
εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων (437b1-4);

In other words, Socrates wants to pair mutually exclusive actions (ἐνάντια) with each other (ἄλληλοις) as a preliminary to dividing the logistikōn from epithumotikon. These opposites then form the general category to which variations of desiring and not-desiring belong:

[…] to feel thirst and to feel hunger, and desires generally, and again wanting and wishing, would you not place all these among those types which we just mentioned?

διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὀλος τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὐ πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι ἂν θείης τὰ εἴδη τά νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα (437b7-437c1);

Socrates then makes the crucial classification of “desires generally” as a type of “reaching out” or “drawing towards oneself.” He indicates this by repeating the verb προσάγεσθαι:

[…] for example will you not say that the soul of the one who desires always either pursues after that which he desires, or draws towards himself that which he wishes to come about for himself […]?

ὀν ἂει τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἢ ἄν ἐφίεσθαι ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ἂν βούληται οἱ γενέσθαι […] (437c1-4);

We see Socrates use the same procedure, this time repeating the verb ἀποθεῖν (here in the active rather than middle voice), to indicate that he places rejection and unwillingness in a common class:

Not wanting, being unwilling, and not desiring, will we not place with [the soul's] thrusting and driving away from itself, and with all the opposites to those
[ekéinoi refers to the class of desires grouped according to the verb προσάγεσθαι].

tὸ ἄβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀποθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα τὰναντία ἐκείνοις θήσομεν; (437c6-437d1)

There might be shades of difference between the three expressions of not-wanting that Socrates lists.268 However, differentiating them would be unnecessarily speculative.

Socrates' point here seems to be quite simple: while there might be a complex phenomenology to the ways we refuse or express aversion, Socrates' point is that they all fall under a certain “action” of the soul, namely, “thrusting away.” Likewise, the variations of desiring and being willing fall under the opposite action that is, “drawing toward oneself.” Since these actions are mutually exclusive under the clause “with respect to the same”—one cannot “reach out” and “thrust away” with respect to the same—we could read the principle as a principle of non-contradiction that grounds the variations of willingness and unwillingness, desire and aversion, that Socrates mentions.269

To see why this is the case, consider Smith's example of the person who lacks a desire for something, and consider what actions this person might take in comparison to the person who has a desire for the same thing, and the person who has an aversion to the

268 Irwin claims that Plato means to separate βούλεσθαι and ἐθέλειν from ἐπιθυμεῖν as modes of desiring distinct from appetitive desire (Irwin, Plato's Ethics, 205). I see little evidence that Plato is drawing this distinction here, but even if it is true, what matters is that ἄβουλεῖν and μὴ ἐθέλειν imply “thrusting away,” or commitment to a certain course of action so as to “refuse” something. At the end of Book IV Glaucon uses the verb “βούλεσθαι” in reference to the vice of doing “whatever one wishes” (Rep., 445b2). Βούλεσθαι in that passage appears to refer to wishes and desires of any sort, whether appetitive or thumotic, rather than rational desires exclusively.

269 Bobonich rightly notes that these metaphors, “pushing away” and “drawing near,” help Plato “redescribe the opposition between desiring and not-desiring in terms of the logical and psychological opposition between assent and dissent” (Philosopher-Kings, 236). He argues that noticing this re-description, in combination with Plato's apparent commitment to differing “strengths” among desires and aversions, is crucial for akratic action (240-242).
same thing. Imagine that the action in question is whether or not to cross the street to pet a dog. The person who desires to pet the dog will cross the street; the person who has an aversion to petting the dog will stay on his own side of the street; and the person who lacks both the desire and the aversion could either cross the street or stay on his own side. Clearly, the first and second person's actions are mutually exclusive. But the action of the third person is under-determined, because a plethora of actions are consistent with lacking a desire for something. The cause of this result is that a person who lacks a desire cannot fulfill the “in relation to the same” clause of the principle Socrates states. If a person lacks a desire for something, then there is simply no appetitive relation we can describe between that person and the object.270

An objection that one might raise against Socrates' use of the terms προσάγεσθαι and ἀποθεῖν to describe actions of the soul is that the verbs actually describe actions of bodies, not of souls. The thrust of this objection follows another common objection about tripartite psychology, namely, that Socrates relies on the category of agent-individuals to describe parts of the soul, which are themselves supposed to compose an agent-individual.271 This objection does not defeat my reading of the PNO. Rather, by considering a reply to the objection, we will actually discover the insight that explains

270 Apathy might become a source of psychic conflict if the logistikon determined that apathy is not a good condition for the epithumotikon to be in. The view I am advocating could be clarified by a distinction Bobonich draws between “complete” and “incomplete” contraries (Bobonich, Utopia, 226). A complete contrary is one in which every aspect of the PNO is violated: something is undergoing contraries with respect to the same thing, in the same part of itself, at the same time. An incomplete contrary is one in which fewer than all of the aspects of the PNO are violated: something is undergoing contraries in the same part, but perhaps not with respect to the same thing. On my reading, Socrates argues for divisions in the soul by showing that the phenomenon of psychic conflict would require instantiating complete contraries.

why the PNO is in fact based on a principle of non-contradiction. Although the verbs describe actions of the bodies, they constitute evidence for attributing mental states to individuals. More importantly, however, “reaching out” and “thrusting away” represent the types of bodily actions one would have to carry out to actually satisfy variations of desire and aversion. This shows how the different shades of wanting and not wanting fall into mutually exclusive categories, despite the more complex phenomenology that they might have: the actions we would have to take to satisfy either the desiring or the not desiring would be mutually exclusive; that is, I could not perform them “in the same part, at the same time, with respect to the same object.” It is in this sense that I suggest the PNO ultimately rests on the principle of non-contradiction. So, on my reading, the various expressions of desire and willingness, refusal and non-willingness, are ultimately categorized as opposites because they rely on a more basic contradiction in action that would occur if a person had both desires and decided to satisfy both.

A second objection is the following. Someone might point out that my interpretation of the PNO would force a division in the soul even when we experience desires that conflict with each other on account of external limitations. For example, suppose that I desired a cup of coffee, but had an aversion to the bitterness of the only

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272 Santas considers this kind of example and proposes the same solution: “It should be noted that no every kind of conflict seemingly within our souls forces us to divide the soul. Some conflicts we can explain by appealing to facts in the external world: I want to eat caviar and drink champagne and I cannot have both, but this maybe so only because I cannot afford both. Or, I might both hate and love my car, but this conflict does not force us to divide the soul, if we can explain it by dividing the object of my love and hate: I love its power but hate its gas consumption” (Understanding Plato’s Republic, 81). Smith suggests that these sorts of examples may compel us to draw more divisions than three in the soul. He denies that this is a problem for Plato, however, because the city-soul analogy does not stipulate that city and soul are limited to a 3-3 correspondence of parts (“Plato’s Analogy of State and Soul,” 38). Reeve deals with this objection by arguing that when we experience desire and aversion to different aspects of the same object, we can reach a “compromise” attitude toward that object (Reeve, Philosopher Kings, 125). He likens the two desires to “forces that form a resultant force;” they do not pull the soul in the opposite direction (i.e., away from the object altogether), but rather in a new direction “determined by both of them working together” (125).
available roast of coffee. In order to satisfy the desire and avoid the thing to which I'm averse, I would have to drink and not drink the coffee. This contradiction would justify a division within the *epithumotikon*. This objection can be answered by pointing out that we commonly differentiate between aspects of objects. In this case, I might say that I desire the caffeine and the warmth in the coffee, but not the bitterness. In this way I could explain my simultaneous desire and aversion by differentiating between aspects of an object, and thereby resolve the apparent violation of the PNO. If I had the power, I would separate these the bitterness from the coffee and consume the beverage without the bitterness: this would be like “drawing in” the part of the coffee that I liked, and “pushing away” the part of the coffee that I disliked. These are not incompatible actions, because by differentiating aspects or parts of an object, we can prevent the motions of “moving toward” and “drawing in” from violating the *with respect to the same* condition. In this way the answer to the objection conveys something important about the type of conflicts Socrates wants to identify: desire and aversion must conflict in such a way that the thing with respect to which they are desires and aversions could not be parsed into different qualities. For example, consider someone who abuses alcohol, and who wants to quit. Although this person may have an aversion to the painful effects that alcohol has on the body, the power to separate the psychotropic effects of alcohol from all its harms would be of little use, because the psychotropic effect is the very thing whose influence this person wants to escape. Thus, whatever aversion “wanting to quit” instills in the person, it is an aversion to that very thing for which the addict has a desire, i.e., the psychotropic effect. As I discuss Socrates' examples below, I will use this strategy as a test to see whether the apparent conflicts in the examples can be resolved. If they fail this test, then
we know that the PNO justifies our drawing a division.273

The second question concerns whether the PNO suffices to explain why the parts of the soul should align according to the hierarchy that Socrates gives them, i.e., with the logistikon ruling, and thumos assisting the logistikon in restraining epithumotikon. Santas, for example, argues that the PNO only suffices to differentiate psychic activities, not to pair such activities with a place on a hierarchy.274 Annas also expresses doubts about the power of the PNO to justify a hierarchy of the parts of the soul.275 In essence, her criticism is that Plato relies on a more robust notion of reason in Book IV than mere calculation, and the PNO cannot identify this more robust feature. If we rely strictly on the notion of the logistikon that the PNO identifies, then there appears to be nothing preventing the logistikon's subordination to either thumos or the epithumotikon, as we see in Socrates' description of the timocratic and oligarchic individuals.276 Ferrari argues that since the logistikon in Book IV lacks real interests of its own, a “bipartite psychology” would suffice in Book IV.277 On his reading, the logistikon in book IV contributes little in the way of interests that actually have motivating force, but is rather posited as a necessary arbiter for the competing interests in self-respect and appetitive goods. These criticisms highlight the difficulty in explaining why the logistikon should rule the soul,

273 Kamtekar overlooks the possibility of differentiating between aspects of objects in her claim that the epithumotikon might undergo divisions within itself (“Speaking with the Same Voice as Reason, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 31 (2006): 177).
274 See footnote 7 for a summary of Santas’ argument.
275 See footnote 1.
276 Annas addresses Hume's competing account of reason and desire by pointing out that “Humean reason is passive and leaves unquestioned the status of the desires which it efficiently fulfills, but Platonic reason does not. Reason is thus being thought of as critical of the other motivations in a way that they are not critical of themselves or of each other” (Introduction, 135). In her discussion of the PNO, however, she argues that the example of the person who is thirsty but refuses to drink only identifies restraint as a feature of reason, and the ability to restrain oneself in situations that thwart one's primary goals belongs to the non-virtuous individuals that Socrates discusses in Books VIII and IX (Introduction, 140).
since it doesn't appear to be *leading* the soul according to some determinate interest. To answer this worry, I will argue in the following sections that while it is true that the *logistikon* in Book IV lacks an overarching philosophical interest or project, the absence of philosophical interests does not prevent it from being the “rightful” ruler of the soul. The *logistikon* could have a positive interest in the project of psychic integration, and this interest would differentiate it from functioning as a mere arbitrator or algorithm for managing the interests of *thumos* and the *epithumotikon*.

§2. First Division: Logistikon and Epithumotikon

Socrates' arguments for the division between *logistikon* and *epithumotikon* are of particular importance for two reasons. First, it is in these arguments that we glimpse the *logistikon*'s power of hypothesis. Second, these arguments test Socrates' competitor theory—the *Technē* Model of justice—for its success in accounting for the phenomenon of psychic conflict. On the *Technē* Model of justice, the *logistikon* stands in an instrumental relation to *epithumotikon* (assumption T1). Acknowledging the refutation of this commitment signals a capitulation on Glaucon's part, because his former position was that the *logistikon* lacks interests of its own and serves pleonectic desire. I identify two moments in particular at which Socrates appears to be testing the *Technē* Model's assumptions concerning the relation between *logistikon* and the *epithumotikon*. The first moment occurs when Socrates and Glaucon consider how appetites are individuated (437d-439a), and the second moment occurs when Socrates considers an objection from someone who argues that any desire is necessarily for something good (438a1). My strategy in identifying these moments is to use them to test whether the *Technē* Model can
account for the *prima facie* character of psychic conflict that we identified above. If the *Technē* Model fails to account for the character of psychic conflict, then we have good reason to abandon its thesis concerning the subordination of the *logistikôn* to the *epithumotikon*. Accordingly, I will draw from both of these moments to construct the most plausible account that the *Technē* Model can offer to explain phenomenon of psychic conflict. I will then show why the account fails.

As indicated in my reading of the PNO, my strategy for dealing with Socrates' examples of psychic conflict is to elicit a contradiction between mutually-exclusive states of “pushing away” and “drawing near,” because these incompatible actions violate the *with respect to the same* condition, and thereby justify our differentiating new parts. Thus I will examine each of his examples and show how the agent would have to carry out incompatible actions if he or she were to satisfy both the desire and the aversion with respect to the same object. Once this is shown, the PNO entitles us to draw a division in the soul.

With regard to the division between *logistikôn* and the *epithumotikon*, Socrates' first and only example of psychic conflict is that of a thirsty person refuses to drink (439c1-2). Socrates says that this example shows that “there is something in their soul urging them to drink on the one hand, and on the other hand stopping them, a thing different and stronger than the thing that urges?”278 Furthermore, he alleges that the “thing that prevents these sorts of things comes about, when it does come about, out of rational calculation [ἐκ λογισμοῦ].”279 On my reading, a sort of practical contradiction would result if one were to satisfy both the imperative of the *logistikôn* and the urging of

278 Οὐκ ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὶ κελεῦον, ἐνεῖναι δὲ τὸ κωλῦον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὄν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος (439c5); 279 Ἀρ' οὖν οὗ τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, ὅταν ἐγγίγνηται, ἐκ λογισμοῦ […] (439c6-7).
the *epithumotikon*. Obeying the imperative of the *logistikon* requires “withdrawing,” while obeying the urging of the *epithumotikon* requires “reaching out.” Since these two actions are incompatible at the same time, with respect to the same object, and in the same part of oneself, the conclusion that Socrates draws from this example ultimately rests on a principle of non-contradiction.

A difficulty emerges, however, when we ask whether Socrates has dispensed with the *Technē* Model's alternative account of psychic conflict. If he has not, then he is not entitled to conclude that the restraint of desire is the exclusive function of the *logistikon*. Accordingly, the remainder of this section will be devoted to clarifying and refuting the *Technē* Model as an alternative explanation of psychic conflict, so as to show how Glaucon is persuaded that the assumption concerning the instrumentality of the *logistikon* is false. The *Technē* Model's alternative can be generated by a fairly elementary problem that arises from the PNO. The satisfaction of two different desires could very well require me to act in incompatible ways, and if this is true, then on the basis of the PNO it seems that we should also divide the *epithumotikon* into “parts” whenever we discover conflicting desires within it.²⁸⁰ In other words, how do we know that it is really the *logistikon* that does the work of “restraining” in this example? In order to show that the PNO really differentiates the *logistikon* and *epithumotikon* in this example, we must ask why it must be the *logistikon* that restrains the *epithumotikon* and not, for instance, another desire.²⁸¹ If the *Technē* Model is to successfully account for psychic conflict, it

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²⁸⁰ A re-statement of the problem Smith raises for the PNO. See Smith, “Plato's Analogy of State and Soul,” 35-37.
²⁸¹ Irwin rightly identifies this problem when he distinguishes between kinds of opposition. He points out that Plato's account must hold that “since no appetite can itself be opposed to acting on appetite, the sort of desire that opposes acting on appetite must be some sort of non-appetitive type of desire” (Irwin, *Plato's Ethics*, 207-208). Concerning the question as to how the *logistikon* opposes the *epithumotikon*, Cooper argues that the *logistikon* must have some kind of desire of its own; otherwise, it could not act.
must explain the restraint that follows on an experience of psychic conflict without appealing to the Virtue Model's interpretation of the distinctive faculties of the *logistikon*. Therefore, if we can show that the *Technē* Model's alternative cannot account for the distinctive character of psychic conflict without appealing to the virtue model's account of the functions of the *logistikon*, then we will have discovered a reason to abandon its assertion concerning the instrumentality of the *logistikon* to the *epithumotikon*.

Socrates can address the proposal above by demanding from the objector an account of how desires are individuated. Glaucon and the party receive just such an account before they consider the example of the person who is thirsty but refuses to drink. 282 Socrates proposes the following schema for understanding appetites. On the one hand, we have a generic desire for a generic, unqualified object that is naturally suited to satisfy a desire of that type. 283 Using the example of thirst, he points out that thirst, by itself, is a desire for drink, while the generic object of thirst, is anything that is *thirst-*

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282 At 437d5.
283 Rep., 43d5-e7. Irwin interprets this passage as a reference to Thrasymachus' requirement in Book I that they consider the ruler in the "strict sense." He also suggests that this passage "confronts an apparently Socratic thesis," i.e., the thesis that all desires are for the good. Here various appetites appear to urge the agent toward certain objects regardless of whether those objects satisfy a desire for the good. Irwin argues that Plato must demonstrate that agents in fact have such desires, i.e., "thirst qua thirst" rather than desire for a drink qua good. He then interprets the Socrates' example—being thirsty and refusing to drink—as a case that is supposed to convince us that there are such generic appetitive desires, and that it is *these* desires that act "without regard for the good." See Terence Irwin, *Plato's Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 206-208. I suggest that this passage is better interpreted as an account of how desires are individuated. Plato's point need not be that we in fact experience such generic desires, only that for such appetitive desires to be reason-responsive, they must be individuated according to reasoned considerations. Reeve holds a view similar my proposal about this passage, i.e., that it concerns the individuation of desires. He claims that by the PNO Plato has in mind a "Principle of Qualification," which is a logical (rather than psychological) principle concerning formal objects. He points out that "Indeed, it is always possible to produce the natural object of a relation simply by modalizing the relation itself—the natural object of a relation R is always, trivially, the R-able" (121). The more concrete point here is that here is that thirst is for something drinkable, but because there are many drinkable things, this appetite must be individuated. The *logistikon* does the individuating. For a similar proposal, see also Burnyeat, "The Truth of Tripartition," 19.
quenching. But Socrates leaves open the question as to how these generic appetites are individuated, asking “...does the addition of a little bit of warmth to the thirst produce the desire for cold as well? And does the addition of cold produce desire for warmth” (437d6-e1, Griffith)? Contained within this question is a proposal on which Socrates does not elaborate, but that might aid the proponent of the Technē Model's account of psychic conflict. The proposal is this: maybe some qualification of the generic desire accounts for the qualification of the generic object, so that psychic conflict arises when two desires receive contradictory qualifications. In Socrates' example, the qualifications stand in a converse relation. The opposite qualification of the generic desire accounts for the opposite qualification of the object: a warm desire accounts for the desire for a cold drink, and the qualified desire finds satisfaction in the oppositely qualified object.284

To generate an example of psychic conflict on this account, the proponent of the Technē Model might suggest something like the following. Suppose I have just finished some vigorous exercise, and I have the following two desires: (1) a desire for a cold drink, which means I have a “warm” desire; (2) a desire for a hot bath, which means that I have a “cold” desire. On this account, then, it seems that I have both warm and cold desires both within the epithumotikon, and since these qualities represent opposite states in the same part (epithumotikon), we have a candidate for the application of the PNO. We can easily reply, however, that the example fails to meet one of the conditions of the PNO, i.e., that the same part cannot be in opposite states with respect to the same object. Here the objects of the desires are different, and so the PNO does not apply. As a more

284 What is striking about this proposal is the resemblance it bears to Socrates' first definition of eros in the Symposium, namely, that eros is a desire for what one lacks (200b1-3). Here the qualification of both desire and object by mutually exclusive opposites would fall neatly under this definition, since a “warm” thirst would describe a condition in which the soul that excludes—and hence lacks—“cold.”
formidable example, however, we might consider the following. Suppose that I have a desire for a sweet drink, which means I have a "bitter” desire. Now, suppose that I am sick, and this means that I have a desire for healthy drinks, among which sweet drinks are not included. This case of conflicting desires better resembles Socrates' example of the person who wants to drink but refuses. The competitor theory might explain this apparent “refusal” by the strength of the person's desire for a healthy drink: the desire for healthy drinks just happened to be “stronger” than the desire for a sweet drink.

Now we must determine whether this second example actually captures the phenomenon of psychic conflict without appealing to the logistikon. I argue that it cannot, because without positing the logistikon, the experience lacks the aspect of evaluation that would make it genuine experience of psychic conflict. To show that the instrumental role of the logistikon cannot account for evaluation, I will identify the powers that the logistikon may have on the Technē Model, and argue that these powers cannot account for the evaluative aspect of psychic conflict. The two powers that the logistikon may reasonably be said to possess on the Technē Model are hypothesis and the ability to prioritize ends.285 An agent must be able to hypothesize in conditional form about the likely consequences of various actions. To experience a conflict between ends, something must tell the agent “achieve end A first and B second,” or “achieve end A rather than end B.” On the Technē Model, the logistikon must be able to hypothesize about the means an agent uses to achieve his ends because that is what is immediately

285 Irwin argues that the epithumotikon shares two features with the logistikon, namely, (1) concern for its desires over time, in the sense that it wants to see its desires satisfied in the future; and (2) recognition of “considerations of efficiency” in the sense that satisfaction of an immediate desire might preclude the satisfaction of some other desire in the future (Plato's Ethics, 220). On my reading, the logistikon's power of hypothesis communicates facts about efficiency to the epithumotikon, and thereby speaks the language of desire.
entailed by placing the *logistikon* in an instrumental role. The *logistikon* may also reasonably be said to be capable of prioritizing ends because it may happen that some weaker desires, if satisfied, hinder the satisfaction of a stronger desire. For example, suppose that I have an intense desire to visit a loved-one for vacation. I am running late and have only thirty minutes to make my flight on time. Suppose I also have not eaten for twenty-four hours, and would like to stop somewhere to buy a snack. I might reason that I ought not to satisfy my hunger yet because doing so will cause me to miss my flight. On the other hand, if I have ample time, I may satisfy my hunger without the risk of missing my flight. These kinds of decisions reflect the *logistikon*'s prioritization of desires.

We must explain how the *logistikon* prioritizes desires, however, because in this explanation we will glimpse a crucial difference between the *technē* and virtue models' accounts of the *logistikon*'s powers. On the *Technē* Model of the relation between the *logistikon* and the *epithumotikon*, we must account for the prioritization of desires in a somewhat roundabout way. For example, a prioritization of ends might result if an agent had formed a habit of satisfying one desire before other desires as a result of repeatedly experiencing one desire “defeat” another. This habit would then be felt as a kind of prioritization. The *Technē* Model must explain the cause of prioritization in this way because it cannot resort to an evaluative function of the *logistikon* that would be causally efficacious in producing a certain action; it cannot say that it is *better* to achieve end rather than another, only that the agent should accomplish one end *before* another in a temporal sequence.

The crucial question is whether this account of the prioritization of ends captures the distinctive features of psychic conflict. I suggest that it does not, because on this
account the experience of the “refusal” that ends the conflict lacks an evaluative aspect. To identify the role that evaluation plays in the work of the logistikon, we must clarify how the refusal is actually felt when the person in Socrates' example refuses to satisfy some immediate appetite. I suggest that it is the interaction between the power of hypothesis and the ability for prioritization that gives rise to an evaluation— that is, a judgment about which course of action is better. Consider a familiar example of psychic conflict: someone restrains his desire for a certain food because he judges that eating it would be unhealthy. The determination of what is healthy for the body is complex enough to require a significant power of hypothesis. For example, suppose the person must decide between a number of foods, of which some he immediately desires but considers unhealthy, and others he considers healthy but does not immediately desire. He might first hypothesize about the options: “If I eat food X, I will experience immediate pleasure but be nauseous later; If I eat food Y, I will get iron but very little protein; if I eat food Z, I will get vitamin B, but likely experience an allergic reaction.” In order for the agent to experience something like a refusal of his immediate desire, he must have a prioritization of desires such that one desire precedes his immediate desire for food X in the order of satisfaction. What I mean is that the person must have a mental schema of the following sort: “my desire to be healthy must receive satisfaction before my desire for pleasure; desire X must be satisfied before desire Y is satisfied.” Particular hypotheses would then be selected according to their proximity to achieving the highest priorities. Such a contradiction between a high priority and an immediate desire could result if the agent had acquired a habit in the way mentioned above.

This account does not capture the distinctive character of the refusal in psychic
conflict because the conflict between habit and an immediate desire is not resolved by refusing the immediate desire, but rather by defaulting to one's habit. If habits are the actions to which we default, then it is odd to describe the relation between the immediate desire and a habit as a “conflict” or a “refusal” of a possible course of action, since one is simply defaulting to the end that has already been assigned the highest priority. Thus, we do not seem to have an instance of genuine aversion in the habit that overrides an immediate desire. The issue at hand here is whether the *logistikon* has an evaluative function that would have causal efficacy in determining the agent's action. According to the above analysis, the *logistikon* does not have such power, because it is the person's habit that accounts for the cause of the action. What is missing from this account is an evaluation that would produce a genuine refusal of the immediate desire, rather than a defaulting to habit. The need for such an evaluation can be seen in cases where the conflict does not arise between an immediate desire and a habit, but between an immediate desire and an agent's deliberations about an action for which he has no precedent; for when actions have no precedent, it is genuinely a question as to which ends should take priority.

For example, suppose I have an immediate desire for a pleasant but unhealthy food and drink, but I am deliberating about how I can best prepare for the battle at Marathon the following morning. Suppose that it is my first time at war, and I have not formed a habit of refusing pleasant but unhealthy food the night before a battle.

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286 This consideration compels me to dispute Bobonich's claim that akratic action is explained by the greater strength of an appetitive desire in comparison to the strength of a rational aversion to the same thing: “The misalignment between strength and evaluation is why akratic action occurs: it is because the causally stronger desire can have as its object something not ranked best overall that akratic action can occur” (*Plato's Utopia Recast*, 241). The model represents a Humean model of competition among desires.
Nonetheless, I conclude from my deliberations that it would be best for me to stay away from the unhealthy food and drink because I want to be in optimal condition the next morning—not simply because I want to survive, but because I also want to show courage. In this example, it is genuinely a question for me as to which course of action is best for me because I have no default behavior to fall back upon. Thus, the crucial difference in this example is that I reach a prioritization of ends in a wholly different way than by habit: I deliberate about the likely consequences of two courses of action, and prioritize one end—optimal performance in battle—over another because of a judgment I have reached. In this case, the only way for me to establish the prioritization of ends is by hypothesizing and evaluating the available options. It is difficult to see how the Technē Model could account for the evaluative aspect without attributing a power of evaluation—with causal efficacy—to the logistikōn. If the proponent of the competitor theory above invokes such a power, then he essentially invokes the virtue model to account for his own paradigm of psychic conflict.

A more sophisticated proponent of the Technē Model of the relation between the epithumotikon and the logistikōn might try to deny that the logistikōn has the power to evaluate ends and to modify behavior accordingly. In response to the requirement for evaluation, a proponent of the Technē Model might simply deny that evaluation occurs, while offering some other explanation for the feeling or appearance of an evaluation.287 We catch a glimpse of this more sophisticated version at a second moment in Book IV, when Socrates seems to entertain a competitor theory in the form of an interrupting

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287 This strategy is consistent with many of Hume's skeptical arguments: show that some fundamental metaphysical or moral commitment we have must be false, but explain the mechanisms that compel our irrationally holding that commitment. Hume employs just this strategy in in the section “Of Necessary Connection” when he suggests “custom” and “habit” as the “solution to skeptical doubts” after he has argued that we ought to be skeptics about the reality of causal relations. See Hume, Enquiry, IV-V.
“uproar” (θόρυβος):

Let no one raise an uproar against us for being unthinking, [and object] that no one desires drink but rather good drink, and not food, but good food. For everyone desires good things.

Μήτοι τις ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ ἀσκέπτους ἡμᾶς θορυβήσῃ, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ καὶ οὐ σίτου, ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ σίτου. Πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (438a1-3).

The question is why this proposal counts as an objection, and to what claim, specifically, it is an objection.288 Socrates does not explain this, but I suggest that the objection is against the account he gave of how the logistikon individuates desires. The objector essentially proposes that our desires are more trustworthy that Socrates is willing to admit. On this proposal desires might come already individuated, but with the guarantee that because they are desires, whatever they seek must be something good. The proposal perhaps resembles an affect-theory of value: things are good because—and just to the extent that—we desire them. This account of value lends itself to the Technē Model because it allows for a radical equality of the value of ends.289

As far as the evaluative aspect of psychic conflict is concerned, the proponent of

288 James Adams suggests that the objection can be expressed in the form of a dilemma that arises when we ask what the objector means by “good.” Does he mean the apparent good or the actually good? If he means that we desire what things appear good to us, then the objector will have difficulty explaining what confidence we could have that we actually attain what we desire. If we are mistaken about what appears good to us, then we may attain what we do not desire. If, on the other hand, he means that we desire what is actually good, then he must explain how we discern what is actually good. In either case, the objector must refer to something like deliberation to explain how we could succeed at attaining what we desire, given that the generic desire for good things is present in the epithumotikon. See James Adams ed., The Republic of Plato, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 250. Irwin proposes that Plato may be referring to a “Socratic thesis” here, specifically the thesis that all desires are for the good (Plato's Ethics, 206).

289 It is worth recalling Hume's declaration that "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me” (Hume, Treatise, 2.3.3.6).
the Technē Model can answer that the “feeling” that one end is preferable or better than another arises when one desire “conquers” another desire, while the logistikon simply invents a justification for the “victor” post hoc.290 Our attributing causal efficacy to this power of evaluation would then turn out to be a mistake, as we would be mistaking a post hoc explanation for a causal power. This answer leaves the logistikon with the powers of hypothesis and prioritization alone, which is consistent with assigning it a purely instrumental function. Consequently, the logistikon would play no part in bestowing value on ends; it would simply calculate the best means for achieving one's ends. On this view, there would also be no adjudicating which ends are more and which less worthy—an implication that clearly contradicts Socrates' argument that preserving harmony among the parts of the soul (justice) is the most worthy end.

The key to answering this objection lies in examining how calculation has “forethought over the whole soul,” and “knowledge of what is good both for each part and for the whole community” of the soul, as Socrates later claims.291 I have already argued that the Technē Model cannot consistently attribute an evaluative function to the logistikon, but if we can show that its psychological model in fact fails, by its own standards, to account even for the feeling of evaluation, then we will have shown that only by positing a logistikon with robust powers of evaluation and hypothesis can we...

290 This proposal is just what Hobbes proposes in the Leviathan, and one that suits Thrasyvachus’ preference for pleonexia: “I put forth a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more” (Hobbes, Leviathan, XI).

291 […] ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν (441e4); ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ξυμφέροντος ἐκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τοῦ κοινόν σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντος (442c6-8). Irwin argues that this function of the logistikon represents a distinct “rational desire,” which he suggests amounts to a kind of “rational self-love.” Rational self-love has a connection with practical reason “because it displays no partiality to some desires or affections, but takes account of them all on their merits” (Irwin, Plato's Ethics, 216). I suggest that this aspect of “rational self-love” is captured by attributing powers of prioritization and evaluation to the logistikon.
account for certain phenomenological features of psychic conflict. We can find the
resources for this sort of argument by considering how the power of “forethought”
(προμήθεια) bestows a comprehensive perspective that is crucial to generating cases of
psychic conflict. The problem for the Technē Model seems to be that if evaluation is
always a post hoc invention, then it is not entitled to claim that the logistikon has any
“forethought” over the soul. But when people restrain their appetites, they restrain them
because they have inferred some likely negative consequence before they satisfy the
appetite, not after. For this reason it is difficult to see how the Technē Model can even
account for the phenomenology of psychic conflict, since it assigns the wrong temporal
order to the aspects of such an experience.

I do not think that the proponent of the Technē Model can have recourse to the
reply that what we call foresight is really just lucky guesswork based on patterns of
habituation. What is conspicuous about the example is Socrates’ neglecting to mention
the reasons a person might have for refusing to drink, for this makes available many
interpretations in which a person might exercise foresight without relying exclusively on
some pattern of habituation. Annas, for example, suggests that Plato leaves us to surmise
that the person in the example refuses drink because drinking would be unhealthy.292 The
example certainly lends itself to this interpretation, but what we should notice is that a
variety of reasons—not all of them related to concerns about health—might compel a
person to “restrain” his epithumotikon from drinking. For example, a person might refuse
to drink something because he knows that drinking will kill him (such is the case of
shipwrecked sailors who find themselves surrounded by a sea of water); another person
might refuse to drink some alcohol because the situation demands his or her alertness;

292 See Introduction, 140.
someone else might refuse to drink because doing so would offend someone he or she
cared about. Regardless of the particular reasons for self-restraint, the same explanation
holds for why the logistikon “rules” the soul in each case: the epithumotikon lacks both
the power of hypothesis and the comprehensive view of the circumstances beyond those
which pertain to the satisfaction of its own particular pleasures.293 Thus it simply cannot
occupy a position from which it could evaluate possible courses of action. Finally,
Socrates' omission of the reason for refusal in fact coheres well with his view about the
individuation of desires. The point is that the epithumotikon communicates rather generic
urges—even if they are not quite as generic as Socrates presents them—that cannot
convey their own importance and priority; hence the necessity of the logistikon's powers
of hypothesis, evaluation, and prioritization.

§3. Second and Third Divisions: Thumos and Epithumotikon, Thumos and Logistikon

The arguments for differentiating thumos from the logistikon and the epithumotikon
(439e-441c) appear slightly more complicated because Socrates in fact has two
argumentative goals. The first is to establish that thumos really is distinct from both the
epithumotikon and the logistikon; the second is to demonstrate that thumos ought to ally
with the logistikon rather than with the epithumotikon. Three examples are of particular
interest for these purposes:

(a) The story of Leontius. Socrates uses this example to divide thumos from the

293 Bobonich argues that the appetitive part “is capable, according to Plato, of means-end reasoning”
(Plato's Utopia Recast, 244). The evidence he offers for this view comes from a passage in Book IX
(580e2-581a7), where Socrates re-describes the life of the appetitive part of the soul as “money-loving”
because money is the chief instrument for procuring the primary pleasures of food, drink, and sex. I do
not think this is very strong evidence for attributing means-end reasoning to the epithumotikon. This re-
description is better understood as the life of a particular person—the oligarch—who orients his whole
life, and thus the parts of his soul, around procuring the pleasures of the epithumotikon. It is a discovery
of the logistikon, not the epithumotikon, that money is the chief instrument for procuring these.
epithumotikon by portraying the self-conflict a person experiences when he becomes angry at himself for some moral failing. Socrates offers this experience of psychic conflict as a reason for dividing thumos from the epithumotikon, but as we shall see, the example does not easily lend itself to an application of the PNO.

(b) The influence of judgment on moral indignation. Judgment—a function of the logistikon—can affect the willingness or unwillingness to suffer punishment, and consequently whether one feels resentment and indignation for punishment.

(c) The episode from Odyssey XX.17. The example of Odysseus “rebuking” his thumos for seeking revenge too soon portrays conflict between thumos and the logistikon, but Socrates does not clarify how the PNO applies.

To sort out these difficulties, I shall argue that if we read the section with a view to the two argumentative tasks mentioned above, then we can easily identify the argumentative functions of Socrates' examples. Doing so will also show that Socrates continues to rely on the PNO in a manner consistent with the arguments that first divided the logistikon and epithumotikon.

As I suggested above, Socrates uses three examples to carry out two different argumentative functions. Identifying the argumentative function of each example will let us say which rely on the PNO and which do not. Below I have organized the examples according to their argumentative function. Those that rely on the PNO are intended to mark a division in the soul; those that do not rely on the PNO offer reasons for assigning a particular hierarchy to the parts of the soul.

Relies on the PNO:
5) The example of Leontius (439e6) differentiates *thumos* from the *epithumotikon*.\(^{294}\) I suggest that the differentiation between first-order and second-order desires explains how the argument relies on the PNO, despite appearances to the contrary.

6) *Odyssey*, XX.17 (441b6) differentiates *thumos* from the *logistikon*. The quote refers to an episode in which Odysseus, still disguised as a beggar, becomes angry with the maid-servants coming out of the hall, those who were in the habit of “mingling” with the suitors.\(^{295}\) Here Odysseus’ *thumos* is “stirred in his own breast” (τοῦ δ᾽ ὠρίνετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φύλοισι, *Od*, XX.9), and he “rebukes his heart with a word” (κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ, *Od.*, XX.17). Socrates takes this as an indication that Homer portrayed two elements, the *logistikon* and *thumos*, since “the part that has reflected rationally on what is better and what is worse has some sharp words to say to the element which is irrationally angry” (441b7-c2, Griffith). The example appears to make use of the PNO, but, as with the example of Leontius, the application of the principle is not as explicit as in the division between the *logistikon* and the *epithumotikon*.

**Does not rely on the PNO:**

5) Anger in response to the perception of deserved and undeserved punishment (550b-e) shows *thumos’* dependence upon, and alliance with, the *logistikon*.\(^{296}\)

This argument does not rely upon the PNO because its purpose is to establish that *thumos* is properly subordinated to the *logistikon*. This example provides evidence

\(^{294}\) The example of Leontius “shows that anger can sometimes be at war with the desires, which implies that they are two distinct and separate things” (440a4-6, Griffith).

\(^{295}\) ταὶ δ᾽ ἐκ μεγάρου γυναῖκες ἤϊσαν, αἱ μνηστῆρσιν ἐμισγέσκοντο πάρος περ (*Odyssey*, XX.6-7).

\(^{296}\) Socrates indicates that he intends for the example to show this conclusion when he says that “In the civil war of the soul, it [spirit] is far more likely to take up arms on the side of the rational part” (440e3-4, Griffith).
for my view that *thumos* offers a surrogate, in the form of accountability to others, for the philosophically mature orientation in which a person develops accountability to reasons. The surrogate role helps clarify how *thumos* can generate second-order desires. Such desires can be described as images or impressions of reason, in the sense that they can represent commitments to principles of which one might lack an explicit articulation.

In the midst of these arguments we must not, however, lose sight our ultimate goal, which is to explain how Glaucon's acceptance of the rule of the *logistikon* in tripartite psychology indicates a turn from becoming to being. Of particular concern is our account of the difference between *thumos* and the *logistikon*, since showing that the *logistikon* ought to rule the soul requires showing that there is a substantial difference between the *logistikon* and *thumos*. An account of the *logistikon* in Book IV must avoid two extremes: on the one hand, a characterization of the *logistikon* that is too robust for Book IV, and on the other hand, a characterization of the *logistikon* that does not significantly differ from *thumos*. If such a reading can be established, then, in addition to having answered some of general criticisms about the *logistikon* in Book IV, I will be

297 Ferrari argues that reason in Book IV seemingly lacks goals of its own and functions as a “mere executive” that balances the goals of “self-respect” and “material goals.” Ferrari even goes so far as to say that “for the motivations of non-philosophers a bipartite psychological analysis would suffice” (*City and Soul in Plato's Republic* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005], 112). This claim is too strong, however. As I shall argue, although it is true that reason lacks its own goals in Book IV, the differences between reason and spirit are significant enough to require a tripartite structure of the soul. Irwin also doubts whether *thumos* is really distinct from the *logistikon* because *thumos* has, like the *logistikon*, “evaluative attitudes” (*Plato’s Ethics*, 212-213). He maintains a distinction between *thumos* and *logistikon* by proposing that thumotic emotions (such as anger) function as a kind of heuristic that tends to identify certain actions as approved or not approved. Because these evaluations do not stem from reasoned considerations, but rather from habituation, they cannot belong to the *logistikon*. This conforms closely to my own proposal that *thumos* captures an enculturated response to various actions, and thus comprises a sort of “aesthetic” side to moral evaluation. However, I dispute the assertion that the *logistikon* does not significantly differ from *thumos*. Another criticism concerns the discontinuity of the *logistikon* with reason in the central books. Roochnik argues that “if reason and desire are counted as distinct parts, then it becomes impossible to account for the passionate desire for wisdom—that is,
in a position to argue that only the rule of the *logistikon* allows both a comprehensive perspective and stable prioritization of the ends of the different parts of the soul.

Two points in particular about the picture of *thumos* in Book IV are crucial for my purposes. First is that thumotic interests are defined by an other-bound consciousness, specifically in the form of a sense of accountability to other persons.\(^{298}\) The thumotic emotions of shame, honor, and anger, can be portrayed as mechanisms that support this form of consciousness. These emotions are complex in that their objects are sometimes other first-order desires, and sometimes counter-factual states of affairs, as in the experience of shame that accompanies regret. It is these interests of *thumos* that Ferrari identifies as “goals of self-respect,” and that seem to comprise the primary ends of the soul in tripartite psychology, i.e., those ends that the *logistikon* assigns the highest priority in the order of satisfaction. One reason that I shall suggest that this set of interests is distinct from the *logistikon* is that it teaches the person accountability to others, but not full accountability to *reasons*. This suggestion will help explain why the thumotic priorities that define tripartite psychology in Book IV fall short of genuine philosophy.

The interest in accountability to others is a thumotic interest that has the potential to resist the self-opposing activity of reason that eventually characterizes philosophy. The resistance from *thumos* is eventually tempered, however, by the virtue of *sophrosunē*—a

\(^{298}\) See Burnyeat, “The Truth of Tripartition,” 9. Cf. Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings*, 138, who also notices this general feature about *thumos*, but who describes *thumos* as primarily comprehending the mismatch between “reality and our ideals.” Cooper argues that thumotic anger is rooted in “competitiveness and the desire for self-esteem and (as a normal presupposition of this) esteem by others.” See John M. Cooper, “Plato on Human Motivation,” in *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 134. This description of the general motivation of *thumos* is correct, but it remains partial to anger as the defining emotion for *thumos*. Shame and anger at oneself are not necessarily born out of competitiveness. Once one considers emotions like shame, or the experience of directing of anger at oneself, the need to see the essence of *thumos* as a generally other-bound consciousness becomes clearer.
virtue that is crucial to the project of psychic integration. The second point that I shall make is that *thumos*, like the *epithumotikon*, lacks a power of hypothesis, and that the *logistikon*’s power of hypothesizing in fact saves *thumos* from thwarting its own interests—that is, saves *thumos* from itself. However, since hypothesis plays a role in the restraint of both *thumos* and the *epithumotikon*, and is the primary exercise by which Socrates characterizes dialectic,\(^{299}\) we can deduce from the arguments regarding *thumos* in Book IV that the *logistikon* has a capacity that is continuous with its philosophical development in the central books.

The story of Leontius does not—at least not superficially—appear to rely on the PNO because it does not portray both desire and aversion in relation to the same object or aspect of an object. Leontius directs his anger not at the dead bodies, but rather at his desire to look at the dead bodies. In other words, Leontius is attracted to the bodies, but angry at himself. Clearly, however, a person’s having contrary affects (desire for the bodies, and anger at oneself) for different objects does not qualify as a case for the PNO. I propose that this apparent inconsistency can be resolved by characterizing the relation between *thumos* and the *epithumotikon* as a relation between first-order and second-order desires. *Thumos* somehow communicates a wish about Leontius’ first-order desire to look at the bodies, and this relation among desires allows for a strict application of the PNO. A second-order desire about a first-order desire—for example, a desire to be rid of certain desires, or simply not to satisfy certain desires—can account for an aversion to the object of the first-order desire. For example, a person trying to quit cigarettes might experience cravings for cigarettes, along with a desire to be rid of the craving. But how might this

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\(^{299}\) Τοῦτον τοινύν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἐλεγον, ὑποθέσεσι ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχήν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ (511a2-3). “As regards this type (εἶδος), grasped by the mind (νοητὸν), I was saying that the soul is forced to use hypotheses in its search for it.”
person rid himself of the craving—that is, how could this person actually satisfy the second-order desire? The person might succeed if he made the object of the craving appear as disgusting or as distasteful as possible. In this way the effort to satisfy a second-order desire to be rid of a certain first-order desire might take the form of creating an aversion to the very same of object of the first-order desire. Thus, if we have second-order desires that we hope to satisfy, then we must attribute those second-order desires to thumos, on pain of violating the PNO.300

This interpretation of thumos finds support in Rana Saadi Liebert's reading of the story of Leontius.301 Liebert suggests that thumos performs a “second-order” function in relation to the epithumotikon. She offers a unique interpretation that is worth considering for what it reveals about thumos’ function as a second-order desire. Liebert rejects the common reading of Leontius as a necrophiliac,303 and instead argues that Leontius’ thumos reacts to a feeling of unlawful pity for the dead. Her case relies on Plato’s use of the word “disgust” (δυσχεραίνω) both in the Leontius episode and in other

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300 Reeve seems to miss the mark in his analysis of the example of Leontius. Because he is committed to each part of the soul having a “natural object,” in the same way that the natural object of thirst is something drinkable (See footnote 28), he must assume that anger has a “natural object.” This might be true, but it would take significant argument to identify the natural object of anger (Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 131). Moral wrongs seem to be a good place to start, but in the example of Leontius, Leontius is angry at himself not for having yet committed a moral wrong, but because of his failure to resist a temptation. Nonetheless, Reeve rightly recognizes that anger, the characteristic emotion of thumos, can morph into a form of self-disgust (137). It is this possibility within anger which I suggest is crucial for interpreting the Leontius example.


302 Liebert, “Pity and Disgust in Plato's Republic,” 185-186.

303 Liebert casts doubt on the common reading by pointing out that the reading relies on a corrupt comic fragment featuring Leontius that has been amended in light of the episode in the Republic. The attempt to establish Leontius’ perverse sexuality on the basis of the Republic thus proves to be circular. Second, she points out that the common reading ignores Socrates’ mention of the fact that Leontius looks on the bodies of recently executed criminals (“Pity and Disgust in Plato's Republic, 181). If the only lesson were to show thumos in conflict with perverse appetites, why include the detail that the bodies belonged to executed criminals?
passages of the Republic. Liebert identifies grief—rather than perverse sexual attraction—as the appetitive desire that Leontius experiences, on the grounds that the expression of grief was significantly restricted in the education of the guardians, and is designated as a lawless desire in Book X. This proposal better interprets the episode because it explains the qualification that the corpses belong to executed prisoners. On Liebert's proposal, the conflict between thumos and the epithumotikon is as follows. Leontius sees the corpses and feels a natural tendency to pity them, but because the corpses belong to criminals, his pity is not sanctioned by the demands of justice, which prohibits citizens from showing pity for dead criminals. The outburst of “disgust and revulsion at himself” (δυσχεραίνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι εαυτόν, 439e8) reflects an enculturated response to an epithumotikon that has gotten out of control.

While I find Liebert’s reading more persuasive than the common reading, it is worth noting that even on the common reading of the Leontius episode, the same mechanism of disgust at an appetite would be operative, so that thumos would generate a second-order desire by first manifesting as anger at oneself, and then disgust at the object of one's appetite. Nonetheless, Liebert's reading has two advantages. First, it reveals a

304 Of particular note is Liebert's use of a passage from Socrates' conclusions about the effects of musical education in Book III. Liebert points out that the effect of musical education is to render students able to perceive what is well-formed and feel disgust rightly [ὁρθῶς ... δυσχεραίνων], and argues that this passage shows Socrates' interesting in giving students a “pre-rational means of evaluating the world” (“Pity and Disgust in Plato's Republic,” 190). Disgust thus represents the aesthetic aspect of moral condemnation.

305 In my opinion Cooper overlooks the significance of thumos ability to direct anger at oneself. Concerning Leontius, he says that “the anger he feels at himself is the natural response to this failure to measure up in his own eyes” (“Plato on Human Motivation,” 134). What Cooper overlooks is that it is not really Leontius “own eyes ” to which Leontius is living up; rather, it is the internalization of cultural norms in the form of a sense of accountability to authoritative persons, such as one's parents and teachers.
neater consistency between the Leontius episode and Socrates’ observations about
*thumos’* response to beliefs about just and unjust punishment. If *thumos* is a form of
moral disgust that arises from cultural conditioning, then it is an attitude that is amenable
to a society’s reasoned—in ideal cases, at least—deliberations about the appropriateness
of, and restrictions on, certain appetites. Similarly, the examples of just and unjust
punishment show how a thumotic response is dependent upon judgments about just and
unjust deserts. On Liebert’s reading, Leontius’ *thumos* is roused because he views the
punishment as *just,* but his appetitive response of grief resists the judgment that the
prisoners somehow “got what they deserved.”306 The second advantage is that her reading
shows how thumotic concerns are dependent upon the consciousness of others, either as
discrete individuals who hold punitive authority, or in the form of the “super-ego” of
social norms.

The education of *thumos* thus fosters a sense of accountability to other persons.
What *thumos* lacks, however, is a sense of accountability to *reasons.* That *thumos* lacks a
full sense of accountability to reasons is apparent in Socrates’ argument for the
subordination of *thumos* to the *logistikon,* which contains observations about the
dependence that feelings of indignation have on beliefs about deserved and undeserved
punishment. Most notably, the examples portray, on the one hand, the emotive response
to the belief that one suffers an unjust punishment, and on the other hand, the lack of
emotive response to the belief that one suffers a just punishment. The first scenario

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306 One might ask whether these arguments reflect Plato’s views on capital punishment, and that perhaps
we ought to reject this account of the relationship between *thumos* and the *epithumotikon.* Pity, the
objection might go, humanizes us; but this account of *thumos* and the *epithumotikon* recommends the
callous indifference to these “humanizing” instincts. Reconstructing Plato’s views on capital
punishment is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but one can reply to the objection by noting that
Socrates’ project here is simply descriptive. All he needs to establish is that *thumos* exercises control
over appetites—sometimes even over pity—by manifesting as a feeling of disgust with oneself.
concerns someone who believes he is committing injustice:

When someone thinks he has committed injustice, is it not the case that the nobler he is, the less he is able to get angry when suffering hunger and cold anything else at the hands of the person whom he thinks does these things justly—and what I am saying—isn't he unwilling to rouse his thumos against that person?

Ὅταν τις οἴηται ἀδικεῖν, οὐχ ὅσῳ ἄν γενναιότερος ᾖ, τοσοῦτον δύναται οργίζεσθαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ῥιγῶν καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων πάσχων ὑπ’ ἕκεινον ὅν ᾖ ὃν οἴηται δικαίως ταῦτα δρᾶν καὶ, ὅ λέγω, οὐκ ἔθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός (440c1-5);

Socrates’ claim in this example is fairly simple: our having an emotive response, such as anger or indignation, depends upon beliefs we hold about the desert of the punishment we are suffering, and, by implication, our beliefs about whether we have done something that deserves punishment. Two points are striking about Socrates' phrasing here, however. First, the willingness to endure punishment depends not upon reasoned judgments about the moral value of one's action, but rather on the confidence one has in the authority and competence of the punisher: that person is someone “whom he thinks does these things justly.” Second, this willingness to suffer just punishment without rousing one's anger stems from the quality of one's “nobility,” or one's being “well bred” (γενναῖος), not from a quality of one's logistikon. In other words, the “well-bred” person holds himself accountable to those whose authority he trusts.

Another reason that thumotic interests depend on an attitude of pistis, or trust in persons rather than responsiveness to reasons, can be found in the set of background beliefs that inform the person's conclusion that, in this particular instance, he or she
suffers a just punishment. The confidence that the person has in the authority of the punisher also assumes confidence in the system that distributes deserts (whether honors or punishments) generally. Confidence in that system does not require insight either into the reasons for that system or whether that system actually conforms to the standards it claims to endorse. For example, one does not need to understand John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice* to have faith that the courts are managing one’s case justly. Nonetheless, the well-bred person in the example above trusts that the authority that punishes him gives what is properly due to him, even if he does not understand the principles or reasons that underlie the system as a whole. Again, what this suggests is that the primary concern of *thumos* is accountability to *persons* rather than to reasons. Moreover, by recognizing *thumos* as this form of accountability we can better see how *thumos* generates second-order desires. The key here is that experiencing or not experiencing an emotive response of indignation does not require that one have in mind the rational basis (if there is one) for such a system of distribution. What matters—if we follow Liebert in characterizing one function of *thumos* as enculturated disgust—is that one’s confidence in this system and its representative authorities can reproduce that the values of that system virtually within oneself, so as to generate feelings of *disgust at oneself* both for failing to conform to the behaviors that typically receive praise, and for having illicit appetites when those

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307 Tad Brennan has offered an account of tripartite psychology that attempts to explain the different elements of the soul from the perspective of the demiurge in the *Timaeus*. From this perspective he aims to explain the necessity of just these three parts—appetite, *thumos*, reason—for an embodied soul. According to his account, the need for *thumos* is explained by the lack of an economy that can distribute appetitive goods in a principled way. Honor, which one wins by taking risks in the acquisition and defense of appetitive goods (such as in war), provides the merit according to which one person will receive more, and another less, of the appetitive goods available. I think Brennan’s approach has difficulty explaining how Plato incorporates *thumos* into a philosophical orientation, though I mention his suggestion in order to draw attention to the intimate relation between thumotic interests and the inter-subjectivity that underlies an economy for distributing honors and appetitive goods. See Tad Brennan, “The Nature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its Object,” in *Plato and the Divided Self*, eds. Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan, and Charles Brittain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 107-108; 122-124.
appetites are invisible to other persons.  

Concerning the subordination of *thumos* to the *logistikòn*, Socrates concludes, on the basis of the examples discussed, that “earlier [τότε] we thought [thumos] to be something desiring, but now we are saying that it falls short by much; rather it is much more likely that in the civil war of the soul, it takes up arms on the side of the rational part.” To clarify this relationship of subordination, we should ask what Socrates means by “more likely” (πολύ μάλλον) in this passage. Griffith's translation is somewhat misleading in that it lends itself to the interpretation that, as a matter of empirical probability, *thumos* will side with the *logistikòn* in most cases where there is a potential for psychic conflict. It is not clear the Socrates has established this, however. As we have seen, the experience of anger depends upon the judgment that one has suffered injustice, but claim that *thumos* is “more likely” to side with the *logistikòn* is a bit puzzling, as there is no guarantee that this alliance will always hold. Moreover, this interpretation of the “likelihood” of the alliance relies on the empirical generalization that in most people *thumos* just happens to side with the *logistikòn*; it does not furnish an argument that *thumos* ought to be subordinate to the *logistikòn* even if, for example, *thumos* is not subordinate to the *logistikòn* in the souls of most people. It is worth noting in connection with this point an admission of the precariousness of *thumos*’ alliance with the *logistikòn* when Socrates says that *thumos* “is auxiliary to the rational element by nature, provided it is not corrupted by a poor upbringing” (441a1-3, Griffith). As with the phrase “more
likely," the phrase “by nature” needs clarification. Socrates must mean “by nature” in the sense that thumos carries out its proper function, or is properly subordinated to logistikon; hence the addition of the clause, “provided it is not corrupted by a poor upbringing.” If the “natural” alliance of thumos and the logistikon were just that alliance which occurs as a matter of empirical probability, in the absence of any conditioning or habituation, then it would make little sense for Socrates to add this clause.

An example of the damage that results when thumos fails to ally with the logistikon is instructive here, as it helps demonstrate the sense of the “naturalness” of the alliance Socrates has in mind.310 There are likely many people who have had the same experience as Leontius in relation to other appetitive cravings (e.g., addiction to cigarettes or other drugs). Some of these people may have the opinion that satisfying their craving is bad, but fail to have thumos as the “ally” of their logistikon. For example, suppose someone else purposely hid an addicts’ drug, so as to prevent him from indulging. Rather than endure this “punishment,” the addict might become angry with whomever hid the drug, even though he would admit that he ought to quit his addiction if he were asked what would be best for his health. Socrates does not mean that thumos is the natural ally of the logistikon in the sense that it is incapable of allying with the epithumotikon; rather, the alliance with the logistikon is “natural” in the sense that it is the best role for thumos, given the sort of thing that thumos is. The justification for this

310 Aristotle’s discussion of the person who is quick to anger as a particular example of the weak-willed person might work here as well. Aristotle’s analysis of the person who experiences weakness of will would also fit this interpretation. Aristotle points out that the weak-willed person must feel regret after indulging some appetite, since regret separates him from the self-indulgent person, whose indulgence stems from an opinion and choice the indulging his appetites brings happiness (EN, 1150b30). What I would point out here is that regret belongs to thumos: regret is an emotional “image” or “reminder” of one’s sincerely held priorities and commitments. Although regret may manifest as a first order desire—“I wish I hadn’t done that!”—the fact that it is a desire for a counterfactual state of affairs actually makes it more complex than standard appetitive desires, since appetitive desires seem to be characterized by the immediacy of their objects.
alignment of the parts of the soul rests on the premise that only the logistikos has a comprehensive perspective of the ends of both thumos and the epithumotikon. As we can see in the example above, the alliance of thumos with the epithumotikon only contributes to the deterioration of the person's health, because the anger the person feels at having his drug taken away lacks a comprehensive view of the effects of the drug on the whole person.

In summary, what I am suggesting concerning the subordination of thumos to the logistikos is that thumos has the power to preserve an internal impression of an external authority. Thumos is “naturally,” or properly subordinate to the logistikos because its form of consciousness is structured with a placeholder for some authority whose demands it can internalize and impose upon itself and appetite. As far as concerns the turning of the soul, we should notice that thumos is primed for the acceptance of reason as the ultimate authority, even though Book IV—and perhaps even the Republic as a whole—lacks an clear portrait of a philosophically mature form of reason. Nonetheless, it

311To make this interpretation more plausible, we might consider what Socrates says about fear, another emotion that has an essential relation to thumos. What will again emerge from studying the virtuous management of fear is an account of thumos as that which may present a sort of image or impression of reason in the form of a second-order desire. Socrates defines courage as the virtue that arises when “the spirited element […] though surrounded by pleasures and pains, keeps intact the instructions given to it by reason about what is to be feared and what is not to be feared” (442c1-3, Griffith). The crucial question that we must pose to this definition is what demarcates the truly fearsome from what is not fearsome? The resources for answering this question are scarce in the Republic, though in light of the dialogue's overarching interest in answering what is good for the soul, a plausible answer is that the truly fearsome is what harms the soul, that is, injustice. The Myth of Er, at least, would seem to corroborate this interpretation, inasmuch as it offers an image of what the unjust soul will suffer as a result of its wrongdoings, and conspicuously lacks the rigorous argumentation that Socrates carries out in the rest of the Republic. This suggests a way of unifying the Myth of Er with the remainder of the Republic's argument by casting it in a sort of thumotic role. I propose this Contra Julia Annas, “Plato's Myths of Judgment” in Phronesis, Vol.27, No.2 [1982], 129; Cf. Ronald R. Johnson, who describes the myth as a “symbolic summary” of the Republic's main argument (“Does Plato's 'Myth of Er' Contribute to the Argument of the 'Republic'?” in Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol.23, No.1 [1999], 12). If this suggestion is accurate, then thumos may carry out its function—preserving the instructions about what is to be feared and not to be feared—without full comprehension of reasons that justice and injustice demarcate “what is not to be feared” from “what is to be feared.” That comprehension is gained from the conversation that spans the whole of the Republic, though for thumos the “image” of this argument

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should be clear that *thumos* is “primed” in the sense that it receives a surrogate for accountability to reasons in the form of accountability to authoritative persons.

In the absence of a clear portrait of the rational life, however, we discover an explanatory gap: how does the transition from accountability to persons to accountability to reasons occur? While I do not think Socrates provides a full account of this transition in the *Republic*, the episode from the *Odyssey* that Socrates uses to argue for the division between *thumos* and the *logistikon* may offer a clue. In the episode from the *Odyssey*, Homer describes Odysseus' experience of the desire for revenge by saying that he “considered many things in his mind and heart, whether darting up he should bring death to each, or whether he should let them mingle with the arrogant suiters for the last time.”

Socrates identifies the moment at which Odysseus “rebukes his heart” as the indication of psychic conflict. Although Socrates does not say it explicitly, I suggest that we interpret Odysseus' actions as another example of the *logistikon* “restraining” or “stopping” another part of the soul. This interpretation is corroborated by what Socrates says earlier about the person whose unjustified indignation at being punished for wrongdoing is “soothed by the *logos* beside him, like a dog being recalled by a shepherd.” Just as the *logistikon* could restrain the *epithumotikon*, so too can it restrain *thumos*. But the question is how the *logistikon* stops *thumos*, given that *thumos* lacks a mature sense of accountability to the *logistikon*? I suggest that the *logistikon* can restrain *thumos* by showing *thumos* that sometimes the satisfaction of its own interests is self-

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312 πολλὰ δὲ μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, ἠὲ μετατέμε μάταν τεῦξειν ἐκάστην, ἦ ἐτ᾽ ἐδὸν μηστήσασιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μιγῆσθαι καὶ πύματα (*Odyssey*, XX.10-14).
313 [...] ὄσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ’ ἀτόφω ἀνακληθεῖς πραυνθῆ (440d3-4);
defeating. This is especially evident in episode from the *Odyssey*: Odysseus “rebukes his heart” because taking revenge at *that* moment, although it might bring immediate pleasure, would thwart the ultimate goal of regaining control of the household.314

Concerning the transition from accountability to persons to accountability to reasons, we might say that the first recognition that one is accountable to reasons comes in the form of an insight about the limited perspective of thumotic interests. Odysseus' self-restraint suggests that the *logistikon* possesses the insight that the satisfaction of thumotic interests are in some cases self-defeating. Although thumotic interests remain primary in this example, *thumos* still needs the *logistikon* to give its interests a stable prioritization. The awareness of *this* need for a stable prioritization of interests indicates the recognition of a non-personal authority.

§4. Unity amid Self-opposition within Reason: The Virtue Model of Justice and the Project of Psychic Integration

A summary of the conclusions from my reading of Socrates' arguments for tripartite psychology is as follows. The *logistikon* deserves its position as “ruler” of the soul because it alone has (1) a comprehensive perspective of the ends of the other parts of the soul (*epithumotikon* and *thumos*) and (2) powers of hypothesis, prioritization, and evaluation that allow it to manage the satisfaction of these often conflicting interests. These features of the *logistikon* are best seen in the examples of Odysseus and the person who refuses drink. In Odysseus' case, the *logistikon* prohibits the immediate satisfaction

314 This observation explains in turn how the episode allows for an application of the PNO. On the one hand, there is the desire for revenge, whose satisfaction would bring pleasure; on the other hand, the *logistikon* prohibits the satisfaction of this desire. To simultaneously achieve the ends of *thumos* and obey the imperative of reason would require incompatible actions; therefore we must divide *thumos* and the *logistikon*. 
of the desire for revenge because satisfying that desire would thwart the long-term aim of regaining control over the household. However, this end is also thumotic in nature, as it concerns Odysseus' honor and reputation. Thus the *logistikon* actually prevents *thumos* from thwarting its own true ends. In the case of the person who refuses to drink, we can imagine any number of undesirable consequences that might follow from the *epithumotikon*’s rule of the soul. Sometimes the *epithumotikon* thwarts its own ends, as in the case where a person suffers a horrible allergic reaction from eating some food he craved, and cannot eat for days thereafter. Sometimes, however, the *epithumotikon* thwarts the ends of *thumos*, as when a guard drinks, falls asleep during his watch, and is later reprimanded for his failure. The *logistikon* stands in a position to rule the soul because it comprehends the separate functions of the *epithumotikon* and *thumos*, and can maintain a stable prioritization of their respective ends.

Having reviewed the arguments for tripartite psychology, we stand in a better position to understand the significance of Glaucon's acknowledgment that just actions preserve the health of the soul, regardless of the consequences of such actions for the agent who performs them. Socrates defines justice as the “the doing of its own” ([…] ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, 433b3-4) and “the thing which provided to all those [virtues] the power to come into being, and provides preservation to them when they have come into being, for as long as it is present.”

From our examination of the arguments for tripartite psychology we have already seen the effects of allowing either the *epithumotikon* or *thumos* to prioritize its own ends without the *logistikon*'s evaluation: either that part of the soul hinders the achievement of its own ends, or it produces some

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315 [...] ὁ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν, ὡστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχει ἐκσπερ ᾖν ἐνή (544b6-8).
effect that is detrimental to the whole person. By defining justice as each part's “doing its own,” Socrates is simply drawing our attention to the hierarchy of the parts that we already described as optimal for the good of the whole person.\textsuperscript{316} Justice is the epithumotikon's restriction of its activities to the communication of urges necessary for supplying material needs; thumos' restriction of its activities to the internalization of social norms and experience of emotions that reinforce social authority; and the logistikon's exercise of forethought and care over the whole soul by hypothesizing, evaluating, and prioritizing the competing ends of thumos and the epithumotikon. Justice is the health of the soul in the sense that the non-interference of these parts best promotes the project of integrating and harmonizing the competing interests of these parts.

Clarifying the difference between justice and sophrosunē offers another way to understand the description of justice as the power that allows the other virtues to come into being. Irwin tests the difference between these two virtues by considering the counterexample of the “continent” or “strong-willed” (ἐγκρατος) person from the Nicomachean Ethics.\textsuperscript{317} Although the strong-willed person succeeds in resisting his epithumotikon, he nonetheless experiences his appetites as recalcitrant; getting his appetites to heed reason is a struggle, even if he succeeds every time. This counterexample illuminates justice as a distinct virtue because it shows how justice can cause a person to act in a way that conforms to the virtue of sophrosunē without himself being sophron. The strong-willed person doesn't have the conviction that satisfying his

\textsuperscript{316} Aryeh Kosman puts this point well: it is just for the parts of the soul to perform the functions that they do because they perform their functions best. In this way justice in the soul preserves the intuition behind the “one man, one task” principle. See Aryeh Kosman, “Justice and Virtue: Inquiry into Proper Difference” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic, ed. G.R.F. Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 128.

\textsuperscript{317} EN, 1102b25-28.
appetites ought to be first in the prioritization of the ends of thumos and epithumotikon; in fact, he consciously rejects this arrangement. Therefore he is just in the psychic sense.

But when the logistikon indicates an aversion to the object of an appetite, this person experiences his epithumotikon as recalcitrant; that is, his epithumotikon does not want to perform the function of the logistikon, but in some sense it does not fully accept the rule of the logistikon. Expressed in political terms, this is the difference between reform and revolution. A reformer need not challenge a governor's rule; he might just want the governor to act differently, even though he accepts the governor as the ruler. In this case, the reformer is just, but not sophron. On the other hand, if the reformer wants to replace the governor altogether, then he becomes a revolutionary; he is neither just nor sophron.

Likewise in the case of the strong-willed person. If the strong-willed person lacked the conviction that the epithumotikon ought to accept the rule of the logistikon, then it wouldn't be possible for him to experience his epithumotikon as “recalcitrant” (indeed, he would no longer be “strong-willed”). Thus, without justice, there is no possibility of sophrosunē; but without sophrosunē, justice in the sense of “non-interference” is still possible. Justice therefore makes the project of psychic integration possible, but does

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318 I dispute the conclusions Irwin draws about the strong-willed man because he wrongly reverses the order of dependency between justice and sophrosunē. He argues that “this sort of conformity [e.g., of the strong-willed man with characteristically sophron behavior] cannot constitute psychic justice” (Plato's Ethics, 228); in other words, he attributes the recalcitrance of the epithumotikon to a kind of injustice. But without this basic conformity, there would be no room for the strong-willed person to develop the virtue of sophrosunē. One might wonder whether the compliance of appetites rules out the need for thumos altogether. I think not. Although it might be ideal if thumos did not have to spend so much effort enforcing reason's commands, thumos would still have the function of “preserving” the instructions of reason, something that the epithumotikon cannot do. My proposal also helps counter some of the excessively intellectualized accounts of sophrosunē. One worry is that the description of sophrosunē as an “agreement” among the parts of the soul attributes cognitive powers each part of the soul: see Irwin, Plato's Ethics, 218; Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast, 219-220. But sophrosunē need not refer to the agreement of beliefs; it might simply describe the way the epithumotikon obeys reason, as either compliant or non-compliant. Irwin shares my view in identifying the “reluctance” and “recalcitrance” of the epithumotikon as the proper test of sophrosunē (Plato's Ethics, 228). Santas also disputes the view that the agreement described by sophrosunē is cognitive, but he neglects the
not fully realize it. This notion of justice is analogous with a state of bodily health because bodily health also allows for the possibility of physical excellence, but does not guarantee it. For example, a person who wants to become a virtuoso dancer needs health to begin the exercises that will improve his dancing; but despite his health, he may still have to struggle to coordinate his movements in a way that would be considered graceful.

This conclusion does not alter the portrait of the *logistikon* as an algorithm or “mere executive” that determines how best to satisfy the demands of the *epithumotikon* and *thumos*. As we saw earlier, this portrait of the *logistikon* typically receives criticism for its lack of philosophical interest, and thus for its discontinuity with the portrait of the lover of wisdom in the central books of the *Republic*. I suggest that this criticism is misguided for two reasons. The first is that the *logistikon*’s power of hypothesis is in fact consistent with the hypothesizing that characterizes dialectical inquiry; the second is that the educational program of Books II-III and virtues of tripartite psychology make the project of psychic integration an imperative, and this imperative is crucial for the philosopher who begins exercising the power of hypothesis with respect to theoretical concerns. Although the hypothesizing of the *logistikon* in book IV differs from the philosopher's hypothesizing in Book VII, the difference concerns the content rather than the form of reasoning: practical rather than theoretical affairs are the primary concern of the *logistikon* in Book IV. Philosophers differ in hypothesizing about such topics as the good, the just, and the beautiful, asking what follows if these concepts are defined in such-and-such ways. But the form of reasoning is the same. Hypothesizing about Forms and hypothesizing about practical matters also differ in that the former have far greater implications for the conduct of one's life—a point that Socrates emphasizes when he connection with pleasure and pain (*Understanding Plato's Republic*, 93).
replies to Thrasymachus that he considers knowledge of justice “a thing worth more than much gold” (πράγμα πολλῶν χρυσών τιμιώτερον, 336e7).

When applied to properly philosophical topics, however, the power of hypothesis threatens the soul with another type of disintegration, one quite different from the conflict of interests that the soul met in thumos and the epithumotikon. We in fact observe this phenomenon in the Republic when Glaucon prefaces his revival of Thrasymachus' view with the disclaimer that he does not actually believe that injustice is more profitable than justice.319 The necessity of hypothesizing contradictory perspectives poses a threat to psychic integrity in the sense that it might be unclear which arguments should be taken seriously, and which entertained solely for the benefit of intellectual exercise. This feature of philosophy threatens psychic integrity by encouraging the view that one's intellectual life has no bearing on one's practical affairs. Worse, it invites the accusation that philosophers are dissemblers par excellence—an accusation that Thrasymachus casts in Book I when he complains of Socrates' irony and unwillingness to answer questions.320 Thrasymachus complains of the “irony of Socrates” when Socrates denies the request to say what he thinks justice is and to take the role as answerer rather than questioner.321 In effect, Thrasymachus' complaint is this: “You agree, Socrates, that this argument is just a game, but you feign seriousness so that you may better entertain yourself by poking holes in the serious arguments of others.”322

Psychic disintegration also threatens to affect thumos, since as a result of this

319 Rep., 358c5-6.
320 […] αὕτη 'κείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους (337a3).
321 Socrates says that he and Polemarchus “are not able” (οὐ δυνάμεθα, 336e10) to define justice.
322 Alcibiades also accuses Socrates of this insincerity in the Symposium when likens Socrates to a Silenus (216d7) and says that he “thinks us nothing, and conducts his whole life playing and being ironic towards other people” (ἡγεῖται δὲ πάντα τὰ κτήματα οὐδένος ἀξία καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι, εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ πάιζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, 216e3-6).
higher-order hypothesizing, in which ultimate questions may be left unanswered for some time, *thumos* is effectively left leaderless. As I suggested above, *thumos* is structured with the placeholder for an authority, which is typically filled by one's accountability to authoritative persons. From a philosophical perspective, however, only reason is truly authoritative, and so the exercise of hypothesis in philosophical topics leaves this placeholder absent. Despite these threats to the project of psychic integration, I argue that tripartite psychology offers crucial resources for counteracting the unique threat of psychic disintegration that philosophical inquiry poses. Two virtues in particular—courage and *sophrosunē*—encourage an interest in psychic integration that can support the soul when it faces the threat of psychic disintegration. The necessity of this interest, which tripartite psychology encourages, is ultimately what makes tripartite psychology continuous with the portrait of the philosopher in the central books.323

The courageous person's *thumos* “keeps intact the instructions given to it by reason about what is to be feared and what is not to be feared.”324 This definition of courage shows interest in psychic unity in the sense that courage is the maintenance of stable character amid a variety of appetitive drives and cravings. For a simple example, we may think of the guard who keeps his watch despite the cold (pain) and the welcome distraction of drinking (pleasure). In its philosophical form, however, courage seems to

323 Kamtekar holds a similar view of the purpose of tripartite psychology, i.e., that it performs the “practical and proterptic goal of representing the development of philosophic virtue to would-be philosophers” (“Speaking with the Same Voice as Reason,” 197). Annas wonders how Plato can claim that habituative education, which encourages “moral conformity” can develop into “intuitive honesty and rigor” (Introduction, 87). The answer I propose here may make the process less mysterious. Richard Patterson holds a view very close to my own. He argues that “factors internal to reason” may “lead reason astray” and, for this reason, reason needs virtues such as self-control and courage (“Plato on Philosophic Character,” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 25/3 [Jul 1, 1987]: 326). My proposal differs in that I do not identify desire, but rather the self-opposing power of hypothesis as the source of internal source of instability in the *logistikon*.

324 [...] ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασώζει διὰ τῷ λυπῶν καὶ ἠδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παραγεγελθὲν δεινὸν τε καὶ μή (442c1-3).
manifest as the willingness to risk answering questions of ultimate concern even when one might be wrong, and to see one's inquiry through to the end even when the competitor theories are numerous. These features of philosophical courage are apparent when Socrates discusses the “test of being,” saying that the philosopher must be willing to “fight his way through all attempts to disprove his theory in his eagerness to test it by the standard of being rather than the standard of opinion” (534c1-3, Griffith). Readiness to fight, a characteristic of the guardians in Books II-IV, manifests as willingness to compete with the many philosophical theories that one may encounter.

Sophrosunē, on the other hand, might assist the project of psychic integration in philosophical matters by encouraging the compliance of thumos. If we consider the difference between accountability to persons and accountability to reasons, we will see that thumos also shows its own recalcitrance. The thumotic perspective that has internalized culturally-sanctioned norms might be unable to admit of exceptions or contradictions to those norms, even when those exceptions are instances of virtuous action. Polemarchus provides a good example of this phenomenon. The internalization of the definition of justice that he learned from his father, Cephalus, represents a thumotic commitment that causes him conceptual difficulties when Socrates presents him with the example of a person who refuses to return the weapons of his mentally-deranged friend. Polemarchus has difficulty reconciling the virtue of the action with the principle—justice is giving everyone their due—that he has internalized. This phenomenon presents an opportunity for the exercise of sophrosunē in the search for wisdom in the following sense. Sophrosunē might manifest as tolerance for, rather than repression of, offensive

325 Cf. Patterson, “Plato on Philosophic Character,” 346-347. 326 See also Patterson, who rightly notes that excessive thumos is the cause of dialectic's dissolution into mere eristic (“Plato on Philosophic Character,” 339-340).
contradictions: the sophron person experiences his thumos as compliant rather than resistant when he encounters such a contradiction for the sake of theoretical inquiry. The over-zealous absolutism of a thumos that cannot tolerate an offensive contradiction thus risks unifying the soul in an artificially rigid way—and this rigidity is no healthier for the soul than it is health for a dancer to obsessively hold a pose for hours on end. In contrast, the unity of the soul which exercises sophrosunē in the face of contradiction better resembles the unity of a living organism—something that maintains its integrity in the midst of both internal and external dynamism.
Conclusion: The Preparatory Function of Psychic Integration for the Philosopher in Republic V-VII

In Republic V-VII, Socrates devotes a considerable effort to discussing arguments that he would use to persuade imagined opponents to accept his proposal that philosophers ought to rule the city. Glaucon imagines as the relevant opponent a crowd of people that would be ready to kill anyone who made such a proposal, and challenges Socrates to make a speech to pacify them (473e5-474a1). Socrates tries to persuade these opponents by way of the following claims. (1) There is a difference between “lovers of spectating” (φιλοθεάμονες, 475d1) and the “true” philosophers (τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, 475e3); (2) There is a distinction between “all the forms of things” (πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, 476a3) and the many participants in these forms; (3) “what altogether is” (τὸ παντελῶς ὄν, 477a2) is an object of knowledge, while the objects of opinion are “between what is not something and what purely and simply is something,” (4) Knowledge and opinion are capacities differentiated by these two types of objects (477a-479d); (5) The true philosophers are defined by their acceptance of this distinction.

327 Some scholars identify the lovers of spectating, (φιλοθεάμονες, 475d1) as the group that Socrates is trying to persuade of the value of the philosopher. See Gail Fine, “Knowledge and Belief in Republic V” in Plato I, Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. Gail Fine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 219; Reeve, Plato's Utopia Recast, 64. In doing so, however, they risk identifying the lovers of sights with the “πάνυ πολλούς” (473e5), the imagined crowd that is ready to kill Socrates. But it is not clear that these two groups are the same. When Socrates introduces the lover of sights, he does so in response to Glaucon's observation that certain people might fall in the group of “lovers of learning” (φιλομαθῆς, 475c2) whom we would not consider philosophers. Glaucon thus introduces the φιλοθεάμονες as a counterexample to Socrates' identification of the φιλομαθῆς with the philosopher. Simply put, there are people who enjoy going to the theater, but who would never go near a philosophical discussion (475d4). We might also think of people who enjoy learning about all kinds of technical skills, but who would never dream of studying philosophy. These people seem to be “lovers of learning,” but Glaucon says they would not consider them philosophers. A plausible resolution of the identities of these two parties seems to be this: the lovers of sights are placeholder for the sophists discussed in Book VI, while the mob represents the demos that needs to be persuaded that true philosophers are not the sophists they know as corrupters of the youth.

328 [...] μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τὸ τα μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς (479d3-4).
329 The phrase “what wholly is” is a cause considerable interpretive difficulties. It may refer to immutability; the non-identity of form with particular; or the simplicity of the form as a “one over many” condition of forms (See Santas, 126-37, 141). A second problem is the “two-worlds” thesis two
while the lovers of spectating are defined by their rejection of it (476c-d); (6)
philosophers love and seek an understanding of “the reality that wholly is,” (ἐκείνης τῆς
οὐσίας τὰς ἁμι oόσης 485b1-2) and precisely because of this love they can provide the
greatest benefit to the city (485b1; 497a1-2); (7) philosophers must undergo an education
in mathematics and dialectic in order to gain insight into the “Good itself” before they
can provide this benefit to the city (519d-e).

Although these arguments are a departure from the main argument and inquiry of
the Republic,330 they raise questions about the accuracy of the account of virtue that we
received in Books II-IV, and the ultimate protreptic effect of tripartite psychology. When
Socrates discusses the effect of mathematical-dialectical education on the soul, he
proposes that the right education will turn “the entire soul […] away from what is coming
to be, until it is able to bear the sight of what is, and in particular the brightest part of it”
(518c7-8, Griffith). Socrates and Glaucon then agree that “number and calculation”
(ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμόν, 522c5-6) form a subject of study that will “draw the soul away
from the world of becoming toward the world of what is” (521d1-2, Griffith), and

which this distinction seems to commit us. It becomes unclear how knowledge could be an
improvement on opinion, for instance, because the types of objects of these cognitive states are
radically distinct (See Annas, Introduction, 194; Irwin, Plato's Ethics, 267). For an argument against the
two-worlds theory, see Fine, “Knowledge and Belief in Republic V,” 216. A third problem is the
problem of the sense of εἶναι when we say something “wholly is.” Commentators have distinguished
between predicative, veridical, and existential senses (Annas, Introduction, 196; Vlastos, “A
Metaphysical Paradox,” 43-47; Kahn, “The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being,” in Essays on
Being [New York: Oxford University Press, 2009], 18). Annas opts for the predicative sense
(Introduction, 198); Irwin appears to prefer the veridical sense (Plato's Ethics, 268). Others dispute
these distinctions altogether. See Kahn, 19; Lesley Brown, “Being in the Sophist, A Syntactical
Inquiry,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4 (1986): 50. Some argue that the phrase might not
even single out forms at this stage in Socrates' argument, because doing so would be too controversial
for those whom he is trying to persuade, i.e., the lover of sights. Cf. Fine, 219; Reeve, who proposes
that “what is completely should be understood as 'what in no way resembles F' [italics mine].” He
alleges that this does not require a reference to forms because it only adds the “conditions under which a
particular property is the property F” (Philosopher-Kings, 65). My purpose in this conclusion is not to
answer these difficulties, but rather to show how an interest in this distinction necessarily arises from
the project of psychic integration.

330 Socrates indicates as much at 449b1.
proceed to describe the mathematical and dialectical education that the philosopher-guardians will receive. Prima facie, then, it would appear that the protreptic of the Republic is really directed at developing our enthusiasm for this form of education, since that education seems to effect the total reorientation of the soul. But the purpose of the second education that philosopher-guardians receive is not simply theoretical. Socrates differentiates between virtues of the soul and body on the one hand—which he says are “close” on account of their “being implanted by habits and training”\(^{331}\)—and virtues of phronēsis on the other hand (518d6-e2). He argues that the virtue of phronēsis differs from the virtues of body and soul because it:

\[\ldots\] becomes useful and beneficial, or useless and harmful, depending on which way it is facing. Think of those people who have the reputation of being evil but clever. Have you ever notice the beady little eyes their souls have, how sharp they are at picking out the things they are after? This suggests that their soul has nothing wrong with its eyesight, but that it is coerced into the service of evil. The more acute its vision is, therefore, the more evil it does. (519a1-5, Griffith).

Socrates' worry seems to be that phronēsis differs from body and soul in that its engagement in evil (κακία) is not a result of a failure to perform its proper function; rather phronēsis can engage in evil and still perform its function to a superlative degree. In this it differs from the virtues of thumos, epithumotikon, and logistikion, because, according to Socrates' argument in Book IV, these parts of the soul cause unjust actions

\[^{331}\] αἱ μὲν τοίνυν άλλαι ἄρεται καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγὺς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος· τῷ ὄντι γάρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι προτερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσειν (518d6-e1).
precisely when they fail to perform their proper function.332 Another worry about the power of *phronēsis* seems to be that it might recruit the virtues of body and soul into the service of some wicked project. This worry is not new to Book VII; in Books I and II, we saw that Thrasymachus and Glaucon considered the recognition of the greater profitability of injustice a mark of personal enlightenment, and counted courage and the ability to speak well as complimentary to the practice of injustice. Thus the Republic's interlocutors themselves provide the evidence that radical notions can reorient the virtues of body and soul toward wicked ends.333 These passages therefore force us to reconsider the accuracy of our account of the virtues of body and soul that we identified as necessary to the project of psychic integration.

In the next sentence, Socrates points out that a soul might be prevented from achieving the virtue of *phronēsis* because it lacks the virtues of body and soul. The “leaden weights of becoming,” he argues, cling to the soul “as a result of eating, gluttony, and pleasures of that sort, and direct the gaze of the soul downward” (519b1-3, Griffith). Since the regulation of these pleasures was associated with *sophrosunē*, it seems that at the very least, the virtues of body and soul serve as a necessary preliminary to the development of *phronēsis*, simply because without the virtues of the body, one could not have an interest in the kinds of activities and studies that *phronēsis* engages with, i.e., the “things above.” But the connection between these two types of virtues is complicated once more when Socrates says that the philosopher-guardians who have directed their

332 See especially 442e1-2. Socrates says that to confirm their account of justice they can turn to the “vulgar” (τὰ φορτικὰ, 443e1) to test their account of justice in the soul. Socrates argues that the person who is just in the psychic sense that he means will behave in ways commonly thought to be just. So, by contrast, a person who engages in actions thought to be characteristically unjust does so because in some way the parts of his soul are not performing their proper functions. This does not seem to be the case with *phronēsis*.

333 Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings*, 50, also advances this view.
phronēsis in the right way and have contemplated the forms will make the best governors of the city, because they “have other rewards and a way of life better than the political.” In other words, phronēsis also appears to have a “downward” effect on the habituated virtues; it allegedly protects the virtues of the body and soul from corruption because those who make the pursuit of wisdom their life-project will be least interested in the rewards of political life. Therefore, philosopher-guardians least of all will experience temptations to seek out political rewards in ways that might bring about the re-orientation of the virtues of body in soul toward a wicked end.

Even if we share Plato's worry about the corruptibility of the virtues of body and soul, the question still stands as to why specifically a mathematical-dialectical education will dispel this worry. This proposition concerning the need for mathematical-dialectical education therefore raises some difficulties. Most notably, becoming a knower of mathematics does not seem to require that one be courageous, keep one's promises, or stop oneself from gorging on food that is unhealthy. The virtues that Plato identifies as part of the project of psychic integration thus seem unnecessary for the study of mathematics and dialectics. The type of reasoning in which mathematicians engage seems to be totally unrelated to moral virtues; neither does it need these virtues as a prerequisite, nor does it influence them.

In Chapter One I argued that two basic interpretive approaches can be made to the Republic on the basis of the division between the inquiries that occupy the central books (V-VII) and the outer books (II-IV, VIII-IX). The common concern among these two interpretations is this question regarding the type of virtue that philosophical education

334 [...] ἔχουσι τε τιμὰς ἄλλας καὶ βιόν ἀμείνω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ (521b6-7).
335 See also Annas, Introduction, 194. Annas proposes the worry that the knowledge obtained from mathematical-dialectical education might be “irrelevant” to the practical problems of political life.
provides. On a methodological view, the general conception of philosophy into which the Republic initiates readers is a practice of dialogical, ethical, and epistemic virtues.336 Our task as philosophers is to continually re-examine our own assumptions, hold open the possibility that we are wrong, and encourage others to do the same. Caring for the soul requires testing our beliefs, maintaining openness to the revision of our beliefs, and pursuing the project of psychic integration by aligning our practical lives—in its epithumotic and thumotic aspects—with our best-tested philosophical convictions. Seeing as this description captures much of what Socrates does with interlocutors in the dialogues, it is unclear why Plato would demand more, *viz.*, that to *really* do philosophy, we must receive a mathematical-dialectical education.

A metaphysical conception of philosophy can answer this question by explaining the insecurity of the virtues of body and soul in terms of a failure to grasp the forms, e.g., of justice or the good. When Socrates draws the distinction between form and participant, he explains why people mistake the form itself as *many* by saying that:

> with regard to just and unjust and good and bad and all the forms […] each
> [form] is one, but through association with actions and bodies and with each other, each makes its appearance as many showing themselves everywhere.337

He later explains that things like actions and bodies disperse the “one” (ἐν) of each form into many because these things “will lay claim to both” of their opposites (ἐκαστὸν ἄμφοτέρων ἕξεται, 479b5). For example, stabbing a person with a spear might in one

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336 See Chapter 1, p.35. See McCoy, *Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists*, 134-137, who proposes that “love, more than knowledge, defines the soul of the philosopher in the Republic.” See also Gordon, *Turning Toward Philosophy*, 31; 39.

337 [...] Καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἐκαστὸν εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινονία πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκαστὸν (476a4-7).
context be just, but in another context be unjust; in extreme political circumstances, devising a plot to assassinate a political leader might be just, but manifestly unjust in other circumstances; \(^{338}\) joining the army to fight an enemy might in some circumstances be courageous, but other circumstances it might be truly courageous to refuse to fight. Finally, the association of the forms “with each other” suggests that actions might be courageous in some circumstances, but just in others. This claim about the nature of participants raises a problem concerning our reliable practice of the virtues of body and soul. Those virtues that we learn by habitually performing certain actions under certain circumstances only prepare us for the circumstances to which we are accustomed. These actions, in other words, do not unqualifiedly represent the virtues of which they are instances. \(^{339}\) Without knowledge of the *eidē* as they are in themselves, separated from the contexts and relations with which we are familiar, we risk committing vicious actions out of sheer ignorance of how the *eidē* of these virtues might appear in unfamiliar circumstances. \(^{340}\) Thus, the virtues without the metaphysical insight that Socrates mentions in Books VI and VII are in a certain sense spurious. \(^{341}\)

\(^{338}\) The German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, for example, participated in an attempt to assassinate Hitler in 1944.

\(^{339}\) A common way of describing the difference between the single “itself” of the form and the “many” participants in this section is to say that the many instances of the form, e.g., in “actions” and “bodies”, are not “unqualifiedly” instances of that form (Annas, *Introduction*, 207). See also Burnyeat, who argues that the purpose of mathematical studies is to learn how to think about “unqualified being” (“Plato on Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul,” 20). Reeve construes the inadequacy of the “many” as a problem of relative resemblance to the form. His terms differ but the proposal is much the same: the “in between” status of objects of opinion consists in their being “less than complete resemblers, no more F than not F” (Philosopher-Kings, 70). Irwin argues that the “many beautifuls” refer to the “many different properties that give equally good answers to the ‘What is it?’ question that Socrates typically asks when discussing virtue with an interlocutor (Plato’s Ethics).

\(^{340}\) Socrates describes the virtues variously as *eidē* and with the reflexive “itself” in the *Republic* and in other dialogues. These are common descriptions that Socrates reserves for forms. See *Phaedrus*, 247d7-8 (*αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην […] σοφροσύνην*); *Republic*, 445c4-5 (*ἐν μὲν εἶναι εἴδος τῆς ἀρετῆς*).

\(^{341}\) Bobonich, *Plato’s Utopia Recast*, 16. Cooper identifies the need for inquiry into the Good itself by pointing out that the *logistikon* must know what is good for the whole person for whom it calculates. Without this knowledge, it risks managing the interests of *thumos* and *epithumotikon* in the wrong way. See John Cooper, “The Psychology of Justice in Plato,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14, Vol.2
The positions of the methodological and metaphysical interpretations therefore leave us with two questions: (1) how can the virtues of “body and soul”—those that belong to the project of psychic integration—be necessary for engagement in mathematical-dialectical education, and (2) how can mathematical-dialectical education influence the virtues that belong to the project of psychic integration? To answer these questions I propose the following path of investigation. Regarding (1), if we show that the virtues of psychic integration are necessary for mathematical-dialectical inquiry, and can be described in the context of this inquiry using the same terms we used to describe them as in tripartite psychology, we will have shown that the virtues of psychic integration are not spurious; they are rather the same form applied to a less-familiar context. Regarding (2), if we show that from within the project of psychic integration a necessary interest in mathematical-dialectical education emerges, as a result of some inability to complete that project, we will have shown a way in which mathematical-dialectical education influences the virtues of psychic integration.342

§1. Response to (1): The Necessity of the Moral Virtues for Mathematical-Dialectical Inquiry

In the conclusion of the preceding chapter I described some ways in which courage and sophrosunē might support the project of psychic integration when the soul is

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342 Reeve argues that in the Republic Plato revised his theory about our acquaintance with the forms from the doctrine of recollection in the Meno. The crucial improvement in his view is that “forms are no longer objects of direct, non-theory-laden cognition” (Philosopher-Kings, 108-109). This revision, he suggests, is reflected in the allegory of the cave: each stage of the cave provides the means to the prisoners to surpass that same stage. If recollection were the model for knowledge of the form, then presumably it wouldn't make sense to describe the process of coming to know the forms as a staged ascent. Miller argues for the same thesis about the stages of education in an excellent analysis of the mathematical studies in Republic VII: each successive study reveals its implicitness in the preceding study. See Miller, “Beginning the 'Longer Way,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 320-323. In this section I argue that tripartite psychology does the same, by providing us with the tools to begin thinking about mathematics and dialectic.
left leaderless by a logistikón that has turned its power of hypothesizing to matters of philosophy. Courage performs three functions that are necessary for mathematical-dialectical education. First, it shows the willingness to put one's beliefs forward when there is a significant risk of seeing one's beliefs refuted. Whether this belief is an uncertain mathematical hypothesis, or a proposed definition of justice, the risk of refutation is the same. Second, courage manifests as perseverance in an inquiry even after one has been refuted. These two functions can be understood in terms of the same emotional stability that the guardians show in the midst of pain (from suffering actual refutation) and fear (of possibly being refuted). Finally, the role of thumos in tripartite psychology explains the effectiveness of Socrates' provocative-aporetic means of persuasion, and shows how the use of these means encourages the virtuous development of thumos. Typically, anger is a response to the perception of some moral wrong, but in the experience of aporia, the interlocutor can find no such perception. If we look carefully, however, we will notice that this experience of an ill-suited target for one's anger is the same experience as is described in the Leontius' case. Leontius would perhaps like to be angry at the dead bodies, but in themselves they cannot provoke moral indignation at one's desire to look at them. Thus the proper target for his anger is himself. In like manner, when experiencing aporia on might like to be angry at one's questioner, but the questioner is not the proper target; the proper target oneself. Thus, the thumos of an interlocutor who becomes angry with Socrates after experiencing aporia is not performing its function in the soul correctly.343

In the preceding section I also suggested that sophrosunē might manifest as

343 Readers may recall the distinction I drew in Chapter 1, p.16, between thumotic anger and aporetic anger. It should be apparent now that tripartite psychology provides useful tools for understanding how aporetic anger results from the improper functioning of thumos.
tolerance of contradictions that appear offensive to *thumos* for the sake of inquiry. We should recall that *thumos* internalizes and enforces cultural norms by means of conditioned aesthetic responses—such as disgust—to perceived violations of those norms. This power of *thumos* also comes with a risk, however: it might perceive any questioning of these norms as an attempt to undermine them. An interlocutor who experiences the intolerance of *thumos* for a hypothesis that he considers offensive resembles Odysseus in the example Socrates used to differentiate *thumos* from the *logistikon*. In this case, the interlocutor might wish to silence the examiner, but lacks the foresight to see that the examiner might benefit him by actually *strengthening* his conviction in the moral proposition or principle that was questioned. This presents an opportunity for the *logistikon* to restrain *thumos*, and thereby satisfy *thumos*’ own interest in maintaining the internalized cultural norm. If *thumos* were allowed to silence the examiner, *thumos* would effectively be disagreeing with the rule of the *logistikon* in this particular instance, but not attempting to perform the *logistikon*’s function. Here the interest of *thumos* is still to perform its function—to preserve a conviction it has received—albeit over-zealously. Therefore, *sophrosunē* is the relevant virtue here: a particular harmony between *thumos* and the *logistikon* is essential to philosophical inquiry.344

Finally, there is a sense in which justice, too, is necessary for mathematical-dialectical inquiry. In other dialogues, Socrates uses legal terms to characterize the relations of interlocutors to each other and of the audience to the interlocutors.345 For

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344 See also Patterson, 333.
345 See *Protagoras*, 337e5-7. When the conversation between Protagoras and Socrates breaks down, Hippias entreats them to consider them all “arbiters” who are trying to “reconcile” them (δισεόρο ὑπὸ διαφθόν ήμῶν συμβαζόντων, 337e6-7).
example, the relation of interlocutors may be likened to that between *rhetors* in court, while the audience might be likened to a jury. In Books I and II of the *Republic* Socrates uses these terms to structure the inquiry into justice. Before Socrates begins his third *elenchos* in Book I, he asks Glaucon whether he agrees or disagrees with Thrasymachus about the profitability of the unjust life (348a5). Socrates then asks if he would like to “persuade [Thrasymachus], if we are able to find a way, that he does not speak the truth?” Glaucon agrees, and Socrates proposes that they set their respective speeches side by side (λόγον παρὰ λόγον, 348a5), and choose jurors to make a judgment. This procedure suggests a division of labor, and hence a requirement that each “do his own;” it also suggests boundaries that people performing these different roles might overstep. But immediately following this suggestion, Socrates violates the logic of this metaphor: he and Glaucon, he says, will be “at the same time both jurors and advocates” (ἅμα αὐτοί τε δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα, 348b1-2). Their playing both “juror and advocate” would seem to be unjust, because now one person seems to be taking on two distinct tasks. I suggest that this moment offers a glimpse into the necessity of the virtue of justice for mathematical-dialectical education. If we assign the tasks of *rhetor* and juror to parts of the soul, the two parts that seem best suited to these functions are *thumos* and the *logistikon*. As we saw in the case of courage, the task of *thumos* is to persevere in an inquiry; it is interested in victory, and shouldn't give up easily. Moreover, in performing just this function, *thumos* provides a valuable service to the inquiry: it presents a hypothesis in its strongest form. But not all hypotheses will withstand the test of examination. Thus, if *thumos* pursues its advocacy after a hypothesis has been refuted, it

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346 Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἂν δυνάμεθα πὴ ἐξευρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἄληθῆ λέγει (348a2-3); 347 [...] καὶ ἧδη δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν διακρινοῦντων δεησόμεθα (348b1-2).
effectively tries to perform the function of the *logistikon*, because it tries to promote its own interest in victory as the good of the whole soul. Therefore justice is the relevant virtue in this instance.

§*Response to (2): The Influence of Mathematical-Dialectical Inquiry on the Virtues of Psychic Integration*

The question remains as to how mathematical-dialectical inquiry can influence the virtues of the project of psychic integration in such a way that they will not be recruited into the service of a project that appears good, but is actually wicked. I should state here that in answering this question, I will not offer any proposals about how to understand the forms, or the form of the Good; rather, I shall try to explain how a mathematical-dialectical education influence the virtues I described as the virtues of psychic integration. To begin answering this question, it will help to identify the recipient of tripartite psychology, the person who is tasked with the project of psychic integration. We might identify this recipient by deciding whether it is necessary for a person to possess the account of tripartite psychology in order to be just in the same way tripartite psychology defines justice. I suggest that it is possible to imagine a person who is just—whose *thumos*, *epithumotikon*, and *logistikon* all perform their proper functions—but who lacks acquaintance with a theory of tripartite psychology. Such a person might rely on terms such as *thumos* in a folk-psychological sense, but reliance on these terms would not imply acquaintance with the theoretical trappings of tripartite psychology, such as the PNO and the specific functions that belong to each part of the soul.

Socrates offers tripartite psychology and the accompanying project of psychic
integration to a rather different person, namely, to a person such as Glaucon, whose *thumos* has internalized the norms conventionally associated with justice, but whose psychic integration is incomplete as a result of encountering the problem of moral skepticism. In the preceding section I also argued that the power of hypothesis and self-opposition in the *logistikòn* renders the success of the project of psychic integration uncertain. When we consider the recipient of tripartite psychology, the reason for the uncertainty of successful psychic integration becomes clear: the recipient's *logistikòn* has already considered hypotheses that are opposed to the norms *thumos* has internalized. Glaucon and Adeimantus have *already* considered how conclusions such as “the unjust man has more in every way than the just man” follow from the premises of the *Technē* Model of justice, i.e., that *pleonexia* is psychologically basic, reason is instrumental to desire, and *nomoi* do not deserve respect because they are human artifacts. Thus, the recipient of tripartite psychology is someone whose *logistikòn* has already begun to hypothesize about matters beyond the scope of immediate practical concerns, such as how best to fulfill a request for a shipment of arms.

Socrates tasks Glaucon and Adeimantus with the project of psychic integration in part because they already sense they are divided within themselves, and he assuages their worries about moral skepticism by persuading them that justice is necessary to achieve psychic integration. But here I suggest that the brothers still sense a threat to psychic integration from the *logistikòn*. Rather than threatening psychic integration with a specific hypothesis that contradicts a present conviction, the *logistikòn* opens up the possibility that hypothesizing might be nothing more than an endless exchanging of appearances. This possibility is represented in the sophists in Book VI (49a6-497a1),
particularly in their description they receive as both shapers and students of public opinion. On the one hand, the sophists exploit the setting of “some common assembly of a mass of people with a lot of noise”\textsuperscript{348} to force individuals who might resist their proposals to “call the same things with them [the sophists] beautiful and ugly.”\textsuperscript{349} If anyone resists, the sophists will use “compulsion” (ἀνάγκη, 492d1) in the form of fines and death-threats (καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις, 492d6). In this sense they create the appearance of a consensus of public opinion by coercing those who disagree to agree. On the other hand, however, Socrates says that the Sophists teach as wisdom “the same opinions of the many, which they [the many] hold whenever they are gathered together.”\textsuperscript{350} They study these opinions as if they were studying the habits of a “creature” (θρέμματος, 493a7); as the creature responds to different circumstances they call “good” anything that causes the creature pleasure, and “bad” anything that causes the creature pain (493a7-c7).

Socrates' purpose in using this analogy is to show that the sophists rely on an unsteady criterion for “good” and “bad,” since public opinion can swiftly change.\textsuperscript{351} But the sophists’ reliance on a dubious epistemic criterion is not the only reason to doubt their claims to wisdom; their role as both producers and students of these opinions suggest a quite different reason for doubting their wisdom. As producers of public opinion, the sophists demonstrate the truth in their reputation for making the weaker argument the stronger. In doing this they argue for whatever position suits their interests at that moment: today it might be that Alcibiades is the traitor who destroyed Athens; tomorrow

\textsuperscript{348} [...] τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλωσιν ξύν πολλῷ θορύβῳ (492b6).
\textsuperscript{349} [...] καὶ φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι (492c6-d1).
\textsuperscript{350} [...] παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ὃ δεξάμενοι ἢ δαναία ἢ χαρακτῆσαν (493a5-6).
\textsuperscript{351} Socrates also proposes that his analogy shows that the sophists mistake the “necessary” for the “good” (493c4). The truth of this claim is more difficult to see.
it might be that Alcibiades is the savior of Athens' democracy. This approach to argument relies on their ability to take a position as simply given—as a sort of hypothesis—and to say whatever is necessary to make this position true. In this sense, the sophists are hypothesizing when they manufacture public opinion: they ask themselves “if X is true, what must be true and what must be false to maintain the truth of X?” But when they study public opinion, they are really studying the opinions that they have produced! Their wisdom thus amounts to a kind of echo-chamber in which they hear the same opinion they manufactured repeated back to them, but mistake “the many” as the origin of this opinion. It is thus reassuring that Socrates describes the sophist as someone who denies the distinction between “something itself” (αὐτὸ τι ἕκαστον, 493e2) and “the many examples of it” (tà πολλὰ ἕκαστα, 493e3, Griffith). In denying this, the sophist inhabits the same dream-like state as the lover of sights (476c).

The sophists therefore represent the threat of a logistikón that continually exchanges its commitments to the truth of various hypotheses. A logistikón that does this negates the possibility of psychic integration, because contradictory pronouncements about a just course of action, for example, leave thumos uncertain about how to enforce the judgments of the logistikón. For example, a Sophist might argue at one time that the Boeotians are enemies of the Athenians, but at another time that they are friends. How is the sophist's own thumos to respond to these contradictory pronouncements, which may require thumos to enforce contradictory restraints on the epithumotikon (e.g., giving

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352 Commenting on the Phaedo, Irwin provides an observation about hypothesizing that helps illuminate the backwardness of the sophist's hypothesizing: “(1) We defend a hypothesis against one sort of objection by showing that its consequences are acceptable in the light of our other beliefs. (2) We defend it by appealing to a higher hypothesis until we 'come to something adequate' [Phd.101d5-el]” See Plato's Ethics, 274. Sophists do not really reason about the “consequences” of a hypothesis; rather, they identify the other beliefs that must be true if their hypothesis is to remain true, and devote themselves to defending those beliefs.
military assistance to the Boeotians versus fighting them)? Most likely the sophist is indifferent to the question of the alignment of his *thumos*, and precisely this indifference is the indication of his failure to achieve psychic integration.

In light of the unique threat that the *logistikon* poses to the success of psychic integration, it makes sense that a person devoted to such a project would want answers about how to keep the *logistikon's* hypothesizing in contact with reality. This conclusion suggests that mathematical-dialectical education can *influence* the virtues of tripartite psychology because we have shown that the project of psychic integration necessarily requires, as a condition for its success, a commitment to the distinction Socrates draws between knowledge and opinion. If tripartite psychology offers the tools for setting out on the path toward mathematical-dialectical education, then we will have more compelling evidence of a point of contact between these two types of education.

I suggest two ways in which the arguments for tripartite psychology resemble mathematical-dialectical education, and thereby provide the tools for the initiatory steps into that education. The first is in Socrates' use of the PNO. When Socrates turns to an investigation of the soul, a crucial aspect of the city-soul analogy comes into play, in that the soul contains the small “letters” of justice that we cannot easily see.353 Thus, the partitioning of the soul requires that we, like the person who Socrates says will be most qualified for dialectic, “give up” our eyesight (537d). Although Socrates justifies his introduction of the PNO by appealing to three-dimensional objects, such as the spinning top, the soul differs in its invisibility; thus in a sense we grasp the different parts “by thought alone” rather than by pointing to an image or diagram.

The second is found in the way arguments for the specific divisions of the soul

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353 368d; for the grammatical analogy, see Chapter 3, p.14.
mimic the progression from the sun-analogy for the Good (507c-509b) to the divided line (509d-511e). One striking feature of this progression is the gradual reduction of complexity between two images—sun and line—in order to reveal pure ratio, which does not depend on any particular image. Socrates introduces the image of the sun as an analogy for conceptualizing the Good as the "cause of knowledge and truth" (αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὐσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, 508e3). The Sun causes sight both by making the objects of sight visible and providing the element through which the visible can become seen. For without the light of the sun we cannot see, even if the organs that make us capable of sight are in perfect condition. Socrates then proposes that we extract this same relation between the Sun and sight and apply it to the Good and the soul's capacity for knowledge. The mention of the capacity for knowledge should remind us of the distinction between the capacities for knowledge and opinion in Book V—a distinction Socrates used to differentiate the lover of wisdom from the lover of spectating. There these capacities were differentiated by their objects: "that which wholly is wholly knowable" (τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν, 477a2), and that which both is and is not, because it can always "lay claim to both" of its opposites (ἐκαστὸν ἁμφοτέρων ἐξέται, 479b5), is an object of opinion. The sun-analogy asks us to think of the Good as playing the same causal role in relation to the capacity for knowledge as the sun does in relation to the capacity for sight: the Good activates the soul's capacity for knowledge by making the

354 Miller argues that the revealing of pure ratio is the function of the study of harmonics at the end of the Guardians' mathematical education ("Beginning the 'Longer Way," 319-20).
355 Cushman suggests that Plato is relying on his own contemporary physiology of sight, according to which "vision occurs when the fire in the organ of sight coalesces with light from the outside organ" (Therapeia, 147). It is not clear what this proposal adds to the interpretation of the sun analogy, however.
356 The description of objects of opinion as "in between" being and non-being also presents difficulties. Annas interprets the εἶναι in the predicative sense and suggests that objects of opinion are "what is F and also not F" (Introduction, 201).
things that “wholly are” *knowable* and by providing the common element through which the *knowable* can become *known*.

When introducing the divided line, Socrates asks Glaucon and Adeimantus to isolate a relation and reproduce this relation in another setting. But Socrates' use of the *line* is striking because it shows a deliberate reduction of the image of the sun to the simplest form of *any* image whatsoever: the line is an image that cannot be any further reduced without *ceasing to be* an image. The division of the line itself is simple. Socrates asks the brothers to imagine dividing a line into unequal parts, and then dividing *those* parts in the same proportion as the whole line was divided in the first division (509d). In asking them to carry out this task, Socrates is directing their attention from the use of analogy in complex images to the building of ratios in the simplest image possible. I suggest that, in like manner, the arguments for the specific divisions of the soul begin by presenting us with a complex image, ask us to isolate the essential relations in this image, and transfer those relations to the non-visible parts of the soul. For example, Socrates uses the example of a person who is thirsty but refuses to drink to divide *epithumotikon* from *logistikon*. By thinking about this image, we had to infer certain things about what

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357 These passages pose significant interpretive difficulties. My only interest here lies in the role that images play in moving the interlocutor from analogy in a complex image to pure ratio in a simple image. One interpretation is that the objects that the Good makes knowable are other forms, and in turn makes possible our knowledge of *any* particular good (Santas, 142; 144). Annas disputes the view that the arguments in Book V show that forms alone are objects of knowledge. She disputes this view on the grounds that Plato has not excluded the possibility that there might be other examples of “what is” than forms (*Introduction*, 210). Reeve also disputes the claim that the forms are the exclusive knowledge of objects on the grounds that dialectician investigates “all things” (παντά, 533b3); he suggests instead that the dialectician seeks a “unified theory of everything” (*Philosopher-Kings*, 92).

358 Nicholas Denyer shares this view with me. He points out that it is possible to construct the line such that the sections representing knowledge is larger than that representing opinion, or that the section representing opinion is larger than that representing knowledge. He argues that the arbitrariness of deciding how to construct the line is inconsequential; what matters is that “we are getting some practice in the kind of strenuously abstract thought that is needed to take us from the visible to the intelligible realm” (“Sun and Line: The Role of the Good,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 294).
the functions and relations of the *logistikon* and *epithumotikon* must be if we are to adequately explain the character of psychic conflict in this example. Likewise with the examples of Leontius and Odysseus, which Socrates used to divide *thumos* from the *epithumotikon*, and *logistikon* from *thumos*. To adequately capture the character of psychic conflict in those instances, we had to isolate the functions of *thumos* in relation to both *epithumotikon* and *logistikon*, i.e., the ability to produce second-order desires, and the ability to internalize cultural norms by creating aesthetic responses to perceived moral wrongs. And just now, when we turned to the question of the preparatory nature of the virtues of body and soul, we isolated the essential relations between the parts of the soul and tried to reproduce them in another context, i.e., the context of intellectual inquiry.
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