2013

THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON GENDER NORMS AND RELATIONS: THE POST-REPATRIATION EXPERIENCE IN BOR, SOUTH SUDAN

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THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON GENDER NORMS AND RELATIONS: 
THE POST-REPATRIATION EXPERIENCE IN BOR, SOUTH SUDAN

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Science at the University of Kentucky

By
MaryBeth Chrostowsky
Lexington, KY

Director: Dr. Monica L. Udvardy, Associate Professor of Anthropology
Lexington, KY
2013

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THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON GENDER NORMS AND RELATIONSHIPS: THE POST-REPATRIATION EXPERIENCE IN BOR, SOUTH SUDAN

My dissertation research was a 14-month ethnographic study of the post-repatriation experience of forced migrants in South Sudan. It was designed to determine if alterations to gender norms and relations that refugees experienced during asylum differed as a function of the asylum environments and if these modifications remained intact upon the refugees’ return. The forced migrants in my sample, the Dinka of Bor from South Sudan, encountered two different asylum environments and experiences: Kakuma refugee camp in northern Kenya and Khartoum, in northern Sudan. After 10-15 years in asylum, these forced Dinka Bor migrants returned to South Sudan. I compared the pre-flight and post-repatriation behavior of these two groups of returnees to determine to what extent gendered behaviors could be attributed to each asylum location. I found that various global forces encountered during asylum were instrumental in forging new ways of life by changing gendered livelihood practices and gendered access to status, power, and resources after return. In addition, the resettlement context played an equally critical role in the gendered behaviors after return.

KEYWORDS: gender, internally displaced persons (IDP), forced migration, refugees, repatriation

MaryBeth Chrostowsky

Date
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THE POST-REPATRIATION EXPERIENCE IN BOR, SOUTH SUDAN

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Date
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements..............................................................................................ix

List of Tables........................................................................................................x

List of Figures.........................................................................................................xi

List of Appendices..................................................................................................xii

List of Acronyms....................................................................................................xiii

Chapter One: Introduction..................................................................................1
  Introduction........................................................................................................1
  Methods.............................................................................................................3
  Research Questions and Hypotheses.................................................................3
    Research Site.................................................................................................4
    Research Design............................................................................................8
  Sample................................................................................................................10
  Data Collection..................................................................................................11
    Formal Semi-structured Interviews...............................................................11
    Main Interviews............................................................................................12
      Returnees.................................................................................................12
      Never Fled...............................................................................................13
      Recruitment..............................................................................................14
      Limitations...............................................................................................17
    Supplementary Interviews.............................................................................18
      NGO and UN Agencies..............................................................................18
      IDPs Bor County.........................................................................................19
      Community Leaders..................................................................................19
      Kakuma Refugee Camp...............................................................................20
      Re-interviews............................................................................................21
    Participant Observation................................................................................21
    Income Survey..............................................................................................23
    Time-Allocation............................................................................................24
    Court Archival Research...............................................................................24
    Data Analysis................................................................................................25
    Positionality..................................................................................................26
      My Identity as a Kawaja............................................................................27
      My Identity as a Woman..........................................................................29
      My Identity as an Educated Person............................................................29
      Feminist – My Personal Limits................................................................29
      First Anthropologist..................................................................................30
      Difficulties in Post-war and Current Conflict Area....................................31
  Organization of the Dissertation.......................................................................32
Chapter Two: Literature Review

Introduction

Migration Studies

Comparing International and Internal Populations

Transnationalism (Macro-Micro Approaches)

Multi-sited Approach

When the Returning Population Out Number the Receiving Community

Refugee Studies: The “Refugee Story”

Essentializing the Refugee Image and Experience

The Post-repatriation Experience

Discourse in Repatriation Studies

Gender and Migration

Migration as a Gendered Experience

Voluntary Migration and Women’s Power

Forced Migration, Conflict, and Women’s Power

Gender Focus Still Sidelined in Forced Migration Studies

Gendered Approach to Migration

My Concept of Gender

Theoretical Approach

Engendering Transnational Migration

Gendered Geographies of Power: A Framework

1. Geographical Scales

2. Social Location

3. Power Geometry

4. Individual Character

5. Cognitive Process

A Feminist Approach

Space: A Medium to Negotiate Gender

Migration a Site for Gender Consciousness

Refugee and Repatriation Studies: A Feminist Approach

Chapter Three: Ethnographic Setting

Introduction

Regional Background

Sudan

Sudanese Second Civil War: 1983-2005

South Sudan

Jonglei State

Gender and Educational Access

Dinka Bor

Gendered Norms and Relations

Dinkahood

Generational Dinkahood

Bor Town
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 1</td>
<td>Numbers of Returned Forced Migrants to Bor County</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 2</td>
<td>Main Interviews by Sex and Asylum Location During the War</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 3</td>
<td>Status of Supplementary Interviewees</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 4</td>
<td>Age and Sex Distribution of Main</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 5</td>
<td>Main Interview Participants’ Educational Level by Sex and Asylum Location Interview Participants</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 6</td>
<td>Main Interview Participants’ Employment Status After Return, by Sex and Asylum Location</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 7</td>
<td>Number of Retuning Households Receiving Food Aid in Bor Town</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 8</td>
<td>Population of Sudan pre- 2008 by Region, Sex, and Household</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 9</td>
<td>Selected 2010 Health Statistics: Sweden, United States, Kenya, &amp; South Sudan</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 10</td>
<td>Most Cited Reasons for Fleeing by Sex</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 11</td>
<td>UNHCR Estimated Numbers of Forced Migrants Returning to South Sudan as of October 2009</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 12</td>
<td>UNHCR Estimated Numbers of Refugee Returnees to South Sudan as of October 2009</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 13</td>
<td>UNHCR Estimated Numbers of IDP Returnees as of June 2009</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 14</td>
<td>Participants Employed With Salary In Bor, by Sex</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 15</td>
<td>Percentage of Women In Main Interviews Who Engaged in IGS or Obtained Salaried Employment, and Level of Formal Education by Asylum Location</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 16</td>
<td>Dinka Female Types in Income Survey: Combinations of their Location During War, Education Status, and Current Income Strategy</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 17</td>
<td>Dinka Male Types in Income Survey: Combinations of their Location During War, Education Status, and Current Income Strategy</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 18</td>
<td>Percentage Male Types Income Survey All Returnees/Never Fled, Only Dinka</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 19</td>
<td>Workplace Location of Returnees by Asylum Location, in Percent...</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1. South Sudan……………………………………………………………………………….. 6
FIGURE 2. GreaterSudan……………………………………………………………………………….. 7
FIGURE 3. Jonglei State………………………………………………………………………………….. 77
FIGURE 4. Rural Dinka Bor Home and Cattle Barn……………………………………………….. 84
FIGURE 5. Marol Market……………………………………………………………………………….. 88
FIGURE 6. White Nile Bor Port. Barge arriving from Khartoum………………………………….. 90
FIGURE 7. SSRRC Food Distribution Center, Bor, Jonglei State………………………………………. 91
FIGURE 8. Dinka woman displaying her embroidery………………………………………………. 91
FIGURE 9. Rain flooding walking path between compounds……………………………………….. 92
FIGURE 10. Marol Market after a rain…………………………………………………………………. 92
FIGURE 11. Crocodile stranded in gully behind my home…………………………………………. 93
FIGURE 12. Bor, Jonglei State………………………………………………………………………….. 94
FIGURE 13. Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) Bor Office 2009…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 101
FIGURE 14. Numbers of Sexual and Gender-Base Violence in Kakuma………………………….. 161
FIGURE 15. Billboards In Kakuma Countering Sexual and Gender-Based Violence……………….. 162
FIGURE 16. Human Rights Billboard in Kakuma…………………………………………………… 191
FIGURE 17. Billboard Against Rape in Kakuma……………………………………………………. 192
FIGURE 18. Freedom Square, Bor…………………………………………………………………….. 194
FIGURE 19: Susan Lith Aloung………………………………………………………………………… 214
FIGURE 20: Amer’s beaded work……………………………………………………………………… 225
FIGURE 21: Social Location Continuum Advantaged………………………………………………. 266
FIGURE 22: Social Location Continuum Disadvantaged…………………………………………… 267
# LIST OF APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPENDIX 1</th>
<th>Interview Questions for Interviews Conducted Between September 2009 and February 2010</th>
<th>297</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 2</td>
<td>Interview Questions for Interviews Conducted Between March 2010 and October 2011</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 3</td>
<td>Consent form in English</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 4</td>
<td>Map of Compounds Participating in Time-allocation Study</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 5</td>
<td>Ecological System of Greater Sudan</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 6</td>
<td>Ethnic Groups in Greater Sudan</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 7</td>
<td>Ethnic Groups in South Sudan</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 8</td>
<td>Data Findings from Main Interviews</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>formerly Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>Cooperative Housing Foundation International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>female genital mutilation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGS</td>
<td>income-generation strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSWU</td>
<td>Jonglei State Women’s Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>LWF</td>
<td>Lutheran World Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>non-food items</td>
<td></td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Science Foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHO</td>
<td>Polish Humanitarian Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSD</td>
<td>refugee status determination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRR</td>
<td>Return, Recovery and Reintegration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sudanese Pounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>sexual and gender-based violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement</td>
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</tr>
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<td>SSCCSE</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Center For Census Statistics and Evaluation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>United Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>UNFAO</td>
<td>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Mission in Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1 Introduction

Introduction

This project is an ethnographic study of the post-repatriation experience of forced migrants\(^1\) that focuses on the effects of their asylum environment on gender norms and relations after they return to their pre-displacement region. I compare the asylum and repatriation experiences of forced migrants who originate from the same cultural background and location, the Dinka of Bor in South Sudan, but who take asylum in two different locations--Kakuma refugee camp in northern Kenya and the city of Khartoum, in the north of Sudan. My aim is to learn to what extent alterations to their gender norms and relations that occurred during asylum were the result of the asylum environment, what factors in asylum contributed to these alterations, and to what extent these modifications remain intact upon the forced migrant’s return to Bor, South Sudan.

To determine both the modifications to Dinka gender norms and relations during asylum and after return and to investigate the causes of these changes, I examine the strategies Dinka women use to deal with gender inequality prior to displacement, during asylum, and after return.\(^2\)

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) considers repatriation the optimal solution to what is now commonly called the “refugee crisis” and encourages the return of refugees to their country of origin whenever possible.

\(^1\) Forced migrants refer to individuals forced to flee their homes due to fear of persecution. This includes both internally displaced persons (IDPs), i.e., those who have fled to other locations within the country, and refugees, i.e. individuals who took refuge outside of their country’s borders.

\(^2\) I would like to acknowledge the following for supporting this research: National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (Award ID: 0921318), University of Kentucky Dissertation Enhancement Award, and Lambda Alpha Graduate Overseas Research Grant. I would also like to thank the Susan Abbott-Jamieson Pre-Dissertation Research Fund Award for funding preliminary research in Nairobi, Kenya and South Sudan in July-August of 2007 that assisted in the development of this project.
(Harrell-Bond 1989; Allen and Morsink 1994). With little research to demonstrate their validity, repatriation policies and aid assistance are based on the assumption that refugees’ return to their country of origin is a return to pre-displacement life (Black and Koser 1999). My study reveals that such an assumption is over-simplified and fails to account for the ways in which asylum experiences have lasting effects on their life after return to the place of origin.

While many studies have examined how migrants experience their lives abroad or in their asylum location (Shandy 2007; Qadeem 2005; Le Houérou 2003) little research has been conducted on the post-repatriation experience, especially with respect to gender (Mahler and Pessar 2001; Brettell 2000). Gender norms and relations are central to a society’s organization of power hierarchies (Ortner 2006, 1996; Håkansson 2003; Udvardy 1990). Therefore, an understanding of the ways in which asylum affects gender relations and norms during asylum and upon return is critical to design and implement appropriate repatriation policy and aid assistance.

Conditions present during the forced migration experience, but absent during the voluntary migration experience, pose further problems for the application of repatriation theory predicated on voluntary migration and return experiences. Examples of such conditions include the increased gender inequality that female forced migrants encounter as a result of war and displacement (Butalia 2006; Hutchinson 2000; Jok 1999a, 1999b), a returning population that outnumbers the resettlement community, disparity among asylum locations’ conditions and access to aid agencies, and the return of both internal and international migrants to a single place of origin. Current migration theory fails to address the possible consequences of these conditions and should not be
used to predict post-repatriation adjustment and reintegration patterns of forced migrants.

My findings on the effects of asylum on existent Dinka gendered norms and behavior, and how and why these alterations were maintained, or lost, after return to South Sudan are relevant to refining gender and forced migration theory. While my research questions and design was inspired by the need for changes in current refugee policy, this study is not a policy analysis and will not directly address current refugee law or humanitarian aid practices. Instead, my study is designed to provide the vital ethnographic insight necessary for policy makers and aid workers who design and implement refugee policy and aid assistance.

Methods

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The aim of this project is to determine if alterations to gender norms and relations during asylum are the result of the asylum environment and to what extent these alterations remain intact upon return. To reach this aim, the project addresses four interrelated research questions:

Question 1: How do gender norms and relations formed during asylum differ from those during pre-displacement and after return?

Question 2: What factors in the asylum environment contribute significantly to altering gender norms and relations during asylum?

Question 3: What strategies developed during asylum continue to be used after return?

Question 4: What factors after return act to maintain or change the gendered inequalities constructed during asylum?
Building upon current research that demonstrates how migration in general alters pre-displacement power hierarchies and hence alters extant gender roles and relations (Qadeem 2005; Oxfeld 2004; Franz 2000; Indra 1999; Benson 1994; Pedraza 1991) and that war and forced displacement increases existing gender inequality (Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008; Hutchinson 2000; Jok 1999a), I hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 1: Disparities in the availability of humanitarian assistance and different security concerns in Kakuma and Khartoum will be key determinates in the differing gendered norms and concerns between returnees from these two locations.

Hypothesis 2: Women displaced to Kakuma will adopt strategies that rely on humanitarian aid institutions to deal with the gender inequalities encountered there, while women displaced to Khartoum, a location where humanitarian aid was not available, will rely on newly invented strategies that do not involve humanitarian aid agencies.

Hypothesis 3: Contrary to the predictions of current repatriation policy and return migration theory, migrants will not revert to pre-flight gender norms and practices upon return, because the return location and the forced migrants’ identity will not be the same as it was before displacement.

Hypothesis 4: Because gender norms and relations change again with a new migration, women will create new strategies to deal with the gender inequalities that they encounter in the return location.

**Research Site**

This study took place in Bor, the capital of Jonglei State, in South Bor County, South Sudan (see Figures 1 and 2). Bor is located on the east bank of the White Nile and is characterized by a tropical climate with a heavy rainy season from the months of April to October. Bor County is primarily inhabited by one ethnic group, the Dinka, thus providing a fairly uniform baseline of perceptions of gender prior to departure. The Dinka are agro-pastoralists who follow a patrilineal descent pattern, practice patrilocal residence patterns, and bridewealth at marriage (Beswick 2004; Jok 1999a, 1999b; Cohen and Deng 1998; Deng 1986, 1972, 1971). Among the Dinka, these cultural
practices create marked gender stratification in which men have many more avenues to prestige than do women.

Like other major towns in South Sudan, Bor was a garrison town fought over and controlled by the Sudanese government for over a decade during the war. As residents sought refuge from the conflict in the neighboring countries of Kenya and Uganda, or became displaced within Sudan itself, the population of Bor shrank from 85,000 to only 2,000 (MSF 2006). Most internally displaced persons (IDPs) migrated to the Equatoria region of South Sudan (MSF 2006). To date an estimated 40,000 of these IDPs have repatriated to Bor County (see Table 1), coming primarily from the internally displaced camps of Manglatore, Barmurye, Kirwa, Mogali, Natinga, Narus, New Cush, and Khartoum in Northern Sudan (personal communication with Abraham Jok Akring Commission Bor, September 11, 2007). The UNHCR assisted 5,510 refugees to return from Kenya to South Sudan from 2005-2007. They estimate that during that same time, 20,061 refugees spontaneously, or without the aid of UNHCR, repatriated from Kenya to South Sudan (UNHCR Mission Reports 2007). In 2005 there were an estimated 229,766 people living in Bor County and 21,000 in and around Bor (IMU OCHA 2005). Bor was selected as a research site in South Sudan based on the demographics of the population. Preliminary contacts I established during reconnaissance research in July and August of 2007, as well as UNHCR reports, suggested that there were large numbers of refugees from Kenya and IDPs from Khartoum returning to Bor. Hence, these demographics encompass two groups who originated from a common cultural background and who subsequently encountered two different forced migration experiences that can be compared.
FIGURE 2: Greater Sudan
TABLE 1. Numbers of Returned Forced Migrants to Bor County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forced Migrants</th>
<th>Estimated Returns to Bor County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>25,571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The United Nations distinguishes between refugees who are forced migrants who flee over national borders and those who flee to other parts of the nation-state. The latter are known as internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Research Design

To determine if alterations to gender norms and relations that occur during asylum were primarily the result of the asylum environment, and if these modifications remain intact upon return to Bor, South Sudan, this study compared forced migrants from the same ethnicity, social class, and geographical location, who took refuge in different asylum locations, but returned to the location from which they fled. Gender norms and relations and the strategies women used to deal with gender inequality during each phase of the refugee experience--prior to flight, during asylum, and post-repatriation--were described through semi-structured interviews. Gender inequality among the Dinka stems from overt or hidden disparities in access to resources, prestige, and decision-making power between men and women (Deng 1986, 1972, 1971; Seligman and Seligman 1932). Disparity occurs due to the surrounding social institutions that assign women and men different positions, roles, and behaviors (Håkansson 2003; Yanagisako 1979; Massey 1994; Udvardy 1988).

In this project, gender inequality was determined by assessing the observed and perceived disparities in division of labor, access to resources such as income, cattle, or kin, and in decision-making ability with regard to household and personal economics, household tasks, childcare responsibilities, choice of healthcare practitioner or method,
as well as in political participation and other life choice decisions (e.g. choosing a marriage partner or to continue one’s education). Information obtained in the interviews was triangulated with 1) data collected in market surveys, court case archival research, and informal interviews and 2) data on observed behavior recorded through participant observation and a time allocation study.

To facilitate relationships with families and daily contact with households, I resided in Bor Town for 14 months. During preliminary research in July and August, 2007, I initiated a relationship with Norwegian Peoples’ Aid (NPA), an agency that has worked in Sudan for 15 years. NPA generously allowed me to live for the entire 14-month period in its compound in Bor Town. The compound is located in a part of town dominated by homes, allowing me to live within the community. The compound was small and not yet fully operating. It consisted of four free standing rooms, a hut for the guards, a hut for cooking, and a set of latrines. The compound was not supplied with electricity or running water. The modest compound and its location allowed those I knew in the community easy access to me. Also, the majority of the staff working for NPA, especially in Jonglei State, who used the Bor compound were South Sudanese, and most were Dinka Bor. These men and women became important informants and introduced me to the community.

I collected data using five different methods: 1) participant observation 2) formal semi-structured interviews 3) time-allocation study 4) income surveys and 5) archival research. I conducted formal and semi-structured interviews, the time-allocation study, and income surveys with the help of two field research assistants, Ajier Ajak Kelei and Akur Bol Nhial, who served as translators. From preliminary research in
Bor, South Sudan, I learned that although many individuals speak English fluently, many others speak little English and have Dinka as their primary language. Due to the lack of Dinka language programs in American universities, I was unable to begin Dinka language training before my arrival. Therefore, my first months in Bor involved language training in Dinka. Despite these efforts in the field, my deficiencies continued to exist and translators were necessary in situations in which a participant’s primary language was Dinka.

Sample

Bor’s population provided the optimal demographic distribution needed for this study. There were large numbers of both refugees returning from Kenya and IDPs returning from Khartoum. These two groups allowed for a comparative study of the effects of migration on gender. Because participants had to fulfill three inclusive criteria (see below), I chose participants purposively rather than randomly; hence, a nonprobability sample was used (Bernard 2006). Furthermore, nonprobability samples are “always appropriate for labor-intensive, in-depth studies of a few cases” (Bernard 2006: 186). A respondent-driven sampling method was used to ascertain possible participants. This method not only provided a means for gathering a sample, but also provided information about the network connecting them (Salganik and Heckathron 2004).

Data Collection

*Formal Semi-structured Interviews*
I conducted a total of 172 formal semi-structured interviews, which I broke into two categories: main interviews and supplementary interviews. Main interviews included those with returnees from Kakuma and Khartoum, and with Dinka who never fled Bor County. Supplementary interviews consisted of employees of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and United Nations (UN) agencies posted in Bor, people newly displaced to Bor County, local community leaders, both NGO and UN employees in the Kakuma refugee camp, and Kakuma refugees currently still living in the Kakuma refugee camp.

**TABLE 2. Main Interviews by Sex and Asylum Location During the War***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kakuma</th>
<th>Khartoum</th>
<th>IDP South**</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Never Fled***</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I interviewed 21 participants on three different occasions for approximately one hour on each occasion. I also interviewed 98 participants on one occasion for approximately two and half hours.

**IDP South refers to forced Dinka migrants who fled Bor and took asylum within the borders of South Sudan.

***Never Fled refers to participants in my study who never left Bor County, Jonglei State, during the war.

**TABLE 3. Status of Supplementary Interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Total Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bor NGO/UN staff</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced to Bor from Werynol</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bor Community leaders</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma Refugees in camp</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma NGO/UN camp staff</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the distributions of 119 main interviews by sex and the migration location to which they fled during the war. Table 3 describes the distribution of the 45 supplementary interviews by the participant’s status (i.e., employee/staff, forced
migrant, community leader). Finally, I re-interviewed eight of the 119 main interview participants to assess the reliability of respondents’ narratives. I conducted all interviews. When a participant did not speak English, I was accompanied by one of my two field research assistants to assist in translation. With participants’ permission, the interviews were audibly digitally recorded for later translation.

Main Interviews

Returnees

Interviews were designed to examine the gender relations and norms prior to departure, during asylum, and post-repatriation (see Appendices 1 and 2). Questions elicited information about: 1) the extent to which differences in gender norms and relations existed between the three forced migration phases, and 2) the extent to which there were differences in gender norms and relations between the IDPs from Khartoum and refugees from Kakuma. These interviews obtained information on division of labor, decision-making ability with regard to household and personal economics, household tasks, and childcare responsibilities, choice of healthcare practitioner, and personal life choices prior to migration, during asylum, and after return. The data on gender norms and relations was further validated by comparing my findings with existing ethnographic work on the Dinka (Jok 1999a, 1998; Deng 1986, 1972, 1971).

Questions also addressed the strategies Dinka women used during each phase of the forced migrant experience. Specifically, I asked about 1) the strategies Dinka women used to deal with gender inequality during each phase of the forced migrant experience, and 2) what factors, conditions, and considerations affected a woman’s
choice of strategy during each phase of the forced migration experience (Bauer and Wright 1996; Ryan and Martinez 1996; Young 1980).

Never Fled

Interviews with people who never fled Bor County were designed to examine their childhood, wartime, and current lives. The nature of changes, if any, to gender norms and relations were compared to the two forced migrant groups. Thus, the study can be conceived as a three-group design: 1) asylum in Kakuma, 2) asylum in Khartoum, and 3) no asylum. I was able to shed light on whether changes could be attributed to differences in refugees’ experiences in the two camps or whether simply leaving Bor—regardless of asylum location—had an effect on gender norms, as well as relations and strategies women use to deal with gender inequality.

Recruitment

I used several criteria to identify returnees and those who never fled to participate in the formal semi-structured interviews for inclusion in this study (Le Compte and Prissle 1993). Participants had to fulfill all of the following criteria: 1) be a returnee (refugee or IDP) or be an individual of Dinka Bor origin who never fled Bor County, 2) returnees had to have come back to Bor prior to August 2009, and 3) be an adult over the age of 18 in married, widowed, or single-parent households with young or adolescent children. Returnees were selected so that a comparison could be made between groups who took asylum in the two different locations, one internal and the other international. To assist in the comparison, I also interviewed returnees from other locations and individuals who never left Bor County.
The second criterion—that participants must have returned to Bor prior to August 2009—was particularly important because participants must have had enough time to re-establish themselves within the community and must have re-established daily routines. Hence, at the beginning of my research, participants had been living in Bor for a minimum of one year. Based on my preliminary research in 2007, it takes a minimum of one year for returnees to build and organize their homes, to clear fields and begin the farming cycle, and to begin to re-establish social and family connections in Bor.

I chose to work exclusively with adult men and women who have young or adolescent children. Estimates indicate that the majority of men and women over the age of 18 in Bor were married (personal communication with Peter Avenell, Country Manager Kenya/Program Manager Sudan Country Program, Norwegian People’s Aid September 22, 2007), but widowed and single-parent households also existed. A household with children permitted a more in-depth examination of the ways in which gender plays out within the domestic arena.

Main interview participants were first recruited from the adult members of the compounds participating in the time-allocation study (n=19). The remaining participants (n=100) were a convenience sample. For example, many of my interviewees lived near my compound or my research assistants’ homes. My assistants or I approached individuals who met the above mentioned three criteria (place of origin, date of return, and age). We explained to the perspective participant that I was a Ph.D. student from the United States who had come to Bor to learn and record the Dinka Bor culture, and to understand how forced displacement has affected Dinka Bor culture and their daily lives after return. Moreover, I planned to use this information to inform future refugee and
development policies in South Sudan. Possible interviewees were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they would not receive any form of payment or compensation. They were also informed that the interviews would be conducted at their convenience and that interview would take at least an hour of their time. This information along with their rights as a participant was reviewed before the interview and an IRB approved informed consent form was signed (see Appendix 3). Tables 4, 5, and 6 provide a basic demographic overview of the 119 main interview participants. Overall, among my 119 main interviews, the data reveal that women have less education than men and fewer women have higher levels of education than do men.3

Among my 119 main interviews, 27.1% of women and 65.3% of men are employed, while 72.9% of women and 34.7% of men are unemployed. The data reveal that overall women experience a higher rate of unemployment than do men in Bor. The age range for men was 20-75 years and for women was 17-74 years. Female participants tended to be younger, with 53.6% under the age of 30, compared to 20.4% for men. There were twice as many men over 50 compared to women (22.4% versus 11.6%).

TABLE 4: Age and Sex Distribution of Main Interview Participants,* in percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17-19</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages do not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

3 Of the 119 participants, 52.9% of women and 22.4% of men have no education, 25.7% of women and 26.5% of men have one to seven years of education, 12.9% of women and 26.5% of men have nine to twelve years of education, and 4.3% of women and 4.4.9% of men have two or more years of higher education.
TABLE 5: Main Interview Participants’ Educational Level by Sex and Asylum Location (n=119)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0 yrs Education</th>
<th>1-7 yrs Education</th>
<th>8-12 yrs Education</th>
<th>13+ yrs Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma (n=48)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum (n=27)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Fled (n=28)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP south (n=13)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda/Kenya (n=3)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6: Main Interview Participants’ Employment Status After Return, by Sex and Asylum Location (n=119)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kakuma (n=48)</th>
<th>Khartoum (n=27)</th>
<th>Never Fled (n=28)</th>
<th>IDP south (n=13)</th>
<th>Uganda/Kenya (n=3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on an NSF reviewer’s suggestion to screen for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), I administered the 4-item SPAN measure (Meltzer-Brody, et al. 1999). Participants rated frequency and severity on items assessing startle, physiological arousal to trauma cues, anger, and numbness. Brewin (2005) reviewed PTSD screening instruments and concluded that SPAN has excellent sensitivity and specificity. None of the participants who answered the 4-item SPAN measure met the criteria for PTSD.
Limitations

While my main ethnographic interview sample represents a cross-section of returnees to Bor by income, education level, and age, clan membership is not adequately represented. The majority of my main interviewees were recruited by my research assistants based on previous family relationships, friendships, neighborhood connections, and proximity to my assistants’ homes. Upon their return to Bor, families most often settled in areas populated by their clan members or by family from the same district (payam). As a result, my participants are mostly from clans or sub-clans who, before displacement, lived in and around Anyidi payam. The direction in which refugees fled from Bor also affected recruiting. Many of the families living around my research assistants fled to Ethiopia or south toward Kenya (where Kakuma is located) and Uganda. Khartoum, on the other hand, is located to the far north of Bor in the Republic of Sudan. As a result, I have a higher number of participants in my study who returned from Kakuma than participants that returned from Khartoum. Despite these limitations, my sample reflects the greater population of Bor.

Supplementary Interviews

NGO and UN Agencies

I conducted a total of 12 interviews with staff from Bor NGOs (Save the Children, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and INTERSOS) and United Nations (UN) offices (UN Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO), UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)). The choice of agency and staff member interviewed was
based on convenience. In the first weeks of my research, I repeatedly visited each NGO and UN office until I was able to find a staff member who was available and willing to sit for an interview (see chapter three and Figure 4).

Interviews with local NGO and UN staff were conducted early in my stay in Bor to assist me with mapping the recent and current state of Bor’s development, the perceived needs of the community, and how the community interacts with development aid agencies. My objective for these interviews was to understand how the NGOs and UN view the needs of the Bor community, the agencies’ past and current projects, the populations with whom each agency works, the results/impacts of the agencies’ past projects, and the difficulties/successes each agency experienced in carrying out its projects. After 12 formal interviews and many more informal interviews with NGO and UN staff, I felt I gained the information I needed.

IDPs, Bor County

During the months of September and October 2009, insecurity and attacks in the county north of Jonglei State Bor caused several hundred individuals to flee and take refuge in Bor Town. I interviewed eight individuals displaced from this county. The interviews were designed to record their experiences as IDPs: how they fled to Bor Town, where they were staying, how they were feeding their families, and how they viewed their experiences with the agencies that were providing them with non-food items and food rations. The South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) supported my efforts to recruit participants. Therefore, I was able to announce to a large group of IDP women collecting food rations at the food distribution center in Bor that I
was interested in interviewing them. More than 20 IDP women volunteered to be interviewed. Unfortunately, the time only allowed me to interview eight. Each interview lasted 20-30 minutes.

**Community Leaders**

I also conducted formal interviews with 13 community leaders in Bor Town. These interviews examined both the history of Bor and Dinka Bor cultures. Participants also provided insight into local leaders’ perceptions of changes to Dinka Bor culture that occurred as a result of forced migration and long periods of asylum in foreign locations. I chose leaders to be interviewed based on their role in the community, the knowledge I believed they held, and my ability to meet them and obtain an interview. Interviews with community leaders ranged in length from one to three hours.

**Kakuma Refugee Camp**

During July 2010, I visited a Kakuma refugee camp in northern Kenya. I conducted interviews with a total of four NGO staff from International Rescue Committee (IRC), Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), and Lutheran World Federation (LWF), five Kakuma UNHCR employees, and four Kakuma refugees (including two Dinka bench court judges). Interviews with Kakuma NGO and UN staff were neither random nor systematic, but based on convenience. I visited each office and interviewed staff who were available and willing to be interviewed. Interviews with agency employees examined the agencies’ roles in Kakuma, the past and current needs of the Dinka population, and the process of refugees’ arrival, registration and in some cases repatriation. Interviews
with Kakuma refugees were informal and focused on life in Kakuma, their opinions on how men and women behaved differently in Kakuma than in Bor, and the way the local Dinka court worked in the camp. A UNHCR staff member introduced me to each of the Dinka Bor refugees I interviewed in Kakuma. He chose these individuals based on who he believed would be willing to meet with me and had the knowledge I sought. For example, my interest in how the Kenyan Penal Code and UNHCR/NGO pressure to follow UN concepts of gendered equality affected Dinka customary practices and law, led him to introduce me to two Dinka bench court judges.

Re-interviews

Returnees to Bor who were interviewed in this study had been in an asylum camp for over ten years, raising concerns both about the accuracy of their narratives about their behaviors, attitudes, beliefs, gender norms, and relations before forced migration, and about their experiences in the asylum camps. Other research has established that returnees’ confidence in their narratives is only weakly associated with their accuracy (Loftus et. al 2006; Shaw et al. 2007). While this research describes memory as a problematic source of data, Shiffman et al. (2008:13) conclude that people’s impressions of past events are good predictors of subsequent behavior. The use of collective memory as a legitimate source of data is well established in the anthropological literature (Nazarea 2006; Rigney 2005; Uehling 2004; Malkki 1995).

A subset of eight participants was re-interviewed on the topics of pre-displacement gender norms and relations only. This subset of interviews allowed me: 1) to examine the consistency in memory narratives, 2) to take into account possible
seasonal effects, and 3) to reveal changes to strategies used to deal with gender inequalities. This subset consisted of my earliest interviews to allow for the greatest amount of time to pass between interviews.

**Participant Observation.**

Participant observation was employed as a primary method of data collection throughout the entire duration of field research. Participant observation built rapport with the community and its residents and created opportunities to engage in informal conversations on sensitive subjects (Bernard 2006). It also allowed me to record daily behavior reflecting gender relations and norms. I observed men and women from each group engaged in various behaviors in different arenas, including households, work spaces outside the home, recreational areas, educational locations, health care locations, NGO offices and facilities, and law/court offices. The time-allocation study, discussed in detail below, gave me direct access to 13 households for 58 weeks. The frequency of my visits led to friendships and intimate insight into their daily and family lives.

I also observed returnee (refugee and IDP) registration, verification, and food/non-food items (NFI) distributed from September 2009 through June 2010 in Bor, Marwal Agoba, and Pariak (see Table 7). These activities were conducted primarily by the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) in Bor County in conjunction with UNHCR, World Food Program (WFP), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), and United Mission in Sudan Return, Recovery and Reintegration (UNMIS RRR). Registration of new returnees to Bor occurred during the first week of each month. In the second week,
verification of the previous month’s returnees took place. In the third or fourth week, food and NFI, if available, were distributed.

These observations allowed me to gain a more in depth understanding of migrants’ return processes, their return routes, the aid they received, UNHCR’s difficulties with getting aid to the community, the returnees’ needs and how well they were being met, and the different strategies used by returnees to improve their lives after return. On four additional occasions, as a result of conflict in Bor County, I observed newly displaced persons (IDPs) being registered, verified, and food/NFI kits distributed.

**TABLE 7. Number of Returning Households Receiving Food Aid in Bor Town***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month and Year</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>No distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2010</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>&lt; 361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2010</td>
<td>No distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Bor Town Jonglei State Office

**Income Surveys**

The purpose of what I call, for simplicity, the income survey, was to learn what income strategies/behaviors repatriated refugees used upon their return to Bor. I interviewed a convenience sample of 509 persons. The survey was conducted in several locations (numbers of interviewed in parenthesis): Malek Secondary School (18), Bor Public Primary School (24), Junction Market (126), Marol Market (223), Bor Police (26), SPLA soldiers at the wildlife headquarters (25), NGO offices (38), UN offices (28),
Social Services and Gender Development Ministry (13), Agriculture Ministry (25), and Ministry of Infrastructure (12). Information gathered in the survey included business, nationality, ethnicity, age, sex, marital status, asylum location, time in asylum, training/education, date of return to Bor town, and, if applicable, time working in office/position. Information from this survey was used to compare strategies/behaviors of the three groups.

**Time-Allocation Study**

The time allocation study involved 13 compounds with a total of 98 individuals (see Appendix 4 and Figure 4). A table of random numbers (Bernard 2006) was used to select the days and times compounds would be visited. Each compound was visited four times a week for 58 weeks. Data from this study shows current gendered behaviors and responsibilities among the Dinka Bor. The study also provides information on seasonal behaviors such as planting, harvesting, and home repair. Furthermore, my continuous contact with the families led to informal interviews and observations that revealed the strategies Dinka Bor women use to deal with family conflict and inequities they face living in Bor. These compounds were chosen because 1) their physical proximity to each other and to my compound facilitated the ease of data collection, and 2) together the compounds encompassed a variety of characteristics including: single mother households, single and multi-wife homesteads, returnees from both Kakuma and Khartoum, diversity of livelihood strategies, and varying educational levels.
Court Archival Research

I transcribed a total of 148 closed court cases that appeared before Judge Enock Deng at the Bor County Court (97 cases from 2009 and 50 cases from 2010). Each case includes the following information: the plaintiff’s petition, the plaintiffs’/defendants’/witnesses’ names, their ages, sex, tribes, clans, occupations, addresses, and their statements to the court. I also recorded the judge’s verdicts. In some cases, I photocopied pertinent documents. These cases provided information on how Dinka women deal with spousal conflict, adultery, divorce and other issues that women commonly face in dealing with the penal court system.

Data Analysis

A thematic approach was used in the analysis of the data, drawing on the key concepts of the study, e.g., gender norms and relations, asylum contexts, time period (pre-, during, and post-asylum), and gender inequality. The experiences of women were analyzed not solely in relation to their individual experiences, but also in relation to men, social environment, economic conditions, and availability and accessibility to humanitarian aid agencies.

Using a thematic approach to analyze the data, I identified and linked recurrent themes and categories, and the different strategies women used to engage with gender inequality. Data from participant observation, field notes, interviews, and case studies were coded and analyzed using ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis software. This software ensured coding reliability, allowed for themes to be revisited as additional
themes were elicited over the course of the research, and revealed how themes, women’s strategies, and categories were linked.

Two types of frequency data analysis were used to make comparisons among groups. I described the relationships among variables using contingency table analysis, which I analyzed with Chi Square statistics. I also developed “people types” based on the Office and Market Survey data. Details of the analysis are described in chapters seven and eight.

**Positionality**

While difficult, the living conditions I encountered in Bor were not unfamiliar to me, having lived previously for three years as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Chad and Cameroon (1996-1999). I am familiar with the daily life conditions in an infrastructurally underdeveloped country. My Peace Corps experience prepared me to live for long periods of time without running water or electricity, without adequate sanitation facilities, with poor, to no, health facilities, traversing dirt and difficult roads, adapting to hot and unfamiliar climates, and coping with a population whose language and culture was very different from mine. These years of living in Chad and Cameroon inured me to the suffering experienced by the local population as a result of the abject poverty and poor infrastructure. I was confident that I not only knew what to expect, but also that I was capable of remaining and finishing my research.

The biggest challenge I faced while conducting my research arose the community and my interviewees’ perception of me as a “Kawaja” (white foreigner⁴), a woman, and

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⁴ Unlike in some African countries such as Kenya and South Africa, there are no indigenous white people in Bor.
an educated person. I also struggled personally on a daily basis to keep my biases as a white, feminist woman from the Global North from impacting my research (Mohanty 2003, 2002). Together with these challenges stemming from my positionality were the difficulties I faced working in a location in which the infrastructure had been destroyed by 22 years of civil war. The poor infrastructure was compounded by the continued internal insecurity and conflict that occurred in the region even after a signed peace agreement.

My Identity as a Kawaja

Directly upon seeing me, the Kawaja, the locals made inferences about who I was, why I was there, and how I lived. First, those in the community assumed that I was very wealthy with money to spare. Anytime I walked along a road, people asked me for money. Requests for money came both from strangers and from those who I came to know well. People also assumed I was working with UN or a NGO and therefore, that I had food, seeds, or tools to give to them. Third, it was assumed that unlike the Dinka, I lived in a superior home (cement home or metal trailer) that was equipped with a generator. They also assumed that a Land Cruiser was at my disposal. When asked to help with transport, my response “I am sorry but I don’t have a car,” was met with disbelief. I imagine they viewed my response as a refusal to help them and judged me to be a stingy person. Even people who came to know me, and had seen that I lived in a small compound without a generator, and that I walked everywhere no matter the distance or heat, continued to believe that I had food rations, seeds, or tools at my disposal for distribution. The perception of foreigners as very wealthy and privileged
with access to volumes of supplies to distribute to the public comes from more than 20 years of humanitarian aid delivered by white men and women from the Global North. Whether in the Kakuma refugee camp or inside South Sudan, a foreigner’s presence was always accompanied by the distribution of large quantities of humanitarian assistance.

Bor residents’ perception of me as wealthy, privileged, and a source of humanitarian aid was at times a barrier to recruiting participants. Most individuals were willing, eager really, to participate. But this willingness was motivated by the expectation that I (the Kawaja) would distribute food or other items. During the recruitment of a possible participant and again as an element of the informed consent form, I devoted significant time to ensuring that the potential participant understood that I was a student and did not have any food aid or money to distribute. As my time in Bor lengthened, I encountered a steep decline in interest in my research as those around my home and in the homes of those I interviewed saw that other participants were not receiving any humanitarian aid for participating. As a result, some people began to refuse to assist me or be interviewed.

Other data collection was also negatively impacted by perceptions of me. For example, I often confronted problems when conducting my time allocation study. Four days a week at different times of the day, I passed through 13 compounds (98 individuals) recording the behavior of each of the compound members. This process necessitated that I carry a clipboard to record the behavior. A Kawaja with clip board was interpreted by those passing by as an act of recording names. Often men and women passing by would impatiently advance toward me and request, sometimes insist, that their

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5 Over the course of 14 months the number of compounds dropped to ten, due to the death of the mother in one compound and two relocations.
names be added to the list. Their behavior was understandable because my actions mimicked those they had witnessed many times in the past. Food and item distributions by UN and NGO agencies were always preceded by recording the names of those in need, followed by the verification of the list, and finally the distribution of the aid. It was only logical for those passing by to assume I was collecting names for aid distribution.

*My Identity as a Woman*

As a woman, I broke several cultural norms that govern Dinka women’s behavior. A Dinka girl or woman would never be allowed by her family to travel so far from her home alone. Therefore, my presence in Bor, South Sudan, was itself an enigma. Second, I was 40 years old and had not yet married, leading to questions about my virtue and suspicions as to why my family could not find a man willing to marry me. Third, I do not have children. This also seemed odd among the Dinka, whose ultimate goal in life is to have many children. Without a husband or child, I was viewed not as a woman, but as a *ŋyan* (Dinka for girl).

*My Identity as an Educated Person*

As an educated person, I was given a certain amount of respect. Since the 1980s, education has become highly valued among the Dinka Bor. My status as a Ph.D. candidate and my “Kawajaness” allowed me access to people and places restricted to most Dinka men and women. For example, my uninvited arrival at the offices of United Nations Mission in South Sudan in Bor (UNMIS), NGO or state ministries was never questioned.
**Feminist - My personal limits**

Among the Dinka Bor, women’s status and power are limited and circumscribed by the status and power of their fathers, brothers, or husbands. As a feminist from the Global North who subscribes to the Western ideals of human rights at the level of the individual and equality between men and women, it was crucial that I did not let these directives and biases affect my research. I made every effort to ensure that my methods, interview questions, and the direction I took my research were not guided by my ideas on gendered norms and relations, but rather by the cultural norms set by the Dinka Bor. In cases when participants’ views did not match mine, I made certain that I did not try to influence the women or men to accept my views of gender and feminist ideas. My goal was to hear the voices of Dinka women and men, not to reinforce my personal beliefs.

**First Anthropologist**

Certainly the most famous anthropologist to work in South Sudan was Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, whose research in the 1930s has made the Nuer a staple in introductory anthropology courses around the world (Evans-Pritchard 1956, 1951, 1940). Work by Godfrey Lienhardt, another well-known early anthropologist, only added to the mystique of the tall, lean, Nilotic pastoralists who sang songs filled with affection and veneration to their cattle (Lienhardt 1961).

Brendan Tuttle⁶ and I were the first anthropologists to conduct ethnographic research in Bor. While familiar with NGO and UN employees as foreigners whose job it

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⁶ At the time, Brendan Tuttle was a Ph.D. Candidate at Temple University in the Department of Anthropology. His dissertation based on research he conducted in Bor, Jonglei State South Sudan is provisionally titled *Life is Prickly: Land, Migration, and the Everyday in Bor, South Sudan*. We were not collaborating as a team and in fact met each other for the first time in Bor.
was to distribute aid donated by the Global North, the population of Bor was not familiar with the role of an anthropologist. The humanitarian crisis and forced migration that resulted from years of conflict brought to the population a deep understanding for the need to record their culture. The Dinka also came to learn that while the NGOs and the UN were working to aid them, these agencies failed to fully understand the local customs and culture. These misunderstandings often resulted in failed humanitarian projects. I believe that a desire to record their culture and the disconnect they experienced with the humanitarian aid agencies partly explained why Brendan and I were accepted. For example, when my participants asked me why I was in Bor and why I wanted to learn about Dinka culture, my threefold response was always met with nods of agreement. I told my participants that first, I would not be honest if I did not admit that this work was part of the requirements for my Ph.D. Second, I explained that I wanted to record their story and culture for their grandchildren. And finally, a correct understanding of the local culture would better assist the NGOs and UN agencies to meet the needs of the Dinka Bor.

**Difficulties in Post-War and Current Conflict Area**

There was, and still is, a lack of historical and statistical records on education, land ownership, population, or health in South Sudan. Most record keeping that was done before or during the war was destroyed or left in a chaotic state. For example, the courts’ clerk’s office in Bor lacked filing cabinets or shelves, impeding the process of recovering case files. Lack of appropriate storage also created great potential for the loss of files to rainy season flooding or to small insects such as termites that eat paper. In most cases,
records only went back two or three years, beginning in 2006 or 2007 after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

Shortly after my arrival in Bor, August 2009, several states in South Sudan, particularly Jonglei, began to experience an increased level of insecurity. In 2009, Jonglei State ranked first among states most affected by tribal conflicts. The death toll in Jonglei State in 2009 reached over 1,500 people (Sudan Tribune 2010). The violence and insecurity was largely the result of cattle raiding and competition over scarce resources such as green pasture and water. The violence and insecurity continued throughout my time in Bor, increasing dramatically after the 2010 elections, the first presidential and legislative elections in 24 years were held in South Sudan. The excitement, campaigning, and preparation for the voting often took precedence over my requests for interviews. Unfortunately, in the first two months of 2010, there were 70 intertribal conflicts in which 450 people were killed and nearly 60,000 people were displaced (Sudan Tribune 2010). During this time the travel routes and general movement of people and goods around Jonglei were inhibited, food prices increased, and people feared for their relatives who lived in the villages around Bor. Many people displaced from the rural areas by violence came to Bor in search of aid from relatives and agencies in the city. I was unable to conduct interviews on days following an attack or when tensions were high and rumors about possible attacks were widespread.

**Organization of the Dissertation**

In chapter two I review the literature related to my ethnography and provide a theoretical framework within which I present my findings. In this chapter, I discuss how
my dissertation challenges several approaches commonly employed in migration studies, provides support for and extends earlier research, and expands refugee studies literature. I illustrate how my ethnography takes both a gendered and a feminist approach to the post-repatriation experience by drawing on Mahler and Pessar’s *gendered geographies of power* approach. Their approach seeks to gain “a more nuanced transnational examination of how gender articulates with migration” (Pessar and Mahler 2003: 815); that is, their intention is to make gender the central concept, not simply to add women and stir. Furthermore, their framework seeks to showcase female migrants as active contributors to the structuring of their lives rather than as passive participants.

Chapter three presents an ethnographic account of Bor. I begin with a description of Sudan, including its terrain and climate, population and health statistics, and its colonial and economic development. I gradually narrow my account as I move from the country of Sudan, to the region of South Sudan, to Jonglei State, and finally to Bor. In this chapter, I also discuss the culture, history, and subsistence patterns of the Dinka Bor. I contrast the life and culture of the Dinka Bor before the onset of the Second Civil War with the culture and life of Dinka Bor today in Bor town. Throughout the dissertation, I begin discussions by first visiting Dinka life ways before displacement. I then follow with descriptions of life today in Bor. This format allows the reader to see which gendered norms and relations remain relatively stable and which ones have been modified. I have also strategically placed vignettes throughout the dissertation. These vignettes are life histories that best illustrate the ways in which forced displacement has affected customary Dinka norms and relations.
In chapter four on displacement and repatriation, I first describe who fled, why they fled, and where they took asylum. I then describe the two asylum locations where participants in my study took refuge: Kakuma refugee camp located in northern Kenya, and Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, located in the north of Sudan. Finally, I differentiate between organized and spontaneous returnees, look at why refugees or IDPs chose to return to Bor, and describe returnee resettlement patterns.

Chapter five examines the role of asylum on gendered norms and relations among the Dinka Bor. I show how forced migrants’ access to humanitarian aid (or lack of access), local laws and legal systems, changes in Dinka subsistence patterns, the loss of cultural and pastoral knowledge, a desire for urban life, and formal education during asylum resulted in changes to pre-displacement identity and perceptions of Dinkahood. I further illustrate how these modifications to identity and Dinkahood that occurred during asylum led to a variety of resettlement patterns, livelihood strategies, and changes to customarily held gendered norms and relations upon return to Bor.

In chapters six and seven, I examine the post-repatriation experience of Dinka Bor who fled and returned to Bor town. In chapter six, I focus on women’s forced migration experience, beginning with a description of customary pre-departure forms of power and access to resources that provided Dinka Bor women with ways to deal with gendered inequality. I then examine how asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum either facilitated or hindered women’s access to customary forms of power. I also look at new forms of power women acquired during asylum. Finally, I discuss what is occurring as women return and resettle in Bor.
Chapter seven focuses on Dinka men’s forced migration experience and how asylum has affected their access to customary and new forms of power upon return. This chapter speaks not only to changes in gendered relations between men and women, but also to changes to marriage and kinship patterns as a result of asylum.
Chapter 2 Literature Review

Introduction

In this chapter I review the literature related to my ethnography and provide a theoretical framework within which I present my findings. I discuss how my dissertation challenges several approaches commonly taken by migration studies and offers support for and extends earlier migration research and refugee studies literature. My ethnography takes both a gendered and a feminist approach to the post-repatriation experience, which, by drawing on Mahler and Pessar’s *gendered geography of power*, seeks to gain “a more nuanced transnational examination of how gender articulates with migration” (Pessar and Mahler 2003: 815).

Migration Studies

In this section I discuss how my dissertation departs from the more common approaches to migration research. I compare international and internal migrating populations, taking both a macro- and a micro-level analysis, using a multi-sited approach, and examining the effects of a larger return population on a smaller one.

Comparing International and Internal Populations

Typically, migration studies have focused either on international or internal mobility, rarely focusing on both within a single study. New research supports the need to examine both forms of migration in concert (Trager 2005). Like Trager, this project argues that international and internal migration processes are not identical and that it is “important to consider the ways in which these processes are similar, in both
substantive and theoretical terms, as well as the ways in which they differ” (Trager 2005:5).

A focus on only one form of migration can lead to many shortcomings in our understanding of and theoretical development of the migration experience and of migrants as actors. Douglas Massey (1998) points out that over the past 50 years, approaches to international migration have been dominated by two theoretical approaches. A macro-level approach has espoused ‘push-pull’ factors, while a micro-level approach views the migrant as a rational actor. Massey suggests that these approaches are not only antiquated and no longer fit today’s world, but they fail to recognize the multiplicity of human behavior and motivation present in international migration (Massey 1998). He argues that “[m]igrants may be motivated not simply by a desire for gain, but by an aversion to risk, a desire to be comfortable, or simply an interest in building better lives at home” (Massey 1998: 9).

His work also illustrates the failure of international migration scholars to recognize the continent of Africa (Trager 2005). Trager (2005) presumes that this is because Africans did not make up a major portion of international migratory movements from which these scholars drew. According to Massey (1998), scholars focused on movement between or within North America, Europe and the East. I suggest further that African migrants, whose early international migration was mostly in the form of slavery, do not fit the dominant theoretical approaches and therefore were simply unnoticed. As a result, for 50 years, international migration scholars ignored research that has documented and examined an African migration in the form of slavery, which could offer important insights into our understanding of migration as a
whole. Differing from the common approach that examines one form of migration, my research considers both the common patterns and the differences between both forced internal and forced international migration with regard to gender norms and relations.

**Transnationalism (Macro-Micro Approaches)**

Much research on migration is limited to either macro-level constructions (De Hass 2005; Harvey 1989; Wallerstein 1974) or locked into micro-level analysis (Uehling 2004; Mills 1997). Trager (2005), Marcus (1995), and other migration scholars advocate the need for both a macro and a micro approach to migration studies. Macro-level analyses of migration focus on the broad structural and historical features of a society (Trager 2005) and are primarily interested in the global forces that compel people to migrate, thus portraying migrants as passive reactors manipulated by the world capitalist system (Brettell 2000). In contrast, micro-level analysis aims to explain how or why the local environment impels an individual to migrate (Trager 2005; Cliggett 2000).

Dissatisfaction with separate macro-level and micro-level approaches to migration has led to a new form of “theorizing about the articulation between sending and receiving societies” that is rooted in the concept of transnationalism (Brettell 2000:104). Brettell (2000) defines transnationalism as a “social process whereby migrants operate in social fields that transgress geographic, political and cultural borders” (p.104). From a transnational view, migrants are no longer passive actors pushed by global forces. Instead, migrants move freely between different cultures and societies (Brettell 2000). Transnationalism reconceptualizes the nature of communities
and how people become members of them (Brettell 2000; Kearny 1995). Rather then seeing culture and society as static, territorialized, discretely bounded, and consisting of homogenous units, transnationalism views culture and society as dynamic, unbounded, deterritorialized, and heterogeneous. Benedict Anderson’s (1983) concept of “imagined community” and Liisa Malkki’s discussion of Hutu mythico-history (1995), where community and membership is located in the abstract (imagination or memory), illustrate transnational perspectives.

Transnationalism also conceptualizes space differently than that commonly used in macro-level approaches. For example, Doreen Massey’s (1994) concepts of time-space continuum and power-geometry and Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) five dimensions of global flows (-scapes) depict space as fluid and irregular rather than as static and defined by borders.

As the Dinka forced migrants in my study crossed the invisible lines in the sand, thereby, officially leaving their country of origin, their identity, history, and membership was not left behind, but moved with them. In asylum, this fluidity and irregularity of space is expressed again as forced Dinka migrants became not refugees, but Dinka refugees. I illustrate how, during asylum, imagination and memory jointly creates a new Dinkahood, within which, for those who fled to the Kakuma refugee camp, the power-geometries of Kakuma could be practiced. This new concept of Dinkahood would not have developed had not space been global and ideas and images free to flow. A transnational approach allows me to show how imagination and memory initiated the development of new strategies to obtain power, resources, and agency, both during asylum and after return to Bor. Thus, a transnational approach proved refugees
to be thinkers and developers whose imagination and mind create solutions and solve problems that befell them rather than as victims of a larger process.

**Multi-sited Approach**

A transnational approach to migration research can be facilitated through a multi-sited design. According to George Marcus (1995), single-site ethnographies continue to be contextualized by macro-level approaches that locate the migrant in a larger social order such as the capitalist world system. He argues that because empirical changes in the world have transformed locations and cultural production, ethnography must become multi-sited. Anna Tsing’s study of the margins is an illustration of what Marcus is referring to by transformed locations and cultural productions. For Tsing, margins are not geographic locations, but rather conceptual sites where instability of social categories exists (1994). Like Marcus, Tsing (1994) argues that the challenge today for ethnographers is to “move from situated, that is ‘local,’ controversies to widely circulating or ‘global’ issues of power and knowledge and back, as this allows us to develop understandings of the institutions and dialogues in which both local and global cultural agendas are shaped” (p. 279).

Following Marcus and Tsing, my research is multi-sited; I examine forced migrants who took asylum in two different locations, and as a consequence, experienced different global and local cultural agendas. Comparing the migrant’s experiences highlights how newly encountered global forces in asylum modify pre-departure gender norms and relations. The comparison also highlights how these modified gender norms and relations are again mediated by local forces after return.
When the Returning Population Outnumbers the Receiving Community

Current theories emerging from migration studies are predicated on either an individual’s or a family’s return and adjustment to a well-established destination community. Such theories are not likely to be generalizable to repatriated groups whose numbers exceed—or even overwhelm—the population of the resettlement community. Studies of resettlement into a larger, stable, surrounding community have found that an individual’s or a family’s adjustment into the larger population is affected by pressure from the resettlement community, the migrant’s survival needs, or their preference for complete or partial adjustment into the larger culture (Hajdukowski-Ahmed et al. 2008; Rogge 1994). It is an empirical question whether these findings can be applied to groups who are being repatriated to communities such as Bor, South Sudan, that are war torn, still heavily affected by conflict, and with little or no receiving community in which to return. My research examines the extent to which theory based on small numbers of migrants arriving in a well established community applies to the post-repatriation period in Bor, South Sudan, where the number of returnees to Bor is greater than that of the receiving community.

Refugee Studies: The “Refugee Story”

In this section, I show how my dissertation departs from common themes and findings in refugee studies and fills needed gaps in the literature. Specifically, I challenge the essentialized image and story of the refugee and dispute the use in current discourse of ‘repatriation as homecoming’ in refugee policy and studies. I also address the need for
a gendered and feminist approach to refugee studies, and focus particularly on the post-
repatriation experience.

**Essentializing the Refugee Image and Experience**

The “refugee story,” be it journalistic or scholarly, tends to reflect an essentialized refugee image and experience. For example, the webpage\(^7\) advertising the film documentary, “The Lost Boys of Sudan,” directed by Megan Mylan and Jon Shenk, exemplifies the “refugee story”:

Lost Boys of Sudan is an Emmy-nominated feature-length documentary that follows two Sudanese refugees on an extraordinary journey from Africa to America. Orphaned as young boys in one of Africa's cruelest civil wars, Peter Dut and Santino Chuor survived lion attacks and militia gunfire to reach a refugee camp in Kenya along with thousands of other children

Nicholas Kristof, a columnist for The *New York Times* since 2001 and whose op-ed columns appear twice weekly, begins his column titled “On Top of Famine, Unspeakable Violence” with the quintessential refugee story:

IMAGINE that you’re a Somali suffering from the drought and famine in that country. One of your children has just starved to death, but there’s no time to mourn. Depleted and traumatized, you set off on foot across the desert with your family, and after 15 exhausting days finally reach what you believe is the safe haven of Kenya. But at the very moment when you think you’re secure, you encounter a nightmare broached only in whispers: an epidemic of violence and rape. As Somalis stream across the border into Kenya, at a rate of about 1,000 a day, they are frequently prey to armed bandits who rob men and rape women in the 50-mile stretch before they reach Dadaab, now the world’s largest refugee camp (Kristof 2011).

\(^7\) The Lost Boys of Sudan Website http://www.lostboysfilm.com/about.html, accessed March 24, 2013, 2013
Such stories follow a similar format; a weak, passive individual runs wildly and chaotically from conflict, to a location of asylum. This image strips the refugee (the individual) of history, identity, and agency. That is, the story neglects the “historicizing condition” that produced the refugee (Malkki 1996: 378). Therefore, while the term refugee “has analytical usefulness as a broad legal term, or as a label for a special, generalizable ‘kind’ or ‘type’ of person or situation,” it is problematic for the repercussions it has on policy and research (Malkki 1996: 378).

This “refugee story” has led to an essentialized image of refugees among the general public and humanitarian aid workers alike. They are seen as skinny, sickly individuals wearing torn clothes, without possessions or money, and who, without humanitarian aid, would soon parish. The most important element in this image is that people fled their country of origin. They crossed an international border. This image, or understanding, of defining refugees stands in stark contrast to views taken by Burundi Hutus in Tanzania refugee camps. Unlike the “refugee story” image, according to Malkki (1996), Hutu refugees in the camps saw “refugeeness” as a process, “a matter of becoming.” Refugeeness was achieved by more than the mere movement across the border (Malkki 1996: 381). The Hutu understood refugees to be active and strong individuals whose lives in a refugee camp have meaning and purpose. Hutu refugees believed that individuals earned the title of refugee rather than having it thrust on them. Their image and definition of a refugee contrasted bitterly with that of the staff, administration, and relief workers who complained, “that these people were not real

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8 The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic] nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
refugees because they did not look (or conduct themselves) like real refugees” (Malkki 1996: 384). Many humanitarian agencies developed programs and policies based on an essentialized conception of a refugee. It is an image so strong that, as noted above, one can tell “real refugees” from others just by the way they look and act. This essentialized image has developed over time and permeates the policies, procedures, and even the manuals of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2004; Hyndman 2000).

Furthermore, refugeeness, or definitions of a refugee, vary not only between those wielding the label and those being labeled, but also among refugees themselves. Malkki’s (1995) work in Tanzania showed that despite their common ethnic and national origins, Burundi Hutu refugees held different conceptions of refugeeness. Among the Hutu refugees who took asylum in a UNHCR run refugee camp, the term “refugee” had a moral connotation. As a moral label, refugee status legitimized peoples’ suffering and their right to return to Burundi. Among other Burundi Hutu refugees who spent asylum living in a town, being a refugee, or refugeeness, was not part of their daily experience nor did being a refugee become part of their identity.

Academic and popular literature persistently describes the grueling and stressful life in a refugee camp. Camps are depicted as barren, desolate places in which refugees are forced to live in unacceptable conditions, confronted daily by unsanitary environments, exposed to violence, and experiencing human rights abuses. While such portrayals do accurately describe conditions in some refugee camps, they simultaneous reproduce and reinforce the essentialized image of “the refugee,” as vulnerable, without hope, and in need of outside assistance to survive. It is in this context that women are
produced and reproduced as powerless, vulnerable mothers in need of assistance to survive (Indra 1999; Malkki 1995). This image of dependency is found even in the work of prominent scholars within the fields of refugee studies, anthropology, and feminism (Malkki 1995). The reproduction of the essentialized refugee experience, male or female, has created a discourse that neglects the impact of class, gender, culture, and race on a refugee’s experience (Hyndman 2000).

The Post-repatriation Experience

As noted in the introduction, UNHCR considers repatriation to be the optimal solution to the “refugee crisis” and encourages the return of refugees to their country of origin whenever possible (Allen and Morsink 1994; Harrell-Bond 1989). This policy initially assumed that the return of refugees to their country of origin was not only ‘natural’ but also problem free (Hammond 2004a, 1999; Black and Koser 1999; Allen and Morsink 1994; Rogge 1994). It was only in the 1990s that the importance of the refugee’s experiences after repatriation was recognized in both the academic and political domains. Despite this recognition, gaps still remain in this new understanding, including that of the gendered repatriation experience.

The international sentiments on refugee return as “the end of the refugee cycle”9 has affected research on repatriation by assuming that it is unnecessary to investigate the entire process of leaving and return. Repatriation is most often viewed as akin to taking square pegs (refugees) and replacing them into their square holes (their ‘home’), polishing a few rough edges and refitting the pieces together comfortably. But this myth

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is far from the reality of repatriation. While the square peg and the square hole will not change shape when separated, over time and geography people and places do not remain constant. During asylum, which in some cases exceeds a decade, refugees’ history, culture, and/or identity are likely to undergo some modifications. Changes can also be expected to occur in their place of origin, their ‘homes,’ both physically and culturally. Therefore, repatriation is not two complementing pieces being put together. The more appropriate analogy might be that of placing a square peg into a circular hole.

Unlike UNHCR, anthropologists recognize that the “refugee cycle” does not end at repatriation (Hammond 2004a, 2004b, 1994; Black and Koser 1999). Repatriation does not simply “put right” or “straighten out” what was shaken or contorted out of shape. Repatriation is not merely a realignment of parts that, once sanded and lubricated, will return to smooth working order, especially in war torn places of origin. Repatriation must be viewed as another beginning for refugees, as part of a continuing physical and cultural movement. Places of return may retain familiar physical and cultural characteristics, yet have undergone change, radically in some cases, to create a new set of circumstances and renewed challenges for returnees. This understanding of repatriation should be reflected in the questions and methods used during research on repatriation. My research contributes to shaping a new understanding of the refugee’s return experience by revealing how the asylum location impacts cultural practices and verifies that refugees most often do not return to life as it was before displacement. Most importantly, my research shows that upon return, refugees must negotiate their new identities in a radically changed home environment.
Discourse in Repatriation Studies

Several scholars of refugee repatriation and the post-repatriation experience have agreed that new language in repatriation discourse is needed (Hammond 2004a, 1999; Long and Oxfeld 2004; McSpadden 2004; Black and Koser 1999; Wilson 1994). The problem stems from the false assumptions that the current terms project and the conclusions drawn from them. Current terminology obfuscates the reality of refugee repatriation.

Laura Hammond (1999) discusses how our current understanding of the sociocultural and economic processes during the post-repatriation period is handicapped because investigators/anthropologists have adopted biased and inappropriate terminology. Hammond focuses on two terms, returnee and home, which connote images and notions of repatriation as the arrival of a ‘returnee’ to his or her ‘home,’ thereby equating repatriation with homecoming. First, equating repartition with homecoming presupposes that all refugees desire to return to their country of origin. Second, the equation assumes it is possible for returnees to regain what they had before departure. According to Hammond, humanitarian assistance and refugee policy founded on these assumptions lead to unrecognized and unmet needs after return (Hammond 1999).

The concept of ‘home’ thus becomes synonymous with where one was born or living before departure. However, repatriation often entails the return of refugees not to their place of birth or to the area where they were living before departure, but to a new region entirely. The concept of “home” is also problematic because refugees may never have lived in their “home” of origin, having been born inside a refugee camp. Moreover, refugees may well have lived more of their lives in a refugee camp than in their country.
of origin. Thus, the terms ‘returnee’ and ‘home’ can be misleading or inappropriately applied to a given repatriation context. These two terms suggest a static reality, implying that despite a change in location and the passage of time, neither refugees, nor their ‘home,’ have undergone any changes.

Hammond (2004a, 1999) demonstrates how repatriation is neither a ‘homecoming’ nor problem free. Working with Ethiopian refugees, repatriated in 1993 after eight years in refugee camps in Sudan, she describes how the first 15,000 refugees were not repatriated to the Ethiopian highland where they lived before the war. They were instead resettled in the western lowlands, a hot and dry environment close to the Sudanese border. These lowlands were culturally, climatically, and agriculturally more similar to the Sudan region where they took refuge than to their pre-refugee home in the highlands of Tigray region. Exacerbating the disparities between the two regions, the new settlement differed from their highland villages both in physical design and in social relationships.

Hammond argues that the language of reintegration, reconstruction, or rehabilitation are not appropriate and that the “operative principles of social change are construction, creativity, innovation, and improvisation” (Hammond 1999: 243). Hammond (1999) calls for a paradigm shift in the way the return experience is conceptualized. Rather than the repair of social identities, this paradigm includes the construction of new forms of social identity, organization, practice, and meaning which are recognized and incorporated.

Building on the work of refugee scholars such as Malkki and Hammond, my research challenges the conventional image, story, and definition of a refugee. I show
how the refugee experience varies greatly even among the same cultural, ethnic, economic, and geographic community. Through the examination of the Dinka female and male forced migrants’ experience, I reveal that the popular “refugee story” represents only one of many different refugee stories. I further illustrate how the “refugee story” hinders scholarly and humanitarian understanding of the experience, which ultimately results in a failure to adequately meet refugee needs after return. My gendered approach to the refugee experience shows that refugees are active agents who are in a constant (re)negotiation or (re)creation of their concepts of gendered identity and behavioral practices.

**Gender and Migration**

In this section, I review both the voluntary and forced migration literatures showing that research on migration, voluntary or forced, is both a gendered and gendering experience. I argue that the literature supports the idea that migration results in the (re)creation or (re)construction of gendered roles, norms, and behaviors. Finally, I establish that there is insufficient research on the consequences of forced migration on gender after repatriation.

**Migration as a Gendered Experience**

Gender and migration studies conclude that migration, whether forced or voluntary, produces experiences that not only vary significantly across genders, but also foster experiences that generate important changes in gender relations and norms (Behera 2006; Cliggett 2005, 2003; Brettell 2003; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Mahler and
Gender related changes occur primarily as a result of rearranged power hierarchies (Pessar and Mahler 2006; Qadeem 2005; Oxfeld 2004; Franz 2003, 2000; Indra 1999; Benson 1994; Massey 1994; Pedraza 1991). Laws, policies, and cultural practices in the asylum and resettlement locations often differ from, or are contradictory to, the cultural beliefs, values, and gender norms of the migrants’ or refugees’ homes of origin. Differing property rights (Cliggett 2003; Colson 1999), norms about employment outside the home (Chrostowsky 2005; Benson 1994), and modifications to religious practices (Krulfeld 1994) are but a few factors in asylum locations or resettlement communities that affect the redistribution of power relations and status of migrants and refugee women and men.

**Voluntary Migration and Women’s Power**

Research shows that upon resettlement after voluntary migration, gender hierarchies are most often rearranged such that migrant women experience greater freedom and rights in the home and in the work place (Matsuoka and Sorenson 1999; McSpadden 1999; Krulfeld 1994). Personal and economic freedom may occur because the resettlement location’s legal system enforces pay equity and criminalizes spousal abuse (McSpadden 2004), or because women find themselves in the unfamiliar role of breadwinner (Constable 2004). On the other hand, migrating

[w]omen are more vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse, lower wages, and other forms of exploitation. [Voluntary] [m]igration is thus undertaken with the aim of betterment, in terms of employment and economic gains, and as an escape from cultural and societal constraints in terms of achieving greater autonomy and independence. However, while it may afford them material gains, whether migration enables
women to completely break free of the binding patriarchal and traditional norms remain questionable (Thapan in Behera 2006: 10).

**Forced Migration, Conflict, and Women’s Power**

Like research on voluntary migration, research on forced migration and conflict has also led to mixed results regarding the effect of resettlement on women’s power and status. Research shows that women’s accesses to pre-displacement forms of power are weakened under conditions of conflict and forced displacement (Behera 2006; Hutchinson 2000; Jok 1999a). As a consequence, during conflict and in asylum, women become more vulnerable to patriarchal forms of control (Freedman 2007; Hyndman 1998; Jok 1998).

For example, Jok Madut Jok (1999b) showed that the long running civil war in Sudan led to the militarization of the Dinka culture in which a Dinka woman’s role in the liberation struggle was that of reproducer. He argued that this “nationalization” of the womb licensed men to assume rights over women’s sexuality, and in many cases led to rape. According to Jok, Dinka women felt that “...the emphasis on reproduction as a national obligation ...exceeded its boundaries to provide men with the power to control sexuality” (1999b:431). Among the Dinka a customary sexual taboo prohibited a husband and wife from engaging in sexual relations while the wife was still breastfeeding. This taboo assisted women to avoid pregnancies that were too close together. Yet, justified by the national ideologies of liberation, “[t]he rules of sexual taboo [were] easily breached when the husband [was] determined to expose his wives to pregnancy before he [was] taken away by the military” (Jok 1999:423). Despite these findings, some scholars found that the asylum environment may provide forced female migrants with new strategies to deal with gendered inequalities such as education and
income generating skills (Chrostowsky and Long 2013; Chrostowsky 2005; Franz 2000; Pessar 2001).

**Gender Focus Still Sidelined in Forced Migration Studies**

Based on an analysis of articles in the Journal of Refugee Studies from its inceptions in 1998 to March 2009, Hyndman (2010) concluded that of the 497 articles published, only 45, or less than 10 percent, of the titles or abstracts contained references to feminism, feminist, gender, or women. Of the 45, only three were explicitly about masculinity and contained a strong analysis of gender. Even more telling is the failure by refugee scholars to develop “feminist frameworks to trace the power relations that shape the gender and other politics of forced migration” (Hyndman 2010: 453). Others joined Hyndman in her call for a feminist analysis of refugee experiences (Al-Sharmani 2010; Grabska 2010; Hopkins 2010; Szczepanikova 2010). Feminist scholars attending a session on gender relations in refugee studies at the 2008 International Association of Studies in Forced Migration in Cairo also “lamented declining interest in gender studies related to refugees and feminist analysis of mobility and displacement” (as reported by Hyndman 2010: 453).

Despite a clear understanding that gender hierarchies are rearranged as a result of migration, forced or voluntary, little research has been conducted on the post-repatriation experience of forced migrants, especially with respect to gender (Mahler and Pessar 2001; Brettell 2000). This leaves both scholars and policy makers guessing whether forced migrant women gain or lose freedoms and access to status and power after repatriation. My research directly addresses this gap in the literature by examining
gender norms and relations after repatriation. I also address calls by refugee scholars for a framework that traces the power relations that shape gender and other politics of forced migration. In the next section I discuss in detail how Patricia R. Pessar and Sarah J. Mahler’s *gendered geographies of power* approach can be used to examine how gendered is negotiated across borders.

**Gendered Approach to Migration**

In section three of this chapter I illustrated the manner in which the stereotypes of the refugee, the “refugee story,” and the discourse used surrounding those concepts (e.g., that homecoming equals repatriation) has perpetuated ineffectual research and failed policy. Therefore, to ensure conceptual clarity, I begin this section by detailing the concept of gender that I use in my study. I then outline a theoretical framework proposed by the Patricia R. Pessar and Sarah J. Mahler, which they have coined “gendered geographies of power,” on which I model my research.

**My Concept of Gender**

First, I do not use gender synonymously with sex. Sex refers to the structural and functional biological traits (such as reproductive organs, hair distribution and muscle) used to distinguish humans into male and female. My use of gender is much more complex and refers to the norms, roles, characteristics, and personality traits that a culture or society deems natural or appropriate to an individual’s sex. Gender is a cultural construction that imbues meaning into the biological differences between men and
women. Therefore, the construction of gender may differ from one culture or society to another.

Gender, as I conceptualize it, varies not only geographically (Massey 1994) and by culture/society, it also varies over time (Bulter 1993). Gendered behavior and practices are not static, but are instead fluid and variable and vary across time and place.

Gender is relational. Gender, although a central organizing factor in human societies (Goździak 2008), articulates with other factors such as location, skin color, ethnicity, and economic class. For example, two American women (one white, one black) living in the same society may experience and identify with different gendered norms and freedoms as a consequence of their racial background and economic differences (Mclaurin 2001). It is useful to think of gender as “a human invention that organizes our behavior and thought, not as a set of static structures or roles, but as an on going process that is experienced through an array of social institutions from the family to the state” (Mahler and Pessar 2001: 442).

Judith Butler’s work has changed the way we conceptualize gender and identity. In her view, we should think of gender as a previously constructed identity that one acquires within an existing power structure--an engaged process. It is through this process that a gendered subject comes into existence. Butler is not interested in the gendered subject or individual per se, but in the process by which the individual becomes the gendered subject. Gender is something we do, not something we are. Butler argues that gender, as a social construction, is arbitrary. There is no necessary relationship between one’s body and one’s gender. When gender is conceptualized as predetermined by one’s sex rather than as a process, gender power hierarchies become naturalized,
creating power relations of inequality that are created and legitimized (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995; Butler 1993). For example, women as care givers or men as providers are not “natural” or permanent roles. I describe how gender roles of returnees to Bor reflect Butler’s notions of process and de-solidification. I show that power hierarchies attached to gender can be, and are, modified over time and space.

**Theoretical Approach**

*Engendering Transnational Migration*

The transnational perspective on migration began in the late 1980s as researchers recognized that the nature and intensity of ties migrants maintained with their homeland affected their resettlement (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 41). Early work on migrants’ ties to home focused on adjustment and assimilation, but paid little attention to gender. Such a lack of attention to gender was in part due to the absence of a framework on ways to incorporate gender into transnational migration studies (Mahler and Pessar 2006).

According to Pessar and Mahler, approaches that integrate gender into transnational studies should recognize that gender is conducted and negotiated on multiple scales. They argue that recognition of spatial scales (i.e. global, local, international, rural, urban), social scales (i.e. skin color, ethnicity, networks, economic class), and cultural scales (i.e. gender hegemonies, age sets) will produce a more nuanced examination of the ways in which gender articulates with migration. Acting on their own prescriptions, Mahler and Pessar developed a framework called “gendered geographies of power” (GGP) (Mahler and Pessar 2006, 2001; Pessar and Mahler 2003). My research is consistent with their critical question:
When the geographical spaces we study extend across international borders does this multiplication and dispersal produce even greater opportunities for the reinforcement of prevailing gender ideologies and norms, or, conversely, do transnational spaces provide openings for men and women, girls and boys to question hegemonic notions of gender, to entertain competing understandings of gendered lives, and to communicate these new understandings across transnational spaces? That is, do international migration and other cross-border activities that bring people into new gendered contexts change gender relations, and, if so, in what direction(s)? (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 42)

**Gendered Geographies of Power: A Framework**

Using the gendered geographies of power framework, I describe how the gendered identities and relations of forced migrants are negotiated across international and internal borders. As I note earlier, these forced migrants originated from Bor with the same cultural background but encountered two different asylum environments (international and internal). I describe the extent to which modifications to gender norms and relations that occurred during asylum are maintained upon return to Bor. Further, I examine how changes to gendered norms and relations effect the power hierarchies that allow women to deal with existing gendered inequalities upon return to Bor.

Mahler and Pessar (2006) note that findings from transnational research are mixed, and gains for women and men may be uneven or even contradictory. Pessar’s (2001) work among Guatemalan refugees in southern Mexico revealed, for example, that women in refugee camps experienced more rights and freedoms than they held before they fled. In contrast, Goldring (2001) found that male migrants from Zacateca, Mexico who migrated to California had access to status building resources that their female migrant counterparts did not. The disparity in these findings should not be surprising.
Not only did the asylum or resettlement locations in these studies differ, but so did the populations studied and the reasons for migration (i.e. voluntary vs. forced). To disentangle the contradictions in gendered transnational research requires analysis of groupings that are similar, based on some framework that takes into account such factors as the population studied, type of migration, asylum location, resettlement location, gender and other macro and micro considerations.

Gendered geographies of power (GGP) is composed of the following building blocks: geographical scales, social location, power geometry (agency), individual character, and cognitive process (imagination or mind work). In the following sections, I describe and begin to operationalize each building block through examples.

1. Geographical Scales

Consistent with the GGP theory’s assumption that gender operates simultaneously on multiple scales, the first building block of GGP is *geographical scales*. Geographical scales refer to the spatial, social, and culture scales in which gender operates. Examples of geographical scales include “the body, the family, the state, gender hegemonies, and counter hegemonies” (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 42). Furthermore, gender ideologies and relations can be strengthened and/or modified within a scale and between and among them (Mahler and Pessar 2003).

My data shows that when forced Dinka migrants strive to renegotiate their power and status after return to Bor, they rely primarily on customary sources of power and status; the system preserves a gendered hegemony that subordinates women. Despite their employing a new Dinkahood that encapsulates the urbane and new ideas of male and
female equality, the returnees’ actions and practices maintain a system of relations that subordinates women.

2. Social Location

This second component of GGP, social location, is a complex construct. It is difficult to define, because social location does not refer to a single physical location, but rather to an abstract space. It refers to an individual’s positioning among interconnecting power hierarchies. These power hierarchies are continually intersecting and mutually constituting each other as the individual moves from one geographical scale to another. Further complicating the construct, many power hierarchies (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity) are created through historical, political, geographical or other socially stratifying factors that the individual had no part in creating (Mahler and Pessar 2003).

The following illustrates the complexity of social location. As head of household, the husband and father among the Dinka has the ultimate say in family decisions. Yet the same man, as the youngest of six male siblings, has much less influence on family decisions when he is functioning within the context of his father’s household rather than within his own homestead. Both his advantaged position as the male head of household and his disadvantaged location within his father’s family were ascribed at birth, and determined by Dinka cultural norms and laws about the relationship between men and women, husband and wife, and sibling order.

In other cases, a single social location can be achieved. For example, a young Dinka man who successfully raids another tribe’s cattle camp, and who returns unharmed and with many cattle, gains respect and status as a brave man. In sum, the GGP model
“takes as its foundation the obvious but not always stated fact that people—irrespective of their own efforts—are situated within power hierarchies that they have not constructed” (Mahler and Pessar 2003: 816). According to Mahler and Pessar (2003), social location can be thought of as continuum anchored at the extremes by the most disadvantaged and the most privileged, with people falling along the privilege-disadvantage scale. One’s location along the scale is not fixed, but can shift over time according to circumstances or actions taken.

The lives of some Dinka men in my study capture the essence of social location and also some of its limitations. As boys, these Dinka Bor men were conscripted by the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) and had no choice but to leave their homes in Jonglei. Some eventually escaped the war and took asylum in the Kakuma refugee camp. Once in Kakuma they had opportunities for education and skills training not available to them in Jonglei. From 2000 - 2001, almost 2,000 of these boys, now young men, were resettled to the United States. Resettlement in a developed nation, a change unimaginable in the cattle camps of Jonglei, was one of luck more than achievement. Any young man in Kakuma could apply to resettle. If he passed the health exam and successfully negotiated the interview, he sat and waited for his name to be chosen by a country for resettlement. Once in the United States, these men found themselves facing racial, ethnic, and economic biases in the job market and in the communities where they settled. Over the years many of these men have returned briefly to Kakuma to marry.

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10 As part of the application for resettlement to a third country, a refugee had to complete a lengthy series of interviews and procedures which included interviews with U.N. staff and resettlement country representatives, health exams, and the various measures used by each country to accept refugees for resettlement. As a result of this lengthy process, refugees faced long periods of waiting. Furthermore, the resettlement application process was not predictable. Therefore, two men could register for resettlement on the same day, but be selected, if at all, by different countries months apart.
Dinka women. Believing Dinka men from America to be educated, employed, rich, and modern (even though for most men this is not the case), their family and friends in Kakuma accord them higher status, more respect, cede to them a stronger voice in decision making, and overvalue their opinions. Upon return to Kakuma then, these men find themselves in a more privileged social location than they held when they left Kakuma or first settled in the United States. Their social location, both historically and currently, is in constant flux.

The way in which Mahler and Pessar define the social location dimension creates possible interpretive ambiguities. People’s movement in terms of privilege-disadvantage should be described in terms of specific domains of behavior. Depending on how one defines the social location continuum, conscripted Dinka boys in Kakuma could be interpreted as shifting toward the disadvantaged end of the continuum (loss of freedoms, loss of home and family) or toward the privileged end (opportunities for education, acquisition of skills, chance for a life in a developed country). In fact, these events may be occurring almost simultaneously to the Dinka boys, making location or shifts in location difficult to determine. Even this brief example suggests that more specific behavioral constructs must be incorporated into the model to make it useful. That is, the anchors of privilege and disadvantage must be unpacked (e.g., Newell’s 2005 distinction between economic and social status prestige).

3. Power Geometry

The third component in GGP directs our attention to the types and degrees of agency people exert. That is, given one’s social location within a geographical scale,
what degree of control does an individual have to access, negotiate, or change the social relationships, economic resources, and political networks that structures her or his life? Here, Mahler and Pessar build on Doreen Massey’s (1994) conceptualization of power-geometry and space-time compression.

Massey (1994), like Pessar and Mahler, conceptualizes space as a lattice of interrelated social locations. Within this lattice, power hierarchies are always shifting in strength and significance. Massey (1994) argues that particular conditions of modernity have essentially changed these power hierarchies and an individual’s location within them. Time-space compression refers to the idea that in the modern globalized world the time it takes ideas, materials, and information to move across space or borders has shrunk.

According to Massey (1994), time-space compression places some individuals in a position that enables them to improve, or impede access to, and power over, social relationships, economic resources, and political networks. Massey’s (1994) examples of those with more control include, the jet-setters, the one’s sending faxes, those holding international conference calls, distributing films, and controlling news (p. 149). There also are those who have little, or no, control but instead receive the flow and movement of power.

4. Individual Character

The fourth component of GGP recognizes that agency is “affected not only by extra-personal factors but also by quintessentially individual characteristics such as initiative” (Mahler and Pessar 2003: 817). Individual personalities are often implied, but
not explicitly conceptualized, in writings about power and agency. Mahler and Pessar’s model addresses the role that an individual’s character, such as tendencies toward introversion or extroversion, can play in social relations. Thus, movement in either direction along the social location continuum is in part due to individual differences in initiative and personal character.

5. Cognitive Process

Cognitive processes are the final component of GGP. This component “acknowledges the role of imagination or mind work, an element frequently ignored in those transnational studies that privilege social relations and social institutions” (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 43, their emphasis).

Greta Uehling’s (2004) research on Crimean Tatars (forced by Stalin to leave Crimea) and Liisa Malkki’s (1995) study with Burundi Hutu refugees (who fled Burundi and took refuge in Tanzania) directly address the role of mind work in the construction of identity, power, and agency. Using memory and imagination as “the field,” they challenge earlier work of forced migrants that ignores the cognitive process and raises the value of memory and imagination for refugee studies.\(^{11}\)

Uehling (2004) explores the history of Crimean Tatar deportation and repatriation. Most Tatars returning to Ukraine were not born in Crimea or forcibly uprooted by Stalin. Rather, the children of the uprooted, born and raised in Soviet Central Asia, returned. Uehling shows how Tatars’ nostalgic recollections for their natal home

\(^{11}\) Gupta and Ferguson’s (1997) call for a reconstruction or retheorizing of “the field.” They argue that the concept of the field should not be limited to a spatial or geographic site, but should be broadened to include political locations. Appadurai (1990, 1996) and Anderson (1991) have brought attention to the role of imagination in the construction of identity and globalization.
and their accounts of deportation jointly created a historical narrative that both defied the state’s accounts of deportation and remade their own identities. Her research shows how parental recollections shaped their children’s identities and compelled the second and third-generation Tatars to return to Crimea.

Malkki’s (1995) research was described above (section 3.1). Here, I note her depiction of how historical consciousness, identities, and cosmologies affect refugees. For Burundi Hutus who took refuge in Mishamo refugee camp, the status of being a refugee had a very pronounced salience. Among the Hutu in the camp, their definition of a refugee developed from a collective narrative of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. In this narrative, the Hutus saw themselves as “a nation in exile” and as the “rightful natives” of Burundi. Exile was viewed as a set of moral trials and hardships, which would allow them, in the future, to rightfully reclaim Burundi as their homeland (Malkki 1996: 380).

Mark Isreal (2000) and Roger Zetter (1999) further demonstrate the role of mind work or imagination in the migrant experience through their examination of what are called “myths of return” created by migrants and refugees. Israel (2000) defines the myth of return as “migrants and refugees idealizing and reinventing a past and imagining a fictitious future that would reconnect them to their home” (p. 27). Zetter (1999) also argues that the myth of return is an outcome of a group’s effort to maintain a connection with its social and cultural past while adjusting to current needs and circumstances in asylum and the possibilities of return. Viewed in this way, the creation of a myth of return by a group of migrants implies both the ability and the willingness to imagine a life after return.
To better frame the cognitive processes that foregrounds what people do when displaced, Pessar and Mahler look to Appadurai’s (1996, 1990) use of –scapes. They contend that prominent in forced or voluntary migrants’ actions are imaging, planning, and strategizing. Furthermore, these ideoscapes and mediascapes are gendered, appropriated, and interpreted differently by women and men (Mahler and Pessar 2006).

The critical role of imagination in the migration narrative is illustrated in Mary Beth Mills’ (1997) research among Thai females migrating from a rural setting to an urban center. These female migrants were motivated by two factors. First, they strived to fulfill a moral imperative of the daughter’s obligation to self-sacrifice–to work hard and save money to help her family. Second, they envisioned their return clad in beautiful clothes and reflecting “modernity”–an urban sophistication. They placed “kinship-based morality alongside desires for autonomy and commodified display” (Mills 1997: 37).

Once in Bangkok, these Thai migrant women not only entered into employment, but also into a process of negotiating and modifying their rural gendered identity (Mills 1997).

In the slick, sophisticated packaging of Thailand's media, whether television commercials and movies or printed posters and magazines, women and women's bodies provide a predominant source of visual imagery. Feminine beauty has become one of the most powerful symbols for representing Thai progress and modernity. In advertising and the entertainment media, the beautiful woman is celebrated and promoted as an example of "up-to-date" style and independence. The fashionably dressed, stylishly coiffed, carefully made-up "modern woman" (phuu ying than samay) parades her beauty at work and leisure in the city setting (Mills 1997: 43).

Thus, even before their actual physical displacement, these women imagined themselves moving along the streets of Bangkok and returning to their rural village with urban sophistication. Mills uses Henrietta Moore’s (1994) idea of “fantasies of identity,” that is, "ideas about the kind of person one would like to be and the sort of person one would like
to be seen to be by others” (Moore 1994:66 cited in Mills). But I believe Appadurai’s notions of *mediascapes* and *ideoscapes* better reflects the cognitive process foregrounding these rural Thai women migrants. In contrast to fantasy, which refers to the formation of mental images that are wondrous, strange, extravagant and or unrestrained, imagination, as used by Appadurai, refers to the production of ideal creations consistent with reality. As he notes, “fantasy can dissipate (because its logic is so often autotelic), but the imagination, especially when collective, can become the fuel for action” (Appadurai 1996: 7). In this way, imagination can be viewed as “a staging ground for action, and not only for escape” (Appadurai 1996: 7).

Sasha Newell’s (2005) *Migratory Modernity and the Cosmology of Consumption in Côte d’Ivoire* illustrates the ways in which imagination influences the process of migration and how people reconstruct their identities. Her sample of Abidjan Ivoirians were motivated to temporarily migrate to Europe not by escape, but by their desire for personal transformation. Their target destination was *Beng*, a local slang term for “the land of the whites.” Those who migrate to Europe undergo a transformation and return to Côte d’Ivoire as *Bengiste*. The *Bengiste* “of popular myth travels to the land of the whites” for several years, is transformed into a rich man, and returns with enough money to build a large house for one’s family and to sustain oneself and family in a life of luxury happily ever after” (Newell 2005: 164). According to Newell, the transformation is not only, or simply, economic but a deep self and social identity change. The *Bengiste* gains attention from friends and family and is “considered to exist on a somewhat different social plane than one’s peers” (Newell 2005: 164). The distinction between simple economic shift and shift in social status corresponds to “an idea of cultural evolution” or
a “kind of geographic ladder of modernity” (Newell 2005:168). In this way, migration combines with imagery and symbolic modernity to create an identity. Cultures continue to extend “across space and time, and are formed through new media and collations of shifting identities and understanding” (Moore 1999:11). Anthropologists such as Benedict Anderson (1983), Arjun Appadurai (1996), and Liisa Malkki (1996) bring awareness to the deterritorilization and reterritorialization of cultures and highlight the crucial role consciousness and subjectivity plays in agency.

Gender is a cultural construction that organizes our behavior and thought. Its relational dimension necessitates that gender adjust, or be modified, over time and from place to place. Therefore, “how people respond to [and experience] forced migration [and return] will be gendered, but it will vary given that they come to the experience with different ‘cultural and individual notions’” (Colson 1999: 37). GGP is a framework that takes into account these key factors of gender often left out of transnational or forced migration theory. In sum, GGP “is a framework for analyzing people’s gendered social agency—corporal and cognitive—given their own initiative as well as their positioning within multiple hierarchies of power within and across terrains” (Mahler and Pessar 2003: 818). Mahler and Pessar (2001) intend this framework to “aid scholarly analysis of gender across transnational spaces for case studies and comparative investigations” (Mahler and Pessar 2001: 448). Using GGP as a framework, I illustrate how the gendered identities and relations of forced migrations are continuously renegotiated through various spatial, social, and cultural scales, resulting in varying degrees of increased or decreased social agency.
A Feminist Approach

Space: A Medium to Negotiate Gender Norms and Relations

How we think about space is important to a gendered approach to migration. If space is viewed as sedentary, static, and unchanging while migration is viewed as the movement between fixed locations, then space prohibits or constrains migrants’ agency. I concur with Jennifer Hyndman (2010), who makes the case that space, conceptualized as a medium to be constantly negotiated, confers agency to migrants and the potential to bring out change.

Doreen Massey’s (1994) concept of power-geometry can be integrated into the conceptualization of space as a medium for negotiation. As they move between what Mahler and Pessar (2006) term geographical scales and along the social location continuum, migrants can negotiate the existing power hierarchies, rather than simply being affected by them. Hence, space as a medium of negotiation, rather a location on the ground, allows for “a materialized sense of agency and potential change on the part of refugee migration strategies and outcomes” (Hyndman 2010: 454) and “creates possibilities for (re)construction and (re)negotiation of gender and other social relations” (Grabska 2011: 81). In other words, viewed as mediums of negotiation, these spaces allow migrants to adjust social relationships, economic resources, and political networks that structure their lives.

My study focuses on the ways in which female and male Dinka forced migrants from Bor negotiated new or maintained customary forms of power and status during asylum and after their return to Bor. In this analysis, pre-departure, asylum and repatriation locations are not viewed in isolation. Rather, the analysis conceives three
locations to be fluid and interconnecting fields where social relationships, economic resources, and political networks that structure a person’s life transcend national borders. These migrants were operating on several geographical scales and social locations at the same time and in different physical locations. A Dinka forced migrant who resettled in the United States must, for example, negotiate and renegotiate the differing power geometries within, say, the Kakuma refugee camp in northern Kenya, the United States, and Bor, South Sudan as well as between these locations.

**Migration as a New Site for Raising Gender Consciousness**

Asylum for many women and men is an opportunity for raising gender consciousness. Asylum is a location where gendered norms, relations, and behaviors, which differ from one’s own culture, can be observed. It is also a place that can raise awareness to the gendered inequality inherent in the Dinka culture’s gendered practices and norms. It is a location where refugees not only see, but also are often forced to practice new concepts of gender and personhood (Chrostowsky and Long 2013; Behera 2006; O’Kane 2006; Chrostowsky 2005; Constable 2004; Pessar 2001; Matsuoka and Sorenson’s 1999; Krulfed 1994). Moreover, such experiences provide the raw material for forced migrants to imagine that change is possible in their lives.

In my study (2005) on the role of asylum location on refugee adjustment strategies, I found that Sudanese refugees who took asylum in Cairo, Egypt prior to resettlement in San Diego had different adjustment strategies and patterns than South Sudanese refugees who took asylum in Kakuma prior to resettlement in San Diego. In Cairo, most male Sudanese refugees, lacking education and skills and facing rampant
racism, were unable to obtain employment. South Sudanese women, on the other hand, were skilled and employable as housekeepers in Cairo homes. In a reversal of customary roles, migrant men in Cairo found themselves dependent on their wives for income and survival. They also spoke of their fears that their wives would leave them for another African man who could find employment. This combination of their husbands’ dependence and their fear of abandonment, both emotionally and economically, enabled South Sudanese wives to attain positions of power in the family unknown to women in South Sudan prior to asylum in Cairo. A deeply engrained, customary power hierarchy that had justified women’s subordinate role to men as natural and unavoidable in Sudan, was radically disrupted in Cairo and hence, women began to question customary gendered norms, relations, and practices.

**Refugee and Repatriation Studies: A Feminist Approach**

Guided by a feminist approach, I address forced migration and repatriation in terms of a patriarchal context. I do not seek to present women as victims, which in the words of Hajdukoswki-Amed et al. (2008) tends to pathologise the “countries of origin as horrifically misogynistic and patriarchal societies, and as a consequence it racializes identities and violence as cultural-specific” (p. 6). Rather, I explore a space for women’s agency and highlight the strategies women use to deal with gender inequality. Behera (2006) noted that refugee scholars question the “stereotypical essentialising of women as ‘victims’ that denies their agency and assumes universal, simplified definitions of such phenomenon” (p. 46). I also share this concern and attempt to avoid such essentialising
and reveal the complexity of the repatriation experience and avoid the use of refugee women-as-victim imagery.

However, I do not neglect the male experience. Like Christou (2006), di Leonardo (1991), and Hirsh (1999), I believe it is not possible to understand gender without examining the experiences of both women and men. Men’s preferences and concepts of manhood place constraints on women’s preferences and practice of womanhood. To gain a full understanding of Dinka gendered norms and relations, I examine the experiences of both Dinka men and women over time (pre-departure, asylum, and post-repatriation) and across space (Bor before the war, Khartoum or Kakuma, and in Bor Town after return).
Chapter 3 Ethnographic Setting

Introduction

Chapter three presents an ethnographic account of Bor, Jonglei State, South Sudan where I conducted 14 months of research. I begin with a description of Sudan, including its terrain and climate, its population and health statistics, and its colonial and economic development. I gradually narrow my account as I move from the country of Sudan, to the region of South Sudan, to Jonglei State, and finally to Bor. In the final section, I provide a description of the customary gendered norms and relations among the Dinka Bor that are the focus of this dissertation.

Regional Background

Sudan

Before the separation of Sudan into two autonomous countries on July 9, 2011, Sudan was the largest country on the African continent, “slightly more than one-quarter the size of the US” (World Fact Book 2011). Its population, an estimated 39 million people (see Table 5), is as diverse as its ecological systems (see Appendix 5). Sudan’s tropical and mountainous south slowly transforms northward into the flat and featureless plains of savanna, and then into arid deserts in the far north. The people of Sudan are as varied as its climate and terrain. As one moves across the country, ethnicity and religious practices differ from location to location (see Appendix 6). The south alone has more than 200 ethnicities (see Appendix 7). And while Arabs and Sunni Muslims dominate the

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12 My research in 2009-2010 took place in what was called Southern Sudan, a semi-autonomous region established in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the civil war between the north and south of Sudan. In July 2011, the southern region of Sudan voted for independence from Sudan and is now the Republic of South Sudan.
north, the south is made up predominately of Christians and those practicing indigenous beliefs.

Like its terrain and population, Sudan’s history is also complex, filled with foreign conquest and occupation, colonialism, and two civil wars. Together these events not only created the division of Sudan into two political entities, but they also created great development disparities between the two halves of the country. During periods of occupation and colonialism, the south of Sudan had limited access to external markets and large-scale economic investment was concentrated in the north. The south lagged behind in education, economic development, and involvement in the government and administration of the country compared to the north (Johnson 2003).

This recent history has left Sudan, especially the south, at the bottom of most world indexes on economy, education, and health. On the 2007/8 Human Development Index, Sudan ranks 147th out of 177 countries. The same report states that among Sudan’s 39 million people, life expectancy at birth is 58.9 years for women and 56 for men. Almost half of Sudan’s women, 48%, are illiterate, as are 29% of the men (Human Development Index 2007/08).

TABLE 8. Population of Sudan pre-2008 by Region, Sex, and Household*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Household**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>39,154,490</td>
<td>19,080,513</td>
<td>20,073,977</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>8,260,490</td>
<td>3,973,190</td>
<td>4,287,300</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei State</td>
<td>1,358,602</td>
<td>624,275</td>
<td>734,327</td>
<td>204,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bor</td>
<td>221,106</td>
<td>104,920</td>
<td>116,186</td>
<td>34155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bor</td>
<td>61,716</td>
<td>29,072</td>
<td>32,644</td>
<td>8,959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Household units were not defined in census document.
**Sudanese Second Civil War: 1983-2005**

The Second Sudanese civil war is most often described as war between the Christian, black south and the Arab north, leading many to believe is was a religious or ethnic war, but there were multiple root causes of this conflict. For example, the north’s shipments of weapons to certain ethnic groups in the south resulted in increased inter-tribal conflicts and deaths there. It also became clear that the north was more concerned with the extraction of resources from the south than its development, which is best demonstrated with construction of the Jonglei Canal. This project, proposed by the north, would help meet the needs of planned agro-industrial expansion in both Egypt and the north of Sudan (Johnson 2003), but would also simultaneously drain the water from the Nile tributaries upon which Jonglei inhabitants were dependent for their crops and cattle.\(^{13}\) Further inciting tensions between the north and south was the failure by the north to reduce its troop levels in the south, which the north agreed to in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. These actions by the north, along with the south’s struggle for governance and control over two of its most precious resources, oil and water, contributed to the eventual Second Civil War.

During the 22 year war, the destruction of lives, homes, and infrastructure occurred solely in the south of Sudan. This devastation and insecurity left many living in the region with no choice but to flee in search of safety. According to UNHCR, the Second Sudanese Civil War created an estimated four million displaced persons of whom 500,000 took asylum outside Sudan in Kenya, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Chad, Uganda, and Egypt. With the help of UNHCR, some refugees who fled to Kenya and

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\(^{13}\) Construction on the canal began in 1978, but was never finished. From the beginning, political instability and conflict hindered any progress. The project came to an end as the Second Civil War began and Jonglei was rife with conflict. Today, the rusted remains of the digger used in the construction remains.
Egypt were resettled to third countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia for permanent residence.

On January 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that included a permanent ceasefire and accords on wealth and power sharing, ending the Second Sudanese Civil War. According to the CPA, after an interim period of five years the south would vote for either unity with the north or for independence. On January 9, 2011, 99% of the southern population voted for independence from the north. On July 9, 2011 independence was claimed and the new nation-state of the Republic of South Sudan was born (see Figure 1).

South Sudan

South Sudan is currently struggling to rebuild and recover from more than two decades of the Second Civil War, which left an estimated two million people dead, four million displaced, and more then 500,000 living as refugees outside the country. The war impeded the growth of southern infrastructure and economy, and destroyed the small infrastructure that existed before the war. Schools, hospitals, and entire villages were destroyed. Roads and bridges were left to deteriorate and fall to waste. During this time, subsistence patterns, such as food production and pastoralism, were severely curtailed by fighting and displacement, as well as by recurrent droughts and floods.

Despite the signing of the CPA in 2005, which brought an end to the conflict between north and south and the hope for development in the south, the south remains undeveloped. As a result, each year thousands of South Sudanese face food shortages.
Sudan is the World Food Program’s (WFP) largest operation in the world. In 2010, WFP provided food assistance for 11 million people in Sudan (WFP 2011). According to the 2009 National Baseline Household Survey (Southern Sudan Centre For Census Statistics and Evaluation 2010), 83% of South Sudan’s estimated population of 8.26 million lived in rural areas in mud wattled and thatched roof huts; 27% of the adult population is literate; only 55% of the population had access to improved sources of drinking water; and 38% of the population had to walk for more than 30 minutes one way to collect drinking water (SSCCSE 2009). The Southern Sudan Centre For Census Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE) estimated that in 2009 the average per capita consumption in Southern Sudan was 100 Sudanese Pounds (SDG) per person per month, or US$42 (units per SDG .420). In urban areas, the average consumption was 168 SDG ($70.56) per person per month compared to 88 SDG ($36.96) per person in rural areas. South Sudan, estimated to be roughly the size of France, has only 50 kilometers [30 miles] of paved roads and almost no public electrical power. It also lacks public water and sanitation systems (Voice Of America 2011).

From 2009-2010, several states in the south, particularly Jonglei, experienced an increased level of insecurity. In 2009, Jonglei ranked first among South Sudanese states most affected by ethnic conflicts. The causes of the conflict ranged from cattle raiding and child abduction to competition over scarce resources such as green pasture and water.¹⁴ The death toll due to the ethnic conflict in the Jonglei State in 2009 alone reached over 1,500 people (Sudan Tribune 2010).

¹⁴ Local, government, and UN officials have recorded incidences of child abduction and assisted in the release of abducted children. At present, the reasons for such behavior are unclear. Participants in my study believe that the Murle steal Dinka and Nuer children because of low fertility rates in the Murle community, but there is no empirical data to substantiate this claim.
From mid-September through mid-November of 2009, while I was conducting my research, the only road connecting Bor with Juba, the capital of South Sudan, was closed for security reasons (see Figure 3). Conflicts on this road displaced 354 households, or 1,662 individuals, from their homes (SSRRC/Field notes October 2009). Because of multiple armed conflicts between the Murle and Dinka ethnic groups, along with an increasing number of attacks on commercial vehicles along the road, United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) declared the road a high security risk and restricted all UN employees and vehicles from traveling this route.

In the first two months of 2010 alone, there were 70 interethnic conflicts in which 450 people were killed and nearly 60,000 people were displaced (Sudan Tribune 2010). Conflict in Jonglei State between the Nuer and Murle ethnic groups began in Pibor County and spread to Akobo and Wandin Counties (Sudan Tribune 2010). Concerns over the possibility of further clashes and attacks resulted in increased UN security levels and mandatory armed escorts along both the Pibor-Akobo road and the Bor-Juba road (see Figure 3) (Sudan Tribune 2010, UNMIS personal interview). Since the declaration of the April 2010 elections, intertribal fighting and cattle raiding have increased, as have the recurring attacks on military outposts and staff by George Athro and his soldiers.15

This volatile security situation had major effects on local subsistence patterns and the level of hunger and malnutrition in the area. Women and men feared returning to their fields and were unable to harvest their crops in the fall of 2009. Thousands of cattle were

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15 George Athro turned against the South Sudan’s army, SPLA, after his unsuccessful bid for the Jonglei State Governorship in the April 2010 general election. He alleged fraud in state elections for governor of Jonglei State and called for the SPLM to loosen its complete control of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). He was killed on December 19, 2011 in a two-hour firefight with the government forces in Marobo County in Central Equatoria State.
stolen during the interethnic conflicts. Finally, as roads were deemed security threats and closed to travel, many people in great need did not receive food aid.

**Jonglei State**

Vast areas of savanna cover Jonglei. The areas that border the White Nile and other rivers and their tributaries become vast swamps during and after the rainy season. Livestock rearing (primarily cattle and goat) and agriculture (mainly sorghum, corn, and sesame) are the main source of food for the majority of the population. Subsistence practices are sometimes supplemented with fishing. The largest and most populous of the 11 states in South Sudan, Jonglei (see Figure 3), is inhabited by six tribes: Dinka, Nuer, Murle, Anyuak, Jie and Ngalam (see Appendix 7). The Dinka make up the largest population, followed by the Nuer. Jonglei State has been a locus of politics and fighting for decades, beginning with the mutiny that led to the creation of Anyanya Two in 1975, followed by the failed Jonglei Canal project in the early 80s, the second mutiny of Anyanya in 1983, and the Bor massacre in 1991. Most recently, Jonglei has been plagued by attacks directed by George Athro in response to perceived fraud the SPLM in the April 2010 elections.

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16 In 1975 a group that opposed the Addis Abba Agreement sought to liberate the south of Sudan from the north with an uprising in Akobo, Jonglei State. These southerners then fled the country to neighboring Ethiopia and formed Anyanya II (Johnson 2003).

17 The Jonglei Canal project was designed to divert water from the south to the north to meet the needs of the planned agro-industrial expansion in both Egypt and northern Sudan. Construction on the canal began in the Jonglei State in the south of Sudan, but was halted in 1984 by the SPLA (Johnson 2003).

18 In February 1983 the Sudanese army battalion stationed in Bor, Jonglei State was ordered to hand over their weapons before their transfer to the north. This battalion, made up of 200 ex-Anyanya troops, refused and mutinied. Desertions and mutinies in other southern garrisons soon followed (Johnson 2003).

19 On November 15, 1991, Bor was destroyed by SPLA-Nasir soldiers, a splinter faction of SPLA whose aim was to replace the leader John Garang. Lead by Riek Machar, the attack resulted in the death and displacement of thousands Dinka Bor (Sudan Tribune 2012).
FIGURE 3: Jonglei State

Map by author. Adapted from Map No. 3707 Rev. 10 United Nations April 2007. Scale is approximate.
TABLE 9. Selected 2010 Health Statistics: Sweden, United States, Kenya, & South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sweden*</th>
<th>United* States</th>
<th>Kenya*</th>
<th>Jonglei, South Sudan**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population with access to health care</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality per 1000 births</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5 mortality per 1000 births</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Morality rate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underweight children under five</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>39.5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2010 World Health Organization  
** 2010 Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan

Table 9 provides a comparison between four nations on four health statistics often used by organizations, such as the UN, to rank health statuses in countries around the world. Compared to its African neighbors and to developed nations, Jonglei State fares poorly. According to the Sudan Population and Housing Census, only 72% of the Jonglei population has access to healthcare, infant mortality is 74 for every 1,000 live births, the under five mortality rate is 108 per 1000 live births, maternal mortality is 1862 per 100,000 live births, and underweight among children under five is 39.5 moderate-severe/16.9 severe (Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2010).

**Gender and Educational Access**

South Sudanese children lacked educational opportunities during the civil war. With schools being destroyed, teachers fleeing as insecurity increased, and salaries not being paid, educational conditions in South Sudan were among the poorest in the world (UN Sudan IG 2011). As of 2009, only 37% of the population above the age of six in Jonglei had ever attended school (SSCCSE 2010). Ironically, forced migrants who fled south to Kakuma, Kenya, had better access to formal education than those who remained in the south (Chrostowsky and Long 2013; Epstein 2010).
Currently, educational conditions in South Sudan are still among the poorest in the world. Jonglei State, the most populated state in the south, has only 288 primary schools (UN Sudan IG 2011). Bor, with an estimated population of 61,716, has only 11 schools (Gurong Trust 2011). While some of the schools in Bor have benefited from the aid provided by local NGO agencies, the funding was targeted to build classrooms. Bor schools suffer from a lack of qualified teaching staff, desks, library books, and texts.

Duot Ajang Dut, a senior official in the Ministry of Education Government of South Sudan (GoSS), named Jonglei as among several states in South Sudan with the highest school drop out rates (Sudan Tribune 2011). He said that according to the Basic Education Statistics report of 2009/10, released by the Ministry of Education, Form two has the highest number of student dropouts. The report states that the main reasons students drop out of school are truancy (36.2%) and pregnancy (20.4%). The report also shows that dropouts caused by pregnancies and early marriage for girls increased from 10.3% in 2008 to 20.4% in 2009.

According to Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces in South Sudan (RALS), within Jonglei State the most common reasons children do not attend school include distance from school and because they are needed at home for work, followed by the lack of materials at schools, early age of marriage, and a belief that young children should not attend school (UNICEF 2006).

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20 Other population estimates of Bor are closer to the 40,000. The discrepancy lies in the borders the census recognizes. The 2008 Bor Census conducted by Southern Sudan Centre For Census Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE) estimates the population to be 61,716, including the surrounding areas around Bor town.
21 The John Garang Institute of Science and Technology is a branch of Free International University of Moldova, located in Bor. The Moldovan firm, ASCOM Sudd Ltd., who agreed in 2005 to build and fund the institute, is one of the companies prospecting for oil in Jonglei State.
22 Form two is equivalent to the tenth grade in the U.S. school system.
23 Truancy means absenteeism, so this may seem a redundant reason for the dropout rate, but it is indeed one of the two reasons given by the report.
**Dinka Bor**

To understand how the asylum location lead to changes in customary Dinka Bor gendered norms and relations requires understanding their lifestyle before forced displacement. In this section, I describe Dinka Bor livelihood strategies, settlement patterns, and gendered practices before displacement. Many Dinka Bor who live in rural areas today continue to practice these customary life ways.

The Dinka are agro-pastoralists who follow a patrilineal descent pattern, practice patrilocal residence patterns, and bridewealth at marriage (Beswick 2004; Jok 1999a; Cohen and Deng 1998; Deng 1986, 1972, 1971). According to my informants, Dinka Bor villages were inhabited by members from the same clan. *Bia calic*, or compounds (sometimes called hamlets), were often separated by fields, but within eyesite of each other. A compound was typically comprised of a male head-of-household, his wife or wives, and his children. It was also common for the compound of an eldest son to contain his aged parents. At marriage, a son would build his own compound close to his father’s.

Typical of the house-property systems so widespread among patrilineal subsistence societies in Sub-Saharan African, each wife had her own hut, called *yoot tit*, where she would sleep with her children, her own *mach tharr*, or cooking hearth, and *guu*, or granary. The male head-of-household had his own hut, called *yoot muth*. Many compounds also had a *luak*, or cattle barn, where the cattle were kept and the men and young boys would often sleep with the cattle.

Animal husbandry dominated Dinka life and acute fluctuations in seasonal temperatures and rain required the Dinka to migrate during part of the year in search of green pasture and water for their herds of cattle. Although the Dinka Bor practiced a
transhumant pastoral life, they spent most of their time in villages (Deng 1973). Only after the grasses and waters began to dry up in the dry season, (according to my informants, January), did the Dinka Bor begin to move with their cattle in search of green pasture and water. When the group found an area with good grazing and water, the women and men would set up a temporary camp where they would remain until the grasses and water were again scarce. The elderly, sick, and breastfeeding women remained in the permanent village with several milking cows, while the men, remaining women, and children moved with the cattle. The group was lead by a designated male leader called beny-wor,24 or cattle camp leader, who decided when the camp would begin to move again. When the group was moving, the women and children carried the gourds of milk and other dairy products. Among the men, some were responsible for driving the herds while others moved ahead of the group in search of a new site (Deng 1973). When the rains began, typically around April, the group returned to the permanent village and the fields to begin preparing them for planting. Among the Dinka Bor, cattle are an essential part of their food supply and cultural practices: including marriage (bridewealth), religion (sacrifice to appease ancestral spirits), lineage maintenance, homicide compensation, male initiation, and naming of children.

**Gender Norms and Relations**

In this section, and throughout the dissertation, I discuss past and present gendered identities among the Dinka. Gendered identity is a process of personal choices an individual makes within a given social experience. Using the experiences of forced

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24Beny means leader in Dinka and wor means cattle camp. According to my informants, the community chose the beny-wor based on his personal manners, experience, and wealth (the number of cattle he owns).
Dinka migrants in Bor, I show how gendered identity is shaped and expressed by an individual’s strategic choices, which are informed by one’s imagined concept of selfhood and one’s agency given one’s spatial, social, and cultural location.

According to my informants, roles and responsibilities in the village and cattle camp were customarily divided up by age and gender. Information gathered from my informants also shows that these cultural practices created a marked gender stratification in which men had many more avenues for prestige than did women. In this section, I use information gathered through interviews to help the reader develop an understanding of customary gender relations and gender stratification among the Dinka.

Reinforcing earlier research on the Dinka, my interviewees emphasized Dinka men’s full responsibility for the care of the cattle (Deng 1986, 1972; Leinhardt 1961). Men herded the cattle to pasture and water, coated them with ash to protect them from flies, diagnosed and cared for sick cattle, and guarded the cattle from wild animals. Men also were responsible for guarding their family and clan from attacks by other tribes. Men collected the wood needed to build the frame of a hut or cattle barn, called a *luak*, and were responsible for mudding the frame. During the planting season, men helped the women clear the fields and plant the seeds. Although wives customarily voiced their opinions about family matters to their husbands in private, it was the man of the family who had the final say on all family matters, i.e. movement, marriage, and cattle to be bought or sold. Among the Dinka, only men could be chiefs. It also was customary for young men to raid other tribes, stealing cattle to increase the number they could offer as bridewealth for marriage. Because women were needed for cooking and fetching water,
some women accompanied the men on the migration, but the seasonal migration was decided and directed by the men.

Young boys (before initiation, 13-15 years old) were responsible for collecting the cattle dung in the morning and laying it out to dry. In the morning, they untethered the cattle that would be driven to pasture by the men. At the end of the day, as the men returned with the cattle, young boys assisted in retethering the cattle and goats. Young boys also collected wood for the fires that were lit to protect the cattle and the goats during the night. Occasionally, a young boy would be enlisted to milk a cow. The rest of the day young boys were free to play.

Women were the primary children’s caregivers (as men were absent most of the day with the cattle) and were responsible for the majority of work needed to maintain the compound. These activities included cleaning the compound, milking cows, making milk by-products, fetching water, preparing meals, washing cooking utensils, and if applicable, washing clothes and bedding. While men built the scaffolding, it was the women who smeared the mudded walls\(^\text{25}\) and floor, cut grass for the roof, and attached the roofing on the mud hut. Women also were the primary actors in agricultural activities. Husbands and male kin often helped clear the land and plant the seeds, but women were fully responsible for deciding when to harvest, what produce from the harvest to store, and how much to prepare each day for meals. Women were also primarily responsible for producing, managing, and distributing the milk supply. Once they became physically capable, young girls performed the same daily chores as their mothers and were often

\[^{25}\text{Men were responsible for putting the mud onto the wood frame of the hut, but the women were responsible for smearing, or smoothing, the mud into a flat and level wall.}\]
responsible for watching over their younger siblings while their mothers worked in the fields or attended to the compound.

Customarily, the Dinka Bor agro-pastoral society did not fully take part in the cash market. Money was not valued or believed to be a viable investment. Therefore, grain was not sold to accumulate money, but only for the purchase of necessary items or more cattle. Any surplus of grain would be traded for a cow or bull, rather then sold for cash. Only when an individual or family needed a particular item, such as medicine, would a cow or bull be sold for money.

FIGURE 4: Rural Dinka Bor Compound and Cattle Barn. (Photo by author)

Dinkahood

The men and women who I interviewed described a good Dinka husband or father as one who cared for his wife and children and would protect them with his life. A good husband was respectful, strong, brave, and generous to his family and clan. He was a hard worker and never failed to fulfill his many kinship responsibilities. Several cultural
practices, along with statements by informants, provide convincing evidence that among
the Dinka Bor, children were of the utmost importance. A goal of all Dinka Bor was to
marry and produce many children. A Dinka man with many cattle could marry several
women and, hence, produce many children, making him, in the eyes of other Dinka, a
very “rich” man. The more wives he had, and particularly the more children he produced,
the more status he gained in his community.

A good Dinka wife was described by my informants as well behaved and
respectful to her husband and his family. She kept a clean compound, cared for her
children, and cooked well. She was a gracious host who welcomed and entertained all
guests. At marriage, a young woman was wife not only to her husband, but also to his
family. She was obligated, without complaint, to carry out any request by her brother-in-
laws and father-in-law. For example, she could not refuse to wash the clothes of an
unmarried brother-in-law, despite her busy schedule. A good wife produced many
children and would not fight with her co-wives. It also was expected that once married, a
good wife would remain at home. She did not move about other than to fetch water or
work in the field. Her sole travels were to visit her mother and then, only with her
husband’s permission.

Generational Dinkahood

Data collected through my interviews also revealed that daily roles and
responsibilities were not only gendered, but also determined by age or generation. As
powerful as the cultural norms that dictate gendered behavior, roles, and responsibilities,
strong cultural norms, based on age also dictated roles and behaviors between
generations. It was also through generation and age that orders of power, status, and authority among men and women were established and accessed (Hodgson 2000; Udvardy and Cattell 1992). The Dinka had a great respect for age and viewed the elderly as knowledgeable and wise (Deng 1972).

The life histories of my informants illustrated how age directed some of the most important life events. Most significant were the rules that dictated the order of marriage, wife-inheritance, and male seniority in a family. Male and female siblings were always married in order of birth, oldest to youngest. Wife-inheritance, elsewhere called levirate marriage, obligated the dead man’s eldest living brother to marry his dead brother’s widow.26 And finally, male seniority fell to the oldest son upon death of the father.

I was also told that as Dinka men and women aged, not only did their responsibilities change, but also the rules that govern their behavior altered. As a man aged, his oldest living son would slowly begin to take on not only the burden of his aging father’s physical responsibilities, but also the role as head of the family. The aged man who could no longer take part in the daily physical tasks or maintain his role as head of the family, became the family advisor (Deng 1972). Respect for a man’s age demanded that “an elder must be consulted and heard” even if he was not obeyed and even opposed (Deng 1972:118). Often an elder man would be asked to appear before the chief or in court. He was viewed as both wise and knowledgeable on Dinka culture and life. Deng (1972) notes that “[t]he attitude of the Dinka toward their elders is not altogether voluntary, for they believe that elders are next to the ancestors in their power to curse” (p.119). Thus, it was difficult for a son or family member to defy the advice of an elder.

26 Under certain circumstances, such as age and wealth, the family may encourage a different male relative to inherit a wife.
Elder men, free from daily responsibilities, were free to move about, socialize and drink beer.

Life for a Dinka woman also changed as she aged. As a woman entered the post-menopausal life stage, she would begin to do less work in the compound. Her roles and responsibilities would slowly be taken over by her first son’s wife or a young co-wife. According to my informants, it was not unusual for an aging wife to encourage her husband to take a younger wife (Deng 1972). A young new wife would assist with or took over responsibilities for strenuous work and represented the possibility for more babies and small children in the compound (Deng 1972), a source of joy for all Dinka. As an elder woman, viewed as knowledgeable and wise, she would now be called on for advice on childbearing and child sickness. Unlike a girl or younger woman, a post-menopausal woman was free from daily responsibilities and free to move about and socialize.

**Bor Town**

This section begins with a physical description of Bor town (markets, infrastructure, layout), followed by an experiential description of life in Bor today, including daily practices, livelihoods, sights, and sounds. It is important to understand the ways in which the urban environment of Bor differs not only in physical makeup, but also how the daily practices and experiences of those living in Bor town differs from that of life in the rural pre-displacement setting.

Bor is located on the White Nile and is a port of call for the few ferries that traverse the White Nile from Juba to Khartoum (see Figure 3). It is the capital and
political center of Jonglei State. It is home to the state courts, Governor’s office, ministry offices and state prison. According to the 2008 Bor Census, Bor’s population is 61,716, (32,644 male; 29,072 female; and 8,959 households). Dinka Bor 27 make up the largest percent of the population, but they are joined by Dinka Twic East, Dinka Aliab, Nuer, and a small number of Shilluk and Anyuak. Also living in Bor are a substantial number of northern Sudanese, Ethiopians, Ugandans, and Kenyans who are primarily business owners or workers. A number of non-African aid workers and UN Peace Keepers living on the UNMIS, UNHCR, and NGO compounds are located in Bor.

FIGURE 5: Marol Market. (Photo by author)

The town has a sub-tropical climate affected by two seasons: rainy (April - October) and dry (November - May) in which daytime temperatures can exceed 105 °F. During the rains, the dirt roads that cross the town and the markets become inundated

27 The Dinka do not form a single ethnic group, but are instead an aggregate of more than twenty-five political units that vary in number and have no political center (Johnson 2003). Each group occupies a stretch of land that is separated by natural boundaries such as rivers or swamps (Lienhardt 1958). For example, among the Dinka Abyei it is customary to transfer 50 cattle as bridewealth and among the Dinka Bor the customary number is 30. There are also differences in language and scarification practices among other customs.
with water and mud, making a simple trip to the market difficult, time consuming, and dirty. Bor has one of only a few dirt airstrips in the state. Air flight as a means of travel is used primarily by UN, NGO, and government employees when the few existing roads are impassable due to rains or a security risk. Despite its position as the state’s political center, Bor has few modern resources or amenities. You will not see electric lines or water taps and all but a few of the buildings (such as the Governor’s office, ministries, hospital and some schools) are mud-thatched huts.

The most common illnesses affecting the population in Bor County include malaria, malnutrition, diarrhea, respiratory infections, trachoma, brucellosis and tuberculosis. The Bor Public Hospital, located on the main road in Bor, is the largest hospital in the state, but lacks adequately trained staff, many basic facilities, and proper medicines. Hospital buildings are old and its walls are riddled with gunshot holes. A set of six water taps and three sets of pit latrines service the hygiene sanitary needs of the entire hospital staff and all the patients. Windows screens, necessary to keep out the malaria carrying mosquitoes, are full of holes or often completely missing. And the hospital has no mosquito nets to provide to patients. Patients must rely on their families for food and personal care, like washing. The hospital pharmacy often runs out of critically needed drugs, forcing patients to go to privately owned clinics which charge high prices and are often operated by individuals who are uneducated and lack training about the pharmaceuticals they sell. Between 2005 and 2007, Doctors without Borders (MSF) and other international donors helped the hospital’s patient capacity grow from 66 to 100 beds (MSF 2008). MSF was also responsible for improving the hospital’s surgical theater (MSF 2008), but by 2010, MSF had left Bor because of security concerns.
Therefore, affected by a high number of returnees and high insecurity, Jonglei State is in great need of humanitarian aid. Bor is headquarters for many NGO and UN agencies working in Jonglei State including: Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Cooperative Housing, Foundation International (CHF), Polish Humanitarian Organization (PHO), Handicap International, INTERSOS, Peace Wind Japan, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Save the Children, Samaritans Purse, UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and UN World Food Programs (UNWFP) (see Figure 3).

**FIGURE 6. White Nile Bor Port. Barge arriving from Khartoum. (Photo by author)**
FIGURE 7. SSRRC Food Distribution Center, Bor, Jonglei State. (Photo by author)

FIGURE 8. Dinka woman displaying her embroidery. (Photo by author)
FIGURE 9. Rain flooding walking path between compounds.  
(Photo by author)

FIGURE 10. Marol Market after a rain.  
(Photo by author)
FIGURE 11. Crocodile stranded in gully behind my home. (Photo by author)
Aid from the Global North has become not only a normal part of daily life in Bor, but also expected by the residents there. The traffic on the roads through town is made up...
predominantly of NGO and UN Land Cruisers. Public facilities such as the hospital, prison, and the secondary and high school buildings are flanked with signs that announce which agency, or agencies, were responsible for their construction. The completion of any building in Bor is celebrated with a large ceremony in which the local politicians and agency staff involved are feted and thanked. Each daily sighting of UN and NGO vehicles is a visual reminder of the great need for development and the disadvantages with which the Bor residents cope.

The barges on the White Nile carry market items and passengers to and from Bor (see Figure 6). Many refugees returning from Khartoum arrive in Bor via these barges. Despite the role of the river in Bor life, homes and businesses are located away from the river. There are three markets in Bor, all located on the main road. The largest market is located in the center of town and there is a small market along the main road leading into the town. The third is a cattle market located on the main road heading out of town (see Figure 3). Northern merchants own most of the shops in the largest market, while most restaurants are owned and run by Kenyans, Ugandans, and Ethiopians. In the markets, greens, milk, fish, wood and grasses are sold predominantly by local Dinka women.

The description of the physical geographical locations of Bor Town, its climate and infrastructure provide only the bare bones of experiencing this center for Dinka returnees to South Sudan. To understand how one experiences and feels the town when living in it, I offer this additional account.

In Bor, where I lived and conducted most of my research, the day begins early with the scent of a new fire and the calming swish of dry twigs brushing the ground as the

28 The placement of homes away from the riverside is due in part to the immense and unpredictable flooding that occurs during the rainy season and in part to the crocodiles and hippopotami that live in and on the banks of the river.
first young girl to awake sweeps the compound around the hearth and areas where people sit in the morning. Shortly, the adult men and women in the compound wake and exit their huts. A woman will stir the fire in the hearth to heat water for morning tea and hot milk.\textsuperscript{29} In some cases, left over food from last night’s dinner will be reheated for breakfast. Men sit by the hut and begin the day by washing their faces and brushing their teeth. The last to wake are the toddlers and young children who may cling to a \textit{koko} (grandmother) or \textit{kuar-kuar} (grandfather), while they wait for their hot milk.

As the sun quickly rises, heating the ground and air, the family takes refuge in the shade of a neem tree. The once quiet morning is now filled with people’s chatter, the clanging of pots, and in a few compounds, news booming from portable radios. The animals also add to the spirit of the morning as goats bleat, roosters crow and cattle bellow. Periodically, one hears the pounding of hooves and the cracking of sticks and dry grass on a nearby path under the cattle’s heavy tread. The yelps of a Dinka man leading his cattle to pasture punctuate the morning air.

In Bor, like their counterparts in rural villages, men are absent from the compound most of the day, returning at dusk in time for dinner. Some men head off to work while others spend the day with other men, often in the shade of a tree talking and playing cards or chess. With the departure of the men and those children enrolled in school off to classes, the women begin their many tasks for the day.

As the Land Cruisers pass along the main dirt road that runs through Bor in the dry season, they kick up and shower orange dust over the huts, market stalls, and people that line the road. While vehicular traffic is infrequent, small motorcycles carrying

\textsuperscript{29} Families without access to fresh cow milk will substitute it with powdered milk (Nido) and sweeten it with sugar.
individuals to and from the market, called “boda bodas,” continually zip past. The main road is bordered by aluminum stalls that sell tea, soda and/or beer, small food goods, and prepared food. Some stalls offer battery charging for mobile phones and several offer to wash clothes. Dinka men frequent local restaurants where servers and cooks are foreigners from Kenya, Uganda, or Ethiopia. Kenyan and Ugandan men and women also own several stalls for men’s and women’s hair care. Along the road, one’s ears are filled with the constant buzz of generators that compete with the music–Sudanese, Ethiopian, or Kenyan–that blares from old radios in the stalls.

The roadsides are filled with people constantly moving to and fro. Women carry items from the market on their heads and children on their backs. Tall Dinka men move fast with their long legged strides, sometimes leading a cow or goat to the market for sale. Bicycles that are often piled high with water jugs or other items for sale move along the road. During the rainy season, the dry orange dust turns into thick and slippery mud, making the road difficult to traverse. Now, along the road, people need to dodge mud spray from the trucks, try to avoid slipping, or keep flip-flops from being sucked into the mud.

Donkey carts led by Sudanese men, dressed in white jellabas, whose ethnic origins lie in the north, are also seen along the road. These men gather at markets, waiting for clients who purchase heavy items, such as 100 lb sacs of sorghum, or a large number of goods, such as bundles of wood for building for building a hut. At times you will need to walk around cattle that have settled down on the side of the road to lie and rest. Or, you may need to shoo away goats that are foraging for food along the roadside.
Moving away from the main road, you pass small pathways that weave through the homesteads. Here the noise of the road–traffic, music, and generators–disappears. The shower of dust is gone. Instead, the sounds of children playing and the pounding of millet fill the air. No longer competing with the noise of the road, the bellowing of cattle, the bleats of goats, and the crowing from roosters can be heard as they make their presence known. The areas around water pumps are crowded and noisy. Women talk and young girls play as they wait their turn to draw water. If the women are lucky, they can find some shade to hide from the hot sun and high temperatures. Several long lines of plastic jerry cans stretch out from the pump like tentacles of an octopus; each jerry can indicating a woman’s/family’s place in line. Further along the path, under one of the few trees in Bor, the voices of men can be heard as they play cards or chess. An occasional cheer rings out when someone wins.

During the rainy season the walking paths around the homes are not much easier to traverse than the main roads (see Figure 9). Sometimes you find yourself wading through water as high as your knees. Stories circulated about crocodiles being spotted in the larger pools of water, but I didn’t believe them. Until, that is, on the morning I awoke to find a young crocodile in the water that pooled behind my hut! The day before, heavy rains caused the White Nile to overflow, bringing the young crocodile outside its banks. The following morning, as the Nile water began to recede, this crocodile became stranded in the gully behind my hut (see Figure 11). Many fish that also came in with the flooded Nile waters had become stranded in the puddles along the roads and paths. Men, women, and children speared them--in some cases picked them up with their bare hands--and brought them home to eat.
Continuing Flow of Returnees to Bor

In 2009, there were still many families returning to Bor from where they had taken refuge after fleeing the civil war violence. Many returnees arrived by barge from Kosti and Khartoum in the north, while others returned on buses from other regions in South Sudan. Because of long distances and difficult travel conditions in South Sudan, most returnees arrived with few possessions. The large gatherings of newly returned women and children in front of the SSRRC office was another visual reminder of how integral humanitarian aid has become to the Bor life experience.

Once a returnee arrived, obtaining food became their biggest challenge. Returnees to Bor first take shelter with relatives or members of their clan. Without cattle, land, or a job, returnees are, however dependent for shelter and food on their extended families in Bor; families who are most likely strained by the high cost of living in the city. Already struggling, these families find the arrival of relatives, or clan members with their children (commonly numbering as high as eight), a huge strain on their resources.

UNHCR, in coordination with SSRRC, distributes a three-month food ration (provided by WFP) to Bor returnees. In order to receive food, families must first register with SSRRC, then return on a later date to be verified as a genuine returnee by SSRRC staff. Verification that families are new returnees to Bor is necessary for two reasons. First, the SSRRC must provide the WFP with an exact number of families and individuals that will be receiving food aid. Based on the verified numbers, the exact amount of food needed is then delivered from WFP to the SSRRC for distribution. Second, because of the desperate situation for many non-returnees living in Bor they
occasionally try to obtain food rations by claiming they have just returned to Bor when in fact they have been there for some time.

Once verified, new returnees arrive again to collect their food rations. The process of verification and food distribution is a chaotic, stressful, and confusing experience for returnees in need, which requires over two months to complete and entails many days of sitting in the hot sun waiting for one’s name to be called for verification and then several days of waiting in the sun to receive one’s food rations.

One (as I was) is struck by the large number of people surrounding the SSRRC office building. Hundreds of people--mostly women and children--swarm around the doors and windows, as others fight to sit in the few areas of shade under the two trees in the area. Others crouch close to the building to sit under the sliver of shade that comes from the edge of the jutting roof. Two or three women and/or young girls sell small packets of biscuits (cookies) or small fried dough balls. The wrappers from these biscuits litter the ground at the end of the day.

The SSRRC building is a two-room cement block building that is old and worn with a roof made from grasses (see Figure 12). The building is painted a light green with black trim around the bottom. The roof, doors, and window shutters are made of aluminum. Around the doors and windows, the cement plaster that covers the mud walls has begun to fall and recede. In the office, a generator operates two fans on the walls of each room and the single bare light bulbs that swing from cords from the middle of the ceilings. A SSRCC representative and a NGO/UN representative sit at each table to interrogate the family members, accept or reject them as returnees, and record the information. A third person, usually a SSRRC staff member, is responsible for calling out
the name of the next returnee family. Sometimes, locating a family requires that staff member to walk through the crowds calling out the returnee’s name.

The verification process may require several trips to the SSRRC location during each month’s verification period that may last from three days to a week. Names are called at random so families must come every day, and stay all day, hoping their name will be called. There is a limit to the number of families the SSRRC will verify each month. The frustration of having to sit in the sun for many days, and anxiety that they will not be called, creates a palpable tension in the air. For returnees this process is frustrating. Yelling and arguing among the returnees and between staff and returnees is common. If their names are not called during a verification period they will have to

**FIGURE 13: Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC)**
* Bor Office 2009. (Photo by author)

return the following month to be verified. If their names are called, families enter the office and sit at a table across from a SSRRC and UN/NGO staff member.
It is noisy in the small room. Conversations and yelling between the staff and returnees combine with noises from outside: the sound of feet shuffling in the sand; returnees talking, yelling, and arguing; children crying and playing; the crackle of unwrapping cookie packages. Together the sounds from inside and outside the room create a cacophony that is both frantic and soothing to the observer. The interview room is extremely hot; rivulets of perspiration collect on people’s foreheads and drip onto the table. The smell of sweating bodies fills the air. Flies buzz around, periodically landing on staff and interviewees’ arms and faces.

Those who are verified and receive a yellow food ration card must now wait until the end of the following month to receive their rations. Getting food is just as frustrating and time consuming as the verification process. In order not to miss their name being called, women arrive early.\textsuperscript{30} An entire group of newly verified returnees cannot be given its rations in one day;\textsuperscript{31} only 150 households can be accommodated daily, which means that many families have to return to the food distribution location several days in a row before they receive their rations.\textsuperscript{32}

As the sun sets in Bor the market stalls begin to close, but the restaurants and bars around the market remain open and full of life until late. The generators buzz loudly as Dinka men and foreigners alike listen to music or watch movies on small TVs. Dinka

\textsuperscript{30} If her name is called and she does not come forward, she must wait until the end of the distribution to collect her rations. In many cases, this means waiting until the staff is free to assist her. In some cases, the delay can be several days.

\textsuperscript{31} During my observations at SSRRC in Bor an average of 554 households each month were verified and provided food rations. See Table 2 in chapter one for a breakdown of households each month from September 2009 through June 2010 when the food distribution was ended by WFP.

\textsuperscript{32} It is important to recognize that problems with food distribution from humanitarian aid sources are often fraught with tensions, frustrations, and delays. I point out this aspect of life in Bor because while it is not unique, it is critical to understanding the return process and the daily life in Bor.
women do not move about in public at this hour. Public entertainment and socialization at night is for men only.

Back at the compound, despite the heat, families sit around a smoky fire. The mosquitoes in Bor are ubiquitous and relentless and the smoke keeps the mosquitoes at bay and allows the family to socialize and tell stories. Off the road, in the compounds, it is quiet. One hears only the sounds of nature—croaking frogs during the rains or chirping crickets during the heat. It is dark except for the flickering light from small fires and the canopy of stars above. Children fall asleep as their elders talk and reminisce about their youth and the time “before” when food was plenty and the cattle numerous.
Chapter 4 Displacement and Repatriation

Introduction

This chapter is divided into three parts, flight, asylum, and return, to reflect the process of migration of the Dinka Bor I studied. I begin by answering the following questions: Who fled, why did they flee, and where did they flee for asylum? Next, I describe the two asylum environments in which the participants in the study took asylum—Kakuma refugee camp and Khartoum. The chapter continues with an explanation of the difference between organized and spontaneous return, detailing the reasons why some refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) chose an organized return while others chose to return on their own. I examine how returning sooner, or later, affected a returnee’s resettlement and post-repatriation experience in Bor. Finally, I describe changes to the customary Dinka settlement pattern upon return to Bor and the major reasons for these changes.

Displacement

Largest Displaced Populations: Nuer and Dinka of Jonglei State

Combat between the north and south during the Second Civil War took place mostly on southern soil resulting in the displacement of large numbers of the southern population. According to UNHCR, the civil war created an estimated two million internally displaced southern Sudanese, of which 1,800,000 took refuge in Khartoum. In addition to IDPs, 500,000 refugees took asylum in Kenya, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Uganda, and Egypt (Global IDP 2005).
From the beginning of the Second Civil War, the Dinka and Nuer communities supplied the bulk of the guerilla forces, with much of the fighting between the north and south taking place in the Western Upper Nile, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Jonglei States (Hutchison 2000). Beginning in 1991, life in these regions became even more difficult as infighting within the SPLA increased and Dr. Riek Machar formed a breakaway fraction called SPLA-Nasir. The increasing south-on-south violence destroyed hundreds of Dinka and Nuer communities in these three regions (Hutchinson 2000) forcing the Dinka and Nuer to leave. As a result, the Dinka and the Nuer made up the largest number of those displaced during the war.

Motivations and Timing of Flight Varies

Most descriptions of refugee or IDP experiences, whether in a news journal or novel, began with a terrifying flight from their home during conflict. This image has become the story of a refugee’s experience. While this image is valid for some Dinka Bor forced migrants, according to the participants in my study, the motivations and timing of flight were not homogenous. Reasons for the flight of many Dinka Bor ranged from the fear of being attacked, to escape from hunger, to the need for health care, to seeking education. Among my participants, reasons for leaving Jonglei varied greatly between men and women (see Table 10). The data show that among women the most of cited reason for fleeing Bor was the war and for men the most cited reason for flight was due to conscription into the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA).
Migration typically was not the result of a single need or for one reason, but a combination of several factors. For some Dinka, flight was spontaneous and unplanned, while for others it was planned and well thought out. Those who had relatives in the SPLA were on occasion given rides in army vehicles, others received word from family in Kakuma about the services, and some waited for the arrival of aid agencies with food rations and left in the back of the empty trucks. The ability to plan in advance for one’s flight was an advantage and may have resulted in a less traumatic, safer, and quicker flight to asylum. Planning, however, did not always ensure that flight would succeed as intended, because fleeing South Sudan meant traversing a combat zone. A minority of my informants were forced Dinka migrants who endured days and weeks of walking through bush, with little food and water, others took a two week trip on a barge up the White Nile, and still others combined walking and riding on public transport. Some fled with family members; others fled alone after watching the loss of their family. Thousands of young boys who were conscripted into the SPLA were led on foot to Ethiopia.

Flight could have been a direct result of active conflict, in which individuals fled a town or village under attack without possessions and in disarray. But among my participants, flight most often occurred when there was no ongoing direct conflict or attack. Continuous fear of attack brought on by violence and knowledge of attacks on other towns and villages in the region could lead an individual, family, or even an entire
village to flee. Furthermore, violence in a region exacerbated hunger among the population. Individuals feared going to their fields or moving with their cattle. The farther people traveled from their village the more vulnerable they became to attack. As a result, crops were not planted or harvested, resulting in severe hunger for the village. Furthermore, most of the fighting took place during the dry season. It was also during the dry season that pastoral societies in South Sudan migrate with their cattle in search of water and green pasture. With the threat of violence, communities often delayed migration, or even failed to move with their cattle, resulting in the death of many or all of a family’s or village’s cattle.

Asylum for some came at the end of a long and circuitous journey. In the early 1980s, many young men were led by the SPLA to Ethiopia for education and military training. While some volunteered, others were forcibly taken. The SPLA demanded that each family give one child to the SPLA. Many of these young men eventually ended up in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in northern Kenya in the early 1990s and became known collectively as the “Lost Boys of Sudan.” Among the men in my study, 36.7% were conscripted into the SPLA.\textsuperscript{33}

The war broke down existing infrastructure, seriously compromising the existing educational and health services available to the southern population. As a result, many fled in search of educational options or medical services. Table 10 shows that for men, education was the second most cited reason for fleeing South Sudan.

\textsuperscript{33} No women in my study were conscripted into the SPLA.
The Walk to Safety is not A Straight Path

The image that has become the “story of a refugee’s experience” in which the asylum experience begins with a terrifying flight from home during conflict also imagines unplanned flight and arrival at a previously unknown destination. The reality for the Dinka Bor forced migrants in my study was much more complicated. Many forces came together to influence the flight routes they took and their eventual destination. Factors included closed or insecure roads, occupied villages and towns, knowledge of routes, money for and the availability of transportation, seasonality (rainy or dry), distance to one location over another, the presence of relatives or clan members in a location, and the availability of humanitarian assistance in a location.

Some of the Dinka forced migrants in my study had to detour around closed roads, points of high insecurity, or roads or towns occupied by soldiers or militia. The need to take such circuitous routes resulted in a much longer flight time or selecting an asylum destination other than the one they originally intended.

Transportation was also a factor in my informant’s flight experience or asylum destination. Travel on foot could take weeks or months and exposed the forced migrant to dangers they would be less likely to experience had they traveled by car, truck, barge, or plane. On foot they were exposed to wild animals and were more likely to suffer from hunger, disease, and violence. For the Dinka Bor forced migrants traveling on foot, the distance to an asylum location constrained their choices. Some informants forfeited an

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34 This section is informed by my 119 main interviews that focused on the asylum and return experience, as well as informal discussions with returnees about their flight experiences. While well over half of my sample volunteered their reasons for flight and described their flight experiences to me, this phase of the refugee experience was not the primary focus for my study, and I did not, therefore, systematically collect data on the flight experience of returnees.
asylum location where they had family because it was too far or too dangerous to reach. Knowledge of the terrain and roads also affected forced migrant Dinkas’ flight pattern.

Dinka men could easily find their way within the territory in which they spent their life migrating with cattle, but once they left this region, they needed assistance to travel. For youth or women, difficulty navigating arose sooner. Help could come from a kin member who had traveled outside the region or from an inhabitant of the area. But help from strangers was risky, especially when those fleeing found themselves in areas in which their tribe and the local tribe had a history of conflict.

For others, transportation rather than walking was an option. Some participants in my study were lucky enough to find a UN or NGO truck delivering humanitarian aid in South Sudan, which was willing to offer them a ride in the empty trucks. These trucks brought forced migrant Dinka to IDP camps in South Sudan or even to the border of South Sudan. Other participants in my study took the barge from Bor to Khartoum or had money and/or contacts to pay for public transportation. Whether traveling on foot or by transport, the seasonal conditions contributed to the decision to flee or to the act of flight. During the rainy season (April – October), travel was difficult and in some regions impossible, as large areas and roads became inundated with water. Roads not covered in water were thick with mud and often impassable.

Many Dinka Bor in my study chose asylum locations where relatives or clan members who had fled earlier settled. For example, once in Kakuma, many of the “Lost Boys” sent word back to their families that they were alive in Kakuma and spoke of the education, health, and food assistance available there. Many of their struggling family members in South Sudan then fled to Kakuma to take advantage of those services that
were so lacking in the war-ravaged south. Many Dinka Bor who fled to Khartoum were invited by a kin member who was living in the area. Also, movement from one IDP camp to another, or from Kakuma to other locations, was influenced by reuniting with family members, as well as the search of better living conditions.

For many Dinka, security and food assistance were of utmost importance, but many informants confided that they were also fleeing to improve their lives now and in the future. For example, some participants with children told me they considered an asylum’s educational opportunities when choosing where to flee. Young adults who wished to complete their secondary education or receive training in a trade often fled alone, leaving their family behind in South Sudan. It was also common for young men to jump from location to location in search of education and training.

**Vignette: Auyuen**

Auyuen (07-07-10) told me about his escape from the SPLA and how it was motivated by his desire for education. Born in Bor County in 1975 to a wealthy cattle keeper, Auyuen grew up in a rural village. He spent his days with his father tending cattle and his nights in the cattle barn protecting cattle from the hyenas and lions.

In 1990, at 15 years old, Auyuen was conscripted into the Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The soldiers told Auyuen and his family that he was going with the army ostensibly to receive education. Traveling by foot, Auyuen, the hundreds of other boys, and the soldiers, spent the better part of a year reaching their final destination--Palotaka, Eastern Equatoria. Upon arrival, he did not receive the promised education; he was trained as a soldier. Within one year of his arrival at Palotaka, at 16
years old, Auyuen said, “I found myself holding a gun.” Auyuen told me that he did receive a small amount of education here and there, under the trees, but he recognized that these minimal efforts by the army were done only to make the boys think they were being educated as promised. Auyuen said that the boys were less likely to run away if they believed they were going to receive an education.

One day Auyuen saw several of his age mates leaving. He continued, “[A] white man went to John Garang and said ‘Let me have these boys. They are good at drawing. I will bring them to be educated. They can profit from their drawing.’” John Garang agreed to allow the boys to go to the Ksubi Missionary in Uganda. Auyuen watched as these boys laid down their guns, changed into civilian clothes, and left with the white man. He said that he and the other boys watching “really shed tears. [Those boys] were going to school and we were left with guns.” The next day Auyuen went to his leader and asked him, “What is of us? Are we to die? How will it end?” He realized, then that the army, and probably death, was his future. Auyuen then decided to leave, to escape from the war and the SPLA. Leaving all his possessions, including his gun, on his bed, Auyuen ran. He said he ran through the bush as fast as he could. He tried to reach an uncle who was a Brigadier in the army and could help him cross the border. He successfully reached the border. In 1995, Auyuen entered Uganda and made his way to the Miriey Refugee Camp. There he attained his goal, the one that motivated him to escape the SPLA, by earning the equivalent of a high school diploma in 2002. When I interviewed Auyuen in 2010, he was studying law at the John Garang Institute in Bor.

35 John Garang was the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) during the Second Sudanese Civil War. After the signing of the CPS in January 2005 he served as the vice-president of Sudan and the first president of Southern Sudan. John Garang died in a helicopter crash in July 2005.
Vignette: Yar

Yar (09-18-10) was born in 1975, the fifth of seven children. Her family was from a small Dinka village in Bor County where they practiced an agro-pastoral subsistence pattern. She told me that she attended school, but after two years, her family refused to allow her return. Yar said her family believed that if she received an education it would be difficult for her to find a husband and obtain the bridewealth her brothers needed to marry. Yar’s childhood was typical. Each morning she helped her mother milk the cows, while her brothers collected the dung to dry, and her father took the cattle to graze.

But Yar’s life changed in 1988 when her mother died of a sickness and Yar began to menstruate. Among the Dinka Bor, a young girl’s first menstruation, *nyan akuay*, is a pivotal event and it is marked with the slaughter of a bull or a goat and a large celebration with dancing. The celebration announces to the community that their daughter was blessed with fertility and will in the future be a mother. But for Yar, this event was marred by her mother’s death and there was no celebration.

In 1993, the Nuer attacked Yar’s village. Many of the villagers fled to the bush, others were killed or captured. Yar was one of the women and children taken by force. She said the Nuer stripped them naked and forced them to carry the loot they stole from the huts of her family and the other village inhabitants. She told me that late in the day her Nuer captors decided to stop walking and ordered the women and children to sit. Yar was worried about her family. She did not know if they had fled the village safely or had been killed by the Nuer. But mostly, she was scared and did not want to go with these men. She decided to run. She told me she ran and successfully escaped, aided by the inability of her captors to chase her and maintain control over the other prisoners. After
hours of running, Yar found some Dinka men who were hiding in the bush. These men took her to the nearest SPLA location. The SPLA took her back to her village where she found that her father and family had survived the attack. But her father feared for his family’s safety. He remained behind with the cattle, but sent Yar and his other children to Magalatoria, an IDP camp located in Central Equatoria, South Sudan.

The following year, 1994, at 19 years of age Yar, met and married a soldier in Magalatoria. In June of that same year her husband became ill. In search of treatment, she and her husband traveled to Uganda. They remained in Uganda until 1997, living in the Donga refugee camp. Yar said she and her husband left Donga because they feared the tong tong (the Lord’s Resistance Army or LRA). The LRA had been brutally attacking villages around the camp. Yar told me that she heard stories of the crimes the LRA members had committed. She told me they would ask their victims “Do you want to laugh?” If the victim responded yes, an LRA member would cut off the victim’s lower lip. If they responded no, the LRA member would force a padlock through the two lips of the victim to lock their lips closed. Fearing the LRA, Yar and her husband moved again, back into South Sudan to another IDP in Western Equatoria. They remained there for three years and survived on food rations they received periodically from the UN and other aid agencies.

In 2000, Yar and her husband registered with UNHCR for an organized return to Bor, Jonglei. UNHCR first brought them to Gorsom. They then were taken by barge to Mabior Agak; next they went by foot to Manyadeng, and finally by foot to Anyidi, the home of her husband’s family. She and her husband lived in Anyidi for four years. They survived on what they were able to cultivate.
In 2005, her husband was called back to work by the SPLA and posted in Malakal (located in Upper Nile State). Due to the high insecurity (fighting between the Dinka Bor and the Murle and accounts of Murle abducting children) her husband feared for his wife’s and children’s security in his absence. Therefore, when her husband left for his post in Malakal, she and her children moved to Bor where she now lives with her husband’s relatives.

**Asylum Environment: Kakuma Refugee Camp**

**Location and Climate**

Kakuma refugee camp is located in the Turkana District in northwestern Kenya, 95 km (59 miles) from the Kenya-Sudan border (see Figure 1). Bor Town is 453 miles from Kakuma (UNJLC 2006). Many of the first arrivals in Kakuma were members of a group who have come to be known as the Lost Boys, an estimated 16,000 young Dinka and Nuer boys who were conscripted into the SPLA. As a group the boys walked across South Sudan, finally crossing the border into Ethiopia. The distance as the crow flies from Bor to the town of Gambela, Ethiopia, is 250 miles. In 1991 the boys moved again, reentering South Sudan and south to the border of Kenya. Due to armed conflict in the region, it took months for the young men to reach the border of Kenya and Kakuma. These young men were not alone in their search for refuge.

Kakuma Refugee Camp was opened in 1992 by UNHCR in response to the thousands of southern Sudanese fleeing the fighting and the destitute conditions in South Sudan. Since its opening, it had expanded to serve 13 nationalities: Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville,
Eritrea, Tanzania, Djibouti, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Until 2005, when the CPA was signed and Sudanese began to return, the Sudanese were the dominant population in Kakuma. In 2006, three-quarters of the total camp population were Sudanese, with the Dinka (49,000) and Nuer (7,000) being among the largest groups (Grabska 2011: 83). In June 2010, four years after the CPA, one third of the camp (20,936) were still Sudanese36 (Amin Afidi, UNHCR Associate Protection Officer Kakuma, June 2010).

The area was sparsely populated with few villages and was largely comprised of nomadic pastoralists from the Turkana community. A semi-arid climate, with average daytime temperatures of 104 degrees Fahrenheit and little rainfall, made subsistence farming in this area difficult.

**History of Kakuma’s Opening**

The Sudanese refugees originally began to gather and take refuge in Lokichogio (Loki), Kenya about 30 km (18.6 miles) from the Kenya-Sudan border. According to interviews I conducted with UNHCR staff in Kakuma, when the 16,000 Lost Boys arrived in Loki, the logistics required to receive and service the needs of such a large number of refugees were not adequate. UNHCR, various NGOs, and other aid agencies began to arrive in the following months, but the small town of Loki was not well suited for the massive humanitarian project being instituted and was overrun by the refugee population. A Christian mission in the town of Kakuma, 60 km (37 miles) south of Loki,

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36 The remaining population included 40,822 Somali or 53%, and 12% “other.”
agreed to assist with the refugee population and, subsequently, the refugee population and NGOs moved to Kakuma. UNHCR administered the Kakuma Refugee Camp assisted by the World Food Program (WFP), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Lutheran World Federation (LWF), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), Windle Trust Kenya (WTK), Film Aid International, and Salesians of Don Bosco in Kenya.

**Arrival and Registration Experience**

While there was a “typical” registration experience, the processes and aid available changed over the years to reflect varying levels of funding to and abilities of the UN and aid agencies. My interviews with NGO and aid agency staff revealed that, as agencies and staff gained knowledge and experience, the assistance provided to the refugees at registration and in the camp improved. As time passed, the staff and agencies learned how to best assist the refugees.

Until 2007, individuals arriving from South Sudan were given prima facie status (Amin Afidi, UNHCR Associate Protection Officer Kakuma, June 2010). After 2007, Sudanese were required to go through refugee status determination (RSD), which involved a series of interviews with UNHCR officials to determine if an individual met

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37 Although the refugee population and NGOs were relocated to Kakuma, registration continued to take place in Loki until 2005.
38 Prima facie refugee: A person recognized as a refugee, by a State or UNHCR, on the basis of objective criteria related to the circumstances in his or her country of origin and his or her flight, which justify a presumption that he or she meets the criteria of the applicable refugee definition. A person recognized as a prima facie refugee enjoys the same status as a person who has been granted refugee status individually (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011).
39 Refugee status determination (RSD): The legal and/or administrative process undertaken by States and/or UNHCR to determine whether a person is a refugee in accordance with national, regional and international law (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011).
the requirements for refugee status (the exception were Sudanese from the Darfur region).

Upon registration, refugees received a food ration card and non-food items such as mosquito nets, mats, pots, and a water jug. They also were given a plot of land upon which to build a hut. While the Lost Boys were placed together in what became known as the minors’ camp, individuals and families where given plots in zones based on their nationality, tribe and clan membership in their place of origin. Families were given materials needed to build a mud hut (tarps, poles and aluminum for the roof) and were loaned implements such as wheel barrels, buckets, and shovels to facilitate building the hut.

*Life in Kakuma*

During a brief visit to Kakuma in June 2010, I witnessed what was essentially a city of mud huts and old patched tents. At its peak, Kakuma was a bustling urban center with more than 70,000 inhabitants. Administratively, the camp was divided into Kakuma I, II, III and IV. Each section was further divided into nine zones, which were sub-divided into blocks. Within each block, families created smaller groups of huts enclosed by makeshift fences. As I walked along the bustling roads that wound through the camp, I had to avoid people as they walked or bicycled by. The only vehicles to pass along the roads were NGO and UN trucks that stirred up eye-irritating dust on the dry roads. Similar to neighborhood place names of cities around the world, local areas in Kakuma refugee camp were given place-of-origin or group identity names like the Somali market or the Minors’ camp.
I visited the distribution center where refugees received food rations once every 15 days. While meeting the WFP standards for nutritional assistance, rations were limited to sorghum, lentils, salt, and oil; the refugee’s diet lacked meat, milk, vegetables, and variety. Because collecting firewood around the camp on their own would have had a negative impact on the environment and local community livelihoods, refugees were given wood for cooking. In 2010, the camp had water taps for every 80-100 persons, but there was no electricity. Latrines and regular garbage pickup kept the camp clean and sanitary.

UNHCR and NGOs working in Kakuma provided primary and secondary education, primary health care, counseling services, skills training in various trades (e.g. masonry, carpentry), education on sexual and gender-based violence, and peace and human rights education. Interviews with NGO staff revealed that NGOs directed their resources at four activities: 1) capacity building (skills and job training), 2) women’s empowerment through scholarships to boarding schools and colleges in other parts of Kenya, 3) income generating activities (restaurant/shop, catering, hairdressing, crafts shop, drink shop, small loans), and 4) sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and equality campaigns.

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40 Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): Any act of violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to persons on the basis of their sex or gender, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. It encompasses, but it is not limited to: (i) physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry[sic]-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; (ii) physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; (iii) physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011).
A semi-arid climate, with average daytime temperatures of 104°F, made cash crop agriculture difficult, if not impossible in the absence of a massive irrigation infrastructure. Also, UNHCR and Kenyan government policies placed restrictions on refugee employment and movement, providing refugees with few avenues for income generation. Current Kakuma refugees and returnees revealed in interviews that a common income generation strategy used by Dinka Bor was to sell a portion of their UNHCR food rations. The money earned in that way was most often used to buy goods they needed but were not included in UNHCR rations, such as spices, meat, or milk.

A UNHCR staff member, David, told me about the time he and other staff where taken hostage in one of the food distribution centers by Dinka and had to be freed by local Kenyan police. That night the refugees had returned and completely dismantled the entire food distribution center. They left not even one nail. The Kenyan government insisted that food distribution be suspended until every piece of the building was returned and rebuilt by those who dismantled the building. Food was suspended for two months. It took one month for the refugees to begin to rebuild the center.

David said the reason the Dinka refugees became angry, took the staff hostage, and tore apart the food distribution center was because UNHCR was about to institute a change in the food distribution policy that would decrease the power of some of the Dinka community leaders. From 1992-1996, the food was distributed through the community leaders. It was discovered that the community leaders where profiting from the distribution by either taking the food from those who did not come on the designated day, regardless of reason, or else they were giving smaller rations to the community and keeping the rest for self consumption or sale (UNHCR staff, June 2010).
As the years passed and the camp grew, both in the size of its population and the number of NGO affiliations, the educational opportunities available in the camp multiplied. In the early years of the camp the only form of formal education available was primary and secondary schooling. In 2000, eight years after Kakuma was established, Don Bosco Vocational Training Center opened and became a major source of skills training including: tailoring, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, secretarial skills training, and welding. Some refugees who received training in carpentry, masonry, or as mechanics were hired either by the NGO/UN or else they started their own small businesses. Refugees who finished their secondary education were trained to become teachers in the camp schools. Several refugees were hired as translators with the UN. Refugee women from the camp were hired by the WFP to assist in distributing food rations. Other women cooked porridge at school, prepared food at the hospital, or swept hospital or office grounds. Some women who were traditional midwives in Sudan assisted in the maternity ward of the hospital (James Akech, Dinka Community Leader, June 2010).

Some groups, such as the Somali, had many individuals who successfully opened and continued to run small business and trading stalls in or just outside the camp. The refugees who were successful at these enterprises came from a tradition of market and trade and arrived in camp with cash savings. The Dinka community did not engage in entrepreneurial enterprises. Prior to departure, the agro-pastoralist Dinka’s wealth was held in cattle, not cash. It appears, then, that the Dinka possessed neither the knowledge nor the collateral needed to begin a small business or enter into trade. I argue, with support from many of my interviewees, that the larger barrier to impede Dinka business entrepreneurship was (and is) a cultural dictate that a Dinka cannot refuse to share with
her or his family and clan. Therefore, shop goods and food cooked for sale would more
often end up being shared with family members in need rather than sold for profit. As a
consequence of an absence of entrepreneurial efforts, many Dinka men and youth
complained about spending their days in Kakuma sitting “idle.”

Life in Kakuma, although designated as a place of refuge and safety, was not free
from insecurity. The Turkana, who inhabit the area surrounding Kakuma, survive on a
subsistence livelihood in a difficult climate. At times they found themselves in dire
situations without food. It must have been frustrating, even infuriating, for the Turkana to
have seen Kakuma refugees receiving food and other forms of aid while they, the
Turkana, received nothing. While the residents of Kakuma were unarmed, the Turkana
were well armed. Their arms came from Sudan, Uganda, and other parts of Kenya and
were used primarily to protect themselves and their cattle. Kakuma was not walled or
fenced which allowed free and unfettered movement in and out of the camp. Thus,
refugees in Kakuma were vulnerable to armed robbery by the Turkana (Stanley Thuku,
UNHCR Senior Field Security Assistant, June 2010). Turkana robbed Kakuma residents
of their food rations, possessions, and money many times. In some cases deaths occurred
(Mogire 2011; Crisp 2000).

Interviewees who took asylum in Kakuma told me that most of all they feared the
Turkana:

The life for the refugee is very hard because sometimes you could not get
food and the insecurity affect[ed] people, especially in Kenya. There is a
tribe called [the] Turkana and they would shoot people and steal everything.
Many [people were] killed by [the] Turkana. And the rations were small for
15 days, not enough. People would eat only once a day. But they provided
materials [to build a] house and provided school (female returnee, 04-06-
10).
In Kakuma, feeding was ok [because] [the UN] distribute food. But the matter of firewood, when you go to collect firewood the Turkana [would] kill you…in Kenya there was [the] UN that distributed food. But in Bor, if you are not working and you don’t have cattle, you have no food (female returnee, 08-15-10).

The shooting of Akoul’s (08-30-10) two sons and daughter-in-law illustrate the dangers refugees faced living in Kakuma. Akoul’s daughter-in-law was nearing the end of her pregnancy. She needed many items for her first baby that could not be purchased in the camp so she planned a trip to travel to Lokichogio (Loki), which had a large market. On her way there, the Turkana attacked the van in which she was traveling. During the attack she was shot and killed. Only one road existed between Loki and Kakuma and for most of the years that the Kakuma Refugee Camp was open and operating, all NGO and UN staff were required to travel the Loki–Kakuma road with an armed escort. Local inhabitants or refugees were not provided an armed escort. When I visited the camp in July 2010 this was still the case. But Akoul’s story does not end with the death of her daughter-in-law. On a different occasion, the van in which her eldest son, Machar, was traveling was attacked by Turkana. He was shot twice and admitted to the hospital in Loki. Knowing only that her son was shot but not his condition, her other son, Jok, headed to the hospital in Loki. On the same road, in the same location, the van he was traveling in was shot at. He was wounded, receiving one bullet to the shoulder. Fortunately, both of Akoul’s sons survived their wounds. But once released from the hospital both had to travel the road again to return to their mother and home in the camp.
**Growing Up Among Diversity**

Many Sudanese refugees spent more than a decade in Kakuma. Some arrived as infants or toddlers, while others were born and grew up in Kakuma. The realities of the location (e.g., they could no longer keep cattle) forced changes to traditional Dinka livelihood and cultural practices. Furthermore, Sudanese refugees were in close and constant interaction with other cultures and exposed to unfamiliar cultural practices. The population in Kakuma represented refugees from 13 different countries and over 20 ethnic groups. Hence, Sudanese refugees were exposed to many diverse gender norms, behaviors, and relations.

Dinka women and men in my study noted that ex-patriot women employed by the NGOs and UNHCR experienced greater rights and freedoms. These women drove cars, managed offices, were highly educated, and traveled freely to foreign lands. The Dinka also were exposed to cultures where women experienced significantly fewer rights and freedoms than did Dinka women. Many Somali refugee women adhered to a conservative dress code that included covering their arms, legs and hair and their movements in the camp were more restricted than that of Dinka women. Many Somalia girls encountered female circumcision, also called female genital mutilation (FGM). The International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Kakuma implemented within its health education program the medical complications surrounding female circumcision--one example of how UN and NGO agencies in Kakuma introduced Western concepts of gender equality and human rights into other topical material.

In my interview with Achol (08-30-10), a female returnee from Kakuma, she relayed her understanding of human rights and gender equality:
According to my understanding, human rights say that you have to treat people equally, so even this child is to be given his rights….in the camp, I see people are trying to practice human rights. In [Dinka] culture you can force a girl to be married, but in Kakuma some girls were refusing to marry. But if people are trying to force [a girl to marry], those people of human rights will come and say you cannot force her, she has the right to refuse. Those people of human rights will come and collect the girl and she will stay with them for a while….some ladies went [to Safe Haven] and they are even some [women] now [living] abroad.

Asylum Environment: Khartoum

Arrival Experience

Most of the Dinka Bor arrived in Khartoum by barges on the White Nile. Departing from the port in Bor, the barge moved slowly against the current north to Kosti (see Figure 1). Many of my interviewees reported trips as long as two weeks to travel 761 miles (1,226 km) up river to Kosti. At Kosti those fleeing Bor would take public transport to Khartoum, 185 miles (298km) north of Kosti. A small number of refugees fled to Juba and were able to find places on cargo planes flying to Khartoum.

Vignette: Nicola

Nicola fled from his village alone, without family, and headed by foot to Bor. He left with the intention of boarding a barge at Bor for Khartoum where he planned to enroll in school. When he arrived in Bor, he had no money to pay for his ticket, so he stowed away on a barge. Shortly after the barge began heading north, Nicola and several other stow away boys were caught by soldiers patrolling the barge and put in the brig. Nicola’s luck soon improved. The soldier guarding them owned a chicken that got lost, forcing the soldier to chase after the chicken. The boys took advantage of the soldier’s misadventure and escaped from the brig. Nicola spent the rest of the trip hiding from the
barge patrols. Again, luckily he found members from his clan on board who helped him
hide and gave him food. The trip to Kosti took nine days. Nicola disembarked and found
a relative who paid for his land transport to Khartoum.

*Life in Khartoum*

Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, with an estimated five million people, is located
in the north, at the junction of the White and Blue Nile rivers. This large African city,
located in a hot arid climate, with daytime temperatures exceeding 127°F in the summer,
offers an extremely different physical environment from the small villages and cattle
camps from which the Dinka Bor fled. Khartoum has sprawling markets, paved roads,
cement homes, multi-story buildings, electricity, and water taps in most homes. During
my interviews, returnees described the city and the homes in which they lived during
asylum in Khartoum. As Akual, a female returnee from Khartoum noted,

> Khartoum [was] very different [from my home in South Sudan] because
development was there. I [saw] many beautiful things [in Khartoum].
Cement block homes, five or three in [a single] compound depending on
your [wealth]. The one I lived in had four [cement block homes] and had
electricity and water (05-15-10).

The population of Khartoum consisted primarily of Arab Muslims whose
customs, traditions, beliefs, and laws were markedly different from or contradicted Dinka
customs, traditions, beliefs, and laws. Mel, a male returnee from Kakuma, described
those differences,

> There are differences and variation [between] the character [of those
returning from Kakuma and Khartoum]. Those returning from East Africa,
like myself, have been exposed to East African food, culture, and behavior.
Like the East Africans have the freedom of everything, even dressing. Like,
most of the women who are returning from Kenya or Uganda are wearing
tight trousers…Now if you go back to those who went to Khartoum, dressing wise is different, it is like they have been tuned to the Islam rule and behavior, because this Islam you must be completely covered even face, but they are Christian so they not cover face, but wear long clothes…because of the laws and the living rules they were not given freedom dressing; you can’t wear a mini skirt. They wear a “toub.”41 Even the food like kissra, that is not indigenous food. It is an Arab food, they adopt it and like, and came back home with it (07-26-10).

Of the 1.8 million IDPs living in Khartoum in 2004, only 270,000 were living in one of the four official camps; the rest lived in squatter camps on the outskirts of the city (Global IDP 2005). Other IDPs lived with relatives who were long time residents and well established in Khartoum with homes and employment. James, a male returnee from Khartoum, explained,

The IDP camps were for the old women and men or women with children. Men like me don’t go to the camp. In Kakuma, if the men lived outside [the refugee camp], the Kenyan government would not allow them to work, so the men [had to] take the aid. But in Khartoum the men were allowed to work, so [the men] didn’t take the aid. The other Sudanese in Khartoum won’t reject someone for taking aid but men don’t want to just sit and eat. In IDP camps you just eat and sleep like cows, we [do] not like [this]. No one says don’t go to camp, but we don’t like to sit and [not work to find our own food] (09-20-2010).

Life in Khartoum meant poverty, victimization, and oppression based on one’s physical appearance42, and/or ethnic and political membership (Holtzman 2000; Hutchinson 1996). Furthermore, the IDP camps suffered from lack of aid assistance due to the refusal by the northern government to allow foreign assistance into the camp (Norwegian Refugee Council 2005; Ruiz 1998). The IDPs in camps were forced to live in

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41 Also, spelled thoub or tiab, a toub is the traditional dress worn by Sudanese women during all activities. It is a colorful 15-foot long piece of material wrapped around the body. Women throw one end over their left shoulder and head and use the other end to wrap around their body, covering their waist, legs, and ankles. The toub is worn over a short dress.

42 Inhabitants in the north central regions of Sudan, where Khartoum is located, are phenotypically similar to inhabitants in North African countries, i.e., they have lighter skin. This is in contrast to the Dinka who are phenotypically similar to sub-Saharan inhabitants, i.e., they have dark skin and tight curly hair.
cramped, unsanitary conditions and lacked adequate food, water, and health services (Crisp and Mooney 1999; Ruiz 1998). Those in squatter camps lived under fear of further displacement by the government. Many IDPs were forcibly relocated to isolated and barren areas far removed from all basic services and job opportunities. More recent reports reveal that in 2005 more than half (57%) of the IDP households could not afford the cost of health care from the local clinics, 30% had no access to latrines, and 80% lived in temporary shelters made of plastic and paper. Almost one-half (48%) of the IDP children were not attending schools due to lack of access and poverty (Norwegian Refugee Council 2005).

Employment for southern Sudanese in Khartoum was limited because of racism and by their lack of education and labor skills. Women feared generating income from such activities as brewing alcohol or selling tea, because the police would often harass them and/or threaten arrest. Athou, a female returnee from Khartoum commented,

[In Khartoum] you never see any women working, but the men go out and stay out for the whole day. When they return home at night they find their wife. It was only the men who struggle in Khartoum (05-08-10).

Many southerners displaced to Khartoum often survived off the generosity of an employed relative who was well-established in Khartoum for years before the war began. Those relatives often served in the army or police. A Dinka man who took asylum in Khartoum told me that the types of work open to South Sudanese men were typically limited to manual labor, including digging drainage holes, collecting trash or carcasses of dead animals (dogs/donkeys) from the streets, and becoming masons. He continued,

It is hard to get money in Khartoum for the South Sudanese unless you use your hands. Southern Sudanese can’t own a plot, can’t own a business, and it is hard to get a job in government. So South Sudanese must work hard. Really the only field open is a soldier, but South Sudanese do not like to be
a soldier for the north. They may end up fighting with south against the south (09-20-10).

**Return to Bor, Jonglei State**

In March 2005, two months after the CPA was signed, UNHCR initiated the repatriation of forced migrants to South Sudan. According UNHCR, as of October 2009, 328,009 refugees of the estimated 500,000 refugees returned to various regions and cities in South Sudan. Also returning to their homes in the south were the estimated 288,516 of the 2 million IDPs from Khartoum and other locations (see Table 11).

**TABLE 11. UNHCR Estimated Numbers of Forced Migrants Returning to South Sudan as of October 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Forced Migrant</th>
<th>Estimated Displaced</th>
<th>Estimated Repatriation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>288,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>328,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>616,525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Organized and Spontaneous Returns**

Those who returned to Bor on their own were labeled *spontaneous* returnees by UNHCR: having left their asylum location without any assistance from UNHCR.

UNHCR assisted returnees were referred to as *organized* returnees. Tables 12 and 13 break down the numbers of refugees\(^{43}\) (Table 12) and IDPs\(^{44}\) (Table 13) into organized and spontaneous return. UNHCR provided transportation for organized returnees, many by land in buses, others by air, and still others by barge. It was not logistically possible for UNHCR to return each individual, or family, to their place of origin. Therefore, to best assist returnees, regional centers were set up, the locations of which were determined by transport access, nearness to a WFP/UNHCR office, and the returnees’ ultimate

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\(^{43}\)Refugees are individuals who fled their home and sought asylum outside the borders of their country of origin.

\(^{44}\)IDPs are individuals who fled their home and sought asylum inside the borders of their country of origin.
destination locations. Upon arrival at the regional center, the organized returnees received three months of food aid and non-food items to assist with their reintegration into South Sudan society. Some returnees could not, or did not want to, wait for the next organized return. In some cases the dates of the organized return were not convenient for them or well-timed. For example, one organized return was scheduled for a time not consistent with seasonal planting. Planting in preparation for next year’s harvest was absolutely necessary; especially for those who lost all their cattle during the war. Without the bi-weekly food aid they received in the camps, they had no way to feed themselves or their family.

### TABLE 12. UNHCR Estimated Numbers of Refugee Returnees to South Sudan as of October 2009*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All South Sudan</th>
<th>Jongeli</th>
<th>Bor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organized</td>
<td>158,602</td>
<td>8,666</td>
<td>4,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted</td>
<td>12,577</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spontaneous</td>
<td>156,830</td>
<td>11,917</td>
<td>5,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>328,009</td>
<td>21,023</td>
<td>10,569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Organized returnees received transport to South Sudan along with non-food items and three months of food aid upon arrival from UNHCR. Returnees who returned to the South Sudan with the financial aid and food assistance, but not organized transport from of UNHCR, were referred to as assisted returnees. Spontaneous returnees returned to Bor without any form of assistance from UNHCR.

### TABLE 13. UNHCR Estimated Numbers of IDP Returnees as of June 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All South Sudan</th>
<th>Jongeli</th>
<th>Bor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organized</td>
<td>90,516</td>
<td>9,512</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spontaneous*</td>
<td>198,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>288,516</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimated return in first half of 2009.

Thus, many returnees chose to leave camp without UNHCR support in order to reach home in time to plant, while others waited for a more timely UNHCR-assisted return. For example, some wanted to wait until their child finished the school year. In most cases,

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45The logistics involved in the transportation (of the returnees and their belongings), food aid, and the process of organizing who among the refugees were returning, and to where, was extremely difficult and time consuming. Therefore, organized returns did not follow a timely and predictable schedule.
those who returned with the aid of UNHCR did not have the resources or money to return on their own and had no choice but to return with UNHCR.

Arrival in Bor

Other than the Marol market (in 2005 this market was located in a different location), Malek High School, Bor Hospital, the few compounds held by Dinka who remained in Bor during the war, and a few cement block or brick buildings (that currently house the state governor, state ministries, and the Jonglei Court), much of the land in Bor was left unoccupied when the northern military forces and northern nationals left Bor and returned north in accordance with the CPA. When forced Dinka migrants began to return, they laid claim to land in and around Bor through squatting, that is through clearing the land of brush or abandoned huts and constructing new compounds.

As the numbers of returnees grew and the land in Bor became populated, later returners were forced to request land from kin who arrived earlier. As a consequence of this process much of Bor is laid out in neighborhoods that reflect clan membership. Upon return to Bor, a returnee, or returning family, most often lived with kin who were already established in Bor. These returnees relied on their kin for food and shelter until they were able to obtain a piece of land and build a compound. Food rations provided by the UNHCR (to organized returnees) or by the SSRRC in coordination with WFP (to unorganized returnees) were crucial for the survival of both the returnees and the families housing them. As noted in chapter three’s sub-section “Continuing Flow of Returnees to Bor,” it can take weeks to months before returnees receive their food rations. In the mean time, they were depleting the resources of the established families. Thus when the food
rations supplied by agencies were given to the returning family, the rations were shared with the kin who took them in upon return.

The Jonglei Government has since established a city plan for Bor and is now requiring all its inhabitants to apply for and pay for a land title. Inhabitants are most often issued a title to a piece of land from the pre-established city plan that is far from where they currently live. The NGOs have already been forced to move to new locations designated for NGOs in the city plan. Once located in various places around Bor, the NGO offices are now concentrated in the same area of town (see Figure 12, numbers 23-29).

During the last month of my fieldwork in Bor, I witnessed the displacement of an entire market to maintain the city design. The city announced to those selling goods and those with shacks in the Junction Market (see Figure 12, number 32) that they had to take down the shacks and remove all their items from the location. The Junction Market, established years ago as returnees filled Bor, would block the construction of a road in the newly designed city plan. Those with shacks and businesses in the Junction Market had only squatter’s rights to their places and were not entitled to any compensation for the land by the city. Aluel, a woman I knew well, was among the very early returnees to Bor after the CPA and had established both a tea stand for herself and a shack that she rented out to others. As a widow with five children, she was dependent on this income for her family’s survival. The city gave her and others in the market one day to remove their goods and threatened to tear down anything that remained. Aluel has her tea, pots, and other items, but now has nowhere to sell her tea. One man who was not in town when the announcement was made returned to see his shack destroyed.
By forcing families to move to various pieces of land throughout the city, the city design and policy will create major shifts in the makeup of neighborhoods. The current pattern of clans living next to, or near, each other will be disrupted. Furthermore, while women have the right under the new constitution to own land, the titles to land are being placed primarily in the names of men (fathers, husbands, or oldest brothers). This is, in part, due to cultural norms that demand married women remain at home, place men as head of household, and restrict unmarried women from living alone. It is also in part due to the fact that few Dinka women have the money necessary to pay for a title.

**Mixed Reasons for Returning**

The typical story of a refugee’s experience depicted in the news and in novels included their deep desire to return home and do so as soon as possible. My research explores the extent to which the desire to return to “one’s home” or to “my father’s land” continues to be a valid reason for return, even if it is not always the direct impetus for why or when a forced migrant returns. I also examine the reasons for return that vary with an individual’s needs, wants, and resources.

When I asked Elizabeth (04-10-10) why she returned to South Sudan from Kakuma in 2006, she told me she accompanied her husband who had found employment with an NGO. Another woman, Atong (05-04-10), returned from Kakuma in 2010 because she was going to give birth to her first child. Among the Dinka, women return to their mother’s home to deliver their first born and remain there for as long as two years.

Some forced migrants, most often women and youth, were coerced to return to South Sudan by their fathers or other family members. There were also instances of
women who traveled to South Sudan to visit family they had not seen in years, with no intentions of staying permanently, but who were forced to marry and remain unwilling in South Sudan. Tabitha (07-04-10), who took asylum in Kakuma, had exactly that experience. She told me that she decided to briefly visit her mother who was living in Bor County, but planned to return to Kakuma. Tabitha had completed secondary school and wanted to return to Kakuma in time to begin her first year of high school. But her family intervened, refusing to let Tabitha return to Kakuma. That same year she was forced her to marry. At the time of the interview, Tabitha had been married seven years and had three children.

Manyuan (08-09-10), another widow who took asylum in Khartoum, related to me how she was forced to return to Bor in 2006. In Khartoum she worked for a government office that withheld her pay for three months. Informed by her supervisor that if she did not return to Bor she would not be paid, Tabitha returned to the city by barge with an UNHCR organized return. Regina (08-03-10), a widowed IDP who took asylum in Khartoum, returned to Bor because she “wanted to come home.” Luck favored Regina, because she returned with a recommendation from a ministry in Khartoum, and so was able to obtain employment as a cleaner and messenger at a ministry in Bor.

For some, the most reasonable choice, the best choice, was to remain in the asylum location. Free and competent health care, formal education, and bi-weekly food assistance were provided in Kakuma refugee camp. A return to South Sudan entailed a move from a stable and secure Kakuma to an undeveloped country whose infrastructure was nearly destroyed by the 22-year civil war, and where health care and education standards were inadequate or non-existent. Small villages where half or more of the
residences died during the war, or were displaced and had not returned, awaited many returnees. They would have found themselves existing in a village without a clinic, a school, or food aid.

Return was also motivated by the need to improve one’s life as much as the desire to return home. For many, life in Khartoum was difficult, with chronic unemployment and daily racial, ethnic, and political oppression. Leaving Khartoum for the south often was an escape from a very challenging and stressful life. For those who were fortunate enough to acquire education and skills training during asylum, whether in Kakuma or Khartoum, return offered hope that with peace, business investment in the south was possible and new government positions would bring employment.

In 2005, with the signing of the CPA, the Dinka refugee population began its slow return to South Sudan. The CPA also enabled NGOs and UN agencies that would open offices and offer possible employment to safely operate in the south. While ministries and NGO/UN agencies opened offices around the south, schools and health facilities were slow to reopen, and those that did were understaffed and provided quality and services far below those found in Kakuma. As a result, a common strategy among the returning Dinka Bor in my study was for the husband, or father, to initially return to find a job and/or locate housing, leaving the mother and children in Kakuma to be repatriated later. This allowed the children to finish school and have adequate health care. It was clear to the Kenyan government that many Sudanese were not repatriating in order to access education in the camp. To encourage the Sudanese to return, in 2006 UNHCR began restricting Sudanese enrollment in school (Epstein 2010).
**Resettlement Patterns Upon Return to Jonglei**

As of October 2009, of the 21,023 individual returnees to Jonglei State just over half resettled in Bor Town (see Table 12). Of the more than 8,000 organized returnees to Jonglei state, just over half resettled in Bor Town. This suggests a preference by the returnees for urban centers rather than rural villages and cattle camps.

Refugee experiences portrayed by the news media and novels further reinforced the assumption that when refugees return to their country of origin they return to pre-displacement life. My findings reveal that this assumption is false in the case of Dinka Bor returning to Bor County, Jonglei State. While customary Dinka Bor agro-pastoral subsistence and settlement patterns continue to be practiced by Dinka who never fled the war and live in the rural areas, UNHCR numbers show that half of all the refugees who returned from Kakuma, Uganda, Kenya, or overseas, chose to live in an urban setting and were (and still are) dependent on a cash economy (see Table 12). These urban settings are similar to those of large refugee camps like Kakuma in northern Kenya, or cities such as Khartoum, Nairobi, or Kampala, where many Dinka Bor took asylum.

Several women relate stories that capture this shift in preference from pastoral to urban living. Tabitha (07-04-10) told me that she moved to Bor because she likes to live in the city. Akual (05-15-10) returned to Bor and stayed with her husband’s mother, because her husband is a mechanic and could not find work in the village. Aluel (07-02-10) said that she chose to live in Bor because her husband taught school in Bor. Also, she is afraid in the village because “there were rebels [in the village] and there was no one there to protect me.” Awel (08-23-10), who believes she is 69 years old, first resettled in her village when she returned to South Sudan, but later moved to Bor to live with her
daughter. Awel said she was too old to live alone in the village. Biar (08-25-10), a 41 year old male returnee, told me that he moved to Bor because there was no food in the village and he wanted to change his life. Deng (08-30-10) returned to Bor in 2009. He told me that in Bor, he would find a job and experience a life he could not get in the village. He told me that he is having trouble enrolling in school, because he lost the documentation certifying he completed Form 1. His certificate was lost and was too far and too costly to return to Kakuma to obtain a new certificate. Upon her return, Adou (09-01-10) first moved to her husband’s family’s village, but later to Bor to be near a hospital when she got pregnant. Abraham (08-25-10), who was 65 years old at the time of our conversation, first resettled in his family’s village, but soon moved to Bor because he feared that the Murle might kill him or his family or abduct his children. He said that as a community development director he has observed that the Dinka people and their sense of community “are confused.” Abraham said that this is because,

people are coming from different places. Different displacement camps, different countries, some were born in displaced or refugee camps. Uganda, Ethiopia, Congo even Khartoum. When they come back, they come back with different cultures, and when they settle here, they settle as individuals, not as communities. I can say, I have my hut here, your hut there. They settle as individuals; we don’t call ourselves communities (male returnee, 08-03-10).

There are good changes, people returned with education. There are bad changes, people have left cultivating, they want to go to town and leave cultivating, but they don’t have education to work (female never fled, 09-29-10).

A middle aged Dinka man named Kuir (field notes, July 2010), an NGO employee, shared with me his observations of how he felt the UN agencies, NGOs, and other humanitarian aid agencies operating in South Sudan have
encouraged urbanization. The various UN agencies, including the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), positioned their offices and/or compounds in locations that were secure and easily accessible by road and air. Such locations do not exist in small and rural villages in Jongeli State, or in South Sudan in general. Only in the large urban and political centers such as Bor Town, the capital of Jongeli State, were roads and landing strips built and maintained. The South Sudanese have learned, based upon historical precedent, that the various UN and NGO offices/compounds are places to obtain food and other forms of assistance. As a result, many returnees who fear future hardships choose to resettle near and around these agency facilities.

Furthermore, it was not possible to bring each organized returnee\textsuperscript{46} to his or her home due to poor or nonexistent roads in Jonglei State. As a result, UNHCR set up stations (in secure and accessible locations, hence, urban centers) around the state, to which the organized returnees would be transported, given their food rations and non-food items (NIF).\textsuperscript{47} At that point, the returnees were responsible for making their way back to their respective villages. Many returnees could either not afford to transport their family and food rations or else there was no transportation available. Consequently, the returnees settled in the urban center. This “problem of urbanization” reached the attention of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), when in 2004 it implemented a policy,

\textsuperscript{46} Distinctions were made between returnees who returned with the aid of the UN (organized returnees) and those who returned by there own means (spontaneous). Organized returnees received assistance with transportation and food assistance for three months after return.

\textsuperscript{47} Non-Food Item Kits or NIF kits are given frequently to displaced populations where it is assumed they fled without many of the basic and essential items a family will need to survive. The kits typically included one blanket, one plastic mat, one plastic tarp, two foldable jerry cans, two large bars of yellow soap, two large rolls of string, one box of fishing hooks, one fishing net, two tin pans and lids, four tin bowls, four tin cups, four tin spoons, one large tin-stirring spoon, and one knife. A family of one-four members receives one mosquito net and a family of five or more members receives two mosquito nets.
entitled “Taking Towns to the People.” The policy’s aim was to entice returnees to resettle in their village rather than resettle in the urban centers. Included in the policy were plans to create two model towns for each of the ten states. Each model town would have a functioning market, community centre, primary school, health centre, water supply, and electricity (Martin and Mosel 2011). The intent was to provide access to basic services and livelihood opportunities to individuals living in rural areas.

While many returning Dinka settled in the urban center out of preference, other Dinka who, although interested in returning to cattle keeping, had no option but to resettle in the urban center because their cattle were stolen or died during the war. Without cattle to support themselves and their family, these Dinka were forced to move to urban centers in search of NGO/UN aid or market opportunities.

Generations of youth living in asylum in Kenya, Uganda, or overseas are now young men and women who are not interested in, or knowledgeable about, cattle keeping and cultivation. As a consequence of resettlement in urban areas, either voluntarily or out of necessity, among this cohort of returnees, status is no longer calculated by the number of cattle one owns, but by one’s employment and the material items that one holds. Preferences for urban living and salary employment upon return to Bor were the consequences of changes from pre-war cultural values and social patterns.

**Timing of Return**

Timing of return played a large role in returnee adjustment to life in Bor. For example, those who returned early and had an education were quickly hired to fill the hundreds of job openings in the newly formed national and state offices, as well as
numerous UN and NGO offices that opened around the South. Also, refugees or IDPs who returned shortly after the signing of the CPA in 2005 were able to claim the most ideal plots of land for their home, market stalls, or business. Aluel, a widowed woman with seven children (two of whom had passed away) who returned early from Khartoum, staked out a location for the tea shop that eventually became a major market in town. When I arrived in 2009, she profited greatly from her choice. Aluel had sufficient space to rent out part of it to another woman and continue to sell her own tea in the other half.

**Conclusion**

In sum, the forced migrant experience is not the homogenous event depicted so often in recounts or studies of displaced persons. My data reveal that the reasons for fleeing, where asylum is sought, and return processes vary greatly among forced migrants. Furthermore, despite the countless images and accounts of forced migrants as passive victims, my data show that instead they are often active actors in the process. It is also clear from my data that not all refugees or IDPs have access to same resources or experience the same global and local cultural agendas (Tsing 1994). I will reveal in the upcoming chapters that despite these important differences in the experiences of the forced migrants in my study, commonalities also exist. I illustrate how an examination of these differences and commonalities, as suggested by Trager (2005), can enhance our understanding of forced migration and gender. Before I begin an examination in detail of the different and common experiences of life in two different asylum locations, Kakuma refugee camp and Khartoum, I offer a précis of gender relations among the Dinka Bor.

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Chapter 5 Monyjang: The Men of Men

Introduction

In this chapter, I contrast customary rural life and daily practices of the Dinka Bor with those of Dinka Bor living today in Bor town to show the way in which rural cultural and subsistence patterns have been altered or modified to fit an urban life style. The comparison allows the reader to appreciate Dinka Bor culture as dynamic and flexible. This section also provides an introduction to the following chapters that examine how the asylum environment affected the post-repatriation experience. The depictions of customary and urban life in this chapter are based on information collected during my main interviews and supported by previously published research on the Dinka.

Customary Life of the Dinka Bor

The Dinka, who call themselves monyjang (which is translated as “the men of men” or “the lord or all peoples”) are agro-pastoralists who still today follow a patrilineal descent pattern, practice patrilocal residence patterns, and transfer bridewealth as the act which constitutes marriage (Beswick 2004; Cohen and Deng 1998; Deng 1986, 1972, 1971; Jok 1999a; Lienhardt 1961).

The homestead of a typical middle-aged man…consists of two or three circular huts of wattle and daub with conical thatched roofs, and a cattle-byre, of the same shape and materials. Each wife has her own hut, with its low mud windscreen for her fire and mud supports for cooking-pots…this hearth – the mac thok - … a wife feeds her own children and takes her turn, in a polygynous household, in preparing food for her husband. In the cattle-byre is a dung-fire, the gol, which is the centre for the men of the home when they are together in the homestead. At these two hearths, the woman’s hearth and the men’s hearth, Dinka children get their first practical lessons in the principles of Dinka organization. The relationship between the several hearths of the separate elementary families and the
central hearth of the men and the cattle is the simple paradigm of the different lineages (also called “cooking hearth”), which form segments of a Dinka subclan, the gol or cattle-hearth (Lienhardt 1961: 2-4).

At the center of the Dinka Bor’s daily and spiritual lives are the cattle they herd. In the customary rural life, cattle dominate the Dinka’s daily and yearly activity (Deng 1972; Lienhardt 1961). Each morning after the men herd their cattle to pasture and water, the young boys clean the cattle barn or camp of dung and spread it out to dry in the sun. Each day, women milk the cattle, and then prepare the milk with sorghum to feed their families. Men decorate their most prized oxen with leaves and other materials and spend hours creating and singing poetic songs that praise and express their love for a special cow, bull, or oxen. At a Dinka boy’s initiation he is given the name48 of a prized bull. At dusk, those at home rise to greet the returning cattle and to assist the herders to tether their cattle to stakes. Hungry after a long day grazing their cattle, the men join their family in the evening meal the women prepared. After the meal, men sing songs late into the night praising their beloved cattle (Deng 1973). As the moon rises, the dung that had been set to dry in the sun during the day is ignited to shield the cattle from mosquitoes. The men and young boys sleep in large luaks (cattle barns) with the cattle, not only to protect their cattle from attack, but also to remain close to their much-loved cattle. In the morning, the Dinka rub the ash from the dung fires onto the cattle to smooth their skin. Sometimes, Dinka men use the same ash to decorate their own bodies. The men then take the cattle to pasture, and this pattern of life directed by the cattle continues to cycle.

As the season grows hot, water becomes scarce and pasture begins to shrink.

The men, accompanied by some young women, migrate with the cattle in search of water

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48 Cattle are named by their pattern of color and the Dinka have hundreds of cattle names (Deng 1972; Lienhardt 1961).
and greener pasture. Later, when the rains reappear, the men, women, and cattle head back to the village. Upon their return, women and men dig and plant sorghum and maize in the fields. Harvesting, on the other hand, is the women’s responsibility. Food is scarce only in the time of a drought or flood. Otherwise, food is plenty; the only thing needed or desired by the Dinka is cattle.

The importance of cattle in Dinka culture and to the daily lives of a Dinka man or woman cannot be overstated. Dinka men and women drink cow’s milk, wash in the cattle’s urine, burn the cattle dung, and use the dung ash to decorate themselves and their cattle. Parting with their cattle is difficult and Dinka kill a cow or bull only in the case of religious sacrifice. The symbiotic relationship the Dinka Bor have with their cattle is evidenced by the central role cattle play in Dinka subsistence patterns, prestige and status attainment, marriage, community/kin building, and religion (Deng 1972; Liendhardt 1961).

I was told a story that perfectly illustrates the deep connection and love the Dinka have for their cattle. A Dinka chief had thousands of cattle, which made him a wealthy man and gave him high status among the Dinka. But a drought had arrived and he risked losing all his cattle. Knowing that the drought would kill all his cattle and he would be left with nothing to support his family, the chief decided to sell his entire herd to a foreign trader. The foreign trader came with trucks to carry away the cattle. Once all the cattle were loaded and doors shut, the trader paid the chief in cash for the cows. Just then, the chief heard one of his cows cry. With that cry, the Dinka man immediately returned the money and retrieved all the cattle (Field notes March 2010).
Although unwilling to give up their cattle for food, Dinka will sacrifice a cow or bull to an ancestor. This use of cattle as a sacrifice in religious ceremony further illustrates the importance of cattle and the deep connection the Dinka had to their cattle (Liendhardt 1961).

Cattle are central to both the formation and strengthening of kinship relations. The practice of *yum de hok ke thiek*, or bridewealth, illustrates how cattle are central in the formation and strengthening of kinship relations among the Dinka. Bridewealth negotiations are a complex and time-consuming process (Fetterman 1978). Male kin from the bride’s and the groom’s family meet many times over several weeks to discuss the details. In addition to the number of cattle the groom’s family is to give the bride’s family, other characteristics of the cattle must be specified, including: the color of each head of cattle to be given, the number of calves a cow has birthed, other bridewealths a cow or bull were previously exchanged in, and the age and health of each cow/bull. Finally, decisions must be made concerning which male kin on the groom’s side will give a particular cow/bull to which kin on the bride’s side.

Customarily, the groom does not solely own the cattle to be used for bridewealth. The groom is dependent on his male kin to provide a cow/bull for his bridewealth. Without his male kin, he cannot marry. In this way, the groom is in debt to them. Because the family provides a portion of bridewealth, the bride becomes a bride to the groom’s family, not solely to the groom (Deng 1972; Fetterman 1978).

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49 The word *hok ke’* in *’hok ke thiek’* is translated in English as the *cattle paid as bridewealth*. Because the Dinka culture only accepts cattle as bridewealth the word *’hok? cattle’* appears here. In some cases, other valuable resources such as money are given but it is never considered as bridewealth. The word *’yum de’* simplified can be translated in English as ‘the negotiation of.’ Therefore the *’yum de hok ke thiek’* means *the negotiation of marriage bridewealth* (Abraham Mading, male returnee, Kakuma).

50 Primarily father, brothers, uncles, and male cousins.
Bridewealth also creates stronger ties among the bride’s kin because the precious cattle received as bridewealth do not remain with the father of the bride, but are distributed to various kin. The larger the bridewealth, the more kin can be given cattle and hence, the more bonds created.

Among the Dinka, cattle are a major source of wealth. The accumulation of large numbers of cattle represents great wealth. While land rights are communal, ownership of cattle is more personal. Among the Dinka Bor, women can amass cattle. But unlike Dinka men who are able to acquire cattle through bridewealth transfer, gifts and raiding, Dinka women are limited to the occasional cow through bridewealth transfers or gifts. As a result, Dinka women are not capable of amassing large numbers of cattle and therefore, can never be wealthier, achieve higher status, or attain a position of authority higher than any of her male kin.

The number of children an individual produces is also a signature of status and wealth. Women are limited to the number of children they can bear. Men, who can take as many wives as they were capable of caring for, can father many more children than any one woman. Relative to women, men therefore, are able to maximize their status through fertility. The inability of Dinka women to ever exceed the number of Dinka men’s cattle or children constitutes an institutionalized form of inequality with respect to the most central economic recourses.

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51 Certain female kin in the bride’s family will also receive a cow from the bridewealth. The bride’s mother, paternal and maternal grandmothers, a bride’s direct older sister (if there is one), and her paternal aunt each receive their own cow.
Life in Bor Today

Livelihood practices in Bor, an urban center, are varied and different from customary rural life. In Bor, cattle no longer direct daily or seasonal life. In the urban center a Dinka man does not wake up next to his cattle nor does he begin his day rubbing ash from burnt cattle dung on his body, drinking fresh milk, and bringing his cattle to pasture. Instead, he rises early from his bed, dresses, takes tea or coffee, and heads to work or in search of work in town. For those with education, this might be in an office, the hospital, or even his own business. For others, their day is spent in search of casual labor. Of the 49 Dinka Bor men living in Bor whom I interviewed 32, or 65 percent, were employed and 17, or 35 percent, were unemployed. Of the 70 Dinka Bor women living in Bor whom I interviewed 19, or 27 percent, were employed and 51, or 73 percent, were unemployed. Among the 32 employed men 15, or 49 percent, were working in the ministry offices, five, or 16 percent, were teachers, and three, or nine percent, were soldiers. Among the employed women five, or 26 percent, were teachers, three, or 12 percent, were working in the ministry offices; and three, or 12 percent, were working as messengers.

In Bor, men’s daily practices have undergone a major transformation. Unlike a rural man who spends the day tending their cattle, the men in my study are obligated to find employment in an office, school, or work as a tradesman. For many Dinka Bor men, finding employment is difficult because they lack education or training. Educated or trained Dinka men find themselves competing with many others for the few jobs that are available. Cultural taboos also exist that prevent men from accepting certain types of employment such as work in restaurants, carrying water, or digging holes (wells/latrines).
As a consequence of these constraints on finding employment, many Dinka men are “sitting idle” with no form of employment and no hope for it.

Results from my time allocation study (not reported in detail in the dissertation) recorded the absence of men from the family compound from dawn to dusk, even the men who were unemployed. When I questioned the women and children about their husband’s or father’s absence, I often was met with a shoulder shrug, indicating that they did not know where he was.

From the time I arrived until July 2010, I observed on a daily basis groups of men who sat in and around the ministry offices, talking and drinking tea, but never working. I learned that these men, known as “ghost workers,” were relatives of employed staff, placed on the payrolls, yet never actually worked. In many instances, they lacked the education or skills to accomplish the tasks required by the position. In some cases, “ghost workers” took the names of men or women who had died, becoming ghostly in the literal sense. One interviewee told me that her son, who worked at the state hospital, had placed her and her husband on the hospital payroll. This married couple collected a monthly salary for almost two years. In other cases, people occupied positions in phantom enterprises. One of my male interviewees was employed as an oil drill operator for the state of Jonglei. Yet, the state had never drilled for oil. When I asked why the ministry employed him for such a position he said, “the state may drill for oil in future.”

The existence of ghost workers in the ministries and other state office payrolls was known by the state governor and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). In July 2010, the governor of Jonglei State, Koul Manyang, revealed that the government recovered 300,000 Sudanese Pounds (approximately $150,000 U.S.) that had been
siphoned off by ministries through ghost worker hiring (Thon 2010). During the last
week of September 2010, the governor called all ministry employees to the courtyard of
his office for an announcement. According to my interviewees, the governor announced
that people “without a desk” could no longer sit in or around the ministries and would no
longer receive a salary. This edict upset many people because the number of ghost
employees on the pay roles was very high. Most of the men on these lists had no
education, skills, cattle, or land upon which to fall back for income. Thus, they were
dependent on their “ghost” salary for survival. For these men and their families, the
announcement was traumatic.

Customarily, Dinka Bor men and women play complementary roles in the
family’s survival. My data show that in the urban setting, men become the primary source
of income/food (see Table 14). Overall, only a few of the women in my main interviews
practice small income generating activities (23, or 32 percent of the 70). Even fewer
asylum educated women find employment in Bor (15 or 21 percent of the 70). Among the
240 female participants in my income survey only 14, or 58 percent, of those with asylum
education found employment in Bor. Most women are prohibited by cultural norms, lack
of education and skill, and child care demands from working outside the home. As a
result, the women in my study became reliant on their husbands for survival.

Table 14 illustrates the employment disparity between Dinka men and women in
Bor. Among those who were employed in my main interviews sample, two-thirds, or 62.7
percent, were men, and only one-third, or 37.3 percent, were women.
TABLE 14: Participants Employed With Salary In Bor, by Sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employed (n=51)</th>
<th>Unemployed (n=68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Employed is defined as employment in which an individual receives a weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly salary from an employer. This category does not include individuals who practice income generation in which an individual does not receive a salary, but whose income is dependent on a daily profit from that individual’s efforts and ability to sale their labor or product.

Women in Bor, like their counterparts in the village or cattle camp, are responsible for fetching water, caring for children, and procuring and preparing food. Nevertheless, women’s daily practices in Bor have also undergone transformations, expressed in the differences in which their roles and responsibilities are carried out. In rural areas, women rely on rivers and open wells for water, which may entail up to an hour’s walk to fetch water. In Bor, women rely on pumps for water.52 The standard is one pump per 500 people.53 In 2010, with only 6154 pumps for a population of 61,716, there are 1,011 people per pump in Bor, making it well below regulation and leading to long lines and waits at the pumps. At the pumps, one sees lines of jerry cans55 with no women in sight. Up to 20 women leave their jerry cans in line, with a young girl left to supervise the jerry can. At times the long waits resulted in accusations of breaking into line, and fights erupted among the women at the pump. If peace could not be restored, the pump was

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52 Water from the Nile River can and is used but is limited to washing clothes and construction.
53 NGOs and UN in South Sudan follow the Sphere Standard. According to Sphere, one pump for every 500 people is the minimum number to ensure a population has clean drinking water (The Sphere Project 2011).
54 Ariel Zielinski (Head of Mission, Polish Humanitarian Action, Bor-Pakwau, Jonglei State) supplied this data from records at the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure of Jonglei State (letter to author, September 28, 2011).
55 A jerry can is any lightweight or plastic container that holds several gallons of a liquid and minimizes or prohibits spillage during transport. In Bor, jerry cans are used to transport water and are most often old plastic containers originally designed to hold 25 liters (6.6 gallons) of vegetable oil.
locked, creating many problems for women who need to drink, cook, and bathe their children.

The ways in which food is acquired, prepared and consumed in Bor differ greatly from those activities in the rural setting. First, food is purchased, not grown at home, requiring daily trips to the market. For women living on the eastern side of Bor Town, or anywhere on its outskirts, walking to and from the market accounts for a substantial amount of time in a women’s day. In urban areas the foods eaten differ from those eaten in the rural setting. Vegetables like cabbage, kale, and potatoes found in the urban area, are unavailable in the rural villages. Unlike rural cooking practices, spices are commonly added to food and meat in the urban areas. Some of the newer dishes also take a long time to prepare. For example, it can take up to an hour to prepare enough kissra (crepe like bread) for a family to eat. Beans are now commonly consumed, but it can take hours of boiling the beans before they are ready to eat.

Unlike a woman living in the rural areas, an urban woman must have cash to purchase food and non-food items. If her husband is unemployed or has a low or unreliable salary, the urban woman might also take part in income generating activities. In my sample, these activities added to her daily workload. Of the 70 female main interviewees 23, or 33 percent, engaged in such IGS activities. Among these 23, ten brewed alcohol, four made and sold charcoal, and two cut and sold grass. Other income generating activities in Bor included cutting and selling firewood, smearing huts, and embroidery.

The most pronounced change for women in Bor compared to customary or rural life is their entrance into the work force. Some women who received a formal education
during asylum in Khartoum, Kenya, or Uganda obtain employment in education, local
NGOs, police, and government ministries. As noted earlier, women are customarily
prohibited by culture to work outside the home. Many Dinka still view the proper
behavior for a wife is to remaining at home. Therefore, women’s ability to work outside
the home relies not only on their educational attainment and employment opportunities,
but also on the dictates of their husbands and family. Women who work outside the home
continue to be responsible for fetching water, caring for the children, and procuring and
preparing food, which make their lives very busy and tiring. If the daughter of an
employed woman is old enough and strong enough, she takes over many of her mother’s
daily tasks. If an employed woman does not have a daughter to help out, a niece will
come to live in and help with the chores. A woman might use some of her income to pay
a young woman to fetch water or wash clothing, but not to do food-related chores.
Caring for the compound and food preparation is closely tied to a Dinka woman’s
identity, whether employed or not. Therefore, a woman will continue to maintain many of
the primary household tasks.

Also adding to an urban woman’s busy schedule is the chore of washing an
increased number of clothes. In the village and cattle camps, children go without clothes
and most adults own only a few pieces of clothing. Because dress is an important part of
urban identity and status, many people in Bor strive to own many clothes. My female
interviewees complained that the energy they expended in washing clothes by hand,
coupled with the difficulties obtaining water in Bor, made washing clothes a time
consuming and loathsome chore.
In Bor, a man with multiple wives often has one or more women living in his family’s rural village, and another with him in town. Leek, a male participant in my time-allocation study, has one wife in town and one living in the village with his family. He travels between the two locations, spending time with each wife. Like other men in Leek’s position, when the children of his wife in the rural area are ready to enroll in school, he brings them to live in town, where they are cared for by the Bor wife and able to attend school. There are, however, many men whose multiple wives live in Bor together, each wife with her own hut for her and her children. While each woman is responsible for the care of her own hut and children, wives also share other compound chores such as cooking and washing their husband’s clothes. Muchar, another male participant in my time-allocation study, lives with both of his wives in Bor. The compound contains three huts, one for each wife and one for him.

Finally, while cattle are still prized and men with vast numbers of cattle are respected and accorded prestige, the visual signs of cash are now beginning to bring more prestige for both men and women in Bor. Having cash is signaled by the clothes one wears (Western style or suits), wearing a watch, owning a cell phone, radio, headphones, or laptop, residing in a cemented home furnished with chairs, and having generator powered electricity. The most prestigious, but the rarest visual signs of wealth, was a Toyota Land Cruiser. In Bor, it was predominately members of government, UN staff, and NGO employees that are seen in Land Cruisers.

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Chapter 6 Asylum’s influence on Customary Practices, Behavior and Identity

Introduction

In this chapter I describe aspects of the environments in Kakuma and Khartoum that contribute to voluntary or involuntary modifications to customary Dinka subsistence patterns, resettlement patterns, gendered practices and relations, and concepts of Dinkahood during asylum. My aim is to illustrate how refugees’ interactions with the asylum environment influenced changes in their customary practices, behavior and identity.

Arid conditions of Kakuma and Khartoum and the loss of their cattle made it impossible for Dinka forced migrants to practice customary livelihood strategies. As a result, Dinka Bor forced migrants became dependent on either humanitarian agencies in Kakuma or family relatives in Khartoum for survival. Furthermore, youth growing up in these asylum locations adopted identities as educated urbanites and preferred salaried employment to life as a rural cattle herder. In Kakuma, the concentrated effort by humanitarian agencies to empower women and to ensure equality between the sexes brought about a shift in Dinka gendered behavior and relations. In addition, within each location local laws and legal systems often imposed changes to Dinka forced migrants’ daily behavior and survival strategies and challenged Dinka customary law.

Factors in Asylum Environment

Without Cattle and Land: The Loss of Knowledge

My participants, especially the elderly, complained that over time, forced migrants’ knowledge about pre-departure subsistence practices was lost, especially
among the youth. During the same time, forced migrants acquired knowledge about new and different ways of subsistence. In Kakuma, there were no cattle to keep, care for, or milk. There was no land to cultivate or harvest. Instead food--sorghum, oil, lentils, and salt--was collected from the food distribution centers in Kakuma. To obtain vegetables or meat to supplement these foodstuffs, the Dinka had to take part in a cash economy. According to my participants, many refugees often sold part of their food rations to locals and used the cash to purchase items they needed or wanted--such as meat, vegetables, school supplies, and clothes. In Kakuma, the Dinka obtained schooling and training, further allowing them to participate in the cash economy as teachers, NGO/UN staff, and traders.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Khartoum experienced a similar loss of knowledge about pre-departure subsistence patterns. Those who fled north also were without cattle or land for agriculture. While some participants in Khartoum had the opportunity to learn a skill such as masonry, many relied on the generosity of a relative already well established with a home and job. According to my informants, most forced Dinka migrants avoided the few IDP camps that existed in Khartoum because they said they felt a loss of pride if they could not support themselves and wished to avoid the boredom of the camp. Unfortunately, the Dinka women and elderly without family who sought assistance in the Khartoum IDP camps found that access to food assistance, formal education, and health clinics was minimal because the northern government would not allow NGOs to open offices in the north (Norwegian Refugee Council 2005; Ruiz 1998).
Generations of youth who came of age in asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum were now young men and women who had no interest in or knowledge about cattle keeping and cultivation. Among this cohort of returnees, status was no longer calculated by the number of cattle one owned, but rather by employment and material goods. As Deborah’s recalled: “Before we kept cattle, it was all about cattle, but today it is about money” (female returnee, 09-05-10).

While photocopying my expense sheets in a local NGO office, I overheard an animated discussion by several Dinka male employees. This NGO focused on agriculture programs including dispersing free seeds and holding workshops on improving farming methods. The employees were discussing the difficulties they faced trying to overcome the resistance among the Dinka population to adopt intensive agriculture. The men in the office all heartily agreed when one man said, “No one wants to be an agriculturist, not even in the village. They don’t want to be farmers, they want office jobs” (field notes, August 2010).

*Life in the Urban Setting: Kakuma and Khartoum*

Many Dinka who lived in Kakuma or Khartoum for as long as 10-15 years became accustomed to living in densely populated areas with access to market goods, restaurants, bars, music, and movies. Furthermore, hospitals and schools that became part of daily life in Kakuma or Khartoum could only be found in urban centers. Finally, returnees, who despite their desire to pursue agro-pastoralist lifestyles, no longer had the requisite resources, like cattle, to do so and were therefore relegated to life in urban areas.
According to my informants, living in the urban setting connoted a level of modernity that those in the rural villages and cattle camps could not possess. Those who fled to Kakuma and Khartoum during the war described themselves as modern and civilized. They maintained such status and identity by living in the urban center, as well as through dress, eating manners, education, and employment. The observable changes in their behavior were shaped by both the foreign influences they experienced during their asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum and the local environment, or context, of Bor. In a similar way, Suzanne Scheld’s (2007) work in Senegal revealed how youth used fashion and their engagement in Dakar’s informal clothing economy to shape a cosmopolitan identity. Dakar’s clothing market was sensitive to global fashion trends because much of the clothing came from overproduction or second-hand clothing from the U.S.A. or Europe. According to Scheld, these youth did not have the means to travel and become truly cosmopolitan, but symbolically traveled to foreign lands through the clothes they sold and wore. Their choice of clothing and access to brand names signaled to their friends, families, and passersbys that they had sophisticated knowledge of fashion—knowledge that only came to those who were truly cosmopolitan. Nilüfer Göleby (2002) discussed different purpose of using public displays of dress to constitute an identity. She explored how Islamic Turkish women challenged the Western construction of modernity as secular by wearing a headscarf in tandem with Western clothing.

Those living in the urban centers contrasted their modern Dinkaness with the traditional Dinkaness that was practiced in the cattle camps. Just as urban, or “modern,” Dinka expressed their modernity through their Western style dress, shoes, watches and mobile phones, those living in the cattle camps expressed their maintenance of a rural
Dinka lifestyle as “organic-ness,” a term they connoted, through the absence of those same material items and dress. The Dinka who never fled and who practiced a customary livelihood and lifestyle at war’s end often referred to themselves in interviews as “organic Dinka.” That is, unlike those who fled, organic Dinka believe they were untouched by foreign influence and cultural practices. Apiel taa’ira is a term used by those who never fled to describe those who did flee. Apiel is a Dinka word meaning excrement and taa’ira is an Arabic word meaning airplane. My informants told me that this term developed from the sight of the first returnees arriving by UN cargo planes and exiting these planes on ramps that drop from the back of the planes. Not only did disembarkment mimic a plane excreting, but the plane stands for foreign influence that appears to have eaten and then excreted a different and inferior Dinka.

**Formal Education**

Informants told me that prior to departure, Dinka Bor did not perceive formal education to be a valuable asset because formal education did not prepare a young man or woman for life as a pastoralist. Therefore, it was rare for a family to send their children to school. During asylum this view of formal education drastically changed among the forced migrants. The Dinka who took asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum were now seeking education for their children. The shift toward privileging formal education was due in part to the conditions of asylum and in part to the resettlement of many Dinka refugees to third countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia.

While my participants in Kakuma were provided with food aid and health care, circumstances there still compelled refugees to use cash for survival and to fulfill basic
wants. For example, to obtain supplementary dietary essentials or small luxuries like a radio, bike, or new bedding, my participants had to participate in the cash economy. To do so it was necessary for Dinka refugees to obtain employment, practice income-generating strategies (IGS), or begin to trade in the market. Refugees who spent time in Nairobi and other parts of Kenya witnessed this new economic and subsistence system and could attest to the benefits of participating in it. Lost Boys who returned with large sums of money also told stories of their great success participating in a cash economy. Most importantly, their stories stressed the value of education as the engine for employment and wealth.

In Khartoum, IDPs who participated in my study were also unable to produce their food as they had in the south before they fled, and survival depended on employment and a cash income. Like refugees in Kenya, IDPs in Khartoum also saw first hand that a livelihood based on a cash economy could be beneficial and viable.

**Humanitarian Agencies**

**Humanitarian Aid Varied Substantially**

Humanitarian aid agencies and the nature of their assistance differed substantially between the Kakuma refugee camp and the IDPs camps in Khartoum. The IDP camps suffered from a lack of aid assistance because the northern government refused to allow foreign assistance into the camps (Norwegian Refugee Council 2005; Ruiz 1998). As a result, the IDPs in those camps were forced to live in cramped, unsanitary conditions and lacked adequate food, water, and health services (Abusharaf 2009; Crisp and Mooney 1999; Ruiz 1998). Contrary to Khartoum, the Kakuma refugee camp was administered by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in collaboration with numerous NGO and humanitarian organizations (see Chapter 3). Together these organizations worked to provide refugees with shelter, clean water, health services, and maintain sanitary conditions through the construction of latrines and regular trash pickup.

**Access to Formal Education Varied Substantially**

IDPs in my study complained that in Khartoum access to education was limited because of high fees and tuition, being age inappropriate, and lack of appropriate language skills. At one time, the Government of Sudan (GOS) withheld a man’s high school certificate until he completed a year of service in the GOS army. This was not an option for southern Sudanese, because it would entail fighting for the north against the south. For those able to attend school, there were two major advantages to formal education in Khartoum. First, teachers in Khartoum primary and secondary schools were well prepared and trained. Second, there are several universities located in Khartoum where secondary school graduates could continue their formal education without relocating.

**Human Rights Agenda in Kakuma**

Refugees in Kakuma had daily contact with and training from UN agencies and NGOs working within a framework of Western values and practices. NGOs offered IGP projects such as microfinance projects, business skills training, and interest-bearing saving accounts. Other training and education programs offered by NGOs included teacher

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56 Many youth arrived in Khartoum without any formal education, but were too old to begin primary school.
57 The language of instruction in Khartoum schools was in Arabic.
training, agricultural skills (plow technology, seed fairs), personal health education, building capacity to engage with grassroots peace activities, and human rights’ awareness.

Rights’ awareness programs included the means for women and girls to live their lives free from sexual and physical violence. Examples in Kakuma included the Safe Haven and Kakuma Brotherhood, both discussed in more detail below. Women also were informed through civic education workshops about their rights under the new South Sudan constitution and their new roles as citizens of South Sudan. According to interviews with staff at the International Rescue Committee (IRC) Nairobi, Kenya, in 2007, IRC’s major role in Kakuma was civic education and the dissemination of information. Each week information collected by IRC staff on events in South Sudan, ranging from violent incidences to the opening of a new hospital, were posted on a centralized bulletin board in Kakuma refugee camp. Many of the women who were the intended audience of this information were illiterate. Others could not access the bulletin board because their movement was restricted, involuntarily or by their own choice. To reach these women, IRC’s staff went door to door with the weekly news and announcements for upcoming events and workshops in the camp. According to the organizers, these workshops were designed to empower female participants with knowledge (IRC Staff, June 2007).

Based on my interviews, it appears that NGO/UNHCR in Kakuma perceived the Dinka women to be disenfranchised or a group who culturally were ascribed few rights or freedoms, and in need of empowerment. NGO/UNHCR saw the camp as an

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58 The IRC does not provide a definition for its use of the term empower.
59 The UNHCR defines empowerment as a process through which women and men in disadvantaged
opportunistic space in which to campaign for gender equality and human rights. Imparting knowledge to women about their rights was only the first step for NGO/UNHCR staff. They also worked to create what they saw as a safe space in which refugee women could practice their new-formed knowledge on gendered equality and human rights.

NGO staff in Kakuma told me that they and the UN made strong efforts to eradicate sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Many SGBV survivors isolated themselves from the community to avoid detection of their abuse. Other SGBV victims became stigmatized and marginalized by the community. Thus, the main goal of the interventions was to facilitate the healing process and to re-integrate the SGBV victims into the community.

Safe Haven Center was a program opened in 2000 by the Lutheran World Federation (LWS). It was designed to protect women and girls from SGBV and to prevent the violation of their human rights. According to NGO and UN staff I interviewed, acts of SGBV in Kakuma included child abduction, forced migration, domestic abuse, and rape. Safe Haven could provide safety, temporary accommodation, meals, primary education for children, adult education, and skills training (e.g. tailoring and embroidery) for up to 49 women and children. The center’s primary goal was to negotiate a solution with the community that enabled victimized women or girls to return home. If negotiations failed, the women was relocated to Dadaab refugee camp or positions increase their access to knowledge, resources, and decision-making power, and raise their awareness of participation in their communities, in order to reach a level of control over their own environment (Baines 2001).

60 Dadaab refugee camp is under the administration of the UNHCR and is located in the North Eastern Province in Kenya.
resettled in a third country. In July 2010, a total of 24 refugees, four women and 20 men, were working as caseworkers in the SGBV program.

I learned through interviewees with Kakuma NGO staff about a voluntary group of men, called the Kakuma Brotherhood, who were against SGBV and attempted to decrease the number of incidences through education and awareness. They received SGBV training from various NGOs, met weekly, and referred cases of SGBV to the NGO/UN agencies. In July 2010, the Kakuma Brotherhood comprised of 275 male members representing refugees from all nationalities present in the camp. The existence of this group and its large membership demonstrated a shift in male refugees’ perspective on SGBV. NGO staff told me that before the group’s establishment, men in the camp rarely reported cases of SGBV to the NGOs or other officials. After the group’s establishment men began to investigate cases reported of SGBV. Moreover, the number of cases reported by men continued to increase during the first six months of 2010 (see Figure 7).

**FIGURE 14. Numbers of Sex and Gender-Based Violence in Kakuma.**
*(Photo by author)*
Under the impetus of the Safe Haven Center, workshops and social movements like the Kakuma Brotherhood messages to prevent SGBV became highly visible around the camp on signposts and billboards. I saw several billboards with messages discouraging spousal abuse and rape (see Figure 13 and 14). NGOs had begun to include SGBV training in schools.

**Programs Aimed at Female Empowerment**

In Kakuma, many programs initiated by the NGOs which were aimed at empowering Dinka women and girls followed Western conceptions of power and proper
forms of gendered relations. These programs fell into two overarching groups—formal education and income generation.

**Formal Education**

While the number of Sudanese girls attending school rose over the years, there were still many girls who sought formal education, but were hindered by customary gender norms and practices. Interviews with NGO staff revealed their endeavors to eliminate this disadvantage by creating programs to motivate young girls to attend school, to urge their families to enroll their daughters in school, and to keep the young girls in class. For example, one program provided vegetable seeds to young girls who enrolled, thereby rewarding their families for allowing them to attend school. The NGOs were also instrumental in installing a form of affirmative action in the schools. Kakuma schools followed a Kenyan curriculum, which required all students to sit for a national exam[^61] in order to obtain one of the limited seats available in the secondary schools. As an incentive for girls to stay in primary school, all girls who scored higher than 250 (an average score) were given a seat in secondary school, while the boys were required to earn very high scores to be admitted.

**Income generation**

According to interviews with Kakuma NGO and UNHCR staff, many Dinka women who took asylum in Kakuma were illiterate but unable to attend school.[^62] Because empowerment through formal education was not an option for this group of women, an effort to empower them was made through Income Generation Strategies

[^61]: Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE)
[^62]: They are too old and/or have many responsibilities with children and home.
(IGS). Examples of IGS training for women included making peanut butter, soap producing, tailoring, and a cottage industry to produce women and girls’ underwear, school uniforms for girls, and reusable sanitary napkins for women. In addition, LWF initiated the Arts and Crafts shop, a cold drinks shop, and offered beauty salon training.

I visited the LWF Arts and Craft shop which is located just outside the compound that housed the NGO offices and staff accommodations. Because of its location, foreign visitors could easily frequent the shop, which provided an opportunity for women to earn substantially more cash for their crafts than they would in the local market. In fact, the LWF staff often informed the women when many guests would be arriving so that the women could prepare extra crafts to sell.

Walking through the Kakuma refugee camp, I saw several hair and soda shops that were set up with the help of the NGOs. Hairdressing and beauty training was available to both men and women. Individuals taking the course were trained not only in hair and beauty techniques, but in business and management skills as well. Upon completing the training, individuals were eligible to receive the capital needed to open a salon; the LWF paid the first three months’ rent and continued to monitor a salon’s progress.

The LWF drink shop consisted of a shack containing a refrigeration unit. The shop sold cold water and soda; the sale of alcohol was forbidden. Two women operated the drink shop each season. At the end of the season, two new women took charge of the

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63 In the cottage industry, the women are not paid a salary but for each item produced.
64 School uniforms for girls are a way of providing security for the girls. If someone sees a young girl in a school uniform being forcibly taken, they know that this child is being abducted for early marriage, or for custody, and they can stop it or report it.
65 See Sub Office Kakuma Operations document for more information on these activities.
66 Guests refer to representatives from funding agencies, journalists, government officials, etc., that, for various reasons, visited the Kakuma Refugee Camp.
shop. This arrangement provided women in Kakuma with an opportunity to learn first hand how to run a business and earn money. All profits made during the season went to the two women who ran the drink shop. Work in the drink shop was reserved for women who the LWF considered to the most vulnerable.67

Catering was another IGS program aimed at empowering female Kakuma refugees and providing them with a source of income. Catering jobs were in high demand. To ensure equal access, income generation groups of women were scheduled to participate. In 2010, there were 24 catering groups operating the camp. Each group consisted of five refugee women who worked together as a group for two years. After two years, the groups were dissolved and other women were allowed to organize as a catering group. The 24 groups rotated catering the meetings and training workshops hosted by the NGOs/UN.

**NGOs and UNHCR: Locations for Employment**

Both NGOs and UN agencies were locations for and generators of employment. Within these agencies refugees could find employment ranging from language translators to members of the cleaning or maintenance staff. The schools and hospitals, organized and funded by NGOs and UN agencies, also created a variety of employment positions including midwives, nurses, cleaning staff, lab assistants, teachers, and administration.

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67 In Kakuma, women sex workers or those who are HIV positive are most often identified as vulnerable.
Local Laws and Legal Systems

Refugees who fled to Khartoum and Kakuma lived under different legal systems and faced different challenges to their customary law practices. In each location, constitutional rights, penal codes, personal insecurity, daily concerns, and interaction between the forced migrants and the police differed.

Customary Dinka Law

According to my participants and other research on Dinka culture and law, the highest forms of status among the Dinka were accorded to men, resulting in unequal status and power between men and women. Nevertheless, my participants stressed that the rights bequeathed to men and women by Dinka law were always upheld, regardless of sex or status. Dinka men and women were aware of their customary rights and how to exercise them. Only when conflicts between individuals could not be settled, nor mediated by kin, were cases brought before the chief. Dinka customary law differed and differs from Western concepts of law, rights, and punishment. While Western law is based on establishing guilt and punishment, Dinka customary law was, and is, grounded in attempts at reconciliation and maintaining peace and harmony (Jok et al. 2004).

Khartoum – Sharia Law

In Khartoum, the Dinka often were obliged to follow the customs, traditions, beliefs, and laws that directed life in the predominantly Muslim capital, many of which differed or contradicted their own customs, traditions, beliefs, and laws. Rogaia Abusharaf’s research in Khartoum among forced migrants found that
the plight of women displaced from South Sudan is exacerbated because the civil war has forced them into locations where they are subject to laws and regulations that pay no heed to their rights and dismiss the legitimacy and soundness of their cosmologies and modes of knowing (2009:62).

She further suggests that the “Civilization Project”68 had “immeasurable consequences for the cultural traditions and worldviews of southerners in Khartoum” because “it imposed the Arabic language and Islamic religion as a uniform national identity while suppressing the multiplicity of ethno linguistic identities and religious affiliations in this complex society” (2009:64). According to Abusharaf, the Khartoum Law of Public Order69 was one of the most important elements in Arabization and Islamization campaigns. The codes included limiting the length and duration of wedding parties, enforcing the hijab, segregating public transportation, and prohibiting the consumption and brewing of alcohol (Abusharaf 2009). “To guarantee the enforcement of this law, the government expanded the Criminal Procedures Act of 1991 and vested the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, General Criminal Courts and the People’s Criminal Courts with full authority to imprison, fine, whip, confiscate property from, and enforce any punishment they see fit on those who violate the law” (Abusharaf 2009: 64-66).

IDPs in Khartoum were unfamiliar with the law, the legal system, or how to exercise their rights in Khartoum. Most southern Sudanese in Khartoum feared the police and avoided any involvement in the legal system. The laws in Khartoum limited women’s

68 According to Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed (2008) “through the Civilization Project the National Islam Front sought to lead Sudanese society toward what it envisaged as the true Islam of the early days of the spread of the Islamic message. It planned to change the day-to-day behavior of individuals and to restructure the state system in a manner that reflected adherence to the basic Islamic principals” (p. 8).
69 Originally issued by the Governor of Khartoum State in 1996, the Khartoum Public Order Act (KPOA) regulates a variety of activities in both public and private life. The KPOA imposes a particular set of values regarding the proper place of women in society and personal morality. For a more detailed discussion on the KPOA and its effects on the lives of women in Khartoum see the Strategic Initiative on Women in the Horn of Africa’s (SHIA) paper, “Beyond Trousers: The Public Order Regime and the Human Rights of Women and Girls in Sudan,” presented at the Session of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Banjul, The Gambia. November 12, 2009.
movement and IGS options. IDPs in Khartoum experienced daily racial, ethnic and political oppression (Holtzman 2000; Hutchinson 1996). Furthermore, those in squatter camps lived under fear of further displacement by the government. Many IDPs were forcibly relocated to isolated and barren areas removed from all basic services and job opportunities.

**Kakuma – Kenyan Penal Code**

Dinka refugees found themselves living under a foreign penal code and constitution that often interfered with Dinka customary practices. For example, Kenyan law establishes legal age of marriage as 18 years old, which interfered with the practice of marrying a young girl of 15 or 16 years old. The Kenyan law also criminalizes spousal abuse, which was contrary to Dinka customary law. Dinka husbands under customary law have, under certain circumstances, and to a limited degree, the right to hit their wives. The LWF reinforced Kenyan law, which prohibited spousal abuse and forced marriage by providing the Safe Haven.

Participants were frustrated when Kenyan laws prohibited them from their cultural practices. For example, many men complained how Kenyan law interfered with the marriage of daughters. Under Kenyan law girls must be 18 years of age or older to marry, and in Dinka law, under which a girl could marry at any age with the permission of her parents. Furthermore, Kenyan law forbids forced marriage, which is practiced among the Dinka. There are also actions, such as adultery, that are punishable under Dinka law that are not punishable under Kenyan law.

If a man or women goes to the Kenyan police to complain about their spouse committing adultery, the police will do nothing, they
will say that nothing can be done (male returnee, field notes June, 2010).

Therefore, unlike in South Sudan, even under the Dinka Bench Court in Kakuma, a man or woman could not be put in jail if found guilty of adultery.

The Dinka community in Kakuma was allowed, even encouraged, to establish its own local Bench Court. While the Kenyan police handled crimes that both Dinka and Kenyan laws viewed as major (rape, murder, abduction, or theft) the Dinka Bench Court dealt with crimes that both Dinka and Kenyan laws viewed as minor crimes (drunkenness or fighting). The Dinka Bench Court also decided domestic relations concerns like adultery, divorce, and issues of bridewealth. Judges on the Bench Court in Kakuma told me that they conducted their courts the same way they would have been run in South Sudan. In Kakuma, however, cases that were customarily resolved through the payment of cattle, had to be resolved differently.

The Dinka Bench Court had seven judges, one of which had to be a woman. The community elected the judges who served on the Bench Court. Interviewees in Kakuma told me that some of the Dinka refugees who repatriated to South Sudan returned to Kakuma because they say that the people in Sudan were not ready to accept human rights.

**Major Concerns Differed Between IDPs and Refugees in Asylum**

Refugees in Kakuma and IDPs in Khartoum had differing legal concerns and relationships with the local police. One major difference between the groups was that the refugees in Kakuma had a powerful ally and representative—UNHCR. The returnees from

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70 Rule instituted by the UNHCR.
Kakuma understood that any abuses committed by the Kenyan police or authorities could be reported to the UN. In Khartoum, Dinka IDPs faced daily racism and harassment from the local police. The participants in my study who returned from Khartoum admitted that they feared the Khartoum police rather than seeing them as a source of protection.

In Kakuma, the Turkana, a local ethnic group, posed a constant threat to the Dinka. Unlike the IDPs in Khartoum, refugees in the camp did not fear the Kenyan police because any mistreatment by the Kenyan police could be reported to UNHCR. Therefore, Kakuma refugees welcomed the assistance of the local police with security issues, even while many returnees from Kakuma simultaneously complained that the local police did not provide adequate protection from the Turkana.

Unlike IDPs in Khartoum, who constantly feared displacement from their camps (Abusharaf 2009; IRIN 2004), the UN protected Kakuma refugees from persecution or forced relocation by Kenyan government. Also, unlike the IDPs in Khartoum, refugees in Kakuma felt free to walk about the camp, to participate in cultural or social gatherings, or to take part in business or income generation activities.

**Asylum’s Influence On Income Strategies After Return**

In this section I review my findings from statistical analyses on data collected in my main interviews (n=119) and in my income surveys (n=501). Representing data from my main interviews, Table 15 (women) and Table 16 (men) show the relationship between asylum location and IGS, salaried employment, and formal education. To simplify the numbers in Table 15 and Table 16, I make two sets of comparisons: 1) Kakuma versus Khartoum, and 2) Kakuma or Khartoum versus those who never fled
during the war. These two comparisons address the effects of asylum on the level of formal education obtained during asylum and the attainment of salaried employment and engagement in IGS after return to Bor.

These findings show that among women, the biggest differences in income strategies and education levels are between those who fled Bor during the war and took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum versus those who never fled (see Appendix 8 for details). Among men, however, differences existed a) between those who fled to Kakuma versus those who fled to Khartoum, and b) between men who fled to Kakuma or Khartoum versus those who never fled.

Comparing women who took asylum in Kakuma with those who took asylum in Khartoum, I found they both engaged in approximately the same level of IGS or salaried employment after returning to Bor and obtained approximately the same level of formal education during asylum. Comparing women who took asylum with women who never fled showed that those who fled obtained significantly more formal education and are obtaining significantly more salaried employment after return than those who never fled. For IGS, there is a marginally significant difference between those who fled and those who never fled. That is, upon return to Bor, women who took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum are engaged in somewhat more IGS than women who never fled.
Table 15: Percentage* of Women In Main Interviews Who Engaged in IGS or Obtained Salaried Employment, and Level of Formal Education by Asylum Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IGS</th>
<th>No IGS</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>No Salary</th>
<th>Edu</th>
<th>No Edu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Fled</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IGS</th>
<th>No IGS</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>No Salary</th>
<th>Edu</th>
<th>No Edu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>100% (n=17)</td>
<td>100% (n=26)</td>
<td>100% (n=19)</td>
<td>100% (n=41)</td>
<td>100% (n=26)</td>
<td>100% (n=32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>0.0 (n=28)</td>
<td>30.0 (n=20)</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>0.0 (n=15)</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>18.8 (n=32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Fled</td>
<td>50.0 (n=4)</td>
<td>20.0 (n=20)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>33.3 (n=19)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>59.8 (n=32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 5.15$ 2 df  p< .08  $X^2 = 6.93$ 2 df  p< .04  $X^2 = 5.82$ 2 df  p< .055

*Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Table 16: Percentage* of Men in Main Interviews Who Engaged in IGS or Obtained Salaried Employment, and Level of Formal Education, by Asylum Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IGS</th>
<th>No IGS</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>No Salary</th>
<th>Edu</th>
<th>No Edu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Fled</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IGS</th>
<th>No IGS</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>No Salary</th>
<th>Edu</th>
<th>No Edu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>100% (n=4)</td>
<td>100% (n=20)</td>
<td>100% (n=28)</td>
<td>100% (n=15)</td>
<td>100% (n=26)</td>
<td>100% (n=32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>0.0 (n=15)</td>
<td>30.0 (n=20)</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>0.0 (n=25)</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>18.8 (n=32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Fled</td>
<td>50.0 (n=4)</td>
<td>20.0 (n=20)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>33.3 (n=19)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>59.8 (n=32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 2.40$ 2 df  p< n.s.  $X^2 = 10.31$ 2 df  p< .01  $X^2 = 5.82$ 2 df  p< .055

*Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Comparing men who fled to Kakuma versus men who fled to Khartoum indicates that there is no significant difference between them in IGS engagement after return or in the level of education obtained during asylum. However, upon return to Bor, men who took asylum in Khartoum are more likely to be salaried than men from who took asylum in Kakuma. Comparing men who fled versus men who never fled showed that upon return to Bor, men who fled obtained significantly more salaried employment and have significantly more formal education than men who never fled. Men who fled are also engaged in somewhat less IGS than men who never fled.
Table 17 and 18 illustrate findings based on my income survey (see Methods Chapter One). Using three of the 11 categories of information gathered in this survey (location during war, education level, and income strategy), I created what I call person types. These person types allowed me to see patterned behaviors and characteristics within and among three major groups, those who fled to Kakuma, those who fled to Khartoum, and those who never fled.

Table 17 is an analysis of the female participants in my income survey. It reveals that the highest percentage of women in the income survey (37.9) never fled, had no education, and engaged in IGS. A much smaller percentage (14.6) of women were IDPs, had no education, and practiced IGS. Probably the most interesting finding from Table 17 is that, regardless of asylum location or level of education obtained, women in the income survey almost universally practiced IGS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location During War</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Income Strategy</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never Fled</td>
<td>No Education</td>
<td>IGS</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>No Education</td>
<td>IGS</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Fled</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>IGS</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>IGS</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>IGS</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Salaried Employment</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18 is an analysis of men in the income survey. The highest percentage of men in the income survey fled to Kakuma, have received at least some education, and attained salaried employment (28.2). They are followed by 17.3 percent of men who were IDPs, obtained at least some education, and engaged in IGS. Table 18 seems to show a contradiction within the smallest category of men who never fled and have no education, yet have attained a salaried employment. This is a result of the fact that many of the men
in this category are employed as police officers or soldiers, jobs which do not require an education in South Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location During War</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Income Strategy</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma, Education</td>
<td>Salaried Employment</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP, Education</td>
<td>IGS</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG/KY, Education</td>
<td>Salaried Employment</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Fled, No Ed</td>
<td>Salaried Employment</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

In this chapter I described aspects of the environments in Kakuma and Khartoum that contributed to willing or involuntary modifications to customary Dinka subsistence patterns, resettlement patterns, gendered practices and relations, and concepts of Dinkahood during asylum. Key factors included: the inability to practice customary agro-pastoral livelihood strategies, adaptation to an urban setting, access to, or lack of access to, formal education, humanitarian aid, food rations, and skills training, exposure to human rights education and promotion, and interruption of customary law practices and enforcement of foreign law.

I argue that the presence of humanitarian agencies was the key determinant of the different gendered norms and relations between returnees from Kakuma and Khartoum. Increased access to and assistance in attending formal education, vocational training, IGS training, and acquiring capital gave Kakuma returnees who participated in these educational programs advantages in the job market upon return to Bor. Furthermore, powerful and daily messages on human rights, gender equality, and SVGB led to new
practices of gender norms and identity (willingly or involuntary) first in the camp and, as I will show in the following two chapters, upon return to Bor.

In the following two chapters, I examine how modifications to gender norms and relations that occurred during asylum are mediated upon return. My aim is to demonstrate how new concepts of male and female Dinkahood formed during asylum were performed after return to the urban setting of Bor.
Chapter 7 Post-repatriation, Gender Norms and Relations: Female Dinka Returnees

Introduction: Strategies and Avenues to Status and Power

In chapter six I identified factors in the asylum environment that contributed to altering gender norms, relations, and practices during asylum: access to formal education, developing income generating strategies (IGS), skills training, being exposed to humanitarian aid and a human rights agenda, urban life, and reliance on and an acceptance of a cash economy. Using Mahler and Pessar’s (2001) gendered geographies of power (GGP) as a framework, in chapter seven I demonstrate how changes to gender norms, relations, and practices that occurred during asylum as a result of these factors, articulate with local forces to reshape Dinka women’s access to power and status after return.

My aim is to show how alterations to concepts of Dinka personhood and gendered practices during asylum are mediated by the local environment to 1) provide women with new avenues to deal with gendered inequalities, 2) grant access to new and to customary forms of status and power, and 3) lead to unexpected disempowerment for women upon return to Bor.

I begin this chapter by examining the avenues Dinka Bor women customarily used to obtain status and power. I will then examine strategies used during asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum, and finally, after return to Bor. This will allow the reader to make comparisons across the three phases of the forced migration experience. This comparison will also illustrate the role of the asylum location and Bor environment in the (re)negotiation, (re)creation or maintenance of gendered practices.
Pre-departure or Customary: Strategies and Avenues to Status and Power

In this section I examine the avenues Dinka Bor women customarily use to obtain status and power. These strategies include food procurement and preparation, marriage and children, her husband’s male relatives, her mother’s home, and bridewealth.

Food: Production and Preparation

Customarily among the Dinka, women’s roles as harvesters and food preparers are well respected and critical to the success of the family. In this way, women are viewed as essential contributors to the livelihood of the family. Among the Dinka, like many other cultures, food production and consumption is complicated by rules that dictate who produces and prepares what food, and who eats where, with who, and when. Food production and consumption also encodes patterns of social relations that illustrate different degrees of hierarchy, inclusion, and exclusion (Douglas 1972). This role as sole regulator of food production, storage, preparation, and consumption is an avenue through which women gains power and status within her family and community. To understand the depth to which Dinka women’s control over the family’s food provides them with power, this section describes the cultural norms associated with food production and consumption and how these norms are intertwined with concepts of Dinkahood and kinship.

The Dinka live in an environment that is periodically subject to droughts and floods and allows for only one harvest season (Hutchinson 1996; Johnson 1992; Deng 1972). In this environment, food security is a constant concern and long periods of hunger are familiar to the Dinka. In fact, the Dinka refer to the period between May and
August as the hunger season, when food rations from last year’s harvest run low or are even depleted. Despite these realities of hunger, Dinka men and women refrain from either announcing that they are hungry or complaining of hunger. My participants told me that from a young age, Dinka children are taught that to complain or announce their hunger is a sign of weakness (Deng 1972). A common strategy used by youth to help them forget their hunger is to sing.

Through my interviewees, I learned that Dinka children also are taught not to walk and eat at the same time because eating while walking can be interpreted by the community in one of three ways, each of which brought shame not only to the child, but also to the child’s family. First, people who eat while they walk can be perceived as weak willed, because strong people can control their hunger and wait until they arrive home to eat. This abstention from food demonstrates an individual’s self-composure and ability to behave with constraint (Deng 1972). Second, eating while walking can indicate that the individual is attempting to avoid sharing food with family members at home. Trying to avoid sharing food signifies to the community that this individual’s home lacks enough food to feed its members. A family’s inability to feed its members brings shame not only onto itself, but also onto the whole clan. Among the Dinka, kinship responsibilities include sharing food rations with any family or clan members in need. Therefore, unless an entire community/region is suffering from drought and food insecurity, there is no reason, other than greed, for a family to go hungry. Third, others may also view people who eat while they walk as selfish. That is, people who eat while they walk are believed to be eating the food before they arrived home to avoid having to share the food with their family. Failure to share with one’s family and kin is a serious transgression among
the Dinka. To be viewed as stingy and/or as failing to fulfill one’s kinship obligations brings great shame upon the individual and his family.

The practice of *aluck thuk* (or *luɔk thok*) further reveals the intricate relation between food and kin among the Dinka Bor. One of the many important moments in the marriage between a Dinka woman and man includes the bride’s transfer from her natal home to the groom’s home. A cohort of a predetermined number of female relatives and friends escort the bride to the groom’s home. The cohort remains with the new bride for as little as three days to as long as a week before she is left alone with her new husband and his family. Members of the bride’s cohort refuse to eat, or even drink water, until *aluck thuk* is completed. In the practice of *aluck thuk* each woman in the bride’s cohort receives a cow or a goat from a male member of the groom’s family.

The English translation of *aluk thuk* is “to rinse the mouth.” Metaphorically, just as people rinse their mouths with water to remove a lingering taste, the gift of *aluk thuk* rinses away the bride’s kin’s memory of her cooked food (Brendan Tuttle personal communication, December 2012; Tuttle 2013). By “rinsing one’s mouth” of the taste of

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71 On a predetermined day, the bride, her sisters and her close female friends negotiate with the groom, his brothers and his close friends about the number of girls and women that will accompany the bride to her husband’s home on the day of the marriage. The negotiation often takes a full day to complete. The negotiations, of which I was once a participant, begin with introductions, in which each individual gives their name (which indicates the person’s father and grandfather’s name), clan, the name of the village where they were born, and marriage status. Providing this information is important because the marriage ceremony is also a location where young men and women search for future spouses. Among the Dinka, there are strict rules of incest avoidance within clan and family (Deng 1972; Fadalalla 2009). The information given during the introduction establishes who among the group is available for possible courtship. This negotiation is an exciting time for the youth involved. While the negotiation is a serious matter, the air is filled with excitement and playfulness. Often laughter breaks out when a girl announces she is a *nyang* (a girl, that is, she is an unmarried and so a possible future bride). The bride and her cohort begin the negotiation with a very large number of girls the bride wishes to escort her to her husband’s home, for example 100. This unrealistic number of girls is met with laughter from the young men. The men then offer an equally unrealistic number of girls, for example five. Because the transportation, food, and housing for the marriage ceremony is organized and paid for by the groom and his family, it is in the groom’s interest to keep the number of girls escorting the bride low. The new bride is moving to an unknown home, most often in a different village. Therefore, she wants as many of her female relatives and friends with her to help her through the process.
the food cooked by their sister or daughter, the natal kin acknowledged that she is no longer cooking for them. That is, she is no longer part of the natal kin’s daily lives, “but rather cooking for someone else and thus a relative to them as she once was to her natal kin” (Brendan Tuttle personal communication, December 2012).

These practices speak to the importance of food in gaining prestige and its links to kinship responsibilities in the Dinka culture. As cultivators, procures, and preparers of food, women become powerful and central to many cultural practices and sources of personal integrity.

**Marriage and Children**

A Dinka girl truly becomes a woman with the birth of her first child. She is now a mother and with this comes a respect and voice she did not have as a nyagn (a girl). Children not only provide women with status and power, but they also serve to prevent her husband from divorcing her. While Dinka customary law allows a man to divorce his wife and collect the cattle given as bridewealth if the woman can not produce a child for him, it is also Dinka customary law that once a wife produces three children, her husband and his kin are forever obligated to fulfill spousal and kinship responsibilities to her. In other words, after the birth of three children a man cannot divorce his wife, nor can he reclaim any cattle given as bridewealth. Children also provide Dinka women with security in their old age. For example, if a man divorced his wife when their son became a man, he can demand that his father take his mother back into his compound and provide for her.
**Her Husband’s Male Relatives**

When a Dinka Bor woman marries a Dinka man she becomes, in essence, a bride to the groom’s family. Not only does the bride gain new obligations and responsibilities to her male in-laws, but the groom’s male kin also has a responsibility to the bride. Among the responsibilities the male family-in-law hold is to ensure the bride’s happiness and well-being in her new home. Therefore, if there is a conflict between the bride and groom, the bride first goes to her husband’s brothers and/or father for help in quelling the dispute. Dinka have a great respect for their culture and laws. Despite the gendered inequalities embedded in the culture, a woman has rights as a wife. If those rights are being violated, her family and community make every effort to ensure that her rights are reestablished.

My informants always began the list of a wife’s rights with her right to reproduce children. Her husband is obligated to perform his role in reproduction (Håkansonn 1990; Deng 1972). A husband’s failure to do so (either through refusal to have sex or physical inability) is sufficient reason for a wife to be granted a divorce. According to my interviewees, a wife also has the right to demand that her husband complete his husbandly and fatherly obligations and responsibilities, i.e., successfully care for cattle, provide her with cows to milk, help her cultivate her field, build the frames to the huts, and protect his wife and children (Håkansonn 1990; Deng 1972). Finally, although a husband’s right to punish his wife for failing to fulfill her wifely or motherly duties included physical violence (Deng 1972), my interviewees agreed that it is unacceptable for a man to hit his wife without valid provocation or to excess.

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72 In accordance with my informants, and as Deng (1972) wrote, while a wife must “be exclusively her husband’s in sex, she must keep an open house and an open heart to all [her husband’s] kinsman.” The Dinka say, “Except in her bed, a wife is wife to all.”
**Her Mother’s House**

According to my informants, if a wife’s male in-laws fail to change her husband’s behavior, a wife can engage a second strategy to deal a husband’s poor behavior. This strategy involves traveling to her father’s home and remaining there for several days. This is a clear sign to her brother(s)-in-law, her family, and the larger community, that things are not going well between her and her husband. Furthermore, the move to her father’s compound signals that her husband is to blame for the conflict.

My informants said that not only does a wife’s abrupt travel to her father’s home bring public attention to her husband’s behavior, and thus shame, it also leaves him in a great predicament. Without a wife he has no one to cook his food, fetch his water or wash his clothes. He cannot perform these tasks, which are considered among the Dinka as strictly women’s work, without being humiliated and/or harassed by those around him. This embarrassment puts pressure on him to engage with his wife’s family and ask for the return of his wife. A woman’s father and brothers will not allow her to return to her husband’s home until they believe that the husband will change his behavior and/or fulfill his obligations and responsibilities to his wife, their daughter, or sister.

**Bridewealth**

My findings reveal that in certain contexts bridewealth can work to limit a Dinka woman’s freedoms and powers. These limitations occur most often in cases where the practice of bridewealth is abused to acquire large numbers of cattle rather than as part of the process to judge a future groom’s quality. As a result, the Dinka women’s desires are trumped by the prospect of a large bridewealth and she is forced into a marriage she did
not want. Bridewealth can also hinder a woman’s ability to obtain a divorce. If her family does not want to, or are unable to return the bridewealth cattle, she will be unable to obtain a divorce.

Despite this limitation, there are also contexts in which bridewealth provides women with protection, status, and power. For example, male siblings have a vested interest in the man their sister marries, because it is with their sisters’ bridewealth cattle that they will marry. Therefore, a girl’s brothers will pay close attention to their sister’s care and reputation. A brother will go out of his way to protect his sister from a “bad” man and will search for the best and richest Dinka men to introduce to their sister.

Bridewealth can also provide a young girl with status. Males contribute to their natal family through the children they produce (patrilineal decent). The only way for females in a patrilineal descent pattern to contribute to the progeny of her natal family is through her bridewealth. Her bridewealth cattle make it possible for her brothers to successfully marry and thus produce offspring.

Customarily, bridewealth is the sole mechanism women have to add to their extended natal families’ wealth and well-being. Therefore, most Dinka women resist legal attempts to limit the number of bridewealth cattle or to the end of the practice of bridewealth entirely. According to interviewees, in the late 1980s the current governor, Kuol Manyang, was a military leader in the SPLA. As a Dinka man in a prominent position of status and authority he tired to enforce a limit of seven cattle for bridewealth. He said this limit was in reaction to the large number of cattle being stolen and dying during the war. But my interviewees said that the Dinka people refused to accept this limit, arguing that Kuol was trying to enforce a new culture on them. My informants also
told me that as governor, Kuol Manyang tried to set a precedent by refusing to accept bridewealth at the marriage of his daughter. But his family became angry and insisted that he accept a bridewealth. In the end, 70 cattle were exchanged.

In sum, customarily a Dinka woman’s status and power is obtained mainly through successful food procurement and preparation, high numbers of bridewealth cattle, marriage to a cattle rich and respected husband, and producing many children. Despite the gender inequality embedded in Dinka culture, Dinka women have measures, or strategies, they can use to deal with their subordinate positions. These strategies include requesting the aid of her husband’s male relatives and traveling to her father’s house.

Asylum in Kakuma: Strategies and Avenues to Status and Power

In this section, I first review the customary avenues Dinka Bor women continued to pursue while in the Kakuma refugee camp to combat existent gendered inequalities in the Dinka culture. Second, I look at customary strategies no longer available to Dinka women in Kakuma. Finally, I examine new measures of status and power available to Dinka women in Kakuma including: Kenyan law, acceptance of and entrance into a cash economy, and formal education.

Kakuma: Customary Strategies Attainable

Food procurement and preparation remained the domain of Dinka women in Kakuma, although expressed in different behaviors. There, rather then obtaining food

73 It is important to note that the “minors,” aka Lost Boys, and men who had no female kin in the camp were forced to collect and cook food. Among the Dinka cooking is viewed as strictly women’s work.
from the fields they planted and harvested or by milking the cows, the bulk of a family’s food supply was obtained from UNHCR. Despite the heavy weight of the bags of food rations, the women were responsible for collecting the food at the distribution center.

In Kakuma, the power and status Dinka women received from bridewealth was diminished or even lost because most, or all, of the cattle owned by many Dinka men who fled to Kakuma were killed or stolen during the war. Often male refugees in Kakuma were unable to contact relatives in South Sudan with whom they left their remaining cattle. In some cases, these men did not know if their relatives, or their cattle, were even still alive. Most often, bridewealth negotiations conducted in Kakuma were made with the understanding that, despite the lack of cattle now, upon return to South Sudan, the groom and his family would turn over the cattle promised during negotiations. Furthermore, bridewealth negotiations conducted in Kakuma most often failed to reach the customary number of cattle (30). In this way, a Dinka bride’s one time chance to fulfill her daughterly obligation to provide for her family was drastically hindered or never fulfilled.

While for most women in Kakuma, a low or promised bridewealth was their lot, a phenomenon that hit the camp in the late 1990s changed this future for a few new brides. Dinka men from Kakuma who were resettled to the United States in the early 1990s were returning to Kakuma in search of wives. They brought with them thousands of United States dollars intended for bridewealth. Interviewees related to me that these Dinka men returning from the United States were spending $20,000 to $30,000 on cattle for

Therefore, men cooking food was an extreme break from the cultural norm. It is only for survival that a man can cook without shame. Therefore, in the circumstances of war and asylum, a man cooking food was, and continues to be, viewed as necessary. Even in these cases the young boys and men would hide as they cooked in order to avoid being seen doing what is strongly viewed as women’s work.
bridewealth74 (see also Grabska 2010; see also Chapter Eight; cf. Håkansson 1988). A young woman chosen by a Lost Boy from the United States had the unique chance to give her family not only a very large bridewealth, but also a husband who would surely be a monetary resource for the foreseeable future (Fanjoy 2011; Grabska 2010).

**Kakuma: Customary Strategies Lost**

Customarily, a woman in South Sudan could consult her husband’s male relatives or go to her father’s home when her husband was not fulfilling his duties as husband or father. Unfortunately, for many women in Kakuma these strategies were not available. Few families arrived at the camp with all members intact. During the 22-year long civil war many refugees lost family members. In some cases entire families were missing. Many died as soldiers, many were civilian victims of the conflict, and in other cases, family members were separated during the chaotic flight from villages. As a result, many of the family units in Kakuma were not complete. Thus, some women in Kakuma had no one to call on for assistance with their husbands’ behavior, or relied on more distant kin or clan members for help. The farther women moved from their immediate families the less influence her husband’s kin could exert on her husband’s behavior.

In Kakuma, it was not possible to reconstruct customary settlement patterns—patrilocalsec post-martial residence—in which a single clan populates a village. While UNHCR took these customary settlement patterns into consideration, placing individuals and families in zones that mimicked clan and village designs, it was not logistically

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74 It is important to note that the family of a Dinka bride would refuse money in place of cattle, even given the difficult asylum situation. The man from the U.S. would have to send the money to his male relatives still residing in South Sudan. These relatives were responsible for purchasing the cattle for the groom and seeing that all the cattle were delivered to the bride’s male kin who were residing in South Sudan at the time.
possible to recreate the exact settlement patterns of South Sudan. This change in settlement patterns affected Dinka practices in many ways. Most critically, it limited a Dinka woman’s ability to call on her husband’s male kin for help with spousal conflict. In South Sudan her husband’s male kin would be living by her, often in the same compound, affording her quick and easy access to them. In Kakuma, her husband’s male kin might be located in a different zone altogether.

A wife’s ability to call on her natal kin to help her was also compromised in Kakuma. At marriage, a bride moves to the home of her husband, which is in a different village or camp. Therefore, it is most likely that the wife’s parents and brothers did not flee with her. As a consequence, the two strategies most commonly used by a Dinka wife to deal with her husband’s behavior, i.e., to consult her husband’s male relatives or to go to her father’s home, were foreclosed to her at the Kakuma refugee camp.

**Kakuma: New Strategies and Avenues to Status and Power**

At the same time that several customary strategies Dinka women used to engage with gendered inequality were lost in Kakuma many new ones became available to them. I argue that these new strategies evolved as a result of certain characteristics present in the Kakuma asylum environment and as an outcome of a new Dinka womanhood that arose there. I begin this section by examining the factors in Kakuma that aided the development of new strategies: Kenyan Law, acceptance of a cash economy as a viable form of subsistence, and formal and education concerned with human rights. I complete the section with the story of Ayen. Her story demonstrates how factors in asylum
impacted 1) gendered norms, relations, and practices and 2) the development of a new Dinka womanhood during asylum and after return to Bor.

**Kenyan Law**

Kenyan law differed in three significant ways from Dinka customary law. Kenyan law established the legal age of consent as 18, it prohibited forced marriage, and it enacted laws to protect women from spousal abuse. UNHCR and NGOs operating in Kakuma made an effort to educate both male and female refugees about the Kenyan laws, the consequences of breaking these laws, and how women could invoke laws to help them fight sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In Kakuma, Kenyan law was most frequently invoked by Dinka girls to delay, or avoid, an unwanted marriage.

Kenyan law and NGO programs (such as Safe Haven75) provided refugee women in Kakuma with new ways to access help in negotiation and protection from gendered inequality. Customarily, a Dinka woman relied on her kin (husband’s and agnatic) to protect her and influence her husband’s behavior. In Kakuma, a Dinka woman whose family was not helping, or a woman without family, could use Kenyan law and the aid of NGOs to invoke her rights.

Kenyan laws and NGO programs not only changed Dinka women’s rights, they also impacted the fabric of customary Dinka kin relationships, responsibilities, and obligations. For example, when a young girl defied her family’s wishes to marry, either by invoking Kenyan law, or by taking shelter at Safe Haven, she risked the loss of future support from her family. If she continued to defy her parents and married a different

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75 Safe Haven was first discussed in chapter four, sub-section Life in Kakuma and again in chapter five section sub-section Human Rights Agenda in Kakuma.
young man, her family could refuse to help her resolve subsequent conflicts with her husband and/or his family, or to provide any food or cash support. The bride’s failure to honor her obligation to her natal family justified the family’s lack of support.

**Acceptance of Cash Economy**

While refugees had access to food aid and health care in Kakuma, they still needed cash in order to fulfill many basic needs and wants. For example, the food rations that were distributed to refugees every 15 days did not include vegetables, meat, or milk. To obtain these dietary essentials, refugees had to participate in the cash economy. Furthermore, small luxuries like radios, bikes, or new bedding also necessitated cash. Therefore, it was necessary for Dinka refugees to obtain employment, practice income-generating strategies (IGS), or begin to trade in the market. Also, refugees who spent time in other parts of Kenya, such as Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, saw first hand how participation in a cash economy was a viable method of subsistence. Some refugees knew about the Lost Boys who returned to Kakuma from the United States possessing large sums of money for marriage and who were telling stories of their great success participating in a cash economy.

Dinka women in Kakuma began to see that a cash income via employment or IGS improved the lives of Dinka girls and women in three ways. First, it provided women with new ways to add to the material well-being of her family (immediate and extended) through the purchase of needed items such as medicine, food, and soap. Second, an educated, employable young girl was less likely to be married off early. Because Dinka custom dictated that once married, a woman stayed at home, a married woman could no
longer make money to aid her family. Finally, an educated girl demanded a higher bridewealth.

**Education: Formal and Human Rights**

In Kakuma, primary and secondary education was free and available to all refugees. Few barriers prevented a Dinka family from sending their boys to school, because there were no cattle to tend nor was there any way to teach the young boys Dinka customary substance patterns. While some girls could not attend school because of Dinka cultural norms or the necessity to assist with chores at home, many young girls growing up in the camp were able to take advantage of the educational opportunities in Kakuma.

While formal education opened new opportunities to Dinka woman, primarily through employment and IGS, exposure to human right’s education began to shape a new concept of Dinka womanhood. UNHCR and NGOs working in Kakuma espoused an ideal of individual human rights and strived to disseminate this message of equality throughout the camp and to include it in all aid projects they provided. Examples of how UNHCR and NGOs incorporated human rights messages include billboards throughout the camp that espoused equal rights, by conducting SGBV workshops (see Figures 15 and 16), and through capacity building programs aimed at women, such as hairdressing and beauty training.\(^76\) I argue that these messages of human rights and gender equality, accepted by some and rejected by others, played an important role in shaping a new Dinkahood among both the men and women who took asylum in Kakuma.

\(^76\) See chapter five sub-section *Programs in Kakuma aimed at female empowerment in Kakuma* for a detailed discussion on capacity building programs in Kakuma aimed at women.
Educated Dinka women in Kakuma (and elsewhere in Kenya) who embraced these new ideas of gender equality and human rights began to organize into women’s groups and associations. Their goals were to increase awareness about the needs of women in South Sudan, to obtain increased rights and freedoms for South Sudanese women, and to empower South Sudanese women through education. The story of Ayen and the work of the JSWU, in which she serves as deputy officer, illustrates the impact that education in Kakuma refugee camp on human rights has had.

FIGURE 16. Human Rights Billboard in Kakuma. (Photo by author)
Vignette: Ayen Chair Lady Jonglei State Women’s Union

Elizabeth Ayen Kuer began her work to improve the rights and lives of women living in Jonglei State in 2007, when she was elected deputy officer of Peace and Development for the Jonglei State Women’s Union (JSWU). JSWU was formed in 2007 during a three-day conference in which women from each county elected one woman to represent them in the Union. Today, there are 16 elected members of JSWU: one representative from each of the 11 counties, one woman to represent widows, and four young women to represent female youth. According to Elizabeth Ayen, the goal of JSWU is “to empower women socially, economically and politically.” She said that at the moment, JSWU’s activities in Jonglei focused on education for women, both young and old. The Union encouraged adult women to return to school or even to begin school.

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77 The name of the organization is now Jongeli State Women’s Association (JSWA).
JSWU also worked with the community members, NGOs, and the GoSS to ensure that girls had the same educational opportunities as boys.

JSWU also actively worked to bring peace to Jonglei State, which had the most severe insecurity problems in the whole of the South Sudan. Because women were said, “to be the peacemakers in the house, the peacemakers in the family,” the women’s group made bringing peace to the state and to the community, part of its mission (Ayen, 04-10-10). On the sixth of December 2009, the JSWU rallied for a peaceful disarmament in Jonglei State. JSWU organized three large rallies around the state in which the community members, the leaders of the cattle camps, and government forces were invited to discuss and agree on disarmament to guarantee peaceful elections. Ayen feels this is one of the Union’s greater successes. It was through their efforts that the disarmament was not only completed, but was also conducted without incident (see Figure 18).

A further concern for JSWU was to ensure the rights of women. JSWU organized workshops to educate the community on SGBV, specifically, to eliminate SGBV against women. Elizabeth stressed that the Union called for unity among all the women in the state. They believed that a unified group of women would be stronger and could talk with one voice. “When you come to our office…[the] women are together. There is no Murle, no Anyuak, there is no Dinka. We are just doing our work together” (Ayen, 04/10/10).

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78 See chapter three sub-section South Sudan for detailed discussion on insecurity in Jonglei State.
79 The three rallies were located in Twic East County, Duk County, and Bor County.
Born in 1983, Ayen was the daughter of a soldier. In 1991, when the violence of the Sudanese Second Civil War hit Bor, her family fled to Ethiopia. In 1992, at the age of nine, her family fled violence in Ethiopia and took refuge in Kakuma Refugee Camp. She lived in Kakuma for 14 years (1992-2006). While in Kakuma, her father arranged for her to go to Kakuma Arid Zone, a Kenyan government run school.  

80 When she completed Level Eight, Ayen spent one year at Napato High School in Kakuma. Ayen then was awarded a scholarship from the Catholic Church to attend Salga Formation Center located in Nakuru, Kenya where she completed Forms One and Two. She then moved to Gigil High School (her father paid), where she completed Forms Three and Four. While

80 Kakuma Arid Zone is a boarding school located in the town of Kakuma and offered classes Level One through Level Eight. Soon after arrival in Kakuma, Ayen’s father began a business in the market, allowing him to pay for his children to attend the local Kenyan run schools rather than those in Kakuma. Organizing and running a camp for a population as high as 70,000 was a difficult task and took many years of learning by the UNHCR and NGO staff. As a result, in the early years of the camp, educational buildings, supplies, and teachers were limited and few in number. While education in Kakuma was free, the schools often fell well behind the quality of education provided in the local Kenyan school system. This has changed over the years as funding targeted at education was used to build schools, buy supplies, and to hire and train teachers.
she moved around Kenya for her education, her parents remained in Kakuma Refugee Camp, running her father’s business. In 2004, after she completed high school, Ayen returned to Kakuma. While living in Kakuma between 2004-2006 she received training in agriculture and in peace and leadership from NGOs and UNHCR. During that period she was employed under a five-month contract with UNHCR as an interpreter in the Protection Unit. In that role, she translated English to/from Dinka and Swahili. When her contract with UNHCR ended, she joined the Lutheran World Foundation (LWF) as a Forester Extension worker in Kenya.

In 2005, she married. In 2006, after 15 years in asylum, Elizabeth Ayen, then 26 years old, returned with her husband to South Sudan. Her husband found work as a field manager with an NGO located in Jonglei State. In 2007, she traveled to Bor for a three-day conference that culminated in the formation of the JSWU and her election as deputy officer of Peace and Development. Her appointment necessitated a move to Bor Town. In 2010, Ayen was 27, married for five years, but did not yet have children. In August 2009, she was elected Chair Lady of JSWU.

According to Ayen, women who took asylum in Kakuma were often better off than those who fled to Khartoum because:

They have education and know how to manage their income. They can even write their names. But [women] who fled north, they only know Arabic. [This] really affect(s) job opportunities, because they cannot write in English...[Also] those who remained don’t know much because they lack knowledge. They have never gone to school. They don’t know how to manage their income. They don’t know how to create income (04/10/10).

For Ayen, the two biggest challenges faced by South Sudanese women, especially those living in Bor, are a lack of income generating ability and the violation of their rights. She said that women do not know their rights.
We women, we don’t know our rights. If you are taken to court and maybe it is your right but the lawyer says no, it ends there. You don’t know. You don’t know what forms to fill (04/10/10).

Using Mahler and Pessar’s (2001) gendered geography of power to frame Ayen’s story helps us understand the ways in which she negotiated gendered identities and relations across transnational borders. As Ayen was forced to flee her village in South Sudan, take asylum in Kakuma, and than return to Bor, she moved through different geographical scales and social locations that positioned her in a variety of webs of power geometry. For example, she moved from a customary legal system (geographical scale) in which the rights (social location) between men and women are different, but complementary (power geometry), to a Kenyan Legal System and UN code that both enforce equality between men and women.

Movement through geographical scales and social locations is not abrupt, like the physical movement across a border. Ayen’s identity and history were not left behind when she moved. Instead, Ayen had to engage in a constant (re)negotiation and (re)creation of her identity and gendered practices. In many cases her identity straddled more than one geographical scale and social location at a time. As an example of these multiplicities, while her marriage ceremony took place in Kakuma, the exchange of her bridewealth cattle, a customary practice, took place in the traditional fashion with relatives living in South Sudan. Ayen’s position as Chair Lady of JSWU is another example of straddling geographical scales and social locations. She works as an agent for this women’s group, which espouses equality between men and women. Because she is no longer located in Kakuma, but lives and works in Bor, Ayen can no longer leverage the resources such as the UN, Kenyan Penal Code, Safe Haven, or educational
scholarships once available to her and other women in Kakuma. In Bor, Ayen is left with few resources to help her improve the rights and lives of women living in Jonglei State.

Her identity and gendered practices in Kakuma, and subsequently in Bor, are modified or maintained not only by her present location within a given power geometry, but by a vision for her future. In Kakuma, she attended UN human rights workshops and met women from other countries who drove cars, attended university, and owned businesses. She observed men from other cultures practicing behaviors and roles that contradict customary Dinka norms. These experiences created an awareness, a consciousness in Ayen, that gendered practices and concepts of womanhood could be different from customary Dinka norms. Together, experience and awareness form part of Ayen’s imagination for her future and the future of the Dinka woman. Her personal character and imagination catalyze her modern identity and behavior.

**Kakuma’s Role in a New Dinka Womanhood**

In sum, several factors in the Kakuma environment contributed to a new form and practice of Dinka womanhood. I argue that this new womanhood was in part shaped by: 1) the ubiquitous enforcement of Global North concepts of gendered equality by UNHCR and NGOs, 2) resources, freedoms, and rights not present before departure but newly available to women, and 3) the environmental stresses in Kakuma that forced the practice of new gendered behaviors and relations.

During asylum in Kakuma, Dinka women not only adopted new ways to obtain customary forms of power and rights, but also were granted new rights through Kenyan law and UNHCR/NGO intervention. Unlike their legal status before departure, women in
Kakuma had the right to education, the right to work, the right to movement, and the right to be free of spousal abuse or forced marriage. Before departure women relied heavily on kin relations to deal with rights abuses under Dinka law that were not honored. In Kakuma, a woman availed herself of a new set of laws, human rights law, and appeals to the NGOs, UNHCR or Kenyan police that superseded her kin’s decisions.

While I argue that a Western framework of gendered norms and relations had an impact on customary Dinka ideas of gendered practices, roles, and responsibilities, I also contend that Dinka women did not totally adopt this framework. Instead they formed a new concept of womanhood in which some Western ideas of gendered practice were mediated by local concepts of Dinka norms and behaviors.

In Bor, among the women that I interviewed, I found differing views on womanhood and feminism. For example, some women want to end the practice of bridewealth. Adut expressed this position in an informal interview at the courthouse, “The [bridewealth] is killing us. It is taking our rights” (May 2010, field notes). Other women I interviewed stated that bridewealth is similar to that of buying a wife. The practice of bridewealth leaves women at the mercy of her “owner” and without the ability to access rights given her in the new constitution and by God.

In contrast, I also found Dinka women who support the practice of bridewealth. They cannot image marriage without the exchange of cattle. When questioned about the practice, they continually revisited the obligation a child has to repay their parents for the care and upbringing they were given. It is through her bridewealth that a Dinka Bor woman can repay her debt to her family. Hence, these women maintain that despite the ways in which bridewealth can inhabit women’s freedoms and access to benefits in the
new urban context, the practice of bridewealth is empowering and core to the Dinka culture.

Most of the women I met wish to maintain the practice of bridewealth and feel the need to reclaim the status and power that bridewealth once provided women before displacement. For example, one of my assistants told me this story during an interview with a woman participant,

… these people of ours [Dinka Bor men] will not change. They refuse the human rights. They can even beat a woman. When you call him and ask him [why he beat her he] is shameless. He doesn’t even give a reason for the beating. He just says that he paid the cows [bridewealth]. And I used to ask them this silly question, “O.K., you paid the cows for your wife, do your cows have the hands to cook your food and wash your clothes. Why do beat her? Why don’t you return your wife and get your cows [to do the work]?” And they say, “You! We [the men] shall beat you one day the way you can talk.” And I say, “But we are all human beings. Although she is a woman, you have to give her a life. And if you beat her everyday, it is better to go and get your cows to cook and clean for you (Mary Akout Deng [Akur], 08-30-10).

I found a similar pattern with regard to the concept of human rights. Some women want the Dinka Bor to adopt the human rights espoused by the UN, that is, equality in all manners between men and women. Yet other women believe that men and women are not equal and should be granted different rights based on their sex. These women wish to maintain gendered rights as they are in customary Dinka culture and law.

What I have observed is that most urban women walk a fine line between the concepts of the UN and customary Dinka rights and gendered relations. Akur, whose story I tell later in this chapter, is an example of a woman who successfully navigates her positions within two social locations. Her education and employment with a NGO in Bor provides her with a degree of freedom and voice within her family and community that other women her age do not experience. Yet, she does not, in her words, “abuse” her
freedoms. She chooses an urbane style of dress, but one that fits the conservative norms that restrict Dinka Bor women/girls from wearing pants or short skits. She is free to move in locations and at times of the day that other women cannot, but she purposely restricts her movement to maintain her reputation as a “good” Dinka wife/woman. Also, she uses her salary to gain customary forms of status rather than to flaunt her status through material items like watches, phones, gold rings and necklaces. Akur *walks a fine line* between new urbane and modern Dinka womanhood and customary Dinka womanhood. She does not flaunt her modernity, nor does she hide it. In discussions with men, Akur refrains from speaking over them, or abruptly arguing, but instead speaks quietly and respectfully, a tactic that gains her respect and an audience. In our discussions, she spoke to me about her acceptance of human rights—that men, women, and children are equal. She also told me that despite the Dinka cultural practices that the “foreign women” want Dinka to give up, Dinka women see themselves as important, empowering, and refuse to abandon the practices.

**Asylum in Khartoum: Strategies and Avenues to Status and Power**

In this section, I first examine how the Khartoum environment affected Dinka women’s customary forms of power and status. Second, I examine the new strategies women in Khartoum used to engage with gendered equalities. Finally, I argue that the environment in Khartoum was confining and restricting, resulting in fewer modifications to customary concepts of gender and Dinka womanhood.
Khartoum: Customary Strategies Attainable and Lost

Unlike many of the displaced southerners in Khartoum who took refuge in an IDP camp or shantytown, the Dinka IDPs I interviewed lived in the homes of male relatives who had been living in Khartoum for many years and were well established with jobs and houses. In Khartoum, the Dinka women in my study became dependent on the male relative with whom they lived. Many interviewees also found themselves living in a compound with several families. It was not uncommon for one Khartoum man’s income to be responsible for feeding several IDP families from the south. Furthermore, according to my informants, female Dinka IDPs in Khartoum were more dependent than were the male Dinka IDPs on the income of the male relative with whom they lived.

Racism and biases against southern Sudanese made it difficult for Dinka men to obtain employment. Also, Dinka men were typically less educated and skilled than other men who competed for these jobs. Despite these difficulties, there were job options open to men. Men’s physical strength, freedom of movement, and willingness to work for low wages made them attractive job candidates for building contractors. Many men found employment in road and home construction. Others, who were lucky, found internships in businesses or learned a trade, such as masonry, carpentry, or mechanics. For southern women in Khartoum, very few options to gain income were available because women were restricted by their lack of skills and education, and were hindered by restricted movement. Because southerners in Khartoum frequently faced harassment on the street from northerners and police, women avoided working outside the home. As a result, most southern women were completely dependent on their male relatives and did not contribute to the financial well-being of the family. Unable to produce or buy food, Dinka
women lost a crucial form of customary power. My findings are consistent with and are supported by other research on forced southern migrants living in Khartoum (Abusharaf 2009; Holtzman 2000; Hutchinson 1996).

While women in Khartoum were predominately dependent on the male head-of-household, women developed strategies to engage with this increased inequality. To illustrate, when several families shared a compound, the women would share the cooking responsibility, often rotating the days they cooked and cleaned, creating time off from chores. Women used this free time to relax or embroider. Embroidery was a common pastime of Dinka women and some women used their embroidery skills to bring in a small income. They sold embroidered pillowcases, sheets or decorative chair/table cloths to other IDPs and northern Sudanese. A major challenge women faced in their embroidery ventures was the length of time it took to complete large pieces or decorative sets. Only with the collaborative help of the women in the compound was embroidery a profitable venture. Dividing up the workload allowed women to complete large embroidered works more quickly and to produce more pieces. Furthermore, embroidery was an IGS that could be completed inside the compound, and hence, a safe option for southern women in Khartoum.

Like marriage and bridewealth practices in Kakuma, these practices in Khartoum also were affected by conflict, forced migration, and factors in the asylum environment. Similar to Kakuma, many Dinka men in Khartoum lost most, or all, of their cattle before fleeing to asylum. Other men could not make contact with relatives they had left in charge of their cattle. Consequently, as in Kakuma, many bridewealth negotiations in Khartoum were made with the understanding that the cattle would be turned over to the
bride’s family in the future. Also like Kakuma, the number of cattle promised as bridewealth was often much less than the Dinka customary number of 30 cattle. As a result, a Dinka bride’s one time chance to fulfill her daughterly obligation to provide for her family was drastically hindered or, in some cases, never fulfilled.

**Khartoum: New Strategies and Avenues to Status and Power**

Among the Dinka, kin relation was a critical determinant of an individual’s roles, responsibilities and obligations. Alliances were strongest amongst one’s patrilineal line, followed by clan, sub-tribe, and then tribal affiliation. Consistent with Rogia Abusharaf’s findings (2009), interviewees told me that Dinka who took asylum in Khartoum did not, either during asylum or upon return, adhere to customary rules of kin affiliation and obligation. According to Abusharaf, “some women construct[ed] social ties across ethnocultural and religious lines based on their common experience of migration or their geographic location” (Abusharaf 2009: 75). Interviewees maintained that those who took refuge in Kakuma continued to adhere to their kin and clan affiliations despite living in an urban center with varying tribes and clans.

Based on data collected through interviews with returnees from both Kakuma and Khartoum, together with Abusharaf’s work, I suggest that the difference in the strength and use of kin affiliation between Khartoum and Kakuma returnees is a consequence of varying settlement patterns in each asylum location. In Kakuma, UNHCR placed refugees in zones according to family and clan affiliation, thereby enforcing and even strengthening, customary forms of kin alliance and obligation. In Khartoum, there was no such zoning. Kin and clan were scattered around a city of over five million people, which
made calling on kin and clan alliances in times of need difficult, if not impossible. The survival strategy that best suited Khartoum was an alliance with a neighbor, regardless of their clan and sub-tribe affiliation.

While the number of women in Khartoum who obtained education (primary, secondary, and higher) was smaller than those who fled to Kakuma, there were women who did attend school in Khartoum. While education provided Dinka women returning from Khartoum the potential to deal with gendered inequality through employment, they were limited in the job market by inability to speak or write English. Education in Khartoum was in Arabic, but in the South of Sudan the official language was English.

In sum, I argue that while asylum in Khartoum affected the daily practice of customary Dinka gendered roles and responsibilities, the modifications to these practices were relatively moderate in scope when compared to those of Dinka displaced to Kakuma. Unlike women in Khartoum, women in Kakuma had: daily contact with agencies whose agenda included changing existing gender norms, and who worked to provide an environment in which these new ideas could be practiced. In addition, women in Kakuma had greater access to skills training and the market and laws that supported and enhanced women’s rights. In Khartoum, no individuals or agencies actively strived to influence IDP women to make changes in their concepts of gendered norms or behavior, nor were there opportunities to practice or perform new gendered practices. Khartoum’s Sharia law and fear of harassment on the streets confined women to their homes and restricted their movement, resulting in limited modification to concepts of gender and Dinka womanhood. Yet, despite the differences between women who took asylum in Khartoum and those who fled to Kakuma, there were changes that both groups of women
held in common. In the next section I examine how these two disparate asylum locations resulted in the use of similar and differing strategies by women to access status, power, and authority after return to Bor.

**Upon Return: Strategies and Avenues to Status and Power**

In this section I examine the post-repatriation experience. Specifically, I describe how modification to Dinka gendered norms and relations and concepts of Dinka womanhood that occurred during asylum are mediated by the resettlement context.

In March 2005, two months after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, UNHCR initiated the repatriation of Sudanese to South Sudan. Repatriation policy and humanitarian aid was based on the assumption that when refugees returned to their country of origin they would return to a lifestyle very similar to the one that was present in the pre-displacement period (Black and Koser 1999). However, as my data on returning Bor Dinka demonstrates, this assumption is false.

As we have seen from chapter four, while some returnees take up customary Dinka Bor agro-pastoral subsistence and settlement patterns, the majority of refugees returning from Kenya and IDPs returning from Khartoum chose to live in an urban setting and became dependent on a cash economy. These urban settings are similar to those of a large refugee camp like Kakuma in northern Kenya, or to cities such as Khartoum, Nairobi, or Kampala—all cities where many Dinka Bor took asylum.

Before people were not so interested in coming to town, the majority stayed in the village…now things have changed. Everyone has come to town, there is no one in the village, no one tr[ies] to teach the children life and culture of the Dinka. We have changed (male returnee, 08/25/10).
This returnee’s observations are born out by UNHCR statistics. As of October 2009, of the 29,689 returnees to Jonglei State just over half, or 14,952, resettled in Bor Town (Interview UNHCR Staff, November 2010). This stunning demographic shift holds clear implications for what will constitute future Dinka life.

**Urban Resettlement and Cash Economy**

Most of my female interviewees tell me that their life in Bor since return from asylum is a struggle. They complain that life in the village before departure was easier than life in an urban center. According to my interviewees, life in an urban setting like Bor brings more daily responsibilities and their tasks require more time to complete than they did in the village. For example, in a rural cattle camp, access to food (milk from cattle) and fuel (wood and cattle dung) is always close by, sometimes even within the compound. In Bor, food and fuel for the fire has to be bought at the market. Depending upon where in Bor a woman lives, her walk can take as long as 30 minutes each way. Rain makes the trip take much longer because the dirt roads, paths, and the market place become muddy and swamped with puddles. If there is no money to buy wood or charcoal for cooking, she must travel far into the bush to collect wood. Travel into the bush is further complicated because of the recent kidnappings and killings of Dinka by the Murle.81

Obtaining water for cooking, washing clothes, and bathing is even more challenging for women in Bor. This essential task consumes much of a woman’s day. A woman can wait as long as an hour at the water pump. Also, different from life in the

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81 For more detail on the Murle kidnapping and murders see chapter one, sub-section *Difficulties in Post-War and Current Conflict Area* and chapter three, sub-section *South Sudan*. 
cattle camp is the amount of clothing people own and wear. In Bor, people own and wear more clothing than those living in the rural villages and cattle camps, making washing clothes a full morning or afternoon ordeal at the riverbank.

Finally, for some women in Bor, formal education obtained during asylum opened up the possibility of employment. But employment outside the home does not relieve women from their household tasks and responsibilities. In the end, women in Bor who obtain employment find themselves doubly burdened. Not only are their days occupied by employment, but they also continue to be responsible for all the household needs.

**Formal Education**

Prior to and early in the civil war (before the late 1980s), formal education generally was not valued among the Dinka Bor because what was learned in the classroom was not applicable to life as a pastoralist. Dinka Bor men’s or women’s livelihood and social status were based solely on cattle camp life. If children spent their time at school they would not learn how properly to care for cattle or how to plant, cook (for girls) and build a mud hut. Moreover, the scheduled school year (September-June) overlapped with the time that most Dinka Bor migrated with their cattle in search of green pasture and water (January – April).  

I have no education because at the time no girls were sent to school, and because the Dinka did not know the value of education, they thought that cattle camp was better (female returnee, 08/24/10).

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82 Schools in South Sudan were established by and continue to follow the British academic schedule, that is, the school year begins around September and finishes in June.
I went to school for two years [in Bor] but then my brother took [me] home because the Dinka didn’t allow girls to go to school. If a girl went to school she wouldn’t get a [bridewealth] (female returnee, 09/18/10).

In a minority of cases, a Dinka boy may have been encouraged to attend school if his family saw him as unfit, or unable, to succeed in cattle husbandry, or if he showed academic aptitude. But unlike “Western hegemonic assumptions of education for individual development, this small commitment to education was made in hopes of diversifying the Dinka household economic base, enriching the social good” (Chrostowsky and Long 2013).

In 2010, it is common for Dinka Bor girls in urban areas to be enrolled in primary education. The Bor County Education Department Annual Report for the Year 2010 shows that the total number of girls enrolled in Bor as 7,040, only just below the total number of boys enrolled (8,504). Husbands are now beginning to encourage their wives to enter school or to continue their education after marriage.

After the [Comprehensive Peace Agreement] girls and boys go to school together in same class. That was not there before…some people [who returned] changed, but those who [did] not leave, [did] not see and [did] not change. But the change is happening. The girl can say I am going to school and the teacher will accept her (male returnee, 08/03/10).

Men without education will say the lady must stay at home. But a man who can understand, he may even let me go on to university (female returnee, 07/20/10).

There are good changes like people returned with education. But there are also bad changes, people have left cultivating, they want to go to town and leave cultivating (female who never fled, 09/29/10).

These quotes illustrate a new outlook among the Dinka Bor, an attitude that favors education and supports sending females to school. During the war, educational opportunities in the south of Sudan were rare. During the conflict, schools were
destroyed, teachers fled as insecurity rose, and salaries were not paid, resulting in educational conditions in the south of Sudan that were among the poorest in the world (UN Sudan IG 2011). As of 2009, in Jonglei State, South Sudan, only 37 percent of the population above the age of 6 has ever attended school (SSCCSE 2010). Ironically, forced migrants who fled south to Kakuma, Kenya, had better access to formal education than those who remained in the south (Chrostowsky and Long 2013; Epstein 2010).

The long conflict negatively affected the agro-pastoral livelihood of the Dinka Bor by restricting the seasonal cattle migration movement and contributing to the death of thousands of cattle. As cattle keeping became a more dangerous and an increasingly risky investment during the war, families and individuals sought new ways to diversify the family’s livelihood strategies. Along with the threat of violence, the war also decimated any existing infrastructure such as health and educational facilities. Therefore, any chance to use education as a means to diversify the family’s livelihood would have to be sought outside the south of Sudan. While the fear of violence in Jonglei was a constant concern to my participants, fully a quarter (24.5 percent) of my male interviewees told me that they fled southern Sudan to seek education rather than to escape immediate violence (see Table 10). These statistics/stories reinforce my argument that forced displacement is a complex phenomenon with multiple, not single, motivations.

Parents knew that the war had decimated the educational system in South Sudan, thus their children could receive a higher quality education outside of South Sudan. Many interviewees reported that when they returned to South Sudan, their children

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83 Cattle were at times killed during firefights or aerial bombing. Sometimes families were forced to kill a cow or bull to feed soldiers passing through a village or cattle camp. Also, conflict made access to veterinary care and vaccines difficult. This often resulted in loss of cattle due to disease.
remained in Kakuma, Kenya, or Uganda to finish their schooling. This further demonstrates the growing value of education among the Dinka Bor.

**Transnational Education Upon Return**

Formal education obtained during asylum provides Dinka Bor girls and women with new ways to negotiate gendered inequalities once beyond their reach. For example, Dinka Bor women are employed as NGO staff or hold elective offices, positions once reserved for men. In 2009, women held 34 percent of all seats in the South Sudan Legislative Assembly. Women in these positions reflect the great change taking place in the role and status of women in South Sudan.

Education has also helped Dinka Bor girls in unexpected ways (Chrostowsky and Long 2013). When a young girl in Kakuma was awarded a scholarship for private or higher education, she was able to delay or avoid an unwanted marriage. Sarah Ajith (04/18/10), whose family took refuge in Kakuma, considers herself lucky because she was awarded a scholarship in Kakuma to attend a private secondary school in Kenya. When Sarah was subsequently approached in Kakuma with a marriage proposal she was able to refuse, citing her unwillingness to give up a hard-earned scholarship. In Kakuma, it became well understood by Dinka refugees that monies for private or higher education were very rare and therefore should not be declined.

Alek (07/28/10), a female returnee from Khartoum, who is 26 yrs old and not yet married, reports that her father found it acceptable for her to remain single as long as she attends university. Sarah Ajith explains that education can improve many areas of a young woman’s life. She said that if a young girl has an education and can find
employment, she is a source of income to her father’s family. With a job, a woman’s family is less likely to marry her off early because as a single daughter she is obligated to share her income with her father’s family. If she married she no longer would be a source of income because customarily, once married, a woman must remain in her husband’s home and give up any employment or IGS that takes her outside the compound. If her husband does permit his wife to continue working, she is obligated to turn her salary over to him.

Thomas Håkansson’s (1990, 1988) research among the Gusii of western Kenya is relevant here. Customarily subsistence cultivators, the Gusii also tend cattle and these cattle are what make up Gusii bridewealth. His research reveals that elite and middle class Gusii families educate their daughters to ensure that their daughters will marry a groom from the same, or higher, economic status. My female participants, like Ajith, also recognize a relationship between education and marriage. Specifically, my female participants note how education and employment can sometimes help a woman, or young girl, avoid an early or unwanted marriage. But they speak of this ability to ward off marriage through education, as an added advantage, not as a family or personal strategy to find a groom.

The Gusii strategy to educate girls to ensure a groom from a certain socioeconomic level reflects significant changes to customary symbolic meanings and economic reasoning once ascribed to Gusii bridewealth. According to Håkansson, this strategy is in part due the emergence over the last 50 years of socioeconomic stratification among the Gusii. Based on Håkansson’s work, I anticipate similar changes in the symbolic meaning and economic reasons for Dinka Bor bridewealth. In chapter
eight I discuss how changes in the choice of groom and the way that men amass cattle may be early signals of change to symbolic meaning and economic reasoning of Dinka Bor bridewealth.

**Employment and Income Generating Strategies**

Prior to the Second Civil War, governance, security, and enforcement of law were strictly the purview of Dinka men. By 2010, women returning to Bor were being employed outside the home and in positions once reserved for men, e.g., as police officers, teachers, or government ministers. Women were also employed as cleaners in NGO, UN and ministry offices, cooks in NGO and ministry offices, messengers,\(^{84}\) and as field or extension workers for NGOs. Dinka women held positions of great authority and status, for example: Susan Lith Aluong, Advisor for Gender Affairs to the Governor of Jonglei State and a member of Parliament in the state legislature, and Dr. Julia Aker Duany, Undersecretary in the Government of South Sudan Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs. I argue that this shift in employment patterns is in part due to the changing identities of returning Dinka women as perceived by both Dinka men and women and a statute\(^{85}\) in the interim constitution that women must constitute a minimum of 25% of the legislative assembly.

Cattle camps or rural villages afford returnees very little opportunity to practice IGS. Surplus harvest, when available, is typically exchanged for a cow or sold so the

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\(^{84}\) As noted in chapter three, the Ministry offices in Bor Town lacked electricity and/or phone and internet service. Therefore, messengers were used to carry papers and messages between offices and employees.

\(^{85}\) The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, 2005. Article 58. Page 21(1.) The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly shall consist of: (a) members directly elected to represent territorial constituencies; (b) women, who shall constitute at least twenty-five percent of the total membership; and (c) such number of representatives of other categories as may be determined by law.
family can purchase medicines or other necessary items. A critical barrier to practicing income generating activities arises because of the cultural norm that kin always share what they possess with one another. Because entire cattle camps and most rural villages are inhabited by members of the same family or clan, they are not customers, only sharers. Moreover, the norm of sharing makes it shameful to sell foodstuffs or items to family members. In larger villages where multiple clans live together, some women brew beer, but the income is small.

Unlike the small rural settings, in an urban center like Bor Town, there are many possibilities to generate income. People cut and sell firewood, make and sell charcoal, collect water, sell tea and/or food (selling tea and/or food was usually restricted to widows), sell bread, vegetables, peanuts or peanut butter, collect and sell grass for roofs (seasonal), dig/prepare the ground for planting (seasonal), smear mud on homes or do roof repair (seasonal), and sell embroidery.

Dinka women use money earned through employment or various income-generating strategies to reduce the extant gender inequalities of Dinka culture and to improve their status in the community. Women with income can purchase status markers such as hair extensions or a wig, Western-styled clothes, shoes, a mobile phone, a pocketbook, and/or jewelry. The “look” or cultural style produced by public display of these items (Ferguson 1999: 95) signifies to others that she is urbane and modern. Figure 19, a picture of Susan Lith Aloung mentioned above, is an example of this “look.” In the

86 Selling food or tea was usually restricted to widows, because it necessitated sitting for long hours in the market serving almost exclusively male patrons. Women by custom did not eat in public venues nor did women have the money to purchase a cooked meal. Married men feared their wives’ reputations might be tarnished doing such work and most often refused to allow their wives to work in such settings. Because a widow needed no permission, as her husband was dead, she was free, if she could find the capital, to sell food or tea in the market.
picture she is carries a pocketbook and wears gold jewelry, a wig, and a Western style coat jacket; the items indicate to those around her that she is an urbane Dinka woman. Employment justifies a Dinka woman’s freedom of movement in town and permits her to eat at restaurants, buy sodas and beer, and attend events in locations previously prohibited to women. Employment allows Dinka women to push the boundaries of women’s freedom of movement.

Earned income also allows a woman to contribute to her immediate family’s well-being by purchasing food and clothes, defraying the cost of school fees for children, buying medicine, and paying for clinic visits. Depending on her income, a Dinka woman also can broaden contributions to her extended kin who are in need of economic assistance, in the form of cash, food, school fees, or cattle. Generosity and aiding of kin is one of the most revered personal traits among the Dinka. These actions bestow a Dinka with great respect and honor from their kin and community.

FIGURE 19: Susan Lith Aloung. (Photo by Sudan Tribune, August 14, 2012)
In the urban context, sources of status and power for Dinka woman continue to be bridewealth, food procurement and preparation, marriage, children, and generosity—all customary forms. I argue that Dinka women in Bor Town, who practice both customary and new forms of Dinka womanhood, experience greater status and power than do women who practice only one form or the other. In the urban context, the practice of a new Dinka womanhood grants a woman additional means to obtain the aforementioned sources of status and power.

**NGOs and UNHCR**

Chapter three and Figure Four detailed the composition of the several NGO and UN agency field offices if Bor Town. These agencies provide assistance to the whole of Jonglei State. Assistance and training comes in many forms depending on the agency’s focus. In general, assistance is not sex specific, but some agencies do design projects aimed specifically at women. I observed one such workshop organized and led by Eki Gbinigie, the Human Rights Officer at UNMIS Bor (field notes, August 2010). The three-day workshop was designed to educate women on the basics of Southern Sudan’s government, how to organize themselves into a group to better accomplish tasks, and how women working together can make changes in their law and their lives. Most women participating in the workshop had never attended school, and among those who had, they had completed only a few years of primary education. These women lacked a basic understanding of how their government was organized, what the government’s responsibilities were to its citizens, and how, as citizens, they could influence the government’s actions. Eki’s goal was to teach the women in the group that government
ministers have responsibilities and obligations to the public, and how the women could access their local government ministers to be heard. Other examples of projects directed specifically at women included Food for Education\(^\text{87}\) (CRS and WFP) and small loans (BRAC). The UN and NGO agencies also target women through funding events and projects run by local women’s groups such as the Jonglei State’s Women’s Association.

Aid and development agencies also endeavor to meet a Global North idea of a balanced workforce in which individuals from different ethnic backgrounds and both sexes are represented in the workplace. In an effort to meet this goal of balance and to counter gender bias in the local job market, agencies often seek out and hire women with an education and the skills required of the open positions.

**Vignette: Akur**

Akur (field notes, September 2010) attended and finished 12 years of formal education in Kakuma. She married a Dinka man who had resettled in the United States in 1999 and later returned to Kakuma to find a Dinka wife. He chose Akur because she was young and educated, bypassing her older, uneducated sister. By permitting Akur to marry first, her family broke a strongly held Dinka custom of children marrying from oldest to youngest. Akur’s husband-to-be amassed substantial capital in the U.S. and was able to offer a bridewealth that was large compared to local norms. His largesse, coupled with the family’s financial straits, made his marriage to Akur all but inevitable. After the

\(^{87}\) Food for Education, funded by USAID, seeks to improve nutrition and promote education. This is accomplished primarily through providing incentives to families who send their children to school. Incentives include free school lunches and giving food rations to the families whose children attend school regularly. This program also funds building toilet facilities and water pumps on school campuses (CRS Education Program Manager, 08-25-09).
wedding, Akur followed Dinka tradition and went to live with her husband’s family while her husband returned to the U.S. There she lives with her two sisters-in-law who had never fled Bor during the war.

Akur’s sisters-in-law follow a customary livelihood strategy and lifestyle and considered themselves to be “organic” Dinka, by which they believe themselves uninfluenced by foreign culture. Akur chooses a very different life from that of her sisters-in-law. Akur’s dress, movements, language, and livelihood strategies mark her as a returnee, as a new Dinka woman. The observable differences in her behavior are jointly shaped by the foreign influences she experienced during her asylum in Kakuma and the local Bor environment. Among the many factors that affect Akur’s behavior after her return to Bor, the education she received during asylum figures prominently in shaping her new identity and livelihood strategies.

As one of the few women in Bor who has a formal education, Akur possesses skills that are marketable to the local NGOs who want to hire women. Akur obtained employment with an NGO soon after her return to Bor. With her new earnings, Akur practices a new kind of Dinka womanhood, contributing to the well-being of both her natal and her husband’s family.

For many women in Bor today, bridewealth still remains the sole mechanism they have to add to their extended natal families’ wealth and well-being. By virtue of employment, some educated women in Bor, like Akur, are able financially to assist their families and need not rely only on bridewealth (cf. Håkansson 1988). Furthermore, these employed women can continually assist their families rather than doing so only once

88 Thirteen, or 18.6 percent, of the 70 women I interviewed had 12 or more years of education. Twelve of these 13 women had salaried employment. Of the 25 interviews with women used for this chapter, six, or 24 percent, had 12 or more years of education. All six women had salary employment.
during their lifetime. They thereby greatly enhance their status within the family and among the wider Dinka community.

Employment yields material benefits beyond customary social status and power. Akur can now afford the clothes, hair products, and jewelry that help her achieve an identity as a new Dinka woman. Akur told me that she has greater freedom to leave the compound and walk around town than did her sisters-in-law and other women who are not employed. Akur says that she was more willing than her sisters-in-law to voice her opinions and to make her wishes known to her male kin. Westernized dress and less constrained mobility signal to the community that Akur is a new Dinka woman. These new freedoms arise in part from the community’s recognition that she has received an education. The legitimacy of Akur’s increased freedoms is further enhanced because her husband resides in the U.S. and does not face daily pressure from his male kin to keep his wife at home or otherwise limit her movements.

Akur’s story illustrates how initial changes to gendered practices and concepts of Dinka womanhood that occurred during asylum are modified once again by the local Bor environment. It is important to note that not all returning women are able to replicate Akur’s successful increase in status and power after return. For example, Akur’s formal education acquired during asylum would probably hinder her access to the customary forms of power in a rural village or cattle camp, where livelihoods are not yet enmeshed in the cash economy. In fact, her lack of knowledge of planting, harvesting, and cattle care would be cause for less bridewealth and a lower social status. Thus, formal education obtained during asylum’s ability to provide women with access to status or
power, be it customary or new, is contingent on factors in the resettlement location; those factors are often overlooked by NGOs providing aid in asylum locations. 89

Akur, like Ayen, straddles geographical scales and social locations, moving her in and out of power geometries. She sees herself as a modern and urbane Dinka woman, portraying this identity through her movement, employment, and “look.” Yet, despite this modern identity and the resources/power that comes with it, she strives to gain customary forms of status and power. Her physical presence is in Bor, yet her employment straddles both Dinka and American gendered norms (geographical scales), placing her simultaneously within increased or decreased equality and rights in comparison to men (social locations), thereby affecting her agency (power geometry). Her employment after marriage challenges Dinka customary norms that women remain at home after marriage. Her husband, a man living in the USA and accustomed to women working outside the home, has given her permission to work. This permission to work absolves her in the eyes of the Dinka community of the title “bad” Dinka wife. Like Ayen, Akur finds herself within geographic scales and positioned in social locations that allow her to practice a new modern and urbane identity. But it is not only Akur’s ability to obtain employment, or her ability to financially assist her family, that defines her new identity; it is her personal character and imagination that catalyzes her modern identity and behavior.

89 A version of Akur’s story appears in Chrostowsky and Long, 2013.
Unanticipated Outcomes Upon Return

Increased Dependence on Men

In the post-war urban environment of Bor, men’s status and their relative importance in the nuclear family grew relative to those of women. Not all formally educated women attain improved status through new avenues of employment in the urban environment. In the urban setting, some educated Dinka women, and most undereducated ones, appear severed from certain forms of power that had in the past been accrued to them via rural agro-pastoralist life.

In this cattle-centric culture, men’s pre-departure role as cattle keeper was the basis for their higher status and power relative to women. Yet women’s roles as harvesters and food preparers also were well-respected activities and critical to the success of the family. In this way, both men and women were viewed in pre-departure days as complementary contributors to the livelihood of the family.

Cultural norms among the Dinka dictate that women remain close to home, whereas men are free to move and travel. Dinka often say that a “good Dinka woman stays home after marriage.” In the urban Bor environment this norm is translated to mean that women do not attend school and do not work outside the home. In the post-return urban center of Bor, the Dinka no longer practice an agro-pastoral subsistence pattern. Instead, livelihood strategies are enmeshed in a cash economy. Some women with access to small amounts of money conduct small income generating activities within the home—for example, brewing beer for sale. Absent their wives’ customary, complementary contributions to the family subsistence through harvesting or gainful employment, men become virtually the sole family breadwinners. In this way, women’s dependence on men
increases. Because husbands become the sole support for the family, they are granted higher status (than their wives) in the family and that of the community at large. Because wives are contributing less materially to the family, their status is reduced from pre-departure days.

Formal Education: A Conduit for Forced and Early Marriage

I described earlier in this chapter how formal education opened up employment and earning options for Dinka Bor girls and women after return. Paradoxically, formal education deprives some young girls of both their choice of groom and when to marry (Chrostowsky and Long 2013). The newly developed positive value placed on education led to substantially more girls enrolling in schools in South Sudan since repatriation began in 2005. Yet, during this same period, interviewees spoke of an increase in forced marriages among the Dinka Bor girls. I propose that two factors account for this phenomenon. First, the scholarships and safe havens in Kakuma that allowed girls to delay, or avoid, an unwanted marriage in Kakuma are not available to them in Bor. Second, fathers in families whose members did not take asylum, and who still hold customary ideas about schooling, are pressured by family members to marry their daughters rather than let them continue their education. The reason for early marriage most often given by interviewees is the belief that young girls attending school are at greater risk to meet boys and run off or become pregnant. Under such circumstances, brides’ families would receive fewer cattle in the grooms’ bridewealth than from an arranged marriage. To avoid losing wealth, some parents remove their daughters from school and offer them in marriage.
According to Kuir, a middle aged Dinka man, “before, when the Dinka did not send their children to school, boys and girls did not mingle” (field notes, September 2010). He said that families spent all their time together and therefore, always knew the whereabouts of their girls. Consequently, there was little concern that daughters would socialize with boys or become pregnant, and tarnish their reputations. In post-repatriation urban environments like Bor, maintaining a daughter’s reputation is a serious concern for families. According to Kuir and others, fathers sometimes think they must marry off their daughters before the daughter behaves in ways that compromises their reputation and reduces their potential for bridewealth cattle.

“I Don’t Know How to Plant!” Formal Education and Rural Life

In rural villages or cattle camps, there are virtually no opportunities for employment, nor are there markets. This lack of job opportunities creates hardships for women who had acquired education or training during asylum because they cannot apply their formal education or market skills training in rural areas. Women who grew up in Kakuma or Khartoum never learned to plant, harvest, store and portion out grains for use over a year, nor did they learn to milk, prepare milk products, or care for cattle. Lacking these skills reduces their ability to bring in a large bridewealth. Furthermore, a girl’s inability to fulfill her role in the family might lead to conflicts with her husband and his family, even divorce.

The mismatch between refugees’ educational experiences in Kakuma and their needs in the rural areas illustrates the disconnect between the framework the UN and NGOs used in Kakuma to shape refugee policy and create aid and development...
assistance for life after repatriation. As noted earlier, repatriation policy and humanitarian aid was based on the assumption that when refugees return to their country of origin they will return to a lifestyle very similar to what it was in the pre-displacement period (Black and Koser 1999). Despite this expectation, assistance offered in the camps by UNHCR and NGOs did not focus on a rural and pastoral lifestyle, but instead introduced formal education and skills training that fit best to life in an urban location and dependence on a cash/market subsistence pattern.

**Vignette: Achol**

As is the custom in Dinka culture, when Ajak’s brother died, Ajak inherited his brother’s widow, Amer. With Ajak, Amer has five surviving children, three girls and two boys. Achol is the second born girl. She has one older sister, Ajier, and three younger siblings: a 12 year old sister and two brothers, ages nine and seven. Her older sister, Ajier, is married with a child. According to custom, Ajier recently returned to her mother’s home for the birth of her first child.

When I met Achol in August of 2009, she was 17 years old and attending Bor Public School, class eight. Achol lives with her father, mother, and siblings (an older sister with her disabled child, a younger sister, and two younger brothers). Living in Bor Town, the family has no land for agriculture and Achol’s father owns only a small number of cattle that are kept by family members in a cattle camp in Anyidi (a day’s travel by truck). The family is dependent on her father’s income. Her father, a retired soldier, was injured during the war, and cannot work. He receives a pension for his service, but it is small and comes infrequently. The SPLA is notorious for failing to pay
soldiers on time or even at all. Towards the end of my 14-month stay, Achol’s mother began to fabricate beaded ornaments and belts to sell for income (see Figure 20). The few material possessions the family owned consisted of: three beds, four foam mattresses, one mosquito net, a radio, a plastic end table, a few broken plastic chairs, some cooking pots, plates, spoons, a plastic tub for washing clothes, and a few jerry cans to collect water.

Achol’s family’s homestead of two mud huts is located on a busy dirt road next to two large compounds. One compound contains several ministry offices and the other is UNHCR Jonglei State headquarters. Both compounds are frequented during the day by NGO, UN, and GoSS trucks that kick up the dirt off the road and into the family’s compound.

During the war her father, Ajak, moved his wife, Ajier, and Achol from the village of Anyidi in Jonglei State to Lobone, an IDP camp located in Eastern Equatoria near the border of Uganda. Here Achol’s younger siblings, Nyanthieth, Kelie, and Nai, were born. In Lobone, Achol attended primary school and completed class six. The family was supported by her father’s SPLA salary, but as noted above, he often went unpaid. The family relied on the infrequent food distributions provided by humanitarian aid agencies. Because the area was not secure, it was difficult for aid agencies to maintain regular food distributions or maintain a presence in the IDP camp.
In 2007, when Achol was 15 years old, Ajak returned with his family to Bor. Upon arrival, he found a location in Bor where many of his clan members were living and built two mud huts. Shortly thereafter, the city of Bor informed Ajak that his land would soon be the site of a new GoSS coordination office and he and his family would have to vacate the land. The city told Ajak that he would be given the title to a different piece of land in Bor and assured him he would not be forced to move again. When I arrived in August of 2009, Ajak had still not moved nor been given a piece of land by the city. Knowing that he would have to move, Ajak did not invest in the compound. The huts in the compound were falling apart and a latrine, a costly and time consuming investment, had never been dug. In the mean time, the coordination office was built and was operating. A fence bordering the offices’ land had been erected. This fence cut directly through Achol’s compound, forcing the family to cut a hole in the fence and duck under the fence wires to move from one hut to the other.
A month after I met Achol, in September 2009, she told me that a man visited her father and announced his wish to marry her. She also told me that she was not happy with the prospect of marrying this man. At the age of 16, Achol found herself betrothed to a poor soldier with an eighth-grade education. The next day Ajier, Achol’s older sister, reported to me that Achol “doesn’t not want to marry this man; he is too old [Ajier guessed the man was 40], he is not educated…the man is a soldier and has no money” (field notes October 2009). During the war the older soldier was shot in the eye. As a result he was blinded in that eye and suffered from mental problems, especially when he drank alcohol. Ajier also did not want her sister, Achol, to marry this man. Ajier told me that that if her sister married this man she “will have a terrible life with him.” Ajier said, “She (Achol) will suffer like those women who have to go to the bush to collect wood to sell” (field notes October 2009). Furthermore, marriage meant that Achol would have to leave school permanently because this man made it clear that Achol would not be allowed to continue her education.

One day, as I passed by Achol’s home, I saw an old woman yelling frantically and pointing her finger in Achol’s face. Her father, Ajak, was also yelling. It was clear from his uncoordinated moves and inability to maintain his balance that Ajak was drunk. I was told later that the old lady yelling at Achol was her grandmother, the mother of Ajak. The grandmother was berating Achol for refusing to marry the man her father and family chose for her.

Her father ranted that he was being “embarrassed” and yelled at by his family because his daughter was refusing to marry.Ajak’s mother and family had instructed Ajak to beat Achol for her rebellion. They also instructed Ajak to beat Ajier because they
believed that Ajier was influencing and encouraging Achol to refuse the marriage. When I passed by I saw only what was to be the beginning of a night of fighting. According to Ajier, later that night her father took a stick (Ajier later showed me the stick he used. It was as long and thick as my forearm) and hit Ajier in the side with it. Ajier called her husband who sent his relatives over to the compound to break up the fighting. Ajier said her father’s family wanted Achol to marry this man and if Achol refused, the relatives would beat her, tie her up, and carry her to the groom’s home. Later that week, Achol was nowhere to be found. Ajier told me that a bull had been slaughtered. This was a sign that the marriage was going forward.

The grandmother’s concern and insistence that Achol marry the soldier is based on customary practices and ideas of a proper Dinka girl’s behavior. In Dinka culture, a good daughter always obeys her father and family; failure to obey brings shame to the father and family. Furthermore, a disobedient daughter is hard to marry. Once she disobeys the family on such a grand matter, the community will see her and all the young girls in the family as poorly behaved. This will make it difficult not only for her, but also for her sisters to find husbands. The grandmother’s threats and encouragement to her son to beat Achol and Ajier are in line with Dinka custom: she (the daughter, Achol) must obey or be beaten.

Achol’s father’s concerns included not only the grandmother’s concerns, but also his pride. Her refusal demonstrated to others that he had not raised his daughter well and his daughter had no respect for him. A daughter who respects her father will never disobey him. Achol’s father, I learned later, also had a personally vested interest in Achol’s marriage to any man—not specifically to the older soldier. Ajak’s wife and child
died during childbirth and he did not have any children of his own. According to Dinka custom, the children he produced with Achol’s mother, the woman he inherited from his dead brother, are not considered his, but his brothers. Therefore, he planned to use the bridewealth from Achol’s marriage to negotiate his own marriage and raise a family of his own.

Ajier said that if she were being forced to marry, she would not argue or resist; thereby avoiding the beating. But after the marriage she would refuse to sleep with her husband or run away from him. Ajier told me that in places like Kakuma, “if you are being forced to marry, you go to the authorities and they keep you safe and send you to America or Europe, but here [in South Sudan] there is no place to go. If a girl goes to the police for help they will send her home saying that it is a family matter, and probably tell the girl to listen to her father” (field notes, December 2009).

In mid-November 2009, three male kin of a man who had been resettled in the United States approached Achol’s father with a marriage proposal. The brother of these three men was planning to return to South Sudan in December to find a woman and marry her before he returned to the United States. This man offered many more cattle in bridewealth then the poor soldier. Because he was a Lost Boy believed to be educated, employed, and rich, Achol’s father considered this offer and accepted the man’s proposal despite his previous negotiations with the old soldier.

On December 14, when I arrived in Achol’s compound, many men were gathered under the tree in the compound awaiting the arrival of a crate of beer on the back of a bike. I also saw a goat tethered to the fence. Ajier told me that it was all part of arranging Achol’s marriage to the man from the United States. The men under the tree were
relatives of the groom, the beer was for all the men, and the goat would be killed and eaten for dinner. The groom’s family was expecting him to arrive in Bor on December 20th. Achol spoke with him a few times on the phone, but had no idea what he looked like. While unhappy to leave school and marry, Achol was relieved that she was no longer being forced to marry the poor old soldier.

Unlike Ayen and Akur, who found themselves in positions within a power geometry that allowed them to practice their imagined Dinka womanhood, Achol was entangled in geographical scales and social locations that limited her agency. Despite her desire to be a modern and urbane Dinka woman, she did not possess the social or cultural capital that Ayen and Akur possessed. She was very young in a culture that respects the aged. Unemployed and not practicing income generation strategies, she had no economic value for her poor family. Moreover, she lived within a family in which the majority of its members, especially those welding the power, never fled Bor during the war and held tightly to Dinka customary norms and practices. It was only upon the arrival of a man from the United States with ability to offer a large bridewealth, that Achol’s position within these webs of power were altered to allow Achol to become that modern and urbane Dinka woman she desired to be. Upon Achol’s marriage, she moved to Nairobi, Kenya, to live with her husband’s brother. In Nairobi, she practiced a new cosmopolitan identity. But again, as with Ayen and Akur, it was Achol’s personal character and imagination that catalyzed her modern identity and behavior. If Achol had not envisioned a future for herself that the old soldier could not deliver and had not protested that marriage, her life’s trajectory would have been very different—not a cosmopolitan Dinka woman. As a postscript, I learned during my last discussion with Achol’s husband on
February 11, 2013, that Achol and their child obtained the papers needed to come and live in the United States.

**Conclusion**

By comparing the disparate experiences of Dinka women in Kakuma and Khartoum, I have illustrated the importance of asylum environments in shaping their lives after repatriation. Different asylum locations led to the use of different strategies to deal with gender inequality. Key differences between the locations included: 1) different local laws/penal system, 2) different relationships between the refugees/IDPs with the police force, and 3) the presence or absence of the humanitarian aid agencies. Alterations to gender norms, relations, and behaviors developed over the course of asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum were further altered upon return to Bor. Finally, in this chapter, I established that women who fled conflict were not homogenously empowered or disempowered upon return. Rather, empowerment depended upon the interaction between education and rural versus urban resettlement. While various factors in the asylum location contribute to changes to pre-flight gender relations by providing forced migrant women with avenues to engage with gender inequality, these same factors might not be present in the resettlement location. I argue that factors in asylum should not be viewed in isolation when trying to explain empowerment after return. Instead, the resettlement location plays an equally critical role in the outcome and must be considered in any explanatory framework.

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90 Here I am using the UNHCR’s concept of empowerment. The UNHCR defines empowerment as a process through which women and men in disadvantaged positions increase their access to knowledge, resources, and decision-making power, and raise their awareness of participation in their communities, in order to reach a level of control over their own environment (Baines 2001).
Chapter 8 Post-Repatriation Kinship and Gendered Access to Resources

Introduction

Chapter seven illustrated the way in which global forces encountered in asylum subtly articulated with factors in the return environment of Bor to shape returnee Dinka women’s access to power and status. My goal in chapter eight is to demonstrate how this same phenomenon—the global articulating with the local—shaped returnee Dinka men’s access to power, status and authority after return to Bor. To do this, I link changes to household production after return to Bor to an increased dependence on a cash economy by returnee men and to underlying concepts of a new Dinka manhood formulated during asylum. I further link changes in household production to changes in male kin relations and practices. I argue that the asylum experience is a critical factor in the construction, or re-construction, of current concepts of male Dinka personhood and male kinship practices in Bor.

Using Mahler and Pessar’s gendered geographies of power (GGP) as a framework, my aim is to illustrate how the asylum environment affected the customary order of power, status, and authority and weakened kinship ties among Dinka Bor men after return. I show how the changes that occurred as a result of an extended time in Kakuma or Khartoum—preference for urban life, valuing formal education, and a reliance on cash economy—granted returnee Dinka men with access to customary forms of status, power, and authority once restricted by kin relations and age.
Changes to Daily Lives

Urban Life: New Subsistence and Income Strategies

My data on returning Dinka Bor reveals that while customary Dinka agro-pastoral subsistence and settlement patterns continue to be practiced in rural areas, the majority of refugees returning from Kenya and internally displaced persons returning from Khartoum chose to live in urban settings. These returnees are abandoning customary subsistence patterns and becoming dependent on a cash economy.

Interviewees expressed a common belief that an individual’s asylum location dictated job opportunities and employment upon return. These emic perceptions are reflected in the quantitative findings derived from the market survey I conducted in Bor Town (see Table 19).

**TABLE 19: Workplace Location of Returnees by Asylum Location, in Percent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asylum Location</th>
<th>Police or Court</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>NGO/UN Agencies</th>
<th>Ministry Offices</th>
<th>Market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Fled</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding

The data in Table 19 supports participants’ perceptions; those who returned, especially from Kakuma, and to a lesser extent from Khartoum, are predominately employed in schools, NGO and UN agencies, and Ministries offices. Those who never fled Bor during the war are predominately practicing income generation activities in the market.

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91 For details on returnee numbers and resettlement patterns see chapter four sub-section Resettlement Patterns upon Return to Jonglei.
Penal Code and Interim Constitution

The use of kin and customary law to resolve family conflict and issues surrounding marriage, adultery, and bridewealth is well respected and most commonly practiced among the Dinka living in Bor (returnees and those who never fled). Yet according to my interviewees, the use of police and the state courts is becoming a common vehicle in Bor to resolve family disputes and issues surrounding marriage, adultery, and bridewealth. The 2008 penal code, which is founded on the new Southern Sudanese Interim Constitution 2005, differed from Dinka Bor customary law in the basic tenets of rights and concepts of equality. The interim constitution was based on the UN concepts of human rights that addressed an individual’s equality independent of sex, race, creed, or ethnicity. Dinka customary law stressed the rights of the family/clan over that of the individual and viewed the sexes as complementary rather then equal.

Nonetheless, despite, or because of, the fundamental differences in rights ideology, the Southern Sudanese penal code 2008 states in Chapter II Application of Law, Conviction and Compensation 6.2 that “courts may consider the existing customary laws and practices prevailing in the specific areas.” In some cases, invoking Chapter II results in reversing the rights a man, woman, or child had gained under the penal code. For example, the 2008 penal code defines the age of consent as 18 years of age and prohibited forced marriage.92 These laws have been successfully challenged using local

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92Penal Code: Chapter XX, Offences Involving Infringement of Liberty, Dignity, Privacy or Reputation. Penal Code 273. Kidnapping or Abducting a Woman to Compel her Marriage, etc.: Whoever, kidnap or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person against her will or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, commits an offence and shall be addressed according to the customs and traditions of the aggrieved party, in lieu of that and upon conviction, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or with a fine or with both. Interim Constitution Chapter II, Guiding Principles and Directives, Family Women, and Marriage15 (1): The family is the natural and fundamental unit of the society and is entitled to the
customary law in which the father and family decide the appropriate age of marriage and choice of spouse.

**Reverse of Male Power**

Despite the penal code’s intention to uphold the rights of South Sudanese citizens, it interferes in various ways with customary male Dinka access to power and resources. When a Dinka man does not have the cattle needed for bridewealth and/or fears the woman he desires to marry will be given to a different man, he would “steal,” or *kiel/kuel*, her in what is virtually an attempt to elope.93 That is, the man takes the willing woman he desires from her home without the knowledge or permission of her father, hides her in an unknown location, and then sends a messenger to the woman’s father to report the daughter’s “theft.” The arrival of the messenger announces to the community that the man and the “stolen” woman likely had sexual relations. Because tainted women are undesirable as wives, other men who are competing for the woman will thereby lose interest in her and rescind their requests for marriage. The abductor will refuse to return the “stolen bride” and refuse to let her location be known until her father and kin agree to the marriage. Under the 2008 penal code the woman’s family can now have the abductor arrested for kidnapping, and force him to reveal the location of their daughter, thereby ending his chances to marry her. David’s story, which follows, illustrates the practice of *kiel*, or to “steal a women,” and how the new penal code can be used to hinder this customary strategy for Dinka men.

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93In most cases the young woman is a willing partner in the plan, but in some cases, one in which I documented, the young girl is taken against her will.
Vignette: David

On July 12, 2010, I called David’s cell phone and heard an automated message that his phone is “out of service range” (field notes, July 2010). This was an odd message because it was a weekday and David should have been at his office in Bor, not traveling in a rural area. I thought the mobile service must not be working correctly and decided to go his place of employment to find him. When I arrived at his office, David’s fellow employee informed me that David was in hiding. The day before, David “stole a girl” for marriage. The employee also told me that the stolen girl’s parents were very angry. The employee went on to say that he fears the brothers of the stolen girl will kill David if they find him.\textsuperscript{94} Several men were competing\textsuperscript{95} for this girl. As a result of the competition, the number of cattle being offered for bridewealth reached such a number that David could not match it. Fearing the family of the girl he desired to marry would choose another suitor and he would lose the girl he loves to another man, David “stole” her. That is, he ran away with her to a rural area where the girl’s male relatives could not find them. The girl’s family was very angry because David’s actions jeopardized the family’s chance to acquire a large number of bridewealth cattle already offered for the girl.

When I next saw David, on July 21, he told me the story first hand. After David “stole” the girl, the girl’s brothers came to his house in search of their sister, but the only one in the compound was David’s mother. When the mother told the girl’s brothers that she did not know where David was, they beat her with a stick and destroyed

\textsuperscript{94} It is the real threat that a man who steals a girl will be severely beat by her brothers. This makes “stealing” a girl dangerous and a last resort for marriage.

\textsuperscript{95} When more than one man announces his intentions to marry the same girl it is called \textit{taar} in Dinka. This is translated into English as \textit{competition}. Each man announces his intentions to marry a woman and offers a number of cattle as bridewealth. Customarily, the girl’s father and family members discuss each man’s character and reputation, his family’s reputation, and the number of cattle offered to decide which man will be chosen. It is also customary that the girl’s opinion be taken into account, but the final discussion does not always reflect her desires.
David’s hut. They ripped his mattress, chair cushions, and clothes and burned some of his household goods. The family of the “stolen” girl then attempted to reclaim her by having David arrested for kidnapping, but the police could not find him. David was charged with violating Penal Code 273 Kidnapping or Abducting a Woman to Compel her Marriage (see Footnote 92). Because the police could not find David, who was hiding with the girl in a rural village, the police arrested his father in his stead.96 The family of the young girl hoped that the news of David’s father’s arrest would coax David to come out of hiding and return the young girl to them. David’s father remained in jail for two days before he was released.97

David told me that the family of the stolen girl went to the police rather than to a Dinka chief to settle the problem, because in cases of “stolen girls” a chief most often rules in favor of the couple. In all likelihood, a Dinka chief would tell David to give the girl’s family the customary number of bridewealth (30 cattle) and declare the couple married. Since the girl’s brothers were in line to gain a significantly larger number of cattle from the other suitor’s bridewealth offers, the girl’s family chose to go to the police in hopes of David’s arrest, the return of their sister, and a substantial bridewealth.

Upon hearing of his father’s arrest, David and his stolen bride returned to Bor. In another twist to the story, they went directly to the police to clear David’s name and free him from arrest. The girl was only sixteen and below the age of consent. David told me that he coached his stolen bride about how to answer the police’s questions. For example, if the police were to question her about her age, she was to tell them she was nineteen, rather than her real age of sixteen. Upon further questioning about her age she was to

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96 It was common practice in Bor to hold the closest male relative in prison until the man that was wanted by the police was found or turned himself in.
97 It is not clear if David’s father was released before or after David’s return.
argue, “How could I have participated in the election if I were not over eighteen year of age?” He told her how to describe the voting process. 98 David’s family and the family of the stolen bride eventually came to an agreement. If the girl returned home, the girl’s family would not give her to another man or have David arrested. But David was given only three weeks to bring the 30 cattle for bridewealth. David told me that he had 25 cattle and was working to obtain the last five. Until he delivered the full 30 cattle David would not move outside his compound, fearing that the girl’s brothers, still very angry at losing the higher number of cattle offered by other suitors, would beat him if they saw him.

In many more cases, the continued high influence of customary law and the inclination of the local police and judges to turn to customary law, protects, rather than diminishes, male power and authority. While police are sworn to enforce law and order, police often see themselves as custodians of customary law and will not arrest a husband or father, but rather will mediate and impose customary law (Gabriel Gop, Lam Minister of Law Enforcement Jonglei State, October 2010). Furthermore, many young girls and women, especially those that never fled, do not understand their rights under the new constitution and fear the police who most often take the male kin’s side.

Using Mahler and Pessar’s (2001) gendered geography of power to frame David’s story helps us understand how he negotiated gendered identities across transnational borders. With an education and a job, David possessed the post-asylum criteria desired by most young women and families wish for in a groom. Yet, he confronted the current needs of a poor family who required a large bridewealth in order

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98 In April of 2010, South Sudan had its first elections in history and most South Sudanese were voting for the first time in their lives.
to marry their sons. David found himself seesawing between geographical scales and social locations. His education and employment most often placed him at an advantage by bestowing him with greater agency. But in the context of the current marriage competition, he was at a disadvantage. His competitors, Dinka pastoralists without education and employment, amassed a great number of cattle and were more desirable as grooms because they fit the pressing needs of the girl’s family. Despite his modern and urbane identity, David was forced to call on a customary practice, “stealing” a girl, to overcome his disadvantage as a suitor. David’s imagined modern and urbane manhood was challenged by customary forms of status and wealth, and in the end, he paradoxically maintained his modern identity through customary practices.

Penal Code Increases a Husband’s Power Over His Wife

Penal code\(^9\) 247.3 concerning rape, states that sexual intercourse between a married couple—whether forced or when a wife is below the age of eighteen years—is not considered rape. This penal code is consistent with and reinforces the customary treatment of sexual intercourse under the same circumstances (forced or when the wife is below the age of eighteen). As a consequence of the overlap between the two legal codes, Dinka Bor women have no source of support or strategy—customarily or through the courts—in the case of spousal rape. My interpretation of penal code 247.3 is supported by my correspondence with highly placed UN staff member,

\(^9\) Chapter XVIII Rape, Other Sexual Offences and Offences against Mortality 247. Rape. (1) Whoever has sexual intercourse or carnal intercourse with another person, against his or her will or without his or her consent, commits the offence of rape, and upon conviction, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years and may also be liable to a fine. (2) A consent given by a man or woman below the age of eighteen years shall not be deemed to be consent within the meaning of subsection (1), above. (3) Sexual intercourse by a married couple is not rape, within the meaning of this section.
[the penal code 247.3] means that if a man or woman below 18 gives consent and sexual intercourse takes place, it IS rape and if a married woman does not give her consent, if sexual intercourse takes place it is NOT rape. However, if a female under the age of 18 gets married and sexual intercourse takes place it is NOT rape. And this last issue is a greater concern to me personally because these female minors are so vulnerable and unprotected. And therefore, it is possible that the penal code could increase male power in relation to their wives. The concept of marital rape does not exist in Jonglei state. I don't know about other parts of South Sudan. I think that male power is such a dominant feature of life that the penal code merely endorses the status quo. It is a little difficult for me to see how it gives men even more power than they are already granted under customary law. I would need to carefully look at that in order to find evidence that the penal code had endowed men with more power relative to women. This law, consistent with customary treatment of the same circumstances, leaves women with no source of support or strategy in the case of spousal rape (09-14-12).

**Polygny in the Urban Setting**

Among the Dinka Bor, children are a source of pride and status. Dinka men and women strive to have many children. Dinka men can increase the number of children they have through polygny i.e., by marrying a second and a third wife. Polygny continues to be a common practice in Bor, with polygamous men often having one wife reside within Bor with him, and the other(s) living with his family in a rural village.

There is a downside to the new realities of life in an urban center where men rely on cash for their livelihood. A few men pointed out to me that the cost of living in urban centers is much higher than the cost of living in the rural villages. Male participants complain that they do not have the cattle to marry more than one wife, nor can they afford the food, school fees, clothes, and medical care of many children. Some men who fled to Kakuma have explored the option of taking only one wife in order to better
provide for wife and their children, but family and societal pressure convinced them to take a second wife.

**Vignette: Garang**

Garang’s (07-07-10) story is an example of a returnee whose choice to marry one woman was thwarted by his family who pressured him to take a second wife. Born to a cattle keeper in 1975, Garang grew up in a small rural village where he spent his days with his father caring for the family’s cattle. It was from this small village that he was conscripted by the SPLA and taken to Eastern Equatoria for training. Two years after his conscription, at the age of 17, Garang began fighting in the war.

In 1995, after three years of fighting in the civil war, Garang fled the army in search of education. He successfully escaped and made his way to a refugee camp in the Adjumani district in northern Uganda. There, from 1999-2004, he attended a school run by Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) and received his high school certificate. In 2005, after the CPA was signed, Garang returned to South Sudan and in 2006 was hired by Save the Children in Bor. In 2007 he began working for the Ministry of Education as Senior Inspector of Schools for Bor County. The following year, 2008, the ministry awarded Garang a scholarship to study law at the John Garang Institute.

Garang married his first wife, Akon, in 2005. He first met Akon in 1995 during his escape from the army. She lived in a small village on the border of South Sudan and Uganda. In 1998, she accepted his request for courtship.\(^\text{100}\) For the next three years, he

\(^\text{100}\) It is Dinka custom that when a man is interested in a girl, he asks her permission to court her. Courting consists of visits by the man, who is often accompanied by a few of his male friends, to the girl’s home. The meeting is always at the home of the girl and is monitored, often at a distance, by her family. Courting may last months or years depending on the girl’s age and the man’s readiness for marriage. Dinka custom
traveled back and forth from the refugee camp in Uganda to South Sudan to court her. In 2001, four other men announced their intentions to marry Akon. In fear of losing her, Garang, although not economically ready, announced his intention to marry Akon. Garang understood that as the poorest suitor, her family would not choose him as their daughter’s groom. He was without cattle while the other four men were rich: a Lost Boy living in the U.S, a wealthy student from Uganda, an army colonel, and an army lieutenant. Garang had not seen or had contact with his own family since his conscription into the war. He did not know where they were or even if they were alive. Thus, he lacked the male kin to help him amass the cattle needed for bridewealth. Garang was convinced that he was going to lose the woman he loved and wanted to marry.

As marriage negotiations between the five competing men and Akon’s family progressed, it became clear that Garang was not going to be chosen to be the groom. Because Akon’s relatives feared that Garang might attempt to “steal” Akon, they sent several warnings to Garang threatening to kill him if he even contacted her. With good reason Garang feared her family and took their threat seriously. The family had a notorious reputation; members of Akon’s father’s clan were infamous for killing a man in 1945 for trying to steal a clan member’s daughter.

The marriage negotiations were nearing the end when the family took Akon to a border town to talk on the phone with the Lost Boy suitor from the U.S. She refused to speak him; she said she could not speak to a stranger. Akon’s relatives beat her for that act of disobedience. Her family threatened that if she did not speak with the man from the U.S., they would kill both her and the man, Garang, who she admired. Akon continued to mandates that brothers marry in order of birth; hence, a man is ready to marry when all his older brothers have married and he is able to amass the cattle needed for bridewealth. It is also common for a girl and man to court several mates at the same time.
refuse to talk on the phone and went on a hunger strike. For three days she drank and ate nothing. When the family realized that she was close to dying, they gave up their fight. They reluctantly let Akon go, telling her that she was stupid to want Garang, but that she was free to go to him.

In 2006, Garang married again taking a second wife. Unlike his first marriage, this marriage was coerced. A year after his first marriage and arrival in Bor, Aboul, a woman he had known in the Adjumani refugee camp, knocked on the door of his home in Bor. Garang first met Aboul in 2004 at school in the Adjumani refugee camp. He told me that in 2004 he considered Aboul to be a girlfriend, but he made it clear to her that he did not intend to marry her. Their relationship was short lived and he returned to South Sudan in 2005. Aboul told Garang that she had been searching for Garang since he left Adjumani and she wanted Garang to marry her. When Garang refused, Aboul threatened to take her life. Garang and his family most likely would have been blamed for her death; a judgment that would incur a large cattle fee and arouse the anger of Aboul’s ancestor’s spirits who would seek to revenge her death (Seligman and Seligman 1932). Garang’s family gathered to discuss the situation. They decided that although Garang had not developed any feelings for her and did not want to marry her, he must marry Aboul. Garang was upset because he had no intentions of taking a second wife and had carefully planned his financial future with one wife. Garang was also upset because it is Dinka custom to take a second wife only after five to ten years has passed and his first marriage was only in its second year. Family pressure triumphed and Garang married Aboul and they had two children together.

101 There were two main reasons Dinka Bor men waited five to ten years before they took a second wife. First was the long held practice that brothers married in order of birth. This practice insured that older
Garang envisioned a future and identity that differs from customary ideas of Dinka manhood. Unlike customary norms where men aspired to have multiple wives and many children, Garang envisioned his life with one wife and a limited number of children. His choice is consistent with conceptions of modern and urbane Dinka manhood, which developed during asylum and is reinforced by the high cost of living in Bor. Like Ayen, Akur, and David discussed earlier, Garang vacillated between geographical scales and social locations. Also like the three of them, Garang’s education most often bestowed him with greater agency in many circumstances—but not in this case. Garang found himself in a geographical space in which his education did not trump his social location as a son in a large family. According to customary law and religious belief, this family would be held guilty for the young girl’s death and potentially victims of ancestor revenge. Strongly held cultural norms, both in the past and in the present, dictated that Garang, above all, maintain an allegiance to his family. He must never act to bring harm to his family or hurt his family’s reputation. Garang’s education provided him no agency in this context and therefore, he must accept a future a life with multiple wives, different from what he envisioned.

*Cattle Raiding*

The Dinka Bor and neighboring pastoral tribes, such as the Nuer and Murle, view cattle raiding as a customary rite of passage for young men. A successful cattle raid demonstrates to a young man’s family and to his community that he is a brave and skilled fighter. It is also a way for a young man who wishes to marry to increase the number of

brothers did not usurp the bridewealth of younger male siblings. Second, co-wives from the same age group were more likely to fight. When the first wife is significantly older, the co-wife relationship was more likely one of mentoring and friendship rather then fighting and competition.
cattle he owns, thereby maximizing his chances to wed the woman of his choice. While cattle raiding continues to occur, men who live in Bor Town do not participate in it. Access to cash through employment or income generating strategies (IGS), permits a Dinka man or youth to purchase the cattle he needs to complete his bridewealth. Cattle raiding has lost its practical utility for urban Bor men.

**Male Kin Roles and Responsibilities**

Wives and husbands were once seen as complementary providers, where each one’s contribution was necessary to the success of the family. In the urban, post-war environment of Bor Town, men’s status and relative importance in the nuclear family has increased over those of women’s. Because formal employment is located outside the home and most often requires education, urban husbands began more and more to accept the burden of sole earner. As men become the primary breadwinners of the family, women become more dependent on their husbands to obtain money needed to buy food, pay for medicine, schooling, and other needs.\(^\text{102}\)

In Bor there are four major sources for Dinka men to find employment or earn cash: 1) the offices of NGOs and ministries, 2) police and military service, 3) teaching, and 4) IGS. The higher paying positions, in the NGO and ministry offices, are limited in number and highly sought. These jobs are prized not only for their high salary, but also because of the perks of employment, which often include access to vehicles, a computer, and internet services. Unfortunately, few of these jobs are available. When a job opening occurs, kin relations are often key to securing the position. There exists a long-standing

\(^{\text{102}}\) Discussed in greater detail in chapter six, Section *Unanticipated Outcomes*, sub-section *Increased Dependence on Men.*
and deep-seeded cultural norm to help any kin in need. When Dinka men or women have a resource, be it food, cattle, or material items, they are obliged to share. Failure to share a resource results in deep shame and can severely harm one’s reputation. Increasingly, being employed in Bor is seen as a resource. Those who find employment in an NGO or government office are pressured to assist their family and clan members in obtaining employment in the same office. In other cases, kin relations became key resources to raise money for education fees or for start up money to begin entrepreneurial ventures.

In the same way that kin relations are valuable resources for men to use to gain entry into the cash economy, kin can also be a major source of distress. The same cultural norm dictating that a man with a job must assist his kin to obtain employment also dictates that a man with a salary must share his earnings. Many of my male interviewees complain that on the day after receiving their salaries, relatives will begin to show up at their home for a share of their earnings.

They expect family [members] who work, like me, to feed them. If I say there is nothing [no money], they will say I am lying, and when you get the whole family, even the clan, they expect you to give them money. But my salary is limited (male returnee, 08-03-10).

**Emotional Difficulties**

While some men profit from the new Dinka male identity as income generator and family provider, other men suffer under its weight. Being employed is not a panacea. Employed men bear a heavy burden to care not only for their immediate families, but also for their extended families. When earnings are limited, these family responsibilities cannot all be met to everyone’s satisfaction. Families are anxious and husbands are especially stressed.
Unemployed men (as there are few jobs available) sit idle and suffer from the shame of not being able to provide for their families, stressed from a combination of many unmet family and personal expectations. The compound is the domain of women and therefore any unemployed men, exhausted or frustrated by the search for employment, must find a place outside his compound to pass the day. It is common in Bor to find groups of unemployed men in the shade of a tree playing cards or chess the whole day. These men will remain outside the compound the entire day, returning only at dusk to join their family for dinner.

Some wives work outside the home, whether to supplement their husbands’ low salary, because husbands are unemployed, or because they simply desire to work rather than need to work. Husbands of working wives face additional pressure and harassment from family and age mates for allowing their wives to move about town and work outside the home. The new, post-repatriation, urban Dinka identity clearly has produced negative consequences to offset the gain—or opportunity to gain—an improved material lifestyle. I am not able to explore the pressure and stresses experienced by refugees or IDPs who returned to village life, but negative emotion outcomes existed there as well.

**Post-repatriation Kinship and Gendered Access to Resources**

In this sub-section I illustrate how changes to the concept of Dinka manhood formulated during asylum articulated with the return environment to provide returnee male Dinka with new avenues to access customary forms of power, status, and authority once restricted by age and generation. Additionally, I link returning refugees’ preference
for urban life, desire for formal education, and reliance on a cash economy, to critical modifications in male kinship relations after return.

**Male Access to Reproduction**

The life goal of every Dinka, man or woman, is to produce children. Prior to asylum, a Dinka man’s fertility was deeply dependent on his male kin. Aside from dangerous cattle raids, the only means a man had to amass the number cattle he needed for bridewealth was through his male kin. In this way, bridewealth broadened and deepened his dependence on his male relatives. Furthermore, bridewealth established a hierarchical structure of power, status, and authority among male kin. Customarily, Dinka male siblings married in order of birth, first-born son to last-born son. This practice made it impossible for a younger male sibling to acquire more wives and children than an older brother. It was in the playing out of this customary kinship structure that a man’s fertility could be said to depend on his male kin.

After return from asylum, access to cash allowed a man to bypass his male kin by purchasing the cattle he needed for bridewealth. This access to cattle through cash created ripples in the customary kin order of power, status, and authority. Furthermore, cash made a man’s access to reproduction a more self-reliant, rather than a group endeavor. Reducing reliance on agnates for what is considered a major goal in life weakened kinship ties. The impact of asylum on the customary order of power, status and authority and its weakening of kinship ties is evidenced by: 1) the occurrence of marriage out of sibling order, 2) the preference for a groom with education over cattle, and 3) the rampant inflation of bridewealth.
**Occurrence of Marriage Out of Order**

Among the Dinka, marriage is the seminal event in the lives of both men and women. It is a clear indicator of full adulthood and begins the process of acquiring various forms of status not available to children or unmarried adults. As noted above, it is the custom in Dinka culture that siblings marry in order of birth, from first-born to last-born son and first-born to last-born daughter. Failure to adhere to this custom is taboo-like, because marriage out of order obstructs and impedes what are seen as essential rights and needs of all Dinka, to marry and have children. For a young man, the marriage of his younger sibling can indefinitely delay his own marriage. If a man allows his younger brother to marry before him, he may have to wait years before his family can amass another 30 or more cattle needed for his own bridewealth.

Akur’s story in chapter seven is an example of how financial desperation led to marriage of sisters out of birth order. The following story about Kon’s marriage to Ajier illustrates how, in some cases, the custom of marriage in order of birth is not adhered to because of logistic impossibilities, rather than financial desperation.

When Kon pronounced his intention to marry Ajier, his family insisted that he wait for his older brother, Majier, to marry first. It was Majier’s time to marry and he had the right to use the cattle his family had amassed. If Kon were to marry, Majier would have to wait for the family to reacquire the cattle needed for his bridewealth. In 2001, Majier was resettled to the United States and was working on a master’s degree when Kon announced his wish to marry. Kon convinced Majier to allow him to marry first. Majier acquiesced, knowing that he did not plan to marry until he completed his studies. And when the time came for Majier to marry, unlike Kon, he would have the money he
amassed in the United States to help him obtain the cattle he would need for bridewealth and would not have to rely on his family’s cattle.

Another example involved Ajok (09-15-10), a man who never fled Bor during the war. Ajok met a woman he wanted to marry, but his older brother, who fled years earlier to Kakuma refugee camp, had not yet married. In March 2005, Ajok traveled to Kakuma, a difficult and long trip that took him across the border of Sudan to convince his brother to find a woman and marry. With the marriage of his older brother, Ajok would now be free to marry. Ajok was in Kakuma for nine months trying to convince his brother to find a woman and marry, but his brother refused. Despite the custom to marry in order or birth, Jok returned to Bor and married the woman he loved before his older brother had married.

Marriage out of sibling order is a major disruption to a long-standing and far-reaching customary Dinka behavior, rooted in forced displacement and the asylum environment. This modification to marriage severely disrupts customary status and authority that is intimately entwined with access to reproduction. A younger male sibling marring a wife and having children before his older brother even marries acquires a status and authority that surpasses an older brother.

**Choosing Education Over Cattle**

Customarily, a woman and her family chose a groom based on his character, reputation, and the number of cattle he could bring as bridewealth. Families sought a groom not only who their daughter wanted, but also a man who could provide future assistance to the family. Prior to departure, a suitor having many cattle to offer in
bridewealth was a sign that the man not only was wealthy in cattle, but also rich in kin. Therefore, he would have many resources to call on in times of need. But recent history has shown that cattle wealth can be risky. During the war cattle were often killed or stolen. Furthermore, the intense and frequent conflict in Jonglei made movement through Jonglei personally risky and disrupted migration to green pasture and water. I was told by my interviewees that there has been a striking change from pre-asylum patterns of groom choice. While a man’s character and reputation is still important, several returnees told me that women and their families often chose a man with education over a man with cattle.

Many lessons were learned during the wartime. Those who were rich with a lot of cattle when disaster came [lost all their cattle [and] they were [left] with nothing. But those with education got jobs with NGOs and money, so people now see that education is better than family background (male returnee, 10-18-10).

Anyang’s (10-18-10) story exemplifies the selection of a groom based on his level of education rather than on number of cattle he offered for bridewealth. He was competing with two other men for a wife. Anyang said his future wife’s family chose him because he was the most educated of the three. One had many cows and no education, the other suitor had education, but less than Anyang. Anyang said that shifts in the basis for groom selection began after many young Sudanese men resettled in well-developed countries such as United States, Australia, and Canada and acquired wealth through education.

Between 2000 and 2001, the United States agreed to resettle nearly four thousand South Sudanese refugees from Kakuma. According to Anyang, shortly after these men,
called the Lost Boys,\textsuperscript{103} resettled in the United States, “they began pouring money [into Kakuma]. Anyone who had a Lost Boy [relative living in the United States] was a rich man and all eyes turned to these men who resettled in the West” (10-18-10). This was before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 that ended the Civil War. During the war, salaries of southern soldiers, teachers, and other governmental officials were rarely paid. At that time (prior to 2005), the only sources of money in the refugee camps and in the south of Sudan were the remittances sent from the Lost Boys living and working in the United States, Australia, and Canada. Diane Shandy (2007) found that “[on] average the unmarried Sudanese men living in the United States [she] interviewed estimated sending about $5,000 per year to relatives in Ethiopia and Kenya” (p.148). When a Lost Boy returned to Kakuma to marry a girl, he was chosen over other men competing for a woman, because Lost Boys where believed to be educated and wealthy.

Men whose cattle were stolen or killed during the war were left with no resources and loss of status. Unlike those dependent on cattle for wealth and status, men with education were able to obtain jobs in local NGOs or engage in small business. And despite flood, drought, or conflict, they were able to maintain their wealth and high status. A shift toward investment in education is now seen as a way to diversify and ensure a family’s security (Dyer 2006; Epstein 2010).

Young girls are vocal about their preference for a groom with education. For example, my friend Ajier told me that her “sister doesn’t not want to marry this man; he is too old (Ajier’s sister was 17 and Ajier guesses the man was 40), he is not

\textsuperscript{103} The Lost Boys is a name given by the humanitarian agencies to the estimated 20,000 unaccompanied young boys (7-17 years of age) who fled Sudan’s Second Civil War and took refuge in Kakuma.
educated…the man is a soldier and has no money.” This shift is at the heart of the new trend by women and families to choose a groom with education over a man with cattle. The attention given to education in groom selection refocuses the lens away from a suitor’s family to the prospective groom himself, further freeing a man from his dependence on his kin’s reputation and cattle for his marriage. This shift creates a greater emphasis on individualism. It is important to note that individualism is in direct opposition to core Dinka cultural practice and values, in which individuals’ identities are derived from and first priorities focus on their family. This change among Dinka women and families to favor a groom with education and few cattle over an uneducated man with many cattle is further evidence of the effects of the asylum environment on customary Dinka behavior.

**Rampant Inflation of bridewealth**

The Lost Boys are blamed for the rampant inflation of bridewealth among the Dinka Bor. When the Lost Boys returned to Kakuma in search of wives, they came with very large sums of money with which to purchase cattle not affordable by their male kin in the refugee camp. The Lost Boys offered as many as 75-100 bridewealth cattle.

One interviewee, James (male returnee, 10-18-10), told me that his brother married in July 2010, after offering 137 cattle. A bridewealth this high is now not uncommon; I met a young woman who, even before she began to menstruate, was married with 150 cattle.

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104 In cases in which a young girl was married before she began to menstruate, the girl most often remained in the home of her parents until she began to menstruate, at which point, she moved to her husband’s home.
It [bridewealth] has changed. Before men only needed a small number of cattle to marry, but now they need 100 (female never fled, 09-06-10).

[The increase in bridewealth] is due to richness…Those who went to the United States and Australia, they have a lot of money (male returnee, 10-02-10).

The reason why [bridewealth] is increasingly high is because of education. Most people who were here, [those who] have not been displaced, can cultivate and can buy some cows. But [men who fled and have] education can work and get a lot of money. If [an educated man] is competing (with another man for marriage)… he can increase his [bridewealth] and will be chosen [by the bride and her family to be the groom]. So the richness has now caused the [bridewealth] to get high (female never fled, 10-06-10).

According to an unpublished United Nations report obtained by Matt Richmond of Bloomberg News, bridewealth has increased 44 percent between 2005 when the CPA was signed and 2011. As a result, half of the male population in rural areas cannot afford a bride (Richmond 2011). In 2011, bridewealth averaged about 200,000 Sudanese Pounds (about $63,000) among the elites, for the average man about $33,000, and $7,000 for a poor man. The inflation in the number of cattle offers is corroborated by Grabska (2010) in Kakuma, where bridewealth costs up to $30,000, equivalent to 250 heads of cattle.

The dramatic increase in bridewealth and its effects on marriage negotiations, women’s choice of husbands, and Dinka culture is documented in local and international newspapers such as the Sudan Tribune and Bloomberg News. Examples of article headlines include:

“The Ugliness of Excessive [Bridewealth] in Southern Sudan”

“Cows-for-Bride Inflation Spurs Cattle Theft in South Sudan”
Matt Richmond and Flavia Krause-Jackson, Bloomberg News, July 26, 2011
At these high rates of bridewealth, men with education, whether in Southern Sudan or those resettled in the West, are at an advantage. Due to their education and therefore potential or current wealth that allows them to purchase large numbers of cattle, these men are the choice of families to marry their daughters. Not only are they able to successfully marry the woman they want, they are also able to do so without the traditional support of male kin.

In conclusion, a Dinka man’s access to a wife and reproduction, which once was dependent on his male kin, is now, for some men, almost entirely an individual venture. Prior to asylum, a man’s source of cattle for bridewealth was through his male kin. This dependence deepened and broadened male kin relations by creating networks of dependence that made marriage a family endeavor rather than an individual venture. After return, and in the urban environment, access to cash now allows a man to bypass his kin by purchasing bridewealth cattle using his own resources. This access to cattle through cash not only weakens kinship ties, but also creates ripples in the customary order of power, status, and authority by allowing sons to surpass their fathers and younger brothers to move ahead of their older brothers.
Conclusion

In the post-war, urban environment of Bor, male returnees find that their daily roles, responsibilities, and kinship practices differ greatly from those before departure. Rather than a complementary partner with his wife in the survival of their family, husbands in Bor often find themselves as the sole breadwinners. While this new role grants husbands higher status and power, it also creates additional stressors through the demands of kin who invoke cultural norms that dictate that earners share with kin members. The stories of David, Garang, and Kon illustrate the ways in which new concepts of male Dinka identity constructed during asylum (urban dweller, educated, and modern), combined with factors in the resettlement environment (the new penal code, dependence on a cash economy, and access to cash) enhance or diminish a Dinka man’s access to customary forms of power, status, and authority and modify kin practices and relationships.

The change I observed in the preference of Dinka women and families for educated men over that of the previously desired cattle rich men may be one of three early signals of change to symbolic meaning and economic reasoning of Dinka Bor bridewealth in new context. Like the Gusii in the 1940s, early 21st century Dinka Bor are experiencing significant changes in their subsistence and social practices. Before the 1940s, the Gusii were predominantly subsistence cultivators whose land was held by corporate clan groups comprised of patrilineal related polygynous extended households (Håkansson’s 1990, 1988). As the Gusii population grew larger and cash cropping came to dominate, land once owned by polygynous extended families became divided into private lots owned by a single husband and wife. Gusii farmers, who became wealthy as a
result of the change, began to diversify their economic strategies opening shops and
hotels. They sent their children to school and to college. According to Håkansson, these
profound economic and social changes led to the emergence of socioeconomic
stratification among the Gusii.

In the aftermath of the war, except for a few elite who hold government positions,
high-ranking military officers, and those who resettled overseas, the Dinka Bor find
themselves in more or less the same diminished economic conditions. Unlike the Gusii
after the 1940s, the Dinka have not yet experienced a multi-level hierarchy based on
economic differences. Yet, I have observed what may be three early signs of a change
like that seen in the Gusii. First, I observed changes to the preferred criteria of a groom
from cattle rich to educated, with the assumption that an educated groom has a more
reliable cash future. Second and third, I have traced how a groom with independent cash
wealth relies less on male kin relations for cattle bridewealth and reduces the influence of
his family in his marriage. All three of these noted modifications to the bridewealth
practice have the potential for significantly altering the symbolic meaning and economic
reasoning currently ascribed to Dinka Bor bridewealth practices. As subsistence and
social practices continue to change among the urban Dinka Bor who are now fully
enmeshed in a cash economy, I anticipate the emergence of class hierarchy and possibly,
as Håkansson has demonstrated for the Gusii, future changes to the symbolic and
economic reasoning not just between past and present, but between socioeconomic
classes.

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Chapter 9  Imagination as a Staging Ground

Introduction

Research on migration, both forced and voluntary, has clearly established that the migration experience generates significant changes in gender relations and norms. Changes occur primarily as a result of rearranged power hierarchies. The laws, policies, and cultural practices in the resettlement and asylum locations are often different from and contradictory to the cultural beliefs, values, and gender norms of the migrants’ or refugees’ homes of origin. Differing property rights (Colson 1999), employment outside the home (Benson 1994, Chrostowsky 2005), and modifications to religious behavior (Krulfeld 1994) are a few examples of factors in resettlement communities or asylum locations that affect redistribution of power relations and the statuses of migrant and refugee women and men within both the domestic and public arenas. Franz (2000) found that while male refugees’ identities are linked to the ethnic and social identities of their place of origin, female refugees are more willing to redefine themselves through individual projects of adaptation to their host society or asylum environment.

Building on these findings and in pursuit of my Master’s degree, I conducted an ethnographic study of Sudanese women who had been resettled in San Diego. I was most interested in the strategies Dinka women engaged in to adjust to life in America, a society whose gendered practices and norms differed greatly from those of the Dinka. The results of this research demonstrated that where Sudanese women took asylum before coming to the U.S. influenced their ability to adapt to conditions in their new American homeland.
Drawing upon the results of my MA thesis, I conducted an ethnographic study of the post-repatriation experience of forced migrants, designed to examine the effects of asylum environment on gender norms and relations upon return to the pre-displacement region. I compared the asylum and repatriation experiences of forced migrants who originated from the same cultural background and location—i.e., Dinka of Bor, South Sudan—yet encountered two different asylum environments—Kakuma refugee camp in northern Kenya and Khartoum, in the north of Sudan. My aim was to determine if alterations to gender norms and relations during asylum are the result of the asylum environment and if these modifications remain intact upon return to Bor, South Sudan.

My results show that various global forces encountered during asylum are instrumental in forging new ways of life by changing gendered livelihood practices after return. Customary Dinka identity is now being shaped by forms of capital valued within global systems. While various factors in the asylum locations contribute to changes in preflight gender relations by providing forced migrant women with avenues to engage with gender inequality, these avenues cannot guarantee their empowerment upon return. Resettlement context plays an equally critical role in such outcomes. For example, women who obtained an education during asylum may be prohibited from gaining employment upon return by family members who maintain customary ideas about the roles of women.

This research also debunks the conventional image, story, and definition of a refugee. I illustrate how the refugee experience varies greatly even among the same cultural, ethnic, economic and geographically located community. Through the examination of forced Dinka female and male migrants’ experiences (pre-departure,
during asylum, and post-repatriation), I show how the popular “refugee story” represents only one of many different refugee narratives. I further illustrate how the traditional “refugee story” hinders scholarly and humanitarian understanding of refugee experiences, which ultimately results in a failure to adequately meet refugee needs upon their return. My gendered approach to refugee experiences shows that refugees are active agents who are in a constant (re)negotiation or (re)creation of their concepts of gendered identity and behavioral practices.

Findings

Based upon my data on returning Dinka Bor, it appears that while customary Dinka agro-pastoral subsistence and settlement patterns continue to be practiced in rural areas, the majority of refugees returning from Kenya and internally displaced persons returning from Khartoum choose to live in urban settings. These returnees are abandoning customary subsistence patterns to become dependent on a cash economy.

My findings suggest that forced migration and an extended time in asylum have led to a conceptual distinction between those who never fled and those who fled during the war. Those who never fled, called “organic Dinka,” know and practice what Dinka themselves perceive to be the true Dinka culture. Those who never fled consider those who fled as being tainted by foreign influences, and to practice an imperfect Dinkaness. In the same manner, those living in the urban centers contrast their modern Dinkaness with a traditional Dinkaness that is practiced in the cattle camps. These conceptual distinctions currently correlate with subsistence strategies, because organic Dinka rely on agro-pastoral practices and returning Dinka rely on a cash economy. I expect to see a
class distinction grow along the conceptual distinction positioning the urban Dinka in economically superior positions.

Factors in the Kakuma and Khartoum environments contributed to refugees adopting both desirable and involuntary modifications to customary Dinka subsistence patterns, resettlement patterns, gendered practices and relations, and concepts of Dinkahood during asylum. Key factors included: their inability to practice customary agro-pastoral livelihood strategies, adaptation to an urban setting, the extent to which they had access to formal education, humanitarian aid, food rations, and skills training, the predominate language spoken in the asylum location (English or Arabic), their exposure to human rights education and promotion, and the interruption of customary law practices and enforcement of foreign law.

The presence or absence of humanitarian agencies was a key influence on the varying gendered norms and relations between returnees from Kakuma and Khartoum. Increased access to and assistance in attending formal education, vocational training, IGS training, English language training, and acquiring financial capital gave Kakuma returnees who participated in these educational programs advantages in the job market upon return to Bor. Furthermore, powerful and daily messages on human rights, gender equality and SVGB led to new gender norms, practices, and identity (willingly or involuntary) first in the camp and upon return to Bor.

Different asylum locations led to the use of different strategies to deal with gender inequality. Key differences between the locations included: 1) different local laws/penal system, 2) different relationship between the refugees/IDPs with the police force, and 3) the presence or absence of the humanitarian aid agencies. Alterations to gender norms,
relations, and behaviors developed by refugees over the course of asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum were further modified upon their return to Bor. I argue that the lack of access to humanitarian agencies and lack of exposure to UN concepts of gendered equality during asylum in Khartoum resulted in fewer modifications to the refugees’ customary concepts of gender and Dinkahood than for those refugees who took asylum in Kakuma. Greater modification among Kakuma Dinka refuges can also be attributed to the ability of women in Kakuma to practice a new form of womanhood. In Kakuma, unlike Khartoum, women had greater access to education, employment, and the enforcement of new gendered rights. In Khartoum, on the other hand, access to education and employment was hindered by the racism and harassment Dinka women frequently experienced on the streets of Khartoum. Furthermore, unlike in Kakuma, women’s rights in Khartoum were stifled by Sharia Law and the Law of Public Order.

After their return to Bor, in the urban environment, Dinka men’s and women’s daily practices and gendered relations underwent major transformation when compared to life prior to departure. Most critical was the shift from husband and wife as complementary contributors to a family’s well being, to a wife’s predominant dependence on the husband for their well-being. Unlike their fathers, who spent days tending their cattle, the men in my study were obligated to look for employment in an office, school, or work as a tradesman. Women, who prior to displacement were responsible for food production, procurement, and preparation, no longer had land in an urban setting to plant and from which to harvest food. While a few women practiced small income generating activities and even fewer asylum educated women found employment in Bor, most women were prohibited by cultural norms, lack of education
and skill, and child care demands from working outside the home. As a result, the women in my study became reliant on their husbands for survival. This new role as breadwinner granted a husband higher status and power over his wife.

In the urban environment, access to cash allows a Dinka man to bypass his male kin by purchasing bridewealth cattle using his own resources. Access to cattle through cash not only weakens kinship ties, but also creates ripples in the customary order of power, status, and authority by allowing sons to surpass their fathers and for younger brothers to move ahead of their older brothers. A Dinka man’s character and reputation is still important. Several returnees told me that women and their families often chose a man with education over a man with cattle. This reorientation by women and families to choose grooms with education rather than man with cattle refocuses the lens away from the suitor’s family onto the prospective grooms, further freeing men from being dependent on their kin’s reputation and cattle for successful marriages. This shift in how Dinka are redefining men’s reputations creates more emphasis on individualism—a concept that is in direct opposition to core Dinka cultural practice and values.

I also recorded the incidence of marriage out of sibling order. Marrying out of sibling order creates a major disruption to a long-standing and far-reaching customary Dinka behavior rooted in forced displacement and the asylum environment. Marrying out of sibling order severely disrupts customary status and authority within the family that is intimately entwined with access to reproduction. Marriage out of order allows younger siblings to marry and have children before their older siblings, thus acquiring a status and authority that surpasses those of older siblings.
Finally, my data establish that women who fled conflict are not homogenously empowered or disempowered upon return. A women’s empowerment depends highly upon the interaction between her asylum experiences (access to aid, formal education, and new penal codes), resettlement location (rural vs. urban), her personal character (extrovert or introvert), and cognitive processes (imagination). While various factors in the asylum location contribute to changes to pre-flight gender relations by providing forced migrant women with avenues to engage with gender inequality, these same structural factors might not be present in the resettlement location. I argue that factors in asylum should not be viewed in isolation when trying to explain empowerment after return. Instead, both the resettlement location and cognitive processes play equally critical roles in the outcome, and must be considered in any explanatory framework.

Gendered Geographies of Power

As I discussed in chapter two, Pessar and Mahler’s GGP can be used as a framework to describe how the gendered identities and relations of forced migrants were negotiated across international and internal borders. I noted that the second component of GGP, social location, was a complex construct and difficult to define because social location does not refer to a single physical location, but to an abstract space. It refers to an individual’s fluid position among interconnecting power hierarchies. These power hierarchies are continually intersecting and mutually constituting each other as the individual moves between and among differing geographical scales and social locations.

The way in which Mahler and Pessar define the social location dimension creates possible interpretive ambiguities. People’s movement in terms of privilege-disadvantage
should be described in terms of specific domains of behavior. For example, Newell (2005) was able to define two constructs, social status and economic status, to describe the movement of his teenagers along what Mahler and Pessar call the privilege-disadvantage continuum. His approach led to analytical clarity and allows other ethnographers to replicate his results. In my study, it is possible to identify the following four potential domains of behavior: (1) asylum location, (2) access to education, (3) exposure to human rights education and promotion, and (4) interruption of customary law practices and enforcement of foreign laws. There also is a need to identify the time horizon involved, e.g., short-term or long-term privilege or disadvantage. A time horizon can be addressed only after the domains of social location are defined. I believe that some anchors will be study specific, while others can be more general across studies.

Depending on how one defines the domains and the anchors, conscripted Dinka boys in Kakuma could be interpreted as shifting toward the disadvantaged end of the continuum (loss of freedoms, loss of home and family) or toward the privileged end (opportunities for education, acquisition of skills, chance for a life in a developed country). In fact, these events may be occurring almost simultaneously to the Dinka boys, making location or shifts in location difficult to determine. Even this brief example suggests that more specific domains (i.e. anchors) must be incorporated into the model to make it useful. That is, the anchors of privilege and disadvantage must be unpacked.

In this section I propose four critical domains that can be used within the GGP framework to examine the forced Dinka migrant experience: 1) asylum location; 2) access to formal education; 3) exposure to human rights education and promotion; 4) and interruption of customary law practices and enforcement of foreign law. I will also
address the role of imagination or mind work, the fifth component of GGP, in the forced migrant experience.

As Dinka forced migrants moved from their place of origin, to asylum, and then back to South Sudan, they moved through a series of geographical scales (spatial, cultural, and social) that in turn altered their social location and power geometry. For example, as a Dinka girl’s location on a spatial scale moved from Bor to Kakuma so did her position within other cultural or social scales e.g., access to formal education, exposure to human rights education and promotion, and interruption of customary law practices and enforcement of foreign law. Changes in her geographical scales and to her social location resulted in changes in her position within her power geometry. In this case, the young girl’s shift from Bor to Kakuma, can be viewed as a movement along the social location continuum as a move from disadvantaged to advantaged (see Figure 20).

Using the same young girl, her repatriation, or return to Bor (spatial scale) again changes her position within other cultural or social scales (lack of access to formal education, non exposure to human rights education and promotion, customary law practices). As her spatial scale moved from Kakuma to Bor her social location also changed, altering the degree of control (or agency) she had to access, negotiate, or change the social relationships, economic resources, and political networks that structured her life. In Kakuma, she maintained an advantaged social location where she had both access to formal education and the support of NGOs and the UN to maintain enrollment in formal education. But upon return to Bor, her social location was altered. She now fell closer to the disadvantaged end of the scale. In Bor, she lost the support of the NGOs and UN and was now subject to customary gendered norms that are biased against Dinka and
girls continued enrollment in school. In this case, the young girl’s movement from Kakuma to Bor can be viewed as a movement along the *social location continuum* as a move from advantaged to disadvantaged (see Figure 21).

**Figure 21: Social Location Continuum Advantaged**
Ayen’s story, which I introduced in chapter seven, illustrates the way movement along the same spatial scale (Kakuma to Bor) can result in vastly different power geometries (agency) upon return to Bor. Like the young Dinka girl above, as Ayen moved from Kakuma to Bor her social location moved and so did the degree of control (or agency) she had to access, negotiate, or change the social relationships, economic resources, and political networks that structured her life. But we see from Ayen’s story that despite the same spatial movement after return, Ayen was able to obtain a high degree of control (or agency) over her social relationships, economic resources, and political networks that structure her life in Bor after return. Unlike the young girl’s shift from Kakuma to Bor, which can be viewed as a movement along the social location continuum as advantaged to disadvantaged, Ayen’s shift along the same spatial scale can be viewed as a movement along the social location continuum as advantaged to
advantaged. While various factors can be argued to contribute to making these spatial movements advantaged or disadvantaged (e.g., husbands’ and families’ consent and/or approval versus opposition or refusal, economic constraints or opportunities, health, age, etc.), I argue that key to Ayen’s success is *mind work*, or *imagination*. Ayen envisioned her return and future in South Sudan differently than did the young girl in this example.

Ayen envisions a future for herself, and for all South Sudanese women, that differs greatly from before displacement. Her vision is one in which customary gendered ideologies and practices are reconstructed so that women gain freedoms and a voice they did not have before departure. Her vision for the future of women in South Sudan was partly shaped by her asylum location in Kakuma where she had access to formal education, was exposed to human rights education and promotion, observed different gendered norms, relations, and behaviors, and experienced interruption of customary law practices and enforcement of foreign law. But while many refugee women in Kakuma were exposed to these same influences, Ayen is a rare and highly visible activist for women’s rights in South Sudan. Her vision of a new Dinka womanhood is visible in the JSWU objectives in which she has been elected Chair Lady. In an interview Ayen explained,

> The objective of the Women’s Union is to empower women socially, economically and politically… Our activities are many…[some involve] adult literacy…we want women to get back to school, even if they are old. [Other activities involve] girl/child education, [we want] girls to have equal education with the boys. [We are] also concerned with the rights of women. We have made some training on gender-based violence to eliminate violence against women.

The role of cognitive processes, the final component of GGP, is often ignored in transnational studies (Mahler and Pessar 2006). Narrowed attention to ‘structure’
minimizes ‘the actor’ in the analysis and limits an actor’s agency, granting greater power to the structure. As a result, such studies privilege social relations and institutions and fail to acknowledge the role of cognitive processes (imagination or mind work) in the (re)creation, (re)construction, or maintenance of gender ideologies and practices. By demonstrating the crucial role of imagination in Ayen’s story, I reinforce the need to address cognitive possesses in gendered transnational migration studies.

Like Mill’s (1997) Thai female migrants, who even before their actual physical displacement, imagined themselves moving along the streets of Bangkok and returning to their rural village with urban sophistication, Ayen envisioned her future, and the future of all South Sudanese women, differently and as improved from life before migration. In search of her vision, she became active in the women’s movement, eventually becoming Chair Lady of JSWU. Despite the prescribed notion of a good Dinka wife to “stay home after marriage,” she took a very visible public appointment. Ayen was able to act outside the prescribed actions of the structure. In this way, Ayen was not simple shaped by her position within the structure, but was actively shaping the structure through her position.

Imagination is the forming of a mental image, or concept, consistent with reality, but not actually present. I contrast this with fantasy, an extravagant and unrestrained mental image, or concept, inconsistent with reality and not actually present. Like Arjun Appadurai (1996) I contend that,

…the idea of fantasy carries with it the inescapable connotation of thought divorced from projects and actions, and it also has a private, even individualist sound about it. The imagination, on the other hand has a projective sense about it, the sense of being a prelude to some sort of expression, whether aesthetic or otherwise. Fantasy can dissipate (because its logic is so often autotelic), but the imagination, especially when collective, can become the fuel for actions. It is the imagination, in its collective forms, that creates ideas of neighborhood and nationhood, of
moral economies and unjust rule, of higher wages and foreign labor prospects. The imagination is today a staging ground for action, not only for escape (p. 7).

Ayen’s desire to change the lives of women in South Sudan is based on an image formed out of her asylum experience. And it is this imagined image that is the staging ground for her action.

Policy Disconnects

Kakuma

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) considers repatriation the optimal solution to what is now commonly called the “refugee crisis” and encourages the return of refugees to their country of origin whenever possible (Omata 2011; Allen and Morsink 1994; Harrell-Bond 1989). With little research to demonstrate otherwise, repatriation policy and aid assistance are based on the assumption that a refugee’s return to his or her country of origin is a return to pre-displacement like life (Omata 2011; Black and Koser 1999). Despite this reasoning, efforts by NGOs and UNHCR in Kakuma refugee camp addressed the immediate needs of refugees within that urban camp setting rather than their potential future needs after return. Based on the belief that Dinka refugees will return to a rural life as agro-pastoralists, training in animal husbandry and agriculture would be reasonable models for them. Yet, despite UNHCR’s own reasoning and logic, the NGOs focused instead on formal education and skills training that are best fit for life in an urban, cash-based economy.

Based upon my research, UNHCR assumption that repatriated citizens will return to their pre-displacement livelihoods is not valid in the case of returning Dinka Bor.
While customary Dinka Bor agro-pastoral subsistence and settlement patterns continue to be practiced, the majority of refugees returning from Uganda, Kenya, or overseas, choose to live in an urban setting and are now dependent on an cash economy. These urban settings are similar to those of a large refugee camp like Kakuma in northern Kenya, or cities such as Nairobi, Kenya, or Kampala, Uganda, where many Dinka Bor took asylum.

Risk factors associated with rapid urbanization in underdeveloped countries include: overstretched public infrastructure, pollution of waste disposal, overcrowded and unsanitary living conditions, unplanned shanty towns, high numbers of unemployment, food insecurity, high levels of crime, and health risks associated with pollution and poor sanitation. Therefore, the sharp increase in urban resettlement caught the attention of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS). Concerned with the rising problem of urbanization afflicting its capital, Juba, and other major centers around the south, in 2004, GOSS implemented a policy entitled, “Taking Towns to the People.” This policy was designed to entice returnees to settle in their villages rather than in the cities (Martin and Mosel 2011). It was believed that if the government was able to provide basic services and livelihood opportunities in rural areas, movement to the cities would slow (Martin and Mosel 2011).

But movement to the urban centers for most returnees is more than a move to obtain access to basic services. For many Dinka refugees, settlement in the urban areas is an identity and a way of life. Many Dinka refugees who fled South Sudan acquired a level and quality of education previously unknown to largely pastoralist people. In Kakuma, refugee education was informed by educational policy ends that assume a general use value of education and is consistent with internationalist perspectives of the
educational good (Chrostowsky and Long 2013). Kakuma’s educational policy, together with socialization in the distinctly urban setting of the camp, produced a new Dinka identity, one with expectations of work in cash economies, and with cultural capital oriented toward the material culture of the urban setting. Overarching this disconnect between UN and NGO interventions in Kakuma and the UN’s assumptions about returnees livelihoods after return, are the recent policy directions by the Government of South Sudan aimed at development of a farming economy for the future of South Sudan.

This disconnect lies between the Western educational agenda being initiated by the government and development agencies in South Sudan, and the reality of pastoralists existing in the context of a broken infrastructure. A Western framework assumes a sedentary, urban, and cash economy lifestyle that for much of the two of the largest ethnic groups in South Sudan—the Dinka and the Nuer—does not exist. To obtain a formal education within a Western framework, the Dinka agro-pastoral subsistence pattern and cultural identity would have to undergo significant changes. Enrollment in school would necessitate a sedentary life, would entail the loss of the skills needed to be a successful agro-pastoralist, and challenge their identity as a cattle centric culture. In addition, there is the question of the use value of a formal education in South Sudan. Obtained at the expense of a pastoral subsistence, there is and will continue to be lack of employment opportunities in a broken infrastructure. Further complicating the matter is the government’s long-term strategy to make South Sudan the “bread basket” of Africa. This policy again questions the use value of a formal education. These disconnects illustrate the silo-ing of policy domains, demonstrating the need for coordination and integration of development policy.
Limitations

In this section I address four limitations in my research design and findings. First, I did not include a rural setting in my research design and hence my study fails to record the post-repatriation experience of the returnees who went to rural areas, as well those who never left the rural areas. Despite the fact that resettlement patterns show that the majority of returnees are choosing to live in the urban setting, many did choose to return to their rural villages. A major conclusion of my study is the impact which resettlement location has on the ability to practice new gendered behaviors and identities developed during asylum. Based on this finding, I would expect to see women in a rural village using different strategies to deal with gender inequality. My failure to examine the post-repatriation experience in the rural setting leaves many of these issues unaddressed. My attempts in the field to gain a rural component were frustrated by financial cost and realities on the ground. Travel in South Sudan is difficult (unpaved and unmaintained roads and during the raining season most roads become impassable due to water or muddy conditions), expense (few cars, vans, or buses are available for rent and drivers demand high prices for transport), and, at the time, insecurity in Jonglei state was high, making travel a risky venture.

A second limitation in the research design was my failure to address the generational differences and age makeup of my participants. Among the Dinka, strong cultural norms based on age dictate roles and behaviors between generations. Generation and age order power, status, and authority. My focus on male versus female and those who fled versus those who never fled failed to address this important cultural element. Once in the field, I attempted to discuss the role of age in daily life and how constructs
and norms that dictate behavior based on age were affected by displacement. This was accomplished through expanding my semi-formal interview questions and seeking out information via informal interviews. But, since age was added to my interview schedule late in my stay in Bor, the data are incomplete.

Like the second limitation, my third limitation resulted in a failure to address another key cultural element. Membership in a family and a clan is critical to a Dinka Bor’s identity and directs much of his or her behavior. For example, an individual’s clan membership directs who one is obligated to assist in times of need, such as during food shortages or during war, who one can and cannot marry, the village in which one lives, or with whom one shares a cattle camp. Despite my failure to address the effects of displacement on kinship patterns and relations, my data do show that displacement has disrupted power relations among men.

Finally, my research design allowed me to make a strong structural exploration of why and how women were able or unable to continue practicing the new concepts of womanhood after returning to Bor. But as I allude to throughout my dissertation and, most strongly in this conclusion, there is a need for an expanded exploration at the personal level—a deeper examination into the personal and cognitive processes behind both the formation of Dinka womanhood and its practice.

**Future Research**

My future research plans include taking these empirical findings a step further by examining how global forces encountered during asylum are mediated through the local. South Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011, making it a propitious moment to
examine the role of the new feminist movement in the construction of a new national identity in South Sudan. Specifically, I want to focus upon how global forces shape a growing feminist movement among Dinka women and contribute to the newly emerging concepts of Dinka-hood and Sudanese nationality in the new South Sudan. Many of the rising female leaders are returnees who were educated during asylum or resettlement in a foreign country. These women work both at the local level in women’s groups and at the government level as ministers and advisors.

My data reveal that education obtained in the Kakuma refugee camp and socialization in the camp’s urban setting has been significant in shaping a new Dinka identity. Together, education and the urban setting has produced an identity where returnees want to work in cash economies and possess a cultural capital oriented toward the material culture of the urban setting. This new identity is not in sync with current government plans to turn South Sudan into predominately an agricultural economy. There is a need to examine the risks and complexities of South Sudan’s educational policy assumptions and plans for agricultural development that are not consistent with the large number of returnees’ livelihood choices and the large number of people who continue to practice a pastoralist livelihood in South Sudan.

Finally, my data suggest the need for research on the interaction between Customary Dinka Law and the new South Sudan constitution and penal code. There is a need to examine how customary concepts of Dinka womanhood supported by customary law merge, or conflict, with new concepts of Dinka women-hood stated in the recently revised constitution and penal code.

While I have tried to summarize here and throughout this thesis the deep
structural changes that migration has had on the lives of Dinka women and men in South Sudan, one of my informants described these profound changes much better and more succinctly:

Before people were not so interested in coming to town, [the] majority stayed in the village…now things have changed. Everyone has come to town, there is no one in the village, no one tr[ies] to teach the children life and culture of the Dinka. We have changed (male returnee, 08-25-10).
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

agnatic kin: any male relation on the father's side.

agro-pastoralism: subsistence pattern based primarily on domesticated animals supplemented with mono-cropping.

bridewealth: the transfer of cattle at marriage from the groom’s kin to the bride’s kin.

clan: a group of people who claim a shared descent based on a stipulated common ancestor.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA): an agreement signed January 2005 by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan. The CPA was designed to bring an end to the Second Sudanese Civil War, develop democratic governance countrywide, and create a strategy to share oil revenues found in the south. It further set a timetable of five years at which point South Sudan could vote to remain united with Sudan or gain independence.

empowerment: a process through which women and men in disadvantaged positions increase their access to knowledge, resources, and decision-making power, and raise their awareness of participation in their communities, in order to reach a level of control over their own environment (Baines 2001).

ethnic group: a group of people that share the same or similar beliefs, customs, traditions, language, religion, gendered and political norms, history, and kinship patterns. These shared cultural similarities both bind them and distinguish them from other groups with different shared cultural similarities.

essentialize: to reduce an identity to a trait(s) or characteristic(s) that is believed to be innate and unchanging.

female genital mutilation (FGM): also known as female genital cutting (FGC) and female circumcision (FC), is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons.

forced migrant: an individual forced to flee their home due to fear of persecution or in search of safety from conflict. This includes both internally displaced persons (IDPs), i.e., those who have fled to other locations within the country, and refugees, i.e. individuals who took refuge outside of their country’s borders.

gender: refers to the norms, roles, characteristics, and personality traits that a culture or society deems natural or appropriate to an individual’s sex. Gender is a cultural construction that imbues meaning into the biological differences between men and women.
gender roles: tasks and activities that a culture assigns to each sex

gendered inequality: unequal distribution of culturally valued power, prestige, freedoms, and rewards between men and women

internally displaced person (IDP): an individual who fled their home and sought asylum inside the borders of their country of origin

IDP South: refers to forced Dinka migrants who fled Bor and took asylum within the borders of South Sudan

jellaba (or djellaba): a loose fitting, ankle length garment with full sleeves worn by men in North Africa or Muslim countries

Kawaja: a local term for foreigner

non-food items (NFI): kits given frequently to displaced populations where it is assumed they fled without many of the basic and essential items a family will need to survive. This kit typically included one blanket, one plastic mat, one plastic tarp, two foldable jerry cans, two large bars of yellow soap, two large rolls of string, one box of fishing hooks, one fishing net, two tin pans and lids, four tin bowls, four tin cups, four tin spoons, one large tin-stirring spoon, and one knife. A family of one-four members receives one mosquito net and a family of five or more members receives two mosquito nets.

non-government organization (NGO): a legally constituted organization created to operate independently from any form of government.

lineage: a group of people who claim a shared descent based on a known common ancestor. Links to common ancestor can be traced.

never fled: refers to participants in my study who never left Bor County, Jonglei State, during the war.

patrilineal descent: descent traced through males only

patrilocal residence patterns: refers to the practice in which the bride and groom takes residence in the home or place of the groom’s family.

polygyny: the practice of having more than one wife at a time.

refugee: 1) The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic] nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 2)
Refugees are individuals who fled their home and sought asylum outside the borders of their country of origin.

repatriation: return to one’s own country

The Lost Boys: a name given by the humanitarian agencies to the estimated 20,000 unaccompanied young boys (7-17 years of age) who fled Sudan’s Second Civil War and took refuge in Kakuma Refugee Camp in northern Kenya.

tong tong: local term for members of the Lord's Resistance Army or the LRA

Toub: Also, spelled thoub or tiab, a toub is the traditional dress worn by Sudanese women during all activities. It is a colorful 15-foot long piece of material wrapped around the body. Women throw one end over their left shoulder and head and use the other end to wrap around their body; covering their waist, legs, and ankles. The toub is worn over a short dress.

organized returnee: returnees who received transport to South Sudan along with non-food items and three months of food aid upon arrival from UNHCR.

assisted returnees: returnees who returned to the South Sudan with the financial aid and food assistance, but not organized transport from of UNHCR.

spontaneous returnees: returnees who returned to Bor without any form of assistance from UNHCR.

prima facie refugee: A person recognized as a refugee, by a State or UNHCR, on the basis of objective criteria related to the circumstances in his or her country of origin and his or her flight, which justify a presumption that he or she meets the criteria of the applicable refugee definition. A person recognized as a prima facie refugee enjoys the same status as a person who has been granted refugee status individually (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011).

refugee status determination (RSD): The legal and/or administrative process undertaken by States and/or UNHCR to determine whether a person is a refugee in accordance with national, regional and international law (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011).

sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): Any act of violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to persons on the basis of their sex or gender, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. It encompasses, but it is not limited to: (i) physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry[sic]-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; (ii) physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and
elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; (iii) physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011).

wife-inheritance: elsewhere called levirate marriage, is the practice by which a dead man’s eldest living brother is obligated to marry his dead brother’s widow
GLOSSARY OF DINKA TERMS

aluck thuk (or luɔk thok): translated “to rinse the mouth.” Each woman in the bride’s cohort received a cow or a goat from a male member of the groom’s family.

apiel taa’ira: A piel is a Dinka word meaning excrement and taa’ira is an Arabic word meaning airplane. Loosely translated as “plane shit.” This is a colloquial term used by those who never fled to describe those returning to Bor.

bia calic: compound (sometimes called hamlet)


gol: 1) dung-fire; a central place for the men of the home when they are together in the homestead. 2) sub-clan

guu: granary

kiel/kuel: to “steal” a girl for marriage

koko: grandmother

kuar kuar: grandfather

luak: a cattle barn

mach thok: central cooking hearth in compound or lineage

mach tharr: women’s cooking hearth

monyjang: name Dinka call themselves, which is translated as “the men of men” or “the lord or all peoples”

ŋyan: girl, unmarried women

ŋyan akuay: a young girl’s first menstruation

taar: competition; When more than one man announces his intentions to marry the same girl it is called taar in Dinka. This is translated into English as competition. Each man announces his intentions to marry a woman and offers a number of cattle as bridewealth.

yoot muth: male head-of-household’s hut

yoot tit: wife’s hut; where a wife sleeps with her children

yum de hok ke thiek: bridewealth; the word ’yum de hok ke thiek’ translates to English as the negotiation of marriage bridewealth.
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Appendix 1 Interview Questions for Interviews Conducted Between September 2009 and February 2010

Background: Family, Economy, and Subsistence Prior to departure

• When were you born?
• Where were you born?
• How many brothers and sisters do you have? How many are older and younger?
• How many wives did you father have?
• Describe your family’s compound, i.e. the number and kind of structures, what the structures are made of. Who constructed these structures? Who repaired these structures?
• What were the roles and responsibilities of your father?
• What were the roles and responsibilities of your mother?
• What were your roles and responsibilities?
• What were the roles and responsibilities of your sisters/brothers?
• Did your family own cattle? Who owned and cared for the cattle? Who milked? Who dried the dung? Who took the cattle to water and pasture? Did you migrate when with your cattle? Where? When? Can you tell me about the migration?
• Did you family own land? How did you get the land? What did your family grow? Who dug the land? Who planted the seeds? Who did the weeding? Who did the harvesting? Who did the drying of seeds? Who ground the grains? Who was in charge of storing the grains?
• Did you mother, father, siblings or you do any from of income generations? Who held the money? What was the money used for?
• Did you go to school? Why or why not? Did any of your siblings go to school? Why or why not?
• When and how did you become a man/woman?
• When were you married? How old where you? How old was your wife/husband? Tell me about your marriage? From beginning to end, every detail? How many cattle? Did you want to get married to this man/woman? Why or why not? Was there a celebration? Where did you live after marriage? What does the cattle exchange mean?
• Prior to departure how was your relationship with you spouse? How did you solve any problems you had with your spouse? What did you argue/fight about most?
• Prior to departure how did you feed your family? What if you ran out of grain or milk?
• Prior to departure what did you do if your spouse or child fell sick?
• Prior to departure what there money in the house? How was it earned? By who? Who controlled it? What as it used buy?
• Prior to departure what were you and your family’s biggest difficulties?
• Prior to departure did boys and girls date or have sex prior to marriage? What would happen if a man and woman where found together talking or playing? What would happen if a woman became pregnant before marriage? What would happen if a man or woman was unfaithful to their spouse?
• Prior to departure could a woman refuse her husband in bed? What he is a soldier and she cannot support/feed another child when he is gone? Did woman have a method for abortion?
• Prior to departure were there spaces for only woman and only men?
• Prior to departure how was a community problem solved? Were women able to voice their opinion? Was there a way a woman could influence the men’s decision?

Asylum: Family, Economy, and Subsistence
• When did you leave for Khartoum/Kakuma?
• How long where you there?
• Why did you leave? Security, need food, education, health,..
• Can you tell me about your departure?
  ➢ Rushed/chaotic or planned
  ➢ Who went with you?
  ➢ What items did you take with you?
  ➢ How did you decide to go to Khartoum/Kakuma?
  ➢ What kind of transportation did you use?
  ➢ Where there any difficulties along the way?
  ➢ How long did it take?
• What happened when you arrived? How did you register as a refugee? How long did it take for you to get a ration card? How much and what kind of food did you receive? How often did you receive it? Did you receive any non-food items? What?
• How did you find a place to live? Did you have electricity? Water? Who build the hut and how?
• Describe your family’s compound, i.e. the number and kind of structures, what the structures are made of. Who constructed these structures? Who repaired these structures?
• How did you feed yourself and family? What would you do if you ran low on food?
• Was there money in the house? How was it earned? By who? Who controlled it? What as it used buy?
• Did you do any income generating? Did any of your children or spouse do income generating?
• What did you own in Khartoum/Kakuma? Radio, bike, bed, pots/pans, stove… how is this different from prior to departure or now after return?
• What were your responsibilities in the household? Did you have any help? Who? How often?
• What were the responsibilities of your spouse? Did he have any help? Who? How often?
• Did you go to school in Khartoum/Kakuma? How many years and what levels?
• Did your spouse go to school in Khartoum/Kakuma? How many years and what levels?
• Did your children go to school in Khartoum/Kakuma? How many years and what levels?
• Was there a charge for school? Uniform? If so, how find money for school fees
• In Khartoum/Kakuma when and how did you, or how does one, become a man/woman?
• If married in Khartoum/Kakuma - When were you married? How old where you? How old was your wife/husband? Tell me about your marriage? From beginning to end, every detail? How many cattle? Did you want to get married to this man/woman? Why or why not? Was there a celebration? Where did you live after marriage? What does the cattle exchange mean?
• How was your relationship with you spouse? Was it different from before you left? How did you solve any problems you had with your spouse? What did you argue/fight about most?
• In Khartoum/Kakuma what did you do if your spouse or child fell sick?
• In Khartoum/Kakuma what were you and your family’s biggest difficulties?
• Do you think life was more difficult or easier in Khartoum/Kakuma than prior to departure? Do you think life is more difficult in Bor then in Khartoum/Kakuma/prior to departure? Why?
• In Khartoum/Kakuma did boys and girls date or have sex prior to marriage? What would happen if a woman became pregnant before marriage? What would happen if a man or woman were unfaithful to their spouse?
• In Khartoum/Kakuma were there spaces for only woman and only men?
• In Khartoum/Kakuma how was a community problem solved? Were women able to voice their opinion? Was there a way a woman could influence the men’s decision?

Post-repatriation: Economy, Subsistence, and Culture Change
Quick review
• Born in and when? How parents feed family? Income generation?
• At marriage moved to? How feed family? Income generation?
• Asylum where and from when to when? How feed family? Income generation?

Leaving Khartoum/Kakuma
• When did you leave Khartoum/Kakuma?
• Why did you return to Sudan?
• With who did you return?
• How? And how long did it take?
• Did you come directly to Bor?
• Had you planned before you left to come to Bor or somewhere else?
• Why did you choose to live in Bor?
• Did you bring any possessions with you? If not, why?
• Did you have any money saved for the return? How did you get that money?
• Do you have relatives in Bor? Who?

Arrival in Bor
• How did you come to live in this compound in Bor?
• Did you have to build you hut? How get money to build?
• How get pots, bed, blankets, tarps...?
• Did you receive any aid upon return? From who and what?
• How did you use it?

In Bor
• Are you employed? What is your salary?
• What kinds of income generation to you do?
• What responsibilities do you have in the compound that you didn’t have before you left for Khartoum/Kakuma?
• Are there responsibilities you had prior to departure that you don’t have now?
• What is your primary source of food and/or income? What kind of income generation activities do you do? Does your spouse contribute to food and income?
• Do the children go to school? Who/how is school fees paid? How do you get this money?
• If someone is ill who pays for the medicine? How do you get this money?
• How is your life different from your mothers/fathers?
• How is your spouse’s life different from your mothers/fathers?
• How has a reliance on cash for food changed your lives? Does it provide you with more or less control?

Then and Now
• Were women worriers/soldiers before the war? Were women soldiers during the war? What changed? And now? Why can women be a soldier now but not before?
• Before the war did girls go to school? And now? Why now and not then what changed?
• Before the war did women cut wood? And now? Why now and not then what changed?
• Before the war did women sell tea and food? And now? Why not and not then what changed?
• Before the war where women MP’s? And now? Why not and not then what changed?
• Why can a woman be a soldier, police officer, or MP but not a chief?
• Are there other things that women didn’t do before the war but do now?
• Do you think the Dinka culture is different now then before? If so, how exactly? Why do you think these changes happened?
Appendix 2 Interview Questions for
Interviews Conducted Between March 2010 and October 2011

Life History
• Where/when were you born?
• How many brothers and sisters do you have? How many pass away? Order born?
• Are your mother and father alive?
  • FA - where live or when die, educated, what do for work when you were a child, did he do anything to gain income, what do now, how many wife’s does your father have, how many total children does your father have.
  • MO - where live or when die, educated, what do for work when you were a child, what do now, did she do anything to earn income, what number wife is your mother, if father die was she inherited, did he produced children, did he help your mother.
• Did you go to school? Why/why not? Did your siblings go to school? Why/why not?
• What your responsibilities as a child?
• What is your fondest memory as a child? What do you miss most about childhood?
• Did you have a menstruation celebration/initiation?
• Did you always live in ______?
• When did you get married? Did family arrange whom you would marry? How long was the engagement? Where you forced? Where you happy? How much bridewealth was paid/promised?
  • Did you where a white dress, henna, hair, check sheet in the morning?
  • ELOPE/STEAL – Why elope? Where run too? How long stay away? What happen when return?
• How old was your spouse? Did they have any education? What kind of work did they do? If man did he have any other wives? What number are you?
• Where did you move upon marriage? How long did you live there?
• Why move and when?
• Why come to Bor? What does your husband/wife do now? Does your husband have any new wives? What do you do for income generation?
• How many children do you have? How old are they? Do they go to school?

Displacement
• How get to KA/UG/Khartoum? Why go? With who? Upon arrival did you find other relatives/clan members?
• When arrive where live? How were the conditions
• With who did you live?
• Was there food aid? Did you receive any non-food items upon arrival?
• Was live easier or more difficult then before you left? And now?
• How long were you there?
• What did you miss the most during your time in ______?
• Did you go to school? How many years? Did you attend any other vocational training?
• Did your children or spouse go to school or training?
• Did you ever attend workshops sponsored by UN or NGO agencies that taught you about woman’s rights? What is an example of what you learned? What do you think about that?
• When did you leave and why?
• Is there anything about ___________ that you miss and wish you could have here?
• Do you have any fond memoirs of life in _________?

Culture and Life Strategies

Health
• Did you give birth in the hospital or in your hut? Why?
• Do you go to the hospital or clinic? What is the difference between them or are they the same?
• What kind of illnesses, or symptoms, necessitate going to the hospital?
• What are the symptoms of malaria? What is syphilis? What are the symptoms?
• Is diarrhea a reason to go to the hospital?

Bridewealth
• Where I come from there is no such thing as a bridewealth, can you explain to me what it is and how it works? Why must a man give a bridewealth? What does it mean? A bridewealth gives the control of a man over a woman what does it give a woman? Should bridewealth be stopped or continue, why?
• Where I come from a woman marries whom she wants to marry, she chooses her husband, and cannot be forced by her family to marry someone she does not want to marry. What happens here if a Dinka girl refuses to marry a man the family has picked for her?
• Is it true that her father, brothers, and uncles may beat her? Is it true that girls have died from this beating? Why doesn’t anyone stop them? Why doesn’t her mother or sisters stop them? Are they brought to the river?
• A woman’s family most also return cattle, who gives, to who, when, and how much?
• If it is the bridewealth that gives a man control and ownership of his wife, that is, he can beat her and tell her what to do, why is it that men who have not paid bridewealth can still beat their wife?

Divorce
• Those I interviewed before you have told me, that divorce is higher now then before the war, do you agree and if so why do you think divorce has increases?
• Can a woman divorce a man? How does she get a divorce?

Difference
• How have those who have returned from East Africa and Khartoum different from those who never left Bor different?
• How are the youth of today different from when you were young?
Human Rights

- Have you every heard of human rights? Where?
- What does human rights mean?
- Do you think there are human rights in S. Sudan?
- Do you think there should me human rights in S. Sudan? Why/why not?
- Do you think there can be development in S. Sudan with out human rights?
- Didn’t the south fight the north because the north marginalized and denied the black south if its rights and freedoms? Yes. How then can you justify the continual marginalization and denial of women’s rights, in the south?
- What do you need to make your life better?
Appendix 3: Consent Form in English

Consent to Participate in a Research Study

The Effects Of Migration on Gender Norms and Relations:

The Post-repatrination Experience in Bor, South Sudan

You are being invited to take part in a research study about the effects the asylum environment has on the construction of gender norms and relations upon repatriation. You are being invited to take part in this research study because: 1) you are a returnee from either Kenya or Khartoum; 2) you have returned to Bor prior to August, 2007; and 3) you are an adult over the age of 18 in married, widowed, or single-parent households with young or adolescent children. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be one of about 32 people to do so.

The person in charge of this study is MaryBeth Chassowsky, a student in the Department of Anthropology of University of Kentucky. Dr. Monica Udvardy, is guiding her in this research.

As you know, the Sudanese Civil War lasted 21 years and the conflict caused thousands of South Sudanese, like yourself, to flee their homes in search of safety. People fled to many different locations, some inside Sudan, for example Khartoum, and others took refuge outside Sudan, for example, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Many South Sudanese were away for as long as 10 years. During that time, and partially as a result of war and displacement, Dinka culture has changed. I am interested in recording Dinka life and culture before displacement and comparing it to Dinka life and culture now, after return. I am most interested in the things that Dinka men and women did before the war and what they do now.

The information from this study has two purposes. First, it will be a record of Dinka culture before displacement for your grandchildren. Second, understanding how war and displacement creates changes to culture can be used by humanitarian agencies to improve refugee law, policy and assistance programs, especially those working in South Sudan with Dinka returnees.

The research procedures will be conducted at Bor, South Sudan. You are being asked to take part in three interviews sessions that will take place at your location of choice. Each interview will take about two hours. The total amount of time you will be asked to volunteer for this study is about six hours over the next five months. You may be asked to volunteer for further interviews.

Each interview will focus on one time period of the forced migrant experience: prior to migration, during asylum, and after return. The interviews are designed to establish gender norms and relations during each of these time periods. Questions are developed to obtain information on division of labor, decision-making ability with regard to household and personal economics, household tasks, and childcare responsibilities, and choice of healthcare practitioner or method prior to migration, during asylum, and
The interviews will also be designed to establish 1) which factors in each asylum location contributed to significantly altering asylum gender norms and relations during asylum and 2) strategies that women in both locations developed to engage with the increased gender inequalities.

I will visit your household unannounced four times a week, for about five minutes, and record what each member of the household is doing. This will occur for the duration of the study, which is 14 months.

To the best of my knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would experience in everyday life.

You will not get any personal benefit from taking part in this study. However, your willingness to take part may, in the future, help society to understand displacement and return after asylum. You may also experience a sense of cathartic release and healing as you share your story of displacement, asylum, and return.

If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer. You can stop at any time during the study.

There are no costs associated with taking part in the study.

We will make every effort to keep private all research records that identify you. Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When I write about the study to share it with other researchers, I will write about the combined information I have gathered. You will not be personally identified in these written materials. I may publish the results of this study; however, I will keep your name and other identifying information private. I will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. My field notes and any recordings taken will be kept in a locked trunk in my home and access to data on my computer is protected by a password. There is one limit to confidentiality. I may be required to show information which identifies you to people who need to be sure I have done the research correctly; these would be people from such organisations as the University of Kentucky.

Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study, you can contact the investigator, MaryBeth Czischowski at 0927 389 571. If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, contact Moses Chuti at 0999-676-600 or Abraham Mading at 0918-722-109. I will give you a signed copy of this consent form to take with you.

__________________________
Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study

__________________________
Date

__________________________
Printed name of person agreeing to take part in the study

__________________________
Name of [authorized] person obtaining informed consent

__________________________
Date

305
Appendix 4: Map of Compounds Participating in the Time-allocation Study
Appendix 5. Ecological Systems of Greater Sudan
Appendix 6. Ethnic Groups in Greater Sudan
Appendix 7. Ethnic Groups in South Sudan
Appendix 8. Data Findings from Main Interviews

Table 16: Percentage* of Women Who Engaged in IGS, Obtained Salaried Employment and Formal Education by Asylum Location

<table>
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<th>IGS</th>
<th>No IGS</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>No Salary</th>
<th>Edu</th>
<th>No Edu</th>
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<td>Kakuma</td>
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<td>34.6</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Never Fled</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>100%</th>
<th>100%</th>
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<td></td>
<td>(n=19)</td>
<td>(n=26)</td>
<td>(n=17)</td>
<td>(n=41)</td>
<td>(n=26)</td>
<td>(n=32)</td>
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<td>$X^2$</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$2\text{ df, } p<.08 \quad 2\text{ df, } p<.04 \quad 2\text{ df, } p<.055$

*Percent do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Comparisons between women who fled to Kakuma and women who fled to Khartoum are as follows:

- The Chi Square analysis shows that for IGS there is no significant difference between the two locations ($X^2 = 2.06$, 1 df, ns). Upon return to Bor women who took asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum are engaging in approximately the same level of IGS. The odds ratio of engaging in IGS after return is 3.9 times more likely if you return from Kakuma than Khartoum, but as above, it is not a statistically significant difference.

- The Chi Square analysis shows that for salaried employment there is no difference between the two locations ($X^2 = 1.56$, 1 df, ns). Upon return to Bor women who took asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum are employed at approximately the same level. The odds ratio of gaining salaried employment after return is 2.3 times more likely if you return from Kakuma than Khartoum, but as above, it is not a statistically significant difference.

- The Chi Square analysis shows that for formal education shows that there is no significant difference between the two locations ($X^2 = .54$, 1 df, ns). Upon return to Bor women who took asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum are obtaining approximately the same level of formal education. The odds ratio obtaining education is 1.7 times more likely if you return from Kakuma than Khartoum, but as above, it is not a statistically significant difference.

Comparisons between women who fled to Kakuma or Khartoum and women who never fled are as follows:

- The Chi Square analysis shows for IGS there is marginally significant difference between those who fled and those who never fled ($X^2 = 3.08$, 1 df, $p<.08$). Upon return to Bor women who took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum are engaging in somewhat more IGS than more women who never fled. The odds ratio of engaging in IGS after return te is 3.9 times more likely if you return from Kakuma or Khartoum than if you never left.
• The Chi Square analysis shows that for salaried employment there is a significant difference between those who fled and those who never fled ($x^2 = 6.24$, 1 df, p < .02). Upon return to Bor women who took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum are obtaining significantly more salaried employment than women who never fled. The odds ratio of salaried employment after return is 6.5 times more likely if you return from Kakuma or Khartoum than if you never left.

• The Chi Square analysis shows that there is a significant difference in formal education between those who fled and those who never fled ($x^2 = 16.58$, 1 df, p < .001). Upon return to Bor women who took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum have obtained significantly more formal education than women who never fled. The odds ratio of formal education obtained during asylum is 17.5 times more likely if you took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum than if you never left.

| Table 17: Percentage of Men Who Engaged in IGS, Obtained Salaried Employment and Formal Education by Asylum Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IGS | No IGS | Salary | No Salary | Edu | No Edu |
| Kakuma | 50.0 | 50.0 | 53.6 | 66.7 | 61.5 | 21.9 |
| Khartoum | 0.0 | 30.0 | 39.3 | 0.0 | 39.8 | 18.8 |
| Never Fled | 50.0 | 20.0 | 7.1 | 100% (n=19) | 33.3 | 7.7 | 59.8 |
| | 100% (n=20) | 100% (n=29) | 100% (n=19) | 100% (n=26) | 100% (n=32) |
| | $x^2 = 2.40$ | $x^2 = 10.31$ | $x^2 = 5.82$ | 2 df, p < n.s | 2 df, p < .01 | 2 df, p < .055 |

*CPercent do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Comparisons between men who fled to Kakuma and men who fled to Khartoum are as follows:

• The Chi Square analysis shows that for IGS there is no significant difference between the two locations ($x^2 = .78$, 1 df, ns). Upon return to Bor men who took asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum are engaging in approximately the same level of IGS. The odds ratio of engaging in IGS after return is cannot be computed because of a zero value in one cell of the frequency table.

• The Chi Square analysis shows that for salaried employment there is a significant difference between the two locations ($x^2 = 5.39$, 1 df, p < .03). Upon return to Bor men who took asylum in Kakuma are more likely not to be salaried than men from Khartoum. The odds ratio of engaging in IGS after return is cannot be computed because of a zero value in one cell of the frequency table.

• The Chi Square analysis shows that for formal education there is no significant difference between the two locations ($x^2 = .55$, 1 df, ns). Upon return to Bor men who took asylum in Kakuma and Khartoum are obtaining approximately the same level of formal education. The odds ratio of obtaining education is 2.5 times more
likely if you return from Khartoum than from Kakuma, but as above, it is not a statistically significant difference.

Comparisons between men who fled to Kakuma or Khartoum and men who never fled to Khartoum are as follows:

- The Chi Square analysis shows for IGS there is no significant difference between those who fled and those who never fled ($X^2 = 1.69$, 1 df, ns). Upon return to Bor men who took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum are engaging in somewhat less IGS than men who never fled. The odds ratio of not engaging in IGS after return to is 4 times more likely if you fled than if you never left.

- The Chi Square analysis shows that for salaried employment there is a significant difference between those who fled and those who never fled ($X^2 = 4.29$, 1 df, $p < .04$). Upon return to Bor men who took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum are obtaining significantly more salaried employment than men who never fled. The odds ratio of salaried employment after return is 2.3 times more likely if you return from Kakuma or Khartoum than if you never left.

- The Chi Square analysis shows that there is a significant difference in formal education between those who fled and those who never left ($X^2 = 1.85$, 1 df, ns). Upon return to Bor men who took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum have obtained significantly more formal education than men who never fled. The odds ratio of formal education obtained during asylum is 3.8 times more likely if you took asylum in Kakuma or Khartoum than if you never left.
MaryBeth Chrostowsky
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EDUCATION
2005  M.A.  Applied Anthropology, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA.

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2011 Fall  Instructor, Department of Anthropology, University of Kentucky
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2007 – 2009  Graduate Assistant, Monica Udvardy Ph.D., University of Kentucky
2008 Fall  Instructor, Department of Anthropology, Transylvania University
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RESEARCH AWARDS
2009  National Science Foundation Dissertation Award ($14,918)
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2009  Dissertation Enhancement Award University of Kentucky ($3,000)
2008  University of Kentucky Graduate School Research Support ($800)
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2007  University of Kentucky Graduate School Research Support ($800)

ACADEMIC RECOGNITION
2009  Sudanese Studies Association Graduate Student Grant ($200)
2006  Foreign Language Area Studies (FLAS) ($6,900)
2004  Norton Allen Graduate Scholarship in Anthropology ($500)
2003  Center for Latin American Studies Language Scholarship (Tuition/fees)
2003  Norton Allen Graduate Scholarship in Anthropology ($500)

PUBLICATIONS
Chrostowsky, MaryBeth and David Long
2013  Education during Forced Migration as the Forge of Cultural Production: Dinka repatriation and transnational educational capital in South Sudan. *In Lives in Motion: Migration and Education in Global Perspective*, Lesley Bartlett and Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher, eds. Routledge.
Chrostowsky, MaryBeth

CONFERENCE PAPERS
2008  Considering the Asylum Experience in Post-conflict Reconstruction Policy: Readjustment in Gender Relation after Repatriation to Bor, South Sudan. Paper accepted for presentation at the Annual Center for Refugees Studies at York University Graduate Student Conference, Toronto, April 25.

ORGANIZED PANELS

MaryBeth Chrostowsky