2017

Ethnic Xenophobia as Symbolic Politics: A Cross-National Study of Anti-Migrant Activism from Brussels to Beirut

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Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/ETD.2017.079

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ETHNIC XENOPHOBIA AS SYMBOLIC POLITICS: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF ANTI-MIGRANT ACTIVISM FROM BRUSSELS TO BEIRUT

Dissertation

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By

Annamarie Manley Rannou

Lexington, Kentucky

Co-Directors: Dr. Horace A. Bartilow, Professor of Political Science and Dr. Emily A. Beaulieu, Professor of Political Science

Lexington, Kentucky

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Xenophobia is examined almost exclusively as a prejudice of advanced western nations. I argue that the field of study of xenophobia must be re-conceptualized in order for comparative, cross-regional inquiry to take place. With a new concept of *ethnic xenophobia*, this dissertation examines the determinants and causal mechanisms of ethnic xenophobic activity across developed and developing countries. I integrate studies of xenophobia and theories of ethnic threat to explain that political elites rely on structural dimensions of threat to convert native anxieties into ethnic xenophobia through the use of anti-migrant myths and symbols. I extend Stuart Kaufman's theory of symbolic politics to further explain how elites mobilize ethnic xenophobic activity in order to gain or maintain political advantage among the native selectorate in their respective competitions for power.

I use a Heckman Selection Model and a Structural Equation Model to test this theory across 14,000 cases of ethnic xenophobic activity targeting refugees for seventy-two developed and developing countries from 1990 to 2014. The results suggest that elites- across both developed and developing countries- do indeed exploit native anxieties in the aftermath of structural crises and events to provoke and mobilize hostilities toward migrants. A most-different systems design is also used to illustrate the causal mechanisms of the argument across two pairs of cases, including Kenya and the Netherlands and Lebanon and the United States. These cases provide additional support to the cross-regional explanation of ethnic xenophobic activity.

This research opens the door to further exploration of similarities in the patterns and trends of ethnic xenophobia and anti-migrant intolerance across different country contexts. The results suggest that efforts for the protection of migrants against such expressions of prejudice require improvement; and that relationships between native and migrant populations matter a great deal for the exploitation of fears and anxieties by political elites especially in and around elections.

**KEYWORDS:** Xenophobia, Migration/Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, Elites, Refugees, Symbolic Politics

Annamarie Manley Rannou

April 17, 2017
ETHNIC XENOPHOBIA AS SYMBOLIC POLITICS: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF ANTI-MIGRANT ACTIVISM FROM BRUSSELS TO BEIRUT

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Director of Graduate Studies

April 17, 2017
Acknowledgements

This project is a culmination of nearly a decade’s worth of field experience in the sphere of refugee protection and advocacy. I began this journey in 2006 as an entry-level reception officer with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kathmandu, working with Tibetan refugees who had been detained by the Nepalese Department of Immigration. It was the first time I had ever considered that the politics of displacement could interfere so directly in protection efforts for people who clearly exceeded the 1951 standard. Within a year, I was reassigned as an Assistant Refugee Status Determination (RSD) Officer (junior: P1) to the sprawling Dadaab camps in the county of Garissa near Kenya’s northeastern border with Somalia. The year I started RSD work in Dadaab was a record-breaking year for drought and violence in both Ethiopia and Somalia. It was also the year of the torrential El Nino rains which struck Dadaab especially hard. The task of resettling nearly 1,000 arrivals a day in the flooded camps fell largely to the local UNHCR field staff. This was when I met 44-year-old Dulane and his family who were members of the Marehan, an ethnic Somali clan. After his in-take interview, he told me that he never expected to leave his home; but when his last camels died from the drought he knew he could no longer afford the ‘protection tax’ to keep he and his family safe. This was the first time I considered the complexities of displacement and the multiple, often interacting, forces that compel a person to leave everything behind. It was not only a matter of conflict or climate or livelihoods—it was a matter of survival. Once my contract in Dadaab ended I left to work with a non-profit resettlement organization among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The authority of the Lebanese state in the camps was striking from the first moments I entered the compound. Palestinian residents could not legally leave the heavily guarded zones of the camp, or own property, or pursue employment. In an NGO cluster meeting with one of the managing authorities of the camp, he said clearly that the Palestinian refugees had to be contained in order to keep the people of Lebanon safe and prosperous. It was the first time I considered that ‘durable solutions’ were not just for refugees, but for their hosts as well. This is the backdrop from which I proceed.

I am, forever, indebted to those who have been willing to share their stories, their wisdom, and their courage with me, both in the field and in this research. I extend endless thanks to my friends and colleagues: Agnes Igoye, Helen Mckreath, Divya Kosla, Myo Ghettalae, Oscar White, Moses Mabobo, and those who must remain unnamed. I would also like to thank the Refugee Studies Center at Oxford University for stewarding an especially pivotal piece of this project over the summer of 2011.

There are several others without whom this project would not be possible, including the faculty of the Department of Political Science at University of Kentcuky and, in particular, the members of my Advisory Committee. To the chair of my committee, Dr. Horace Bartilow: you have inspired me to grow and learn and stay committed to this work, which is the most precious gift.

I cannot, however, bestow enough gratitude to the members of my family- especially my husband, Matt, my daughter, Florence, and my dear parents- who have granted me love beyond measure in every endeavor.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Alien Registration Certification (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>Community Based Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Central Agency for Reception of Asylum Seekers (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRA</td>
<td>Department of Refugee Affairs (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPM</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement (Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDGS</td>
<td>General Director of General Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIP</td>
<td>Human Innovation Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFE</td>
<td>Lebanon Institute for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>Minorities at Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORR</td>
<td>Organization of Refugee Resettlement (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEGIA</td>
<td>Germany Patriotic Europe Against the Islamization of the Occident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Party for Freedom (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELA</td>
<td>Ikatan Relawan Rakyat (People’s Volunteer Corp, Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSCA</td>
<td>Rotational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP</td>
<td>Radical Right Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM</td>
<td>Structural Equation Modeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIOE</td>
<td>Stop Islamization of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLC</td>
<td>Southern Poverty Law Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Swiss Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>Tanzania One Theatre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USRAP</td>
<td>United States Refugee Admissions Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOLAG</td>
<td>Volunteer Agency (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Conceptual Nature of the Problem: The Ideological Bias in the Conceptual Construction of Xenophobic and Ethnic Conflict

The harms, however, of xenophobia can be identified, contextually understood, and condemned, and highlighting them is what is needed to keep these harms from being swallowed up by nationalist narratives... -- David Haekwon Kim, 2014

1.1 One Man’s Xenophobia is Another Man’s Ethnic Conflict

In October 2015 *The Atlantic* published an article titled, “Is Eastern Europe Any More Xenophobic than Western Europe?” in an attempt to illustrate the tit-for-tat accusations of xenophobia made by various heads of state against one another across the region (Horn 2015). It all began with Chancellor Angela Merkel criticizing Eastern European governments for their isolationist response to the region’s refugee crisis in late 2015; from there, a firestorm of comments was exchanged between the Austrian Chancellor, the former U.S. Ambassador to Hungary and the Romanian President each accusing one of being more ‘xenophobic’ than the other. Xenophobia is a term that has become increasingly mainstream in the context of European politics, especially as the rise of anti-immigrant populism collides with an unprecedented influx of asylum seekers from Syria and beyond. There are, however, large discrepancies over its meaning and manifestations, especially in the cross-regional context. The truth is, very little is known about expressions of xenophobia across the European continent, or elsewhere for that matter. The majority of scholarship relies upon regional survey data to measure attitudes toward migration in a select group of countries in Western Europe and the United States. Research on xenophobia outside of the Western European and American contexts is in its infancy, with a small selection of single-shot case studies or intra-regional examinations in Japan and South Africa. There has, to date, been no systematic attempt at cross-regional research in the developing world, and no inklings of inquiry for comparative scholarship relating to xenophobia between developed and developing regions.

The lack of systematic, comparative research on xenophobia is puzzling, especially given the breadth of recent cross-regional scholarship relating to other ‘discourses of exclusion’, such as racism and nationalism. It is more puzzling still, as one considers the rising *global* trend of
xenophobic intolerance and the striking similarities of related activisms across developed and developing regions. So, why does xenophobia appear to be a focal point of scholarship in the west to the exclusion of research elsewhere?

The answer lies in the epistemic structure of mainstream social science research, in particular its perceptions of migration and the western nation state. Constructivist scholars advise that we take a ‘second order’ perspective in scrutinizing what professional academics observe and do not observe in their respective fields of inquiry (Luhmann 1993). Throughout the development of this project, including the documentation of tens-of-thousands of cases of xenophobic intolerance toward refugees in countries worldwide, it has become increasingly apparent that scholars have failed to observe a crude bias of their own design. Namely, that the conceptual framework of xenophobia is constructed on a foundation of modernization ideology with the post-war phenomenological timber of migration in the west. In other words, anti-migrant intolerance is portrayed as a pathology of modernity—a pointedly civic ostracism whose exclusions rest on the presence of robust institutional frameworks and nationalized attachments to the collective imagery of the hierarchical western state. This ideological overture has driven a conceptual wedge between perceptions of xenophobia in the west and the aggregation of ethnic intolerance elsewhere, to the detriment of cross-regional exploration and inquiry everywhere.

In the eyes of Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Parsons, the growing differentiation, rationalization and modernization of society gradually reduced the importance of ethnic and national sentiments. These markers of modernity were theorized to drive a more civic conceptualization of peoplehood reflecting the institutionalization and polity structure of the modern nation state. Contemporary scholars of xenophobia cast western society as unique in the approximation of this modernist ideal—portraying anti-migrant intolerance as a decidedly civic prejudice that revolves around advanced institutional and ethical features of life in the western polity.
Civic life in advanced nations of the west is presumed to be highly evolved (Silvermann 1991, Kohn 1994, Gellner 1995, Kim and Sundstrom 2014). Individual identities are meaningfully attached to the institutions and governmental ethos of the state, including the functions they serve and the imagery they project. Who they are and how they go about leading their daily lives corresponds directly to the security of their ontological presence in the nation-state. Loyalties of ethnicity and kinship are not seen as complimentary to this civic ideal; instead, they contradict the most fundamental elements of western statecraft and design—the centrality of territorial boundaries, the authorities of law and order institutions, the sturdiness of majoritarian solidarity and the securities of citizenship in a sovereign nation (Ignatieff 1993, Stroup 2015). The personhood of others, or foreigners in this instance, is thought to be judged symmetrically—in apportionment with their ethical relation to the state, its institutions and its imagery. The extent of foreign exclusion is fundamentally drawn from the specific historical and contextual orientations of migration in the west, and the corresponding salience of civic attachments and nationalized identities among native members of society. The postwar experiences of western nations, including intense industrialization, colonization, and consolidation of national identities, are treated as essential to understandings of modern xenophobic expression; particularly as these processes relate to the large-scale arrival of migrants from former colonies, the pursuance of nation building programs, and the development of robust immigration control regimes. For example, in a 1991 op-ed in the French magazine Le Monde, psychoanalyst and feminist writer Julia Kristeva said that, “[T]here is a French national idea which could constitute the optimal version of the nation in the contemporary world” (Le Monde, 29 March 1991). This ‘optimal version’ of French national identity, specifically the secularization of the state and its institutions, is popularly characterized as antithetical to that of non-European (especially North Africa) migrants and the countries from which they arrive (Silvermann 1991, Taguieff 2001). According to western scholars, the exclusion of migrants from the contemporary world-view of mainstream French identity is mediated by the state’s attempts to recreate the social and civic boundaries that collapsed with decolonization.
through the assimilationist models of citizenship developed in the postwar period (Balibar 1988, Silvermann 1991, Rose 1994). These processes are believed to legitimize the forcible ostracism and widespread criminalization of migrants within the state and civil society; and rationalize the pervasive fears and suspicions of native nationals against the *étranger* or *immigré*.

The portrayals of western exceptionalism and the processes of civicization that are thought to have contributed so greatly to its unique brand of foreign intolerance remain virtually unchallenged in the existing scholarship. Instead, these conceptualizations of xenophobia are reinforced in a growing number of studies that widen the existing analytical gulf between developed and developing states. The framework is discriminatory in the sense that it assumes vast conceptual and operational incongruities in the nature of xenophobic expression across regions. Developing states are seen as incapable of experiencing xenophobia in the same ways as western nations; mainly because they lack the civic and experiential necessitates that are associated with foreign salience in modern societies. But also because they are painted with the same ‘ethnic’ brush as the foreign migrants arriving on western shores (see Table 1.1). The insinuations throughout the literature are numerous, for example: traditions of pan-Africanism reflect territorially unbounded societies that prioritize kinship and tribal relations over national or Westphalian affiliations (Bach and Gazibo 2014; Sohjell 2013; Bratton 1994); the ‘artificial’ or ‘forcible’ carving-up of tribal areas into states in the paternalistic image of external actors and colonizers left institutions shallowly planted with patrimonial authorities in de facto positions of power (Alesina 2006; Green 2010); patterns of migration from developing states are directed primarily toward the west, and movement of people across borders within the region is largely inconsequential for receiving societies (Mantu 2016; Landau 2007). These myths- whether explicit or implicit- diminish the xenophobic reality that millions of foreigners face throughout states in the developing world. They also distort the fact that the number of migrants, in particular refugees, is significantly higher within developing regions, and the expressions of xenophobia are nearly identical to those in the west without the
same level of recognition or specialized academic consideration. In fact, the entire categorical scheme of xenophobic incidents in developing regions is biased toward a whole-sale aggregation of anti-migrant events into accounts of ‘ethnic conflict’, further illustrating the conceptual disparities and ideological undercurrents in the field (see Table 1.1 below).

Table 1.1
This table illustrates the differential categorization of similar incidents of xenophobia across developed and developing regions, in order to show side-by-side comparisons of the bias that characterizes understandings of ‘xenophobia’ in the west and ‘ethnic conflict’ elsewhere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Xenophobia in Developed Regions</th>
<th>“Ethnic Conflict” in Developing Regions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the run-up to the 2016 Austrian Presidential elections a group of twenty Freedom Party nationalists surrounded and violently attacked three Syrian refugee men with knives and police-style batons in the streets of Vienna. The attack took place mid-day in a popular, commercial area of the city with several witnesses including two police officers. The President of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim, quickly spoke-out against these ‘blatant acts of xenophobic hatred’ and warned against the escalation of such xenophobic activity throughout the region (NPR 2016; AP 2016).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The fire-bombing of refugee registration centers throughout Germany in late 2015 was quickly addressed as a ‘horrific xenophobic event’ in a string of incidents that targeted the growing number of Syrian refugees in the country (UNHCR 2015; Connelly 2015). Many experts pointed toward the mainstreaming of the radical right along with the growth in native fear and uncertainty as explanations for the uptick in hostilities (Betts 2015; PRI 2015). Others suggested that the fire-bombs were intended as retaliation for preceding events in Paris or as a deterrent for other prospective terrorists in the region (Guardian 2015; Herbert 2015; Times 2015).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar arsonist attacks against Syrian refugee communities in Lebanon a few months prior, in 2014, received little attention from the international community and were not directly referenced as xenophobic in nature. After the burnings in Lebanon, Nadim Houry - Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) - stated, “Even prior to the large number of arrivals in Lebanon, we have definitely seen an increase in hostilities toward refugees— with arsons, police violence, and local opposition. There is plenty of fear-spreading and blaming, especially in Beirut, but not a lot of attention or concern about the consequences (HRW 2015; Houry 2015).”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 white supremacist and anti-immigrant groups staged protests in major cities throughout the United States calling for the immediate detention and- in some cases- corporal punishment of resident refugees, especially those from the Middle East. They also demanded an end to the US resettlement program. Groups of vandals in Minneapolis and St. Paul Minnesota busted windows and tagged local refugee shops for nearly two weeks before being apprehended by the police. The President of the neighboring University of Minnesota spoke-out against the vandalisms as ‘disheartening xenophobic retaliations’ to the Trade Center attacks three weeks prior (U. Minnesota 2001).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali refugees in Kenya were targeted by government crackdowns in 2001, which included several violent episodes of mass arrest in and around Nairobi. Refugees throughout the country reported violent and non-violent incidents including kidnappings, intimidation, robbery, vandalism of property and sexual assault from locals and security forces. An Amnesty International report documented many of the cases, referencing the activity as mostly ‘ethnic and tribal conflict’ (AI 2001; Al Jazeera 2001).</td>
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</table>
On February 23, 1995 a seventeen year old refugee male from the Congo was shot and killed by a group of three men posting election posters for the rightist leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in the port city of Marseille. The Le Pen supporters called it a 'justified killing' of an illegal stranger threatening the safety of their city. French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, stated publicly that 'such xenophobic outrages would not be tolerated' (Reuters 1995).

In late 1995, local Ivorians worked in coordination with para-military forces to attack a Liberian refugee community near the capital. Nearly two-hundred refugees were killed and over five-hundred were wounded. Attackers stated that the shelling was in retaliation for cross-border violence from Liberian rebels three months prior. The Liberian refugee community was relocated by the UNHCR in fear of further violence. The New York Times labeled the event as a 'mass-casualty ethnic clash' (NYTimes 1995).

In February of 1994, six firebomb attacks across Holland, Sweden and Norway killed ten refugees and injured four others. In a separate incident, a proposed asylum center at Limburgian Meerssen in Holland was firebombed twice in one month. In Denmark, an asylum center was burned down days before seventy six refugees were due to move in. And in Belgium a factory being converted into a refugee center was destroyed by protesters. Journalists blamed the rise in 'xenophobic tensions' on tough new regional asylum laws, including the Labour party's Government Asylum Bill in the UK (Goodchild 1994; The Independent 1999).

Refugees in the northern camps of Uganda went on hunger strike in June 1993 after a series of threats from locals and police harassment. The regional UNHCR representative stated that 'native and ethnic frustrations' had reached a breaking point and camp authorities feared for the safety of the refugees, especially those self-settled on the periphery of the camps without protection (Stackhouse 1993; The Globe 1993).

A Sri Lankan refugee man died in an Italian hospital corridor for lack of treatment of a broken leg he received from a xenophobic attack in the streets of Rome. Two weeks later a wave of gun attacks against refugees in Stockholm killed two men from Zaire and injured twelve. Members of a neo-Nazi organization known as White Aryan Resistance were prime suspects. A spokesperson from a local immigrant advocacy organization called for a 24-hour general strike to protest the 'xenophobic outrage' (The Ottawa Citizen 1992).

In 1991, the Malawian government spoke out against Mozambican refugees as unduly burdening the country during the worst drought on record. Days after, Mozambican refugees were rounded-up and relocated to the Lisungwe Camp. The camp was targeted by angry local gangs who set fire to garbage piles and relief rations on site leaving resident refugees without adequate food supplies. The local area camp commissioner suggested that security presence around the camp be increased to avoid future 'hostile ethnic encounters'. Local residents condemned the camp and the continuation of assistance to refugees as unjust during a period of such national struggle and uncertainty (French 1991; Guardian 1991).

Twenty-first century scholars of nationalism have ventured down this misleading path of civic exceptionalism before, developing distinct methodological and theoretical agendas along the ethnic/post-ethnic binary (Ignatieff 1993, Kohn 1994, Hjerm 1998). Their efforts are being undone, however, by scholars who persistently chip away at the myths of this dichotomization with the pluralities of the nation-state reality. The notion that societies of nations, and their interactions with one another, are distinguishable along civic and ethnic lines is misguided, at best. It also runs the risk of unwittingly reinforcing the presumptions of nationalistic prejudice it looks to avoid (Wimmer 2002, Act" 2006, Stroup 2015). The same can be said of xenophobia. As much as Nigerians used the apparatus of the state and its influence over civil society to systematically expel hundreds of thousands of resident Ghanaian migrants from the country throughout the 1980s; the
The United States used its powers of exclusion for a massive deportation and internment campaign, involving nearly two hundred thousand Japanese Americans in incarceration camps throughout World War II. For scholars of xenophobia, the similarities across regions and contexts are eclipsed by the differences to a point that has paralyzed the field of inquiry, personifying Gidden’s ‘container model of society’ (Giddens 1992). It is verging on unthinkable that xenophobic intolerance could be, and likely is, similarly spawned from Brussels to Beirut, or that ethnic dimensions of foreign hatred could reside alongside modern civic exclusions. The ideological barriers of modernism and civic difference in the ‘contemporary nation-state’ do not have to trap the conceptualization of xenophobia in a cage of western regionalism.

This project argues that xenophobic intolerance is neither post-ethnic nor contextual. It denies that xenophobia is a bump on the linear pathway of advanced nations to the ‘ideal humaine’, or that it is a specific experiential manifestation of western state-craft and historical exclusion. It refutes that xenophobia is a pure prejudice, in the sense that it is formed by a singular thread of civic or racial or nationalistic intolerance. And it absolutely rejects that the societies of developing nations are so ethnically oriented that nationalized perceptions of foreignness are insignificant or under-formed. Instead, it develops an integrated theory of xenophobic activity and draws attention to the similarities of xenophobic expression across developed and developing regions through the systematic examination of over fourteen thousand cases of xenophobia across a varietal mixture of seventy-two countries from 1990 to 2014.

1.2 The re-Ethnicization of Xenophobia

In order to address the conceptual pitfalls of xenophobia in the present literature, this project identifies xenophobia as both a form and function of ethnic conflict. I reassert xenophobia’s conceptual location along the spectrum of theories of ethnic conflict and present systematic case evidence to underscore the fallacy of previous western designations. Throughout this study, it is made evident that western countries are not exceptional in the ways they experience xenophobic
intolerance, nor are the causal mechanisms distinct from those in developing regions. As discussed in detail above, the conceptual field of xenophobia is dislocated from the broader, related enterprise of ethnic conflict scholarship to the detriment of cross-regional examination. The first step in remedying the deficiencies of the existing field is to construct an unbiased concept of xenophobia that can become part of an integrated theoretical framework.

Following Max Weber (1985:237), ethnicity is understood as a subjectively felt belonging to a group that is distinguished by a shared culture and by a common ancestry. This belief in shared culture and ancestry rests on cultural practices perceived as “typical” for the community, or on myths of a common historical origin, or on phenotypical similarities indicating common descent (Weber 1978:385-298; Schermerhorn 1970; Erikson 1993; Jenkins 1997; Cornel and Hartman 1998). In this broad understanding of ethnicity, “race” is treated as a subtype of ethnicity, as is nationhood. Xenophobia may occur simultaneously with other prejudices in this framework of ethnicity, or be ensconced within them (which is often the case with nationalized narratives of racism, for example). But it remains conceptually distinct from racism, nationalism, or nativism.¹

It is useful to reframe this conceptualization into a more pluralist understanding of what will be called *ethnic xenophobia*. Ethnic xenophobia may be directed toward any migrant, including immigrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers or those individuals and people-groups perceived as such. It may manifest along a variety of different planes of fear and hatreds toward foreigners, including cultural practices, phenotypical traits, linguistic traditions, political histories, or various combinations and degrees of these singularities. It is not a ‘natural’ response by native populations to the presence of foreigners. Like racism and nationalism, it is a social and political phenomenon that contributes to the marginalization and/or exclusion of migrant groups in social and national settings.

¹ For more on the existing controversies of categorization relating to various discourses of exclusion, specifically involving the anti-racist approach in the United States see Wimmer (2014).
Ethnic xenophobia occurs amid ordinary exclusions, hierarchies and indignities based upon ascriptions of a subject not properly belonging to the civic community or society. This may take the form of thinking that some person or group cannot be authentic participants in a nation’s cultural, linguistic, or religious traditions, and even that they cannot be associated with the soil of the land or the blood of its people (Kim and Sundstrom 2014). In the latter, the institution has a collective intention or neglectful orientation that ostracizes or excludes a group from the mainstream. In the spirit of Arenditian statelessness, ethnic xenophobia may be institutionalized within the policies of a state or in the practices of its civic actors (including the police and military forces) taking the form of nativism once it reaches the point of systematized preference for nationals or indigenousness. In its observed form of activism, it may be agentive, or individualized, with atomistic expressions of xenophobia occurring at the interpersonal level without the direct, incidental involvement of broad structural exclusions or discriminations among other societal or institutional entities.

Conceptual proximities include those of racism, nativism, nationalism, and ethnocentrism. Ethnic xenophobia, like these other subordinations, is not one thing. The ideas of any of these intolerances are highly interactive across societies and throughout histories, especially with respect to the nationalization of various prejudices to a point where they endure unseen. In the United States, especially, there is such a historical overlap between racist ideas and events and nativist and xenophobic ones that these ideas are codependent and at times blend into each other. Nevertheless, there are important differences between types of prejudice and structural exclusion that need to be addressed for equally important historical, socio-scientific, and practical reasons. For example, in contemporary philosophical debates about racism, with its three models of racism—behavioral, doxastic, and affective—the focus is on the behavior, beliefs and attitudes that highlight on perceived racial difference rather than foreignness (Garcia 1996). While the perception of racial difference is often indistinguishable from perceived foreignness, the two are not necessarily related. In short,
migrant outsiders are not necessarily racial outsiders. We can imagine someone who qualifies as a racist because they have malevolent feelings about a group, but nevertheless may accept them as citizens (though not equal citizens).

Nativism, likewise, merges with ethnic xenophobia throughout history to influence various manifestations of ostracisms relating to perceived foreignness. But the particular pursuits of chauvinistic ethics and racial group-interests based on claims of indigenousness are wholly nativistic. “Nativism is a useful concept and marks the point in which ethnic xenophobia is elevated to a national political project that is committed to the exclusion of groups perceived as foreign, and perhaps even to the egoistic promotion of the perceived interests of a purified nation (Higham 2002).” Ethnocentrism is similarly distinguished from ethnic xenophobia in the sense that its conceptual and operational center is ethnic or cultural superiority, not necessarily fear or suspicion of foreigners. Psychologists suggest that the in-group favoritism associated with ethnocentrism is not a necessary concomitant for out-group hostility (Struch and Schwartz 1989, Hammond and Axelrod 2006, Oğretir and Ozcelik 2010). Ethnic xenophobia is, instead, a priori characterized by a fervent focus of hostilities toward outsiders, which does not necessarily reflect in-group favoritism.

The conceptual relationship between ethnic xenophobia and nationalism is considerably more complex, since nationalism often envelopes ethnic xenophobia in nearly inextricable ways, particularly in its twentieth century manifestations. It also contains doctrines that legitimize ethnic xenophobia as part of the nationalistic narrative. For example, the organization, Stop Islamization of Europe (SIOE) displayed the following phrase on its website in 2007, “…racism is the lowest form of human stupidity, but Islamophobia is the height of common sense.” Nationalism is commonly defined as an extreme form of patriotic feeling, principles or efforts, especially marked by a feeling of superiority over other countries. But the primary scholarly definition comes from Ernest Gellner, who conceptualizes nationalism as, “The doctrine that the political unit (the state)
and the cultural unit (the nation) should be congruent” (Gellner 1995, Snyder 2000). As prior discussion has shown, the geo-spatial boundaries of nationalism are confined to physical areas in ways that ethnic xenophobia is not. Ideas of a foreignness that inspire ethnic xenophobia may or may not be attached to territorial boundaries or understandings of statehood. Considerations of sovereignty and symbolic ideological or national-historical integrity are also constituent dimensions of nationalism in ways that are unnecessary for ethnic xenophobia. Ethnic xenophobia is far more likely to be contextualized alongside or within nationalism when national persons perceive foreign threats or inundations. It can also be spurred on in the context of nationalist aspirations as was the case in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union as establishments over territorially sovereign nation states sharpened perceptions of foreignness between the peoples of would-be nations.

Situating these prejudices alongside one another on the common spectrum of ethnic conflict provides more collective utility, and plurality, to the conceptualization of ethnic xenophobia and the ways it is likely to relate to and interact with other intolerances. It also allows one to appreciate all of the ways in which ethnic xenophobia may be expressed, in observable forms of activism across context. Unlike racism, studies of xenophobia have tended to emphasize its affective dimension with survey research projects that gauge attitudes and ideas relating to foreigners among native respondents. This project, instead, emphasizes the behavioral aspects of ethnic xenophobia, specifically those that manifest into observable displays of activism against foreigners. These forms of *ethnic xenophobic activism* include violent and non-violent action taken by native or perceived non-immigrant groups toward foreigners and perceived foreigners. The activist may be an individual or a group, a representative of the state or a member of civil society, an entity of the military or state police force, or a private citizen. Ethnic xenophobic activism may include (from non-violent to violent): taunting and gesturing, broadcasting and canvassing, imagery and graffiti, stalking and harassment, verbal and physical threats, protests and riots, intimidation,
vandalism and robbery, arsons and destruction of property, kidnapping, brutalization, physical and sexual assault, weaponized assault and armed battery, and individual and mass killings.

1.3 The Road Map of the Manuscript

Ethnic xenophobic activity is the phenomenon of interest examined throughout the course of this study, starting with a comprehensive review of the literature relating to ethnic conflict and xenophobia in Chapter 2 and leading into an integrated theoretical framework in Chapter 3. The project focuses primarily on ethnic xenophobic activity as it pertains to refugee populations in countries throughout the developed and developing world. The corresponding theory of ethnic xenophobic activity explains that the meaning of structural dimensions of threat are mediated by the anti-migrant rhetoric of elites to mobilize ethnic xenophobic activity for political gain. I draw on the work of Stuart J. Kaufman to argue that elites use the symbolic politics of migration to convert structural uncertainties into existential threats which, in turn, inspires extreme anti-migrant activity, including violence. Chapter 4 includes the operationalization of the primary variables as well as a detailed description of an original dataset, including event count data of incidents of ethnic xenophobic activity from seventy-two countries across developed and developing regions from 1990 to 2014. Chapter 5 details the econometric methods and estimators used to examine the causal determinants and structures of ethnic xenophobic activity. These econometric estimators include the Heckman Selection Model and Structural Equation Modeling. It also provides theoretically-based justifications for the use of both econometric models in the context of presenting the results. Chapter 6 offers two pairs of most-different case studies: Kenya and the Netherlands and Lebanon and the United States in order to more fully illustrate the causal mechanisms that lead to ethnic xenophobic activity and their cross-national similarities. Chapter 7 includes the conclusion of the study with a discussion of its implications that relate to the relationships between migrants and their

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2 The term refugee as it is used here corresponds to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and those persons determined to be refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in accordance with its member states.
hosts from the various perspectives of practitioners who work in the field of refugee protection and advocacy.
Chapter 2: Bridging the Conceptual Divide between Theories of Ethnic Conflict and Studies of Xenophobia

2.1 Introduction to the Theoretical Integration

In order to more fully establish a conceptual framework of ethnic xenophobic activity as it has been presented in Chapter 1, it is necessary to review two, seemingly disparate, fields of literature. But more than a review of these literatures, it is important to bridge them together to further show how xenophobia (as it has traditionally been conceptualized) is part-and-parcel of ethnic conflict. The two primary literatures of interest are (1) studies of xenophobia and (2) ethnic conflict scholarship.

This chapter asks how a comprehensive theory of ethnic xenophobic activity may best be developed in conjunction with this existing scholarship. The conceptual endeavor that follows presents a fresh look at existing studies of xenophobia and ethnic conflict in an integrated framework in order to reveal that xenophobia is not, in fact, excludable from the discourse of ethnic conflict. And that theories of ethnic conflict can accommodate existing explanations of xenophobia, regardless of their geographic specification.

The first portion of this chapter uses theories of ethnic threat and competition to bridge explanations of ethnic conflict and xenophobia together. It also shows that these theories identify the many structural and discursive dimensions of threat that become central to the mobilization of fear and violence toward migrants and ethnic others. The second section of the chapter begins the disaggregation of these threat dimensions within the literature. It specifically discusses the economic threat hypothesis—emphasizing the role of perceived competition with migrants and ethnic minorities among certain sectors of the native labor force. The third section focuses on explanations of cultural, social and political threat. It explains how ethnic minorities and migrants become targets of majority hostilities through perceived power-threats and incompatibilities. The fourth section, underscores the importance of ethnic identity formation and the role of elites in
actuating ethnic, or migrant, threats to native security or survival. I draw on the works of Olzak (1992), Kaufman (2001), and Brass (1997) to illustrate how ethnic boundaries become salient and available for exploitation by political elites. In conclusion, I connect these studies to those of xenophobia, focusing squarely on research that explains the rise of the Radical Right in Europe. Fifth, and finally, the chapter offers thoughts on how to expand on the integration of these literatures in order to develop a cross-national theory of ethnic xenophobic activity, which will be the main objective of Chapter 3.

2.2 The Key to Integrating Seemingly Unrelated Literatures: Theories of Ethnic Threat and Competition

Theories of ethnic threat and competition are central to both literatures on xenophobia and ethnic conflict. The baseline presumption is that particularly large and concentrated waves of newcomers, who are perceived as ethnically or racially distinct, are especially likely to receive a hostile response from native populations. Furthermore, as migration and immigration of distinct ethnic and racial populations surge, the potential for protest and violence directed against ethnically distinct newcomers becomes more likely (Koopman and Olzak 2004). Those perceived as ethnic others by native groups are commonly labeled as ‘trespassers’ who compete directly with locals for access to scarce resources or public goods and services (Hannan 1979). They may also present clear confrontations to the majority culture or belief system, including national historical narratives of righteousness or frameworks of patriotic identities. In addition, suspicions can arise in relation to the intention of arriving foreigners, especially if native groups have experienced past episodes of domination or attacks from similarly perceived ‘outside forces’. Distinguishing the social, political and economic features of ethnic threat and competition is analytically useful, and will be done in the following sections of this chapter, but it is important to note that in practice these elements often occur simultaneously and are mutually reinforcing. Taken together, this body of
literature on the so-called ‘ethnic threat’ forms the basis upon which xenophobia may be integrated into the paradigm of ethnic conflict scholarship.

Ethnic conflict scholars have, predominately, viewed ethnic threat as a mechanism by which groups spiral into a reciprocal exchange of hostilities and attacks, inspiring what is often referred to as a ‘security dilemma’ between groups; meaning that each group defines itself in relation to the other as existentially incompatible. The only certain end to such dilemmas is engaging in conflict to dissolve (or render into submission) the opposing group. For studies of xenophobia, ethnic threat is more asymmetrically defined. The activation of threat hostilities among native groups is aimed in a single direction (without effective reciprocation) toward ethnic outsiders, in this case migrants. Although migrant groups may share in the affective fears or suspicions of natives, which may prevent them from pursuing meaningful integration into local society, the reciprocation of hatreds is in reaction to (or retaliation against) xenophobic intolerance within the native community.

*Theories of Economic Threat*

Following an economic logic, the first – and most elemental version of ethnic threat theory- posits that as ethnically distinct groups, such as migrants, enter a population, competition for limited resources ought to increase (all else being equal). Economic contraction further intensifies competition over increasingly scarce resources, raising the potential that dominant groups will restrain or exclude less powerful competitors (Olzak 1992). This argument also implies that marketplace competition will raise perceptions that unfair competition is occurring, increasing the likelihood that tensions will lead to activism and violence (Bobo and Hutchings 1996).

The types of economic competition that spark ethnic conflict and xenophobic activity, depends largely on the distribution of members of different ethnic (or migrant) groups into productive niches (Hannan 1979). Economic competition is believed to rise to the extent that *niche overlap* occurs (Olzak 2013). This happens when new groups invade another’s niche, which can
be fueled by in-migration, economic contraction, or upward mobility of a disadvantaged group. Conflict arises when members resist the entry of members of an ethnically distinct group into their niche.

One of the most consistent findings throughout existing studies of xenophobia reflects the niche overlap hypothesis, particularly in low-income earning, or industrial, sectors of the native economy. In their study of ethnocentric attitudes in the Netherlands, Eisinga and Scheepers (1989), explain that a large low-skilled workforce- combined with low levels of education- increases the level of threat perceptions toward migrants among majority Dutch communities. In a similar study of anti-migrant attitudes in Croatia, Kunovich and Deitelbaum (2004) advance this idea, suggesting that new generations of migrant arrivals compete directly with low-skilled native workers for minimum wage earning positions (or below) which drive perceptions of unfair job loss or reductions in native earning-potential. Coenders (2001) adds further that this competition is especially problematic when native workers perceive wage rate reductions as a result of a growing presence of migrants in the local workforce (Coenders 2001, Scheepers, Gijsberts et al. 2002). “It is a matter of status frustration among the native workforce who grow dissatisfied with precarious livelihood circumstances. This frustration is accelerated by fears of further deterioration as a consequence of immigration, leading individuals to develop hostilities toward those they perceive as a threat to their position (Felling and Peters 1991, Feldman and Stenner 1997), (Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim 2004, Tolsma, Lubbers et al. 2008).”

Theories of Cultural, Political and Social Threat

Other sorts of status fears and frustrations- including those qualified as cultural or political- may invoke similar native motivations toward ethnic hostility and action. In the political field, ethnic conflict scholars emphasize that mobilization arises when newcomers, or ethnic minorities, pose threats to the power balance and political control of dominant groups. In this view, powerful ethnic groups mobilize collective action in response to a potential loss in political control (Olzak
1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995). Such power-threats may be instigated by a recent arrival of a racially or ethnically distinct population (to a city, state or country) that threatens the political balance, or by a sudden shift in political opportunities afforded by new or expanded voting rights. Consequently, politically threatened groups will mobilize to restore the status quo.

Prospect theorists, in particular, focus their explanatory energies on how the threat of a loss is especially motivating, even more so than the possibility of a gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), (Midlarsky 2011). Using this perspective, lynching and ethnic violence, anti-migrant protest, disenfranchisement, racial gaps in arrests and incarceration can all be understood as a response to real or perceived threats activated by a minority population’s increased political leverage (seemingly at the expense of the majority-favored balance of power).

In a similar cultural-nationalist vein, Max Weber and Michele Lamont emphasize the notion of ‘group honor’. They elaborate that group honor is, “The feeling of dignity that comes from seeing oneself at the apex of the moral history of mankind rather than in one of its shadowy valleys and the personal security and psychological stability granted by a sense of belonging to a community whose support one can rely and where one feels culturally ‘at home’ (Wimmer 2013).” They further explain that group honor, moral dignity, and personal identity combine with more mundane preoccupations, such as access to pastures, professions, public goods, or political power.

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to inform the struggle over who legitimately should occupy which seat in the arena of society.\(^4\) In this instance, it is the preservation (or restoration) of group honor- and its constituent parts- that invokes an atmosphere of competition between natives and ethnic others (or migrants). For example, a report by Lord Ashcroft on the attitudes of the United Kingdom’s Independence Party (UKIP) shows that while immigration is the top concern among party supporters, they ‘are driven towards UKIP by a deeper unease simply with the way life has changed in modern Britain’:

…schools, they say, can’t hold nativity plays or harvest festivals anymore; you can’t fly the flag of St George anymore; you can’t call Christmas Christmas anymore; you won’t be promoted in the police force unless you’re from a minority; you can’t wear an England shirt on the bus; you won’t get social housing unless you’re an immigrant… (Skey 2014).

The sentiments of the UKIP appeal to broader factors of globalization and change, specifically the uneven exposure to the outcomes of globalization (such as increase trade flows and foreign direct investment) which increases perceived competition among ethnic groups and exaggerates the salience of ethnic boundaries. But, even the small, localized changes at the neighborhood level have substantial impacts on perceptions of ethnic threat. This is especially evident in residential and settlement patterns of ethnic minorities and migrants in historically majority-dominant communities.

Ethnic residential segregation has long been viewed by social scientists as a major aspect of urban inequality and as a structural mechanism through which ethnic and racial minorities are excluded from opportunities, rewards, and amenities of the state and civil society (Massey and Denton 1988, Farley and Frey 1994, Clark 2002, Charles 2003)\(^5\). For studies of xenophobia, it is also increasingly seen as a mediator of short-term inter-ethnic contact and isolation, thereby, holding implications for prejudice duration and the prevalence of xenophobic expression

\(^4\) This is not dissimilar to Anthony Giddens’ writings on ‘ontological security’ which refers to, “the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action” (In The Consequences of Modernity, Giddens, A. (1992). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, Stanford University Press.).

\(^5\) For further discussion on the reasons for ethnic residential segregation and whether it is self-selected or forced through discriminatory structural and societal patterns of discrimination see: Dill, V., U. Jirjahn and G. Tsertsvedze (2015). "Residential Segregation and Immigrants' Satisfaction with the Neighborhood in Germany." Social Science Quarterly 96(2): 15.
throughout native society. Legge (2003) study of Germany, for example, concludes that the marked variations in contact with foreigners between the eastern and western parts of the country contributed to the uneven growth of xenophobia. Residents of former West Germany, who were three times more likely to come into contact with migrants at work or in their neighborhood, displayed significantly more favorable attitudes (nearly 10 percentage points higher) toward migrants than their formerly-East German counterparts.

The growing body of research on patterns of residential segregation and xenophobia also demonstrates that spatial segregation is associated with socio-economic status of the residents. That is, racial and ethnic minorities tend to reside in the poorer neighborhoods of the inner city while members of the majority population tend to live in affluent and prestigious neighborhoods (Semyonov, Gilkman et al. 2007). Since individuals possess a ‘cognitive map’ of communities and neighborhoods and since individuals organize city-neighborhoods on hierarchical scale of desirability according to their social status and ethnic composition, ethnic or migrant neighborhoods have become less desirable, if not an undesirable, place of residence or entry. These desirability structures of segregation are thought to influence inter-ethnic relations and perceptions as well—becoming a cause of prejudicial views against ethnic minorities and the communities in which they live.

Conversely, the rapid desegregation of historically homogenous communities with ethnic newcomers is shown, also, to be characterized by social exclusion and intolerance, including acts of personal violence—such as forcible expulsion—against newly settled individuals and groups. In their study of school desegregation in the United States, for example, Olzak, Shanahan and West (1994), find that more accelerated school desegregation significantly raised rates of protests against the busing of children from predominately African American communities. Similarly, McLaren (2003) uses Eurobarometer data to show that negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities and
migrants increased significantly during the implementation-period of an accelerated residential-integration program in Brussels in late 2001.

Theories of Security or Existential Threat

There is a vast body of ethnic conflict scholarship that explains how threats of inter-ethnic insecurity mobilize violence. In particular, rationalist and constructivist scholars explain that individuals work through a framework of social processes to strategically construct their ethnic identities; the outcome of these identity choices may produce more or less peaceful relations between groups. But third parties often interfere in these processes in order to influence identity choices in ways that provide maximum benefit to their position in the state and society. The dominant narrative throughout these works is that large-scale ethnic violence and conflict is provoked by such third-party elites who seek to gain, maintain, or increase their hold on political power. The inter-ethnic provocations of elites are intended to spur perceptions of insecurity and incidents of actual violence so that group identities are constructed in more antagonistic and rigid ways. Paul Brass (1997), for example, argues that Indian elites engaged in contests for power sometimes find it in their interest to publicly frame violent incidents as “communal”- whether they are or not- an interpretation that is then accepted by publics favoring more violence. Brass explains, “When political elites interpret local disputes in an ethnic frame, they are merely giving people the license to pursue their own agendas under the banner of “communal conflict” (Brass 1997: 32; Fearon and Laitin 2000).”

The same could be said of elites and their use of anti-migrant rhetoric. Studies of xenophobia likewise designate the primary task of actuating security threats in the minds of native

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6 The social processes of ethnic identity construction presented here are meant to theoretically dispute the premises of primordialism which claims that ethnic identities are ‘hard wired’, natural, or inevitable.
7 Arguments of this sort have been around in political science and sociology for a long time, though without the constructivist language. See: Simmel 1955; Cosner 1956. See also diversionary war theory, for example, Levy (1989).
populations to political elites. Increasingly, theories of Radical Right populism-for example- focus on the performance quality and personalities of anti-migrant leaders (the so-called charismatic leader thesis); of particular importance for these explanations is the elite’s ability to incite and coordinate the fears and grievances of native voters. For most theorists, the shaping of anti-migrant hostilities among native voters, in particular, is pursued by right-wing elites through established party structures and systems which provide the resources (including the people, the stage and the material resources) to launch seemingly legitimate campaigns within a framework of fair and equal competition. This again, like Brass mentions, grants supporters a license to pursue their own (including escalatory) agendas under the banner of “anti-migrant resistance”.

In his book on the Lega Nord and the third-wave of right-wing populism, Andrej Zaslove (2011), explains how Umberto Bossi was able to capitalize upon the growing economic power of the Third Italy and the decline of the Christian Democratic hegemony to construct a formal alliance of several political ‘leagues’. Bossi used these leagues to broadcast his populist accusations of corruption and incompetence within the central government—identifying migration as a central source of danger and threat (of all varieties) to Italian citizens. In a 1991 press conference, Bossi said, “Immigration is out of control. It is the responsibility of the central government to make sure we are not overrun by outsiders. I will protect Italy and our way of life (Zaslove 2011: 14).” The leagues became mobilized around a heavily anti-migrant platform that featured emotional appeals to the existence, security and prosperity of native Italians. League members were accused of inciting violence against migrants in their rallies and protests across the country, culminating in several widespread xenophobic events. To use the language of Brass once-again, Bossi developed an “institutionalized system” of xenophobic activity, converting native anxieties into anti-migrant hostilities and tending the flames so that the Lega Nord might enter the mainstage of Italian politics.

The case of Bossi and the Lega Nord is a good place to transition into the development of a more comprehensive theory of ethnic xenophobic activity, since it highlights the potential for
synchronizing the dimensional threat variants of the ethnic conflict scholarship together into a more complete causal sequence. Chapter 3 will take on the task of expanding on the integration of the literature presented here, and draw, still further, theoretical conclusions to form a complete theory and a series of testable hypotheses.
Chapter 3: An Integrated Explanation of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

3.1 Introduction to an Integrative Theory of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

Taken together, the existing literature on xenophobia and ethnic conflict provides important insights into how a fuller conceptualization of ethnic xenophobic activity may begin to take shape. Perhaps unwittingly, however, the existing scholarship reflects a broader framework of competing theories that can be used to develop an explanation of ethnic xenophobic activity. Two competing categories of explanations appear throughout the literature as the most important potential cross-national determinants of ethnic xenophobic activity: (1) constructivist explanations that draw on discursive, or symbolic, politics and the rhetoric of elites and (2) structuralist explanations which emphasize the actual social, economic, spatial or political conditions of the nation (or community). Both would claim to have important implications for acts of intolerance, such as ethnic xenophobic activity. For constructivists, ‘elite entrepreneurs’ are able to interfere in the social processes of native identity formation in ways that cast foreigners as threats or villains and mobilize acts of intolerance against migrants. For structuralist scholars, ethnic xenophobic activity is most likely a function of structural dimensions of threat at the national level, including economic loss or political crisis. Factors such as rapid urbanization, poor economic performance (especially in the employment sector), demographic changes, or transitions of government (during elections), sharpen the perceived negative images of migration among local host state populations in ways that increase the likelihood of ethnic xenophobic activity.

I propose that both constructivist and structuralist explanations identify key factors that determine the incidents and the intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity. The discussion of these theories generates a set of testable hypotheses regarding the determinants of ethnic xenophobic activity across developed and developing countries.
I also argue that the factors identified by these theories, while necessary, are not sufficient to develop a comprehensive causal account of ethnic xenophobic activity. In this chapter, my main argument integrates constructivist and structural dimensions of threat to provide a more complete explanation of the ways in which structural dimension of threat—such as economic, political or social crises—among citizens of a nation are mediated by the anti-migrant discourse of elites that inspire hostility and activism against foreigners. As mediators of the structural dimensions of threat, elites engage in strategic discourse, including the scapegoating of migrants, in order to mobilize ethnic xenophobic activity to gain or maintain political power.

In developing this argument, this chapter asks two related questions: What determines the incidents and the intensity of ethnic xenophobia in a country? And, what are the causal mechanisms that lead to violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity? To answer these questions, this chapter is organized as follows. The first section of this chapter discusses the constructivist and structuralist determinants of ethnic xenophobia. This discussion produces several testable hypotheses that are used to test the accuracy of these theoretical predictions regarding the incidents and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity. The second section provides a discussion that integrates constructivist and structuralist theories to demonstrate the theoretical causal pathways of how the structural dimensions of threat are mediated through elite symbolic rhetoric to produce ethnic xenophobic activities that are both violent and non-violent.

3.2 Competing Theories of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

Elite Constructions of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

In their explanations of ethnic conflict and intolerance, constructivist scholars emphasize the power of elite discourse and interference in the construction of extremist ethnic identities and conflict. Of particular importance are the symbolic elite narratives against ‘ethnic others’ and outsiders which are intended to induce threats and inspire violence that will, in-turn, compel ethnic moderates to join ethnic extremists in their support of illiberal elites (as in Yugoslavia and
In his examination of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, Kapferer (1988), for example, explains how then-president of Sri Lanka, Jayawardene, tried to establish his own legitimacy as an extremist leader by organizing pogroms, alongside his ministers, against innocent Tamils (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 860). Prunier’s (1995) account of the Rwandan genocide likewise explains that the leading Hutu extremists tried to cast the Tutsis as purely evil outsiders, and Hutu moderates as their stooges, by broadcasting calls to “vigilance” and murder against the “foreign Tutsi invaders” on their radio station, Radio-Television Libre des Mille. And following in the footsteps of Brass (1997), Varshney (2002) and Wilkinson (2004) formulate explanations of Hindu-Muslim riots that emphasize the coordinated provocations of elites, particularly in areas of the country where intercommunal relations are weak and partisan incentives for minority inclusion are low. They explain that, “… elite discourse on Hindu-Muslim communalism operates as a cover for the political ambitions of elites and as a smokescreen to draw attention away from the consequences for its people of the policies of the modern Indian state and its leaders (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 864).”

Stuart Kaufman’s (2001) theory of symbolic politics incorporates these constructivist elements together in a way that is most helpful for an explanation of ethnic xenophobic activity. According to Kaufman, elites activate emotionally potent, nationalized myths in order to incite hostilities between groups and unite the selectorate in fear or anger against perceived ethnic enemies. Elites build these emotional, symbolic narratives by exploiting well-known, often polarizing, histories of triumph against- or defeat at the hands of- perceived enemies. In very similar ways, elites frequently rely on national myth narratives of belonging, or foreignness, to unite coalitions of native supporters in their shared hatred and suspicion of migrants. The aim, for anti-migrant elites in this case, is to inspire dilemmas of existential incompatibility in the minds of local citizens so that they qualify migrants as clear and present threats to their livelihoods and well-being. Elites engage in any number of mobilization activities to broadcast their pogroms and
coordinate the direction (and intensity) of hostilities, including working with local party officers to post intimidating anti-migrant signage in municipalities, or instructing police officers to publicly harass migrants and recruit civilian groups in these efforts. In the case of Tanzania, for example, the dominant Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party employed a performance group called Tanzania One Theatre (TOT) to travel throughout local districts in and around the capital with dramatic portrayals of refugee violence and inundation. In addition, CCM party leaders paid local radio stations around Dar es Salaam to play their campaign song, “CCM is Number One”- which includes references to ‘dangerous refugees’- at least once an hour each day. Similarly in Switzerland in the early 1990s, the leader of the People’s Party- Christopher Blocher- announced a relentless campaign strategy to visit every district to fly his banner that read, “Immigrants threaten the Swiss way of life and the security and well-being of all its citizens” (Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 2010). Local People’s Party supporters made their own versions of the banner and brandished them on the sides of buildings, in public squares and attached them to the back of bicycles to ride throughout their towns and cities.

The constructivist scholarship presents clear expectations for the incidents and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity, which leads to the formation of the following proposition:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Increases in negative elite rhetoric toward migrants, increases the incidents and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity.

The Structural Determinants of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

Structuralist scholars, instead, focus on national, structural factors as the primary sources of explanation for ethnic hostilities or prejudice. There are several possible structural contributors to ethnic tensions and conflict, including economic or political crises and social or demographic change. In terms of explaining acts of intolerance against migrants, structural events or transitions can heighten native anxieties toward foreigners who are perceived as contributing to future uncertainties and loss, including workforce competition and access to social services or resources.
Rapid urbanization, for instance, as a structural-spatial event, brings crowds of urban settlers into cities at rates that can easily outpace infrastructural capacity, strap social services, raise rents, and flood the local jobs market with a surplus of labor. The pressures of these circumstances are likely to exaggerate the frustrations that native urbanites cast toward non-native arrivals; especially if they perceive themselves to be in direct competition with migrants over urban entitlements or access to the conveniences of life in the city (Bayat 2010).

It was Fromm (1941) who first argued that dramatic structural change would produce mass feelings of insecurity and uncertainty which could- in turn- inspire illiberal attitudes and reactions toward those deemed responsible, in this case migrants. Likewise, modern Frommian scholars claim that a lack of control over such structural circumstances and events contributes directly to the popularity of the Radical Right in Europe since people are looking for ways to exercise authority over national, or system-level, change that appears worrisome or dangerous (Mirisola 2014). Tendencies toward authoritarianism among native populations are central to these theorists; they explain that there are three dimensions of authoritarian behaviors that are most likely to surface— even in the most advanced democracies— and cluster under such structural strain and uncertainty: (1) authoritarian submission (a strong tendency to submit to authorities, which are perceived as established and legitimate in the society in which one lives); (2) authoritarian aggression (a general aggressiveness, perceived to be positively sanctioned by established authorities, directed against various people); and (3) conventionalism (a strong tendency to adhere to the social conventions, which are perceived as endorsed by the society and its established authorities) (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, Funke 2005).

Economic shocks, for example- as mentioned in the previous chapter- are thought to have direct implications for illiberal attitudes and activisms against migrants. As generations of scholars suggest, a declining economy is likely to build native resentments toward migrants, especially for low-income wage earners and social service recipients whose ‘niche overlap’ with migrant workers
is most often greater than that of other natives. Under these circumstances, native workers fear that migrants will displace them from the labor force, compete for social services and benefits, or drive native wage-rates down, resulting in the escalation of status fears and frustrations that are likely to increase illiberal inclinations toward migrants and contribute to demands of authoritative, and thereby xenophobic, action.

Other structural changes within society, such as a sudden increase in the numbers of migrant arrivals, can likewise raise native anxieties. Such large-scale changes to the demographic (and spatial) landscape of a nation’s communities have far-reaching implications for the economic, political and societal status quo; this includes settlement (or residential) patterns, especially for local communities and neighborhoods that have been historically segregated from ethnic minorities and migrants. Similar to what ethnic residential scholars claim, these dramatic changes can exacerbate existing social exclusions between migrant and native communities, and worsen forecasting error-potential with a higher frequency of impersonal, short-term encounters. Without the development of meaningful relational ties to restrain ethnic stereotyping or threat perceptions, the boiling over of frustrations or resentments is likely to- once again- mobilize public demands to take action against migrants.

Elections- as structural transfers of political power- can also contribute to ethnic xenophobic activity by casting atmospheres of political uncertainty or anticipations of change across native societies. The confusion and controversy involved in competitive politics is- in and of itself- stressful for nations to endure; add-in the incentives for elites to build winning coalitions of native voters at whatever costs, and the potential for conflict increases substantially. This is particularly the case for ethnic xenophobic activity. As elections approach and political uncertainties loom, migrants become focal points of native discontent over economic and social issues of all varieties, including rising crime rates, housing shortages and religious practices. Within this arena of expression, it is common for grievances to be mobilized into action among the
native selectorate—meaning that the number and intensity of ethnic xenophobic incidents is expected to increase.

Each of these structuralist arguments presents clear expectations for the incidents and/or intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity. In consideration of these claims, I present the following hypotheses:

**Structural Hypotheses:**

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *Increases in the structural dimensions of threat, increase the incidents and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity.*

3.3 *An Integrated Theory of Structures and Symbols*

In answering the question regarding the causal mechanisms that lead to ethnic xenophobic activity, I develop a theoretical framework that integrates essential components of constructivist and structuralist theories. These competing theories emphasize that elite rhetoric and structural dimensions of threat drive ethnic xenophobic activity, but provide incomplete explanations for the phenomenon. The theory that is advanced in this chapter is that structural dimensions of threat are converted into anti-migrant symbols by elites in order to mobilize ethnic xenophobic activity for political gain. It is important to recognize that constructivist and structuralist scholars fall-short of this fully integrated explanation. Out of the constructivist literature, Kaufman (2001) goes furthest in explaining that elites use historical symbols or threats to mobilize ethnic violence. However, the specification of the prior structural threat dimensions are undefined. Conversely, structuralist scholars theorize that the structural dimensions of threat have a direct effect on ethnic conflict and violence and largely ignore the mediating role of elite symbolism.

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8 The structural dimensions of threat include: increased numbers of refugees, economic crises, political transition or crisis, and rapid urbanization. This also includes transfers of power during election years that threaten incumbent political elites and provide opportunities for their opponents.
While both are necessary, neither is a complete or sufficient explanations of ethnic xenophobic activity. It is only through the discursive power of elites that the structural dimensions of threat are translated into the symbols that provoke native intolerance and ethnic xenophobic activity. Prior structural dimensions of threat will produce both violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity when they are mediated by the symbolic, discursive rhetoric of elites.

But exactly how does this causal mechanism unfold cross-nationally? In their conversions of prior structural dimensions of threat into anti-migrant symbols, elites identify the most emotionally potent, low-cost narratives available. The myths surrounding refugee threats are well-established throughout history, and are versatile enough to mediate the meaning of a variety of different structural dimensions of threat within host countries of all types. Elites persistently scapegoat refugees for unduly burdening the host state economy or for contributing to acts of terrorism and violence against native communities. In the aftermath of a security event or political crisis, refugees are often portrayed as embodiments of the conflict from which they have fled and vessels through which radicalization (or violence) may be transmitted. The image of the ‘refugee warrior’ using flight as an opportunity to carry-out political objectives abroad, or as a means to mobilize resources in exile, carries enough elements of truth in history to produce contemporary stereotypes and hyperbole of mysterious migrants from dangerous places (Young 1979, Lischer 2008, Salehyan 2010). As part of their opposition strategy, elites may also use refugees as indictments against existing leadership—especially in the context of competitive elections or during periods of large-scale refugee arrival. This has become a common practice of elite members of the alternative (or ‘alt’) right in the United States and Europe. But it is also increasingly apparent in developing host states such as Lebanon and Malaysia. Many elites go so far as to claim that refugees are the panacea for all that is wrong with native lives (including all that has been or is anticipated to be lost); refugees are made emblems of the destructive- and dangerous- processes of globalization, regional interdependence, terrorism and disease. Elites often resort to highly illiberal
methods of mobilization; including corruptive police and para-military practices, recruitment of vigilante groups, and broadcasting of bogus news stories.

Beyond their prevalence and versatility, the costs of using refugee myths to mediate the meaning of these structural dimensions of threats is relatively low in most circumstances as well; due to the fact that refugees are excluded from host country politics and often, more broadly, from effective participation in civil society, elites are unlikely to be met with meaningful resistance or punishments if they pursue such symbolic ‘refugee threat’ maneuvers.

Consider, for a moment, the Moscow theater siege as an example of this integrated approach. The Moscow theater siege— in which some eight hundred people were held captive by Chechen rebels for five days in Russia’s national theater- took place nearly six months after President Putin declared an end to Russia’s war with Chechnya in 2002. The forceful response of the Russian military to the siege inspired widespread uncertainty and concern over the state of Russian-Chechen relations, including Putin’s ability to keep his declarative promise of security and peace for the Russian people. With major Federal Assembly elections on the horizon, in which the pro-Putin United Russia party stood to lose 450 seats in the lower house, Putin banded together with legislative allies to direct national energies toward ‘unknown foreign threats’ as perpetrators of the theater siege—casting these external forces as, “[L]ooming threats to the security of the people and the stability of the nation (Karon 2002).” The campaign tapped into the myths of foreign terrorism and migration as a means of subversion and violence toward the daily life of Russian nationals. In one of a series of public statements relating to the siege and the nearing election, a pro-Putin legislator remarked, “Global forces have brought the world’s people to our door, some of whom wish to do us significant harm as they have elsewhere. It is prudent for us to remain united under the existing authorities of the nation in our resolve against such foreign elements (Oetgen and Balmforth 2012).” The anti-foreigner message was successfully consolidated once the Kremlin shut down the only remaining source of nationwide, independent television news in
the country three months prior to the national election, and promised to “Take charge in the stand
to protect and defend the homeland against foreign threats in Russia, many of which are worsened
by the liberal opposition (Karon 2002).” The 2003 Federal Assembly elections were reported as
the most fraudulent in modern history, as the United Russia party took control of parliament by
removing members of the opposition with physical force. A survey released by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) within the same year, showed a dramatic increase
(upwards of sixty-percent) in the numbers of hospitalizations for refugees as a result of physical
attacks. Refugees from Afghanistan and a variety of African nations, especially Sudan, suffered
the most numerous and serious injuries from assaults with crude weapons, such as metal chains and
pipes. A significant portion of the violence was centered in-and-around Moscow where the largest
portion of self-settled urban refugees reside (Crush 2009). Follow-up survey reports confirm rising
trends of physical violence coordinated against refugee communities throughout the country
(UNHCR 2009).

Symbolic politics proved an effective strategy for Putin and the United Russia party in the
aftermath of the theater siege as they faced electoral uncertainty. By shifting post-siege anxieties
onto foreign threats and resident refugees, the regime avoided undue scrutiny from the public in its
control of the Chechen rebel threat and legitimated illiberal, authoritative actions in the take-over
of parliament and the independent media as a response to the demands for safety and restorations
of security. The mobilization of ethnic xenophobic activity against refugees in Moscow was based
on retaliatory rhetoric and a widespread belief in an existential foreign-turned-domestic threat. The
prior victimization of Russians in the siege further rationalized the emotional response of anti-
migrant groups who took to the streets to avenge their fellow patriots and to send a message of
nationalist-preservation to those they deemed responsible. An Afghan refugee victim of the
xenophobic attacks provided the following anonymous statement, “They attacked me with metal
chains, demanding that I confess to wanting to kill Russian people and kidnap their children (Crush
Despite all the public violence, the cost of continuing such anti-migrant mobilizations for the Kremlin elite remains relatively low since refugees have no direct political recourse and are-for the most part- highly isolated from Russian nationals in their day-to-day lives.

This integrated theory is, however, less likely to explain ethnic xenophobic activity under conditions of socio-economic interdependence between refugees and native populations. Chapter 6 discusses in detail the case of the densely populated micro-city camps in northern Kenya, where refugees and natives experience high-levels of interconnection in their daily economic and household activities. It is shown that locals have directly resisted the anti-migrant provocations of elites in these situations. However, for the vast majority of cases, where refugee and host populations are not socially or economically interconnected, this integrative theory does explain the causal mechanisms that drive both violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity.

The theoretical discussion above generates the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *Increases in the structural dimensions of threat will increase ethnic xenophobic activity (violent and non-violent) only when they are mediated through the anti-migrant rhetoric of elites.*
Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology

4.1 Introduction to the Research Design

In order to test the hypotheses put forth in the previous chapter, this study employs a mixed-methods approach. First, I use an original cross-national dataset to analyze the determinants of ethnic xenophobic activity with two econometric estimators, a Heckman selection model and a structural equation model (SEM). The dataset includes nearly 14,000 observations of ethnic xenophobic activity across seventy-eight host countries from 1990 to 2014. The sample of host countries was determined in part by the availability of data for refugee populations during this twenty-four year period. The primary data source for refugee statistics is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Statistical Database. Sample selection was also meant to establish a relatively even distribution of developed and developing countries within the dataset. The dataset includes observations for 36 developed host countries and 43 developing host countries in order to gauge cross-regional effects and trends relating to ethnic xenophobic activity (see Appendix A for a full list of countries). The countries represent the following regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, and North America.

The development of the dataset was guided in large part by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project Database (2009). I followed many of the coding rules established by the MAR project and drew raw data from several of its primary sources. I also relied heavily on its research protocols, including code-sheets, overviews, chronologies, and summaries.

The general sources of information for the original variables listed below include world news sources in Lexis Nexis, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Fact Book, country reports from the UN and various non-profit monitoring agencies, national crime statistic databases, and interviews with various stakeholders in positions with multilateral state and non-state migration

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9 For a full list of all countries included in the sample please see Appendix B. For my complete codebook please see Appendix C.
agencies. Further information relating to specific sources for variable formation are included in the data descriptions below.

Second, I use a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) to examine two pairs of cases. The first set of cases includes Lebanon and the United States and the second set of cases includes Kenya and the Netherlands. The objective of such a design is to illustrate how such seemingly different development contexts can converge on similar outcomes. The technical aspects of this case study approach will be discussed thoroughly below.

4.2 Estimation Models

The Heckman Selection Model

Since one of the main theoretical questions of this study relates to the determinants of the incidents and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity, countries who experience an ethnic xenophobic incident are not random from those countries where ethnic xenophobic activities are intense. To address this non-random selection bias in generating estimates, this study employs the Heckman selection estimator. Factors that determine the intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity in stage two of the Heckman model is not a random process that is unaffected by factors that determine the probability of experiencing an ethnic xenophobic incident in stage one. The first stage, or the selection stage, determines the characteristics that make incidents of ethnic xenophobic activity likely to occur. Countries that pass through the selection phase are included in the second phase which determines the intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity. Correcting for selection bias is important because certain observations are systematically censored and included in the second stage sub-sample by the preceding selection process. Least-squared estimation among censored observation risks producing bias and inconsistent estimate in the second stage equation and could mislead the analyst into attributing causal effects to the central explanatory variables.
**Structural Equation Modeling**

Since this study also concerns itself with the causal mechanisms through which anti-migrant elite rhetoric is used to mediate the structural dimensions of threat, SEM which features a latent path analysis is used to estimate the data. SEM allows multiple indicators that measure an unobserved latent variable. By explicitly modeling measurement error, SEM produces unbiased estimates for the relationships between exogenous co-variates and the unobserved latent variable.

4.3 Data Measurement

**Dependent Variable**

The primary variable to be explained in this project is *ethnic xenophobic activity*. Ethnic xenophobic activity is operationalized as the following activities toward refugees (ranked least to most violent): protests, rallies, marches, imagery, demonstrations, campaigns, party formation, signage/brochures, broadcasts, taunts/threats, stalking, verbal confrontations, vandalism, theft, destruction of property (including arsons), physical assault, kidnapping, police brutality/harassment (including the use of tear-gas and spontaneous arrest/detention), sexual exploitation or abuse, gun and knife violence, group-based assault, mass weapon (or high casualty) violence. In coding ethnic xenophobic activity, I relied heavily on world news sources in Lexis Nexis, country reports from the UN and various non-profit monitoring agencies, national crime statistic databases and event-coding software (KEDS/TABARI). In order to measure this phenomenon I have developed the following indicators:

1. *The incident of ethnic xenophobic activity.* This is a dichotomous variable measuring whether or not an ethnic xenophobic incident occurred within the country-year. The variable is coded 1 if an ethnic xenophobic incident is reported, and 0 otherwise.

2. *Ethnic xenophobic intensity.* This is a count variable of the number of incidents of non-violent and violent ethnic xenophobic activity within a country-year. Incidents of non-violent xenophobic activity include: protests, rallies, harassment, stalking, the distribution of pamphlets or imagery (including graffiti or graphic expression), and verbal
confrontations. Incidents of violent ethnic xenophobic activity include: vandalism, theft, destruction of property (including arsons), physical assault, kidnapping, police brutality/harassment (including the use of tear-gas and spontaneous arrest/detention), sexual exploitation or abuse, gun and knife violence, group-based assault, mass weapon (or high casualty) violence. This variable is not normally distributed and therefore would bias regression estimates. The variable is therefore transformed as a natural log.

The dependent variable in the SEM, is the latent variable, ethnic xenophobic activity. This is comprised of the following indicators:

- **Non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity.** This is a count variable of the number of instances of non-violence ethnic xenophobic activity that occurred within a country-year.

- **Violent ethnic xenophobic activity.** This is a count variable of the number of instances of non-violence ethnic xenophobic activity that occurred within a country-year. Incidents of violent ethnic xenophobic activity include: vandalism, theft, destruction of property (including arsons), physical assault, kidnapping, police brutality/harassment (including the use of tear-gas and spontaneous arrest/detention), sexual exploitation or abuse, gun and knife violence, group-based assault, mass weapon (or high casualty) violence.

*Co-Variates*

Both the Heckman selection model and the SEM, use the same exogenous co-variates that measure different dimensions of structural threat. In this study, I theorize that ethnic xenophobic activity is driven by these structural dimensions of threat as they are mediated by the anti-migrant rhetoric of elites. Drawing from constructivist and structuralist theories, the following co-variates that measure these structural dimensions of threat are included in the statistical analyses.
Anti-migrant elite rhetoric. This is an original variable that captures the number of negative references to refugees made by host country elites within a given year. I used critical content analysis to hand-code public statements of host country elites from world news sources, unclassified country reports from the UN and other agencies, as well as interviews with state and non-state representatives. Host state elites include: heads of state, legislative members, judicial officials, high-ranking religious officials, military officials, state agency representatives, local elected officials, cabinet members, royal family members, primary business leaders, and diplomats. The hand-coded variable was cross-checked with an open-source content analysis software, KEDS/TABARI. I have set forth the expectation that negative elite discourse regarding refugees and migrants increases the likelihood of both violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity. In specific causal terms, this variable is seen as a mediator between structural events or change and ethnic xenophobic activity.

Election year. I use IDEA election data to indicate whether there is an election within a country year. This is a dichotomous measure, coded 0 if no election occurred and 1 if an election took place. The existing literature explains that elections increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict or tension because competing elites will use divisive politics to build winning coalitions around conflicting identity structures. This project incorporates a similar argument—that elections provide incentives for elites to engage in symbolic politics against migrants to unite native voters in support of illiberal, and xenophobic, activity, especially when the uncertainties of elections produce anxieties among native populations.

Number of refugees. The UNHCR reports refugee figures for host countries worldwide. These statistics are available for most countries since 1990. I use this continuous variable to measure the number of refugees for each host country-year. Contact theorists explain that larger numbers of migrants increase the likelihood of intergroup interaction with native groups. However, these interactions are not always positive and do not encourage long-term positive relationships,
especially since refugees tend to be highly isolated from natives in their daily lives because of urban
settlement patterns and host state restrictions on integration (such as rights to work).

State Fragility Index (SFI). This index serves as a proxy for the political, economic and social
dimensions of threat. The Center for Systemic Peace’s SFI (1995-2014) provides annual state
fragility, effectiveness and legitimacy indices along with the eight component indicators for the
world’s 167 countries with populations greater than 500,000. The Fragility Matrix scores each
country on both effectiveness and legitimacy in four performance dimensions: security, political,
economic, and social. Each of the matrix indicators is rated on a four-point fragility scale: 0 “no
fragility”, 1 “low fragility”, 2 “medium fragility”, and 3 “high fragility” with the exception of the
economic effectiveness indicator which is rated on a five-point scale (including 4 “extreme
fragility”). The SFI then combines scores of eight indicators and ranges from 0 “no fragility” to
25 “extreme fragility”. Countries that have high levels of fragility are also countries that have high
levels of political, economic, and social dimensions of threat.

Urban population. This variable captures the perceived or actual competition between native
populations and refugees over scarce urban resources such as housing, jobs and social services.
The variable represents a demographic dimension of threat that would produce anxiety among
native groups and provide opportunities for political elites to exploit public uncertainty by using
anti-migrant rhetoric. The variable measures the percent of urban population across countries and
is taken from the United Nations Population Database (UNPD) for the years 1990 through 2014.

Social Globalization. This variable is not a dimension of structural threat. It is included in the
statistical analyses as a control variable that is hypothesized to have a direct negative effect on
ethnic xenophobic activity. I argue that countries that have high levels of social globalization,
represent societies with high degrees of transnational interdependence. It is recognized in the
international relations literature that high levels of economic interdependence reduce the likelihood
of war and conflict between nation-states (Oneal and Russett 1997, Oneal and Russett 1999). This
insight may also predict intra-social relations within states. That is to say, that in countries where there are high degrees of transnational interdependence along cultural, technological, and personal lines we should expect that the transnationalization of social life will become a bulwark against ethnic xenophobic activity. The social globalization measure is adopted from the KOF Globalization Index and includes data on personal contact (including telephone traffic, transfers, international tourism, foreign population, and international letters), data on information flows (internet users, television, trade in newspapers) and data on cultural proximity (number of McDonald’s Restaurants, number of IKEA, and trade in books). The data is transformed to an index on a scale of 1 to 100, where 100 is the maximum value and 1 is the minimum value. Higher values denote greater social globalization. The variable approximates the interconnectedness of transnational societies.

4.4 Case Selection Methodology

A Most Different System Design (MDSD) compares as contrasting cases as possible in order to show the robustness of a relationship between dependent and independent variables (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Such a design assumes that by demonstrating that the observed relationships hold in a range of contrasting settings the argument of the research is better supported. The outcome variable is the same across cases. The objective of this comparative approach is to appreciate the complexity across cases, unravel historical conditions, and illustrate the operationalization of the primary independent variables across disparate contexts. The logic of MDSD is that differences cannot explain similarities; therefore, similar outcomes of interest across contexts are explained by similar explanatory factors across such contexts. Here, MDSD is useful as a tool of discovery—particularly as it relates to underappreciated similarities in the casual pathways of ethnic xenophobic activity across different regions. The pairs of cases included in the MDSD in this project include: Kenya and the Netherlands and Lebanon and the United States. All cases experience positive outcomes of the dependent variable. Otherwise, their differences are
apparent. These cases were chosen because of my immediate familiarity and experience in the respective countries over the past decade, including field research experience and valuable internal contacts both inside and outside official state positions. Another determining factor for case selection was the availability and access to information, particularly as it relates to hate crime statistics and descriptions of xenophobic incidents. Data sources, including unclassified government documents and archived journalistic accounts, were very comparable in accessibility and availability across states. The selected countries are also not connected directly through colonialism or unilateral political (or military) occupation.
Chapter 5: Cross-National and Country Level Assessments of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

This chapter discusses the results from the two-stage Heckman selection model and SEM. The chapter is organized as follows: the next section discusses the results of the Heckman model and this is followed by a discussion of the SEM results and goodness of fit statistics. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of these findings for constructivist and structuralist theories of ethnic xenophobia.

5.1 The Determinants of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

Table 5.1 presents estimates from the Heckman model of ethnic xenophobic activity in a sample of seventy-two countries. Models 1, 2, 3, respectively, provide estimates for all countries, developed countries, and developing countries. To control for the problem of heteroscedasticity in both the selection and the intensity equations, the regression coefficients are accompanied by robust standard errors that cluster on country. In all models, the Wald Test of the independence of the equations is statistically significant, indicating that selection equations and intensity equations are correlated. In other words, the countries selection into the sample at stage two is not a random process that is unaffected by factors that determine the likelihood of an ethnic xenophobic incident at stage one. The Heckman technique is therefore the appropriate remedy for correcting selection bias when estimating the determinants of ethnic xenophobic activity.

In all models, election year, elite rhetoric and the number of refugees not only increase the probability that an ethnic xenophobic activity will occur in the selection equation, but they all increase the intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity in stage two (the intensity equation). While increases in the percent of the country’s urban population fails to rise to the level of statistical significance in models 1 and 2, and reduces the probability of countries experiencing an ethnic xenophobic incident in model 3, it has a significant, positive effect on the intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity in all models in the second equation. Increasing levels of the fragility of states
increases the probability of an ethnic xenophobic incident across all models as theorized. This variable is dropped in the second, intensity equation to correct for sampling selectivity. Increases in social globalization reduce the probability of an ethnic xenophobic activity across all models in the selection equation, and also fails to rise to the level of statistical significance in the intensity equation.

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<tr>
<th>Table 5.1</th>
<th>The Determinants of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stage One: The Selection (or ‘Incident’) Equation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Explanatory Variable</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
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<td>Election Year</td>
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<td>Number of Refugees</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.00135*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000678)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.647***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations at the Selection Stage</td>
<td>1617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stage Two: The Intensity Equation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Variables</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ALL HOST STATES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.421***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-migrant Elite Rhetoric</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ALL HOST STATES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00306*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0000314***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000887)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00760***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Globalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.492**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations at the Intensity Stage</td>
<td>1384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heckman Model Chi-Square</td>
<td>178.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Test of Independent Equations, Chi-Square</td>
<td>149.42***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust Standard errors in parentheses + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
5.2 The Causal Pathways to Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

The SEM presented below represents the causal pathways that lead to ethnic xenophobic activity (Pearl 2000). The results of the SEM are presented in Figure 1 as well as Table 5.2 which features goodness of fit statistics. Estimates of the data support the integrated theoretical approach to ethnic xenophobic activity. The dimensions of structural threats’ effect on ethnic xenophobic activity are all mediated by anti-migrant elite rhetoric. There are also important theoretical additions, the effect that the number of refugees has on ethnic xenophobia is not only mediated by elite rhetoric, but it also has a direct effect in increasing both violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity. Increasing levels of social globalization have direct, reductive effects on ethnic xenophobic activity. This suggests that high levels of transnational personal contact, information flows, and cultural proximity to other countries in the international system provides the context of transnational interdependencies that reduce ethnic xenophobic activity.

Figure 5.1 Structural Equation Model Diagram
Table 5.2 provides the same results of the SEM figure discussed above. It also provides details on the goodness of fit statistics for the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables in Bold Face</th>
<th>Explanatory Variables Below</th>
<th>Estimates of the Structural Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-migrant Elite Rhetoric</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>.093*** (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td></td>
<td>.199*** (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fragility Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>.069*** (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Number</td>
<td></td>
<td>.022*** (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.011 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (violent)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (latent)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.84*** (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Number</td>
<td></td>
<td>.277*** (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>.25*** (.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (non-violent)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (latent)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.92*** (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Number</td>
<td></td>
<td>.28*** (.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>.485*** (.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (latent)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-migrant Elite Rhetoric</td>
<td></td>
<td>.269*** (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Globalization</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.123*** (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses:
Levels of statistical significant: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

**Goodness of Fit Statistics**
Model chi-square: $p \gamma^2 = .000$
Population error: Root Mean Squared Error Approximation (RMSEA) = .073
Baseline comparison: Comparative Fit Index = .97, Tucker-Lewis Index= .95
Size of residuals: Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR) = .04
How well do the data fit the model? With the exception of the chi-square, the model fits the data very well. Although the chi-square statistic is significant, it suggests that the model is not properly fitted for the data, the chi-square estimation is considered to be a weak indicator of model fit, especially for large sample sizes (which is the case here) (Rasch 1980). In general, large sample sizes will cause most chi-square-based statistics to almost always report a statistically significant difference between the observed data and model expectation, suggesting misfit, regardless of the true situation (resulting in Type 1 error). One potential mechanism for accommodating large sample sizes (of 500 or more) is to use the Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA). The RMSEA is widely used in SEM to provide a mechanism for adjusting for sample size where chi-square statistics are used. Here, the RMSEA is reported as 0.07 which suggests a good fit, with only a ten percent margin of a misfit of the data to the model. The closer the RMSEA is to zero, the better the fit; and most values that fall below 1 are considered acceptable. Likewise, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) approaches its upper boundary of 1 (at .97), suggesting an acceptable model fit. Finally, the Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMSR) provides another strong confirmation of fit at 0.04. The SRMSR is an absolute measure of fit and is defined as the standardized difference between the observed correlation and the predicted correlation. A value of zero is considered a perfect fit, which the statistic approaches here (Bentler and Chou 1987).

5.3 The Implications of the Findings for Constructivist and Structuralist Scholarship

This research presents an integrated theoretical approach to ethnic xenophobic activity, but this approach is based on the factors first developed in the constructivist and structuralist scholarship (as discussed throughout chapters 2 and 3). One of the primary goals of this study is to determine which theoretical framework provides the most effective explanation of ethnic xenophobic activity, constructivists or structuralist.

10 Typically only one of the two fit indices are reported—either the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) or the Tucker-Lewis Index (TFI). The CFI is more often reported because of its interpretability. I choose to follow this convention here. The CFI and TLI are highly correlated estimators of fit.
According to the results presented in this chapter, it appears that both explanations have merit. The main indicator of the constructivist argument—anti-migrant elite rhetoric—is shown to be a central explanatory variable of ethnic xenophobic activity. This means that the myths and symbols used by elites to antagonize migrants do significantly increase the likelihood of ethnic xenophobic activity. For structuralist scholars, elections, the number of refugees, and state fragility all influence the incidents and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity. Although urbanization is found to have mixed results for the occurrence of ethnic xenophobic incidents in stage one of the Heckman model, it is found to be a significant determinant of intensity in the second stage.

However, the results of the SEM confirm that both constructivist and structuralist claims are crucial for a comprehensive explanation of the causal mechanisms and pathways of ethnic xenophobic activity. Structuralist variables— including elections, number of refugees and state fragility—effect ethnic xenophobic activity to the degree that they are mediated through the anti-migrant rhetoric of elites. Therefore, Kaufman (2001) correctly theorizes that the symbolic discourse of elites serves as an intermediary of threats and violence; but this research presents clear evidence that the specification of the structural dimensions of the threats used by elites in their exploits matters a great deal as will be further illustrated in the case studies below.
Chapter 6: Cross-Regional Comparative Case Studies: the Most Different Contexts of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

6.1 Introduction and Case Structure

This chapter develops two pairs of cases in order to provide further insight into the causal mechanisms of ethnic xenophobic activity across regional contexts. The pairs of cases are compared using a most-different systems case design (as described in the final section of Chapter 4). The first pair of cases includes Kenya and the Netherlands (6.2). The second pair of case studies includes Lebanon and the United States (6.3). Each case study features an extensive review of the country’s history of refugee settlement as well as the policy regimes that govern the rights and privileges of refugees. In addition, each case includes discussion of a structural event that is then portrayed, by elites, as somehow connected to the ‘refugee threat’. Elite mobilizations are shown to take place across a variety of similar planes, including political party structures and through police or security forces. The purpose of these cases is to sharpen the identification of the shared patterns and processes of ethnic xenophobic activity across vastly different regional contexts. In short, similar mechanisms- operating within these four diverse fields of consideration- lead to similar outcomes.

6.2 Kenya and the Netherlands

CASE 1: Kenya: Background and Settlement Context

For nearly a quarter of a century, Kenya has played a vital role as a primary first-country of asylum for forcibly displaced people and populations of concern within the region. Beginning in 1971, Kenya experienced its first major influx of refugees from Uganda. Nearly 20,000 Ugandans self-settled in Kenya and were largely integrated into economic and social life without significant policy resistance or local opposition. But conflicts throughout the 1990s placed Kenya at the center of unprecedented receiving efforts for massive movements of refugees from the Great Lakes countries, East Africa and the Horn. Between 1991 and 1992, Kenya’s refugee population soared from 14,500 to 400,000 thanks, in large part, to an “arc of instability” to the north that spanned from Somalia to Sudan. The enormous scale of refugee arrivals occurred just as the
country was grappling with major political transitions, including the formulation of its own multi-party political system. The influx of refugees- particularly in the North Eastern province- placed significant strain on the liberalizing nation, forcing the Government of Kenya (GoK) to rely on emergency intervention and assistance from the UNHCR. The establishment of large ‘temporary’ camps and registration processes soon followed. Through this coordination, Kenya rapidly gained recognition from the international community as one of the most flexible and accommodating host countries on the continent. And despite hardships, mistakes, and noteworthy imperfections, the GoK was seen as a generous- and eager- partner in multilateral arrangements with the UNHCR and other leading humanitarian agencies. Throughout the 90s and early 2000s, the GoK relied heavily on the UNHCR- including their subcontracting agencies- to manage the camps, determine the status of new arrivals, and make decisions relating to camp capacity and appropriate levels of response. Occasional upheavals did occur—particularly in the form of GoK policy threats of camp closure and flare-ups of hostility between locals and refugees (and between refugee communities) within the camps. Instability within the camps and surrounding areas tended to rise and fall in accordance with the numbers of arrivals and departures, cross-border incursions or security events relating to neighboring country conflicts near the northern camps, and host country elections. For example in 2011, when the population of refugees swelled by nearly 10,000 arrivals in a single month in one of the northwestern camps, protests broke out among refugees over the crowded conditions and lack of sufficient food or housing; security forces responded by firing on refugee crowds.

As of October 2016, Kenya ranked seventh out of the top ten refugee hosting nations worldwide, with nearly 600,000 registered refugees residing in the country (International 2016, UNHCRa 2016). The majority of resident refugees are settled in one of three primary locations throughout the country: Kakuma Camp in the Northwest district of Turkana approximately 100 kilometers from the Sudanese border; Dadaab and Alinjugar Camps in the North East, 100 kilometers from the border with Somalia; and the capital city of Nairobi in the Southwest. Somali
refugees constitute nearly half of Kenya’s refugee population (332,785 registered as of November 2016), with large populations distributed across all settlement locations. Refugees from South Sudan number over 90,000 and reside mainly in the Kakuma camps. Refugees from Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) rank third in resident numbers, with large settlement clusters in and around Nairobi (ReliefWeb 2016, UNHCRb 2016).

Overall, the number of registered refugees in Kenya has declined by over 90,000 in the past year (2015 to 2016); this is mainly due to large-scale (and controversial) ‘voluntary’ repatriation programs for Somali refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma camps. The figure may also represent the persistent rise in urban self-settlement for refugees who are either not registered with the UNHCR/GoK or who leave their registered camps for a growing number of refugee communities in Nairobi. Kenya has experienced dramatic growth in the estimated number of refugees in urban areas; the pace and scale of urban arrivals are expected to increase exponentially as northern camps face pending closures and as the GoK hardens its resettlement policies toward
resident refugees who are forced to pursue work ‘illegally’ in one of three primary areas of Nairobi (Eastleigh, Koyole, or Kitengela).

The GoK established the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) within the Ministry of Interior to manage and coordinate refugee issues. And since the Refugee Act of 2006, the DRA- in coordination with the UNHCR- has been the main government actor involved in the registration and status determination of refugees. The DRA is additionally responsible for overseeing and affirming the GoK’s commitment to international refugee conventions (including the recognition of asylum seekers, their protection from arbitrary arrest, and their rights to economic and productive activities) (Act" 2006, UNHCR-DRC 2012). As a part of this mandate, the DRA issues Alien Refugee Certificates (ARCs) to newly registered arrivals for five year permitted residence in the country. Most ARCs are limited to residence in one of the two primary refugee camps. A separate process is required through the DRA for a ‘Class M’ refugee work permit—which confers the right to employment for refugees in Kenya. Such permits require special status designation and are rarely granted.

Kenya: Local Perceptions, Police Treatment and Policy Frameworks

The Camps

The Northern border camps- in both Dadaab and Kakuma- are active micro-cities, approximately the size of New Orleans or Zurich, that remain unmarked on any official map.11 For over twenty-five years, these camps- including their residents, surrounding local communities, and the systems of relief and security- have incubated the development of complex economic, social, and political relationships in a strange limbo of life.12 There are cinemas, soccer leagues, hotels and hospitals indicating the permanence of life, contrasted by the near-constant patrolling of Kenyan security forces attempting to contain- or capitalize upon- what were intended to be

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11 Dadaab includes 3 camps: Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera.
12 The term ‘displacement economies’ has been applied in an attempt to describe the new physical, social, economic and political spaces, relations, systems and practices that displacement itself produces in such settings (Hammar 2014).
temporary systems of aid and assistance. Neither the GoK nor the UNHCR admits that the temporary settlements have taken on increasingly permanent qualities in contradiction to their intended purpose. This paradox characterizes many of the formal policies of camp management, including the absence of any meaningful integration programs on behalf of both the GoK and the UNHCR. Resident refugees are not permitted to leave the designated camp areas to pursue employment opportunities, visit relatives, or engage in travel within Kenya of any kind without specialized travel documents. Income is based on the rations refugees receive from the UNHCR in coordination with other aid agencies, including the World Food Program (WFP). Rations are a primary source of currency and trade within the camps, both between refugees and with local communities and merchants. The food sold by refugees is among the cheapest in all of Kenya which has supplied a reasonably sized population of ‘aid entrepreneurs’ with food products that can be sold at much higher prices both in and around the camps and elsewhere. The agencies within the camps are not permitted to hire refugees, and rely instead on local Kenyans as a main source of labor for positions within the WFP warehouses or lower-level UNHCR field posts. The surrounding markets in Dadaab, for example, are sources of black market labor and goods for refugees and locals alike. Refugee men (and boys) take jobs with local merchants and shop keepers as couriers and porters, driving over-loaded wheelbarrows full of merchandise from one end of the crowded market to another. Women are typically in charge of overseeing the trading of rations and the transactions (including informal savings groups’ arrangements) involved in making household purchases or securing necessary goods. A 2011 impact study estimated that the local host community in Dadaab earns approximately 1.8 million (USD) from the sale of livestock or slaughter in the camps on a yearly basis. The total annual turnover of ‘camp business’ is about 25 million (USD) and the market shops are estimated at close to 2 million (USD). The same study found that the camps provided about 14 million (USD) in total economic benefit to the host community (UNHCRc 2014). The camps, then, are central to an alternative economy of
displacement for hundreds of thousands of refugees, locals, government officials, and aid agencies throughout the otherwise inhospitable northern territories of the country.
The interdependencies produce complex social dynamics, however, between refugees and host communities particularly as issues relating to security and resource shortages intervene. The refugees in Dadaab, for example, outnumber locals in the area by a quarter of a million at least. Locals and refugees compete, sometimes fiercely, over access to grazing land—particularly during long periods of drought. Water in the area is also seen as a major drawcard. Dadaab- and its surrounding districts, including Liboi near the Somali border, have far more boreholes than the neighboring areas. But many host communities pay for water to fund the fueling and maintenance of the pumps in order for refugees to receive water access for free; which has produced ill feelings toward camp residents. This speaks to broader resentments of the local host population with respect to resource allocation and assistance to refugees—particularly since both the Turkana district (where the Kakuma camps are located) and Dadaab have been historically marginalized and under-represented on the national political stage. Much of the local perception is that many non-refugee nationals have fraudulently registered as refugees to access the benefits of the camp, especially with the prolongation of drought seasons, which stirs issues of legitimacy and access to ‘free’ services.

Locals in both Turkana and Dadaab are not surprised by the insecurity of the camps, or their tactical value for the cross-border activities of extremists and rebel militia. In fact, locals are, in many cases, more inclined to talk of insecurities as they arise from the GoK’s complicity and incompetence than to rest such externalities on the shoulders of resident refugees. For example, a 2012 survey of nearly 2,000 local Turkana surrounding Kakuma camps reveals that attitudes toward the Kenyan government are generally far more negative than attitudes toward refugees, particularly involving issues relating to camp and border security (Aukot 2003). A similar study in Dadaab finds that district locals, likewise, identify the government (more often than they do refugees) as the main arbiter of insecurity and violence (Crisp 2003).
Police and security officials are placed in relatively unlimited and ill-monitored positions of authority and access. Reports of rape and harassment by police and security officials are routine. Bribery and police corruption for movement in and out of the camps as well as access to resources or merchandise are likewise common. In a 2013 interview with a Dadaab resident, he recounted his own personal experience with security officials, “Everyone knows that the police laugh and call undocumented refugees ‘ATM machines’. After crossing the border in a sugar-truck on my way to Ifo [one of camps in Dadaab], police stopped me and told me that I must empty my pockets and surrender all my valuables to them in order to pass through. Of course, I did (Rawlence 2016).”

Security in and around the camps became a focal point of attention throughout the country when, on 2 April 2015, gunmen stormed the campus of Garissa University College in Garissa district near the northern camps. One hundred and forty-seven people were killed in one of the deadliest attacks in the country’s history, falling nearly a year and a half after the fatal attacks at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi. The GoK immediately claimed that the Garissa gunmen were al-Shabaab recruits from the camps in Dadaab, and vowed to close the refugee camps since they had become ‘nurseries for terrorists’ (Thurston 2016).13 Locals in Nairobi were especially reactive in their calls for camp closures and the expulsion of refugees throughout the country, including the growing communities of refugees in and around the city.

The City

As of 2014, over 60,000 refugees were registered with the UNHCR in and around Nairobi.14 Unofficial estimates place this figure closer to 100,000. Registration officials estimate that between 300 to 500 new refugees arrive into the city each day. In Nairobi, refugees are dispersed throughout the city, often highly mobile and reluctant to come forward to register for

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13 Reports indicate that al-Shabaab, a Somali militant group, is recruiting young men in the Dadaab camps. The GoK is accused of similar recruitments on behalf of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and is claiming UN and international backing despite the fact that recruitment within the camps violates international law (HRW 2009).

14 This figure includes refugees settled in Mombasa, Kisumu, Kisii, and Nakuru.
support or inquire into residency requirements because they fear deportation or worse. There are three main concentrations of refugee communities in the city. The largest of these communities is Eastleigh in central Nairobi, with large populations of Somali and Ethiopian refugees. Refugees from Uganda, Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, Eritrea and Burundi live in other predominately low-income sectors of the city including Kayole and Kitengela.

There is a great deal of confusion with respect to the legal status of urban refugees. The Refugee Act of 2006 was intended to set out an institutional framework for the management of refugee affairs; but the GoK has left the details of this framework unclear and has not taken any action to bolster institutional capacity or protection efforts within the city. In practice, this means that many refugees have different types of documentation and remain unsure of what papers they should apply for or how to apply for them. The confusion further compounds fear of spontaneous detention or deportation, with virtually no available recourse; especially since the GoK announced in 2013 that its registration of urban refugees would cease and ordered all refugees to move to the northern camps. It also means that most refugees are forced to pursue livelihood opportunities in the informal sector, and to live as much as possible ‘under the radar’ of detection of authorities or locals. Therefore, refugees in Nairobi remain highly isolated and ‘hidden’ from mainstream Kenyan life; there is an enormous degree of segregation between local Kenyans and refugees, with high levels of reported avoidance of refugee areas among the native host population.

Refugees in Nairobi attest to deep-rooted suspicions and negative perceptions of refugees among police officers in the city. There is widespread belief within the police ranks that refugees should be restricted to camps; and that those who self-settle in the city are either criminally minded or have links with terror organizations (this perspective is especially targeted toward Somalis)

15 As part of the registration and status determination process for refugees, the following documents are required: Asylum Seeker Certificate; Refugee Identification Pass; Movement Pass; Alien Cards; Appointment Letter; UNHCR Mandate Refugee Certificates; class M work permit. Many urban refugees do not formally register with the UNHCR in order to receive documentation (due to fear of arrest or detention); there is a large counterfeit market for these documents in Eastleigh as well.
A series of recent focus group discussions with refugee communities in Eastleigh revealed widespread patterns of abuse and extortion, with refugees being routinely stopped, arrested and charged with one of several crimes: ‘idling with intent of committing a crime’; ‘unlawful presence’; or being ‘illegally outside a designated area’. These arrests are almost always made with the intention of seeking a bribe—according to local sources, police patrols are arranged to maximize bribe-taking and to inflate rates of detention which are part of city police performance evaluations. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) country director in Nairobi, Kellie Leeson, revealed that refugees, ‘...report constant harassment from the police—from officers demanding financial bribes to physical beatings and intimidation. Some refugee communities have even come together and organized monthly financial collections, which they pay to police to prevent such harassment (Leeson 2015).”

Criminal violence toward refugees is also a significant threat, particularly from the Mungiki gang, a politico-religious group characterized by a revolutionary ideology based on a return to Kikuyu traditions and opposition to modernization. But there is urgent, and increasing, concern regarding the rapid rise in reported generalized incidents of xenophobic attacks against refugees in Eastleigh and elsewhere. A local staff member of a refugee NGO in Nairobi remarked, “There is a growing perception, among authorities and Kenyans alike, that refugees represent a significant threat to national security. Just last week the Kenyan Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons said that the influx of refugees to Kenya is creating a major terrorism threat and putting tremendous strain on social services and amenities. He went on to say that ‘extremist groups’ and ‘Islamic radicals’ may use refugee flows to smuggle weapons and people into the country to engage in terrorist attacks. Many people believe the rise in levels of harassment and violence toward refugees is because of such public comments and perceptions (Cechvala 2014).”

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16 Men, for example, are mostly targeted mostly during the day while women are targeted at night, because police officers know that families will pay a premium ransom to have a woman released after dark for fear of physical assault or sexual abuse.
Kenya: Garissa and the Anti-migrant Elite Rhetoric

The ascendancy of Somali terror group al-Shabaab- al-Qaeda’s affiliate in East Africa-represents Kenya’s most profound security challenge. Since Kenya joined the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2011, Kenya has been increasingly subjected to cross-border attacks and seen an expansion of al-Shabaab recruitment efforts among Kenya’s marginalized Muslim communities. Al-Shabaab regularly claims its attacks are reprisals for Kenya’s participation in AMISOM. One such attack, was on Garissa University, situated near Dadaab refugee camp near the Kenya-Somali border. 147 Christian students were killed in the most deadly terrorist attack since the 2008 bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi. It was the country’s 135th terrorist attack since 2011.

The attack greatly undermined an already waning public confidence in the GoK’s ability to protect Kenyan nationals and confront the threats of future attacks. During the fifteen-hour siege, it took eleven hours for the Kenyan security forces to arrive in which time most of the hostages were killed. Furthermore, recent warnings of an imminent attack on educational facilities in Garissa were all but ignored with only a small group of five security personnel guarding the campus prior to the attack. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, a string of deadly protests in Nairobi-led by opposition leader Raila Odinga- called for an overhaul of the country’s electoral commission, which they claimed was secretly supporting the ruling coalition led by President Uhuru Kenyatta.

In April 2015, in addition to the reforms directed at the country’s Muslim population, Kenyatta threatened to deport thousands of Somali refugees in a public display of governmental authority and assurance. The threats were followed up with concerted public statements by national government officials and local representatives affiliated with Kenyatta’s Jubilee Coalition that encouraged citizens to “…blame radicalized refugees for these recurring, heinous attacks” and focus their energies on, “uniting under the authority of the Kenyatta in a strong, national response to such threat (IOA 2016). Much of the anti-refugee rhetoric has been focused on native
communities in and around Nairobi where electoral opposition to Kenyatta is most evident. Television advertisements for Kenyatta replay images of the attacks with the following voice-over: *Kenya is facing a critical, historic election that will determine our nation’s identity and security for decades to come. President Kenyatta is taking action with experience.* In a recent nationally broadcasted radio interview, the Director of Interior and Coordination of National Government (part of Kenyatta’s cabinet) claimed that, “We can no longer sustain this threat of refugees. We have dealt with too much violence and fear from Al-Shabaab, the refugees are all part of that (Paris 2009).”

This is not the first time that Kenya has threatened to close Dadaab—in 2011, for example, a surge of new arrivals from Somalia, Ethiopia and the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo prompted the GoK to issue the “*Operation Linda Nchi*” (Operation Protect the Country) in response to perceived security threats inside the camps. But the most recent statements have not been qualified and the GoK appears to be moving forward with the announced closure and other anti-refugee policy escalations. In May 2016, one week before Kenyatta began campaigning for the 2017 elections, the GoK reaffirmed the camp closure as, “A necessary action for the security and wellbeing of every citizen in the country. The decision to repatriate the refugees is final (IOA 2016)” In the same press conference, the Interior Ministry Principle Secretary announced that the DRA- the main national refugee agency- would be disbanded and officially decommissioned with the positions left unfilled and international agencies expected to pick up the backlog. Cooperation with the UNHCR on registration and status determinations hangs in a precarious balance as well. In response to these announcements, UNHCR released a statement at a press briefing in Geneva communicating its apprehension, including that, “…the humanitarian and logistical implications would be in breach of Kenya’s international obligations. In addition to the direct challenges to refugee protection with respect to rising levels of harassment and xenophobia, this is seen as an
unwise and consequential domestic political maneuver. The plan to close the world’s largest refugee camp is illogical and illegal (RefWorld 2016).

Kenya: Existential Threats and the Mobilization of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity

As illogical and illegal as the closure of Dadaab may be, it scores needed political points for a struggling Kenyatta regime. Kenyatta and his advisors understand that scapegoating refugees is an easy way to score political points with voters; it helps that the refugee issue is inextricably linked with one of Kenyatta’s other favorite campaign themes: the ongoing war in Somalia. It is no coincidence that in his electoral appeals he calls for the deportation of refugees and the construction of an “impenetrable wall on the border with Somalia”.

Police and security forces appear to be at the forefront of stoking and permitting public hostilities toward migrants, particularly in and around Nairobi. Recent interviews with members of the city police force suggest that police are not sure how to deal with refugees in the city other than to threaten arrest or force detention. One police officer stated, “All we know is that the government is shutting down refugee programs and we are supposed to stop and apprehend all individuals who may be living in the city illegally (Services) 2016).” Interviews with local NGO staffers confirm that police, “…antagonize the harassment and coordinate anti-refugee activity to incite fear for the government in order to secure their positions and to line their pockets (IRIN 2016).” Reports from refugees reveal that the police identify members of local communities to stalk and intimidate refugees, including the vandalism of refugee-owned shops and the theft of their groceries or cell phones (HRW 2015). There are growing suspicions that major criminal gangs in and around Nairobi are recruited by the police to join these efforts, to coordinate xenophobic activity throughout the city in order to stir chaos and justify local retaliations against refugees (Thurston 2016).

In a response to a recent question relating to the closure of Dadaab, Kenya’s Deputy President William Ruto said, “The way America changed after 9/11 is the way Kenya will change
after Garissa. If Washington can pursue securitization and exclude refugees, Kenya’s logic runs, then Kenya should be able to do the same at whatever social costs (Igoye 2016).”

CASE 2: The Netherlands: The Numbers, Regional Policies, and Local Regime Context

Since the summer of 2015 the number of refugees entering the European Union (EU) has doubled. According to the latest national figures from the end of 2016, there are 49,400 refugees registered in the country (well over three times as many as two years ago). EU member states, including the Netherlands, have agreed to divide 120,000 refugee arrivals to Europe across the various member states. According to the terms of this highly controversial regional deal, the Netherlands will receive 7,000 of these 120,000 asylum seekers (in addition to 2,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece brokered in a prior arrangement). The Netherlands, in line with broader EU policy, aims to contribute to better reception opportunities for refugees in ‘safe countries’ within the region of origin, particularly for Syrian migrants in places such as Turkey and Jordan. The ‘Merkel Plan’, by which it is known, broadly holds that any refugee coming from Turkey to Greece after 20 March 2016 will be returned after a short legal procedure (by the end of April 2016, 340 people were returned). The deal with Turkey stipulates that for every refugee that Turkey takes back from Greece, the EU will take over one Syrian who now resides in Turkey. These people will be divided according to the distribution program mentioned earlier across EU member states (in early May 2016, 350 Syrian refugees were redistributed). In return, Turkish nationals will be permitted to travel into the EU without a visa, something the Turkish government has long desired. Moreover, the EU will pay the Turkish government 3 billion euros for its reception of refugees (Vos 2016).

17 The primary source of controversy relating to the deal is the designation of Turkey as a ‘safe country’ by the EU. Incidents of forcible return and ill treatment of refugees in Turkey are exceptionally high according to reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and several other non-governmental agencies.
The Netherlands domestic asylum procedures are governed by the Ministry of Security and Justice in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights. National asylum laws specify a process of application and assessment for asylum and resettlement that begins with registration through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND). After identification and registration, asylum seekers are transferred to a reception center, which is usually near the application center that will process the asylum application and follow-up with a series of interviews and determination procedures. The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) is responsible for the reception, supervision and departure (from the reception center) of asylum seekers; they are also in charge of securing benefits, assisting with employment, and providing social housing for those who qualify for refugee status.18

In contrast to what is often expected of Dutch policy, the Netherlands in particular has one of the toughest national refugee policies in Europe. Refugees are exceedingly less likely to be granted residency permits in the Netherlands than in neighboring Germany, Belgium or Sweden. Based on a 2015 report from the Justice Ministry’s Research Department, just under thirty-five percent of refugee requests in the Netherlands are honored, compared to a regional average of nearly forty-eight percent (JMRD 2015). In addition, the fifteen month rulings period in the country is often too long for refugees to wait to receive any assistance or accommodation—many asylum seekers, instead, choose to return to their region of origin (mainly to Turkey at this point) even though they would likely have been granted a residence permit.19

For resident refugees, the Dutch government requires working refugees to contribute seventy-five percent of their income to cover the cost of food and living expenses.20 After a six month

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18 This process looks slightly different for unaccompanied minors and children, but does not ensure or expedite access to asylum.
19 The Dutch government is also notoriously slow in processing requests for family reunification which can contribute to the lengthy assessment periods and higher-than-average return rates of asylum seekers.
20 Other European countries have also attracted criticism for plans to confiscate cash and valuables from refugees when they enter the country in order to pay for their resettlement expenses. Denmark’s government, for example, wants to seize any amount above 10,000 kroner. Two German states- Bavaria and Bage-
period of residence, refugees are allowed to work for up to twenty-four weeks of the year in order to manage the impact on local labor markets. Asylum seekers are also required to declare any savings or valuables they bring into the country to the COA (this may include personal possessions such as smartphones or wedding rings), which may be used as collateral for required asylum payments.

Settlement Patterns and Local Perspectives

Historically, asylum seekers have been primarily settled in major towns and cities across Holland, including Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft and Eindhoven. This is largely due to patterns of reunification for refugee families and close friends from the same countries of origin. Refugee communities tend to be clustered in relatively segregated enclaves in the lower-income parts of these cities, often in and around the social housing complexes that accommodate new arrivals. Prior to the Syrian migration crisis affecting EU nations in 2013, the Netherlands was home to approximately 200,000 refugees. The top countries of origin for resident refugees were: Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, and Somalia.

The labor market position of refugees in the Netherlands is, and has been, generally poor. With restrictions to 24 weeks of work a year and barriers to employment such as employee required permits for refugees. Because of the meager earning potential, nearly half of all refugees in the country subsist on social assistance programs and often seek employment illegally in a highly exploitative alternative jobs market. These factors in combination have influenced a growing negative public perception of refugees, especially in relation to criminal activities and workforce participation (Vos 2016).

Württemburg- plan to claim cash and possessions worth more than €750 and €350 respectively. Switzerland already requires refugees to contribute any amount above 1,000 francs, though they may re-claim the amount paid if they leave the country within six months.
The Syrian Migration Crisis and “Brexit”

Between January and October 2015 more than 57,000 people sought asylum in the Netherlands. The majority of the arrivals were Syrians (47%), followed by lesser numbers from Eritrea (17%), Iraq (6%) and Afghanistan (COA 2015). This was a surge in asylum seekers not seen in the country since the height of World War II. And, the direct entry of such unexpectedly large numbers of refugees into the country quickly overwhelmed the systems of registration and assessment—undermining public confidence and drawing intense political scrutiny toward the weaknesses of existing reception mechanisms. EU nations in general were not accustomed to the large-scale, on-shore arrivals of refugees from such active zones of conflict; nor were their technical procedures of reception or registration prepared for a regional event of this magnitude. The breakdown of EU asylum mechanisms exposed cracks in asylum procedures and immigration control throughout the region, sharpening the apparent deficit in capacity and resources of countries on the frontier borders. Within weeks, Hungary and Austria announced border closures and enacted strict control policies that criminalized any migrants attempting to gain entry into the countries through spontaneous arrival from Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon or Greece.

Anxieties in Great Britain also boiled over in a major display of discontent, as the ‘migration crisis’ ushered the country’s leading critics of the EU into the mainstream. For the once fringe proponents of a British exit from the EU, the arrival of Syrian migrants stood as a panacea for all that was wrong with the regional union. And a majority of those who turned out to vote on the EU referendum agreed. Over the course of the Brexit campaign, immigration became a primary focal point for politicians and voters throughout Europe—polling revealed that immigration quickly rose to the top issue of concern for residents of 12 European nations during months leading up to the vote in Great Britain. Amid the Brexit frenzy, the media portrayed the arrival of migrants as an

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21 According to the figures from the Dutch COA, by far the largest group (about 18,000) is 18 to 29 years old. Next are the groups aged 30 to 39 years (nearly 10,000 asylum seekers) and 12 to 17 years (5,031). There are about 10,000 minors in the refugee reception centers. Fifteen to twenty percent of the residents are children of school age.
inundation, blasting images made public by far right leader Nigel Farage of a poster with refugees crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border with the words “BREAKING POINT” written over the picture. In smaller script, the line above read, “We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders (Hall 2016).” Although Europe has experienced but a fraction of Syrian refugees in comparison to neighboring host states (approximately 1 million Syrian refugees have requested asylum in Europe, compared to the 4.8 million refugees residing in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey), the drama of such an historic event provided ample opportunities for elites throughout the region to exploit anxieties and play to the extremes, including calls for a ‘Nexit’ among far right party leaders in the Netherlands.

Prior to the enforcement of the Merkel Plan, Syrian refugees arrived to the Netherlands by three main routes: the Western Balkan route, the Eastern Mediterranean route, and the Central Mediterranean route. Entry primarily occurred through sea ports in either Greece or Italy via long, dangerous journeys across Turkey and the Aegean or Mediterranean Sea. For those continuing on to the Netherlands, refugees then traveled north- often by foot- along the railway lines, through Macedonia and Serbia, into Hungary (or Slovenia) and Croatia, and towards Germany before crossing the southern border of the Netherlands to claim asylum.22

Since the Merkel Plan, the on-shore arrivals from Greece to the Netherlands have all but stopped. Syrian refugees are, instead, airlifted directly from Turkey to one of several reception sites for processing and resettlement by the COA. The reception sites include thirty-two large and medium-sized cities across the country, including Rotterdam, Maastricht, and Zeist. Municipal authorities in these areas enter a voluntary contract with the COA, with quotas set for a 6-month period. As part of the contract, municipalities agree to house a certain number of refugees and to

22 It did not matter that these images were later discovered to be ‘fake’ pictures of people crossing a border in the Middle East.
coordinate with local agencies (often the Dutch Refuge Council) to provide integration services and support (ERN 2015).

In addition to the broader regional and national controversies surrounding the distribution plan for refugees in the EU, the COA municipal contracts have become a major source of tension among locals within receiving towns and cities. The main points of contention are municipal financial support and social housing availability. Municipal authorities have complained to the Danish government that there is not enough money available to provide the services required. Nor is there enough housing. Before the current arrivals from Syria began, there was a significant social housing shortage across the country. Housing associations, which used to own most of these houses, have in recent years sold much of their social housing stock, and the increase in the number of asylum seekers has only exacerbated the problem. Municipalities in the north ran out of social housing options for refugees and have, instead, repurposed unused prison facilities to accommodate arriving refugees; which has drawn its fair share of criticism. But the shortages of social housing for refugees and other Dutch residents remains a major source of concern and a favorite point of reference for illiberal elites in their anti-migrant appeals.

**Symbolic Elite Rhetoric and Anti-Migrant Mobilizations**

Political elites from the country’s growing far right movements have capitalized upon local unease and uncertainty relating to the number and scale of migrant arrivals as well as the momentum from the departure of Great Britain from the EU. Recent mass casualty events throughout Europe, the most recent being an attack on a Christmas market in Berlin, also feature centrally in anti-refugee antagonisms. The infamous leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), Geert Wilders, has made xenophobic rhetoric routine in public statements that are broadcast nationwide, saying that “refugees need to be locked up in asylum centers” and that Dutch women need to be protected from “testosterone bombs” waging “sexual jihad” (Cluskey 2015). He has blamed refugees for rising sexual assault rates throughout the region, and makes frequent calls for
the Netherlands to close its borders to “all asylum seekers”. At PVV party rallies, supporters pass out fake pepper spray or ‘resistance spray’ with images of fleeing migrants printed on the sides of the small containers. In general, political parties are the main vessel through which illiberal elites exercise their muscle for anti-migrant mobilization. This is increasingly the case for a proliferating base of far right parties that seem to be splintering along lines of anti-migrant extremism. Self-appointed ‘anti-crime’ groups who are known to be expressly anti-migrant have also ballooned, from 124 groups in 212 to 661 in 2016. Many of these groups promote “organized vigilance against outsiders and the large number of foreigners in our communities (NYT 2016).”

Tensions have come to a head in many municipalities, including recent wildcat protests in Oude Pekela (a mid-size city near the German border) whose citizens expressed rising fear over the number of arriving refugees and the lack of space to accommodate them in the town. The protests have become violent in places like Enschede, another mid-size industrial city in the eastern part of the country; where local PVV party activists and anti-crime group members attacked refugee reception centers with firebombs and teargas. Refugees in the Brabant village of Heesch have likewise been targeted amid plans for the construction of a new reception center in the town’s center (Vos 2016).

Much of the anti-migrant activism revolves around town halls and local municipal offices. Anti-migrant groups have hurled bottles and fireworks outside council meetings, sent bullets in the mail to officials, and dumped severed pigs’ heads at sites of proposed refugee centers. Politicians competing for national power have seized on local tensions, driving a wedge between local municipal authorities and their constituents in order to consolidate more centralized support at the national level. Several legislative leaders of the PVV, including Jack van der Dussen, have publicly fueled the controversies over municipal resettlement contracts and housing shortages; saying that,

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23 In December 2016, Wilders was found guilty of inciting discrimination against migrants by a panel of 3 judges in a national court.
“Municipal authorities do not have the best interest of their communities in mind. Instead, they violate residents’ trust by contracting with the COA to overrun the services and residences of the town with refugees. The end goal should be stronger national policies to reduce migrant arrivals altogether which would bring an end to the municipal contract program (NLTimes 2016).”

Table 6.1: Cross-Case Comparison, Kenya and the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KENYA</th>
<th>THE NETHERLANDS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refuges Numbers: 638,000 (registered)</td>
<td>Refugee Numbers: 49,900 (registered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Regime: GoK-UNHCR</td>
<td>Refugee Regime: GoN, COA (and municipal officers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Dimension of Threat:</td>
<td>Structural Dimension of Threat:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garissa University attacks</td>
<td>Syrian migration crisis/Brexit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign policy toward Al-Shabaab</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Past history of resettlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Migrant Elite Rhetoric:</td>
<td>Anti-Migrant Elite Rhetoric:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Kenyatta makes Al-Shabaab connection with</td>
<td>1. Geert Wilders and PVV portray Syrian migration as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugees in camps. Pledges to shut down</td>
<td>‘inundation’ of Europe.</td>
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<tr>
<td>camps and crack-down on refugee presence in</td>
<td>2. Focus antagonisms against refugees at the</td>
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<tr>
<td>cities.</td>
<td>municipal level to incite opposition against</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Opposition uses refugee threat and attacks to</td>
<td>federal government decisions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>question the competency of the Kenyatta</td>
<td>3. Exploits momentum from Brexit to advocate</td>
</tr>
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<td>regime.</td>
<td>similar departure.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mechanisms of Mobilization:
Mechanisms of Mobilization:
Using the police and security forces.

Using the PVV party system and supporters.

Examples of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity:
Coordinated police harassment
Stalking, theft and vandalism of refugee property
Stabbings and physical violence

Examples of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity:
Imagery and language suggesting violence
Protests and rallies at municipal offices
Physical violence (including gun violence)
Vandalism of refugee homes and shops

6.3 Lebanon and the United States

CASE 1: Lebanon: Regime Context and Resettlement Practices

Lebanon has a long and storied history of hosting refugees in the region. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War 100,000 Palestinians fled to the country. Today, 450,000 of these refugees and their descendants remain in 12 camps; a clear indication that Lebanon—unlike neighboring Jordan—has not pursued meaningful policies of integration due to fears that such inclusion would upset its delicate sectarian balance of Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians. The arrival of 1.5 million mostly Sunni Syrian refugees has reiterated this history of isolation and exclusion as a way to contain the externalities of such a large-scale immigration event, especially as Syrian migrants have risen to over a quarter of the population in Lebanon.
As these practices may suggest, Lebanon is not party to the 1951 Convention Pertaining to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, both of which are the central fixtures of the international refugee regime guiding the designation and treatment of those seeking protection from persecution or life-threatening circumstances in their countries of origin. The country also lacks any domestic legislation specifically addressing the status of refugees. Refugee status is, at present, determined mainly by the provisions of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Lebanon and the UNHCR in September 2003. The MOU provides a mechanism for the “issuing of temporary residence permits to asylum seekers (LOC 2015).” Under the terms of the MOU, the UNHCR adjudicates claims for asylum and the government issues a $200 (USD) temporary residence permit, normally for three months but possibly extended for six to nine months with additional fees as high as $2,000 (USD). The existing legal instruments pertaining to refugee status and treatment have been widely criticized by the international community, as well as other independent stakeholders of protection, as inadequate and insufficient. In 2010, for instance, the UNHCR reported that, “Refugees enjoy few, if any, legal rights in Lebanon. (UNHCRd 2014).”
The only piece of domestic legislation that relates to refugees is the Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country which was enacted in 1962 which stipulates provisions for providing sanctuary to refugees as well as their subjugation to deportation for any ‘illegal’ activities.24

Other instructions applicable to the entry of Syrians into Lebanon have been published by the General Directorate of General Security (GDGS). These assign lengths of stay and require different supporting documentation depending on the purpose of stay (tourism, attending school, receiving medical treatment, etc). These instructions stipulate that, “no Syrian shall be permitted to enter as a refugee save in exceptional circumstances as shall be later determined in coordination with the Ministry of Social Affairs.” They further state that, “Syrians previously registered as refugees will be allowed to reenter if they meet the conditions set out in this memorandum”, and that, “a notarized commitment not to seek employment shall be provided when renewing temporary residency permits…by Syrian refugees holding UNHCR certificates (Saliba 2015, General-Security 2016).”

In addition to the $200 residency permit refugees are required to purchase (which often includes additional unofficial ‘administrative’ fees), refugees in Lebanon are- as stated by the GDGS instructions- not permitted to pursue employment or participate in any paid work in the country. This stipulation has forced refugees into the black market economy, working illegally in arrangements that compound their vulnerabilities and offer wages at forty-percent less than the

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24 The relevant provisions of this law include articles 26, 31, and 32: Article 26 stipulates that: “Any foreigners who is subject of pursuit or has been convicted for a political crime by a Non-Lebanese authority or whose life or freedom is threatened because of political considerations may ask for political asylum.” Article 31 stipulates that: “If a decision to expel a political refugee has been made it is not permissible to deport such refugee to the territory of a state where his life or freedom are not secured.” Pursuant to article 32, “foreigners who enter Lebanon illegally can be imprisoned for one month to 3 years and/or fined” (GoL 1962 Law, 2016).
$448 per month Lebanese minimum wage rate (ILO 2015). Unemployment among refugees is staggering, doubling to nearly forty-five percent since 2012.

Some eighty-six percent of Lebanon’s refugees live in poor villages, with no access to work or education; there are no formal camps for non-Palestinian refugees in the country. Nearly half of resident refugees reportedly live in unfinished buildings, empty stores, parking lots, and on the periphery of agricultural fields—including in predominately Shiite areas like the Bekaa Valley. Refugees, without systematic support or access to parallel benefits, compete directly with poor members of local communities for access to available resources, including housing and informal sector employment. In the Northern territories (including El-Koura, Beharreh, Zgharta, and Minieh-Dannieh districts), near one of the two main border crossings with Syria, towns and villages have been intensely affected by large-scale refugee arrivals; particularly in terms of competition in the traditional labor markets and the wider economic implications of sectarianism and social polarization since the fall of Homs at the hands of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The influx of Syrian refugees has exacerbated inequalities in host communities to the benefit of land and business owners, while negatively affecting workers. Business and capital owners have taken advantage of Syrian refugees who provide them with cheap labor and rent their properties. Lebanese workers have lost their jobs to Syrians and suffer from rising commodity prices and rents (Oxfam 2016).

Many municipalities have implemented curfews for refugees in response to local fears and anxieties. But the absence of effective law enforcement makes these curfews nearly unenforceable, except by vigilante groups within local host communities. Still, municipalities consider law enforcement as a fundamental means to sustain social cohesion, especially to maintain restrictions on refugee’s livelihood activities or engagement in civil society. The pressure on municipalities is tremendous—garbage collection, infrastructure repair and security needs have doubled, while their respective revenues have declined. Since there are no taxes placed on Syrian refugees (without
access to employment and thereby diminished spending power), there is no sustainable mechanism in place to maintain such public goods and services. A major cause of the problem is that the central government has transferred the responsibility of handling the arrival and settlement of refugees to local authorities without providing the appropriate financial or administrative means with which to do so (Oxfam 2016).

Making matters worse, there is nearly no coordination among humanitarian actors in the country who have overwhelmed municipal leaders with bureaucratic demands and processes. Aid delivery is splintered across several donor organizations with their own procedures and priorities. In response to criticism over the systems of aid and relief in the country, an Oxfam staffer responded, “Municipal leaders do not understand the complexities and overlapping nature of aid relationships. What is more, the fragmentation of assistance is ineffective on a systemic level, and municipalities want more durable and long-term development projects (ReliefWeb 2016).”

Unsurprisingly, local opposition toward refugee arrivals and settlement is on the rise, especially as more of the burden falls on host communities for the coordination of scarce resources and assistance without much- if any- support from the central government. Polling in three of Lebanon’s largest metropolitan districts the year before the 2014 revealed that 90% of local Lebanese support discriminatory policies toward refugees, 75% want to prohibit refugee employment and political freedoms, and over 10% “highly endorse” violence directed toward Syrian refugees (Harb and Saab 2014).25 There are widespread anti-refugee social media campaigns organized at the municipal level calling for action against refugees—including video posts that show violence being carried out against refugee men, women, and children.

_Lebanon: Ethnic Xenophobic Activity, Structural Dimensions of Threat, and the 2014 Elections_

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25 This study was conducted by Dr. Charles Harb and Reem Saab of the American University of Beirut and summarised in an _Al Akhbar English_ article. The surveyed areas were Akkar, the Bekaa Valley, and Wadi Khaled. See more at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/syrian-refugees-lebanons-latest-scapegoat-1532320963#sthash.ZfZAPS2Q.dpuf

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The 2014 elections worked as a pivotal, symbolic event for the exercise of frustrations and anxieties toward refugees (and the central government) among much of the electorate. Not only because the central government had postponed the general election for months-on-end due to a parliamentary deadlock, but because the opposition- led by Michel Aon and his Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) (allied with Hezbollah which supports Assad’s regime in Syria) - campaigned vigorously across the country on an anti-migrant platform which portrayed the central government as incompetent, and its ‘liberal treatment’ of refugees as the main source of rising crime rates, extremist recruitment, unemployment, and inequality (ReliefWeb 2016). The FPM mobilized municipal authorities as party agents throughout the 17-month extended period in the run-up to elections, providing scripts of heavily anti-refugee broadcast materials and instructions on how to, “…suppress the refugee threat with help from the local opposition (Alabaster 2016)” Local municipalities, including those in Ehden, erected party signs at their local offices telling all Syrian workers and all unregistered foreigners in Lebanon to, “Leave by October 31”. Aon was the originator of the ‘curfew dialogue’ and encouraged all municipalities as a symbol of support in the election to enact a 6pm curfew for all resident refugees (or individuals perceived as such) (Chehayeb 2016).

Aon and the FPM are reviving old animosities that stem from historical relationships between Lebanon and Syrian workers—dating back to well before the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, and the influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon. Specific appeals reference the nearly thirty-year occupation of Lebanon by Syrian forces as a basis for discrimination and exclusion. Nationalistic narratives of Lebanon’s ‘superior intelligence and statehood’ (as descendants of the Phoenician people) in the region are also common rhetoric for the FPM elite and their followers. This is especially the case with respect to Syrian workers and what is seen as a social hierarchy between Lebanese and Syrians. Assaf Dahdah, a visiting professor of human geography at Lebanese American University, commented that, “To the people of Lebanon, Syrians are just workers who are valuable only to the extent that they contribute to the economic advancement of Lebanon. They have been useful to the development of the country, but the Lebanese don’t want them to stay. Locals are accustomed to short-term circular patterns of labor migration with the Syrians which complimented the seasonal movement of many middle-class Lebanese
from their winter and summer homes. This indefinite settlement in the country is causing much anxiety among locals, which is being twisted by the FPM for sure (Dahdah 2016).”

FPM spokesman and Minister of Education, Elias Bou Saab, has made repeated remarks relating to the threats of refugees for the people of Lebanon, in relation to a second occupation and a loss of control over daily life in Lebanon, including, “The Lebanese people must take a stand against Sunni extremism and an occupational surge from Syria. These are dangerous times for our country and the insecurities increase with each Syrian crossing the border. History mandates a defense (Chehayeb 2016).” The tone has, likewise, become retaliatory among supporters, with reports of escalating actions against refugees that are becoming increasingly violent. Municipal vigilante groups are suspected of coordinating a nation-wide burning of refugee reception centers from Beirut to Tripoli, affecting nearly 10 towns and villages in between. Atomistic attacks against refugee men include reports of stalking and intimidation on the streets followed by several incidents of forced entry and physical assaults at night in often insecure refugee dwellings. Ali, a refugee from Syria, describes one such attack against him in his home in Jnah when he was, “…shot with a pump-action shotgun by a group of men from a Lebanese political party (HRW 2014).”

Clashes in Arsal between Lebanese forces and extremist groups in August 2014 fueled the rising activisms, including anti-refugee protests that turned violent in several locations. Human Rights Report documented eleven attacks over a three week period after the encounter in Arsal. Several of the attacks involved community groups coordinating through FPM municipal offices to forcible expel refugees from their town. The primary areas affected included Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Northern governorates. In response, Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch in the Middle East and North Africa, Nadim Houry, appealed, “Lebanon’s security forces should protect everyone on Lebanese soil, not turn a blind eye to vigilante political groups who are terrorizing refugees (Houry 2016).” The Lebanese Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (LIFE), a local non-governmental organization, said it had documented two dozen violent attacks against Syrians in the same period. Several of the attacks involved locals with knives or guns pulling refugees out of buses or vans. The majority of these
attacks were reported in the Bekaa, the Nabaa, and the Bourj Hammond neighborhoods of Beirut and Beirut’s southern suburbs (LIFE 2015). The local media reported on similar incidents in Douris, al-Lailaki and Hay al-Sellom—including the tying up of two men by locals who left them as human roadblocks facing traffic. The same day, assailants fired on an unofficial refugee settlement in Hermel, wounding two Syrians (LIFE 2015). No follow-up actions were taken to apprehend or question those responsible for the attacks, according to local agencies. One of the refugee victims explained his ordeal to the police and recorded the following response, “Don’t get so upset about such things. There is really nothing we can do any way (HRW 2014).” In the aftermath of these reports Aon released a statement on the honorable position of police and security forces on the ‘front lines in our communities’ and promised to raise the wages of security and police officers, including more resources and relief for their work (LIFE 2015). Refugees in areas throughout Beirut began reporting the posting of flyers by local residents demanding that Syrians leave their neighborhoods by a certain date. There were also mass SMS messages sent out via an unknown number to large populations of Syrian refugees throughout the city with a message to “Leave immediately or you will be slaughtered or tortured to death (Oxfam 2016).” The stabbing of a Syrian refugee man in Rawda set off a series of copy-cat attacks in several districts, justified as punishment for refugees being out after curfew hours.

Few politicians have stepped up to condemn the violence and harassment. There have been recent statements from Walid Jumblatt of the Progressive Socialist Party and Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah from Hezbollah calling for an end to the brutalities. A group of FPM loyalists in municipal leadership positions, including Antoine Chakhoutra from Dekwaneh (a suburb of northern Beirut), responded with a full page advertisement in the local newspaper that showed images of people (supposed to be Syrian refugees) wielding guns with the text, “Every gathering by Syrians is a sleeper cell directed against the security, economic, livelihood, or environmental sectors of our nation (LIFE 2015).”

The election of Michel Aon and the FPM to the presidency in August of 2016 has left the fate of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in question. The calls for expulsion and concerted attacks continue. Aon made it a promise to end the arrival of Syrians and force their return to their country of origin so that
they may pledge allegiance to Assad. In his inaugural address, Aon stated, “There will be no solution in Syria without the immediate return of the Syrian refugees to their country. The issue of Syrian refugees will be resolved as soon as possible (Alabaster 2016).”

CASE 2: The United States: the History of Resettlement and Third Country Protection

The United States is by far the largest of the 10 “traditional” resettlement countries, in that it has historically accepted more refugees for resettlement than all other member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) combined.26 The US began formally resettling refugees in the aftermath of World War II, admitting over 250,000 displaced Europeans. The first piece of refugee legislation was passed soon thereafter in 1948, called The Displaced Persons Act. The legislation provided for the admission of an additional 400,000 displaced Europeans. It established a precedent of resettlement that is based on country of origin and the urgency of individual situations. The Cold War ushered in an era of heightened political resettlement for refugees who ‘voted with their feet’ by fleeing communist regimes in the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia and Cuba. The US loosened resettlement criteria to also accept refugees from other communist nations including Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Korea and China. The

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26 The US also grants political asylum to more than 20,000 persons each year, extends temporary protected status (TPS) to tens of thousands of foreign nationals who would face refugee-like conditions at home, and offers protection to survivors of human trafficking. The main difference between refugees and asylum seekers in the US is their location. Refugee determinations take place outside the US and asylum claims are considered within the country, but the same standard governs both determinations. Under US law, political asylum can be granted at the discretion of the US Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security to migrants who have a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (INAa 2016).” The legal definition of “refugee” excludes many categories of persons at risk of persecution and violence, and does not correspond to the more expansive public understanding of the term. Under US law, a refugee must live outside his or her country of nationality or, in special circumstances, within his or her country of origin. In addition, a refugee must be at risk on account of an enumerated ground and cannot have persecuted others. Among other requirements, a political asylum seeker must establish that he or she meets the refugee definition (ether based on past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution), did not firmly resettle in a third country, could not have avoided persecution by relocating within his/her country, did not persecute other or commit certain crimes, and is not a security risk (INAb 2016). Under the UN Convention Against Torture (ratified by the US in 1994), withholding can also be granted to a person who established that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured in the proposed country of removal (CFR 2016).
primary sources of assistance for refugees at the time were private ethnic and religious organizations, which formed the basis of the public/private arrangement that characterizes the present-day resettlement program.

In 1975, the US resettled hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees through an ad hoc Refugee Task Force with temporary funding and limited mandate. This encouraged Congress to pass the Refugee Act of 1980, which incorporated the United Nations definition of “refugee” and standardized the resettlement services for all refugees admitted to the US. The Refugee Act provides the legal basis for today’s US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). And set the stage for an expansion of funding to include victims of persecution and violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burma, and Sudan (including Darfuris) in the 1980s and 90s. The US has mostly continued to expand its list of approved countries of resettlement to include Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Bhutan to name a few. Since the beginning of the USRAP, the US has resettled over 3 million refugees, with annual admissions figures ranging from a high of 207,000 in 1980 to a low of 27,110 in 2002 (Bruno 2016, RCUSA 2016).

Each year, the President of the United States, after consulting with Congress and other federal agencies, determines the designated nationalities and processing priorities for refugee resettlement for the upcoming year. The President also has the authority to set annual ceilings on the total number of refugees who may enter the US from each region of the world. This gives the executive branch tremendous authority in controlling and shaping the number of arrivals as well as their respective countries of origin.

There are currently nine refugee resettlement agencies (known as Volunteer Agencies, or ‘VOLAGs’ for short), with over three-hundred local sites and affiliates that provide resettlement and integration support to new arrivals. These organizations include: Church World Service, Ethiopian Community Development Council, Episcopal Migration Ministries, HIAS, The International Rescue Committee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, US Committee for
Refugees and Immigrants, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops/Migration and Refugee Services, and World Relief. They all have cooperative agreements with the Department of State to serve as contracts for the resettlement of refugees. In addition to these domestic actors, there are five international NGOs that operate Resettlement Support Centers around the world under the supervision and funding of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and the US Department of State, and thousands of private citizens who also contribute to these efforts. Other major administrative agencies include the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

Four US states resettled more than 40 percent of refugees since 2010: California (nearly 16 percent); Washington (just under 10 percent); New York (just under 9 percent); and Florida (7 percent). The resettlement patterns of refugees within the states of the US are generally dominated by ethnic communities; meaning that US resettlement agencies try as much as possible to place refugees in areas in which the refugee may already have family members or where there are pre-existing ethnic communities (in order to coordinate services around shared languages and cultural practices). To date, Florida—perhaps unsurprisingly—has resettled more Cubans than all other states combined. New York has resettled the largest number of refugees from former Soviet states, Sierra Leone, and Liberia; whereas California has resettled large numbers of Vietnamese and Iranians. The largest number of arrivals from Iraq was resettled in Michigan and many Somali and Ethiopian

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27 PRM also contracts with overseas processing entities (OPEs) to screen persons referred to the program, and to prepare their cases for consideration by USCIS. OPEs collect important biographic information as well as personal information to assist resettlement agencies in placement decisions, including information on medical conditions, languages spoken, and job history. OPEs enter this data into DOS’s Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS).

28 The International Organization of Migration (IOM) also arranges in coordination with PRM refugee travel to the US through a loan program. PRM also funds nonprofit refugee resettlement agencies to provide ‘reception and placement’ services for refugees for their first 30 to 90 days in the US. ORR coordinates the provision of benefits and services to refugees in the US.
refugees were resettled in Minnesota. The largest number of Sudanese refugees arrived in Texas (Patrick 2004).

The UNHCR also partners with the US refugee resettlement program to identify those in most urgent need of resettlement around the world. The process is referred to as “Third Country Resettlement” which is one of the three “durable (or permanent) solutions” promoted by the UNHCR. Most often, refugees identified for resettlement to the US by the UNHCR are at risk for forced repatriation, face threats in the country of first asylum (or first arrival) similar to those that forced them to leave their homes in the first place, and/or those with particular disabilities or health concerns.29

Despite being the top third country of resettlement, the US retains a large resettlement shortfall that has accumulated to more than 500,000 between 1991 and 2013. It is true that refugee ceilings are rarely reached—and the remaining slots cannot be carried over to the next fiscal year. Thus, the actual number of refugees admitted for resettlement has also dropped dramatically over the last decade.30

9/11 and Refugee Program Reforms

The declining trend in resettlement rates began, most notably, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. In the same way that dramatic expansions of the resettlement program occurred within the context of the Cold War as an important political action against communism, 9/11 inspired a significant reaction

29 The UNHCR communicates recommendations for US resettlement to the DOS via a process of priority referrals, primarily what is called the “P-1” (meaning priority 1) referral or P-1 group referral. There are also P-2 and P-3 referrals for cases involving persons of special humanitarian concern to the US (e.g. Iranian religious minorities) and cases of family reunification.

30 Reasons for the decline include the decreased demand for US resettlement from communist countries, and a new era of interviewing much smaller clusters of refugee candidates from some 80 different countries. Therefore the numbers of refugees declined into smaller clusters, from a greater number of non-Soviet or communist countries, where access to refugees for determination and referral is nearly impossible because of on-going or active conflict. This occurred simultaneously with new security procedures that revealed substantially higher levels of fraudulent refugee claims from new and emerging populations of concern (DOS 2002).
against migrants from predominately Muslim countries that drove resettlement numbers to an historic low. The resettlement program was frozen for 2 months with an emergency moratorium in order to conduct a comprehensive review of procedures, including those involving security. A number of new security measures were adopted as a result and incorporated into the resettlement process, including conducting enhanced security checks of applicants against an additional 10 international databases and using biometrics to track and verify the identities of all refugee travelers before boarding flights to the US.\(^{31}\) Post 9/11 legislation- including the *USA Patriot Act of 2001* and the *REAL ID Act of 2005*- significantly expanded the grounds of inadmissibility based on “terrorist activity.”\(^{32}\) The enhanced security checks affected the admission of thousands of would-be refugees to the US, especially in the Middle East where many individuals already approved by DHS were subsequently denied entry.\(^{33}\) In a recorded response to the media, David Burnham- the co-director of Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) - commented that, “After 9/11 the Bush administration tried to see immigration enforcement-particularly for refugees- as a way to fight terrorism. And it’s just not (Newland 2015).”

\(^{31}\) These background checks are conducted by the USCIS in coordination with the FBI, the CIA, and DOS conduct. Certain refugees receive Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) reviews based on classified criteria. SAO screening also covers persons in unclassified categories that have been established by DOS’s Bureau of Consular Affairs based on US foreign policy interests and security concerns. A major problem with SAO review is that it can cause significant delay in processing refugees—it can take months to receive responses from the relevant agencies in particular cases.

\(^{32}\) As it stands, the terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility have led to the exclusion of thousands of refugees, and the delays and denials in the cases of hundreds of asylum seekers who opposed repressive governments or who supported terrorist groups under duress.

\(^{33}\) A one-year filing deadline for asylum applications and grants was also implemented, along with a heightened burden of proof for asylum claims, new corroborations requirements, and a more exclusive definition of social group membership (Kerwin/MPI 2011). The “expedited removal” process established in 1996, has also expanded since 9/11 to concern noncitizens (with insufficient or no documents) who arrive at US ports of entry, cross US land borders, or enter by sea which also affected the claims of thousands of asylum seekers.

The US also has limited legal tools to admit and offer temporary protection to persons who do not meet the strict refugee standard. It can “parole” noncitizens into the nation, but only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or to provide a significant public benefit. It can extend temporary protected status to residents of a foreign state in which there is an armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that temporarily prevent them from returning. It can also exercise its discretion not to remove noncitizens in certain cases. Finally, it can provide temporary visas- leading to lawful permanent resident status in some cases- to certain survivors of severe human trafficking.
Despite their symbolic value, the moratorium and enhancement of security screenings did little to assuage the intense political backlash and public scrutiny. The scenario was unfamiliar to say the least; since its inception, the US refugee program- and in particular those involved in admission and resettlement work- had never been thrust into the limelight of national controversy in such a dramatic way. Nearly every top-level federal employee involved in the program was called to testify before congress, despite any evidence that refugees formally resettled in the US were involved in planning or carrying-out the 9/11 attacks (DOS 2003).

In response, the DOS, in coordination with DHS and UNHCR field affiliates, shifted their focus away from the resettlement of refugees from the Middle East toward displaced populations elsewhere, including the Somali Bantu, Columbian refugees in Ecuador and Costa Rica, and the “Meshketian Turks” in southern Russia (Dewey 2003). The acts of exclusion by USRAP- and coordinating agencies- did not, however, designate enhanced protection mechanisms or special provisions for refugee groups (particularly those perceived to be of Middle Eastern origin) already resettled in the US. The vulnerabilities of these populations to rising hostilities among citizens across the country was immediately evident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released figures of hate crimes against immigrants in the months following 9/11 which showed a 1,700 percent increase in the number of discriminatory acts (mostly violent) committed against immigrants, including refugees (FBI 2001).

US Invasion of Iraq, the Islamic State, and the Economy: the Rise of ‘Blue Collar’ Authoritarianism

The United States’ decision to invade Iraq on 20 March 2003 was a deeply partisan issue that polarized large portions of the electorate and drew widespread condemnation from the international community, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Justifications for the invasion centered upon the “imminent threat” of then-President Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorism, including attacks in the US. Republicans in congress overwhelmingly supported the Bush administration with the passage of the Iraq Resolution
(formally the *Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002*), which authorized military action against Iraq. The invasion of Iraq was a continuation of the paradigm of US foreign policy outlined the previous year in the *National Security Strategy of the United States* (published on 17 September 2002), also referred to as the Bush Doctrine (Krauthammer 2008). This doctrine set forth a collection of strategy principles rooted in neoconservative ideology and reflected a unilateralist approach of intervention, including pre-emptive strikes and democratic regime change. In his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush declared, “Americans are free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity (Knickmeyer 2006).”

In a previous speech to the cadets at the US Military Academy at West Point, in June 2002, Bush spoke directly to the perceived threats of the nation saying, “If we wait for the threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long—our security will require transforming the military you will lead—a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives (Krauthammer 2008).”

After nearly nine years of the war in Iraq, in which tens of thousands of Iraqis died and nearly 4,500 US service-members were killed, it was apparent that there would be no clear victory for the US. The US declared an end to the Iraq War on 15 December 2011 and withdrew the last convoy of American troops three days later. But not without serious consequences for the deepening of sectarian divisions and the growth of extremism throughout the war-ravaged country. The perceived failure of the Bush administration’s foreign policy approach in the Middle East (including the exorbitant costs- in terms of the economy and human lives- associated with the invasion and occupation), turned large portions of the US public against the President and
Republican members of congress. The end of the war in Iraq did nothing, however, to quell the anxieties of Americans toward terrorism and its implications for daily life in towns and cities across the country. If anything, anxieties rose as a new terrorist threat, called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syrian (ISIS), capitalized upon the chaos in Iraq left behind by the invasion, focusing coordinated energies of destruction toward the west with highly publicized calls for violence and disorder against North Americans and Europeans.

The seeds of ISIS were being sown as the US experienced the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s, known as the ‘Recession of 2008’ (officially lasting from December 2007 to June 2009). The recession affected the lives of millions of Americans with the bursting of an 8 trillion dollar housing bubble, resulting in a significant loss of family wealth and cutbacks in consumer spending that would cripple business growth and investment and trigger massive job loss nation-wide. In 2008 and 2009, the US labor market lost 8.4 million jobs (or 6.1 percent of all payroll employment), and the income of working-age household fell by more than $5,000 (USD) - a total of ten percent- in the two year span. The recovery came slowly with controversial bank bailouts and corporate subsidization, and was overseen by the newly elected administration of President Obama and a broad majority of Democrats in both houses of congress (EPI 2010).

For many Americans, the damage was too severe to forget (or forgive) and mixed with rising fears and anxieties over, not only financial security within their communities and households, but also personal and political security from a nascent foreign terrorist organization in a region of the world that was still associated with the events of 9/11. The economy continued to improve overall, but it did not fully restore certain- primarily industrial- sectors of the economy to where they once were. The perceived loss penetrated American psyche for those who felt threatened by

34 This was especially the case as intelligence information was made public that no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq—and that the Bush administration was very likely aware of the flaws in the intelligence they used to justify the invasion from the beginning.
the world, abandoned by the system, and betrayed by the leadership. Inklings of discontent played out in virtual communities of people on social media, Fox News, and other alternative sources of news and commentary that carried inertia into emotionally charged narratives of grievance and loss. An alternative ideology began to cluster around national identity and security, social and demographic change, and rightful priority to privilege and prosperity.

*The Mobilization of the Alt-Right in America*

Donald Trump made a name for himself as a real-estate billionaire-turned-reality TV star, whose brutal firing practices drew millions of viewers each week. He relied on this celebrity as a platform to air his political skepticism against President Barack Obama; accusing the President of lying about his place of birth (in the US) and thereby violating the constitutional rules of the office. He became an agent of antagonism and irreverence throughout Obama’s presidency—beyond what had been experienced previously with the break-away Tea Party Movement. Trump’s approach mixed the pageantry of a seasoned ratings-mogul with the tactics of the far-right in Europe in order to build a brand as a high-powered Washington outsider with all the answers. He had considered entering the presidential race as the Reform party nominee in October 1999, and again in 2012; but did not formally commit as a candidate—this time for the Republican Party nomination—until the run-up to the 2016 presidential election. Candidate Trump campaigned on a platform of status restoration, in particular dismantling all the decisions made during Obama’s tenure that, in his words, “…have disadvantaged the American people by making [them] absolutely less safe and less prosperous (Tumulty 2016).” Hence, his revival of Ronald Reagan’s well-known slogan from his 1980 campaign for president: Make America Great, *Again.*

The notion that there was a paradigm through which the US could turn back the clock to a pinnacle of past prosperity while moving toward an even brighter future seemed at first peculiar. But it tapped into the emotions that millions of predominantly white, working class- Americans

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35 Although Trump denies having known about Reagan’s popular use of the phrase.
felt in post-9/11, post-recession society. Trump’s message (including his modes and methods of
delivery) drew enthusiastic support from those who felt ‘left behind’ by the progress of the nation
or threatened by its future trajectory. Part of realizing this ‘again’ meant addressing much of the
social and political change (real and perceived) of the past decade, including reigning in the forces
of globalization through opposition to free trade agreements and controlling the number and nature
of migrants who either currently reside within or are seeking entry into the US.

Trump made two promises relating to immigration throughout his campaign, (1) that he
would build a wall at the US southern border with Mexico to stop immigrants from entering the
country illegally and (2) that he would enhance the screening of migrants from predominately
Muslim countries (both residing in and traveling to the US). In the context of these commitments,
Trump labeled Mexican immigrants “rapist and criminals”; he also repeatedly targeted immigrants
from Latin American countries as threats to the ‘American workforce’. He frequently railed against
the USRAP as well as the arrival of Syrian refugees—saying that, “They have used the weaknesses
of this process against us to come into our country and kill us. This is a great Trojan Horse (Tumulty
2016).” Trump also called for something of a ‘loyalty test’ to gauge the ideological leanings of
Muslim Americans throughout the nation, which would also include similar screenings for any
individuals arriving to the country from predominately Muslim countries. The appeals were
relentless (in his rallies, on twitter, and elsewhere) and nearly unapologetic, winning tremendous
favor among his supporters and contributing to his electoral victory in November 2016.

Recent real-time figures for hate crimes against migrants from 2015 through 2016 show a
nearly 3,000 percent increase in incidents of harassment and violence. And in the two days
following Trump’s election as President of the United States, nearly 400 reports of such crimes
were reported (SPLC 2017). The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC)- a legal advocacy group
based in the US- has created a *HateWatch* project to record all reported incidents of xenophobia
and intolerance from news articles, social media posts, and direct submissions (online and through
twitter, at #ReportHate). The President of SPLC, Richard Cohen, made the following comment in relation to this work, “These are unprecedented times for immigrant communities and their supporters. In twenty-five years of this work, I’ve never experienced anything on this scale of intolerance and activism against immigrants. Someone has to account for the consequences of spreading such fear and hate. Our lawmakers are refusing to act—it is up to us to protect our neighbors and make sure we uphold the values of this country (Cohen 2016).”

Table 6.2: Cross-Case Comparison, Lebanon and the United States

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<tr>
<th>LEBANON</th>
<th>THE UNITED STATES</th>
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<td>Refugee Numbers: 1,300,000 (2016)</td>
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<td>Structural Dimensions of Threat:</td>
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<td>Anti-Migrant Elite Rhetoric:</td>
<td>Anti-Migrant Elite Rhetoric:</td>
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<td>Aoun and his FPM party campaign on an anti-refuge platform in an elongated election process</td>
<td>Trump scapegoats refugees for insecurity (including crimes and violence) and subversion</td>
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<td>Mechanisms of Mobilization:</td>
<td>Mechanisms of Mobilization:</td>
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<td>the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)</td>
<td>Alt-Right/Political Rallies/Social media</td>
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36 At the time of this writing, President Trump announced a suspension of the USRAP as well as a travel ban on seven predominately Muslim countries in the Middle East.
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<th>Examples of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity:</th>
<th>Examples of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity:</th>
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<td>Social media posts of violence against Syrian refugees</td>
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<td>Kidnappings and 'disappearances’</td>
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Chapter 7: Ethnic Xenophobic Activity: Theoretical and Policy Implications

7.1 The Main Thesis and its Empirical Support

This research has shown that xenophobia is a reality for developed and developing counties alike, often in strikingly similar forms; it has also questioned the paradigms through which scholars have historically, and disparately, examined xenophobia and ethnic conflict. From the outset, I use constructivist insight to examine the conceptual biases that have placed xenophobia in a western framework of theoretical and empirical examination. I re-cast xenophobia in light of ethnic conflict scholarship, in a way that may begin to reveal the broader similarities in the patterns and manifestations of, what I term, ethnic xenophobic activity. And stimulate the development of more systemic cross-regional comparative inquiry.

This research formalizes and develops a cross-national analysis of ethnic xenophobic activity which builds on Kaufman’s (2001) theory of symbolic politics. Throughout this project, I have developed a series of statistical analyses- using an original dataset- that provide systematic confirmation of the integrative theory of ethnic xenophobia. The results of the Heckman selection model show that the determinants of ethnic xenophobic activity include structural dimensions of threat as well as the anti-migrant rhetoric of elites. In addition, these results are not significantly dissimilar across developed and developing host states which provides empirical confirmation of the theoretical concept of ethnic xenophobia. The SEM model further supports the causal pathways of the argument, in particular that elites mediate the meaning of structural dimensions of threat that drive violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity.

Two pairs of countries- Kenya and the Netherlands and Lebanon and the US- illustrate the similarities in the contemporary patterns and outcomes of ethnic xenophobic activity across very different cases; which, once again, provides additional empirical confirmation that the distinctions between ethnic conflict and xenophobia are false conceptual constructs. Despite geographical, historical, political, economic, and social differences, common causal themes shine through; the
Garissa attacks, Syrian migration crisis and Brexit, the 2014 elections, and 9/11 (leading into the invasion of Iraq and the economic crisis of 2008) were all significant structural threats that provided opportunities for elites to exploit native anxieties with divisive symbolic rhetoric.

The remainder of this chapter is organized around a discussion of the implications of this research across the following three categories: (1) policy-making at both the national and international level, (2) practical intervention in the field of migration advocacy and protection, and (3) future academic engagements in the systematic study of ethnic conflict and xenophobia. This discussion is based on a series of conversations and interviews with nearly two dozen actors in these fields, and is intended to offer insight into how the results of this study can influence practical, academic and policy efforts to reduce the prevalence of ethnic xenophobic activity in all its forms. It is also intended to shed light on pathways of future research opportunities in this area of study.

This project may lead some readers to feel pessimistic about the future prospects for reduction or prevention of ethnic xenophobic activism. But, I believe, this study shows that ethnic xenophobic activity is far from an inevitable by-product of structural dimensions of threat and symbolic elite rhetoric. There are communities and cases where the theory is falsifiable, where preconditions of ethnic xenophobic activity exist, and yet such intolerance does not occur or is on the decline. While such situations are fruitful areas of future research, as will be discussed further below, the cases examined for this project suggest that these contrasting situations have something in common: refugees and natives have robust and resilient relational networks centered upon economic exchange and associational interconnectedness. This suggests that intercommunal aspects of civil society, especially those in the economic or private sector spheres, are worth exploring as potential bulwarks against the mobilization of anti-migrant intolerance. The notion that these relational frameworks contribute to peace between groups is itself nothing new; in his work on Hindu-Muslim ethnic riots in India, Ashutosh Varshney has argued very clearly that such “intercommunal civic life is the key to peace” (Varshney 2002: 282). How one may go about
developing such intercommunal resilience between refugees and natives is, then, the baseline from which the following recommendations for future policy, practical and academic work are formed. I focus on the prospects of innovation across these categorical sectors that are likely to unlock the development or economic potential of refugees in coordination with local markets for the sake of cultivating robust, prejudice-resilient relationships.

7.1 Policy-Making at both the National and International Level

In its search for the cross-national factors that determine ethnic xenophobic activity, this research has shown specifically that the nature of relationships between native and refugee communities matter a great deal. In particular, ethnic xenophobic activity is shown to occur and intensify in situations where elites mobilize structural threats among natives with anti-migrant rhetoric and symbolism. The potency and effectiveness of these elite exploits depends, however, on the existing relationships between refugees and natives. Since relational ties between these two groups are generally weak across different contexts, elites are able to effectively stir the kinds of emotional potency that mobilize often widespread ethnic xenophobic activity among native groups. More robust relationships between natives and refugees (or migrants in general), especially of the economic variety, are therefore more likely to challenge the credibility of such elite symbolism and build collective resilience against the effectiveness of anti-migrant elite rhetoric in the wake of structural crises and events.

This seemingly simple relational objective confronts a stark policy landscape, however. For one, the international refugee regime- led by the UNHCR- is a juggernaut of complex policy infrastructure (known as the “conceptual maze”) that is stuck between its 20th century past and the realities of 21st century displacement. In broad strokes, the regime has failed- on a number of occasions- to fully transition from the traditional, short-term model of relief application and crisis
response for refugees to integrated, long-term recovery and development solutions. For the most part, the policy paradigm of relief operations remains unchanged from its inception more than half a century ago—refugees flee conflict and persecution to neighboring countries while donor states provide funds for external assistance and protection programs to the UNHCR and its local partners until refugees are able to either return home or until the baton is passed on to development actors to facilitate integration efforts. This approach is based on two faulty assumptions: (1) that the pathway from relief to development (including the integration of refugees into local economies) is linear and (2) that funding sources from donor states will remain consistent through the period of external intervention and assistance. The reality is that most large-scale, increasingly protracted refugee relief situations are stuck in an operational phase that lies somewhere past immediate relief intervention but just shy of tactical development work at the community level. The result is a nebulous infrastructure of aid dependency and policy ambiguity which props-up the fallacy of temporariness with waning stocks of resources and attention from donors. This conventional approach to refugee assistance is increasingly unsustainable. The relief-development limbo contributes to the policies of refugee containment and sequestration sought out by so many host state governments, and animates the stereotypes of refugees as ‘dependents’ or ‘burdens’ within host state society. It often too precludes meaningful pathways to longer-term social engagement or relationship building between refugees and host communities since many refugees remain unable to work (legally) or engage in livelihood activities that would promote inclusion in business, civic life, or formal institutions. The skills, talents, and aspirations of generations of refugees is frequently squandered—ranging from the Dadaab camps in Kenya to the Nyarugusu camp in

37 The UNHCR has technically had a long history of searching for durable solutions alongside development actors (starting with the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, ICARA, in 1984), including a number of policy papers and deliberations, but efforts to change/implement policy or apply new frameworks on the ground have been minimal.
Tanzania and the position of many Palestinians throughout the Middle East, such situations are often described as a ‘denial of rights and a waste of humanity’ (USCRI 2004).

As a second, related issue, primary host states have taken it upon themselves to unilaterally develop exclusionary, often rights-violating policies, outside of the regime framework in order to minimize the impact of refugees on local labor markets, politics and civic life. This is especially true as- once again- refugee crises persist into decades-long, if not permanent, situations of arrival and settlement. Simultaneously, the main donor states of the international refugee regime (including the US, Australia and a handful of nations in Western Europe) are dramatically reducing both monetary and resettlement support which places even more pressure and demand on developing neighbor states to host larger numbers of refugees with less resources, for longer periods of time. The framework of durable solutions is, then, becoming increasingly regionalized and focused on host states within refugees’ regions of origin. The processing of refugees off-shore, the designation of ‘safe places’ within border regions of neighboring states or even within countries of origins themselves, and the premature return of still very vulnerable people-groups to existing zones of conflict and persecution all signal a significant shift in the nature of involvement and commitment of the regime’s main actors. The Merkel Deal- as discussed in the case of the Netherlands in Chapter 6- is perhaps the most immediate, well-known case-in-point of such regionalization efforts; which airlifts thousands of newly arrived refugees from European Union countries back to camps in Turkey in exchange for partial accession to the EU and a suite of diplomatic and material accompaniments. The result of this trend has been for host states to either threaten the dissolution of camps and settlement policies in order to push back against the short-falls of commitment (often perceived as negligence), or to continue to force the containment of refugees into frequently overcrowded, under-resourced camps for the foreseeable future. Needless to say, this does nothing to promote sturdier relations between refugees and their hosts, and only advances the use of symbolic politics as a strategy of extremist elites.
With a glacially paced international refugee regime that is wedged between the diminishing commitment of major donor states and the exhaustion of neighboring host countries, the private sector is emerging as a potential remedial intermediary. Both Alexander Betts and Paul Collier have called for advanced private sector engagement in refugee crises, specifically with the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) in or around large concentrations of refugee populations (Betts and Collier 2015). In theory, SEZs hit the sweet-spot of a ‘win-win-win’ scenario for refugees, their countries of origin, and their hosts: they have the potential to incubate ‘economies in exile’ for large concentrations of long-staying refugees by providing an infrastructure of industrial training and occupation with multinational companies as well as those similarly displaced by conflict or disaster; they promote commercial and industrial development and trade for the host country with high rates of return on limited resource-commitment or investment; they contribute to a framework of resiliency within the region of origin for potential dislocations in the future; and they provide refugees with a source of employment and access to a full-range of livelihood activities and benefits, including relationships with co-workers of native and foreign origin. As a potential side-benefit, SEZs could also help streamline the flow and delivery of aid and assistance to refugees and host communities in ways that are similar to camps, without the restrictions on freedom, independence or dignity and without the loss of investment once camps are closed. In addition, SEZs are complimentary of UNHCR’s policy to avoid the establishment of refugee camps wherever possible, especially in regions where displacement is likely to include large numbers of people for long periods of time. The UK government in coordination with several UN offices and sub-contracting agencies is presently piloting an SEZ project for refugee residents in the Zaatari refugee camp in southern Jordan. The Zaatari camp in Jordan lies a short distance away from the King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area, which is already designated as an SEZ. This is the place where some of the sharpest policy minds in the world are at work, pushing for a plan to relocate Syrian refugees out of camp and into legal work and residence. On 26 June 2016, a deal was finalized between the Government of Jordan and the
EU granting sought-after trade concessions in exchange for work opportunities for refugees. The agreement spans ten years and will apply to fifty-two product groups that are manufactured in SEZs, on the condition that producers employ more Syrian refugees. One of the primary aims is to attract investment and employment, but the SEZ may also have implication for the rebuilding of the Syrian economy in exile (especially for business or corporations that were also forced out by the conflict). It is what Betts has called, “The Zonal Development Model”. He suggests that the development of such manufacturing clusters will benefit refugees, and will have great implications for a struggling Jordanian economy that is in desperate need of an industrial opportunity; it may also have future implications for developing pathways to circular labor migration in the region (Miller 2016). The goal, of course, is for successful implementation and replication in similar circumstances among some of the most heavily affected host states in the region.

7.2 Practical Interventions in the Field of Migration Advocacy and Protection

For a number of years practitioners in the fields of migration advocacy and protection, particularly for refugees, have stressed the need for programs and efforts to foster self-sufficiency so that refugees can engage meaningfully and reciprocally in the development of their host communities while building (and maintaining) the skills that would be required for work if/when they were to return to their homeland. On the ground, both multilateral and local organizations have worked on such initiatives to reduce refugee reliance on indefinite assistance and to dissolve what the UNHCR has historically called ‘care and maintenance’ programs for refugees in camps. These efforts have focused mainly on long-term refugee situations in rural areas where refugees are granted a plot of land to farm or a herd of livestock to raise in coordination with local farmers and shepherds, often in share-cropping arrangements. But the implications of a self-reliance

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38 The requirement for workforces is 15% Syrian participation now, rising to one-quarter after three years.
approach extend much further, especially as the number of self-settled refugees continues to increase in predominately urban areas.

Across settlement contexts, the policy- or ‘best practices’- goal of practitioners, in general, should be to reduce the number and extent of parallel structures that externalize refugee assistance and interfere with the role of the state and civil society in their inclusion of refugees. Of course the consultation of refugees and local host communities is integral in order to assess and gauge capacity and preparedness of communities both in terms of material support and social receptivity. But developing synergies between the delivery of refugee services and national development planning efforts is an equally imperative piece of the settlement process. This might include a framework similar to the self-reliance strategies employed for refugee groups and host communities in the camps of Northern Uganda, or the less formalized arrangement of Sahrawi refugee workers in the textile factories of southwest Algeria. Central to these efforts is a major shift-in-focus among service providers toward a market-based approach that builds upon the economic activities of refugees themselves; of particular interest are cash-based interventions for refugees, especially in urban settings. The adaptation and innovation of service delivery for refugees is more crucial than ever before—not only because of the challenges of providing services to self-settled populations scattered throughout cities, but also because of the market implications of material aid in these situations. Cash-based assistance programs may seem relatively insignificant on the surface, but they have tremendous development potential for refugees and host communities alike: they restore the purchasing power of refugees as independent consumers in the host state economy; they empower refugees to choose how they may best go about satisfying their needs as a household; they promote platforms of equal exchange in goods and services between refugees and locals; and they cultivate both formal and informal financial planning and institutional engagement for refugees and their families, including small business development, home ownership, and emergency preparedness often through rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). Cash-
based interventions are likely to contribute to stronger private sector engagement in the
development activities of refugee service providers as well, to unlock the development potential of
refugees and establish what have been called “refugee development coalitions” which may include
intercommunal consumer interest groups or multi-ethnic investment boards. The goal is to engage
the private sector in the cultivation of intercommunal resilience. In Germany, for example nearly
forty companies have joined together in an initiative called “We Together” (or “Wir-Zusammen”).
Thyssenkrupp, for example, has pledged the creation of an additional 150 apprenticeship
placements and 230 internships for refugees at their facilities over the next two years. Such skills-
based training arrangements with the private sector are a strong step toward providing integrated
support services to refugees. The We Together group have developed a website and are presently
organizing a summit so that they may present their integration programs together for the first time.
In addition, the companies are consulting with refugee scholars and experts to expand their
knowledge and update their practices to successfully incorporate large numbers of refugees into
the workforce. As a principle of this approach, they establish working-care groups of German
employees (including their families) to act as mentors and resources to refugees who join their
ranks. Multinational companies such as IKEA and Starbucks have likewise made pledges to
employ refugees and provide integration services and support within their places of work. Overall,
there is a great need to understand the economic lives of refugees and host communities better, and
to stop looking at outcomes as shaped solely by states and refugees, but also by markets and private
interest groups.

For practitioners in the field, planning on the basis of data, information and analysis should
also be paramount—especially as refugees increasingly face environments of hostility and
uncertainty. Of particular importance are protection interventions and programs that enhance the
routine monitoring and evaluation of refugee (and more broadly migrant) vulnerability without fear
of reprisal or loss of status. The scale of ethnic xenophobic activity presented throughout this
project illustrates clearly the weaknesses of existing community-based protection frameworks, including the ways that information is reported, shared and analyzed.

7.3 Academic Engagement in the Study of Ethnic Conflict and Xenophobia

It has been shown that the existing scholarship relating to xenophobia suffers from a conceptual bias that prevents it from appreciating the cross-national similarities in the manifestations of anti-migrant intolerance across developed and developing regions. By situating xenophobia within the theoretical framework of ethnic conflict, this study has leveled the playing field of inquiry so that future scholars may embark on similar cross-national inquiry within an integrated conceptual paradigm. The use of the term *ethnic xenophobic activity* is meant to indicate a shift toward a more intentionally equalized approach to the study of anti-migrant prejudice and actions of all types across all contexts. It is intended also to reinforce that xenophobic activity qualifies as a form of ethnic conflict whether it occurs in New York or Nairobi.

An important departure for this project is the use of a mixed methods approach to inquiry. Existing studies of xenophobia tend toward econometric analysis using regional survey datasets while the ethnic conflict literature remains heavily saturated with qualitative case studies. This project shows that the limitations of each approach are best reduced when used in combination with one another. It also demonstrates that important causal pathways can be systematically explored for a range of seemingly dissimilar cases. This is not to say that weaknesses do not exist. In many ways, this study raises more opportunities than it does answers in terms of how future scholarship may go about examining the politics of migration and intolerance.

The research on incidents of anti-migrant activity is in its infancy. An obvious next step to extend what has been started here would be to examine cross-national incidents (and intensity levels) of ethnic xenophobic activity across migrants of all types. This will require extensive and tedious attention to data collection from a variety of sources to develop estimates of global
migration figures, especially for countries in developing regions. The question is raised as to whether the processes of ethnic xenophobic activity put forth in this study (for refugees) would in fact extend to other types of migrants as well; or does the symbolic politics of elites somehow work differently across different categories of foreigners. Generalizations have been made throughout this study that assume the processes work the same, but this is not adequately examined empirically, and there are theoretical reasons that could be thought of as to why differences in outcomes might exist.

Yet another way forward is to build an interactive, transnational database—similar to that of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s HateMap—to capture reports of ethnic xenophobic activity in real time across regions. This, again, would require broad-scale coordination among a variety of actors on-the-ground and likely local law enforcement agencies as well—but the implications for data to influence the improvement of policies of community based protection would be immense. Such data could also provide opportunities for projects to examine trends in ethnic xenophobic activity spatially, with visualization of data points and activisms around the world.

In the short-term, the case studies presented here could be expanded to include in-depth examinations of cases where ethnic xenophobic activity has low-level occurrence or has declined over time. Two primary candidates for inclusion in such an endeavor are Uganda and Canada which have both experienced trends counter to the majority of countries with respect to anti-migrant hostilities and activisms. Countries in Latin America should also be included in future research, especially as they become increasingly popular alternative destinations of resettlement for refugees from major disasters and conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. And because of some of the unique institutional arrangements at the regional level that are meant to increase cross-national cooperation and curb hostilities toward refugees, in particular the “Solidarity Resettlement Programme”. Such in-depth case examinations could further expose the national and municipal-
level institutional influences on ethnic xenophobic activity, including political party structures and resettlement policy frameworks.

The exact symbolic language of elites could be further examined as well. The measure of elite symbolic rhetoric used here is a first-cut at an attempt to shed light on how the construction of hostile threat-narratives influences mass mobilization against perceived outsiders. There are many prospective improvements to be made; for one, elite rhetoric could be categorized into a typology of anti-migrant discourse to shed light on the patterns of symbolic politics that occur most frequently or are most potent across different contexts. Elites could also be categorized by position in relation to the executive office or further specified as national or local level actors. Major policy interventions at both the national and international level are likely worth consideration in future research too—especially as they can often represent the institutionalization of elite rhetoric and legitimation of anti-migrant actions. Regime level factors—such as the financial or aid contributions and resettlement rates—may likewise hold implications for policy activism and elite rhetoric that remain largely unspecified here.

A general guidance is to move toward a more holistic understanding of the lives of host communities and refugees—most of the work in this area has been done away from academia, by organizations for a particular instrumental purpose: either to enhance livelihood interventions or to justify inclusion of refugees in national development plans. There is a need to develop a theoretically informed and data-driven approach to understanding the dynamics of the social, economic, and political engagement between refugees and locals. The distinct institutional positioning of refugees (and other categories of migrants) is likely to influence the boundaries of such relationships and hold implications for intercommunal life between groups. The fact that refugees lie between state and international governance, between the formal and informal sectors, and between national and transnational economies must also be appreciated—especially as these institutional positions have the potential to foster the growth of transnational communities that
likewise may contribute to innovation and guard against the rise in ethnic xenophobic activity. As long as refugees remain a distinctly ‘humanitarian’ issue in the minds of global development actors, host states and their populations, the true development potential of human mobility will remain unseen and intolerance will likely continue to rise. In the end, to establish resilient relationships between refugees and host communities, the development potential of displacement must begin to be harnessed more effectively.
APPENDIX A: List of Countries in the Analysis

Angola                        Namibia
Austria                       Nigeria
Belgium                       Niger
Burkina Faso                  Norway
Botswana                      Netherlands
Burundi                       Philippines
Canada                        Portugal
Cameroon                      Rwanda
India                         South Africa
Ivory Coast                   Senegal
Central African Republic      Sierra Leone
Chad                          Spain
Congo                         Sri Lanka
Denmark                       Sudan
Djibouti                      Sweden
Democratic Republic of Congo  Switzerland
Egypt                         Syria
Ethiopia                      Tanzania
Finland                       Thailand
France                        Togo
Gambia                        Tunisia
Ghana                         Turkey
Germany                       Uganda
Guinea-Bissau                 United Kingdom
Greece                        United States
Guinea                        Zambia
Indonesia                     Zimbabwe
Iran                          
Iraq                          
Israel                        
Italy                         
Jordan                        
Kenya                         
Liberia                       
Lebanon                       
Libya                         
Mauritania                    
Malaysia                      
Malawi                        
Mali                          
Morocco                       
Mozambique
### APPENDIX B: Summary Statistics of Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Min/Max</th>
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<td>3.24</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>0/72</td>
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<td>7.06</td>
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<td>.364</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Electyr</td>
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<td>.41</td>
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<td>487.11</td>
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<td>554354</td>
<td>19/7949507</td>
</tr>
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<td>UrPopperchs</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>50.36</td>
<td>23.59</td>
<td>0/97.8</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX C: Dissertation Codebook

Anna Rannou

Dissertation Project

CODEBOOK

May 2016

ABSTRACT: The fire-bombing of refugee registration centers throughout Germany in late 2015 was quickly addressed as a “blatant act of xenophobic hatred” in a string of incidents that targeted the growing number of Syrian refugees in the country (UNHCR 2015; Connelly 2015). Similar arsonist attacks against Syrian refugee communities in Lebanon a few months prior received little attention from the international community and were not directly referenced as xenophobic in nature. Speculation quickly swirled around the German attacks; many experts pointed toward the mainstreaming of the radical right along with the growth in native fear and uncertainty as explanations for the uptick in hostilities (Betts 2015; PRI 2015). Others suggested that the fire-bombs were intended as retaliation for preceding events in Paris or as a deterrent for other prospective terrorists in the region (Guardian 2015; Herbert 2015; Times 2015). Meanwhile, the incidents in Lebanon remain largely un-analyzed by scholars or practitioners, left dangling as yet another outburst of violence in a region where isolated incidents of refugee-targeted xenophobia are often buried in the aggregate of ethnic competition and conflict. After the burnings in Lebanon, Nadim Houry - Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) - stated, “Even prior to the large number of arrivals in Lebanon, we have definitely seen an increase in hostilities toward refugees— with arsons, police violence, and local opposition. There is plenty of fear-spreading and blaming from politicians and others, especially in Beirut, but not a lot of attention or concern about the consequences. It is no surprise that no one is talking about these incidents or how comparable they may be to others elsewhere (Houry 2015).”

Despite the exceptional nature of the Syrian migration crisis, the arson attacks in Germany and Lebanon are part of a more general trend relating to a surge in rates of anti-refugee activism across host states worldwide; there is, however, a general lack of systematic inquiry into the common, cross-regional patterns of such xenophobic activity. This project takes a first-step in examining the rise of anti-refugee activity across developed and developing host countries, drawing particular attention to the underlying similarities in xenophobic activism across regional contexts. I raise three primary questions of interest: why is anti-refugee activism on the rise in host countries worldwide? Are the determinants of anti-refugee activism more or less similar across developing and developed host states? Do international events and actors play a role in mediating levels of such xenophobic activity? Using an original dataset, I demonstrate that average rates of activism against refugees— both among natives and on behalf of the state— have risen across nearly all fifty host countries observed over the past twenty-four years (1990-2014). The over fourteen thousand incidents recorded for this study reveal several generalizable trends, including large escalations in xenophobic activity around host state election years and more frequent violent attacks in urban areas during periods of economic or political shock. Numbers remain an important part of the broader story as well, especially as refugee arrivals exceed twenty percent of the previous year’s total. I situate these findings in a comparative framework, focusing on the destabilizing effect of elections in divided societies and the role of ethnic competition in times of national stress and uncertainty. I also underscore how host states elites learn to use systems of divided authority and governance— primarily as it relates to the international refugee regime- to shirk responsibility, garner benefits, and gain political advantage in ways that compound local tensions and contribute to increased levels of xenophobic activity.

Variable Description and Reference Guide
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Var Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XA(#), DV1</td>
<td>Count variable of number of xenophobic events</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>International media/print publications/online news sources/humanitarian archives/first-hand sources/unclassified government docs *Cross-checked with ACLED</td>
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<td>XA(V), DV2</td>
<td>Count variable of number of VIOLENT xenophobic events</td>
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<td>XA(NV), DV3</td>
<td>Count variable of number of NON-VIOLENT xenophobic events</td>
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<td>Ordinal measure of type and scale of xenophobic activity</td>
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<td>International media/print publications/online news sources/humanitarian archives/first-hand sources/unclassified government docs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1- Low levels of non-violent XA</td>
<td>1- Low levels of non-violent XA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2- Moderate to high levels of non-violent XA</td>
<td>2- Moderate to high levels of non-violent XA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- Low levels of violent XA</td>
<td>3- Low levels of violent XA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4- Moderate to high levels of violent XA</td>
<td>4- Moderate to high levels of violent XA</td>
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<td>International media/print publications/online news sources/humanitarian archives/first-hand sources/unclassified government docs *Cross-checked with ACLED</td>
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<td>Variable</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<tr>
<td>force/military/peri-military</td>
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<td>sources/humanitarian archives/first-hand sources/unclassified government docs</td>
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<td>XA (D)</td>
<td>Dichotomous measure of XA</td>
<td>0 - No XA, 1 - XA</td>
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<td>ElectYr</td>
<td>Dichotomous measure of election year</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ref#</td>
<td>Count variable for total number of refugees in host country</td>
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<td>UNHCR database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref%</td>
<td>Number of refugees as percent of host country population</td>
<td>Continuous (%)</td>
<td>UNHCR database</td>
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<tr>
<td>RefDist</td>
<td>Nominal variable measures distribution of refugees in host country (rural, urban, camp)</td>
<td>1 - Rural, 2 - Camp, 3 - Urban</td>
<td>Humanitarian archives/International media/print publications/online news/unclassified government docs/UNHCR database</td>
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<td>HSPop</td>
<td>Count variable of host state population</td>
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<td>UN Population database</td>
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<tr>
<td>UrPop%(HS)</td>
<td>Urban population as percentage of total host state population</td>
<td>Continuous (%)</td>
<td>UN Population database</td>
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<tr>
<td>UnEmp%</td>
<td>Percent unemployed of host state labor force</td>
<td>Continuous (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>Dichotomous measure of whether a high causality terrorist (HCT) event has occurred</td>
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<td>Ordinal measure of tone of comments made by political</td>
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<td>Scale</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<td>----------</td>
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<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elites toward refugees</td>
<td>(neutral, positive, negative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>Annual measure of democracy and institutional features</td>
<td>-10 to 10</td>
<td>Polity IV</td>
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<td>GDPpc</td>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>Conflict</td>
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<td>0 - No conflict</td>
<td>UCDP/PRIO</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and income per capita indicators, which are used to rank countries into four tiers of human development.</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFF</td>
<td>Effectiveness Index</td>
<td>0-13 (low to high fragility)</td>
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<td>Legit</td>
<td>Legitimacy Index</td>
<td>0-12 (low to high fragility)</td>
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<td>Security Effectiveness Index</td>
<td>0-3 (low to high fragility)</td>
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<td>PolEff</td>
<td>Political Effectiveness Index</td>
<td>0-3 (low to high fragility)</td>
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<td>EconEff</td>
<td>Economic Effectiveness Index</td>
<td>0-4 (low to high fragility)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*SEE SFI CODEBOOK

SFI= effectiveness score + legitimacy score (25 points possible); The State Fragility Index and Matrix 2014 lists all independent countries.
in the world in which the total country population is greater than 500,000 in 2014 (167 countries). The Fragility Matrix scores each country on both Effectiveness and Legitimacy in four performance dimensions: Security, Political, Economic, and Social, at the end of the year 2014. Each of the Matrix indicators is rated on a four-point fragility scale: 0 “no fragility,” 1 “low fragility,” 2 “medium fragility,” and 3 “high fragility” with the exception of the Economic Effectiveness indicator, which is rated on a five-point fragility scale (including 4 “extreme fragility”). The State Fragility Index, then, combines scores on the eight indicators and ranges from 0 “no fragility” to 25 “extreme fragility.” A country’s fragility is closely associated with its state capacity to manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining
progressive development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inflate</th>
<th>Inflation rate; Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used.</th>
<th>Continuous (%)</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coups</td>
<td>Dichotomous measure of attempted/successful coup occurrence. 0= no coup 1= coup/attempted</td>
<td></td>
<td>INSCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Coups are also measured in the SFI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOF Globalization Index</td>
<td>SEE Codebook for definitions and sources: KOF CODEBOOK</td>
<td>Ranges vary by variable</td>
<td>KOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EcGlob</td>
<td>Economic Globalization</td>
<td>See: Methods of Calculation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoGlob</td>
<td>Social Globalization</td>
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<td>PoGlob</td>
<td>Political Globalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pcont</td>
<td>Personal Contact</td>
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<tr>
<td>INFO</td>
<td>Information Flows</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>Indicates 1 for DEVELOPED state</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>COW regional data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Indicates 2 for DEVELOPING state</td>
<td>0-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** CCodes are from the Correlates of War project as are state names and abbreviations

** Missing Data/Data Precision

The missing data code is -99. Data precision, especially in developing regions, is also an issue of consideration. The data only includes information that I am quite confident is correct; the dataset does not include information on key variables where definition of criteria for inclusion was
uncertain or missing. The bias introduced by this approach is the inclusion of information on variables in later decades in developed regions. All developing world event-count data was cross-checked with 2014 versions of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED).

The Dependent Variable: Xenophobic Activity

Xenophobic Activity as it is used here may include reports of the following activities directed at refugees or individuals/groups in refugee-like situations (ranked least to most violent): protests, rallies, marches, imagery, demonstrations, campaigns, party formation, signage/brochures, broadcasts, taunts/threats, stalking, verbal confrontations, vandalism, theft, destruction of property (including arsons), physical assault, kidnapping, police brutality/harassment (including the use of tear-gas and spontaneous arrest/detention), sexual exploitation or abuse, gun and knife violence, group-based assault, mass weapon (or high casualty) violence.

- **XA(#)**
  - The first continuous measure of Xenophobic Activity is a total annual event-count measure of anti-refugee activity for host states in the sample. There is no distinction made between violent and non-violent events.

- **XA(V)**
  - The second continuous measure of Xenophobic Activity is a total annual event-count measure of VIOLENT anti-refugee activity for host states in the sample.

- **XA (NV)**
  - The third continuous measure of Xenophobic Activity is a total annual event-count measure of NON-VIOLENT anti-refugee activity for host states in the sample.

- **XA(O)**
  - The ORDINAL measure of Xenophobic Activity orders the severity of activity from 0 to 4. O= no xenophobic activity reported; 1= low levels of non-violent xenophobic activity reported; 2= moderate to high levels of non-violent xenophobic activity reports; 3= low levels of violent xenophobic activity reported; 4= moderate to high levels of xenophobic activity reported
    - The Minorities at Risk dataset was used as a template for categorization of the DV.

- **XA (S)**
  - This measure of Xenophobic Activity is an event-count measure representing the number of anti-refugee incidents involving state actors (primarily member of the police force or military forces). These are included in the total stock of XA in the measures above.

- **XA (D)**
  - The final measure of Xenophobic Activity is a dummy variable designating whether or not XA occurred. The variable is coded 0 for NO XA and 1 for XA.
The Primary Independent Variables

I argue that the global rise in Xenophobic Activity (XA) is influenced by 3 primary factors: (1) host state elections; (2) systemic impact of economic/political shocks; (3) urban growth rates and settlement patterns. I also emphasize the ability of elites to use divided authority to their advantage when competing for power, primarily vis-à-vis the presence of the International Refugee Regime (IRR); this will be modeled by the elections variable in the quantitative analysis and drawn-out more fully in qualitative case studies.

1. Host state elections
   a. Election year
      i. The election year variable is drawn from the IDEA dataset and models national elections for heads of state and legislative bodies. For European Union member states, European Commission elections are also included.
   b. Elite rhetoric
      i. TABARI content analysis software along with hand-coding from 7 international news and unclassified government sources were used to develop an event-count variable of the number of times elites referenced refugees in a year (1990-2014). The terms *asylum seeker* and *displaced person* were used interchangeably as co-search terms with that of *refugee*. Elites are classified as heads of states, department ministers, members of parliament (MPs), religious leaders, and diplomats; this also includes all elites in contest for these positions in a given year.

2. Systemic impact of economic/political shocks
   a. Economic shock indicators:
      i. Annual unemployment figures for host states drawn from the World Bank (available from 1991-2014)
      ii. Annual GDPpc figures for host states drawn from the World Bank
      iii. Annual Human Development Indicator score drawn from UNDP (available in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2010-2014)
      iv. Inflation Rates (from World Bank)
      v. State Fragility Index (SFI)
         1. Economic Effectiveness
   b. Political shock indicators:
      i. High Casualty Terrorist (HCT) attacks is used as an indicator of political shock and is drawn from INCSR database on HCT (available form 1990-2014).
      ii. State Fragility Index (SFI)
         1. Political Effectiveness
         2. Security Effectiveness

3. Urban growth rates and settlement patterns
   a. Percent urban of host state population figures are drawn from the World Bank
   b. The settlement patterns variable indicates the area/condition of settlement for the majority of refugees in the host state annually as follows. These figures were compiled using UNHCR country reports, humanitarian news agency reports, and unclassified host country documents.
i. 1 = Majority rural
ii. 2 = Majority camp
iii. 3 = Majority urban
References


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RefWorld (2016). UNHCR Appeals to Kenya Over Decision to End Refugee Hosting, UNHCR.

ReliefWeb (2016) "Oxfam Staffers talk North Lebanon and Syrian Crisis."


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SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCE AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Teaching, Research and Advising

- **Teaching.** Instructed a variety of university courses—both graduate and undergraduate—in international organizations, world politics and human security. Awarded best instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky in 2011 and 2012.

- **Research.** Conducted multiple mixed-methods research projects on international development and human security, many of which are now published and represent a new direction in the field. Awarded best graduate student and researcher in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky in 2012 and 2013. Recipient of four research grants from 2009-2012, including a Peace Science travel grant.

- **Advising.** Held the position of departmental advisor for the Capstone International Internship Program from 2010-2012, advising and mentoring twelve students per semester in research, writing, independent travel and professional development. Presently coordinator for the Department of Economics and Development internship program and social science research lab.

Non-Profit Project Management and Administration

- **Project Management.** Managed a variety of programs and new projects for organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and Southeast Asia. These projects included: protection services for street children in New Delhi, arranging settlements for urban displaced in Nairobi, establishing rural emergency response for a clinic in the northern mountains of Nicaragua, advocating for policy change toward refugees in Thailand and coordinating teams of medical staff for a migrant worker community in northern India.

- **Administration.** Performed project monitoring and evaluation for annual reports, implemented new administrative systems (including software systems), maintained donor database and oversaw marketing campaigns.

Grant Writing and Non-Profit Consulting

- **Freelance grant writer and researcher.** Successfully built and implemented data management systems for organizations including Children’s Nutrition Program, VIDYA International, Right to Play, Cambodian Children’s Fund and Bridge Refugee Services. These services included grant writing and research, database construction, donor relations and data tracking, reporting and fund development for new programs.

- **Consultant.** Oversaw server-to-cloud transitions, performed annual evaluations, coordinated partnerships and developed strategic plans for small to mid-size international non-profits based in the U.S. and Canada.
EDUCATION

Ph.D., Political Science, University of Kentucky, May 2017
Fields of Study: Comparative Politics (Forced Migration), International Relations (Human Security)
Dissertation: Ethnic Xenophobia: Establishing a Cross-Regional Paradigm

Certificate(s): Forced Migration, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford
International Summer School of Forced Migration, 2011

M.A., Political Science, University of Kentucky 2011

B.S., Political Science, Middle Tennessee State University, 2007 (Magna cum Laude)
Fields of Study: International Relations, International Law

Certificate(s): Asian Politics and Civil Society, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2007
Global Studies (Asia and the Middle East), Middle Tennessee State University, 2006

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

April 2014-Present
Internship Coordinator, Department of Economics and Community Development at Covenant College (Lookout Mountain, GA)
- Internship placement, monitoring and evaluation
- Social science research advising

July 2013-March 2014:
Consultant, Amani ya Juu (Kenya)
- Grant writing and research
- Program advisement

June 2012-January 2014:
Consultant, Children’s Nutrition Program (CNP) of Haiti
- Grant writing and research
- Donor development and strategic planning
- Data management and program assessment

January 2012-January 2013:
Consultant, Cambodian Children’s Fund (CCF)
- Program evaluation and strategic planning
- Grant management and administration
- International organization representative

January 2012-January 2013:
Lead Researcher, Right to Play (Sudan)
- Resettlement development and research on Sudan border
- Database building and analysis
- Staff liaison and translator
October 2011-December 2012: Research Associate, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
- Research fellow for Sub-Saharan Africa desk at the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- Lead researcher for women’s issues and humanitarian aid

July 2011-January 2012: Field Observer and Protection Officer with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Based in Addis Ababa and Beirut

August 2011-May 2012 Adjunct Professor, Centre College (Danville, KY)
- GOV 462, International Migration (Winter Intercession 2012)
- GOV 400, Forced Migration (Spring 2012)

August 2008-May 2012: Course Instructor and Adjunct Professor, University of Kentucky
- PS 235, International Relations (Spring 2010)
- PS 410, International Migration (Fall 2010)
- PS 391, Contemporary Global Politics (online course) (Summer 2011)
- PS 101, American Government (Fall 2011)
- PS 391, Comparative Political Movements (Spring 2012)

July 2008-November 2011: Consultant, Kentucky Refugee Ministries (USA)
- Advisor of case management
- Donor relations and match-grant management

June 2008-March 2009: Project Manager, Vida Joven (Nicaragua)
- Manager of rural clinic operations and emergency services in Matagalpa, Nicaragua
- Grant manager and branding strategist

July 2007-August 2008: Case Manager and Donor Development, Bridge Refugee Services (USA)
- Managed a case load of 82 refugees
- Donor development and sponsorship coordinator

May 2006-May 2008: Program Manager and Development Director, VIDYA International (India)
- Grant writing, research and administration
- Donor relations and strategist
- New program development for child protection initiative in New Delhi, India
November 2008-May 2008: Refugee Status Determination (P1), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/Community Action International (India)
- Conducted RSD for Nepali refugees
- Director of Community United Project in Dharamsala, India and Lahore, Pakistan
- Supervised daily youth programs and activities

June 2006-August 2007: Southern Coordinator, Amnesty International (USA)
- Managed events for universities throughout the southeast
- Consulted on website and online marketing initiative
- Revived two major campaigns throughout the region

**PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS**


Manley, Anna. 2015. “Data Collection and Coding: Anti-Refugee Activism in Developing Host States.” Paper accepted for presentation at the University of Sheffield's *Second Annual Post-Graduate Conference on Migration*.


PROFESSIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE

Graduate Student and Faculty Representative for the External Review Committee and Self Study (2010-2011)

Faculty Mentor, Directed International Research (INT 495, Spring 2011)

Internship Adviser (EXP 396, Spring 2011)

Board of Director’s Member, Children’s Nutrition Program (CNP) of Haiti

Marathon Runner for Refugees International and World Relief

Volunteer, Medical Teams International (Haiti, Syria, Cambodia, India, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia)

Volunteer, Presbyterian Disaster Assistance (New Orleans and Southern Arizona)

Volunteer, Bridge Refugee Services (Chattanooga, TN)

Volunteer, Kentucky Refugee Ministries (Lexington, KY)

Member of Saint Elmo Presbyterian Church (Chattanooga, TN)

Volunteer, Chattanooga Center for Language Learning (Chattanooga, TN)

Volunteer, Lookout Mountain Presbyterian Church (Chattanooga, TN)

Volunteer, Chattanooga Organized for Action (Chattanooga, TN)

REFERENCES

AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST