A CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHY OF OCCUPATION: IMAGINARY, EMOTIONAL, AND EVERYDAY SPACES OF PALESTINIAN CHILDHOOD

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A CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHY OF OCCUPATION: IMAGINARY, EMOTIONAL, AND EVERYDAY SPACES OF PALESTINIAN CHILDHOOD

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

By
David Jones Marshall

Director: Dr. Anna Secor, Professor of Geography

Lexington, Kentucky

2013
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

A CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHY OF OCCUPATION:
IMAGINARY, EMOTIONAL, AND EVERYDAY
SPACES OF PALESTINIAN CHILDHOOD

This research examines the political geographies of Palestinian children, and the ways in which their everyday spaces and practices are shaped by broader social and political processes. This research begins with an investigation into the role of the child in the moral geopolitics of humanitarianism and the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. From here, the research explores how the competing discourses of Palestinian nationalism and international humanitarianism, and the legacy of forced migration, have shaped the subjectivity of Palestinian children and the spaces of childhood in a West Bank refugee camp, from homes, to schools, streets, and youth centers. Finally, using participant observation, visual methods and guided tours, this research explores how children reshape the discursive spaces of childhood and child subjectivity through their everyday practices.

KEYWORDS: Palestine, children’s geography, humanitarianism, affect, aesthetics.
A CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHY OF OCCUPATION:
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By

David Jones Marshall

Professor Anna Secor, Director of Dissertation

Dr. Matthew Zook, Director of Graduate Studies
For Muna and Salma
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Situating geographies of Palestinian childhood

Introduction

Young people under the age of 18 make up nearly 50 per cent of the population in Palestine, and up to 60 per cent in densely populated urban areas including refugee camps (PCBS 2012). Indeed 44% of all children living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are refugees (ibid). It is no surprise then that Palestinian children have borne their share of physical, psychological, and emotional hardship under the Israeli military occupation. This has been especially true during the years of heavy fighting that characterized the Second Intifada, starting in September 2000.

In the twelve years since the intifada began, over 1,300 Palestinian children have been killed, and hundreds more have been injured, imprisoned, interrogated, and tortured in Israeli prisons, exploited as human shields, and coerced into becoming informants (Cook, Hanieh, and Kay 2004; DCI-Palestine 2009, 2011, 2012; Delegation 2012; B’Tselem 2012). In Gaza alone, nearly 500 children have been killed since Operation Cast Lead in 2008, including 30 who were killed in the latest attacks as part of Operation Pillar of Cloud (B’Tselem 2012). Between these punctuated bursts of highly visible violence, children in Gaza also endure the deleterious physical and psychological effects of siege, sanctions, and restrictions on mobility, as well as regular shelling, bombing and shooting (Children/MAP 2012; OCHA 2012).

Meanwhile, in rural areas of the West Bank, children and families contend with settler violence, housing demolitions, and an economic situation worse than Gaza (Al-Jazeera 2010). Palestinian children in occupied East Jerusalem face similar threats to their home and family from Israeli citizenship and housing policies which aim to solidify a Jewish majority in the holy
city (OCHA 2011). Indeed, in addition to targeting children’s bodies, the occupation also targets family and childhood spaces; military incursions have damaged and destroyed hundreds of homes and schools, while closures, curfews and imprisonment have interrupted schooling for thousands of Palestinian students for months and years at a time (MIFTAH 2011; Campaign 2007). Everywhere the occupation affects the lives of Palestinian children, albeit in different ways.

Beyond the physical and psychological effects on children, images and definitions of childhood itself are also heavily contested territory over which Israelis and Palestinians wage a geopolitical contest of moral and political legitimacy. As Burwell (2004) puts it, “the children of Palestine are not only the targets of military warfare; they are also markers in the corresponding war over ‘images and ideas’” (p. 34). This battle of hearts and minds fought through representations of children is part of what Scheper-Hughes and Sargent (1998) call the “cultural politics of childhood.” In this political struggle over childhood, Palestinian children variously represent the promise of national liberation; a threat to Jewish demographic superiority; innocent victims of violence and hate; as well as harbingers of hate and violence to come. Of course, the Manichean character of childhood is not unique to the Palestinian context. Throughout history societies have glorified and demonized children as both innocence and incivility personified (Valentine and Holloway 2000; Burman 2008; Katz 2008). Nevertheless, the representational investment in children is perhaps greater in situations of irredentist national struggles and ethnic conflicts where the emphasis of cultural and biological reproduction is more overtly political (Kanaaneh 2002).

Complicating the Palestinian context further is the significant influence exerted by international humanitarian agencies in shaping the spaces and discourses of childhood in
Palestine. Making up 31 per cent of the country’s GDP, the Palestinian Authority is one of the highest per-capita foreign aid recipients in the world (AidEffectiveness.Org 2011). The dominance of foreign aid in the economic, governmental and charitable sectors has also had an effect on how the Palestinian struggle against occupation is represented internationally, as well as internally. The political language of human rights and humanitarian suffering has come to dominate the war over “images and ideas” being fought in the global public sphere. In this war, children are both the prime targets of humanitarian aid and social development projects, as well as key symbolic markers of humanitarianism and development. This research takes the humanitarian present (Weizman 2012; Fassin 2012), and the child’s place in its reproduction, as its entryway into the politics of childhood in Palestine.

This research is not specifically concerned with analyzing the political work that images of children perform in humanitarian discourse or Palestinian politics (Burman 2008, 1994; Robson 2004). Nor is my central concern the political or social utility of the Palestinian child, or how children are socialized to reproduce dominant cultural and political narratives (Rosenfeld 2004, 2002; Habashi 2008b, 2008a; Habashi 2009; Kanaaneh 2002). Further, I do not seek to replicate the valuable work being done to document the physical and psychological abuses that Palestinian children endure (Khamis 2008; Punamaki, Qouta, and El-Sarraj 2001; Barber 2009; Thabet, Abed, and Vostanis 2002). Finally, while this research contributes to the growing body of work critiquing the aid industry in Palestine (Craissati 2005; Hammami 2000; Hanafi 2005; Hanafi and Tabar 2003, 2005; Jad 2007b; Jarrar 2005; Shawa 2005; Challand 2005, 2008; Merz 2012), my approach differs from the dominant political economy perspective which takes as its focus the relationship between international donors and Palestinian NGOs. While these various lines of inquiry help contextualize this research, this dissertation takes a different approach. I
adopt a discursive, ethnographic approach that centers on the targets of aid and development, namely Palestinian children and youth. This research, then, contributes to the growing literature on the politics of everyday life in Palestine, decentering the focus on political elites, and instead examining how the politics of occupation, humanitarianism, development, resistance and existence is played out in the quotidian spaces of homes and neighborhoods (Harker 2006, 2009a; Junka 2006; Makdisi 2008; Feldman 2007). Further, rather than focusing only on the effects of aid, violence, or political struggle on the lives of children, my approach emphasizes children’s ability to affect as well as be affected by politics.

Specifically, in this research I ask what it means when Palestinian children are rendered visible only to the extent that they suffer or threaten to inflict suffering. What aspects of Palestinian childhood are obscured through a focus on suffering and strife alone, and what other ways of being political does this politics of trauma occlude? Finally, how do children themselves negotiate the competing discursive constructions of the Palestinian child - how do they make sense of, and rework, all the different meanings of Palestinian childhood?

Given the unprecedented influence that international humanitarian aid and development agencies exert in shaping the lives and spaces of Palestinian children, this research is primarily concerned with the way that humanitarian aid and development practices mobilize particular forms of childhood subjectivity. Specifically, I argue that the traumatized, suffering child has become the dominant subject position of Palestinian children. While many Palestinian children endure great hardship, the emphasis on trauma invites disempowering aid and development practices that negate children’s role as political actors and discount other possible responses to violence and occupation. Further, I make the claim that humanitarian relief projects targeting Palestinian children serve as a form of social control and population management, thus operating
as an extension of, rather than a challenge to, the logic of occupation. However, through this research I also hope to demonstrate how children exhibit creative flexibility in challenging, combining and reinterpreting the multiple meanings of childhood in Palestine, enacting their own resistant forms of political subjectivity in the process.

In order to appreciate how children perform and transform dominant discursive constructions of childhood, we first must understand the role that humanitarian aid and development organizations play in producing childhood subjectivity. Further, we must also account for the way that multiple, historic discourses of childhood combine to produce complex, layered childhood subjectivities and spaces. To assist us in this endeavor, I enlist a Foucauldian understanding of discourse and power to question the way that humanitarian aid discursively constructs the child. Further, I turn to Foucault’s concept of governmentality to explain how humanitarian practices in Palestine construct the traumatized Palestinian child as a target for intervention, thus transforming the political struggle against the occupation into a psychological problem, repositioning the individualized self as a terrain of intervention.

To understand how humanitarian governmentality de-politicizes the Israeli occupation of Palestine, but also how Palestinian children re-politicize the discourse of humanitarianism, I use Rancière’s notion of aesthetic disruptions (dissensus) to dominant discursive narratives (consensus). By foregrounding everyday aesthetics and affect I seek to demonstrate how discourses literally take shape as embodied, material spaces and practices, and how they are transformed through embodied spatial practices. In order to distinguish between everyday acts of evasion and resistance and broad societal transformations, I borrow Certeau’s concept of tactics and strategies to illustrate how children’s everyday lives are shot through with continuous power struggles that always have the potential to coalesce into wider systemic challenges.
Finally, in theorizing how historically layered and overlapping discourses produce unpredictable spatial, material and embodied effects and transformations, I adopt a feminist ecological ontology (Sullivan 2001). This relational ontology helps us go beyond subject/object dualism and instead understand discursive practices as oscillations between the material and representational. Further, this relational approach helps us to re-think the dominant rights-based understanding of childhood, and instead appreciate the diversity of childhood experience and the way that children are embedded in reciprocal social webs of responsibility and care.

**Humanitarian discourse and childhood subjectivity**

Humanitarian discourse draws upon universalized notions of children’s rights, often discounting, and even demonizing, diverse cultural understandings of childhood, and depicting as deficient childhoods that do not conform to Western cultural ideals (Boyden 1990; Rosen 2007; Roberts 1998). Furthermore, children’s rights discourse typically positions children as passive, voiceless recipients of protection (Bentley 2005). This emphasis on the autonomy of the child as an individual rights-bearing subject ignores children’s rootedness within families, communities, cultures and religions, as well as children’s role in transforming these social institutions (Hartas 2008).

Aitken (2001) argues that the dominant discourse of children’s rights used by humanitarian organizations and researchers alike works to render the “otherness and peculiarity of children” as “safe and manageable for programmatic research and instrumental notions of justice” (p. 119). Likewise, Wall (2008) observes that the concept of children’s rights, whether conceived of in a protectionist or developmentalist framework, serves to other the child, either through “over-sentimentalization” or by defining children by what they lack. We can see this process of othering with humanitarian relief projects in Palestine which depict children as
passive, voiceless victims in need of protection and empowerment, but also potentially volatile and emotionally unstable. This notion of Palestinian children as passive, voiceless and in need of empowerment stands in stark contrast to the active and visible role that children have and continue to play in Palestinian political life. Indeed, it is as a result of their political agency that children are targeted by the occupation in the first place.

I argue that, as opposed to providing protection for Palestinian children, humanitarian relief projects in Palestine seek to protect society from children by redirecting childhood agency away from political confrontation with the occupation, and towards a psychologized project of self. Thus, humanitarian relief for children and youth in Palestine serves as a form of governmentality seeking to render the Palestinian population manageable through self-government (see Chapter 4). As such, humanitarian relief projects targeting Palestinian children operate toward an aim which is indistinguishable from that of the Israeli occupation – governable children and youth.

To help us unpack these claims I turn to Foucault’s concept of governmentality and Rancière’s notion of consensus. Foucault’s earlier work on power/knowledge, particularly his studies on the clinic and the prison, was concerned with the way that discourse produces subjects by delineating the boundaries of what is utterable or knowable (Foucault 1978, 1977, 1980). In his later lectures Foucault’s “genealogy of the modern subject” turned from a concern about the way docile bodies were acted upon by power/knowledge, to the “governing of the self,” what is often called governmentality. Lemke’s (2001, 91) definition of governmentality is useful here:
the term pin-points a specific form of representation; government defines a
discursive field in which exercising power is ‘rationalized’. This occurs, among
other things, by the delineation of concepts, the specification of objects and
borders, the provision of arguments and justifications, etc. In this manner,
government enables a problem to be addressed and offers certain strategies for
solving/handling the problem.

In this analysis, the medical gaze of humanitarian organizations produces the discursive field of
the traumatized Palestinian youth, which is framed as a security problem with specific
psychological techniques to address it.

While sovereignty has as its goal controlling territory, and discipline works through the
body, governmentality has as its main goal the security of society, that is, a population that is
“properly managed, maintained and encouraged” (Foucault 2009, 42). In Rancière’s (2010b)
terms, governmentality can be considered a technique of consensus government, since consensus
“strives to reduce the people to the population” (198). That is, as opposed to political dissensus,
governmental consensus seeks to transform the conception of the people as a political category
into a demographic reality to be managed. Further, Rancière (2010b) argues that the
“management of insecurity”, in particular, “is the most appropriate mode of functioning for our
consensual states/societies” (106); external threats suture political divisions and create consensus
around technical solutions to insecurity.

With governmentality, as with consensus, control of territory is marginalized and security
of the population emphasized (Elden 2007, 32). The population is managed through maximizing
“positive elements” and minimizing risk and inconvenience (Foucault 2009, 19). Further,
governmentality emphasizes self-regulation of the population rather than direct control (37-42),
and looks at danger as risk to be mitigated rather than events that can be prevented (56-59).
Risks are minimized by trying to reduce levels of “deviant normalities” in line with the “normal, general curve” (Foucault 2009 60-62).

How then are these deviant risks normalized? In short, the self must govern the self. Governmentality is part of a “continuum”, as Lemke (2001) puts it, that “extends from political government to self-regulation”, what Foucault termed “Technologies of self” (1988). For example, Barbara Cruikshank (1999) has examined the role that civil society organizations play in producing governmentality and reproducing democratic subjects through programs which promote empowerment. Her work on the “self-esteem” movement in the US is instructive. With the self-esteem movement “the self is made into a terrain of political action,” specifically “a terrain that carries with it new political possibilities for self-government” (Cruikshank 1999, 5). It is through the self that social problems are territorialized and “governmental solutions” mobilized (40). As Cruikshank (1999) contends: “Building self-esteem is a technology of citizenship and self-government for evaluating and acting upon ourselves so that the police, the guards and doctors do not have to” (91). Lemke (2001) argues that this is a specifically neo-liberal strategy which “entails shifting the responsibility for social risks […] into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of ‘self-care’.” In the case of Palestine, NGOs transform the work of policing unruly Palestinian youths into a project of self-governance.

If governmentality is about management of the population, as opposed to controlling territory, then promoting self-care becomes a way of managing the population through the terrain of the self. Viewed in this way, international NGOs and civil society organizations in Palestine relieve the occupier of its burden of managing the largely urban Palestinian population, allowing the occupation to focus on the acquisition and control of physical territory in the remaining rural
parts of Palestine (about 60% of the West Bank). However, the strategy of population management through self-care is by no means straightforward, and often produces unpredictable and contradictory results (see Bondi 2005; Swyngedouw 2005). As Rancière (2010) reminds us, while human rights are precisely the rights of those who have no rights, these rights are not therefore empty. “Political names and political places never become merely void”, Ranciére writes (2010, 72). “The void is always filled by somebody or something else” (ibid). Indeed, in her study of formal human rights education in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Bjawi-Levine (2009) notes that these rights, while forming a void where childhood difference and agency disappear, also create space for boys and girls to reinterpret rights in their own way. Similarly, the spaces created by humanitarian discourse and children’s reinterpretation and appropriation of these discursive spaces form the focus of this work.

**Performing and transforming discourses of childhood**

Following Certeau (1984), the goal of this research is not merely “to make clearer how the violence of order is transmuted into a disciplinary technology, but rather to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, tactical, and makeshift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in the nets of ‘discipline’” (xiv). Specifically, I am interested in how the dispersed tactics undertaken by Palestinian children in their daily lives might form a broader political challenge to the dominant humanitarian consensus. In Certeau’s (1984) terms, this research explores “the space instituted by others, characterized by the subtle, stubborn, resistant activity of groups which, since they lack their own space, have to get along in a network of already established forces and representations” (18). Palestinian children enter into a world of childhood already heavily over-inscribed with political meaning. Moreover, children enter into a physical world not of their own making, but shaped by broader historical and social processes.
Yet children are able to “make do” by creatively re-appropriating representations of childhood. They do so through everyday embodied spatial practices where different subjectivities and political imaginaries are performed.

Certeau characterizes these everyday resistant, space-making practices as being forms of art. These creative, artistic techniques are what Certeau refers to as tactics. Strategies, on the other hand, are methods by which powerful actors delineate their own space. The difference between tactics and strategies, then, lies in the “types of operations and the role of spaces: strategies are able to produce, tabulate, and impose these spaces, when those operations take place, whereas tactics can only use, manipulate, and divert these spaces” (1984, 30). Strategies seek to create space and to bring about a particular spatial distribution. As Certeau writes, “every ‘strategic’ rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish its ‘own’ place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an ‘environment’” (1984, 36). Tactics, on the other hand, are those actions which seek to re-appropriate or re-imagine these dominant conceptions of space (Certeau 1984, 29). In other words, tactics are “ways of using the constraining order of the place” in order to establish a “degree of plurality and creativity” within a place where one “has no choice but to live” (1984, 30).

However, tactics are not determined on their own terms, but are defined and delimited by dominant strategic constructions of space (1984, 34). As Certeau explains, “the space of a tactic is the space of the other. Thus it must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power”. Children must always play upon, through and with an existing (cultural, material, embodied, discursive) terrain, shaped by the foreign power of previous generations. The approach provided by de Certeau accounts for the political agency of children.
but also recognizes that the agency of children, as well as that of adults, is produced as well as delimited by broader social and historical processes.

But how might these “tactics of the weak”, as Certeau calls them, form broader challenges to discursive strategies? In seeking to understand how children challenge dominant constructions of childhood through their everyday spatial practices, I turn to Rancière’s conception of aesthetic political dissensus. Specifically, Rancière contrasts ethics, the distribution of perceptions and capacities according to one’s position in society, with aesthetics, internal disruptions within the ethical order (Rancière 2010a, 19). Ethics are a form of (strategic) consensus, that is, a dominant distribution of the senses. Consensus is the space maintained and ordered by the police, the term Rancière uses to refer to any form of governmental social control. Aesthetics, in contrast, is the tactical, political disruption of the dominant distribution of the senses; a re-ordering of the sensible world and the creation of new political realities.

Because aesthetics seeks to create a new sensible world based on “the idea of a future and the idea of another place” (Robson 2005, 80), it is the expression of utopic political imaginary. However, rather than the non-place of utopia, Rancière understands aesthetic imaginaries as emerging between “a discursive space and a territorial space; the identification of a perceptual space that one discovers while walking with the topos of the community” (Rancière 2004, 14 quoted in Robson 2005, 80). In other words, utopias emerge between the physical space that is perceived through the senses and the discursive space that regulates our way of seeing and doing. It is this aesthetic rupture that allows new forms of seeing and doing, and thus, new spaces, to emerge.
To draw a parallel with Lefebvre’s influential spatial triad, we might consider this perceptual space to be akin to Lefebvre’s representational (or lived) space, that is, the space which is “lived through its associated images and symbols”, a “dominated – and hence passively experienced” space, and yet the “space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate” (Lefebvre 1991, 39). Rancière’s aesthetics provides the means for such imaginational re-appropriation, a disruption of everyday spatial practice, and a contestation to the dominant discursive (conceptual, to use Lefebvre’s term) construction of ethical space. Thus, using spaces, representations and spatial imaginaries not of their own making, children, through their everyday spatial practices, perform creative acts of resistance against dominant discursive constructions of childhood and childhood space, and in doing so create the potential for reimagining childhood subjectivity (see Chapter 5).

**Discourse, embodiment, and materiality**

These conceptions of aesthetic disruption and tactical subversion help us to understand how dominant discursive constructions are challenged and potentially transformed through the very embodied subjectivities that these discourses produce. What is missing, however, is a sense of the messy materiality of the constant renegotiation and re-inscription of discursive space. The models of spatial/social transformation put forward by Certeau and Lefebvre, and to a lesser extent Rancière, are largely dialectical, reminiscent of a Gramscian dialectic of hegemony and counter-hegemony. While compelling, this dialectical approach fails to account for the ways in which multiple discourses produce spatial practices and effects which linger, becoming layered over time in material/cultural sediment that litters the embodied and physical landscape.

To achieve a clearer understanding of the fleshy materiality of discourses and their transformation, I adopt a relational approach provided by a feminist ecological ontology. For this
I turn to Sullivan (2001) in her feminist reworking of John Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism. Rejecting a strict subject/object dualism, as well as the notion of the subject as an atomized self, separate and isolated from the world, Sullivan (2001) borrows Dewey’s concept of transaction to connote the “dynamic, co-constitutive relationship of organisms and their environment” (1). Understanding how bodies transact with their environment emphasizes not only how bodies are shaped by the cultural environment, but also how they shape it. This is one of the main aims of this research – to understand not only how children are affected by the political situation in Palestine, but how children themselves affect politics.

According to Sullivan (2001), despite the constant flux of transaction that occurs in everyday environments, organisms, objects, spaces and selves achieve a kind of stability, predictability, and durability through habit. Habits are material formations and practices that enable action, and structure who we are, but also constrain the possibilities of what else we can become. Habits, including spaces, objects, and the way they are used, become solidified over time, in what Sulivan calls sedimentation. Environments can become cluttered by the sediment of new and old habits, overlapping each other.

One pertinent example of a material/discursive habit is that of gender. Akin to Butler’s (1990) notion of gender performance, we can consider gender roles as habits which have achieved relative stability over time. However, Butler’s concept of gender performativity, while leaving open the possibility of transformation through parody and juxtaposition, errs on the side of idealism, minimizing the materiality of the body while simultaneously failing to explain why embodied performances of gender are not more easily altered. When gender performativity is read in through the lens of transactional bodies, we can see bodies are not passively inscribed by
culture, but rather push back in all their vibrant fleshiness, compelled in different directions in different contexts. As Sullivan writes:

The sedimentation of habit does not preclude transformation because the different contexts in which particular habits occur can promote their reconfiguration. Because the relationship between individual habits and the environments in which they are performed is transactional, even relatively fixed habits can be changed.

Like Massey’s (1994) concept of space as being alive with complex “dynamic simultaneity” in which new “social effects” are produced when different phenomena are placed in relation with one another, the possibility to transform our bodily/spatial habits is brought about through our transaction with other habits and environments. In other words we can “loosen the sediments of our habits and performances” by re-contextualizing them in new transactional environments (Sullivan 2001, 98). This re-contextualization is an inherent part of childhood. New bodies are introduced to an ever changing environment already in progress, resulting in novel subject formations.

Here, the idea of layered historical habits helps explain the often contradictory impulses that compel bodies/subjects in different ways, and thus how gender and other subject formations change and can be changed over time. As Sullivan (2001) explains, for Dewey, impulses are bodily energies that are organized by habit. Thus, habit itself is not agency, it is rather that which organizes the agency of bodily power. Put in Foucauldian terms, discourse brings bodies to life in a certain way, disciplining them into certain bodily habits. Here we see how habit, sediment and transaction combine and result in unpredictable effects. Discourses take on habitual durability in the environment, forming the sediment of spaces, symbols, practices, utterances and subjectivities, which are brought into transaction with each other, thus forming new habits and configurations in the process. Competing, contradictory and overlapping discourses provoke
impulses that cannot be fully contained, and thus compel bodies in unpredictable directions. As Sullivan (2001) writes:

[H]abits make up a complex web of overlapping habits in which individual habits began to wear upon and challenge and influence each other. When they do so, the resulting friction between and weakening of some habits disrupts the usual ways adults habitually transact with the world, opening up possibilities for reconfigurations of habit and thus of culture as well (105).

Again, viewing habits as multiple, overlapping and transacting, presents not only a view of how habits change overtime but how they can consciously be changed.

We can see then that the environment with which children transact is cluttered with the products of other historically and geographically non-present transactions. The grid layout of Balata Camp was produced by UN planners and camp administrators in the early 1950s, with generations of families filling in the vertical space by adding second and third stories over the years. Today, children claim the spaces that have emerged haphazardly between the informally constructed homes, using narrow alleyways and doorways as football pitches and playgrounds. So it is with the self; our bodily habits are constituted through layers of discursive sediment, the gaps between which compel new, unpredictable ways of being that form the basis of new habits.

For girls living in Balata camp, for example, various discursive and cultural habits impel their bodies in different directions: to be polite young ladies, good students, and respectful daughters, as well as to be rights bearing refugees, children who need protection, Muslims who practice their faith, “‘tweens” who chat on-line and watch Hannah Montana, and Palestinians who resist occupation (see Chapter 6). The everyday material-discursive environment of the camp is cluttered with the sediment of different spatial habits. From the multistory-multifamily dwellings that have been informally constructed on the grid of tents once laid out by camp administrators, to the home interiors that have been impeccably and painstakingly decorated, to the UNRWA
schools, children’s centers, street murals, vegetable vendors, faded martyr posters, and
demolished buildings -- all of these sites form a transactional stew of different historical and
social forces that make up the environment that children encounter, transact with, and alter in
their own ways. This results in childhood subjectivities that are rooted in historic configurations
of childhood in Palestine, but are nevertheless dynamic and changing.

**Childhood and relational rights**

The embodied, material and spatial perspective offered by feminist ecological ontology
helps us to theorize how children make sense of and re-negotiate the layered spaces and
discourses of childhood through their everyday practices. At the same time, this relational
approach is also helpful in rethinking the formalistic, instrumental notions of childhood and
children’s rights. I do not wish to entirely abandon the language of children’s rights in a
misplaced preference for relativism over universalism. Like the young people who participated
in this research, I see children in Palestine as having the same right to childhood as any child in
the world -- not the right to one universal conception of childhood, but rather the right to their
own conception of childhood, or as Hartas (2008) puts it, the right to different childhoods.
Children’s rights need not be conceived in a protectionist mentality as preserving some natural,
pre-cultural state of childhood against the corrupting influences of adulthood. Rather, children’s
rights should be conceptualized in relation to their everyday environments, reflecting the reality
of children’s experiences, needs and desires in a relational rather than dualistic understanding of
childhood.

A strict relativist critique of universalist discourses of children’s rights would be
incapable of confronting, for example, the abuses of Palestinian children under Israeli military
occupation. Under the Israeli military rules of engagement, a child of 13 can be engaged with
lethal force if the soldier feels threatened (Hass 2000). Indeed, in the context of Palestinian resistance to the occupation, youths can potentially pose a real threat to Israeli soldiers and, given the way they inhabit the adult worlds of political organizing, are in a position to possess valuable, sensitive information about subversive political activities. Likewise, although human rights organizations would likely categorize the fatal shooting of a 17 year old throwing stones at Israeli soldiers as a child casualty, the youth himself would probably reject such categorization (Collins 2004). Rather than resort to crude relativism, or disempowering protectionism, we might instead adopt a relational approach.

Like Hartas (2008), Wall (2008) similarly argues for a relational approach to human rights over an abandonment of rights-based claims altogether. Specifically, he argues that a relational understanding of childhood helps us to rethink the traditional liberal approach to human rights. Children’s rights, Wall (2008) argues, “should be understood as pressing for a new conception of human rights as such” (536). This new conception of rights should “account for the full diversity of human age” and should be grounded “not in autonomy, liberty, entitlement, or even agency, but in a postmodern circle of responsibility to one another” (Wall 2008, 524). This relational conception of rights starts from a moral responsibility to the other, that is, to the “irreducible diversity of difference”, and the “networks of interdependent human relations responsible to each other in their endless otherness” that constitute our complex social worlds (Wall 2008, 537)

Again, the relational approach provided by the feminist ecological ontology standpoint adopted in this research helps us theorize children not as separate, isolated objects to be protected, but as agents embedded in a social environment who have particular needs as well as responsibilities. As Wall (2008) puts it:
children start out life constructed by vast networks of interpersonal, social, and historical relations which they are at once passively shaped by and actively begin to shape for themselves. They should be welcomed into these larger worlds in their greatest possible otherness. On the other hand, children are also increasingly responsible to the otherness of others around them, and from the day they are born. Starting in the narrower circles of relations to family, friends, and other close others, children are called upon to reconstruct their own already constructed lives in increasingly other-responsive ways (538).

Rather than taking rights as individual liberties or protections, we can read them in terms of responsibility to others, as well as needs that we cannot fulfill ourselves. As opposed to providing top-down protection and relief, the task for those concerned with the welfare of others, including children, becomes expanding the circle of reciprocal responsibility to ever wider circles of inclusiveness (Wall 2008, 541-42). The theoretical and methodological approach adopted in this dissertation seeks to foster this type of inclusiveness and responsibility to others in an attempt to enact this relational approach to rights, rather than merely critique dominant approaches to children’s rights (see Chapter 2).

**Organization and overview**

The intent of this introduction has been to position this dissertation in relation to existing studies of Palestinian childhood and research on international development, human rights, and humanitarian aid in Palestine. In addition, I have sought to outline the unique theoretical approach that this dissertation adopts. Following these themes, Chapter Two seeks to contextualize this research within the literature on children’s (political) geography. Specifically, I hope to demonstrate how this dissertation attends to contemporary debates within the emerging sub-field of children’s geography by seeking to emphasize children’s political agency, while at the same time accounting for the ways in which discourse of childhood both enable and restrict this agency. Furthermore, I argue that this approach expands the boundaries of what is considered political in research with children while still providing insights which are politically
relevant and potentially useful to policymakers and activists. These debates, and the theoretical framework introduced in this chapter, are both intimately connected with questions about methodology, which will serve as the focus of the following chapter.

Rounding out the first part of this dissertation, Chapter 3 provides historical context to this research. This chapter traces various historical trajectories, from the flight of refugees from their homes in historic Palestine to refugee camps, to the shifting role of children in the family and in the nation (including gender roles), to the development of the Palestinian NGO sector, all within the context of the changing political realities of occupation and resistance. This chapter helps us understand the material/cultural/discursive sediment that shapes the spatial habits of contemporary Palestinian childhood.

With the groundwork for this study laid in these early chapters, I turn in the second half to my empirical field research in the West Bank. Specifically, three separate interventions are presented here. Although each can be read as a stand-alone essay (indeed, these chapters are in preparation for separate publication elsewhere), they are arranged in a logical fashion which deepen and develop the analysis of the previous chapter. With the theoretical, methodological and contextual heavy lifting having been performed in the first three chapters, the next three present an extended view into the rich ethnographic data produced as part of this research.

Chapter Four examines the role of trauma in humanitarian aid discourse in producing childhood subjectivity in Palestine. Specifically I argue that humanitarian relief projects targeting Palestinian children and youth adopt a human rights based approach that position children as autonomous rights-bearing individuals, an approach that often fails to appreciate the significance of children’s collective (national, religious, familial) identities. Moreover, I argue that the
specific appeal to the psychological language of trauma serves to de-politicize the context in which political violence occurs in Palestine, and transforms a political project of resistance to occupation into a therapeutic project of self. As such, trauma relief projects serve as a form of governmentality, the aim of which is to render children and youth manageable. Nevertheless, children inhabit the discourses of trauma and empowerment in different and unexpected ways. As this chapter shows, children often see their political subjectivity not in terms of individual agency but as being situated within wider collectivities such as the nation, the camp, and the Islamic ummah. Moreover, this chapter demonstrates how children often interpret the language of rights, trauma, care and protection in divergent ways rooted in their own daily practices, not in abstract political categories.

Following on from this chapter on trauma discourse, Chapter 5 further explores how children undermine the discourse of trauma and suffering through the language on everyday beauty. I argue that everyday beauty in the lives of Palestinian refugee children, as found in mundane spaces and enacted through interpersonal relationships constitutes an aesthetic disruption to the dominant representation of trauma as put forward by international humanitarian aid organizations and development agencies. Far from being restricted to the immediacy of everyday spaces and individual acts of creation, however, everyday beauty emerges through inter-subjective collectivities situated within and emerging between wider national and religious geographic imaginaries. Moreover, far from depoliticizing or distracting from the context of occupation, children formulate critiques of social and political injustice, as well as demands for a more just and equitable future, through the language and imagery of beauty. Specifically, I argue that children enact an everyday Islamic ethic of beauty as part of a wider political demand for life itself. Finally, I argue that beauty can serve as the de-centering shock to thought that allows
for wider transactive, relational circles of responsibility to form, and thus can be the basis of a reconfiguration of rights in relation to the Palestinian struggle.

Chapter 6 also analyzes how children creatively combine and re-imagine the multiple layers of childhood discourse and space, however with a specific focus on gender. Using the concepts of sediment, habit and affective impulses, I demonstrate how affective regimes regulate gendered space in the camp, simultaneously restricting and enabling the relative mobility of girls and boys. However, I also demonstrate the creative, everyday embodied tactics that girls and boys use to widen their mobility and use the restricted space of the camp for their own needs and interests. Further, I show how girls creatively combine the discourses of children’s rights, psychology, resistance to occupation, and women’s rights in Islam to argue for and realize greater access to space.

Finally, the strands of thought spun in the previous chapters will be woven together in a concluding chapter. In this conclusion, I will discuss the wider relevance of children’s lives to the politics of occupation and humanitarianism in Palestine, and indeed politics more broadly. My hope is to demonstrate not merely how children’s lives are effected by the politics of occupation, or how we can understand the Palestinian struggle through children, but rather how children play a role in transforming politics and our understanding of it.
CHAPTER TWO: METHODS

Thinking and doing children’s political geographies

Introduction

Having outlined the theoretical framework of this dissertation and situated this study in relation to other approaches to childhood and humanitarian aid in Palestine, this chapter works to locate my research on Palestinian refugee children within the literature on children’s (political) geography and ongoing intra- and interdisciplinary debates about scale, subjectivity, agency and definitions of the political. Lately, children’s geography has been characterized by a productive tension between two countervailing impulses. On the one hand, children’s geographers have long sought to situate their research at the level of children’s everyday experience, researching with and alongside children and foregrounding their voices in research outcomes. Such participatory practices have sought to correct the exclusion of children’s voices in social science research and stems from an understanding that children are agential social actors worthy of study in their own right. Conflicting with this impulse, however, are more recent concerns in children’s geography that this focus on children’s everyday experiences has come at the cost of understanding how these everyday experiences are situated within, are affected by, and affect wider social, political and economic processes. This is a particularly relevant concern to geographers interested in the politics of childhood. Children’s voices continue to be excluded from research within political geography, and children’s geographers are often hard pressed to demonstrate just what is political about the lives of children.

There are several notable and influential examples of research within children’s geography that have sought to connect the everyday lives of young people with wider economic
and political transformations. For instance, Katz’s (2004) classic study of the effect of economic globalization on social reproduction explores the many unexpected connections between two disparate sites, New York City and Howa, Sudan, through the perspective of children’s everyday practices and environmental knowledge. Crucially, Katz seeks to demonstrate not only how children’s everyday lives and spaces are transformed through the processes of neoliberal economic globalization, but also how children, through everyday practices, rework the process of social reproduction to re-imagine other revolutionary possibilities. Along similar lines, taking a unique historical geography approach to the study of children’s politics, Kallio (2008) explores the way that children’s lives are political both in the sense that their bodies are targets of state policy and that children manage to enact their own political agency by resisting and evading these policies at the level of the body. Specifically, Kallio (2008) examines the evacuation of children from Finland during World War II, and the various embodied tactics that children deployed at a micro level to resist this policy. Drawing from these and similar studies, Bosco (2010) argues that children demonstrate political agency both through their participation in broad-scale social movements, as vividly demonstrated by the leading role students have played in recent immigrants’ rights protests in the US, as well as through more subtle forms of political engagement played out in everyday settings of the home and school. For example, citing research with Latino immigrant children living along the US/Mexico border, Bosco (2010) insightfully argues that children engage in a form of political advocacy by serving as English/Spanish translators for their parents, helping their mothers and fathers to navigate the complexities of institutional bureaucracy in the US, all the while exerting their influence over family affairs in the process. Drawing from Benjamin’s notion of child’s play as form of revolutionary imaginary (Buck-Morris 1991, Katz 2004), as well as the recent turn toward Deleuzian non-representational
theory in children’s geography (Jones 2008) which stresses the indeterminate nature of children’s becomings, Bosco (2010) contends that such translation practices constitute a form of play as mimesis wherein children both mimic and reimagine social processes.

Such studies help make the case for the relevance of children in political geography, and how children’s geographies are always potentially political. However, in each of the illustrative examples provided above, there is an unresolved tension between the concept of scale and different notions of children’s political agency. The dialectical notion of scale in Katz’s (2004) research on economic globalization and social reproduction inadvertently reproduces a scalar hierarchy in which children can only rework or resist, at the local level, the overarching global phenomenon of neoliberal capitalism. There is a similar scalar hierarchy at play in Kallio’s (2008) research which pits children’s embodied tactical responses against the geopolitical strategies of nation states. Bosco’s (2010) takes a somewhat different approach, asking how children’s everyday acts of play, even play not easily recognized as such, may open space for wider social transformation – and yet how such transformations could be achieved is never made explicit, apart from reference to children’s participation in social movements alongside adults. Further, Bosco’s (2010) emphasis on the liberating effects of play perhaps over-romanticizes the revolutionary character of children’s political agency, downplaying the extent to which children are already enrolled, however imperfectly and incompletely, within social hierarchies. Indeed, play is not always liberating. It is sometimes, perhaps more often than not, a practice that regulates and reproduces gender hierarchy, hetero-normativity, and other social hierarchies (Harker 2009).

Significantly, Bosco (2010, 387) argues that “children’s activities have implications across scales” but that this fact “is often missed because most research in children’s geography is
conducted at micro-scales.” However, Bosco (2010) fails to demonstrate how his own research escapes this scalar trap. We are left wonder: “How can research in children’s geography not be conducted at the micro-scale?” At least, how can this be done without returning to the abstraction and reification of childhood that characterize earlier, societist approaches? This question relates directly to the research methods of this dissertation. Would a geography of Balata Refugee Camp, a quarter-kilometer square piece of land situated in a political territory slightly smaller than the state of Delaware, necessarily be a micro-geography? If so, would the research carried out for this dissertation, conducted in the spaces of two schools, a handful of community centers, and a few specifically defined routes through the camp itself, then be considered a nano-geography? Whatever the relative physical size of the camp, and the spaces where this research was conducted, the space that Palestine occupies in global religious and political geographic imaginaries is colossal. Likewise, the spaces of Balata Camp, its alleyways, walls, homes, community centers, cemeteries, mosques, markets, and schools are all bursting with the material sediment of non-present historical and social processes and political discourses from political Zionism to forced migration, international humanitarianism, Palestinian nationalism, political organizing and resistance, human rights, state-building, etc. In such sites, designations of micro and macro begin to lose meaning.

As such, the rather straightforward critique leveled at children’s geography for failing to adequately examine wider social context actually requires critical engagement with some of the foundational concepts of geography, such as scale, politics, transformation, and agency. When we ask the question “At what scale are children political?” we cannot help but ask “What is scale, and do we mean by political?” These are the questions that drive this chapter. In it I hope to demonstrate how the ecological ontology approach adopted by this research (as discussed in
the previous chapter) represents a kind of site ontology that requires not so much particular research methodologies, but different approaches to existing research methods in order to do children’s geography without scale.

Following this introduction, this chapter goes on to trace the various approaches children’s geographers have taken in addressing issues of scale, agency and politics in their work. Specifically, I examine the role that children’s geography continues to play in extending as well as challenging some of the core principles of the New Social Studies of Childhood (NSSC) research paradigm, including the social construction of childhood, assumptions about children as agential subjects, and the privilege of children’s voice and experience in research. From here I examine the critique that NSSC has overcorrected the traditionally held view of children as passive and voiceless by overemphasizing children’s agency to the detriment of more critical understandings of subjectivity. Likewise I examine the claim that NSSC has unintentionally reified an adult/child dichotomy in pursuit of an otherwise commendable goal of treating young people as worthy subjects for research in-and-of themselves.

From here I go on to explore the challenge to the social-constructivism of NSSC, as well as traditional conceptions of the political, put forward by non-representational critique. Non-representational approaches have been at the forefront of recent research in children’s geography, deployed with the goal of opening up our understanding of children’s experiences in ways that challenge the adult/child, subject/object, and structure/agency binaries that continue to undergird research in childhood studies. However, as I will discuss below, the non-representational approach to children’s geography has likewise been criticized for unduly focusing on de-contextualized, micro-geographies of childhood experience, thus mirroring the over-empiricism of NSSC, while being less well-equipped to theorize the relationship between
adult political and social processes and the everyday lives of children. Finally, having outlined these emerging fissures in childhood studies and children’s geography, I return to my own methodological framework and make the case for experimental approaches to qualitative methods which allow us to explore broader political issues through everyday embodied practice. Here I argue that this attention to embodied practices provides a way of thinking through children’s geography as site ontology.¹

Children’s Geography and the New Social Studies of Childhood

Unlike other social sciences, geography has only relatively lately developed a sustained research agenda on childhood and youth. Nevertheless, human geographers now join sociologists and social anthropologists, as well as researchers in law, education and psychology, in contributing to the interdisciplinary milieu that constitutes childhood studies. Principally, research in childhood studies has sought to redress the absence of children’s voices in the social sciences. As a “counter-paradigm,” this “new social studies of childhood” has been guided by a few established “mantras” that serve as guiding principles of practice (Tisdall and Punch 2012, 251). Many of these principles were articulated by Prout and James (1990) in their landmark publication *Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood*. For example, one of the central theoretical pillars of NSSC, as the title suggests, is that childhood is a socially constructed category which positions children in marginal relation to adults (James and Prout 1990). In contrast, NSSC research has been characterized by its recognition of children as active participants in, not just products of, social reproduction and the social division of labor (Qvortrup 1985, 1994; Punch

¹ It should be noted that the structure of this chapter reflects my own evolving understanding of the methodologies of geographic research with young people, a transformation that has taken place in tandem with on-going conversations within the sub-discipline of children’s geography, as well as through discussion and discovery with the young people who participated in and helped to shape this research. In Chapters Five and Six, I provide greater reflection about how my own understanding of qualitative, visual research methods was challenged through the very embodied process of conducting research with boys and girls in Balata Refugee Camp. Indeed, it is this reflexivity and openness in research, and the discoveries that come from such approaches, that I make a case for in this chapter.
Thus, children are considered to be worthy subjects of social science research in and of themselves, not merely in relation to adults. Seeing children as capable, autonomous human beings, and not mere “human becomings,” researchers seek to foreground children’s voices and employ methods which allow for their meaningful participation in the research process (Qvortrup 1994; James 2007; Christensen and James 2008). Geographers have contributed greatly to the development of “playful” and “child friendly” methods including qualitative research tools such as focus group interviews, journal writing, and visual methods like drawing, mental mapping, and photography (Young and Barrett 2001; Rudkin and Davis 2007; Loebach and Gilliland 2010; Aitken 2004; Punch 2002b, 2002a; Aitken 1994). A crucial aspect of child-friendly research involves an awareness of the inherent power imbalance between children participants and adult researchers (Holt 2004). This involves being careful not to speak for children, but rather learning “the language of young people” by spending prolonged periods of time conducting ethnographic research and observation in the “microspaces” of childhood, such as classrooms and playgrounds, where “children have most scope to openly construct and express their social and cultural worlds” (Holt 2004, 17-23). Towards this end, participatory methods have also been advocated and debated as a method for addressing adult/youth power-structures in research with young people (Cahill 2007a, 2004; Cahill 2006; Dennis et al. 2009; Francis and Lorenzo 2002; Freeman 2003; Matthews 2003a; Cope 2008, 2009; Gallagher 2008; Skelton 2008).

However, contributions from radical and feminist human geographers in many ways preceded the new social studies of childhood, with research from human geography helping to reinforce the central “theoretical scaffolding” of this paradigm (Holloway and Valentine 2000; Aitken et al. 2006; Vanderbeck 2008). For example, William Bunge’s “Geographical Expeditions” into inner city Detroit and Toronto are often cited as pioneering forays into the geographies of children and youth which established an early commitment to the place of children’s voices in geography (Bunge 1977; Bunge and Bordessa 1975; Aitken 1994; Holloway and Valentine 2000). Stewart Aitken (1994), being careful to “listen to” rather than “speak for” children, takes up this mantle by concluding his broad-ranging and ground-breaking monograph *Putting Children in Their Place* with an appeal to take seriously the contributions that children can make in such fields as urban and environmental planning and design. Since then, the call to increase the participation of children and youth in research, planning and design has echoed through the discipline (Cunningham 2003; Cahill 2004, 2007b; Cahill 2006; Pain 2004; Philo and Smith 2003; Spencer 2005; Cope 2008).

Despite well-deserved enthusiasm within the sub-discipline for these many advancements, there continues to be concern about how research in children’s geography might engage more productively with theoretical debates within the discipline (Valentine and Holloway 2000; Vanderbeck 2008; Horton, Kraftl, and Tucker 2008; Holloway and Pimlott-Wilson 2011). Much-needed internal critique is beginning to emerge in children’s geography and childhood studies, which has the potential to speak to these wider disciplinary debates. For example, there has been growing concern that, despite the welcomed proliferation of children’s voices in social science research, such research often produces highly-localized accounts which are positioned to speak to narrow policy and planning concerns, leaving the wider theoretical significance of
children’s everyday lives and experiences unexplored (Beale 2006; Horton and Kraftl 2006b, 2005; Horton, Kraftl, and Tucker 2008; Vanderbeck 2007; Ansell 2009). Moreover, while the focus on children’s agency and competence has been a necessary correction to the marginalization of children in the social sciences, this emphasis on agency is somewhat paradoxical given the pervasive pessimism about the limits of human agency following the discursive turn in social theory (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin 2007; Robson, Bell, and Klocker 2007; Ansell 2009; Jeffrey 2010, 2012; White and Choudhury 2010). Similarly, the emphasis on respecting children as worthy subjects of research in-and-of themselves has had the unfortunate effect of reifying a rigid child/adult dichotomy. As Prout (2011) points out, childhood studies continues to perpetuate a number of unhelpful structural dichotomies such as child/adult, nature/nurture, psychology/sociology, and biological determinism/social constructivism, (and I would add micro/macro) despite recent developments in social theory such as actor-network-theory and site ontology which emphasize complexity, horizontality, and hybridity. It is to these critiques that we turn below.

**Children’s political geographies and non-representational critiques**

Related to these issues is a central debate emerging within children’s geography concerning the definition of the political in children’s political geographies. It has long been one of the foundational principles guiding research in children’s geography that children are social agents whose lives are implicated in political and economic processes at a variety of scales and who play a role in shaping these processes (see for example Valentine, Skelton, and Chambers 1998; Katz 2004; Ruddick 2007). But the ways that children actually influence politics, the sites and scales at which they do so, and the limits of children’s political agency, are all issues which continue to confront children’s geographers. Indeed, researchers in children’s geography have
consistently faced a heavy burden of proof in demonstrating the relevance of children to politics at all (Philo and Smith 2003). Likewise, while the politics of childhood is a hotly debated topic within children’s geography, children are still largely absent from mainstream accounts of political geography (Skelton 2008; Horton, Kraftl, and Tucker 2008), let alone economic, urban, or historical geography.

Early work on children in political geography focused on this absence of young people, particularly their lack of voice in formal political institutions, political decision-making, and policy formation (Matthews 2003a, 2001; Matthews, Limb, and Taylor 1999). This early concern has extended to a call for a broader understanding of children’s participation in society as political actors, including their role as citizens (Skelton 2007, 2010). Some geographers have pointed to children’s ability to identify and articulate their own demands or views on political issues as evidence of young people’s political agency and the necessity of including their voices in politics (Matthews and Limb 2003; Wyness 2003; Wyness, Harrison, and Buchanan 2004). Similarly, in the context of Palestine, Habashi (2008a, 2011) has argued that children prove themselves to be political actors in the way they reproduce national political identities and perform political agency through national and religious frames.

More recently, children’s geographers have called for a widening of our understanding of young people’s politics beyond strictly modernist “Big-P” understandings of the political (Kallio 2008; Kallio and Hakli 2011; Bosco 2010; Skelton 2010). This includes research on children’s embodiment, and the way that discursive power works to discipline children’s bodies, and how children resist, evade and reproduce these discursive practices through the body (Kallio 2008; Bosco 2010; Colls and Hörschelmann 2009; Evans and Colls 2009; Evans, Colls, and Hörschelmann 2011). Similarly, following a path forged by feminist geographers in examining
the (geo)politics of everyday life (Secor 2001), children’s geographers are increasingly examining the power-relations that undergird everyday embodied spatial practices and children’s role in reproducing and resisting these structures of power (Skelton and Valentine 2003; Horton and Kraftl 2006a; Hopkins and Pain 2007; Skelton 2010; Elwood and Mitchell 2012).

Perhaps the most sustained attempt to push theoretical critique within childhood studies, and to push the boundaries of the political in children’s geography, has been driven by the non-representational impulse in social theory generally, and human geography especially (Thrift 2008, 2003). Reacting against reductive, programmatic, and policy-driven research with children, Horton and Kraftl (2005) express concern that by taking children seriously, that is, by considering their importance only in relation to how the concerns of young people can be translated into the adult language of politics, policy and planning, researchers may be stifling other more creative ways in which children’s geography can be “powerful, positive, inspiring and enabling” (132). Following Lorimer’s call for “more-than-representational” research in geography (2005), Horton and Kraftl (2005) ask children’s geographers to expand their notion of the useful to include what they call the “more-than-useful” (133). That is, while appreciating the important role that children’s geography can have in terms of formulating policy or advocating for rights, researchers should embrace the possibility that children’s geography can be “useful in so many more (interesting, enabling, inspiring, vibrant, exciting, affecting and cool) ways than existing understanding of ‘usefulness’ allow” (Horton and Kraftl, 2005, 133).

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2 To give an example of NRT’s impact in children’s geography, three of the top ten most cited articles in the journal Children’s Geography (Horton and Kraft 2005; Horton and Kraftl 2006; Horton, Kraftl and Tucker 2008) are articles largely arguing from an NRT perspective.
Articulating similar concerns about the adultist agenda in children’s geography, Jones (2008, 2001) has registered his unease about the ever-present potential for adult researchers to “colonize” the worlds of children with their own political concerns, particularly the constant striving for meaning and explanation. “Research which has the ethnographic bent of revealing the world view of the subject, or ‘seeing through the eyes’ of the subject,” write Jones (2008, 197), “is inevitably trying to enter the other space of children’s worlds and needs to recognize limits.” Indeed, the “through their eyes” trope is a well-worn device in humanitarian aid and development projects targeting children, and one that usually reflects the concerns and priorities of the adult practitioners who are ultimately responsible for framing what it is we see “through their eyes.”

In contrast to such approaches, Jones (2008) argues for more modest research: “Research into children’s lives, and adult knowledge of them more generally, should acknowledge that some things cannot be (fully) known about children’s worlds” (197). Rather than seeking exhaustive, reductive accounts of the condition of childhood, research with children should instead seek to proliferate different possible understandings of children’s lives, while acknowledging the necessary “limits and disorder” of such research (Jones 2008, 203). Specifically, Jones (2008) calls for research based on “(modest) witnessing and narrative”, seeking to be present with events as they unfold, rather than continuously try to explain them away. This approach follows Horton and Kraftl’s (2006, 274) advice to slow down the research process and resist the urge to “quickly analyse, distill, generalise and categorise” everything in
an attempt to fix the meaning of childhood. Instead, they argue, we should take our time in bearing witness to how life is lived (Horton and Kraft 2006, 269-70).

Such imperatives form part of a growing praxis of non-representational research methods within children’s geography which embrace the excessive messiness of everyday life, the inherent fallibility of research, and the embodied, emotional, affective “way that we are all the time” of the researcher (Horton 2008, 377 emphasis original). Indeed, several studies within children’s geography have argued for non-representational approaches to research, and have attempted to sketch out in more detail what a non-representational methodology would look like (Horton and Kraft 2005, 2006; Jones 2001, 2008; Harker 2005, Kallio 2008, Kullman 2012). Further, this non-representational research in children’s geography has proven relevant to timely developments within human geography more broadly, including research on the body (Longhurst 2000) and materiality (Lorimer 2005), as well as affect and emotion (Thrift 2004).

However, whatever the potential theoretical contributions of non-representational theory to children’s geography or the discipline more broadly, NRT has also drawn sharp criticism. For instance, non-representational approaches have been critiqued from a feminist perspective for failing to take into consideration historically produced geometries of power and positionality in its narrow focus on narrating ephemeral affect and disconnected events (Tolia-Kelly 2006; Sharp 2009). More recently, Pile (2010) has critiqued the apparent contradiction of researchers who manage to spill so much ink over the stuff of life that is supposedly pre-cognitive and un-representable. Both feminist and psychoanalytical critiques challenge the opacity of NRT, arguing that non-representational theory reproduces a kind of funhouse mirror inversion of the

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3 This is good advice for all kinds of research, not just research with children – representing one way that debates within children’s geography has the potential to speak back to the wider discipline.
Cartesian god-trick, where the incorporeal philosopher appears as disembodied affect. Of particular interest to children’s geographers is the concern that the use of NRT as a research method de-politicizes the lives of children through a focus on the micro-geographies of everyday events and experiences, thus failing to overcome one of the main hurdles that political research with children has long faced: making the connection between children’s everyday lives and broader political and social processes (Mitchell and Elwood 2012).

For instance, though proponents argue that non-representational theory continually strives for greater, more diverse and complex understandings of children’s worlds (Horton and Kraft 2006; Horton, Kraftl and Tucker 2008; Jones 2008), critics such as Mitchell and Elwood (2012, 789) argue that “an over-emphasis on the ephemeral, non-cognitive world of affect and performance” in children’s geography “comes at the expense of a more holistic analysis of the longer-term forces which help to produce and condition these practices and feelings”. For example the authors take to task Harker (2005) for his non-representational theorization of play which, they claim, privileges “disembodied ‘feelings’ such as affect” over substantive political analysis, in contrast with Aitken’s (2001) reading of play as a form of resistance to neoliberalism (Mitchell and Elwood 2012, 794).4

Mitchell and Elwood (2012) take particular issue with non-representational theory’s “call to witness” being used as a research method in children’s geography (Dewsbury 2003; Jones

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4 Harker’s argument is more complex than the straw man caricature sketched by Mitchell and Elwood (2012) allows. In Harker’s (2005) own words: “My argument here is that although playing (often when it resists commercialization), can be key to young people’s abilities to secure rights to and control over space, this is only telling half the story. As we see in Gagen’s (2000) study of gender normalization in nineteenth-century American playgrounds, playing was not, and is not, separate from sedimented regimes of power-discourse. Or put another way, playing isn’t all fun and games.” This is in fact a highly political reading of play, and one that seeks to theorize play as discourse and as embodied practice without reducing it to a simplistic equation of play = resistance. Similarly my research seeks to understand how “sedimented regimes of power-discourse” are both reproduced and transformed through the embodied practices of Palestinian refugee children.
In contrast to similar, more overtly political approaches adopted by feminists “who trace witnessing to subjectivity formation and relational ties,” the authors contend that witnessing in NRT primarily involves “paying individual attention to what is in front of one, including the importance of noticing and reflecting on one’s personal emotions, such as being clumsy, wearing glasses, feeling bored, wanting sleep, or other ‘small-scale’ enactments of Being” (Elwood and Mitchell 2012, 796). Referencing Jones (2008), Elwood and Mitchell concede that some researchers “invoke the necessity to empathize with the pain or joy of what is witnessed rather than merely describing it,” however they argue that “this tenderness is often deliberately disarticulated from a politics that is analyzed collectively” (ibid). Thus, far from opening up a new horizon of politics, as proponents would argue, the hyper-(individual)-reflexivity of non-representational methods instead represents a form of closure. As Mitchell and Elwood (2012, 796) again put it succinctly: “We find instead that much of NRT research presages a closure of politics, or more accurately, a de-politicization of ‘events’ through its emphases on the personal, the affective, the individual, and the ephemeral.”

How then are researchers to reconcile the fundamental feminist-inspired impulse within children’s geography to foreground the voices of children while also paying attention to equally related concerns about positionality and the situatedness of the researcher in relation to research participants, without becoming mired in individual self-reflexivity, theoretical naval gazing, and political parochialism? Further, how do post-structuralist and feminist researchers balance a desire to move beyond formalist conceptions of politics and political agency without depoliticizing research by making everything political? As indicated in the introduction, and as discussed further below, feminist and post-structural theory are not diametrically opposed to non-representational critiques but can incorporate them in ways that open up research practice.
This can be done by using qualitative, visual methods which seek the full and equal participation of all research participants informed by the modesty, slowness, and openness to surprise advocated by NRT proponents.

For “more-than-representational” geographies of children

Demonstrating the way that feminist and post-colonial theory can be read in conjunction with Deleuzean, non-representational approaches to affect, Hemming (2005) provides a helpful explanation of the relationship between affect and representation. “Judgement,” Hemming (2005) writes, “links the body and the social and gives both interpretative meaning” through what she calls “affective cycles” (564). These affective cycles consist of “an ongoing, incrementally altering chain– body-affect-emotion-affect-body, doubling back upon the body and influencing the individual’s capacity to act in the world” (ibid). Thus, affect is a bodily sensation that inevitably is shaped by, interpreted through, and re-shapes representational discourse.

Thus, far from being disembodied, free-floating events, affective cycles form part of patterns, or habits, which are “subject to reflective or political, rather than momentary or arbitrary judgement” (Hemming 2005). This, in Hemming’s reading, is what Deleuze means by “maps of intensity”, affects which unfold in time, resonating with previously felt, learned and patterned bodily affects. Such affective intensities are either “curtailed or extended” by reflexive judgment. Hence, non-representational, embodied affect cannot be separated from the representational processes that reflexively pattern and regulate affect. Cresswell (2006) demonstrates as much in his study of race, ball-room dance and mobility. Dance is simultaneously a representational process, with proscribed dance steps and approved forms of movement. Yet movement to music also always involves an element of un-representable affect, of feelings and impulses which propel the body in new, “improper” ways. Indeed, this is how
new dances develop, in a constant (re)negotiation between non-representational affect and representational discourses.\(^5\)

Perhaps, with this in mind, we can follow Latham’s (2003) advice to make methods “dance a little” by imbuing “traditional research methodologies with a sense of the creative the practical, and being with practice-ness” (2003). In his examination of photo-diary and interview methods, Latham advocates for a methodology that dances between discourse and embodied practices. Such a practice/performance-based methodology, he argues, helps researchers resist the urge to constantly represent the world in broad narratives, and instead seek more detail in examining the mundane events of everyday life “where social power is exercised and maintained, and the everyday simultaneously opens-up new realms of resistance to mainstream networks of power/knowledge” (1997). Although arguing from another side of the same problem, that children’s geography has become too mired in empirical details and detached events, Ansell (2009) nevertheless advocates for a similar embodied approach to research. Specifically, Ansell (2009, 200) argues for an embodied methodology that mediates the divide between physical embodiment and conceptual faculties:

Embodied encounters, then, are not simply perceptual, but always involve emotional, cognitive and imaginative engagement; they are always relational. Other than, perhaps, in the youngest infants, perception cannot take place without interpretation, and interpretation involves bringing into play memories, images and feelings acquired elsewhere. Thus affective experiences of place are neither individualized nor unmediated.

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\(^5\) Another useful example of how the social/discursive representations of race and racism shape both the cultural environment as well as lived, embodied experience is provided by Sullivan (2004) in her discussion of psychoanalysis and phenomenology in the thought of Franz Fanon. For Fanon, “somatic and psychical operations” were produced by and reproduced the spatial-discursive constructions of “racism and colonialism” (10). Sullivan (2004) writes, “body, psyche, and world mutually influence and constitute each other” in a recursive, affective chain – “In a raced and racist world, therefore, the lived bodily experience and the unconscious of human beings will be racially and racist-ly constituted as well” (ibid).
If embodied affect is neither individualized nor unmediated, then embodied, performative research methods always have the potential to interrogate wider social/discursive practices through the realm of everyday experience. Indeed, all research methods already are physical embodiments of wider social/discursive practices. My own research with children in Balata refugee camp was shaped by the very discursive practices that this research seeks to critique, namely, the framing of children in relation to the suffering and victim-status under occupation, and a desire to represent the world “through their eyes.” Likewise, the children who participated in this research did so with certain conceptions of how children should perform for a foreign researcher interested in the lives of Palestinian refugee children (see for example Allen 2009). And yet, as the latter chapters of this dissertation demonstrate, through the embodied, affective and representational practices of taking photographs, touring the camp, and conducting focus group interviews, practices which reproduce the historically embedded subject positions of “foreign researchers” and “refugee child”, we were nevertheless able to collectively pry apart these narratives and explore other possible ways of being together.

For all the eye-rolling exchanged between researchers who deride the “dour denouncements of injustice” of conventional Political analysis (Popke 2009, 81) and those who disparage the “body therapies and somatic exercises” that pass for NRT methods (Mitchell and Elwood 2012), such overstatements unhelpfully reify a representation/affect duality. Indeed, proponents of non-representational theory insist that asking the question of “what else” can be political, is not intended to supplant, but rather supplement understandings of the political (Lorimer 2005, Horton and Kraft 2005). For example, Beale (2006) argues that explorations into children’s geographies can and should produce inspiring and “cool” ideas, but this need not
prevent the emergence of other types of knowledge that are also useful for policy or other applications (220).

Likewise, while remaining weary of the sometimes lofty claims of non-representational theory, there is nevertheless begrudging recognition among critics that affect has some theoretical contributions to make to our understanding of social life. For instance, Elwood and Mitchel (2012) see the need to find a happy medium between “modernist narratives of ‘P’olitics” and “conceptualizations of affect and performance that locate individual politics and agency everywhere, and negate or underplay the socioeconomic conditions of power in which these politics play out.” Likewise, while I remain circumspect about the sometimes uncritical celebration and openness for the new, dynamic, creative becomings emphasized in NRT literature (language which oddly mimics the discourse of supply-side capitalism and fails to take into account the many ways that life is also slow and stifling), I nevertheless share a commitment to proliferating understandings of the many other ways that Palestinian children are and can be political than dominant frames of representation allow. Similarly, while I do not share Jones’ (2008) debilitating unease about disturbing the pristine otherness of children’s worlds, I do take seriously his call for humility in research and his concern about the limitations of trying to see “through their eyes.” Further, while I am skeptical about research projects, as well as humanitarian aid and development programs, that seek to “empower” children with very narrow, preconceived, outcome-oriented notions of what empowerment looks like, I nevertheless share Elwood and Mitchell (2012) interest in providing children the “rare opportunity” to “publically articulate themselves in relation to a wider world.” Crucially, to do so means paying attention both to how the researchers habits of interaction with children may be inhibiting this articulation, and how, by paying attention to the affective overflow of everyday, embodied practices and lived
experiences, we might loosen these habits. This is what I have attempted to do this throughout the entire process of research, analysis, and writing. Before outlining the specific methods used in this research, let us first return though, through the body, to the issue of scale.

De-scaled children’s geography and site ontology

The embodied methodological approach advocated by Ansell (2009) and adopted in this research represents an attempt to de-scale children’s political geographies, circumventing the unhelpful micro/macro duality that has structured recent critiques of children’s geography. At present, children’s lives and experiences are typically viewed as political only to the extent that they are seen to be targets of top-down social and economic processes or are enrolled within larger societal level political movements or institutions. However, by eschewing these hierarchical notions of scale in favor of site ontology, children’s geography can retain its commitment to foregrounding the everyday lives and experiences of children while at the same time contextualizing everyday practice in terms of non-present (in spatiotemporal terms) social processes. Given the relatively recent, and highly contested, development of site ontology and scalar flatness in human geography, I will present a brief discussion of this concept, how it relates to the theoretical framework adopted by this research, and the methodological challenges this approach presents.

That scale is central to recent debates about children’s geography is but one indication of the general importance of this concept within the wider discipline (see Herod 2010). It is the centrality of the scale metaphor to geographic thinking that has made recent debates about the social construction of scale (and less recent debates on the social/material dialectical production of scale) so hotly contested. One of the early salvos in the scale debates was fired by Marston (2000) in her study of the home as a key site of social reproduction and political transformation.
In the piece Marston (2000) examines the way that the home became enrolled in discourses of national industrial production and efficiency toward the end of the 19th century, enabling women to transform their domestic labor into a form of national citizenship, with all the rights and privileges that implies. This intervention helped to flip the scale debate on its head, and to shift focus on capitalist production toward the role of social reproduction, and the way that wider social, economic and political processes are materialized in everyday spaces. Taking this critique further, Marston, Jones and Woodward (2005) put forward their argument about the possibility of a human geography without scale. In this seminal piece, the authors argue against the centering essentialism of vertical scalar hierarchies such as micro/macro and local/global, as well as the naïve optimism of the network flow metaphor, which imagines a smooth social plane unencumbered by the topological cliffs and valleys of inequality. Instead, they argue for a flat ontology where complex spatial arrangements emerge through practice.

In developing this site ontology, Marston, Jones and Woodward (2005) borrow heavily from similar debates within social theory about the social construction of scale in social science research more broadly. For example, Schatzki (2003) puts forward a way of conceiving of social context through sites and practice instead of reified notions of scale. For Schatzki (2003, 179) site ontology “forges a path between individualism and hitherto dominant societisms.” Specifically, site ontologies “join cause with societism” in contextualizing the actions and relations of individuals within “wider social vistas,” while at the same time allowing for a continuity between individuals and broader social processes not allowed for in traditional societisms (ibid). As a result, “site ontologies are able to elude two pervasive criticisms, that of incompleteness directed at individualism and that of reification leveled at societism” (ibid). To clarify, contexts should not be seen only in terms of physical sites, but rather should be taken as a
set of practices carried out by individuals (but not reducible only to the individual). Practices, Schatzki (2003, 192) argues, are organized by “an array of intelligibilities, rules, ends, projects, and ways things matter,” and are materialized in the form of “arrangements of people, artifacts, organisms, and things” (195). Schatzki (2003) provides the example of banking as a set of practices – individuals carry out the practice of banking, and yet banking is not idiosyncratic to those individuals, but is rather structured around various material and embodied sites, activities and mental states. Similarly, for Palestinian children in Balata camp, walking to school and being in class is an embodied spatial practice that takes place in specific material sites through certain physical comportments and mental states.

Missing from this view, however, is the way that multiple practices mesh together to produce unexpected and unpredictable effects. Indeed, as Schatzki (2003, 198) concedes, one of the tasks of social scientists is to uncover “the further meshes, nets, and confederations to which this mesh, net, or confederation is connected, intentionally or unintentionally.” This is precisely what this present research seeks to do. Rather than looking at the way that the geopolitics of occupation or humanitarian aid affects the lives of children in a hierarchical, unidirectional concept of scale, this research instead asks what sites and practices are brought into being through the meshing together of these different spatial-temporal processes. How do military occupation, political organizing and resistance, humanitarian relief, and state building, mesh together to create the sedimented spaces of childhood in Balata Camp and how do they compel the bodies of children in different sometimes unexpected directions? Further, this research asks how this meshing of sites and practices creates at once a sense of stability and predictability, as well as openness and indeterminacy allowing children to both reproduce and transform these
spatial practices in their own ways. It is to these research questions and their attendant methods that I turn in the final section.

**Research questions, sites, and methods**

In order to understand how Palestinian youth produce and disrupt the various and competing discursive constructions of childhood and childhood space in Palestine, this study seeks to answer three recursively interpenetrating research questions:

- **RQ1)** How do the overlapping discourses of the Palestinian family, Palestinian cultural and political nationalism, Israeli colonial expansion and occupation, international humanitarianism and human rights, universal children’s rights, and Islamic ethics, produce multiple and complex childhood subjectivities (identities) in Palestine?

- **RQ2)** What material effects, such as spaces, objects, and habits, are produced by these discourses?

- **RQ3)** How do Palestinian boys and girls reproduce and transform these spaces, objects, and habits through their everyday spatial practices and imaginings?

In order to answer **RQ1**, on the discourses of Palestinian childhood, I carried out participant observation over the course of two years, working primarily with a youth-oriented humanitarian NGO in Nablus, but also with other smaller community centers serving children, youth and families in Balata Refugee camp. This participant observation work was combined with discourse analysis of reports, documents, and project proposals pertaining to Palestinian refugee children, as well as interviews with other youth workers, school administrators, psychologists, teachers, and parents.

In addition to conducting participant observation, discourse analysis, and interviews with adults, I also conducted participatory research with Palestinian children in schools and community centers to understand how they reproduce and reshape the discourses of Palestinian childhood in their daily lives. To understand the material effects of these discourses on the lives,
spaces and practices of Palestinian children (RQ2), I used qualitative visual methods, including mental mapping, drawing, photo-tours, diaries, and video-making. The products of this research were both as data as well as elicitation devices in focus groups in which children reflected upon their daily interactions with these spaces and objects (RQ3). Crucially, these research activities served as embodied spatial practices in which the discourses of Palestinian childhood and youth were both performed and subverted, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5 (RQ3). This qualitative approach foregrounds the voices of children and provides in-depth, reflexive ethnographic data, while the reflexive, embodied practice of participatory research allows children to critique the practice of research from within.

The first task of this research was to examine the discursive construction of the Palestinian child in humanitarian aid and development literature. Following Butler (1993), I understand discourse in its performative and material sense, as embedded in embodied everyday practices. Thus, I combined critical discourse analysis of the written texts through which humanitarian discourses of trauma and suffering vis-à-vis Palestinian childhood are constructed (see Fairclough 1995) along with participant observation in order to examine the social lives of these texts how they are produced and reproduced in everyday spaces and practice (see Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). By working alongside Palestinian staff and volunteers in writing, translating and discussing the texts that I examine in this research, I was able to inhabit the living, breathing discourse of humanitarianism in a practice I term “participatory discourse analysis.” Consequently, by engaging in ongoing critique of the discourses we produced together
I was able to gain an understanding of the limits, flexibility and possibilities of the humanitarian discourse vis-à-vis Palestinian children and youth.6

Beyond understanding the way that humanitarian discourse frames the lives and spaces of Palestinian children, and thus works to shape their political subjectivity, this research also takes into account the ways in which children themselves perform, evade, combine and transform these discourses in their everyday lives. To do this, as mentioned above, I used qualitative methods, including visual research tools. However, following Maclure (2006), I do not see these qualitative, visual methods as giving direct access to the reality of childhood through a kind of “mundane realism” provided by the camera lens. Instead, like Thompson (2007), I see these research methods as being spatial/discursive practices which are performed, critiqued, parodied and undermined through the very material, embodied practice of research (Kullman 2012). As such, this aspect of my research focuses on what Mitchell (2006) refers to as the “bottom-up realm” of subjectivity formation, namely “the general and particular responses to new technologies and rationalities of state institutions and actors, the evasions, resistances,

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6 By treating discourse as produced in sites through embodied practices, rather than as text to be analyzed, researchers can approach discourse from a different angle - revealing its flexibility and the limits to which it can be pushed. However, this practice also opens the researcher to the very obvious charge of “doctoring” discourse to suit the interests of the research in some way. It is vital, then, to be explicit about the extent of my participation in producing the textual discourse that I critique in subsequent chapters. In my work with Palestinian NGOs my role was largely that of translator - helping to take concepts and proposals written in Arabic or non-native English and help to flesh them out and translate them into NGO-speak English. I acquired an ear for NGO-speak by reading prior successful project proposals and reports from Palestinian NGOs, as well as from the documents and calls for proposals distributed by international donors. In addition to helping write proposals, I also helped to implement projects, working along staff, youth volunteers and child participants, in coordinating and carrying out activities. Finally, I helped to document these activities, taking pictures and video, doing evaluations with participants, and helping to write reports. All these activities gave me an embodied sense of the practice of humanitarian aid and youth development. As for the actual project proposals and documents that I directly quote and analyze in this project, on none of them was I the sole or original author - all of them were initially conceived of or originally developed by people other than myself. While I do quote from some projects on which I provided substantial input, the parts that I quote are the standard boilerplate sections, not areas where I have provided any unique insight. For many of the projects I discuss in this research I wrote project reports for the organization as an outside investigator. However, given my single, original authorship of those documents I chose not to include them in my direct textual analysis, although, again, writing these reports provided informative insights into how international donor organizations and NGOs view the lives of Palestinian children.
enablements, exclusions, and/or motivations for individual behavior which occur alongside and in relation to new forms of contemporary ‘government’” (390). By combining performative discourse analysis with qualitative ethnographic research with Palestinian children, this research is situated at the nexus of the mutually constitutive worlds of discourse and everyday experience (Kallio 2007).

As we can see, then, this research follows Ansell’s (2009) recommendation that, in addition to researching directly with children, children’s geographers should also conduct research with “those who are actively involved in constructing the policies and discourses that affect children” (205). Regarding direct research with children, I conducted participant observation with Palestinian refugee children aged 10-13 in the schools and community centres of Balata Refugee Camp over the course of two years. The children who participated in this study are third and fourth generation refugees - the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the Palestinians who were displaced from their homes in historic Palestine in 1948 (see Morris 1987; Pappe 2007). The United Nations Relief and Works Agency, the organization responsible for the wellbeing of Palestinian refugees, defines a Palestinian refugee as anyone whose normal place of residence in 1948 was Palestine and left their homes as a result of the fighting, or a descendant from the male line of any original refugee (Akram 2002; UNRWA 2010). As officially registered refugees with UNRWA, and as children growing up in Balata Refugee Camp, these children are refugees both in legal status and as part of their cultural identity. I chose to work with refugee children specifically because, given their political and symbolic significance in the Palestinian struggle and their perceived added vulnerability, they are multiply inscribed by the competing discourses of Palestinian nationalism, Zionist colonialism, and international humanitarianism. Likewise, I chose Balata Refugee Camp near the northern West Bank City of Nablus as the
primary site for this research given the prevalence of internationally funded projects and other community initiatives in the camp, as well as the recent, traumatic violence this area endured during the Second Intifada (Weizman 2007; Gregory 2004).

In cooperation with local community centers in the camp, as well as the camp schools, I formed 6 research groups with children from Balata—two groups of boys, two groups of girls, and two mixed groups of boys and girls. The research groups fluctuated in size as some children decided to stop participating, while others invited other friends, family and neighbors to join in. However, each group averaged about 6 children each for a total of around 36 participants. Children and parents were invited to an initial information session at the host community center where I outlined the purpose, goals and design of my research and how the children would be involved. Children were asked to give their verbal assent if they wanted to participate in this research and parents, if they agreed, gave their verbal consent in front of two adult witnesses. Once the groups were formed and a research schedule agreed upon, we conducted a variety of qualitative, visual research activities including guided tours of the camp, photo-diaries, participatory video projects (which the children themselves suggested), mental mapping, drawing and focus-group interviews. While these methods have become standard practice for research with children in geography (Young and Barrett 2001; Rudkin and Davis 2007; Loebach and Gilliland 2010), as I have discussed above, and as will become apparent in subsequent chapters, I approached these methods as embodied practices through which the discursive positions of researcher and Palestinian child could be performed, critiqued and transformed. However, again as we will see in subsequent chapters, even an intentional and mindful openness to unexpected becomings can often be stifled by preconceived notions of “serious” research subjects. As I
discovered, the unexpected shocks of otherness often help loosen the sediment of research practice enabling new insights and ways of communicating.
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Layered discourses of childhood space and subjectivity in Palestine

Prologue: Layered images

 Perhaps no other photo better illustrates the layered discursive inscriptions of Palestinian childhood than that of 14-year-old Faris Odeh from Gaza. Though his name may linger in obscurity, most would likely recognize his iconic image: stone in hand raised defiantly, poised in a seemingly biblical showdown with an Israeli tank. The image depicts a carnivalesque role-reversal with a Philistine cast as the boy king David, and Goliath played by a Merkava tank, a piece of modern war machinery that explodes the antique imagery of the scene. In the scene, the boy’s back is to the observer; he wears an old sweater and an ill-fitting pair of sandals over his socks. One cannot help but see the boy as Handala made flesh. Like Fares, Handala, that other iconic child symbol of Palestine sketched by the great Palestinian political cartoonist Naj al-Ali, is also permanently depicted with his back to a global audience of onlookers, witness to the violence and struggle played out before him (Najjar 2007; Hamdi 2011). Like Handala, Fares too is frozen in perpetual youth.

In the photo of Fares, the weighty historical and religious imaginary of the Israeli occupation of Palestine comes crashing down upon itself, sliding into the future, portending more violence to come. Behind the tank are yet more jeeps and soldiers, and behind Fares more generations of Palestinian refugees - the infamous “demographic threat” - promising, threatening to take his place (see Kanaaneh 2002; Robson 2004). In the photo, Fares resembles one of the aTfaal al-Hijaarah (children of the stones) - Palestinian youths who had come to symbolize the

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8 I have chosen not to reproduce the photo here precisely to illustrate, in its absence, how easily this image is conjured up in the imagination of the reader.
popular struggle of the intifada beginning in 1987, when Fares was only two years-old. However, in this photo, taken in October 2000, just one month after the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada, rather than throwing stones at army jeeps and soldiers in riot gear, as youth had done before, here Fares faces a new reality. He is not confronting a police-style military occupation; he is staring in the face of an opposing army. The image represents a logical conclusion to the so-called two-state solution. One of the outcomes of the Oslo Peace Accords was the creation of a 40,000-strong Palestinian security service tasked with policing the occupied Palestinian population. Once peace negotiations collapsed under the pressure of continued expansion of Israeli settlements and checkpoints, and violence ensued following a provocative visit by then opposition-leader Ariel Sharron to the Haram ash-Sharif in Jerusalem, the military response that was unleashed was of a far different nature than the response to the previous intifada. No longer were Israeli police and soldiers suppressing a largely civilian population. Now, a vastly superior, high-tech Israeli army was attacking a separate political entity, with its own security force, however rudimentary, which the Israeli military sought to summarily decimate (Gregory 2004). Three days after the photo was taken, Fares’s cousin Shadi, a Palestinian police officer, was shot and killed in a firefight with Israeli soldiers. A week later, Fares Odeh was throwing stones at the Karni crossing, avenging his cousin’s death, when an Israeli soldier shot him in the neck. Over an hour later, once an ambulance was allowed on the scene, the boy was taken to a hospital and pronounced dead (Hockstader 2001).

To many, the picture of Fares symbolizes the enduring spirit of “Palestinian defiance” against a vastly superior Israeli military occupation, and by extension the righteousness of the Palestinian cause (ibid). However, the photo also marks a dramatic shift from a disciplinary police-style occupation, toward the use of sovereign power and overwhelming violence (see
Gordon 2008). This shift also signals a change in the political role of children and youths in the Palestinian struggle. During the predominantly youth-led uprising of the late 1980s, Palestinian children and youth not only symbolized rebellion against the Israeli military occupation, but also against the inaction of Palestinian political leaders. In the intervening years since the First Intifada, however, children’s embodied and representational roles in the conflict changed dramatically. The focus on Palestinian state-building and civil society development as part of the Oslo peace process repositioned Palestinian children as citizens-in-the-making who must be properly socialized, a response to the threateningly disproportionate political and social influence rebellious youth had gained in the uprising. When the Second Intifada began, the role of children and young people yet again changed. Where everyday childhood spaces such as homes, schools and community centers had once been sites of protest and resistance in the First Intifada, the Second Intifada saw children’s homes, schools and bodies turned into the sites of extreme violence. The massive destruction and loss of life caused by the Israeli military response to the intifada prompted international humanitarian outrage. Children’s bodies, once sites of resistance, struggle, and valor became sites of sovereign violence and sights of humanitarian suffering, offered up to the world as proof of the existence of the Palestinian people. They suffer, therefore they are.

However, this photo of Fares is not just a representation of the changing political realities in Palestine. It also takes on its own affective political life. That this photo, and others like it, would spark more attention and controversy than the deaths and injuries of thousands of other Palestinian children who were killed and wounded in anonymity speaks to the political
significance of such images. Indeed, responding to images of Palestinian children as brave fighters and innocent victims, counter-images circulate that depict Palestinian children as brainwashed pawns of a Palestinian society supposedly obsessed with death and hatred. Likewise, similar images of Israeli children, much less visible in this conflict, compel the viewer to consider the way that most children are socialized into worlds of violence, albeit in different ways.

The power of images like that of Fares Odeh partially lies in their ability to circulate and create their own political effects, prompting protests, inspiring acts of solidarity, spurring humanitarian organizations into action, and mobilizing resources to provide relief. Indeed, images and stories of suffering and abuse have allowed Palestinian rights activists and humanitarian aid works to counter the dehumanization that Palestinians have long endured. And yet, the access to world sympathy such images have garnered has come at a cost. Once the symbol of defiance and heroism, Palestinian children have become the ultimate symbols of suffering, vulnerability, and tragedy (Khalili 2007). Then again, these photos also have a life of their own, outliving the subjects they depict, taking on new meaning and significance, and creating unexpected social effects. This chapter seeks a partial excavation of the shifting aesthetics and discursive practices of Palestinian culture and society vis-à-vis Palestinian children. This examination will help us to better understand the material, spatio-discursive

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9 The Washington Post report on the killing of Fares Odeh focuses largely on the boy’s “daredevil” antics and desire for martyrdom, ignoring Israel’s policy of engaging minors with lethal force. Similarly, the killing of Muhammad ad-Durrah, discussed below, has been overshadowed by ongoing disputes as to whether or not he and his father were killed by Israeli fire, or crossfire from Palestinian militants. Likewise, the Israeli government has attempt to stir up confusion in the case of Huda Ghalia, who became another child symbol of Palestinian suffering when eight members of her family, including her father, were killed by an Israeli artillery shell as they picnicked on a beach in Gaza in 2006. The Israeli military claimed that the explosion was the result of a Palestinian landmine, although a Human Rights Watch investigation concluded that the cause of the explosion was a shell fired from an Israeli warship. See Human Rights Watch “Indiscriminate Fire” July 1, 2007.
worlds that Palestinian children today negotiate in their everyday lives, as explored in the chapters to follow.

**Introduction: The intifada as ongoing aesthetic disruption**

Though it is a refugee child who has come to represent the “Palestinian everyman,” this has not always been the case (Valier 2004). As Swedenburg (1990) demonstrates in his seminal article on the role of the peasant in Palestinian political imaginary, the image of the felah long served as a unifying signifier for the nation as a whole. The symbolic work the felah performs is not merely the romantic preservation of village idyll against the forces of capitalist modernity. Rather, the image of the Palestinian peasant has been mobilized primarily as an anti-colonial strategy emphasizing the rootedness of Palestinians to their land in the face of a Zionist settlement and displacement. Swedenburg (1990) argues that the PLO adopted peasant imagery in their visual rhetoric in order to build a united nationalist bloc that blurred the boundaries of class and regional differences. This strategy is best illustrated by the sartorial symbolism of late Yasser Arafat’s use of the checkered kuffiyeh as his signature accessory. A garment associated with village dress became the symbol of the nationalist struggle in general, and Arafat’s nationalist Fateh party and their Fedayeen guerillas in particular. It was through adopting the aesthetic of the Palestinian peasant, itself a trope for the nation as a whole, that the Fedayeen could claim their role as the vanguard of a popular people’s struggle to reclaim the land and return home.

Though Swedenburg carried out his research on the Palestinian peasant as nationalist trope prior to the irruption of the intifada in 1987, he provides a post-script written during the

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10 As Swedenburg (1990) acknowledges, the strategy of using peasant imagery for populist nationalist purposes is not unique to the Palestinian context, although it was perhaps more pronounced due to the abrupt loss of rural land and the fracturing of the nation in 1948.
height of the uprising recognizing that the Palestinian struggle was undergoing a process of “resemanticization” (Swedenburg 1990). It was “The People,” not “the Peasant” who had taken over as the “real active agents of national liberation” (Swedenburg 1990). The grass-roots organizing efforts of labor unions, student groups, women’s associations and other civil society organizations contributed to this significant shift in symbolic and political power. With formal political parties having been banned, civil society organizations served as the visible elements of the Palestinian public sphere under occupation. Though many of these bodies were established as proxies for PLO political factions, they grew to acquire “considerable independence and local autonomy,” resulting in a shift of political initiative away from the PLO leadership (Swedenburg 1990). As Swedenburg wrote at the time:

Ownership of the concept of struggle has been partially transferred from the armed vanguard and the PLO leadership outside to the popular organizations of the Occupied Territories inside. The masses, formerly led, now precede the leadership. Kufiyas, once worn chiefly as a sign of solidarity with the fedayeen, have become common property, symbols of the local struggle.

Thus, the significance of the Palestinian intifada was not just that it was a popular uprising against the Israeli military after forty years of displacement and twenty years of occupation, it was also a direct challenge to a Palestinian political leadership that had lost touch with its popular revolutionary origins (Sayigh 2007, 151).

Crucially, this shift in political power is indistinguishable from the symbolic shift in the semantics of struggle, both of which are likewise inseparable from the changing practices of political organizing and resistance. As Swedenburg again recounts:
The activists of the intifada have caused a shift in the notion of political struggle, so that it is no longer a vanguard activity. Struggle now involves such actions as rock-throwing, demonstrating, organizing strikes, constructing barricades, growing vegetables in the backyard, setting up alternative schools, clinics and police, and so on. These are all activities in which women and children can, and do, play as prominent a role as adult men.

This co-occurrence of representational and political transformation is a textbook illustration of Rancière’s theory of political aesthetics. For Rancière, politics is primarily a matter of what it is possible to see and what is rendered invisible (Rancière 2010b). Aesthetics, in this view, refers to the political struggle over sensible perception. For Rancière, an aesthetic revolution occurs when there is a reframing of self-perception of people as the people, that is, when people appropriate for themselves the means of aesthetic reproduction through the use of common language and symbols (Rancière 2005, 19). This aesthetic disruption to the established symbolic order is what Rancière refers to as dissensus. Specifically, dissensus is an internal disruption, or supplement “that brings about a more radical way of seeing [political] conflict” (Rancière 2009a, 3). Aesthetics serves as a process of re-inscribing “descriptions and arguments in the war of discourses” through the use of a “common language and the common capacity to invent objects, stories and arguments” (Rancière 2009, 19). Rancière’s classic example of aesthetic disruption and re-inscription is that of the 19th century French worker’s revolution, when workers acquired the means of self-representation by appropriating the common symbol of “the people” to represent the worker’s struggle (Rancière 2005, 15).

We see a similar situation of aesthetic disruption to the dominant political order in the case of the Palestinian intifada. Though women, students, youths and workers played a highly visible role in political organizing in the occupied territories, they were rendered invisible as political agents, a role reserved for the political leadership and military vanguard of the Fateh ascendancy as symbolized by imagery of a lost Palestinian peasantry. Through the common
language of anti-occupation struggle, and common symbols such as the peasant *kuffīyeh*, however, youths and other invisible political actors burst onto the scene, re-appropriating the means of reproduction and casting themselves in the role of the people, the agents of history. Every political development in Palestine since the First Intifada has been, in part, an internal struggle over the means of aesthetic reproduction. The peace process can be read as an attempt by Palestinian political leaders and their Israeli counterparts to re-assert control over the political situation in the occupied territories, wresting power away from the streets and back into the negotiating room (Said 2001). Likewise, the armed insurrection of the Second Intifada played a similar function in displacing women and youth from their role as political organizers, and returning the political struggle once again to a military vanguard (Johnson and Kuttab 2002).

Finally, as Chapter Four will demonstrate, the humanitarian turn in response to the violence of the Second Intifada has likewise been an attempt to de-politicize the role of youth in society, returning them to their proper place as innocent, vulnerable victims.

What is important to understand about these political/aesthetic shifts and the transformations that preceded them is that they represent internal disruptions, or excesses, to the sensible order, not outright displacements. Though the Palestinian resistance movement appropriated peasant imagery such as the *kuffīyeh* to unite political factions in common cause and to articulate connections to the land, an older generation of Palestinian villagers do still wear the *kuffīyeh*, albeit perhaps with added political significance. Likewise, despite the process of resemanticization of the Palestinian struggle, and the appearance of other historic agents such as the stone-throwing youth, the symbols of Palestinian *felah* culture still appear in the graffiti of refugee camp walls, the embroidered costumes of youth *dabka* dance troupes, and the *kuffiyat* worn by demonstrating youths. Similarly, the symbolic significance of the resistant youth has not
been entirely displaced by the humanitarian aesthetic of innocence and suffering. These various aesthetic re-distributions of perception bring into being new objects, stories, and arguments through re-inscribing, re-valuing and re-arranging existing objects, words and bodies, adding new layers of discursive sediment to the scene. My aim here is to trace the trajectory of these aesthetic shifts and their associated discursive practices and spaces, highlighting where they intersect with the lives of children in their everyday lived experiences. These spatial-historical intersections are what Jeffrey calls the “vital conjunctures” of childhood and youth, that is the spaces which “contingently combine to shape action in particular spans of time” (Jeffrey 2010, 498; Johnson-Hanks 2002; Sewell 2005). Of interest is how these shifting discourses play a role in shaping the environment that children transact with, both in the form of spatial and embodied discursive sedimentation – that is in the spaces of the home, school, home, street, and youth centers and also the habits of going to school, being a family, being a refugee, resisting occupation, and being a boy or girl growing up in a refugee camp.

Memories of village life

The majority of the residents of Balata camp are the descendants of refugees who fled from villages in the Jaffa area of historic Palestine during the 1948 Nakba. While humanitarian assistance for refugees appeared early on, families also sustained and supported themselves through the traditional hamula, or extended family networks, that typified village life prior to an-Nakba (Feldman 2010; Abdo 1991, 2000; Rothenburg 1990). The maintenance of extended family networks in exile was not only a matter of physical survival, but eventually came to be seen as essential to cultural survival as well, representing a dedication to carrying on village life until a return home could be achieved. While the United Nations Relief and Works Agency was initially set up to address the Palestinian refugee situation through assisted resettlement in
neighboring countries, resistance from refugees and host Arab states led to UNRWA repurposing its mission to that of providing education, health and humanitarian relief, and helping to sustain refugee survival in exile until return. Thus, refugee camps served as a space of isolation and control, but also space which allowed refugees to maintain family and village connections making possible “the continuation of Palestinian village relationships and values” (Sayigh 2007, 111-12).

In camps throughout the region, village associations and extended family networks continue to provide social support to their members, and to preserve the social history of the family or village. In Balata Camp, neighborhoods such as Terawiyeh bear the names of the prominent families that settled in that particular part of the camp, while community centers such as the Jamaseen Neighborhood Center, the Yazour Center and Nahr al-Oja Society, retain the names of the villages from which the families fled. Balata residents even retain a rural inflection in their speech, making the camp accent a recognizable part of the Balata identity, and a distinct aural boundary marker. As Sayigh (2007) argues, though, the continuation of rural customs and manners amongst Palestinian refugees is not a mere byproduct of camp life, or an exercise in transplanted rural conservatism. Rather, the conscious effort to retain village values and social organization is also a form of active resistance and struggle against exile and occupation (Sayigh 2007, 191). Indeed, many of the conservative customs, such as deference to elders, familial honor and patronage, exist alongside strong egalitarian and collectivist values, which have been reinforced by a shared experience of exile and political struggle.

However, as Sayigh contends (1998), it has mainly been refugee women who have borne the responsibility for not only reproducing the biological nation in exile, but also for keeping alive the cultural narratives and traditions. Nevertheless, the conscious effort to maintain family
ties, village networks, and traditions in the camp has not meant that the class, age and gender
hierarchies that typified the Palestinian village social structure have gone completely unchanged
or unchallenged (Rosenfeld 2004, 2002). Indeed, as many refugee women in Balata camp are
quick to point out, refugees have simultaneously sought to preserve “traditional values” while
also reinterpreting them in progressive ways, particularly in the field of education and women’s
rights. As Umm Mahmoud, a mother of four and a volunteer psycho-social counselor at the
Disability Resource Center in Balata Camp explains:

> Even in the old days, we said that the mother has to educate her children, so how
can she do this if she is not educated herself? But the concept of education was
different then, based on old traditions. If parents in the villages wanted their
children to go to school, they would have to send them outside the village,
because there weren't any schools nearby. But people were more conservative
then, they were afraid to let their daughters leave the areas, thinking she might do
something to bring shame to the family. That was their thinking, their habit, the
old way. But in the camps, we built schools, we insisted that our daughters get an
education, and now for high school and even university we send them outside if
we can, for the best education. The camp has become more open and free as
compared to the villages which remain fairly closed and conservative. (Interview,
21 March 2011.)

Similarly, Rosenfeld’s research in the Dahaysha camp in the West Bank likewise demonstrates
that refugee women are not merely passive victims of oppressive cultural traditions but are active
producers of culture, and shapers of their own lives, demonstrating high levels of participation in
formal education and professional employment (2004).

Indeed, this view of girls’ education being a “traditional” value may not be far off the
mark. Recent scholarship has shown that it was not for lack of demand, but rather lack of
funding from the British Mandate government, which prioritized funds for the construction of
new police barracks rather than schools, that schooling in general, and girls schooling in
particular, did not reach higher levels in rural areas (Marshall 2011; Campos 2010; Jad 2007c;
Moors 2000). Prior to the establishment of the British Mandate in 1920, national education in
Palestine was carried out under the Ottoman Education Regulation of 1869, which sought to modernize the Ottoman school system on par with Europe. Under this system, at least 3 years of mandatory schooling was required for boys, with no minimum requirements for girls (Campos 2010, 343). In Palestine, the system allowed for communal education of Muslim, Christian and Jewish students at either the Ottoman public schools or the Jewish Alliance schools, resulting in a thoroughly ecumenically Ottoman education (Jad 2007b, 338). Nevertheless, national schooling remained the purview of urban life, with education in rural areas consisting mostly of Islamic religious education carried out in local madaris. Two significant changes to education occurred during the British Mandate period. One was that the Jewish Agency was given autonomy over Jewish education in Palestine, while the British authorities, in conjunction with private religious missionary schools, would provide schooling for the Arab-Palestinian population, resulting in national and religious segregation in schools (Jad 2007b, 339). Secondly, though the goal of the British authorities was initially to provide education for all mandate residents, a socially stratified schools system was developed with the aim of creating an educated urban elite alongside a rural proletariat; village schools were to provide vocational and agricultural skills for rural children, thus fostering further regional and class differences (ibid). Despite differences in pedagogy, however, Khalidi (1999) argues that the national school system established for Arabs during the British mandate helped to diffuse an incipient Palestinian national identity, actually helping to obscure geographic and religious divisions among Palestinians. As Khalidi points out, “by the end of the mandate, a majority of Arab boys in both city and countryside, and of Arab girls in the city, were in school”; as early as 1923, Arab school children were studying from texts that depicted Palestine as a separate geographic entity from the Ottoman province of Syria (1999, 174).
Increasing political consciousness and popular unrest among the Arabs in Palestine in the 1920s caused British authorities to reconsider their educational policies, shifting public expenditure toward policing and security instead of schooling. With cuts to education, urban schools for boys were given priority, while schools in villages, especially for girls, suffered. Though demand for education in villages, including girl’s education, continued to grow, the Mandate Government refused to spend the money to build more girls’ schools, citing social and religious barriers to educating girls as the obstacle (Jad 2007c; Rosenfeld 2002, 519). The curriculum for urban schools provided for boys and girls education equally, while the curriculum of villages schools focused mainly on agricultural science and mechanics for boys, with limited offerings in embroidery and sewing for girls (Jad 2007c; Moors 2000, 875). According to a 1932 report to the League of Nations on the progress of the mandate government in Palestine, the government was found to be deliberately keeping the population in a “state of illiteracy and ignorance” (Swirski 1999, 55). It was not until 1935 that the British opened a training center to train female teachers for girls’ schools in rural areas, though education in villages never reached the level of that in urban areas. In hindsight, refugees can now view the provision of universal education for refugee girls and boys by UNRWA as the culmination as a long-term desire for equal access to education.

The Nakba and camp life

The traumatic events of the nakba of 1948 would radically transform Palestinian society and culture, including gender relations and national identity. In 1948, through strategic attacks and psychological warfare, Zionist militias displaced nearly 800,000 Palestinians from their land and destroyed over 400 Palestinian villages (Pappe 2007; Morris 1987; Khalidi 2006). Palestinians peasant farmers, rural land-owners, and educated urban dwellers had been
transformed into an urban refugee proletariat with no access to land as a source of income. Whether they sought refuge in neighboring countries such as Lebanon or Syria, or other parts of Palestine such as the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian refugees found themselves in a new environment with entrenched social hierarchies based on familial patronage and land. However, despite cleavages between refugees and host communities, the shared trauma of the loss of national dignity and land, and the dispersion of Palestinians throughout the region, contributed to the universalization of a coherent Palestinian national identity (Khalidi 1999). In addition, the institutionalization of a modern education system through UNRWA school would also contribute to the transformation of Palestinian society and culture (Peteet 2005).

The United Nations Relief and Work Agency, in addition to providing subsistence-level shelter, food and medical care to refugees, also provided emergency education for camp residents. The majority of refugees who received assistance from UNRWA were displaced villagers and peasant farmers who had very little formal schooling. Men who had finished elementary school were considered the best educated residents of the camp. Following the establishment of the UNRWA in 1949, those with at least some schooling took jobs as camp administrators and teachers. As Abu ‘Adel, a Balata resident, veteran UNRWA teacher and current English curriculum inspector in the northern West Bank, recalls:

When we came here in 1948, I was just a boy, but I remember my father, who had completed 7th grade, was respected as a highly educated man, so he was suited for a job that required an education. He started working for the Agency [UNRWA] and in just 6 years he became head of camp services. That was when people valued education, and when people were really educated. Even if they had just a few years of school, they knew their rights and responsibilities toward each other – that was the most important thing. Now, we have more education, but less knowledge (interview 29 March, 2011).

With a relatively high salary, as well as the social status conferred on those with an education and professional job, teachers were among the most admired and respected residents of the
refugee camp. As Sayigh (2007) observes, teachers were well-respected members of the camp who served as “leaders and guides” to a “community in exile”, helping to preserve cultural knowledge and impart new survival skills (Sayigh 2007, 124). As hopes faded for an immediate return to their land, refugees began to see education as the only resource of value left to bequeath to their children. Thus, UNRWA schools were charged with heightened “symbolic and emotional significance” as “generators of hope” and “windows to a different future” for boys and girls alike (123).

At first, with no school houses, limited access to materials and few teachers, small classes were arranged in tents, taught by educated camp residents (Rosenfeld 2002, 527). Under pressure from refugee families, UNRWA set out to build a primary girls and boys school in every camp, beginning with the establishment of 61 schools in 1951 (Rosenfeld 2002, 529). By the 1960s, the gender-gap in education had nearly closed, and a generation of young women were completing their schooling and traveling to Jordan, Egypt, and other countries further afield such as the Soviet Union, to complete their higher education. By the mid-1970s, UNRWA had reached its goal of providing a 6-year education to all refugee boys and girls, and Palestinian refugees had become amongst the highest educated in the region (ibid). Moreover, the training of female teachers for girls schools provided new occupational options for refugee women, and new professional role models for girls (Fronk, Huntington, and Chadwick 1999, 709). Both supply and demand for education amongst refugee children had grown, and by providing education to both boys and girls’ UNRWA schools assisted in opening up new opportunities for, and measures of, social advancement.

While universal education served to transform gender relations for a new generation of Palestinian refugees, UNRWA schools also served an important function in transmitting
intergenerational Palestinian cultural identity and political awareness. Teachers who had grown up as “sons of the camp” were seen as public intellectuals who were called upon to “fulfill political as well as cultural functions, interpreting political events to the masses, mediating new ideas” (Sayigh 2007, 191). Not wanting to be accused of cultural or political indoctrination, however, UNRWA officially adopted the curricula of the host countries, with students in the West Bank learning from Jordanian text books. Still, UNRWA teachers surreptitiously altered their subject matter to include lessons on Palestinian politics, history, literature and geography (Peteet 2005, 90). Rather than administering “neutral” instruction, UNRWA teachers provided an education in revolutionary, nationalist politics, facilitating the growth of political and national consciousness amongst Palestinian youth (Peteet 2005, 88).

Palestinian education became (and remains) a highly contentious political issue. Following the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the June 1967 war, Palestinian education in the occupied territories became a target of Israeli military control. Just two months after the war ended and occupation ensued, the Israeli army issued Military Order Number 101 on the 27th of August, 1967, “Concerning Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda” (Israeli Defence Forces 1967). The order sought to suppress any visible manifestations of Palestinian cultural identity or political organizing. Protests marches and meetings of 10 or more “where the subject concerns or is related to politics” were banned, as were Palestinian flags or “other symbols.” Likewise, the distribution of political publications including “pictures with political connotations” was prohibited. Recognizing the role of schools in reproducing Palestinian cultural and national identity, a subsequent order targeting textbooks was issued two days later. Order number 107, “Order Concerning the Use of Textbooks,” lists 55 books which were banned from being taught in schools including “Arabic language books, history, geography,
sociology and philosophy books” (Kirshbaum 2007). As Gordon (2008) observes, by making Israeli officers “directly responsible for the management and pedagogical supervision of the governmental education system,” Israeli military officials attempted to use the modern education system to suppress Palestinian national identity (55-56).

However, Palestinian students and school teachers, in national and UNRWA schools alike, resisted the move. In September 1967, the start of the school year and a month since the orders had been passed, Palestinian teachers and students in Nablus and other cities called for a strike, refusing to let the Israeli military occupy their curriculum. In response, the Israeli military commander for Nablus issued Military Orders 123 and 124 imposing a general curfew on the city and blockading the transfer or movement of goods to or within the municipal boundaries (Israeli Law Resource Center 2007). What started as a school strike escalated into a general strike of all workers and merchants in the city. A retaliatory military order was issued forcing shop owners to “open his business during regular working hours” making it impermissible for “a shop-keeper to refuse to sell his stock or to provide a service in an irrational manner.” Punishment for violating the order to open shop could involve, paradoxically, “enforced closure of the shop” or alternatively, “the dispensation of the stock in whatever way the Military Commander sees fit.”

Seeking to avoid further confrontation, however, UNRWA officials sought to accommodate Israeli demands regarding education for Palestinian refugees in the territories. For example, references to Palestine were eventually removed from school books, as were hostile references to the state of Israel. Nevertheless, whatever the changes in official curriculum, UNRWA teachers continued to play their role in propagating Palestinian national identity. In the revolutionary period of the 1960s and 70s, teachers, long respected as cultural stewards, were
transformed into grassroots political activists helping to foster a revolutionary consciousness among Palestinian youths (Khalili 2007; Sayigh 2007). Thus, while UNRWA educational practices at once posed a challenge to traditional knowledge and authority, while simultaneously seeking to accommodate an imposed political status quo (Peteet 2005, 92), parents, children and teachers were not merely passively inscribed by these new discursive practices but rather actively engaged in transforming gender norms, social and cultural values, and political consciousness, as we will see further in the next section.

**Shaking off: Gender, home, and family**

Following the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and the prohibition of Palestinian political parties and factions, the national and political consciousness that had been awakened in Palestinian youths was kept alive through the activism of various social and cultural organizations. Palestinians became increasingly frustrated by the harsh restrictions imposed by the occupation, as well as by the blatant economic inequalities that the occupation brought about between occupiers and occupied. With a purposefully de-developed industrial economy, educated Palestinian young men had little choice but to accept menial labor jobs in Israel or on Israeli settlements, where they were often subjected to exploitation and abuse. This, according to Gordon (2008), points to a fundamental internal contradiction in Israeli policy. On the one hand, Israeli policy sought to normalize life under occupation by allowing the establishment of universities and colleges, though seeking to limit the political content of education. On the other hand, the Palestinian industrial economy was de-developed, and Palestinians’ access to land and mobility was severely restricted, thus transforming Palestinians into a captive, urbanized labor force, stifling the elevated ambitions of educated Palestinian youths (see Roy 1995). This contradiction contributed to the irruption of the intifada in 1987, a predominantly youth-led
eruption of anti-occupation resistance, sustained by a network of popular organizing committees, women’s groups, students unions, and other social and cultural organizations.

The intifada, or “shaking off,” was not just a revolt against the Israeli occupation; it was also a shaking up of class, gender, and age hierarchies. As young demonstrators directly confronted Israeli soldiers and police the balance of political power in the Palestinian struggle shifted from the old revolutionary guard to a young generation of activists who were leading their own revolution. As Sherwell (1996) notes, this generational shift was part of a wider disruption to an entrenched division between the male dominated public political sphere and the private, culturally symbolic sphere of the home, inhabited by women and youth. As Sayigh (1998) argues, anti-colonial nationalism has a tendency to conform to the state-centered logic of the colonizer by bifurcating the masculine, public, political domain and the “inner domain” of cultural authenticity as represented by feminine domesticity (166). While women may be encouraged to take part in the national political struggle, their role is primarily that of biological and cultural reproduction, reproducing future generations while preserving the nation’s traditional cultural heritage (Sayigh 1998; Kanaaneh 2002). Policing gender roles in Palestinian society thus became a way of guarding national honor; women’s bodies and mobility were subject to greater control for the sake of the nation (Sayigh 1998, 169; Fronk, Huntington, and Chadwick 1999, 227). This began to change during the intifada, however, when women took

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11 Children are positioned in an awkward liminal space, simultaneously occupying the inner-sphere of domesticity and cultural stasis, and the public domain as citizens in the making.

12 In his discussion of masculinity and Palestinian nationalism, Massad (1995) explains the metaphor of familial honor at work in the Palestinian national narrative. One significant example that Massad sites is the Palestinian Nationalist Charter, which presents the Zionist conquest of Palestine in terms of a violation of Palestinian familial honor by the rape committed by the Zionist enemy. In this narrative, the “Zionist enemy is clearly seen as masculine, and the wrong committed by this enemy against Palestinians is considered metaphorically to be of a violent sexual nature” (Massad 1995, 470). Ironically, this version of events corroborates the Zionist narrative of “fertilizing the virgin land” and redeeming the effeminate European Jew by transforming him into “a new masculine pioneer impregnating the virgin/motherland with new life”, a narrative which itself is informed by Orientalist
on an active role in organizing strikes and demonstrations, transforming the home into a center of political activity and social transformation, rather than a symbolic realm of traditionalism and stasis (Sherwell 1996). The political center of gravity also shifted away from prominent urban families. Women and youths from villages and refugee camps were highly visible during the intifada, not only because of the significant symbolic role they play in representing cultural authenticity and the right of return, but also in their active role in demonstrations and confronting soldiers (Amireh 2003, 795; Abdo 1991, 28).

The symbolic importance specifically attributed to women, however, both enabled and constrained their political agency. In political discourse, such as posters, leaflets and communiqués, women were still largely relegated to their position as mothers reproducing the next generation of fighters (Sherwell 1996). For example communiqués issued by popular organizing committees routinely called upon young men, the “Sons of Palestine”, “Brothers” or “Cubs,” to fight against the occupiers (Sherwell 1996, 301), whereas the role for women in the struggle remained that of “Mother of the Martyrs” (Peteet 1986, 24). Nevertheless, the everyday, embodied performances of confrontation with soldiers at demonstrations and house searches transformed the role of the Palestinian mother into one that was more directly confrontational. Though motherhood is still emphasized to the exclusion of other political roles, one communiqué from 1988 reflects the active and visible role that women played during the uprising: “Mothers,

depictions of the Middle East as exotic, sensual and awaiting rescue (Massad 1995, 471; Said 1979). Such tropes are not mere metaphors, however, but were consciously and strategically enacted by Zionist armed militias who targeted women and girls, or at least, spread rumors to that affect, in order to bring about the mass exodus that was necessary to ensure Jewish demographic superiority in the land; it was correctly assumed that Palestinian men would rather defend the honor of their families than their land (Warnock 1990; Peteet 1991; Holt 2003). This connection between familial honor and national sovereignty is what King (2008) refers to as “namus as sovereignty.” Namus, or familial honor can be conceived of as a form of “patrilineal sovereignty,” which must be guarded from external usurpation by “protecting the honor” of the women in the family. This patrilineal notion of sovereignty stands in for national sovereignty in the geopolitical imagination, where national borders protecting the nation’s soil become the figurative hymen protecting the woman’s womb. This rape of the land, then, has tarnished the honor of national family, and has displaced the land of Palestine as the true progenitor of the Palestinian people.
in camps, villages, and cities, continue confronting soldiers and settlers. Let each woman consider the wounded and imprisoned her own children” (Peteet 1994, 42).

In addition to challenging gender roles, the intifada also served as a youth uprising confronting both the political power of an older generation of exiled leaders, and also the age hierarchies that structured Palestinian society and the family. Media images of youth confronting occupation soldiers changed the political landscape of the Palestinian struggle, placing youth at the political fore. However, it was also the physical scars of beatings and torture imprinted on the bodies of young people that transformed the age-based hierarchies of respect and deference within the Palestinian family. Youths who had endured imprisonment and abuse at the hands of Israeli soldiers acquired much higher social status and respect than was normally afforded to them. This transformation of traditional age hierarchies was manifested in the everyday space of the family home. For example, Peteet (1994) relates the case of a young man named Hussein who had resisted interrogation under torture in prison and was released only later to become an active leader in the underground resistance. The respect the young man had earned tangibly transformed the spatio-familial relations of the home and habits of intergenerational communication; the son now occupied the center seat of the family room, with his father at his side, giving him the floor to speak (Peteet 1994, 39). Renewed hope had been glimpsed in the younger generations, and for that they were afforded greater respect (Fronk, Huntington, and Chadwick 1999, 711)

This respect and admiration extended even to younger children. Children as young as 10 engaged in demonstrations, were beaten, imprisoned, and tortured, becoming symbols of national struggle and valor (Peteet 1994, 41). In doing so, these young people challenged traditional notions of what it means to be young. As Peteet (1994) notes, ‘aql, or mental maturity, was
traditionally acquired by youths as they achieved important milestones in life such as finishing school, getting a job, establishing a house, getting married, and having children. However, with general strikes, school closures, mass imprisonment of youths, and a cessation of wedding parties out of respect for the martyrs, the intifada disrupted these important “life-cycle transitions” (Peteet 1994, 41). New social value was placed on other rites of passage such as confronting soldiers, imprisonment, torture, and even martyrdom. The experiences youth endured on the streets and in prison instilled in them an ‘aql beyond their years.

However, just as women straddled the line between performing and transforming their role as mother of the nation, youth too occupied dual discursive positions as heroes of the uprising, and innocent victims of occupation. While the occupation’s strategy was to break the resistance through physical violence inflicted upon the bodies of young men, the effect this violence had was the opposite: rather than break the youth, it empowered them (Peteet 1994). Nevertheless, for all the empowerment and maturity that was gained through confrontations with soldiers, many of the young participants in the intifada were still very much considered children. Images of children being beaten and forcefully arrested by heavily armed Israeli soldiers, and the regular occurrence of mothers in the camp intervening in the arrests of children by shaming and scorning the soldiers, did much to undermine Israeli national myths of masculinity and moral legitimacy, while imbuing the Palestinian cause with a sense of moral superiority and righteousness.

These challenges to traditional age and gender hierarchies, and the contradictory subject positions occupied by women and children, created a great deal of social anxiety, which persists until today. As Amireh (2003) contends, the increased visibility of women led to a threatening feminization of Palestinian society, fear of which was expressed in popular stories about the
dangers of loose, seductive women. Rumors spread about women collaborators using sexual temptation to compromise male resistance fighters (Amireh 2003, 758). Homes, salons, and other private areas where women congregated were deemed dins of seduction and moral peril (Amireh 2003, 759). Meanwhile, the anxiety caused by the deterioration of male authority, and the perceived threat posed by unrestrained female visibility in the public sphere, led to veiling campaigns spearheaded by the burgeoning Islamist movement (Amireh 2003, 706). Indeed, even the youths who participated in the intifada expressed anxiety about the breakdown in traditional family structures, perhaps due to the general absence of formal state institutions and general chaos that the intifada caused (Fronk, Huntington, and Chadwick 1999). Although the intifada had raised expectations among female adolescents about achieving greater gender equality, more individual autonomy, and increased participation in the public sphere, according to a study of young participants in the intifada, young women and men alike nevertheless concurrently expressed a strong desire to maintain traditional family roles (ibid).

Along with anxiety regarding the changes in gender relations the intifada had prompted, there was also a backlash against the challenge to age-based hierarchy. The uprising against the occupying military authority, it seemed, had become a general revolt against all forms of adult authority. Many adults felt that the youth were out of control and that a breakdown of all respect for teachers and parents had occurred, creating an intergenerational crisis in families and schools. Indeed, the intifada was just another in a series of blows to patriarchal authority starting with the loss of land following the *nakba* (Sayigh 2007, 193). By the 1990s, as the intifada was dying down, adults sought to regain control of the youth. For example, a communiqué circulated by the popular organizing committees in the early 1990s implored parents to reassert authority over
their children and instill in them a respect for their elders (Amireh 2003). Indeed, even today, parents and teachers blame the apparent unruliness of Palestinian youths on the breakdown in adult authority caused by the intifada, combined with a tendency of Palestinian parents to spoil their children to make up for their own lost childhood, sacrificed to years of struggle and fighting.

State-building and destruction

As fathers sought to reassert patriarchal authority in the family, a similar process was beginning in the national sphere with the exiled PLO leadership seeking to reassert its political control. The PLO, wanting to use the political capital of the intifada to reestablish control over the national struggle, found common cause with Israel, which was eager to find a way to manage an unruly Palestinian population. While the Israeli army was adept at fighting conventional territorial conflicts with its neighbors, it proved largely ineffective in confronting mass demonstrations and civil disobedience. The image of armed soldiers beating youths and being pelted with rocks by children dented the Israeli sense of moral and military superiority. The peace process promised the exiled Palestinian leadership all the trappings of a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (albeit with highly restricted political autonomy), in exchange for maintaining Israeli security interests, thus outsourcing the morally and materially costly business of policing the Palestinians to the Palestinians themselves.

The creation of the Palestinian Authority following the 1993 Declaration of Principles included the transformation of various committees and organizations into the new ministries and

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13 Despite the persistent and widespread belief that children’s lack of respect for adult authority stems from the experience of the intifada, research has found that children themselves do not perceive the events of the intifada as having caused a lack of respect for their parents or lack of affection between parents and children. However, girls in families that have experienced traumatic political violence tend to feel more restricted by their parents, whereas boys sometimes feel a sense of rejection and blame (Punamaki, Qouta, and El-Sarraj 2001).
departments of a would-be Palestinian government. However, women’s unions and committees were largely ignored in this state-building process. As a result, these organizations played a leading role in the creation of an independent, oppositional civil society sector. However, the influx of Western aid money worked to reorient the goals of Palestinian community organizations and women’s groups toward international donor priorities, which focused on strengthening official government institutions (Johnson and Kuttab 2002, 29) Thus, the women’s movement shifted from political mobilization and popular organizing to professional training and “capacity building” (Kuttab 2010). Nevertheless, many of the community centers and women’s organizations that were active in the first intifada continued to play an important role in providing education, health, welfare and other social services to the community. In additions, women’s organizations continue to be active in providing support to prisoners’ families, organizing protests against the occupation, and raising critical awareness about social issues such as gender inequality and domestic abuse.

While women’s organizations played an important role in civil society building during Oslo, the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September of 2000 saw a significant shift in the role of women and children in the political sphere. While the Oslo process had raised the hopes of political autonomy for many Palestinians, instead what they witnessed was a massive increase in settlement building, the creation of numerous checkpoints that carved up the West Bank, continued Israeli military presence, and still no agreement on any of the outstanding political issues, including the status of East Jerusalem and the return of refugees (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003). In a deliberately provocative move, then Likud opposition party leader Ariel Sharon made a visit to the al-Aqsa Mosque holy site with a massive security entourage, sparking off riots in Jerusalem. Demonstrations quickly spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, resembling
the kind of massive, unarmed demonstrations that occurred during the first intifada (Smith 2004). Israeli soldiers and police used lethal force in suppressing demonstrations, including inside Israel itself, and the Israeli army deployed tanks and began restricting movement throughout the occupied territories. Palestinian militants met the heavy handed tactics of Israeli police and military with armed reprisals and the uprising quickly escalated into a full-fledged military confrontation.

One contributing factor to the quick escalation of military violence during the Second Intifada was the creation of a Palestinian security force with over 40,000 police and soldiers as part of the Oslo Accords. While the first intifada resembled an intractable indigenous revolt against a colonial police state, the second intifada became an exercise in asymmetrical warfare, something Israeli military planners had more experience with. Indeed, Operation Defensive Shield, launched by the Israeli military in March 2002, was the largest mobilization of Israeli troops since the June 1967 war. During this operation, the Israeli military attacked Palestinian Authority security and policing infrastructure and other official institutions including the Legislative Council offices, government ministries, and municipal buildings. As Gregory (2004) puts it, the attacks served as the destruction of “the very archive, the institutional memory – of Palestinian society,” representing a complete suspension of everyday law and order and the full re-imposition of direct, sovereign violence from the occupier (Gregory 2004, 112; Marshall 2011; Gordon 2008).

This destruction only served to escalate violence even further. As Johnson and Kuttab (2002) argue, the overtly militaristic response on the part of the Palestinian resistance was, in part, due to an ongoing crisis of Palestinian masculinity caused by the humiliation of prolonged occupation. During the 1990s, Israeli authorities had limited work permits for Palestinians, as an
influx of Soviet immigrants lessened Israel’s reliance on Palestinian workers. Many Palestinian men had little choice but to take demeaning jobs working on the new Israeli settlements that were rapidly being built inside the West Bank. Workers faced daily humiliations both on the job and at the checkpoints they had to pass to get there. Adding insult to injury, these daily humiliations were brought about by the emasculating failure of the Oslo peace process: Palestinian resistance had capitulated to their occupiers with little to show for it but increased settlement building and more checkpoints (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003). Just as Palestinian men felt unable to provide for or protect their families, Yassir Arafat, as leader of the PLO, was seen as having failed to defend the national family (Johnston and Kuttab 2002). The motif of the Second Intifada thus became of one of hyper-masculinity; reclaiming the lost image of Palestinian male revolutionary fighter through a performance of manhood that mirrored the occupier himself. Young fighters and aspirant militants patrolled the streets of Balata Camp and the Old City of Nablus, donning combat boots, bomber jackets and buzz cuts, mimicking the masculinity of the Israeli (and American) soldiers who had humiliated and emasculated the Arabs with their invasions of homes and homelands. Martyr posters featured young men brandishing American M-16s, wearing army fatigues and even flak jackets and helmets, against the backdrop of photo-shopped images of the Dome of the Rock, representing the promise of return and the restoration of national honor.

Indeed, though the Second Intifada was sparked off by clashes at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, it was sustained through demonstrations around the very sites and symbols of Palestinian national and individual humiliation: Israeli checkpoints. In response to these humiliations, the Palestinian resistance became more militarized with the use of suicide bombings and attacks inside Israel, seeking to disrupt the everyday lives of ordinary Israelis, just
as ordinary life had been suspended for Palestinians. As the Israel military ran out of official Palestinian security sites to target, the occupation responded to terrorist attacks by targeting the most intimate of private spaces for Palestinians: the family home. As a site of treasured social capital, cultural and personal significance, and economic value, Palestinian homes and even entire apartment complexes were targeted for destruction in a policy of collective punishment. By destroying the homes of suspected Palestinian terrorists Israeli policy attempted to transform the act of martyrdom from an honorable deed into an act of familial shame. Though housing demolitions increased during the early years of the Second Intifada, the destruction of Palestinian homes had long been a strategy of occupation, with over 8,000 homes having been destroyed in the West Bank since 1967 (Gregory 2004, 131). As Abdo (2008, 179) argues, such tactics do not just target the physical space of the home, but the family itself. Through housing demolitions, family separations caused by imprisonment and deportation, and the tarnishing of family honor through the threat of rape, the Palestinian family has long been a target of Zionist colonial violence (Warnock 1990; Peteet 1991; Holt 2003).

Having already lost their homes in the nakba of 1948, refugees living in Balata camp found their homes once again threatened during the massive Israeli invasions of 2002, in which 400 homes were completely destroyed, and another 1,000 partially damaged. These home destructions were not just symbolic punitive attacks, however, but also represented an attempt by the Israeli military to relearn the rules of war, shifting tactics from conventional warfare to urban combat. During the April 2002 Israeli military incursion into Nablus and surrounding refugee camps, IDF commander Aviv Kochavi eschewed the traditional IDF military tactics that had
proven so vulnerable to guerrilla attack, and instead deployed a new method he called “walking through walls” (Weizman 2007:193). Weizman explains the procedure:

Soldiers assemble behind a wall. Using explosives or a large hammer, they break a hole large enough to pass through. Their charge through the wall is sometimes preceded by stun grenades or a few random shots into what is usually a private living room occupied by its unsuspecting inhabitants. When the soldiers have passed through the party wall, the occupants are assembled and, after they are searched for ‘suspects’, locked inside one of the rooms, where they are made to remain – sometimes for several days – until the military operation is concluded, often without water, sanitation, food or medicine […]

As Weizman observes, “The unexpected penetration of war into the private domain of the home has been experienced by civilians in Palestine, just like in Iraq, as the most profound form of trauma and humiliation” (2007:194). As one Palestinian mother describes this traumatic experience:

Imagine it – you’re sitting in your living room, which you know so well; this is the room where the family watches television together after the evening meal... And, suddenly, that wall disappears with a deafening roar, the room fills with dust and debris, and through the wall pours one soldier after the other, screaming orders. […] The children are screaming, panicking… Is it possible to even begin to imagine the horror experienced by a five-year-old child as four, six, eight, twelve soldiers, their faces painted black, submachine guns pointed everywhere, antennas protruding from their backpacks, making them look like giant alien bugs, blast their way through that wall? (Weizman 2007, 195).

This collapsing of the distant battlefield into the intimate setting of the domestic space represents a hallmark of late modern war. While the goal of historical siege warfare was to penetrate city walls signaling “the destruction of the sovereignty of the city state”, contemporary urban warfare “is increasingly focused on methods of transgressing the limitations embodied by the domestic wall” (Weizman 2007, 208).

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14 As Weizman (2007) notes, while these new tactics were relatively successful against a poorly armed and hastily organized Palestinian resistance, the same tactics failed against highly trained and well-equipped Hezbollah fighters during the summer 2006 Israeli assault on Lebanon.
Thus, the home, which had been a site of political activism and resistance during the first intifada, had been transformed into a target of destruction and sovereign violence in the second. Similarly, the iconic image of the “children of the stones” that had come to represent hope and resistance in the first intifada, had been transformed into a symbol of suffering, humiliation, and victimization. The image of a defiant Fares Odeh was overshadowed by that of Mohammad Durrah, a 12 year old boy from Gaza who was killed in his father’s arms. To many Palestinians, such images symbolized the failure of the Palestinian father to protect his children (Johnson and Kuttab 2002, 37). That children were being killed in their parents’ arms and in their own homes also caused a similar crisis of Palestinian motherhood (Johnson and Kuttab 2002, 37). Whereas one of the key roles for women in the first intifada had been that of the mother-protector, in the Second Intifada such protection appeared impossible, and death all but certain. As “mother of the martyrs,” women had to reconcile their grief of loss, and guilt of not being able to protect their children, with the honor of martyrdom and the knowledge it was perhaps a better fate than the alternative: a life of humiliation and hopelessness. However, women did play a large role in the second intifada beyond that of just Mother of the Martyrs. Following the killing, imprisonment and maiming of their husbands and children during the second intifada, women took on the role of caretaker of the handicapped and breadwinner of the house. Likewise, many women were forced to step outside the domestic domain and into the public sphere as representatives for their killed and imprisoned husbands and sons (Bornstein 2010, 470). Though the work of caring for the injured and imprisoned is often done in private (Johnson and Kuttab 2002, 38), many women have transformed the act of care into a political gesture through their public activism in organizing disability resource centers, children’s clubs, prisoner’s societies and women’s centers whose purpose is ameliorate the continued effects of occupation.
Conclusion

The historical processes explored in this chapter have deposited sediment in the material surroundings, habits and practices that form the environment that children inhabit today. Spaces such as UNRWA schools, village association centers, clinics and community centers were formed at different times with different purposes, and today are used by children in different ways. Familiar objects and spaces, such as keys and home interiors, have been recontextualized, stripped of their once mundane habitual use and imbued with symbolic political significance. Similarly, embroidery, still displayed in homes and taught to women and girls in cultural centers, no longer serves as a symbol of family status or marker of regional identity; still part of the daily landscape, embroidery represents cultural authenticity, an important skill for girls to learn in order to understand their cultural heritage, a lucrative craft for women, and something to be sold or given to foreign visitors. Like the faded martyr posters and bullet holes perforating the walls of homes and shops, the material and spatial sediment that surrounds children in their daily lives are the deposits of social and historical processes out of the reach of children’s memories and beyond their full comprehension, which shape their lives in profound ways, and which are nevertheless open to subtle forms of reconfiguration. Likewise the multiple, competing discourses of the family, humanitarianism and international human rights, and the Palestinian national struggle, manifest themselves in different spatial practices, arrangements and comportments, and yet also swirl together in ways that allow for novel and unpredictable formations. It is the way children negotiate these material/discursive habits, and the new ways of being they are enacting in the process, that will be considered in the following chapters.
Today I was invited to the community center where I had worked with youth volunteers and staff to design and implement a children’s arts project. I was invited on the occasion of a visit from a delegation of officials from a European consulate coming to see the results of an art therapy project they had funded, and to discuss the possibility of further funding for future projects. When the delegates arrived the center’s director was eager to show them a video that had been taken of one of the art therapy sessions. In the video soft music plays as a psycho-social support counselor leads the participating girls through a visualization exercise. The camera pans around the room and focuses on a girl as she buries her face in her hands. At first it appears as though the girl is hiding her face in embarrassment, or perhaps uncontrollable laughter. Then it becomes clear that she is sobbing. The other girls soon follow suit, stifling sobs in their hands.

In the video it is unclear who the girls are, why they were chosen to participate in the project, or why exactly they are crying. But none of that matters. In fact, this ambiguity is essential for such projects to work. Tears serve as blank slates upon which international donor priorities can be projected – whether they be humanitarian relief, girls empowerment, or citizenship promotion. Trauma and suffering serve as currency in the affective economy that regulates relations between local humanitarian organizations and international donors. Suffering, in the form of children’s tears, is displayed as both the justification for and outcome of humanitarian intervention. However, the thorny political question of what causes the suffering is left unasked and unanswered, and only personal catharsis and healing is emphasized (field notes 7 July, 2011).
Introduction

This chapter examines the role of humanitarian trauma discourse in producing childhood subjectivity in Palestine. Specifically, in this chapter I ask what kind of political subjectivity is mobilized when children are framed through the discourse of trauma, and what other ways of being political are rendered invisible? Further, given the significant role that international aid and development agencies play in shaping the lives and spaces of Palestinian children, especially refugee children, what kind of future citizens do humanitarian projects seek to produce (or prevent from emerging), and how do children themselves creatively combine the competing discourses of Palestinian childhood and enact their own politics in the process?

In this chapter I argue that trauma simultaneously serves as a justification for humanitarian intervention and is produced through this intervention. Further, I argue that trauma discourse positions Palestinian youths as volatile security risks which must be mitigated through techniques of self-management. Implicit in trauma relief projects is the threat that children’s untreated psychological troubles and pent up emotional energy will be violently released in the future. This serves to perpetuate Orientalist representations of Palestinians as outside the space of enlightened reason (Gregory 2004, 120-121). The question thus arises as to whether the purpose of such projects is to protect Palestinian children, or protect against them. Finally, I argue that the emphasis on self-expression, self-esteem and self-empowerment in trauma relief places such work within a wider governmental scheme of Palestinian state-building. While the discourse of trauma originally served as justification for humanitarian solidarity with Palestinians in response to the violence of the Second Intifada, today trauma discourse is enrolled in a resurrected post-intifada neo-liberal state-building project seeking to render the Palestinian population governable through rational self-management. Thus, rather than being used to highlight the on-going
violence of occupation, the discourse of trauma now serves to de-politicize this violence. Trauma reduces the effects of occupation to a set of psychological symptoms and transforms a collective political struggle for self-determination into an individual struggle for self-esteem.

Having already provided a general historical context for the emergence of competing discourses of Palestinian childhood, this chapter focuses specifically on the history of trauma and its deployment in humanitarian projects in Palestine, as well as the changing political role of Palestinian civil society organization. From here, this chapter turns to a discussion of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, as well as Rancière's notion of consensus, in arguing that trauma relief projects targeting Palestinian children serve to rein in the unruly child and produce productive, governable, future citizens. Turning to my field work, I examine examples of how trauma relief projects targeting Palestinian children seek to mobilize apolitical forms of childhood subjectivity. However, I also examine the ways that Palestinian community workers and youths themselves variously reinterpret and re-politicize these projects in an anti-occupation framework. Specifically, I consider examples from my research with Palestinian boys and girls living in a Balata Refugee Camp to illustrate how children creatively perform and transform discourses of trauma, suffering, human rights, and security in their own ways, casting themselves as active political agents rather than passive victims of human rights abuse.

**Trauma and humanitarianism**

With its roots in medical psychiatry emerging in the First World War, and later research on post-traumatic stress disorder with Holocaust survivors and Viet Nam War veterans (Argenti-Pellin 2003; Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Edkins 2003; Kaplan 2005), trauma has arguably become the “dominant paradigm for understanding the processes of victimization, remembering, witnessing, and recovery” in our time (Schaffer and Smith 2004, 9). As Ahmed and Stacey
contend, “speaking out about injustice, trauma, pain, and grief, have become crucial aspects of contemporary life”, and have in turn “transformed notions of what it means to be a subject, what it means to speak, and how we can understand the formations of communities and collectives” (Ahmed and Stacey 2001, 2). While the discourse of trauma has been a politically useful tool in mobilizing political communities and bringing to light concealed forms of coercive power (as in the case of domestic violence, which feminist activists have worked to change from a private family affair to a legal matter and public health issue), a question nevertheless arises as to what kinds of political subjectivities are mobilized by a politics of injury, suffering and mourning.

Beyond its role in political struggles in the West, Schaffer and Smith observe that the Western psychoanalytical model of trauma has been “enlisted in human rights frameworks” and spread “through global circuits into dispersed local sites” to address the deleterious psychological effects of a range of violent crises and disasters (Schaffer and Smith 2004, 5). The psychoanalytical model of trauma relief, which involves survivors telling their stories of suffering, reinforces the juridico-legal practices of human rights advocacy, with its emphasis on witness and testimony. Thus, the language of trauma provides medical justification for external humanitarian intervention while simultaneously delivering a discursive frame for representing the humanitarian suffering of distant others. The result is that a very specific cultural and historic understandings of trauma and human rights have been “transformed into a near-universal set of theories and practices” used to treat and represent suffering (Thompson 2009, 56).

However, the coupling of trauma discourse and humanitarianism is not merely a global diffusion of particular legal and psycho-therapeutic practices, but rather, as Rancière (2010b) argues, is indicative of a wider ethical turn in contemporary politics. Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the concept of human rights has formed a triumvirate with liberal democracy and the market economy in dominating the global landscape of the so-called post-historical world (Rancière 2010, 62). Unencumbered by the drive of progress, emancipation or any other “end to be accomplished,” the ethical turn in politics is first of all marked by a “reversal of the flow of time,” from a fixation on the future towards fixing the “catastrophe behind us.” Thus, trauma serves as both the aesthetic motif of the contemporary ethical turn and the practical framework for carrying out the forms of treatment and mediation that have come to replace political struggle and liberation. Using the specific example of childhood trauma, Rancière (2010, 187) argues:

Childhood trauma has become the trauma of being born, the simple misfortune that befalls every human being for being an animal born too early. This misfortune, from which nobody can escape, dismisses the very notion that injustice could be dealt with by enforcing justice. It does not do away with punishment. But it does eliminate the justice of punishment. It reduces punishment to the imperatives of protecting the social body, not without the usual few blunders. Infinite justice then takes on its 'humanist' shape as the necessary violence required to exorcise trauma in order to maintain the order of the community.

In other words, political struggles over right and justice are subsumed by ethical calculations and the necessary corrections needed to maintain the order and security of the community.

In this sense, the ethical turn that characterizes contemporary politics actually represents an “erasure of politics” and the “shrinkage of political space,” as questions of right dissolves into concerns over fact (Rancière 2009b, 72, 189-90). In Rancière’s terminology, the politics of humanitarianism represents a transformation from political dissensus into ethical consensus, that is, the replacement of political struggle with technocratic fixes. According to Rancière (2010, 72), humanitarian rights are “the rights of those who cannot enact them, of victims whose rights are totally denied.” Since the victims of human rights abuse are, by definition, those who cannot exercise their rights, then human rights can only be upheld through external humanitarian
intervention, in all its various manifestations. Therefore, a political struggle over rights is transformed into an ethical issue to be resolved by external actors. In this way, victims of human rights abuses are placed in a “sphere of exceptionality” that, far from being the foundation of politics as in Agamben’s conception, is a state of “anthropological sacredness situated beyond political dissensus,” thus “de-politicizing issues of power and repression” (emphasis added, Rancière 2010, 64).

There is perhaps no better example of humanitarian intervention de-politicizing contentious political conflict than that of humanitarian aid to Palestine. However, the role of trauma in mobilizing and sustaining this humanitarian response is somewhat ambiguous. As Fassin and Rechtman (2009) argue, the move toward trauma relief in humanitarian aid to Palestine was part of a wider “ethical shift” that recognized physical and psychological pain not merely as medical symptoms but moral and political categories (174-177). The medical discourse of psychological trauma provided the justification for intervention by international humanitarian organizations whose work involved not only treating the physical and mental scars of war, but also representing the human rights abuses and suffering they witnessed. Given the severity of the crisis in Palestine, the level of violence that the Israeli occupation was inflicting upon a largely civilian urban population, and the inaction and complicity on the part of Western governments, humanitarian organizations were compelled to intervene in any way possible. Since Palestinians were already relatively well equipped to handle emergency medical situations, intervention in the nascent mental health sector was one way that international health and humanitarian aid practitioners could help (Fassin and Rechtman 2009, 190). Thus, humanitarian relief served a dual purpose: providing care for people who had endured violence and suffering, and bearing witness within the international public sphere to the violence and suffering that the
occupation was inflicting; humanitarian intervention as “political gesture” and “clinical act” (Fassin and Rechtman, 192).

Nevertheless, in seeking to both portray and intervene in the human suffering of Palestinians, the discourse of humanitarian trauma places Palestinians in a sphere of exception, as merely human, unable to uphold their own rights. Moreover, while individual stories of victimization and abuse draw attention to human suffering, such discourse often distracts from the wider context of political violence. The discourse of suffering victims “on both sides” depoliticizes the violence of occupation and obscures the massive asymmetries in power between occupied and occupier (Fassin and Rechtman 2009, 202-205). Indeed, as Rancière (2010) again argues, “today, evil, with its innocent and guilty parties, has been turned into the trauma which knows of neither innocence nor guilt, which lies in a zone of indistinction between guilt and innocence, between psychic disturbance and social unrest” (186). In other words, the language of trauma collapses right into fact, and wider concerns about social justice are reduced to psychological pathologies. Moreover, these pathologies are used to define “Our” moral and cultural superiority thereby providing the ethical justification for the full spectrum of humanitarian intervention, including so-called humanitarian war (Rancière 2010; Hart 2006). As Hart (2006) observes, failure to meet international standards of psychological health in children is often considered to be the result of misguided cultural attitudes, in this way “humanitarian concern fuels ethnocentric disdain.”

The discourse of psychological trauma delimits political agency by pathologizing the suffering “victim” and justifying intervention by external experts. The assumption here is that the default response to any kind of violence or hardship is debilitating psychological trauma. In fact, symptoms of PTSD are often seen in only a minority of cases after exposure to violence, and the
majority of these cases appear to heal on their own with time (Thompson 2009, 52). However, as we see in Palestine, entire populations are deemed to be traumatized by violence and thus rendered politically disabled and in need of external intervention. Thompson (2009, 55) calls this a case of “universalizing the particular,” where the particular experience of, for example, a traumatized child, comes to represent the collective as a whole. However, the response to this trauma is not to look at the holistic political context in which suffering occurs, but rather to treat the individual symptoms.

Moreover, not only is trauma the assumed default response, but the emphasis on “telling one’s story” is assumed to be the universally appropriate way to heal and liberate oneself from past violence (Thompson 2009, 45). This imperative to speak about trauma emerges from a very specific cultural, medical and legal discursive framework, and fails to recognize the many different cultural as well as individual idiosyncratic responses to violence, including silence as a form of agency. In the case of Palestine, the discourse of trauma imposes a ready-made set of responses which emphasize tales of individual suffering, eschewing other possible responses including steadfastness, empowerment and resistance.

While Fassin and Rechtmen’s study focuses on the role of major international NGOs in carrying out humanitarian psychiatric relief in Palestine, what is not captured by their study is how ubiquitous the language of trauma has become at every level of civil society in Palestine, including smaller Palestinian NGOs. As (Abourahme 2011) points out, the adeptness at negotiating the language of international donors that many local Palestinian NGOs have developed is indicative of the flexibility and creativity that Palestinian refugees must use for survival. Nevertheless, as (Feldman 2009) argues, humanitarian discourse limits as much as enables political mobility by requiring victims to surrender their political agency in order to be
perceived as exemplary, innocent victims worth of sympathy. Moreover, the reliance on the medical discourse of trauma in projects targeting Palestinian youth is indicative of the trend toward professionalization among Palestinian NGOs. This trajectory from national liberation, to state-building and personal development will be discussed in the following section.

From national liberation to personal empowerment

The Palestinian NGOs responsible for implementing child trauma relief projects have their roots in the voluntary associations that have sustained Palestinian civil society for the better part of a century, and which have been crucial to the material and cultural endurance of Palestinian refugees since their displacement in 1948. The earliest incarnations of non-governmental organizations in Palestine were the charitable institutions such as clinics, orphanages and aid societies that developed in urban areas during the early part of the 20th century, in much the same vein that voluntary societies like the Salvation Army operated in Europe and the US during that time. Indeed, many Protestant Christian organizations carried out their “civilizing mission” in the Holy Land, a lasting example being the still active International YMCA in Jerusalem. Many similar local and internationally supported charitable organizations still exist, forming about 10 per cent of the Palestinian non-governmental sector (Jarrar 2005), with women and children’s health and educational services continuing to be a major function of these organizations.

It was the Israeli invasion of 1967, however, and the need to provide sustainable sources of medical and social services that eventually led to the formulation of active aid networks linking urban and rural communities and refugee camps (Jarrar 2005). Compensating for the lack of services provided by the occupying authority, these voluntary societies began receiving funds from the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee in 1978 (Craissati 2005). Seen as a Band-Aid
solution that sustained Palestinian survival while leaving unchallenged the conditions of the occupation, however, this passive form of *sumud* (steadfastness) developed alongside more resistant forms of steadfastness, or *sumud muqawim* (Craissati 2005, 186). The re-articulation of grass-roots volunteer activism in political terms was grounded in the direct experiences of the occupation and was given voice by politically-conscious, university-educated Palestinian refugees and villagers who sought to challenge the “traditional, nationalistic and elitist patterns of development through the mobilization of the poor” (Craissati 2005, 187).

Following a brief period of popular mobilization, the newly energized volunteer base splintered into multiple competing political factions. Leftist political groups took the lead in grass-roots volunteer organizing, receiving substantial solidarity support from leftist organizations and communist parties in Europe (Hammami 2000, 16). Despite political factionalism, these grassroots organizations played a crucial role in sustaining the momentum of First Intifada starting in 1987 (Craissati 2005; Gordon 2008; Hammami 2000). Likewise, women, children and youths played a leading role in the popular struggle (Johnson and Kuttab 2002; Peteet 1991). Not only were homes, schools and universities sites of political organizing and protest, but Palestinian children and youth themselves became highly visible symbols of resistance (Peteet 1994). This youthful resistance posed a challenge not only to the then 20-year old Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also to the Palestinian political leadership, and the gender and age hierarchies internal to Palestinian society.

The challenge that the intifada posed to the Israeli occupation as well as the authority of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in exile led to attempts by the Israeli government and the PLO to seek common cause in quelling the uprising and initiating political negotiations, starting informally with the Madrid talks of 1990 and 1991. With the possibility of a Palestinian state in
sight, NGOs began early preparations for an eventual shift to state-building activities, coinciding with a broader neo-liberal trend of private expansion into welfare service provision filling the void of state retreat (Hammami 2005; Hulme 1997; Shawa 2005). As bi-lateral “peace funds” began rolling in from the West, replacing the leftist solidarity donations that Palestinian NGOs had typically relied upon, there was increasing pressure, and incentive, placed on NGOs becoming “professionalized”, leading to increasing estrangement between professional NGO workers and the grassroots upon which they had once relied for support (Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 25-26). Part of professionalization meant adopting international donor priorities, practices and discourses. In this way, Palestinian NGOs became the “conduits” for transnational discourses of humanitarianism, development, and human rights (2007, 38).” Moreover, in the “struggle for international sympathy, recognition, and resources” Palestinian NGOs were obliged to “appeal to the larger international audience,” often by downplaying the political struggle for independence and instead adopting a victimized subjectivity in order to portray Palestinians as “worthy and ‘innocent’ recipients of aid or sympathy” (Khalili 2007, 38, 205; Allen 2005). As innocent, vulnerable victims par excellence children in Palestine went from being agents of history to representatives of humanitarian suffering and key targets of humanitarian relief.

With the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority a year after the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, many observers believed that the well-developed Palestinian NGO sector would play a central role in building an independent civil society by, as Shawa (2005, 211) puts it, “strengthening the rule of law” and “spreading the spirit of association and democratization”. Indeed, some Palestinian human rights NGOs tasked with monitoring the abuses of the Israeli military occupation widened their scope to include the potential human rights abuses of the PA, calling for increased transparency in the application of the law and in the
operations of government. This oversight, combined with a perceived challenge to PA authority, not to mention competition over funding, led initially to hostility between the PA and many Palestinian NGOs. After the World Bank established a $15 million for trust fund for NGOs, emphasizing the efficient direct service-provision role that private NGOs could play in health, educational and social service sectors within a neo-liberal governmental framework, the PA seized the opportunity and created the Higher Council of NGOs in 1996, distributing funds as political patronage to Fateh loyalists while marginalized oppositional Hamas-linked charities (Hammami 2000, 16). However, in 1998, independent and left-oriented NGOs managed to organize for the passage of an NGO law clearly defining the limits of government in the NGO sphere, creating one of the more progressive laws of its kind in the Arab world and to the proliferation of local NGOs (Jarrar 2005).

Nevertheless, with the influx of large amounts of foreign funding and the concomitant professionalization of Palestinian NGOs, many came to associate NGO workers with the same charge of unaccountability that has long plagued the Palestinian Authority (Hammami 2006). Furthermore, the production of the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a “peace project” recruited Palestinian NGO professionals into various networks of project funding and international conference circuits. This process is what Hanafi and Tabar (2005) refer to as the creation of a “new Palestinian globalized NGO elite” (Hanafi 2005; Hanafi 2005). As Jad (2007) similarly observes, “this ‘NGOisation’ of the national agenda in Palestine,” in keeping with similar trends in NGO politics internationally, has transformed “a struggle to realise self-determination and sovereign statehood into ‘projects’ for donor funding, in which donors play a vital role in choosing their local interlocutors” (628). These local elites, however, as Hanafi and Tabar (2005) emphasize, are not mere pawns of international donors, but play a role in shaping
donor agendas and asserting a relative amount of control over the ways in which development funds are distributed and utilized. Nevertheless, NGO elites remain highly unaccountable, answering neither to voters nor dues-paying members (Jad 2007).

This professionalization has likewise led to a process of overt de-politicization of Palestinian NGO activism (Shawa 2005). While many Palestinians have rejected the politics-as-usual of the dominant political factions, NGOs, fearing that an overtly political agenda would jeopardize international funding, have failed to provide the viable political alternative that some had hoped they would (see INCITE! 2007). During the height of the violence of the Second Intifada, many viewed internationally funded NGOs as being out of touch with the needs and opinions of the majority of Palestinians - continuing to support democracy promotion trainings and holding press conferences while Palestinian cities were being bombed (Allen 2002; Jad 2007a). However, in response to this massive violence there was also a massive resurgence of grass-roots voluntary society organizing. Networks of rural, urban and refugee camp voluntary societies once again mobilized to provide emergency assistance and other social services to areas cut off by checkpoints and military closures, oftentimes doing so in cooperation with larger international humanitarian organizations (Challand 2005, 2008; Fassin and Rechtman 2009).

Following the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, the democratic electoral victory of Hamas in 2006, and the subsequent US-backed coup that entrenching the territorial split and political rivalry between a Fateh-controlled West Bank and a Hamas-governed Gaza Strip, international humanitarian funding has taken on a state-building and consolidation function rather than emergency response. As can be illustrated in the chart below measuring humanitarian aid flows to Palestinian over the past decade, aid money peaked first in 2001 in response to the violence of the Second Intifada beginning in September of 2000, and then peaked again in 2009. The second
peak is not in response to a particular humanitarian crisis, but rather was brought about by
greater security cooperation between the West Bank Palestinian Authority and the Israeli
occupation which allowed for loosened restrictions on travel and building within Palestinian
Authority controlled areas of the West Bank (Area A), thus facilitating renewed state building
efforts and infrastructure repair. Thus, rather than responding to a humanitarian crises, current
aid flows to Palestine are intended to stave off political crisis by buttressing the legitimacy and
authority of the West Bank government.

![Graph of International Humanitarian Aid Flows to the Palestinian Authority in millions USD.](Image)

*Figure 1. International humanitarian aid flows to the Palestinian Authority in millions USD.*
*Source: GlobalHumanitarianAssistance.org.*

The influx of humanitarian aid money to the Palestinian Authority during a time of
relative calm reveals the utility of aid as a technique of governmentality, and the function of
humanitarian aid in the calculus of Israeli security. In Gaza, under intensified Israeli blockade
since the Palestinian legislative elections of 2006, humanitarian assistance is used to prevent a
full-blown humanitarian crisis that might prompt the international community to pressure Israel
to ends its siege (Gordon 2009a, 2009b). In other words, humanitarian aid is used to keep a
besieged population alive enough to continue to besiege them. In the West Bank, where there is both a high level of foreign direct assistance and a high level of cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli occupation, humanitarian projects serve a similar but slightly different governmental function. Humanitarian intervention, the peace process, and security cooperation all represent different attempts to transform the political dissensus of the first Intifada into technocratic ethical consensus. Here the “peace process” serves as a humanitarian/development/security complex managed by diplomats, political and military leaders, and international experts who share the same goal of managing the Palestinian population.

**Discourse, governmentality, and political subjectivity**

Having provided an account of the multiple political trajectories of Palestinian civil society, this section will further explore the role of humanitarianism in producing governable subjects. To do so, I draw upon a Foucauldian conception of discourse and power, as well as Rancière’s notion of governmental consensus, to argue that humanitarian trauma relief in Palestinian can be understood as a governmental technique of security, the aim of which is to render the Palestinian population manageable by territorializing the self as a target for intervention.

Foucault’s earlier work on power/knowledge, particularly his studies on the clinic and the prison, were concerned with the way that discourse produces subjects by delineating the boundaries of what is utterable or knowable (Foucault 1978, 1977, 1980). In his later lectures Foucault’s “genealogy of the modern subject” turned from a concern about the way docile bodies were acted upon by power/knowledge, to the “governing of the self,” what is often called governmentality. While sovereignty has as its goal controlling territory, and discipline works through the body, governmentality, Foucault (2009) argues, has as its main goal the security of
society, that is, a population that is “properly managed, maintained and encouraged” (42). In Rancière’s terms, Governmentality can be considered a technique of consensus government, since consensus “strives to reduce the people to the population”, that is, as opposed to political dissensus, governmental consensus seeks to transform the conception of the people as a political category into a mere demographic reality to be managed (189). Further, Rancière argues that the “management of insecurity”, in particular, “is the most appropriate mode of functioning for our consensual states/societies” (106); external threats serve to suture political divisions and create consensus around technical solutions to achieve security.

With governmentality, as with consensus, control of territory is marginalized and security of the population emphasized (Elden 2007, 32). The population is managed through maximizing “positive elements” and minimizing risk and inconvenience (Foucault 2009, 19). Further, governmentality emphasizes self-regulation of the population rather than direct control (37-42), and looks at danger as risk to be mitigated rather than events that can be prevented (56-59). Risks are minimized by trying to reduce levels of “deviant normalities” in line with the “normal, general curve” (60-62). Lemke’s (2001, 91) definition of governmentality is useful here:

the term pin-points a specific form of representation; government defines a discursive field in which exercising power is ‘rationalized’. This occurs, among other things, by the delineation of concepts, the specification of objects and borders, the provision of arguments and justifications, etc. In this manner, government enables a problem to be addressed and offers certain strategies for solving/handling the problem.

In this analysis, the medical gaze of humanitarian organizations produces the discursive field of the traumatized Palestinian youth, which is framed as a security problem with specific psychological techniques to address it.
Watts (2003), among others (Ferguson 1994, 1999; Li 2007; Mitchell 1995, 2002), has argued that international development is a form of governmental power/knowledge that defines a problem to be addressed with specific tools and practices to address it. As Watts (2003) argues, through “a variety of technics and micropolitics of power” (12), development seeks to shape conduct and secure rule “through a multiplicity of authorities and agencies in and outside of the state and at a variety of spatial levels” (13). Similarly, we can see governmentality at work in the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the role that civil society agencies play in managing the Palestinian population through humanitarian aid and development projects.

Since the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, and increasingly after the invasion and occupation of the remainder of historic Palestine in 1967, political Zionism has been vexed with the paradoxical dilemma of seeking to maximize the amount of territory under Israeli control, while simultaneously minimizing the burden of managing the Palestinian population (Gregory 2004). The Oslo Accords outsourced the task of managing the Palestinian population to the Palestinian Authority, which would be responsible for the welfare of the maximum number of Palestinians in the least amount of area, leaving the less densely populated rural areas of the West Bank under direct Israeli control (Gordon 2008). International humanitarian organizations and local Palestinian NGOs and civil society groups are complicit in this division of territorial space and management of the population. International development projects in Area C (see below) are subject to direct Israeli control, and relieve the occupier of its legal responsibility to provide for the welfare of the occupied civilian population. Meanwhile, humanitarian projects in Palestinian-administered Area A, including trauma relief projects targeting children, serve to manage, maintain, and encourage the population through techniques of self-government and empowerment, as we will see further below.
What is important to remember here is that this conception of governmentality is part of a “continuum”, as Lemke puts it, that “extends from political government right through self-regulation,” what Foucault termed “Technologies of self” (1988). For instance, Barbara Cruikshank (1999) has examined the role that civil society organizations play in producing governmentality through programs which promote empowerment. Her work on the “self-esteem” movement in the US is instructive. With the self-esteem movement “the self is made into a terrain of political action,” specifically “a terrain that carries with it new political possibilities for self-government” (Cruikshank 1999, 5). It is through the self that social problems are territorialized and “governmental solutions” mobilized (Cruikshank 1999, 40). As Cruikshank (1999) contends, “Building self-esteem is a technology of citizenship and self-government for
evaluating and acting upon ourselves so that the police, the guards and doctors do not have to” (91) Lemke argues that this is a specifically neo-liberal strategy which “entails shifting the responsibility for social risks […] into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of ‘self-care’.” In the case of Palestine, NGOs transform the work of policing unruly Palestinian youths into projects of self-governance.

If governmentality is about management of the population, as opposed to controlling territory, then promoting self-care becomes a way of managing the population through the terrain of the self. Viewed in this way, international NGOs and civil society organizations in Palestine relieve the occupier of its burden of managing the population, allowing the occupation to focus on the acquisition and control of physical territory. As Swyngedouw (2005) argues, this “governance beyond the state” is often celebrated by NGOs and “other civil organisations speaking for the disempowered or socially excluded”, without recognizing “how these instruments are an integral part of the consolidation of an imposed and authoritarian neo-liberalism, celebrating the virtues of self-managed risk, prudence, and self-responsibility” (1998). Civil society organizations and their practices are thus “embedded within autocratic modes of governing that mobilise technologies of performance and of agency as a means of disciplining forms of operation within an overall programme of responsibilisation, individuation, calculation and pluralist fragmentation” (ibid, 2003). In this view, NGOs focusing on the empowerment of Palestinian youth, for example, reproduce a neo-liberal mode of governmentality.

However, the strategy of population management through self-care is by no means straightforward, and often produces unpredictable and contradictory results. Bondi (2005) explores this duality of neo-liberal governmentality in her research on psychotherapeutic volunteer-sector counseling. Bondi (2005) explains: “As a form of governmentality,
neoliberalism works by installing a concept of the human subject as an autonomous, individualised, self-directing, decision-making agent at the heart of policymaking” (499). Nevertheless, she continues, “aspects of neoliberal subjectivity hold attractions for political activists because activism depends, at least to some extent, on belief in the existence of forms of subjectivity that enable people to make choices about their lives” (ibid). Moreover, the discursive practices of psychotherapeutic counseling “elude their textual representation in important ways” (Bondi 2005, 502) making room for more liberating understanding of these practices than textual deconstruction allows. Likewise, as we will see in the empirical examples provided below, the multiple, competing impulses which produce the political subjectivity of Palestinian children make for unexpected consequences as discourses of trauma and individual healing are taken in different directions.

**Producing trauma and traumatized subjects**

While the language of trauma is useful in highlighting the often hidden, psychological scars of war, paradoxically, this focus on the human suffering and individual healing can obscure the very context of occupation that such stories attempt to bring to light (Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Argenti-Pellin 2003). Rather than being used to draw attention to the violence of occupation, the language of trauma is used to sanitize any perceived political content of work with children and youth, providing instead a sterilized medical discourse that reassures foreign donors. For example, in a project proposal by a youth-oriented NGO in Balata camp the organization states that the “target group,” for the project, meaning children and youth, “suffers from past and on-going violence” leading to “educational, social and behavioural problems […] and to the development of negative psychological conditions” (Balata project proposal, 2 February 2011). Similarly, an afterschool program for children in Askar refugee camp near
Nablus targets “children between the ages of 8 – 11 who suffer from violence, or whose families suffer from harsh economic, social and psychological conditions” (Askar project proposal, 25 May 2011). In both cases the source of violence and harsh conditions is left intentionally vague, and children are rendered as passive victims.

Beyond this assumption that Palestinian children are always already traumatized by unnamed violence, however, there is also an implicit threat about what will happen if this deep-seated trauma is not addressed. For example, the mission statement of an internationally funded Palestinian NGO targeting “war affected children and youth” states that they seek to improve the “the physical and mental health” of children by providing “alternatives to violence” and a safe space for children to “release frustration” (NGO mission statement). Here, it is assumed that Palestinian children have no alternatives to violence already, and that external intervention is needed, not to protect Palestinian children, but merely to deflect their inevitably violent reactions by giving them other more productive tools to cope with their subjugation.

The threat of violent children is also implicit in another funding proposal submitted to an international donor for an art therapy and education program run by a Nablus-based NGO. The goal of the project, the proposal states, is to “improve the psycho-social health of marginalized Palestinian children from areas that have suffered violence, and to encourage tolerance and peaceful expression through the use of arts and other creative activities” (Nablus proposal, 1 July 2011). The project goes on to state that such creative activities empower children through “the means of self-expression” and provide “outlets for their energy and emotions.” Here again the assumption is that Palestinian children lack the means to peaceful expression, that cultural tolerance (as opposed to military occupation) is the underlying cause of strife in Palestine, and that children have potentially dangerous and irrational emotions and energy that must be
channeled into positive, creative and productive pursuits, rather than the inevitable alternative: violence and destruction.

Self-expression is also emphasized in a computer-related project run by the same organization. In a proposal to an international donor, the organization makes an appeal to funding for a computer education program on the grounds that internet-related activities can be a form of “psychological support” as blogging provides a medium of self-expression that allows students to “deal with their own personal trauma,” thus “strengthening the child's psychological coping mechanisms” and equipping “them with new confidence to take control of their lives” (blogging project, 21 February 2010). Interestingly, in addition to the Mental Health goals of the blogging project, other goals included learning valuable language skills and promoting peace. As the project description puts it, “Education in emergencies” not only “helps to heal the pain of bad experiences,” but is also useful to “build skills, and support conflict resolution and peace-building.” Specifically, “learning a new language” instills a “new sense of confidence” in children, and is likewise “of vital importance in the Arab world due to the high demand of fluency in the workplace.” So, here we see the logic of the market overriding the irrationality of Palestinian youth – if we empower children through language learning they will be peaceful and productive workers. Here, we see an example of what Prasad and Prasad (2012) refer to as the “recurrent anxiety of slippage between the ‘best global citizen’ and the terrorist” often conjured up in the flat-world geographic imaginary of neo-liberal globalization (352). International donors are presented with an ultimatum: help mold Palestinian children into productive global citizens, or allow them to become global terrorists.

As we can see then, a connection is made in trauma relief program between individual healing and personal productivity. As a youth media education project puts it, the goals of the
program are “to provide psychological relief and a productive means of self-expression to children and youth who have suffered trauma and other effects of violence and conflict,” and to give children the tools to “transcend personal barriers, such as trauma and lack of self-confidence, through self-exploration and personal development” (media project, 5 April 2011). Here, the violence of occupation is reduced to a set of personal psychological symptoms and individual developmental hurdles to be overcome through self-expression and improved self-esteem which are valued as being more productive.

In these examples, Palestinian children are assumed to be always already traumatized by an unnamed violence that, if left untreated, will produce a generation of potentially unruly, Palestinian youths, capable of launching another violent uprising. The solution is to equip them with the means to govern themselves through self-expression, personal development, and even professional development.

**Transforming the discourse of trauma**

Despite the de-politicized language, the Palestinian professionals and volunteers who implement these projects often see their work in a much different light. Indeed, in another section of the proposal for the children’s blogging program, the language reveals an understanding of the limitations of such programs admitting that “healing trauma” is “impossible in the current circumstances” because “the conditions causing it [occupation] are ongoing.” Instead, the project aims to “embolden the resiliency” of Palestinian children and strengthen their ability to “imagine alternatives” (blogging project, 22 February 2010). This language suggests that such work is more political than the language of mental health allows.
Similarly, the youth workers with whom I conducted interviews for this research saw their work as contributing to the ability of their community to survive and resist the occupation. For example, as one of the volunteer directors of a Balata-based community organization put it, her goals for the organization were “personal as well as social and national.” As she told me:

On one hand, I just want to help the people of my community, my neighbors, our children – because it gives me personal satisfaction to help people. But also, I see this work as pushing our society forward, creating a place for women and youth, with the goal of creating a strong nation that can resist occupation. (Interview 21 March, 2011).

Here, the work of healing the physical and psychological scars of war is not about an individual project of self-empowerment, but an individual responsibility to the community, itself part of a wider collective project of resistance to occupation. Likewise, another volunteer at a neighborhood association and youth space in Balata camp said that he saw his role as “organizing the power of the members of society so that we aren’t just surviving, but thriving.” In both cases we see the language of empowerment not being used as a personal project of self, but as a form of individual and collective empowerment to exist and resist.

This language of collective survival and resistance also animated focus group discussions and other research activities carried out with Palestinian refugee children as part of this research. In a focus group interview conducted with boys and girls at the Happy Childhood Club in Balata Camp, before I could start with my questions, 12 year old Wafa had questions of her own for me:

“So, do you want to just know about the bad things in Balata, or the good too? Because it’s important for you to see the bad things about the occupation, about how people suffer, but also how we live together and help each other” (Happy Childhood Club focus group, 16 October 2010). Here, Wafa acknowledges the suffering of Palestinian refugees, often the subject of
humanitarian and social science investigation, but is quick to underscore the active process of living and caring for each other that Palestinian refugees carry out each day.

When specifically talking about the negative effects of the occupation, Wafa’s friend Shireen acknowledged the issue of fear and psychological trauma: “It’s not as bad as it was during the intifada, but the army still comes at night, there is shooting and they use grenades, it effects the children, especially the young ones.” Wafa agreed “Until now you can still find injured people from the intifada, injured psychologically as well. When you see someone killed, or your house destroyed, that will affect you forever. A child who is injured or witnesses violence, that will stay with him his whole life.” But in speaking about their own personal experiences, the girls and boys explained that different people have different emotional responses to such violence. As Ihab, one of the boys in the group, put it: “For me, I was young during the intifada, so I don’t remember much – I remember shooting and people yelling, and I remember being scared, but it doesn’t affect me now. But other kids, it makes them nervous.” Similarly, Shireen admits she was scared of the soldiers when they came to her house, but unlike Ihab she says the experience did have a lasting effect. As she describes it:

I still remember when the soldiers came to the house, they blew open the door with a bomb, and they took my older brother, and when the soldiers came back after a while they came and took my two uncles, one is still in jail, and the other one is living in Nablus now. I was young, so it affected me, my psychology [nafs]. When they took my uncles, I was in 4th grade and I was very afraid. But when they came a second time to take my other brother I was in the 5th grade, I talked back to the soldiers, and he looked at me like he was going to hit me. Then he started to go past me and I started hitting him! [Laughs] I just started hitting and yelling at him to leave, and he was so shocked and confused. Then the soldiers started yelling at each other and they left! It’s just something I became used to, you know? They try to scare you with their weapons so that you cooperate; they use psychology so we have to show them that we aren’t afraid. (Focus group, 16 October 2010).
Here, rather than being depicted as a moment of injury in need of healing through education and self-expression, Shireen’s encounter with the soldiers is described as being itself a moment of self-empowerment and education about occupation and resistance.

The theme of overcoming violence was explored in other research groups that I conducted with boys and girls in Balata camp, as well. However, rather than telling stories of individual empowerment, or depicting violence in terms of suffering and trauma, one group chose to depict overcoming violence as part of a collective, creative struggle against occupation. In a mixed research group of 3 boys and 3 girls, the children took pictures of places in the camp that they felt were in some way significant to them and their daily lives. The children then grouped the pictures into themes that would tell a particular story. This group chose to tell a story about Palestinian refugee children using the cramped spaces of the camp to create places of play. The children felt that such a story would acknowledge the difficult circumstances of life in the camp, while also highlighting the creativity and resilience of the people. As one girl put it, “These pictures show our struggle, how despite the difficulties, we still have life, we have skills and interests” (Focus group, 25 January 2011). Here, in the reference to skills, interests and overcoming difficulties, we see traces of the types of trauma relief projects cited above, which emphasize individual empowerment through education, expression and learning new skills. However, the reference to “our struggle” suggests a more collective political alignment, and her defiant insistence that “we still have life” resists both the erasure of Palestinian existence in Zionist narratives, and the focus on suffering and death foregrounded in humanitarian discourse.

Beyond merely resisting the restricting frame of humanitarian suffering, however, this photography project serves to completely invert the geographic imaginary of humanitarian relief, in which active, globally-mobile experts dispense care and raise awareness about static, distant
others. As Yasmine explains, she intends the photographs she took to serve as an inspiration for children in other parts of the world: “When I think of kids in other places like in America, I think they probably have a lot of problems. Maybe they don’t have the strong family and society like we have. And they feel weak. So when they see what we are doing, they will be inspired to be strong” (Focus group, 25 January 2011). In Yasmine’s rendering, far from being helpless victims, Palestinian children are the actors seeking to mobilize a message of solidarity and assistance to children in privileged countries who have their own problems but who may lack the resources to address them.

Figure 3. Alley play.
In this visual story of children’s creativity and resilience in the cramped spaces of a refugee camp, most pictures depicted young boys playing soccer and riding bikes in narrow alleyways, and girls playing games in the confines of front doorsteps and rooftops. One picture, however, elicited disagreement between the boys and girls in the group. Nasr, one of the boys, objected to an image of a gun painted on an alley wall. “I don’t like this picture,” he said “it’s too violent, and it doesn’t fit with the idea about how children play in the camp.” But Nisreen disagreed, “No, it shows that there is freedom.” Nasr immediately objected “What freedom? There’s no freedom here!” Nisreen responded: “Of course not, but the picture shows that although we don’t have freedom, we still struggle, and we still have abilities. Like, we have the ability to create pretty pictures even on the walls of the camp” (focus group, 29 January 2011). In this situation, rather than the gun representing violence or trauma, or art being a means of
individual self-expression or healing, the ability to paint graffiti on the walls represents a creative struggle to not only survive but thrive under circumstances of occupation and exile. Here, the representation of children being traumatized by violence is again inverted, and the gun instead becomes a symbol of creativity and expression rather than suffering and strife.

While this group debated the place of violence in their story about play in the camp, another research group sought to directly capture in photos and video what they refer to as *athar al-ihtilal*, or effects of occupation – that is the physical and emotional traces of violence still imbedded in the landscape of the camp, such as bullet holes, martyr posters, and the blank spaces of destroyed homes. In this mixed research group of boys and girls, the children chose to conduct interviews with their neighbors, learning the stories of suffering and loss in the camp, not for external exhibition, but as an embodied, affective process of care and commemoration (see Till 2012a; Till 2012b). As one boy explains: “The video we made isn’t for the people outside. It’s for the family and the people of the camp. Like something nice to give people to remember the martyrs” (focus group, 1 February 2011). Beyond reproducing familiar visual representations of suffering for external viewing, or photographing traces of violence as part of personal catharsis, the act of representation becomes an interpersonal and intergenerational act of remembrance and solidarity, a gift given to neighbors and family members. Indeed, this film, and others, was screened for neighbors and community members in one of a handful of film-screenings organized as part of this research, at the behest of the participants.

Although projects that seek to relieve trauma in children often obscure and depoliticize the context of occupation, children use the creative means employed in these projects, such as photography and video, to highlight the violence of occupation, and emphasize stories of resilience. Likewise, while children perform acts of empowerment and self-expression through
these representations, the stories they tell deal with themes of collective struggle, memory and care. Finally, rather than being passive, immobile victims in need of external assistance, children see themselves as being active members of a resilient community that cares for each other, with strength in store for inspiring distant others in different parts of the world.

**Conclusion**

As we have seen in this chapter, discourses of humanitarian trauma relief serve to depoliticize the context of occupation in which violence and suffering occur. Moreover, trauma relief projects pathologize Palestinian children and transform the occupation from a political struggle into a set of psychological symptoms and behavioral problems to be treated by external experts. In this way, trauma relief projects and the civil society organizations that implement them play a role in reproducing governmental strategies of population management under occupation. Nevertheless, as this chapter has also demonstrated, NGO professionals, community volunteers, and children themselves often interpret violence, suffering and trauma relief in very different ways. Specifically, we see how children perform the discourses of individual healing and empowerment in the face of violence and suffering, but in a way that emphasizes the political context of occupation and collective resistance. Finally, in a similar move, we see how Palestinian children invert the geographic imaginary of humanitarian aid, by understanding themselves as mobile political actors who can assist and act in solidarity with other children around the world. As Rancière (2010) reminds us, though human rights are essentially useless, “sent abroad along with medicine and clothes to people deprived of medicine, clothes and rights,” these rights are nevertheless “not empty” and never “merely void”, but always potentially filled, and made meaningful, “by somebody or something else” (72). We have seen
how Palestinian children put notions of trauma, relief and empowerment into practice in ways that strengthen, rather than limit, a capacity for resistance.
CHAPTER FIVE: BEAUTY

“It’s just beautiful, ok?”

It must have been the beautiful spring weather today after the long rainy spell we’ve had, because, although they’d been reluctant to do so before, today the group insisted on giving me a walking tour of the camp. Ibrahim was particularly enthusiastic about the outing, rounding us up and literally pushing us out the door. When we got outside I said to Ibrahim, “You’re right, it is a beautiful day for a walk”, to which his friend Abu Amjad sarcastically agreed “Yeah, a beautiful day in a NOT beautiful camp.”

We walked along School Street, around the perimeter of the camp, Abu Amjad narrating our tour: “ok, well these are some old cars, and these are some crazy people from the camp.” Then he lowered his voice to a whisper adding, “And this store, the person who owns it does magic.” Ibrahim gave him a sideways glance. “Look, if you want to see a really scary place, this is our school! I regret the day I registered my name there. Someday I’ll escape,” he grins.

We keep walking, and the girls stop us. They discuss whether or not to go down an alley to see a martyr’s shrine. They want to show it to me, but there is a bunch of shabab [young guys] standing around smoking. “It’s better if we go another way,” Hadeel advises, “also the man who lives here keeps goats and the smell is killing me!” We walk to the cemetery, and another discussion ensues. Leena wants to go in: “It’s beautiful in there,” she insists “because there are flowers and birds and martyrs, and it’s safe, I come here all the time.” But Aisha is scared, not because of the dead people, she assures us, but because snakes hide in the cemetery grass. We move on, and as we pass the cemetery Ibrahim asks if I’d ever visited the camp during Eid. “It’s absolutely beautiful” he says “all the families come to bring palm branches to decorate the cemetery.”
We keep walking and we come across strands of brightly-colored bunting, which turn out to be torn up pieces of old cloth strung across the street. Hadeel explains that a family is preparing a celebration for either a wedding or someone getting out of jail. As we continue by, we pass two boys standing on the street, eating ice cream, watching us pass. Before I realize it, Abu Amjad and Ibrahim had made a go at the two boys. The youth volunteer who was accompanying us held them back, as the boys spat insults at each other, finally managing to drag them apart. I hadn’t noticed, but apparently one of the boys made a comment about Abu Amjad’s sister. Ibrahim helped Abu Amjad shake off the scuffle: “don’t worry man, if they come to our neighborhood...” leaving the threat hanging in the air to be filled with anyone’s guess.
The girls were waiting for us up the street, completely unfazed by the tussle and eager to show me the martyr’s shrine they were telling me about. “This guy lived on my street, he was my neighbor. I remember him, he was nice to me.” Hadeel tells me. “I remember his funeral, when they carried his body to the cemetery. I watched from my roof. It was loud, because they were shooting guns, but I wasn’t scared, it’s normal.” The girls comment on how pretty the memorial is, and how carefully it was constructed by friends and family. We walk a ways up, and the girls stop to show me a brightly colored mural of the Ka’ba in Mecca. They comment about how nice the mural is and on the beauty of hajj. Hadeel and Leena, being close to home, decide to take their leave. Abu Amjad, still upset by the fight, decides to go home too, his sister Aisha in tow. Ibrahim and I walk silently up the street, the fight weighing heavily on my mind. “How could I
have allowed that to happen? Should I have tried to make peace between the boys?” Then, Ibrahim stops abruptly, and, breaking the heavy silence says in a serious voice: “wait, there’s something I want to show you, something very important... look.” I can’t figure out what he’s showing me. The martyr posters? The bullet holes? “What is it?” I ask, looking for something important. He points, then bursts out laughing, putting his hand over his face trying to contain himself. Then I see it. Right in front of me. It’s me. It’s us. I hadn’t noticed, but right beside us was a shop with tinted mirror windows which were buckled and warped, distorting our reflections, giving Ibrahim short stumpy legs and a long face, and me, a squished-up head and bulging torso. “I love things like this,” Ibrahim sighs. We continue walking up the street in silence, Ibrahim grinning as I gazed anew at the landscape of the camp, once seemingly familiar, now alien and bursting with surprise, cast in the strange and beautiful hue of a springtime sunset (field notes, 31 March 2011).

Figure 7. A painted image of the Ka’ba in Mecca indicating that the resident of this home has made the hajj pilgrimage. The Arabic reads: “There is no god but Allah, Mohammad is the messenger of Allah.”
“I want freedom, the right to self-expression, everybody's right to beautiful, radiant things.”

- Emma Goldman

“…the days that will follow will be more beautiful, so let the days pass now and wear your prettiest clothes, run and then run again in the gardens of your long life, go forward and forward for nothing is behind you but the past, and this is your voice I hear all the time as a melody of freedom.”

- Palestinian hunger-striker Thaer Halahleh in a letter to his daughter

10 May 2012

“To God belongs whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth, so that He may recompense those who do ugly for what they have done, and recompense those who do what is beautiful with the most beautiful.”

- The Holy Qur’an, Surat an-Najam (The Star) 53:31

Introduction

As we saw in the previous chapter, the language of trauma has created space in the global public sphere where Palestinians’ stories can be heard and where the violent effects of on-going occupation can be highlighted even during times of “relative calm.” However, trauma discourse delimits as much as enables Palestinian political maneuverability (Feldman 2009; Allen 2009). An overreliance on the language of trauma risks infantilizing Palestinians, limiting their political subjectivity to that of child-like victims (see Peteet 1994; Thompson 2009). While Allen (2009) points out that images of suffering have been used in an attempt to portray the humanity of Palestinians to a global audience, Feldman (2009) argues that humanitarian aid limits humanity

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15 For the full text in English and a link to the original Arabic see Linah AlSaafin’s blog on The Electronic Intifada entitled “Thaer Halahleh’s letter to his daughter: ‘My Beloved Lamar…Forgive me’” posted on 12 May 2012, http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/linah-alsaafin/thaer-halahlehs-letter-his-daughter-my-beloved-lamarforgive-me

16 See Murata and Chittick (1998) for a wider discussion on beauty in Islam, including the dual meaning of goodness and beauty as implied by the terms iHsan and Hasana.
by “reducing people to their victim status [...] requiring them to appear as exemplary victims and not political actors in order to receive recognition of their suffering.” Moreover, trauma discourse summons a range of disempowering practices that aim to alleviate individual injury without addressing the structural violence of occupation. Finally, while stories of suffering and abuse speak real truths about people’s lives under occupation, a focus on injury alone presents an impoverished view of life in Palestine (Harker 2009a, 2006). As Fassin and Rechtman (2009) remind us, Palestinians’ stories of the past and demands for the future are not “fixed in the landscape of trauma” (211). Having explored this landscape of suffering, this chapter asks how children may be forging paths out of the heavily-trodden terrain of trauma, creating new political subjectivities and assemblages in the process. Specifically, I examine the role of everyday beauty in the lives of Palestinian children, as aesthetic disruption to dominant discursive representations and representational practices.

Representations of trauma and suffering underscore the significance of aesthetics in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Borrowing from Rancière’s political theory, we can understand aesthetics not as the philosophy of art or beauty, but as “a relation between what people do, what they see, what they hear and what they know” - what Rancière calls “a distribution of the sensible” (Rancière 2010a, 15-17). For Rancière, it is in the disruption of the dominant distribution of the sensible where politics occurs (Rancière 2010a). While this view of aesthetics is not specifically concerned with questions of beauty as such, this chapter examines the role of beauty in disrupting the discourse of trauma that dominates humanitarian aid projects targeting Palestinian children. Further, this chapter asks how beauty might help create space for other political subjectivities to emerge. In so doing, this research takes aesthetics beyond its traditional
focus on visual arts and representation, and toward the role of aesthetics in reproducing and transforming everyday life (see Mandoki 2007; Saito 2007; Rautio 2009).

Following this introduction, this chapter provides an examination of the treatment of beauty within the geographic and social science literature. Here, a case is made for a re-evaluation of the political potential of beauty as an affective, aesthetic disruption to political ethics. Following this theoretical discussion, I go on to consider the implications this political conception of aesthetics and ethics has for research in children’s geography. Finally, I turn once again to my fieldwork with boys and girls in Balata Camp. Using qualitative ethnographic and visual methods, I examine the aesthetics of everyday life in the camp, and how, for the children in this research, everyday beauty serves as a touchstone for religiously inspired political commitments, imaginaries and desires.

**Locating geographies of beauty**

Geographers have been reluctant to treat the subject of beauty with anything but distant skepticism. This reluctance is a result of the forceful critiques put forward by post-structural, feminist, and post-colonial theorists of the masculinist, European gaze (Rose 1993; Said 1979). Apart from humanistic treatments of beauty as everyday aesthetic experience (Tuan 1989) what little geographical research there is on beauty tends to view the subject within the context of neo-colonial scopic-regimes (Fluri 2009). Similarly, the attention that beauty receives in other social sciences largely focuses on role of the beauty industry in naturalizing white, Western standards of beauty (Adrian 2003; Hobson 2005).

However, feminist scholars and cultural theorists have lately begun to question whether beauty is necessarily predicated on female subjugation, or whether beauty might instead be
considered something positive, such as a social value promoting justice and equality (Scarry 1999), or a hopeful impulse toward the future (Felski 2006; Rautio 2009; Coleman and Figuero 2010). Indeed, one wonders whether this suspicion of beauty itself stems from a misogynistic attitude toward sensual forms of knowledge (Steiner 2002). Despite the endeavor within feminist geography to valorize marginalized forms of knowledge (Anderson and Smith 2001; Davidson and Milligan 2004; Bondi 2005; Tolia-Kelley 2006; Wood and Smith 2004), and despite recent debates about the function of affect in politics (Popke 2009; Lawson 2007; Smith et al. 2010; Barnett 2008; Wright 2010; Roe 2011; Ruddick 2010), the role that beauty as affect and aesthetic might play in creating new political assemblages and subjectivities remains under-theorized.

In considering the question of affect and its role in performing and transforming subjectivity, beauty presents a rather attractive, if overlooked, entry into this discussion. Neither residing solely in the eye of the beholder, nor existing as the intrinsic quality of an isolated object, beauty is perhaps best understood as a relational “embodied affective process” (Coleman and Figuero 2010, 360); a “deeply somatic” (Scarry 1999, 77) tangle of affective intensities including joy, longing, and even sadness, experienced at the level of the body. Indeed, we often refer to beauty as being “moving”, “breath-taking”, “stunning” and “jaw-dropping”, alluding to the embodied physical responses and movements that beauty evokes. As Scarry (1999) argues in her call for renewed attention to the importance of beauty as a social value, this strong, embodied response to beauty prompts a “radical decentering” of individual subjectivity, demoting us from our role as the “central figure of our own private story” and producing a lateral adjacency with the world that is closer to true equality than liberal notions of individual equal rights allow (Scarry 1999, 77-79). This decentering is brought about through the humbling effect of beauty on the beholder, and the way that a disparate assemblage of various human and non-human
elements, beholders and beheld, come together in order to create moments of beauty. Not just isolated events, however, these fleeting moments ripple outward, inspiring yet more acts of beauty as we seek to create, replicate and preserve beauty to be shared with others (Scarry 1999, 21, 310.) It is the sensual generosity of beauty, and its tendency toward balance and symmetry, that imbues beauty with notions of social justice and fairness, as the dual-meaning of the word fair implies (1999, 37-38, 76).

In thinking about the potential role of affect in creating egalitarian political assemblages as described by Scarry (1999), Thompson suggests that the “affect of beauty” provides an attractive alternative to the “aesthetics of injury” constructed by rights-based humanitarian discourse (Thompson 2009, 146). While pain, he argues, “reduces the person to the boundary of her or his body”, beauty, in contrast, opens the body to an “intimate politics of sharing,” as the sensual generosity of beauty provokes an “affective impulse toward engagement with others” (Thompson 2009, 147, 155). This urge to share beauty with others serves as a modest, “universal claim to some form of good” (154). The purpose of such claims is not to define beauty in fixed terms, as such definitions will always be inadequate, but rather to involve others in asking “what beauty might be” (Thompson 2009, 139-141). Since beauty inspires an engagement with others in defining what is good, which in many contexts will involve a “comparison with circumstances that are experienced as unjust”, beauty is not a distraction from injustice but “can be part of its critique” (Thompson 2009, 150). For this reason, beauty takes on added significance in situations of violence. More than a mere coping mechanism, beauty contrasts with and draws attention to injustice, pointing toward other more hopeful futures. In this view, beauty and trauma are intimately intertwined but have divergent trajectories: trauma draws pain out of the body, whereas beauty draws the body out of pain.
Though Thompson contrasts the aesthetics of injury with the affect of beauty, this contradistinction can be better understood in Rancière’s terms as the difference between ethics and aesthetics. While aesthetics is often associated with the philosophy of art and beauty, Rancière sees aesthetics not as “a matter of art and taste” but “first of all, a matter of time and space” (Rancière 2005, 13). Aesthetics, then, refers to the spatial-temporal distribution of the senses - what can be done, seen, thought, and said, where, when and by whom (Rancière 2010a). Rancière does not claim that politics is or should be grounded in sensation, or that sensation is necessarily political. Rather, he argues that what is political about aesthetics is that it involves a particular, contestable distribution of the sensible (Rancière 2009a, 1), and that it is through a disruption of the dominant distribution of perception that politics occurs (Rancière 2010a).

Specifically, Rancière contrasts ethics, the distribution of perceptions and capacities according to one’s position in society, with aesthetics, internal disruptions within the ethical order (Rancière 2010a, 19). Rancière locates an example of “aesthetic subversion of the ethical order” (ibid) in an essay published by a French workers’ newspaper from 1848. The essay is written in the perspective of a joiner working on a luxurious estate: “Believing himself at home, he loves the arrangement of a room so long as he has not finished laying the floor” (Rancière 2009a, 7). Recalling Kant’s notion of beauty as being neither an object of knowledge nor of desire (Rancière 2009a, 5), Rancière argues that the worker does not desire the floor as much as he ignores that it is not his. Contra the critique of beauty as ideological mystification (see Bourdieu 1984), Rancière contends that this ignorance is “by no means the illusion that conceals the reality of possession”, rather “it is the means for building a new sensible world, which is a world of equality within the world of possession and inequality.” (Rancière 2009a, 8 emphasis added; 2010a, 20). As Rancière explains, again evoking Kant, “The joiner acts as if he possessed
the perspective. This as if is no illusion. It is a redistribution of the sensible” (Rancière 2009a, 8). This is what Rancière calls the “aesthetic performance of the as if”, a “political dissensus” created through the disruption of one imaginary world by another (Rancière 2009a, 13). While the ethical ordering of society operates according to one “as if”, aesthetics ruptures this ethical order by constructing a different “as if” in its place (ibid).

Aesthetics, then, is political because it is the expression of a political ideal: “the idea of a future and the idea of another place” (Robson 2005, 80). However, rather than the non-place of utopia, Rancière understands aesthetic imaginaries as emerging between “a discursive space and a territorial space; the identification of a perceptual space that one discovers while walking with the topos of the community” (Rancière 2004, 14 quoted in Robson 2005, 80). In other words, utopias emerge between the physical space that is perceived through the senses and the discursive space that orders our way of seeing and doing. It is this aesthetic rupture that allows new forms of seeing and doing. As alluded to in Chapter 2, this notion of aesthetic rupture presents a new way of thinking about visual research in children’s geography.

**Ethics and aesthetics in research with children**

The notion of ethics as the distribution of what can be seen and heard and aesthetics as the disruption of the dominant distribution of the senses not only presents a challenge to conceptions of the political, but also challenges social science research itself, in particular research with children. Much research with children, especially in the field of psychology and education, is concerned with determining what is considered to be normal childhood development and categorizing children accordingly (Maclure et al. 2010, 554; Burman 2008). Even qualitative methodologies critical of the “patriarchal assurance of positivism,” as Maclure (2006) puts it, nevertheless tend toward ethical closure and yearn for some form “generalisation, abstraction
and mastery,” or at the very least, “settled accounts” (225). An aesthetical methodology, however, would be open to unsettling disruptions. Rather than ignoring, editing out or smoothing over the ragged edges of research, an aesthetic methodology would recognize the political potential of things out of place. In part, this is what Horton and Kraftl (2006a, 274) argue for when they urge researchers to resist the impulse to “quickly analyse, distil, generalise and categorise” the world, thereby draining everyday life of its political potential, and assimilating possibility into predictability.

Nevertheless, the slow method approach of Horton and Kraftl (2006a), and of non-representational approaches in children’s geography more generally (Harker 2005), has come under attack for being unduly restricted to the realm of personal experience, and failing to take into account wider social and political contexts (Ansell 2009, 196; Mitchell and Elwood 2012). Part of the blame for the myopic focus on the micro-geographies of children’s experiences, Ansell (2009) contends, is the persistent use of child-centered methodologies, including visual methods. Originally touted as a corrective to the disempowering, positivism of structuralist approaches which blur differences in children’s experiences, the turn to child-centered methods encounters the opposite problem: research is limited to the level of individual child perception and is thus unable to adequately account for the ways in which political and social forces work to shape children’s lives. Instead, Ansell (2009, 200) argues for an embodied methodology that mediates this divide by emphasizing connections between physical embodiment and conceptual faculties:

Embodied encounters, then, are not simply perceptual, but always involve emotional, cognitive and imaginative engagement; they are always relational. Other than, perhaps, in the youngest infants, perception cannot take place without interpretation, and interpretation involves bringing into play memories, images and feelings acquired elsewhere. Thus affective experiences of place are neither individualized nor unmediated.
Indeed, while embodied affect may be pre-linguistic, it is not pre-discursive (see for example Sullivan 2001). Although affect exceeds the boundaries of language, it is experienced by and works to shape bodies which are always already gendered, raced, aged, and otherwise situated within the social field. While Ansell calls for methods that take into consideration the elsewhere of broader-scale social processes that shape children’s lives, we can take this critique further by imagining how embodied, affective experiences might also, in Rancière’s language, serve as aesthetic disruptions that prise apart territorial and discursive space, and open up a perceptual elsewhere where different places and futures can be imagined.

An example of this sort of disruptive, aesthetic methodology is provided by Maclure et al (2006). In defiance of the “mundane realism” that continues to undergird visual methodologies in children’s research, Maclure et al (2006) borrow from Deleuze’s (1986) work on cinema to argue that visual methods can instead be used to explore “depth, complexity and the layering of history, memory and possibility in images and to connect the ‘closed set’ of entities bounded by the frame to the continuously changing ‘out-of-field’” (545-6). This “out-of-field” refers not only to the social processes not captured in the frame, but also “a more radical Elsewhere, outside homogeneous space and time,” the more radical Elsewhere of possibility (Deleuze 1986, 17 cited in Maclure et al 2006, 546). In this sense, the problem is not with visual methods as such, but the way they are used to serve strictly ethical, rather than aesthetic ends – that is, the way that visual methods are used to represent of the closed space of childhood, rather than to disrupt to such closure.

As noted in Chapter 2, child-centered visual methodologies have become standard methods used in research with childhood and youth (Young and Barrett 2001; Rudkin and Davis 2007; Loebach and Gilliland 2010). Though I had sought to balance child-centered methods with
adult-centered research and discourse analysis, in starting this research, I nevertheless regarded the child-centered methods used in my research rather uncritically, viewing visual methods as providing the sort of “mundane realism” that Maclure et al (2006) critique. Specifically I saw photo diaries, photo tours, and mental maps as glimpses into the real everyday lives of children. I failed to take into account how these visual methods are themselves central to the reproduction of Palestinian childhood discourse. As Allen (Allen 2009) argues, in a confluence of three intertwined elements, affect, visuality, and human rights, visual representations of suffering, in particular children’s suffering, are central to the formation of Palestinians’ rights-bearing political subjectivity. In this sense, the visual methodologies used in this research did not so much capture the ways in which Palestinian refugee children perform the discourses of childhood, as much as provide the very embodied means by which such discourses were performed. However, as we will see below, visual methods not only serve to mechanistically reproduce performances of childhood discourse, they also provide a means to aesthetically reimagine and disrupt these discourses.

How life in the camp is beautiful

In my research with girls and boys (age 10-13) from Balata Refugee Camp, children frequently used the word beauty17 in our discussions. At first, I ignored beauty as an irrelevant filler-word, used by children when they were unsure of what to say to a prying researcher trying to extract meaning from their photos and drawings. Over time, however, I became aware of other ways that children mobilized the language of beauty, specifically as a way of expressing

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17Children often use the formal Arabic word for beauty, jameel, in discussing the family, religion, and historic Palestine, while Hilol/Hilwa, literally meaning sweet but implying nice or pretty, is used more casually in talking about people, places and situations. The word betjanin is used emphatically to describe something as amazing or gorgeous. Coming from the root j-n-n meaning hidden, as in jinni (embryo), jinn (genie), jannah (paradise), and majnoon (mad), betjanin literally means to hide reason, that is, to make crazy – a term expressing the notion of beauty as affect.
religious and national imaginaries; describing and making judgments about everyday people, places and behaviors; critiquing social and political injustice; enacting the affect of care; expressing hope for the future; and as aesthetic rupture to the dominant perceptual order of trauma and suffering.

One particular focus group served as a turning point, highlighting the way I had ignored beauty as a distraction from the real politics of suffering that academics, activists and humanitarian workers are prone to seek out. The research session began with a discussion about life in the camp. Predictably, our conversation had turned to overcrowding and lack of places to play. One of the girls, Yara, at 10-years-old the youngest member of our group, arrived late to the discussion. “What are we talking about?” she asked, “problems in the camp?” I told her that we were not specifically discussing problems, but life in Balata in general. I asked her what aspect of life in Balata she wanted to discuss. She thought for a moment then answered: “How it’s beautiful. How life in the camp is beautiful [jameela]” (focus group, 10 February 2011).

When asked to elaborate Yara was hesitant at first: “I don’t know, it just is,” she said. She paused again, and then answered: “I mean how close people are. How we take care of each other.” The other girls and boys nodded in agreement. Jenna, one of the older girls in the group agreed: “That’s true. The respect and cooperation between people in the camp is something unique, something nice [Hilo]. People are close here, you feel warm.” Moments ago the children had been discussing physical proximity as one of the main difficulties of life in the camp. The discussion was framed within a particular ethical understanding of refugee childhood predicated on that which is lacking – space, privacy, rights. Yara, however, in her aesthetic rendering, had transformed the physical and social proximity in the camp from its main problem into its
defining beauty, and had transformed the overcrowding of the camp from a story of everyday suffering into a narrative of everyday care and beauty.

This disruption of the ethics of suffering by the aesthetic of beauty was played out in a different, all-girls research group as well. In this case however, beauty was not evoked as characterizing the relations between people in the camp (which this group criticized for being especially not beautiful), but in describing the care that goes into maintaining a beautiful home. For her photo-diary, Iman, who aspires to be an interior decorator, took a series of pictures of the interior spaces of her home. While her focus on the space of the home is in part a reflection of the spatial restrictions imposed upon adolescent girls in the camp\(^\text{18}\), Iman’s photos evoke wider spatial-temporal, even sacred, geographic imaginaries. As Iman explains, “I wanted to send a message with these images that this is a home, I live here, I’ve lived in this home my whole life, and it is beautiful” (focus group, 23 September 2010). The photos feature images of neatly arranged furniture and perfectly plastered and painted walls adorned with various religious and Palestinian decorative accoutrements including a Qur’an, decorative prayer beads and Palestinian embroidery. The other girls responded positively to the photos: “I like this picture because it is clear from the beautiful decorations that they have been building a home for long time,” one girl remarked. Another girl commented: “I love the picture of the Holy Quran in the home. That’s something beautiful, because we love the Qur’an.” In speaking about her photos, Iman commented that the decorations are beautiful because they show how her mother “cares for us in

\(^{18}\) During early adolescence, girls and boys in the Middle East often experience a transformation in their spatial mobility. Boys become less welcome in female-dominated domestic spaces, whereas girls, previously able to play in the streets around the house, find their unaccompanied mobility restricted to private spaces of the family home and school (see Gregg 2005). Many parents suggest that while this restriction to girls’ mobility is something found in the cities and villages of Palestine, it is more pronounced in Balata due to the already restricted amount of space and lack of privacy. Girls often describe feeling imprisoned by these restrictions, whereas boys often complain of having nowhere else to go but the streets. However both boys and girls use a variety of tactics in using their spaces to their advantage, as I will discuss in the following chapter.
this home, and how hard she works to maintain the home.” Again, this theme resonated with the other girls in the group. As one of the girls commented:

I like these pictures because it shows how her mother raises her well and takes care of her family. That reminds me of the sacrifices our mothers make for us, and how we want to please them, and please God by helping them. Also how mothers raise their children in Palestine, in difficult circumstances, so we must be strong and protect Palestine (focus group, 23 September 2010).

Following from this comment, I asked the girls how Palestinian mothers raise their children, and one girl responded: “They raise them in the Islamic religion, which means they give instructions about how to treat other people in a good way.” Another girl added: “Palestinian mothers must be extra careful with their children, especially here in Balata, because of the occupation.”

Figure 8. Iman’s photograph of plaster wall decorations in her home - this one featuring the name of the Prophet Mohammad, the 99 names of God, and the Fatiha – the opening verse of the Qur’an.

This spatial-temporal up-scaling of the girls’ interpretation of the beautiful home suggests that the space of the home, and relations between and within families, are enrolled within wider
national and religious geographical imaginaries. However, the use of Palestinian embroidery and Islamic decorative arts in the home are more than just symbolic performances of Palestinian identity; such images and practices simultaneously produce the home and nation while also serving as reminders that one is not at home – neither in one’s actual home, one’s homeland, nor one’s eternal home in the hereafter - evoking a spatial-temporal imaginary that stretches beyond the physical territory of the present state of occupation and exile. Likewise, rather than expressing a purely ethical or normative understanding of how a home should look or how a mother should behave, by bringing to light the aesthetic value of the work that goes into building and maintaining a beautiful home the girls express a kind of political solidarity with the physical and symbolic labor of homemaking.

Beyond just keeping up with the neighbors, maintaining a beautifully decorated home in a refugee camp (a meticulous practice often associated with landed Palestinian urbanites) also serves as a disruption of the aesthetic divide between city and camp, and an aesthetic subversion of the broader ethical order in which refugees must remain in their place as humans in waiting. Building and decorating a home is not a passive surrender of the right of return nor is it a simple act of coping or making do. The difficult, patient work of maintaining a home and raising a family under occupation is an act of steadfastness (samud). It is the “aesthetic performance of the as if” at the heart of refugee subjectivity – a refusal to give up their status as refugees, while at the same time refusing to be homeless, voiceless and invisible.

19 Maintaining an elegantly decorated and impeccably cleaned home is a labour-intensive and time-consuming aspect of many women’s lives in Nablus, with the relative tidiness of the homes of friends, family and neighbours being a common theme of everyday conversation. To urban-dwelling Palestinians, the refugee camps appear to be a place of perpetual chaos and messiness, such that maintaining a tidy home seems like an impossibly futile feat. However, as Abourahme (2011) puts it, “the turn to beautification and improvement of houses in many camps displays an awareness of the importance of interiority and nearness, as means of mediating both the uneasy senses of belonging and ‘home’ as well as the continuing existential threat; this is borne out in Shu’fat camp where the most ornate and decorated houses are also those that stand closest to ‘the wall’ (Bulle, 2009: 29).”

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If decorating the home is a way of disrupting one distribution of the sensible, and creating another visibility of beauty, cleanliness and control inside the refugee camp, it is the external world of *fawda* or chaos in the camp that threatens to disrupt such a carefully maintained space. In another session with the same group of girls, a discussion about the home turned into a discussion not of beauty and care but anxiety and fear. During the discussion, Leila remarked, “there’s no place in the camp where we can feel safe, not even the home,” to which Raghad added, “especially not the home.” Raghad went on to explain why: “The arguing. Sometimes my dad doesn’t have work. Other times he goes away for a long time to work inside [Israel]. My brothers don’t work, and sometimes they’re in jail, so there’s a lot of stress and fighting in the house.” Iman agreed adding “and sometimes the soldiers come to the house to take our brothers.” Here, the direct and indirect violence of occupation invades the house preventing any feeling of safety or security. However, this anxiety caused by the threat of the violent external world invading the space of the home manifests itself in other ways, too. As Leena explained:

> In our house, we all sleep in one room, and I sleep near the door. We keep the sleeping mats upstairs in the dark, so when it’s time to sleep I run upstairs to get the mats, and then I run back down again because I’m scared. Then I can’t sleep because I hear noises outside. Like, last night someone was kicking a can down the street and it sounded like it was in the house. I got scared, I couldn’t sleep all night! (Focus group, 2 August 2010).

Here, the sounds of the street invade the space of the home, creating fear and anxiety. Other girls agreed, adding that they are scared of burglars and kidnappers.\(^{20}\) Raghad, however, has her own way of coping with such fear. As she says: “Sometimes when I’m scared, I sneak out of the house and go to the cemetery, even at night. It’s nice there [Hilo], and my grandmother and

\(^{20}\) In an interview with the mothers of this group, they expressed fear not just that thieves and kidnappers would invade their homes, but that the very bodies of their children would be violated by collaborators working with Israeli organ harvesters (see Scheper-Hughes 2000 and Weir 2009 on Israel and the global organ trade). However, this bodily anxiety was rejected in another interview with a group of mothers who said that not only is kidnapping unheard of in Balata, but when children get lost in the camp the neighbors will help find the child, or return the child home.
grandfather are there, so it gives me comfort.” In a counterintuitive role-reversal, the beautiful space of the cemetery provides the care and comfort that the home cannot.

Against the violent and messy outside world, it is the desire of this group of girls to externalize the domestic aesthetic of care and beauty into the public spaces of the camp: a reconfiguration of ethical space – the displacement of one as if with another. In discussing a picture of flowers that Raghad had taken for her photo-diary, the girls discussed the benefits of beauty in public places, and their desire to see beautiful places and behaviors fostered in the camp. As Raghad explains: “I took a picture of flowers because it’s pretty [Hilwa], not just how they look, but everything […] I mean, they have a sweet smell [Hilo]. Also people can benefit from flowers because they make you feel good, and they attract birds and butterflies too” (focus group, 23 September 2010). The other girls agreed and listed other benefits of flowers: “Some people even make some drinks from flowers, or perfumes, or give them as gifts. If I had a garden I would do that.” The girls then discussed the possibility of growing gardens throughout the camp, not just in the nearby park or the cemetery, but along the streets, in front of shops and homes, and in schools. Leila, however, had her doubts: “I wish we could have gardens in Balata, but we can’t, they would all get crushed and destroyed.” Amina concurred, “yeah, the boys would destroy them or eat them!” But Raghad had a different suggestion: “We could build a special place for flowers, maybe just in our school at first, then we could encourage others to grow them, and show them how to plant them.” Leila agreed that this could work, but not without an appeal to Islam:

We would need to encourage people to take care of the space. For example, I’m always careful about keeping the space in front of my house clean. And if I see some glass in the street I’ll kick it away with my foot, to clear the path, because that’s Islam. Also, if I see someone throw garbage on the ground I will speak to them, and tell them “cleanliness is Islam, and dirtiness is from the devil,” and I will be polite to them (focus group, 23 September 2010.)
Here Leila echoes the *hadith*, or saying of the Prophet Mohammad, that removing a stone or thorn from the road is an act of charity. Raghad agreed and suggested that if the girls were polite, and remind their neighbors that “God is beautiful and loves beauty” (*inna Allah jameel wa yuHibuu al-Jamal*) people would surely agree with them and change their behaviors accordingly, thus redistributing an aesthetics of beauty and care from its place in the home, toward its proper Islamic ethical position infusing all aspects of public and private life.\(^\text{21}\)

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\(^{21}\) This notion of an Islamic aesthetic of public cleanliness runs counter to Winegar’s (2011) class-based interpretation of the trash clean-ups in Cairo following the Egyptian revolution as being an expression of middle-class values of cleanliness. Moreover, the emphasis on changing public behaviours and attitudes through acts of fostering beauty runs counter to the view that sees art, beauty or natural green space as having a deterministic, pacifying effect. For a discussion on attempts to enlist art and beauty to bring about public order see Castronovo (2007.)
In this discussion, the girls appeal to an everyday, Islamic ethic of beauty against the moral and sensory chaos of the camp. However, more than just serving as an aesthetic judgment about the everyday spaces and behaviors in the camp, this Islamic ethic of beauty informs broader notions of social justice. In a mixed group of girls and boys, one of the girls, Sajood, drew a mental map of her world as situated within a larger moral universe:

This is a map of good and evil. The ugly colors are evil. And the beautiful colors are good. The ugly colors represent corruption, the people who are strong and wealthy and have power so they violate the rights of the weak and poor. It’s like the Israelis [yahud] do to us, but also other countries, even the Arabs (focus group, 2 February 2011).

Figure 10. Sajood’s map of good and evil.
Ibrahim agreed, adding as an aside: “That’s like my big brother does to me!” In describing the beautiful colors, Sajood explains: “These colors are the good people, the weak and poor who are deprived of everything in this world [ad-dunya – the material world].” When asked if this geography of good and evil corresponds to any physical place, she answered:

There are ugly things and nice things everywhere in the world. In the camp, the ugly places are like the coffee shops where guys spend all day just sitting and smoking. It’s something very ugly [saya – bad/ugly] to waste your life and health like that. It’s haram [sinful]. On Resurrection Day, God will ask them to account for how they spent their time in this life, and what they did. (focus group, 2 February 2011).

As for the beautiful places, Sajood added: “Any place where people take care of each other without asking anything in return. Like, here in this center where they take care of kids and disabled people, and when people help their neighbors, that’s something nice [Hilo].” Here Sajood constructs a counter-topography of everyday beauty, goodness and care against the ugly injustices of the world.

In the same mixed research group Nisreen also used the language of beauty in critiquing the injustice of occupation. However, her mental map incorporates a temporal dimension, stitching together her everyday material world with collective memories of historic Palestine, and hopes for a life of security and freedom in another time and place. As Nisreen explains:

This picture shows the life with security. This is the camp. Not the real camp, of course, but how I wish it to be. Here’s our house. Actually, this is my real house. It has three levels, my grandfather’s home on the ground floor, my uncle’s home in the middle, and our home on top. So it’s our real house, but it’s like how it would be if it weren’t in the camp. The houses are right next to each other and you can’t see anything. But, here you can see all the beautiful things [Hilwa]. Like, there’s a river between the houses, because that would be something nice, right? And these are our fields, like we have outside the camp, and like they used to have before the nakba, only here the fields are right outside your door, and I could look at them every day from my window. Here you can breathe, there is freedom (focus group, 2 February 2011).
Here, idyllic scenes of beauty such as fields and rivers (often used in the Qur’an to describe paradise\textsuperscript{22}) evoke memories of historic Palestine while critiquing the current conditions of the camp. However, Nisreen’s map is not a map of the camp as such, nor a map of historic Palestine. Rather, it is a map charting the space that emerges between the material surroundings of the camp and broader spatial-temporal symbolic imaginaries. More than just romantic memories of an idealized past, or practical remedies for making life more tolerable, the language of beauty is used to express a political demand for life itself, a life of beauty and security.

\textbf{Figure 11. “The life in security” - Nisreen’s mental map featuring green fields, a river, olive trees, spacious homes, happy girls, a big school, a shining sun, and traffic moving freely.}

\textsuperscript{22} For example, in Surat al-Hijr (The Rocky Tract) 15:45-46 the Qur’an says: “Indeed, the righteous will be within gardens and springs, [having been told] ‘Enter it in peace, safe [and secure]’”, and similarly Surat ad-Dukhan (The Smoke) 44:51-52 says “Indeed the righteous will be in a secure place; with gardens and springs.”
Where the First Intifada was marked by disruption of normal life by strikes and curfews, the massive violence experienced during the Second Intifada has led toward a turn toward life-affirming forms of struggle, and the demand for life itself as a political demand enacted in mundane spaces and actions (Kelly 2008; Allen 2008). As Allen (2008) explains, “Although Israel overwhelmingly controls the material production of space through their monopoly on the force and technology involved in the creation of physical settings, Palestinians’ adaptation to and rejection of their effects are in many ways beyond the control of those who dominate and destroy buildings, olive groves, and roads” (475). It is through everyday spatial performances that refugees reassert control over space through their “capacity to stop noticing [the occupation], or at least stop noticing all the time” (Allen 2008, 476). What Allen (2008) describes is an aesthetic shift in the distribution of knowledge and ignorance. Neither resistance nor surrender, such aesthetic subversions serve as ruptures in daily life, providing the means for “reworking” the prevailing order into a new sensible world; creating “counter topographies” through the “unexpected connections” that emerge between overlapping layers of material and discursive sediment (Katz 2004, p.xi-xiv; Rancière 2009a). Rather than being a distraction to the injustice around them, everyday beauty draws attention to these injustices while calling for new ways of doing and seeing that are more beautiful, just and good.

**It’s just beautiful, Ok?**

As we have seen thus far, children in Balata camp use the language of beauty in expressing religiously-inspired ideals of caring, solidarity, mutual responsibility, social justice, and human security. Moreover, these beauty-based aesthetics serve as disruptions to the ethics of suffering and individual rights-based humanitarian claims. However, beyond seeing beauty as a counter-representation to trauma and suffering, or as pointing to other forms of political
subjectivity distinct from individual rights bearing personhood, this research stumbled upon more subtle encounters with beauty. Affective moments of beauty and the sublime, like that described in the prelude to this chapter, are political not just in that they resist dominant representative frames, but in that they evade and even parody the process of representation itself. In doing so, children disrupted the process of representation that typifies social science research by demonstrating on one hand the limits of visual methods to capture momentary affect but also how images themselves produce unpredictable, non-representational affective excess.

For example, for Ibrahim, whom we met in the prologue to this chapter, encounters with animals and nature were beautiful and inspirational in ways that he felt exceeded explanation. Before our walking tour of the camp, Ibrahim gave us a speedy narration of the images in his photo-diary, eager to finish and go outside. As he explains:

Figure 12. Ibrahim’s picture of rabbits. Not pictured: rabbits.
I took this. This is a picture of rabbits. You can’t see them, but they’re in the cage, and the dog is behind the cage. This is at our house, on the roof. I took this picture because... animals, man. I love animals. Here are some more animals, this is my sheep, and my father is putting the baby sheep next to the mother. I took it because animals. I love this because it is a beautiful scene, and the baby sheep is nice. This is nice too. This is a picture of ants, because, you know, bugs, animals (focus group, 31 March 2011).

Figure 13. Mother and baby sheep pictured with Ibrahim’s father.
At this point, his friend Abu Amjad\(^{23}\) interrupted incredulously: “What ants? What are you talking about, man? You can’t see anything in this picture!” But Ibrahim insisted, “It’s not important, I know there are ants there, so be quiet!” Here, it is not important that the subject of the photo is invisible, the photo serves as a memento of an affective moment of play and discovery with Ibrahim’s non-human neighbors. Showing frustration with others’ inability to see the significance of these unseen ants, he presented his favorite image, resplendent with such self-evident beauty that he refused any discussion on the matter: “This is the most beautiful picture. I’m not going to say anything about it. It’s just beautiful, ok?” (focus group, 31 March 2011).

\(^{23}\)To avoid confusion it is worth mentioning here that although the boy in this group is referred to by the Arabic kinship term “Abu” he is not, in fact, the “Father of Amjad.” As his friend Ibrahim explained to me: “There’s a man in our neighborhood named Abu Amjad, and he sells used electronics on a cart that he pushes through the streets, like old mobile charges. One day, Abu Amjad here took a cart, not the real Abu Amjad’s cart, just one he found, and loaded it with old mobile phone chargers and other things and started walking through the streets like Abu Amjad shouting ‘Chargers! Mobiles! Batteries!’ So, now we call him Abu Amjad! Everyone! Even his parents and teachers!” (Focus group, 2 February 2011.)
Perhaps it was just the pull of a beautiful spring afternoon waiting outside that prompted Ibrahim to curtail his analysis. But Ibrahim’s refusal to offer any greater or deeper meaning as to “why” something was beautiful was at least in part a rejection of what he considered to be such a silly line of questioning. For Ibrahim, the beauty of this picture and the moment it captures, cannot be explained by words or subjected to inquiry, it is just beautiful. For other pictures, though, he played the game, giving answers which are meaningful, and sure to satisfy the prying researcher’s search for significance. In another picture, Ibrahim explained: “I took this because, I mean, it’s a beautiful view. The grass, and flowers, it’s something nice. But, I didn’t notice the shadow, that’s a mistake, actually.” He pauses, then continues: “But, I like it, because it shows how my friends and I were together in the field, it’s not just any field” (focus group, 31 March 2011.) At the time of taking the picture, Ibrahim was so focused on capturing the beauty
of the moment in the field that he failed to notice the trace of himself in the frame. Then, upon discovering this mistake later, he nonetheless sees it as enhancing the picture by serving as a reminder of the fun he had together with his friends. Perhaps sensing, though, that this answer might not be meaningful enough he added: “Also, I mean, the field is green and that’s the color of Palestine, it’s on the flag, and, you know, the land.” Ibrahim took a similar approach with a picture he took of peas. He had a hard time explaining why he had taken the picture in the first place: “I took this picture on my roof with my family, because, it’s bazilla, you know...[pause] we eat it.” This time his friend Abu Amjad helped out, whispering a plausible answer into his ear. “Oh yeah, I took this because my mom makes it, and the mother is very important in our culture, and this is a traditional Palestinian food” (focus group, 31 March 2011). Here, a fun
family moment shucking pea pods on the roof of his home is transformed through the lens of the researchers gaze into a performance of traditional Palestinian cooking and family life.

![Figure 17. Bazilla, a "traditional" Palestinian food.](image)

For Ibrahim, his pictures were taken during moments of play, discovery, whimsy and inspiration, as well as just being with friends and family. For some of his pictures, he is at a loss to describe the meaning, and can instead only point to its inherent beauty, which provides some clue as to why he was moved to take the picture at the time. For other pictures, with the moment of inspiration long since passed and unable to be recalled, Ibrahim resorts to an adroitly performed parody of the research process by providing canned responses about the deeper meaning of the photo.

In discussing his photos, Ibrahim variously resisted and parodied the process of meaning-making and interpretation. Hadeel, however, subverted and re-appropriated the entire research process to suit her own interests and desires. As instructed, Hadeel took pictures of
ordinary objects and places that she encountered every day and that were meaningful to her in some way. Demonstrating the restricted range of her mobility as compared to Ibrahim (a subject which will be discussed in the following chapter), all 24 pictures on her roll were taken at home - the living room, the roof, and her shared bedroom. Moreover, almost every picture features a member of her family. Her cousins and sisters playing together on the roof; her brother sleeping in his bed; her little sister’s feet caught in an accidental flash of white flesh as her mother prostrates in prayer in the background. They are all pictures of everyday spaces and events which are meaningful to her. They are also pictures of such warmth and intimacy that even if everyone pictured had given their permission, displaying them publication would still feel like an inappropriate violation. Thus the pictures remain her cherished private possessions, not subject to the process of meaning extraction that is research and analysis. However, Hadeel did take a few pictures that were not of her family. Around dusk, she found a few moments alone to quickly and carefully snap a few shots of some beautiful scenes from her roof: a cat amidst the ubiquitous roof-top water tanks, a yellow-blossomed tree growing between the tight spaces of neighboring houses, and a distant hilltop, with settlements creeping up the side toward an infinite blue dome. All of these pictures could be framed within the themes that regularly came out of our group discussions: the shortage of water in the camp, the lack of space, the occupation and settlers. But she offered only one simple explanation: “they’re just beautiful” (focus group, 31 March 2011). The cat, the flowers, the sky, and the hill, are just beautiful.
For more beautiful geographies, more beautiful politics

In this paper I have argued that, in their everyday spatial practices and imaginings, Palestinian refugee children perform an aesthetics of beauty that disrupts the ethics of trauma. In so doing, children take political subjectivity based on suffering into new, beautiful directions. For children in Balata camp, beauty is performed through everyday acts of care between neighbors and within the home. However, these everyday spaces and practices are not confined to the micro-geographies of immediate experience, but rather are mediated through wider religious and national imaginings. Far from being simple symbolic performances of national and religious identity, it is the space between these wider imaginings and the everyday material word that the possibility of new political subjectivities and assemblages emerges. Children are well-versed in the rights-based language of trauma. But, through the language of beauty they demand
something more: life itself. They make this demand through an everyday, Islamic ethic of beauty - not an overt political Islamism, but rather a religiously inspired faith that everyday acts of beauty and goodness is part of confronting inequality and creating a more just world.²⁴

In focusing on the role of beauty in imagining, enacting, and articulating political ideals and desires, this paper makes room for aesthetics and beauty in our conception of the political. While beauty has lately been regarded with distant skepticism this research suggests a second look. Of course, there is danger that in searching for significance in everyday beauty, and by couching it terms of politics and religion, we are once again attempting to capture the excessive, affective potential of beauty, translating it into a stagnant truth. Indeed, even as I write this chapter about beauty, I am reminded of the many other sublime, funny, awkward, and boring moments that punctuated my research with children, and which evade easy signification with terms like politics and resistance. However, as Maclure (2010) reminds us, we can proceed “in the face of this limitation” by pursuing aesthetic methodologies which seek to “release a more open array of responses that are less burdened with the weight of prior assumptions, our own included.” Perhaps geographers can lessen this burden through research that engages more openly with aesthetics, perhaps even pursuing more beautiful geographies.

Similarly, this research suggests a need for greater attention to the role of aesthetics in politics more broadly, including the politics of occupation and resistance, humanitarian aid and

²⁴ This finding both confirms and extends Habashi’s (2011) findings about the increasing importance of an Islamic religious identity to Palestinian children’s political agency. Habashi (2011) finds that Palestinian children articulate a politics of transnational solidarity, Palestinian nationalism and resistance to global cultural hegemony in largely Islamic religious terms. While this research too found religion to be an important aspect of children’s political agency, what is interesting here is how an Islamic religious imaginary infuses the practice of everyday life as well as hopes and desires articulated in terms other than the familiar language of political resistance.
development, and childhood. The current political impasse in Palestine is marked by the failure of a particular aesthetic distribution of ignorance and sense known as the two-state solution. In this arrangement, a matrix of walls, by-pass roads, underpasses, checkpoints, permits and even noise restrictions on the call to prayer, conceals a Palestinian population whose very presence disturbs a Zionist aesthetic imaginary, while simultaneously maintaining constant visual surveillance of the occupied populace (see Segal 2003; Weizman 2007, 2002; Monk 2002). The occupation makes itself visible through watch towers and walls, while concealing itself in the flashpoint areas of cities and refugee camps, where the task of policing the Palestinians has been outsourced to the Palestinians themselves. Palestinian police patrol the streets during the day, surrendering sovereignty to Israeli soldiers after dark - an occupation of the night (Marshall 2011). With this particular distribution of the senses proving untenable, the task now it seems is to imagine new forms of collective identity and political sovereignty that could take us “beyond the national impasse” (Bamyeh 2003, 688). Counter-intuitively, perhaps the supposed obstacles for peace - land, security and religion - could serve as the basis for some kind of shared sovereignty, an accommodating aesthetic imaginary based on a common need for a secure life, a common love for a beautiful land, and even a shared faith in the promise that the land represents.

The recent protests against the Palestinian Authority and increasing living costs currently taking place in cities and refugee camps across the West Bank (including Balata Camp), suggests that the two-state peace process, propped up by international donors, is in serious doubt. And yet, what might take its place is still very much uncertain. Perhaps it is the Palestinian refugee child, dis-embedded spatially and temporally from the official political community of the nation (see

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25 Indeed, raising the political stakes of this discussion on aesthetics is the role of art in portraying the “humanity” of Arabs (simultaneously placing their humanity in doubt), as well as the use of beauty, culture and art as a “civilizing” tool in youth development projects. See Winegar 2008 and 2009.
Abourahme 2011), but also over-determined discursively and governmentally as symbols of the nation and citizens in the making, who can give us unique insight into emerging political identities, imaginaries and assemblages in Palestine. In the next chapter, we will explore further the way that girls and boys in Balata Camp work to re-imagine political identities in their everyday lives.
CHAPTER SIX: SHAME

“We have a place to play, but someone else controls it.”

There was a family that consisted of a father, a mother, two sons, and a girl. The family gave more advantages to the boys in treatment and everything in the family. The girl was prevented from going to the houses of her friends because they thought she would learn bad things from them. They didn’t know that rather than protecting her, they were actually weakening her. Rather than doing right, they were causing her to be in error. The reason was their wrong ideas and ignorant thinking. Finally, we address our parents and tell them: “Allah has ordered you not to give advantage to boys over girls.”

- Raghad, age 12, Balata Camp (Focus group interview, 22 February 2011)

Fear Allah and treat your children with equal justice.

-Hadith reported in al-Bukhari and Muslim

Introduction

As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, one of the major concerns for children and parents in Balata camp is a perceived lack of space. This chapter will examine how girls and boys of different ages are positioned within and use the limited space of the camp in different ways. I argue that geographies of shame compel and restrict children’s mobility, relative to their age and gender. For girls in particular, the imagined gaze of potential onlookers permeates public spaces of the camp, provoking and restricting certain movements and bodily comportments. Nevertheless, girls realize increased physical mobility and comfort through the use of various spatial tactics which serve to change their relation to restricted space (Valentine and McKendrick 1997; de Certeau 1984). However, I do not conceive of these tactics as a clear cut form of resistance against unidirectional gender/age domination, but rather I see them as everyday
maneuvers and accommodations by which gender and age roles are performed and improvised (Kandiyoti 1988; Baxter 2007).

In addition to tactically expanding their mobility, girls also use their relative immobility to their own advantage. For example, girls use access to study space, the computer, and television to achieve educational goals, broaden their understanding of the world, and create their own spaces of leisure. In this way, girls use their confinement in order to achieve the goal of unrestricted physical and social mobility later in life, often motivated by the promise of studying or working abroad, or at least outside the camp. As such, we see how children work to perform and push in new directions gender roles and expectations through their everyday embodied actions. Further, situating children’s mobility within the context of their imagined life course highlights the changing nature of young people’s relative mobility over time (see for example Green and Canny 2003).

In addition to exploring the ways that girls make do with restricted mobility in the camp this chapter also provides insight into the ways that adolescent boys face age- and gender-based spatial exclusion, as well. Although boys generally have a wider range of mobility in Balata Camp than girls, and have more freedom to wander, explore, and seek out places of play, this enhanced mobility comes at a price. As many boys and parents contend, the everyday terrain that boys navigate is rife with violence and stress. Boys must constantly defend their neighborhoods, homes, and places of play against rival neighborhood boys, older youths, and adults. Many of the boys with whom I researched in Balata expressed a deep longing for quiet, peaceful places of contemplation, and often expressed frustration about always being told to “go outside” by adults. Also, while girls aim for a university education and the promise of travel, many boys see their older male relatives with university degrees struggling to find work. According to many parents,
given the economic situation in the territories and the restrictions against working in Israel or immigrating, most young men in the camp have few options but to take up a trade or join the security services and eventually build their own extension on the family home. Therefore, while boys enjoy greater mobility in adolescence, they too experience their own form of confinement to the family home in later life.

Following this introduction, I explore the issue of honor in Palestinian society to consider the way that shame structures children’s everyday mobility in Balata Camp. From here I will provide a brief overview of recent research on children’s gendered mobility in relation to the youthful spaces of the home and street. Finally, I will turn to my research with boys and girls in Balata camp, as well as my interviews with parents, educators and community workers, in order to understand the different restrictions to mobility that boys and girls in Balata face, and the spatial/discursive tactics they employ in navigating these restrictions. I draw from focus group interviews with adults and children, as well as journal entries, drawings, maps, photos, and videos produced by the children in my research to explore the gendered geographies of children’s mobility in Balata Camp.

**Shame and honor as affect and ideology**

Any academic discussion of family honor, shame and gender in the Middle East is likely to tread into theoretically problematic and politically thorny territory. Yet the sheer ubiquity of the word ‘eb (shame), used by parents and children in focus group interviews to describe inappropriate spaces and behaviors, and overheard in everyday usage as a parental rebuke, forces us to consider the role that shame plays in shaping the lives and experiences of girls and boys in Palestine.
There is a lengthy lineage of literature from both social-cultural and cultural psychological perspectives on familial honor as a defining feature of Middle Eastern and Mediterranean culture (Peristiany 1965; Antoun 1968; Dodd 1973; Campbell 1964; Gilmore 1987). There is certainly truth to the claim that familial honor is an important aspect of family life in the Middle East. However, this view risks reifying “Middle Eastern” culture in monolithic and reductionist terms as traditional and unchanging in contrast to the dynamism of Western modernity and progress. Moreover, portrayals of “honor cultures” as inherently backwards and oppressive serve to justify a range of colonial interventions. While such instances of orientalist imperialism might seem anachronistic, they are alive and well in debates surrounding the so-called “Israel/Palestinian conflict” and recurrent discussions of “women in Islam.” For example, Salzman (2008, 2007), though lauding honor culture as an egalitarian approach to achieving collective responsibility, contends that the high value placed on family honor makes Arab society more prone to conflict, factionalism, and corruption, and thus less inclined to peace, human rights and development. A more inflated example of this honor discourse is found in Landes (2007) who claims that the perpetuation of violence between Israelis and Palestinians can be blamed on the unwillingness of Arabs to recognize the existence of the state of Israel out of their irrational attachment to outdated notions of national honor and dignity.²⁶

In contrast, a slightly more nuanced approach is offered by Hunt (2008) who argues that Israeli and American politicians representing “post-honor” societies need to make more of an effort to understand Palestinian definitions of respect, dignity and honor in order to achieve

²⁶ This view cannot explain why Arab leaders unanimously agreed to give full political recognition to the state of Israel if it withdraws from territories which it has occupied since the 1967 war, and why Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority have regularly reaffirmed their commitment to recognizing Israel’s right to exist. Likewise, this view cannot explain why some Israeli and American political leaders, apparently unencumbered by a culture of honor, show a similar unwillingness to recognize Palestine as a state, or indeed the very existence of Palestinians as a culturally distinct people with their own national history and heritage.
lasting peace and reconciliation. Still, this approach comes dangerously close to reproducing the same forms of cultural determinism and essentialism that neo-colonial discourses of honor in the Arab world perpetuate. As Baxter (2007, 740) argues, while such orientalist representations have largely “lost sway within the academy” they nevertheless play a prominent role in popular political discourse about Islam and the Middle East, ranging from neo-conservative apologies for American and Israeli policies to more liberal concerns about human rights and gender equality in the Middle East. So-called “honor killings,” gender segregation, and veiling have come to symbolize the oppression of Arab and Muslim women by the fundamentally repressive nature of honor culture (Baxter 2007, 743).

Against this view, Baxter (2007, 738) claims that this “honor-as-problem-for-women-and-progress” paradigm “obscures the rights and strengths of women and the obligations and anxieties of men.” In making this claim, Baxter (2007) does not mean to suggest that there is perfect parity between men and women in the rights and responsibilities owed to one another. Rather, her intention is to complicate simplistic cultural generalizations about honor as oppression in favor of explanations rooted in everyday experience which allow more room for messiness, ambivalence, and flexibility. Specifically, Baxter (2007, 738-41) argues, that honor should not be viewed as a systematic code but rather should be seen as a “sweeping ideology” about “right living.” In this view, honor serves as a “way-of-life” or guide for comfortable living that “imparts responsibilities and rights, regulates, restricts, disciplines, and denies” and also “calls for certain beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors while devaluing or prohibiting others” (Baxter 2007, 746). While the honor-as-problem paradigm focuses on female sexual purity as the source of familial honor, the honor as way of life view acknowledges other aspects of honor and
respectability including displays of generosity, hospitality, reciprocity, strength, dignity, humility, deference, and agreeability (See also Joseph 1993, 1996, 1999). Being honorable brings with it various social, psychological and emotional rewards, such as good social standing, respect, and confidence. The alternative to honorable living is a life of “embarrassment, humiliation, shame, and guilt” (ibid). Though honor and shame are felt individually, honor as a social value is invested in the family. As a familial system both men and women are required “to act and be acted upon, to dominate and be dominated” for the sake of family honor (Joseph 1999; Baxter 2007, 745-47). In this way, although men are more often held publically accountable for familial dishonor than women, women and girls are not mere props in a male honor show but are “principal actors” within the “complex and dynamic ideological construction” that is honor (ibid).

How, then, is this ideology of honor and shame experienced in everyday life? As we saw in the introduction, ideologies like honor take on material permanence in the form of everyday embodied practices and spaces. Again, Baxter (2007) provides a useful overview of what is considered proper behavior, dress and bodily comportment in performing the ideology of honor and avoiding the feeling and stigma of shame:

Women and girls are expected, for example, to have a clear destination in mind when they walk; sauntering is mistrusted as it might appear that they are “looking for trouble,” i.e., men. Eye contact with men is to be kept to a minimum. “Flirting” is disallowed. Home visits of non-relative males should occur when other adults (and, in some families, male relatives) are present. […] While women have responsibility to abide by these mores, their male relatives, as well as older female relatives, have the authority to and are expected to monitor them. This is generally considered to be an important form of protection for women—their right as females and something that males are obligated to provide.
Actions, gestures and modes of dress can thus be marked as shameful when they transgress the boundaries of appropriateness relative to one’s age and gender. In this way, shame can be seen as a representational category. In everyday practice, though, these shameful boundary transgressions are experienced as an intense embodied affect or feeling, that is, a bodily impulse or reaction that exceeds conscious control (Massumi 2002; Clough 2010; Sedgwick 2003). However, while the embodied affects of shame and anxiety compel bodies in one direction, other affective impulses such as boredom, curiosity, hope, and desire can propel bodies in other directions, working to bend boundaries of shame and redefine social mores in the process (Sedgwick, Frank, and Alexander 1995; Brown et al. 2011). The next section will consider how it is the affect of shame, rather than an overtly oppressive code of honor, that structures children’s gendered mobility in Balata Camp.

**Bodies, spaces and mobility in Balata Camp**

Studies of mobility in Palestine understandably tend to focus on the restrictions to mobility imposed upon Palestinians by the Israeli occupation. Technologies such as military check points and ID cards form what Halper calls the “matrix of control,” restricting the mobility of Palestinians while enabling the mobility of Israeli settlers (Halper 2001; Harker 2009b). This relational understanding of mobility reaffirms Adey’s (2006) notion of “relative im/mobilities,” that is, how the mobility of some is defined in relation to the immobility of others. In this way mobility serves as a key marker of difference and identity. As such, Cresswell (2006, 56) argues that mobility is always a “politically fractured and contested” resource, experienced and challenged at multiple scales (Cresswell 2011; Cresswell and Uteng 2008). The contested, multi-scalar nature of mobility is clearly evident in Palestine where the geopolitics of colonial expansion, bordering, and differentiation is performed and resisted through the everyday,
embodied encounters of Israeli soldiers and Palestinians at checkpoints (see for example Harker 2009).

The young Palestinians who participated in this research, however, do not regularly confront checkpoints, road blocks or other closures throughout their daily travels. The everyday mobility of most children from Balata is restricted to the camp itself. Apart from the rare shopping trip to nearby Nablus, an occasional visit to family members who live outside the camp, or the yearly school trip to the springs of Wadi Badan, school-aged refugee children rarely travel beyond Balata’s boundaries. As such, it is not checkpoints and restricted roads that serve as markers of relative im/mobility, but rather the everyday spaces of home and street. It is through crossing the everyday boundaries of thresholds and alleyways that girls and boys in Balata reproduce the gender and age hierarchies that shape their lives and actions. Nevertheless, as we will see further below, the geographic imaginary of occupation features prominently in children’s understandings of gendered mobility and the restricted spaces of the camp.

The street and the home have been treated as significant sites in children’s geographies and are presented here as key sites for social reproduction and transformation. Early sociological inquiries into youth culture privileged the street as a site of spectacular and threatening displays of male youth culture, with the home only later being put forward by feminist researchers as a worthy site for the study of gender, youth and families (Valentine, Skelton, and Chambers 1998; Gough and Franch 2005). Both street and home are complex and dynamic sites, with contested meanings and power relations. The home has been variously understood as a place of nurture, care, fear, violence, alienation, and resistance, as well a node of economic, biological and cultural reproduction (hooks 1999; Massey 1994; Marston 2002; Hayden 2003; Blunt and Dowling 2006; Blunt and Varley 2004; Blunt 2005). Streets too are complex and contradictory
spaces, having have been researched as sites of resistance, oppression, anxiety, pleasure, exclusion, creativity, and control (Sibley 1995; Fyfe 1998; Chawla and Malone 2002; Gough and Franch 2005; Herrera, Jones, and Thomas de Benítez 2009; Simpson 2008; Young and Barrett 2001).

In the Middle Eastern context, Asef Bayat (2010) argues that, in addition to being a vital space for sub-altern economic activity in the neo-liberal city, the street serves as an important public communication forum in the absence of a free press and civil society, as well as a significant site of a youth-driven cultural revolution against social conservatism. However, what might be seen as liberating spaces of free expression to young men could be viewed as threatening or oppressive spaces to young women. In my research, girls, boys and parents alike often portray the streets of Balata camp as a morally questionable place where older male youths congregate in displays of machismo style and consumption - showing off their mobile phones, jeans, and “spiky-look” hair. As such, girls and younger boys often find such spaces and performances threatening and uninviting. The privileging of the street in Middle Eastern cultural studies as the site of national politics ignores the internal gender dynamics undergirding this space. Moreover, this view discounts the home as a site of communication flows and social gatherings where national, cultural and religious norms and social hierarchies of gender and age are reproduced and transformed (Abu-Lughod 2005).

Rather than segregating home and street, this research shows how both spaces are constructed through complex, often messy interrelations (Matthews 2002). As we saw in the previous chapter, the spaces of street and home are often uncomfortably intertwined, with unwanted sights, sounds and smells from the street invading the sanctuary of the home. Likewise, the domestic disputes, family feuds, and physical waste of the home spills onto the
communal spaces of the streets. This boundary spillage, as we have seen, is experienced in the form of bodily anxiety which provokes various attempts at bodily control. Moreover, the ambivalence surrounding these spaces – the home as site of comfort, fear and boredom, and the streets as representing freedom, violence, and shame – complicates any straightforward understanding of gendered childhood mobility in Balata Camp.

**Affect, shame, and gender differentiation**

The narrative that opens this chapter was written by an 11-year-old girl named Raghad who participated in a mixed boys and girls research group organized at the Disability Resource Center in Balata camp. She shared this passage from her journal during a week in which participants were asked to make notes about their daily routines, the places they visited, and any thoughts, observations or feelings they had. Like almost all the other girls her age who participated in this research, the issue of *tefriq*, the inequitable differentiation between boys and girls, was an issue of great concern to her. Given the age of these research participants, on the cusp of early adolescence, it is no surprise that the experience of spatial differentiation is such a salient topic (Gregg 2005). The girls and boys who participated in this research were either just beginning or had recently undergone a significant shift in their social-spatial relations. As they enter adolescence, girls find their access to public spaces more limited, their mobility restricted, and the modesty of attire and coverage of their bodies more of an issue. Likewise boys are no longer as welcome in the spaces of the home marked as feminine and private. Not yet old enough to join the older youths in sports clubs, barber shops, and cafes, boys have few other places to go for enjoyment apart from the streets and alleyways of the camp.

Many parents and adults contend that although they strive for equal treatment of their sons and daughters, their inclination is to be more protective of their girls, for the sake of their
daughter’s safety and their family’s honor. Nevertheless, parents argue that the tendency to overprotect girls is found in many cultures, and, as Arab Muslims, is part of their own cultural child-rearing custom. Moreover, parents in Balata often argue that girls are subjected to stricter controls in the camps due to the general lack of privacy, and the precariousness of the environment. Most parents see a direct connection between the restrictions placed on girls in Balata and the experience of displacement and occupation as refugees. As Saleh, a youth worker from the Balata Disability Resource Center explained in a group interview:

> All the places that we could go to outside have been made forbidden to us by the occupation, so there are no public places to go to that aren’t crowded. There are lots of beautiful places, like the ocean, for example, in Jaffa or Haifa, all my life I've never been to the ocean, it’s forbidden. Here in Nablus, the only public places we have are small, like the Happy Childhood Park or Jamal Abd-al Nasr Park. Even this is a treat for the children in Balata, to leave the camp to go to one of these parks for the day. It's ok for families to go there with girls, they keep the young guys out, but still the space is too small, the girls can’t play comfortably. [...] By the time girls are as young as ten-years-old we have to start protecting them from so many things in the camp - life is more dangerous here (focus group, 21 March 2011).

In this view, the restriction of space caused by displacement and occupation creates a general lack of privacy that further restricts girls’ mobility. While young men are restricted from some areas reserved for families and children, they nevertheless are given free reign of the streets, thus preventing girls’ use of the streets as a play-space.

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<sup>27</sup> In line with this view, several studies in different cultural contexts have shown greater mobility amongst boys (Hart 1979; Hillman and Adams 1992; Hillman, Adams, and Whitelegg 1990; Tucker and Matthews 2001), while others studies suggest that differences between the mobility of girls and boys is contingent upon complex array of factors including but not limited to gender (Kytta 2004; Spilsbury 2005; Brown et al. 2008; Evans, Colls, and Horschelmann 2011).
Many other parents and children echoed this view that girls were placed under stricter control in the camp due to lack of privacy and security. In an interview at the Happy Childhood Club, 12 year-old Deema compared play in the camp with play outside:

I don’t play in the camp. The only place we have to play is the streets, but the streets of the camp are crowded with impolite boys. But if I go to my grandfather’s house outside the camp, I play outside around his house, in the streets, it’s normal. Here in the camp it’s a scandal! It’s not forbidden, but people will talk, they think differently here, the space is different, it’s too close, not comfortable (focus group, 16 October 2010).

Here, Deema explains that while play in the streets for girls is not expressly forbidden, the threat of family scandal is enough to restrict outside play. Her view that girls are afforded more freedom of movement outside the camp, as well as fewer impositions on their attire and behavior, was a view shared by many other girls her age. Indeed, some parents also observed that during times of relative political calm, parents in Balata were more relaxed with their restrictions on girls. This suggests a direct relationship between political instability and familial insecurity which manifests itself in terms of tighter restrictions on girls’ mobility.

Many mothers whom I interviewed cited the dangers posed by unfamiliar men, and the concomitant threat to family honor, as their main reason for restricting the mobility of their daughters. As we saw in previous chapters, repeated experiences of displacement and destruction have created a general sense of insecurity and precariousness among Palestinian refugee families, which is compensated for by the restriction of girls’ mobility. As Umm Ali, a mother from the Jamaseen neighborhood in Balata explains:

We’re afraid for our girls. We hear stories. Actually, just the other day we heard about a girl who was kidnapped from her school. And you know, in Balata camp, you have to be careful. Then there’s the TV, you know with those TV shows, and the internet, and the new culture, with dating and texting and I-don’t-know-what. It's dangerous for the girls (focus group, 26 September 2010).
Her friend, Umm Mahmoud agrees, adding:

There are men who do drugs, or drink beer, and maybe they’ll give the kids drugs and kidnap them to steal their body parts and sell them to the Jews. You know, because, maybe he can’t afford his drugs or cigarettes, because there’s no work. Not men from the camp, of course, but maybe from outside, in the villages (focus group, 26 September 2010).

In this conversation, a host of external dangers, ranging from the internet and dating to drugs and organ theft, threaten to invade the very bodies of their children. Girls, as symbols of familial honor as well as carriers of cultural tradition (King 2008; Sayigh 1998), are seen as being the most vulnerable and in need of protection.

Many other mothers, however, do not share this fearful view, contending that it is precisely because of the close relations of the camp that there is safety and security for children. Umm Sohaib, a young, divorced mother of two explains that it is this familiarity between the boys and girls in the neighborhood that makes it safe for girls to get around:

The girls of the camp are well-known. They are familiar to the boys of the camp, and none of the boys of the camp would do anything wrong to any girl of the camp. There are borders, you know. They wouldn’t do anything because everyone knows what goes on here, you know what happens. The boys and girls here live like a big family, for example, this boy knows that this girl is his neighbor, so he will never, never try to do anything with her. He talks with her and cares for her as a sister, just that. Some of the guys stand around in front of the school after class and talk, you know, and look at girls, but they never do anything, they’re not dangerous. They know they are like a family, they are neighbors (interview, 12 October 2010).

However, as Umm Sohaib clarifies, this only applies to the area she is familiar with - her own neighborhood. As she explains:

My son knows half the camp, he can go there and back, but still there are some areas that he doesn’t go to because he doesn’t know them, and he’s not known there. My daughter, she has friends and family in the area but she doesn’t leave the neighborhood. I’m afraid for her. That’s my right as a mother, isn’t it? They say we oppress girls here, but I think all people are more afraid for their
daughters. And, really, people in the West give children unnatural freedom, right? I mean, after 18 they make them leave the house and survive on their own. But here, no, this thing doesn’t happen in our lives, in our society, not the boys or the girls. Look, my daughter has a few friends from high school who live in the city. She visits them, but she comes back directly to entrance of the camp after they finish studying. Her uncles get nervous if she’s not back on time, so they’re strict with her, which is good, especially since her father isn’t around, that means they care about her (interview, 12 October 2010).

Here, the stricter control she places on her daughter is presented as a parental right and duty, stating that the double-standard for boys and girls is a universal, but that the independence given to girls and boys alike in the West, in general shows a lack of care for children. Similar comparisons were made in other focus groups. For example, in a group of mothers at Balata Girls School, one mother explained: “We treat boys and girls the same, but sometimes we’re more careful with our girls. I think that’s true everywhere, although maybe Eastern culture puts more emphasis on protecting girls. It’s part of our religion to protect women.” Here again we see an expressed commitment to gender equality balanced with the admission that greater “protection” is afforded to girls, something which is seen as being inherent in all societies, although perhaps not as overtly. In the research I conducted with girls in Balata camp, most did not see restrictions to their mobility as a form of oppression, but rather as a necessary precaution to preserve privacy, respect and protection.

For many girls, the issue is not that they do not have the same unrestricted mobility as boys, but that boys have disproportionately more space than girls. Many girls see disparity in access to space as being both unfair and harmful to their growth and development as people. In this way, girls see parents as being misguided by their “old way” of thinking, believing confinement to be the best mode of protection. Moreover, as we will see further below, rather than seeing restrictions to mobility as a necessary outcome of displacement and occupation, girls
contend that gender equality in access to space is a central part of the overall Palestinian struggle for equality, freedom of movement, and self-determination.

Discussing the lack of space for girls in the camp, Taghrid, a 12 year-old girl who participated in the Disability Resource Center research group explained: “We go from the school, to the youth center to home. That’s our whole lives. We’re not allowed to play in the streets” (focus group, 22 February 2011). Her friend Abeer agrees: “if girls go in the streets all the neighbors will talk and say she’s a bad girl, or it’s shame.” At this point, Ibrahim, an 11-year-old boy in the group, spoke up: “That’s right, because it is shame. Look it is taboo in the camp, it

Figure 19. A mental map drawn by a girl at the Jamaseen Neighborhood Center. The map features only her house and the center and the route between them, illustrating the limited mobility of girls in the camp.
just doesn’t happen.” Taghrid conceded that playing in the streets was taboo but argued that if it is shame for girls to play outside, then girls, more than the boys, needed their own private places to play. “Okay, I agree, it’s not nice to go around playing alone in the streets,” Taghrid argued, “but if all I do is sit at home all day, I’m gonna go crazy. I’ll feel so sad if I don’t go outside and have fun. We play in front of the house sometimes, or on the roof, but these are small spaces, so if we can’t play in the streets then we need our own special/private places [amkaan khasa].” Again Abeer agreed: “Yeah, why should boys have special places to play and not us? There must be equality for boys and girls. Boys must have the same benefits as girls, not more. I’m not saying we should be out in the streets, but give us a private place for us to play equal to the boys” (focus group, 22 February 2011).
Although there are youth clubs and schools that provide activities for girls, the girls in this group insist that the clubs are small and cramped and thus only suitable for crafts and other activities, not sports. As Taghrid explains “The big outdoor places to play sports are all reserved for boys – girls can only use the playgrounds for organized team sports, but the boys use it for team sports and for just playing whenever they want, and they have more teams than we do, so they get it all the time.” Abeer elaborated, “We can’t even use the girls’ school. We aren’t allowed to. They kick us out. I mean, it’s not that it’s forbidden, it’s just that it’s not considered private enough, so we can’t use it” (focus group, 22 February 2011). On a photo-tour of the camp, the girls took me to the school to show me what they meant. “You see,” Abeer said, pointing out the space of the school which consists of a big open courtyard, surrounded by adjacent apartment buildings on the street just above and outside the camp overlooking the playground:

There is a big area for boys to use here, but we can’t use it because it’s too open. It doesn’t seem open but look, people can look down at us from their houses up there, you see? We train in the small sports hall inside during PE, and we can only use this big space during school recess, when there are teachers and when we are wearing our uniforms, but it’s so crowded with girls we can’t play anything. Outside of school hours, the boys come in and use this space (walking tour, 28 February 2011).

As we were speaking the school guards came in to tell us that the boys were coming in now. “See?” Abeer says with vindication, “we have a place to play but someone else controls it.” Just as she had previously indicated, the girls were not being kicked out, but they were putting themselves in an increasingly uncomfortable situation by staying, as boys in sports gear poured through the gates, looking and wondering what these girls were doing here with this foreign guy and a camera.
Figure 21. The mural at Balata Girls School. Note, there is one in Arabic for the girls, and one in English for foreign visitors.

Figure 22. Apartments overlooking the girls' school playground.

Abeer wanted to stand a while longer to videotape the boys playing in front of a mural painted on the school wall depicting a little girl and the slogan: “security, activities, and freedom
from violence.” However, Taghrid was becoming less and less comfortable: “Yallah, Abeer let’s go. Khalas, enough, all the boys are looking at us!” Taghrid had turned her body inward towards Abeer, her eyes cast downward, hands tightly gripping Abeer’s arms. Abeer shook off her friend, and walked closer toward the boys, immersed in the act of capturing this scene, safely observing from behind the camera. For Taghrid, however, Abeer’s interest in the scene only intensified the shame. Taghrid walked away, arms folded across her chest, biting her thumb, looking as though she would soon be on the verge of tears. I insisted that we leave, and Abeer, still unsatisfied with her shot, came running to catch up with us as we hurriedly left. When we got outside, Taghrid was still a bit upset and walked quickly in front of us back to the youth center, Abeer concluded: “We all suffer from lack of space, it is part of the occupation, we can’t go back to our land, but we girls suffer the most from this. We must all work together to change this situation. All of us” (walking tour, 28 February 2011). When we got back to the Youth Center, Taghrid had regained her composure and her confidence, insisting that next time she would hold the camera.

Again, this scene illustrates that although there is no official prohibition of girls being in certain spaces, the presence of boys and the gaze of neighbors creates a deeply felt sense of shame in the body. For Taghrid, not actually holding the camera, it became an object that magnified the attention they were giving the boys, and the attention they were attracting in exchange, thus further compounding her shame (Brown et al. 2011; Sedgwick 2003; Sedgwick, Frank, and Alexander 1995; Tomkins 2008). For Abeer, however, holding the camera changed her relation to the space, giving her a reason for being there, shielding and distancing herself from the boys’ reciprocal gaze. Finally, in Abeer’s view, the scene that she had captured, the lack of space for girls neatly depicted in a biting pictorial juxtaposition of boys freely playing in the girls’ school, is framed as being part of an overarching spatial injustice of forced migration and
occupation. While girls are viewed as the ultimate victims of occupation, suffering restrictions to
space doubly as Palestinian refugees and as girls, Abeer sees this intersectional oppression not in
terms of vulnerability, but instead as putting girls at the center of anti-colonial struggle; the
struggle of girls for gender equality in the camp is the same as the struggle of Palestinian
prisoners against Israeli prisons or of Palestinian refugees for their right of return. In her
aesthetic rendering, the girls of Balata become the people of Palestine. We will turn to this
discursive tactic in articulating spatial equality further below, but first let us further explore
further this use of bodily tactics and prosthetics in negotiating spaces of shame.

**Where do they want us to go? Objects, bodies, and spatial tactics**

The scene above illustrates how gendered spaces are enforced through surveillance which
manifests itself as a physical response in the body. The scene also demonstrates how different
bodily comportments and prosthetics work to reorient bodies in relation to space, deflecting
shame and permitting passage. Similarly, as Dalia (age 12) from the Jamaseen neighborhood of
Balata explains, girls sometimes use the appearance of performing a parentally sanctioned task to
expand mobility:

> Sometimes I get bored helping my mother in the house. But, I always agree when
she asks me to do a chore outside, like take something to my aunt’s house, or buy
something from the store. I’ll take a long time, and see my friends, and if my
uncles see me I’ll just tell them I’m doing something for my mom. If I come back
a little late, it’s normal (focus group, 24 September 2010).

While boys are out playing in the streets, girls are often playing or studying in and around the
house, and are at more immediate disposal to assist their mothers with various household chores.
Girls, then, use their position as household helper to realize greater mobility outside the house.
Figure 23. Girls carrying bags of groceries to their home.

Very often it is the presence of certain objects, such as a bag of groceries and a handful of shekels that indicates that girls are helping their mothers, transforming what would be a shameful act of playing in the streets unaccompanied into a commendable act of obedience. Even the presence of the camera, as in the example above, changed the girls’ relationship toward the space. Abeer, who was imbued with a sense of purpose by the camera, felt empowered to be there, whereas for Taghrid, the gazes that the camera attracted turned her presence into an act of shame. Other students reported similar experiences when taking disposable cameras out on their own, or with older siblings, saying the camera allowed them access to places they had never been before, but sometimes attracted unwanted attention.
In another mixed boys and girls research group, the presence of the camera, and a specific research task, allowed us access into otherwise prohibitive spaces. Two participants, Omar and Mais, decided that I had not really seen enough of the camp. On all previous photo tours with other groups, the tour more or less consisted of a walk around the camp. A typical tour would start at the UNRWA Girls’ School, near the camp services office and other community and youth centers, and travel up the wide boulevard of School Street that marked the western edge of the camp, toward the old cemetery at the south-west corner. The route then curves down toward the new cemetery for a view of the outlying fields that border Balata camp to the south. After that, the tour takes a straight shot up the main Market Street, towards the big mosque at the camp entrance. With a large group, the wider streets are easier to navigate than the more private, inner-streets of the camp where the presence of such a group might make navigating the tight spaces uncomfortable, and might draw unwanted suspicion.

Omar, age 12 from Balata Boys School, and Mais, also age 12 from Balata Girls School, wanted to document two features of the camp that they felt were essential to understanding the lives of children in the camp, so the three of us, along with a volunteer from a local youth center, went on a small guided tour together. Omar wanted to photograph the athar al-iHtilal, or the effects of occupation, by which he meant the traces and artifacts that testified to the events of the intifada in Balata camp, specifically martyr posters, bullet holes, and destroyed houses. Mais wanted to document how children use the narrow alleyways of the camp as spaces of play. Omar knew of two homes in his neighborhood that had been destroyed, and suggested that we could find kids playing nearby for Mais as well. Coming out of the community center, we took one of the by-ways up to the main market street where we waded through a crowd of shoppers and vendors and entered into a quiet side street, with a mix of houses and small shops. In front of the
small shops selling trinkets, stuffed animals, and CDs, young men stood outside together smoking and listening to music. At nearby houses, women stood chatting with neighbors as children played at their feet. We turned another corner and came to a barber shop that was cattycorner to a small empty lot. “This is it,” Omar announced.

We had arrived at a suspicious blank spot in an otherwise dense urban area. The walls of three adjoining houses, the sky, and the street, formed an empty box carpeted with concrete and dirt, where two small children sat playing. This was the effect of the occupation that Omar had come to photograph: the absence of a house. Loud Arabic pop music blasted from a small barber shop nearby, which was full of young men, smoking and chatting, as they waited their turn for a shave and a haircut. An immaculately coiffed coiffeur dressed in a black t-shirt and jeans came outside to greet us at the doorway. The windows were plastered with glossy portraits of Leonardo DiCaprio, posters of Real Madrid striker Cristiano Ronaldo, and a poster of an equally coiffed man, apparently the barber’s brother, staring off in profile, flanked on either side by Palestinian flags, with a photo-shopped image of the Dome of the Rock behind him. Omar politely asked permission to photograph the house, to which the barber replied: “What? Why do you want to take a picture of that? Take a picture of me, it’s a nicer view!” Omar smiled sheepishly and dutifully took his picture. Then, Omar explained what he was doing, and started asking some questions about the man’s brother. The man held out his fingers and thumb pinched together in an upward fashion in the “wait a moment” gesture. Then, he put his hand on Omar’s shoulder gently and said “come,” as he led Omar to read his brother’s poster. Omar read the poster silently, as the barber looked at him intently. Then the barber posed next to the poster with a more serious face, and held up his index finger in silent testimony that “there is no god but God and Mohammad is the messenger of God.” Omar again, dutifully took the man’s picture, and
upon giving it an approving nod, the barber broke his serious pose and put on his big grin again. “So what, habibi, you’re a journalist now or something?” Omar just smiled and said, “Maybe. Be careful, I will put you on the news” (guided tour field notes, 24 February 2011).

Omar then turned to photograph the empty space of the house, trying to get the best shot. Mais had already been clicking away behind us, taking pictures of the two kids playing in the empty lot, and was now standing in the shadow of the adjacent house looking at her shots. As Omar was taking his pictures the rest of the guys from the barber shop came outside and crowded around to see what was going on. One of the guys put his arm around the barber and said “yallah, take a picture, Omar!” The two men grinned, and Omar again obliged. Mais and I started attracting their glances, nods and whispers. I thanked them for letting us take some pictures of the area, and Mais did her best to absorb herself in the camera and appear inconspicuous. Her physical comportment took on a more childlike stance. As she fiddled with the camera in her hands, she swayed in place and kicked the rocks at her feet, perhaps unconsciously playing to the indeterminacy of her age to gain access to this space dominated by men. The camera also gave her access to this scene, giving her both a purpose to be there, and a mechanism for distancing herself from the men, as well providing her with a reason to leave once she started getting uncomfortable. As the crowd of men grew larger, Mais and I made eye contact and she nodded at me decisively then turned to Omar: “yallah, let’s go, that’s enough, we have more pictures to take.”

Omar thanked the barber and we left quickly, with Mais leading the way. She turned to me and whispered “those guys are nawar”, providing a rough translation in English: “naughty!” Then, looking back at Omar, she asked “is this the right way?” Omar replied with a silent, affirmative nod, navigating the streets with sense memory while reviewing the shots he had just
taken with the digital camera. I asked Omar what he had found out about the house and the man who lived there, and he said “I’m not sure, exactly. He was martyred in 2002. Then the Jews destroyed his family’s house. That’s it.”

We turned a few more corners, walking through narrow alleyways into a more private, domestic area. The narrow streets opened up to a random courtyard formed by a T-junction of alleyways, the front walk-ways of six or so multi-story dwellings, and another conspicuous blank spot in the urban fabric of the camp. This confluence of semi-private alleys, walkways and doorsteps, along with the site of a destroyed house, came together to create a bustling communal play-place. One group of boys, who looked to be between the ages of 7 and 10, raced up and down one end of the corridor on bikes, while another group played football at the other end. Girls of a similar age, and their younger brothers, were playing house in the space of the destroyed home, while younger boys and girls sat together playing patty-cake and other games in the doorways of their houses. A woman carrying a cordless phone, wearing sweats, flip flops, and a casual house-hijab, exited the house and yelled something at the kids playing football. Two girls Mais’s age passed through carrying groceries. This intersection of small intimate alleys, far removed from the shops of the side streets and the crowds on Market Street, has a private, domestic feel. The protection of domestic privacy and familiarity extends from the houses and combines to form semi-public play-space for children, retaining a private feel that makes it off-limits to older male youths. Young men are noticeably absent, and the only men we see in the area hurry by us with groceries, eyes cast downward, heading intently toward their homes.
The alleyway football game stopped as soon as the players saw the approaching camera. “No, just keep playing, no over there, where you were, just keep playing,” Mais commanded them, pointing back toward where the game had been going. Mais had transformed from a nearly invisible girl at the barber shop, into the commanding presence of a tall young woman with a camera. Play commences, this time with running commentary from the players. “Messi gets the ball, he shoots...” - the ball bounces forcefully off the wall right between the painted-on goal-posts. The boy-Messi effortlessly flips his t-shirt up over his head, in a move he has clearly been practicing, and shouts “Gooooal!” while swooping across the concrete pitch with arms outstretched like wings. Mais rolls her eyes and shouts “ok, khalas, enough”, turning away up
the smaller alleyway to photograph the younger boys and girls playing with each other in front of their home.

Figure 25. Playing in the narrow pathways of the camp.
Figure 26. The destroyed home.

Figure 27. Picturing destruction.
Meanwhile, Omar had spotted a few of his friends standing across from the vacant lot, chatting and casually passing around a football around their tight circle. One of them had a stick nonchalantly yet ominously resting on his shoulder, like an old-timey police constable. Omar went over to chat with them, and his friends started admiring his camera and his pictures, crowding around him with their arms across his shoulders to see. His sheepish grin had transformed into a proud smile he was fighting to contain. The boys looked back at me and one of them beckoned: “come, come!” Omar’s friend, the one with the stick, said in a mix of Arabic and English, eager to host a visitor to this area, “Al-Yahud, they destroyed this house, you see?” He pointed to the patch of sunlight hitting the empty lot. “Come, come… no, not you, get out of here” he ordered, pushing away some little boys, threatening them with his stick. The boy took us over to the empty lot and hopped up to sit on the half-wall. “You see?” he said, indicating with his stick “there were actually, like, three houses here. The Jews destroyed them in the intifada days. You know, it was like Gaza here, really. Then the family built them again, and then in, about, 2004 or 2005, does it say?” The boy checks one of several faded posters pasted behind him on the wall. “It’s not clear. I think in 2004 he made an operation inside Israel. So the Jews destroyed the houses a second time, just these two, though.” The boy explained that the man’s parents moved into the extended family home next door, and that his other brothers and sisters were all married now, and had homes elsewhere. “It’s for the best, both for them and for us,” he smiled “they get to live somewhere else and we have this space to play!” However, he added that sometimes “the neighbors get mad and yell ‘get out of here you boys!’” Motioning with his stick toward a broken window in the home next to the vacant lot, he added “You see that over there? We broke that window playing football yesterday. So, we can’t play here today.” We watched for a moment as the girls and little boys played their own imaginary game of house
in the space of this destroyed home, taking advantage of the temporary football hiatus. After a pause, the boy with the stick concluded: “I mean, where do they want us to go?”

Omar asked his friend to check if it is ok to take some pictures. The boy nodded with an air of responsibility and walked to the door of the house. After getting the ok, he nodded again approvingly. Omar took a few shots, carefully considering the composition. Meanwhile, Mais had been taking pictures of the kids playing, but they were getting rowdy so she decided it was time again to leave. We said our goodbyes and headed off with Omar leading the way. He took us through narrow passage-ways, just barely wider than shoulder-width. Mais said to me in a loud whisper, “We have to move quickly, we don’t want the boys to follow us. And don’t look through any of the windows. It’s shame. If anyone sees us they will make problems.” As she spoke, Omar cupped the camera in his palm, and hid it close to his leg. We turned a corner, and light from a small side street greeted us ahead. In the middle of the alley was another little space that formed the walkway up to Omar’s house. His little brother and sister, aged 3 and 4, were playing at the doorway. His mom and older sister came out to greet us. Omar took some pictures of his brother and sister playing while Mais and I chatted with his mother. Once Omar had finished we waved goodbye and left again.

Recognizing where we were, Mais guided us out of the alley, right at the small alley, left at another small side street, and back up to the main thoroughfare. We gingerly crossed the bustling market street, and continued back up another small side street toward the wide boulevard of School Street. Our pace relaxed from a fast walk to a light stroll. We made our way back up the street towards the youth center. We passed boys on bikes, girls playing hopscotch, vendors selling their wares, young men chatting together outside of shops, and old men and women sitting in front of their houses smoking argileh. I remarked to Omar that there is much
more space to play in this wide perimeter street than there is in the small alleys inside the camp. He replied “most of the camp is crowded and small like that. If you have only seen School Street, then you haven’t seen the camp” (guided tour field notes, 24 February 2011).

Taking us off the main public thoroughfares, our walk had allowed us to experience the various spaces of “naughtiness,” privacy, and semi-privacy of the camp, and how these zones mapped onto geographies of gender and age. While most of the shoppers and vendors are men, the main market street is also a place where women shop with children in tow, where boys help their fathers at the shop, and where girls go to buy things for their mothers. At night, with women at home, and sons taking over the second shift at their father’s store, the main streets are mostly the domain of young men, who hang out and talk, and walk together arm and arm. Nevertheless, girls are still sent to the shops at night and older boys take the chance to play more freely in the streets, especially in the summer and on weekends. The side streets are a mix of houses and small shops such as mobile phone shops, music stores, internet cafes, and barber shops, catering mostly to young men. Meanwhile, the narrower alleyways and corridors that make up residential neighborhoods have a private, domestic feel, but also form together to make communal semi-private playgrounds for children. It is a space dominated by younger children, policed by older boys, peripherally supervised by mothers and older sisters, and passed through quickly by men on their way to and from home. Bodily comportment and pace change as one passes through these spaces.

As young people in early adolescences, Mais and Omar have access to all these spaces, and yet, as they would tell me frequently, they feel as though they have no space all their own. In front of the barber shop, Omar was slightly more sheepish and unsure, but held his own with the young men as they teased him fraternally. Mais meanwhile was afforded access on the
assumption that she was still a child, who was here with an adult, apparently doing some school project. She made herself inconspicuous, hiding her face behind the camera, taking pictures and interacting with the younger children playing in the vacant lot, and standing around girlishly. In the area where the younger children were playing, Mais and Omar both took on a more confident and controlling comportment. As boys of 12 and 13, Omar’s friends took on the role of policing the younger kids and checking outsiders. However, at this age these boys have become too big to play in this space – their play can accidentally cause damage to surrounding houses. Still too young to hang out with the young men or play in their sports clubs, but too old to play football in the narrow alleys, Omar and his friends feel like they have no place to go. Likewise, were it not for her camera, Mais would have been out of place as well. Not being in her neighborhood reduced the risk of crossing paths with a disapproving neighbor or uncle, but it also meant her presence could quickly cause suspicion. The only girls we saw Mais’s age were the two carrying the groceries to their homes. It was the camera that Mais carried and her task to take pictures that likewise gave her the ability to pass through this space.

**Freedom isn’t free – the space of the street**

These walking photo-tours of the camp illustrate how bodies and spaces are gendered and aged in relation to one another. This view complicates a straightforward understanding of gender difference and childhood mobility in the camp. While boys have a wider range of mobility than girls, girls nevertheless find ways to cross boundaries and widen their mobility, and adults accommodate them. Likewise, boys too face certain restrictions imposed upon them by older youths and adults. Boys must constantly negotiate their play-spaces with adults, often being chased out of certain areas by annoyed neighbors and relatives. At the same time, they must police the areas around their homes, protecting the space from outsiders, and defending the honor.
and privacy of their family, violently if necessary. As one father explained: “Just walking to school and back is like a battle for boys – the streets are crowded, and just one bad word can start a fight” (interview, 26 September 2011). The freedom boys enjoy to play in the streets also imposes a stressful and often violent situation on them.

In a research group conducted with students from Balata Boys School, the boys undertook similar photo-tour and photo-diary research activities as the other groups. Not satisfied with photos and discussions to convey what they wanted to say, however, the boys suggested that they use the cameras to make fictionalized films about children in Balata camp and their everyday lives. To generate ideas and to see what kind of film might be feasible, the boys each drew a story-board depicting their ideas for a story about the lives of children in Balata. The boys produced an assortment of concepts ranging from an action film about the Israeli army invading the camp to capture wanted men, to a documentary about the destruction of houses in Balata, and another about the martyrs and prisoners, as well as an inspirational drama about a boy who successfully tries out for the men’s soccer team. Another proposed film focused on the challenges that boys face in finding places to play.

Figure 28. Boys’ storyboard.
In the boys’ story board the film opens with an angry dog chasing two boys out of a nearby field where they had been playing, sending them running back toward the camp. Out of breath, the boys finally make it back to their neighborhood. They decide to continue the football game in the narrow alleyways, but are quickly frustrated by the debris in the streets, adults passing through, and neighbors shouting at them -- the *fawda*, or chaos of the streets, as they describe it. Suddenly, the scene becomes violent as feuding family members begin fighting in the streets where they are playing football. As the fight turns bloody, the boys run to their homes. The camera focuses on the boy, now inside his home and looking out longingly into the streets. The home is crowded with siblings and relatives so he goes up to the roof. He looks down at the narrow alleyways below and then turns his attention to the flowers and plants he has on his roof and begins to water them. His gaze is then cast on the far horizon, at the trees and hills beyond Balata camp and the setting sun. The story, the boys tell me, is about how they long for a place far away from the chaos of the streets. While girls feel trapped inside their homes and unable to breathe, boys feel choked by the streets, searching for the comfort and security of home, nature, and an elevated perspective that allows them to see beyond the confines of the camp.

In another mixed group, the violence that boys face on the street was raised by 11-year-old Ibrahim, whom we met in the previous chapter. In his mental map of the camp Ibrahim drew his home and his neighbors’ houses, and in between them two stick figures obscured by a blur of scribbled lines indicating violence. Ibrahim explained:

The streets are all violence. You leave the house, violence. Neighbors yell at us, boys fight in the street, maybe some boys come from another neighborhood and make problems, or maybe someone’s cousin makes a problem with another family, and it’s war, so everybody fights. It’s all violence (focus group, 2 February 2011).
Figure 29. Ibrahim’s map of the camp locating “violence” in the lower left hand corner.

Figure 30. Another map of boys fighting in the streets.
Figure 31. Gates closed at the nearby park.

Many boys and parents expressed similar experiences: that boys enjoy little respite from the daily stresses and violence of the streets, school and home. As one mother explained, the violence on the streets is intertwined with the pressures of home:

> Our home is crowded, people coming in and out, there’s no place for him to study, so he feels pressure at school. He is good at school, but he feels pressure. His father is gone so he must be the man of the house, but he’s still young, he’s only 13. All that pressure builds up at home, so what does he do? He fights in the streets (interview, 12 October 2010).

Boys face the multiple pressures of home and street, but are also afforded relative freedom of mobility to escape and find fun when and where they can. In Ibrahim’s photo diary, for example, several of the pictures he took were of him and his friends playing without supervision in the fields outside Balata Camp. However, it is only outside the camp that this freedom can be found. Ironically, spaces that would seem intuitively welcoming to children, such as newly built local
park, are often too restrictive. As Ibrahim explained to me, describing a picture of the park from the outside:

I hate the park! I had a problem there. I snuck in there and the man caught me and he said I can’t be there, and I said why, and he said because I didn’t pay a shekel, and I said to him “hey man, what are you talking about one shekel?” And then he went for me and I ran and he chased me but I escaped! (focus group, 31 March 2011).

Built only within the last year adjacent to the camp, the park provides a small green space with gardens and walking paths for families. However, as many parents complain, the cost of entry, although only one shekel, is prohibitive for families with many children, especially when added to the costs of drinks and snacks. Also, many girls complain that the park usually has a lot of young guys crowded around smoking, making it an uncomfortable place for them as well.

**Making do with boredom**

While girls often lament being confined to the home and unable to go out to the streets, they nevertheless use the space of the home to their own advantage. For example, girls have space to study at home, whether on the roof or in their shared rooms. In their leisure time, girls say they enjoy playing games on the computer and watching television -- Arabic language soap operas and American TV shows like “Hannah Montana” being favorites. The time they spend on the computer and watching American TV might account for the generally better English language skills that girls have compared to boys, skills which open greater career and educational opportunities for them in the future.

In an interview with Abu ‘Adl, a father from Balata, and an UNRWA school inspector, he suggested that girls in Balata Camp regularly outperform boys on school leaving exams
because they spend more time at home and have their own places to study. Further, he contends that the greater academic promise exhibited by girls earns them more privileges at home:

Nowadays, parents are less concerned with boys. Boys have sports, or they spend all their time playing in the streets. But our girls do not leave the house, their lives revolve around studying and education, and they feel that if they do well, maybe they can get out. So, parents sometimes feel more invested in girls’ education. If parents have a boy and a girl, the old thinking was to invest in the boy, because the girl will just be married off. But girls are the lucky ones now. Parents invest in the ones likely to succeed, the ones who have potential in this life and work hard – the girls. I know people who even take out loans just to send their daughters to university. And sometimes the sons will help pay for his sisters education, that’s common. It’s something great for a family to say their daughter is studying engineering or English, or something, in university (interview, 29 March 2011).

As this father explains, the strict restrictions placed on girls can also be seen as a form of parental support and attention. Furthermore, while girls’ education was once seen as a waste of time and money, since their only future was to get married and have children, today the value of educating girls is seen as a social value in and of itself, which, unlike property, cannot be transferred to another family at marriage.

![Figure 32. A picture from a girl's photo diary - her computer at home.](image)
However, as Umm Mahmoud, a psycho-social counselor and mother, suggests, the education of girls is both a social value and also a practical, economic decision:

In regards to the daughters, nowadays, there are families that privilege them above boys. They think, “If I can educate my daughter, I must, because she may have more opportunities, and you never know, she may not get married, she might get divorced, her husband might be killed, or put in jail, or might not have work, so she might need to earn for her family, support the house” (focus group, 21 March 2011).

Here, the education of women is seen as being important, although primarily as a safety net in the absence of a husband to take care of her -- a precaution against the precariousness of life in Palestine. This confirms Rosenfeld’s (2002) suggestion that the academic and professional achievements of Palestinian refugee women, while impressive, are still relegated to a patriarchic family system.

Nevertheless, these transformations within the family are significant. Umm Mahmoud was not suggesting that the education of women was valuable *only* for its economic utility to the family, but also as an important part of a woman’s self-sufficiency. Indeed, Umm Mahmoud is a university educated woman herself who finds professional fulfillment and personal independence, if not financial freedom, by volunteering her services to the community center. Her younger colleague, Khadija, agreed, saying that girls are enjoying more freedom and independence today because of their academic achievements:

Girls today are enjoying much more freedom, and I don’t mean just more freedom than before, but actually more than *boys*. Girls can travel to study, there are sponsored trips abroad for girls who study hard, and they have opportunities to look forward to. The boys, they have too many things to worry about nowadays, to build their future, it distracts from their education. They see even educated men struggling to survive. The guys must eventually work to get money, to support their families and build a home, but the girls can put all their focus on education, the most important thing for her is education (focus group, 21 March 2011).
In this view, the patriarchic family structure is seen as restrictive to boys as well. While boys must prepare for a job to earn money and build their own home, girls have more upward mobility through education. Khadija’s brother agrees, as he put it: “The guys have to start working to build and house, and then khalas, their life is fixed” literally, as it were, in concrete.

Therefore, although boys are afforded more lateral mobility in the streets as children, as older youths and adults, they are confined to the home by having to support their parents and siblings, build upon the family home and start their own families. Their mobility is upward but stationary, as they build another level on their family home. Many girls, however, are now being encouraged to pursue their education, abroad if possible, with parents going to extreme lengths to support girls’ higher education, in an economy of social value that rewards families for the high academic achievement of their sons or daughters. With scarce resources, parents invest in the child they feel most likely to succeed, and with few external distractions facing girls, they are often the ones with the best chances of success. In this way, girls’ mobility extends outward and upward as a university student with greater access to a professional career and more valuable marriage prospects.

Still, the situation described here in these interviews represents an ideal to strive for and not necessarily a common reality. In my discussion with parents, in many cases girls were privileged in the academic support they were given. With better test scores and study skills, parents paid for their daughters to study at local universities, whereas their sons learned trades at technical schools or joined the security service in order to pay for college. Given the current economic situation, a technical skill may be worth more than more prestigious professional skills. In many families, parents could not afford to put any of their children through university. Some daughters, like Khadija, work to put themselves through school in the local Open
University system, and work to support their family. Also, increasingly, young women and men both are joining the Palestinian Authority security service in exchange for free open-university classes. Nevertheless, this research also involved participants whose sisters and daughters had studied abroad on scholarship, received degrees in subjects such as English language translation and Electrical Engineering, found jobs and now frequently travel with their colleagues to Europe for trainings and conferences. Many of the younger girls point to such successes, while still not the norm, as inspirations of what they hope to achieve in the future.

**Playing with gender discourse**

Despite the privileging of girls in education, girls contend that they experience other forms of gender inequality that negatively impact their growth and development and make it more difficult for them to achieve their goals later in life. Access to sports clubs, youth centers, playgrounds, and natural areas, girls say, are all essential to a physically and psychologically healthy childhood to which they have a universal right. Likewise, girls maintain that access to such spaces and opportunities must be granted equally to boys and girls, as this is an imperative in Islamic ethics. This discursive tactic of advocating for girls’ equality by combining the discourses of human rights, psychological development and Islamic ethics, is the focus of this last section.

After the incident with Abeer and Taghrid at the girls’ school, described above, the group decided that they no longer wanted to go outside to take pictures, and agreed that they could better represent the issues facing children in Balata camp through short fictional films. Specifically, they wanted to address the issue of differentiation between girls and boys in the style of a *musalsal*, or dramatic series. The children explained that the issue of gender inequity is a common theme in Arabic soap operas, often involving stories about families cheating widows
out of their inheritance. They wanted to make similar films about gender issues more directly related to children in Balata. Together the boys and girls in the group wrote and filmed a series of vignettes about the different treatment that boys and girls receive in Balata Camp, and specifically, the unfair restrictions the girls face.

In one story, a boy and girl are preparing for school. On their way out the door, their mother gives the boy 10 shekels and the girl only 5. Naturally, the girl is upset by this blatant inequality and makes her way to school crying. Noticing her depressed behavior at school, the school psychologist intervenes, calling the mother to her office. The mother is at first annoyed that the school psychologist would intrude into her family’s private business. However, once at school, the counselor politely explains that her daughter is showing signs of depression because she’s being treated unfairly at home, and that Islam demands equal treatment of daughters and sons. The mother is quickly convinced by this psychological and religious explanation, and accepts the counselor’s advice. The next day her mother gives her son and daughter both 10 shekels each on their way to school, to the ecstatic delight of her daughter.

Figure 33. Screenshot - crying in the counselor’s office.
In another scenario, while eating dinner that night, the same boy asks his parents if he can join a new sports club. The father happily agrees, even offering to pay for new sports gear and all the necessary fees. When the girls in the family ask if they too can join they are immediately rebuked by both Mom and Dad, who exclaim: “What? A girl going to the sports club? No daughter of mine is going to a sports club!” The girls are sent to their room crying. Feeling guilty that he has caused his daughters to cry, the father goes in to check on his girls. They explain to them that they want to grow happy and healthy, and that sport is important to their physical and psychological development, and that God orders parents to treat their children alike. Again, the emotional response of his daughters and the rational appeal to Islam and psychology convinces the father who agrees that the girls can go to the sports club after all, and that he will pay for the registration fee, uniforms and everything.

Figure 34. Father sitting down to talk with his upset daughters.
In both stories, it is the “old culture,” not lack of resources or money, that prevents the girls from enjoying the same rights and privileges as their brothers. Uniquely, the issue of gender inequality is treated through the combined discursive lenses of Islamic ethics, child psychology and children’s rights. The children explained to me that the stories about unequal treatment between sons and daughters were made up to illustrate a point. While none of them had directly experienced this kind of blatant inequality in the home, they said, this unfair treatment was representative of an old way of thinking that is still prevalent in the camp and which prevents girls from participating in various activities outside the home. On a broader level, the inequitable treatment between brother and sisters serves as an allegory for the unfair allocation of space in the camp, with boys having both the streets and sports facilities to play in, with the girls having only limited access at schools and youth centers.

What is significant is the way these appeals are grounded in the authority of religious discourse as well as psychological development discourse, and couched within an overall “right to childhood” framework. The girls contend that the Islamic command to protect and respect girls, combined with the demand that parents treat their daughters and sons equally, puts the onus on society to create private places for girls to grow and develop, equal to what the boys have access to. As Taghrid explains, boys and girls have equal rights and responsibility toward themselves and each other:

Our religion says that girls, after a certain age, should go out covered, dress and act politely, but this is for boys too. We both have equal responsibility to protect each other together, so why should we be treated unequally? (focus group, 23 March 2011).

Abeer agreed, emphasizing the importance of equality of treatment in Islam:

Allah orders us to respect and protect both boys and girls equally, so we can’t treat people unfairly. Our religion says that no one is better than anyone else
except in strength of faith, we’re all born equal, at the same level. Boys and girls are equal, so we should be given equal treatment (focus group, 23 March 2011).

Finally, Taghrird stresses that protecting and respecting girls does not mean imprisoning them but rather means giving them access to their own space, equal to that of the boys:

Our religion says that girls should be protected and respected, but that doesn’t mean they should be unfairly discriminated against. Maybe we have to protect girls more than boys, but some people go too far. That way of thinking comes from an old culture that doesn’t like girls. That’s not Islam. We have to balance respect and protection with treating girls equally. Protection doesn’t mean imprisoning them or treating them unfairly, on the contrary, it means letting them grow and develop. (focus group, 23 March 2011).

Taghrird here is combining childhood development discourse, that children need their own spaces to develop and grow, with an Islamic imperative to afford girls privacy but also treat them equally with boys.

In this conversation, the girls further backed up their religiously-based claims with appeals to child psychology. As Abeer added, “To keep girls imprisoned in their homes harms them psychologically; it affects her behavior and emotions, it is not normal.” Raghad and Taghrird agreed, saying that girls need to go outside and play sports, just as much as boys, and that this is part of developing “healthy children and a healthy society.” In our group discussion, I noted that, in their story, it was a school psychologist who solved the family problem of gender discrimination, and that she did so by appealing to psychology and Islam. I asked if they actually had a school counselor who did that kind of thing. Raghad, the main script writer for the story, explained: “Actually, we have a psychologist, but her work doesn’t have anything to do with the family, or religion, just school problems.” But, Abeer continued:

Only the psychologist is qualified to solve this type of problem, to explain the error of differentiating between sons and daughters. She can explain giving examples from the Quran and Hadith, that religion says we should treat people equally (focus group, 23 March 2011).
Raghad agreed. The psychologist “can explain that the girl will get a complex if she’s treated differently. It’s not just religion that tells us this, but science. Islam and psychology both say that.” In this discussion, girls subverted the discourses of child psychology, discourses prevalent in humanitarian and educational projects targeting children in Palestine, by combining it with everyday understanding of Islamic ethics gleaned from religious education and even soap operas in order to put forward their own political claim for greater access to space and mobility for girls in Balata Camp.

**Conclusion**

As this chapter has illustrated, girls and boys alike are both constrained and compelled by the relative im/mobilities that their age and gender afford them. The cultural expectations for girls to be shy, polite and modest compel girls to experience a sense of bodily shame when entering impolite or mixed-gender spaces, enforced by regimes of familial surveillance and the gazes of strangers. Nevertheless, girls also use the cultural expectations for them to help their parents, or to be good students, to gain access to otherwise restricted space. Likewise, girls use their confinement to the home as an asset, taking advantage of much needed study space in the hopes of achieving academic and professional success in the future. For Palestinian refugees, who value academic achievement highly, girls hope that such confinement in the home studying will later pay off in the form of greater social and spatial mobility in the world.

Furthermore, as we have seen, boys too contend with lack of space and restrictions on their movement. While cultural expectations compel boys to defend their homes, families and neighborhoods, violently if necessary, the boys I researched with seek the peaceful comfort and security of the home and natural spaces. Moreover, we have seen the way in which boys and girls both use the restricted spaces of the camp to their own creative ends. Children in Balata
make football pitches out of the alleyways that have been formed between the expanding multi-family dwellings in the camp, and play house in the spaces of destroyed homes. This general lack of space that boys and girls both contend with is perceived within an overall framework of occupation and displacement. Girls in particular see the demand for gender equality in spatial mobility as being part of a wider anti-occupation nationalist discourse. Just as boys and girls find spaces of play between the material sediment of historical events in the camp, we see how girls are producing a new discourse of children’s rights and gender equality, using the discursive sediment of Palestinian nationalism, child developmental psychology, international human rights, and Islam.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Today I visited a friend of mine in his home in Balata Camp. Abu Ali is a tall, lanky fellow with gentle eyes and a welcoming smile. He speaks fluent English and French, and has a thoughtful and humble demeanor. Like many other bright young Palestinian refugees, he works as a member of the Palestinian security services in exchange for having his education paid. He is happy to have work, although he says the official duty he performs would have gotten him killed as a collaborator in Balata Camp only a few years ago. “Collaboration with Israel is policy now,” he says. His wife too speaks fluent English and works as an UNRWA school teacher in a different camp. She welcomed me with juice and popcorn and the three of us chatted together as their children played. They live with their two young children in an apartment that Abu Ali spent the better part of a decade patiently constructing and reconstructing as an addition to his grandfather’s home. They live above his elderly parents, and next to his older brother. His family home, Abu Ali tells me, has grown from a tent, to a three bedroom concrete house, to a 3-story multi-family dwelling, which was damaged during the invasions of the camp in 2002 and 2003.

We talk about the challenges of being a parent in Balata camp. Abu Ali’s parents help look after their children when he and his wife are at work. He tells me that as his son is growing up he is finding it harder to explain to him the reality of where he lives. “He knows where he is from - that he is a refugee and that he’s originally from Jaffa - but he doesn’t know what that means or why he can’t go back there or why we’re here. I can’t teach him that. He’ll discover that on his own. It’s hard when we watch TV and he sees pictures of the ocean or people at the beach. It’s like it’s in his blood, he wants to go there. He always asks me ‘When can we go to the beach, Baba?’ and I tell him, ‘When you’re a little older, Baba.’ Someday he’ll find out that I’ve
been lying to him this whole time. I just hope he can forgive me. I just don’t want him to grow up thinking everything is impossible in life or that his life is some kind of tragedy.”

We talked for the next hour or so about his memories growing up in the camp. He emphasized to me that he didn’t want to focus on tragic stories, that there are too many of those stories in the world and that his was nothing special or unique. He tells me about how during the first intifada the Israeli soldiers were always coming around to his house to lift his older brother Mahmoud, who was a well-known political activist. One day a different Israeli officer showed up whom they had never seen before. The soldier asked for his brother Mohammad, the quiet and unassuming school teacher, and not Mahmoud, the radical political activist. They tried to point out the soldier’s apparent error. “Even Mahmoud was pleading with the soldier to take him, but the man wouldn’t listen and he took Muhammad anyway instead!” Abu Ali laughed. An hour later the soldier came back with Muhammad, embarrassed, asking if Ahmed was still home. He was there waiting for the soldier to tell him “See, what did I tell you?”

Abu Ali laughs about the time when he was 12 and the soldiers captured him and dragged him to the army jeep where they made him sit on a seat wrapped in barbed wire. He says the whole camp must have heard him yowl that day, and that his brothers laughed at him when he got home because it looked like his ass had been stung by bees.

He fondly remembers the old lady who lived next door to him. “Every time the army invaded the camp and put us under curfew she would take her chair out to the middle of the street and just sit there. Sometimes she’d just sit there with her bowl and knife preparing okra or something for lunch, and the soldiers couldn’t do anything but plea with her on the loudspeaker – ‘Hajja, please go inside, there is a curfew!’ But she wouldn’t move.”
Then Abu Ali stops and says “See, here I am talking about tragedy again. It’s a habit I guess.”
But to me these were not tragic stories. They sounded more like stories of strength, humor, warmth, resilience, and humanity – not tragedy. (Field notes and interview 25 May 2011).

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“The children in the camp are not a symbol of Balata camp, they're a symbol for tragedy itself. Not just the children. Youth, women, men, everyone! Look, let me tell you the first thing, why we are a symbol of tragedy. We’re just people - bani Adam - we came here with nothing. The houses you see are not how they were in the past. All the houses you see here today were tents. The UN gave us nothing but a tent. You could see all Balata from one end of the camp to the other, just tents. So we built the homes from nothing, with no money, just our work. We survived. But nowadays, I feel, we’re suffering too much. We’ve reached the limit. Enough. What else now?”

- Umm Mahmoud, Balata Camp (interview 12 October 2010)

Summary and conclusions

With this dissertation on children’s everyday lives and spaces in Balata Refugee Camp I have sought to provide a different perspective from that provided by the discourses of human rights, humanitarian aid and trauma – the narrative frames that have come to dominate understandings of childhood in Palestine. While valuable in their own right, these discourses tend to provide an aggregated view of Palestinian childhood – numbers of killed, injured, and imprisoned – blurring over differences in age and experience and presenting instead an abstract image of the child as a suffering, rights-bearing subject, standing in for the nation as a whole. At the same time, in order to show the humanity of Palestinians, this abstract image of humanitarian suffering is represented through overly individualized case studies that focus on the symptoms of violent trauma at the expense of an understanding of the wider political context of occupation, or the other ways that
children experience life in Palestine. Humanitarian discourse has been useful in creating space in the global public sphere for the oft-neglected Palestinian narrative to be heard, and for rights claims to be made. However, as I have argued in this dissertation, this appeal to humanitarian ethics – as symbolized by the tragic figure of the innocent, suffering child – has transformed the occupation of Palestine from an issue of politics and justice into a humanitarian case to be managed by international experts. Nevertheless, as I have also sought to demonstrate, Palestinian refugee children, while adept at using the language of humanitarianism, often see the challenges they face not in terms of suffering and trauma, but instead in terms of struggle, resilience, and responsibility. Likewise, while children have individual dreams and ambitions that are often articulated in terms of empowerment and self-improvement, these individual desires are situated within and attached to larger collectivities ranging from the family and the nation, to the Islamic *ummah* and duty to God. Indeed, though religion is rarely mentioned in humanitarian relief and development projects targeting children and youth (except in broad terms such as religious tolerance or combating repressive religious traditionalism), faith is central to children’s sense of self, their political subjectivity, and their understanding of everyday ethical living.

In this dissertation I have attempted to mediate the two perspectives upon which humanitarian discourse pivots – the aggregate and the individual case study – by researching the everyday lives and spaces of Palestinian refugee children within the context of displacement, occupation, and humanitarian aid and development. By doing so I have sought to de-center a focus on the effects of occupation or humanitarian aid, and instead sought to analyze the way children inhabit and negotiate a material/embodied landscape shaped by these discursive practices, and how children make sense of this landscape in their own unexpected ways. This approach seeks to address a similar and persistent tension within children’s geography – pulled
in one direction by the impulse to foreground the voices of children, and in the other direction by seeking to situate children’s lives within wider political, economic and social contexts. In the sections that follow I hope to drive home how the preceding chapters offer us new ways to think about and do children’s (political) geography as well as new ways to think about humanitarian aid, children’s rights and the occupation of Palestine.

**Thinking and doing children’s (political) geographies, again**

As emphasized in Chapter 2, a central issue within contemporary children’s geography relates to the concern that visual, child-centered methods produces research which myopically focuses on the micro-geographies of children’s immediate experience, occluding an understanding of how children affect and are affected by broader scale-social processes. This anxiety relates to a general concern within the social sciences about bridging the gap between individual experience and social structure. However, this problem presents itself in children’s geography in a unique way. Researchers in children’s geography and allied fields have long debated the extent to which children can competently contemplate and talk about wider social context, as well as the extent to which the pre-conceptions of adult researchers constrain their ability to understand and represent children’s views and experiences. The general neglect that children had previously received as a research category, and the long-held assumption that children were not competent social actors in their own right, has led to a well-intentioned corrective to treat children as competent agents whose views, opinions and experiences should be taken seriously. However, this move has served to reify an adult/child duality, failing to account for the way that identities and experiences of both children and adults are formed in relation to one another.
The research presented in this dissertation has adopted many of the same methods that have become commonplace in child-centered research, including participant observation, focus group interviews, and visual methods such as mental mapping, drawing and photo-diaries, but I have approached them in a slightly different way. The children in this research proved themselves to be highly capable of discussing not only their everyday lives and surroundings, but also reflecting on the way their lives are situated within wider spatial-temporal geographic and political imaginaries, including the Palestinian national struggle, the history of displacement and occupation, international human rights and global childhood perspectives, and the hope for more beautiful personal and political futures. However, beyond these representational practices, the children in this research also taught me to see visual, child-centered research methods as a form of performance or embodied discursive practice. For example, in taking pictures of the everyday spaces of the camp, children performed, subverted, critiqued, and parodied a discursive practice associated with humanitarian witnessing and academic research - one that has become central to the construction of Palestinian childhood subjectivity. In this way, embodied experience becomes the medium through which the researcher and participants can collectively understand and interrogate the wider discursive practices that shape their interaction. This understanding challenges the view that visual methods are revealing a snapshot of life where social context is cropped out. Instead, we see can visual methods as performing and reflecting the embodied and material sediments of on-going, non-present social and historical processes. This flattened ontological approach sees children’s micro-geographies of everyday experience as always already connected to a spatiotemporal elsewhere.

While child-centered research is always already situated within wider social processes, we can better understand the dynamic spatial-historical context of children’s lives through
research that also takes into account the (adult) institutions and practices that give shape to the world-in-progress in which children find themselves. This is the approach I adopted through my participatory research with youth-oriented NGOs and community centers as well as my interviews with parents, teachers, youth workers, and volunteers. This approach helped to provide the social and political context that critics argue is often missing in qualitative research with children. Moreover, like my research with children, this participatory research with NGOs served as a form of embodied practice through which I learned the flexible contours and boundaries of childhood discourse in Palestine.

By combining research on the adult practices and institutions that shape children’s lives and qualitative research with children themselves, and by seeing these research methods as modulating between representational practice and affective interaction, this research has sought to achieve a greater level of complexity in mixed methods research with children. Hemming (2008) argues that a mixed method approach in children’s geography, combining participant observation and semi-structured interviews, provides a more holistic view of children’s lives and experiences by exploring both the doing of childhood and how children talk about or otherwise represent this doing. Rather than seeing combined methods as a form of triangulation, that is, honing in on one concrete reality from different angles, Hemming (2008) sees mixed methods in terms of “crystallization,” or providing greater and greater detail and complexity through shifting perspectives, contexts and power dynamics of different methods. Taking this concept one step further, this research has combined different visual and non-visual qualitative methods with children, and different modes of understanding these methods, along with adult-centered research including interviews, participant observation, and discourse analysis. In doing so I have sought to emphasize the doing-in-context of children’s everyday lives and spaces, interrogating
the predictability and stability of everyday practices, and exploring the indeterminate spaces of flexibility and creativity that unexpectedly emerge. It is to these unexpected emergences and the shifts in direction that they provoke that I shall turn in the next section.

Re-imagining humanitarianism? Re-imagining Palestine?

Children’s geographers lately have become fond of methods which destabilize adult-child dichotomies in order to accommodate the full participation of the child in the co-production of knowledge. Likewise, the non-representational turn in children’s geography calls for a methodological approach which allows for a patient and hospitable openness to the unfolding of worlds and lives. As I have found in the course of this research, however, actually implementing these imperatives is often easier written in research proposals (and even then it is not exactly easy) than done in research practice. It is a hard thing indeed to unlearn the ingrained habits of knowledge extraction and production, and harder still to determine which habits need adjusting in the first place. For instance, one of the vexing problems that children’s geographers have had to contend with is balancing the inclination to challenge the strict hierarchies of adult researcher and child research subject with the responsibility we have to protect, care for and preserve the best interests of our young research participants. I was confronted with this very dilemma directly during the fight that broke out on one of our walking tours of the camp between Ibrahim and Abu Amjad and some local neighborhood boys. In this moment, my role as responsible adult researcher, outside visitor, and friend to these children, collided in paralyzing contradiction leaving very little course of action apart from trying to prevent further escalation. And if it is hard for adult researchers to loosen and interrogate the habits that structure adult-child interactions, this is equally challenging for children. It took time, for example, for the children to adjust the habit of always wanting to provide me with the “correct” answer.
It was the unexpected eruption of the fight, juxtaposed minutes later with that sublimely frivolous moment with Ibrahim at the store-front window, that provided that moment of “radical decentering” which demoted me from my self-appointed position of “central figure” in this research story to a position somewhat closer to lateral adjacency with the world (Scarry 1990, 77-79). This moment was the “affective impulse toward engagement with others” that prompted me to look anew at all the rich research data of everyday experience and interaction that I had ignored for not fitting neatly into predetermined research categories like agency, politics, or resistance (Thompson 2009, 147, 155). Beauty was one of those vexing categories. However, it was precisely because beauty was so easy to ignore that it begged for a second look. Looking again at my conversations with children, as well as their drawings, maps, and photos, I learned to see beauty not just as a meaningless filler word, but a touchstone for ethical behavior and political desire that helped to order the way they inhabit their world.

As we saw in Chapter 5, that political desire for a world infused with the justice and generosity of beauty presents a radically different aesthetic political configuration than the rights-bearing political subjectivity produced by the ethics of injury and suffering. The politics of beauty as articulated and performed by the children in this research is closer in spirit to Wall’s (2008, 541-42) conception of human rights (discussed in Chapter 1) as a “circle of responsibility to one another” that we must seek to more widely and inclusively expand. As Wall (2008, 537) contends, it is only though “encountering the shock of otherness” that “selves and societies open themselves up in hospitality to the genuine complexity and fullness of humanity.” This shock of otherness can help bring about our own ethical de-centering that allows both patient listening and understanding as well active giving and engagement (Wall 2008, 538). This rethinking of human rights in terms of mutual responsibility and solidarity is not to imply that we should disregard the
grievances and rights claims of others in favor of some idealized notion of ethical consensus-making. Rather, it is to suggest that, beyond merely seeking justice from the law, we might seek to ask each other what we need to live more justly together in and with the world. This also suggests that we begin to think about how writing, research, art, performance, activism, and other forms of political engagement, might be seen as ways to create the conditions for these kind of shocks of otherness to occur, in order to prompt discussions on differing notions of right and justice. To do so would mean rethinking the relations that undergird contemporary conceptions and practices of humanitarianism and human rights.

Taking a cue from Yasmine in Chapter 4, we should perhaps invert our view of the relation of international humanitarian assistance and trauma-relief to Palestinians and ask what emotional and psychological traumas Western aid agencies are seeking to address in themselves by such actions? If trauma, defined as a memory of past violence that can never be healed and which continues to surface in the present, is the aesthetic motif of late-modernity, then perhaps it is the partition of Palestine, and the perpetual crisis of what is called the “Israel/Palestine conflict,” that continues to fester as an unhealed scar on the wounded Western psyche. In seeking to treat the trauma of Palestinian children, in whom we invest a dwindling hope for the future, Western donors are perhaps not trying to help the Palestinians as much as they are seeking to allay the traumatic memories of the West’s own violent past of nationalism, genocide and colonialism; memories which continue to haunt the dreams of modernity, and which continue to resurface as political violence in Israel/Palestine. However, rather than attempting to heal the psychological damage of conflict, perhaps the international community would do best to merely stop perpetuating the conflict itself. Western nations cannot simultaneously provide military, diplomatic, and economic assistance to the occupation and then be received as benevolent
humanitarians providing relief to the occupied. To end this relationship would first mean acknowledging that there is no technical fix for Palestine, no ethical humanitarian resolution, only political solutions and the will to implement them. Only then can we enter into discussions about what real peace, justice, dignity and freedom could look like for everyone.

Future directions

One of the stated aims of this research has been to open up our understanding of children’s experiences in Palestine beyond that which is provided by the narratives of humanitarian suffering. To do so, I chose Balata Refugee Camp in the West Bank as a site that has been a target both of the violence of occupation and a target of international humanitarian aid and development. However, by examining how children in Balata camp, as symbols of humanitarian suffering, perform and transform the layered discursive inscriptions of Palestinian childhood identity, I have reinforced this notion that the refugee child is somehow representative of the Palestinian experience. The impulse to provide detailed ethnographic data on the everyday lives of children in Balata Camp in order to provide more complexity to the typical representations of humanitarian suffering and tragedy has prevented me from presenting a broader perspective on the differences and commonalities between Palestinian children of different backgrounds. The experiences of children in this research are not necessarily representative of the lives of children in Balata Camp, or any other camp for that matter, let alone the Palestinian nation as a whole. Given the opportunity, I hope to expand this research in order to further explore some of these differences and further complicate the picture I have painted here with this research. In the Nablus area alone my research could be expanded to include the other camps in the city, the historic Old City of Nablus, nearby towns and villages in Areas B and C, or the new suburban areas that are now being built near “New Nablus.” Likewise, comparisons could be drawn
between children’s experiences in West Bank refugee camps and life in refugee camps in Jordan, or Gaza. Similarly, in seeking to break down the green line that partitions research on Palestine, studies could be conducted on children’s experiences growing up in predominantly Palestinian urban areas within present-day Israel such as al-Lydd, Haifa, or Umm al-Fahm, or Palestinian Bedouin communities in the Naqab. Broadening further in scope, research on the different experiences of Jewish, Christian and Muslim children in Jerusalem and their understandings of the holy city could further enrich our understanding of religiosity and childhood in Israel and Palestine, as would research with children growing up in Israeli settlements.

Further, while this research has already sought to examine the ways in which children’s experiences in Palestine are shaped by international discourses of humanitarian aid and human rights, other studies exploring the transnational geographies of Palestinian children could be conducted. For example, there are many families and children who have divided their time between Palestine and the US and other minority world countries, some of whom are returning to the West Bank now for the first time since the Second Intifada. The popularity of “American Style” open-planning in home design, planned suburban communities, mortgage lending, and private schools offering “Americanized” curricula are all prime examples of how childhood and family life in Palestine is shifting in response to this return migration, an area where more research is needed. Also, while my research has touched upon the impact of global media on Palestinian children’s understanding of childhood, further research is needed on the ways in that children use satellite TV, internet communication technology, and on-line social networking in Palestine and the Middle East more broadly. Finally, while this research has sought to challenge the narrative of trauma that has come to represent Palestinian childhood, there is still a need to tie together the many disparate studies of children’s mental and physical health in Palestine.
conducted by various NGOs in order to create a more holistic understanding of the different ways that the occupation effects children’s health and mobility in different geographic areas of Palestine.

Beyond these expansions into different geographic areas of intervention, there is also room to expand this study into the different discursive landscapes that children inhabit in Palestine. This study has mainly focused on the role of psychological trauma and humanitarian psychiatry in framing representations of Palestinian children and shaping their political subjectivities. I chose to focus on the discourse of trauma because of its dominance as a discursive frame, its emotive and affective capacity, and because of the unavoidable ubiquity of trauma discourse in my work with local Palestinian NGOs, and in my discussions with Palestinian children, parents, teachers and community workers. While I have demonstrated the relation between the discourse of humanitarian trauma and liberal notions of human rights, it would be useful to conduct research that more thoroughly mapped out the discursive range of different projects targeting Palestinian children and youth. To do so might involve comprehensively mapping the network of community centers, Palestinian NGOs and international donors implementing child and youth development projects in the Occupied Territories. This would provide a more holistic view on the spectrum of youth development projects in Palestine, ranging from trauma relief, to human rights education, and citizenship promotion. For instance, I found through the course of my research that citizenship promotion projects targeting older youths (age 18-25) are becoming increasingly common in Palestine, representing the latest trend in international donor funded youth development. I have demonstrated in this research how trauma relief and empowerment projects targeting younger children often mobilize particular neo-liberal understandings of individual political subjectivity.
and citizenship. Similar research is needed on the citizenship projects targeting older Palestinian youth, the role of these youth projects in producing the globalized elites that Hanafi and Tabar (2005) refer to in their study, and the ways that youth mobilize their own conceptions of citizenship through such projects.

Relatedly, one crucial area for further research relates to these changing conceptions of rights and citizenship amongst children and youth in Palestine and the broader region – conceptions that both combine and resist straightforward understandings of national or neo-liberal citizenship. One of the more intriguing findings of this research is the extent to which children’s religious identity in Palestine informs their political subjectivity and shapes their understanding of broader political questions of rights and justice, ranging from gender rights and equality to the injustices of occupation (see also Habishi 2011). However, while the religiosity of children was perhaps more pronounced, as many children were in a process of understanding their newly religiously situated selves, children are not alone in viewing issues of human rights, gender equality, and democracy through the lens of Islamic ethics. Indeed, many teachers, youth volunteers, and community workers expressed similar views. As Umm Shadi, a staff member of a youth organization in Nablus affiliated with the secular nationalist party Fateh told me as we discussed the recent democratic uprisings in the Middle East, “we will never have democracy or rights or an end to oppression in the Arab world until we implement true Islam, and we can’t work toward implementing true Islam until we have rights and equality – Islam and democracy are one in the same” (personal interview, 10 January 2011). Rejecting both the strict, programmatic formalism of political Islamism, as well as Western liberal notions of secular democracy, many young people throughout the Middle East are articulating “post-Islamist” political imaginaries of an (Islamic) democracy to come (Bayat 2005, 2007, 2011). Further
research is needed on how this political imaginary is being enacted, what new spaces, practices, subjectivities and collectives are being formed in the process, how these practices are shifting popular discourse in the media, schools and civil society, and how international NGOs and Western governments might be seeking to strategically encourage these softer forms of political Islam.

Finally, I wish to end on a positive yet cautionary note regarding some of the policy implications of this research. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, while the motivation behind this research has been to explore the different affective registers of Palestinian childhood that exceed the narratives of tragedy, suffering and trauma, this focus does not necessarily preclude the emergence of practical tools that may help to address the real challenges that Palestinian refugee children do face in their everyday lives. I am pleased to report, for example, that over the course of conducting this research many of my findings were directly fed back to the NGOs and community organizations that cooperated in this research, very often resulting in improvements to the design of their programs. For example, a community center in Balata camp restructured the use of the computer lab to create time and space for boys’ homework help and study hours, and open hours for girls’ use. Likewise, I have provided input on a proposed project to build a sports and playground facility in Balata, the first of its kind, to ensure that children’s views and opinions would be central to its design, including the creation of spaces that were welcoming and suitable to the needs of both girls and boys. Similarly, this research has informed a recent proposal to create a green space and art garden near Balata, where ongoing gardening and recycled art activities could be conducted. Although the proposed activities will still serve a “therapeutic” function, the overall emphasis is on community resilience and care.
For all the positive aspects of these projects, I still must caution against seeing the results of this research – such as the significance of religiously inspired ideals of beauty, girls’ desire for equality in access to play space, or children’s interest in created green spaces in the camp - in strictly utilitarian terms. While I have tried to demonstrate how something as unremarkable and seemingly a-political as everyday beauty could actually provide insights into how we relate to the world and one another, there is equal danger that the affect of beauty could serve as a means to depoliticize the situation of Palestinian children, much as the affect of trauma has done. Indeed, art therapy projects seeking to promote personal growth and healing through individual self-expression already edge around the idea of beauty as tool. Similarly, though children have articulated their desires for green spaces in the camp, they also made it clear to me that the greater priority is the end to the occupation and the lifting of all restrictions to their mobility. I would treat very suspiciously projects seeking to foster of peaceful and healthy children through the creation of green spaces. Indeed, it is not so much improving the methods of humanitarian aid and youth development that I am concerned with, as much as changing our understanding of humanitarianism from a unidirectional flow of professional aid and expert assistance, to an inclusive, multi-directional discussion about grievances, needs, desires, and responsibility toward one another.


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NAME: David Jones “Sandy” Marshall

EDUCATION

2013 – Ph.D. in Geography, University of Kentucky
Advisor: Dr. Anna Secor

2007 – M.A. in Near Eastern Studies, University of Arizona
Advisor: Dr. Leila Hudson

2006 – Arabic Language Certificate, University of al-Quds, East Jerusalem
Modern standard and Levantine colloquial Arabic

2004 – B.A. in Politics, 1st Degree Honours, Queen’s University of Belfast
Honours Thesis: “A Nation without a State, A State without a Nation: Palestinian Identity formation in Jordan”
Advisor: Dr. Beverly Milton-Edwards

RESEARCH GRANTS


Research Fellow, Palestinian American Research Center Fellowship (PARC is funded by CAORC, Ford Foundation, Getty Foundation, NEH and others.) $8,500. Title: “A Children's Geography of Occupation: The Everyday, Imagined, and Emotional Geographies of Palestinian Children.” Funded July 2010 to June 2011.

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

2012-2013 ACLS/Mellon Dissertation Completion Fellowship ($28,000)

2012-2013 Dissertation Year Fellowship, University of Kentucky ($15,000) declined.

2011-2012 Presidential Fellowship, University of Kentucky ($15,000)

2010 Dissertation Enhancement Award, University of Kentucky ($3,000)
2009  Preliminary international research travel support, Department of Geography University of Kentucky ($1,500)

2006-2007  Academic Year Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Recipient, U.S. Department of Education, University of Arizona ($15,000)

2006  Summer Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Recipient, U.S. Department of Education, University of Arizona ($1,500)

2005-2006  Graduate College Fellowship, University of Arizona ($14,000)

2004  Lemberger-Mettrick Prize for best Politics student, Queen’s University of Belfast (£500)

2004  David Mulholland Prize for best Politics dissertation, Queen’s University of Belfast (£500)

PUBLICATIONS

Submitted:


Forthcoming:

Marshall, David Jones. “‘All the beautiful things’: trauma, aesthetics and the politics of Palestinian childhood.” Accepted with minor revisions for a special issue of *Space and Polity* on children’s political geography.


CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

2012  Paper presenter, “‘Allah has ordered you not to give advantage to boys over girls’: Gender differentiation and spatial equality in Palestinian childhood.” Third International Conference on Geographies of Children, Young People and Families, Singapore.

2012  Paper presenter, “‘We have a place to play, but someone else controls it’: Gendered spaces, shamed bodies, and childhood mobility in Balata Refugee Camp.” Third International Conference on Geographies of Children, Young People and Families, Singapore.

2012  Co-organizer of panel entitled: “Children’s Political Geography”, American Association of Geographers annual meeting, New York. Papers in this panel will be included in a special issue of Space and Polity.

2012  Paper presenter, “‘Don't ask me why, it's just beautiful, ok?’: Palestinian refugee children and the politics of representation and non-representation”, AAG annual meeting, New York.


2007  “Keepin’ it Real or Frontin’?: Issues of Authenticity in Palestinian Hip Hop.” Middle Eastern and North African Graduate Student Forum, University of Arizona.

2006  “Boom or Bust?: Economic Restructuring in Jordan.” MENA Graduate Student Forum, University of Arizona.
INIVTED PRESENTATIONS

2012 “Save us from the children: Trauma, Citizenship and the Politics of Palestinian Childhood.” Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Arizona.


2007 “Introduction to the Israel/Palestine Conflict”, community education program, Southside Presbyterian Church, Tucson, AZ

2006 “Israel/Palestine and the War on Terror” for the Re-examining Sept. 11th public forum at the University of Arizona

2006 “Democracy Deterred: The War on Terror and the War on Iraq” for the Iraq War Anniversary Public Forum at the University of Arizona

PUBLIC FORUMS ORGANIZED

2009 Organizer, speaker and moderator for a public forum entitled “Gaza: The Crisis Continues – Prospects for Peace?”, University of Kentucky. Presenters included academics, researchers and humanitarian activists.

2006 Speaker and co-organizer of a public forum entitled “I Witness the Middle East: Israel, Lebanon and Palestine”, University of Arizona. Presenters included students who had witnessed the events of the 2006 Israel/Gaza/Lebanon war first-hand.

PROFESSIONAL POSSITIONS

2009 Instructor, University of Kentucky - Department of Geography. (Geo 328) Geography of the Middle East.

2008-2009 Research Assistant, University of Kentucky – Department of Geography Supervisor: Dr. Anna Secor


(Indv 101) *Middle Eastern Humanities.*

**ADVISING**

2010  Field Advisor to Mirthe Biemans, Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam.

2010  Faculty Advisor to Kawthar Suleiman for Honors 395: Independent Study, University of Kentucky.

2010  Faculty Mentor to Jack Miller for Intl Studies 495: Senior Capstone, University of Kentucky.

**SELECTED PROFESSIONAL SERVICE**

2009  Co-organizer, faculty and student post-colonial reading group, University of Kentucky.

2008  Graduate student representative on the Colloquium Committee, University of Kentucky, Department of Geography.

2008  Graduate student representative on the Personnel Committee during an active hiring process, University of Kentucky, Department of Geography.

2006  Representative for the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Graduate and Professional Student Council, University of Arizona.

2006  Graduate student representative on the University Wide Committee, on General Education during curriculum restructuring, University of Arizona.

2005  Outreach coordinator, Middle East and North African Studies Association, University of Arizona, Department of Near Eastern Studies.

**PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS**

American Association of Geographers

Middle East Studies Association

Palestinian American Research Center