2013

SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND (IM)MOBILITY: THE UNEVEN GEOGRAPHY OF MIGRATION AND BORDER MANAGEMENT IN UKRAINE

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SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND (IM)MOBILITY: THE UNEVEN GEOGRAPHY OF MIGRATION AND BORDER MANAGEMENT IN UKRAINE

THESIS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By

Jonathan Austin Crane

Lexington, Kentucky

Director: Dr. Michael Samers, Professor of Geography

Lexington, Kentucky

2013

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT,
AND (IM)MOBILITY: THE UNEVEN GEOGRAPHY OF
MIGRATION AND BORDER MANAGEMENT IN UKRAINE

As a country of origin, transit, and destination for migrants that now borders four European Union (EU) member countries, Ukraine has seen future integration possibilities with the EU become, in part, conditional upon its willingness to cooperate in controlling cross-border migration. The EU is now “externalizing” aspects of migration and border control to Ukraine through making investments in Ukraine’s capacity to selectively “manage” cross-border flows in line with EU security and economy priorities. In the context of this emerging spatial arrangement of EU externalization, this thesis analyzes how, by whom, and to what effect migration is being managed in and through Ukraine. Policies of migration and border management are now materializing in Ukraine in relation to actors and discourses that incorporate imperatives for security and development in their approaches to governance. Therefore, this thesis investigates migration and border management at the geopolitical nexus of development, security, and migrant (im)mobility. It does this with a critical concern for those migrants whose exclusion from the EU is subject to humanitarian management in Ukraine.

KEYWORDS: Migration, Development, Security, Borders, Externalization

Jonathan Austin Crane
June 17, 2013
SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND (IM)MOBILITY: THE UNEVEN GEOGRAPHY OF MIGRATION AND BORDER MANAGEMENT IN UKRAINE

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis greatly benefited from the insights and care of many people. I would like to thank, first of all, my Advisor, Michael Samers, for generously giving his time to many helpful conversations and for his insightful and constructive feedback throughout the development and culmination of this thesis. I also want to thank the other two members of my Thesis Committee, Susan Roberts and Anna Secor, for their engagement with this project – I have grown as a thinker and researcher in many ways thanks to both of them. My colleagues Malene Jacobsen and Eric Nost provided helpful and timely comments throughout the writing process, for which I am most grateful. I am fortunate to have had the luxury of undertaking this thesis throughout its various stages amongst many wonderful colleagues at the University of Kentucky, who are some of the most engaging, brilliant, and fun people that I have had the pleasure of meeting. This thesis is very much a product of this community.

This research was made possible thanks to a generous grant from the University of Kentucky Barnhart-Withington Award, for which I thank the UK Department of Geography. I would also like to sincerely thank my interviewees in Ukraine for giving their time and sharing their thoughts for this project. Any errors in the following content are mine alone.

I am grateful to my family in so many ways. Finally, I want to thank Megan for being my best friend and for her loving support throughout this process.
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION

In late 2007, a Readmission Agreement (RA) was signed between Ukraine and the European Union (EU), allowing for migrants who enter “illegally”¹ into the EU from Ukraine to be “readmitted” back to Ukraine (EU, 2007). The RA went fully into effect in early 2010. This agreement was part and parcel of many post-2004 EU investments made towards creating spaces of migrant detention in Ukraine and building the capacities of Ukrainian officials to ‘manage’ cross-border flows of people and goods. The RA is exemplary of recent EU policies of “externalization” for migration and asylum control, which maintain the goal of stemming the stream of migration into the EU by allocating resources and responsibility to countries of transit, like Ukraine, to more effectively police their own borders in line with EU standards. Since the entering into force of the Schengen Convention² in 1995, and particularly after the 2004 and 2007 EU eastern enlargements, EU immigration policies have shifted towards remotely managing the root causes of immigration from neighboring countries (Samers, 2004; Leonard, 2010; Smith and Swain, 2010). The emergence of externalization policies beyond the outer borders of the EU “produc(es) a new geography of remote control” for migration (Samers, 2004: 40).

Despite the discourse of economic freedom and openness that defines neoliberal globalization (Harvey, 2005), borders today are very much defined by a dialectical relationship of opening and closing – of securitized walls to keep the poor out alongside expedited lanes for the transnational economic elite (Coleman, 2005; Sparke, 2006a; Brown, 2010). Increasingly complex technologies of risk analysis, smart borders, and border management are emerging in places like the US, EU countries, Canada, and Australia that enhance selective capacity towards letting the ‘right types’ of migrants in and keeping the ‘wrong types’ out (Samers, 2010). The fundamental concerns of this

¹ I use this word because it is widely employed in EU laws, such as the Readmission Agreement. I understand migrant ‘illegality’ not as a quality inherent to any person, but as a legally constructed status that is produced through relations of (geo)political power.
² The Convention establishes the set of regulations and safeguards for EU countries to allow for the freedom of movement for EU nationals between the signing states. The increasing liberalization of internal mobility has motivated the EU to collectively pursue securing the Union’s outer borders (see Chapter Six).
thesis are to understand how, why, by whom, and to what effect this selectivity concerning migration is being managed in Ukraine.

Over the past ten to fifteen years, EU-facilitated policies for migration and border management have emerged in what is considered the ‘European neighbourhood.’ These strategies have resulted in a scenario where migrant bodies are increasingly being monitored as they move across space, and if uninvited or unwanted in the EU, targeted for exclusion – potentially for detention and return (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). As flows of migration are being managed by a proliferation of actors and technologies across the territorial boundaries of the EU, it is important for this management to be theorized at various intersecting scales – from the level of supra-national EU governance, to the national “third country,”3 to the institutional apparatus of management, to the migrant’s embodied experience.

The scope of this thesis is to investigate the new standards and partnerships that are being rolled out in Ukraine for managing migration as they are embroiled within wider (geo)political-economic relations between the EU and Ukraine. The “management approach” to migration entails intertwined security and development policies that are integral to the EU’s ongoing processes of border externalization to Ukraine. In the pages that follow, I discuss this post-2004 spatial arrangement for “managing” migration and borders as it has taken shape according to an apparatus of state, non-state, development, and security actors.

After the 2004 EU enlargement, EU development assistance for their closest neighbors has become significantly integrated with the EU’s geopolitical priorities for engendering a stable and cooperative neighborhood. Through the “European Neighbourhood Policy,” development instruments such as the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States in Eastern Europe (now the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)) contain integrated initiatives for enhanced border security and development assistance from the EU. The EU’s

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3 This term in EU policies generally refers to any non-EU country, and will be used throughout this thesis. A “third country national” is a citizen of a non-EU country. However, in cases such as the EU/Ukraine Readmission Agreement, “third country” refers to any country that is not privy to the agreement. For example, Ukraine is a “third country” to the Schengen Agreement, but a Somali is a “third country national” in the context of the EU/Ukraine Readmission Agreement.
development assistance to Ukraine is increasingly provided in instrumental and conditional ways, particularly towards facilitating and incentivizing Ukraine’s conforming to EU-prioritized ways of managing migration and borders. This project seeks to contribute to the literatures on critical border studies, EU externalization, and the security/development nexus by considering the processes of security and development together as “very remote control” (Samers, 2004) in the place of Ukraine.

It has been argued that migration into the EU is “securitized” – a term that generally refers to the process of identifying an existential security threat discursively and thereby enacting a presumably effective response. Many have written about the securitization of migration in relation to Europe’s changing territorial arrangements over the last 10 years (Huysmans, 2006; Boswell, 2007; Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Neal, 2009; Leonard, 2010; Feldman, 2012). Migration and border management, however, is an approach that integrates techniques of selective securitization and facilitation. I argue that this more appropriately than securitization describes the sort of governance that is now taking place in Ukraine. My analysis accounts for some of the ways in which the EU’s “management approach” to controlling versus facilitating cross-border flows attempts to “secure the external” (Bialasiewicz, 2012) in coordination with a proliferation of security and development actors, discourses, and practices.

In light of the issues raised within the literature review, this thesis asks three related research questions. First (RQ1), how are migration and borders discursively framed in the politics of security and development between the European Union and Ukraine as issues to be managed? In pursuing this question, I sought to understand how officials in Ukraine describe management as an approach to governing migration, and in what ways the politics of security and development are integral to the management approach. Second (RQ2), how is the EU externalizing migration control out to Ukraine, and what effects is this having on migrants? Here I investigated the practices of migration and border management that are being funded and implemented by the EU through a complex apparatus of state and non-state partnerships in Ukraine. Third (RQ3), what is the relationship between security and development in the political-economic relations between the EU and Ukraine over migration and borders? Here I specifically analyzed how development assistance (or ‘capacity building’ aid) is being
enrolled in the processes of EU externalization and the management of migration and
borders in Ukraine. These three research questions are addressed in relation to one
another throughout Chapters Four, Five, and Six of this thesis.

In this project, I look at the management of migration and borders from a critical
geopolitical perspective (O Tuathail, 1996; Agnew, 2003; Kuus, 2007; Dalby, 2010). I
consider the related processes of EU externalization, assistance, and management as they
are discursively constructed and materially enacted by specific officials spanning
between Brussels, Kyiv, and small towns in Ukraine where detention centers are now
being constructed. I focus on processes of remaking migration and border governance
that are now taking place in Ukraine with a critical concern for how migrants’ lives and
future possibilities are being affected. Perhaps nowhere in Eastern Europe is the
vulnerability of migrants to EU policies of exclusion more apparent – or more invested in
– than Ukraine.

Ukraine has historically been considered a “borderland” country, and today is no
exception. Bordering four EU states, Ukraine has been called a “migratory highway” in
the center of larger Europe (Tolstokorova, 2011: 10). It is a country of both emigration
and transit migration to the EU. Due in part to global economic and political instability
and in part to changing EU borders and policies, Ukraine’s role as a country of transit for
migrants and asylum seekers has solidified over the last two decades. Many of these
migrants transiting through are undocumented, and hope to find refuge and employment
in the EU. Migrants have been attracted to Ukraine as a transit country not only due to its
proximity to the EU, but also because of the country’s notoriously weak post-1991
immigration control system which has easily allowed undocumented residence and
employment within the shadow economy (ibid.).

However, this is now changing, as Ukraine’s capacity to manage migration and
cross-border flows is being heavily invested in by the EU. These investments are
beginning to have effects for migrants. For example, between 2005 and 2008 the number
of migrants refused entry to Ukraine doubled in concert with EU investments (ibid.: 5;
Human Rights Watch, 2010). Tolstokorova (2011) thus claims that Ukraine has now
morphed from a “migration highway” into a “migratory bottleneck on the fringes of
Europe” (6). I argue in this thesis that this new spatial arrangement can have dire effects
for uninvited migrants’ lives, as they are now being managed, processed, and, in some cases, detained in Ukraine – a country whose legal system and political-economy is in great transformation.

Ukraine is one of the countries most seriously affected by the recent systemic global financial crisis (Aslund, 2009). Despite the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 which saw thousands of Ukrainians taking to the streets in protest to demand greater political transparency, the country has suffered since that time from years of political stalemate, and has seen little in the way of economic development (ibid.). Ukraine remains a geopolitical “outsider” in the larger European landscape and faces prospects of “shallow integration” with the EU (Smith and Swain, 2010: 3; Browning and Christou, 2010). Ukraine’s simultaneously pivotal and precarious regional standing has been highlighted in the last decade by tumultuous politics over gas pipelines and prices with Russia, ongoing loans and accompanying structural adjustment from the IMF since 2008, and accusations of corruption and dirty politics leveled from the EU and US (The Economist, 2011; Tolstokorova, 2011).

All of these factors help to define Ukraine’s current situatedness as a country in transformation, as a strategic “buffer zone” (Dahlman, 2009) between the EU and the former Soviet republics, and as a place where migrant lives are in a precarious balance. I am interested in how this condition provides a productive site for EU intervention to ‘guide’ a transformation in Ukraine – to help the Ukrainian officials develop their capacities in the “EUropean” ways of governance. The EU remains invested in Ukraine becoming a stable neighbor and reliable partner, particularly in areas of migration and border management.4

In a moment of anemic economic growth in the EU and in Ukraine, discourses of security are ever-present. In this way, the insecurity of those within the EU and that of the uninvited migrant can be juxtaposed. In a post-9/11 context, there are many discourses that negatively frame the subject of the migrant – criminal, potential terrorist, drain on the welfare state, and disposable laborer being just a few. For some, the migrant has come to represent both an existential and economic threat. For the EU, however, this

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4 As I will discuss in Chapter Four, these are some of the primary purposes of the EU’s “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP)
is a threat that can be managed according to a neoliberal, developmentalist, and exclusionary logic. Many geographers have considered the spatial production of security and insecurity surrounding migration (Coleman, 2005; 2009; Staeheli and Nagel, 2008; and Fitzgerald, 2010 are but a few). The spatial relationship between security and insecurity can be seen in how the European Union is securing itself as a “gated community” (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007) – closed to the immigrant, closed to its Eastern “Other” (Kuus, 2004). I employ Foucault’s (2007) notions of governmentality and biopolitics towards understanding how powerful techniques, often taking the form of ‘capacity building’ development assistance projects, are being applied at various scales to control the migrant’s mobility and access to the EU from Ukraine – producing security for the EU and insecurity for the uninvited migrant (Huysmans, 2006).

This thesis discusses the management of migration and borders in Ukraine as it is embedded within a wider (geo)political-economy of “bordering, ordering, and othering” (van Houtum, 2010) between the EU, Ukraine, and the subject of the migrant. Chapter Four of this thesis explicitly addresses the progression of post-2004 relations between the EU and Ukraine with respect to the governance of migration. Drawing from interviews with EU and Ukrainian government officials and various managers, as well as from analysis of numerous EU policy documents, I detail the ways in which migration and border management have become central to the EU’s attempts to ‘reform’ Ukraine according to “EUropean” standards and values. Chapter Five specifically addresses migration and border management. In this chapter I situate the seemingly apolitical and developmentalist texts of management-related documents and the language of management-related officials with whom I spoke in Ukraine within a field of often exclusionary practices. I discuss the sort of calculations that factor into the “management approach” to bordering as a “security/development nexus” in economic, pedagogical, and humanitarian valences. Chapter Six focuses explicitly on the effects of this new spatial arrangement on migrants and asylum-seekers who are now being managed and filing their claims in Ukraine.

I conclude the thesis with an emphasis on the political question of why certain migrants’ lives are being managed in Ukraine. Migration confronts us with the starkly uneven realities of our world today – it prompts a fundamental consideration of how
places and categories (i.e. ‘migrant,’ ‘(il)legal,’ ‘citizen’) are constructed in relation to one another (Silvey and Lawson, 1999). This thesis investigates the apparatuses that attempt to govern flows of migration between the EU and Ukraine with a critical attention to the walls that are being constructed in today’s ‘globalized’ world – these entail imagined, yet political and materialized distinctions between EU and non-EU, between ‘illegal’ and invited, between mobility and detainment, and between manager and managed. The EU’s spatial regime for remote control of migration is integral to the maintenance of ongoing processes of uneven geographical development, (im)mobility, and migrant insecurity.
CHAPTER TWO. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. European Union and Post-Soviet space: dynamics of inclusion and exclusion

The spatial project of the European Union (EU) offers enormous potential for some while maintaining walls of exclusion for others. While the EU was founded upon ideals of a common market and mobility regime, exclusionary policies and practices of security towards migration are present inside the EU itself, at its peripheries, and are now being exported beyond to the eastern and southern neighboring countries. Within and without the EU, changing legal and physical infrastructures are now leading migrants to live in economically and socially precarious scenarios. It is with this concern that I focus on the managed inclusions and exclusions of migration through Ukraine into the EU.

This story begins in many ways with the events of 1989, which engendered a new era in European migration. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, a barrier to migration had also fallen, and many were now able to migrate from east to west (King and Mai, 2008). At this time, the economies and societies of the former Soviet Union were thrust into rapid change, in part facilitating new patterns of migration. Processes of economic neoliberalization that have taken place in countries like Ukraine have, in part, resulted in the vast majorities of their societies being in economically precarious positions5.

What King and Mai (2008) call Post-communist “transformation” can be seen as a new social reality, a dialectical construction between Western democracy, communist heritage, and pre-communist history (ibid.: 41). In the context of this transformation in Eastern Europe, Europe at the macro-level is today defined by a “dialectics of exclusion and inclusion” (ibid.: 13). A spatial arrangement for inclusion, mobility, and mutual economic development prevails amongst the EU countries, whose citizens are free to move throughout EU territory. However, structures of exclusion dominate for the majority of those in bordering non-EU countries. The Ukraine/EU border is now the outer wall of “EUrope’s” Schengen mobility regime and the EU is making many investments in Ukraine’s capacity to selectively manage what enters its “gated community” (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007).

5 While Ukraine’s major cities show signs of extreme wealth, Ukraine’s GDP per capita, adjusted for PPP, is $7,600. This is approximately half of Bulgaria and Romania’s – which are the lowest in the EU (CIA, 2013).
These EU investments are now being made through policy frameworks that marry development assistance with initiatives for political reform through the EU’s “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP, see Chapter Four). Smith and Swain (2010) point to the “shallow integration” that the EU has offered its Eastern European non-member neighbors since the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (24). The ENP seeks to bring countries like Ukraine closer to the EU economically and geopolitically, but not in a way that meaningfully offers the possibility of social inclusion through accession. This has resulted in the consolidation of groups of geopolitical “insiders” and “outsiders,” with this “uneven landscape” of Europe exacerbated by recent financial hardships in the Eurozone and the disastrous recent economic conditions in Ukraine, leading to IMF intervention (Smith and Swain, 2010: 3; Tolstokorova, 2011).

EU communications tend to represent the ENP as being about establishing a “ring of friends” cooperating on the basis of shared values and mutual interest (Kuus, 2011). However, Dahlman (2009) states that along with the promises of extended prosperity and stability, the ENP framework was rolled out with “built-in conflict prevention strategies, trade and investment liberalization, and security cooperation,” to ensure that Europe’s surrounding “neighbourhood” does not become “a source of conflict, immigrants, and illicit flows” (in Bialasiewicz, et al., 2009: 80). In this way, the ENP can be seen as establishing a “buffer zone” at the EU’s periphery with respect to various ‘threats’ looming outside of its borders (ibid.: 80). Indeed, many have argued that the ENP represents external action with the tacit aim of enhancing the EU’s internal security – and that this external action is based upon powerful geographical imaginations of what it means for the neighboring countries to be and become “EUropean” (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009; Browning and Christou, 2010; Kuus, 2007; 2011).

Pickles (2006) notes how as the public realm is restructured in much of post-Soviet territory and post-industrial Europe, “new geographies of citizenship and class” are being produced across the region (Pickles, 2006: 183). The EU’s treatment of low-income migration highlights how the EU’s idealized “project of the commons” is in many ways at odds with the neoliberal market-based mentality upon which the EU was built (ibid.: 184). Social marginalization and the general “precariousness” of migrants’ everyday lives are being exacerbated in the face of chaotic capitalism. Pickles (2006)
here cites how “official economies of incarceration” are emerging across wider Europe, referring to detention camps, deportation offices, and security companies for policing and controlling migration (ibid.: 182). Staeheli and Nagel (2008) claim that EU policies from the 1990s forward have tended to conflate immigrants with terrorist threats, reinforcing a fear of the “other” and a logic of “us” versus “them.” “The insecurity of security” is a context of fear within which many migrants inside and at the edges of the EU live, as heightened governmental focus on promoting EU security has made their daily lives less secure (Staeheli and Nagel, 2008: 787).

EU migration politics reflect the operation of Edward Said’s notion of “imaginative geographies” – meaning the construction of “a familiar space which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’” (Said, 1977: 54). This is the process of determining “the Other” (ibid.: 325), which I examine through EU policies and practices of migration and border management for the very reason that it can have dire consequences for uninvited migrants’ lives. Said’s work showed us how seeing “Others” as “ontologically given” maintains biases of exclusion (Said, 2000: 315). This promotes discourses of superiority and inferiority, deserving and non-deserving, which are then attributed to specific cultures, influencing their mobility and access of to resources (ibid.).

Smith and Swain (2010) have noted how a persistent and controlled geopolitical and geoeconomic dichotomy between “EUrope” and Eastern Europe looms large today, despite the recent extensions of tiered memberships to certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is in this way that Kuus (2004) applies Said’s post-colonial framework to Eastern Europe as Europe’s “Other.” Post-colonial theory offers insights into how distant places are imagined as sites of difference, and thus as places that have the opportunity to develop to become more modern, like “us” (Gregory, 2004). Kuus (2004) argues that instead of reducing Eastern Europe to “a generalized non-West,” there is an important role for political geographical scholarship to situate regional change in “the production of difference” (Kuus, 2004: 473). Discourses of “Europe” and “Eastern Europe” are reproduced through “Other-ing” practices between EU members and the neighboring states (Kuus, 2004).
I will outline with respect to migration how material relations of “bordering, ordering and othering” (van Houtum, 2010) in Ukraine work to maintain an order of distance and thus, difference and exclusion. Following Kuus’ (2004) call above, I give evidence from ENP documents and interviews to show how “imaginative geographies” of difference justify the EU’s pedagogical projects for capacity building and technical assistance in Ukraine in order to reform the ‘not yet European neighbor’ in line with EU standards and values. First and foremost, this reform has been about ensuring that a properly managed system of migration and border control is established. I now move to discuss these dynamics of inclusion and exclusion on the edge of the EU in relation to processes of neoliberalization.

2.2. Neoliberalization in the borderlands

This thesis analyzes migration and border management in Ukraine as a neoliberal modality of governance. I am interested here in the operation of neoliberalism as defined by Sparke (2006a) – a “contextually contingent articulation of free market governmental practices with varied and often quite illiberal forms of social and political rule” (153). To this effect, what Brenner, et al. (2010) call “variegated neoliberalization” provides a helpful way of understanding the “messy actualities” (Larner, 2000) of certain neoliberal projects in society. Their argument is that processes of neoliberalization develop unevenly while at the same time tending towards the furtherance of uneven development (Brenner, et al., 2010). For example, EU assistance to Ukraine has led to the implementation of a classed mobility regime that works towards the facilitation of economically ‘desirable’ migrants and the selective exclusion, return, and detention of the uninvited. It is in this way that I explore how countervailing discourses of security, economy, and development coalesce in the EU’s neoliberal approach to managing migration in Ukraine.

David Harvey (2005) describes neoliberalism as a theory of political-economic practices that, in the interest of heightened human wellbeing and entrepreneurial freedom, prioritizes unfettered markets, trade, and property rights. According to Harvey, under neoliberalism, “the market is assumed to work as an appropriate guide – an ethic – for all human action” (ibid., 165). Despite the neoliberal discourse of freedom, Harvey (2005)
notes how neoliberal governance according to this market ethic has strong tendencies in practice towards furthering uneven geographical development.

Coleman (2005) and Sparke (2006a) show how in one incarnation neoliberalizing policies tend to privilege the flow of capital, goods, and certain classes or categories of migrants. In another, they can regulate the in-migration of low-skilled migrants as ‘burdens to society.’ Cunningham (2001) refers to the simultaneous processes of geoeconomic globalization and geopolitical securitization as “gated globalism” (see also Brown, 2010 for a discussion of the violence of walling as integral to neoliberalism). Concerning the U.S. context, Coleman (2005) describes a “security/economy nexus” of disjointed trade and border policies. Here, for the neoliberal state, “borderland geopolitics and geoeconomics are matching imperatives” (188). As the EU is now offering Ukraine political-economic incentives of visas and free trade in exchange for conforming to EU standards of governance, Ukraine currently provides an excellent opportunity for studying how processes of neoliberalization are being contingently “roll(ed) out” (Peck and Tickell, 2002).

Foucault’s description of circulation in *Security, Territory, Population* is central to how I understand the neoliberal “management” of flows of migration that is now taking place in Ukraine. In his discussion of the construction and development of the city of Nantes in the eighteenth century, Foucault showed how as political-economic theories and practices were shifting, so did the demands for the city to become open to economic circulation. As countries liberalized trade flows, their cities’ streets had to be laid out in such a way as to facilitate the inflows and outflows of trade. This posed a problem precisely for the goals of effective surveillance and security – “the insecurity of the towns was increased by the influx of the floating population” (Foucault 2007: 18). Who made up this “floating population”? Foucault described this population in ways that are often employed today to frame immigrants as ‘illegal’ – “beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, thieves” (ibid., 18). Therefore, due to the liberalization of trade flows, managing circulation and determining between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ categories thereof has become the central problematic for the apparatuses of security (ibid.).

This problematic of managing circulation reflects the paradoxical nature of neoliberalization. Sparke (2006a) identifies this as “a notably neoliberal nexus of a
securitized nationalism and free market transactionalism” (153). In this way, ‘statecraft’ operates today as “a fraught bundle of geopolitical and geoeconomic storylines,” underpinned by multiple competing identities between inside/outside, citizen/“other” (Coleman, 2005: 201). Under accelerated ‘globalization’ in recent decades, political, economic, and social processes of inclusion and exclusion associated with neoliberalization have redefined the requirements for citizenship in receiving countries of migration. For Gökariksel and Mitchell (2005), this can be seen in how institutions and regulations work to discipline individuals such that they understand who they are “in ways that are compatible with neoliberal trends towards greater individual autonomy and entrepreneurship and away from a more social understanding of the world” (149). For example, immigrants as proper “neoliberal subjects” are said to be “self-motivated and self-disciplined to perform effectively as autonomous actors with few collectivist or state-oriented expectations” (ibid.: 155). Understanding how such neoliberal and biopolitical calculations articulate in migration management in Ukraine is central to this thesis project (see section 2.3).

In opposition to the powerful narrative today of neoliberal globalization as an all-encompassing force leading to global peace and trade-fueled prosperity (a la Thomas Friedman’s (2005) ‘flat’ world), Roberts, et al. (2003) call attention to “how neoliberal marketization dynamics are hybridized and supplemented by various extra-economic forces” (887). Here, we can include (anti-)immigration policies as one such force. Neoliberalism’s discourse of economic integration and openness has served to obscure the more traditional imperial aspects of geopolitics. In contrast to the “imagined geography” of neoliberalism, the authors argue that, in fact, neoliberalism has “necessary spaces of exemption” of policing, warfare, and, often violent regulation (ibid., 894).

Feldman (2012) attests to how the admittance of migrants into the EU increasingly relies upon the rational calculation of risk and benefit, as migrants are differentiated according to education and income level (Feldman, 2012: 116). For Sparke (2006a), alongside the expedited flows of transnational elites, neoliberal reconfigurations of citizenship also entail migrants as subject to “new exclusionary exceptions from citizenship” and “techniques of expedited and transnationalized alienation” (157). This sort of exclusionary management is now playing out in Ukraine through a plethora of
actors such as state governments, transnational corporations, international (humanitarian) organizations, and security/police groups. The articulation of processes of neoliberalization and security is evident in the (geo)political-economy of bordering in Europe’s neighbourhood.

2.3. Critical geopolitics and borders: security, economy, governmentality

It remains a central task for political geography to account empirically for the changing geopolitical and geoeconomic modalities of governance as it is undertaken by situated officials in particular roles of expertise. This thesis considers the operation of migration and border management in this way from a critical geopolitical perspective. In the last twenty years, a body of work under the moniker of “critical geopolitics” has emerged out of the writings of political geographers building on the theoretical foundations of Foucault, Agamben, Butler, Derrida, Said, and others (Jones and Sage, 2009). O’Tuathail (2009) defines critical geopolitics as a “gathering place for various critiques of the multiple geopolitical discourses and practices that characterize modernity” which has worked towards the “displacement of state-centric readings of world politics and the recovery of the many messy practices that constitute the modern inter-state system” (in Jones and Sage, 2009). As a body of literature, critical geopolitics has deconstructed discourses of geopolitics with intent to critique the power relations that undergird them (Power and Campbell, 2010).

Hyndman (2001) calls for a “feminist geopolitics” which juxtaposes human and state security towards a more embodied notion of geopolitics – a framework that is particularly applicable to migration and the insecurity produced for migrants by changing techniques of governance. For Dalby (2010), as critical geopolitics is applied to matters such as security, development, and fear, its function as critique remains vital. Critical geopolitics is fundamentally about “challenging how contexts are constructed to justify violence” (Dalby, 2010: 281). Therefore, there are three ways in which I find utility in critical/feminist geopolitics for this project: 1) in the potential for critiquing the geopolitical context of EU externalization as it is constructed through neoliberal, humanitarian, and securitized discourses; 2) in the recognition of various political, social, and economic actors as formative to geopolitics, within and beyond the state; and 3) in
how geopolitical and embodied notions of security and insecurity can be analyzed in relation to one another.

My purpose in analyzing the governance of migration in the EU’s ‘borderlands’ is not to delineate a clean outline of relations between the EU and Ukraine as two hermetically-sealed territorial units. This would be to fall into what Agnew (1994) calls the “territorial trap” – where sovereignly bounded states “exhaust the political-geographical form of world politics” and where there is a “fundamental opposition” between internal and external affairs (Agnew, 2003: 53). As Parker and Vaughn-Williams, et al. (2009) claim, there is a need today, in light of increasingly sophisticated border governance regimes, to move beyond the ‘territorial trap’ to think of the border as a “series of practices” (586). It is this way that I research migration and border management, as it is now operative in Ukraine through an apparatus of actors and security/development partnerships.

I pursue an analysis of EU/Ukraine relations and bordering through the lens of what Foucault has described as “governmentality”:

“The ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 2007: 108).

Foucault understood power as operative through apparatuses of governance which depend upon knowledge of subjects and the calculation of various risks amongst the population and which encompass a host of techniques, or “technologies,” of government.

Merje Kuus (2011) claims that the literature on the EU’s “Neighbourhood Policy” has thus far failed to effectively question “how the policy is operating through particular technologies of government” (1146). Following her call to “examine the whole range of formal and informal practices that form the analytical and social space of geopolitical reasoning,” I draw on the perspectives of particular actors of migration and border policy in order to understand the interconnections between the geographical imaginations of these officials and the practices and partnerships of (b)ordering now taking place in Ukraine (Kuus, 2011: 1152-3). I analyze the present day geopolitical relations between
the EU and Ukraine as they are shot through with individual actors, conflicting priorities, and spatialized notions of difference. In as much as the EU is an “actor,” I outline how – through policies, partnerships, and development aid – apparatuses of governance are involved in exporting responsibilities to Ukraine for keeping uninvited migrants out of the EU.

One of Foucault’s central insights towards power was that it cannot be identified solely with a specific institution, such as the state. Per his example of the panopticon, discipline is to be understood as a “technology” of power, meaning that it comprises “a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets” (Foucault, 1995: 215). Mechanisms of discipline work through “a whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal” (ibid.: 199). In his lectures Security, Territory, Population, Foucault (2007) discussed how the apparatuses of security are chiefly concerned with the level of the population, whereas discipline “concentrates, focuses, closes” a space or segment (44). The apparatuses of security work at the level of the population by constantly expanding and taking on new elements, grasping them at the level of their “effective reality,” and operating at the very level of life itself (Foucault, 2007: 47).

For Foucault, “biopolitics” was about “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life,” depending upon “a series of interventions and regulatory controls” (Foucault, 1990: 139-140). Fitzgerald (2010) discusses how Foucault identified new spaces beyond the state where “biopolitical regulation extends the power of the state territorially and ideologically” (281). Understanding the human body to be a critical site for control, she relates Foucault’s notions of biopolitics and governmentality to the receiving and regulation of migrants in Europe (Fitzgerald, 2010). According to her understanding of biopolitics as “a distinctly racialized form of state regulation of ‘Others,’” the management and regulation of migration from afar can certainly be considered as one such form of biopolitical state power (ibid.: 281). This power of “very remote control” (Samers, 2004) is argued to have become a central component to the tactics of the neoliberal state and its selective interventions towards managing the lives of migrants (ibid.: 288).
Foucault’s notions of circulation, governmentality, biopolitics, and the apparatuses of security are useful concepts for understanding the technologies of power that are attempting to manage borders and the migrants’ lives that cross them in Ukraine. In my discussion of migration and border management, I follow Sparke’s (2006b) call for a “geographical sensitivity” to “how biopolitical transformations and political-economic transformations come together in different context-contingent ways” (3). As mentioned in the previous section, biopolitical and neoliberal calculations are very much intertwined in the selective management of migration in Ukraine (see Chapter Five). Techniques of governmentality are embedded within wider political economic frameworks between the EU and their ‘not yet European neighbor,’ Ukraine. Calculations for security are a central part of this equation.

2.4. The securitization of migration

Over the last two decades, the securitization of migration has become a central concept for those studying migration in the fields of Geography, Security Studies, and International Studies. Historically, many scholars have been methodologically nationalist, studying migration and security primarily through the lens of the nation-state. Now, however, critical geographers and other scholars are investigating the “up-scaling,” “down-scaling,” and even the privatization of the processes of securitization (Samers, 2010: 226). Securitization has been defined in many ways, but there are five views that I believe are relevant to this project. First, the Copenhagen School of Security addresses securitization at the level of discourse – the social relations and actions that are ushered in through the “speech act” of “framing” a phenomenon, like migration, as a security threat (Huysmans, 2006; Weaver, 1995). Secondly, Boswell (2007) describes securitization as a politically discursive connection between migration and the threat of terrorism, which she differentiates from the variegated practices of security as exclusion which can now be seen in the EU. Third, in a Foucauldian and postcolonial sense, Hyndman and Mountz (2008) define securitization as “a governmentality based on mistrust and fear of the uninvited other” (254). Fourth, Leonard (2010) privileges a practice-based definition over the discursive in her analysis of the current situation in the EU. Finally, Samers (2010) references securitization in the context of “the heightened criminalization and restriction of migration” in politics and policies (222).
The Copenhagen School of security (Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, and others at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (1987-2003)), in the effort to widen the concept of security beyond the neo-realist “zero-sum” approach, laid a foundation for the topic of securitization. This school largely privileges the notion of security as discourse (Huysmans, 2006). For example, for Weaver (1995) security can be understood as a “speech act,” where it can be “talked into being,” introducing a “structure of meaning” that acts in accordance with the rationale of security (Huysmans, 2006: 25). According to Buzan and Weaver (2003) “a security issue is posited (by a securitizing actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object […] the securitizing actor therefore claims a right to use extraordinary means or break normal rules, for reasons of security” (71). For the Copenhagen School, framing migration as a ‘security problem’ discursively defines an existential challenge, bringing forth a structured set of meanings inhabited within the language of security (Huysmans, 2006).

The Copenhagen School has been critiqued along the lines of its state-centric and primarily discursive framing of securitization (Wyn Jones, 1999; Huysmans, 2006). For example, the Copenhagen School’s conception of securitization insufficiently accounts for “alternative logics of security” (Huysmans, 2006: 29), such as the technical incorporation of development aid with aims of security. Huysmans (2006) undertakes a Foucauldian analysis to view security practice as a “technique of government” (6). He draws attention to the “technological and technocratic” practices of security that function through “training, routine, and technical knowledge skills” (Huysmans, 2006: 9).

Leonard (2010) focuses explicitly on securitization as practiced through the operations of FRONTEX, the EU-wide on call migration and border enforcement unit. She discusses the EU’s design of “Rapid Border Intervention Teams” (RABITs), which are teams of “specially trained experts” from FRONTEX who are deployed in exceptional situations to help EU nations manage the illegal influx of migrants (Leonard, 2010: 244). Other practices of securitization in which FRONTEX is involved include surveillance of the EU’s borders, the organization of “joint return operations” to neighboring countries, and the training of national border guards (ibid.). Her emphasis is on such practices of securitization in the EU as they are technical in nature and removed from public debate.
Boswell (2007) takes a different definitional approach to the securitization of migration in the EU, claiming that the patterns of regulating migration after 9/11 are much more variegated in nature than the critical security studies literature has suggested. According to her, securitization is a way of discursively “framing” migration in response to a terrorist threat – constructing migration issues as “legitimate objects of social concern” which require response(s) of security (591). Boswell differentiates this from how securitization also occurs at the level of policy practice. Here securitization offers one plausible alternative of many for organizational action, and what appears as the securitization of migration may be regulation for a host of other means. Boswell’s analysis finds that, instead of overwhelming responses of securitization to a terrorist threat, an “emphasis on exclusion” predominates at the level of both politics (discourse) and policy (practices) of migration control (ibid.: 595).

This project’s discussion of migration and border management proceeds from Boswell’s (2007) critique and another important intervention that Neal (2009) makes in the EU securitization literature. Similar to Hyndman and Mountz’s (2008) understanding of securitization as a form of governmentality towards the uninvited other, Neal argues that a “governmentality of risk” better describes the EU’s response to migration than “urgent and exceptional policy” (349, emphasis mine, 334). While discourses of security have certainly not disappeared in the EU’s external policy, he argues that it is a mistake to read security as “a single overarching logic” (351). In his analysis of FRONTEX, Neal (2009) claims:

“FRONTEX must also be considered in the context of the numerous other institutional, technical and legal tools being developed by the EU for the management of migration, security and indeed many other areas of policy. Given that this complexity far exceeds that of the political theatre of securitization, we should be less concerned with a spectacular dialectic of norm/exception and more concerned with an ongoing process of incremental normalization that is not quite spectacular or controversial enough to draw attention to itself” (Neal, 2009: 353).

In line with Neal, this thesis primarily takes an interest in how security and development actors are employing such integrated tactics of governmentality to “manage” migration in a normalized fashion according to security, economy, and humanitarian calculations (see
Chapter Five). I argue that this is how the exclusionary processes of EU border externalization are now being rolled out in Ukraine.

2.5. EU externalization as bordering

This research is situated within an emerging literature on the changing processes of governance associated with EU “externalization” – or how the EU attempts to stem the stream of migration into its territory by remotely allocating resources and responsibility to neighboring areas for them to more effectively manage their own borders in line with EU priorities (Samers, 2004; Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Bialasiewicz, 2012; Casas-Cortes, et al., 2013). This project considers the current processes of EU externalization as explicitly spatial phenomena with direct consequences for migrant’s lives. Instead of viewing migration and border management as the maintenance of a static, fortified wall, the aim of this study was to investigate EU-funded processes of “bordering” (van Houtum, 2010). This entails an understanding of the border “as a process, as a verb” – as always in a state of becoming (ibid.). In this thesis, I investigate the EU/Ukraine border as it is contingently managed through a host of actors, discourses and EU-prioritized practices.

This project’s discussion of externalization in Ukraine is situated within a growing body of work in political geography that accounts for the changing spatial and material nature of borders and migration control (Johnson, et al. 2011) – which Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2009) have termed the field of “critical border studies.” Mountz (2010) claims that states are now constructing “spatial arrangements that render people stateless by geographical design,” expanding the policing of migration beyond their own borders into “ambiguous zones of sovereignty” (123, emphasis mine). This is evident in how migration policies in Europe have shifted towards addressing immigration at its sources in the EU’s ‘neighbourhood,’ involving a “re-scaling of the control of illegal immigration to third countries” (Samers, 2004: 38). Building on Zolberg’s (2002) idea of “remote control,” this re-scaling of the territorial extent of migration control that

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6 Though the building of walls along borders and the management of populations in relation to them are certainly in effect throughout the world today (Brown, 2010).

7 New technologies of migration control, such as biometric passports, are also re-scaling measures for monitoring the ‘riskiness’ of migrants to the scale of the body.
defines EU externalization efforts is described by Samers (2004) as “very remote control.”

Hyndman and Mountz (2008) claim that the “externalization of asylum” represents a shift from a legal domain of refugee protection to a “political domain where migrant flows are managed, preferably in regions of origin” (251). Hyndman and Giles (2011) address the mobility of asylum seekers in relationship to EU policies of externalization. Externalization policies are shown to (re)produce protracted refugee situations (PRS), as asylum seekers are kept out of EU territory at great effort and cost, and kept at bay in liminal spaces. The authors associate EU development assistance with “third country” policies of externalization for managing returned migrants and stymieing further migration, noting the recent construction of “offshore transit processing centers” in nations like Ukraine and Albania (Hyndman and Giles, 2011: 370). A geopolitics of externalization and remote control keeps refugees at bay in PRS, and also away from the watchful eyes of human rights groups (ibid.; Samers, 2010: 213). The externalization of migration control represents the suspension not only of mobility, but also of political rights. These policies result in an increased potential for asylum-seekers to end up in protracted liminal states with their basic needs met only on a “don’t-die survival” basis (Hyndman and Giles, 2011:362). I detail in Chapter Six how this sort of scenario is now playing out in Ukraine.

The EU’s emerging strategies through the ENP for shallowly integrating (Smith and Swain, 2010) countries like Ukraine have entailed the creation of new partnerships and institutions for “development, regulation and policing” (Casas-Cortes, et al., 2013: 2). Casas, et al. (2011) show how the management of the EU’s outer borders has become a focal point of EU external relations, “rearticulating practices of border management and policing [and] creating novel forms of economic cooperation and integration between countries” (75). The authors charge that:

“following border externalization logic provides a more complex window into how processes of transnationalization are creating new regimes of governance that both facilitate and shut down movement […] in precise ways” (Casas, et al., 2011: 87).
In this way, a EU-centric model for migration and border management is being rolled out now through the ENP in Ukraine – often in the name of development and capacity-building assistance. I discuss how the EU’s “carrot and stick” policy arrangements for selective integration are now playing out in Ukraine with regards to the installation of legal and physical infrastructure for migration and border management (see chapter five).

Duffield (2007) draws a connection between humanitarian intervention and the externalization of the EU’s asylum system since the mid-1990s. The threat of “invasion” is enough to warrant “zones of exception” on the edge of the EU where migrants can be held outside of the law, yet fully operative within the framework of humanitarian development:

“The attempts to police spontaneous migration are intimately bound up with the wider technologies of humanitarian intervention, sustainable development, human security and fragile state support that seek to contain global surplus population in situ” (Duffield, 2007: 209).

In this way, policies of “aid and trade” (ibid.: 207) are intertwined with the EU’s external techniques for controlling immigration from the neighboring countries.

This can be understood through Weizman’s (2012) central argument that “humanitarianism and human rights” have become “the crucial means by which the economy of violence is calculated and managed” (4). When employed in contexts such as the externalization of detention, humanitarian aid maintains the health of the detained and “operates to manage […] exclusion” (Weizman, 2012: 62). Due to EU policies of externalization, migrant lives are now being managed in Ukraine – some according to humanitarian standards in detention. This has taken place in a manner that is funded and facilitated according to the EU’s priorities for migration control, humanitarian aid, and “neighbourhood” development (Chapter Six).

2.6. The management approach: integrating security, migration, and development

Migration management is often portrayed as an approach to governing migration and borders that is based on expert knowledge and is focused upon realizing optimal

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8 In this, Duffield (2007) discusses how Agamben’s (2005) “state of exception” becomes the dominant paradigm of migration control without relation to actual trends. This is particularly important in the case of Ukraine, where – while migrants are still transiting through the country – major flows of migration have shifted to the south/southeast of Europe (see Chapter Six).
outcomes for development. The management approach \textit{seemingly} takes place outside of politics through objectively managing migration to realize a ‘win’ for all parties involved – pragmatically incorporating security concerns for the EU and development considerations for the migrant (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010; Geiger and Pecoud, 2011). However, I argue in Chapter Five that migration and border management are politically central to processes of EU externalization. Management regulates the selective decisions regarding which migrants are invited into the EU and those whose exclusion is managed outside of the EU.

The management approach to migration fits well within what Rancière (2010) has termed a “post-political” framework – where democracy is reduced to the “way of life […] of a specific group,” which is maintained in tandem with global capitalism as a common sense “consensus.” Rancière (2010) defines the post-political framework as a “police” order precisely in how it operates according to a common sense of whose life “counts” as a part of the community (36). The police order counts those who belong according to biopolitical considerations of place of birth, status, and class. Migration management is a way of accomplishing the selective inclusion and exclusion of migrants that reflects Rancière’s police order – precisely in how it selectively controls who is allowed into the commons of the EU according to logics of EU internal security and EU capital accumulation. Further, this management relies upon an unquestioned distinction between the managers and the managed – between those who are made secure by bordering practices and those migrants who are excluded as subjects of humanitarian assistance.

Of course, this is a deeply political distinction – which for Rancière (2010), a proper political moment would call into question at an ontological level. For Rancière, the activity of politics questions the border between the subject of bare life and a politically qualified life. A proper politics disrupts the common sense of ‘who counts’ and supplements the present political arrangement “with a part of those without part” (2010, 36). The productive power of migration management is that this division is discursively removed from the realm of politics, operating instead as a technical and humanitarian common sense approach to governance that simply needs to be calibrated correctly.
Migration management will be analyzed in this thesis as an approach to governing migration that brings together security concerns with economic and humanitarian considerations. I analyze development, securitization, and migration management as variegated and contingent processes that articulate in the particular political project of EU externalization. In order to set up my analysis of migration management as a “security/development nexus,” the next two sections explore some of the literatures that bridge issues of migration, security, development.

2.6.1. Migration-development nexus

It is well-documented that EU policies have shifted in the last decade towards managing the circulation of migration externally and are, therefore, often forcing migrants to settle in precarious, liminal, and often undocumented, conditions (Samers, 2003; de Haas, 2005; Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; de Bel Air, 2011; Hyndman and Giles, 2011). Indeed, at the scale of larger Europe, geopolitical relations between “insiders” and “outsiders” (Smith and Swain, 2010), between EU members and neighboring third countries, have facilitated the ongoing development of uneven political and economic geographies in which migrants are often caught in precarious places ‘in-between.’ Due in part to the untenable and inhumane conditions migrants often face today, some have argued that migration has become a necessary and unavoidable component of today’s ‘globalized’ world, and that it cannot be stopped by economic and security-minded policies (de Haas, 2005, 2007; Hyndman, 2005; De Bel Air, 2011). If we understand the structural aspects of migration as a manifestation of global inequality, then, as Hein de Haas (2007) argues, the right choice for development may be to facilitate circulation instead of closure. He makes the argument that migration can be viewed as a strategy for equalizing opportunity and enhancing wellbeing, instead of as a threat to be managed (de Haas, 2007).

A sizable literature has emerged in the last decade to study and assess the possibilities of a “migration-development nexus” (see Nyberg-Sorenson, 2002 for an overview). In much of this literature, migration as a phenomenon provides an urgent wake-up call for governments and societies to rethink their roles in global inequality, strategies and relationships of development, and the consequences of and possibilities for regional (un)cooperation (Davies 2007; De Haas, 2007; De Bel Air, 2011). The nexus of
migration and development is not only of considerable theoretical interest, concerning issues such as remittances, brain gain/drain and the flows of ideas/knowledge, security, and ‘moral panics’ over such issues as global poverty and the loss of state sovereignty; its relevance has also increasingly become clear in international policy (Bailey, 2010: 375). Bailey (2010) notes how the expressed goals (and related programs) of international migration and development organizations are often couched in fear-laden discursive terms, which facilitates the maintenance of popular crisis-driven debates over economic, population, demographic, and ecological security (ibid.). It is in relation to such perceived threats and development possibilities that stem from migration that Silvey (2009) argues that scholarship on migration has a significant role to play in the creation of “robust geographies of development” (508).

2.6.2. Security-development nexus

There is a burgeoning literature on the nexus of security and development to which this project aims to contribute (Duffield, 2002, 2007; Mohan and Mawdsley, 2007; Hyndman, 2009; Reid-Henry, 2011; Essex, 2008, 2013). Mohan and Mawdsley (2007) state that “security-development interventionism” has long undergirded the expansion of empire and U.S. hegemony, processes within which NGOs have been embroiled as humanitarian “soft power” (440). Duffield (2002) describes the “will to govern” by development as enacted by networks of public and private actors (1050). Through development aid, “a veil of civility” is drawn over conflict and an “us versus them” logic prevails, justifying “metropolitan” intervention into the “borderlands” (Duffield, 2002: 1052). This “will to govern” the unstable “borderlands” provides validation for the diversification of networks of development practice, such that security and development can function in tandem.

It is in this way that I investigate migration and border management as a “security/development nexus” (see chapter five). Understanding the relationship between security and development in the management of migration and borders in Ukraine is a central component of this project. Through the ENP and EU externalization efforts, development aid is being tied to countries like Ukraine’s willingness to cooperatively manage migration (Samers, 2004; van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007; Hyndman and Mountz,
For Ukraine, this now includes receiving migrants who are returned from the EU and managing the flows across their borders in cooperation with EU governing bodies.

Critical scholarship has thrown into doubt the possibility for development assistance, so often administered from headquarters in the ‘Global North,’ to intervene apolitically in other regions of the world (Ferguson, 1994; Duffield, 2002; Harvey, 2006). For example, attention has been given to the enrollment of development in neoliberal state projects towards enhancing the funder’s political and economic security (Mohan and Mawdsley, 2007; Essex, 2008; Fluri, 2012). Hardt and Negri (2004) describe an “imperial humanitarian logic” as part of their conception of Empire today (60). According to this logic, violence is often advocated in the name of human rights, and NGOs are increasingly incorporated within today’s imperial politics (ibid.).

Fluri (2012) also brings together development and security in the context of critical geopolitics to chart the history of “politicized aid” to Afghanistan up unto the present. Development aid to Afghanistan serves twin purposes of assistance and geopolitical strategy, regarding the social reproductive nature of Afghani’s everyday lives “as bare life, requiring ‘aid/development’ intervention” (Fluri, 2012: 37). Fluri (2012) describes the interventions of humanitarian organizations as intimately interwoven with sovereign power. The “creation of victims into sites for humanitarian intervention” reveals the functioning of biopolitical governmentality at multiple scales (ibid.).

As with any study of neoliberalism, development and the securitization of migration, it was necessary for my analysis to determine who the actors of management are in the specific place of Ukraine in its relations with the European Union. To this effect, Silvey (2010) writes about the relationship between development and the state, and claims that the state is one mediator of development among many, including NGO’s, financial institutions, and corporations. She argues that greater attention is needed to “people’s lived engagements with political spaces” in which multiple actors, state, non-state, and intra-state, operate (ibid.: 831). In accord with this, I have pursued an understanding of how the multiple actors of development and security are engaging the political spaces of Ukraine, and how their interventions are impacting the lives of migrants attempting to enter the EU.
One such actor in Ukraine is the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Ashutosh and Mountz (2011) critically address the work of IOM, which, like the IMF and World Bank, works with and beyond the nation-state in the management of flows and bodies. IOM stands “at the intersection of the nation-state, international human rights regimes, and neoliberal governance” (Ashutosh and Mountz, 2011: 22). They argue that in order to understand the transnational nature of state activities such as the securitization of migration, attention must be paid to the way that states are “collaborating and contracting out” tasks related to migration management (ibid.).

Andrijasevic and Walters (2010) situate IOM’s “constructive and constitutive” role in the governmentality of border management today. For researchers to look exclusively at the state is to miss the increasingly vital role of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the policies of migration control (not to mention corporations and other actors which are increasingly important under neoliberalization). IOM serves as an exemplary model for one way in which neoliberal states are now structuring migration flows, “legitimized in the language of humanitarianism” (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010: 22). Studying the roles of multiple actors who are involved in the management of migration and the facilitation of processes of EU border externalization in Ukraine provided insights into how development assistance can be contingently imbued within exclusionary political projects.

2.7. Summary

I have reviewed a range of theoretical avenues for how I will analyze, contextualize, and critique the management of migration and borders in Ukraine in the pages that follow. I aim to situate this project within the literatures of critical geopolitics, EU externalization, critical border studies, and the security-development nexus.

I have drawn on the literatures of securitization, neoliberalism and the security/development nexus, because in this thesis I am fundamentally interested in how migration management takes place in Ukraine through EU-centric calculations according to imperatives for security, economic health, and humanitarian standards. The governance of migration in Ukraine does not happen outside of politics. It is embedded
within wider EU/Ukraine political-economic relations of inclusion and exclusion (Section 2.1). To provide an example of Ukraine’s “shallow integration” (Smith and Swain, 2010), I explain how the EU offers selective opportunities for integration to Ukraine in exchange, in part, for cooperation with controlling flows of migration into the EU.

Whether or not this represents the securitization of migration (section 2.4) is a debate that this thesis engages with. Boswell’s (2007) critique of the securitization literature raises important questions for this project – namely, are the discourses and practices from the EU a securitized response to a threat from migration, or are they implicit within a neoliberal logic of selective economic and social exclusion? Based on this project’s research, I am inclined to answer that logics of securitization and neoliberal selectivity can contingently be operative in a “conjunctural” manner in the management approach (Sparke, 2006a). My fieldwork’s results led me away from understanding the governance of migration strictly as securitization and towards the selective approach of “management,” where goals of security and development are both incorporated (Section 2.6 here, see also chapter five).

I specifically analyze migration and border management as a neoliberal form of governance (Section 2.2). This project has the potential to explore the contradictions embedded within this powerful neoliberal discourse of freedom and mobility (Harvey, 2005). As a contribution to the literatures in critical geopolitics and EU border externalization (Sections 2.3 and 2.4), this project provides a situated perspective on how new spatial modalities of managing migration are being implemented and operationalized, outside of the EU, in Ukraine. While not denying state power in the least, I investigate how this external management of circulation occurs through specific techniques of governmentality that are implemented by an apparatus of diverse actors. I outline processes of externalization in relation to their effects on migrants who are managed in Ukraine.

This thesis’s central contribution is to expand upon Sparke’s (2006a) analysis of a “neoliberal nexus” and Coleman’s (2005) idea of the U.S. border as a “security/economy nexus” to think about processes of bordering now being rolled out in Ukraine as a “security/development nexus.” I have detailed some of the wider literature on this nexus that exists (Section 2.6), but the literature lacks an application of this nexus to specific
projects of bordering and managing migration. Therefore, I analyze how the management approach to migration blends imperatives for security and development, and how these calculations are bound up together within the EU’s ENP processes of bordering and externalization. I hope that theorizing migration and border management as a security-development nexus will be an important contribution to geographical scholarship in “critical border studies” (Parker and Vaughn-Williams, 2009; van Houtum, 2010; Johnson, et al., 2011).

In conclusion, the EU-Ukraine border provides a valuable vantage point to investigate the governance of migration in relation to the changing geographies of “EUrope’s” neighborhood. As institutional politics, physical infrastructure, and operational norms are being rapidly (and often repeatedly) reimagined and implemented, Ukraine offers a unique insight at the moment into how spaces of (in)security and (im)mobility are constructed and maintained. In light of much of the literature reviewed above, such a case study can be instructive as to how processes of neoliberalization, securitization, and humanitarianism intersect in the governance of international migration.
CHAPTER THREE. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

I approached this research project methodologically through a triangulation of the following methods: 1) semi-structured interviews, conducted over five weeks in late-summer 2012; 2) content analysis of relevant policy documents, NGO/IGO development publications, and human rights reports; and 3) critical discourse analysis of the textual information I gathered. In this chapter I outline each of these methods, followed by a discussion of researcher positionality and conduct. I conclude with a discussion of how this project is an effort at critical scholarship, and the challenges that lie there within.

3.2. Interviews

I chose to conduct interviews for this project because I wanted to gain a deeper understanding of the discourses surrounding security and development in the governance of migration in Ukraine. From my preliminary research of human rights reports and EU policies and development contracts, I became interested in how EU externalization efforts facilitated the intertwining of security and development calculations and polices. Therefore, I sought to understand how those implementing or resisting these policies in Ukraine explained and justified their actions.

As opposed to the standardization of surveys, interviews are useful, as a conversation, for people to explore the “complexities and contradictions of their experiences” (Valentine, 1997: 111). Interviews place an emphasis on the meanings that people attribute to their lives and work, the lives of others, and the social processes in which these are imbued (ibid.). McDowell (2009) claims that interviews are useful when the researcher is aiming for depth and detailed understanding. In contrast to quantitative techniques (for example, quantifying the change in amount and type of immigrants in and through Ukraine in response to policies of securitization), interviewing is an interpretive methodology, allowing for the investigation of meanings (McDowell, 2009). Interviews proved quite important for my study, as they allowed for an understanding, for example, of how officials saw their work to be “managing” migration for development. Interviews
allowed for an exploration of the conflicted feelings and paradoxical practices that came along with this work, particularly in the context of wider EU-Ukraine relations.

I interviewed twenty officials in fifteen interviews between July 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 30\textsuperscript{th}, 2012:

\textbf{Table 1, Interviews}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>European Union Delegation to Ukraine</td>
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<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2:00 PM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM Official #1</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>July 5, 2012</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3:00 PM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM Official #2</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>July 5, 2012</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3:00 PM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM Official #3</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>July 23, 2012</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3:00 PM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR Official</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td>July 16, 2012</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5:00 PM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Official #1</td>
<td>United States State Department (law enforcement)</td>
<td>July 17, 2012</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Official #2</td>
<td>United States State Department (law enforcement)</td>
<td>July 17, 2012</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US official #3</td>
<td>United States State Department (border security)</td>
<td>July 17, 2012</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM #1</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM)</td>
<td>July 19, 2012</td>
<td>Odessa, Ukraine</td>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official/Activist/Official</th>
<th>Agency/Group</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Meeting Format</th>
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<td>Odessa, Ukraine</td>
<td>Joint</td>
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<td>July 19, 2012 11:00</td>
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<td>Single</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Single</td>
</tr>
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<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Activist #1</td>
<td>(confidential)</td>
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<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Activist #2</td>
<td>(confidential)</td>
<td>July 10, 2012 2:00 PM</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Activist #3</td>
<td>(confidential)</td>
<td>July 17, 2012 2:30 PM</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Civil Society #1</td>
<td>(confidential)</td>
<td>July 23, 2012 3:00 PM</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Civil Society #2</td>
<td>(confidential)</td>
<td>July 4, 2012 11:00 AM</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>Single (with interpreter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I tried whenever possible to set up one-on-one interviews. However, there were four interviews where interviewees either requested to meet as a group or brought a colleague along with them (IOM Officials #1 and #2; US Officials #1, #2 and #3; EUBAM Officials #1 and #2; and Migrant Activists #1 and #2). I did not object to the interviewee’s request to meet as a group in any of these cases, as I wanted to be respectful of these officials’ time, and did not want to be perceived as difficult or raise
suspicions of my intent. Whenever more than one interviewee was present, I attempted to note when comments were made in direct response to my questions versus in interaction between the participants. Though my project was not designed initially to include “focus groups,” the interactions between interviewees proved to be quite instructive towards understanding the meanings these officials attribute to migration management and processes of EU externalization – particularly in moments of confirmation, disagreement, or silence (Wilkinson, 1998; Secor, 2010).

I primarily conducted interviews with those whom Andy Herod (1999) titles “foreign elites.” These interviewees ranged in profession from state delegates, to overseeing migration management projects, to running programs for refugee protection, to directing capacity-building in risk analysis and border management for Ukrainian border guards. I also interviewed three migrant activists and two lawyers (all Ukrainian, except for one), whom I shared a degree of affinity with their critical assessment of migration management in Ukraine. I have generalized their titles throughout (“Migrant Activist” and “Migrant Lawyer”) in order to ensure confidentiality, as they worked for small organizations.

Interviewing foreign elites allowed me to gain insight into how issues related to my research questions are being discussed in circles where techniques of governing migration are being crafted and implemented. It also allowed me to hear first-hand about their successes and frustrations with managing migration and borders in Ukraine. In this way, interviews produced a valuable opportunity to “probe […] issue(s) in depth” (McDowell, 2009: 157) in ways that would not be possible from only doing content analysis on policy documents. In particular, interviews help to get at “the meanings people attribute to […] the processes which operate in particular social contexts” (Valentine, 1997: 111). For example, holding semi-structured interviews with officials in Ukraine afforded the opportunity to probe the meanings attributed to “migration management” in relation to wider EU externalization efforts. Interviews were thus particularly valuable for my attempt to understand how, why, and with what success EU externalization efforts are being rolled out in the context of Ukrainian society today.

In deciding who to contact and interview for my research, I attempted to select an “illustrative sample” in accordance with my research questions, thoroughly researching
the organization beforehand, and selectively targeting individuals to contact (Kuzel, 1999; Valentine, 1997). Choosing an “illustrative sample” for my project meant that I tried to interview a range of officials – from those active in crafting policies of governance to those resisting these policies’ effects on migrants. This was helpful towards understanding the “management approach” to migration and borders as it is situated within a field of diverse practices, actors, and resistance. In terms of gaining access to the foreign elites that I sought to interview, I started by utilizing organizational websites and the contact information contained there (Herod, 1999). I sent initial emails to prospective interviewees in May 2012, and in some cases I sent a follow-up email again in June 2012. I then followed up with those who had responded to my emails by email or phone when I arrived to Ukraine in late June 2012 to arrange meeting times. After my initial meetings with EU (7/2/12) and IOM officials (7/5/12), I was able to employ “snowballing” – using initial contacts to gain further contacts, based upon mutual trustworthy recommendations (Valentine, 1997; Secor, 2010).

Kuzel (1999) encourages researchers to consider both appropriateness and adequacy in choosing a sampling strategy for whom to interview for one’s project – considering if the sample is appropriate for their research purpose, subject of interest, and style of inquiry, and adequate in terms of what information has already been gained and how the researcher’s theories and interpretations are developing. In this respect, I sought to spread my interviews across the field of migration and border policy, implementation, and resistance in Ukraine. Being ultimately subject to my interviewees’ availability, I was fortunate in that it worked out for my first interviews to be with two EU and two IOM officials whose work directly pertained to the political intentions for and implementation of EU-funded projects for migration and border management in Ukraine (RQ1, RQ2: see chapters four and five).

I thus pursued subsequent interviews and designed their interview schedules, in part, based upon the interesting questions, dilemmas, and contradictions that arose from my initial interviews with EU and IOM officials. As one is in the field, conducting subsequent interviews requires flexibility and openness to the emergence of alternative explanations (Kuzel, 1999). For example, though I came to Ukraine initially interested in how discourses of security framed migrants as a threat, I quickly realized that the
dominant paradigm for governing migration in Ukraine was “management,” and particularly managing migration “for development” (RQ1, RQ3: see chapter five). This led me to analyze EU, EUBAM, IOM and ICMPD documents on migration and border management while in the field, and to let this inform my later interviews with EUBAM, UNHCR, and others.

Speaking later with migrant activists and lawyers was valuable in relation to these initial interviews because these individuals work directly with migrants and asylum-seekers in Ukraine, often on a case-by-case basis. The migrant activist and migrant lawyers were able to relay some of the specific effects of EU externalization and management efforts on migrants in Ukraine (RQ2: see chapter six). While these perspectives certainly do not replace the voices of migrants’ themselves (Lawson, 2000), I believe that these interviews added an important critical perspective to my analysis. This was the perspective of Ukrainians engaged in local struggles against the negative effects of the EU’s externalization efforts and against the discrimination towards uninvited migrants that this thesis ultimately critiques (RQ2: see chapters four and five). Interviewing officials from civil society in Ukraine allowed for Ukrainian perspectives on the EU/Ukraine relationship, which was valuable to contextualize migration and border management in the wider political-economic relations of the ENP (RQ1, RQ3: see chapters four and five).

Regarding format, I held semi-structured interviews, entering with a “guide” of potential questions to proceed with contingently. Regarding content, I aimed for what Crabtree and Miller (1999) describe as “depth interviews.” Depth interviews are conducted with people working in a similar context, or with similar goals, where the aim of the interview is to “generate themes and narratives” (Crabtree and Miller, 1999). While my interviewees all worked in a similar context, they held often quite different views on EU externalization and Ukraine’s “EUropean” trajectory, which allowed for my analysis to present contrasting views in order to show that these issues are contested.

In terms of “scripting the interview” (Kvale, 2009) and conducting the interview itself, I followed several guides for research techniques (Crabtree and Miller, 1999; Kvale, 1996, 2009; Valentine, 1997). Due to the fact that I was interviewing these professionals to understand the nature of their work, it was crucial that each interview...
schedule be tailored to the individual interviewee. This necessitated reviewing their credentials beforehand, in addition to the policies and project histories that related to their specific area of expertise. This preliminary research allowed for the interviews to produce information that would not be available from solely analyzing policy documents.

I tried when appropriate to conduct the interviews in relation to the policy documents analyzed in the thesis. EU ENP “Progress Reports” on Ukraine from 2011 and 2012 were particularly helpful in this respect, as they provide specific and recent information on projects that were being undertaken with EU funding in Ukraine, and further, detail how the EU saw that progress was being made. Doing this ‘homework’ before each interview allowed for me to ask specific policy or event-related questions, in lieu of using blanket terms like “development” or the ‘academic-speak’ of terms like “neoliberalization.” Oftentimes the interviewee would begin the interview by stating how much time we would have to talk and ask me what I already knew about my research objectives. It was thus essential (in part to develop good rapport) to appear knowledgeable about their line of work and be respectful of their time.

Officials are likely to be more comfortable for the interview when in their “own environment” (Valentine 1997). I held interviews in the interviewee’s offices whenever possible, though I did not resist if they suggested another location, such as the US embassy cafeteria. The majority of the project’s interviews were held in English, but there were three interviews where the interviewee preferred to speak Russian. In two of these cases, there were other officials with the interviewee’s organization whom the interviewee themselves arranged to interpret into English. For my interview with the Ukrainian State Migration Service, a Ukrainian colleague of mine who had helped to set up the interview volunteered to interpret. In this particular instance, I confirmed the content of my notes with him after the interview to ensure accuracy.

When given permission by the interviewee, I recorded the interviews using the recorder on my phone. However, in four of the interviews, interviewees requested that I not record. In these cases, I took notes by hand, noting any statements that were direct quotations, and expanding upon my jottings within hours after the interview. I transcribed the recorded interviews as soon as possible to the date of the interview in order to maintain a sense of the context and climate of our conversation (Poland, 1995;
Valentine 1997; Crabtree and Miller, 1999). All recorded interviews were transcribed by late-August, 2012.

3.3. Content analysis

According to Colin Robson (2002), content analysis begins with the collection of documents and transcripts that pertain to the study’s research questions. In triangulation with interview data, I chose to undertake a content analysis of EU and Ukrainian policy documents, and NGO and IGO publications of relevance to development, security, and migration in Ukraine. In advance of my fieldwork, and in light of the information revealed through my interviews, I devised a “sampling strategy” (Robson, 2002) for focusing on approximately fifteen EU policy documents of relevance to Ukraine today. Furthermore, I analyzed the content of relevant human rights reports, such as a 2010 report on Ukraine by Human Rights Watch, Buffeted in the Borderland, which presents the dire effects of EU externalization of migration control on migrant life possibilities. Finally, I incorporated several documents from migration and development organizations into my analysis. The deciding factor for whether or not a policy or publication was employed was its relation to the project’s research questions, and its reference to project-specific relations between the European Union and Ukraine or to specific events in Ukraine post-2004.

Once the project’s sample is collected, according to Robson (2002), a “recording unit” must be determined, as the units around which the analysis will be structured. Here I paid particular attention to the relations in these texts between language of security and that of development assistance (or ‘aid’, ‘technical assistance,’ and ‘capacity-building’) (RQ3). I also paid close attention to language of “managing” migration and borders (RQ1). When this language was found in the text, I focused on understanding its use in context. As I conducted my analysis, I focused on identifiable categories through which I could construct a cohesive argument based upon my data (Robson, 2002). I variably employed the following categories to conduct my analysis, taken from Robson (2002): subject matter (are security, development and migration being talked about?); traits (how are they being described?); goals (with what intent?); methods (what actions are being taken toward these goals?); actors (who is acting?); authority (with whose consent?);
location (where?); and finally, consequences (at what costs?). Since varying degrees of inference are involved in content analysis, employing this method in triangulation with interviews and discourse analysis proved important to contextualize and situate these categorical claims within a wider field of practice (ibid.).

3.4. Critical discourse analysis

Fairclough (2009) defines discourse as “semiotic ways of construing aspects of the world (physical, social or mental), which can generally be identified with different positions or perspectives of different groups of social actors” (164). Discourses are “put into practice,” “inculcated as new ways of being,” and “physically materialized” (ibid.: 165). In line with Fairclough’s (2009) Critical Discourse Analysis, I have analyzed these documents and the words of policy and development professionals as they are situated dialectically in a wider level of events, practices, and orders of discourse (RQ2). I believe these are influential to the ways in which migration and borders are being “managed” in Ukraine (RQ1).

To answer my research questions, it was important for my analysis to go beyond simply relaying the content of relevant documents and interview transcripts. This is where I sought to make connections as to how “texts unfold into broader discourses” through discourse analysis (Secor, 2010). When situated in the wider context of social actions and orders, the discursive constructions of policy documents and the language of those I interviewed hold “points of entry” (Fairclough, 2009) to understanding the complex relationships between the purposes of policy makers and development organizations, what these actors publish and say about their work’s intent, and what happens in practice as programs for migration and border management are implemented in Ukraine (RQ1, RQ2, RQ3). I view EU policies, the documents of development and migration organizations, and human rights reports as discursive productions of socially constructed knowledge. For example, I found that ENP documents are rife with “geographical imaginations” (Gregory, 2004) of difference that directly inform the conditions for reform that they prescribe to help Ukraine come in line with “European standards and values.”
This project thus follows Kuus’s (2007) call for critical geopolitical analyses to consider the role that specific actors of policy play in the functioning of geopolitical discourses. Spatial assumptions underlie these officials’ speech and influence the policies and mechanisms of control that they help to realize. Understanding discourse as language and practice (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Müller, 2008), I underline the importance of juxtaposing language of “EUropean” standards, development, and management with the practices of bordering now taking place in Ukraine. Talking with officials in the fields of security, development, and those associated with migrant activism and legal defense allowed for my analysis to situate the discourses of management within a wider field of practice and intervention – the very practices of bordering, selection, return, and detention which migrants often encounter in Ukraine (RQ1, RQ2).

3.5. Positionality and researcher conduct

Interviews entail both collaboration and contested social encounter (McDowell, 2009). The interview is “an interpersonal situation, a conversation between two partners” where knowledge is created between the interviewer and interviewee’s two points of view (Kvale, 2009: 123). It is in this way that Crabtree and Miller (1999) describe the interviewer’s body as the “research instrument.” The interview becomes a sort of “partnership and communicative performance” (Crabtree and Miller, 1999: 91). Through the interview conversation, the interviewer and interviewee are unearthing histories, relations, tensions, and even contradictions – both parties are impacted and changed by the encounter (McDowell, 2009). Conducting research is an inter-subjective process.

As much as possible, I tried to conduct this research project reflexively with an awareness of the situated position from which my interview questions were asked, texts were analyzed, and knowledge was produced. When doing fieldwork, an important part of conducting research reflexively and managing one’s positionality is to pay attention to the differential power relationships that exist between the interviewer and interviewee, relative to each party’s social situatedness (Valentine, 1997; Nagar, 2002; McDowell, 2009). Throughout my interviews, I tried to manage my positionality as an inquisitive and open-minded male American graduate student who had come to Ukraine to learn as
much as possible about the nature of my interviewee’s work and their opinions on how migration and border management was being implemented in Ukraine. At times I was uncomfortable with asking my interviewees questions about the problems in Ukraine and with their line of work – particularly since I had come from afar to investigate their place of work. I took opportunities when they arose to compare the EU/Ukraine arrangement with American migration politics, admitting that our immigration system faces similarly difficult issues, and that I did not have the answers. I was also honest with my interviewees about the fact that I have family living in Ukraine and have traveled repeatedly to the country in the past. Recognizing the privilege I have as an American researcher (evidenced alone by my ability to fly to Ukraine), I tried to position myself as someone who was grateful for the interviewees’ time, eager to understand my research topic through their perspective, and open to continued collaboration and communication after the interview was over.

Sundberg (2003) calls for researchers to consider the “politics of fieldwork,” meaning the geopolitical relations that enable the fieldwork to happen, and the power relations that exist between researcher and researched (180). Both Valentine (1997) and Herod (1999) note that when interviewing elites, it may be the researched who feel as if they ultimately have to power to determine what the researcher records, writes, and conveys in their scholarship. I found this to be the case in several interviews, where accomplished male interviewees explicitly told me what I could and could not repeat, once with a half-joking threat to “come to Kentucky and kick my ass” if I repeated what came out in the interview (I have judiciously heeded this request). Also two of my interviewees told me that they had previously earned PhDs and offered advice as to how I should conduct my research and what my findings should communicate. These moments of attempted control over the research’s process and outcome provided occasion for me to struggle with the tension between: 1) my own positionality as a male graduate researcher from the U.S.; 2) the wishes of my interviewees for their work in migration management to be portrayed in a particular way; and 3) the critical aims of my scholarship to address the negative conditions that migrants are facing in Ukraine (RQ2).

In the process of interviewing elites, the expectation for me to “take sides” on issues of migration politics did occasionally emerge (Herod, 1999; Myers, 2009). For
example, I was once asked at the beginning of an interview what my “hypotheses” were about the success of migration management in Ukraine. While being honest, here I sought to maintain a “veneer of neutrality” (Myers, 2009) in order to allow the interview to proceed positively and productively. Ultimately, I realized that I had little control over how others perceived me, or the intent of my work (ibid.).

Throughout the research process, I made every effort to maintain subject confidentiality and take research ethics seriously (Valentine, 1997; Secor, 2010). Conducting interviews and analysis has been an ongoing process of learning from past mistakes and incorporating lessons learned into further work. This project has been a process of growing and being stretched in my abilities as a listener, communicator, and co-producer of knowledge.

3.6. Conclusion

My main purposes for employing interviews, content analysis, and critical discourse analysis were to understand: 1) how an apparatus of actors are undertaking, justifying, and struggling with managing migration in Ukraine (RQ1, RQ2); 2) how this management is situated within a wider political economy of EU “Neighbourhood” relations with, and intentions for, Ukraine (RQ2); 3) how these policies for security and development concerning migration are intertwined in their implementation through specific actors in Ukraine (RQ3); and 4) what effects this power-laden management has for migrants’ lives in Ukraine (RQ2). Triangulating the above methods has facilitated what I hope is an appropriate handling of a research topic with political, economic, and social concerns.

I have undertaken this project from its beginning as an effort for “critical scholarship,” the aim of which McDowell (2009) claims is to “traverse the boundaries between research, policy, activism, and theory construction.” In accord with recent critiques of critical scholarship (Nagar, 2002; Hyndman, 2005; McDowell 2009), I am committed to engaging with alternative possibilities for creatively disseminating my results beyond this thesis and resultant academic publications. Hyndman (2005) argues that this is a task which remains for critical geopolitics – to activate a “culture of resistance” to the walls of exclusion which are being daily built (5).
CHAPTER FOUR. UKRAINE’S CURRENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE EU

4.1. Introduction

Foucault (2007) describes the “milieu” as that in which circulation occurs. This chapter’s aim is to illuminate the milieu within which the EU’s management of migration now takes place. It is well documented that since the European Union’s 2004 territorial enlargement, the EU has become an increasingly external actor in policy areas of migration and security. Casas, et al. (2011) describe the EU border externalization regime as “a process of de- and re-centering European identity, territory, and sovereignty” (74). In this chapter, I focus on the political-economic relations and the institutional and legal transitions that have undergirded the post-2004 transformations in the governance of migration and borders between the EU and Ukraine. This will allow me to later situate the “management approach” to migration (Chapter Five) and the EU’s efforts at “externalization” (Chapter Six) in their political, economic, and geographical context.

Ukraine is a historically significant country of origin, transit, and destination for migrants. Since 2004, it now shares four borders with EU member countries – Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania. As Ukraine’s western neighbors have joined the EU, these countries’ bi-lateral arrangements with Ukraine for trade and mobility have been erased in lieu of more direct and comprehensive relations between Ukraine and the EU as a whole (Interview, Civil Society #1, 7/23/12). This has meant that migration and border issues now figure at the heart of any direct relations between Ukraine and the larger EU.

Mountz (2010) claims that “geography and the law are intertwined” as states extend their borders through various practices that produce the controlled spaces which migrants encounter (xviii). In this chapter I focus upon the EU’s legal and political-economic design of exclusionary external arrangements for migration and border “management” in Ukraine. Central to this analysis will be what I call the EU’s “conditionality mechanisms” – arrangements that hold development assistance and political ‘carrots’, such as visas and free trade agreements, hostage to Ukraine’s willingness to meet various EU requirements. These conditional arrangements are now
operative through the EU’s “Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP, see section 4.3). The ENP intertwines development assistance with policy directives in the attempt to bring Ukraine in line with the EU’s priorities for migration and border management.

By way of an outline, I first discuss Ukraine’s geographical and political importance for the EU. I then outline the EU’s “European Neighbourhood Policy” and the conditionality mechanisms there within. As examples of this conditionality, I then move to the two major policies that are in flux at the moment between Ukraine and the EU – the Association Agreement and the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. I juxtapose these with the Readmission Agreement, which was signed recently between the EU and Ukraine for the return of migrants from the EU to Ukraine. Finally, I address the current EU/Ukraine relations in relation to the EU’s ongoing efforts at implementing the necessary infrastructure (legal and physical) for migration and border control in Ukraine. Throughout this chapter I draw out the significance of a tension which became tangible for me in interviews with EU officials: a conflict that exists for the EU between interacting with and imagining a future Ukraine as ‘misbehaving neighbor,’ ‘reliable partner’ and ‘cooperative migration/border manager.’

4.2. Ukraine’s “unique importance” for the EU

The language of Ukraine’s importance for the EU can be found in many of the EU’s communications. For example, the EU Delegation to Ukraine’s website calls Ukraine “a priority partner,” a sentiment that was echoed in interviews with EU officials in Ukraine. One EU official explained the country’s significance rather succinctly, stating that, for the EU, “Ukraine has a unique importance […] they are big and they are close.” This official also claimed that outside of membership, Ukraine “cannot be any closer” as they are “the only country which has borders with four member states” (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12). From interviews and the study of post-2004 EU/Ukraine policy documents, it is clear that shared borders are a major motivation for Ukraine’s ‘priority’ status. This proximity entails direct cooperation on border policy, trade, energy, and relations with Russia – all of which have been focal points of targeted EU development assistance.
However, while the relationship with Ukraine is politically and economically a priority for the EU, it has had a tumultuous history since the 2004 Orange Revolution – particularly since the election of current Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in early 2010. One EU official expressed concerns over Ukraine’s active “third-world-ization,” based upon recent economic and political decisions by the country’s leadership (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). This official further described Ukraine as “one of the most corrupt countries in the world,” listing examples such as the jailing of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in late 2011, politician’s “buying the vote,” and a political climate that “does not apply EU values” (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12).

Here, an important question is posed by Browning and Christou (2010): to what effect do the “outsiders in the margins of Europe have a constitutive impact” on the nature of EU internal policies (109)? They claim that Ukraine has the potential to have “considerable constitutive impact” as an outsider for the EU leaders’ internal decision-making processes (ibid.). Following from this, I am interested in how, despite Ukraine’s apparent disposition as a ‘misbehaving neighbor,’ EU leaders refuse to withdraw from cooperation and assistance in the area of migration and border management. As I detail further in section 4.5 of this chapter, EU officials and ENP reports reiterate in many ways that the failure of the relationship is not an option. I argue that this, at least in part, is due to the need for Ukraine to be a ‘stable neighbor’ and ‘cooperative migration manager’ in light of the shared borders.

4.3. External action, internal priorities: European Neighbourhood Policy

The EU’s “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP) framework was rolled out in the midst of the 2004 territorial expansion as a common policy framework for “strengthening the prosperity, stability, and security of all” with the EU’s neighboring countries – including countries across the Mediterranean, several countries of the Middle East, and the bordering countries of Eastern Europe (EC, 2013b). The ENP works in addition to the External Action Service (the EU’s wider foreign policy framework) to extend a “privileged relationship” to sixteen nations, including Ukraine, on the periphery of the EU who are politically expected and concretely incentivized to cooperate with the
EU on issues such as security, trade, and migration. The Eastern Partnership represents a
dimension of the ENP specifically focused on East and Southeast Europe, offering:
“…new association agreements including deep and comprehensive free trade
agreements with those countries willing and able to enter into a deeper
effort; […] (and) gradual integration in the EU economy and easier travel
to the EU through gradual visa liberalisation, accompanied by measures to tackle
illegal immigration” (EU, 2013)
This conditional exchange of ‘gradual integration’ based upon the ‘willingness to engage’
is exactly what is playing out now in Ukraine. It is in this way that Vobruba (2007) has
described the ENP’s operation as “expansion without enlargement,” whereby the EU’s
periphery is concretely incentivized towards economic development and cooperation.
In this section I outline Ukraine’s place in the ENP and discuss how this concerns
the governance of migration. One of the lessons of this chapter is that embedded within
the ENP framework for Ukraine are mechanisms that make EU development assistance
conditional upon Ukraine’s cooperation in security and border affairs. This
conditionality is operative concerning EU development assistance funds and the granting
of larger-scale opportunities, such as visas and trade agreements (see next section), for
Ukraine to ‘develop’ through accessing the EU market. ENP-related communications are
rich with geographical imaginations of EUrope’s neighborhood and its needs to reform:
The Eastern Partnership addresses the issue of unfinished transformation.
It helps partners to accomplish their transition towards democracy and
market-oriented economy by supporting their reform process (EC, 2012a: 4).
Ukraine’s “unfinished transformation” and “reform” is now being heavily invested in by
the EU – with a strong emphasis on migration and border management.
The EU is the largest donor of development assistance to Ukraine, with annual
bilateral funding having doubled in the 2000’s (Delegation of the European Union to
Ukraine, 2013). As part of the ENP, Ukraine stands to receive benefits through the
European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in accordance with their
willingness to implement specific EU directives. Under the ENPI the Ukraine/EU
partnership is said to have “graduated from mere technical assistance to more substantial
and focused support to reforms and the EU integration process” (ibid.). The overall
budget for the ENPI to Ukraine for 2011-13 is 470.05 million Euros (ENPI, 2010(b)). Of these funds, the priority area of “Good Governance and Rule of Law,” under which fall the “sub-priorities” of “Justice, Freedom, and Security” and “Integrated Border Management,” will receive approximately 20-30% (€94-€141 million) (ibid.). The EU’s objective for these ENPI funds is stated to be the “alignment of management practices and procedures to European standards as well as building up capacity for better fighting cross-border crime,” including efforts towards enhanced border control, infrastructure, and surveillance (ibid.: 11). Other priority areas of assistance for Ukraine for 2011-2013 through the ENPI include “facilitating the entry into force of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement,” including the pending free trade agreement, and “Sustainable Development” (ibid.). It is important to recognize, however, this is not unconditional aid for Ukraine.

The ENP operates on a “more funds for more reform” approach (European Union, 2011), offering benefits to the partner countries that are conditional upon the implementation of specific EU-directed goals. This is what I refer to as “conditionality” in the EU/Ukraine relationship. As evidence of this, Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, claimed in a 2010 speech that “the ENP is a win-win game: the higher our partners’ reform ambitions, the stronger our response” (EU, 2010). In a speech this year, Füle announced that ENP funds will be increasingly distributed according to an “incentive based approach” where there will be a direct link between EU Progress Reports9 and the further distribution of assistance funds (EC, 2013a). According to the ENP’s “more for more” approach:

“every major change in the level of assistance is seen as a political message, either to encourage progress or signal reservations with regard to the implementation of the reforms” (ibid.).

To encourage ‘reform,’ the EU offers “tangible incentives” to the neighbors described as the “3Ms”: money, market access, and mobility of people (ibid.).

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9 Füle conveys the purpose of these Progress Reports, saying that: “a key challenge in implementing ‘more for more’ is how we assess progress. The assessment needs to be based on open consultation with a large number of stakeholders including civil society and verified against international indicators. Our assessment is captured in the ENP country progress reports” (EC, 2013a)
I see this instrumentalization of development aid as a further expansion upon what Vobruba (2007) describes as the “prosperous core’s self-interested aid to the periphery” (7). In this way the ENP incentivizes the neighboring countries: 1) to modernize according to EU standards; and 2) to accept exclusionary conditions in exchange for immediate assistance and the future prospect, however distant, of membership. From its inception in 2004, one of the main goals of the ENP has been to “reinforce stability and security and contribute to efforts at conflict resolution” in the EU’s immediate surroundings (EC, 2004:4). The EU’s expressed aim is to bring its closest neighbors to the east and south into a close partnership of countries that “share the EU’s fundamental values and objectives,” with the benefits to the neighboring country of “increased stability, security and well being” (ibid.: 5). Of course, the EU reaps these benefits in much more powerful way. I argue in line with Dahlman (2009) and Kuus’s (2011) critiques of the ENP that, despite the EU’s talk of values and mutual development, one of the central aims of the ENP in Ukraine has been enhancing border security and ensuring Ukraine’s stability.

The themes of stability and security came up often in my interviews with EU officials, reinforcing that the EU is chiefly invested at the moment in securing its border with Ukraine, stemming flows of ‘illegal’ migration, and promoting the stability of its neighbor. For example, one EU official claimed that the main priorities for the EU in Ukraine at the present time are “border management and stable relations” (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). It was stressed by this same official that, due to the country’s size and political-economic importance to the EU, “no one wants Ukraine to be destabilized” (ibid.). Detailing recent troubles at the geopolitical level between the EU and Ukraine, another EU official shared the following perspective:

“But, and this is really my opinion, we should go ahead. Because, I mean, we should change this country. I mean, the European Union is not a policeman […]. Even if sometimes it is difficult…actually, we do not have any other choice. So we should help them in this, because it is no one’s interest to leave them and there would be a kind of chaos here” (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12).

It is through situating the opinions of political actors such as this within a wider set of practices of bordering and ordering that the “othering” nature of the EU’s neighborhood
relations with Ukraine become apparent (Kuus, 2004, 2007; van Houtum, 2010). The sentiment expressed by this official is that while the EU is not a police force in Ukraine, they must take the necessary steps to ensure that Ukraine does not become destabilized, because “everyone would like to have a normal neighbor” (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12). What it is that distinguishes a ‘chaotic’ from a “normal neighbor” for the EU is a question suited for critical geopolitical analysis.

In interviews with the EU Delegation, EUBAM, US, and certain EU partner organizations, there was consistent language of Ukraine’s need to implement EU “standards and values.” For example, one EUBAM official described the goal of the mission to be to “establish European standards in the Ukrainian authorities” (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12). Officials I spoke with from the US State Department even claimed that the “end goal” for the US is to see Ukraine “approximate as much as possible with European standards and values,” and to move towards “Europeanization,” because the US shares “common values” with the EU (Joint interview, US Officials #1, #2, #3, 7/17/12). According to these US officials, a Ukraine that is integrated with the EU “provides geopolitical stability” (ibid.). Language such as this reflects “imaginative geographies” of what it means to be or not to be “EUropean,” which I argue are central to the sorts of reforms that are now being prescribed for Ukraine through the ENP.

This language can be read in recent European Commission (EC) “Progress Reports” on Ukraine which detail the status of EU ‘value alignment’ in Ukraine (EC 2012b; 2012c). For example, a 2012 EC Progress Report expresses concern at the “selective justice” applied to former Prime Minister Tymoshenko over the last year (EC, 2012b: 2). This report further pinpoints the lack of transparency in Ukraine’s judicial system and pervasive corruption as major remaining barriers to European integration. It cites, for example, Transparency International’s 2011 ranking of Ukraine as 152nd out of 187 countries concerning the level of corruption in society as well as the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business Index” where Ukraine slipped from 149th place to 152nd in 2011. Finally, the report expresses concern over the fact that Ukraine’s IMF program is currently off-track, though the country has resumed talks with the IMF in February 2012 (ibid.). These reports simultaneously reflect Ukraine’s “outsider status” (Smith and
Swain, 2010) and justify further EU interventions towards reforming and stabilizing Ukraine according to EU standards and values.

I now turn to focus on several specific policy frameworks that the EU is employing conditionally to motivate reform in Ukrainian governance. Beyond stability and value-instillation, it is clear that a major part of the EU’s neighborly expectations for Ukraine is to “manage” migration in compliance with new border management paradigms.


In this section I discuss the two major policies that are currently on the table in EU/Ukraine relations. I focus as well on how the “Readmission Agreement” for the return of ‘illegal’ migrants from the EU to Ukraine was passed in relation to these. Many of my interviewees discussed the EU’s blatant “carrot and stick” approach to implementing policy directives in Ukraine (many using the exact language of “carrots”). These carrots of visas and closer association serve as incentives for Ukraine to follow through with its neighborly responsibilities, which are, in part, to embrace its role as a migrant “buffer-zone” (Dahlman, 2009) on the edge of the EU.

In the framework of the ENP, the EU’s political and economic motivations for regional stability, growth, and shared values are expressed tangibly in conditionality mechanisms called “Action Plans.” Action Plans provide a checklist-like, step-by-step path for the neighboring countries to follow towards receiving rewards of selective political and economic integration. Since 2007, the EU has offered Ukraine Action Plans for visa liberalization and an agreement towards deepened association. I discuss these in turn.

The EU-Ukraine “Association Agreement” (AA) will comprehensively define the bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine, and was “initialized” (the first step of three for it to go into effect) in March 2012. One EU official described this to me as “the most complex agreement ever with a third country” in how it encompasses political relations, security priorities, and a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12). In relation to Ukraine’s adoption of “standards and
values” and cooperation in the area of mobility, the AA offers a plan towards “developing a conducive new climate for economic relations” through “economic integration.” Significantly, the text of the AA notes “the importance Ukraine attaches to its European identity,” affirming Ukraine’s “European choice:”

“Ukraine as a European country shares a common history and common values with the Member States of the European Union (EU) and is committed to promoting those values” (EU, 2012).

It speaks further to enhanced “travel” for “citizens of Ukraine,” but this is “provided that the conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place.” The AA document can thus be read as an outline of the EU’s security and economic motivations for Ukraine. As an Action Plan, it is also indicative of how the EU instrumentally offers Ukraine opportunities to ‘develop’ through EUropean integration, assuming that the EU’s conditions for change in Ukraine are first met.

The passing of the AA is viewed by EU officials as a major step towards integration for Ukraine, bringing Ukraine “as close as it could be for a country which […] isn’t a member state” (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12). The question now, as expressed by the EU officials I spoke with, is whether or not to move forward with the agreement based upon Ukraine’s recent political trajectory of corruption and selective justice. On the one hand, at the level of geopolitical relations, it seems that many leaders from EU member states are tending towards lessening association with Ukraine – this is particularly true in the wake of recent suspect elections and the ongoing imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. This was made evident in the refusal of high-profile EU leaders, such as Angela Merkel of Germany, to attend the EURO 2012 soccer games held in Ukraine out of protest to Tymoshenko’s imprisonment. On the other hand, more association potentially means greater influence. There is a degree of control that becomes possible with the AA’s passing, as expressed by one EU official:

“Because right at the moment the European Union has very limited legal background to (…) require anything from Ukraine. If we are signing the Association Agreement, we will have a kind of legal argument to (…) say to them "hey guys, you just signed something, so this is not the way to do it" (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12).
As of early 2013, further progress beyond the initialization of the AA seems more or less stalled based upon Tymoshenko’s jailing and 2012 parliamentary elections. This does not mean, however, that progress in the implementation of migration and border management has ceased.

Negotiations over providing visas to the EU for Ukrainians have been occurring alongside, but as distinct from, the Association Agreement talks. The EU-Ukraine Visa Facilitation Agreement was signed in 2008, resulting in the easing of visa attainment for certain classes of Ukrainian citizens – namely students and business professionals (Sagrera, 2011). However, concerning (slightly) more widespread visa attainment, a more comprehensive Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP) was rolled out in November 2010. In traditional Action Plan “carrot and stick” format, the VLAP lays out a checklist of numerous criteria for Ukraine to meet in order to achieve the abolition of the EU’s short-term visa regime. When passed, the VLAP will allow for the abolishment of short-term visas (allowing up to 90 days in the Schengen area within six months). Longer-term visas will still be issued by individual EU member countries (ibid.).

According to interviews with members of government and civil society in Ukraine, these visas are highly desirable for Ukrainians – at least the select class of Ukrainians that can afford to travel and do business with the EU. A member of Ukrainian civil society informed me that only 17% of Ukrainians have been able to travel to the EU up to this point, reflecting that these short-term visas are a motivating incentive primarily for politically-influential Ukrainians (Interview, Civil Society #2, 7/4/12, with translation).

Visa liberalization was often described in interviews to function “like a carrot” for the EU to employ in negotiations with Ukraine (interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). Another EU official explicitly confirmed that the VLAP is particularly useful as a ‘carrot’ for implementing changes in migration and border policy in Ukraine:

“But if we are talking about migration policy […] we have the political will to fulfill these conditions, not because (Ukraine) like(s) this issue […] They are fulfilling these conditions because it’s part of a bigger package. At the end of this bigger package is a big carrot – the visa free agreement” (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12).

To effectively employ this ‘carrot’, the EU has divided the VLAP for Ukraine into two
distinct phases: 1) legislating and planning; and 2) implementation of reforms. This two-step conditionality in the VLAP is significantly different from how the EU has rolled out Action Plans with countries in Southeast Europe, reflecting, perhaps, the difficulty and importance of Ukraine’s compliance with the EU’s plan (Interview, Civil Society #1, 7/23/12).

The EU has issued two “progress reports” on the VLAP thus far (EC, 2011; EC, 2012c). The second of these reports provides approximately twenty-five pages of recommendations for Ukraine, stating that once sufficient progress is confirmed by the EU and once an "assessment of possible migratory and security impacts” on the EU has been made, Ukraine will graduate to the second set of “benchmarks” (EC, 2012c: 29). An EU official confirmed that Ukraine’s success with the second part of the Action Plan – implementation – is largely dependent upon the analysis of the European Commission, Council, and Parliament:

“This is how the European Union works […] some of the member states were very reluctant to propose Ukraine this kind of deal, I mean. The compromise is that we are offering the deal, but there (are) no automatic conditions” (interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12)

Therefore, Ukraine’s progress is being monitored alongside the assessment of the risk of a security threat to the EU that would result from abolishing the visa regime. At the moment, Ukraine remains in the first phase.

One EU official reflected upon both the EU’s distrust of the current political climate in Ukraine and their strong desire for implementation by saying that the VLAP is “not by chance called an action plan:”

“Right now the ball is on the Ukrainian side. And they basically have to do their homework. What we see […] is a huge political will from the Ukrainian side to fulfill these conditions. […] It’s a two-phase process. The first phase is […] what we call the political, or the legal phase. Basically it is that they should just tailor-fit their legal background to what the European Union demands. So they should accept those kinds of regulations, institutions, laws which are necessary for us. And of course here is the Readmission Agreement, this is very much a kind of cornerstone of this” (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12).
Evident in this quote is the blatant conditionality that the EU is now employing with Ukraine in these sorts of negotiations. Also evident in language such as this are geographical imaginations of Ukraine as a pliable and ‘chaotic’ place that can be reformed with the proper incentives to become a stable neighbor for the EU. In concert with the EU’s wider ENP approach (“more aid for more reform”), what will be offered to Ukraine is ultimately dependent upon how much Ukraine is willing to conform to the EU’s priorities, such as implementation of migrant readmission from the EU.

Sagrera (2011) points out that, while the European Commission supports this technical approach to the abolishment of the Ukrainian visa regime, not all EU members may be ready to liberalize their borders with Ukraine at this point and time. There is a lingering fear amongst certain EU countries that a visa-free regime would prompt a flood of ‘irregular’ immigration into the EU from Ukraine, and that many Ukrainians would overstay their short-term visas. An official from the EU confirmed in an interview that granting visas to Ukrainians is not the most popular policy in some EU member states, though a concern over other nationalities transiting through Ukraine was discussed as a more significant ‘threat’ (this biopolitical differentiation is discussed in chapter five).

As mechanisms of EU ‘carrot and stick’ conditionality, both the Association Agreement and the VLAP have central components pertaining to Ukraine’s implementation of migration and border management. The VLAP contains 4 main pillars: document security, illegal immigration, public order and security, and external relations and fundamental rights (European Union, VLAP). The first two pillars outline numerous institutional, legal, and infrastructural objectives for Ukraine to achieve in the areas of migration and border management, including biometric passports and enhanced border surveillance (EC, 2012c). In sync with the VLAP pillar on ‘illegal immigration’, at the same time as the VLAP emerged, not coincidentally, so did the EU/Ukraine “Readmission Agreement.” A member of civil society described to me that the two were designed in concert with one another, with visas as a “carrot” for Ukraine to accept the return of migrants from the EU (Interview, Civil Society #1, 7/23/12).

The Readmission Agreement (RA) for Ukraine was drawn up by the European
Council in 2007 and went fully into effect in 2010\textsuperscript{10}. In the 2007 official agreement, it states that: “Ukraine and the Member States of the European Union should make best efforts to send third-country nationals and stateless persons who illegally entered their respective territories, back to the States of origin or permanent residence” (EU, 2007). In practice, the RA has two processes: one that applies to the return of Ukrainian nationals to Ukraine who are ‘illegally’ residing in the EU; and another, perhaps more controversial process of readmission that applies to any migrant that is apprehended in transit through Ukraine, or proven to have ‘illegally’ entered EU territory through Ukrainian territory. Under the RA, these so called “third country nationals\textsuperscript{11}” can also be returned to Ukraine (ibid.). It is in this way that EU readmission agreements are an essential component of EU border externalization efforts to control and exclude ‘illegal’ immigrants from the EU.

Several interviews confirmed that Ukrainian officials were not keen to implement such a legal framework, understanding that this would mean more migrants to be processed and held in Ukraine. It was thus no accident that the Readmission Agreement was rolled in concert with the VLAP and Association Agreement (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1 & #2, 7/10/12; Joint interview, IOM Official #1 & #2, 7/5/12). In addition, the official RA document states that the EU is “committed to make available financial resources in order to support Ukraine in the implementation of this Agreement,” with “special attention […] devoted to capacity building” (EU, 2007). This is one example of the post-2004 conditionality mechanisms that brings together EU ‘capacity building’ assistance, opportunities like visas for Ukraine to ‘develop,’ and Ukraine’s

\textsuperscript{10} The European Union Lisbon Treaty article 79.3 guarantees that the EU “may conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission to their countries of origin or provenance of third-country nationals who do not or who no longer fulfill the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the territory of one of the Member States” (EU, 2008: 78). Readmission agreements are described “the main tool” of the EU’s “fight against illegal immigration” and as the “cornerstone of the external dimension of the EU migration policy” (Sagrera, 2010: 572). Lavenex and Kunz (2008) argue that the difficulties encountered in getting “third countries” like Ukraine to sign on to “readmission agreements” for the return of migrants from the EU reveals the “restrictive, unbalanced, and EU-centered approach” of the ENP framework (445). Their review of recent EU policy documents reveals what they call a “repression of unwanted migration” (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008: 453).

\textsuperscript{11} According to the RA text, “‘third-country national’ shall mean any person who holds a nationality other than that of Ukraine or one of the Member States (EU, 2007).
cooperation with EU security priorities. This is precisely what I will discuss as a “security-development nexus” in the next chapter in relation to the EU’s “management approach” to migration.

It is important to note that Ukraine has seen a steady decline in the amount of transit immigration through its territory to the EU over the last five to ten years. Despite mediatized fears of floods of migrants returned to Ukraine with the passing of the RA, interviews confirmed that the agreement has not had a huge impact in terms of numbers of returned migrants from the EU, and that many of the large channels of transit migration into the EU have now moved south (Joint interview, IOM Officials #1 & #2, 7/5/12); Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1 & #2, 7/10/12; Interview, Civil Society #1, 7/23/12). This decline in transit migration may be because Ukraine is now one of the least desirable places for migrants due to lack of employment and pervasive racism in Ukrainian society (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12; Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12). It could also be because of the EU’s recent efforts at border externalization (Joint interview, IOM Officials #1 & #2, 7/5/12; Interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12; Interview, Migrant Lawyer, 7/16/12). Regardless, the RA, AA and VLAP as conditionality mechanisms reveal how the EU remains fixated on closing Ukraine off as an avenue for migration into the EU. These serve as evidence of the EU’s ongoing efforts at shoring up its outer walls against uninvited migrants and externalizing migration control to the neighboring countries.

For the migrants who do make it to Ukraine, several interviewees (even some of the EU’s partners in implementation) expressed concern over how Ukraine’s compliance with the Association Agreement and VLAP’s checklists has been a technical process with human rights protections for migrants left as somewhat of an “afterthought”:

“the EU can say "yeah we're returning, but we're also making sure that rights are (there)" – I mean, that, […] to be cynical, […] is an afterthought” (Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12).

A migrant activist expressed a similar concern for migrants in Ukraine:

“So there are many small things, important for individuals, important for people, for their wellbeing here, that are totally missed in this huge program. So basically
Ukraine is trying technically to show to European Union that we did something. The European Union is mostly paying a blind eye on human rights values, but for some mentioned in the agreements. They have a number of detentions mentioned, and they have the number of refugee centers mentioned, so (speaking for the EU) “it’s fine to give you money for that, but we don’t really care how you manage this, and how you manage people, and how you behave with people, and what they feel about the system” (Interview, Migrant Activist #1).

These interviewees emphasize how, since 2007 when the above legislation began to be introduced, the EU’s focus has been overwhelmingly on the installation of legal and physical infrastructure for migration management in Ukraine. As a member of a migrant activist group said in an interview, this can be seen even in the space accorded to migration and border management as compared to migrant protection in the EU’s Action Plans for Ukraine. Suffice it to say that the former dwarfs the latter. Thus, the physical infrastructure for “very remote control” (Samers, 2004) is being installed, the legal mechanisms are on their way, but human protection for migrants is still severely lacking. This means that these practices of governance are negatively affecting many migrants’ lives – sometimes facilitating protracted scenarios of detention – in an unnecessary way, but according to the EU’s spatial design.

Reflecting the results of the EU’s emphasis on conditionality, interviewees expressed concern over how the pending ‘carrot’ of visas encouraged Ukraine to adopt migration and border policy in a hurried and non-protective manner. Concern here was expressed about a culture of “box-ticking” (referring to laws being passed in quick succession according to the EU’s Action Plan) that this carrot and stick conditionality facilitated:

“If you look at the Association Agreement, or generally at Ukraine with talking about EU membership, it’s not just signing the document, and then OK, you’ve done it all. It’s about the values, the standards, about implementing those into, just, the way things are done in Ukraine. […] I think that comes out from (what) the Europeans say a lot when negotiations break down. They (Ukraine) want just a box checked to say "we’re EU compliant, we meet EU standards, the EU gave
us, here we are we're fine, but you know, we're going to stand in place now”
(Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12).

Following from this, another IOM official confirmed that implementation of migrant
protection in Ukraine remains a major challenge:

IOM Official #2: And now […] we are at a point where we see that - Ok, it’s nice
that Ukraine has been trying to implement all of these obligations, and has been
adopting new laws, has been going through an institutional reform, (but) now it
kind of becomes clear that it’s still very difficult to implement all of that and that
the Ukrainian government is not ready, and that sometimes the government sees it
more as a 'box-ticking' exercise than something they even want to do […]

AC: And because this 'carrot' of visa liberalization is hanging and potential
membership down the road?

IOM Official #2: yeah, yeah. So I don't think that migration or having a migration
strategy is part of the agenda at the high level – it’s getting visa-free (Joint
interview, IOM Official #2, 7/5/12).

It was in these sorts of ways that migration and development officials expressed
frustration about the lack of a functional, integrated, and protective system for migration
in Ukraine – especially one that can adequately care for the needs of migrants. This is the
fruit of ongoing processes of ‘box-ticking’ by the Ukrainian officials in line with the
checklist of the latest EU Action Plan. These results, which migrants now encounter in
Ukraine, will be discussed further in Chapter Six. The main point of this section has been
to show how the AA, the VLAP, and RA, as conditionality mechanisms, undergird the
ways in which migration is now being “managed” in Ukraine (Chapter Five).

4.5. EU and Ukraine: cooperation where it counts

What Smith and Swain (2010) have described as “shallow integration” resonates
with the EU’s attempts, such as the AA and VLAP, to extract specific demands from
Ukraine outside of offering future membership. As an update of Kuus’s (2004) analysis
of pre-expansion Central Europe, I argue that Ukraine is expected by the EU officials to
be a reliable partner, but yet remains discernably “Other.” Ukraine remains a potential
EU candidate pending how well its future development exhibits “EUropean” qualities. I
asked two EU officials how they saw Ukraine’s future membership prospects in the EU. Their responses follow:

“Ukraine needs to make an effort themselves; they are making efforts to destabilize now. They cannot think the EU will endorse all actions and give further concessions” (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12).

Another EU official reflects how conditionality operates at the core of EU neighborhood relations and provides Ukraine the opportunity to show that it can become “EUropean”:

“They (the EC) are not talking with them about the membership perspective. And what […] I think that we are telling them is that, it’s my opinion, it’s […] not effective for them to […] keep asking (for) this member perspective. Because right now there is no reality […]. And if they are fulfilling these conditions, they are doing these kinds of reforms, it will be much easier for them to ask at the end of the road for (membership) […]. If it will be a normal functioning European country, nobody will tell them just ‘do not join us’” (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12).

Here again we see the imagined construction of a ‘normal’ European identity that Ukraine must come in line with. With a population of 40 million, an increasingly totalitarian leadership, and enormous unmonitored borders with Russia, Ukraine remains a distant candidate for membership for most EU countries – particularly considering recent financial hardships in the EU itself (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12). The EU remains quite motivated, however, for cooperation with Ukraine in the framework of the ENP. This is in no small part due to shared borders and the need for coordinated migration and border policy.

Along these lines, a discernible tension between Ukraine as ‘misbehaving neighbor’ and ‘cooperative migration/border manager’ became evident throughout my interviews with EU officials. It is along these lines that Ukraine is imagined as a site of both reform and intervention. This is a powerfully productive tension that facilitates the exclusionary practices that are now being instituted towards uninvited migrants in Ukraine. Despite what was described as the deterioration of democracy in Ukraine under the current leadership and a “lack of political will” to implement EU mandates, an EU official described how a level of “realpolitik” remains such that cooperation will continue
on migration/border concerns, claiming that “we will not take a step back – we cannot” (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). This commitment is reflected in how the most immediate component of the ENP strategy for Ukraine has been setting up migration management infrastructure.

The conditionality mechanisms I have outlined above are part of an ongoing process whereby the EU is externalizing aspects of migration control and asylum to Ukraine. Significantly, this has entailed organizations such as IOM and UNHCR being called upon to do much of the ‘heavy lifting’ in terms of implementation of border management and migrant protection. In the ‘void’ of implementation that exists between the EU’s ‘carrots’ and the effective compliance from Ukrainian bodies of governance lies an entangled network of state, non-state, and quasi-state actors – what I will refer to as the “management apparatus” as the focus of the following chapter.

4.6. Conclusion

In the European Union’s borderlands we can see that exclusionary practices of bordering and migration management occur at the nexus of countervailing geoeconomic and geopolitical motivations. This resonates with how Coleman (2005; 2007) and Sparke (2006) have described border management in the US context. Perhaps what is different here is that Ukraine is expected not just to cooperate with the EU, but to conform to its own image. This relies upon what Kuus (2004) has called the “ongoing construction of Europe and the East,” which implies an inferiority of “the Other,” and essentializes the difference between the two (483). As this chapter has shown, Ukraine has been presented a pathway for reform that reflects imagined geographies of difference as much as it reflects the EU’s own interests.

In this chapter I have laid out how, in order to incentivize Ukraine’s “EUropean” trajectory, the EU has positioned future ‘carrots’ of development assistance, visas, deepened economic integration, and the distant hope of membership inside the “gated community” (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007). The quotes in this chapter from EU officials, when situated in relation to the practical value prescriptions and policy mechanisms that these actors of the ENP are now rolling out, reflect what Kuus (2011) has called the “constructive ambiguity” of Europe – an entity that is often presented as
borderless in discourse, yet remains clearly materially bounded. She claims that actions of the ENP establish a “tacit hierarchy that is based not only on standard of living […] but on an undefined yet desirable quality of Europeanness” (Kuus 2011: 1151). I argue that what Kuus (2004) describes as the “Othering” practices between the EU and its “not yet sufficiently European” neighbors are now playing out in Ukraine (472). These practices are facilitating what Samers (2004) describes as the production of a “new geography of remote control” (40).

This chapter has outlined several of the prominent legal and institutional mechanisms whereby “EUropean” reform is being incentivized and implemented in Ukraine. By way of transition to the next chapter, I emphasize that the ‘checklists’ of EU Action Plans and the geographical imaginations of various officials quoted here are productive towards the exclusionary practices of neoliberal governmentality (Lemke, 2001) that are now taking place in Ukraine for managing migration. These practices allow for the mobility of the economic elite and the exclusion of the uninvited migrant – benefiting certain classes of people and detaining others by “geographical design” (Mountz, 2010).

By juxtaposing the words of agents of policy, the texts of these influential policy documents, and the practices of inclusion and exclusion happening in Ukraine, we can understand how selective processes of neoliberalization are occurring alongside illiberal exclusion in Ukraine (Roberts, et al., 2003; Sparke, 2006a). In the case of Ukraine, it is crucial to go beyond “the territorial trap” (Agnew, 2003) to consider an apparatus of “management” that entails actors such as the IOM, EU bureaucrats, Ukrainian politicians, border guards and migrants themselves. In the next chapter I investigate the “management” approach to governing borders and migration in Ukraine as it occurs through an apparatus of security and development actors. As I have here, I will focus on both the geographical imaginations and the exclusionary practices there within.
CHAPTER FIVE. MIGRATION AND BORDER MANAGEMENT AS A SECURITY/DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

5.1. Introduction

On the EU’s Europeaid website, one can view a video entitled “Managing migration: a new European strategy.” This video discusses the potentiality of migration, when managed properly, to provide “manpower” for Europe’s aging population, to add “cultural diversity,” and to “stimulate growth” (Europeaid, 2012). It features an official from the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM) who claims that the mission’s goal is to “guide” Ukrainian and Moldovan officials, who “see the job as guarding borders,” “towards the concept of border management.” In line with how I describe the management approach as a “security/development nexus” in this chapter, the EUBAM official claims that “managing a border means guarding when and where required” (ibid.).

This official in the video is referring to an EU-funded and facilitated process of migration and border management that is now underway in Ukraine according to a diverse field of international state, non-state, and quasi-state actors. It is a process, in part, of ‘guiding’ a transformation in Ukrainian officials from guards into managers of the EU’s external border. This is a pedagogical process of assistance, aid, and capacity building – an opportunity for Ukrainian officials to be and become more “EUropean.” This chapter’s goal is to understand this move towards management as it is now being rolled out in Ukraine with specific geographical effects.

Žižek (2008) claims that the “truth of globalization” can be seen in the walls that are built to safeguard the wealthy populations of the world from the impending threats of impoverished immigrants (102). However, as Weizman (2012) argues, the violence of building walls today often occurs according to a “humanitarian management” of the population on the other side of the wall (81). In this chapter I focus not on physical walls per say, but on the “management approach” to governing migration and borders. This approach is now being mobilized in Ukraine through an apparatus of state, quasi-state, and non-state actors and security/development partnerships – which I refer to here as the “management apparatus.” My goal for this chapter is to understand the discourse of
management, what material practices are associated with it, who the actors of management in Ukraine are, and ultimately – what this approach can tell us about the nature of the EU’s processes of bordering in Ukraine. I am interested in the power relations of political violence and exclusion that undergird the seemingly technical, apolitical, and development-oriented approach of management. Here I follow Sparke’s (2006a) charge to “focus on particular spaces of border management technologies” through investigating the selective inclusions and exclusions, as well as the biopolitical reconfigurations of citizenship, that are now occurring in Ukraine (157).

Towards this goal, I draw from interviews with officials that comprise the migration management apparatus in Ukraine, as well as from policy documents and human rights reports, to address the implementation of “migration management” and “integrated border management” as a spatial manifestation of EU external policies of control. I am specifically interested in understanding how management is an approach to governing migration that marries security and development. Despite the positive and technical language that officials employ of maximizing positive outcomes for development, this chapter discusses how discourses of migration management are in fact embedded within political and economic processes discussed in the previous chapter of “Other-ing,” neoliberal selectivity, and “carrot and stick” conditionality between the EU and its ‘not-yet-European’ neighbor, Ukraine.

This chapter proceeds in three main parts: 1) it details who the actors of migration and border management are in Ukraine and what their roles in management are; 2) it explains the logic and operation of the management approach in Ukraine as it entails intertwined policies of security and development; and finally 3) it examines the biopolitical aspects of migration management. I conclude with a discussion of management as a security/development nexus that is politically central to the wider political-economic relations between the EU and its ‘not yet European’ neighbor that are now leading towards the installation of a regime of (im)mobility on the edge of the EU.

5.2. The actors of the management apparatus in Ukraine

Knowing who constitutes the management apparatus in Ukraine and what roles they serve is the first step towards understanding how EU-prioritized processes of
bordering are now being rolled out in Ukraine. Andrijasevic and Walters (2010) claim that “the international government of borders is a crowded, heterogeneous, and sometimes disputed field of expertise and intervention” (979). I understand the management apparatus in Ukraine to include cooperative arrangements between humanitarian actors such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the International Center for Migration and Policy Development (ICMPD). Under the management paradigm, these development-oriented organizations work in close coordination with the EU and its more security-oriented organizations, EUBAM and FRONTEX. The US Department of State also makes strategic investments in areas of border management, towards “integrating Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic institutions” (Joint interview, US #1, 7/17/12).

According to the EU’s Annual Action Programme for Border Management in 2010, primary donors for the sector include the EU, US, IOM, World Bank, and UNDP, whereas implementation is largely done through coordination between these bodies and EUBAM and USAID (ENPI, 2010(a)). It is particularly important to consider the role of humanitarian IGOs in conjunction with states in the management approach, as their efforts of “capacity building” and “technical assistance” are politically important to, and embedded within a neoliberal refashioning of the EU’s governance of migration and borders. In accordance with my ability to access these groups for interviews, in what follows I mainly discuss the roles of IOM and EUBAM, in addition to briefly highlighting the roles of UNHCR and the US State Department.

5.2.1. International Organization for Migration (IOM)

In the management apparatus’s division of labor in Ukraine, IOM largely plays the role of EU implementer and program facilitator, as well as adviser and partner to the Ukrainian migration officials. IOM is central to the management of migration that is now taking place in Ukraine in a paradoxical way that is reflective of the tensions held within the management approach more generally. While IOM does significant work in Ukraine towards ensuring migrant protection amidst EU externalization efforts, they are a major implementer in the EU’s externalization of migration control to Ukraine. Indeed, IOM’s
management approach to migration is increasingly receiving attention in the literature for its role in EU externalization efforts (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010; Ashutoush and Mountz, 2010, Geiger and Pecoud, 2011). I follow Andrijasevic and Walters’s (2010) call here for empirical studies of the organization’s activities and engagements with states, precisely to understand how IOM is involved in border externalization and EU-funded “very remote control” (Samers, 2004) in Ukraine.

To begin with, IOM is central to the capacity-building that is now taking place in Ukraine in accordance with the EU’s Action Plans for the VLAP, AA, and RA (see prior chapter). One IOM official described the organization’s role in capacity-building as such:

“Something that we've been able to do as a part of our approach is aligning what the EU wants with what Ukraine wants - bringing people together and working in a joint manner too, because of course if we just try to impose something that comes from the EU, then through us, then we're just seen as some 'middle man' by the government, we're not going to be very successful. I think that's been the hallmark of our approach” (Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12).

As the IOM official themselves described their role, one EU official described IOM as the EU’s “main implementer” for migration management, whereas the EU Delegation to Ukraine is involved primarily in administration, high-level communication, and the provision of funds (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). US officials also considered IOM a “big partner” for cooperation and implementation (Joint interview, US Officials #1, #2, #3, 7/17/12). When asked about the role that IOM served between the EU and Ukraine, an IOM official expressed the following:

“We have a quite privileged position, where the work we do is supported by the government, the government really does appreciate it. Especially in the spheres where we are quite major in - counter-trafficking, border management, migration management - we're seen as a pivotal partner” (Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12).

One EU official stated that IOM and EU are a “good combination” for the situation in Ukraine due to the fact that IOM has international legitimacy to hold Ukraine to its commitments to international human rights agreements, whereas the EU holds the
“political weight” to encourage Ukraine to comply (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). Especially in light of Ukrainian officials’ purported lack of capacity to manage EU funds and directives, this EU official claimed that IOM’s role in maintaining Migrant Accommodation Centers (see Chapter Six) and training/coordinating with the Ukrainian partners is essential (ibid.).

Many of the projects that IOM has undertaken in Ukraine have been funded through contracts with the EU, and this matters significantly for the nature of their work in Ukraine (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12; Joint interview, IOM Officials #1 & #2, 7/5/12). IOM’s work has done much to soften the impact of the EU’s externalization efforts on migrants in Ukraine. But in such work IOM has played an integral role in training Ukraine to accept its new role according to EU priorities, as well as in establishing the conditions for this new arrangement to function (including migrant return and detention). In Ukraine IOM has served in numerous capacity-building efforts, which can be seen as normalization in line with EU standards and values. Andrijasevic and Walters (2010) have noted the constitutive role of “technical norms, standards, and regulations” in IOM’s promotion of migrant mobility and immobility (995).

One of the most significant examples of this from Ukraine is the ongoing role that IOM has played in facilitating the implementation of the Readmission Agreement (RA, described in the previous chapter). In accordance with the introduction of the RA, IOM ran two consecutive projects titled “Capacity Building in Migration Management” (CBMM I and II) from March 2005 through December 2008 (IOM, GUMIRA Anthology). With a budget of 7.2 million Euros, this project’s chief aim was to “strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian Government in the sphere of migration, based on the EU acquis communautaire” (ibid.). This was followed by the EU-funded GUMIRA project. The chief aims of this project were focused on the ongoing implementation of the RA, but with a particular focus on the rights and detention conditions for apprehended irregular migrants being held in Ukraine’s Migrant Accommodation Centers (MACs). At the present time, the SIREADA program is

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12 Short for “Technical Cooperation and Capacity Building for the Governments of Ukraine and Moldova for the Implementation of Readmission Agreements with the European Union.”
13 Short for “Support to Implementation of EC Readmission Agreements with the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine”
running, funded at 2.37 Million Euros. This program is also concerned with the ongoing implementation of the Readmission Agreement, but is focused particularly on Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) and the reintegration of migrants readmitted from the EU. All three of these programs were funded by the EU, and by various EU member development agencies.\textsuperscript{14} Reflecting IOM’s central role in management in Ukraine, IOM officials explained that the GUMIRA and SIREADA projects are about “bringing together all the actors who might be in this field” (Joint interview, IOM Official #2, 7/5/12).

In addition to these programs around the RA, IOM’s management-related work in Ukraine includes AVR of migrants from the EU, reintegration, informational campaigns to dissuade migrants from migrating ‘illegally,’ and programs geared toward the facilitation of labor migration between Ukraine and the EU. According to IOM’s Ukraine directive, AVR is about facilitating the “orderly, safe and dignified voluntary return options for irregular, stranded migrants and failed asylum seekers” (IOM Ukraine, 2011: 12). Between 2005 and 2011, IOM facilitated the voluntary return of over 400 individuals from Ukraine, and also facilitated the return of Ukrainians from EU countries (ibid.). Related to this is the reintegration of Ukrainians who have been residing ‘illegally’ within the EU. IOM runs informational campaigns aimed at “discouraging Ukrainians from migrating irregularly and informing them about potential abuse when going abroad” (ibid.: 13). Finally, as mentioned earlier, IOM has been a strong proponent of enforced circular migration as a way that migration to the EU can be managed for development.

While many of IOM’s projects are focused on the protection of migrant rights in conditions of detention in Ukraine, the organization has been a key partner to the EU in the security aspects of migration and border management. For example, IOM has been integral to the construction and maintenance of Ukraine’s two main “Migrant Accommodation Centers” (MACs), and is involved to some degree in the EU’s recently funded project (referred to as “Readmit”) to construct more centers (Joint interview, IOM Officials #1 & #2, 7/5/12). In this respect, one IOM official described the organization’s missions that are in concert with the EU as having a “hard” and “soft” side:

\textsuperscript{14} These included the Italian Development Corporation, the Austrian Development Corporation, and the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
“If ‘Readmit,’ building the new centers, is the harder component, ‘GUMIRA’ and ‘SIREADA’ are sort of the soft, complementary components” (Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12).

The range between these projects – between detention and integration – reflects IOM’s difficult positionality as a humanitarian (with the slogan “migration for the benefit of all”), yet contract-driven organization. In the context of the EU’s externalization of migration control to Ukraine, IOM often fills the void between the EU’s dictates and the Ukraine authorities’ ‘capacity’ to implement them. IOM ensures that conditions of detention are at what Hyndman and Giles (2011) have called “don’t die survival,” while also providing capacity-building assistance towards increasing the Ukrainian authorities’ ability to self-sufficiently manage the centers – to step into their new role as a migrant ‘buffer zone’ in the EU’s neighborhood. Though the above programs are only part of IOM’s total mission to Ukraine, it is in these ways that they figure centrally to my interest in migration and border management as a security/development nexus in the context of EU bordering.

5.2.2. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

UNHCR was often described as playing a uniquely “humanitarian” role in the management apparatus in cooperation with the EU and IOM (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12; Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12). According to one UNHCR official, the organization’s mandate is to focus explicitly on advocating for and meeting the needs of refugees and asylum seekers. This is in contrast to IOM, who is concerned with “everybody else on the move, besides refugees and asylum seekers” (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12). IOM and UNHCR cooperate on the process of identification – determining “who belongs to whose mandate.” Once a migrant is identified as an asylum-seeker, they fall under UNHCR’s and their partners’ mandate. However, one UNHCR official described that UNHCR and IOM have “different institutional cultures,” and can conflict at times: UNHCR is “more of a human rights organization, and IOM is more of a support to governments” (ibid.).

The EU and UNHCR are currently implementing two projects together: 1) the Regional Protection Programme, that is involved in border monitoring to make sure that asylum-seeker rights are preserved in light of the Readmission Agreement; and 2) the
local reintegration of refugees – to show how refugees can be “positive, contributing members of society” (ibid.). A UNHCR official told me that the organization does not do migration management – because here the EU’s agenda is “politically determined.” Instead, UNHCR deals with “highly technical issues” such as deportation hearings and securing basic necessities for refugees (ibid.).

5.2.3. European Union Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM)

EUBAM was formed by the EU in 2005 with the goal of “assisting in the enhancement of border management and border control capacities in line with EU standards” (EUBAM Annual Report, 2011). Levy (2011) has described EUBAM as the EU’s “modern prototype of the remote control border.” With headquarters in Odessa, Ukraine, the organization trains the border guard forces of Ukraine and Moldova, conducting capacity-building training for monitoring the Ukraine/Moldova border, the Transnistria region, and the countries’ shared borders with EU member states. One EU official claimed that EUBAM is chiefly about “diplomatic stabilization and conflict prevention” for the EU and costs the EU approximately 20 million Euro/year (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). This official further stated that EUBAM is an example of how “the EU is not a military force,” but instead exercises “preventative diplomacy,” saving money and violence in the long run (ibid.) Another EU official claimed:

“EUBAM is a very good example of how the European Union can […] really provide this kind of expertise. The tool, or the instrument, is the assistance programs. And this is why the assistance programs are very important here.”

(Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12).

Therefore, EUBAM plays a central role in the EU’s pedagogical capacity-building efforts in Ukraine, bringing together “EUropean” expertise and assistance to reform the Ukrainian authorities according to EU standards.

This assistance through EUBAM takes different forms, though it is largely centered around increasing Ukraine’s ability to surveil cross-border activity, facilitate ‘legitimate’ flows and enforce threats at its various borders. A few examples of this assistance include: “Joint Border Control Operations” between EUBAM officials and their local counterparts; “Joint Assistance Actions” that evaluate the quality of border
control at crossing points (9); capacity building towards “achieving legislative approximation and regulatory convergence within the process of establishing Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with the EU” (10); and technical assistance and training in support of the VLAP (EUBAM, 2011). These are a few of the ways in which EUBAM’s mission is integral towards rolling out the larger political-economic frameworks and changes that the prior chapter detailed.

EUBAM’s mission is central to the implementation of “integrated border management” (IBM – detailed in the following section) in Ukraine. Indeed, one of the mission’s priority goals is to:

“reform the integrated border management regulations (through) harmoniz(ing) national legislation with […] the standards, models, and recommendations of the European Union in accordance with the code of Schengen Borders and the Catalogue of External Border Control, return and readmission of persons” (EUBAM, 2011: 11).

According to this same report, EUBAM’s stated aim for IBM reflects nicely what Coleman (2005) describes as a “security/economy nexus”:

“(To) facilitate legitimate border crossing by people, vehicles and goods, while countering illegal migration and cross-border crime more effectively, and maintaining a high level of border security” (ibid.: 22).

This facilitation relies on the installation of “modern equipment,” and the training of border officials for the optimization of all “control procedures,” so that “the time of crossing the border by persons, goods and vehicles” is “significantly reduced” (ibid.: 22). In EUBAM’s version of IBM, we see security and economy imperatives as integral to one another for successful management.

What EUBAM calls “risk analysis,” or an “intelligence-led approach” is tantamount to the sort of management approach that the EU is seeking to establish in Ukraine. Reflecting the importance of risk-based calculation to management, a EUBAM official claimed that “enhancing the analytical capacity” of their Ukrainian and Moldovan partners is central to their mission (Interview, EUBAM Official #2, 7/19/12). Quality intelligence ascertained through technical border monitoring leads to a proper “awareness” of risks (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12). While EUBAM officials
asked me to keep the specifics of statistics confidential, various reports from EUBAM’s IBM capacity-building missions reveal closely monitored figures on categories ranging from “cigarettes smuggling” and “forged documents” to “passenger flow” and “illegal immigration.” This reflects the technocratic and calculative nature of border management. In a Foucauldian register, EUBAM’s management of circulation depends upon knowledge, allowing for differentiation of flows, identification of threats, and selective technologies of power to operate.

EUBAM’s 2011 yearly report claims that IBM will “remain at the top of our agenda,” as its implementation spreads throughout the EU’s Eastern Partnership countries (EUBAM, 2011: 22). In many of the mission’s efforts, EUBAM has ongoing cooperation with other international actors within the management apparatus – for example, partnering with FRONTEX and EUROPOL on security concerns, and UNDP, IOM and UNHCR on development-related issues. EUBAM’s mission serves as an excellent example of the sort of EU-funded inter-agency cooperative partnerships that are forming in the EU’s neighborhood with the aim of implementing migration and border management according to EU standards and political-economic directives.

5.2.4. United States Department of State

Another important actor and investor in the management apparatus is the US State Department (as well as USAID). Besides the EU, the US is the next major donor to Ukraine in the sector of border management. In contrast to the EU which has to worry about ‘illegal’ migration, the US officials I interviewed stated that “the US is concerned generally with Ukraine as a transit country” (Joint interview, US Officials #1, #2, #3, 7/17/12). For example, they claimed that the US’s main priorities for border management in Ukraine are WMDs, trafficking in persons, smuggling, addressing the threat of terrorism, and cross-border crime. The US provides equipment to Ukraine to help “fill in the gaps” towards effective border management across sectors – including towards intercepting “illegal aliens” and smuggling (ibid.).

Ultimately for the US government, their “end goal” is to see “Ukraine fully integrated into the EU,” approximating EU standards and values as much as possible. Since the US “shares common values” with the EU, Ukraine’s “Europeanization” will mean that the country becomes a better place to do business and to invest – where “free
market ideals will be fostered” (Joint interview, US Officials #1, #2, #3, 7/17/12). Therefore, as could be expected, the US is interested in promoting Ukraine’s development as a secure site for capital accumulation where terrorist threats are not fostered or transported through. The US has supported the implementation of IBM in Ukraine through the donation of border monitoring equipment and the training of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service. As an example of the technocratic and apolitical discourse of management, a US official claimed:

“we are helping to develop capacities that are here and will be here regardless of politics – things that you need with any government, that are not influenced by politics” (Joint interview, US Official #1, 7/17/12).

Concerning the US’s role in the management apparatus, the US officials claimed that they work together with IOM on “persons of concern,” and described IOM as a “good partner” that is willing to work with the US and EU on issues of illegal migration. These US officials said it was most important for the US and the EU to “speak together as one team and one voice” to the Ukrainian government – particularly in terms of their shared goals of “secure borders” and managing “who’s crossing and what’s crossing” (ibid.).

The management efforts that these groups undertake are by no means a command and control project of bordering being cleanly rolled out according to the EU’s every dictate. In fact, this management is often frustrated by the situation in Ukraine, and must always adjust to migrants’ movements and strategies15. However, the majority of the management apparatuses’ activities in Ukraine do fall in line with EU policies, priorities and funding (often through Europeaid contracts).

Some of the management practices that IOM, UNHCR, EUBAM, and the US State Department facilitate, such as voluntary return, do allow positive outcomes for migrants in particular cases. The attempt here is not, for example, to wholesale dismiss IOM’s work. Instead, I draw attention to how migration management is embedded within and inseparable from EU conditionality mechanisms that incentivize Ukraine to become a “normal neighbor” and reliable partner (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12). The

15 Indeed, this is evidenced by the EU’s attempted incorporation of increasingly complex technologies for risk analysis, biometrics in border management. Mezzadra’s “autonomy” of migration is an important contribution here (see interview in Cobarrubias, et al. 2011).
migration and border management efforts that these organizations undertake are the exact processes that maintain the EU as a “gated community” (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007). Whatever migrant protection groups like IOM, UNHCR are able to achieve now occurs within an environment that is fundamentally legislated and funded by the EU for external migration and border management. I now turn to discuss the management approach as a modality of governing migration that incorporates EU-centric calculations for security and development.

5.3. The “management approach” as a security/development nexus

[...] we should understand not only the material network that allows the circulation of goods and possibly of men [sic], but also the circulation itself, that is to say, the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things (Foucault, 2007: 325).

The above quote from Foucault’s lectures Security, Territory, Population describes well the task that the management apparatus has undertaken towards ‘managing’ the circulation of goods and people in and through Ukraine according to imperatives for security and development. Management is an approach to the governance of migration and borders that depends upon the expertise of officials in the management apparatus toward selective interventions in the field of migration and cross-border flows (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010). The management approach is heralded by implementing officials as an objective and development-focused solution toward harnessing migration’s benefits while addressing the ‘threat’ of irregular migration (Geiger and Pecoud, 2011). In this section I consider the discourses employed by experts within the management apparatus to entail both language and practice (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Müller, 2008). Situating the words of officials in a field of practice is important precisely because discourses of “management for development” are employed as part and parcel of the political processes of EU externalization. The apparent need for migration to be managed, in part, justifies the existence of the managers and the exclusionary political projects within which the management apparatus are imbued.
A management-oriented approach to the governance of migration and borders is being increasingly implemented in EU policy as the Union has expanded its territory (Kofman, 2008; Samers, 2010; Geiger and Pecoud, 2011). Kofman (2008) has described the discourse of management in regards to a “sense of control, design, and planning” (25). As such, it is fundamentally a utilitarian calculation of the benefits and costs of migration for the EU. Management allows the EU to incorporate processes of immigration and integration such that it can selectively accommodate ‘qualified’ migrants through pathways to work and citizenship, while simultaneously managing the short-term inclusion or exclusion of unwanted migration in accordance with the demographic and labor needs of certain EU countries (Kofman, 2008).

Management is therefore an approach within which exclusion and inclusion comfortably coexist. In line with Sparke (2006a), I argue that the technologies of migration and border management in Ukraine can be seen as manifestations of a neoliberal form of governmentality, expediting the flow of the economically advantageous while excluding others. It is to this end that the management apparatus regularly applies development aid and technical/capacity-building assistance – towards serving the EU’s interests for security and capital accumulation.

My analysis is centered here upon the operation of management as a “security/development nexus.” As part of this concept, I account for development in what I will term its economic, pedagogical and humanitarian valences. More specifically, I look at how migration management is: 1) prescribed for Ukraine and the migrant’s economic “development” in the (geo)political-economic context of the ENP; 2) centered upon pedagogically building the capacity of Ukrainian officials as “managers” of migration and borders; and 3) central to EU externalization whereby certain uninvited and unwanted migrants are managed in detention, in Ukraine, according to humanitarian standards. Migration management in Ukraine entails ENP/Europeaid investments of EU aid, technical and capacity building assistance in each of these three respects.

5.3.1. Discourses/practices of management

I first focus on the work that migration and border managers’ representations do to situate management within what they see as the apolitical and technical realm of
development. The following quote is representative of the depoliticized, pedagogical, and developmentalist tone that typifies the management approach to bordering:

“[…] We are not dealing with politics. We are neutral in this regard. We don't mind much who is the leader in Kyiv. We did not face any obstacles since the change of the government, and we can really deal with the practical, with the technical issues - with law enforcement, with capacity-building in the services. So the political situation and these disputes on the high level of the political stage is not affecting us at all. And this is positive, we would not have the capacity to move together with the political opinions. We are really here to deal with the authorities on the operational level” (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12).

This reflects a discursive removal of the work of migration management from political motivations and incentives. Geiger and Pecoud (2011) have argued in this vein that the discourse of migration management is often presented as a “technocratic and apolitical” solution for all parties, with the effect of “evacuat(ing) questions of power, interests or conflicts” (11). In an arrangement where some migrants are a threat to be controlled, but others are a potential benefit to be realized, the productive power of management as a discourse is to remove the technologies of risk calculation, selection and control from the arena of the political.

Andrijasevic and Walters (2010) show through an analysis of IOM how the management approach re-construes the border through “technical norms, standards and regulations and their implementation through networks and partnerships,” allowing for a governance that seems “beyond politics” (995). They claim in response to this that “politics happens in technocratic spaces” (ibid.). Despite the EUBAM official’s statement above that “we are not dealing with politics,” I argue that the migration management discourse is deeply embedded within uneven power-laden political processes – maintaining a particular geography of exclusion with deleterious effects for migrants’ lives.

Migration management in Ukraine does not occur outside of the uneven political calculations discussed in the prior chapter – the very conditionality mechanisms that incentivize Ukraine to conform to the EU’s image. Nor is the management approach devoid of material mechanisms for control. The case of Ukraine shows how migration
management is firmly embedded within policy frameworks and practical partnerships that allow for practices of security and control to meet with those of development assistance. Migration and border management is interwoven into a classed and governmentalized regime of (im)mobility on the edge of the EU.

The explicit goal for the management of migration and borders was discussed by IOM, EUBAM, EU and US officials in interviews as the approximation of EU “standards and values” in Ukraine (Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12; Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12; Interview, EU Officials #1 & #2, 7/2/12; and Joint interview, US Officials #1, #2, #3, 7/17/12). This implies a hierarchy of European values and standards over those found in Ukraine, justifying a pedagogical intervention in the interests of development. The management apparatus’ technical and capacity-building assistance in Ukraine is almost universally tied to goals set out in the EU’s Action Plans for visas, free trade, and closer EU/Ukraine association. Migration and border management, therefore, offers a heavily incentivized opportunity for Ukrainian actors of governance to become more European – to learn management according to a higher standard. This is assumed by EU-funded managers in Ukraine to be ultimately in Ukraine’s own best interest.

It is in this way that the experts from the management apparatus whom I spoke with in Ukraine tended to frame their management-related activities in positive discursive constructions of “capacity building,” “technical assistance,” and “management for development.” The discourse follows that development assistance and capacity-building training are made available to Ukraine so that migration’s benefits can be optimized for all parties involved, according to EU standards. Here we can see how migration management signifies a discursive approach that moves away from control, securitization, and ‘law and order’ (Geiger and Pecoud, 2011), and towards a balanced approach – for development.

However, this does not signal an all-together replacement of the discursive securitization of migration, as heralded by the Copenhagen school (Weaver, 1995; Buzan and Weaver, 2003; Huysmans, 2006). In a period of anemic economic growth in the Euro-zone and Ukraine, security-related concerns over migration were still expressed to me in interviews. The typical post-9/11 notions of the migrant as economic and security “threat” were also voiced by certain officials, or at least recognized to exist in EU
members and Ukrainian societies (i.e. criminal, terrorist, and drain on the welfare state – see Staeheli and Nagel, 2008). However, if migration is perceived to represent an existential or economic threat, this is only for certain types of migrants under certain conditions.

Under the migration management paradigm, to focus only on closing down the threats of cross-border traffic is ‘old-fashioned’ (deemed “the soviet approach” (Interview, IOM Official #3, 7/23/12)). Instead, the discourse of management is that the threat/benefit calculus of migration and borders can be managed according to a selective, more economically and socially advantageous logic. Development, safety, and security for all, according to the EU’s rules – this is the message of management. The problem with such an approach that recognizes the inevitability of migration, and therefore takes the maximization of its benefits as a course of action is precisely in how it allows for the legitimation and naturalization of security and the ‘necessary’ exclusion of the ‘wrong types’ of migrants – those which are not invited and not wanted in the EU.

As evidence of this positive, developmentalist language of management, an IOM official described management to me in the following way:

“I mean if it’s managed effectively [...] I see it as being very positive - if they manage to be able to manage it effectively, let's say. But then it is coming to this [...] idea of migration for development, keeping that idea of the development potential of it in mind when you are developing these different policies and programs, rather than seeing it as just borders and visas.” (Interview, IOM Official #3, 7/23/12).

The various members of the management apparatus with whom I spoke were careful to avoid demonizing migrants or the effects of migration as a phenomenon. Rather, the conversation tended towards management for development. Instead of a discussion of migrants simply as a threat to be controlled, our conversations were often centered on strategies for selectively managing flows – where threats are present, and they must be analyzed and sequestered – but on the whole, when properly managed, migration can and should be a “win-win-win” (for the migrant, the home, and the host countries):

“Well, everyone says it’s like the 'triple-win' idea. You know, the country of origin reduces the pressure on the labor market, the country of destination fills
gaps in their labor market, and the individual migrant gets to travel safely and utilize the sort of financial, the money they've saved and the experience they've had, to be able to eventually return home and be able to have a sustainable household income in the country of origin. Yeah, I mean, it's about developing the incentives for circularity” (Interview, IOM Official #3, 7/23/12).

Proper management is thus a matter of calibrating the incentives properly for all parties concerned – focusing, for example, on alleviating demographic challenges in Europe and expanding development potentialities for the migrant (Interview, EU #2, 7/2/12).

Importantly, the managed inclusions of migrants often entail practices of management that ensure a circular pattern of work and then enforced return. The activity that IOM, ICMPD, and other EU partner organizations undertake towards circular migration provides an excellent window into how migration management can be understood as a neoliberal mechanism of governance. One hallmark of management approach is how it works to selectively accommodate the necessary kind and number of migrants in accordance with labor market demands for capital accumulation in the wealthy receiving countries (Sparke, 2006a; Kofman, 2008; Samers, 2010). On one hand, migration management forthrightly recognizes the economic value of migration. On the other, managed migration depends upon an assessment of the migrant’s “risk profile” and potential benefit (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12). This calculus occurs in relation to the political and economic needs of the host country – in this case, EU member states (Samers, 2010).

Managed circular migration functions through agreements between a host country and an organization such as IOM for short-term labor contracts that are granted to particular categories of migrants. These contracts are temporary and enforceable by design. One EU official discussed how Europe, at the moment, “faces its own demographic challenges,” referring to its aging population and need to maintain the fiscal solvency of state programs. Thus, this official claims that migration can be beneficial when migrants come in young, work hard, and pay into the system – but “we want people to come in and out” (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). The logic underlying management is that there is “a place for migrants” in the EU, assuming the ‘right types’ come and leave when required:
“I think people understand that there is a place for migrants to be working in the European Union. Especially if you can almost guarantee that it’s going to be circular. But, I mean, because of public opinion - you know, the word ‘migration’ is a pretty dirty topic in most countries” (Interview, IOM Official #3, 7/23/12).

The management approach thus accommodates for exclusionary and securitizing tendencies in the EU by ensuring that the right types of migrants come and leave when requested. This notion of guaranteed circularity serves as an excellent example of how EU motivations for security and development can meet under the management paradigm. This security/development connection was explicitly made by this same IOM official:

“It’s just about everyone sort of understanding this is going to happen with or without their control, if you like. Developing a circular migration mechanism is, you know, basically the best option that's available in order to [...] weigh out the security risks versus the [...] development potential.” (Interview, IOM Official #3, 7/23/12).

In this way, migration management in Ukraine is enunciated discursively as an approach to the governance of migration in which aims for security and development are balanced. This is an approach that is situated comfortably within the EU’s wider ENP efforts for reforming Ukraine according to EU standards.

It is important to view this seemingly apolitical and developmentalist discourse of ‘management’ in light of the practices and policies of externalization that are now being implemented in Ukraine. Put most simply, these practices pertain to the installation of a technically advanced border monitoring system and infrastructure for the containment of ‘irregular’ migrants in Ukraine alongside the training of a skilled Ukrainian border guard force that can together facilitate ‘the right types’ of migration and intercept and contain ‘the wrong types.’ A focus on these practices of management reveals what Sparke (2006a) has called neoliberalism’s longstanding “authoritarian underbelly” (154).

The EU is now making significant investments in both Ukraine’s physical border infrastructure as well as in building the capacity of Ukrainian authorities to manage migration and borders according to EU standards. In addition to the building and outfitting of detention centers, other EU-funded and prioritized practices of bordering in Ukraine include: the installation of heightened surveillance technologies such as
biometric passports and electronic systems for monitoring the cross-border movement of individuals; rapid training/equipping of Ukrainian border guards; assisted return of ‘irregular’ migrants from Europe\textsuperscript{16}; facilitation of the implementation of the EU/Ukraine Readmission Agreement; and capacity-building training for ‘risk-analysis’ and proper facilitation of people and goods at Ukraine’s borders. Interviews with officials from groups such as EUBAM and IOM often centered on how the Ukrainian officials “lack capacity” to successfully implement migration policy – therefore, the need exists for ongoing capacity-building training. The material relations of this language of ‘capacity-building’ are all important to delineate. It is along these lines that migration management in Ukraine is intelligible as a form of neoliberal governmentality (Lemke, 2001; Sparke, 2006a).

As mentioned in the prior chapter, the EU is now rather blatantly incentivizing Ukraine to “raise its standards” and move towards “European values” in accordance with pending ‘carrots’ of visa liberalization and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA). In one interview an EU official told me that Ukraine’s “destabilization” is “a huge risk to the EU in terms of border management” (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). In this way, the EU’s political and economic motivations for regional stability, growth, and shared values are represented in these policies as conditionality mechanisms that incentivize Ukraine to cooperatively manage cross-border flows of migration. For example, the EU has explicitly tied the VLAP for Ukraine to the implementation of practices for migration management, listing the following requirements for Ukraine to implement:

> “Adoption of a legal framework for migration policy providing for an effective institutional structure for migration management, rules for entry and stay of foreigners, measures for the reintegration of Ukrainian citizens (returning voluntarily or under the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement), monitoring of migration flows, the fight against illegal migration (including return procedures, rights of persons being subject thereto, detention conditions, efforts to conclude readmission agreements with main countries of origin, inland detection of irregular migrants)” (EC, 2012c).

\textsuperscript{16} Return may be voluntary or forced. It may now apply to Ukrainians and those who have transited through Ukraine to the EU – this is according to the EU/Ukraine Readmission Agreement.
This reflects a main bloc of each of the VLAP and AA Action Plans that focus specifically on implementing an apparatus for the management of migration and borders in Ukraine, with only a few lines dedicated to assuring migrant rights and protections. I argue this provides strong evidence of where EU policy makers’ priorities lie – this was confirmed in interviews with several members of Ukrainian civil society and migrant activist groups. Certain officials from the management apparatus that I spoke with in Ukraine lamented how the implementation of migration policy in Ukraine – and its associated aid/assistance – has taken a technical form towards controlling migration, with conditions and future possibilities for migrants often left to be determined after implementation (Joint interview, IOM Official #1 & #2, 7/5/12).

As EU funding dictates, combatting ‘illegal’ migration remains the EU’s chief focus – with selective exceptions that are managed according to biopolitical calculations. This was how the practices of migration management were described to me by one migrant lawyer:

“What do you call migration management – because it’s a very multi-faceted thing. It also might involve, for instance, some demographic things, just quotas for migrations, refugees, etc. Now it’s much more simplified from my point of view. So there (are) more funds to prevent illegal migration, and the EU […] is very much concerned about that because Ukraine is perceived as a kind of a buffer between EU and the rest of the ‘wild world’” (Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12).

It is in this way that migration management operates within EU security-development frameworks that “secure the external” (Białasiewicz, 2012: 3). When contextualized within the wider political-economic relations between the EU and its ‘not yet European’ neighbor, the practices of migration and border management – despite their developmentalist guise – are instituting an arrangement where liberal regimes of mobility are facilitated alongside illiberal architectures of exclusion and detention. It is in this vein that I now move to discuss the EU’s policy architecture entitled “Integrated Border Management,” which by nature integrates security and development concerns to facilitate the movement of some while securitizing ‘risky’ mobilities.

5.3.2. Integrated Border Management (IBM)
Integrated Border Management (IBM) is a recently favored approach of the EU for management that has the explicit aim of maximizing the efficiency and security of flows across the EU’s borders. IBM is central to the EU’s development strategies for the ENP, and within this the Eastern Partnership. It is the paradigm for border management that is now being rolled out in Ukraine through EU capacity-building assistance and state/non-state partnerships. One official stated that IBM has the sense of a “new wave” in EU policy circles at the moment, where “one can either get on or off the bandwagon” (Interview, EUBAM Official #3, 7/19/12).

What Coleman (2005) describes as a “security/economy nexus” is reflected in how IBM relies on identifying and containing threats while letting ‘normal’ economically advantageous cross-border flows proceed unfettered. The EU’s stated goal for IBM is to: “increase the security of land and maritime borders and facilitate legal movements of persons and goods, by the alignment of management practices and procedures to European standards as well as building up capacity for better fighting cross-border crime (including trafficking […] and irregular migration)” (ENPI, NIP 2011-2013).

IBM is thus funded through the ENPI according to co-extant goals for: 1) “facilitation” of movement; 2) “security” for borders; and 3) “alignment” to “European standards” through capacity-building training in the authorities of neighboring countries like Ukraine.

Concerning facilitation and security, IBM entails the implementation of legal and physical apparatuses for facilitating cross-border flows of goods and people. One example of this is the adoption of biometric passports along with the installation of an electronic registration system, as mandated in the EU’s Action Plan for the VLAP. Regarding alignment to European standards, a 2010 EU press release claims that a 66 million Euro IBM-related investment in Ukraine is for “modernisation of land and maritime border infrastructure as well as enhancing border checking and surveillance capacities” (EU, 2010a IBM). In short, the roll-out of IBM in Ukraine entails both a “technological fix” for border management (Sparke, 2006a: 152) and numerous pedagogical capacity-building for reforming Ukrainian officials.
The importance placed upon training Ukrainian border guards in IBM reveals the extent to which instruction and cross-border cooperation are central to the EU’s externalization of migration control to Ukraine. Herein lies the role of EUBAM. A EUBAM official detailed the mission’s vision for the implementation of IBM in this way:

“Because, of course, we support any kind of legal transaction, and facilitat(ion) of trade, and facilitation of people crossing the border. These legal parts should have as much convenience as possible, and IBM is helping when it comes to selectivity, when it comes to risk analysis - you know, not 100% checks at the border are needed if you have proper risk analysis, if you have proper selectivity. So the facilitation of the legitimate trade and people flows is of course a main issue of IBM, and also a main issue for us. At the same time, you have to have these IBM tools of risk analysis - the technique behind the facilities - to identify also the threats, and to counteract any kind of illegal transaction. And this balance I think is a very important one. If you check 100% you don't check anything. So you need to know what to check to not bother the normal traffic flow too much, to make it easy, (so) that people are happy […] At the same time, you really tackle the threats […] the IBM is helping you as a guiding concept to implement this” (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12).

The EUBAM official shows us how security and development are balanced in IBM’s approach to bordering. Border management is represented as being about facilitating movement “properly” for accumulation’s sake. In the language of experts such as this, migration is situated within the realm of a technical, trade-friendly calculation – removing the issue from the calculi of security and politics. Instead of a militarization of the borderlines between Ukraine and Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, we have a vision here for a border that is protected through the constant calculation of risks, through the identification of certain flows as threats (quite possibly far before they reach the border), and through the normalization and facilitation of other flows.

In order for selective facilitation to occur, the calculation of risks is an integral part of border management. For example, a EUBAM official explained to me how IOM and EUBAM collaborate together on the sharing of migration statistics to establish “risk profiles” for migration-related threats (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12). Such
knowledge allows for the mobility of capital and the economic elite to occur without too much interruption, while ‘illegal’ migrants as security or economic threats are identified and stopped. As Sparke (2006) and Coleman (2005) have attested to in the US context, the EU/Ukraine border is increasingly liberalized to capital accumulation, while maintaining an illiberal and authoritarian stance toward the uninvited and disadvantageous. It is thus not coincidental that migration and border management figure centrally in the EU’s Action Plan for the pending “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” as part of the Association Agreement. EU officials stressed to me that they cannot open the border to visa-d Ukrainians or free flows of trade until a properly functioning system of border management is put in place. There remains a discernible order that management attempts to preserve – one that is dictated by the EU, which assesses the risk of flows into its territory.

The integration of security and development in the IBM approach is instructive towards how the architecture of bordering is being established in Ukraine. Considering security and development motivations as intertwined reveals how IBM in Ukraine is set up for a political-economic relationship of control through the selective facilitation of flows. Two ENP documents evidence this tension particularly well.

First, the “ENPI 2011-2013 National Indicative Programme for Ukraine,” claims that the desired impact of IBM is the “facilitated movement of persons and goods in the context of increased security at the borders” (11). The expected results are to integrate policy, a legal apparatus, “modern border infrastructure, information systems and border checks and surveillance equipment,” and “biometric passports” towards facilitating legal movement and “combatting cross-border crime,” such as “irregular immigration” (ibid.). Importantly, this report also ties IBM in with “efficient implementation of the EU-Ukraine Readmission Agreement” (ibid.). Second, the ENPI’s “Annual Action Programme 2010” for Ukraine reveals a EU investment of 60 million Euros in the sector of border management. The main objective of this investment was to “support the efforts of the Ukrainian Government to achieve an effective balance between secure borders and the facilitation of legal movements of persons and goods, according to EU standards” (ENPI, 2010(b): 5). As a reflection of what I have detailed thus far as the discourse of management, one can find language of “risk management,” border “modernization,”
proper “facilitation,” and compliance with “EU standards” throughout both of these EU ‘Programmes’ that direct the implementation of EU development assistance towards IBM in Ukraine.

One EUBAM official somewhat critically described the Ukraine/Moldova version of IBM as a “police function,” where people are what are to be managed, not goods (Interview, EUBAM Official #3, 7/19/12). This official claimed that with the advent of the Schengen accord in the mid-1990s, it was realized that better cooperation and integration amongst EU-members was needed for the collective management of both people and goods entering the EU commons. This was the driver for the EU’s IBM concept, and the system of goods/customs was set up at this time. However, with the EU’s territorial expansions there has emerged “a new worry about people” (Interview, EUBAM Official #3, 7/19/12).

This ‘new worry about people’ appears to be the impetus for many of the exclusionary practices of bordering in Ukraine that are happening in the names of development, aid, technical assistance and capacity-building. IBM serves as an example of how the management approach can be considered as a security/development nexus – bringing security, economy, and humanitarian investments together in such a way that EU-centric security work happens as development. A host of organizations, actors, and practices are associated with the management of borders in Ukraine. This apparatus diversely undertakes practices that ‘integrate’ security risks and development potentialities, thereby maintaining a particularly uneven geography of exclusion alongside facilitation.

5.4. The biopolitics of management

The management approach fundamentally represents a selective logic for ordering the ‘right kind’ of flows of capital and people across space to the detriment of the ‘wrong kind’ of people. It depends on knowledge of the population of potential migrants and of

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17 To this effect, the EU migrant police task force FRONTEX emerged in 2005 to facilitate “an integrated system of border management” (Vermeersch, 2007: 476). FRONTEX has been integral to the IBM project in Ukraine – another EUBAM official described FRONTEX as one of EUBAM’s “strongest partners,” with the two organizations cooperating in the sharing of intelligence and training methods (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12).
circulation, and this knowledge allows for the operation of technologies of power that work to facilitate the movement of some and the removal or even detainment of others. This involves a security/economy calculation (Coleman, 2005), but it also involves what Sparke (2006) discusses as a “biopolitics of citizenship.” For Foucault, biopolitics were about “the calculated management of life” as regulated, controlled, and differentiated by technologies of power (Foucault, 1990: 139-140). Sparke (2006) relates this to both discipline at the border and the generalized neoliberal refashioning of citizenship.

Reflecting the latter, or what Gökariksel and Mitchell (2005) call the “neoliberal subject,” an EU official told me that “the EU wants Ukrainians to come to the EU,” describing Ukrainians as “well integrated,” “hard workers,” “young,” “respectful of laws,” and that they “pay taxes, but do not take from the system” (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/2/12). For EU leaders, selectively managed migration can be a good thing as far as it fills labor market niches and meets EU economic needs. However, for citizens of EU member states this is a sensitive matter – as evidenced by the rise of far right parties in EU member states such as France, Italy, and Greece (ibid.). This is why, for the EU governments and their leaders, “border management is key” (ibid.).

Several interviews revealed distinctions made between productive laborers (those who are white, industrious, flexible, obedient, Christian, Ukrainian, will return home) and, for example, Iraqi or Somali migrants, who are assumed to embody the opposite characteristics. It is in this way that “Fortress Europe’s” gates open selectively according to biopolitical calculations. I argue that one reason that IBM is being rolled out in Ukraine – in its technocratic and capacity-building components – is to facilitate this calculation.

Biopolitical differentiation between migrants was made by both EU and Ukrainian officials in relation to how migration should be managed effectively. One EU official expressed that the for the EU:

“This is a very sensitive issue in the EU, we need to be careful. We want to see people from Ukraine, and not Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Somalia. Therefore, Ukraine needs to increase its standards” (Interview, EU Official #2, 7/5/12).

The EU’s investments in a managed border are an attempt to accomplish this selectivity. A similar biopolitical and racialized differentiation was made by a Ukrainian official,
who claimed that “Ukraine does not have a problem with illegal immigration,” in part, because Africans and “strong Muslims” do not stay in Ukraine. Whereas the EU has accepted Africans “who do not want to work, but stay there and access the social welfare system,” this official claimed that Ukraine will not support them:

“It is not profitable to have strong Muslim Afghans here – they cannot live together with Ukrainians. “Normal Afghans” don’t want to accept them here either. Ukraine says ‘if you want to be crazy, you can go to Europe’” (Interview, Ukrainian Migration Official, 7/24/12, with translation).

This official claimed that Ukraine is not like the EU, which does not pay attention when immigrants “make fires and trash cars” (in protest). Ukraine has a different mentality – “we have a limit of acceptable behavior for foreigners, and the foreigners here understand this.” He then jokingly added that the EU is rich, so they can afford to get trashed cars fixed, whereas Ukraine is not (ibid.).

This sentiment reflects Fitzgerald’s (2010) understanding of biopolitics as “a distinctly racialized form of state regulation of ‘Others.’” The targeted exclusion of certain migrants in and through Ukraine – ranging from risk profiles, to readmission, to detention – occurs through an apparatus that integrates biopolitical, geoeconomic, geopolitical, and humanitarian motivations. This is how the management approach to migration in Ukraine is operative as a security/development nexus.

5.5. Conclusion

Migration management is politically important to the uneven power-laden political processes that maintain an exclusionary arrangement on the edge of Europe. I will discuss in the next chapter how this can have grave consequences for migrants’ lives. In line with Coleman (2005) and Sparke’s (2006) consideration of security and economic motivations in bordering, as well as what Hyndman (2012) has called the “geopoliticisation of humanitarianism” (242), in this chapter I have described migration and border management as a security-development nexus. Managing migration for development operates discursively to remove the exclusionary work of border externalization from the world of politics through providing a common-sense technocratic solution. I have emphasized through detailing the practices, partnerships
and EU-funded priorities of management, that the management approach is in fact deeply political. Management is associable with exclusionary tendencies towards keeping certain types of migration in Ukraine, and out of EU common space.

Much of what is being done in the name of humanitarianism, development, and aid as migration and border management in Ukraine serves security purposes for the EU. Therefore, management in Ukraine manifests as a “security/development nexus” in several ways: 1) direct development assistance from the EU to Ukraine (which is increasingly made conditional on Ukraine’s cooperation as part of the ENP); 2) EU “capacity-building” and “technical assistance” geared towards enhancing stability, security, and border/trade infrastructure in line with EU standards and values; and 3) the enrollment of international humanitarian organizations into management-related partnerships with the EU and neighboring countries. There is a fourth nuance to this nexus, which the next chapter will detail in the context of EU externalization – the humanitarian management of those in detention in Ukraine.

In conclusion, a critical attention to both the language of management discourses and the associated policies and practices which migrants encounter in Ukraine reveals how management discursively represents a seemingly apolitical and cooperative solution toward harnessing migration’s benefits that is in fact employed amidst exclusionary and power-laden tactics. I thus call into the question the possibility of migration management to truly be a “win-win-win,” especially for the uninvited and unwanted migrant. I see the developmentalist framework of migration and border management as a productive form of power that is deeply embedded within the EU’s “othering” neighbourhood (ENP) politics. Despite the sentiment found within the management apparatus that “we are not dealing with politics,” discourses of management are part and parcel of the political decisions about selectivity and control that maintain an exclusionary spatial arrangement on the edge of the EU with serious consequences for migrants’ lives. It is to this arrangement of EU externalization that I now turn.

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CHAPTER SIX. “KEEP THEM OUT, BUT TREAT THEM WELL:” EU EXTERNALIZATION EFFORTS AND THEIR EFFECTS IN UKRAINE

6.1. Introduction

New geographies of bordering and managing migration are emerging on the edges of Europe. Many political geographers have addressed the various processes whereby the EU is “externalizing” substantial components of migration and border control to the neighboring countries (Samers, 2004; Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Kuus, 2011; Bialasiewicz, 2012; and Casas-Cortes, et al., 2013). Especially since the 2004 and 2007 eastern enlargements of the EU, we have seen the EU’s externalization of migration control and asylum to Ukraine take shape through legal, institutional, and development-related changes. The previous chapter showed how the EU’s externalization efforts in Ukraine articulate with a governmentality of “managing” migration and borders for development according to EU “standards and values.” The management approach is politically central to ongoing processes of EU externalization which include exclusionary practices of bordering and detention.

What the EU calls its “external dimension” operates at the level of policy through the ENP framework and includes a host of bordering practices. We have seen thus far how this externalization happens in several ways. First, I showed in Chapter Four that a sort of ‘carrot and stick conditionality’ is part and parcel of the transformation of migration control practices now taking place in Ukraine. These political-economic transformations through the ENP have facilitated the emergence of a new spatial arrangement for managing migration. This has happened through the implementation of policies, such as the Readmission Agreement, the enrollment of many actors, such as EUBAM and IOM, and the funding of many EU ‘assistance’ projects to be implemented in Ukraine. Second, externalization happens through an apparatus of migration and border managers whose technical and pedagogical interventions are funded by the EU to guide the “not yet European neighbor,” Ukraine, towards implementing procedures for selectively “managing” migration flows. Externalizing control depends in part upon installing a system for border management in Ukraine so that “proper facilitation” can be ensured at the border (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12).
Thirdly, externalization entails humanitarian assistance to provide care and reform conditions of for processing and detaining migrants in Ukraine. This emerging spatial arrangement for externalization takes place in Ukraine according to EU standards of management that reflect a “keep them out, but treat them well” (Joint Interview, IOM #2, 7/5/12) logic towards uninvited and unwanted migrants’ lives. It is in this way that this chapter offers a critique of EU standards through discussing some of the results of externalization in Ukraine.

The externalization of detention and migration management to Ukraine reflects Mountz’s (2010) claim that states can:

“manipulate space to subvert access to human rights, alter legislation, and extend their reach beyond territorial borders. These strategies are part of the securitization of migration” (xvii).

In this chapter I illustrate how recent changes in the EU’s law, politics, and bordering practices facilitate the exclusionary spatial arrangement that certain migrants find in Ukraine today. I take a critical political geographical approach to questioning why, how, and to what effect state bodies like the EU externalize border practices. Following Bialasiewicz’s (2012) charge to theorize the political and ethical implications of the EU’s transformation of bordering practices, this chapter discusses the EU’s investments in externalization and the impacts of EU bordering processes in Ukraine on migrants who for various reasons are trying to reach the European Union. Therefore, I here seek to elucidate what effects such spatial practices of “bordering, ordering, and othering” (van Houtum, 2010) have on migrants’ lives and their future possibilities in Ukraine.

6.2. A brief political history of EU externalization

When the Schengen agreement went into effect in 1995 it dispelled the internal border checks within the EU and strengthened the borders externally. This initiative was bolstered under the mantle of increased economic freedom for the movement of labor, capital, and goods in the Euro-zone. However, with the opening of internal borders, there was also a strong accompanying motive of security for borders to be strengthened externally towards Europe’s neighbors (Samers, 2004; Bufon, 2011). While free movement within the Schengen-zone is surely beneficial to its members, the advent of
Schengen space has had negative consequences for many Central and Eastern European countries, members and non-members alike. For example, in the historically strong economic relationship between Poland and Ukraine, where Ukrainian migrants for a long time have been able to easily obtain visas to fill low-income labor shortages, Poland’s entrance into Schengen space has resulted in a dramatic decline in Ukrainian immigration (Bufon, 2011). What can be surmised is that since the mid-1990s, and especially after the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, the countries of the European Union have moved towards a more “communitarised,” or inter-governmental, approach towards enforcing the EU’s external borders (Geddes, 2000; Samers, 2004; Leonard, 2010).

In December 2001, the European Council met in Laeken to construct an action plan to address “illegal immigration,” which included plans for “pre-frontier measures,” financial support for third country action, and readmission and return policies (Samers, 2004: 31). From this time, a 2001 Commission Communication on a “common policy on illegal immigration” posited that EU nations should use their “political weight” to encourage reluctant third countries to “fulfill their readmission obligations” (Cholewinski, 2003, quoted in Samers, 2004: 39). Setting the stage for the conditionality mechanisms I outlined in Chapter Four, the European Seville Council of 2002 concluded that insufficient cooperation from the third country in regards to migration could impede upon their future economic trade and political relations with the EU (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). Tying cooperation with migrant readmission to such incentives is exactly what is now taking place in Ukraine through the RA, VLAP and AA.

Another important and earlier piece of this historical development of externalization is the Dublin Convention of 1990. This convention was concerned in part with the establishment of policies which allow for asylum seekers in the EU to be returned to the first “safe country of transit” (Samers, 2010: 212). In practice these countries, like Ukraine, may not be safe at all (ibid., see also Human Rights Watch, 2010). This convention laid the groundwork for the present-day EU policies for returning migrants to third countries (such as the EU/Ukraine Readmission Agreement (RA)). In 2003, the EU updated the 1990 Dublin Convention. What is now called the Dublin Regulation aims to expedite the process of assigning an asylum case to a single member
country in coordination with the EURODAC fingerprinting system, thereby preventing asylum ‘shopping’ (EU, 2003; Samers, 2010).

According to Hyndman and Mountz (2008), EU policies such as these are now used to prevent asylum seekers from making spontaneous claims within more than one country within the EU’s territory. They argue that “legal and extra-legal geographies of exclusion” in Europe have led to “neo-refoulement,” which is the return of migrants and asylum seekers to transit countries, such as Ukraine, before they are able to reach the sovereign territory where they could appeal for protection (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008: 250). This has the consequence for many asylum seekers of ending up in unprotected and liminal scenarios, often waiting for long periods of time in detention and sustained on “don’t die survival” (Hyndman and Giles, 2011). This is the sort of humanitarian provision that is now being invested in within Ukraine.

6.3. Ukraine as a “reservoir:” EU investments in externalization

The EU is now making many investments in ‘pre-frontier’ measures for controlling migration through Ukraine. In line with my concern to understand how externalization is taking place in Ukraine, these investments reflect the EU’s “very remote control” and efforts to “secure the external.” According to a European Court of Auditors report, between 2000 and 2005, the European Commission financed 31 projects in Ukraine with a total EU contribution of 73.8 million euros in the areas of “border management, migration and asylum, fight against organized crime, and good governance” (EU Court of Auditors, 2009: 37). A further 38 projects to the tune of 48.3 million Euros were spread between Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus in these same thematic areas. The report justifies this expenditure in terms of the “shared challenges” the EU and Ukraine face in light of their common borders:

“One of the fundamental objectives of the European Union (EU) is to offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice. This objective has an important external dimension. Following the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the EU became a direct neighbor of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, sharing a common border and facing common challenges” (ibid.: 7).
The 2004 and 2007 EU expansions coincided with the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its funding instrument (ENPI). Since then, the EU’s level of coordination for migration and border management with Ukraine has intensified.

The ENPI 2011-2013 National Indicative Program for Ukraine notes an increase in “transit irregular migration” through Ukraine since the establishment of a “common frontier” in 2004 (46). This report claims that:

“the territory of Ukraine is on a major Central European route of irregular migration, including several channels of illegal movements of persons: Vietnamese, Pakistani-Indian, Sri Lankan-Bangladeshi, Afghan, Chinese, Kurdish, Uzbek-Tajik, and Chechen channels” (ENPI, 2010(b): 46-47).

The report further notes that controlling irregular migration through Ukraine is a “priority area of integral migration policy,” and that there are “changes required for controlling irregular migration in a more effective manner” (ibid.: 47-48). It then details Ukraine’s shortcomings in areas of government agencies, legal infrastructure, border policing, and “funding for combatting irregular migration” (ibid.: 48). Reflecting the merger of security and development, the report benevolently claims in regards to the EU-Ukraine Readmission Agreement (RA) that “the European Commission has agreed to […] enable Ukraine to have technical and financial assistance for (the RA’s) implementation and define it as one of its priorities.” In this vein of EU assistance for the RA, and regarding the return of non-Ukrainians to Ukraine for processing, the report states that:

“appropriate regulations will come into force in the two-year transition period during which Ukraine, with EU assistance, will create the required infrastructure essential for [the readmission agreement’s] admittance and subsequently return them to their countries of origin” (ibid.: 48).

This report identifies the irregular transit migration through Ukraine as a priority problem and assesses that Ukraine lacks the capacity to control this.

The “illegal movement of persons” thus becomes the target of EU “capacity building” funding through the ENPI. This illustrates well the sort of geographical imaginations at work in how I am describing EU bordering efforts in the prior chapter as a “security/development nexus.” This funding for implementation of the RA and for transforming Ukraine’s ability to control migration is precisely the shape that
externalization efforts are now taking in Ukraine – these are the processes that are now taking place in the name of “management” in Ukraine.

But why is the EU seeking to set up this “infrastructure” (ENPI, 2010(b)) for controlling migration flows in Ukraine? I asked this question to one migration lawyer, and he replied:

“The EU of course is very much interested to settle, to have a […] reservoir, maybe. I don't know how else to put it – to accommodate mostly asylum-seekers […] to stay in Ukraine, not to penetrate further” (Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12).

As Ukraine is imagined and invested in by EU bodies of governance to become a ‘reservoir’ for asylum-seekers and poor migrants, one of the immediate effects is that it becomes harder for migrants to seek political asylum in the EU. Migrants who are trying to cross the Ukraine/EU border are now being detained and processed in Ukraine – it has become increasingly difficult for these migrants to reach a EU country where they can make an asylum claim. This is an example of how states “manipulate space to subvert access” for migrants (Mountz, 2010: xvii). As the EU funds capacity-building efforts in Ukraine for “proper selectivity” (Interview, EUBAM Official #1, 7/19/12), access to the EU as a “gated community” (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007) will be increasingly only available for those who are invited to come in.

While critically recognizing the occurrence of EU externalization, one IOM official told me that Ukraine also has to prove itself as a cooperative partner:

“I think that the outsourcing element is definitely there, but at the same time it is also a challenge for Ukraine to prove that they are a worthwhile partner to the EU. The EU realizes at the same time that it cannot do it on its own” (Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12).

This idea that the EU cannot go at it alone resonates well with how Ukraine has been considered a “priority partner” in the context of the ENP (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12). The notion that Ukraine should prove itself to be ‘worthwhile partner’ is the impetus for many of the EU’s investments in building Ukraine’s capacity for migration and border management that groups like IOM and EUBAM are implementing. To receive the benefits of visas, trade, and closer association, Ukrainian officials must prove
first to be a cooperative partner to the EU in its ‘neighbourhood’ externalization efforts. According to the EU’s externalization of migration management, Ukraine is expected to take returned migrants, but insure a humanitarian minimum in the conditions provided for them.

One Ukrainian migration official expressed frustration to me concerning the EU’s “unclear determinations” for Ukraine. His sense was that when Ukraine detains ‘illegal’ migrants, the EU (and related IGOs and NGOs) blames Ukrainian officials for the conditions in which these migrants are kept (Interview, Ukrainian Migration Official, 7/24/12, with translation). For example, a scathing Human Rights Watch report from 2010 criticized the conditions in Ukrainian detention centers, describing Ukraine’s “dysfunctional asylum system” and the “arbitrary and disproportionate use of migrant detention” (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 2, 5; see also Amnesty, 2010). During our interview, the Ukrainian official mentioned the Human Rights Watch report, claiming:

“It would be easier for us to just let them go through, but then the EU would fault us that we should be doing a better job fighting illegal migration” (Interview, Ukrainian Migration Official, 7/24/12, with translation).

This tension between externalization of migration control and the humanitarian treatment of (detained) migrants in Ukraine was described well by one IOM official:

“I think that the EU’s priorities in Ukraine are still to protect the EU borders. So that's the first priority on the list. I mean, one can tell by reading the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, for example. Then, of course, there are some human rights or international standards elements […] I mean, "keep them out, but treat them well" is the […] thing” (Joint interview, IOM Official #2, 7/5/12).

Thus, Ukraine is being concretely incentivized and expected by the EU to take on its new role as “cooperative migration manager,” but is also expected to do this according to a certain humanitarian minimum. “Keep them out, but treat them well” sums it up nicely.

Such efforts at keeping migrants out are often justified through statistics, and it is important to note that the statistics on immigrants within and transiting through Ukraine vary significantly.18 According to one migrant activist, the flexibility of these “strange

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18 According to 2010 World Bank data, the total number of Ukrainian emigrants was approximately 6.5 million, which is 14.4 % of the country’s total population of approximately 46
statistics” affords a certain political utility – serving to satisfy the EU of Ukraine’s “efficiency” in the area of migration management, justifying further EU externalization efforts, as well as providing fuel for the fire of Ukraine’s developing right-wing populist political movement (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12). In any of these calculations, migrants are considered as a threat that can to be managed. Despite sensationalized predictions from right-wing politicians of millions of migrants coming to and through Ukraine, the number is not nearly that high. Indeed, several of the officials that I spoke with recognized that the largest migration flows may have moved at this point to the southeast of the EU (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12; Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12).

Despite these slippery statistics, what is instructive towards understanding externalization is the apparatus that the EU continues to construct for external control in Ukraine. A migrant lawyer I spoke with pointed to the persistent nature of EU externalization efforts as follows:

“[…]last year it was 500 or 600, I'm not sure about the exact number of those who were sent back according to the Readmission Agreement – it’s next to zero! […] But the EU is still trying just to allocate, just to try (get) people to stay in Ukraine, to make Ukraine as a country of asylum. […] Now what is the most exciting thing they have done? They constructed MACs (Migrant Accommodation Centers). […] I think the prolongation, […] the increase of the detention period, is caused mainly by […] the European request to extend, to make people stay here longer. But from my point of view, if you want people to stay here, then make for them some conditions to stay here” (Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12).

million. From this data, four of the top ten countries of destination for Ukrainian emigration were EU countries (World Bank, 2011: 23, 25, 249). Zimmer (2008) discusses these strange statistics in Ukraine, saying that estimates of migrants in Ukraine range from 20,000 to 500,000. What is generally agreed upon is that most migrants do not want to stay in Ukraine, and are staging for transit migration to the EU (Zimmer, 2008). Several interviewees made the point that the statistics they don’t know (i.e. how many got through) are what is concerning for the EU and the project of migration management.
This lawyer is referring to a ruling in late 2011, which increased the maximum period a migrant could be detained in Ukraine from six to twelve months. As I will discuss later in this chapter, migrants in Ukraine often struggle with protracted scenarios of detention, which this ruling has exacerbated. The lawyer also discusses a point that came up often in interviews – that the EU has pushed hard for the technical installation of this new arrangement for remote control of migration in Ukraine with little concern for the quality of conditions for migrants there within.

Externalization happens, first and foremost, to quell the threat of ‘illegal’ migration. According to one migrant activist, both EU and Ukrainian actors share the sentiment that ‘illegal’ migration is a threat:

“Well I'd say from politicians, for our state actors, (migrants) are perceived as a threat – same way as European Union saw them, so they are kind of a threat for the development with the European Union, because they signed the (Readmission) Agreement, they took the money […] and they have to do everything, at least formally, what they are told by the European Union to do. So if they are told they have to develop a kind of new law, they do it, but they usually do it formally - not really looking at the quality of this law. If they are pushed to some human rights development, they try – when really pushed – to do something, but again not really caring what the quality is behind it” (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12).

This imbalance of priorities towards controlling migration was also reflected in this migrant lawyer’s statement to me:

“the problem is – if you compare the funds that the EU has invested in the last five or six years […] against illegal migration […] to asylum issues, these are two incomparable things. It’s like ten times or even twelve times (more). So it’s not because of the number of refugees here – it’s smaller than just illegal migrants […] But the needs are more and more compelling […] it requires more funds than just to assist people to make people sitting in the detention center and then to deport them” (Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12).

Through the ENP and through various types of assistance, the EU continues to make investments in Ukraine’s becoming a “buffer zone” for migration and asylum on the edge.
of the EU. Whether it is hundreds, thousands, or ‘millions’ per year – migrants excluded or deemed as a threat to the EU, perhaps to Ukraine as well, are being detained in difficult conditions in Ukraine according to the EU’s geographical design. I now turn to discuss this spatial arrangement for containment and then, the resultant conditions that migrants are finding in Ukraine.

6.4. Migrant “accommodation” in Ukraine

The EU has not only created a legal apparatus for migrants to be returned to and processed in Ukraine, it has also invested in the physical infrastructure for detention. One of the most salient examples of where the EU’s priorities lie is the externalization of detention to Ukraine. An investment was made by the EU in 2007 towards the creation of “Migrant Custody Centers” (MACs and THFs) where “irregular migrants are treated in line with European standards” and “capacity” is developed with the Ukrainian authorities (ENPI, 2007: 19). The EU’s investments in spaces of containment for migrants in Ukraine illustrate how externalization happens along the lines of “keep them out, but treat them well.”

According to the Ukraine-EU RA, when migrants are apprehended at the EU/Ukraine border or are returned to Ukraine from EU member countries they are to be processed in Ukraine. Migration officials whom I interviewed said that what happens to the migrant post-apprehension or return largely depends upon where they are from. Apprehended migrants from former Soviet countries are often given the option to “voluntarily return” within five days. However, those from Africa and further away in Asia are often held in centers to await a legal ruling on their status or deportation (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12).

The centers within which these migrants are held to wait in Ukraine are referred to benignly as “Migrant Accommodation Centers” (MACs). A UNHCR official claimed that: “accommodation center is not an appropriate name for these facilities – these are prisons” (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12). There are also Temporary Accommodation Centers (TACs), where migrants are placed first after apprehension or upon return to Ukraine, for which conditions are described as dismal (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1 & #2, 7/10/12; Human Rights Watch, 2010; Amnesty, 2010). There
are currently approximately 600 places for migrants in the MACs and 320 in the TACs, though some rooms in the TACs were described to be uninhabitable (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12). The EU’s goal at present is to increase Ukraine’s numerical capacity for holding migrants in centers as well as their capacity to manage the lives within – a humanitarian form of capacity-building that is intimately woven into EU externalization.

As mentioned above, in 2007, the same year that the RA was drafted, the EU invested 35 million Euros in what the 2007 ENPI Annual Action Programme for Ukraine titled:

“Readmission-related assistance (Improving infrastructure and capacity to deal with irregular migrants and to reduce irregular migration flows through Ukraine) and EUBAM-flanking measures (Support to the implementation of EUBAM recommendations)” (16).

The primary goal for this investment, in sum, was to provide space for migrants who are returned from the EU according to the Readmission Agreement, or who are apprehended crossing the Ukraine/EU border to be detained:

“As evidence of the sort of state/non-state partnerships that make up the management apparatus’s detention-related activity, this report claims that the project will “build upon the EC (European Commission) funded projects "Capacity Building of Migration Management: Ukraine 1 + 2" which are implemented by the IOM” (ibid.: 17).

Interviews I conducted with IOM officials confirmed the organization’s involvement in the refurbishment and maintenance of migrant detainment facilities. Their involvement was, in part, to insure that minimal humanitarian standards are upheld in the centers (Joint interview, IOM Officials #1 & #2, 7/5/12). While insuring that the basic needs of detained migrants are met, IOM is imbricated within a wider humanitarian mission of the EU’s that is now underway, involving the funding of infrastructure, the training of officials, and the evolution of a new sort of external migration management.
IOM, in accordance with its funded mandates, works to improve the conditions for migrants that are now being held in Ukraine according to new spatial arrangement of externalized control. IOM’s work with these centers reflects the conflicted, but ultimately EU-centric management of migration in Ukraine as a simultaneously humanitarian and securitarian project.

Since this 2007 investment in detention, the EU has expressed its intentions toward the construction and refurbishment of multiple more detention centers, all implemented with ENPI funding, and all complementing the passing of the Ukraine-EU RA (Delegation, 2011; Joint interview, IOM Officials #1 & #2, 7/5/12). In 2011 the EU made 30 million Euros available towards the construction, refurbishment, and outfitting of nine more detainment facilities to be built throughout Ukraine. According to the EU:

“the project's specific objective is to support Ukraine in designing, establishing/refurbishing and equipping Temporary Holding Facilities and Custody Centres for irregular migrants in line with European standards”

(Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, 2011).

This 30 million Euro investment was intended for the construction or refurbishment of seven “temporary holding facilities” (TACs) in Pavlovychi, Smilnitsya, Uzhgorod, Velikiy Berezniy, Solotvino, Sopych, Krasnodon – mostly locations in close proximity to the border between Ukraine and EU member states to hold those recently apprehended. This investment is also toward the construction of two new longer-term MACs that are to be built in Zhdanivka (Donetsk region) and Martynivske (Mykolaiv region) – both in geographically peripheral locations to the west and south (ibid.). A UNHCR official noted how the MACs are located in the “middle of nowhere,” 30 km from the nearest town, which creates major problems for delivering quality services for detained populations. For example, in the Volyn MAC there is no doctor for the center because they cannot find any doctors who are willing to live so far out (Interview, UNCHR Official, 7/16/12).

Several of the migrant activists and lawyers whom I spoke with in Ukraine expressed a perplexed frustration at this idea of building more detention centers, in part, due to the fact that the centers now are not even full. While implementation of these centers seems to be caught up in Ukrainian bureaucracy at the moment (Interview, EU
Official #2, 7/2/12), these funded intentions serve as evidence of where the EU’s priorities lie. One migrant activist, considering the conditions asylum-seekers face in Ukraine, found this particularly offensive:

“The thing is that a number of people who are transiting are seeking asylum, like transit migrants, is very low right now. What we’ve observed through our practice is that the detention facilities for migrants, they are not filled to their capacity. But according to the […] EU/Ukraine arrangements, Ukraine is yet supposed to build more of the detention facilities. And they are a higher priority than accommodation facilities for refugees and asylum seekers. And what Ukraine basically does, practically, to fill in those centers, they kind of create illegal migrants” (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #2, 7/10/12).

This activist is referring to how migrants have been released from the centers in Ukraine without paperwork after their twelve-month stay in the center is up, and then re-apprehended and placed back in the center for processing – allowing for positive reports of ‘effectiveness’ and statistics to garner further EU funding. The occurrence of repeat admission was also noted in the aforementioned Human Rights Watch (2010) report, and came up in several other interviews I conducted (Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12; Joint Interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12; Interview, Migrant Activist #3, 7/17/12).

Another migrant activist expressed the somewhat ridiculous nature of the current arrangement for MACs in Ukraine in light of wider security/development relations between the EU and Ukraine:

“So it’s easy (to) see that these places are never full – it’s like half of the capacity is used more or less. So basically because they have to, the government […] have to do something to show that they are using these capacities, and that they need more money for the technical assistance from European Union to continue this successful migration management” (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12).

The EU’s assistance to Ukraine is thus two-fold: first and foremost, it is directed to constructing new centers to contain newly apprehended migrants (who will be identified through increasingly complex technologies of risk-analysis and border management); secondly, the investment is made to ensure a humanitarian minimum of conditions for
those within detention. This reflects how Europeaid assistance to Ukraine is embroiled within a wider political economy of bordering and migrant exclusion.

I quote the following exchange at length for how it relays this EU’s official’s explanation for the “assistance” provided to Ukraine for the construction of these centers (MACs and TACs) in line with the Readmission Agreement.

EU Official #1: “Now, right now if we are talking about immigration issues, the European Union is also providing them assistance to build up so-called "migration centers," which (are) basically detention centers for the illegal migrants.”

AC: “And this is for those who, as a part of the Readmission Agreement, would be returned back to Ukraine?”

EU Official #1: “Yeah, so if I know properly, there will be something like 10 or 11 readmission centers. They are throughout the whole country. […] We are basically financing […] all of the building of structures and things like that.”

AC: “Is this because that’s a priority for the Readmission Agreement?”

EU Official #1: “Yeah, of course, they should handle it. Another issue is that, you know, the conditions that they have here are not the best, so it’s kind of improving the conditions […] (for) how they can handle the migrants. […] If we are talking migration here, it’s not only a technical problem. It’s also a kind of problem of the society is not very much open in this issue.”

AC: “Sure…”

EU Official #1: “If we are honest, it’s a problem inside the European Union as well (laughing). […] I mean, Ukraine is more or less a transit country. So these people, these illegal migrants, do not want to stay here. But, if they are here, the society is not very tolerant” (Interview, EU Official #1, 7/2/12).

So here we see the need to reform conditions in Ukraine in accordance with the new spatial arrangement that has been created for returning migrants from the EU to Ukraine. The EU is giving assistance towards the establishment of a humanitarian detention system in Ukraine according to EU standards. However, when we look at the detention centers in Ukraine we come to understand how these human detention centers are actually prisons. It is in this way that I call attention to the importance of situating EU standards in relation to the conditions that migrants find in Ukraine, inside and outside of
detention, as their movement is targeted through EU-funded techniques of bordering, exclusion, and containment in Ukraine.

6.5. Conditions for migrants in Ukraine: exclusion, detention, liminality

As the EU official above mentions, Ukraine remains a threatening place for many migrants to be. EU externalization efforts are ongoing despite the fact that xenophobia, racism, and hate crimes remain serious issues within Ukrainian society. Discrimination is a common problem for minorities, particularly Roma, Crimean Tatar, and African populations (EC 2012b: 7; Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1 & #2, 7/10/12; Migrant Activist #3, 7/17/12). Perhaps even more disconcerting is that the EU’s externalization efforts are ongoing despite the lack of a coherent apparatus in Ukraine to receive and process migrants in a safe and expedient manner. But, of course, herein lies one justification for the EU’s capacity-building for migration and border management.

Migration policy in Ukraine was often described by interviewees as a system that does not work together in a functional and integrated way (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12; Interview, Migrant Activist #3, 7/17/12). This legal chaos was frequently attributed to the ongoing ‘box-ticking’ of Ukrainian authorities in line with the EU’s Action Plans (Chapter Four), leading to shallow laws that are not integrated and are impractical for implementation (Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12). There was a period in 2011, even, where the asylum system in Ukraine was not functional at all due to institutional reorganization (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12; Interview, Migrant Activist #3, 7/17/12). Ukraine is also a country that is notorious for corruption, and the migration and asylum system is no exception here (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12; Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12). These challenges result in Ukraine remaining a difficult place for migrants to become and stay legal. Several interviewees discussed how migrants often unwittingly become “illegal,” are released without status, and lack legal explanation (or at least in a language they understand) for their detention and status.

Concerning the Ukrainian migration system, it is important to note as well that the State Migration Service (SMS) – an entity that was approved in 2011 according to EU encouragement as Ukraine’s “migration agency” in contradistinction to its State Border Guard Service – is currently located within the country’s Ministry for Internal Affairs.
This Ministry is the authority over Ukraine’s wider police force, and it is said to influence the SMS towards a police-like function. This results, in effect, in the same organization both policing ‘illegal immigration’ and deciding on asylum cases. This has a profoundly negative effect on how detention-related decisions and asylum claims are processed, and may be one reason for why so few refugee statuses are awarded in Ukraine (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12; Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12; Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12).

In light of these conditions, a UNHCR official told me that one of their organization’s main purposes in Ukraine is to convince the EU that it is not appropriate to return asylum seekers to Ukraine. This official claimed that “the basic elements of due process are not there” for asylum-seekers’ claims to be heard, such as access to legal representation and interpretation, saying that, here, “a person’s life is often decided in twelve hours” (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12). Further, it was said that, in Ukraine, “there is no quick exit from detention,” with decisions always taking at least six months (ibid.).

Another refugee-related official claimed that since the period of allowable detention in Ukraine was extended from six to twelve months, decisions for what to do with detained migrants almost always take twelve months, and are often still not decided at the end of this time (Interview, Migrant Activist #3, 7/17/12). Migrants are then often released without documentation that affords the right to work and to medical care – leaving those outside of the center sometimes even more vulnerable than those within (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12; Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12). In the context of EU externalization, UNHCR’s message to the EU was said to be that “if you encourage detention, you should also encourage better reception” (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12).

While these centers are designed for ‘illegal immigrants’ and not asylum-seekers, at one point UNHCR determined that up to 77% of migrants in the MACs in Ukraine were asylum seekers (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12). Aside from people from former CIS countries, Afghans and Somalis are the top populations of those attempting to cross the EU/Ukraine border – many to make asylum claims in the EU (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12; Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12). Afghans and
Somalis were described by one Ukrainian official as the “two problem groups” for the country to deal with, due to the difficulty of determining what to do with them, or where to send them outside of detention (Interview, Ukrainian Migration Official, 7/24/12, with translation). One migrant activist stated the following regarding these populations:

“I think that the most desperate people come to Ukraine. Well if we look at our refugees, they come to Ukraine just because they cannot come somewhere else. They cannot make it to European Union, so they are stuck in Ukraine. […] If we talk about the migrants […] from third countries, from Africa/Asia - they are probably the most unlucky people to be here” (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12).

If caught trying to cross the border, Somalis are particularly in a challenging place in Ukraine – many of my interviewees communicated this.

Coming from a war-torn country, Somali migrants should not be deported from Ukraine, as this could be considered refoulement according to the European Court of Human Rights (Interview, Migrant Activist #3, 7/17/12). However, one migrant worker informed me that out of several thousands of Somali asylum claims in Ukraine only a handful had been afforded status. The result is that Somalis and other refugee populations are often left to await their status determination in detention in the MACs for protracted periods – reflecting what Hyndman and Mountz (2008) have called “neo-refoulement” through EU externalization. There have been a few cases of refoulement in Ukraine, but for the most part, when the Somalis’ or Afghans’ twelve-month stay in the center is up, if their status has not been determined within twelve months, they are released without documentation of any sort of legal status (Interview, Migrant Activist #3, 7/17/12). This creates a scenario that this same migrant activist described as follows:

“And where are you going to go? And if you exit Ukraine, you will probably be arrested for illegally exiting Ukraine - because you are illegally in Ukraine, even if you are trying to go home, if you don't have some form of repatriation support that's set up for you, or some sort of a program where you are going with your documents etc., or with the help of the Ukrainian government, or with the help of your government, or with the help of IOM – it’s a sadly funny no-man's land
This relays sadly the sort of precarity that EU externalization efforts have created for certain migrants attempting to transit through Ukraine. This is what one migrant lawyer called a “vicious cycle” of detention, indeterminate status, and sometimes, re-apprehension (Interview, Migrant Lawyer #1, 7/16/12). These re-apprehensions are documented and make their way into reports for Ukrainian and EU agencies to demonstrate efficiency and garner future funding (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1 & #2, 7/10/12).

This precarity and liminality came to a head in early 2012 when approximately sixty Somali refugees being detained in Ukraine staged a hunger strike. Amnesty International (2012) reported that these Somali migrants were picked up by Ukrainian police in 2011 for being “illegally present in Ukraine.” The basis of their protest was over being detained indefinitely, supposedly “for the purpose of deportation.” In reality, they were being denied fair consideration for asylum procedure (Amnesty, 2012). A UNHCR official told me that their protest was in part due to the extension of the detention period from six months to twelve months – and that this happened during a time in which the Ukrainian system for asylum was barely functional (Interview, UNHCR Official, 7/16/12). It was also not the first period that many of these Somalis had been in detention in Ukraine (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1 & #2, 7/10/12).

One migrant activist responded to my question about the Somali hunger strike as follows:

“So basically if Ukraine is trying to fulfill, at least formally, its obligations unto human rights treaties, they would have to invent something to provide these people with documents, OR to keep them arresting like twelve months after twelve months after twelve months, and just hoping that they would somehow disappear themselves. Because it’s part of the problem that never was solved before - it exists and it’s not only about Somalis in detention right now. It’s about some other people being free, but hiding somewhere, having no hope in this country” (Joint interview, Migrant Activist #1, 7/10/12).

This quote reflects the sort of spatial arrangement for EU security and migrant insecurity that is now being constructed in Ukraine. While it is not a crime to flee war and famine,
these Somalis came across the world to face prolonged imprisonment and precarity – this within a geographical arrangement that is now structured for externally managing the EU’s uninvited and unwanted.

6.6. Conclusion

Due to the perceived threat of immigration, migrants targeted as ‘risky’ for the EU through the various technologies of border management are now being managed externally in Ukraine. In this chapter, I have attempted to show how this external management occurs according to a “keep them out, but treat them well” logic, with the later part of this equation minimally assured. Ukraine has seen the externalization of detention first and foremost, accompanied by a humanitarian minimum of standards for migrants there within.

In Ukraine we can now see the effects that result from an extension of bordering practices from the EU into Ukraine. We can see security and insecurity, mobility and immobility, inclusion and exclusion – all managed according to the EU’s geographical design. For some, this allows for their expedited facilitation into the EU, for some it allows for managed circular labor migration. For others, it results in protracted indeterminate periods of detention in Ukraine. A range of officials expressed opinions to me that instead of focusing on controlling illegal immigration and establishing a system of control in Ukraine, the EU would do better to focus on facilitating a functional system of asylum in Ukraine and to focus more generally on the conditions that lead to uneven development, and thereby uneven migration. One IOM official expressed this sentiment particularly well:

“I don't know how much the EU links exactly economic development as well to (migration management) […] I mean it’s not necessarily going to achieve this goal through funding migration and border management. What I think generally is that these controlling irregular (migration) and border management projects are a stop-gap effort, which are needed in a period of time when Ukraine economically is so far behind other countries, and there are such gaps that the pull-factor of Europe is so great. What the EU can only hope […] is that Ukraine economically becomes more stable and it grows and develops. Maybe this is more through the
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. Because I think you have to look at [...] what they are doing right now. [...] They are outsourcing their policy for irregular migration management, right? Which can only be temporary. Which if Ukraine economically stays in the same situation it is now, politically, OK, the situation is never going to change. And you're going to throw money on infrastructure and things like that. [...] But, on the other hand, that's easier than developing [...] a policy that helps Ukraine become economically strong” (Joint interview, IOM Official #1, 7/5/12).

Here is the recognition from an IOM official that migration and border management on behalf of the EU’s interests will never truly address the larger causes of uneven development and uneven flows of migration. As plans are being made for the construction of new detention centers in Ukraine, and as migrants in Ukraine face such conditions as I have outlined here, the EU’s bordering regime can be seen for what it is – a shoring up of the EU’s “gated community” (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007).

Migration confronts us with the uneven development of the world in which we live. Spatial arrangements of bordering such as I have detailed here facilitate capital and trade, facilitate competition in the global race for ‘human capital,’ and exclude or even detain the poor and uninvited as ‘risks’ to be managed. As the EU seeks to externalize the management of such risky people, it is important to recognize the liminality and precarity this produces. Externalization happens through EU policies and development assistance that focus solely on how these people are to be managed. In the following conclusion, I argue that it is vital to question why migrants are facing such conditions in Ukraine. This is a political question with political consequences.
CHAPTER SEVEN. CONCLUSION

I have outlined in this thesis how an uneven geography of migration and border management is now taking place in Ukraine. This project has provided a situated perspective on how migration management is embedded within political processes of EU border externalization, or “very remote control,” now being implemented between the EU and Ukraine. Ukraine allows for unique insights into migration and border management due to its geographical location. Here the management approach, as it is situated within EU externalization efforts, has been conjuncturally securitarian, neoliberal, and humanitarian. As the EU seeks to reform Ukrainian governance according to EU standards through frameworks of “capacity building” and “technical assistance,” migrant detention and classed regimes of mobility are operative as part and parcel of migration management. In Ukraine, migration management operates according to a biopolitical selectivity based upon internal security and accumulation according to specific labor market demands as mediated by EU governments.

In concert with my research questions, this thesis’s three empirical chapters have addressed how, by whom, in what context, and to what effect migration is being managed in and through Ukraine. In Chapter Four, I provided the political-economic context for my analysis of migration and border management, detailing the conditionality mechanisms and “othering” tendencies present in the EU’s “European Neighbourhood Policy” relations with Ukraine. I explored some of the geographical imaginations implicated in the imagined hierarchy of EU standards and values over those found in Ukraine. Through the EU’s Action Plans, ENP Progress Reports, and interviews with EU officials, I showed how Ukraine is imagined in the future to become a ‘stable neighbor,’ ‘reliable partner,’ and ‘cooperative migration manager’. This impetus to reform the ‘not-yet-European neighbor’, in part, normalizes and justifies the EU’s security/development interventions of border externalization in Ukraine.

In Chapter Five, I focused specifically on the management approach to governing migration and borders at the levels of actors, discourse and practice. I considered management as an approach to governing migration and borders that brings together imperatives for security and development. Management was often described by officials
as an apolitical, technical, and development-focused approach to ordering flows of migration. I discussed how the management approach is mobilized through a field of security/development partnerships and their pedagogical interventions towards building the capacity of Ukrainian officials to control/facilitate cross-border flows of migration. In relation to the interventions of EU externalization, I argued that the management approach is indeed political. It is politically motivated by the EU towards keeping unwanted, uninvited, and ‘risky’ migrants in place in Ukraine, while facilitating the controlled migration of those who would benefit the EU.

Chapter Six viewed migration and border management as simultaneously humanitarian and exclusionary in the context of EU border externalization, focusing specifically on the effects of EU externalization on migrants in Ukraine. In this chapter, I detailed some of the specific investments that the EU is making in creating a migrant “buffer zone” (Dahlman, 2009) in Ukraine. Here I fundamentally questioned EU standards in relation to the precarity of detained migrants that is produced through EU externalization efforts in Ukraine. Through EU externalization efforts we can see the production of the “insecurity of security” (Staeheli and Nagel, 2008), as detained migrants become subjects of humanitarian assistance, and are managed according to “don’t die survival” (Hyndman and Giles, 2011) in liminal and protracted scenarios in Ukraine. I argued that this spatial arrangement of insecurity exists, in part, due to the legal chaos created by the EU’s ongoing initiatives to reform Ukraine in its own image.

In each of these chapters, I have attempted to explain how a sort of “security/development interventionism” (Mohan and Mawdsley, 2007) and “imperial humanitarian logic” (Hardt and Negri, 2004) are at work in the post-2004 evolution of how migration is being governed in and through Ukraine. I described the approach of migration and border management in Ukraine as a security-development nexus, considering development’s economic, pedagogical, and humanitarian variations. The case of Ukraine shows us how security and development are intertwined in the EU’s externalization efforts of “bordering, ordering, and othering” (van Houtum, 2010). I have described the EU’s bordering efforts in Ukraine as a security/development nexus in several ways.
The first way that I described a security/development nexus was in how opportunities for Ukraine to ‘develop’ economically are made conditional upon Ukraine’s willingness to implement the EU’s designs for enhancing its own security. The conditionality mechanisms of the ENP offer Ukraine opportunities to ‘grow up’ to be a cooperative migration manager. This sort of cooperation requires a “proper selectivity” (Joint interview, EUBAM #1, July 19, 2012) for facilitating the right type of flows across the border, while threats to the EU are simultaneously disciplined. Ukraine’s purported lack of capacity to manage justifies an ongoing series of EU-funded pedagogical interventions towards transforming the Ukrainian authorities in line with EU priorities for how migration and borders should be managed.

Secondly, a security/development nexus is blatantly evident in how EU development assistance to Ukraine is tailored towards securing the EU/Ukraine border. Here I discussed how EU aid/assistance is related to specific techniques of governmentality that are employed to control the circulation of cross-border flows of migration in line with the EU’s priorities. These included direct funding of border management through contracts for management-related programs, technical assistance towards the installation of border management infrastructure, and, as discussed above, capacity-building assistance provided to reform Ukrainian officials to manage migration and borders according to EU standards.

A third way in which we have seen a security/development nexus in Ukraine is in the enrollment of numerous humanitarian and security actors into partnerships and cooperative arrangements for managing migration and borders, and thereby furthering EU externalization efforts. A proliferation of state and international humanitarian actors are involved to varying degrees in the security dimensions of managing migration. Many of the exclusionary interventions of bordering in Ukraine occur through an apparatus of security and development actors who wield their humanitarian expertise – even in detention – towards the implementation of EU-financed assistance for external migration and border management.

The final variation of a security/development nexus pertains to the “humanitarian management” (Weizman, 2012) of those migrants excluded from the EU, who are detained in MACs and TACs in Ukraine. It is in this final sense that I consider
humanitarianism as a sort of calculation whereby EU externalization takes place. Within the overarching goal of keeping uninvited migrants out of the EU, capacity is built in the Ukrainian officials to insure humanitarian conditions for migrants according to EU standards in detention – now in Ukraine, according to the EU’s “geographical design” (Mountz, 2010).

Van Houtum and Pijpers (2007) describe the EU today as a “gated community,” managing the “floating population” (Foucault, 2007) out of fear in such a way as to selectively choose its elite members and exclude, even detain, unqualified migrants. It is in this context that humanitarian intervention and management of those ‘outside the gates’ needs to be studied alongside more traditional avenues of intervention and exceptional violence. Studying specific spaces of border management (Sparke, 2006a), particularly those undergoing partial state reconstruction like Ukraine, reveals how decisions that are made about which migrants have the ability to move are not just abstract calculations “the state” makes. Instead these managed inclusions and exclusions are driven by the needs of capital accumulation, are related to various (in)securities, and are accomplished by a whole host of security and development actors in particular places.

The externalization of detention to Ukraine and the management of conditions for migrants within can be understood through Weizman’s (2012) central argument that humanitarianism and human rights (such as those championed as “European values”) have become “the crucial means by which the economy of violence is calculated and managed” (4). The management of migration and borders in Ukraine occurs through the calculation of risk, the normalized facilitation of some flows, and the securitized targeting of others, who then become subjects of humanitarian assistance. Under the management approach this process is humanitarian and objective, based on statistics, in line with European standards, and supposedly occurring outside of the messy and polluted world of politics.

Žižek (2008) describes the dominant exclusionary modes of capitalist governance today as marked by “expert management and administration.” It is here that I situate migration management in Ukraine, and suggest that it is important to critique the power relations whereby the managers are differentiated from the managed. The
security/development interventions of migration and border management in Ukraine typify Rancière’s post-political police order in how the political questions of why certain migrants are categorized as risks, and why certain migrants end up in detention are eschewed for managerial techniques of how risk analysis should be undertaken and how migrants should be sustained according to humanitarian standards in detention in Ukraine.

Management has indeed become a powerful discourse in the politics of international migration (Geiger and Pecoud, 2011). However, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) remind us of the impossibility of any given discourse to implement a final suture. Recognizing the political nature of migration management not only allows us to see its classed and discriminatory nature, situated firmly within ongoing processes of uneven geographical development; further, this recognition identifies a terrain for struggle against exclusion and towards a different form of politics that doesn’t erect walls and detain migrants in camps.

Weizman (2012) makes the argument that a different form of politics from humanitarian management, such as the EU is now investing in externalizing to Ukraine, are possible. He claims that: “aid without a camp is aid that does not seek to manage, house, develop and perform migration control,” (61, referencing Agier, 2011). If employed, aid should support the politics of the displaced and marginalized themselves.

Ultimately, the study of migration and border management in Ukraine draws attention to those who are and those who are not being made secure through processes of bordering and EU externalization. This thesis argues that power is operative through humanitarian technologies of management as they are embedded within the EU’s efforts to reform Ukraine. I have provided a critique of the ways in which calculations along security, economic, and humanitarian lines articulate in the management and maintenance of an exclusionary spatial arrangement for migrant (im)mobility on the edge of the EU.
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