Coups and Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing

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COUPS AND CONFLICT:
A COUP-PROOFING PARADOX

DISTRIBUTION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
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By

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

COUPS AND CONFLICT:
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This study develops a leader-centric theory of civil-military relations that expands upon three broad areas of research. Specifically, the study suggests that leaders will evaluate multiple threats to their political survival and will ultimately implement strategy that is most likely to keep them in power. While Downs (1957) has noted such a tendency in democracies, this study expands this rationale to authoritarian regimes by focusing on the primary means of authoritarian removal: the military coup. In contrast to the state-centric nature of traditional international relations theory, this dissertation finds that leaders frequently undermine the power of the state in order to accomplish the self-interested goal of political survival.

First, the study carefully describes a number of coup-proofing strategies that leaders can implement. These are broadly defined in terms of influencing either the military’s willingness or its ability to attempt a coup. In addition to testing the effectiveness of these strategies, this study also theoretically explores the implications of coup-proofing for other political development of the state: interstate and intrastate conflict.

Second, the study considers the influence of coup-proofing on interstate conflict. This study builds on the diversionary literature by investing coup risk as an incentive to use diversionary tactics as well as coup-proofing as a potential disincentive. The latter can both undermine the necessity of diversion as well as military capabilities, making leaders less capable of utilizing international conflict as a political tool.

Third, the dissertation considers the influence of coup-proofing on intrastate conflict. The theory argues that the capability-reducing practice of coup-proofing can have important domestic consequences. Specifically, the practice can increase the mobilizational potential of would-be insurgents, can reduce the mobilizational capacity of the state, and leaders that are particularly fearful of a coup will likely tolerate the rise of an insurgency.
Results suggest that coup-proofing is indeed an effective strategy for preventing coups. The practice further discourages leaders to initiate interstate disputes. Finally, authoritarian leaders are more likely to face insurgency when high levels of structural coup-proofing coincide with high levels of coup risk.

KEYWORDS: Coup d’état, Civil-Military Relations, Coup-Proofing, Diversionary Conflict, Civil War
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION

1. A SURVIVAL PARADOX

This dissertation tells a story about survival. While international relations scholarship will generally focus on the survival of the state, in the following pages I will draw out the influence of domestic survival strategies on both inter- and intrastate conflict. Specifically, I explore what has been described as the civil-military problematique, a condition in which those that are entrusted to protect a polity may ultimately become its greatest threat (Feaver 1999). Due to this threat leaders will be forced to form defense policies that balance their intentions to continue in office with the military capabilities of their state, largely erring on the side of preserving their own rule.

The United States, for example, saw this calculation play out in its early years. While textbooks will focus on the political institutions that were created in the Constitution of 1789, the founding fathers had to give due diligence to military policy as well. The strength of the modern U.S. armed forces belies the trends seen in the country’s early years, where the government took steps to ensure that the military would be a weak institution. Within just six months of the end of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Army had been reduced to only 700 men. This was still seen as too strong a force by many and it was soon reduced to “twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point…with a proportionate number of officers,” none of which would be eligible for a rank above Captain (Huntington 1957, 144). The swiftness of the Continental Army’s demobilization is intriguing for two reasons. First, the infantile nation had only just exited a war with a major world power and bordered territory controlled by two others in France and Spain. Second, the desire
to dismantle the military capabilities of the national government was all but universal. Eventual Massachusetts governor and U.S. vice president Elbridge Gerry, for example, argued that “standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted in destructive engines for establishing despotism” (ibid). Gerry’s fears of a praetorian state are interesting in that he was seen as a champion of a Federalist cause that sought to create a far stronger national government. Indeed, his sentiments were shared by other leaders of the Federalist movement. Alexander Hamilton, for example, noted that national armies were “a dangerous and expensive undertaking” (Huntington 1957) and James Madison similarly remarked that “a standing military force…will not long be safe companions to liberty…the means of defense against foreign danger have always been the instruments of tyranny at home” (Banning 1998, 188).

The resulting security apparatus saw the national army become but a token force and defense was relegated to numerous individual militia. The United States subsequently avoided military intervention into politics but also experienced a number of consequences. First, the U.S. sacrificed any war-making ability. George Washington noted in his farewell address that “overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty” (Avalon). The resulting policy became that of conflict avoidance in the form of international isolation, an inevitable trend for a country with little standing military capability. This policy become official with the “Monroe Doctrine,” though threatening European states that incursions into the Americas would be seen as acts of aggression could not be backed with a credible military threat in terms of
either a ground army or a navy. It would eventually be the British navy, in what Kissinger (1994, 223) has described as a “precursor” to the special relationship between the two states, that would have to enforce the doctrine. The growth of this relationship was of course not without conflict. The boarding of the *USS Chesapeake* by the *HMS Leopard* in June 1807 indicated the vast superiority of British forces after the U.S. vessel was forced to surrender—and parts of its crew forced into impressment—after only managing to fire a single shot. Subsequent calls for military action quickly died and President Jefferson was left to resort to economic retaliation in the form of an economic embargo that would quickly prove to be ineffectual.

The lack of a capable standing army also had serious domestic consequences within two years of the final dismantling of the Continental Army. A former Continental Army captain, Daniel Shays, demonstrated the inability of local militia to defeat a rising insurgency in what became known as Shays’ Rebellion. Subsequent efforts to address the insurgency largely centered on proposed legal penalties, not the introduction of a more capable fighting force. In a response that would echo Arab leaders such as Hosni Mubarak and Hafez al-Asad two centuries later, Samuel Adams blamed the uprising on foreign meddling and declared “the man who dares rebel against the laws of a republic ought to suffer death” (Pencak 1989, 64).

Though the Constitution of 1789 would grant the federal government the legal and financial ability to raise an army, the founding fathers continued to rely upon state militia event after the rebellion. The Shays-inspired Militia Act would give the president the authority to call up militias from other states in order to deal with the subsequent “Whiskey Rebellion,” but these militias remained decentralized and ineffectual.
(Huntington 1957). The Act allowed President Washington to mobilize militia from New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland, but the ranks were still thin. Efforts to enforce a draft proved counterproductive as draftees themselves sometimes took up arms to protest conscription. This was perhaps most visible in Maryland, where Governor Lee was forced to deploy nearly 1000 militiamen to suppress an uprising in Hagerstown (Slaughter 1986).

This episode prompted many anti-Federalists to finally accept a strong central government as a necessity, but opinion was not sufficiently altered to push for stronger armed forces (Boyd 1985). Such feelings reflected the overall military policy of the infantile state. Instead of building up a strong military that could adequately guard against a foreign foe such as Great Britain or a domestic foe such as insurgency, the founders crafted a limited military that could not act as a threat to the government. The consequences of this were illustrated in the famed Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, when the American navy was wholly embarrassed by the British. This episode is widely noted as being an important catalyst for the War of 1812 but also reflects a realization that a crippled military capacity brings with it important consequences. With the crafters of the government being primarily concerned with guarding against tyranny, they had crafted a Constitution that would undermine the ability for a civilian to become a dictator and they weakened the military to the point that the rise of a military regime was not feasible. However, by adopting the latter strategy they were accepting that the country would be more vulnerable to other threats, such as foreign incursions or insurgency.

The willingness of the American founding fathers to maintain a weak military is by no means unique. Countless leaders have shown a willingness to either maintain a
weak fighting force or even dismantle their national capabilities due to a fear of military interference in political affairs. While the founding fathers veiled this as a fear for society’s well-being, in this dissertation I will argue for a more practical purpose for such policies: political survival. Realists will point to external threats as the major determinant of military policy, but I contend that a leader’s primary fear is not for the power of the state, but rather guaranteeing their continued rule.

2. PUZZLES AND OMISSIONS IN THE LITERATURE

A considerable body of literature has been dedicated to studying intrastate conflict. The bulk of this literature, however, has tended to focus on civil war, ranging from dynamics such as onset, duration, termination, or recurrence, or type of war, such as secession, ethnic, or territorial. Far less attention has been given to another aspect of intrastate conflict that seemed to be a primary concern for the American government: the coup d’état. Efforts focusing on the latter have also frequently conflated coups with civil war. The pioneering work of Londregan and Poole, for example, sought to theoretically explain the occurrence of coups, which they viewed broadly as “the transfer of executive power through the use or threat of force.” The data they ultimately utilized from the *World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators*, however, was even more broad, including any form of *irregular* transfer of power (Taylor and Jodice 1983). These disparate events include assassination, popular revolutions, insurgency, external invasion, coups, and even plane crashes. Most of these events reflect what might be termed political instability in a general sense, but these are each different political processes that are at their very cores are carried out by different types of actors. Civil war, for example, is defined by the Correlates of War as “fought within state borders between a government
...the central government should be actively involved in military action with effective resistance for both sides, and there should be at least 1000 battle related deaths” (Sarkees 2000). This is in stark contrast with coups, which have been defined by Powell and Thyne (2011, 252) as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.” Aside from intellectual curiosity, the distinction is meaningful in that attempts to combat each of these domestic threats will require different approaches from the government, as each type of event is undertaken by completely different actors. The actor that is most feared is expected to be the primary concern for those hoping to increase their survival prospects.

A growing body of literature has considered the implementation and consequences leadership survival strategies, specifically coup-proofing (e.g., Belkin and Schofer 2003; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011). The tendency for a leader to prolong their tenure through a has long been attested to by scholars, though the phenomenon has traditionally been unaccounted for in the quantitative literature on coups. This omission has limited our understanding of both international and domestic politics. First, numerous studies have ignored the influence of coup-proofing when attempting to explain the phenomenon it directly aims to influence: the coup d’état (e.g., Londregan and Poole 1990). Coup studies have consequently displayed a theoretical disinterest in coup-proofing, while consideration of the military has been lacking more generally. This trend is quite problematic given the primary role that the military plays in coups. This changed when coup-proofing was finally implemented quantitatively in the work of Belkin and Schofer (2003), who found that countries with a high likelihood of a coup
were more likely to use “divide-and-conquer” policies with the design of their militaries. This precedent, however, was still limited. Belkin and Schofer were only interested in whether or not at-risk regimes actually implemented those strategies and efforts to explain other types of coup-proofing, and specifically the consequences of coup-proofing, remained elusive.

Second, this lack of attention has also kept scholars from understanding the role that coup-proofing plays in international conflict. Diversionary theory, for example, has long contended that leaders will utilize conflict abroad to help them retain office at home. Though compelling, much of the literature fails to distinguish between the diversionary needs of democracies and authoritarian regimes. Democrats will face the prospect of removal through regular elections, but scholars long passed on explaining why dictators would have the same need to generate a “rally ‘round the flag” effect. Recent work has begun to theoretically explore the diversionary behavior of autocracies (e.g., Mitchell and Prins 2004), though only two prior efforts have looked at the influence of coup risk on conflict (Belkin and Schofer 2005; Miller and Elgün 2010). Strangely, Belkin and Schofer (2005) found that states with a higher likelihood of a coup were actually less likely to enter international conflict. This counterintuitive finding can potentially be explained by addressing the alternative strategies that leaders have at their disposal and what the consequences of those strategies might be. Coup-proofing can potentially lower the need for seeking diversion by reducing the likelihood that the leader will actually be removed from office. Further, I will later point to a number of ways in which coup-proofing weakens the military capacity of the state, making diversion an even less likely scenario.
Third, the detrimental influence of coup-proofing on military effectiveness can extend to the domestic level. Coups are by far the most common means of irregular loss of office and I argue that leaders will give the most attention to combating the means that is most likely to unseat them. Coup-fearing leaders, then, will act to reduce the likelihood of a coup even if the strategies they use to do so increase the likelihood of being removed through other means. In short, leaders will sacrifice their military capabilities in order to reduce the likelihood of being toppled in a military coup. This dynamic was illustrated in the early years of the United States, where politicians demonstrated their willingness to maintain a token national military force despite the rise of insurgencies such as the Shays and Whiskey Rebellions. Such skirmishes, it seems, are acceptable costs when compared to increasing the likelihood of a coup.

A recent data collection effort by (Goemans et al. 2009) has revealed that of nearly 3000 global political transitions between 1875 and 2004, only 72 were brought down by foreign actors. Even this number is perhaps overstated, as many of these “foreign removals” were actually done to restore a legitimate regime that had been removed illegally (e.g., Jean Hilaire Aubaume’s post-coup three days in power in 1964 Gabon), and the trend has declined over time. Figure 1.1 shows a breakdown for the 489 leader exits that came about through irregular means between 1875 and 2005. Only 45 (9%) were removed by foreign intervention. This is in stark contrast to another means of removal: the coup d’état. Overall, coups (70% of exits) were more than twice as likely to
remove a leader than all other forms of irregular removal combined and were over seven times as likely to remove a sitting head of state than foreign intervention.¹

These trends seem to justify the fears of the American founders and concerns regarding a military’s seizure of power did in fact prompt military policy that specifically dealt with that particular threat. Instances such as Shays’ and the Whiskey Rebellion suggest that a weakened fighting force would be maintained even when confronted with the prospect of civil war, a rational position given that the Archigos data reveal that both organized civil wars and popular uprisings only account for a fraction of removals than coups. The story of America’s early years seems to suggest leaders are willing to make trade-offs in order to prevent a coup, and the trade-offs involve a willingness to tolerate a reduction in military capabilities. This reduction, of course, will raise the prospects of other forms of anti-regime activity. I now proceed to a brief overview of those trade-offs.

3.1 THE UTILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF COUP-PROOFING

I argue that as an alternative to strengthening a state’s armed forces, leaders can implement “coup-proofing” strategies that aim to lower the ability or willingness of elites in the state apparatus to illegally unseat the sitting executive. The early years of U.S. history illustrates this process, though a more comprehensive assessment of the practice has been offered by a number of civil-military relations scholars. I follow the lead of Feaver (1999) in treating coup-proofing as efforts that can attempt to lower either the willingness or ability of militaries to attempt a coup. Willingness has primarily been treated as a concept that will be broadly referred to as “spoils.” These selective benefits include any number of perks that the military can enjoy, ranging from high pay or other

¹ In chapter 2 I show that this trend has grown even more disparate during the timeframe of this study, with coups being three times as likely as all other forms of irregular removal and over 13 times more likely than removal through foreign intervention.
allowances, or more and better tools of their trade. Leaders provide spoils to their armies in order to give credible signals that leadership is giving attention to the military’s organizational interests and these actions should reduce the willingness of the military to target the leader (Coup Hypothesis 2). Leaders can also attempt to reduce the likelihood of a coup by reducing the ability of the military to plan and execute a conspiracy (Coup Hypothesis 1). This is done in a variety of ways, ranging from demobilization, disarmament, or creating structural obstacles such as parallel armed bodies. These approaches are expected to influence conflict in important ways.

3.2 COUP-PROOFING AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT

The consequences of coup-proofing can be witnessed at the interstate level. The threat of a coup is intriguing from an international perspective because the threat of coup can be said to provide an incentive to seek diversionary conflict abroad (e.g., Miller and Elgün 2010), while a variety of hallmark works of international relations scholarship (e.g., Reiter and Stam 2002) have insinuated that coup-proofing can undermine military effectiveness. These trends point to a paradox in which countries that are most likely to benefit from diversion are perhaps the least able to attempt it. I investigate this paradox by accounting for both diversionary incentives and coup-proofing.

First, prior literature has largely worked with an implicit assumption that each leader can be removed, though scholarship largely builds theory based on electoral processes. I build on a small body of work by contending that even non-democratic leaders face the threat of removal to varying degrees and that the threat of a coup is a major concern. Previous work on diversion in the face of coup risk, however, has not taken into account the influence that coup-proofing will have on military capabilities or
willingness to utilize diversion (Miller and Elgün 2010). I thus build on this body of work by offering three new innovations. First, I argue that coup risk—as a general rule—should promote diversionary actions, but those actions will become less likely as coup-proofing increases (Diversionary Hypothesis 1). Second, I argue that increases in structural coup-proofing or military purges will effectively undermine the military capabilities of the state. In addition to reducing the incentive to seek diversion due to a reduction in the likelihood of a coup, manipulating military structure or personnel will also undermine the ability of the military to undertake such tasks. More recent scholarship has indicated that regimes with higher levels of coup-proofing have demonstrated less effectiveness in combat than their less-coup-proofed adversaries (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011). I argue that the challenges presented in combat will be paralleled when attempting a coup. Leaders that have high coup risk will be less likely to seek diversionary actions after structurally coup-proofing or purging their militaries due to a loss of necessity and a loss in capabilities (Diversionary Hypotheses 2 and 4).

Third, I offer two predictions regarding the influence of military spoils on interstate conflict. Autocracies that provide their militaries with more resources—in terms of finances or materiel—will have a reduced need for diversion. However, increases in spoils are not expected to have an influence on military capabilities. Meanwhile, democracies that have higher levels military spoils will have better military capabilities. The distinction is drawn due to the nature of their regimes. Being transparent, democratic leaders will need to ensure that precious financial resources are being dedicated to a public good. In regard to the military, expenditures will be required to reflect a dedication to the public good of national security. Such leaders will have no
shortage of political opponents, media watchdogs, think tanks, and even auditors in their own administrations that will dedicate special attention to monitoring military policy and spending. Authoritarian leaders, meanwhile, will not have the same limitations on their use of military funds. In autocracies I expect military expenditure to be far more likely to be dedicated not to public goods, but rather to private goods that aim to reduce the military’s willingness to meddle in politics.

The disparate trends in the nature of military resources lead me to two competing hypotheses. First, autocracies should lose the incentive to initiate an interstate dispute when military resources are higher due to a growth in contentment with the regime within the ranks (Diversionary Hypothesis 3a). Second, though democratic regimes should lose the incentive for conflict due to a growth of contentment within the ranks, their conflict likelihood is not expected to decline. Democratic leaders that have well-funded and well-armed militaries will possess a fighting force that is readily capable of international conflict. Further, democratic leaders that have background characteristics that predispose them to a coup (e.g., lack of legitimacy, economic decline) are also likely to influence a leader’s electoral prospects. The military may be appeased but at-risk democrats will still be likely to utilize their militaries for diversionary tactics due to tenuous electoral prospects (Diversionary Hypothesis 3b).

3.3. COUP-PROOFING AND CIVIL WAR

Finally, the disparate influence of coup-proofing on military capabilities is not limited to the interstate level. The goal of coup-proofing is to limit the military’s ability to attempt a coup, even at the expense of raising the likelihood of other forms of anti-regime activity. The previous section briefly discussed how coup-proofing can
undermine the capabilities of the state, potentially making them more vulnerable to foreign aggression. I argue that coup-proofing will also raise the likelihood of another form of anti-regime activity: civil war. Though more common than leadership changes via foreign invasion, regime change via civil war accounts for less than one-seventh that of coups. Leaders, then, should be far more likely to fear a coup and will dedicate attention to combating that particular means of removal, even at the expense of increasing the likelihood of rebellion.

I argue that coup-proofing can increase the likelihood of civil war onset in three ways. First, the limitations introduced by structural coup-proofing will extend to internal conflict dynamics. Though a regime-protecting paramilitary unit such as a Presidential Guard will likely have the capabilities to crush an insurgency, their role will keep them confined to the capital. Counterinsurgency activity will then be relegated to a regular armed forces that has likely seen an increase in coordination obstacles and a reallocation of crucial resources to the paramilitary. Coup-proofed armies are simply less combat-capable, making the probability of a rebellion’s success increase. As structural coup-proofing increases, so should the likelihood of civil war onset (Civil War Hypothesis 1).

Increases in military spoils are once again expected to have a disparate influence on conflict activity. Autocracies are more likely to spend military funds as patronage resources and equipment that is purchased is often done so for symbolic purposes (Henk and Rupiya 2001). Though beneficial in that such resources will reduce the likelihood of a coup, these resources will do little to increase the military capabilities of the state. Military spoils are not expected to influence the likelihood of civil war in autocracies (Civil War Hypothesis 2a). However, the transparent nature of democracies will require
spoils to be legitimately pursued and expenditures and equipment will be a much more accurate reflection of military capabilities. Therefore, increases in military spoils are expected to reduce the likelihood of civil war onset in democracies (Civil War Hypothesis 2b).

Finally, purges are similarly expected to increase the likelihood of rebellion in two ways. First, purges negatively influence state military capabilities by reducing overall personnel numbers, reducing the competence of soldiers that remain in the ranks, and making loyalty more important than competence in recruitment, retention, and promotion. Second, purges will increase the mobilization potential of the citizenry by increasing the number of potential recruits that have military training. This dynamic is expected to be particularly strong with ethnic purges, as such exclusions serve to both alienate a discriminated group and provide that group with a more capable batch of recruits. Purges, both in terms of military numbers and ethnicity, are expected to increase the likelihood of civil war onset (Civil War Hypothesis 2).

4. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

The remainder of this dissertation will be dedicated to drawing out a more in-depth theory for the preceding discussion and empirically testing the hypotheses summarized in Table 1.2. Theory development is the primary objective of Chapter 2. I begin with a basic discussion of the multiple types of threats that leaders can face in terms of political survival, and then develop a theory that explains how leaders will address those threats. In short, leaders will put more emphasis on combating coups than other forms of irregular removal since it a more common threat to their tenure. I will then move on to a discussion of the multiple strategies that leaders implement, including
structural coup-proofing, purging, and providing the military spoils, as well as the consequences that those strategies has for the likelihood of coup, international conflict initiation, and the onset of civil war.

In Chapter 3 I test the utility of coup-proofing by investigating whether coup-proofing actually reduces the likelihood of a coup. Previous efforts (e.g., Belkin and Schofer 2003) have pointed to the tendency of states to coup proof when the likelihood of a coup is elevated, but this represents the first cross-national effort to determine whether coup-proofing is a successful endeavor. The chapter also represents the first effort to implement model that controls for sample selection (i.e., a coup attempt) in determining the outcome of coups. I find that efforts that aim to reduce the willingness of the military to intervene effectively deter coups, while structural obstacles to their execution act as a determinant of the coup’s outcome.

In Chapter 4 I test the diversionary implications of coup-proofing. I build on prior efforts to explain authoritarian diversion by considering both the motivation for conflict initiation (coup risk) and alternative strategies (coup-proofing) that can impact the willingness or ability to seek diversion. As a general rule, I argue that coup-proofing will reduce the incentive for diversion, though I make a distinction when considering military spoils. Military resources are expected to be fungible in their nature for autocracies. That is, leaders are largely free to utilize these resources for either private goods such as allowances. Democracies, however, have a number of constraints that will make military resources be dedicated to the public good of national security. Democracies will see a bump in military capabilities when providing armies with more
resources, leaving them particularly capable of seeking out a foreign dispute. The analysis strongly supports the predictions.

Chapter 5 considers the implications of coup-proofing for civil war. Prior scholarship has suggested that government purges can increase the mobilization capacity of rebels (Roessler 2011). I go beyond this effort by directly considering how coup-proofing influences the capabilities of the state. Specifically, coup-proofing will generally reduce the state’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations and increase the likelihood of civil war onset. Structural coup-proofing will reduce the combat effectiveness of the state in two ways. First, it will reduce the capabilities of the regular armed forces by creating coordination obstacles and redirecting resources to the paramilitary. Second, the existence of a strong paramilitary is an indication of a leader’s dedication to capital security. While a paramilitary organization will often include well-trained and well-equipped soldiers, these soldiers are unlikely to be deployed for combat outside of the capital. This means that a leader’s ablest soldiers will not be used to deter an uprising.

I close the dissertation with a chapter dedicated to reviewing the findings and their contribution to the literature, including civil-military relations, interstate conflict, and, ultimately, literature on the onset of civil war. I also point to a number of ways in which the analysis can be extended in order to investigate a number of other puzzles. ©
Figure 1.1: Modes of Irregular Power Transfers, 1875-2005

- Coup: 70%
- Popular Protest: 6%
- Civil War: 10%
- Foreign Intervention: 9%
- Assassination: 5%
Table 1.1: Summary of Hypotheses

Coup Hypotheses (Chapter 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CH1</td>
<td>States with stronger structural coup-proofing (paramilitary size and fractionalization) should have a lower likelihood of a coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH2</td>
<td>States that provide higher levels of financial or materiel resources to their militaries should see a lower likelihood of coups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH3</td>
<td>States that have higher levels of purges should have a lower likelihood of a coup</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diversionary Hypotheses (Chapter 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DH1</td>
<td>Leaders with higher coup vulnerability leaders should be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DH2</td>
<td>Leaders with high coup vulnerability should be less likely to initiate interstate disputes when structural coup-proofing measures are strong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DH3a</td>
<td>The impact of coup risk on the initiation of disputes should decrease as military spoils increase in autocracies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DH3b</td>
<td>The impact of coup risk on the initiation of disputes should remain positive as military spoils increase in democracies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DH4</td>
<td>Leaders with higher levels of purges should be less likely to initiate an interstate dispute.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil War Hypotheses (Chapter 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CWH1</td>
<td>States with high levels of structural coup-proofing should have a higher likelihood of civil war onset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWH2a</td>
<td>Increased military spoils should have no impact on the onset of civil conflict in authoritarian regimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWH2b</td>
<td>Increased military spoils should reduce the likelihood of civil war onset in democracies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWH3</td>
<td>States with higher levels of military purges should have a higher likelihood of civil war onset.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 2: THE UTILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF COUP-PROOFING

1. INTRODUCTION

“And by whose power I well might lodge a fear to be again displaced; which to avoid, I cut them off; and had a purpose now to lead out many to the Holy Land, Lest rest and lying still might make them look too near unto my state. Therefore, my Harry, be it in thy course to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out, may waste the memory of the former days.”

- Henry IV

International relations literature is replete with testimony regarding the impact of foreign threats on military policy. Realists, for example, point to the ubiquitous threat from foreign foes, threats that prompt states to exercise policies ranging from arms races (Richardson 1960), to alliance formation (Walt 1988), to pre-emptive attack (Mearsheimer 2001). Comparatively fewer efforts have considered how leaders will manipulate their militaries as a reaction to domestic threats. This is puzzling given that leaders are far more likely to fall from power through a variety of domestic mechanisms than international ones, ranging from insurgency, to social uprisings, and to attacks from their own militaries via a coup d’état. This project will move beyond traditional state-centered explanations of international survival of the state by considering strategies that are implemented in order to preserve the domestic survival of the state’s individual leader. In contrast to the perception that states will constantly seek to maximize international power, the story that will unfold in this dissertation tells of leaders that willingly sacrifice the well-being of the state in order to increase their individual survival prospects.
Consider, for example, the quote offered above. Penned over 400 years ago, Shakespeare’s *Henry IV* offers a vivid portrayal of a struggling leader attempt to use military policy in order to maintain a grip on domestic political power. Instead of taking action that would make England a stronger entity, Henry instead sought a military campaign that would leave a weaker force at home but would potentially increase support from the masses. Henry was not alone in this reasoning, as modern-day scholars continue to point to the use of conflict to distract from domestic woes. Indeed, such policies can be seen as an extension of the most well-established theories of political survival.

For example, the model of democratic governance presented by Downs (1957, 11) assumes that “every government seeks to maximize political support” and “its primary goal is reelection…” To attain and maintain power is the first order of business for those in power, being more important than even strengthening the state. Once in power, leaders will seek out “the most efficient means” by which they can maintain their rule. Likewise, leaders operating under the rules of democracy will implement policy that aims to maximize their support amongst voters with the least amount of effort, as it is the voters that will ultimately choose whether they will retain office. Just as those in democracies will target the voters due to elections acting as the primary means of removal, those in regimes facing other means of removal will seek out strategy that will directly account for the means that is most likely to remove them.

In the international context, David (1991) has offered an “omnibalancing” theory, arguing that vulnerable leaders will turn their attention to internal threats when forming alliances. Moving from a state-centric to leader-centric theory, David (1991, 238) summarizes the disparate views in international relations by noting that balance of power
theorists assume a leader asks “How does this policy affect the power of the state?” while they should be asking “How does this policy affect the probability of my remaining in power.” David (1991, 236) claims that “since the dominant goal of third world leaders is to stay in power, they will sometimes protect themselves at the expense of the interests of the state.” Such an approach reflects Downs’s belief that individual survival interests prevail and when looking at alliance arrangements, and in the case of alliances it seems that Third World leaders side with states that are most likely to keep them in power, not those that will protect them from an international threat. This has been widely noted in the rationale of leaders to seek alliances with world powers. Islam Karimov, for example, did not seek rapprochement with Russia because the Uzbek President wished for a strong ally in the face of a growing external threat. Instead, he shifted away from cooperation with the United States because the latter’s growing emphasis on democratization and the promotion of human rights could serve to undermine the regime’s ability to crush domestic dissent and destabilize the regime’s grip on power (Fumagalli 2007). The house of Saud’s alliances with the United Kingdom and United States have similarly been efforts at maintaining domestic control (Nonneman 2005), a trend that has been noted for U.S. alliances in the middle east more generally (Miglietta 2002). While David’s look at this intersection of domestic politics and international conflict focuses on an external means to retain power, I will show that leaders also use domestic policy to increase their prospects for survival. Specifically, vulnerable leaders will give policy preference to their primary means of removal: the coup.

The relationship between political survival and conflict has been most commonly attested to in international relations with studies on diversion, defined by Levy (1989) as
the use of force for domestic political purposes (i.e., retain power). With theory almost exclusively focused on the existence of elections, Levy (1989, 283) called on researchers to consider “questions of under what kinds of conditions what kinds of states resort to what kinds of external conflict in response to what kinds of threats to the security of political elites.” A limited number of studies have since moved beyond democracies by considering the diversionary actions of autocracies (e.g., Mitchell and Prins 2004; Pickering and Kisangani 2010), but these efforts have universally passed on considering alternatives that leaders might be able to implement, such as coup-proofing. A further limitation in the extant literature is consideration of the military. Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues (2003), for example, have attempted to look at how leaders have accounted for the preferences of other elites—particularly those in autocracies—in their study on political survival, but gave little consideration to the primary actor in their potential removal: the military. Such a trend is truly puzzling considering the military’s primary role in conflict, the existence of other policy options that can target the military, and the military’s primary role in coups.

In this project I hope to build on Levy’s suggestion to consider the types of conditions that will prompt states to use diversionary action by considering the benefits and consequences of survival strategies, particularly those related to coup-proofing. In doing so, I consider the three centers of domestic power illustrated in Figure 2.1. First, I look at the preferences of the head of state and their inner-circle. Treated as the ruling coalition and the paramilitary bodies that will be tasked with protecting them, the inner-circle will manipulate policy in order to increase their individual survival prospects. I follow the assumptions of Downs (1957) by considering the chief executive to be a
rational, self-interested actor whose primary goal is to stay in power. I begin by building on the belief that leaders who are fearful removal (through a coup or otherwise) will be more likely to wage interstate disputes for diversionary purposes. Other than promoting a rally affect amongst the public, the theory presented here will consider how diversion will impact the primary undertakers of coups: the military.

Second, I consider the implications of coup-proofing for the military. I argue that leaders are willing to increase their likelihood of removal via comparatively rarer methods (e.g., invasion, insurgency) if it serves the more expedient purpose of reducing the likelihood of removal via the most common means (i.e., coup d’etat). Leaders fearing a coup, then, are willing to radically reduce the fighting capacity of their armed forces if it serves the immediate goal of coup-proofing. This suggestion is in contrast to the traditional expectations of realists in that it refutes the assumption that states will perpetually increase their military capabilities in an effort to maintain a balance of power (or preponderance of it) with external foes (Morgenthau 1967). I argue that leaders with a heightened vulnerability to a coup, though no doubt to a degree wary of potential foreign aggressors, are concerned first and foremost with maintaining personal power and policy will reflect the primary threat to their individual survival and not that of the state. This reduction of military capabilities points to a paradox. The diversionary literature has suggested that a heightened likelihood of a coup will make leaders more likely to utilize international conflict for diversionary purposes, but the reduction of the fighting capacity of their regular armed forces undermines their ability to actually use diversion as a viable policy option. Diversion in a coup-proofed regime would thus be a risky maneuver.
Third, I consider the implications of coup-proofing for non-state actors. This pole of domestic power refers to the public, specifically civilians that have the potential to seek the creation of an insurgency. While coup-proofing is expected to effectively reduce the likelihood of a coup, these actions will undermine the fighting capacity of the regular armed forces and will at times make non-state domestic actors more militarized, that is, possess better military capabilities than an average citizenry. Further, well-trained and well-equipped leader-protecting paramilitary units are unlikely to be used in conflict, whether interstate or intrastate, in essence doing little to deter rebellion. This points to a second paradox in which leaders may effectively reduce the likelihood of a coup, but in so doing they increase the likelihood of civil war onset.

This theory will be drawn out in three sections. First, I will offer the theoretical mechanisms that will prompt leaders to utilize interstate disputes to improve their likelihood of maintaining office. While I briefly review relevant electoral-focused literature, the main argument presented here is that leaders that are fearful of a coup will be more likely to behave belligerently in the international arena. The second section will detail the alternative mechanisms that leaders can undertake to preserve their rule. This section will illustrate the benefits of coup-proofing and highlight the impact of coup-proofing on military capabilities. Finally, the third section considers the implications of different coup-strategies for both inter- and intrastate conflict. While leaders are occasionally removed via insurgency, such events are rare and pose far less of a threat to a leader than a coup. Leaders are thus willing to degrade their military capabilities to the point that the state no longer possesses the ability to crush would-be insurgents. The
theory suggests that though a capital may be safe from a coup, these leaders will often witness, and even tolerate, rebellions in the hinterlands.

2.1 COUP VULNERABILITY AS A DIVERSIONARY INCENTIVE

Attention has been given to a variety of characteristics of states involved in diversionary conflict. Looking at post-World War II United States, for example, James and Hristolas (1994) considered country peculiarities, such as legislative control of the Congress, proximity of elections, and term limits. Though they were looking specifically at domestic changes in the United States, differences amongst states throughout the international community are clearly important, and subsequent research has considered a variety of peculiarities in the electoral process. The bargaining framework of Schultz (1998), for example, is reliant upon the existence of a credible opposition party and the preferences of an electorate, Smith’s (1998) formal model considers electoral consequences of failed foreign policies, and Clark and Nordstrom (2005) focus on democratic processes in a general sense. While more recent scholarship has moved beyond elections by considering aspects such as executive-legislative relations (Brulé and Hwang 2010), diversionary theory has still primarily been a theory attempting to explain the behavior of democracies. Indeed, even the rebuff of diversionary theory offered by Meernik and Waterman (1996) largely limits itself to democracies by pointing out that states should refrain from diversionary use of force due to the “immoral and criminal” repercussions involved. Non-democracies may be less concerned about violating international norms or laws, especially when confronted with threats to their rule.

Growing evidence suggests that authoritarian leaders do in fact use diversionary tactics. Miller (1995), for example, surmised that authoritarian regimes must utilize
diversionary war to deal with domestic dissent since they have few other means to deal with crises. A similar suggestion was put forth by Lai and Slater (2006), who extend this argument by focusing on military regimes. Countries ruled by military strongmen or juntas are found to be much more likely to use force than even other authoritarian governments. They explain this trend by theorizing that military governments lack institutional capability and must resort to “desperate measures” when attempting to quell dissent. Mitchell and Prins (2004) went a step beyond authoritarian motives by looking at opportunity, theorizing that authoritarian governments are more likely to use diversion than democracies because the transparent nature of democracies will allow potential targets to strategically avoid an altercation. Their study does not discount the possibility of democratic diversions, but it is groundbreaking in its effort to describe a theoretical mechanism by which non-democracies will have increased diversionary opportunities.²

Though these previous works might suggest that non-democracies possess fewer means to deal with crises and possess greater opportunity to utilize diversion, it is still unclear why diversion is a necessity. Missing from these studies is a consideration of the likelihood of a leader’s removal. As Morgan and Bickers (1992) have pointed out, different states will have different turmoil thresholds that will allow them to tolerate legitimacy crises to varying degrees. It is thus necessary to specify which countries would have lower turmoil thresholds and would thus be more vulnerable to removal if scholars are to accurately portray the impact of economic or other crises on diversionary actions. We can begin to understand the threats leaders face by looking at likely means of removal. Irregular exits from power are illustrated in Figure 2.2, which summarizes

² More precise conceptualizations of opportunity include contentious issues (Mitchell and Thyne 2010) and territorial conflict (Tir 2010).
five different forms of non-democratic exit of leaders as indicated by the Archigos data project (Goemans et al. 2009): coups, civil war, foreign intervention, popular uprising, and assassination. A forty-five year sample (1961-2005) reveals that 210 different leaders fell via a coup d’état, followed by 28 via civil war, 18 through popular uprisings, 16 by foreign interventions, and seven in assassinations. Authoritarian leaders are thus over seven times more likely to be removed via a coup than the next most common means of removal, and three times as likely as all other forms of irregular removal combined. In contrast to the overwhelming focus on international threats in international relations, leaders were over 13 times more likely to fall via coup than at the hands of a foreign foe. These trends point to an important conclusion for a leader’s survival prospects. A rational leader, primarily concerned with retaining power, will need to account for the likelihood of a coup. This is particularly true for non-democratic regimes, which see coups as the most likely means of removal, but is also true for democratic regimes that otherwise have a high likelihood of a coup. Coup-proofing, quite simply, is of paramount importance for political survival.

A number of democracy-focused studies on diversion have hinted at the importance of other elites. For example, Gowa (1998) attests to the importance of party control of the Congress in the American context, while Brulé (2006, 2008) points to U.S. diversion as most likely during periods of low approval and high legislative constraints. The literature regarding democracies is intriguing in that it points to the importance of cohesion within the political elite even though it is the masses that will largely determine their fate at the polls. Elite cohesion should be of particular importance for authoritarian

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3 For a direct look at the dynamics of party dynamics and diversion in the U.S. context, see Foster (2006, 2008).
regimes given their dependence on the continued support of other elites in the state apparatus (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). With the primary survival threat for authoritarian leaders coming from within the government itself, it is important to give closer consideration to this ruling coalition.

The ruling coalition has been dealt with most explicitly in the context of authoritarian diversion by Pickering and Kisangani (2010). Their political incentive theory predicts that authoritarian diversion will be implemented when the distance between available resources to provide patronage and the amount spent on patronage becomes small. Diversion, they argue, becomes likely when other means of control become fragile. They conclude that authoritarian regimes with the largest winning coalitions, single-party states, should be the most likely to utilize international conflict in times of economic crisis due to the strain that their extraordinary coalition size puts on patronage resources. Though theoretically compelling, their analysis fails to find strong support for their theory of “despotic diversions.” The theoretical offerings of this dissertation suggest that their findings can be explained by one important omission: the actual likelihood of being removed from office. Geddes (1999) and Hadenius and Teorell (2007) show that single-party states are among the most stable regimes in existence, more stable even than multi-party democracies. Further, these regime types are particularly unlikely to be targeted in coups. As Pickering and Kisangani (2010, 479) note, “the military’s subservient state within the hierarchy is almost always well established” in single-party regimes. The chances for a coup, then, are minimal, calling into question the conclusion that these states should have the incentive to attempt diversionary actions, even during a time of crisis. In order to properly determine which states should be likely
to utilize diversion, we must first consider how diversion is expected to benefit the regime.

2.2 THE BENEFITS OF DIVERSION

There are three ways in which diversion is expected to benefit the ruling coalition. First, leaders can use diversionary conflict to attempt to generate a rally ‘round the flag effect amongst the masses. While most commentaries point to the influence on the public, some seminal civil-military relations offerings have pointed to the impact of such efforts on the military. Andreski (1968, 88-90), for example, has noted that nationalism is an essential determinant of military subordination. Many new states, for example, are built around artificial borders and often devolve into identity-based power struggles after a common goal of nationalism is lost upon gaining independence (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Having an external foe, on the other hand, will help create a common national identity. Finer (1988, 9) believed this process began during military training with the “systematic disparagement of the foreigner, and the channeling of all aggressive tendencies into hatred of the enemy.” In the absence of a natural rival, leaders have the incentive to create one in order to foment such an identity. Though Meernik and Waterman (1996, 577) can claim “the average boost to a president’s approval rating following a visible use of force is close to zero,” such a sweeping generalization does not discount the possibility of using diversionary conflict to influence other elites, especially soldiers.

Second, conflict has been argued to increase the extractive capacity of the state. Herbst (1990) has articulated the potential for legitimization of rule through conflict for weak regimes. He points to the European precedent that saw centuries of warfare craft
national identities, give credibility to leadership, and increase the state’s ability—and public’s willingness to allow—taxation. Without international conflict, Herbst argues, infantile states seem to be destined for perpetual weakness. For example, Herbst (1990, 135) notes that the African context offers “plenty of border disputes and fragments of ethnic groups that need to be rescued from ‘foreign domination’ to provide enough rationalization for hostile action against other African countries.” Issues such as “conflicts between language blocks, disputes over control of rivers and railroads (especially given the number of land-locked countries), or the simple need to have more land for populations that double every twenty years” will provide ample justification for diversion (Herbst 1990, 135). In the end leaders will opt to “increase their state’s extractive ability and divert their citizens from inter-ethnic squabbles by seizing upon the multitude of provocations, always present, to provoke a fight with neighboring states” (Herbst 1990, 134).

Other than simple “diversion,” it would appear that a variety of issues would push weak states toward conflict for practical policy purposes. Leaders’ patronage could be improved, as many economies have “suffered economic decline for so long that the possibilities for their own personal enrichment have become severely limited, and therefore will seek to seize the assets of other countries” (Herbst 1990, 134). We can see this in other literature, as Africa’s most politically open states have been argued seek to expand patronage networks through international conflict (Henderson 2009). Such expansions would allow leaders to keep their winning coalition at ease. The influx of resources can allow a leader to increase the flow of patronage to other elites, the military,
or more generally, the winning coalition that Pickering and Kisangani (2010) feared would be vulnerable due to strains on those resources.

Third, occupying the military with a foreign task, such as a crusade in the case of Henry, could reduce the ability of a military to target a fledgling leader. Civil-military relations literature has suggested such a dynamic, claiming that civilian control of the military is strengthened when the armed forces are provided with an external rival. Aside from an increased sense of nationalism, militaries will be distracted from internal politics as they remain dedicated to an external mission. Desch’s (1999) structural theory, for example, claims that civilian control is most likely when the international threat environment is high, as an “externally oriented military will have less inclination to participate in domestic politics.” Mambo and Schofield’s (2007, 302) look at Amin’s Uganda similarly views diversionary action as allowing the military to “pursue policies preferred by its organizational interests.” In addition to inclination, Andreski (1968) claims that militaries grow more dedicated to an external mission, their resources and abilities become less applicable to domestic circumstances. This dynamic will be given considerable detail in the following section, but the discussion to this point suggests that vulnerable leaders have a strong incentive to utilize foreign quarrels when in fear of a coup d’état.

**Diversionary Hypothesis 1: As coup vulnerability increases, leaders are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes.**

Interestingly, though Herbst (1990) has detailed a strong diversionary potential for Africa, the continent is notable in its lack of international conflict. This points to an interesting puzzle. African regimes are not using conflict in a state-building context as
suggested by Herbst, they are not seeking to expand patronage networks as suggested by Henderson, nor are they seeking to provide their militaries with an external mission in the spirit of Andreski or Desch. I believe that in addition to need-based aspects of conflict, we need to give more attention to addressing the alternatives to international force.

While many states have reduced the likelihood of a coup by externalizing their militaries, many—especially those in Africa—have put a premium on internal force, specifically in deterring coups. Scholars have previously hinted at such an alternative, as Bueno de Mesquita (1980), Richards et al (1993), and Gelpi (1997) have pushed researchers to consider other alternatives that autocrats might be able to implement during crises, such as repression. Repression, however, has a notable shortcoming: the intended target. Repression might be useful when facing challenges from the public, but the utility of using repression against the likely instigators of coups—the military or security services—seems very questionable given their possession of arms and ability to retaliate.

However, there are other policies that leaders can implement in order to lessen their vulnerability to a coup. These strategies, commonly referred to as “coup-proofing,” will have a dramatic influence on a leader’s willingness and ability to use diversion as a policy tool.

These alternatives have been woefully neglected in prior diversionary literature, but have important consequences for each of the three spheres of domestic power illustrated in Figure 2.1 (head of state and their inner-circle, the regular armed forces, and non-state domestic actors). Each power center will have different capabilities, and I argue that the relative balance of domestic capabilities will ultimately determine the conflict behavior of the state.
For example, Figure 2.1 shows these entities being of equal size, suggesting they are in balance. The arrows indicate the ability to utilize force against the other power centers. The head of state’s inner-circle, the paramilitary, can repress citizens as well as use force against the regular armed forces, while the regular armed forces can repress the citizenry or attack the head of state. However, these groups are frequently not balanced, as leaders have clear incentives to undermine the ability of their military to unseat them and their people to rise against them. Figure 2.3 illustrates an ideal scenario in which a leader will be more likely to seek diversion as a survival strategy. Here we see that the country possesses strong regular armed forces, meaning that they are plenty capable of being used for diversionary purposes. However, given the relative weakness of the military capabilities of the leader’s paramilitary, the regular armed forces can be seen as a major threat to the leader’s survival. Though diversion may reduce the incentive for the military to oust a leader, the leader will be uneasy when facing high coup risk and a weak security apparatus. Leaders are thus expected to shift the balance of capabilities from the regular armed forces to their paramilitaries through the practice of coup-proofing.

In the next section I move to discussing the phenomenon of coup-proofing, giving specific attention to how these policies can influence the willingness and ability of militaries to intervene in politics and how these policies will influence the balance of capabilities between the centers of power. I begin by offering the theoretical expectations of coup-proofing, offering a rationalist perspective that demonstrates why coup-proofing will successfully deter putschists. In short, leaders can diminish the expected utility of a coup by reducing the expected gains from it or by decreasing its likelihood of success. Next, I move on to the theoretical mechanisms behind three specific strategies. Finally, I
consider how these coup-proofing efforts will influence the likelihood of international conflict, specifically in the diversionary context.

2.3 THE UTILITY OF COUP-PROOFING

This section will lay out the general theoretical expectations of coup activity following a rationalist perspective. Coup conspirators will carefully evaluate their chances of success and should only attempt a coup when the expected rewards of the maneuver and its probability of victory are high enough to offset the dire consequences of a failed putsch. The estimated costs from a coup’s failure extend to multiple levels. These include individual consequences such as imprisonment, exile, or execution, and group-level sanctions such as abolition of the military (Costa Rica, Haiti), the purging of a branch’s officer corps (Kenya), and the massacre of ethnic groups associated with the coup (Liberia). Further, state-level fallout, such as civil war, is also a possibility. Powell and Thyne (2011), for example, identify 50 cases of coups that resulted in enough fatalities to be included in the Uppsala/PRIO armed conflict dataset, as well as nine cases of coup attempts reaching the Correlates of War’s 1000-death threshold to qualify as a civil war. Though there is an occasional granting of amnesty to plotters (see 1995 Sao Tome and Principe, for example), these cases are rare and usually come about after the conspirators have already successfully seized power and are able to negotiate an exit. As a result, plotters should refrain from action until the expected likelihood of success is sufficiently high enough to offset the associated risk.

The decision to attempt a coup can thus be thought of in terms of a rationalist framework, as seen in the civil conflict literature in works of scholars such as Lichbach (1995), and in the coup literature by Thyne (2010). The aforementioned groups that can
face reprisals for an attempted coup can, of course, also rationally expect to reap the benefits of success. At the individual level, Miller (1970, 17), claimed coups are due to “a man pushing his own interests,” a view that is echoed by Decalo (1990). At the group level, organizational interests of the military are also often noted as catalysts for coups, though they have received limited treatment in the empirical literature, a trend that is largely true for characteristics of the military in general. The seminal offerings of Jackman (1978) and Londregan and Poole (1990), for example, do not offer a single measure accounting for characteristics specific to the military, nor does the more recent offering of Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000). Finally, the benefits of a coup could also be realized at the state level. Legitimacy is an often cited determinant of coups, a dynamic that can be treated as regime type, economic performance, and overt signs of discontent with the regime. Thyne and Powell (2012), for example, argue that coups undertaken against authoritarian leaders are significant determinants of democratization, opening the door for an increase in regime legitimacy and, they presume, improved economic performance.

The original impetus will no doubt center upon the expected payoffs of the victory, though plotters will also be aware of the likelihood of that goal being realized. Finer (1988), for example, offered a second set of concerns that should accompany disposition: opportunity. Elites may possess the disposition to overthrow the head of state, but they must also take into account their ability to do so, that is, the likelihood of the maneuver’s success. This is particularly important given the tendency of regimes to protect themselves through coup-proofing efforts. Feaver (1999) has noted that the available options in accomplishing this task are limited. Legal provisions placing
restraints on the military, for example, are useful only to the extent that the military is willing to conform to the law, a distinction that might be lost when disposition is otherwise high. Rational leaders, dedicated to maximizing their likelihood of remaining in power, actively undertake efforts to reduce coup likelihood though coup-proofing.

Numerous efforts have been made to lessen the likelihood of a coup, though they are generally lumped into two categories. Finer’s seminal *Man on Horseback*, first published in 1962, pointed to efforts to influence disposition and opportunity. Disposition refers to the willingness of elites to attempt the ouster of their chief executive, while opportunity is treated as as the military’s popularity amongst the population and the justifiability of the maneuver (Finer 2002, 72-75). The importance of public opinion has been attested to elsewhere. Sutter (1999, 130), for example, claim citizens can have a hand in inhibiting a coup’s outcome by “credibly refusing to support an illegitimate regime.” He goes on to liken a coup attempted in the face of public disapproval to seizing the bridge of a ship whose engines are inoperable. A poll conducted by Rajabhat Suan Dusit University indicated that 84% of Thai respondents favored the successful 2006 military coup (Faiola 2006). On the other hand, Gibson (1997) indicates that mass opposition to the Soviet putsch of August 1991 was directly responsible for the coup’s demise, illustrating the tendency to return to the barracks in the face of popular disapproval. However, the swiftness with which coups are undertaken leads many to succeed (or fail) before the public is even aware that the maneuver is underway. Though public sentiment is no doubt an important component of coup activity, the most immediate determinant of the effort’s success will be other aspects of the state’s security apparatus.
I thus choose to follow Feaver’s (1999, 225) more general approach, as he notes that civil control techniques can be classified as either “those that affect the disposition of the military to subvert” or those that reduce “the ability of the military to subvert control.” The former refers to the willingness to act, and has been attested to in numerous studies. Decalo (1990), for example, argued that coups could largely be attributed to selfish desires of individual soldiers. Others have pointed to organizational grievances for the military as a whole (Thompson 1973), and disposition-based coup-proofing efforts will aim to create content soldiers.

Ability, however, can be reflected in efforts to undermine the capacity of the military to organize and carry out a coup. Efforts to influence this ability have varied. These include “setting various branches against each other,” “using parallel chains of command,” or using numerous institutions such as “border guards, secret police, paramilitary forces, militaries, presidential guards, and so on” to act as an armed counterweight to the military (Feaver 1999, 225). These efforts will require even the most likely putschists to carefully evaluate the prospects of organizing a coup and successfully executing it. In the following pages I will speak of “disposition” in regard to efforts that aim to reduce the willingness of militaries to attempt a coup. I will speak of “ability” in regard to efforts that aim to reduce the ability of soldiers to either organize or execute a coup plot.

Consideration of both ability and disposition is important for two reasons. First, they are both theoretically expected to reduce the utility of diversionary conflict, as a vulnerable leader will grow more secure with an increase in either strategy. Second, the respective categories have important implications for the fighting capacity of the military.
Disposition efforts are generally seen as having no ill-effect on fighting capacity of the regular armed forces (Feaver 1999), though I will offer a partial critique of this assumption. However, a strong and growing body of literature suggests that efforts to reduce the ability to undertake a coup substantially alter the ability of militaries to function in combat (Welch 1976; Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Feaver 1999; Quinlivan 1999; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011). So in addition to lowering the utility of diversion, these strategies can lower the capacity for diversion, both making diversion risky and undermining the regime’s ability to suppress insurgents.

Figure 2.4 illustrates the balance of domestic capabilities in a coup-proofed regime. We see a number of changes to each center of power. Coup-proofing has increased the power of the inner circle’s paramilitary at the expense of the regular armed forces. As will be discussed below, a redirection of resources, the introduction of coordination obstacles, and little attention to merit-based promotion and retention will undermine the capacity of the armed forces. The reduced relative capabilities of the regular armed forces will act to deter a coup attempt, as their ability to succeed has been greatly undermined. As we will see later, these efforts to weaken the regular armed forces will also create an advantage for would-be insurgents, as they will often increase the mobilization capacity of non-state actors.

I now proceed to illustrate the theoretical mechanisms behind three coup-proofing strategies: the creation of structural military divisions, manipulation of military finances, and military purges.
3. COUP-PROOFING

3.1 STRUCTURAL COUP-PROOFING

“Coordination of efforts is a necessity in a struggle between groups. In large groups it can be achieved only on the basis of subordination and unitary command. The proposition that unitary command is advantageous in war is so evident that no elaborate proofs are required.”


Geddes (1999) has noted that the worst possible outcome for a military is to have to fight other factions of the armed forces, and over half of successful coups reported by Marshall and Marshall (2009) are indeed bloodless. This reality has led many leaders to reduce the ability of their armed forces to attempt a coup by providing a number of structural obstacles to organizing and executing a conspiracy. Though Svolik (2009, 484) has recently “assumed away” any collective action problem elites may face when confronting a dictator with a coup, I argue that cohesion obstacles are of paramount importance and are the most visible aspect of coup-proofing.

Cohesion has previously been noted as an important factor in studies on other forms of intrastate conflict. Tilly (2003), a student of Barrington Moore, goes beyond the efforts of his mentor by looking not just at the incentives to seek out political violence, but by considering the opportunities that those with grievances possess. Tilly specifically looks at the ability of people socially interact as a determinant of political violence. Goodwin (2002) and Brockett (2005) similarly treated large-scale political revolution as a function of the ability of revolutionaries to coordinate. While members of a state’s military may not have to deal with repression from the government, the ability of
conspirators to organize their effort is of paramount importance, and indeed many leaders attempt to reduce the ability of their militaries to act in a coordinated manner.

Aware of these trends, a limited number of studies have theorized that militaries with less “cohort rivalry” are more likely to attempt coups. However, these efforts have either limited their analyses to single-year data on counter-forces, or have relied on overall military size as a proxy for centrality (e.g., Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993). Larger militaries are more likely to be composed of separate units, companies, platoons, or informal cliques, and plotters will have to successfully recruit from those potential rivals. Aside from intra-branch recruiting, plotters may also need to go outside of their own service. Thompson (1976), for example, offered an early test of this inter-branch obstacle by using descriptive statistics to demonstrate that coups attempted with the overt support of more armed service branches were more likely to succeed. Though he does not claim more branches translates directly into fewer attempts, potential plotters are no doubt aware of such obstacles and will be wary of attempting a coup as the number of necessary co-conspirators or potential opponents increase.4

Aware of such obstacles, leaders have made efforts to increase either the number of obstacles or the strength of them. The most comprehensive treatment of these actions in the quantitative literature has been undertaken by Belkin and Schofer (2003). They consider the number of military branches, paramilitary organizations, and their respective personnel numbers to create a measure for “counterbalancing.” Their analysis reveals that regimes with heightened vulnerability to a coup do in fact divide “their armies into numerous, mutually suspicious rival forces that check and balance one another” (Belkin

4 Many small African militaries, such as Togo and Burkina Faso, have had their armies, navies, air forces, and gendarmes unified under a single command structure (IISS). These systems could potentially see a plotter face fewer obstacles during the recruiting phase of a coup, making an attempt more likely.
and Schofer 2003, 596). This effort provides strong support that coup risk can be said to promote efforts to fractionalize militaries in an effort to survive. There are, however, two important extensions to be made to this groundbreaking effort. First, there has been no attempt to systematically investigate whether such efforts successfully reduce the likelihood of a coup. Second, prior efforts to account for coup-proofing in the empirical literature conflate different types of policies that have theoretically distinct implications for the study of conflict.

Belkin and Schofer’s innovative offering essentially aggregates three different types of military coordination obstacles. First, it includes the number of organizations that comprise the regular armed forces, such as the army, navy, and air force. With few exceptions, virtually every country is going to have a unit of ground-capable soldiers (armies) and to a lesser degree an air force, though capabilities of the air force will vary dramatically. Though landlocked nations will usually lack navies, their ability to act as an obstacle to coup-plotters has been called into question (Luttwak 1968). Next, the measure considers the number of paramilitary organizations. First (1970, 429) has noted that numerous African regimes decreased the prospects of a coup by “building up counter-forces” within their militaries and security services. Meanwhile, Welch (1976) argued that leaders should attempt to deter coups by increasing the degree of specialization within different entities of a state’s armed forces, thereby creating coordination challenges. Aside from efforts such as developing parallel chains of command, leaders sometimes build entirely independent armed counterweights to their militaries, such as the General Service Unit in Kenya or the Jamahurriyah Guard in Libya. An increase in the number of paramilitary organizations will decrease cohesion in
the armed forces, essentially creating a collective action problem for the military. Finally, Belkin and Schofer incorporate the number of personnel in a regime-protecting paramilitary versus the regular armed forces. This aspect looks more directly at the relative power of the paramilitary and regular armed forces. This is an important theoretical distinction from the number of organizations, as it could be the case that the number of competing organizations could differ in its effectiveness from the strength of a single paramilitary unit that acts as a military counterweight. For example, the infamous 1982 coup attempt perpetrated by the Kenyan Air Force was violently crushed by Kenya’s only paramilitary group, the General Services Unit (Frazer 1994; N’Diaye 2002). Meanwhile, Decalo (1990, 160) has noted that Milton Obote’s excessive divisions within the security apparatus ultimately undermined its ability to protect him due to their inability to unify against Idi Amin. Although Amin’s putsch was not supported by the vast majority of the Ugandan army, Obote’s “divide and rule” policies toward his military prevented any would-be protectors from organizing resistance to Amin.

What we see here is a domestic extension of balance of power politics. Independent of the military’s disposition to attempt a coup, if the army possesses a preponderance of power over other security services, a leader can be said to be vulnerable to a coup. Leaders, then, will act to tilt the balance of power toward their paramilitary. In doing so, structural coup-proofing efforts also provide the paramilitary with (sometimes excessive) materiel and training, while the regular rank-and-file is allowed to whither. Scholars of both civil-military relations and international conflict, for example, have suggested that coup-proofing often hinders state fighting capacity (Quinlivan 1999; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Reiter and Stam 1998; Biddle and
Long 2004). First, when a state puts more resources into coup-proofing, they inevitably do so at the expense of the regular armed forces. This is due to a reduction in personnel, armaments, or in soldier quality due to a lack of training and non-merit recruitment and promotion. Second, in addition to shortages in training or materiel, coup-proofing also undermines the fighting capacity of a military by creating coordination challenges in the field. This is as true for waging battle as it is for attempting a coup. Durrell-Young (1997, 23), for example, has claimed that unity of command is a “sine qua non for successful military operations,” and unity of command is precisely what structural coup-proofing ultimately attempts to avoid.

In short, coup-proofing undermines the ability of militaries to act cohesively and to utilize advanced weaponry and modern strategy, a reality that is in stark contrast to well-trained and well-armed coup-proofing units whom conspirators will have to overtake during the putsch. So while plotters might on occasion attempt a coup in a “coup-proofed” state, these efforts are generally risky and will be more likely to fail generally fail.

*Coup Hypothesis 1: States with stronger military structural coup-proofing (paramilitary size and fractionalization) will have a lower likelihood of a coup.*

The first coup hypothesis suggests that structural coup-proofing will significantly reduce the likelihood of a coup attempt. These efforts reflect the leader’s primary goal: retaining power. While this primary goal may be accomplished through these efforts, coup-proofing has important consequences for state power, especially regarding a leader’s willingness and ability to use force. This reality has important implications for both international and civil conflict.
3.3 IMPLICATIONS OF STRUCTURAL COUP-PROOFING FOR DIVERSION

From an international perspective, the work of Belkin and Schofer (2005) and Belkin (2005) has indicated that coup-proofing (i.e., counterbalancing) is additive to international conflict. These works theorize that conflict is yet another way in which leaders can create divisions within their armed forces and will complement other-coup-proofing efforts. Two concerns arise from this body of work. First, their models (Belkin and Schofer 2005) find that coup risk is not a significant predictor of ICB conflicts, while coup risk is found to negatively influence MID initiation. Such a finding would seem to undermine the diversionary argument that I, Miller and Elgün (2010), and Pickering and Kisangani (2010) have specifically suggested, as well as the belief in authoritarian diversion in a more general sense. Second, given the critical reduction in capabilities that accompanies coup-proofing, it is unclear why vulnerable leaders would initiate interstate disputes when their militaries lack the resources to properly function. Further, given the dire consequences of authoritarian leaders failing at war (Goemans 2000), it would seem that leaders with crippled militaries should be particularly restrained from initiating interstate disputes, even when possessing the diversionary incentive.

The relationship between coup risk, coup-proofing, and conflict is thus best treated as an interactive relationship. The first diversionary hypothesis predicts that a militarized interstate dispute is more likely when a regime’s characteristics predispose it toward a coup. Leaders that have these vulnerabilities (e.g., prior coup history, lack of legitimacy), but can be said to be coup-proofed, should be less likely to attempt diversion for two reasons. First, the act of structural coup-proofing will reduce the ability of the military to organize and execute a coup-conspiracy, even if they otherwise have the
disposition to do so. A leader will thus have less need for diversion. Second, the act of structural coup-proofing will reduce the ability of the military to function in combat. In addition to losing the incentive to divert, leaders will also lose the ability to utilize diversion as their militaries become less capable as coup-proofing efforts are increased.

*Diversionary Hypothesis 2: Leaders with high coup vulnerability will be less likely to initiate interstate disputes when structural coup-proofing measures are strong.*

Ever fearful of a coup, leaders do not only reduce their fighting capacity relative to foreign armies, they also weaken themselves relative to potential rebel activity. Civil war, I argue, is a secondary concern of leaders and coup-proofing will once again have important implications for this other form of conflict.

### 3.3. IMPLICATIONS OF STRUCTURAL COUP-PROOFING FOR CIVIL WAR

Despite the considerable number of studies on the causes of insurgency, there is a surprising lack of discussion on military matters (Herbst 2004). This is particularly true for considering the military capabilities of the state. Efforts to account for a regime’s battlefield capability have thus been crude and limited, largely relying upon economic indicators. Fearon and Laitin (2003), for example, proxy a state’s “police and military” capabilities by looking at per capita income (inter alia), an approach that parallels that of Collier and Hoeffler (1998). The theoretical impact of the measure, however, has varied. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) consider the factor to reduce the willingness to rebel by raising the opportunity costs of rebellion. Buhaug (2006, 2010), meanwhile, has treated the proxy as an indicator for the ability to undertake costly reforms and the ability of the state to project power over great distances. Others have more generally looked at the ability of the government to outspend those “challengers capable of mobilizing rebellion”
(Fjelde and de Soysa 2009; see also Azam 1995; Collier 2000; Ghandi and Preworski 2006). These approaches go beyond other efforts in that they explicitly tie a country’s economy to its ability to procure arms or otherwise prepare for combat, thus lowering the probability of victory for rebels. However, the multitude of explanations for how state wealth influences conflict illustrates the crudeness of the reliance on economic indicators.

I believe that a much more direct assessment of military capabilities can be taken by considering coup-proofing. First, coup-proofing will effectively undermine a regime’s ability to conduct counter-insurgency campaigns by reallocating crucial resources from the regular armed forces to coup-proofing units, by creating structural obstacles within the military, and by limiting the level of expertise in the regular armed forces. In short, coup-proofed armies are inherently less capable. Second, the presence of a strong coup-proofing apparatus signals a commitment to capital security. Though leaders will make important efforts to protect the formal structures of political power, they have less incentive to conduct counter-insurgency operations away from the capital.

We can see these trends in both prior literature and history. Rebellions are often crushed during infancy, though Herbst (2004, 364) has noted that many African armies have displayed a “quite remarkable” failure to mobilize against domestic crises. I argue that coup-proofing is what is ultimately suppressing the mobilization potential of the continent’s armies through two broad mechanisms. First, counter-insurgency efforts require incredible coordination and it is coordination that structural coup-proofing ultimately aims to undermine. Coup-proofing will thus inherently reduced the counterinsurgency capabilities of the armed forces. Second, leaders have an additional incentive to keep their coup-proofing apparatus at home. Though regimes will continue to
put considerable resources into coup-proofing paramilitary units, these units will be unlikely to be used in a conflict arena that does not threaten a leader’s grip on power. Quinlivan (1999), for example, has noted that Saddam Hussein refused to deploy his well-trained Republican Guard despite reaching a military stalemate against Iran in the 1980s. Mobutu Sese Seko, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, similarly refused to deploy his special forces against multiple insurgencies during his rule.

These changes to domestic capabilities are illustrated in the figure below. Figure 2.5 offers an update of the balance of domestic capabilities, showing that the capabilities of non-state actors are high relative to the regular armed forces, while the paramilitary is unlikely to utilize force against them. Instead, efforts to combat would-be or extant insurgents will be delegated to those forces that are not needed in the capital: the weakened regular army.

These trends point to a scenario under which we can explain another observation of Herbst. Of the rebellions that are not crushed, we often see an “equilibrium” in which a government remains stable in the capital, while a rebel group remains active in the countryside. Leaders will reap the benefit of retaining power, even if the state is allowed to suffer the costs of prolonged insurgency. While Herbst was silent on the exact cause, the current argument suggests that this equilibrium is the result of deliberate actions from leadership. In short, survival strategies are having disparate effects on the capabilities of rebels, the military, and coup-proofing units, and these actions often result in an army that is unwilling to risk a coup but is coerced to fight an insurgency despite having limited capabilities. For example, just prior to Mali’s March 2012 coup, its soldiers began publicly claiming they had grown tired of fighting against the Tuareg insurgency.
in the north. These soldiers openly complained that the government was providing insufficient resources to combat the rebels, a trend that was due to President Amadou Touré’s desire to “fight a war against the rebels in return for staying in power” (RFI 2012). This equilibrium was ultimately disrupted when 2000-3000 Tuaregs, trained and armed as mercenaries in Libya, returned home after the fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya. This tipped the balance of capabilities in favor of the rebels, and the regular rank-and-file of the Malian army calculated that Touré would do little to better their situation. The 7350-man army, balanced by a 7800-strong paramilitary spearheaded by the elite Red Beret Presidential Guard, no doubt feared the consequences of failure, but had weighed the alternative of continuing to fight against a much-improved Tuareg force. Though risky, these soldier’s saw the utility of a coup skyrocket and thus took action against the Touré regime. Mali provides a clear case in which soldiers believed that their president was willing to tolerate an insurgency in the long-run if it meant preserving their power in the short-term, a trend that accurately reflects the theoretical offering that leaders will prefer to take their chances with a civil war in exchange for lowering their primary means of removal: the coup.

Civil War Hypothesis 1: States that have high levels of structural coup-proofing will have a higher likelihood of civil war onset.

4.1 FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THE MILITARY

Structural coup-proofing is but one option that a leader has to coup-proof, and other strategies have been alluded to in the preceding discussion. While structural efforts target the ability of militaries to attempt a coup, other efforts can attempt to target motive. In this section I hope to demonstrate that leaders can utilize funding and materiel to make their militaries less likely to seek their ouster.
Aside from legitimacy concerns from the public perspective, some commentaries have considered the specific organizational interests of the armed forces. Under the corporate grievance model, militaries oust governments when their organizational interests are at stake (Thompson 1973). These concerns should also be of interest to those studying coups due to the intent of many leaders to coup-proof their regimes. Just as some actions can be seen as acting counter to the wishes of the armed forces, some leaders aim to lower the disposition to intervene by increasing their organizational resources. Huntington (1991) illustrated these interests by making a number of relevant suggestions for democratizing states that wish to avoid praetorianism. First, he warned that soldiers will think “they are badly paid, badly housed, and badly provided for—and they are probably right” (Huntington 1991, 252). Writing of the 1994 putsch by the Gambia National Army, Lt. Col. Samsudeen Sarr (2007, 32) noted that prior to the attempt “most of the soldiers looked like they just escaped from Nazi concentration camps” and a lack of organizational resources were a primary concern of the conspirators. Regimes should address these deficiencies, Huntington claims, by reducing the size of their militaries and by allocating the saved funds to increase individual salaries, pensions, and benefits. Meanwhile, Decalo’s (1989, 573) look at “modalities” of civil-military stability attests to the use of “tacit but very visible trade-off of material benefits…in exchange for political fealty.” The types of trade-offs are innumerable. Decalo (1989, 573-574) points to government job guarantees and other individual perks such as salary, as well as “unnecessarily sophisticated equipment.” N’Diaye (2000) has pointed to cooptation of the military through spoils such as state jobs and increased pay, while Kenneth Kaunda’s efforts even went so far as to offer subsidized beer to the
Zambian military (Lindeman 2011). Short-term increases in material or financial incentives send a clear signal to the armed forces that their interests are being taken into account. This should greatly reduce the expected pay off from a coup, rendering one less likely.

In addition to a military that wishes for better pay or resources, low levels of funding per soldier could also reflect a lack of training, professionalism, and a more general long-term distaste for a regime. Interestingly, though military professionalism or soldier quality has widely been said to impact the military’s willingness to attempt a coup, efforts to quantitatively explain this aspect are virtually nonexistent.\(^5\)

Operationalizing the quality of a state’s armed forces is notoriously difficult of course. It can be hypothesized, however, that soldiers with fewer organizational resources will be less likely to adhere to norms that might otherwise keep the military removed from politics. Further, Decalo (1989, 573-574) has suggested that coup-proofing will often entail acquiring “unnecessarily sophisticated equipment.” If procured for the regular armed forces, the action should reduce the disposition to attempt a coup. These trends lead us to a second coup hypothesis

*Coup Hypothesis 2: Countries that provide higher levels of financial or materiel resources to their militaries should see a reduced likelihood of coups.*

### 4.2. IMPLICATIONS OF SPOILS FOR DIVERSION AND CIVIL WAR

In addition to this concept of “spoiling” members of the armed forces, Huntington (1991, 252) makes suggestions regarding materiel by advising leaders to give their militaries “toys” such as “fancy tanks, planes, armored cars, [and] artillery.” Desch\(^5\)

\(^5\) A recent exception is Ruby and Gibler (2010). They find U.S. military education programs reduce the likelihood of coups in states who have higher numbers of graduates of these programs.
(1999) has similarly claimed that states would be more immune to military interventionism when “supplying sufficient resources” for external missions, while Decalo has pointed to the acquisition of “unnecessarily sophisticated equipment.” Though the utility of diversion might be reduced when providing such spoils, it would appear that the actual ability to undertake it could be increased. This suggestion, however, is potentially at odds with both recent international relations scholarship and case histories, as countless leaders have sought to coup-proof their regimes by crippling the capabilities of their militaries. Siaka Stevens, for example, allowed the “standard of training” in the army to digress while giving Sierra Leone’s paramilitary “special attention” (Keegan 1983, 517). These efforts saw a radical departure between the capabilities of the coup-proofing Internal Security Unit and the regular army, which was eventually disarmed (Kposowa 2006). Nearby contemporary Sekou Touré went through the process of “decapitating his own armed forces” through a variety of capability-inhibiting efforts, ranging from building up coup-proofing paramilitaries with Soviet and Chinese support while appointing illiterate soldiers to command positions in the regular army (Camara 2000, 322). The increased benefits Huntington recommended were reserved for loyal coup-proofing units in these states, while the regular rank-and-file saw their resources diminish.

The failure of spoils to reach the rank-and-file has been reported elsewhere. In an overview of African military spending, Henk and Rupiya (2001, 18) have painted a very clear picture regarding the purpose of military expenditures, concluding that “an overwhelming proportion” of military spending goes to officer salaries and personnel allowances. They cite an unnamed West African country where only 5% of the military
budget was dedicated to operations, maintenance, and training, and as of the time of their writing Robert Mugabe was putting 68% of Zimbabwe’s expenditures toward officer allowances. The result is an African continent whose militaries are “chronically short of ammunition, fuel, other basic supplies, and spare parts” (Henk and Rupiya 2001, 18). This trend can be seen beyond Africa as well. For example, Saudi Arabia’s coup-fearing leadership ultimately became the highest per capita defense spender in the world, yet as little as 5% of these expenditures were dedicated to military hardware (Pollack 2002, 427).

The difference between Huntington’s generalization and these cases is his focus on policy for democracies, and there is growing theoretical and empirical evidence that democracies behave differently than autocracies in regard to military policy. Reiter and Stam (1998), for example, have suggested that democracies display better battlefield effectiveness due to merit recruitment and promotion in their ranks. Democratic leaders might possess the incentive to limit promotions to political allies, but will face a variety of obstacles due to the transparency of their regimes. Pilster and Böhmelt (2012), for example, note that the presence of third parties like the media and think tanks can keep a watchful eye on military policy and will keep such patronage efforts to a minimum. Therefore, military spending in democracies is expected to do far more for increasing state fighting capabilities than in autocracies. Further, given the disastrous electoral consequences of failed military endeavors (Goemans 2000), democratic leaders have an increased incentive to maintain a high quality fighting force. As a result, democracies that put more financial resources into their militaries are expected to have more capable fighters.
Figure 2.6 reflects the disparate outcome for military capabilities in each regime-type. All else being equal, coup-proofed democracies will retain higher military capabilities in their armed forces. Authoritarian regimes, due to a lack of transparency on spending, recruitment, promotion, and training, will see their capabilities wither as coup-proofing is strengthened. This leads to an important theoretical distinction in the predicted conflict behavior of leaders in these regimes. For autocracies, military spoils—particularly expenditures—will frequently act as little more than graft and will poorly reflect the fighting capability of the state. Therefore, autocrats that have a high risk of a coup will be seen as losing the incentive to utilize conflict as spoils increase, while more spoils will have little impact on practical military capabilities and will thus fail to deter would-be insurgents.

*Diversionary H3a: The impact of coup risk on the initiation of disputes will decrease as military spoils increase in autocracies.*

*Civil War Hypothesis 2a: Increased military spoils will have no impact on the onset of civil conflict in authoritarian regimes.*

Leaders in democracies can similarly lose the necessity for diversion as their militaries grow more content as their resources increase. However, the transparent nature of democracies will lead to military expenditures that more accurately reflect the fighting capabilities of the state. First, the regime will need to demonstrate a commitment to providing a demonstrable public good in democracies (Huntington 1991). Second, democratic militaries are more likely to face constraints in the form of civilian oversight, both inside and outside of the government, in the form of auditors, think tanks, or the media (Pilster and Böhmelt 2012). Democratic leaders might have the incentive to use
military expenditures as patronage, but they will simply have severe constraints on their ability to do so. Finally, these constraints will also act to ensure that expenditures, even when dedicated to bona fide military hardware, is done so in a sensible manner. The lack of a legislative mandate and expertise in the African context led Henk and Rupiya (2001) to conclude that leaders would often engage in symbolic spending. This would involve purchasing highly sophisticated weapons systems that—while prestigious—have little to do with practical security needs. This generalization, however, is limited. While the authors were using general language to portray the general state of African armies, the ability of the continent’s regime to engage is such tactics varies considerably. Democratic South Africa, for example, saw the government become the subject of intense scrutiny following the purchase of submarines and Swedish fighter jets, both of which would have made the South African Defense Force but had little connection to actual issues of national security. Leaders in these regimes will have to spend much more efficiently and will be more likely to invest in materiel that will actually serve a practical purpose.

Furthering this problem is the danger of attempting to institute stronger oversight, as efforts of authoritarian leaders to reduce patronage could act as a catalyst for military intervention. Milton Obote, for example, offered the BBC a rather direct explanation after being ousted in Idi Amin’s 1972 coup (Lofchie 1972, 24):

“…a person very close to Major General Amin…ordered materials worth Shs 40,000,000 [approximately $6 million]. There are no documents, no copies of the invoices, no copies of any delivery note…On the same day I left for Singapore, I asked General Amin, on my return, to give me a written report on how the Shs 40,000,000 was to be spent. I have no doubts at all that what is now developing
in Uganda is another attempt to hide the loss of Shs 40,000,000 and an attempt to
prevent me from getting back to the country and punish the culprits.”

These dynamics suggest that vulnerable leaders can reduce the disposition to
attempt a coup by increasing the individual benefits of their soldiers. Fighting capacity
of the regular military, however, can be allowed to suffer at the expense of patronage.
These trends point to a stark contrast when comparing structural coup-proofing and
financial efforts that target disposition. Military expenditures are in essence flexible.
The transparent nature of democracies will require funding to be used for bona fide
military capabilities in order to provide the public good of national defense. Lacking
such constraints, authoritarian regimes are free to utilize defense expenditures to provide
a selective benefit for a privileged group. These inherent differences lead to an important
distinction for diversionary activity and counterinsurgency capabilities.

*Diversionary Hypothesis 3b: The impact of coup risk on the initiation of disputes will
remain positive as military spoils increase in democracies.*

*Civil War Hypothesis 2b: Increased military spoils will reduce the likelihood of civil war
onset in democracies.*

5.1. PURGES: STRUCTURE MEETS DISPOSITION
“...the chances of the success of a rebellion depend on whether the rebels possess arms
and the knowledge of how to use them”

- Andreski (1968, 159).

Belkin and Schofer (2003) treat coup-proofing exclusively as promoting divisions
amongst the armed forces. This belief was so strong that their subsequent work theorized
that states that are more heavily coup-proofed would be more likely to go to war (Belkin
and Schofer 2005). International conflict, they believe, is another means by which leaders can create rifts amongst the armed forces. Such rifts, however, have drawbacks. The 1966 and 1972 Ghanaian coups, for example, were due in part to such rivalries (Onwumechili 1998, 41). Other coup-inspiring divisions have been said to arise through ethnic divisions, which have been purported causes for coups in a variety of case studies (Onwumechili 1998; Decalo 1990) and quantitative analyses (Jackman 1978; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993). Aside from committing to coup-proofing by committing to divisions, leaders can also attempt to coup-proof by unifying their regime under a similar identity.

Luckham (1984, 1994) has suggested that security must go beyond force and encompass identity. Nationalism is particularly useful, as it “serves as an ideological cement” that “binds armies together and links them to the broader purposes of the state” (Luckham 1994, 23). Just as some leaders will coerce their militaries by providing selective benefits, others will use some form of identity to provide selective incentives to an in-group that is deemed loyal to the regime. Such efforts will involve purging the government of elements whose loyalty is suspect. Leaders have largely accomplished this in two ways. First, many leaders have ridded their regimes, and sometimes militaries, of those of a different political ideology. Ghanan President Kwame Nkrumah, for example, expelled non-socialist elements from his government by 1960 (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). A second strategy has been to build a security apparatus based on ethnicity. Indeed, some states have seen entire ethnic groups purged from a state’s government or armed forces in an effort to reduce the likelihood of a coup. Under Daniel

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6 This reality has prompted some leaders to ethnically “stack” their militaries with a loyal group, as seen during Saddam Hussein’s tenure in Iraq (Quinlivan 1999).
Arap Moi, the Kenyan army went from being “almost exclusively Kikuyu” to “Kalenjin at the bottom, in the middle, and at the top,” this following an original purging of non-Kalenjin elements at independence (N’diaye 2002).

Theoretically, purging can be said to influence both aspects of coup-proofing: disposition and ability. For the former, leaders lower the disposition of their militaries to seek their ouster by filling the ranks with those that share their political views and/or ethnic background. In such cases the military—and the group that comprises it—can be seen as a privileged class that receives the benefit of a job simply due to these loyalties. The utility of a coup, then, will be low since the group is already privileged. Another aspect of purging is that recruitment is based on loyalty and not ability, leaving armies that are stacked with loyal soldiers but lack the skills of a professional army.

The practice of purging has been widely attested to in cases studies (e.g., Camara 2000) and in region-specific inquiries (e.g., Quinlivan 1999), but has received minimal attention in the quantitative literature. One notable effort is the exceptional work of Roessler (2011), who utilizes data from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset to test the impact of political inclusion of ethnic groups on coups and civil war in Africa. Roessler finds that groups that have a formal role in the government are both more likely to attempt a coup and are less likely to rebel. Roessler’s offering is notable in its effort to theoretically distinguish between two often conflated forms of intrastate conflict, but also presents a number of concerns. First, coups, by definition, must be undertaken by members of the state apparatus. This is the primary distinction with civil war (Powell and Thyne 2011). While Roessler views the findings as evidence that leaders will sacrifice coup risk to avoid a rebellion, it is also true that included groups are essentially
the only groups that are capable of meeting the definition of a coup. If a group is fully excluded, for example, a coup is a definitional impossibility. The results could be driven by the very few examples in which “excluded” groups still have representation in the armed forces, as was the case in the Kabrai-led ouster of Sylvanus Olympio in the 1967 Togolese coup.

Second, other than looking at whether groups are included, we should consider the actual act of including or excluding such groups. For example, Cederman et al (2010) utilize the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset to show that ethnic groups that are excluded from power will be more likely to rebel. While it is clear that groups who lack access to state power may have the incentive to rebel, having the capability to do so is critical. Groups that have been perpetually excluded from political power, it would seem, should have a far lower mobilizational capacity than a group that was excluded the prior year. Recently-ousted groups would have had considerable resources, ranging from military hardware and training, to education, and to critical foreign contacts that could provide support at a later time. In short, groups that were recently in power have a far greater mobilizational potential. The results of Cederman et al. (2010) can potentially be explained by the nature of their dependent variable. Unlike Roessler, who carefully vetted his dependent variable in an effort to distinguish between coups and civil wars, Cederman et al. have failed to distinguish coups from civil wars in their data. Vetting their dependent variable reveals that all but two (1960 Congo, 1992 Afghanistan) cases of these “civil wars” began as coups, that is, the rebels were part of the state apparatus at the time of conflict onset, such as the coups in 1966 Syria and 1973 Chile. This clouds the
findings offered in their analysis, and this offering hopes to more carefully identify the mechanisms at play for each form of anti-regime activity.

These exemplary efforts have left a number of avenues for improvement, though the basic belief that purging will reduce coups remains. Figure 2.7 illustrates the impact of purging on military capabilities. First, regimes that have been “purged” are expected to be considerably less likely to experience coups due to the presumed loyalty of those that remain. Second, purging falls in line with Huntington’s suggestion that military’s should downsize in order to be able to increase the resources available for the remaining soldiers. These soldiers thus have little utility for attempting a coup, and could risk losing their privileged status if they were to attempt one. Third, the act of purging is often accompanied by non-merit recruitment practices. Leaders will often purge soldiers that are the most competent, as it is the most competent that are seen as best able to execute a coup attempt. Meanwhile, these competent soldiers will be replaced with those that display loyalty, not competence. Figure 2.7 thus shows a reduced capability of the armed forces, as leaders have taken drastic measures to ensure their survival by handcuffing the military. These reductions will make the military less able, and less likely, to attempt a coup.

Coup Hypothesis 3: Militaries that have been purged are less likely to attempt a coup.

5.2. IMPLICATIONS OF PURGES FOR DIVERSION

In addition to guaranteeing loyalty within the armed forces, purges are often accompanied by a dramatic reduction in soldier quality. Pollack (2002, 386), for example, has noted that Muammar Qaddafi “frequently and unexpectedly” rotated and purged command positions during the 1980s, limited the military’s training through
prohibition of live-fire exercises, and proscribed the regular military from forming division-level commands, which would have to be created “on an ad hoc basis in the field” (Pollack 2002, 386). The Libyan leader instead put paramount importance on his Jamahiriyyah Guard, who proved their utility by beating back an army coup attempt in May 1984. The end result was a regular army in which “concerted” action was “nearly impossible,” and accounts of the Chadian conflict fail to report “a single mention of Libyan forces conducting a tactical counterattack” (ibid). In the conflict the Libyans deployed “far more advanced and far more powerful weaponry [against the Chadian army]…but were crushed nonetheless” (Pollack 2002, 417). Coup-proofing was the goal of the strategies, while a weakened fighting capacity was the consequence, in spite of Qadhafi’s penchant for buying up advanced armaments. In addition to illustrating the consequences of coup-proofing, the Libyan example is intriguing in that it demonstrates a leader intentionally crippling his military while the country was at war. State capabilities were clearly less of a concern than his own personal survival. While the regular armed forces are allowed to whither, the regime can retain a functional paramilitary. As we will see in the next section, purging will also cause the military capabilities of the public to swell, thus increasing the mobilization capacity of rebels.

Qadhafi was placed in a conundrum since his coup fears skyrocketed during an ongoing militarized conflict. During the war he displayed a willingness to risk losing the war by removing his field commanders in order to retain power. If faced with this decision prior to the conflict he may have acted differently, as the lessening of the capabilities of the armed forces would have important consequences in the Chadian

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7 More recently, Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) used large-N analyses to find that coup-proofed armies are less effective on the battlefield, supporting earlier suggestions by international conflict scholars (Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Reiter and Stam 1998; Biddle and Long 2004).
conflict. Conflict with weak armies, then, is risky, and empirical work by Goemans (2000) has illustrated the dire consequences of failed war efforts in authoritarian regimes. After war losses, 24 of 57 dictators were removed from office within a year, and 21 of those ousted faced further consequences of exile, imprisonment, or execution. Therefore, even though the risk of a coup may promote the incentive to seek diversionary conflict, the capability-reducing impact of coup-proofing (purging personnel) will reduce their capacity to utilize it as a policy option.

*Diversionary Hypothesis 4: Diversion should become less likely after regimes have undertaken military purges.*

5.3. IMPLICATIONS OF PURGES FOR CIVIL WAR

In addition to undermining the fighting capacity of the state, purges are particularly troublesome because they can directly improve the fighting capacity of would-be insurgents. Civil conflict scholars have estimated rebel strength in a number of ways, though still very crude. Perhaps most common is to look at the total population of a state. This is seen as both increasing the number of potential rebel groups as well as the size of the population from which the rebellion can recruit (Sambanis 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Thyne 2006). Others have looked more specifically at the size of a minority ethnic group, arguing that as a minority’s size relative to the dominant ethnic group increases, conflict is more likely (Collier et al 2003). Ellingsen (2000) similarly found that states with medium-sized ethnic groups were more likely to experience civil conflict. Such groups will have a larger potential pool of recruits.
Aside from potential personnel numbers, another indirect way to look at capabilities has been to look at terrain. If rebels have access to favorable geography we can think of the probability of a rebel victory as increasing. The most common treatment of this factor in the quantitative literature has been the presence of mountainous terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Others have considered access to a transnational border. Buhaug and Rod (2006), for example, have shown that conflicts seem to be close to international borders, supportive of the contention that rebels fair better when they have access to resources from cross-border ethnic brethren (Gleditsch 2007) or a cross-border sanctuary (Salehyan 2007). Others still have considered access to exploitable natural resources. Access to primary export commodities, oil, gemstones, or opiates can provide rebels with the fiscal capacity to launch and sustain armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Regan and Norton 2005).

A more direct way to consider rebel capability is to once again consider the consequences of coup-proofing. I argue that coup-proofing can actually increase the ability of rebels to wage an insurgency, just as the capabilities of a state to fight one are diminished. Aside from facing a regular army with diminished capabilities, coup-proofing can also increase rebel capabilities in one major respect: creating a pool of soldiers from which to recruit. Purges do not only reduce the fighting capability of a state’s regular military by removing competent soldiers, they create more grievances within an ethnic group as well as provide that group with a readily available cadre of trained soldiers. This last point cannot be overstated. In an effort to coup-proof their regimes, many leaders have purged their militaries of elements that are perceived to be disloyal, creating a potentially highly-trained force from which a rebellion can recruit.
Such action is not only detrimental to the capabilities of the state, it is additive to the capabilities of would-be rebels. For example, the Karen in Myanmar were armed and trained by the British army during the colonial period, only to be cast out after independence. The fighting capabilities of the Karen—at least at the onset of the conflict—can be looked at as more than simple demographic or geographical peculiarities, and more than simply a government that weakened its military. Probability of victory was dramatically higher amongst the Karen than other groups, raising the likelihood of civil conflict. Returning to Figure 2.7, we can see this dynamic illustrated. As purges are implemented, non-state domestic actors, rebels, are far more likely to be able to raise a competent force and will be able to take advantage of a primary opponent that has had its fighting capacity undermined.

Roessler (2011) has suggested such a heightening of rebel mobilizational capacity, but there remains to be one major improvement to his model. Roessler was concerned primarily with the capacity of rebels, and thus utilized ethnic group as the level of analysis in his study. While such an approach is helpful in that it allowed him to consider differences between specific groups, the approach undermines the ability to assess the overall implications for the state. For example, Roessler considers whether a specific group has been purged and then looks to see if that group rebelled. While useful, looking at the response of the purged group is only one part of the puzzle. While purging is expected to increase the mobilizational capacity of specific groups, purging also undermines the capabilities of the state’s armed forces. This distinction is important because purges will reduce the relative capabilities of the regular armed forces against all potential insurgent groups, not just those that were targeted with a purge. I thus hope to
extend the work of Roessler by utilizing a global sample as well as more fully account for the consequences of purges.

Civil War Hypothesis 3: The onset of intrastate conflict is more likely when regimes have undertaken military purges.

6. SUMMARY
The preceding discussion has offered a number of expectations regarding the implications of coup risk and coup-proofing. First, this study will build on prior diversionary arguments by illustrating the additive influence of coup risk on interstate conflict (DH1). Second, this study offers an original contribution to diversionary and coup literature by considering the benefits and consequences of three broad coup-proofing strategies: structural coup-proofing, spoils, and purges. The utility of coup-proofing has not been previously been assessed in a cross-national sample, making this offering particularly novel. Higher levels of coup-proofing are expected to reduce the willingness and ability of the military to attempt a coup (CH1, CH2, and CH3). Third, this study will assess the consequences of coup-proofing by considering its negative impact on military capabilities. This points to a paradox in which coup-proofing accomplishes the leader’s primary goal of retaining power, but in doing so they drastically reduce the capabilities of the state. This trend has a number of implications. For example, coup-proofed regimes lose the incentive and ability to utilize diversion (DH2, DH3a, and DH4) and become more vulnerable to insurgency (CWH1, CWH2a, and CWH3). An exception to these expectations are democracies that are coup-proofed through “spoils,” as transparency and accountability mechanisms will lead them to justify military expenses and prompt them to keep their equipment in working order. They will as a consequence be capable to utilizing diversion and will not be vulnerable to insurgency (DH3b, CWH2b).
The remainder of this dissertation will be dedicated to empirically assessing and illustrating these expectations. Chapter 3 will offer an empirical assessment of the impact of coup-proofing on coup activity. Chapter 4 will then apply the implications of coup-proofing to the diversionary literature by assessing the marginal influence of coup risk and coup-proofing on international conflict behavior. Chapter 5 will then evaluate the implications of coup-proofing for civil war. These quantitative assessments are accompanied by in-chapter illustrations of Mobutu Sese Seko’s survival strategies in Zaire. I then close the dissertation with a summary of the findings and the implications of the dissertation for our understanding of domestic and interstate conflict processes. ©
Figure 2.1: The Competing Centers of Domestic Power

1. Inner-Circle: Chief Executive, Ruling Elite, Paramilitary
2. Regular Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, other regulars
3. Non-State Domestic: Citizens not affiliated with the inner-circle or Armed Forces.
Figure 2.2: Irregular Leader Exits from Power, 1960-2005

- Coup: 75%
- Popular Protest: 6%
- Civil War: 10%
- Foreign Intervention: 6%
- Assassination: 3%
Figure 2.3: The Internal Balance of Power: Conditions for Diversion

1. Inner-Circle: Chief Executive, Ruling Elite, Paramilitary
2. Regular Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, other regulars
3. Non-State Domestic: Citizens not affiliated with the inner-circle or Armed Forces.

These conditions are likely to promote diversionary activity. In this case the regime has a strong army that can potentially act as a threat to the inner-circle. The risk of a coup will prompt diversion when the coup-proofing apparatus is weak.
Figure 2.4: The Internal Balance of Power: A Coup-Proofed Regime

1. Inner-Circle: Chief Executive, Ruling Elite, Paramilitary
2. Regular Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, other regulars
3. Non-State Domestic: Citizens not affiliated with the inner-circle or Armed Forces.

These conditions make a coup unlikely. The regime is backed by a well-guarded inner-circle that dwarfs the military capabilities of the regular armed forces. In many cases the regular armed forces will be comparatively weak to non-state domestic actors and can be vulnerable to insurgency.
Figure 2.5: The Internal Balance of Power: Conditions likely to Promote Civil War

1. Inner-Circle: Chief Executive, Ruling Elite, Paramilitary
2. Regular Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, other regulars

Non-State Domestic: Citizens not affiliated with the inner-circle or Armed Forces. These conditions illustrate a coup-proofed, yet still domestically fragile state. The inner-circle has been effectively coup-proofed, but is unwilling to use paramilitary units against non-state domestic actors during rebellion due to continued fears of a coup. The regular armed forces, far weaker than the paramilitary, will be left to fight a relatively stronger civilian rebellion.
Democracies are likely to dedicate their resources to the public good of national defense, while authoritarian regimes will dedicate resources to the private good of spoils. Democracies maintain a high fighting capacity while authoritarian regimes will not see these resources increase the capacity of their armies.
Figure 2.7: Impact of Purges on the Internal Balance of Power

1. Inner-Circle: Chief Executive, Ruling Elite, Paramilitary
2. Regular Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, other regulars
3. Non-State Domestic: Citizens not affiliated with the inner-circle or Armed Forces.

This figure represents the influence of purges on military capabilities. These regimes have qualitatively and quantitatively degraded their armed forces, while purged soldiers are now free to join an insurgency. While coup-inhibiting, these actions are expected to reduce the ability to carry out diversion and are expected to be additive to the onset of civil war.
CHAPTER 3: THE PRACTICE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF COUP-PROOFING

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to empirically test the effectiveness of coup-proofing. As noted in Chapter 2, leaders can take a variety of actions toward their militaries in an effort to reduce the likelihood of coup. However, coups remain a very real threat, having recently unseated leaders in locales as diverse as Thailand (2006), Honduras (2009), Niger (2010), Egypt (2011) and Mali (2012). Though subsequent commentaries on each case tend to focus on the motives of the coup plotters, these factors come up short as stand-alone factors in explaining coups. Honduran president Manuel Zelaya was ousted after his attempt to abolish presidential term limits, while Nigerien president Mamadou Tandja was ousted following a successful effort to do the same. Though these explanations may capture the justification offered by the conspirators, there is comparatively less commentary on how the militaries of such countries were able to successfully organize and execute these conspiracies. Thaksin, for example, was assuredly only one of many heads of state accused of corruption, while Zelaya and Tandja were only a pair of numerous leaders that have attempted or succeeded in abolishing term limits. Zelaya fell a year to the week after Ecuador’s legislature loosened its one-term limit for Rafael Correa, while neighboring Nicaragua altogether abolished term limits less than six months after Zelaya’s ouster, yet neither of the latter experienced the same fate. The same can be said for African politics, where Tandja’s fall came on the heels of the abolition of term limits in neighboring Chad and Algeria, neither of which saw its leaders targeted in coups. Though motives for the undertaking of a coup may have been similar in each case, coups were not a common outcome.
Motives may be shared between cases, but countries will ultimately differ in their vulnerability to coups in accordance with the ability of plotters to organize and execute a conspiracy. This chapter thus fills a gap in the study of coups by empirically assessing a variety of characteristics that can impact a military’s disposition and its ability to organize and execute a coup, specifically the practice of coup-proofing. The efforts of leaders to reduce the likelihood of a coup has been well-established in case studies, has been empirically shown to be attempted (Belkin and Schofer 2003), and has even been argued to reduce the fighting capacity of a state (Quinlivan 1999; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011). However, efforts to assess the ability of such strategies to effectively reduce coup likelihood are lacking. This investigation aims expand the coup literature by testing the prudence of coup-proofing efforts.

The remainder of this chapter progresses as follows. I start by reviewing the theoretical impact that coup-proofing should have on a military, following a rational actor perspective. First, I begin with a review of the theoretical impact of actions aiming to target the disposition to attempt a coup. Leaders often manipulate policy toward their armed forces in an effort to lessen the willingness to attempt a coup, such as increasing organizational resources (CHI). Second, I review theoretical expectations regarding the ability of militaries to organize a plot. This is primarily treated as coordination obstacles for the armed forces, including a variety of specifications of intentional coup-proofing strategies that target the structure of the armed forces. Though a number of important offerings discuss characteristics of militaries (Johnson et al. 1984; Jenkins and Kposowa 1992), this chapter will offer a more comprehensive look by considering multiple aspects of military funding and structure, including coup-proofing efforts such as the use of
armed counterweights against the regular military, the effectiveness of which has been all but overlooked in the empirical cross-national literature on coups. A third conceptualization of coup-proofing incorporates aspects of both ability and disposition: purges. Regimes that purge their militaries of potentially subversive elements are expected to reduce the likelihood of a coup by keeping the most loyal members within the ranks, by allowing leaders to reallocate limited resources to the remaining soldiers, and by reducing the capabilities of the armed forces.

Third, I briefly walk through an illustrative case by describing the coup-proofing efforts of Mobutu Sese Seko. The case will illustrate the theoretical mechanisms and potential fall-out regarding such efforts, the latter of which will be drawn out in subsequent chapters. Fourth, I test how these factors will impact the likelihood that a coup will be attempted, as well as the likelihood that an attempt will succeed. This last offering is particularly novel, as this analysis represents the first effort to empirically distinguish between the onset and outcome of coup activity in a large cross-national sample. Overall, the chapter offers a number of important findings. First, there is considerable evidence that coup-proofing efforts are important guarantors of political survival. Multiple aspects of coup-proofing are found to reduce both the likelihood of a coup attempt, as well as the likelihood that an attempted coup will succeed. In contrast to the idea of a civil-military problematique, coup-proofing policies seem to accomplish a dual desiderata of deterring coup attempts and lessening the likelihood of success. Second, when controlling for military factors, economic concerns have little impact on coup activity. Instead, economics is important only in the sense that it provides governments with resources with which to coup-proof.
I then close the chapter with a discussion of the implications of findings, focusing on what this chapter offers the wider literature international relations and civil-military as well as the lessons it provides for later chapters in this dissertation.

2. A REVIEW OF THE THEORY

I treat coup conspirators as rational actors that will carefully assess the expected payoffs from a coup as well as the likelihood of success. These considerations fall in line with the basic typology of coup-proofing offered by Feaver (1999), that is, that leaders will coup-proof by lowering either the disposition or ability of soldiers to undertake the conspiracy. Leaders can lower a military’s disposition to attempt a coup by lowering the expected payoffs of the putsch. A considerable amount of literature has attested to coups being a function of organizational grievances within the armed forces, as they are a method by which armies can potentially increase their rents from the government. Heads of state will be aware of this dynamic and are rationally expected to avoid creating grievances amongst those that possess the means to unseat them. Further, leaders that are particularly fearful of a coup are expected to go the extra step of guaranteeing the military special privileges. Huntington, for example, has suggested democratizing states should provide militaries with increased pay, benefits, and even materiel. N’Diaye (2000, 2002) has pointed to access to state jobs and other spoils in the Ivory Coast and Kenya, while Lindeman (2011) even pointed to Kenneth Kaunda’s efforts to provide subsidized beer to his soldiers in an effort to keep their favor. With such resources readily provided, these countries will see a substantial reduction in the expected payoffs from a coup, rendering them unlikely (CH2).
Efforts to structurally manipulate the armed forces are expected to reduce the likelihood of success. Centralized armies are expected to provide soldiers with more opportunities to interact with one another, making planning a much easier endeavor. However, leaders frequently create coordination challenges amongst their armed forces by creating structural obstacles. These can include an armed counterweight to the army, such as a Presidential Guard, or dividing the responsibility of state security to numerous independent organizations. Both strategies reduce the ability of soldiers to plot and will increase the likelihood that a coup will have to be conducted without the promise of support from other security organs. Such uncertainty, combined with the increased likelihood of seeing resistance from another security service, will reduce the coup’s likelihood of success. Aware of this, rational plotters will tend to avoid coups when structural coup-proofing has been undertaken (CH1).

Leaders can also pursue a combination of these strategies by purging their militaries of undesirable elements. Such strategies attempt to replace groups whose loyalty is suspect with individuals from the in-group, thus lowering the disposition for a coup within the ranks. Doing so, however, inevitably puts political loyalties over military competence. Purging, then ultimately reduces the level of competence within the armed forces, making their ability to undertake coordinate action suspect. Purged militaries are expected to be unlikely to attempt a coup (CH3).

3. ZAIRE AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE

In this section, and in analogous sections in Chapters 4 and 5, I will consider the efforts of Mobutu Seso Seko as an illustration of the processes described in Chapter 2. Mobutu’s activities are interesting in that they were remarkably varied, he shifted
between strategies over time, and he was ultimately able to retain power for over 30 years despite considerable economic and political instability. Mobutu operated under a framework that would best fall under Huntington’s “objective control” rubric upon seizing power in 1965. He made efforts to professionalize his army by increasing military spending in a modernization effort that saw the armed forces’ prestige increased. He further promoted efforts to “ensure that the military’s role remained restricted to external defense,” as well as pushed education in the officer corps by having hundreds of its members given tutelage at the “best military schools in the west” (Kisangani 2000, 211). Finally, the patronage politics for which he would become famous remained separated from the military, though that fact would soon be resented by those in uniform. In short, Mobutu had begun down a path that would have proved exceptional in region: promoting a modernized, professional armed forces.

In contrast to benefitting from a professional fighting force, Mobutu began to fear his army. Strong resistance came from the army high command after his promoting of Colonel Leonard Mulamba to Prime Minister and he ultimately succumbed to the wishes of his army by dismissing Mulamba in October 1966. He was then coerced to take the retraction a step further by agreeing not to appoint him to the defense ministry. In short, Mobutu’s efforts at professionalism created little more than a body that would be more capable to target him and he became very fearful of a coup (Williame 1970, 149). This was leading the domestic balance of capabilities to become tilted away from him and in favor of his army, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.

The Mulamba Affair led to a dramatic policy shift in which coup fears were met not with efforts to promote professionalism, but rather the creation of coordination and
competence obstacles within Zaire’s Armed Forces. Mobutu proceeded with a balancing act in which he made efforts to appease the armed forces while at the same time checking their influence through coup-proofing. Kisangani contends that Mobutu’s goal for his armed forces had made a complete transition from protecting against external foes to protecting against domestic elements by 1975. Though he originally sought to fulfill the suggestions of Desch and Huntington by giving his military the tools of the trade and an external mission, he had reason to believe that this was a potentially disastrous policy given the hard line his military had taken on Mulamba. So while his early efforts may have set him up nicely to potentially use diversionary actions as a coup-proofing scheme, his new approach would have the opposite effect on his military capabilities as his early professionalization efforts.

Instead of a highly capable army, Zaire’s military capabilities were crippled in exchange for the short-term goal of avoiding a coup. Military expenditures, while remaining high, shifted from training to graft, while ethnicity would become a primary source for promotion. Mobutu thus kept the motivation for a coup low while systematically working to coup-proof through other means. Structural coup-proofing was particularly notable. Though weak at the time of the 1965 coup, by 1980 Zaire would have one of the strongest coup-proofing apparatuses in the world. Zaire’s counterbalancing score remained below the sample mean prior to 1975, while its effective organization score was in the lowest quartile. However, by 1980 Zaire ranked in the 90th percentile of both measures, supporting Kasangani’s claim that Zaire’s security forces has shifted from externally to internally focused by 1975. There were no shortage of regime-protecting armed bodies. Wrong (2002, 258) pointed to numerous
counterbalancing bodies that included “the DSP [Special Presidential Division], the Garde Civile, SARM [Military Intelligence and Security Service], the Kamanyola division, the para-commandos, the 21st brigade, the 31st brigade, SNIP [National Service for Intelligence and Protection], and, bringing up the rear, the gendarmerie…” The creation of divisions, through creating new independent paramilitary units and creating new brigades within the army itself, completely changed the dynamics of coup-plotting. The resulting military was one in which a coup became a very risky prospect, as plotters would be required to gain the cooperation of a number of different coup-proofing units that were designed specifically for preventing such an act. These obstacles proved to be strong, as any would-be plotters were successfully deterred from attempting to unseat Mobutu through a coup. However, as following chapters will illustrate, these efforts had dire consequences for the fighting capacity of the Zairean armed forces.

4. DATA AND METHODS

4.1 SAMPLE AND ESTIMATOR

The expectations espoused in the preceding section are tested using yearly data from 151 states for the years 1962-2008. Simultaneously modeling attempt and outcome equations allows the model to consider a relationship between the two stages, making a Heckman model the appropriate estimator for the analysis (Heckman 1979). The traditional Heckman model will first estimate the likelihood of coup attempt, then use a selection hazard as a regressor in the second stage (outcome of the attempt). This provides the outcome stage of the model with a built-in control for having a coup attempted. This is essential when testing the theory since structural coup-proofing efforts—though expected to reduce the benefit of a coup and thus deter an attempt—are perhaps best treated as
making an attempted coup more likely to fail. Further, higher levels of expenditures per soldier and military mechanization, though expected to reduce the disposition to attempt a coup, can potentially increase military capabilities and thus make coups more likely to succeed. The two-stage estimator is thus not only attractive, it is a necessity. The traditional Heckman model uses OLS to estimate the second equation, an approach that could prove to be inefficient given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. I instead opt to use the “probit-probit” variation detailed by Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981).

4.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Though there are a limited number of efforts to quantitatively assess the determinants of coups, there has been a surprising amount of variation in operationalizing coup activity. Relying on the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (Taylor and Jodice 1985), Londregan and Poole (1990) were able to investigate the causes of both successful and unsuccessful “irregular transfers of executive power” for preliminary descriptive statistics. However, the authors only utilized data on successful attempts for their main analyses, discounting failed coups because “there is no such thing as ‘half a coup.’” Alesina et al. (1996) followed suit with the same data, censoring all failed coup attempts from the analysis.

On the other hand, others have used a weighted measure called the Total Military Involvement Score (TMIS).\(^8\) TMIS includes reported plots in addition to overt coup attempts from the analysis.

attempts, giving five points to a successful coup, three points to a failed attempt, and one point for a coup plot. TMIS is advantageous in that it accounts for all coup activity, but it is not without setbacks. Coup plots are often impossible to confirm objectively, and factors leading to whether an even verifiable plot was unraveled can differ from causes that determine whether the plot succeeds. Consequently, the plotting stage of a coup could be said to be a wholly different phenomenon. Wang (1998) and Jenkins and Kposowa (1990) have also noted that such an index is really capturing coup “intensity,” and not its likelihood. My theory concerns the decision to attempt a coup, and there is no reason to weight the dependent variable based on the outcome of the attempt. Further, I ultimately wish to distinguish between the attempting and outcome of coups and will have to utilize disaggregated measures of coup attempt and coup outcome. Using global data from 1960-2000, Belkin and Schofer (2003) demonstrated similar effects of their coup risk indicator on failed and successful coups, and Lunde’s (1991) look at Africa showed both successful and unsuccessful coups could lead to future coups. These findings would hint there is no clear reason to disqualify failed attempts when theoretically explaining the decision to attempt a coup.

Coup attempt thus follows the definition of Powell and Thyne (2011): “attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of government using unconstitutional means.” Successful coups are events in which sitting head of government is removed from office for at least one week. Data are available from 1950-2010, accounting for 457 coup attempts, of which 227 succeeded. The data are recoded from a count of each failed or successful coup in a country-year to a

82
dichotomous measure that considers whether or not at least one attempt was made in that year.

4.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF INTEREST

The first coup hypothesis considers the disposition of potential coup plotters. Historical accounts frequently attest to the tendency of soldiers to rebel following a blow to their corporate interests. The 2008 Mauritanian coup, for example, transpired following the dismissal of the heads of each branch of the armed forces. Unfortunately, specific instances of pay cuts or soldiers facing forced resignation are no doubt too mundane to be regularly picked up by international news outlets. Scholars investigating specific coups will benefit from post-hoc reporting of military grievances, but we are left with no reliable data that cover personnel-related grievances that are not accompanied by military intervention in politics. In short, data for cases in which the dog “did not bark,” to use Chan’s (2002) phrase, are in short supply. I thus opt to use the most reliable measure of military interest that is available, their funding. Military expenditure data are taken from Correlates of War capability (CINC) components (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). States that spend more money per soldier are likely to have soldiers with more training and better equipment. Conflict literature, for example, has seen the measure used to operationalize “troop” or “soldier quality” on a number of occasions (Huth, Gelpi and Bennett 1993; Reiter and Stam 1998). While the measure might not serve as an adequate proxy for Huntington’s (1957) conceptualization of military professionalism, it is expected to reflect the military’s feelings toward the status quo. The measure thus captures two important factors: contentment and quality. Expenditures are operationalized as military expenditures per soldier, once again using data from the
Correlates of War. Higher expenditure values are expected to decrease the chances of an attempted coup \((CHI)\).

A second approach to assessing spoils is to look at the actual equipment that a military possesses. After lamenting on the simple treatments of military power frequently offered in international relations studies, Sechser and Saunders (2010) completed a data collection effort that assessed military “mechanization rates” for 153 countries from 1979 to 2001. Relying on data from the *Military Balance*, published yearly by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Sechser and Saunders account for the number of three classes of armored vehicles per 100 soldiers. These include traditional battle tanks, such as the American-made M-1 Abrams, Soviet T-80 or Chinese Type-59; heavy armored combat vehicles, such as the Chinese Type-63 light tank or Britain’s “Ferret,” an armored reconnaissance vehicle; and armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles such as the Bradley (Sechser and Saunders 2010, 492). Their National Mechanization Index only considers equipment appropriate for army, naval infantry, and marine troops, as their work is focused on the skills of land armies. The lack of consideration of Air Force (e.g., fighter jets, military transports) or naval (e.g., frigates, aircraft carriers) is not seen as problematic due to their relative lack of importance for the execution or prevention of a coup (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Lutwak 1968). Their focus on ground-capable resources is particularly attractive for a study on coups, as an increase in such resources is expected to reduce coup activity \((CHI)\).

Efforts to coup-proof regimes have also seen leaders divide their militaries into “mutually suspicious” organs, thus precluding the possibility of a widespread conspiracy.
There are two notable efforts to quantitatively account for this aspect of coup-proofing. Belkin and Schofer (2003) computed the ratio of military to paramilitary organizations and personnel numbers as determined by *The Military Balance*. More recently, Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) have improved upon this precedent by expanding and refining data from the *Military Balance*. First, their data are expanded from Belkin and Schofer’s very limited 1966-1986 timeframe to 1970-1999. Second, greater steps are taken to ensure that the organizations for which they are accounting can credibly be expected to influence coup activity. Amongst regular armed bodies, for example, they rely solely on ground military forces, as suggested by Luttwak (1968). Non-army but ground-capable soldiers such as naval marines are also included. They next refine paramilitaries by excluding those with no ability to combat a coup, such as port authorities or maritime police. They arrive at a coup-proofing operationalization for the number of ground-combat capable organizations. I will refer to this variable as *effective organizations*. Though Pilster and Böhmelt have specifically coded an approach to coup-proofing, this chapter represents a unique effort in assessing whether or not the strategy is effective.

I also utilize original data to account for paramilitary strength as a last test of the utility of coup-proofing. *Military Balance* data are available yearly beginning in 1966 and ending in 2010, though there are some notable gaps. Early years of the sample, for example, saw the IISS only include information for states with militaries of at least 5,000 soldiers. This problem is compounded when looking at African regimes. Already hampered by omission due to the typical African military being small, many African states were left out of the early years of the publication due to the publisher’s focus on the American-Soviet competing spheres of influence rather than small, non-aligned third
world regimes. Following 1980 the publication is comprehensive. Before 1980 data from Africa (and Latin America and Middle East to a much smaller extent) are sporadic and have been supplemented with data from Adelphi Papers, especially numbers 15 (Bell 1964), 20 (Wood 1965), 23 (Bell 1965), 27 (Wood 1966), 34 (Wood 1967), and 93 (IISS 1972). Paramilitary is operationalized by computing the ratio paramilitary personnel to the total of paramilitary and regular armed forces personnel. A regime is expected to experience fewer coup attempts as these collective action obstacles increase.

The paramilitary measure offers a number of advantages. First, it is temporally available from 1964 to 2008, adding 15 years to the measure offered by Pilster and Böhmelt. Second, the measure does not rely on interpolation, such as Belkin and Schofer’s data which are 75% interpolated. Third, the measure will act as a measure of relative capabilities between the regular armed forces and the paramilitary. For example, Togo and Kenya each have only one ground-capable paramilitary organization. However, while Togo’s 750-member Gendarmerie faces a regular army with greater than ten-times the personnel, Kenya’s General Services Unit is one-quarter the size of the regular army and has been described as being able to single-handedly crush it. These disparate capabilities represent important differences that will not be captured in the Pilster and Böhmelt data. Fourth, the measure allows the disaggregation of the Belkin and Schofer counterbalancing measure. Counterbalancing essentially conflates two alternative strategies: number of armed counterweights and number of respective personnel. Such a distinction could have a meaningful influence on the analysis. The greater the level of structural coup-proofing, the less likely coups are to be attempted (CH2).
Finally, I take multiple approaches to quantifying purges. First, I utilize data from the Correlates of War to observe decreases in military personnel. To be clear, a reduction in military size can be done for a variety of reasons. The United States and much of Europe, for example, drastically reduced their number of military personnel following the end of the Cold War. South Africa similarly saw a dramatic reduction in military personnel following the end of Apartheid. While such reductions are not specifically tied to coup-proofing, they do have important implications for the fighting capacity of the state and would-be insurgent groups, as will be drawn out in the next chapter.

Specifically, I look at two measures. First, I look at percentage change in soldiers over a three year period using data from the Correlates of War. Second, I use data from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset to create a measure for Ethnic Purge. Ethnic purges occur when the political power of a particular group is reduced. I use an ordinal scale that considers the number of categories that each group drops in a year (Cederman et al. 2010):

- **Monopoly**: Elite members hold monopoly power in the executive-level at the exclusion of members of other ethnic groups.
- **Dominant**: Elites of the group hold dominant power in the executive-level but there is some limited inclusion of members of other groups
- **Senior Partner**: Representative participate as senior partners in a formal or informal power sharing arrangement
- **Junior Partner**: Representatives participate as junior partners in government
- **Regional Autonomy**: Elite members of the group have no central power but have some influence at the subnational level
- **Powerless**: Elite representatives hold no political power at the national or regional levels without being explicitly discriminated against.
- **Discriminated**: Group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination with the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power

Dropping from a senior partner to a junior partner, for example, would be coded as 1, dropping to being powerless would be coded as 3, etc. Totals for each group are
collected for a three year period and are then totaled for the entire country. Ninety percent of observations of the data see no purge, and the variable ranges from 0 to 11. The highest value reflects the massive power shuffle in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the late 1990s following the fall of Mobutu. Falling farthest was Mobutu’s favored Ngandi ethnic group, which fell from being a senior partner to being powerless.

4.4 CONTROLS

A number of controls are also included. Studies on coup activity commonly attest to the importance of regime legitimacy, and I take three approaches to addressing the phenomenon. First, economics is perhaps the most consistently noted marker of legitimacy in the coup literature, whether in regard to state wealth or economic performance. Johnson’s (1962, 260) commentary on Latin America, for example, notes that economic decline will “invite coups that will have popular approval” while Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000, 194) similarly argue that a citizenry is more “willing to obey a new ruler when the short-run performance of the economy is bad.” In addition to the dynamic factor of short-term economic performance, a state’s general level of wealth is also an important determinant. In their quantitative analysis of successful coups, Londregan and Poole (1990) have described a dramatic “coup inhibiting” effect of higher income, a finding supported elsewhere by Belkin and Schofer (2003). I thus include two variables related to the economy: wealth is measured as GDP per capita from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, held in constant 2000 dollars. Growth is measured as year-to-year change in GDP per capita. Percent changes are reflected in all models. As per capita GDP and economic performance increase, coups are expected to be less likely.
Second, I include multiple specifications of regime type. A dummy variable for military regime is included (Banks 2011), as military regimes are frequently noted as being vulnerable to coups (Belkin and Shofer 2003; Thyne 2010). Next, I consider regime type in regard to level of democratization. Lindberg and Clark (2008) have claimed that liberal regimes are less likely than authoritarian countries to face military coups due to their ability to “demonstrate their credentials,” that is, gain legitimacy. Contrary to this claim, non-democracies can similarly deter coups, as repressive leaders will have significant resources to combat attempts to end their rule. Svolik’s (2009) formal model regarding leadership dynamics, for example, contends that dictators can consolidate executive power to the extent that they can no longer be credibly threatened. I thus incorporate two additional regime variables: polity and polity$^2$. Each variable is expected to have a negative relationship with coup activity.

Beyond legitimacy, numerous studies have attested to the additive impact of a previous coup d’état (Londregan and Poole 1990). Countries that have had a recent coup tend to be more vulnerable to another attempt. I address this temporal dependence by including years since last coup attempt, as well as the squared and cubed terms to control for temporal dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010).

5. RESULTS

5.1 COUP-PROOFING

The estimations of the Heckman models can be found in Table 3.1 (coup attempt) and Table 3.2 (coup outcome). The models reveal a number of interested trends regarding expenditures per soldier. The measure is excluded from the military mechanization model due to a high correlation between the two. The measure possesses the expected
negative sign and is statistically significant in each specification. This robust statistical relationship is also substantively meaningful, with the effects of the spoils measures being illustrated in Figure 3.1. Moving from the minimum to maximum range of military expenditures per soldier reduces the likelihood of a coup attempt from .064 to .008, a reduction of 87%. A more modest shift in expenditures per soldier (20th to 80th percentile) reduces coup likelihood from .033 to .019, a reduction of 43%. Model 2 considers the level of military mechanization, as coded by Sechser and Saunders (2011). Once again, the measure for spoils yields the expected negative sign and is statistically significant in the first stage of the model, though it is insignificant in the second stage. This finding suggests that militaries that possess heavier hardware, or “toys” as Huntington has noted, are indeed less likely to attempt a coup. In fact, moving from the 20th to 80th percentile of the measure reduces the likelihood of a coup by 31%. However, unlike increasing military expenditures per soldier, increasing mechanization does not have a negative influence on coup outcomes. Such a trend is unsurprising, given that increased mechanization can be argued to increase the military’s ability to attempt a coup.

These trends are supported when returning to the case of Zaire. The Correlates of War reports that Zaire spent $1280 per soldier in 1966, Mobutu’s first full year in power. This number steadily increased over the next decade, more than doubling ($2687 per soldier) by 1975, the year that Kisangani notes as the definitive point at which Mobutu’s policy had shifted from external to internal defense. When considering the size increase of the Zairean Armed Forces (25,000 to 55,000), overall expenditures nearly quintupled
over the period. Later we will see, however, that this increase of resources did little to actually increase the fighting capacity of the FAZ.

Interestingly, structural coup-proofing fails to gain statistical significance in the first stage of any specification (Models 3-5), though all three are significant with the negative sign in the second stage. The substantive influence of structural coup-proofing is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Increasing from the 20th to 80th percentile in paramilitary strength reduces the likelihood of coup success by 31%, while the same increase in counterbalancing reduces the likelihood of success form .69 to .36 (a 47% reduction). Increasing the number of ground-capable military forces in a country similarly reduces coup success rates from .77 to .22, an impressive reduction of 72%. Once again, the Zaire case offers an interesting parallel to the statistical findings. In a report completed for the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College, Metz (1996) offered a detailed analysis of the current state of Mobutu’s fledgling regime. Metz duly noted that the FAZ was “less important” that the “well-equipped, regularly-paid, and foreign-trained” 31st Parachute Brigade, Civil Guard, and DSP, with the latter groups being dedicated to preventing the rise of a “praetorian guard.” However, Metz (1996, 9) points to mixed results in this effort, claiming that “while this structure of counterbalancing forces did not prevent coup attempts, it has kept them from succeeding.” To be clear, Metz’s portrayal of Zairean “coup”s is a bit overstated in that he is including coup plots that were never put into operation, but both his assessment and the analyses presented above point to an important determinant of coup outcomes: the structural coup-proofing apparatus.
Purges, both in terms of ethnic exclusion from government and downsizing of the military, perform poorly. As noted above, purges are dangerous endeavors that will increase grievances and potentially prompt coups. While I agree with the work of Roessler (2011) that ethnic exclusion can reduce the likelihood of a coup, the actual undertaking of removing such groups is dangerous and could promote mixed results. Quinlivan (1999), for example, has noted that the survival of Arab leaders such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qadhafi, and the al-Assad family has largely been due to their reliance on their own ethnic groups—or those closely allied—in the security apparatus. However, successfully stocking the armed forces or the paramilitary with your ethnic brethren can clearly act to alienate other groups that are suddenly faced with the prospect of losing jobs and, perhaps more importantly, power. In Chapter 2 I Daniel Arap Moi reshuffled the Kenyan military to be “Kalenjin at the bottom, in the middle, and at the top” (N’diaye 2002). This effort was not accepted without a fight, as the still predominantly Luo and Kikuyu Air Force attempted a bloody, but failed, coup attempt in 1982. The importance of ethnicity in coup-proofing might also be overstated in that it is frequently accompanied by structural coup-proofing. Saddam Hussein, for example, relied on Sunnis, particularly those from his home region, but he also used paramilitary military bodies such as the Republican Guard. The same can be said for Mobutu’s Zaire. While reliance on loyal ethnic groups, particularly the Ngbandi, was an important part of his coup-proofing apparatus, his success in deterring coup activity was perhaps primarily accomplished though patronage and the use of armed counterweights.

Overall, these findings suggest that increases in paramilitary strength, the number of paramilitary units, and a hybrid counterbalancing measure do not necessarily deter
coups from being attempted, but they act as important impediments to coup success and are a very important piece of the coup story. On the other hand, measures attempting to account for a military’s willingness to attempt a coup seem to have far better predictive power for the decision to take action.

5.2 CONTROL VARIABLES

Also intriguing are the results concerning economics and regime type. Neither GDP per capita or economic growth rate gained significance in the first stage of any model, a result that is in stark contrast to prior literature (e.g., Londregan and Poole 1991). Greater levels of wealth do not seem to be a coup-inhibitor. GDP per capita is significant with the expected negative sign in the second stage of only Model 2 (Mechanization), once again suggesting that the measure does not have a meaningful impact on coup activity. Economic growth rate is significant in the second stage of Models 2 and 4, with a positive sign. Though not robust, such a trend would indicate that coups attempted against countries with expanding economies are actually more likely to succeed than those in recession.

There is also extant literature suggesting that democracies are inherently less coup-prone than non-democracies, but the polity measure failed to gain significance in any model. However, the polity-squared measure suggests that the relationship between coups and democratization could be non-linear. While democracies are no more or less safe from coups than autocracies, it appears that strong democracies and strong authoritarian regimes are more immune from coups than the mixed regimes commonly referred to as anocracies. This finding supports Svolik’s contention that authoritarian regimes can witness consolidation of power to the point that coups become obsolete in
Staunch autocracies. Substantive effects of control variables are illustrated in Figure 3.3. Moving from a 0 on the polity squared measure (0 on polity) to 100 (-10 or +10 on polity) reduces coup likelihood from .058 to .011, a reduction of 81%. A more modest change from 0 to 36 (-6 or +6 on polity) reduces the probability from .058 to .034, a reduction of 42%.

As expected, military regimes are also coup-prone. The measure has the expected positive sign and is significant in all models with the exception of Model 5. It is worth noting that Model 5, which tests the counterbalancing measure, omits 49 countries and over 71% of the observations due to temporal and geographical limitations. As noted above, the Military Balance data are largely incomplete prior to the 1980s and Belkin and Schofer stopped their data at 1986. Subsequently, a loss of data—especially for the third world—is problematic. While civilian regimes have a .027 probability of a coup, this increases over 103% for military regimes (.055).

Finally, a prior history of coups is in fact a very strong predictor of coup activity. The substantive results would be difficult to overstate. A state that has had a coup in the previous year faces a .38 likelihood of a coup in the present year, a number that declines to .0001 after 30 years. While this 99.97% reduction in coup likelihood is revealing, it may be more worthwhile to consider more short-term changes in coup risk. Ten coup-free years will reduce the likelihood of an attempt by over 87% (.38 to .049), while five will bring a 56% reduction (.38 to .17). Though far more modest, these shorter time horizons still bring with them large substantive effects for coup activity and suggest that some post-coup states can increase prospects for stability quickly (e.g., Egypt).
5.3 ADDITIONAL TESTS

One of the surprising results of the preceding analysis is the poor explanatory power of the economic indicators. The consistency of the expenditures per soldier measure indicates that funding is an important determinant of coup activity. While scholars such as Huntington can make generalizations regarding the need to increase their organizational resources, it is clear that some states may simply lack the capacity to do so. It could be the case that factors such as state wealth are important in that they provide the government with the means to coup-proof. I thus re-rerun the original models omitting the expenditures per soldier variable. The results are available in Tables 3-3 and 3-4.

The alternative specifications are revealing. The measure for state wealth is significant with the expected negative sign in the first stage for all models, with the exception of the heavily-truncated mechanization and counterbalancing models (Models 2 and 5. Substantive results from the first model give a strong indication of the hazards of omitted variable bias. Devoid of the spoils measure, the first model now suggests that a decrease from the 80th to 20th percentile of GDP per capita increases coup likelihood from .022 to .035, a 59% jump. This is in stark contrast to the full specification, which indicates statistical and substantive insignificance. Though GDP per capita is not expected to directly influence a military’s ability to coordinate a conspiracy, the second stage of the model provides evidence that increased state wealth acts as an inhibitor of coup success, even when controlling for sample selection. Models 1, 4, 6, and 7 reveal a negative and significant sign. Looking at wealth in the absence of expenditures per soldier would have pointed to a substantial role of economics in the execution of coups.
This analysis suggests that prior efforts attesting to the influence of wealth on coups could be undermined by omitted variable bias (e.g., Londregan and Poole 1990).

Level of economic growth continued to perform poorly, yielding an insignificant sign in the first stage of all seven models. There is modest evidence (Models 4 and 6) that a coup attempting during economic growth will actually make a coup more likely to succeed. Though not robust, future efforts could attempt to theorize on the role that economic performance plays in both the plotting and execution of a coup.

Other variables behaved as in the earlier models. The structural measures for coup-proofing were once again insignificant in the first stage (Models 3-5), though they were significant with the expected negative sign in the outcome stage.

6. CONCLUSION

The empirical findings in this chapter have important implications for both scholars studying coups and for policy makers that wish to either prevent or promote them. For scholars, this offering has made a number of novel contributions to the literature. First, an empirical assessment of the utility of coup-proofing had yet to be undertaken with a large cross-national sample. This paper points to a number of effective survival strategies that target both the disposition and ability of the military to attempt a coup. Huntington (1991), for example, has argued that democratizing states should give their armed forces “toys” in order to appease them, though such practices have been met with skepticism by others (e.g., N'Diaye 2000). Despite prior suggestions that militaries will be more capable of undertaking a coup as they are given more organizational resources, but this potential “paradox of professionalization” was not supported. In fact, the results suggest that militaries that are given larger financial endowments lack both the
disposition and ability to attempt a coup. This is not to say that such soldiers are incapable of mounting a coordinated effort, rather their resources appear to provide the military as a whole with enough incentive to resist any potential coup that might arise. Further, a consideration of actual military hardware reveals that more mechanized militaries are less likely to attempt a coup, while mechanized militaries are no more likely to succeed than militaries with fewer capabilities. N’Diaye (2000) is correct in noting that regimes such as the Ivory Coast have sacrificed long-term civil-military relations in order to appease their militaries in the short-run, and a lack of improved security sector governance no doubt contributed to the Ivory Coast’s eventual 1999 coup, subsequent coup attempts and, ultimately, to civil war. However, the policy of providing spoils was also an important contributor to the country’s prior three coup-free decades. The results of this analysis, then, indicate that coup-proofing can bring increased stability to an otherwise vulnerable country. Such a trend should thus be of interest to infantile democracies that fear their militaries in the short-term.

In addition to organizational resources, this analysis has also revealed the importance of efforts to structurally coup-proof. Though others have commented on counterbalancing (Belkin and Schofer 2003), the actual ability of these practices to reduce coup likelihood had gone uninvestigated. I find that increasing the relative strength of a paramilitary versus the regular armed forces can act as a deterrent for coups, or the number of ground-capable organizations, has a negative influence on coup outcomes. So while military resources seem to be strong indicators of when a military will attempt a coup, structural obstacles to the putsch seem to undermine their ability to succeed. In short, the chapter empirically demonstrates that factors influencing military
disposition are likely to reduce actual coup activity, while factors influencing the military’s ability to coordinate a conspiracy reduces their ability to succeed.

Second, this chapter theoretically distinguished between the decision to attempt a coup and the ability to successfully execute it. This incorporation of a selection model is the first such effort in the study of coups, and reveals that coup-proofing accomplishes a dual benefit of both reducing the military’s willingness to organize a plot and reducing their ability to execute one.

Third, there has been considerable testimony pointing to the influence of state wealth or economic performance on coups in both case studies and empirical analyses. However, the findings in this chapter suggest that economics is a poor predictor of coups. To the contrary, wealth seems to be important only in the sense that it provides a regime with the resources that will allow them to undertake coup-proofing strategies. Once considering the level of funding dedicated per soldier, economics has no discernible effect. Omitting the measure, however, yields the expected findings, hinting that prior efforts could be suffering from omitted variable bias.

Finally, these results have implications for foreign policy. In his aptly titled *Washington Post* editorial “Let us now praise coups,” Collier (2008) pushes Western governments and international organizations to foment coups in Zimbabwe and Myanmar. This suggestion has recently been strengthened by Thyne and Powell’s (2011) work showing that coups undertaken against staunchly authoritarian regimes can effectively promote democratization, and Thyne (2010) has shown that both military and non-military signals from the U.S. toward a target can effectively promote a coup.
Findings regarding regime type, however, show that efforts to promote a coup against staunchly authoritarian governments are unlikely to promote an actual coup attempt. ©
Table 3.1: The Determinants of Coup Attempts, 1961-2008

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***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two-tailed). Models reflect logistic regressions. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses.
Table 3.2: The Determinants of Coup Success, 1961-2008

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Observations 231 49 231 141 83 225 222

***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two-tailed). Models reflect logistic regressions. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses.
Figure 3.1: The Substantive Impact of Spoils on Coup Activity, 1961-2008

Onset of Coup Attempt

Outcome of Attempt

Expenditures per Soldier - Percentile

Military Mechanization - Percentile

Pr(Coup)

Pr(Coup Success)
Figure 3.2: The Impact of Structural Coup-Proofing on Coup Activity, 1965-2008

- **Onset of Coup Attempt**

  - Pr(Coup) vs Effective Organizations
  - Counterbalancing - Percentile
  - Paramilitary Strength - Percentile

- **Outcome of Attempt**

  - Pr(Coup Success) vs Effective Organizations
  - Counterbalancing - Percentile
  - Paramilitary Strength - Percentile
Figure 3.3: The Impact of Control Variables on Coup Attempts, 1961-2008
Table 3.3: Determinants of Coup Attempts (omitting Exp. Per Soldier), 1961-2008

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***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two-tailed). Models reflect logistic regressions. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses.
### Table 3.4: Determinants of Coup Success (omitting Exp. Per Soldier), 1961-2008

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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.436</td>
<td>-0.333</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>-0.702</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.545)</td>
<td>(1.942)</td>
<td>(0.754)</td>
<td>(0.783)</td>
<td>(1.075)</td>
<td>(0.706)</td>
<td>(0.628)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,426</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two-tailed). Models reflect logistic regressions. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses.
CHAPTER 4: COUP RISK, COUP-PROOFING, AND THE INITIATION OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the puzzles of African politics is that while the continent is rife with domestic instability in the form of military coups or civil war, international conflict is comparatively far rarer. A number of notable exceptions are apparent, such as the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict at the close of the twentieth century or internationalized civil wars as seen in the Congo, but conflict has largely remained a domestic peculiarity. The rarity of international conflict is particularly strange if one accepts the diversionary theory of conflict that claims leaders will utilize conflict abroad to increase support at home. With a continued history of domestic political instability, Africa would seem to be particularly likely to have diversionary conflict, and Herbst (2004) has made a clear case for this belief. However, in contrast to leader’s attempting to increase their survival prospects by initiating interstate conflict, leaders have instead largely refrained from international belligerency.

This chapter will empirically test a theoretical reason for why leaders that are otherwise vulnerable to a military coup will have the incentive to avoid conflict. Specifically, while agreeing with the claim that the risk of a coup will significantly increase the likelihood of diversion (Miller and Elgün 2010), this chapter will argue that the practice of coup-proofing will reduce the incentive and, sometimes, the ability to utilize diversionary conflict. The third chapter illustrated how the disposition to attempt a coup can be lowered through the practice of providing spoils to the armed forces and how the ability to attempt a coup can be undermined through structural coup-proofing.
practices such as counterbalancing. In this chapter I will show how these efforts are effective at reducing the likelihood of diversionary conflict.

The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with a brief review of the theoretical argument detailed in chapter 2. I then follow the theory with a brief illustration of it with the case of Zaire. I then move on to testing the theory with a global sample and close the chapter with a discussion of the implications of the findings.

2. A REVIEW OF THE THEORY

Diversionary theory has largely been aimed at explaining the conflict behavior of democracies, especially the United States. Only a limited number of empirical efforts attempt to explain the diversionary incentive in authoritarian regimes, but even works investigating democracies hint at the utility of conflict for non-democracies. Brulé (2006, 2008), for example, notes that high legislative constraints are a source of diversion, suggesting that democratic leaders will look at other elites and not just the public. Elites are of critical importance in authoritarian regimes because it is elites that will ultimately be the most likely to unseat the leader. I point to three methods by which an authoritarian leader will benefit from diversion, keeping in mind their need to appease other elites.

First, external conflict will provide the military—the primary instigators of coups—with an external focus that can act as a scapegoat and will increase nationalism within the ranks. Soldiers can be socialized through disparaging characterizations in training over time, and these efforts will be particularly effective when accompanied with the use of conflict. Second, conflict can improve the extractive capacity of the state. War has been seen as providing leaders with the justification to levy taxes and has increased bureaucratic power and effectiveness (Tilly 1992). Not only would an
increased extractive capacity allow the state to put more resources toward the military, but it will also provide the leader with a resource for patronage that can be used to appease other elites. Finally, occupying the military with a diversionary conflict can reduce the military’s willingness and ability to undertake a coup through providing them with training and materiel that is less suitable for domestic security purposes (Andreski 1968).

Previous analyses have considered the likelihood of authoritarian diversion, though Miller and Elgün (2010) are notable in being the only prior effort to specifically consider the risk of a coup as a direct cause of diversion. Their work can be expanded upon in two major respects: moving beyond Latin America and introducing alternative policies that leaders can implement. In this chapter I demonstrate how the alternatives offered through coup-proofing will influence the calculus of diversion. Structural coup-proofing efforts are theoretically expected to reduce the likelihood of a coup by reducing the need for diversion (i.e., lower likelihood of losing office through a coup) and by reducing the fighting capacity of the armed forces. A similar reduction in conflict likelihood is expected following military purges, while disparate impacts are expected for military “spoils.” Democratic regimes are expected to significantly increase military capabilities when increasing the organization’s resources, but authoritarian regimes are not expected to have similar improvements in fighting capacity due to a lack of transparency and accountability. In short, authoritarian regimes are much more likely to squander resources through patronage. While democracies may lose the incentive to utilize diversion, they become more able to undertake the policy when providing their militaries with stronger endowments and can actually become more antagonistic.
Authoritarian leaders, on the other hand, see no similar improvement in capabilities and will solely lose the incentive for diversion.

3. ZAIRE AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE

Zaire example is once again a compelling case in terms of the varying influences of coup-proofing. The coup-proofing apparatus of Mobutu Sese Seko was briefly detailed in chapter 3. Mobutu’s strategies, ranging from ethnic purges and preferential recruitment and promotion, to the reliance on numerous parallel security services, to financial privileges that would be given to preferred ethnic allies all played an important role in his being able to maintain power for three decades. Though Mobutu possessed many of the incentives for diversion that were detailed by Herbst, in this section I hope to illustrate that Mobutu’s coup-proofing efforts left him with an army that was woefully lacking in military capabilities, in spite of substantial military aid from third parties such as the United States.

Chapter 3 detailed Mobutu’s practice of military purging, which saw many experienced western-trained officers dismissed and often executed. Restocking the military would take a personalist character, putting “political considerations” over “military ones” (Kisangani 2000, 215). Promotions were isolated to those with “enthusiasm for the existing regime,” specifically those from the Ngbandi ethnic group (Kisangani 2000, 215-216). General Massiala was seen as a well-educated, vigorous, and popular officer that many expected to ascend to the position of army chief but was instead surpassed General Bosango. Bosango had previously been fired for cowardice and commanded “little respect from other senior officers and is treated with pure contempt by the junior officers [who] want a commander who is technically proficient” (quoted in Young and Turner 1985, 264). Such efforts undermine the quality of new
recruits and according to Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) reduces individual initiative. Bosango’s appointment would have left him as a non-threat to Mobutu, but his ability in combat had already been called into question by even Mobutu himself. It would not take long for his contemporary’s to display a lack of effective military leadership as well.

During the Shaba conflicts, for example, FAZ soldiers under the command of General Bumba Moaso displayed little initiative or competence in combating Katangan rebels. On the other hand, the rebels acted “skillfully,” circling Bumba’s positions in a “lightning attack that erupted…everywhere at once,” overtaking the command post and a trainload of American and Belgian-made armaments and ammo (Time 1977a). Rebels were so easily able to conquer “sizeable swatches of land” that *Time* began questioning whether Mobutu would soon be forced into exile, though the Zairean leader did attempt to boost FAZ morale by sending 16,000 cases of Coca Cola to the conflict zone (Time 1977b). Mobutu was ultimately saved not by his coup-proofing apparatus, but rather a surprising decision from Morocco to deploy 1,500 elite troops. These newly arriving soldiers found little resistance. “This isn’t a war,” lamented one officer. “It is a matter of making armed reconnaissance and then retaking ground without a fight. To call it a war is a joke” (ibid). Zaire’s heavily degraded army, however, lacked the training and initiative of the Moroccan soldiers and was soundly humbled.

The FAZ’s inability to function in combat was due in part to a lack of competent soldiers, but the challenges of structural coup-proofing also played a role. Many resources had been redirected to the paramilitary units in Kinshasa, units that would remain in the capital in order to continue to guard against a potential coup (Mangold 1979, fn6; David 1987). Mobutu was willing to let the FAZ lose ground so long as the
capital remained secure. In chapter 5 I will show how this reluctance was repeated against the Democratic Alliance for the Liberation of the Congo two decades later. In addition to a lack of resources, coordination challenges also proved strong to the military. Military units were often proscribed from direct communication, a trend that was particularly true for inter-branch collaboration. This challenge, too, had dire consequences when the Zairean air force accidentally bombed its own ground soldiers (Young and Turner 1985, 252).

Finally, financial or material endowments did little to improve the fighting capacity of the FAZ. Though considerable funds were occasionally spent on sophisticated armaments, “costly equipment…proved of little value” and the FAZ continuously displayed “severe limitations…despite substantial aid” (Young and Turner 1985, 258-259). Instead, funding was largely distributed through graft and had little connection to actual military competence. Equipment that was purchased often fell into disrepair, as seen in 1981 when Mobutu was left with an air force with no flight-capable aircraft with which to transport soldiers during skirmishes on the Ugandan border (Young and Turner 1985, 269). Though scholars such as Herbst can point to a strong utility for implementing international conflict, an alternate path was chosen by Mobutu and many others. It is possible that Mobutu would have been willing and able to utilize international force early in his tenure, and it is possible that such actions could have increased nationalism or improved his ability to extract resources, and ultimately to protect him. What is clear is that coup fears pushed Mobutu down a different path, one that made international conflict essentially impossible. In the remainder of this chapter I use empirical analyses to determine if these trends can be generalized to a global sample.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 SAMPLE AND ESTIMATOR

The analysis is conducted within a pool of politically relevant directed-dyads in order to capture the dyad member that is the initiator of the dispute and to account for relevant control variables (e.g., joint democracy, power ratio). Directed-dyads are not only attractive, they are essential. Availability of Belkin and Schofer’s (2003) coup risk measure limits the scope of the study to 1962-2000, though different specifications will see fluctuations in temporal range. Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, a logistic regression is employed.

4.2. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Multiple approaches are used to account for conflict. In addition to kinds of conditions, states, and threats, Levy (1989) also noted that scholars must consider the kind of conflict that leaders will implement when diverting. This is a particularly important distinction given the wide conceptual and operational treatment of the dependent variable. For the diversionary literature alone, conflict has been treated as everything from “diplomatic rebuffs” (Collins 1973) to dispute initiation (Chiozza and Goemans 2003), “low-level uses of force” (Morgan and Anderson 1999), to all-out war (James 1987). Addressing different types of conflict could potentially lead to different results, making it important to theoretically justify the level of force that is analyzed. For example, Diehl (2006, 204) has hinted that inconsistent findings in the diversionary literature could be due to the

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9 Using a monadic dataset resulted in no notable substantive changes to the model.
10 An alternative approach would be to utilize a count of the total number of disputes initiated in each directed dyad-year for the dependent variable. This alternative specification, using negative binomial regression, yielded no substantive differences. I choose to report logistic regressions due to the ease of interpretation of the results.
failure to distinguish between dispute initiation and escalation. It could be the case that some leaders wishing to “wag the dog” are not willing to pay the higher costs associated with war. Morgan and Bickers (1992) have also suggested diversionary tactics should come short of war, a sensible assumption given the negative consequences of casualties on public opinion (Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner 2008) and the potential to be ousted due to military fiasco (Goemans 2000). Others have made note of the tendency of some leaders to deploy soldiers on international peacekeeping missions as a diversionary tactic (e.g., Pickering and Kisangani 2005). Though compelling, participation in international missions is problematic for at-risk leaders in that they are dependent upon the existence of a mission and must be accepted for participation. For example, Fiji is currently one of the world’s major suppliers of peacekeeping personnel but were barred from participating in future UN missions following its 2006 coup (Xinhua 2009). These dynamics suggest that diversionary should most likely reflect policy that leaders directly control: dispute initiation.

Given these considerations, I primarily rely on the militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) dataset (Ghosn and Palmer 2003). For the purposes of this study, MID initiation is coded as 1 if state A at a minimum issued a threat of force toward state B in a given directed dyad-year, and is coded 0 if no dispute is recorded. To be clear, more belligerent classifications of MIDs are also included and only the first year of the MID is included in the analysis. I include alternative specifications of the dependent variable to test the robustness of the findings. First, I consider a higher level of conflict intensity by including war, or the initiation of a MID that resulted in over 999 battle deaths. Next, I include two dependent variables from the International Conflict Behavior (ICB) dataset.
Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2010). First, an international crisis (IC) refers to events in which state A acted as the trigger for a foreign policy crisis, defined as an “act by a state as creating a basic threat to values, time pressure, and heightened probably of military hostilities” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2010, 14). Second, a violent international crisis (VIC) considers only events that included an overt and violent military act, such as a border clash, invasion of air space, bombing of a large target, or war.

4.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE OF INTEREST

Coup risk is derived from Belkin and Schofer (2003), who constructed an index that reflects a country’s structural vulnerability to a coup d’état by considering its suffering of a coup attempt in the previous five years, the strength of civil society, and regime legitimacy. The existence of a recent coup has been widely accepted as a predictor of future coups (Londregan and Poole 1990). Civil society is treated as the number of international non-governmental organizations and legitimacy as leadership competitiveness as defined by Polity. The index omits some factors that have consistently been found to have an impact on coups, but in this case those shortcomings are not problematic. The omission of wealth (Londregan and Poole 1990) or economic performance (Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000) are most obviously omitted. To be clear, Belkin and Schofer (2003) were more interested in structural characteristics that would allow crises to matter, not the specific economic or political crises themselves. Given the need to control for economic performance in diversionary conflict models, the exclusion makes the Belkin and Schofer measure particularly attractive.

A variety of machinations have been implemented in order to reduce the likelihood of a coup d’état. Feaver’s (1999) summary of civil-military relations has
simplified coup-proofing efforts to two categories: efforts that attempt to reduce the ability of a military to intervene, and those that reduce the disposition of the military to intervene.

Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) developed a measure that captured the former, using data from *The Military Balance* to assess the number of military organizations that could act as an effective deterrent to a coup in a given country. I thus incorporate this measure of *Effective Organizations* as one measure of structural coup-proofing. As a second test, I include Belkin and Schofer’s (2003) *counterbalancing* variable. This is a continuous variable that considers the ratio between regular and paramilitary forces, as well as the number of personnel in those forces. Finally, I incorporate *paramilitary*, which reflects the ratio of paramilitary personnel versus the regular army. Regimes that are at risk for a coup will need to use diversion to varying degrees based on these coup-proofing efforts. The second hypothesis predicts the use of diversion should subside as structural coup-proofing increases.

The financial aspect of coup-proofing considers military expenditures per solder as a measure for *spoils*. This measure has been used by a variety of conflict scholars as a measure for “troop quality.” To be clear, the expenditures per soldier measure is not meant to be a proxy for military professionalism in the spirit of Huntington (1957), as this is assuredly not the case in authoritarian regimes. It can instead be more generally thought of as a measure of contentment with the regime, though it is expected to be accompanied by an increase in fighting capacity in the context of democracies. I also incorporate Secher and Saunder’s (2010) measure of military mechanization, which

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11 See, for example, Huth, Gelpi and Bennett 1993; Reiter and Stam 1998; Reiter 1999; Reiter and Meek 1999, 2002
considers the number of armored vehicles per 100 soldiers. The additive impact of coup risk on conflict initiation is expected to subside as spoils and mechanization increase in authoritarian regimes \((H3a)\), while spoils are not expected to significantly reduce diversion in democracies \((H3b)\).

Finally, I include the two specifications of purges detailed in chapter 3. First, I use data from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset to consider the extent of ethnic purges from the central government in the previous three years. Second, I consider military personnel losses over the prior three years. Both measures were found to have no significant impact of coup activity but are expected to negatively influence the military capabilities of states, thus reducing the likelihood of diversionary action.

4.3 CONTROLS

A number of necessary control variables are also included. *Wealth* refers to the logged value of gross domestic product per capita, held constant in 1996 dollars (World Bank 2011). *Growth* measures the year-to-year change in real per capita gross domestic product. As growth and wealth increase, regimes should be given a legitimacy boost and will not need to “busy giddy minds” as suggested by King Henry. On the other hand, economic crises can undermine the legitimacy of a regime and raise the likelihood of a coup. Growth, then, is expected to negatively influence dispute propensity. A benefit of dyadic analysis is the ability to control for important factors such as *alliances, joint democracy, power ratio, peace years, and distance*. *Allies* are coded with the Alliance and Treaty Obligations (ATOP) dataset and is coded 1 if the dyad members are considered to be in a “formal agreement…to cooperate militarily in the face of a potential or realized military conflict” (Leeds 2005, 4). Joint democracy is a dichotomous variable
coded 1 if both members of the dyad score above +5 on the Polity IV scale. The claim that two democracies will not go to war with one another has been described by Levy (1988) as being “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.” I also incorporate dummy variables for whether the initiator (Dem. Initiator) or target (Dem. Target) is a democracy. Power ratio will rely on COW’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC). A state’s CINC score is constructed by aggregating six components that can reflect power: number of military personnel, military expenditures, iron and steel production, energy consumption, and total and urban population. For power ratio, I divide the initiator’s capabilities by the total capabilities of the dyad. A value of 1 would indicate the initiator has a complete preponderance of power over the other dyad member. A state is believed to be more likely to initiate a MID as the power ratio increases. Peace years records the years since a MID was last initiated in the dyad. I also incorporate squared and cubed polynomials for peace years at the suggestion of Carter and Signorino (2010). Finally, I use the natural log of the distance between capitals to address geographical constraints on conflict. As two states are farther from one another, they should be less likely to wage conflict.12

5. RESULTS

5.1 COUP RISK AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

In this section I report the results of the models suggested by the hypotheses. I begin with a test of the first hypothesis by offering base model that considers the impact of coup risk on international conflict while omitting coup-proofing. In doing so, I present

12 Alternative specifications consider whether the countries are contiguous. Substantive results are unaffected by the distinction.
two different operationalizations of the dependent variable: militarized interstate disputes (Model 1), and war-level MIDs (Model 2).  

Table 4.1 offers a test of the first hypothesis. I present models for the full sample, and split democracy-autocracy samples in addition to the multiple specifications of the dependent variable. Models referring to the full sample will be followed by the suffix “a,” democracies “b,” and autocracies “c.” The coup risk measure is significant with the expected positive sign for all six specifications, indicating that the impact of coup risk on interstate conflict is consistently additive across conflict levels as well as regime type. A graphic representation of the likelihood of a state initiating an interstate conflict in accordance with their level of coup risk is presented in Figure 4.1. Each specification reveals a similar trend for the full models, as conflict propensity is largely unchanged when moving from the first to 30th percentile, then gradually increases until the 90th percentile, after which there is a strong increase in conflict likelihood. Moving from the 20th to 80th percentile of coup risk increases MID likelihood by 72% and the likelihood of war by 150%. In addition to providing strong support for the first hypothesis, the findings suggest that the diversionary incentive of vulnerable leaders is not constrained by the level of force and is actually substantively stronger at higher conflict levels. Further, the findings also suggest an exponential increase in conflict likelihood for democracies when they are most vulnerable. While I avoid drawing inferences from the extremes and instead rely on more modest 20th to 80th percentile changes, democracies still seem to be more belligerent when weak. For example, such a growth in coup risk

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13 Hypotheses are also tested with models utilizing both ICB crises and violent crises. Due to the numerous models that result from the multiple specifications of the different coup-proofing strategies and the need to split populations (democracy v. authoritarian), only the MID models are presented here. ICB data resulted in similar results to those presented here.
increases war in democracies by 172%, compared to 61% for autocracies. This will be a common trend throughout the findings and suggests that democratic leaders are particularly likely to utilize diversion.

5.2. COUP-PROOFING

The second hypothesis predicted that leaders will lose the incentive and ability to undertake diversionary actions as structural coup-proofing is strengthened. This is due to two mechanisms. First, leaders are expected to lose the incentive to utilize conflict when alternate means of survival are already employed. Second, structural coup-proofing can hamper military capabilities, reducing the feasibility of diversion at higher levels of structural manipulation. The marginal influences of coup risk and structural coup-proofing on conflict are found in Table 4.2.

Ai and Norton (2003) have noted that interpreting continuous interaction terms using a logit or probit coefficient is misleading, as an interaction might be significant even if not indicated as such by a t-test. Further, the sign of the interaction coefficient might be the opposite of the actual effect. Following this warning and the more recent suggestion of Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), multiplicative effects are not interpreted from the models in Table 2. I instead rely on the Grinter utility developed by Boehmke (2006) to graphically illustrate the marginal influences of coup risk and coup-proofing on conflict initiation. A graphical representation of the models is available in Figure 4.2. The left column of Figure 4.2 presents the results for the full models (3a, 4a, 5a), while the middle column presents democracies (3b, 4b, 5b), and the right column autocracies (3c, 4c, 5c).
The structural coup-proofing measures present a similar slope for the full models, indicating they are having a consistent influence on conflict behavior. The vertical axis represents the marginal effect of coup risk on conflict initiation and moving to the right along the horizontal axis shows how the influence of coup risk changes in accordance with each respective value of coup-proofing. Each specification (3a, 4a, 5a) displays a positive association between risk and conflict in states with low levels of coup-proofing, such as ranking less than two for effective ground-capable organizations or less than four (50\textsuperscript{th} percentile) on the counterbalancing scale, and .3 on paramilitary. The influence of coup risk, however, declines as each measure of structural coup-proofing increases, until the relationship is insignificant at the upper extremes of coup-proofing. Models 3a and 5a indicate that coup risk actually becomes negative and significant at those upper extremes, lending support to the idea of conflict aversion. In cases of extreme coup-proofing, leaders effectively cripple the fighting capacity of the state, rendering diversion not only unnecessary but perhaps even dangerous. As a consequence heavily coup-proofed armies may be significantly less likely to be utilized.

Substantively, when looking at high risk states (90\textsuperscript{th} percentile of coup risk), moving from the 20\textsuperscript{th} to the 80\textsuperscript{th} percentile in effective organizations reduces the likelihood of MID initiation by over 80\% (.011 to .0032). Similar changes in counterbalancing and paramilitary reduces MID initiation by 49\% (.022 to .011) and 59\% (.007 to .003), respectively. The second hypothesis came with an inherent assumption that structural coup-proofing brought with it an inevitable reduction in military capabilities. This is an important distinction from military spending, which is expected to influence democracies and autocracies in different ways. To test this assumption I also
present the findings for structural coup-proofing when considering samples of democracies (Models 3b, 4b, 5b) and autocracies (Models 3c, 4c, 5c). Democracies display results that are highly consistent with the full specifications, though they once again appear to be substantially more belligerent when vulnerable. This is true for having a lack of coup-proofing just as it is for having high coup risk. In high risk democracies, increasing each structural coup-proofing measure reduces MID initiation by 95% (effective organizations), 67% (counterbalancing), and 93% (paramilitary). These numbers are far stronger than the decline for autocracies (71%, 33%, and 15%), though with the exception of the paramilitary measure, the difference is still significant for autocracies. The second diversionary hypothesis is strongly supported and democracies once again seem to be particularly prone to conflict when presented with diversionary incentives.

The third diversionary hypothesis predicted that the impact of military spoils will be dependent upon regime type. Specifically, the transparent nature of democracies will lead military expenditures to be a more accurate reflection of military power. Democracies with high military expenditures may lose the incentive to utilize diversion, but should be particularly capable of doing so. In the absence of strong accountability measures, however, authoritarian regimes will have expenditures more likely to be dedicated to officer allowances or graft, investments that while coup-inhibiting have little impact on improving fighting capacity. Highly funded authoritarian armies, then, are not expected to as well equipped, trained, or effective as their democratic counterparts. Models 6a-6c distinguish between regime type and can be found in Table 4.3. The top row of Figure 4.3 graphically illustrates the relationship.
The split samples reveal important differences in state behavior when distinguishing between regime types. Coup risk has no influence on conflict initiation at lower levels of spoils in democracies (6b), and gains significance with an increasingly positive effect on conflict behavior at higher levels. The substantive influence of coup-proofing and high coup risk can be found in Figure 4.3, which distinguishes between regime type for each mode of coup-proofing. Once again, we see a similar negative decline in conflict likelihood as coup-proofing increases for both democracies and autocracies, though democracies begin at a much higher initial likelihood.

Autocracies, however, display a stark contrast. Increasing spoils from the 20th to 80th percentile increases MID initiation by 906% in democracies (.0014 to .015). Just the opposite is true for non-democracies. Poorly-funded militaries are most likely to be used for conflict at times of high coup risk in authoritarian regimes and the trend subsides as spoils increase (6c). A 20th to 80th percentile change reduces MID initiation by 63% in high risk autocracies (.021 to .008). These results provide substantial support for hypotheses 3a and 3b. As Henk and Rupiya (2001) have noted in the African context, expenditures are more of a reflection of patronage politics than military capabilities in autocracies. It appears this reality has important implications for the study of diversionary conflict.

However, another operationalization of military resources failed to find a similar trend. Democracies and autocracies displayed similar reductions in conflict initiation when accounting for military mechanization (36% and 21% reductions, respectively). One potential limitation of the mechanization is its reliance on ground capabilities. Sechser and Saunders (2010) were not interested in naval or air capabilities and they are
excluded from the measure. This is not a problem when investigating coups due to the reliance on ground capabilities, but could have an important impact on the findings for conflict. Heightened expenditures in democracies can reflect any number of capability-increasing acts (training, small arms, air power, sea power, etc), though increased ground capabilities may prove limited for diversion due to the added need to transport ground equipment. As it stands, it appears that increased mechanization acts only to reduce the utility of diversionary conflict.

The fourth diversionary hypothesis considers the impact of purges. Purges are expected to significantly reduce military capabilities and the likelihood of diversion. Each measure, ethnic purges and military purges, had inconsistent effects on coup activity. One potential challenge is the nature of each variable. Ethnic purges, for example, rely on data related to the government—not the military—while military reductions are not necessarily reflective of coup-proofing (e.g., post-Apartheid South Africa). The ethnic purge models presented in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4 indicate an insignificant relationship. Results are consistent between populations but fail to find any support for either diversion or a loss of diversionary incentive.

Model 9, however, suggests that coup risk is generally associated with a higher statistical likelihood of conflict. The exception is at the highest levels of purges, where the relationship between coup risk and conflict becomes insignificant. Though in agreement with the theoretical expectations, there is not a meaningful reduction in conflict propensity when considering differences in MID likelihood at different levels of the purge measure. A graphical summary of the impact of the independent variables of interest is presented in Figure 4.5. As a general rule, coup-proofing reduces the
likelihood of MID initiation, though the initial conflict propensity of democracies is far higher than that of authoritarian regimes. However, when both regimes have a high likelihood of a coup they are roughly equal in terms of conflict likelihood when “coup-proofed.” A notable exception is higher military expenditures per soldier, which sees democracies become much more belligerent while authoritarian regimes will avoid conflict. Overall, these results provide strong support for the diversionary hypotheses presented in Chapter 2.

The influence on international conflict is also witnessed in the case of Zaire. Mobutu’s continued efforts to undermine the capabilities of the FAZ are expected to have reduced their capacity for conflict. This was illustrate theoretically in Chapter 2 and was supported with a brief historical account of their effectiveness earlier in this chapter. Upon seizing power, Mobutu’s regime had a high risk of a coup, as illustrated historically by the Mulamba Affair and statistically by Belkin and Schofer’s (2003) coup risk measure. Zaire fluctuated between 7.7 and 8.0 on their index, which sees a 7.8 represent the 90th percentile in the sample. Mobutu lacked a strong coup-proofing apparatus in his early years and it would ultimately take him a number of years to develop the gendarmerie and analogous paramilitary bodies. His counterbalancing value stayed below the sample mean until 1974, while his ranking on Pilster and Böhmelt’s (2011) effective organizations index remained at a “1” until 1980. This place him in the bottom quarter of the sample, indicating fears of a coup should be a serious concern. By 1980 each measure of structural coup-proofing would reach the 90th percentile of the sample. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Mobutu’s interstate conflict behavior would dramatically change in subsequent years. From 1965 to 1980 Zaire acted as the initiator
of 12 MIDs (.75 per year). Following the consolidation of a strong coup-proofing apparatus this rate would drop to .33 over the next twelve years (1981-1992). Economic turmoil during the 1990s would have a number of dramatic influences on the regime, including heightened coup fears and dramatic cut-backs to the paramilitary. Data from *The Military Balance*, for example, indicates that Mobutu had slashed his gendarmerie from 35,000 to 21,000 and the Civil Guard from 25,000 to 10,000 in his final years. Perhaps not coincidentally, Zaire also became more belligerent internationally over the same period as his grip on power became more tenuous.

A similar reduction in the willingness to seek out conflict can be seen in the Arab world. Syria, for example, ranked at the median of counterbalancing (4.8) in 1970 but took a number of efforts to domestically stabilize the regime. In addition to relying on the Alawi ethnic group, Hafez al-Assad more than doubled the pay of the military and granted “tremendous benefits” to the *mukharabat* (Paul 1991, 11; 41). However, he also acted to create a number of structural obstacles in the military, particularly with the Republican Guard and the Special Forces division (Quinlivan 1999). By 1980 Syria had moved into the 95th percentile in counterbalancing and the 75th percentile in effective organizations. This shift toward a consolidated security apparatus led to a reduction in MID initiation. Prior to 1991 Assad had averaged one MID per year, the regime initiated 6 for 1991 to 2000, and none from 2001 to 2006. The trend could of course be due in part to the transition to Bashir al-Assad, but the recent decline was in line with a larger historic decrease in Syria’s willingness to initiate an interstate dispute.

This discussion is not meant to demonstrate that coup-proofed regimes are completely conflict-avoidant. Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, for example, came at a time
when his regime had a number of classic hallmarks of a coup-proofed regime. However, it is worth nothing that states he directed hostile action toward (e.g., Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) were had regimes that were similarly hampered by coup-proofing and thus would have made them easier targets for Saddam’s fighting force.

These cases, as well as the global analyses offered in this chapter, paint a very clear picture of the relationship of coup risk and coup-proofing for international conflict. Though coup risk might be an important incentive for diversionary activity, we must also take into account the alternative strategies that leaders have at their disposal as well as the implications of those strategies for their ability to utilize conflict.

5.3 CONTROLS

The control variables largely behaved as expected. The economic measures (wealth and growth) performed poorly, just as they did the third chapter. This result is unsurprising, as economic performance and wealth are generally treated as a proxy for leader vulnerability in the diversionary literature. Having already controlled for the likelihood of a coup attempt would seem to be a more direct test of the diversionary incentive. Joint democracy was negatively associated (79% reduction in Model 1) with conflict initiation in each specification, while the power variable primarily indicated that conflict initiation was more likely when the initiator was the stronger member of the dyad. Moving from the 20th to 80th percentile in power ratio reduced conflict by 281% in Model 1. Allies showed a more modest 18% reduction in conflict likelihood than non-allied dyads. The most powerful indicators of conflict, unsurprisingly, are distance and peace years. Going from the 20th to 80th percentile reduced conflict by 98% (contiguous
to 6000 miles) and 99.9% (4 years to 27 years), for distance and peace years, respectively.

6. CONCLUSION

Shakespeare once vividly depicted diversion by describing a turmoil-plagued king who sought to solidify his rule by waging a crusade in the holy land. While Henry IV’s desires are famously captured in literature, empirical study on diversionary conflict has had little to say on the matter. Though a rich tradition of diversionary study exists, few efforts have attempted to identify the conditions that would see an unelected leader such as a king have the need to implement diversionary tactics, and fewer still have incorporated alternative strategies that a leader can implement to preserve their rule.

This chapter sought to move beyond an election-focused approach to leadership turnover by providing a proper theoretical treatment to the threat of a coup—the most common form of authoritarian removal (Svolik 2009). The analyses presented here indicate that interstate belligerency can be attributed to the conditional influences of coup risk and coup-proofing. Morgan and Bickers (1992) once suggested that different types of states have different tolerance thresholds in regards to potential loss of office. I find this assumption to be true both in terms of coup risk and threshold-altering self-preservation strategies, as coup-fearing leaders are more conflict prone, but only when they lack a strong coup-proofing apparatus.

In addition to the general findings regarding coup risk and coup-proofing, the analyses point to disparate findings regarding the diversionary activities of democracies and autocracies. The idea of spoils has long been a supposed determinant of coup activity, both in the pejorative sense of N’Diaye (2000) and in the professional sense of
Huntington (1991). The results suggest that authoritarian leaders lose both the will and ability to utilize diversion when providing spoils (in the form of higher expenditures) to the armed forces. In short, such funds are unlikely to go toward improving the fighting capacity of the rank-and-file. Already treated as inferior to well-funded and well-armed coup-proofing units, members of coup-proofed regular armies lack the ability to fight in the international arena but could still pose a threat to domestic security if alienated. Sarr (2007, 40-41), for example, has noted that the motivation for the Gambia National Army’s 1994 ouster of President Dawda Jawara included grievances surrounding an intervention in Liberia. In addition to lacking both training and equipment, the government refused to bring home the bodies of fallen Gambian soldiers. These soldiers were then buried at the battlefield, with their families receiving a conciliatory sum of less than $50 from the government. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) have noted the tendency to utilize such interventions for diversionary purposes, though the Gambian case illustrates the potential fallout for regimes that do so with limited capabilities. Sarr (2007) suggests that the government never gave consideration to the consequences of soldiers being killed, though it appears that other coup-fearing leaders who coup-proofed their regimes are very cautious in utilizing diversion.

Meanwhile, democratic rulers have heightened ability under the same conditions, capabilities that they readily use. By putting more emphasis on the fighting capabilities of their militaries, democracies appear to be very capable of pursuing diversionary tactics. Despite the incentive to use such tactics, democracies appear to avoid diversion in the absence of a well-funded military. Such a trend supports prior literature suggesting
democracies will be risk averse when choosing to enter a conflict (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Reiter and Stam 1998).

A few words of caution should be made in regards to this analysis. First and foremost, this work does not suggest diversionary conflict will be sought in order to accomplish a rally ‘round the flag effect amongst the general population. Previous research on the rallying strength of external aggression is at best mixed (Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000), and this analysis does not offer direct support for the “rally” theory. Nor does this paper suggest that diversion is attempted in order generate divisions within military, as suggested by Belkin and Schofer (2005). Instead, I argue that diversion is utilized in an effort to distract elites that can credibly undermine a regime by providing them with a foreign focus. Civil-military relations scholarship has long noted that civilian control can be strengthened when the armed forces are provided with an external mission (Huntington 1991; Desch 1999). Finer (1988, 9) believed this process began during training, describing the “systematic disparagement of the foreigner, and the channeling of all aggressive tendencies into hatred of the enemy.” For those that fear a coup and lack alternative means to preserve their rule, such a strategy seems to be particularly attractive. ©
Table 4.1: The Impact of Coup Risk on International Conflict, 1962-2000

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***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two-tailed). Models reflect rare events logistic regression. Robust standard errors (clustered by dyad) are in parentheses.
Figure 4.1: The Impact of Coup Risk on International Conflict, 1962-2000

- **All States**
- **Democracies**
- **Autocracies**
Table 4.2: The Marginal Influence of Coup Risk on MID Initiation

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***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two-tailed). Models reflect case events logistic regression. Robust standard errors (clustered by dyad) are in parentheses.
Figure 4.2: The Influence of Coup Risk and Structural Coup-Proofing Conflict Initiation

A. All States

B. Democracies

C. Autocracies
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Table 4.3 (continued): Marginal Influence of Coup Risk and Coup-Proofing on Conflict Initiation

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Figure 4.3: The Marginal Influence of Coup Risk and Military Resources on Conflict Initiation
Figure 4.4: The Marginal Influence of Coup Risk and Purging on International Conflict Initiation
Figure 4.5: Marginal Influence of High Coup Risk on MID Initiation
CHAPTER 5: COUP-PROOFING AND THE ONSET OF CIVIL WAR

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to empirically test the implications of coup-proofing for intrastate conflict, specifically civil war. In Chapter 2 I highlighted a number of theoretical mechanisms that can influence both military capabilities and a leader’s willingness to use military force. These mechanisms will be briefly reviewed in the next section. Chapter 3 empirically demonstrated efforts to structurally manipulate the military reduces its ability to successfully undertake a coup, while financial and material resources effectively reduced the willingness of the military to intervene. Purging, whether ethnic or military, proved to be of little utility for deterring coups. Chapter 4 demonstrated that structural coup-proofing reduces a leader’s willingness to utilize conflict as a diversionary action. This is due to both a reduced need for diversion due to a presumed decrease in the likelihood of a coup at high levels of structural coup-proofing and because of a decrease in military capabilities. Further evidence regarding military capabilities was revealed when considering military resources such as spending or mechanization.

Democracies and autocracies were both less likely to utilize diversion at higher levels of military mechanization (less need for diversion), though they displayed disparate trends when looking at expenditures. The fungible nature of expenditures is an important theoretical consideration that has been overlooked in prior studies. Democracies are inherently more transparent and spending is more likely to reflect a demonstrable public good: national defense. Unconstrained by third parties such as think
tanks and auditors, autocrats can more freely dedicate military expenditures to private goods such as officer allowances and other selective perks. This leads to a disparate trend in military expenditures where increases in the measure is a bona fide indicator of improved military capabilities in democracies, while the measure is little more than graft in autocracies.

Finally, purges appear to have little utility in both deterring coups and reducing the likelihood of diversion, though there is evidence that military personnel reductions reduced the willingness to initiate conflict. In this chapter I aim to investigate the implication of these practices for another form of conflict: civil war. I will begin with a brief review of the theory offered in the second chapter. This will involve a general overview of prior literature on the decision to rebel, particularly in regard to the perceived military capabilities of both the state and a would-be insurgent group. I proceed to illustrate the theory with the case of Zaire, as seen in prior chapters, then test the theory with a global sample of cases for the years 1962-2008. I close the chapter with a summary of the findings and a brief discussion of how the chapter adds to our understanding of intrastate conflict.

2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As with coups, the decision to rebel is thought of in terms of a rationalist framework, as suggested in the work of scholars such as Lichbach (1995) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004). This approach suggests that would-be insurgents will carefully evaluate a number of important considerations before revolting, including the likelihood of victory, the gains to be realized from victory, and costs associated with fighting and
(potentially) defeat. Civil wars will occur when the expected gains and likelihood of success offsets the costs associated with the rebellion.

Prior civil war literature has largely focused on the former, that is, the gains associated with the effort. This is perhaps best illustrated in the “greed versus grievance” debate. In many cases civil war can be virtually indistinguishable from banditry or piracy, and the work of Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) and Regan and Norton (2005) have noted natural resource wealth can provide rebel leaders with a cash cow from which they can promise—and deliver—selective rewards to those who take up arms. Though the logic is clear, greed-based explanations of civil conflict have led to inconsistent results. Models supporting the theory have been argued to be “fragile” (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002), with Regan and Norton (2005) actually finding that “lootable resources” such as diamonds, other gemstones, and opiates actually decreased the onset of civil war.

Meanwhile, grievance-based arguments have been similarly diverse. Gurr treated conflict as resulting from a gap between expectation and reality, while a flurry of recent literature from political geographers has suggested a neo-Malthusian view of conflict (Urdal 2005; Barnett and Adger 2007). Others, still, have looked at grievances as a function of state-level economic conditions, especially GDP per capita. Conscious efforts to reduce grievances could be important, while Sambanis (2004) urged scholars to move beyond aggregate measureables such as GDP. Thyne (2006) represents one such effort, finding that an increase in spending on education reduces the likelihood of civil conflict.

Despite a rich body of broad literature on civil conflict and growing attention to numerous specifications of economic and political indicators, less attention has been
given to one important consideration: military capabilities. While heightened grievances or the presence of exploitable resources could promote the incentive for conflict, these approaches largely ignore one important consideration: the probability of success. Coup-proofing has important implications for the likelihood of a rebellion’s success by influencing the fighting capacity of both the state and rebels. The remainder of this section seeks to highlight these trends.

2.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT STRENGTH

Siaka Stevens was able to peacefully retain power for 17 years in Sierra Leone. It is paradoxical that the resource that would eventually serve to fuel Sierra Leone’s civil war was actually the primary revenue generator for Stevens and his security apparatus, and it was indeed diamonds that were used to explain the country’s stability. Snyder (2006) has pointed to a decay of the relationship between the administration of Joseph Momoh and Lebanese diamond merchants as a major cause of state collapse, but the behavior of his predecessor toward his military provides an important lesson. Like others, Stevens relied on a paramilitary organization for his personal survival and it was this organization that would reap the spoils of the regime. While his Internal Security Unit (ISU) was given “special attention” with Cuban advisers and modern weaponry, Stevens would eventually disarm the regular armed forces (Keegan 1983; Kposowa 2006). Adding to a lack of materiel were similar capability-reducing efforts in retention and promotion in the ranks. Stevens preferred the Limba and Temne ethnic groups and readily purged anyone with suspect loyalty, while the military as a whole was left demoralized and lacking in both training and equipment. It is no surprise then, that the state would eventually become susceptible to rebellion.
The Sierra Leone case points to a number of previously-discussed ways in which coup-proofing undermines the fighting capacity of the state. Structural coup-proofing efforts such as the use of armed counterweights such as Stevens’ ISU is beneficial in that it effectively reduces the likelihood of a military coup, but reliance on these parallel armed bodies also has drawbacks. Structural military divisions will create coordination obstacles for the armed forces just as they will for coup conspirators. As Andreski (1968, 92) has noted, “the proposition that unitary command is advantageous in war is so evident that no elaborate proofs are required.” This trend is exacerbated by further efforts of leaders to explicitly forbid inter-branch communication. This was a critical determinant of Libyan military effectiveness during the Chad campaigns and has been noted as a shortcoming of Arab armies in a more general sense (Pollack 2002; Brooks 2008). Second, coup-proofing further reduces military capabilities by reducing materiel. While many states have taken Huntington approach of providing the military “toys,” others have taken steps to disarm their armies and have instead provided spoils only to their paramilitaries. Third, leaders have an incentive to keep their combat-capability paramilitaries in the capital. Created and maintained for leadership survival, leaders should be reluctant to weaken their security in the capital in order to fight a far-off insurgency. Chapter 2 suggested that leaders will dedicate more resources to combating their primary means of removal and will tolerate army failures in the field (e.g., Iraq, Libya). This dynamic will be illustrated in the civil war context with the case of Zaire in a following section and readily accounts for what Herbst (2004, 364) has described as a “quite remarkable” failure of African militaries to mobilize in times of crisis. The preceding theory indicates that such trends may reflect both a weak military capacity as
well as an incentive for a leader to refuse to mobilize their most capable soldiers. Refusing to deploy the regime-guarding paramilitary will maintain stability in the capital while allowing an insurgency to fester in the countryside. In short, states that have high levels of structural coup-proofing will have a higher likelihood of civil war onset (CWH1).

The second chapter also argued for a coup-inhibiting influence of financial and material resources. Providing militaries with higher expenditures or “toys” effectively reduced the likelihood of a coup in chapter three, while these resources were later found to have disparate influences on diversionary activity in chapter four. Democracies seem to capitalize on an abundance of resources and use diversion while authoritarian regimes become less conflict-prone. I explain this trend by distinguishing between the nature of military expenditures in both regime types. Democracies will inevitably face constraints related to transparency. Government watchdogs, think tanks, and auditors specifically employed for oversight will keep a watchful eye on the character of spending. This reality essentially ensures that such expenditures will actually be dedicated to the public good of national security. Free from these constraints, autocrats can use military expenditures for the private good of spoils. To be clear, a significant amount of resources can still be dedicated to legitimate military expenses such as hardware and training. An inordinately high portion, however, is likely to be spent on private benefits such as high officer allowances. This will keep potential opponents appeased, but the practice does little to promote an effective fighting force. Further, there is also the tendency for authoritarian regimes to engage in symbolic military spending in which hardware has little to do with the defense needs of the state and are instead purchased in order to
increase the prestige of the military. Militaries will frequently lack competence in operating such equipment and it is consequently allowed to fall into disrepair. These trends point to two competing hypotheses for the influence of military resources on the onset of civil war. First, increased military spoils will have no impact on the onset of civil conflict in authoritarian regimes (CWH2a). Second, increased military spoils will reduce the likelihood of civil war onset in democracies (CWH2b).

2.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR REBEL STRENGTH

The second chapter also detailed the capability-inhibiting practice of military purges. Purges can be seen as tilting the balance of capabilities in favor of insurgents in two ways. First, regimes that practice purging will undermine their own forces in three manners: personnel reductions, removal of competent soldiers, and non-merit recruitment and promotion. Leaders will put primary importance on ensuring loyalty, and even capable soldiers will be removed from service if their dedication to the regime is suspect. Second, purging will tip the balance of capabilities toward rebels by directly increasing their fighting capacity. Roessler (2011), for example, has used data from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman et al 2010) to show groups that are removed from the government are more likely to rebel than groups that are included or groups that never had a role in government. Roessler believes that surges purges will increase the mobilizational capacity of the group, thus increasing the prospects for civil war.

I build on Roessler’s work in three ways. First, I offer a measure that will directly look at personnel changes in the military instead of political power. Second, by considering a country-year level of analysis I can investigate a state’s overall propensity for conflict, not just the potential belligerency of an individual ethnic group. Finally, the previous
section has discussed how the practice of purging, and coup-proofing in a more general sense, will directly influence the conflict capacity of the armed forces of the state. These trends point to a final hypothesis: the onset of civil war is more likely when militaries have been purged (CWH3).

In the next section I will once again draw out the coup-proofing dynamics in the case of Zaire, this time pointing to the influence of the practices of Mobutu Sese Seko on civil war. I then proceed to an empirical investigation of the hypotheses.

3. ZAIRE AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE

Mobutu Sese Seko’s efforts at coup-proofing had important implications for both the fighting capacity of the Zairean Armed Forces and their balance of capabilities with multiple insurgent groups that they would eventually have to combat. Prior chapters have illustrated a number of maneuvers that Mobutu took to ensure the loyalty of his security services while crippling his regular army. These include a reliance on redundant paramilitary organizations that undermined the ability of the military to undertake coordinated action and was accompanied by a proscription of direct communication between branches. These were perhaps best illustrated by the Zairean Air Force’s bombing of FAZ soldiers during the Shaba conflict, the latter of which was routinely humbled in ground combat by rebels. Chapter 4 made note of the FAZ’s incompetence in the field, with *Time* magazine concluding that the rebels so easily captured “sizeable swatches of land” that Mobutu was likely on his way out. Morocco’s deployment of 1,500 of its special forces both helped Mobutu retain power and acts to illustrate the implications of coup-proofing for the analysis of civil war. The theory relies on the idea of rational rebels that carefully evaluate the likelihood of a rebellion’s success. Katangan
separatists liked their prospects against the FAZ and readily took up arms against the Mobutu regime. Their calculations seemed to be justified as they continued to make gains against pro-Mobutu forces. However, they had not calculated a foreign intervention as likely. The arrival of more skilled soldiers from Morocco changed the expected utility of the conflict and the rebels would quickly begin to retreat. The decision to avoid hostilities was not lost on the Moroccan contingent. One commanding officer informed *Time* correspondents “This isn’t a war…It is a matter of making armed reconnaissance and then retaking ground without a fight. To call it a war is a joke” (*Time* 1977b).

These efforts further saw many expensive arms systems dedicated to the paramilitary at the expense of the regular armed forces, while “costly equipment…proved of little value” in combat (Young and Turner 1985, 258-259). Problems with coordination and equipment were also exacerbated by an abject lack of professionalism. Purging the military of ethnic groups with suspected loyalties further reduced the FAZ’s fighting capacity. Mobutu willingly removed his “ablest soldiers” and replaced them with those of more dependable political loyalty. A lack of military competence was dramatically illustrated by General Bosango’s ascendance to head of the FAZ. Bosango was widely disliked and commanded “little respect” from other officers, and his forces would eventually be overrun by Kantangan rebels. In addition to reducing the military capacity of the state, these actions also contributed to the strengthening of would-be and extant insurgent groups. Mobutu’s troublesome Katangan rebels, for example, were originally trained as part of the Gendarmerie and later as members of the FAZ during Mobutu’s efforts at professionalization (Young and Turner 1985, 255). Following his
shift to patronage politics, however, these soldiers were purged from the FAS following mutinies in the late 1960s.

The importance of preventing a coup was also illustrated in Mobutu’s selective deployment of his security apparatus. The Zairean leader showed a complete unwillingness to deploy his paramilitary out of Kinshasa while his regular troops were being humbled by rebels both during the Shaba conflicts and during the westward march of his eventual ouster, the ADLC (Mangold 1979, fn6; French 1996, 1997). This was done to such a degree that vast swathes of the country were left unsecured. As Wrong (2002, 258) notes, “…these elites were kept close to Kinshasa, rather than patrolling the borders. Their positioning reflected their role…It was an internal security machine whose sole raison d’etre was protecting the president.”

Wrong’s generalization is made even more clear in news reports of the first Congo war. General Eluki Monga, the head of the FAZ during the ADLC’s march westward, was suspended for publicly noting that “Zaire’s ill-equipped and untrained army had not been given the means to fight a war” while the “well-equipped” Special Presidential Division was seeing “no action in recent fighting in the east” (French 1996). Unlike 1977, outside actors showed little interest in backing the regime. To the contrary, Mobutu had been confronted with the withdrawal of military and foreign aid from the United States, and the cutting off of loans from the IMF and World Bank. Indeed, even token statements of support were in short supply. The White House press secretary claimed “Mobutism is about to become a creature of history,” while Belgian officials declared Mobutu had been done “for some time,” and French Prime Minister Alain Juppé called him a “tired dictator” (French 1997).
The impending demise of the regime was in stark contrast to prior three decades, a period in which Mobutu ruled without serious threat to his tenure. Perhaps even more strange than the prospect of a Zaire without Mobutu was the seeming disinterest the dictator had in preserving his regime. Even as the Democratic Alliance for the Liberation of the Congo continually pushed westward, the inability of the Zairean Armed Forces to slow the insurgents did little to change Mobutu’s military policy. Confusion regarding Mobutu’s indifference to rebel gains was aptly summed by Wrong (2002, 264):

“Zaireans waited for Mobutu to send the elite forces they had heard so much about to the east. No one, after all, could expect the FAZ to stand up…They waited and waited. Was Mobutu playing some kind of clever tactical game? Was he saving the DSP for later?”

The answer is, of course, no. Mobutu’s tactics were simple: preserve the capital, even at the expense of the state’s well-being. First, rebels gains may have indicated a lack of competence in the FAZ, but this was not indicative of the military forces stationed in and around Kinshasa. Forces such as the DSP were well-armed and highly-trained, and could have slowed the rebel advance. Second, in spite of a presumed safety net, these elite soldiers were never deployed and in the end it was ultimately the DSP that would fire upon Mobutu and his family as they fled Kinshasa. Herbst (2004, 364) has noted that attacking rebels is a very costly activity, and Mobutu refused to utilize his best soldiers in accomplishing that costly task. He instead opted for a strategy that successfully reduced the likelihood of coup, but ultimately undermined national security and made rebellion all but certain.
Even in the final weeks of Mobutu’s rule, there were acute fears of the loss of life that would be associated with a “last stand” mounted by the Special Presidential Division and the Civil Guard. French (1997) notes that loyal forces were still advertising that “We are going to battle it out until the last man.” However, no last stand was to be mustered, as a crucial component of the coup-proofing apparatus had been exhausted: funding. The collapse of the Zairean economy led, the unwillingness of external actors to prop up the regime, and the inability to continue providing his paramilitary spoils would ultimately cause the regime to fall. Unable to continue providing patronage to even his most loyal units, Mobutu and his family were ultimately fired upon by the DSP as they fled from the capital.

Zaire under Mobutu is a strong illustration of the consequences of coup-proofing but testimony to the theory is best accomplished by more robust analyses. In the next section I offer a more formal test of the theory by using multivariate analyses to investigate civil war activity in a global sample for the years 1962-2008.

4. RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 SAMPLE AND ESTIMATOR
The analysis is conducted within a global sample, using country-year as the unit of analysis. Data availability allows for a sample of 151 states to be tested for the years 1962-2008. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, a logistic regression is employed to test the hypotheses.
4.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Civil war data are taken from the Correlates of War Project. Civil war is thus defined as “fought within state borders between a government and non-government forces…the central government should be actively involved in military action with effective resistance for both sides, and there should be at least 1000 battle related deaths” (Sarkees 2000). A number of scholars have begun to note the importance for accounting for coups when assessing civil war. Cunningham (2006) called for investigators to control for coups when investigating civil war duration, as coups are “always short.” This lead has since been followed by continuing to control for whether or not the conflict is coup (e.g., Thyne 2012), or by removing coup events from the data altogether (e.g., Buhaug, et al. 2009). Buhaug et al. (2009) were concerned with explaining the role of geographic in conflict processes, and given the capital-focused nature of coups, such conflicts will have “little to do with geography.” I follow the lead of the latter and remove coups from the data for two reasons. First, it is questionable that these events should be considered “civil wars” in that they—at their onset—do not meet the criteria for being fought between government and non-government forces. To be clear, many coup attempts result in prolonged violence in which many soldiers join or form an insurgency and are no longer members of the state (e.g., post-2002 Cote d’Ivoire). At the onset of conflict, however, both sides of the coup were members of the state apparatus, an important distinction that would seem to distance coup events from the definition offered by the Correlates of War. Second, this study is particularly interested in explaining disparate influence of coup-proofing on coups and civil war. The theory suggests that while members of the state apparatus will lose the ability to attempt a coup and will lose the ability to function
effectively in combat (whether interstate or intrastate), non-state actors will see an increased opportunity for rebellion. Including civil wars that are merely bloody coups could potentially lead to biased estimates that inflate risk posed by non-state actors. Following the approach of Thyne (2012) yielded substantively similar results to those presented.

4.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF INTEREST

The first civil war hypothesis predicted that states with higher levels of structural coup-proofing will have a higher likelihood of civil war onset. Prior chapters have discussed three alternative measures for structural coup-proofing. First, I rely on Pilster and Böhmelt’s (2011) measure for *Effective Organizations*. This measure accounts for the total number of armed ground organizations that could legitimately combat a coup, excluding unarmed bodies and naval entities such as port authorities or maritime police. Second, I utilize data from *The Military Balance* to develop a measure for *Paramilitary Strength* that considers the paramilitary’s share of the total personnel of a state’s ground forces. Third, I utilize Belkin and Schofer’s (2003) measure that combines these features by creating an index that considers a state’s total number of military and paramilitary organizations as well as the personnel ratio for the paramilitary versus the regular armed forces. The Belkin and Schofer measure is adjusted so that it only reflects positive values. Increases in each of these measures is expected to increase the likelihood of rebellion (CWH1).

“Spoils” were expected to effectively reduce a military’s willingness to attempt a coup, a belief that was supported in the analyses offered in Chapter 3. Spoils, however, are expected to have varying influences on a state’s combat capabilities. Chapter 4
showed clear support for the idea that spoils have differing impacts due to regime type. While democracies that give their militaries resources are expected to see an accompanying increase in military capabilities, the same actions are likely to be little more than forms of patronage in authoritarian regimes. Therefore, increases in military resources are believed to have a negligible influence on rebellion in autocracies (CWH2a) but are expected to reduce the likelihood of civil war in democracies (CWH2b). I return to the two forms of spoils described and investigated in previous chapters. *Expenditures per soldier* are operationalized with data from the Correlates of War project. *Military Mechanization* is taken from Sechser and Saunders (2009) and reflects a national mechanization index that accounts for the number of armored vehicles per soldier.

Purges are accounted for by using the two variables described in the third chapter. First, I consider the total drop in rank for all ethnic groups in accordance with the categories offered in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman et al. 2010). I use a three-year total for the variable of interest. Second, I consider drops in military manpower as seen in the Correlates of War military personnel data, once again considering a three-year period. Stronger purges are expected to be additive to civil war onset (*CWH3*).

4.4 CONTROLS

I also incorporate a number of traditional control variables that are common to statistical assessments of civil war onset. *Terrain* accounts for the percent of a state’s territory that is mountainous. Rough geography can reduce the ability of the state to project power and can give an insurgency a sanctuary (Fearon and Laitin 2003). *Ethnic fractionalization* refers to the probability that two randomly selected individuals will be
from different ethnic groups. *Wealth* refers to the per capita GDP for each state, held in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (World Bank 2011). *Population* considers the natural log of the total population of each state. The likelihood of civil war is expected to increase as a state’s number of inhabitants grows. Finally, I incorporate a measure for years since the last onset of a civil war as well as squared and cubic polynomials in order to account for temporal dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010). States with a recent civil war are expected to be more likely to have another.

5. RESULTS

5.1 BASE MODELS

Table 5.1 offers a base model for the civil war hypotheses. We can immediately see results that are inconsistent for the expected additive effect of structural coup-proofing. Of the three alternative measures for the practice, effective organizations is statistically insignificant (Model 1), paramilitary strength is *negative* and significant (Model 2), and counterbalancing alone has the expected positive sign at a significant alpha level (Model 3). At this point the first civil war hypothesis is not supported, though further consideration of the hypothesis will be discussed below.

The measures for military resources provided mixed results in the base models of Table 5.1. Expenditures per soldier were found to have no influence on civil war onset, while military mechanization displayed a negative and significant sign. This is unsurprising, given that a military with more military resources should be more likely to deter would-be insurgents. An important distinction could be made with conflict onset and conflict performance. An impressive array of military hardware could send a signal to potential insurgents that they will be crushed. In such a case civil war will be avoided.
However, mechanization as a coup-proofing strategy could lead to an ineffectual use of the same equipment during combat, as seen in the Zaire case. Further investigation of intra-conflict dynamics such as conflict duration and resolution could be another interesting avenue of study but is beyond the scope of this analysis.

An additional consideration arose in Chapter 4, as military funding and equipment were theorized to have a disparate influence on capabilities when distinguishing between democracies and authoritarian regimes. The next section will directly test hypotheses 2a and 2b by considering differences between democracies and authoritarian regimes.

Once again, the military purge variables performed poorly. Neither ethnic purges nor military purges approached conventional levels of statistical significance. Though theoretically compelling and clearly an important determinant in specific cases, the idea that purges increase the likelihood of rebellion is not supported. This suggests that prior findings on the matter may be attributed to a limited geographic sample (Africa) and a different unit of analysis (group-level) (Roessler 2011). This prior effort might see purged groups become more likely to attempt to rebel, but the approach does not consider other aspects that accompany the maneuver, such as a potential consolidation of power in a more general sense. I now proceed to re-specifying the models to distinguish between democracies and autocracies in order to more carefully investigate the hypotheses.

5.2 SPLIT SAMPLE

Earlier chapters revealed that regime type has important implications for the influence of coup-proofing on combat capabilities. In this section I further explore the first hypothesis and directly test the second hypothesis by considering differences between regime type.
The base model is limited to democracies in Table 5.2 and autocracies in Table 5.3. Table 5.2 suggests structural coup-proofing has negative and significant influence in democracies, indicating that democracies with more military fractionalization are actually less likely to experience civil war. Table 5.3 reveals that effective organizations and paramilitary strength are once again insignificant for autocrats, while counterbalancing remains alone with the expected positive sign. The split samples, then, continue to offer little support for the first civil war hypothesis, and democracies in particular seem to behave the opposite of expectations. Though in contrast to the stated expectation, the finding can potentially be explained by the consequences of insurgency. Prior civil-military relations scholarship has suggested that in the Indian context, the military’s division has actually allowed the regime to focus specific groups on potential or existing domestic conflict arenas (Janowitz 1977). Regimes with divided militaries can benefit by keeping the regular army free from the distraction of a domestic conflict by using a specialized independent unit to deal with internal security, allowing he regular armed forces to focus on external security.

Though potentially true in the context of a democracy like India, it is worthwhile to consider if democracies should be unique in this regard. Authoritarian regimes could possess the same incentive (military specialization; combat effectiveness) but do not demonstrate the same behavior. The answer to this puzzle is potentially described in the Zaire case that has been used to illustrate the theory. Mobutu Sese Seko, for example, had multiple coup-proofing units (Guardia Civil, DSP, etc) that each would have possessed far greater capabilities than both the regular army and any rebels they would encounter. However, the Zairean leader steadfastly refused to commit these forces to
internal combat both during the Shaba campaigns and during the western march of the ADLC, the latter of which would ultimately unseat him. This curious behavior can be explained by Mobutu’s fears of a coup in Kinshasa. Mobutu refused to deploy his paramilitary units because he was primarily concerned with maintaining power in the capital, not providing security for the state as a whole. Mobutu, as an authoritarian leader, was free to dedicate his security apparatus to the sole goal of preserving security in the capital and, in the absence of elections to unseat him, did not have to deal with the backlash of the many citizens that would be faced with the hardships of war. Democratic leaders, however, will need to consider the will of the country at large. Electoral prospects could be heavily influenced by the rise of an insurgency, giving democratic leaders a strong incentive to pursue effective counter-insurgency operations that autocrats simply do not share.

To more fully account for this dynamic, I offer a new set of models in Table 5.4. Here I take two steps to refine the model. First, I interact the level of democracy as determined by Polity with the level of structural coup-proofing. This will once again reveal differences in regime behavior. Second, I now split the sample based on the level of coup risk. It could be the case that authoritarian regimes will tolerate an insurgency, but only when they feel the current climate is very likely to see the face a coup threat in the capital. It could be useful to consider both dynamics in attempting to explain the role of coup-proofing on civil war.

I consider high risk states to be those in the upper quartile of the Belkin and Schofer (2003) coup risk measure. Interpretation for the interaction coefficients is once again undertaken using the Grinter utility development by Boehmke (2006) and
substantive interpretation of the results is done through CLARIFY (Tomz, King, and Wittenberg 2003). The Grinter output for the models are offered in Figure 5.1. The rows represent the results for effective organizations, paramilitary strength, and counterbalancing, respectively. The columns, starting from left, reflect the full model, high risk states, and low risk states, respectively.

We can see the results in the left column are once again inconsistent. Effective organizations are insignificant at each level of democracy in model 8a, while paramilitary strength (9a) is only negative and significant at the middle range of the Polity scale (+4 to +12 of the adjusted scale). Counterbalancing is again the only structural coup-proofing variable that behaves as expected (10a). States in the lower end of the Polity scale are more likely to experience the onset of a civil war at higher levels of counterbalancing, while the variable is insignificant for democracies.

I also consider how leader behavior can change due to their fear of losing office through a coup. The center column of Figure 5.1 illustrates the conditional relationship between coup-proofing and democratization for states in the highest quartile of coup-proofing. Here we see a trend that is consistent across all three measures for structural coup-proofing. States ranking lower on the Polity scale are more likely to experience the onset of a civil war as each respective measure of coup-proofing increases (8b, 9b, 10b). This trend subsides as the level of democratization increases, becoming insignificant around a value of 7 on the adjusted Polity scale for each variable. For paramilitary strength (9b), states at the highest levels of democratization actually see a significant reduction in the likelihood of civil war onset at higher levels of coup-proofing. These
trends are not repeated in states which are at lower levels of coup risk (column 3), which show results that are similar to those seen in the full sample.

These results point to an interesting lesson for understanding the behavior of leaders. The theory in Chapter 2 and empirical results offered in Chapter 4 suggested that structural coup-proofing would similarly influence democracies and authoritarian regimes, and the alternate regime types are in fact similarly influenced by structural coup-proofing in their international conflict behavior. However, here we see important differences in the implications for civil war. Specifically, when otherwise fearful of a coup, we see the coalescence of two important determinants of combat effectiveness. While cohesion obstacles will reduce a military’s ability to undertake coordinating action, and thus increase the prospects of a rebellion, the presence of high coup risk will reduce the fighting capacity of the state by reducing the willingness of leadership to dedicate crucial resources to counterinsurgency operations. However, in the absence of a high level of coup risk, structural coup-proofing does not act as additive to civil war onset in autocracies.

Democratic and authoritarian leaders can both at times have a high likelihood of a coup. Democratic leaders, however, also face the legitimate prospect of removal via elections. This reality will make democratic leaders dedicate more attention to public goods such as security and will have to dedicate important resources to stability, even if this means deploying an anti-coup unit in an effort to accomplish the task. While doing so might increase the likelihood of removal via a coup, fears of this type of ouster might pale in comparison to a democratic leader’s electoral prospects if the country was to fall into civil war under their watch. Authoritarian leaders, meanwhile, need not be
responsive to far-off uprisings and will be more likely to survive if the capital remains secure. They will instead continue to maintain a focus on capital security.

The substantive influence of structural coup-proofing on civil war onset is highlighted for democracies and autocracies in Figure 5.2. The left column displays the results for the base model interacting regime type and coup-proofing, while the right shows the results for states in the upper quarter of coup risk. For high risk autocracies, changing from one to three in effective paramilitary organizations increases the likelihood of civil war onset by 900% (.016 to .16). Moving from the 20th to 80th percentile of paramilitary strength leads to a 56% (.009 to .014) increase in civil war likelihood, while a similar increase in counterbalancing leads to a 78% growth (.009 to .016) in civil war onset. This finding supports the first civil war hypothesis, though conclusions regarding the hypothesis are inevitably qualified. Democracies, needing to guarantee domestic stability in order to improve or maintain electoral prospects, actually see a 64% reduction (.025 to .009) in civil war likelihood when paramilitary strength is increased from the 20th to 80th percentile (model 9b).

The split samples do little to support hypotheses 2a and 2b. Expenditures per soldier, which is expected to reduce the likelihood of civil war in democracies but is expected to have a negligible influence in autocracies, is insignificant for each regime type. Following the lead set with structural coup-proofing, I also took the extra step of including an interaction term that would look at the influence of expenditures at each level of democratization. Figure 5.3 reveals that the coefficient is not significant at any level of the Polity scale. Hypotheses 2a and 2b are clearly unsupported by the military expenditure models.
The results for mechanization also reveal a coefficient that is insignificant for democracies (Table 5.2), while the coefficient is negative and significant for non-democracies (Table 5.3). For the latter, an increase in military mechanization brings with it a 39% reduction (.015 to .009) in the likelihood of civil war onset. The interactive models, however, call into question the robustness of these results. Figure 5.3 indicates that the least democratic countries have an insignificant coefficient regardless of the level of coup risk. Mixed regimes and democracies, however, are consistently less likely to experience conflict. The interactive model, illustrated in Figure 5.4, shows that a state at +20 on the adjusted Polity scale sees an 89% drop (.038 to .004) in conflict likelihood when moving from the 20th to 80th percentile.

5.3 CONTROL VARIABLES
The controls largely behaved as expected. The substantive impact of the control variables is illustrated in Figure 5.5. Substantive effects are derived from the expenditures per soldier model due to the model having the most observations. While polity was insignificant in each specification, polity-squared was the most consistent variables in the models. The terrain variable was consistently positive and influenced democracies and authoritarian regimes in the same manner. Moving from the 20th to 80th percentile in mountainous terrain increased conflict likelihood by 79% in the full model. There was a stronger magnitude in democracies than autocracies (182% v. 97%), though is can possibly be attributed to the very low starting point in conflict likelihood for the former (.0023 for democracies, .014 for autocracies). This trend would be common throughout the controls.
Ethnic fractionalization was consistently additive to conflict in the first two sets of models but was not significant in any specification for authoritarian regimes. Increasing ethnic fractionalization increases the likelihood of civil war by 72% in the full model and 512% in the sample of democracies. Wealth displayed a similar trend by displaying the expected negative and significant coefficient throughout the first two sets of models, reducing conflict by 51% in the full sample and 79% for democracies. The coefficient, however, never gained statistical significance for authoritarian regimes.

Just the opposite was true for a state’s total population. The measure was significant with the expected positive sign in five of the seven models with a full sample but never gained significance in a sample of democracies. Increasing population from the 20th to 80th percentile increased conflict likelihood by 72% in the full sample and by 38% in the autocratic sample. These inconsistent findings suggest that civil war scholars can potentially benefit from considering theoretical differences between how these variables, consistently argued to be related to civil war, will differ in their impact based on inherent qualities of the state, specifically regime type.

6. CONCLUSION

This chapter has revealed a number of trends regarding the determinants of civil war onset. Perhaps the most important lesson of the chapter is reinforcement of a finding offered in Chapter 4: the importance of regime type. The theoretical expectations that were drawn out in Chapter 2 were largely. Coup-proofing actions such as structurally manipulating the armed forces, providing the military with spoils, and conducting purges did not show a clear-cut direct influence on the onset of civil war. However, two important dynamics that have been suggested in prior analyses proved important in
understanding the conflict processes in coup-proofed regimes: level of democratization and current coup risk.

Democracies are once again seen as being cautious entities that will attempt to provide the public good of national security. Even under the threat of a coup, democratic leaders appear to take steps to deter rebellion. It is possible that democratic leaders will be fearful of their electoral prospects if a civil war is launched under their watch and they appear to take effective action in undermining insurgencies. This can include using the paramilitary to seek out and destroy any potential rebels (e.g., Janowitz’s commentary on India). Autocrats, however, behave differently. Free from the specter of elections, autocrats are free to use their paramilitaries solely to provide protection. This is particularly important during times of high coup-risk, and autocrats do in fact appear to be much more prone to civil war when coup risk is high. I speculate that such leaders are unwilling to dedicate their coup-proofing apparatus to crushing an insurgency, and when coup-proofed the regular army will not be up to the task. ©
Table 5.1: The Determinants of Civil War Onset, 1961-2008

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***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two-tailed). Models reflect logistic regression. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses.
Table 5.2: The Determinants of Civil War Onset in Democracies, 1961-2008

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***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two-tailed). Models reflect logistic regressions. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses.
Table 5.3: The Determinants of Civil War Onset in Autocracies, 1961-2008

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<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
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<td>2,667</td>
<td>1,266</td>
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***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two-tailed). Models reflect logistic regressions. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) are in parentheses.
Figure 5.1: The Marginal Influence of Structural Coup-Proofing and Regime on Civil War Onset

A. All States  
B. High Risk  
C. Low Risk

168
Figure 5.2: The Influence of Military Resources and Regime Type on Civil War Onset

[Graphs showing the relationship between military resources and civil war onset for different regime types]
Figure 5.3: The Impact of Structural Coup-Proofing on Civil War Onset

- **Base models**
- **High Risk States**

Graphs show the probability of civil war onset ($Pr(Civil\ War\ Onset)$) as a function of effective organizations, paramilitary strength (percentile), and counterbalancing (percentile) for different types of states (All States, Democracies, Autocracies).
Figure 5.4: The Impact of Military Resources on Civil War Onset

- **All States**
- **Democracies**
- **Autocracies**

**Base models**

**High Risk States**

![Graphs showing the impact of military resources on civil war onset for base models and high risk states. The graphs illustrate the relationship between expected expenditures per soldier and the probability of civil war onset for different levels of mechanization.](image-url)
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. CONCLUSION

The preceding pages have sought to improve both our understanding of political survival and the consequences of the desire to survive in office. Continued tenure has been treated as the primary goal of politicians, and this goal will generally be sought via the most efficient means available (Downs 1957). Though this assumption was originally offered by Downs in explaining the behavior of democracies, the desire to retain office is clearly a wider goal that every leader shares, as illustrated by the willingness of leaders such as Saddam Hussein to fight a war against an invading superpower, or Muammar Qadhafi and Bashar al-Assad’s willingness to suppress an uprising at the cost of tens of thousands of lives. Each case has witnessed subsequent commentary on the poor performance of the armed forces. The regular armed forces flatly refused to protect Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidine or Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Though Hafez al-Assad’s and Muammar al-Qadhafi’s inner-circles largely maintained the loyalty of the domestic security apparatus (e.g., Libya’s Revolutionary Committees and Syria’s Republican Guard and Mukhabarat), the less-prestigious regular armed forces displayed little interest in—or ability to—combat the uprisings. In fact, this disinterest included a degree of sympathy to the uprisings and in both cases army regulars defected en masse and formed crucial components of the National Transition Council and the Free Syria Army (ICG 2011a, 2011b). These soldiers would have had little chance of succeeding in waging a military coup, but would prove to be crucial to the uprisings.
Though the magnitude of conflict defers, the introduction illustrated how the early years of the United States saw politicians deal with similar fears. Just as coup-fearing autocrats such as Hussein, Qadhafi, and Assad have sacrificed their ability to repel an invasion or an insurgency, so too did America’s military-fearing founding fathers.

Overall, recent decades have seen a dramatic decline in the likelihood of a coup d’état, with 2007 being devoid of even an attempted coup anywhere on the globe (Powell and Thyne 2011). The 2009 coup in Honduras and continued coup activity in West Africa indicate that the phenomenon remains an important—though less common—part of international politics. In this dissertation I have attempted to identify not only the practice and effectiveness of coup-proofing, but rather the consequences of such efforts. This later offering, the consequences of the strategies that helped lead to the coup’s decline, is as relevant as ever and is being dramatically illustrated in the events surrounding the Arab Spring.

2. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF COUPS

2.1 CONTRIBUTIONS

This dissertation made a number of contributions to the literature on coups. Characteristics of the military have largely been overlooked at the expense of factors such as economic performance or level of democratization. This is particularly true for the quantitative literature, where precious few studies have included military variables that would seem to be of paramount importance in the decision to attempt a coup. This is perhaps most apparent with coup-proofing. While scholars have long noted the tendency of leaders to preserve their rule by lowering the ability or disposition of the military to
target their heads of state, attempts to test the effectiveness of these strategies has been lacking. Belkin and Schofer (2003), for example, provided a novel addition to the study of coups by developing the first cross-national measure for counterbalancing and found that regimes with higher likelihood of a coup are more likely to coup-proof. However, the effectiveness of the strategy was never tested. Such was the purpose of Chapter 3.

These tests resulted in a number of original contributions. A small body of prior work (e.g., Kebschull 1994; Barracca 2007) attempted to explain why some coups fail, but this is the first effort to assess the outcome of a coup when controlling for sample selection. Modeling coups in terms of both the decision to unseat a sitting executive and in terms of the outcome of the effort led to a number of interesting findings. First, efforts to structurally coup-proof an army had a negligible influence on the decision to attempt a coup, but significantly reduced the likelihood of success. Efforts to undermine the willingness of the military to intervene (financial or material spoils) effectively reduced the likelihood of a coup. Purges, however, had no discernible influence on coup activity. This could suggest that the influence of purges on stability may be overstated, though below I will make a few suggestions that could help clarify the relationship between purges and coup activity.

Second, the analyses also led to an important conclusion regarding the influence of economic strength on coups. Traditionally seen as a major determinant of coup activity, Chapter 3 reveals that economics only seems to be important in that it provides a leader with the resources with which to coup-proof. As a stand-alone influence, economic strength appears to be weakly associated with coup activity, if associated at all.
In addition to providing regimes with the ability to build a strong security apparatus, the presence of such an apparatus could also be allowing leaders to survive during economic crises.

2.2 POTENTIAL EXTENSIONS FOR THE COUP LITERATURE

The null findings for ethnic or military purges could be further explored. The practice has been noted as an important determinant of regime stability in some cases (e.g., Iraq) while it has acted to destabilize others (e.g., Cote d’Ivoire). More attention could be given to the effort to undertake purges, particularly in regard to efforts to promote an effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy for those being expelled from the armed forces. Further, purges are frequently accompanied by other coup-proofing efforts, such as the awarding of spoils and the creation of armed counterweights. An additional exploration could attempt to consider the influence of purges in the absence of other coup-proofing mechanisms.

Studies of coups often attest to what is referred to as a “coup trap.” The most powerful determinant of coup activity offered in Chapter 3 was the years since the last coup. While a strong coup-proofing apparatus would certainly make a coup unlikely, coups that succeed in a heavily coup-proofed regime would seem to suddenly pit a new leader against a well-armed cadre of loyalists that might seek the return of the old regime. Just this year in Mali, for example, the Presidential Guard’s elite “Red Beret” unit attempted just such a counter-coup just months after the ouster of president Amadou Toumani Touré. Coup-proofed regimes could be less likely to face a first coup, but could
potentially fall into prolonged instability due to the dynamics of the defense apparatus after the coup precedent.

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF INTERSTATE CONFLICT

3.1 CONTRIBUTIONS

Political survival is most connected to the study of interstate conflict in the diversionary literature. Diversionary theory purports that leaders will sometimes use foreign conflict for the purpose of improving their domestic standing. Dozens of studies have assessed the theory, though results have frequently been inconsistent or even contradictory (Meernik and Waterman 1996). Any inconsistencies could potentially be explained when one considers how little effort has been taken to distinguish how likely a leader is to actually lose power. In the context of democracies, of course, leaders that are managing a poorly performing economy or are otherwise losing legitimacy are likely to face removal through a free and fair election. Though a loss of legitimacy could undermine an authoritarian leader’s support amongst the citizenry, those constituents will have few means to unseat the head of state. Diversionary theory has consequently been largely limited to explaining the behavior of democracies and the inclusion of authoritarian regimes in models that use proxies as simple as economic performance could seem ill-founded. Not until the offerings of Pickering and Kisangani (2010) did researchers offer an explicitly authoritarian theory of diversion, and it was not until later that the likelihood of a coup was directly attested to (Miller and Elgūn 2010).

These contributions, however, were still limited. While the risk of a coup can—and does—prompt some leaders to behave more belligerently, conflict is not the option at
their disposal. Efforts to promote legitimacy domestically are one obvious avenue, though this dissertation has been more interested in looking at the influences of coup-proofing. Coup-proofing should be of interest to diversionary theorists because it reduce the incentive for seeking diversionary actions by lowering the likelihood they will actually be removed. It should be of interest to conflict scholars more generally due to the influence of coup-proofing on the fighting capacity of the state. Influence conflict scholars such as Reiter and Stam (1998) and Biddle and Long (2004) have pointed to coup-proofing as having a detrimental influence on capabilities due to selective recruitment and promotion policies that had little to do with merit. Pilster and Böhmelt (2012) furthered this by pointing to a lack of transparency and accountability in the armed forces. The preceding pages have pointed to how coup-proofing can undermine the quality of a national army by creating coordination obstacles in the armed forces and through these transparency mechanisms. The findings indicate that the conflict likelihood of democracies and non-democracies are similarly influenced by structural coup-proofing. However, the transparent nature of democracies will guarantee that resources given to the military in terms of funding and materiel will be a legitimate contribution to the quality of the armed forces, in contrast to authoritarian regimes that put a disproportionately high level of emphasis on salaries and symbolic spending. Such findings clearly have important implications for the growing literature on regime type and war.
3.2 POTENTIAL EXTENSIONS FOR THE INTERSTATE CONFLICT LITERATURE

The findings offered in this dissertation can be extended in a number of ways. First, the work of Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) suggests that armies that are less coup-proofed display better battlefield effectiveness. Chapter 4 suggested that coup-proofed countries should be less likely to enter a dispute to begin with. Future efforts could refine the relationship between conflict onset and performance by employing a selection equation as seen in Chapter 3’s coup tests. Second, prior efforts to assess the influence of military resources (e.g., expenditures) on conflict performance have yet to consider the conditional influence that regime type (i.e., level of democratization) can have on such variables. The findings in this dissertation suggest that the nature of regime type has a dramatic influence on the relationship between military expenditures and military effectiveness.

Third, this dissertation looked specifically at the decision to initiate a dispute. More attention could be dedicated to the beginning of conflict by considering the additional dynamics of dispute reciprocation or conflict avoidance. Leaders could wait to capitalize on a verbal threat from a rival or, conversely, a leader could intentional avoid potentially hostile interactions with a leader that they view as vulnerable.

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF CIVIL WAR

4.1 CONTRIBUTIONS

Given the much more frequent nature of coups than civil war, rational leaders can be expected to dedicate more attention to preventing coups than civil war. Rational leaders would consequently dedicate more resources to combating coups than preventing other forms of intrastate conflict, such as a popular uprising or insurrection. Chapter 2
carefully discussed a number of important consequences that coup-proofing has on military capabilities, and Chapter 4 demonstrated that coup-proofed regimes are indeed less likely to initiate an interstate dispute. Chapter 5 sought to test whether the negative consequences of coup-proofing would have important implications for the onset of civil war. Prior efforts to quantify the fighting capacity of the state has largely relied on crude indicators such as GDP per capita or number of military personnel. This offering presented a more direct consideration of military capabilities by looking at the implications of coup-proofing, offering a potential paradox: efforts to prevent coups will make leaders more vulnerable to insurgency.

Support for this paradox was mixed. Coup-proofing, as a general rule, does not seem to be additive to the onset of civil war. Purges were not at all indicative of conflict occurrence, while efforts to spoil the armed forces presented mixed results. However, the assessment led to an interesting finding in regards to structural coup-proofing. The chapter found tentative support for the idea that paramilitary units can actually serve well in preventing or combating insurgencies (Janowitz 1977). This view, however, assumes that those in power are actually willing to deploy units meant to protect the regime to potentially far-off arenas of conflict. The results reveal that regimes seem to be less willing to utilize their paramilitaries to prevent the rise of an insurgency when the risk of a coup is high. In times when leaders might feel comfortable in their capitals they are freer to use these precious resources to combat other forms of removal, in this case civil war.
4.2 POTENTIAL EXTENSIONS FOR THE CIVIL WAR LITERATURE

A number of steps could be taken to further the analyses presented here. First, coup-proofing could have other meaningful implications for other civil war dynamics such as duration or outcome. Structural coup-proofing might only have a conditional influence on the onset of civil war, but could have a meaningful influence on how the war is actually fought. Second, I earlier noted the potential relationship between structural coup-proofing and the coup trap. Coups in heavily coup-proofed regimes will frequently see the need for a shuffling of the armed forces. While the average purge of the armed forces might be meaningless, purges of a highly capable paramilitary could dramatically increase the mobilizational capacity of would-be insurgents. Additional investigations could consider the nature of those being purged, giving specific attention to these well-trained coup-proofing units.

5. CLOSING REMARKS

This dissertation speaks to a number of bodies of literature. Though contributions are made to broad sub-fields such as civil military relations, inter- and intrastate conflict processes, the ultimate goal of the dissertation was to consider the implications of one desire: political survival. The preceding pages have discussed multiple strategies that leaders can implement in order to retain office. Some seem to be more effective in accomplishing their goal, some undermine the international survival prospects of the state, while others—especially when coinciding with domestic coup vulnerability—can allow a state to implode from within. Feaver’s (1999) review of civil-military relations literature has pointed to a “civil-military problemmatique” in which the military, though meant to protect the polity, can under some conditions become the greatest threat to it.
However, the consequences of undermining this potential threat brings with it important consequences as well. Ridding of a strong military, though a potential threat to the polity, will leave a state with a heightened vulnerability to other potentially more destructive threats. ©
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